FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1950, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, VOLUME V Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 Volume V The Near East, South Asia, and Africa United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume V) Contents Preface List of Abbreviations and Symbols The Near East: Multilateral Relations: Conference at Cairo, Egypt, of American diplomatic and consular officials involved in Near Eastern affairs, March 7–11 (Documents 1-2) Interest of the United States in the development of the petroleum resources of the Near East (Documents 3-54) General policies of the United States with respect to the Near East and South Asia: A. Proposed military and economic aid to the Near East and South Asia (Documents 55-84) B. United States–United Kingdom military and political talks on the Near East and South Asia (Documents 85-96) C. Policy statements and proposals regarding the Near East and South Asia (Documents 97-101) The Point Four program in the Near East (Documents 102-105) Egypt Interest of the United States in the proposed revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and in the future of the Sudan; development of a program of military assistance to Egypt; concern over Egyptian restrictions on the use of the Suez Canal (Documents 106-129) Greece United States military and economic assistance to Greece; the Greek question at the United Nations; offer of a Greek armed forces contingent for the United Nations command in Korea (Documents 130-202) Iran Negotiation of United States military, financial, and technical assistance for Iran; the question of extending the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession; the desirability of close cooperation by the United States and the United Kingdom in matters of common interest in the Near East (Documents 203-294) Agreements between the United States and Iran Iraq Response of the United States to Iraqi requests for technical assistance and military aid; joint Anglo-American cooperation in Iraq (Documents 295-303) Israel Interest of the United States in the Arab-Israeli controversy over the future status of Palestine (Documents 304-617) Agreements between the United States and Israel concerning a civil air transport agreement and an arrangement on copyrights; initiation of negotiations with Israel for a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation (Documents 618-622) Jordan Policy of the United States with respect to Jordan (Documents 623-623) Lebanon Interest of the United States in mitigating anti-western attitudes in Lebanon (Documents 624-626) Saudi Arabia Interest of the United States in questions of economic and military assistance to Saudi Arabia; the question of the renewal of United States tenancy at Dhahran airfield (Documents 627-664) Syria Policy of the United States with respect to Syria and the possibility of a Syrian-Iraqi union; development of a program of technical and military assistance to Syria (Documents 665-680) Turkey Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Turkey (Documents 681-753) Agreement between the United States and Turkey Yemen Relations of the United States with Yemen (Documents 754-757) South Asia Multilateral Relations: Efforts to resolve the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (Documents 758-814) Interest of the United States in preserving peaceful relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding jurisdiction over the North-West Frontier Province and the Tribal Areas (Documents 815-823) Interest of the United States in resolving the dispute between Afghanistan and Iran over distribution of the waters of the Helmand River (Documents 824-824) India Relations of the United States with India (Documents 825-835) Agreements between the United States and India Nepal Policy of the United States with respect to Nepal (Documents 836-836) Pakistan Policy of the United States with respect to Pakistan (Documents 837-839) Agreements between the United States and Pakistan Africa Multilateral Relations: General policies of the United States with respect to Africa (Documents 840-863) The United States participation in discussions on disposition of the former Italian colonies in Africa (Documents 864-864) Libya (Documents 865-885) Eritrea (Documents 886-909) Italian Somaliland (Documents 910-910) Ethiopia Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Ethiopia (Documents 911-919) Liberia Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Liberia (Documents 920-943) Agreement between the United States and Liberia Morocco Policies of the United States toward the French Protectorate in Morocco (Documents 944-955) Tunisia Interest of the United States in the evolution of Tunisia toward self-government (Documents 956-970) Union of South Africa Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with the Union of South Africa (Documents 971-988) Index Errata List of Abbreviations and Symbols List of Abbreviations and Symbols Editor’s Note .–This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context. A, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration A–, airgram AA, antiaircraft AA–AW, antiaircraft-aircraft warning AC, Advisory Council AF, Office of African Affairs, Department of State Afg, Afghanistan AFL, American Federation of Labor AHC, Arab Higher Committee AIOC, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company AL, Arab League AMAG, American Mission for Aid to Greece; also Amag, series indicator for telegrams from the Mission AMAT, American Mission for Aid to Turkey Amb, Ambassador AmEmb, American Embassy Aminoil, American Independent Oil Company ANE, Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State ANE/E, Officer in Charge, Economic Affairs, Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State AP, Associated Press ARA, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Aramco, Arabian-American Oil Company ARMAT, Army Attaché ARMISH, American Military Mission with the Iranian Army AT, antitank AUB, American University of Beirut AW, aircraft warning BA, British Army Bagen, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, at Geneva Balcom, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans Bapco, Bahrein Petroleum Company, Limited bn, battalion BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State BPC, Basra Petroleum Company b.p.d., barrels per day BritEmb, British Embassy C/S, Chief of Staff CAA, Civil Aeronautics Administration Caltex, California Texas Oil Company, Limited CanaDel, Canadian Delegation CARE, Committee for American Relief for Europe CCP, Conciliation Commission for Palestine (United Nations) CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers CFP, Cie Française Petroles CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CID, Criminal Investigation Detachment CinC, Commander in Chief CINCNELM, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean CIO, Congress of Industrial Organizations cirtel, circular telegram CM, Career Minister CO, Commanding Officer Combal, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans Cominform, Communist Information Bureau Con, Consulate ConGen, Consul General CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office (British) CSGPO, Plans and Operations Division, General Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army DAB, Dhahran Airbase DAF, Dhahran Airfield Def, Department of Defense; defense Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly Delli, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation on the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya Deltc, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations Trusteeship Council in Geneva Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram Depinfotel, Department of State information telegram Depinst (Deptinstr), Department of State instruction Depreftel, Department of State reference telegram Deptel, Department of State telegram Deptintel, Department of State circular information telegram DOT, dependent overseas territory DP, displaced person DRN, Division of Research for Near East and Africa, Department of State E, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs EAM, Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon (National Liberation Front), resistance group controlled by the Communist Party of Greece ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration ECA/G, Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece ECA/W, headquarters of the Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East ECCH, Economic Cooperation Administration Chief of Mission to Greece ED, Investment and Economic Development Staff, Department of State EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State Emb, Embassy Embdes (Embdesp), Embassy despatch Embtel (Emtel), Embassy telegram EPEK, Ethniki Prodeftiki Enosis Kendrou (National Progressive Union of the Center), Greek political coalition EPU, European Payments Union ER, Economic Resources and Security Staff, Department of State ERP, European Recovery Program EthioDel, Ethiopian Delegation EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State Exim (Ex-Im Bank, Eximbank), Export-Import Bank of Washington FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization FBO, Division of Foreign Buildings Operations, Department of State FCN, friendship, commerce, and navigation (treaty) FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State FinMin, Finance Minister FM, Foreign Minister FMACC, Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee FO, Foreign Office FonMin, Foreign Minister FonOff, Foreign Office ForMin, Foreign Minister FP, Division of Foreign Service Personnel, Department of State FSI, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State FY, fiscal year FYI, for your information G, Deputy Under Secretary of State G–2, Army general staff section dealing with intelligence at the divisional or higher level G–3, Army general staff section dealing with operations and training at the divisional or higher level G–4, Army general staff section dealing with supply at the divisional or higher level GA, General Assembly of the United Nations Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly GAF, Greek Armed Forces GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GAUN, General Assembly of the United Nations GDA, Greek Democratic Army, the military establishment of the Communist-led Greek guerrilla movement Genba, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, at Geneva GENMISH, United States Military Mission with the Iranian Gendarmerie GLS, Greek Liaison Service with the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans GNA, Greek National Army GOI, Government of India GOP, Government of Pakistan GSEE, Genike Synomospondia ton Ergaton tes Ellados (General Confederation of Greek Workers) GT, Greece and Turkey GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State H, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations H’s, howitzers HE, His Excellency HICOM, High Commission (er) for Germany HIM, His Imperial Majesty HJK, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan HM, His Majesty HMG, His Majesty’s Government H.R.H., His Royal Highness IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IC, Indochina IC, Interim Committee of the United Nations General Assembly ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization ICFTU, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ICJ, International Court of Justice ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross infotel, information telegram instr, instruction intel, circular information telegram IPC, Iraq Petroleum Company IRC, International Red Cross IRO, International Refugee Organization ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State ITO, International Trade Organization JAMMAT, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff; also designation for telegrams from the Joint Chiefs of Staff JUSMAG, Joint United States Military Aid Group JUSMAPG, Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group JUSSGSA, Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia KKE, Kommounistikon Komnia Ellados (Communist Party of Greece) KOC (KUOCO), Kuwait Oil Company L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State L, designation for telegrams from the Joint United States Military Aid Group in Greece L/E, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State L/P, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs, Department of State LA, Latin America Leg, Legation Legdes, Legation despatch Legtel, Legation telegram Lib Govt, Liberian Government Lidel, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation on the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya MA, Military Attaché MAC, Mixed Armistice Commission MAP, Military Assistance Program Mapai, Mifleget po’ale Erets-Yisrael (Israel Labour Party) Mapam, Mifleget HaPo’alim HaM’uhedet (United Workers Party) MATS, Military Air Transport Service MC, Member of Congress MD, Munitions Division, Department; of State MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program ME, Middle East MEA, Metopon Ethnikes Anademiourgias (National Regeneration Front), party in the Greek elections of March 5, 1950 MEA, Ministry of Exernal Affairs of India MEA, Monades Ethnofroura Amynis (Units of National Guard Defense), armed civilian organization in Greece Mepco, Middle East Pipeline Company MID, designation for telegrams from the Military Attache in Greece MinFin, Ministry of Finance MinFonAff, Minister for Foreign Affairs MKA, Morrison-Knudson of Afghanistan, Inc.: MN, Monetary Affairs Staff, Department of State MND, Ministry of National Defense mytel, my telegram NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems NAC, North Atlantic Council NAT(O), North Atlantic Treaty (Organization) NE, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Near East; Near Eastern NEA, Bureau, of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State niact, night action communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night NME, National Military Establishment NSC, National Security Council NSRB, National Security Resources Board NWFP, North West Frontier Province OCI, Overseas Consultants, Inc. OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation OIR/GE, Special Adviser on Geography, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OSR, Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 OTC, Overseas Territories Committee of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation P, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Palun, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Representative on the Conciliation Commission for Palestine PAP, Polilike Anexarletos Parataxis (Independent Political Array), coalition of Greek political parties of the extreme right PCC, Palestine Conciliation Commission (United Nations) PD, Passport Division, Department of State PED, Petroleum Policy Staff, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State PG, Persian Gulf PHC & T, packing, handling, crating, and transportation PL, Public Law PM, Prime Minister POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants PPS, designation for documents by the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State PRA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East PriMin, Prime Minister PRL, Parti Républicain de la Liberié , a French political party PT and T, Posts, Telegraph, and Telephone PWOC, Pacific Western Oil Company R, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State RAF, Royal Air Force (British) Rapun, series indicator for telegrams from or concerning the United States Member of the Advisory Commission to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East reDepcirtel, regarding Department of State circular telegram reDeptel, regarding Department of of State telegram reEmbtel, regarding Embassy telegram refcirtel, reference circular telegram reftel, reference telegram reLegdes, regarding Legation despatch remytel, regarding my telegram Respec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State from the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 Repto, series indicator for messages to the Economic Cooperation Administration headquarters in Washington from the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 reurtel, regarding your telegram RN, Royal Navy (Greek) RSSS, Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh , a militant Hindu communal organization S, Office of the Secretary of State S/ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of State S/MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State SA, Saudi Arabia SA–M, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Press Relations) SAG, Saudi Arabian Government SC, Security Council of the United Nations SE, southeast SecGen, Secretary-General SecState, Secretary of State Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State when he is absent from the Department; also, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the May and September Foreign Ministers meetings and the NATO Council meetings SG, Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council SMA, Senior Military Attaché SOA, Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State SONJ, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations TA, technical assistance Tap, series indicator for telegrams from the Technical Assistance Program Mission Tapline, Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company TC, Trusteeship Council of the United Nations TCD, Interim Office for Technical Cooperation and Development, Department of State Tcdel, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations Trusteeship Council in Geneva TD, tank destroyer telecon, telephone conversation TGS, Turkish General Staff TIAS, Treaties and Other International Acts Series TJ, Transjordan TL, Turkish lira TO, Table of Organization, United States Army Toeca, series indicator for telegrams to the Economic Cooperation Administration in. Washington from its missions abroad Tomap, designation for telegrams concerned with the Mutual Defense Assistance Program Torep, series indicator for messages from the Economic Cooperation Administration headquarters in Washington to the United States Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State when he is absent from the Department; also, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the May Foreign Ministers meeting TSO, Truce Supervisory Organization of the United Nations TU, trade union TUSAFG, The United States Air Force Group in Turkey TUSAG, The United States Army Group in Turkey TUSNG, The United States Navy Group in Turkey TWA, Trans-World Airlines, Inc. U/FW, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Fisheries and Wildlife) UGTT, Union Generate des Travaitleurs Tunisiens , a Tunisian nationalist trade union organization UKDel, United Kingdom Delegation UKG, United Kingdom Government UM, Under Secretary’s Meeting UN, United Nations UNA, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State UNA/P, United Nations Planning Staff, Department of State UNCIP, United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan UnComlnq, United Nations Commission of Inquiry UND, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State UNDel, Delegation to the United Nations UNGA, United Nations General Assembly UNICEF, United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Department of State Unpal, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Representative on the Conciliation Commission for Palestine UNPRA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees Unrap, series indicator for telegrams to or concerning the United States Member of the Advisory Commission to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNRPR, United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees UNRWAPRNE (UNRWA), United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UNSC, United Nations Security Council UNSCOB, United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans UNTS, United Nations Treaty Series UP, United Press urinfo, your information urtel, your telegram USA, United States Army USAF, United States Air Force USDel, United States Delegation; also Usdel, designation for messages from the United States Delegation on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans USG, United States Government USIE, United States Information and Educational Exchange Program USIS, United States Information Service USN, United States Navy USPCC, United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission USRep, United States Representative UST, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements USTC, United States Representative on the Trusteeship Council USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations USUNNY, United States Mission at the United Nations, New York VOA, Voice of America WAR, series indicator for telegrams sent overseas by the Department of the Army or by Army Headquarters, Washington WB, Wireless Bulletin WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State Weeka, weekly, interagency, summary analysis from United States diplomatic missions The Near East: The Near East: Contents Conference at Cairo, Egypt, of American diplomatic and consular officials involved in Near Eastern affairs, March 7–11 (Documents 1-2) Interest of the United States in the development of the petroleum resources of the Near East (Documents 3-54) General policies of the United States with respect to the Near East and South Asia: A. Proposed military and economic aid to the Near East and South Asia (Documents 55-84) B. United States–United Kingdom military and political talks on the Near East and South Asia (Documents 85-96) C. Policy statements and proposals regarding the Near East and South Asia (Documents 97-101) The Point Four program in the Near East (Documents 102-105) Interest of the United States in the proposed revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and in the future of the Sudan; development of a program of military assistance to Egypt; concern over Egyptian restrictions on the use of the Suez Canal (Documents 106-129) United States military and economic assistance to Greece; the Greek question at the United Nations; offer of a Greek armed forces contingent for the United Nations command in Korea (Documents 130-202) Negotiation of United States military, financial, and technical assistance for Iran; the question of extending the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession; the desirability of close cooperation by the United States and the United Kingdom in matters of common interest in the Near East (Documents 203-294) Agreements between the United States and Iran Response of the United States to Iraqi requests for technical assistance and military aid; joint Anglo-American cooperation in Iraq (Documents 295-303) Interest of the United States in the Arab-Israeli controversy over the future status of Palestine (Documents 304-617) Agreements between the United States and Israel concerning a civil air transport agreement and an arrangement on copyrights; initiation of negotiations with Israel for a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation (Documents 618-622) Policy of the United States with respect to Jordan (Documents 623-623) Interest of the United States in mitigating anti-western attitudes in Lebanon (Documents 624-626) Interest of the United States in questions of economic and military assistance to Saudi Arabia; the question of the renewal of United States tenancy at Dhahran airfield (Documents 627-664) Policy of the United States with respect to Syria and the possibility of a Syrian-Iraqi union; development of a program of technical and military assistance to Syria (Documents 665-680) Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Turkey (Documents 681-753) Agreement between the United States and Turkey Relations of the United States with Yemen (Documents 754-757) Multilateral Relations: Multilateral Relations: Contents A. Proposed military and economic aid to the Near East and South Asia (Documents 55-84) B. United States–United Kingdom military and political talks on the Near East and South Asia (Documents 85-96) C. Policy statements and proposals regarding the Near East and South Asia (Documents 97-101) Conference at Cairo, Egypt, of American diplomatic and consular officials involved in Near Eastern affairs, March 7–11 Conference at Cairo, Egypt, of American diplomatic and consular officials involved in Near Eastern affairs, March 7–11 [1] Editorial Note [2] Report of the Near East Regional Conference in Cairo Cairo, March 16, 1950. 120.4374/3–1650 Editorial Note [Document 1] Editorial Note Between March 7–11 a conference of United States diplomatic and consular officials was held in Cairo. Fifty-one Foreign Service officers from fourteen posts in the Near East attended as well as officials of the Economic Cooperation Administration and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. The purpose of the conference was to bring together at the working level the officials who dealt with all aspects of Near Eastern affairs. It was hoped that these officials would derive benefits similar to those which were gained as a result of the Chiefs of Mission Conference in Istanbul in November 1949. Both meetings were designed to facilitate an exchange of ideas relating to United States policy in the Near East. Although Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, George C. McGhee, was originally scheduled to serve as chairman of the conference, his extended tour of seven African countries in February and March prevented his presence at Cairo. For a description of his trip to Africa, see the editorial note, page 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] . In his place, Jefferson Caffery, Ambassador in Egypt, served as chairman of the meetings; he was the only Chief of Mission to attend. The highest ranking officials from the Department of State were Burton Y. Berry, Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, and William M. Rountree, Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. For the statement released by the Department of State on February 6 concerning the plans for the conference, see the Department of State Bulletin , February 20, 1950, page 301. Report of the Near East Regional Conference in Cairo 120.4374/3–1650 [Document 2] Report of the Near East Regional Conference in Cairo 1 secret Cairo , March 16, 1950. Summary of Conclusions Conference discussions of the many aspects of United States policy in the Near Eastern area were directed toward the proposition that the basic objective of that policy must be the maintenance of peace and the development of area political and economic responsibility, stability and security; the enhancement of United States prestige and that of the United Nations, and the orientation of the area toward the United States and Western powers and away from the USSR. The deliberations developed many conclusions, as reflected in the report of the Conference. The principal ones reached are: 1. Economic Survey Mission and Palestine Relief Agency Steps should be taken to focus the attention of the Syrian and Lebanese peoples on the possibilities of Point IV, rather than on PRA, in view of the fact that major projects under the latter scheme are to be confined to Arab Palestine and Jordan. Syria and Lebanon have been anticipating that considerable work would be undertaken in each country and the contemplated program will come as a shock to them. A major problem is to bring the host governments and Israel to the realization that responsibility for the refugees is primarily theirs. It was felt that great difficulty will be encountered in convincing the refugees themselves that they should attempt to settle permanently in the countries in which they are now located. 2. Future Settlement in Palestine There is little likelihood of an early over-all settlement in Palestine, but our policy of creating conditions favorable for a settlement through the economic and social strengthening of the Arab States is considered to be the correct one. We should maintain this active interest within a framework of strict impartiality toward the Arab States and Israel. As far as Jerusalem is concerned, we should continue our bona fide effort for internationalization, while doing all we can to reconcile the conflicting interests of both sides with the legitimate demands of the world community. 3. Regionalism ( a ) The Arab League The Arab League, whatever its potentialities may be for contributing to political stability and to economic and social reforms in the Near East, can find little place in United States foreign policy until it puts its house in order. ( b ) Syrian-Iraqi Unification No new factors have arisen which would alter the position previously announced by the United States on this subject: The United States, while neither opposing nor favoring unification, is convinced that such a union should be in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned and not as a result of force or outside interference. Continuing efforts should be made, within practical limits and in accordance with conditions prevailing in each country, to persuade as may be appropriate the various Arab governments and the British and French Governments as well, to refrain from interference in Syrian affairs. Only thus would the Syrians be assured of opportunities to work out this problem for themselves. ( c ) Near East Regional Defense Pact The conference considered the conclusions reached at Istanbul that it would be impractical and undesirable for the United States to encourage any Near Eastern regional defense pact. Developments since the Istanbul conference confirmed the continued validity of the position. The United States, moreover, should not encourage any regional grouping directed against any other state in the area but should give its support to such regional arrangements as promise to bring about political stability, peace, and improvement of economic conditions. 4. Internal Trends ( a ) Communism The Near East is vulnerable to communistic exploitation should the USSR set out with determination to intensify its activities in the area. The natural deterrents to the success of such a drive, such as religion, a modern social system, a flourishing economic life, and a democratic political structure, are weak or lacking. The deterrents that exist are of a negative nature, such, for example, as the apathy of the uneducated class, the general absence of a large middle class and the opposition to change of the small political-economic hierarchy in each state. Only in Turkey where there is a strong general dislike of anything coming from the USSR, and in Greece where our aid has removed the immediate threat of communism is the democratic position strong. In Cyprus, however, the Greek communist movement is a serious matter. In Iran the factors favoring communism have increased in recent months. In the Arab states and in Israel communism is a potential rather than an actual danger, although there are indications that the communist leaders in Beirut are preparing to intensify their activities. Throughout the Near East we still have the opportunity of preventing a communist conflagration. This will require in the border states continuing our aid to Greece and Turkey and taking such action in Iran as the situation and our national objectives demand. In the Arab states we should seek to create conditions which make the democratic way of life more attractive to the local people than communism. This should take the form of encouraging the improvement of economic, social and political conditions. The PRA projects are an excellent beginning. The implementation of Point IV should carry these a long step further. In our efforts we should aim at steady progress at a no faster pace than the people are themselves willing to travel in order not to explode the social system. The same principles are applicable but in a lesser degree to Israel where there already exists a large reservoir of technical skill and experience. ( b ) Reactionary Forces Incident to the implementation of various American programs in the area, the problem is to introduce into Near Eastern political and social systems a compelling degree of liberal thought and desire for social justice without forcing a too rapid change of the existing order which might create an opportunity for communism to develop rapidly. There are some signs that the ruling classes are commencing to accept the inevitability of social advancement in their own best interest. ( c ) Attitudes toward Minorities Conditions concerning minorities were considered encouraging. The situation of the Jews in Iraq, who were discriminated against but not persecuted as Jews, has materially improved since last October. It was estimated that probably 25 to 50 percent would leave Iraq for Israel under the conditions of the legislation now in its final stages. All restrictions against Jews have been lifted in Egypt. Discrimination against the Arab minority in Israel was reported but the current trend was toward better treatment. At present no special minority problem exists in connection with the Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. ( d ) Shifting Centers of Political Power In the Arab States no effective change seems likely in the near future. In Israel there is the possibility of a slight shift to the right. Turkey’s internal situation is stable. The threat to Greece has decreased, with United States aid, but the coalition which will emerge from the recent elections will face a measure of political instability and the Communists may be expected to enter the political field. The situation in Iran remains precarious and needs immediate reforms to restrain serious unrest. 5. Military Aid to Greece, Turkey and Iran A continuation of such aid, plus economic assistance needed to prevent the spread of communism is necessary to the security of Greece, Turkey and Iran, and consequently to the security of the entire area. 6. Relationship of GTI States with Each Other In general such relations are very good, and though Iranian distrust of Turkey is still apparent, our representatives find no sound reason for it. Greek–British relations are at times troubled over the Cyprus question, and Turkish–Greek relations could be endangered if Greek agitation of this issue were to show signs of achieving results. It is important that we encourage the GTI states to develop their confidence in and cooperation with each other. 7. GTI Relations with Other Great Powers; British-American Relations Greek relations with the United States are naturally excellent, and the British, too, have considerable prestige in that country. French influence is confined mainly to cultural matters, and Greek-Italian relations seem likely to improve. Our relations with Turkey are excellent. Britain and France, through their alliances with Turkey, are also highly regarded in that country. Signs of revival of the traditional friendship between Turkey and Germany are apparent, and Turkish-Italian relations seem satisfactory. Iranian regard for the United States is high, despite their feeling that we are neglecting them. Their relations with Great Britain, whom they fear and dislike, are correct and are handicapped by the unsettled A.I.O.C. concession issue, and by Iranian claims to the Bahrein Islands. Our relations with the British Colonial Government in Cyprus are good. Generally speaking, Anglo-American relations throughout the area are very satisfactory. 8. Great Power Position in Other Near East Countries The overall objectives of the United States and British Governments in the Near East are substantially the same and, therefore, a common approach to the problems and collaboration whenever possible should bring results mutually desired. The missions in several Arab states report that since the Istanbul conference there has been evidence of increasing desire on the part of the British to collaborate with American officials working in the same area. There is need, however, to develop this situation. The delegates felt that much could be accomplished in this respect by concentrating on the points of agreement with the British and minimizing the points of difference. The conference felt that in those instances where it locally appeared possible we should attempt a similar cooperation with the French. A like opportunity exists, but in a much smaller degree, as regards the Turks. 9. Future Role of United States in the Near East The delegates believe the way is open for the United States in the future to play a more positive role in the Near East. Opportunities for this should increase as the ill will generated by the Palestine conflict recedes into the background and as the realization grows that the United States Government is acting in an impartial manner as regards Israel and the Arab states. In such circumstances United States missions can exert their influence in the manner in which American national interests demand. All delegates felt that in the countries bordering the Soviet Union some continued military assistance, and economic aid when needed, should be extended to bolster their resistance to Communism. In the Arab states there was general agreement that there was a need to restore the prestige of the United Nations. This might be initiated through PRA and possibly Point IV multi-lateral programs, or through publicizing United Nations achievements in varied fields. 10. Economic ( a ) Point IV 2 (i) There is need for directing and servicing Point IV country programs on a regional basis, and for coordinating with United Nations and international specialized agencies, and the European Cooperation Administration efforts. Wherever a local program is extensive, there must also be unified direction to assure that the total program will be well integrated, without attempting to interfere with technical guidance. (ii) We should cooperate with any government or organization which may be capable of helping to achieve sound economic development. For example, it may be possible to cooperate with the British Middle East Office. Cooperation should be informal, however, to avoid linking the Point IV Program with any failures or ill-will towards existing organizations. (iii) Projects eligible for the program should be screened to eliminate those which are not considered economic, e.g. the Latakia Port project in Syria, and other projects generally defensible only from a nationalistic or political standpoint. (iv) Training of nationals abroad is an integral part of Point IV, but maximum training should be undertaken within the various countries themselves, or other countries in the area, as experience has shown the latter method to be most effective for all except higher levels of technical training. (v) The inadequacy of local currency resources within the countries of the area may become a serious limitation in the attraction of foreign capital or even carrying out technical assistance projects. Only in Cairo, Beirut and Istanbul do there now exist even elemental capital markets; in many countries, Government funds cannot easily be expanded to cover new development programs. (vi) Even though technical assistance programs may be successfully carried out in Near Eastern countries, it should be recognized that the flow of private American capital into such areas probably will be strictly limited by present political and economic considerations. However, there are encouraging indications that local investments are playing an increasing role in the development of the countries concerned, particularly in the cities of Cairo, Beirut, and Istanbul. (vii) Since the Near Eastern countries are primarily agricultural, paramount consideration should be given to assistance directly affecting the welfare of the rural populations in the negotiation and execution of technical assistance programs. (viii) Especially during the initial stages of Point IV, care should be taken to overcome any doubts or suspicions by recipient governments and populations regarding the United States intentions. In this connection provision for United States and local trade union participation in the implementation of the program would dramatize the broad democratic support of the program. (ix) Appropriate inter-departmental machinery should be established in Washington for the purpose of coordinating and integrating United States technical assistance activity in the Near East. It would coordinate with United Nations agencies in its relief and resettlement activities concerning Arab refugees, and with the technical assistance activities of the United Nations and of the European Cooperation Administration where appropriate. (x) Existing educational institutions in the area should be utilized immediately to the maximum for both technical and vocational training. (xi) Where country programs are extensive in scope and involve technicians from more than one United States Government agency, it should be the general policy to place a qualified director in charge of administration and program coordination, leaving technical guidance entirely to the substantive agencies. (xii) As a general rule, technical assistance agreements negotiated with recipient countries should be informal and as simple as possible. (xiii) Where the inadequacy of local currency resources would limit otherwise economic and practicable programs, consideration should be given to meeting local currency as well as foreign exchange financing of technical assistance programs. ( b ) Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties 3 FCN treaties with Middle and Near East countries are highly desirable as a means of creating a more favorable climate for private investment from abroad. Proposed FCN drafts submitted to countries in this area should be concise and clear and, where possible, should be negotiated in the capitals of the states concerned. ( c ) Possibilities of Expanding Near East Exports An effort should be made to expand Near East exports, and though it was recognized that the non-dollar markets at present offer a more promising possibility in that respect, it is apparent that expansion of exports to such markets will not ease the critical dollar problem. The most desirable solution of the latter problem lies in the expansion of exports to dollar areas, but substantial success in that field is dependent upon price reductions of many products. United States products, already handicapped by local dollar shortages, are also meeting increasing competition due to the practice of American authorities in Germany of promoting German products in the area. 11. USIE Our USIE program is of great importance both as the best means of explaining our policy to the peoples of the Near East in terms they can understand, and in countering communist and other anti-United States propaganda. Departmental offices concerned should give increased attention to providing materials better adapted to local understanding, particularly at elementary levels. The present program is not reaching all sections of the potential audience, a goal which can be attained with material more closely tailored to area needs. Emphasis should also be placed on America’s homelier qualities and methods of doing things, including our attention to social welfare and ethical and moral achievement, rather than stressing financial and technical strength only. [Here follows section twelve, the last sentence of the Summary of Conclusions, which concerned consular affairs and policies affecting personnel in the Near Eastern posts.] 1 Transmitted to the Department of State by the Ambassador in Egypt as enclosure 2 in his despatch 486 of March 16. The Summary of Conclusions printed here originally served as an introduction to the 134-page report prepared by Caffery, Rountree, and Berry. 2 For documentation concerning the development of the Point IV program, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. i ; pp. 757 ff. 3 For documentation concerning the policy of the United States to modernize its treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, see vol. i , pp. 681 ff. Interest of the United States in the development of the petroleum resources of the Near East Interest of the United States in the development of the petroleum resources of the Near East 1 1 For previous documentation on this topic, see Foreign Relations , 1449, vol. vi , pp. 91 ff. [3] Memorandum by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] January 9, 1950. [4] Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs (Jackson) to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Labouisse ) [Washington,] January 10, 1950. 780.022/1–1030 [5] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] January 10, 1950. 886A.2553/1–1050 [6] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] January 24, 1950. McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [7] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] January 25, 1950. 874.2553/1–2550 [8] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Wilkins) [Washington,] January 31, 1950. McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [9] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] January 31, 1950. 884.2553/1–3150 [10] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] February 6, 1950. 886A.2553/2–650 [11] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State Jidda, February 10, 1950. 886A.2553/2–1050: Despatch [12] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, February 24, 1950. 886A.2553/2–2450: Despatch [13] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] March 1, 1950. 886A.2553/3–150 [14] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Labouisse) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Hare) [Washington,] March 3, 1950. McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [15] Memorandum by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) and Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Same Office [Washington,] March 15, 1950. McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [16] Memorandum by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) and to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) [Washington,] April 24, 1950. 786A.022/4–2450 [17] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Francis E. Meloy of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 25, 1950. 886A.2553/4–2550 [18] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 25, 1950. McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [19] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] May 11, 1950. McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [20] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, June 1, 1950. 886A.2553/6–150: Airgram [21] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, June 12, 1950. 786A.022/6–1250: Despatch [22] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, June 13, 1950—10 p. m. 886A.2553/5–2350: Telegram [23] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, June 22, 1950—midnight. 886A.2553/6–2250: Telegram [24] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, June 23, 1950—noon. 886A.2553/6–2350: Telegram [25] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, July 3, 1950—7 p. m. 886A.2553/7–350: Telegram [26] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, July 10, 1950—2 p. m. 886A.2553/7–1050: Telegram [27] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, July 25, 1950. 886A.2553/7–2550: Despatch [28] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) [Washington,] July 31, 1950. 887.2553/7–3150 [29] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, August 4, 1950—6 p. m. 887.2553/8–450: Telegram [30] The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, August 10, 1950—8 a. m. 887.2553/8–1050: Telegram [31] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq Washington, August 18, 1950. 887.2553/8–1050: Telegram [32] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] August 23, 1950. McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [33] The Consul General in Dhahran (Hart) to the Secretary of State Dhahran, August 29, 1950. 886A.2553/8–2950: Despatch [34] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State Jidda, August 31, 1950—9 a. m. 786A.022/8–3150: Telegram [35] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in London Washington, August 31, 1950—7 p. m. 886A.2553/8–3150: Telegram [36] Paper Prepared in the Department of State [Washington, September, 1950.] McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Special Briefing Memoranda Prepared by Mr. Funkhouser [37] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 7, 1950—4 p. m. 886A.2553/9–750: Telegram [38] Memorandum by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] September 14, 1950. McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Special Briefing Memoranda Prepared by Mr. Funkhouser [39] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, September 15, 1950—1 p. m. 786A.022/9–1550: Telegram [40] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fred H. Awalt of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] October 5, 1950. 886A.00/10–550 [41] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fred H. Awalt of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] October 26, 1950. 886A.2553/10–2650 [42] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] November 2, 1950. 886A.2553/11–250 [43] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] November [6?], 1950. 886A.2553/11–2250 [44] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. Earle Russell of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] November 6, 1950. 886A.2553/11–650 [45] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, November 7, 1950—7 p. m. 886A.2553/11–750: Telegram [46] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 12, 1950—1 p. m. 886A.2553/11–1250: Telegram [47] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 18, 1950—10 a. m. 886A.2553/11–1850: Telegram [48] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 20, 1950—2 p. m. 886A.2553/11–2050: Telegram [49] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, November 22, 1950—7 p.m. 886A.2553/11–2250: Telegram [50] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 30, 1950. 786A.022/10–950: Airgram [51] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, December 6, 1950—3 p. m. 886A.2553/12–650: Telegram [52] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, December 12, 1950—4 p. m. 886A.2553/12–1250: Telegram [53] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, December 29, 1950—11 a. m. 886A.2553/12–2950: Telegram [54] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, December 31, 1950—noon. 886A.2553/12–3150: Telegram Memorandum by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum 2 [Document 3] Memorandum by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) secret [ Washington ,] January 9, 1950. Subject: Progress Report on US–UK Oil Talks After two months of painful interagency discussion, the US came up with an oil policy which stated in brief that we should discuss with British authorities the possibility of US oil companies selling part of their production against sterling payment, and we would urge the British to discuss the details of such arrangements with American oil companies. Briefly, the plan was for American oil companies to “sterlingize” (i.e. bring their dollar costs as close as possible to those of British companies), sell part of their oil for sterling and convert back into dollars no greater sums than the British would have to pay to finance the oil expansion required to replace US oil imports. UK–US Government discussions in Washington and UK Government–US company discussions in London proceeded without results. The British claimed that any plan allowing US companies to sell for sterling and convert profits would increase the dollar drain on the UK balance of payments. The third week in December, the British suddenly announced that all US imports of fuel oil and one-third of dollar gasoline imports into the UK and dependent overseas territories would be prohibited. Other sterling countries followed this lead. The US Government strongly condemned this precipitate move and stated that such arbitrary action was unwarranted in view of the fact that it was this very problem which was being currently negotiated. Furthermore, American companies claimed they had been given the run-around by British officials in London and no serious attempt had been made by the British to show a willingness to negotiate. News hit the press. ECA was under heavy pressure for financing the replacement of US owned oil facilities abroad. ECA, in view of British refusal to modify their position and in view of Hoffman’s being extremely annoyed with the British for their accumulating record of non-cooperation, concluded that the British would be told that not only would no further expansion of oil facilities at home or abroad be financed by ECA but if expansion of oil facilities which depended for continued operation upon practice of currency discrimination or other undesirable trade restrictions persisted through use of free dollars, ECA would reduce UK allocation of ECA aid by a corresponding amount. This staggering policy was read to the British by Labouisse (State) and Jeffers (ECA) Tuesday, January 3. Members of the British Embassy, including Franks, are reported to be bombarding ECA with statements to the effect that recovery of the UK will be blocked by such a decision. Hoffman and other ECA officials are reported even more adamant at this time. Of course, the real purpose of the ECA move is not to penalize the UK but to force them to study and work out arrangements whereby normal suppliers can continue to operate in sterling areas without greater cost to the UK balance of payments. I am at your disposal for further details and documentation. 2 Lot 53 D 468 contains copies of memoranda and correspondence of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs George C. McGhee for the years 1949–1951. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs (Jackson) to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Labouisse ) 780.022/1–1030 [Document 4] Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs ( Jackson ) to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Labouisse ) secret [ Washington ,] January 10, 1950. Subject: Attached Telegram 1 There are, I understand, a mass of boundary disputes on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf in which various Arabs, aided and abetted by oil companies, either singly or in combination, assert territorial claims. The principal current dispute is between Saudi Arabia and a number of Trucial sheikdoms which are under British protection. There have never been any definitive boundaries in this area and the Saudi Arabian claims are based largely on the traditional payment of tribute by wandering tribes. Negotiations for settlement between Saudi Arabia and the UK, acting on behalf of its protectorates, broke down in mid-October. Since then an exchange of notes has taken place in which Saudi Arabia has advanced even more extreme claims than in the past and the British, in retaliation, have stated they must have recourse to a line of demarkation decided upon in a treaty between the UK and the Turkish Empire many years ago, which was never ratified and which goes beyond previous British objectives in the area. While the pieces of land (some of which are islands and some of which are shoals and tidal flats) are otherwise unprepossessing, apparently all you have to do is to drill a hole to get a billion barrels of oil in any place in this area. As a consequence, these disputes will be, to put it mildly, difficult to resolve. Our own policy is one of strict neutrality in these matters, as important American oil interests in Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, and the Trucial sheikdoms would be adversely affected if we became involved. 1 Telegram 5167 from London, December 30, 1949, not printed, summarized a review of British territorial disputes with Saudi Arabia. In contention were rights to the seabed between Bahrein and Saudi Arabia, and land boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Muscat. The British Foreign Office claimed to have a sound basis for its claims in the Anglo–Turkish Convention of 1913, and suggested Aramco influence might be shaping the Saudi Arabian attitude on boundary matters. A handwritten note in the margin read: “WGJ—What’s this all about? HL.” (780.022/1–1050) Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 886A.2553/1–1050 [Document 5] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] January 10, 1950. Subject: Current Aramco Problems Participants: Mr. Duce, Aramco 1 Mr. Wilkins, ANE 2 Mr. Funkhouser, ANE Mr. Await, ANE Mr. Duce reviewed current Aramco problems as follows: 1. Boundary Questions The National Geographic Society is reissuing their African charts in which Saudi Arabia appears; Aramco has been consulted. Trucial, Oman, and Qatar boundaries as shown on the latest editions do not reflect current SAG claims, and Aramco suggested that these disputed areas be left uncolored. National Geographic Society stated that final decision on boundaries came from the State Department; therefore Aramco was bringing this problem to the attention of the Department. Mr. Await stated that Mr. Boggs 3 of the geographic section would be informed of the problem. Aramco feels that the Saudi Arabian Government should endeavor to reach an early agreement on the submerged area boundary between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Aramco geological information indicates interesting structures in the area. Oil was found at 700’ depth in the structural rig test six miles off Ras Safaniyah; marine exploration indicates that large structures exist in the submerged area both north and south of this structure test. 2. Current Operations Aramco production for the first two weeks in January averaged 535,000 b.p.d. or approximately 100,000 b.p.d. more than in recent months. Duce was unable to account for this sudden increase except to state that it might have resulted from the peculiar position of tankers in international oil trade at that time. Both Bahrein and Ras Tanura refineries were running at capacity (165,000 and 125,000 b.p.d. respectively) while 245,000 barrels of crude were exported. Mr. Duce did not know the destination of these tankers. Tapline operations are moving ahead without particular difficulty. The last steel pipe will be rolled June 30 and will arrive in the Near East in late fall. The total number of American employees in Saudi Arabia has increased due to additional Tapline employees brought in from Kuwait. 3. Financial Mr. Duce had information that the Fund would try to postpone decision on the South African application to sell gold sovereigns to Aramco at prices above par until such time as the Fund gold policy were reviewed. 4 It was not known whether this review could be completed before Aramco exhausted sovereign supplies. Aramco information was that the Fund might throw the issue back to the individual governments concerned, a not unfavorable development from a company point of view. Aramco is about to make a $4,000,000 loan to the Saudi Arabian. Government. The company had resisted strong Saudi Arabian pressure to make a $500,000,000 gold pound loan but now feels that it can hold out no longer. Mr. Duce asked that this information be held confidential until the field were notified of the Aramco decision. In exchange for the loan Aramco desired Saudi Arabian agreement to allow Aramco to employ workers from soft currency countries, such as Italy, Lebanon, Egypt, etc. Saudi Arabian agreement to a fixed sterling equivalent of the gold pound would also be sought. 4. Miscellaneous The SAG plans to develop an armed force to protect the Trans Arabian pipeline; the cost has to be borne by the company. The company is concerned about their insecure position with respect to the purchase price of Saudi rials; at present Aramco buys rials for 30¢ against the Government’s purchase price of approximately 23¢. The SAG thus makes approximately 7¢ per rial or roughly $3,000,000 per year from rial sales. There is no agreement which would prevent Saudi Arabian Government from increasing the price of rials at any time. Mr. Duce promised to give the Department available details on the Howard, Ltd., bid on the Neutral Zone submerged areas. Mr. Duce mentioned that the John Howard construction firm had failed in their Aramco contracts and he questioned whether they could make a success of this new oil venture if their bid were successful. 1 James Terry Duce, Vice President, Aramco. 2 Fraser Wilkins, Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs. 3 Samuel W. Boggs, Special Adviser on Geography, OIR. 4 R. I. Brougham of Aramco reported to Henry R. Labouisse, Jr., Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, that Aramco royalty payments would be increased about 50% if it had to pay Saudi Arabia in dollars. Aramco believed it could arrange to have gold sovereigns minted in South Africa at a price that would save it a considerable amount of money, but was concerned that the International Monetary Fund would object because of its concern over black market operations in sovereigns. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 5, 1950; 886A.2553/1–550) Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [Document 6] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] January 24, 1950. Subject: Discussions with Anglo–Iranian Oil Company Officials Participants: Assistant Secretary McGhee (part-time) 1 Mr. Heath-Ives, AIOC, New York Office Mr. Sedden—AIOC newly appointed Manager, Tehran Mr. Lockett, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Representative Middle East Pipeline Company Mr. Becker, AIOC Legal Counsel, Washington GTI—Mr. Jernegan 2 ANE—Mr. Funkhouser GTI—Mr. Ferguson 3 GTI—Mr. Kitchen PED—Mr. Moline 4 ANE—Mr. Clark 5 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company officials called on the Department ostensibly to introduce Mr. Sedden who will leave shortly for Iran to take over the managership of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company operations. Discussion centered about the following points: ( a ) Political conditions in Iraq which would affect the successful negotiation of Middle East Pipeline transit rights. ( b ) Situation in the US with respect to oil imports. ( c ) Request by the Department for statistical information on AIOC producing and refining operations in Iran and Kuwait. ( d ) Request by the Department for information on latest developments concerning AIOC–Iranian concession contract renegotiations. The only substantive information which the Department gained from these discussions was that: ( a ) Kuwait production was not expected to increase substantially over the next year despite the completion this month of the new 600,000 b.p.d. Mena Al Ahmedi Pier. ( b ) The Iranian port of Bandar Mashur could handle 160,000 b.p.d. crude liftings. ( c ) Abadan refinery was producing approximately 500,000 b.p.d. ( d ) AIOC planned to increase the capacity of their Kermanshaw refinery. No definite information was available. ( e ) Mepco was proceeding with its efforts to obtain transit rights through Iraq and was optimistic that these negotiations could be carried out successfully. Discussions had not progressed to the point where any Iraqi demands that Basra oil be transported through the line had teen made but Mepco officials were prepared to negotiate on this point. ( f ) Heath-Ives promised to make more frequent trips to Washington to discuss latest AIOC developments and offered to try to answer any information requests the Department would care to make. Assistant Secretary McGhee then met briefly with the AIOC officials. Following a brief summary of points noted above, the status of AIOC negotiations with the Iranian Government was discussed. AIOC officials stated that they had no late information which would indicate any change in the AIOC position. Mr. McGhee informed them that during his recent visit to the area the informed consensus in Tehran indicated only a small margin separated the two sides and that the chief point of contention arose over funds allocated to reserves before profits were declared. Mr. Sedden expressed great interest in this issue since he personally was not aware of the importance attached to this point by the Iranian Government. Mr. Heath-Ives added that the company already had, however, made liberal concessions and that the point would arrive where AIOC would have “nothing in the till”. Mr. McGhee stated that having read the AIOC annual report, he was convinced that, as one oil man to another, profits were still far from disappearing. Mr. McGhee added that conditions had greatly changed in the Near East since most contracts were signed, that Iranian and other Near East officials were now perfectly aware of the more favorable concession terms existing not only in the western hemisphere but even in the Persian Gulf, and that it was therefore necessary for oil companies to deal with the situation realistically by recognizing the legitimate demands of oil producing states. Mr. McGhee briefly reviewed the importance to the stability of the area involved in successfully concluded oil negotiations. Anglo-Iranian officials expressed their appreciation of the Assistant Secretary’s views, particularly the information regarding the AIOC impasse, and promised to keep in closer contact with the Department. 1 George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. 2 John D. Jernegan, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. 3 C. Vaughn Ferguson, Officer in Charge, Iranian Affairs. 4 Edward G. Moline, Assistant Chief, Petroleum Policy Staff. 5 Harlan B. Clark, Officer in Charge, Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 874.2553/1–2550 [Document 7] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs restricted [ Washington ,] January 25, 1950. Subject: Standard of New Jersey Decision to Terminate Exploration Operations in Egypt Participants: Messrs. Sherman, Pannill and Ruedeman, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey ANE—Mr. Berry ANE—Mr. Burns ANE—Mr. Funkhouser ANE—Mr. Nelson PED—Mr. Moline Mr. Sherman reviewed the history of SONJ exploration activities in Egypt and the Company’s difficulties with Egyptian Mining Laws and License–Lease forms. (Details are available in reports from Cairo.) Mr. Sherman stated that if the difficulties over the Law and License–Lease forms had been settled last year, as had been promised, SONJ would still be operating in Egypt. However, since the original difficulties with Egyptian laws and mining legislation began, the world situation with respect to oil had drastically changed. Even if the Egyptian Government were now to write their mining legislation to the complete satisfaction of Standard of Jersey, the company would not change its plans to terminate all exploration operations. Due to the world surplus oil conditions, dollar short markets and more profitable oil areas in the world such as Canada and the Persian Gulf, Standard was shutting down their exploration operations in over half a dozen foreign countries. Included were the Bahamas, Santo Domingo, Cuba, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Guatemala and the Peruvian mountains area. Mr. Sherman added that the Peruvian case was particularly embarrassing, since the Peruvian Government had finally passed mining legislation which was to the complete satisfaction of the company. Mr. Sherman further added that Creole Petroleum Corporation which had 37 exploration rigs in Venezuela before the war was now reduced to 7. Staff of Creole, largest producing oil company in the world, had been reduced this year from 20,000 to 16,000 with another 4,000 cut imminent. Therefore, it was obvious that in reviewing those areas which were marginal from Standard’s viewpoint, Egyptian exploration would be one of those terminated. Liquidation would come after Standard had spent $15,000,000 over a 12-year period and had finally in 1949 completed its first successful well. Standard had had to drill this well with only the promise of government officials that a license would be granted. SONJ later found itself in the uncomfortable position of making an oil discovery without holding title to the land. Mr. Ruedeman then read an open cable which the company had despatched to Cairo. The purpose of the cable was to counter charges made by Director of Mines and Quarries Abu Zeid in private and probably in official circles that the company had never made their position clear and that provisions of proposed mining legislation were not unsatisfactory for foreign oil companies. The cable refuted point by point the allegations made by Abu Zeid and called attention to the long history of fruitless negotiations and to the fixed position from which the company had never waivered. Mr. Funkhouser stated that the Department viewed the termination of such important private industry operations in the Near East with great concern, particularly since it came at a time when the government was endeavoring to make conditions abroad attractive to US private enterprise. It was felt that this corpse of private enterprise would warrant coronary study by those officials working on Point 4. It also appeared that there were two courses of action open to the government: ( a ) If Egyptian legislation were inequitable, the Department could endeavor to persuade the Egyptian Government to make such changes as would be necessary to attract American capital. However, since Standard had stated that regardless of the changes made the company would not return to active operations, the US Government and the company would be put in an embarrassing position should the Egyptian Government make any such changes advocated. Standard officials agreed that no action along this line would help their case. ( b ) The second course of action would be to attempt to harvest whatever profit could be gleaned from this not unspectacular development. (The termination of an oil company’s activities just after finding oil would be publicized for the news that it obviously was.) Mr. Funkhouser stated it would be advantageous for the company and the US Government to make certain that an accurate report and honest understanding of the situation reached the Egyptian officialdom and public as well as the public in other parts of the Middle East. For that reason, Mr. Funkhouser stated that an approach such as contained in the Standard cable might damage the company’s reputation in Egypt and reflect on the prestige of Standard and other American oil business in the area. It was felt that rather than give a technical and detailed analysis of the company’s objections to Egyptian law which would in turn serve to force the Egyptian Government to counterattack in order to justify their position, it was suggested that a simple statement be made to the effect that in view of the changed world oil picture characterized by surplus oil conditions, dollar short markets, Standard was forced to terminate its Egyptian operations, and other marginal operations in order to concentrate on areas with better oil prospects and more favorable conditions. In other words, if the company wished to maintain public favor to protect its Egyptian marketing operations, it would be useless to criticize Egyptian legislation. Putting the blame where it principally belonged, i.e. the fact that Standard did not need the oil, was cutting back all over the world in marginal territories, and was having difficulty selling for dollars what oil they already possessed would be the best way to salvage any local sympathy and understanding available. Such a presentation might also serve to impress Near East States with the need for increased local efforts to develop conditions attractive to foreign capital. Although these Standard representatives stated that Mr. Hoskins, their Middle East consultant, fully agreed with this position, that their open cable was not intended to be a press despatch, that Standard would leave publicity up to their officials in the field who obviously agreed with this approach, they, nevertheless, appeared to return to the position set forth in their cable in their subsequent arguments. Mr. Pannill could not effectively be moved off the position that Abu Zeid criticism of the company and of company procedures should not be refuted point by point for the record. Mr. Burns and Mr. Moline endeavored to phrase the Department’s position more succinctly in order to impress Mr. Pannill with the fruitlessness of engaging in debate over technicalities of the Egyptian regulations, if the company had no intention of continuing operations, Mr. Sherman agreed that all had the same point of view and that Mr. Pannill who was sailing for Cairo early next month for consultations with Messrs. Anderson, Walters, and Owens of SONJ would convey the Department’s views to the field. Mr. Funkhouser stated that the Department would cable the results of this meeting to the Embassy and that Embassy officials would be more than glad to cooperate with the company on this problem in every way possible. Mr. Sherman appreciated the close cooperation which Standard had with the Embassy and it was agreed that those in the field would be in the best position to handle this delicate problem. Standard officials were warmly thanked for making their special trip to Washington. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Wilkins) McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [Document 8] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs ( Wilkins ) restricted [ Washington ,] January 31, 1950. Subject: Conference with Judge Manley Hudson and Aramco Officials on Persian Gulf Problems Participants: Mr. Fraser Wilkins—ANE (Chairman) Judge Manley O. Hudson—Int’l. Law Counselor for Aramco Mr. Richard Young—Ass’t. to Judge Manley Hudson Mr. James Terry Duce—Vice President, Aramco Mr. John Noble—Aramco L/P—Messrs. Snow, Vallance, and Sweeney 1 L/E—Mr. Wallace U/FW—Messrs. Chapman, Looney, and Taylor 2 OIR/GE—Mr. Boggs ANE—Mr. Awalt Summary: Mr. Wilkins welcomed the visitors and expressed the Department’s appreciation for the opportunity to meet with Judge Hudson, Mr. Duce, Mr. Ray, and their colleagues and have the views of such an eminent international jurist as Judge Hudson on the land and offshore problems in the Persian Gulf area. Judge Hudson opened his comments with the statement that the principal difficulty in settling the problems was that the SAG had to deal with the British Government rather than with the individual Sheikhs directly. He added that the dominance of the British tended to intimidate the Arabs and place them at a disadvantage in the bilateral negotiations which have been intermittently carried on since 1949. 3 He hoped the Department would be willing to counter this with an expression of encouragement to the SAG. He also cited the unhurried attitude of the East which needs prompting when matters require expeditious action, and he expressed the belief that the USG could be of service in urging greater progress toward settlement upon both sides. Judge Hudson cited five disputes which most urgently needed settlement: 1. Saudi Arabia—Abu Dhabi land boundary 2. Saudi Arabia—Qatar 3. Jurisdiction (SAG vs. Bahrein), over Fasht abu Saafa, shoal area 4. Jurisdiction (SAG vs. Bahrein), over Fasht al Jarin, shoal area 5. Jurisdiction (SAG vs. Kuwait), over Arabi Island Delineation of land boundaries, he said, was difficult because they have no historical background in the disputed areas. The traditional nomadic life there had no need for fixed lines separating one territory from another. Political history of the area is, therefore, almost useless. Both sides, moreover, lack complete information on the terrain, Judge Hudson stated, while tribal allegiances and the extent of their ranges are too conflicting or indefinite to offer a fully reliable basis for judgment. Water boundaries also offer many difficulties, he asserted. The various fisheries—pearl, fish, and sponge, offered no basis for jurisdiction because they were regarded by littoral peoples as common rights in which they all shared. The islands lack a political history of ownership because for the most part they lack water and hence have supported no permanent populations, and in most cases are uninhabited. Contiguity on the basis of the Truman Proclamation of 1945 offers some basis for attributing islands to littoral states, but experience has shown that it is not a sure criterion in the area, e.g. Hawar Island, off Qatar, but attributed by the UK to Bahrein, and Maqta, Harkus, Farsi, and Arabi, off Saudi Arabia which were among nine islands attributed by the UK to Kuwait in 1923. The only possible basis for attribution of islands and shoals, Judge Hudson felt, was practical necessity. Certain principles might be established for determining water boundaries such as those elaborated by Boggs and Kennedy. However, in spite of their relevance and high merit, it must be admitted that they were not as yet recognized as acceptable principles in international law. In the case of land and water boundaries Judge Hudson was of the belief that direct negotiations, as is now the case, should be attempted in the first instance and that if the differences could not be resolved an investigation commission might be established to consider the facts and report. Such commission should not have the power of decision in land boundaries as the negotiators thereafter could reach a solution. An investigating commission for water boundaries might, however, be authorized to decide because their terms of reference would include definition of principles to be applied. With regard to the attribution of islands, Judge Hudson believed such matters could best be resolved in high-level negotiations and that it would be fruitless to appoint an investigating commission because there were neither facts to be established nor did there exist relevant principles on which a decision by a commission could be based. Judge Hudson and Messrs. Duce and Ray repeatedly urged the Department to give friendly encouragement to the SAG and thereby strengthen its hand. Both feared that if too much time passed the present problems would be further confounded by discoveries of oil in or near disputed areas. Mr. Ray added that Aramco believed the various problems should be handled separately rather than together because of their complexity and the many parties involved. Mr. Ray and Judge Hudson expressed the hope that the Department would also remonstrate with the British for their threat to the SAG to return to the 1913 Turko-British line as a basis for negotiation if the SAG persisted in advancing its extreme claim to western Abu Dhabi and Buraimi. Judge Hudson stated that the 1913 line had no legal basis for consideration since that convention was never ratified and presumed to divide territory (Al Hasa) of which neither side had possession at the time. Mr. Wilkins stated that the Department had been following the boundary and island questions with interest, and that it had informed both parties of the desirability of reaching an early solution and had suggested that if an impasse were reached recourse might be had to a neutral commission of arbitration. Both sides, particularly the SAG, were aware of our interest. The United States could not intervene in the current negotiations by championing one side or criticizing the position of the other. It would be proper, however, to enquire of each with regard to the progress of the negotiations. Such query might have the effect of precipitating action. It was added that the Department did not have the impression the parties had reached the extent of impasse indicated by Judge Hudson and Mr. Ray. It was suggested that if this were the case it would seem appropriate for either side or both to suggest an investigating commission along lines suggested by Judge Hudson. Judge Hudson and Mr. Ray thought it would be premature to propose an investigating commission as the current talks were still taking place and, although slow, had not reached a definite impasse. Any impetus that could be given to the present negotiations would, therefore, be helpful. 1 Conrad Snow, Assistant Legal Officer for Political Affairs, William R. Vallance, and Joseph Sweeney. 2 Wilbert M. Chapman, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, Warren F. Looney, and Fred E. Taylor. 3 For documentation on petroleum, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 91 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 884.2553/1–3150 [Document 9] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] January 31, 1950. Subject: French Scheme to Divert Haifa Pipeline Participants: NEA—Assistant Secretary McGhee Mr. de Metz, Compagnie Française des Petroles Mr. Benard, French Embassy Mr. Vandenpeyre, French Oil Mission, N.Y.C. ANE—Mr. Funkhouser Mr. de Metz reviewed the French proposal to divert the unfinished 16-inch IPC pipeline from the Israel border to Lebanon in exchange for Iraq approval to reopen the southern 12-inch line to Haifa. He stated that a distance equivalent to Rouen-Paris separated the French from one-quarter share of 5,000,000 tons of crude oil per year. This loss caused a $25,000,000 drain on the French balance of payments at a time when the French economy could ill afford it. Both British and American partners in IPC were unenthusiastic about the French diversion scheme according to Mr. de Metz; he stated he realized that they had adequate supplies of oil whereas his French company did not. Mr. de Metz stated that if British and American partners could not agree to the diversion scheme, the French would have to consider completing the 16-inch line to Lebanon on their own. Mr. McGhee asked if the terms of the IPC Group Agreement allowed the company to proceed unilaterally. Mr. de Metz replied that the Agreement was indefinite as to whether IPC partners would be allowed to take their share of production at a designated land spot instead of the Mediterranean coast, since the existing situation had never been anticipated. Mr. McGhee stated that the US Government was fully sympathetic with the position in which the French company found itself and could understand French impatience with the 18 months closure of the two southern pipelines. However, Mr. McGhee added that, unlike the French and UK Governments, the US Government was not directly involved in IPC and that the Department felt the decision to undertake a new pipeline route should be properly left to the companies, particularly in view of the added expenditures and risks involved. Mr. McGhee stressed the Department’s continuing interest in cooperating with the French on Near East problems and mentioned past joint efforts to open the line as well as effective support of French best interests by the US Government at the time the IPC Group Agreement was drawn up. Mr. McGhee agreed that no early solution to the Israel-Iraq impasse appeared imminent and stated that Iraqi opinion seemed more intransigent than ever. He thanked Mr. de Metz for coming to Washington to present French company views on the IPC situation and expressed the hope that the partners in IPC could work out a mutually satisfactory solution to this difficult problem. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 886A.2553/2–650 [Document 10] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] February 6, 1950. Subject: Socony Near East Operations Participants: NEA—Mr. Hare 1 Mr. Brewster Jennings, President of Socony Vacuum Mr. Charles Harding, Director of Socony Vacuum ANE—Mr. Funkhouser Problem: Socony not in favor of diverting Haifa 16-inch line. Sterling oil problem and danger of US import restrictions will affect Socony’s Iraq and Saudi Arabian investments before their Venezuelan operation; however, Socony contracts to buy oil from Iran unaffected. Mr. Harding stated that the American partners in IPC were not in favor of the French proposal to divert the Haifa pipeline. He felt that the diversion scheme entailed risk to the Haifa refinery, that it would be illogical to expect to trans-ship crude from Lebanon to Haifa if Arab States opposed direct flow and that neither British nor American companies had any use for further supplies of crude oil. Socony lawyers held the opinion that the French had no legal case for building the diversionary pipeline unilaterally. Mr. Harding felt that British companies would fight any such unilateral French action violently. He, however, stated he had not been in London for three months and that it was conceivable that the British companies, in view of the changed circumstances and the premature French approach to Iraq, might feel that diversion of one of the pipelines would present the only opportunity for moving the oil from Iraq. Mr. Harding added that it was particularly unfortunate the Iraq Government had learned of this diversion scheme since it would probably ruin any immediate chances the company might have of opening the lines without such diversion. The general aspects of the dollar sterling oil problem as it affected the Near East were discussed. Mr. Jennings and Mr. Harding agreed that balance of payments reasons were responsible for British moves to displace dollar oil rather than any long term British plan to force American oil companies out of the Middle East. Mr. Jennings also agreed that if current US–UK negotiations were fruitless and if the threat of American import restrictions was not overcome, the suggestion of a price war by American companies with surplus overseas oil would be a powerful argument to convince the British that it would pay them to keep American companies in business. Mr. Jennings added that this, of course, was a last resort to which no oil company would want to be forced. Mr. Harding stated that restrictions on imports in the United States and British restrictions on dollar oil would fall most heavily on Socony’s Iraq and Arabian production. He continued by saying that reductions in operations of partly-owned companies were less serious than reductions in 100% controlled operations. Socony’s Venezuelan production was 100% owned as against an 11.875% share of IPC production and 10% share of Aramco production. Mr. Harding mentioned that Socony was drawing approximately 40,000 b.p.d. from Iran through the terms of a short-term contract ending in 1952. This agreement was for oil imports in the US only. The 20-year contract with Anglo–Iranian, which Mr. Harding said was binding, called for Socony purchases of approximately 75,000 b.p.d. of Anglo–Iranian crude starting in 1952. Mr. Harding added that this oil could be used in Socony’s worldwide markets. On the subject of Standard and Socony contracts with Anglo-Iranian to purchase crude and build the Middle East pipeline, Mr. Harding initimated that existence of surplus oil would be insufficient reason to allow cancellation of either contract. 1 Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/2–1050: Despatch [Document 11] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia ( Hill ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential No. 53 Jidda , February 10, 1950. Subject: Further Sovereign Advance Made by Aramco to the Saudi Government. Presumably in response to a direct plea for funds from Najib Salha, Assistant Deputy Finance Minister, Garry Owen of Aramco at noon yesterday advanced to the Government another 100,000 sovereigns on January royalties, normally payable towards the end of this month. According to one account, within two hours of this action, the sovereigns had been sold to Sadaka Ka’ki, one of the leading Jidda bankers and money-changers, for riyals, most of which were distributed to Prince Tallal and other sons of the King. So great was the need of Tallal for his share that he sent an emissary to the Dutch Bank, Aramco’s depository, to ask when he could receive his riyals while the Bank was still in the process of counting out sovereigns for payment to the Ministry of Finance! Another, and probably more accurate version, is that Tallal received 90,000 sovereigns direct and took them with him by plane to Riyadh today. With this payment, total Aramco advances to the Government on January royalties reached 268,205 sovereigns (see Embassy’s despatch no. 31 of January 27 and no. 37 of January 30). 2 Owen left hurriedly for Dhahran by plane immediately after authorizing the transfer, and it has not been possible to ascertain the exact reasoning behind the move, in view of the Company’s evident extreme disappointment with the Saudis over the granting of a six million dollar loan to Syria. 3 Another Aramco source has confided privately to an officer of this Embassy his amazement that the advance was authorized and has expressed his belief that no further similar payments can be expected. Since the balance due the Government on January royalties is in any case only some 60,000 sovereigns, the force of this attitude will doubtless be largely lost on the Government. The Department will note from despatch no. 31 that the Saudi Government has absorbed royalty advances at a greater rate over the period December 31–February 4 than at any similar time. In a little over a month, the Company has paid to the Ministry of Finance 600,000 sovereigns, plus another half million dollars representing Saudi profits on riyals sold Aramco. The Embassy understands that the Company does not view this development with equanimity, but so far it has apparently taken the position that royalties, although strictly payable only twice a year, or at most, following recent practice, at the end of the month following which the royalties were earned, should nevertheless be turned over to the Saudi Government whenever an advance is requested. While this practice may have the merit of keeping Company–Government friction to a minimum, it renders impossible the institution of modern budgetary procedures so desperately needed by this country and increases the likelihood that the Government’s, considerable financial difficulties will only be further compounded at some later date. For example, Saudi Arabia will receive between now and early March (barring some further advances) only about 60,000 sovereigns (royalties) from Aramco, plus $400,000 profit from the sale of riyals to the Company and the $1,000,000 minimum annual royalty payment from the Pacific Western Oil Company, due on February 20. This, together with Aramco’s loan (only two-thirds of which can probably be used in this country, since $2,000,000 must be paid to Syria by March 1 in fulfillment of the terms of the Saudi–Syrian loan) appear to constitute the country’s entire resources from which the Government’s forty million dollar debt and current expenses may be met. In these circumstances, a continuation of the present crisis and a rise in the price of gold and the riyal, with attendant hardships on the bulk of Saudi citizens, can only be expected. For the Ambassador: Heyward G. Hill Counselor of Embassy 1 Repeated to Cairo. 2 Neither printed. The despatches under reference listed Aramco advances to the Saudi Arabian Government on December and January royalty payments. Royalties for a given month were due at the end of the following month, but Aramco had been making payments ahead of time. Documentation is in Department of State file 886A.2553. 3 In telegram 63 from Jidda, February 2, not printed, the Ambassador reported: the Saudi Arabian Government had signed an agreement on January 31 to loan Syria $6 million, without interest. The loan was to be repaid in Syrian products over the four-year period from 1955–1958. (883.10/2–250) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/2–2450: Despatch [Document 12] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential No. 85 Jidda , February 24, 1950. Ref: Emb. desp. 50, Feb. 10 and desps. 77 and 80, Feb. 24, 1950. 2 Subject: Background Concerning Problem of Protection by Saudi Arabia of Tapline Route. Following my conversation with Najib Salha, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance, in which he outlined the Government’s position regarding the amount of protection to be furnished by Saudi Arabia for the Tapline route and installations in the northern Nejd (see my desp. 77 and 80) I asked Garry Owen, Representative with the Government of both Aramco and Tapline, to give me more of the background on this problem which, it appears, will for some time be a matter of dispute between the Company and the Government. According to Owen, the question of payment for protection for the Tapline route was first raised by Mr. W. F. Moore, President of Aramco in a letter to King Ibn Sa’ud in June of 1947 enclosing a draft of the desired Convention. Moore, who was in Riyadh at the time, proposed in the letter that Tapline pay the Government every year $500,000 in consideration of transit rights, protection costs and the execution of the Convention as then drafted. This draft and accompanying letter were, however, rejected, His Majesty pointing out that Saudi Arabia wanted merely reimbursement for legitimate expenses incurred in connection with the establishment of the pipeline. 3 Subsequently, in July of 1947, negotiations leading to the signing of the Tapline Convention took place in Jidda between Fuad Bey Hamza, King’s Royal Councillor, and William J. Lenahan, Tapline negotiator. In the course of these discussions, the Government proposed an all-inclusive paragraph which would have permitted this country to collect very large sums from the Company for protection and other facilities. Lenahan rejected this, and the resultant agreement, embodied in Article XVII of the Convention (see Embassy desp. no. 237 of Nov. 26, 1949) and paragraph 1 of the attached exchange of letters (see Embassy desp. 76 of Feb. 27), 4 provides that the Government shall take “reasonable measures” to protect the pipeline and that “the Company will reimburse the Government for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by the Government … for protection, administration (and) formalities …” Owen stressed to me at this point that the Tapline Convention, as concluded, differs in several important respects from the draft proposed by President Moore at the time the offer of a $500,000 annual payment was made. For example, the question of payment of a transit fee was regulated elsewhere, and amounts due the Government under Article XVII do not include it. Furthermore, due to delays at the western end of the line resulting from the Palestine fighting, the pipeline as far as a point slightly east of Qaisuma (formerly pump station 3) was actually constructed and will be operated by Aramco, as a part of its field gathering system, and protection and other services are already furnished for these facilities by Sa’ud ibn Jiluwi, Amir of Al Hasa Province, in accordance with the Aramco concession. As a result, according to Owen, the actual Tapline area requiring protection has now been reduced by about two-fifths. Until very recently, the Company heard nothing further regarding: the question of protection. As Tapline extended its operations through the northern Nejd, a few ibn Jiluwi khuwiyya (irregular troops) and customs, police and other officials were assigned to the various pump stations and construction camps (see desp. no. 50), and no unusual difficulties have been experienced by Tapline. However, shortly after the appointment of Najib Salha as Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance on December 26, the latter told Owen he would shortly receive a very large claim from the Government for protection of the pipeline route (see desp. 50). A copy of the Government’s letter which was received by Aramco early in January, has been given to the Embassy. Although couched in vague terms, it appears to insist that a large Governmental organization be set up under an official termed “the Protector” with financial, health, and security personnel in addition to “detachments” of troops. Should this have been agreed to by Tapline, Owen states that he believes the Company would have been called upon to support large numbers of Saudi soldiers along the five hundred miles right-of-way in Saudi Arabia, and he therefore replied to the Government that “the proposed organization goes far beyond the Company’s concept of its obligations under the Convention … the Company cannot accede to the Government’s proposals.” At the time this claim was received, Fred Davies and Floyd Ohliger, Vice Presidents of Aramco, were in Jidda attempting to get agreement from the Government regarding (1) the employment of technicians from soft currency countries; (2) the payment of royalties in soft currencies; (3) the question of the construction program for the Dammam-Riyadh railway; and (4) the financial aid to be furnished the Government. 5 In their discussions they also took up the question of Tapline protection, although it was agreed with Salha, with whom most of the talks took place, that there should be no bargaining over the various items. As he had already told Owen, Salha repeated to Davies and Ohliger that he thought the Saudi claim was extreme, but as it had been approved by the Foreign Minister, Prince Feisal, the Minister of Defense, Prince Mansur, and the Minister of Finance, Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, there was nothing he could do but pass it on to the Company. He said he would endeavor to support Aramco’s position with his superiors, and was told that Davies and Ohliger would pass on to their New York office Najib’s statement of the Government’s current financial crisis. Once the six million-dollar loan was granted by Aramco, the Embassy believes Salha may have cooled slightly towards the Company position on the protection question. While Najib still claims to agree with the Company, he is now of the opinion that he cannot support Tapline’s position with higher authority, and in his conversation with me (see desp. 77) made no allusion to the fact that he is not in full agreement with the Government’s views. It appears that Salha, having secured his main objective in satisfying the King by securing the loan from the Company, is no longer interested even in appearing to oppose the views of his Government superiors on the protection question. On February 11–13, Lenahan, now Assistant Vice President of Tapline, and George Mandis, Tapline’s Relations Representative in Dhahran, were in Jidda for discussions on this question with Shaikh Abdullah and Najib. In an effort to avoid further complications, it had been decided to offer the Saudis an annual lump-sum payment to cover all obligations incurred by the Company under the terms of the Convention. Following several lower offers (see desp. 77), the figure of 1,250,000 riyals ($250,000 except to Aramco, for whom, buying its riyals at 30¢ each, it represents $375,000) was mentioned to the Finance Minister. He categorically rejected this offer, and the Government is now insisting on the initial sum of $500,000 first mentioned in 1947. Shaikh Abdullah also disclosed—and Shaikh Yustif Yassih, Deputy Foreign Minister, later confirmed to me—that orders have been issued for the movement of a unit of 1200 Saudi soldiers from Taif to the north (see Embassy desp. 69 of Feb. 24). 6 In the face of such an uncompromising attitude on the part of the Government, Owen states that the Company has decided to wait and take the matter up when Aramco receives a clear itemized bill of charges. Owen also informed me that Lenahan had told him that there was no mention during the 1947 discussions of arbitration by the American Ambassador (then Minister) should the parties be unable to reach agreement as to what constituted “reasonable measures” requiring “necessary expenses”. The Department will note that this specifically contradicts the opinion of Fuad Bey Hamza, Saudi negotiator in 1947 (see desp. 50). It may be that the latter is actually thinking of the need for arbitration of the question now. When I asked Owen for his opinion of the motivation behind the current Saudi intransigence in this matter, he said that he felt the Government was very fearful of its Hashemite neighbors to the north and was determined to take all possible steps to protect its borders. In view of the fact that the position of the United States Government has been to take all feasible measures to strengthen internal security forces in this country, it appears possible that the Saudi Government may appeal to this Embassy (in which case Najib’s recent call on me would have served to prepare the ground) for support in its efforts to persuade the oil company to subsidize large protective forces along the Tapline right-of-way. In view of this possibility, the Department may wish to inform me of its views. 7 J. Rives Childs 1 Repeated to Cairo and Dhahran. 2 None printed. Despatch 50 reported a letter from the Saudi Arabian Government to Aramco calling on Aramco to pay for the maintenance of large Saudi Arabian protective forces along the pipeline. Ambassador J. Rives Childs reported it appeared the Minister of Defense was “attempting to transfer to Aramco the entire cost of protecting Saudi Arabia’s northern marches from the exaggerated Hashemite menace on their flanks.” Despatch 77 reported a visit by Najib Salha to acquaint the Ambassador with the background regarding discussions with Aramco over the expenses incurred by the Saudi Arabian Government for administration and security in connection with Tapline. Despatch 80 reported a call by Yusef Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister, to tell the Ambassador the number of forces necessary to ensure the security of Tapline could only be decided by the Saudi Arabian Government, since it alone was responsible for security. Documentation is in Department of State file 886A.2553. 3 Correspondence between Moore and King Saud not printed. But see telegram 272 from Jidda, July 9, 1947, Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , p. 662 , which reported the conclusion of the Tapline negotiations. It informed the Department of State that no fixed annual obligation had been assumed for security expenses involved in protecting the pipeline, “instead Tapline assumes fair and reasonable costs such as security protection.” 4 Neither printed. Despatch 237 transmitted a copy of the Tapline Agreement signed in Jidda on July 11, 1947. Despatch 76 transmitted copies of an exchange of letters which took place between the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance, Abdullah Sulaiman, and William J. Lenahan, Assistant to the President of Tapline, at the time of the signing of the Tapline Agreement. (886A.2553/3–650) 5 Telegram 31 from Jidda, January 16, reported negotiations on the items under reference (886A.2553/1–1650). 6 Not printed; the subject was the movement of Saudi Arabian troops from Taif to the northern Nejd (786A.54/3–150). 7 Instruction 14, April 14, informed the Ambassador the Department of State would not object if the Embassy discussed the matter with either the Saudi Arabian Government or Tapline officials, “if it is made clear that it is doing so in an informal and unofficial capacity.” The Department said it could not assume any responsibility in the matter because it was essentially a contractual obligation between the Saudi Arabian Government and Tapline. On the other hand, it considered it inappropriate to act as an arbiter because the United States could not be a disinterested party where the interests of an American firm were involved. (886A.2553/2–2450) Despatch 231 from Jidda, dated May 1, was an answer to instruction 14. The Ambassador reported Tapline intended to leave the initiative to the Saudi Arabian Government for the time being and did not intend to suggest arbitration unless the Government presented it with an itemized bill for support of the troops moved into the northern Nejd. Transmitted as enclosures to despatch 231 were a statement of facts bearing on the Saudi Arabian proposal for pipeline protection, prepared by the Tapline representative; a letter from Najib Salha to the Tapline representative, dated December 31, 1949, in which he informed Tapline of his Government’s plans for its protection; and an answer from the Tapline representative, dated January 9, 1950, in which he informed Salha Tapline could not accede to the Government’s proposals (886A.2553/5–150). Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 886A.2553/3–150 [Document 13] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] March 1, 1950. Subject: Aminoil Operations in Kuwait Neutral Zone Participants: Mr. Harley C. Stevens, American Independent Oil Co. ANE—Mr. Wilkins ANE—Mr. Await ANE—Mr. Clark ANE—Mr. Funkhouser ANE—Mr. Thayer Problem: Aminoil reports ( a ) first well unproductive, ( b ) arbitration proceeding on Kuwait Oil Company—Aminoil rights to Kuwait Islands, ( c ) Kuwait–Kuwait Neutral Zone boundary under active discussion, ( d ) US Consulate in Kuwait highly desired by Aminoil, ( e ) jurisdictional difficulties becoming evident in Neutral Zone, ( f ) British Cable and Wireless complaint concerning Aminoil communications Mr. Stevens gave the Department the following information: (1) First well drilled in the Neutral Zone was “dry and abandoned”. Depth was approximately 5,000 feet; the location was approximately 24 miles south of the Kuwait Neutral Zone northern border on the 48 degree W. Longitude. Mr. Stevens believed that the Kuwait sand was found in this first test well but contained salt water. He indicated that the geological section was considerably thicker than had been anticipated and that the well had been drilled on the eastern flank of the structure. The location had been selected on seismograph evidence which indicated a saddle between the Burghan Field and the Neutral Zone. Mr. Stevens stated that a second seismograph crew would be dispatched to the Zone immediately and believed that the second test well had already spudded in. It was considered likely that the location would be as close to the Burghan Field as possible. Mr. Stevens stated that Pacific Western Oil Company had been originally in favor of sinking the first well near the Saudi Arabian boundary. (2) Mr. Stevens said that the Kuwait Oil Company was protesting Aminoil’s concession covering the islands Kubbar, Maradim, and Qaru. Under the terms of Aminoil concession the former Sheikh of Kuwait made the concession contingent upon the absence of previous claims. Both Kuwait Oil Company and Aminoil had already nominated legal counsel to represent them in this arbitration. They were now trying to agree on the third man; the trio would be charged with settling the issue. Mr. Stevens felt that the company should never have been forced to name the Kuwait Oil Company in the following article in their island concession: “The rights and duties established by the Agreement shall cease and terminate with respect to the defined area or any part thereof in the event that through arbitration proceedings duly instituted under the terms of the Agreement of December 23, 1934 by the Sheikh of Kuwait and the Kuwait Oil Company Limited it should be decided pursuant to the provisions of Article 18 ( c ) thereof that the said Kuwait Oil Company Limited has a prior right to search for, develop and exploit the petroleum resources of the defined area or any part thereof.” Aminoil had originally been told by the British Foreign Office that no special Article stating Kuwait Oil Company previous claims would be required. (3) Mr. Stevens stated that Aminoil, like Aramco, recognized and was urging the adoption of six-mile territorial waters for the Neutral Zone and the Kuwait Islands. Mr. Stevens said, that, since 12 miles had been claimed elsewhere in the Persian Gulf, fewer complications would result if the Neutral Zone followed these precedents. Mr. Stevens, however, intimated that the phraseology of the Saudi Arabian proclamation on territorial waters and submerged areas made the decree inapplicable to the Neutral Zone. Mr. Stevens conceded that the submerged area off the Neutral Zone was still open for concession but he had no indication that either the Sheikh of Kuwait or King Ibn Saud or any other oil companies were actively interested in this area. (4) The British asked local Aminoil representatives for their views on the delineation of the Kuwait Neutral Zone northern boundary. Mr. Stevens stated that the British withdrew the request when told it would have to be forwarded to San Francisco offices. Mr. Stevens stated that Aminoil was confident that they could prove the location of the boundary within one-quarter mile. This was of particular interest in that this boundary might bisect one of the greatest oil fields in the world and consequently determine the division of ownership of vast oil resources. Mr. Stevens mentioned, however, that the British felt that Aminoil should not operate nearer than two miles south of Qurain Hill. This advice had not been followed by the company and no protest had been received. He felt that the key to demarkation lay in Qurain Hill specifically mentioned and shown in the treaty of Oqair documents. Since Qurain Hill was an easily identified feature, Mr. Stevens felt that the boundary could be easily established. Mr. Stevens stated that he has seen this original map in the London offices of the Royal Geographic Society. (5) The British also asked Aminoil for the terms of their operating agreement with Pacific Western Oil Company. The terms were not divulged. Mr. Stevens was asked why the British were particularly interested in this agreement since the same request had been made to the Department. Mr. Stevens stated that the British attributed their interest to Sheikh of Kuwait’s administrative responsibilities in the Zone. There seemed some indication in Mr. Stevens mind that the British, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of Oqair, might be interested in arranging with the Saudi Arabian Government a division of the Neutral Zone. Mr. Stevens inquired if the Department had any indication that SAG–British talks were proceeding on these issues. He was told that the British Government was reportedly ready to submit their views on the boundary to the Saudi Arabian Government. (6) Mr. Stevens discussed the application of the British treaty rights in Kuwait to the Neutral Zone. He felt that the company could make a strong case that the Sheikh’s Neutral Zone rights were not covered by these Orders of Council but that it might be to the company interest not to press the point. Mr. Stevens felt that advantages to the company would be gained if British law prevailed and the Sheikh’s rights were protected in any controversy with the Saudi Arabian Government by the weight of the British. Mr. Stevens was interested in the Department’s views on this point. Mr. Stevens was also interested in progress on establishing a Consulate in Kuwait. He assumed that the authority of the Consulate would also cover the Sheikh’s interest in the Neutral Zone. He urged the utmost speed on this issue. (7) Mr. Stevens mentioned that the first indication of jurisdictional troubles had arisen over the passports of the Aminoil drilling contractor, Webb-McGhee. Pacific Western representative, George Getty, had raised the question as to whether the Aminoil contractors should not have Saudi Arabian visas as well as Kuwait visas in the Neutral Zone. Entry of the contractors was thereby delayed for several weeks until Aminoil’s Arab representative went to Cairo and resolved the difficulty with Sheikh Abdullah, SAG Minister of Finance. Sheikh Abdullah had apparently been annoyed that this issue had been raised with Tewfik, PWOC Egyptian legal counsel, instead of with him, but thanks to the able efforts of the Aminoil representative finally waived the necessity for Saudi Arab visas. Mr. Stevens felt that although George Getty was of exceptional intelligence and ability his inexperience was proving a handicap to Neutral Zone operations. (8) Mr. Stevens mentioned that the Saudi Arabian Government was already raising customs issues and was expected to inject itself farther into the administration of the Zone. The former Sheikh of Kuwait was particularly desirous that Aminoil not identify itself in any way with the Pacific Western Oil Company since he had feared that it would put the company under increasing control of Saudi Arabian administration, law, etc. Aminoil explained that their working arrangement with Pacific Western had only been made for practical purposes and that the sovereignty of the Sheikh over the Neutral Zone was in no way impaired. Mr. Stevens added that as long as Mr. MacPherson was in charge of Neutral Zone operations no trouble with King Ibn Saud would be possible. (9) Mr. Stevens gave the Department biographical information on the new Sheikh of Kuwait which will be forwarded under separate cover. (10) Mr. Stevens stated that Aramco should have no reason to complain of Aminoil high royalty rate since if Aramco had been willing to tip their hand on their relinquishment of the Neutral Zone, Aminoil could have obtained the concession at much lower royalty rate before bidding was opened to all comers. Mr. Stevens felt some bitterness toward Max Thornburg, former Petroleum Adviser to the Secretary of State, since Thornburg had accompanied the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to Kuwait in the Shell Oil Company attempt to get the concession away from Aminoil three hours after bidding had been closed. (11) Mr. Stevens reported that Cable and Wireless had complained that Aminoil communications were shortcutting their monopoly. Aminoil can send messages through RCA at 35¢ per word whereas Cable and Wireless charges 85¢. I told Mr. Stevens that the Department did not favor monopolies in this field but that the Aminoil concession appeared to clearly grant the company the right to conduct its own communications; therefore if Aminoil facilities were used solely for company business the problem appeared to be a case of conflict between the terms of the concession and the terms of the Cable and Wireless monopoly. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Labouisse) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Hare) McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [Document 14] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs ( Labouisse ) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( Hare ) confidential [ Washington ,] March 3, 1950. Subject: US–UK petroleum talks As I believe you know, during the course of our discussions with the British on petroleum matters we have taken the position that US political and strategic considerations are involved, and that consequently the British should not govern their actions with respect to US companies solely on “dollars and cents” grounds. Representatives of NEA, as well as from the Departments of Defense and Interior, have urged this line, and I have tried my best to employ it during the discussions. The main difficulty with this line of approach is that the US could presumably maintain its overseas production at higher levels if we were to import petroleum into this country in substantial quantities. It is therefore difficult to persuade the British that it is the action of the British which is threatening our overseas concessions. I have discussed this matter from time to time in the past with representatives of NEA including Mr. Funkhouser and Mr. Deimel, pointing out the importance of our being able to support our position. We are now faced with the necessity of doing that for the British have expressly requested us to “analyze the alleged damage to the concession interests of US oil companies and to US strategic and political interests, distinguishing between that attributable to actions of HMG and to other causes such as the general dollar shortage”. I have said to the British that I did not believe it would be possible to make any more distinction between British action and other causes. Such questions as the relative rates of production in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq are involved, and it is hard to fix any precise action as to the entire cause. Nevertheless, it is important that we prepare as strong a paper as possible on this point. I hope that NEA can prepare a memo on the Middle Eastern aspects of the situation by next Thursday, March 9. 2 2 For the reply, see the memorandum of March 15, infra . Memorandum by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) and Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Same Office McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [Document 15] Memorandum by the Acting Deputy Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Wilkins ) and Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Same Office 1 secret [ Washington ,] March 15, 1950. The basic British and American interest in the Near East is indivisible. Both the United States and the United Kingdom desire the economic improvement of the area and further political development on which stability is based. It is in the interest of the United States and the United Kingdom that such stability should continue. The British have hitherto made it clear that they wish the United States to lend a helping hand in achieving these objectives and have stated that Saudi Arabia presents a fertile field for coordinated United States–United Kingdom action in the Near East. The economic stability of Saudi Arabia is directly determined by the rate of development of Saudi Arabian oil resources. Oil is the economy of Saudi Arabia. During recent years royalty payments arising from oil production have increased Saudi Arabian income from approximately $20,000,000 to $80,000,000 a year. Major economic improvements such as harbor facilities, roads, railroads, and agricultural developments have taken place. It would be impossible to expect that Saudi Arabia could without extremely severe dislocations find its former standards acceptable. American oil companies have invested approximately $390,000,000 in Saudi Arabian concessions and they employ approximately 5000 Americans in the field. This expenditure and this personnel, aside from fulfilling valuable commercial functions which warrant the support of the United States Government, Resent an effective weapon against the advance of Communism in backward areas by providing; even the lowest levels of local society with a livelihood, with programs for health, education and sanitation and with a picture of the democratic way of life. Reduction of such United States investments would jeopardize the success of that part of the proposed United States Government’s Point Four Program which is directed towards inducing private capital to move into economically undeveloped areas. The economic health of Saudi Arabia makes possible continued political stability in that country. The political stability of Saudi Arabia is not only important in itself but is indivisible with the stability of the Near East as a whole. Saudi Arabia has consistently exerted stabilizing and pro-Western influence in the area. During the Palestine War Saudi Arabia provided an important moderating influence on the other Arab States. The United States Government considers Saudi Arabia a strategically located state and desires to maintain the close ties of friendship which characterize relations between the two countries. During World War II Saudi Arabia was a valuable ally to the Western Powers. Strategically located at the land, sea and air crossroads of Eurasia, south of the heart of Russia, it houses at Dhahran the most important United States military air base in the area. If this strategically located country is to fulfill its role as an outstanding stabilizing influence in the Near East in time of peace and as a sympathetic ally in time of war, it must have not only the ability but also the willingness to fulfill that role. This ability is adversely affected if the political and economic stability within Saudia Arabia is impaired, while its willingness to fulfill this role is jeopardized if actions of the Western Powers are damaging to Saudi Arabia, particularly if these same actions concurrently give profit to Saudi Arabia’s neighbors. The United Kingdom decision to substitute British-owned oil for United States company oil in the sterling area as well as other United Kingdom currency and trade restrictions affecting United States company oil have forced a serious cutback of Saudi Arabian oil production while oil development in Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran has advanced. More serious cutbacks are threatened. Saudi Arabian oil production is approximately 200,000 barrels per day below production schedules formulated last year, and 100,000 barrels per day below production one year ago. Another cutback of 100,000 barrels per day is anticipated. There has thus been set in motion reactions which not only place in jeopardy the stability of Saudi Arabia but will also, if unchecked, work to the detriment of general economic, political and strategic interests in the Near East area which are of mutual importance to both the United States and the United Kingdom. 1 The source text was a revised draft of a memorandum prepared for presentation to the British. It was attached to a memorandum from Hare to Labouisse dated March 15 which suggested that if it were handed to the British, it should be given the most informal treatment. Earlier drafts of the source text, dated March 6, 8, 9, and 11, are in Department of State file 780.022. Memorandum by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) and to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) 786A.022/4–2450 [Document 16] Memorandum by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) and to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Berry ) confidential [ Washington ,] April 24, 1950. Subject: April 25 Meeting with Aramco on Saudi Arabian Boundary Problems. Mr. Duce of Aramco has proposed a meeting in the Department at which Aramco officers, their international law advisor, Judge Manley O. Hudson, and officers of the Department might discuss the following subjects: (1) British attitude on jurisdiction over the island of Farsi; (2) British attitude toward the desire of the Saudi Arabian Government to deal directly with the Rulers of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms; (3) British attitude toward Qatar and Trucial Oman boundaries of Saudi Arabia. The meeting is scheduled from 11:00 a. m. to 1:00 p. m. on April 25, 1950 in Room 2180 New State. It is expected that Mr. Berry will chair the meeting and that Mr. McGhee and Mr. Hare 1 will join the group about 12 o’clock. A brief memorandum containing background information on the three subjects proposed for discussion has been prepared for distribution to the Departmental officers participating in the talks for their information only (Tab A). The Department’s attitude toward the jurisdictional disputes of Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf is set forth in the paper on this problem prepared for the London Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (Tab B). While carefully refraining from taking sides in the dispute or otherwise becoming embroiled, we have consistently urged upon both sides the need to settle these boundary issues promptly and amicably (before the discovery of oil in the area can complicate the problem further). In the conduct of the meeting, it is recommended that the Departmental officers: (1) welcome an exposition by the Aramco representatives of the problems involved and of the company’s views on them; (2) engage in an informal discussion of the problems with the company’s representatives; (3) adhere to our previously expressed position that we urge the early and amicable settlement of the boundary issues by the two parties, while avoiding any statement or commitment which could be interpreted as involving the Department in the dispute or as taking sides on the issues. The Chairman, in his discretion, may wish to advise the Aramco representatives informally along the lines of certain of our recommendations on this problem prepared for our Delegation to the London Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, such as: (1) that a stalemate in the Persian Gulf area is not conducive to its orderly development and tranquility, and that the recent settlement of the Abu Dhabi–Dubai boundary by arbitral award sets an admirable example. (2) that as stated previously, a fact-finding investigating commission agreeable to the two governments might be able to reduce the field of differences between the Saudi Arabian Government and the United Kingdom acting on behalf of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. (3) suggest that, as previously stated, any remaining differences in the boundary problem might be resolved by means of a neutral commission of arbitration. (4) that we will continue to urge both the United Kingdom and the Saudi Arabian Government to move toward settlement. [Tab A] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Berry ) to the Officers Concerned With Persian Gulf Boundary Problems confidential [ Washington ,] April 20, 1950. Subject: Saudi Arabian Territorial Disputes. Mr. Duce of Aramco has proposed a meeting in the Department at which Aramco officers, their international law adviser Judge Manley O. Hudson, and officers of the Department might discuss the following subjects: 1) British attitude on jurisdiction over the island of Farsi. 2) British attitude toward the desire of the Saudi Arabian Government to deal directly with the Rulers of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. 3) British attitude toward Qatar and Trucial Oman boundaries of Saudi Arabia. The meeting is scheduled from 11:00 a. m. to 1:00 p. m. on April 25, 1950 in Room 2180 New State, The meeting will be chaired by Mr. Burton Berry and it is anticipated that Mr. McGhee and Mr. Hare will join the group at noon. After the meeting the participants are invited to a luncheon as guests of Aramco. The following information is offered for briefing on the three subjects to be discussed: (1) The island of Farsi lies about midway across the Persian Gulf from the northeast coast of Saudi Arabia. It is one of a group of five islands (Harkus, Karan, Kurain, Arabi and Farsi), which are claimed by the United Kingdom for Kuwait. Saudi Arabia also claims it, and so does Iran. Farsi is uninhabited. Its value lies in the fact that jurisdiction over it will advance the seabed rights of the owner state, and the sub-seabed is a potential source of petroleum. In order to substantiate its claim to Farsi, the Saudi Arabian Government erected a marker on the island last November. The British Government in behalf of Kuwait, has requested the Saudi Arabian Government to remove the marker, or the United Kingdom will do so unless the Saudi Arabian basis for its claim is submitted. The Saudi Arabian Government has replied that it would be glad to discuss all boundary disputes with the United Kingdom whenever it is ready to do so. (2) The Saudi Arabian Government has made claims to territories in the southeastern part of the Peninsula which lie in the hinterland of the Trucial Coast and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. It has offered to discuss with the United Kingdom the conflicting territorial claims between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial Sheikhdoms, but it stated that it preferred to discuss directly with the minor independent Sheikhs of the Buraimi area its boundary problems with them. The Saudi Arabian Government took the same position in regard to its boundary problems with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. This position was taken in view of the fact that the United Kingdom did not have the special treaty relations with Muscat and Oman that it enjoyed with the other Persian Gulf principalities. The Saudi Arabian Government position was correct in that the United Kingdom does not have the treaty right to control the foreign relations of the Sultanate, but the United Kingdom has recently received from the Sultan authority to negotiate in his behalf the boundary dispute with Saudi Arabia. The British Government considers the Saudi Arabian attitude “impertinent” and appears to attribute the desire of the Saudi Arabian Government to deal with the Sultan directly as indicative of a similar intent to do likewise with Rulers of the Sheikhdoms. There is no evidence of such an intent in the Saudi Arabian Government note, except for its claim that the Sheikhs of the Buraimi area are not under British jurisdiction. The King did address a letter directly to the Sheikh of Bahrein in November of last year when the jurisdiction over Abu Saafa shoals came into dispute, and another one to the Sheikh of Kuwait over the conflicting claims to the island of Arabi. Both letters suggested direct negotiation of all territorial disputes. (3) The boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and Abu Dhabi (one of the Trucial Sheikhdoms) date back to the 1913–14: inconclusive negotiations between the United Kingdom and Turkey. Negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom took place in 1934 and again in 1937–38, but both failed to reach agreement. The disputed areas are little known and have importance now only because of their potential sub-soil resources. The governments concerned and their concessionary oil companies, whose concessions follow national boundaries, are of course eager to advance territorial claims as far as possible and negotiations were begun last year between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia to settle the Saudi Arabian-Qatar and Abu Dhabi boundaries. Conversations were desultory until the Saudi Arabian Government set forth claims going somewhat further than had previously been considered. In effect these claims included a good part of the southern Qatar Peninsula and a long sweep of coast between Qatar and the Trucial Coast which the United Kingdom considers to be Abu Dhabi’s. The British reply was a threat to return to the old 1913–14 line drawn during the United Kingdom–Turkish negotiations. This line is at least as extreme as the United Kingdom considers the Saudi position to be. The Saudi Arabian Government rejected that basis for negotiation and offered to undertake a joint study of the facts, but the United Kingdom has not replied. No further progress has therefore been made. [Tab B] Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the London Foreign Ministers Meeting in May restricted [ Washington ,] April 20, 1950. Jurisdictional Dispute of Saudi Arabia problem To persuade the British Government, acting on behalf of the Sheikhdoms of Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, and Trucial Oman, and of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, of the desirability of progress in the settlement of boundary issues in eastern Arabia and of conflicting claims to islands and adjacent sea-bed areas in the Persian Gulf. background Saudi Arabia has land boundary disputes with the Sheikhdoms of Qatar and Abu Dhabi. A large area in the southeastern corner of the Peninsula has never been delimited between Saudi Arabia, some of the Trucial Sheikhdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The unratified Anglo–Turkish Convention of 1913–14 had delineated the area between Nejd (eastern region of Saudia Arabia) and the coastal area under British protection. In 1934, and again in 1937–38, negotiations were entered into between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom in which compromise proposals by both sides suggested a frontier to the east of the 1913–14 line. This compromise proved unacceptable. In 1949 conversations on the subject were renewed. Potential oil resources in the area had, however, prompted Saudi Arabia to extend its claims into the Qatar Peninsula, and to large areas of the hinterland of Trucial Oman. In view of this extreme claim, the United Kingdom has threatened to return to the 1913–14 line as a basis of negotiation. Although the Saudi Arabian Government has been unwilling to accept this line as a basis for negotiation, it has suggested the creation of an investigating commission to determine the facts. Thus far the U.K. has not replied. Saudi Arabia claims 18 islands in the Persian Gulf. Of these, the U.K. claims 5 for Kuwait (Harkus, Karan, Kurani, Arabi and Farsi). In addition to these claims, Iran asserts sovereignty to one of them (Farsi) and the island lying between Saudi Arabia and Qatar may be claimed by the latter (Anaibar). Furthermore, if Saudi Arabia is able to establish its claim to the coastal areas between Qatar and Abu Dhabi, other islands lying off these coasts may be involved (Natta, Ghara, Kafai, Makhasib, and Shuraveh). The Saudi Arabian Government began erecting markers on the above-mentioned 18 islands last November in order to substantiate its claim to them. The British Government took issue with Saudi Arabia over the marker on Farsi Island and has asked that it be removed or that Saudi Arabia submit the basis for its claim to Farsi. The Saudi Arabian Government has replied that it would be glad to discuss all boundary disputes with the U.K. whenever the latter is ready to do so. Thus far the British Government has not accepted this offer. discussion The United States is involved in this general question because of the substantial American investment in Saudi Arabia through Aramco on the one hand, and the similar American investment in the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms through Bapco, IPC, Superior, and Kuoco on the other. The potential value of untapped petroleum in the areas under dispute has focused attention upon them by claimant governments and by rival concessionary oil companies. The U.S. believes that claims can best be settled before oil is discovered and has endeavored to impress upon both sides the desirability of early settlement. During recent weeks British Foreign Office spokesmen have indicated that the U.K. was content to let the boundary question drift and have even suggested that American and British oil companies could work out a practical arrangement as to units of concessions without reference to the governments concerned. We do not believe that this thorny problem should be handled in this way because such practical arrangements, even if desirable, would not be binding on either the concessionary companies or the governments of the areas in which the concessions are situated. The U.S. has pursued a policy of strict impartiality on these boundary questions. It has at the same time, as occasion warranted, urged both the U.K. and the Saudi Arabian Government to adopt a conciliatory attitude and to make strenuous efforts to reach a settlement through utilization of investigating commissions and, if necessary, by means of a neutral commission of arbitration. An early settlement would, in addition, reap rich dividends in the attitude of King Ibn Saud toward the British. During the past few years the King has become convinced that the British are endeavoring to encircle him through their control of the Hashemites of Iraq and Jordan and through their special treaty relationships with the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. It may, therefore, be seen that an amicable arrangement regarding boundaries would remove an irritating factor In U.K.–SAG relationships. recommendations 1. The Delegation should point out to the British Delegation that the U.K. threat to return to the 1913–14 proposed line of demarcation appears as extreme as the Saudi Arabian claim. 2. The Delegation should suggest to the British Delegation that a stalemate in the Persian Gulf area is not conducive to its orderly development and tranquility, and that the recent settlement of the Abu Dhabi-Dubai boundary by arbitral award sets an admirable example. 3. The Delegation should suggest that a fact-finding investigating commission agreeable to the two governments might be able to reduce the field of differences between the Saudi Arabian Government and the United Kingdom acting on behalf of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. 4. The Delegation should also suggest that any remaining differences in the boundary problem might be resolved by means of a neutral commission of arbitration. 1 Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Francis E. Meloy of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 886A.2553/4–2550 [Document 17] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Francis E. Meloy of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 1 confidential [ Washington ,] April 25, 1950. Subject: Conference with Aramco Officials and Judge Manley O. Hudson on Saudi Arabian-UK Boundary Disputes. Participants: Mr. Burton Y. Berry—ANE (Chairman) 2 Judge Manley O. Hudson—International Law Counselor for Aramco. Mr. Richard Young—Ass’t to Judge Hudson Mr. James Terry Duce—Vice President, Aramco Mr. George W. Ray—General Counsel, Aramco Mr. John Noble, Jr.—Ass’t General Counsel, Aramco NEA—Messrs. George C McGhee    Raymond Hare attended part of meeting. L/P—Mr. William R. Vallance OIR/GE—Mr. Boggs LP—Messrs. Snow Sweeney L/E—Mr. Wallace DRN—Dr. Sethian BNA—Mr. Ranney U/FW—Mr. Taylor ANE—Messrs. Wilkins Funkhouser Meloy Problem: The meeting was proposed by Aramco in order that Aramco officers and their international law adviser, Judge Manley O. Hudson, might discuss with officials of the Department the following subjects: (1) British attitude on jurisdiction over the Island of Farsi; (2) British attitude toward the desire of the Saudi Arabian Government to deal directly with the Rulers of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms; (3) British attitude toward Qatar and Trucial Oman boundaries of Saudi Arabia. Summary: Mr. Berry opened the meeting by welcoming the visitors and briefly sketched the background of the points which Aramco had proposed for discussion. He indicated that we were currently thinking that our delegation to the London Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 3 may: (1) Point out to the British delegation that the UK threat to return to the 1913–1914 proposed line of demarkation appeared as extreme as the Saudi Arabian claim. (2) Suggest that a stalemate in the Persian Gulf area is not conducive to the region’s orderly development and tranquility, whereas the recent settlement of the Abu Dhabi-Dubai boundary by arbitral award sets an admirable example of progress. (3) Suggest that a fact-finding investigating commission, agreeable to the two governments, might be able to reduce the field of differences between the Saudi Arabian Government and the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. (4) Suggest that any remaining differences in the boundary problem might be resolved by means of a neutral commission of arbitration. (5) Suggest, in a tentative and exploratory manner, that it would be profitable if there were direct contact between Ibn Saud and the Rulers of the various Sheikhdoms with the British playing an appropriate advisory role. Mr. George Ray opened his remarks by stating that he had recently returned from a visit to Saudi Arabia. He recalled that in the January 31, 1950 meeting between Aramco and Departmental officers to discuss Persian Gulf boundary problems, the question had arisen as to what the United States Government could do to assist in the early settlement of the dispute. Mr. Ray said that he proceeded from the basic premise that we all wanted British power in the Middle East to be preserved but preserved with respect. He stated that the British are delaying and that British prestige is suffering from their own conduct. For example, he felt that the British were resorting to bullying tactics, as in their threat to tear down the Saudi Arabian marker on the Island of Farsi. Mr. Ray said that through British instigation we may have been getting the idea that the Arabs are “over reaching”, particularly in the southeast. Aramco has made a thorough investigation and Mr. Ray believes that the Saudi Arabian claims are justified. Saudi Arabian Government officials want the United States to persuade the UK to allow direct negotiation. Mr. Ray said that the Saudi Arabs make two points: (1) They are prepared to be generous; (2) Direct negotiations would bring quick settlement (They believe that negotiations through the British bring only insults and impede settlement). The British claim Farsi for Kuwait on the basis of a light placed there by the Persian Gulf Lighting Service which operates throughout the Gulf. Mr. Ray said that the Sheikh of Kuwait in reality had nothing to do with placing the light on Farsi. The British, he believes, have not set forth their full case for Farsi. Mr. Ray stressed his belief that the British are building up a case against themselves by forbidding direct negotiations. He stated that Aramco had been asked by the Saudi Arabians to ask the US Government to intervene with the UK to permit direct negotiation. Aramco is now doing so because the Company believes in the good effects of this procedure. He summarized by saying that Aramco wants the Saudi Arabians given a chance to show what they can do with direct negotiations. Aramco wants the US Government to “get in and fight” for this. In concluding Mr. Ray added that before leaving New York he had just learned that the British had sent two notes to the Saudi Arabian Government. The first promised settlement of the sub-sea boundaries between Bahrein and Saudi Arabia, and urged restraint meanwhile. The second note wanted the Saudi Arabian Government to submit its claim to the island of Farsi and Arabi. Judge Hudson said that previous knowledge of this area has been almost completely from British sources, and that the British disclose what they want to. Larimer’s Gazetteer printed in 1908, for example, and containing much information on the area has never been made available to the public. Judge Hudson said that Aramco has made studies and given information at the request of the Saudi Arabian Government. Judge Hudson, himself, has given his opinions impartially. Aramco, he said, has no desire for aggrandizement, but it is required by the terms of its concession contract to use “due diligence”. Judge Hudson said that there have been several incidents in the Saudi–UK boundary controversies. The first was the Stobart incident, which occurred about one year ago near Suffuk Wells where Aramco withdrew at the British request. The second incident occurred last October at Fasht Abu-Sa’afa, where Bapco was operating. The third incident was that of Farsi Island, where markers were put up. Judge Hudson indicated that he would like to review some of the problems connected with the boundary disputes. In regard to Kuwait, the question was that of creating a boundary, not of determining one already existing. The British return frequently to the Anglo–Turkish Convention of 1913 which was never ratified by the British. The object of the Convention was to prevent a railroad terminus on the Gulf that was not British controlled. It dealt mostly with Kuwait, which Turkey wanted to keep. At the time of the Convention Ibn Saud had already thrown the Turks out of Hasa. The Convention created the Neutral Zone. At the Neutral Zone Saudi Arabia would like to have a boundary in the marginal sea. Aramco, however, has made no recommendation to the Saudi Arabian Government on this. The western boundary of the Neutral Zone, on the other hand, is a rocky projection which covers a large area and it is difficult to decide just where a line should be drawn. There is uncertainty as to the northern boundary of the Neutral Zone, that with Kuwait itself. From where do you measure? In regard to the islands in dispute between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Judge Hudson related that the British first said that “some or all are understood to be claimed by Kuwait”. They later said that Farsi belongs to Kuwait. Judge Hudson says, “why bring Kuwait so far”? Many of the islands are very near Saudi Arabia. Why do the British back Kuwait? There is no reason to claim them for Kuwait. Farsi was not included as belonging to Kuwait in the 1913 Anglo Turkish Convention. Judge Hudson expressed his opinion that in claiming these islands Saudi Arabia is not over reaching itself. Concerning the boundary dispute with Bahrein, Judge Hudson listed the following points: (1) Saudi Arabia needs a water boundary between the islands and the mainland. The water is very shallow, and there are some small bird islands. Both of the principal small islands should not go to Bahrein; (2) Saudi Arabia needs a boundary in the north, where Fasht al Juri and Fasht Abu Sa’af a are concerned; (3) Saudi Arabia needs a water boundary in Salwa Bay. In this area Anabar Island was recently marked by Saudi Arabia. The boundary here depends on the land boundary with Qatar. Judge Hudson claimed that “everybody admits that the boundary should not be at the bottom of the Peninsula, but should be up a way—which would give Anabar Island to Saudi Arabia”. It could be that Saudi Arabia would receive the whole of Salwa Bay or the Bay could be divided. Turning to the question of Qatar, Judge Hudson stated that there is an urgent need for a land boundary between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. There is a very sparse population in the Qatar Peninsula. The Sheikh of Qatar has very limited control. His authority extends to the area just around Doha. The only other permanent settlement is at Sikak, back on the mainland. For a long distance along the coast toward Abu Dhabi, there are no permanent inhabitants. The area is occupied mostly by the Murra and Manasir tribes. At the base of the Peninsula the area is a potentially profitable one for oil exploration by Aramco and Petroleum Development Ltd. (Qatar). Examining the problem of the Trucial Coast, Judge Hudson stated that the shore line is not definitively marked in any way and that it runs out under water. There are no ports of consequence. The Saudi Arabian Government on the basis of taxes and the allegiance of the tribes has made a claim. The British, Judge Hudson added, might say that the claim goes far. However, in the Judge’s opinion, George Rentz’s investigation makes a strong basis for the Saudi Arabian claims. Abu Dhabi, said Judge Hudson, is a skeleton of a government, and little more. The Judge said that Ibn Saud can be trusted to keep the peace. The Saudi Arabian Government has demonstrated its ability to rule this area. It collects taxes, even around Buraimi. The British peace has been useful, but it is no longer needed. Why do the British keep the one great power in this area from dealing directly with the local people? Judge Hudson emphasized the following points: (1) The Saudi Arabian Government is prepared to sustain its own claim on the basis of new information now available through non-British sources. (2) The Saudi Arabian Government is not over-reaching, despite the British repetition that they are. The Saudi claim is on the basis of tribal relationship and taxes. (3) The Saudi Arabian Government is convinced that it could reach agreements with the local Rulers. The Saudi Arabian Government could easily reach a modus vivendi and a definitive settlement at once with the local Rulers by direct negotiation. Judge Hudson said that Saudi Arabia has acute boundary problems with Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and Abu Dhabi. The British assume a general overlordship over all four. They do not suppress local customs or make colonies of them. They do wish to boss the external relations of these Sheikhdoms. The United Kingdom is exercising its dominance without any admitted international authority. The British are using their dominance to serve their own ends, namely: (1) to control Middle East oil, and (2) to maintain a 19th century imperialist system. In respect to the control of oil, the British have impressed on these states the obligation to grant no oil concession without British approval. To go into Bahrein United States interests had to form a Canadian Company under British economic and political control. In Kuwait, United States interests were allowed to have 50% of the company. In order to go into these areas at all United States interests had to be subject to British control. Judge Hudson reiterated that the British acted in their own interests. In his view, there are no signs of relaxation of British control. Judge Hudson suggested that long range British policy might be based on more democratic principles—on gradual change—to avoid a violent debacle later to the British position. The United States should urge the British to adopt a more democratic policy in this region—a policy which will save the British themselves. The Saudi Arabian Government is now most willing to continue negotiations and get on with the British. The British, however, do not recognize or realize that Saudi Arabia is a strong independent country. They treat it as they would the Sheikhdom of Qatar. Arab dissatisfaction with the British desire to dominate could be assuaged by the British letting them negotiate directly. With regard to the possibility of a neutral investigating committee, Judge Hudson stated his belief that if the Saudi Arabian Government could be given some confidence in such an arrangement, and if the British would abandon their 19th century imperialism, agreement could be reached. Mr. Ray interposed to say that on the basis of his recent visit in Saudi Arabia, he is convinced that the Saudis want a chance to reach agreement. Direct negotiations would be good for the United States, the United Kingdom and everybody. Otherwise, there will be bitterness and resentment. Mr. Vallance asked if Judge Hudson would express his ideas on an investigating committee. Judge Hudson replied that it would be no good if the committee dealt only with the British acting for the local Rulers. Mr. Berry summarized the points made in the discussion. He stated that from the discussion it would appear that: (1) We are agreed that the British should maintain their position; (2) The present UK attitude is not maintaining it; (3) There is need to facilitate a solution. Mr. McGhee asked Mr. Duce whether, in his opinion, it was more important to the British to control the oil resources of the area or to maintain their position there. Mr. Duce replied that he believed that the British were more interested in preserving their position in the Persian Gulf, with a view especially to the preservation of their interests in the north. Mr. McGhee then stated that it would appear desirable in order to facilitate a solution of the disputes that some formula be reached which would preserve the outward forms of the British special treaty position while at the same time allowing direct negotiation between King Ibn Saud and the local Rulers. He felt it possible that direct talks might take place with the British sitting in and perhaps advising the local Rulers, with the right of review of, and even a possible veto over, the final position of the local Rulers. The Aramco officials indicated that they could perceive no major objection to such an arrangement. 1 Despatch 347 from Jidda, June 12, p. 53 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 21 ] , transmitted the Embassy’s comments on this meeting. 2 Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs. 3 For documentation concerning the London Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in May 1950, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [Document 18] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] April 25, 1950. Subject: IPC Developments Participants: Mr. Charles Harding, Director of Socony Vacuum NEA—Assistant Secretary McGhee ANE—Mr. Berry ANE—Mr. Clark ANE—Mr. Funkhouser PED—Mr. Moline Problem: IPC is concerned with their relations with Iraq and plans to increase royalties by 50%. The AIOC partner wants to make any royalty increase contingent on Iraqi agreement to reopen the Haifa pipeline; the French partner desires to pay increased royalties only in paper currency or in kind. The company will press for unitization of the three separate Iraqi concessions. The company will postpone decision to transfer or divert Haifa pipe and/or equipment until the end of the year. Mr. Harding stated that the Iraq Petroleum Company had been asked by the Iraq Government to revise the royalty terms of the IPC concessions and asked that negotiators be sent to Baghdad immediately. At the IPC Board Meeting in London, from which Mr. Harding just returned, it was decided to comply with this request. Mr. Wheatley and Mr. Gibson were proceeding to Baghdad for this purpose. No American negotiator would participate in these discussions. Mr. Harding stated that American partners were in favor of meeting Iraqi demands for an increase in royalties from four to six shillings gold per ton, approximately 34¢ per barrel, since this was the average level of royalties in the area. British and French partners similarly favored an increase in royalties but only under certain conditions. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was insisting that the increase be made contingent upon Iraqi agreement to reopen the Haifa pipeline. Other partners in IPC felt that this quid pro quo was unrealistic at this time. The French Company wished to make any increase in royalties payable in crude oil or in paper currency. They feared that the price of gold might appreciate considerably over the future to the detriment of oil companies paying royalties based on gold. The negotiators were instructed to seek agreement on these points but were given authority to use their own judgment in finding a compromise in Baghdad. The company in these negotiations will endeavor to unite the three separate concessions. The company feels that in view of the 20% free crude provisions given the Iraq Government in the Mosul and Basra concessions these two concessions will only be developed to the minimum extent allowed under the contracts. They believe it is to the advantage of both company and Iraq Government to make the terms of all concessions similar so that the most economic development can be effected. IPC tried during 1949 negotiations to get the Iraq Government to agree to the removal of the 20% free crude oil provisions in the Basra and Mosul concessions. This proved impossible and Mr. Harding stated that the company was now going to suggest that the 20% provision remain for the first million tons of oil produced from both concessions as written in the two contracts. However, IPC now will propose to pay the Iraq Government an increased royalty without the 20% crude oil for production above this minimum one million tons per year production on each concession. Mr. Harding stated that in this way the company would be able to increase production from Kirkuk and develop Basra rather than attempt to expand production from the meager discoveries of the Mosul concession, All partners desire the earliest reopening of the two southern Haifa pipelines. However, they recognize the difficulties in trying to persuade the Iraqi to make any concessions on this subject at this time. In order to postpone action on this matter until the end of the year, they have decided on the following procedure. The company will proceed full speed with the 30-inch pipeline to Banias, Syria. By completing the 30-inch line through Syrian territory and by joining it to the northern end of the two inoperative pipelines to Haifa, the company will be able to increase production by 100,000 barrels a day by January 1, 1952. By putting the 30-inch pipeline on stream ahead of schedule, French needs for crude and Iraqi needs for increased revenue can be satisfied. By the end of the year it may be that some solution will have been found to the Haifa pipeline problem. If not the company will make the decision as to whether to transfer pump station equipment from the southern Haifa lines to the new 30-inch line or whether to divert the southern lines to an Arab port. The company feels that to divert the Haifa lines at this time would require from 18 months to two years and would slow down progress on early completion of the new big inch line. Mr. Harding stated that both Mr. Gibson and Mr. Wheatley are of the opinion that it is impossible to discuss the reopening of the Haifa pipeline at this time. According to Mr. Harding, the company was concerned with the report that the proposed route for a diversionary pipeline, which would come within three miles of the northern tip of Israel, was within an area currently being bought up from Arab landowners by the Israelis. The Department had no knowledge of any such development. Mr. Harding stated that the company had important problems outstanding in Syria. The Syrian Government was still actively trying to collect 15 years back payments for transit fees on IPC’s pipelines to Tripoli. IPC only began paying the Syrian Government for transit rights after Tapline offered such fees in 1948. The Syrian Government feels that they have been dealt with unfairly and are insisting on retroactive payments amounting to approximately $15,000,000. The Syrian Government also is insisting upon a refinery at the Banias terminus of the IPC big inch line. The Syrian Government will receive enough crude for their domestic needs under the terms of the Tapline Convention. In addition Syria washes to minimize their dependence on the Lebanese. The company feels that to build a refinery in Syria would be to encourage Syria along the path of nationalization of the petroleum industry even though Syria would be satisfied with a small 5000 barrel per day topping plant. Mr. Harding stated that U.S. lawyers also had recommended that the American partners discourage the extension of IPC group activities into the refining field. Mr. Harding stated that the American partners were actively seeking to decrease IPC holdings wherever possible. IPC efforts to give up their concessions in Transjordan, Lebanon and Dhofar have been temporarily blocked. Mr. Gulbenkian feels that individually or collectively the IPC partners might give up valuable concessions in order to obtain these same concessions without his participation. Efforts were being made to work out an agreement which would assure Gulbenkian that his interests would be protected. Mr. Harding also stated that the American partners were urging the company to give up concessions in Israel and Syria. Although there were prospects for oil discovery in Northwest Syria, the American partners did not consider them sufficiently attractive to warrant further IPC expenditures. Mr. Harding referred to a new Lebanese problem which Socony was now facing. The Lebanese Government owed Socony approximately a half million dollars for oil imports. Socony had asked for prompt payment of this sum and payment on a current basis for any future imports of oil products. The Lebanese Government, in view of the increased capacity of the Tripoli refinery which could provide Lebanon with products sufficient for local consumption payable in Lebanese pounds, was reluctant to make available the scarce dollar exchange to pay off this debt at this time. The Lebanese Government had gone to Tapline and threatened Tapline, in which Socony owns 10%, with non-cooperation if Socony pressed this claim. Mr. McGhee thanked Mr. Harding for bringing the Department up to date on IPC developments. He further expressed the Department’s view that the history of IPC operations left much to be desired and that a situation had developed in Iraq which was of concern to the U.S. Government. Iraqi dissatisfaction with the terms and development of the IPC concessions was a source of serious instability in the area and a vulnerable target for Communist attack. Many of the company complaints the Department felt were to a considerable extent justified. Mr. McGhee mentioned specifically that production and development of Iraq concessions had proceeded much more slowly than in neighboring countries, that the Iraqi complained of few opportunities for holding important jobs with the company, that IPC progress in housing, labor relations, education, social amenities was considered the slowest in the Middle East in spite of the fact that interest in Iraq oil had been manifested earliest. Mr. Harding agreed with most of the points raised, and expressed his interest in any further information the Department could give him on this subject. He confessed that the American partners had only become actively interested in IPC in the last two years. However, Mr. Harding added that it was difficult for the two American minority partners alone to bring about progress in these fields and he expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would endeavor to gain the support of the British and French Foreign Offices for action in this matter. According to Mr. Harding it was the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the CFP, in which the British and French Governments respectively had policy control, which were the most reactionary partners in IPC. Mr. McGhee assured Mr. Harding that the Department had already discussed its views with the British and was prepared to take further action at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers Meeting. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [Document 19] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] May 11, 1950. Subject: IPC Developments Participants: Mr. C. S. Brewster, Socony-Vacuum Mr. Frank Canfield, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey NEA—Assistant Secretary McGhee ANE—Mr. Funkhouser Mr. McGhee briefly summarized the Department’s position regarding the development of Iraq oil resources. He stressed Iraqi sources of dissatisfaction as discussed with Ambassador Crocker 1 and Labor Department official Kaukonen 2 during the Assistant Secretary’s visit in Iraq and as described in the position paper prepared by the Department for the Foreign Ministers Meeting in London. The company representatives agreed that IPC was vulnerable to most of the charges described and expressed their desire to bring about as quick an improvement in the situation as they could. It was realized, of course, that the American partners only represented a minority interest in the company. Mr. McGhee stated that the Department was endeavoring to urge the British and French Governments to intercede with the other companies participating in IPC. Mr. Brewster stated that both American partners had confidence in the ability of the new Managing Director of I.P.C., Mr. Gibson. Mr. Gibson had been formerly in charge of AIOC operations in Iran and was therefore well qualified to spot many of IPC’s shortcomings. Mr. Canfield expressed his view that the American partners should recommend that a group of employee relations experts from each of the partners in IPC visit the area and make an exhaustive study of methods by which the situation in Iraq could be improved. These top company employee relations experts would have had experience in other areas and would be able to see where IPC was deficient in its Iraq operations. Mr. McGhee fully supported this approach. 1 Edward S. Crocker, 2d, Ambassador in Iraq. 2 Jorma L. Kaukonen, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 886A.2553/6–150: Airgram [Document 20] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1 confidential Washington , June 1, 1950. A–46. Terry Duce called at the Department May 24 and among other things mentioned the intent of the SAG to obtain a larger share in Aramco’s profits. He subsequently sent a copy of a cable from Dhahran dated May 21 2 giving the substance of comments on that subject by Shaikh Abdullah Suleiman. In essence, the Minister of Finance stated that the SAG knew what Aramco’s profits were since it was aware from reports that it paid 38% of its profits to the US in income tax and it also knew how much the taxes were. He appreciated that Aramco was guided by an enlightened policy of benefit to Saudi Arabia and that much of the profit was turned back into increased operations. He insisted, however, that higher payments to the SAG could be made without seriously harming the Company’s beneficial activities. Moreover, he added, the SAG has waited more than a year for a favorable answer from Aramco on this subject and it was now becoming impatient. He therefore warned that there should be no delaying tactics and asked that a yes or no answer should be given in two weeks. If a favorable answer is not forthcoming in that time, he expressed his belief that he would be removed as negotiator with the company and the latter would have to deal with less sympathetic parties. The reporting official (presumably Colonel Eddy) 3 commented that the Minister of Finance was quite dispassionate in his remarks. The SAG was convinced it should have a larger share and was determined to get it. The official added that there was a chance that Shaikh Abdullah had issued the warning in anticipation of Emir Faisal’s return. Mr. Duce expressed no thoughts on how Aramco planned to meet the SAG demand. Acheson 1 Repeated to Dhahran. 2 The cable was attached to a letter from Duce to Wilkins, dated May 25, not printed. The cable read, in part: “Aside from passing reference to size U.S. Government’s take via taxes which he wished were coming to SAG instead, Minister Finance did not specify nature increased payments.… There is some chance Minister Finance called for session so he could report to Faisal who arrived that afternoon, that he had such talk and that he delivered warning.” (886A.2553/5–2550) 3 William A. Eddy, political adviser to Aramco and former United States Minister to Saudi Arabia. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 786A.022/6–1250: Despatch [Document 21] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 347 Jidda , June 12, 1950. Ref: Dept.’s Memorandum of Conversation, April 25, 1950. 1 Subject: Comments on Dept.’s Memorandum of Conversation Dated April 25, 1950, Concerning Anglo-Saudi Arab Boundary Negotiations in Trucial Coast. The Embassy received on June 10 a memorandum of conversation dated April 25, 1950, entitled “Conference with Aramco Officials and Judge Manley O. Hudson on Saudi Arabian–United Kingdom Boundary Dispute.” While the delay in the transmission of this memorandum probably renders the following comments of little use, the Embassy feels that there are certain inconsistencies and contradictions in Aramco’s position which should be pointed out. I and members of my staff feel strongly that this memorandum indicates a dangerous tendency on the part of Aramco, as it appears that the oil company in this meeting was acting for the Saudi Arabian Government. It is noted that Mr. George Ray, Aramco’s General Counsel, stated that the Company had been asked by the Saudis to request the United States Government to intervene with the United Kingdom to permit direct negotiation of the boundary question (see page 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] of memorandum). To our minds this indicates a rather irregular procedure, since it would normally be expected that such a démarche would be undertaken either by the Saudi Embassy in Washington or by the Saudi Foreign Office here with this Embassy. No such démarche has been made by the Foreign Office here nor to our knowledge has the Saudi Embassy approached the Department on this subject. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Company, while thus acting for the Government, elsewhere claims that the same Government is perfectly capable of acting for itself when it comes to the complex matter of administering the area claimed by the Saudis. It would appear that this latter point would be considerably strengthened if the Saudi Government acted for itself in requesting the United States Government to intervene. Aramco officials well know that the United Kingdom does not regard territorial claims in eastern Arabia based on tribal allegiance and tax payments alone as particularly valid. Yet it persists in stating that on the basis of these disputed claims alone the Saudi Government is entitled to its most extreme claims. If the Company is interested in seeking an equitable solution to this matter, in the Embassy’s opinion it would be more productive for Aramco officials to attempt to meet the arguments of the United Kingdom concerning the invalidity of tribal claims (see Embassy’s despatch 339 of June 8, 1950 2 ) rather than ignoring them. As set forth on page 5 of the memorandum, Judge Hudson’s position appears to be that the Rentz investigations regarding taxes and tribal allegiance make “a strong basis for the Saudi Arabian claims”, since Abu Dhabi is “a skeleton of a government and little more.” While the Embassy is not competent to pass on the extremely detailed investigations of George Rentz (see despatch 65 of Feb. 20, 1950 3 ), we believe that Judge Hudson’s statement indicates a misconception, namely that since Abu Dhabi is merely a skeleton of a government Saudi claims based on taxes and tribal allegiance are particularly strong. As the Department is well aware, there is scarcely a skeleton of a government existing in the disputed area so far as Saudi Arabia is concerned. In fact, we believe it a mistake for anyone to discuss the Trucial Coast boundary problem in terms of which Arab state exercises more effective control, since it is generally recognized that the only humans regularly visiting the area are wandering sections of the Manasir, Murra and Awamir bedouin tribes. This Embassy believes that neither Abu Dhabi nor Saudi Arabia exercises effective control over the area. On the basis of the referenced memorandum, we also feel that Aramco exhibits a certain inconsistency in asserting, on the one hand, that it is interested in preserving the British position in the Persian Gulf and, on the other hand, specifically advocating direct negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial Shaikhdoms concerned, a development which appears pointedly to ignore that special position which has been confirmed not only by the Shaikhs concerned but also even by the Saudi Government (see Article 6, Treaty of Jidda, 1927). Furthermore, we question whether short trips to the area form a sufficient base to enable Aramco officials to determine with any accuracy such important and imponderable questions as the present state of British prestige in the Persian Gulf. It is noted that Mr. Ray stated that “British prestige is suffering from their own conduct.” While this Embassy itself feels competent neither to confirm nor challenge this statement, it is firmly of the opinion that reports from our Consulate General in Dhahran and our Consulate in Basra have at least equal authority with bald assertions of returned Aramco travelers. This Embassy continues to believe that an early settlement of the vexing boundary problems in the Persian Gulf is urgently required, but it is not of the opinion that such an approach as indicated by Aramco in the referenced memorandum will have the desired effect. While we have no intention of underestimating the very able work of Rentz and other Aramco officials in establishing facts with respect to the Trucial Coast, we do wish to emphasize that the British Government, as far as can be ascertained here, shows no disposition to grant an overriding validity to much of this work. The Department will have noted in this connection from despatch No. 339 of June 8, 1950, that the British Government is so far unprepared to accept claims based solely on tribal allegiance and tax payments that it is prepared to issue a unilateral statement establishing boundaries of its protected Sheikhdoms along the Trucial Coast if the Saudi Government does not agree to certain points prior to negotiations. Although admittedly somewhat remote from the scene of the problem, this Embassy has given much thought to furthering a solution of the boundary problem. In our opinion there are two primary points which are blocking agreement: 1) the question of the special British position in the Persian Gulf, and, 2) the question of the validity of claims based on tribal allegiance and tax payments. An equitable solution to the boundary problem can only be the result of a compromise, and we respectfully suggest to the Department for possible transmission to the British Government and Aramco that some compromise might be worked out which would reaffirm the British position in the Gulf while emphasizing the special importance to be placed on claims based on tribal allegiance and tax payments. In this way both the British and Saudi Governments would obtain recognition for part of their claims. In this connection it is noted from the memorandum that Mr. Terry Duce, Vice President of Aramco, stated in response to a question from Assistant Secretary McGhee that he believed that the British were more interested in preserving their position in the Persian Gulf than in controlling the oil resources of the area (page 7 of memorandum). We assume that Saudi Arabia and Aramco are more interested in the latter than the former and therefore suggest that a compromise along the line suggested above might prove workable. J. Rives Childs 1 Ante , p. 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] . 2 Not printed; it transmitted a paper entitled “Frontier Negotiations wife Saudi Arabia,” prepared by the British Embassy in Jidda (786A.022/6–850). 3 Not printed; it transmitted a copy of an Aramco study of the eastern Arabian area by George Rentz and William Mulligan of the Aramco Research Division. The despatch read, in part: “The sponsors of the report can scarcely be regarded as disinterested parties, and the material should be considered with that point well in mind.… The value of this report and its accompanying maps to students of the area is nevertheless extremely high, since it contains information in many instances never before compiled.” (786A.022/2–2050) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/5–2350: Telegram [Document 22] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Jidda , June 13, 1950—10 p. m. 348. Embtel 316, May 23. 1 Aramco reply SAG request for additional share company profits conveyed government by Fred Davies, Executive Vice President, in talks here June 8–11. Despite favorable nature reply, SAG officials June 11 for first time openly indicated to company that Aramco might be forced register in Saudi Arabia and entire concession might be revised. In conversation with him prior his departure, Davies stated that in response request from SAG Aramco is deferring for one year beginning in June the government’s monthly railway installment payments as well as payments on the six million dollar loan granted last January which were due to begin August 1950. While no cancellations involved, Davies pointed out these deferments represent total of roughly $10,000,000 and payments under railway obligation are calculated to amount to $400,000–600,000 monthly, although this does not include liquidation total obligation estimated at $15,000,000 as of March 1950. Davies intimated foregoing deferment decided upon by Aramco in view SAG financial situation and in effort ease increasing pressure on company for greater share profits. Aside requesting such action, SAG had also expressed hope for large-scale grant dollars for development projects and other uses, but this not agreed to by company. As result no actual increase in government share Aramco profits has yet been agreed upon and pressure for such continues. In course discussions SAG officials referred to fact Aramco paid in 1949 USG taxes totalling 38 percent its profits, an amount equal to some $40,000,000. Davies confirmed to me this figure approximately correct indicating SAG research this question preparatory pressing demands along lines indicated above. Following Aramco reply deferring above payments Finance Minister presented Davies unsigned letter listing projects for which dollar grant from Aramco requested. Davies indicated in absence Finance Minister’s signature this could not be considered and letter was returned Finance Minister. Colonel Eddy informs he believes Finance Minister will present letter to Crown Prince Saud in Taif June 13 pointing out he has done all he can obtain concessions Aramco. Crown Prince or other high government officials may then take up question revising concession or registering company in Saudi Arabia in order enable SAG to obtain taxes now paid USG, but Eddy does not believe these questions will be formally raised by Finance Minister who is about to depart on extended vacation. Questions may be raised with Aramco President Moore whose arrival June 20 anticipated. Alternatively Finance Minister demand may be bluff and no further concessions may be required of company. Embassy does not believe matter ended. We fully expect continued SAG efforts obtain larger share Aramco profits. Foregoing for Department’s information only. Sent Department 348, repeated info London 85, Arab capitals, Tehran unnumbered. Childs 1 Not printed; it reported a week of discussions between Aramco officials and the Finance Minister. It read, in part: “View SAG’s continued financial straits FinMin requested several items from company which would in effect mean increasing SAG share Aramco income.” (886A.2553/5–2350) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/6–2250: Telegram [Document 23] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Jidda , June 22, 1950—midnight. 372. Aramco today informed UK has indicated to company representatives London Aramco cannot qualify for sale within sterling area even under marketing provisions recently approved permitting Jersey and Caltex sell oil in UK against sterling. Matter viewed with extremest gravity by Aramco whose president Moore and executive Vice President Davies (at request UK) are flying Dhahran to London by special plane. Financial vice presidents Socony, Jersey and Aramco will also travel London soonest for discussions with British in attempt draft plan qualify some Aramco production for sterling markets. Should attempt be permitted fail, we are informed no Aramco oil could be sold for sterling and as result no sterling royalties would be paid SAG despite latter’s reluctant indication willingness accept 25 percent royalties in sterling. Aramco London source informs chief reason current UK position due problem connected SAG use sterling if paid as royalties. While question uses royalty sterling by SAG complex and technical and can doubtless be defended on economic grounds I consider this action on part British may also represent extremely potent form political pressure in SAG. As Embassy has emphasized in recent months there is every indication here widespread UK dissatisfaction with subordinate role in Saudi Arabia which it forced to take increasingly over past few years. SAG independence vis-à-vis British in boundary negotiations; encouragement by SAG anti-Hashemite bloc; SAG loan Syria to counter Syro-Iraq union with UK blessing; summary cancellation English electric contract for electrification Jidda and Mecca; growing US economic predominance west coast Saudi Arabia which long considered last UK stronghold, are all factors which may have contributed to UK decision take action which may, if persisted in, place SAG at mercy British. Aramco informed undoubtedly recognize great importance this issue both to USG and to SAG. With financial situation here such as it is and economy country geared to present existing production 450,000 to 550,000 BPD closing doors sale Saudi Arabian oil for sterling which alone may make preservation current level production possible might have catastrophic effect. It seems unnecessary stress relation this to our great strategic position here which UK should be as interested as we in safeguarding. Sent Department 372 priority repeated priority London 87, Dhahran unnumbered. Childs The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/6–2350: Telegram [Document 24] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Jidda , June 23, 1950—noon. 373. Embtel 348, June 13. 1 Compounding further critical situation, Finance Minister on June 20, before any news developments reported Embtel 372, June 22, 2 sent written ultimatum to company emphasizing large concessions recently requested from Aramco must be answered within two weeks. These included payment: 1. No less than 10 million dollars welfare fund annually. 2. Royalty on oil used in refinery operations. 3. Cost construction Dammam pier and railway Dammam to Abquaiq. 4. Postponement current invoices until January 1951 (these estimated over half million dollars monthly). First demands made on April 29 were that Aramco bear Dammam pier and railway costs to Abquaiq and pay annual welfare fund 2½ million dollars with intimation these not all. These proposals considered by Aramco and reply reported Embtel 348, June 13 in which Aramco announced effort to relieve SAG payment would be deferred on 6 million dollar loan and railway payments some 4 million dollars would be deferred twelve months. Aramco considered this its final answer to SAG’s requests and stated not prepared make other concessions this time. Renewed demands prepared by Finance Minister were handed company June 9 in unsigned memorandum (Embtel 348) together with comment by Assistant Deputy Finance Minister that they should be accepted in toto to avoid much greater demands which might include making Aramco pay taxes in SA or revision basic concession agreement. In courtesy call on Finance Minister who returned here from Riyadh 19th, Moore was confronted by Shaikh Abdullah’s demands for reply from company despite previous statement to Najib by Davies that complete reply had been made. 3 Moore stated he unwilling reopen discussion at this time in Jidda. In fact, new demands from SAG each time Aramco makes financial concessions such as deferment for one year 10 million dollar obligations SAG, Aramco has indicated to us it unwilling make further concessions now, which would lay it open to probable new and further demands, although recognizing possibility SAG may force shutdown. Company officials believe government in its present financial straits can afford shutdown much less than can company. Najib called on me today to express concern over critical nature situation. Fortunately, Colonel Eddy had just acquainted me with foregoing as well as developments reported Embtel 372. I stated I considered situation extremely grave and reminded him cooperation not one-way street. I stated only satisfactory basis working relations was mutual confidence and respect which ultimata did not engender. When Najib objected that neither Moore nor Davies had shown disposition discuss request, including particularly royalty on crude used in Ras Tanura operations, which SAG willing to arbitrate if no mutual agreement possible, it was pointed out company might have reached limit concessions as AIOC, IPC, and KOC all operated on much lower royalty basis and Aramco already placed at great competitive disadvantage. It was suggested it would be graceful gesture SAG withdraw its ultimatum in recognition necessity presenting united front in London. Najib endeavored represent it as merely basis for discussion. His main grievance was Aramco had evinced no willingness discuss SAG’s point view. In face rigorous defense of Aramco, Najib was visibly shaken and crestfallen. I and member my staff who present independently reached identical conclusion Najib, faced with huge demands on existing income and unwillingness SAG reduce expenditures, was himself supporting Finance Minister’s policy of milking Aramco and all comers for sufficient funds to balance budget. Having felt Aramco would in end acquiesce to almost all demands, he now in his belief unwilling accept fact that company has been driven as far as it will go without any corresponding improvement in financial position SAG. I referred to general deep dissatisfaction not only Aramco but other US interests here including Bechtel with inability SAG meet payments due. I stated recent discussion with Deputy Foreign Minister re free arms said indicated complete lack grasp realities on part SAG as it inconceivable to expect US taxpayer bear burden cost SAG arms in face SAG financial profligacy and improvidence. We believe Aramco attitude should remain firm as no indication King and Princes as determined force concessions from Aramco as Finance Ministry officials. In fact, very well informed source has indicated Finance Minister practically forced return from Riyadh by King to discuss budget with Crown Prince. As Najib left, I stated whole general situation gave me cause for deep misgiving and that in face all he and I had done so far unsuccessfully to bring extremely critical financial situation home to King and others, with view its rational solution, perhaps only way to correct situation might be for it to be brought to head by really first-class crisis. Sent priority Department 373; repeated priority London 88, Dhahran unnumbered. Childs 1 Ante , p. 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 22 ] . 2 Supra . 3 Telegram 379 from Jidda, June 27, reported Aramco’s written reply of June 25 to the Finance Minister’s ultimatum. The company stated it had gone as far as it could, and noted it had been generous and had produced actual revenues to the Saudi Arabian Government beyond all expectations. (886A.2553/6–2750) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/7–350: Telegram [Document 25] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State confidential London , July 3, 1950—7 p. m. 40. Deptel 3165, June 28 1 and Jidda’s 372, June 22. 2 While recognizing British generally keep in mind political implications of their foreign economic policies, we do not believe British negotiations re use of sterling by Aramco represent attempt employ financial weapons regain dominant political position in Saudi Arabia, or indeed, that there is concerted campaign of any kind to bring SAG to heel on wide front. As reported Embtel 3763, 3 UK has agreed in principle to use of sterling essentially as desired by Aramco, which seems quite satisfied with understanding reached. British concern in present instance seems to have arisen primarily from general financial and economic considerations not peculiar to SA rather than from political difficulties resulting from UK–SAG differences. This concern, moreover, seems to have emanated from British treasury rather than Foreign Office, which to best our knowledge has played little part in present discussions. Furthermore, with regard to implication in conversation reported by Saud’s Private Secretary (Jidda’s 378, June 26), 4 we do not think it is in any sense British policy to advance in SA at expense US position or influence. To contrary, conversations we have had with responsible Foreign Office officials indicate that UK places great value on security deriving from strong US position in NE generally and would wish do nothing weaken or discourage this support. Foreign Office officials seem fully appreciate underlying importance US role in SA to common US–UK objectives of stability and security in NE as whole and to recognize direct benefit to UK position our presence in area signifies. We are not unmindful of fact that differences with SAG are source of irritation to UK and that, in promoting its case, UK may at times show impatience and resort to somewhat brusque tactics in dealing with SAG. We do not, however, find sufficient ground here for suspecting UK of deliberate effort impose its will on SAG through pressures such as suggested in Jidda’s 372. Sent Department 40, repeated info Jidda 2. Douglas 1 Not printed; it contained a request from the Department of State to the Embassy in London for information on British regulations against Aramco sales in the sterling area. 2 Ante , p. 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] . 3 Not printed; it reported British agreement to an Aramco plan to make sterling expenditures in the sterling area and to make certain payments in sterling to the Saudi Arabian Government. The British, however, stated it would be necessary to stabilize the amounts of sterling Saudi Arabia would use in order to avoid great fluctuation, and indicated final agreement would be subject to arrangements made with Aramco’s parent companies for the utilization of sterling. (886A.2553/6–3050) 4 Crown Prince Saud’s secretary told the Ambassador Saud feared British actions with regard to Aramco might be the first step in a British plan to crush Saudi Arabia. (786.00/6–2650) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/7–1050: Telegram [Document 26] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Jidda , July 10, 1950—2 p. m. 19. Deptel 8 July 7, 1 London telegram 40 July 3. While agreeing there is no sense in British policy advancing in SA at expense US position, we do feel recent events here indicate British efforts buttress their position (Embtels 372 June 22 2 and 159 March 14 3 repeated London as 87 and 35 for details). Long paramount in NE, they unconsciously resent growing US role, believing they still best equipped handle problems area, traditionally their sphere influence in which they may consider us as interlopers. Doubtless Foreign Office officers appreciate US role here, but UK Embassy officers Jidda already accused by members British community of lack force opposing US companies, cannot be expected play down UK interests in difference underlying importance US role which they, of course, also recognize. Announced agreement use of sterling desired by Aramco very gratifying, but I feel we must remain watchful lest future UK appeals on behalf weakened economy result in crippling restrictions on US oil companies operating in areas. Sincerely hope Embassy London telegram 40 is sound analysis, but basis local evidence, I feel British will do all possible regain dominant position SA. Sent Department 19; repeated info London 3. Childs 1 Not printed; it requested the Embassy’s comments on telegram 40 from London, July 3, supra . (886A.2553/7–750) 2 Ante , p. 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] . 3 Not printed. It read, in part: “Believe some British circles particularly concerned about economic advantages we have gained in area which they have regarded as their special preserve even while reconciling themselves to our predominant position east coast SA.… Fact our unique advantages here ultimately benefit British should always be emphasized.” (786A.022/3–1450) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/7–2550: Despatch [Document 27] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential No. 35 Jidda , July 25, 1950. Subject: Discussion With Aramco and Saudi Arabian Government Officials Regarding Saudi Arabian Government Requests for Increased Participation in Revenues of the Arabian American Oil Co. During the past several months relations between Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government have been increasingly strained chiefly as a result of numerous demands which the Saudi Arabian Government has made for increased participation in the revenues of Aramco and Aramco’s unwillingness to make further concessions to the Government at this time. Aramco feels that the Saudi Arabian Government has been attempting during the last few months to force it to alter its position with regard to the Government’s demands by throwing numerous petty obstacles in its path, all of which have resulted in the needless expenditure of time and effort which could, they believe, be more profitably spent in increasing oil production and revenues to the advantage of both Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government. In view of the growing difficulties and increasing intransigence on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government, Aramco sought my help and asked if I would come to Dhahran to discuss these difficulties with the Aramco officials there and, if necessary, go to Riyadh to explain the difficulties to His Majesty the King. On July 15 I flew to Dhahran in a plane provided by Aramco and for two days discussed with Mr. Moore, President of the Company,. Mr. Ohliger, Mr. Davies, Mr. Eddy and Mr. Spurlock, 2 the difficulties which are confronting Aramco in an attempt to come to some decision as to what might be the best way to solve these difficulties. Just prior to my departure for Dhahran I called on Najib Bey Salha, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance (see enclosure No. 1) 3 and Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance (see enclosure No. 2) 4 in order to obtain their views with regard to the difficulties between the Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco. Shaikh Abdullah was in a rather uncompromising mood and emphatically claimed that Aramco was proving uncooperative and that they had neither answered his recent communications relating to the Saudi Arabian Government’s requests nor had they appeared the slightest bit willing to discuss these matters with His Excellency. During my discussions with the Aramco officials in Dhahran I mentioned Shaikh Abdullah’s grievances regarding the unanswered communications and the alleged failure of Aramco to agree to discuss with the Saudi Arabian Government’s representatives, and as will be seen from enclosure No. 5, 5 I learned that Aramco has in fact replied to all of Shaikh Abdullah’s communications with the exception, of course, of those to which replies are still under consideration by the Company. I also found the Aramco officials very eager to discuss on friendly terms the differences between Aramco and the Saudi Government although, as was pointed out by the Aramco officials, Aramco does not feel that it can make any further concessions to the Saudi Arabian Government. Aramco feels that the deferments of the payments by the Saudi Arabian Government on the $6,000,000 loan granted by Aramco and on the payments for construction of the Dammam pier and the Saudi Arabian Government railroad are as far as it is financially able to go at the present time and that further concessions on the part of the Company would not only invite additional demands by the Saudi Government but would be financially unwise. After discussing these various difficulties, Aramco prepared for me a memorandum covering the situation to use as a basis of any further discussions I might have with the Saudi Arabian Government officials on any of the subjects discussed. It was decided at that time that, since Shaikh Abdullah was necessarily the man with whom Aramco would constantly have to deal, it might be unwise for me to bring the present difficulties to the attention of the King as this might very well irritate Shaikh Abdullah and result in even more difficulties for the Company. I told Aramco, however, that since I had promised Shaikh Abdullah that upon my return I would present him with the views of Aramco it would of course be necessary for me to do so. After completing our discussions at Dhahran I flew to Riyadh for the purpose of taking leave of His Majesty before departing on leave. Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister, met me at the airfield and, though I wished him to be aware of our discussions in Dhahran, I did not feel it wise to become involved personally in any discussion with Shaikh Yusuf on the points of dispute. Consequently, I requested Mohammed Effendi, the Embassy’s Arab Secretary, to explain the situation to Shaikh Yusuf in order to acquaint him with the matter and obtain his views. This Mohammed did, and found Shaikh Yusuf quite unsympathetic with Aramco’s viewpoint and of the opinion that if Aramco continued to be uncooperative with reference to the Saudi Government’s demands, a revision of the Aramco concession might become necessary. A copy of the memorandum of Mohammed’s conversation with Shaikh Yusuf is attached as enclosure No. 3. 6 As mentioned previously, I did not mention this subject to the King during our brief conversation. Upon my return to Jidda on the 19th I called on Shaikh Abdullah and, finding him to be in a more reasonable mood than I had on our previous meeting on July 13, I informed him in general of my talks with the Aramco officials in Dhahran, pointing out that I had found these officials to be extremely anxious to maintain the most friendly relations with His Excellency and that they deeply regret that Shaikh Abdullah had felt that they were not prompt in replying to his various communications. (See enclosure No. 4). 7 I mentioned at that time that Aramco had given me an inclusive memorandum on the entire subject under discussion and would shortly forward to him a memorandum which I had prepared, outlining the Company’s point of view as expressed in the memorandum. Shaikh Abdullah stated that the Government was also anxious to continue friendly discussions with Aramco and suggested that it would be best for the Company officials to come to Jidda for a preliminary exchange of views and later go to Riyadh to report their findings if such appeared necessary. The memorandum (enclosure No. 6) 8 has been prepared and forwarded to Shaikh Abdullah but as yet no answer has been received from him, and I have had no further discussions with him or any other members of the Ministry of Finance on this subject since that time. J. Rives Childs [Enclosure 6] Memorandum by the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance ( Sulaiman ) The American Ambassador wishes to acquaint His Excellency, as he promised, somewhat more in detail, with the result of the Ambassador’s recent discussions with Aramco officials in Dhahran concerning relations between the Saudi Arabian Government and the Company and, in particular, with the claimed failure of the Company to reply to His Excellency’s communications and a reported evasiveness on its part in responding to His Excellency’s desire to meet with representatives for an exchange of views. In conveying the Government’s appeals for increased participation in revenues, the Minister of Finance recently pointed out what he described as huge profits of the Company. In answering the Minister’s assertions in this regard, Aramco points to the Company’s vast investment in Saudi Arabia (now totalling over $600,000,000) and abroad necessary for the success of the enterprise and the absolute necessity of maintaining costs on a competitive basis in order to obtain maximum benefits for both the Company and the Saudi Arabian Government. The Aramco officials also referred to the Tapline project and the large expenditures which it entails, all of which represents an addition to the total investment of Aramco in Saudi Arabia. It now appears that the total investment in Tapline alone will amount to approximately $225,000,000 or an increase of approximately $100,000,000 over the original estimate. Aramco considers that it has examined sympathetically the Government’s requests for increased participation in Aramco’s operations and Aramco has within the past year made the following concessions in order to meet the Government’s requests: In January of this year Aramco advanced $6,000,000, interest-free, to the Government with repayment to begin in July, 1950. This advance was made on the assurance that it would tide the Government over its financial difficulties. Despite an unexpected increase in production and royalties this proved to be insufficient, and pressure for further assistance was renewed. In view of this, Mr. Davies, after consultation with the Company’s Board of Directors in the United States announced to the Minister of Finance that the Company had decided to defer for an additional 12 months the repayment of the $6,000,000 loan as well as of the funds advanced by Aramco to cover construction cost on the Dammam port and Saudi Arabian Government railway projects. These deferments, totalling between $10,000,000 and $12,000,000, are now in effect. It is understood that His Excellency has expressed the view that this was not enough and that he has requested $10,000,000 annually from the Company for public works programs and a waiver by Aramco of repayments on the Company’s pier and railroad expenditures. To these requests Mr. Davies states that he replied verbally and by letter that the deferments already granted were as far as the Company could go. With regard to curtailment of Aramco’s right under the Concession, the following demands are reported as having been made on the Company by the Government and the following is the status of these demands as reported to the Ambassador by the Company: 1) Customs duties must be paid on all imports other than equipment and machinery: Aramco’s reply to this demand should now be in the hands of the Finance Minister. The Company points to its immunity from such duties under Article 21 of the Concession but recognizes that this immunity does not extend to materials (such as food) subsequently sold within Saudi Arabia; 2) Demand for quarantine fees: Aramco in its reply, which has probably just been received by the Ministry, admits that reasonable charges may be made for appropriate quarantine services at ports of entry but protests that the current tariff is exorbitant and, as to any excess, claims immunity under its tax exemption from all travel on Company business; 3) Demands for tax on material sold: Aramco’s reply is still under consideration, though the Company maintains that its exemption is clear under Article 21 and its right under Article 22 to the natural products necessary for the enterprise. The amount involved, however, is, Aramco states, insignificant; 4) Demands for royalty on oil used in the operation of the refinery: Aramco maintains that this deduction is clearly provided for in the Concession and has been so recognized since the first operation of the original refining unit established in 1940 at the Ras Tanura terminal. Aramco has replied to the Ministry of Finance that Aramco stands on its right to deduct. The Government has indicated that it may take this issue to arbitration; 5) Demand for aircraft landing fees on all landings made anywhere in Saudi Arabia: Aramco received this letter only recently and is now preparing a reply. Early this year the Company offered to pay the established landing fees on airports of the Government and this arrangement is in effect. However, Aramco claims immunity from any fees on aircraft facilities established by the Company; 6) Demand for termination of Aramco’s Dhahran-Jidda radio services: This demand was received only recently and Aramco’s reply is under consideration. The Agreement with regard to this circuit which provides for termination only for non-performance by the Company or in the event of an adequate service being established by the Government was concluded after long negotiations within the past year and a half. Aramco believes that neither of these conditions prevail; 7) Demand that oil for the Trans-Arabian Pipeline be gauged for royalty purposes at Abqaiq: Aramco has only recently received this letter and is now preparing a reply. Following the suspension of construction during the Palestine trouble, Aramco substantially increased its delivery facilities at Ras Tanura and arranged to extend its pipeline gathering system to include the vicinity of Abu Hadriya. When Tapline resumed construction arrangements were made for that Company to take delivery of crude oil at Qaisumah. The royalty gauging tanks were therefore placed at Qaisumah. Aramco maintains that this arrangement is consistent with its Concession and with the long established gauging practice; 8) Tapline security fees: While Aramco acknowledges the necessity for reasonable requirements of a civil administration and the usual guards at camps, it does not feel it should be obliged to support a Saudi border force. The Ambassador recalled that a particular grievance expressed to him by His Excellency was that Aramco had not only ignored the Minister’s request for additional assistance, but that Aramco officials had been evasive and appeared unwilling to discuss these matters with the Saudi Arabian Government. The Ambassador has learned that Aramco sincerely regrets that such was the impression gained by the Finance Minister, for Aramco feels that Mr. Davies made it quite clear in the course of his announcement of the deferments arranged last month that he brought the final word of the Company and that Mr. Moore’s visit to Saudi Arabia was in no way connected with the Minister’s request for additional assistance. As Mr. Davies pointed out in his last visit to Jidda he and the other Aramco officials are prepared at any time to meet with the representatives of the Government at any place such representatives might choose to discuss and explain the Company’s position. Although the Company stated it cannot change its position with regard to additional assistance it is nevertheless prepared, in fact, anxious, for continuing friendly discussion with the Government and is prepared to meet with His Excellency, as the Ambassador has confirmed orally, at any time or any place whether Jidda, Taif or Riyadh, as may be found agreeable and convenient. The Ambassador hopes that this frank expression of Aramco’s point of view with regard to the misunderstandings will be of assistance to His Excellency and will help in restoring the atmosphere of frankness and friendly partnership which has for so long existed between the Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco. Jidda , July 20, 1950. 1 Copies sent to Cairo, Dhahran, and Aramco. 2 Aramco Legal Counsel. 3 Memorandum of conversation of July 13; not printed. Salha told the Ambassador he deplored the worsening relations between Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government, and he arranged a meeting for that night with the Minister of Finance. 4 Memorandum of conversation, dated July 14; not printed. 5 Statement of Aramco’s position with regard to the Saudi Arabian Government’s demands for increased participation in Aramco’s earnings—prepared for Ambassador J. Rives Childs by Aramco, dated July 16; not printed. The statement contained a list of Saudi Arabian requests and the Aramco replies to each of them. The last paragraph read: “We are hopeful that the American Ambassador will take any opportunities available, to confirm the fairness of the Company’s position and to counter the charges of intransigeance being made by the Minister of Finance. We will welcome any meetings he may arrange for us, either in Riyadh or elsewhere.” 6 Memorandum of conversation of July 17; not printed. When Effendi explained that Aramco considered it impossible to meet the Saudi Arabian Government’s financial demands if it was to remain competitive with other oil companies in the Middle East, Yassin replied that if Aramco was not prepared to help, the Government would probably find it necessary to revise Aramco’s concession. 7 Memorandum of conversation of July 19; not printed. 8 Printed below. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) 887.2553/7–3150 [Document 28] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs ( Rountree ) confidential [ Washington ,] July 31, 1950. Subject: A. Iraqi and Iranian Petroleum Discussions B. 7.92 Ammunition under S/MDA Participants: Mr. Aram, Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Iran Mr. Rountree, GTI Mr. Aram called on Monday, July 31, to discuss several current matters. Mr. Aram said that he had received a telegram from Tehran indicating that discussions were being held in London between the Iraq Petroleum Company and Iraqi officials concerning oil concessions, and wondered whether the Department had any information concerning this matter. Mr. Rountree said that we are aware that such discussions are taking place, but are not informed on the details. 1 It is understood that the discussions embrace several aspects of the Iraq concessions, naturally including questions of royalties. It is understood that the discussions have now been transferred to Baghdad, where they will continue. Mr. Aram said that his interest was primarily in connection with the report that the United States Government had taken the position with the Petroleum Company to the effect that it should accede to the demands of the Iraqi Government, or at least to conclude an agreement which would be favorable to the Government. He said that if the United States Government had in fact followed this course, he thought it would be proper for the Iranian Government to request that a similar position be adopted vis-à-vis the British Government in relation to the AIOC concession. Mr. Rountree said that he was certain the United States Government had taken no such position in the oil discussions but considered the matter to be as between the contracting parties, although we were naturally interested in the outcome. He pointed out that in the case of Iran we had expressed to both parties of the dispute our interest in their coming to an agreement acceptable to both, but we of course had not injected ourselves into discussions on the merits of the respective positions nor had we suggested particular concessions to be made by either. Mr. Aram appeared to agree that this was as far as the United States Government properly could go in the matter. Mr. Aram then raised the question of the urgent desire of the Iranian Government to obtain substantial quantities of 7.92 ammunition under the Military Aid Program. He said that he had received a communication from his government suggesting that the United States provide this material under the “current year’s appropriation”, which Mr. Aram interpreted to mean the second annual appropriation for MDA. Mr. Rountree said that he thought this matter should be considered by the appropriate representatives of the two governments at the time military lists in general are discussed between them in connection with the second appropriation bill. He said that while he must confirm this point with the appropriate authorities in the Department, he felt our position would be that this matter should be taken up by the Iranian Government in Tehran with General Evans (this position was later confirmed to Mr. Aram following discussions with S/MDA). 1 Telegram 3429 from London, June 17, informed the Department of State that the Iraq Petroleum Company had decided to invite the Government of Iraq to send representatives to London for detailed discussions preliminary to negotiation of new agreements. Telegram 9 from Baghdad, July 3, advised the Department that “Ex Prime Minister Nuri Said and Minister economics Dhia Jaffar leaving Baghdad late tomorrow for London to conduct negotiations re IPC convention.” Telegram 546 from London, July 25, advised the Department that “Iraqis seeking redefinition gold basis present royalty rate instead of asking for outright increase ostensibly so that agreement does not have to be submitted Majlis for ratification.” It stated that the issue of royalty payments had almost monopolized the London discussions. Documentation is in Department of State file 887.2553. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 887.2553/8–450: Telegram [Document 29] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State confidential London , August 4, 1950—6 p. m. 762. According Williams, 1 foreign affairs, IPC and Iraqi negotiators have now agreed that Kirkuk royalty as of January 1, 1950 will be paid at six shillings gold (i.e., maximum possible under present IPC concession based on official London rate). Agreement is “without prejudice” to other provisions of IPC concession and is also subject to understanding that arrangements in Article 10 IPC concession for rescaling royalty in 1954 and every 10 years thereafter are henceforth inoperative. Agreement expected to be formalized by exchange of letters today and will probably be subject to ratification by Iraqi parliament. Williams believes company will insist on ratification. Two groups will issue largely non-committal press release stating merely that agreement has been reached “on a major issue of royalties” and that other important issues will be subject to later discussion. Williams says present negotiations have been terminated and Nun 2 will return Baghdad tomorrow. Other outstanding matters have apparently been shelved for discussion later in year. New rate will give Iraqis approximately 18 current sterling shillings (based on bank of England buying rate for gold bullion). Idea of referring “gold clause” to English courts has apparently been dropped, at least for present. Williams thinks Iraqis are well satisfied with present payments and may hope that someday London rate will be freed. Sent Department 762, repeated information Baghdad 5, Cairo 13, Jidda 7, Tehran 13. Douglas 1 Alan Meredith Williams, Iraq desk, British Foreign Office. 2 Nuri Said, former Prime Minister of Iraq. The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Secretary of State 887.2553/8–1050: Telegram [Document 30] The Ambassador in Iraq ( Crocker ) to the Secretary of State confidential Baghdad , August 10, 1950—8 a. m. 95. 1. Finance Minister Uzri, discussing IPC negotiations with Embassy officer, summarized results substantially as reported by London telegram 762, August 3 [ 4 ] 1 to Department. Uzri said: a . Change from four to six shillings gold increases Kirkuk royalties from under 12 to approximately 18 shillings per ton, retroactively effective January 1, 1950. He roughly estimates resultant additional revenues will be 1,800,000 pounds for calendar year 1950 and total of 17,000,000 pounds for years 1950 through 1954. Net effect is IPC has given now royalty increase which Iraq would probably have received in 1954 in any case. b . Cabinet now giving further consideration to referring “gold clause” to courts. We realize it is complicated question. c . Question, IPC and BPC concessions left for further negotiations which expected take place later this year. 2 2. Uzri, while not jubilant over results negotiations, seemed feel they had been moderately successful from Iraqi standpoint. 3. Noncommittal press release (London telegram 762) issued stating “agreement reached on one major issue re royalties”. Otherwise no facts yet made public. Reportedly government considering whether or not submit agreement to Parliament. 4. Despite lack of factual information re agreement, opposition papers attacking Nuri and government for “failure” of negotiations, while pro-government papers claim success, saying “benefits will soon be evident”. Comment: Embassy feels that due appreciation should be expressed to American partners for whatever influence they may have exercised in persuading IPC grant royalty increase agreed upon at London. This will presently improve relations with Iraq Government and should provide sufficient revenue to assure success of any Point Four program that may eventually be instituted here. Sent Department 95; repeated information London 19, Tehran 24, Cairo unnumbered, Jidda unnumbered. Crocker 1 Supra . 2 Telegram 696 from Paris, August 7, not printed, advised the Department of State that a Cie Française Petroles official had expressed satisfaction to an Embassy officer about the conclusion of the Iraq Petroleum Company negotiations with the Government of Iraq. The last paragraph read: “Questions re unification IPC, BPC and NPC concessions and reopening Haifa pipeline were reportedly scrupulously avoided at London meeting though IPC Board stressed importance developing Basra area fields rather than Mosul.” (887.2553/8–750) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq 887.2553/8–1050: Telegram [Document 31] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq 1 confidential Washington , August 18, 1950. 69. Reur 95 Aug 10. 2 You shld indicate to Iraqis that new IPC royalty rate now equals or surpasses those in other NE producing areas. This includes latest AIOC terms offered Iran. Above condition plus IPC liberality in granting royalty increase without quid pro quo shld in Dept’s view dissuade Iraq from new demands. In view (1) present world situation, (2) alignment of royalties offered Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran and (3) US–UK continuing efforts to encourage cos. mend fences in NE concessions, Embs Baghdad, Jidda and Tehran shld as occasion arises maximize efforts with respective Foreign Govts to endeavor obtain period of relative stability re concession contracts. 3 Acheson 1 Sent to Jidda as 61, Tehran as 314, repeated London as 931, Cairo by air, Moscow by air. 2 Supra . 3 Despatch 554 from Baghdad, November 30, advised the Department of State that a group of Iraq Petroleum Company officials called on the Chargé on November 27, and informed him that it was “no longer an ordeal to travel to Baghdad where a feeling of friendship and cooperation is now prevalent in contrast to the pre-London Agreement days when visiting officials from IPC London were subjected to constant pressure to raise oil royalty rates; increase oil production and divert the Haifa pipelines to an Arab port.” (887.2553/11–3050) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Petroleum [Document 32] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) top secret [ Washington ,] August 23, 1950. Subject: NSC 26/2 Participants: Department of Defense—Admiral B. B. Biggs 1 NEA—Mr. George C. McGhee Counselor, British Embassy—Mr. B. A. B. Burrows British Army Staff—Colonel Terrence G. Morton I received the above named participants and briefly outlined to them the proposal contained in the attached briefing memorandum 2 with respect to coordination of US and UK plans for destruction of oil facilities in the Middle East in the event of imminent capture. In addition to the points made, I stressed that neither the US nor UK should delay any planning or preparations already underway, pending further discussions and development of coordinated plans. Mr. Burrows stated that he would be pleased to transmit the proposal for joint discussions to London, and advise when the reply has been received. He stated that he understood that the British had already initiated planning with respect to destruction of oil facilities under the jurisdiction of the British companies although he, himself, was not familiar with details. It was brought out that previous decisions by the US–UK military authorities had allocated Bahrein as a US responsibility in connection with any destruction of facilities, and that in accordance with the new proposals, this allocation must be reviewed and appropriate changes made in the planning papers. It was also brought out that it would be necessary to make an allocation of responsibility with respect to Egypt. It was stated that in accordance with the principles we had proposed, the responsibility would follow the domicile of the company concerned, i.e. UK companies would be responsible for their demolitions and US companies responsible for theirs. However, this should be reviewed in the light of the special British position in Egypt. It was brought out that an important aspect of US–UK planning in this matter was in achieving uniformity in the degree of denial, i.e. the degree of permanence in the destruction. Mr. Burrows raised the question of who would be brought into the initial discussions on our side, and it was decided that Admiral B. B. Biggs, a State Department representative, and a CIA representative could represent this government. They would be available whenever the British were ready to continue talks. It was agreed that representatives of oil companies would not participate in discussions for the time being, but would be represented by their governments. It was agreed that Admiral Biggs and Colonel Morton would, in the meantime, engage in talks concerning military aspects of the problem, including required changes in the military planning papers. There was a miscellaneous discussion on the importance of the oil facilities in the Middle East. It was agreed that they would be of use to the Russians in that theater in the event of capture intact, but that it was unlikely that Russia could transport large quantities of petroleum from the Persian Gulf area to Russia. It was also agreed that the refineries in the area would, in all probability, be destroyed by bombing early in the war no matter whose possession they were in. 1 Rear Adm. Burton B. Biggs, USN, Executive Secretary of the Petroleum Committee, Munitions Board. 2 Not found attached. The Consul General in Dhahran (Hart) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/8–2950: Despatch [Document 33] The Consul General in Dhahran ( Hart ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential No. 15 Dhahran , August 29, 1950. Subject: Bahrein Petroleum Company’s (Bapco) Position as Sterling Company Russell M. Brown, General Manager of the Bahrein Petroleum Company, Ltd. (Bapco), informed me brifly on a recent visit to Dhahran that he has been in correspondence with the company headquarters in New York regarding plans of Bapco and Caltex to ensure the status of Bapco as a sterling company by segregating Bapco’s production and sales sharply from its services as a processor of Saudi Arabian crude. Under the plan envisaged by Bapco’s headquarters, Bapco would continue to produce and refine Bahrein oil with a minimum of dollar costs and sell it through sterling Caltex marketing organizations, such as Caltex India. Arabian crude, which comprises roughly ⅘ of Bapco refinery through-put, would be imported into Bahrein by a dollar Caltex organization as dollar oil, refined by Bapco on a fee basis, and sold by the dollar Caltex organization as dollar oil. What Aramco’s parent organizations will have to say about this plan was not elucidated. Since Bapco now does more than one-half of the local refining of Aramco’s oil, it may be that this project will be consistent with the recent sterling agreement between Aramco parent companies and the British Government. Apparently the plan is in the exploratory stages, and as Brown gave me this information in confidence, and without time to elucidate, I have felt it unwise to query anyone else on the matter. Possibly, however, the Department will be able to piece the news into a broader picture. Brown indicated that he had objected to the plan, in a communication to New York, pointing out that Bapco has the exclusive right to import crude oil into Bahrein free of duty. Should a Caltex organization try to assume this privilege the Shaikh of Bahrein might forthwith demand duty; since he has assured Brown that had he been Ruler when Bapco’s concession was granted, he would never have agreed to the inclusion of this privilege. (This privilege appears to be implicit in Article III of the Concession as amended by the deed of June 3, 1936.) Parker T. Hart 1 Repeated to Jidda and Cairo. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State 786A.022/8–3150: Telegram [Document 34] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia ( Hill ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential Jidda , August 31, 1950—9 a. m. 122. Embtel 117, August 30. 2 Was called to Foreign Office again yesterday morning by Yusuf Yassin. Subject his talk was additional grievances over British notes on boundary dispute. Little was added to his remarks previous date. However he said King had just telegraphed him to inform Embassy officially in this matter. While he admitted Department probably well acquainted with this whole situation, Yusuf Yassin nevertheless asked that Embassy transmit SAG present views which as follows: SAG does not consider it has made any moves which not legally correct since SAG’s actions taken only after consultation with American lawyers such as Manley Hudson and Spurlock of Aramco. SAG believes that British were well aware its intentions to place markers certain locations but British made no protest at time and even inquired when SAG would place markers and when they would issue statement concerning them. But when SAG had set up markers then British protested. SAG then adopted attitude let us talk it over and suggested setting up committee to which British agreed. Nevertheless, even while arrangements going on organize this committee British now informs SAG it will remove markers. When British Ambassador informed Foreign Office of this Yusuf Yassin told him this was aggressive action. SAG knows that according principles of UN all regional disputes must be settled through peaceful means. Furthermore, American and British Ambassadors both went Riyadh recently to convey King’s message re tripartite declaration but now one member violates it with aggressive action. Yusuf Yassin has requested British Ambassador to ask British Government to leave everything as is until after negotiations between the two governments completed. Foreign Office note embodying this request now being prepared copy of which will be furnished Embassy. 3 Yusuf Yassin then closed his remarks saying, “I therefore in name His Majesty’s Government request friendly US Government use its influence with British in preventing such aggressive action on Saudi lands while reminding US Government of its previous promises that it will always defend SAG against aggressive action. I at same time wish to emphasize to US Government that SAG has no desire whatsoever to have any disputes with UK. On contrary SAG would [garble] like solve difficulties with UK on peaceful basis and not through violence”. Comment: Embassy feels sure that Yusuf Yassin’s aggressive temperament and tendency blow off steam when occasion permits well-known to Department and that his strong comments will be judged in that light. While he certainly knows US Government not likely become party to boundary dispute he seemed relieved to get these remarks off his chest. End comment . Yusuf Yassin left today for Riyadh. I have not discussed any of foregoing with British Ambassador here. Hill 1 Repeated to London as Deptel 1363. 2 Not printed; it reported the receipt from Yassin of copies of two notes concerning disputed boundaries from the British Embassy. The first note informed Saudi Arabia the British Government would remove any markers in disputed areas that claimed Saudi Arabian sovereignty. The second proposed the Saudi Arabian and British Governments each prepare a memorandum of their claims to the disputed areas and exchange them two months before beginning discussions on the matter. Yassin stated that if the British Government had removed Saudi Arabian markers he would advise that they be replaced and guarded by troops. (786A.022/8–3050) 3 A handwritten note in the margin read: “Let’s call Greenhill and say lay off.” The Secretary of State to the Embassy in London 886A.2553/8–3150: Telegram [Document 35] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in London 1 secret Washington , August 31, 1950—7 p. m. 1157. For urinfo, SAG demanding complete renegotiation of 1933 Aramco concession contract. Aramco Board has authorized Pres Moore to discuss renegotiation with SAG. Revision contemplated by SAG cld be expected to have obvious repercussions on other contracts in area, particularly since key issue appears to be Saudi Arab demand for income tax for which co. might obtain US Treas tax credit. No NE concessionnaire now pays local income taxes. Acheson 1 Repeated to Tehran as 391, Baghdad as 88, Jidda as 80, Moscow as 168, and Cairo as 174. Paper Prepared in the Department of State McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Special Briefing Memoranda Prepared by Mr. Funkhouser [Document 36] Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1 secret [ Washington , September, 1950.] Middle East Oil (Background Paper for September 11 Meeting) i. problem The threat of Communist aggression is increasing. The Middle East is highly attractive and highly vulnerable to this threat. Rupture of the flow of Middle East oil to normal markets or seizure of these resources from without or within would seriously affect U.S. and allied economic, political and strategic interests. The problem is to develop lines of action to protect and maintain allied oil interests in the area and lines of action by which allied oil interests can help protect and preserve overall U.S. interests in the area, e.g. removal of the sources of Communism and attainment of overall U.S. policy objectives such as economic and political stability, increased standards of living, and the development of Western orientation and democratic processes. ii. background A. Description—Middle East Oil Important Middle East oil resources are confined to the area technically known as the Persian Gulf geosyncline, roughly a long, narrow oval encompassing the Persian Gulf, most of Iraq, S.W. Iran and N.E. Arabia. This area is a uniquely rich section of the earth’s crust. Except for certain submerged areas under the Persian Gulf, it is completely covered by concessions belonging to U.S. and foreign oil companies. Proven oil reserves, approximately 40 billion barrels, equal those of all the rest of the world combined and are almost double U.S. proven reserves. Only some 500 wells have been drilled in the Persian Gulf as against over one million in the U.S. U.S. wells average 12 barrels per day, Middle East wells 5000 barrels per day. It is further estimated that the Persian Gulf area has an even greater proportion of the “probable” or “possible” oil reserves in the world, i.e., some 150 billion barrels. Reserves of undeveloped natural gas are also immense; natural gas burned in daily operations amounts to approximately 1 billion cubic feet per day. Currently, oil production is approximately 1,800,000 b.p.d., or 90 million tons per year and comes from: Iran– 700,000 b.p.d. Iraq– 125,000 b.p.d. Saudi Arabia– 555,000 b.p.d. Qatar– 40,000 b.p.d. Kuwait– 350,000 b.p.d. Bahrein Island– 30,000 b.p.d. United Kingdom (and Dutch) companies produce and sell 50% of this production, United States companies 45%, French and other companies 5%. The breakdown of this production by oil companies is as follows: Anglo–Iranian (British) 915,000 b.p.d. Cal–Tex (U.S.) 360,000 b.p.d. Standard Oil of New Jersey (U.S.) 175,000 b.p.d. Gulf (U.S.) 175,000 b.p.d. Socony (U.S.) 90,000 b.p.d. Shell (British–Dutch) 40,000 b.p.d. C.F.R. (French) 40,000 b.p.d. Gulbenkian 5,000 b.p.d. The world’s largest oil refinery is located at Abadan. Other important area refineries built for Middle East crude are located at Bahrein Island, Ras Tanura (S.A.), Haifa, Ahmedi (Kuwait) and Tripoli (Lebanon). Thousands of miles of pipelines and extensive port facilities have been constructed to bring this oil to Mediterranean and Persian Gulf tankers. Approximately 1,000,000 b.p.d. of Persian Gulf oil transits the Suez Canal daily and account for ⅔’s of total Suez traffic. Middle East oil currently supplies 75% of European demand, the major part of African and South Asian consumption and virtually all Near and Middle East demand. By 1953, Middle East production is expected to equal total Eastern Hemisphere requirements. Costs are generally considered the lowest in the world and allow Persian Gulf oil to compete in the USA with indigenous supplies, notwithstanding the 9,000 nautical miles distance, U.S. import duties and Suez Canal tolls. The approximate value of crude oil produced in the Middle East is $1 billion per year. The value of crude and products produced is approximately $2 billion per year. The total gross retail value of the oil to the companies, and to the consumers involved, currently amounts to 3–4 billion dollars per year. Both crude and products are controlled by 7 major international companies and the commodity is generally retained within the group through production, refining, transportation and marketing stages. Oil companies have invested over 1 billion dollars in pipeline, refinery, port, communication, transportation, housing, etc., facilities in the Near East. Oil producing states currently earn 100–200 million dollars per year in direct royalties, the greater part of which is hard or convertible currency. Non-oil producing states make indirect financial gains through receipt of transit fees, security fees, refinery taxes, canal dues, port dues, etc. Approximately 100,000 employees are locally engaged by oil companies in the Middle East area. B. The Importance of Middle East Oil (1) To the Middle East: The important resources of this barren, desert area, half the size of the United States, are human resources and oil. Development of the human resources depends to a large extent on the development of the oil resources. The introduction of the Bedouin to the 20th century western civilization is promoted by foreign oil companies. Without oil the incentive of the Western World to develop this desert area, as well as the ability of the peoples in the region to develop the resources of their own states, would be almost totally absent. Among the specific advantages gained by the Middle East from the progressive development of oil resources are (1) for oil company employees: food, pay, housing, sanitation, health facilities, social welfare, occupational training and education and (2) for the area at large: the development of roads, airports, seaports, communications, water supplies, new methods and equipment, new skills and new enterprise. These activities primarily affect the lives of those directly associated with oil activities but an indirect impact of the Western World reaches peoples and areas far removed from the locus of oil development through such oil operations as involved in the big inch pipeline projects from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. Most obvious and tangible contribution to Middle East states is money. Oil companies virtually support the economies of the riparian states of the Persian Gulf. 75% of Saudi Arabian income is directly derived from oil royalties; with this money Saudi Arabia has launched an ambitious development program. Oil royalties play an even more important part of Kuwait’s income. In Iran the Seven Year Plan for economic development uses AIOC royalties exclusively; due to the importance of AIOC oil the U.K. converts into hard currency approximately $100 million per year of company sterling payments in Iran. In Iraq the recent IBRD loan for improvement of irrigation facilities is guaranteed by oil royalties. Even in Egypt, Persian Gulf oil is responsible for two-thirds of all Suez Canal revenue. These various payments for the most part represent hard currency earnings and place Middle East oil states in a uniquely advantageous position in international trade. There are many miscellaneous benefits derived from oil company operations. For example, oil companies contribute, help to foreign governments in establishing procedures and giving advice on such diversified and technical subjects as mapping, boundary disputes, town planning, airline operations, etc. Foreign governments, generally rely too heavily on oil companies for miscellaneous advice and assistance outside the normal scope of oil activities. Although this informal assistance is often of an importance which is only recognizable locally, the summation of these personal considerations contributes to closer ties of understanding between Orient and Occident. Since the economies of the Persian Gulf states are based on oil and since economic progress is derived from oil operations and oil royalties, so too is political stability in these countries a direct function of oil operations. When oil production is threatened as in the case of the recent sterling difficulties of American companies in the area, the continuing political stability of governments which have come to depend on oil company revenues to run their governments is likewise jeopardized. (2) To the rest of the World (ex. U.S.): Middle East oil currently supplies approximately 75% of all European requirements, a major part of the petroleum requirements of Africa, South Asia, and almost all the requirements of the Near and Middle East. By 1953 Middle East production should be sufficient to satisfy the total demand of the Eastern Hemisphere. Due to U.K. control of approximately 50% of Middle East oil resources, Middle East oil represents a vital contribution to the viability of the U.K. The U.K. uses Middle East oil to balance trade with many different countries of the world. The operations of AIOC in Iran are considered to be the most important commercial U.K. holding abroad. The French and Dutch also profit heavily from Middle East oil operations. Middle East oil assures Eastern Hemisphere markets of adequate supplies of fuel at lower cost than would be possible if the Western Hemisphere were forced to supply these needs and is a strong force contributing to lower world prices. (3) To the USSR: If the USSR could break the flow of Middle East oil to its normal markets, international trade would suffer a severe dislocation affecting, probably by shortages and rising prices, the economies of all states using oil. In the case of the U.K. and other western European countries highly geared to the use of oil this rupture could in turn affect not only economic viability but also political stability and the defensive position of Western Europe. Such rupture would place strains on the U.S. domestic economy and would greatly increase the drain oil the strategic reserves of the Western Hemisphere. If the USSR could obtain control and use of these resources, it would not only provide the USSR and Satellite countries with adequate supplies of fuel in peace and war but it would provide Communism with an easily developed weapon with which to gain political ends in other states of the Eastern Hemisphere. At present the USSR and Satellite countries are reportedly hampered both in peace and in war by a shortage of petroleum products. (4) To the U.S.: Middle East oil is chiefly important to the U.S. for reasons given in (1), (2), (3). In addition, Middle East oil is used in U.S. to supplement domestic supplies. It further exerts deflationary pressure on oil prices to U.S. consumers. Use of Middle East oil conserves Western Hemisphere resources which are vital to the Allied Nations in an emergency. The military draws heavily on Middle East oil for its world-wide requirements. Middle East oil provides commercial American firms and American investors with profitable enterprise, U.S. companies owning approximately 45% of Middle East production. Control of this source of energy, important in peace and war, is a desirable goal in itself. Oil operations of U.S. companies in the area familiarizes large numbers of U.S. technicians with strategic materials in a strategic area; area intelligence is consequently excellent. Oil company activities provide the West’s broadest contact with the lower levels of Middle East peoples; oil companies are instrumental and can be more instrumental in contributing to the attainment of overall U.S. policy objectives for the area, e.g. economic and political stability, increased standard of living, Western orientation, development of democratic processes, expansion international trade, etc. (5) It is obvious that the underground oil resources of the Middle East do not constitute an unmixed blessing. The fallowing general propositions have been used in support of this point: ( a ) Oil has been instrumental in making the Middle East a battleground of world powers and has interfered with the independence of Middle East states. ( b ) Many Arabs do not desire 20th Century Western civilization and culture and ill will may also be engendered by foreign enterprise. ( c ) Foreign states and foreign interests may have profited more than the states and people of the producing areas. ( d ) Development follows the convenience of oil companies and immediately affects a relatively small proportion of nationals. ( e ) Oil wealth of ten breeds corrupt and inefficient oligarchy. ( f ) Oil exploitation may not be translated fully into capital formation. ( g ) Development of Middle East oil may adversely affect the economies of certain Latin American states of strategic interest. ( h ) Middle East oil may adversely affect the development of strategic Western Hemisphere reserves. These general propositions have a validity of little relation to the strength of the preceding affirmative points. C. Conflicts over Middle East Oil—Background The history of Middle East oil has been chiefly characterized by ( a ) extraordinary technical development making vast supplies of oil available to world markets, ( b ) conflict between foreign companies and between foreign governments for control of these resources, ( c ) increasing conflict between nationals and foreign interests over increasing the national share of benefits from oil development and national control of these resources. The outstanding importance of oil to nations in peace and war is responsible for these developments and, since this importance is increasing, so these conflicts can be expected to continue until the oil is either exhausted or supplanted by a new source of energy. To review briefly the background of these conflicts: Control of the first Middle East oil production, developed in Iran by private British interests, was effected by the British Admiralty in order to secure a strategically located source of Empire oil supplies. At about the same time Germany and Great Britain carried their commercial struggle to control potential Mesopotamian oil into Near Eastern battle fields. Following World War I the U.K. and France divided former German claims to Mesopotamian oil; the U.S. Government contested this division, and by diplomatic means won the participation of private American interests in Iraq oil. These U.S., British, and French companies then drew a “red line” around the rest of the Middle East, promising to work together in this area. Intercompany disputes between these established companies and non-established interests typified the first mid-war period with new U.S. interests securing important concessions. The Axis powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, as well as the USSR all sought to break this Anglo-American monopoly, both before and during World War II. During hostilities wells were destroyed or plugged in all Mid-East areas but Iran and Saudi Arabia where production greatly expanded. Since the World War II production has quadrupled; the USSR has been the only foreign power outside the area to attempt challenging US–UK control of Middle East oil. Minor conflicts continue between US and UK established companies as well as between established US–UK companies and new US–UK competition, but chief conflict has developed between established foreign companies and nationals desiring increased control of and/or increased benefits from these natural resources. D. Conflicts over Middle East Oil—Current Problems (1) Iran: The long unresolved problem of the AIOC Supplemental Agreement menaces economic progress and political stability in Iran. Following Iran’s demands for the Venezuela type sharing of profits arrangements, AIOC and Iranian officials reached a compromise agreement in 1948 calling for an increase in royalty from approximately 22¢ a barrel (1933 Agreement) to 33¢ a barrel plus miscellaneous additional financial benefits. This would mean a lump sum payment by AIOC of approximately $60 million and future payments of approximately $100 million at present production rates. The Iranian Majlis, however, refused the agreement in a 1949 session marked by emotional excesses and has since shown no disposition to sign. AIOC and the British are genuinely hated in Iran; approval of AIOC is treated as political suicide. Iranians have since made miscellaneous requests for additional benefits including: Increased employment of Iranians, government right to audit books, 5–10 year renegotiation, increased role of Iranians in AIOC management. The Prime Minister has asked AIOC to begin payments at the new rate and make installment payments of back sums due under the unratified Supplemental Agreement. Since the Majlis is not in session, the agreement cannot be submitted for ratification for months; meanwhile, Iran urgently needs this money for its 7-Year Plan. Both US and UK Governments believe it important that AIOC comply with this request because of the economic, political and strategic considerations involved. AIOC, however, refuses to pay until the agreement is ratified; progress is nil, the Prime Minister has threatened concession cancellation. (2) Iraq: IPC similarly has agreed to increase royalty rates in its one producing concession in Iraq from 22¢ a barrel (1931 agreement) to approximately 33¢ a barrel. As in the case of the favorable AIOC terms, the company has received little credit from the public for this increased payment. Iraq still demands payments on Baghdad gold rates and production of all concessions far in excess of company schedules. IPC maintains production cannot be maximized until the two Haifa pipelines are operating, the three concessions unified, and 20% free crude provisions changed. There appears little chance of resolving these differences, most important of which is the Haifa pipeline issue, in the near future. (3) Saudi Arabia: The Saudi Arabian Government is now demanding complete revision of the 1933 concession contract, claiming conditions have changed since 1933, the company has been far more successful than anticipated in 1933, other companies pay more both in Saudi Arabia and in other areas of the world, AIOC and IPC have renegotiated in their respective areas. Aramco meanwhile has been reporting an increasingly anti-American undertone in their relations with Saudi Arabia and report ceaseless Saudi Arabian nibbling at company operations wherever money is involved. The Saudi Arabian Government has received large advances and loans, and now demands the company postpone invoices, pay “protection fees” adequate to support a Saudi Arabian army, shut down company communications centers, pay sterling royalties at discount rates, pay other fees, duties, etc. Unfortunately whereas Iraqi and Iranian royalties are put to relatively worthwhile purposes, Saudi Arabia remains in financial anarchy. The company would be better prepared to make a new agreement with the Saudis if there were any assurance that a new document would settle outstanding issues. The Aramco Board has, however, authorized President Moore to discuss renegotiation with Saudi authorities. Revision as contemplated by the Saudi Arabian Government could be expected to have obvious repercussions on other contracts in the area, particularly since the key issue appears to be Saudi Arab demands for an income tax. No Mid East concessionaire now pays local income taxes. (4) Kuwait and Other Arab Sheikhdoms: Oil problems in Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms principally involve land and sea boundary disputes. Settlement of the counter claims of the Kuwait Oil Company and the American Independents Oil Company over the three Persian Gulf Islands of Karu, Maradim and Kubbar awaits selection of the third arbitrator. Oil company operations and Saudi Arab–UK relations continue to be adversely affected by the unresolved dispute over land and sea boundaries between Saudi Arabia and Arab Sheikhdoms of the Peninsula, particularly Qatar, Bahrein, Trucial Oman and Muscat. The Saudi Arabian Government has asked that a commission examine counter claims in the field and desires to deal with the Sheikhs directly. The U.S. Government supports this position. The U.K. agrees in principle to such a field commission but desires prior submission of Saudi Arab claims, acceptance of the U.K. right to negotiate for all Sheikhs involved and has also demanded that the SAG remove certain Saudi Arab markers from certain Persian Gulf islands and shoal lights. The policy of mutual restraint from oil activities in disputed areas is meanwhile being generally followed. (5) Other Near East States ( Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey ): Chief problem of oil companies throughput this area is the increasing encroachment of government in business. In Turkey the government controls all oil exploration, and now desires a government refinery and a pipeline to the Mediterranean from their one producing field. The government already directly handles through the Petrol Office 30% of the Turkish market. Syria too wants a local refinery and has started increasing government storage facilities to handle the 200,000 tons per year of oil provided the government under the Trans Arabian pipeline contract. Lebanon is seeking the same crude oil provisions won by Syria from Tapline and is demanding a direct share of the output of the IPC Tripoli refinery. Jordan wants its own refinery and enough crude oil from Tapline to supply their total petroleum requirements. In Iraq the government continues to press foreign loans to start work on their Kellogg-designed refinery. Israel has threatened nationalization of the Haifa refinery. The government is also considering forming a new marketing company which would have government participation and would take over a share of markets now held by established private interests. The Egyptian Government is increasing the government refinery capacity to 26,000 barrels a day. The government not only expects to acquire ownership of the Cairo-Suez pipeline but has requested bids on a second pipeline from Suez to Cairo. Legislative control of all phases of the oil industry from exploration to marketing continues to increase in Egypt and has already resulted in Standard Oil of New Jersey abandonment of its Egyptian exploration operations. Oil companies in Egypt demand (1) exception of oil companies from Egyptian Company Law requiring 51% Egyptian capital, (2) modification and clarification of mining regulations which overcontrol the industry, (3) repatriation of profits, depreciation, expenses, (4) modification of government right to obtain crude and products at special prices, (5) payment for oil at world market prices (Piatt’s low). Latest crisis in Egypt resulted from oil company advisement that 987 oil workers would be released this year and that Sinai reserves would be depleted in 1952 if present conditions persisted. The Egyptian Government reacted first with threats of taking over the industry, then agreed once more to work out differences with the companies. Meanwhile, Socony and Shell continue prepared to pull out of Egyptian exploration and the Egyptian Government continues to woo other petroleum interests without noticeable success. It should be mentioned that this friction in Egypt over oil prices extends throughout the Near East area. Price troubles have caused three industry ultimatums to the Syrian Government in the past two years. Dollar-short Near East states still find it difficult to pay their oil bills and to appreciate company explanations of Piatt’s oil prices. Since oil companies cannot indefinitely supply products without payment, crises inevitably result. (6) All Areas: Possibly the outstanding problem throughout the whole area is the problem of public relations. It is believed that few Middle Easterners would lament expropriation or nationalization of the oil companies in any part of the Middle East. Few are aware of the benefits received from oil operations. Oil companies’ efforts at public relations are usually devoted to political leaders; little is done to win over the people in the areas of operations on whom the long-run stability of the concession essentially depends. In Iran AIOC has been wrongly predicting the passage of their generous Supplemental Agreement for one year while the government on the other hand is speaking of cancelling the concession. In Iraq IPC granted generous terms and expected automatic approval by Iraqis without press buildup; large segments of the press immediately criticized the terms. Although oil companies may not expect to become popular, techniques used profitably in the Western Hemisphere to improve public relations would be useful in the Middle East. iii. discussion With the threat of Communist aggression increasing throughout the world, the Middle East is attracting the close attention of world powers. The incentive for Communist attention to be directed to the Middle East is evident. The area is highly attractive to the USSR because of oil, its strategic location at the air, land and sea crossroads of Eurasia and its vulnerability to attack from without and within. Apart from the outer shell of resistance exhibited by Turkey and Iran, states historically familiar with the USSR, the ability of Middle East armed forces and the desire of local populations to resist Communist military forces appears almost non-existent. It is believed that Soviet striking forces could not be prevented by the West from fast overrunning Persian Gulf oil fields. The vulnerability of the area and the oil to internal attack also appears high. Communism’s alleged support for the underdog, in an area of underdogs, and its promise of quick relief have opportunity for expansion in the Middle East where masses of people live in circumstances of exceptional poverty and ignorance, where governments are often corrupt, inefficient and of, by and for the upper class and where increasing numbers of partially educated but frustrated younger generations are becoming available for explosive action. Communist propaganda tries to exploit this internal situation and to place responsibility on the West. Unfortunately, Western powers are already unpopular, the European nations chiefly because of their lingering reputation for colonialism and imperialism, the U.S. chiefly because of its support for the Jewish state of Israel. There unfortunately also exists a history of friction and dissatisfaction over the oil operations of foreign interests in the area. “Anglo–American oil imperialists” receive their full share of attention not only from those preaching Communism but from the increasing numbers of xenophobes in the area who believe that both the West and the Soviets are interested in only the exploitation of the Middle East and that both should be rejected. It has therefore seemed evident that to maintain and protect the West’s oil position in the Middle East and to attain overall U.S. Middle East policy objectives, including economic progress, political stability and the development of Western orientation and democratic processes, increased efforts must be made on every available front to prove that the American way of life and the American meaning of democracy can be made to have meaning for people living in the Middle East and can be shown to offer more rewards during their generation than those offered by others. In these efforts oil companies are playing an essential role. Oil companies occupy, as described above, not only an integral part of Middle East affairs but present the West with its broadest contact with local peoples at the lowest level. Thus, to a large extent the maintenance and protection of Western oil interests in the Middle East depends on the attainment of overall U.S. policy objectives for the area and similarly to a large extent the attainment of these objectives depends on the manner in which oil operations are carried out. As local dissatisfactions with oil operations are removed the strength of the Middle East to resist the appeal of Communism and anti-West nationalism is proportionately increased. Near East people must be more clearly shown that oil operations work to their direct benefit. In bringing this situation about oil companies must improve their salesmanship of their considerable accomplishments and they must through imaginative leadership show themselves capable of making continuous and difficult internal and external adaptations to their fast changing Middle East environment. Discussion of specific issues and suggested recommendations follow: 1. Public Relations Attention of Mid East oil companies to their public relations is immediately needed. Means of reaching the illiterate elements must particularly be found. Top government officials are usually well-briefed by companies, but critical movements for expropriation, nationalization, etc. usually come from below. Even Parliament deputies seldom seem to be aware of basic information, such as annual royalty payments of oil companies. The Iranian Majlis, appears to have had little idea of what they voted on when rejecting the large AIOC offer contained in the Supplemental Agreement. Without such knowledge translated to the lowest levels it is difficult to see how local satisfaction with oil operations can be approached. Oil companies which have been so effective in selling their products should devote more energy selling themselves to the Middle East. As long as US–UK oil companies are condemned, so too will the U.S. and U.K. and their principles. Specifically, recommendations in the field of press and public relations include: ( a ) The U.S. Government should warn oil companies against concentrating public relations efforts on high government officials rather than directing such approaches to the public. ( b ) The U.S. Government should encourage fullest company use of press and public relations staffs in the field to assure fullest local understanding of benefits received from company operations. ( c ) The U.S. Government through its own media should itself support such efforts to publicize foreign and domestic accomplishments of oil companies. ( d ) The U.S. Government should endeavor to minimize publicity of Anglo-American “collusion” on oil in the Middle East while at the same time avoiding Anglo-American conflicts over oil, i.e. no oil publicity mentioning the US–UK together. ( e ) Oil companies should be cautioned not to overplay publicity on benefits received from pipeline operations. ( f ) The U.S. Government should encourage publicity involving abandonment of exploration activities by oil companies in the area. ( g ) The U.S. Government should encourage publicity of new companies interested but not well-known in the Middle East. ( h ) The U.S. Government should encourage oil publications to distribute free copies to foreign petroleum officials and to solicit substantive views on substantive issues from them for publication. 2. Intelligence Sound public relations are impossible without thorough knowledge and understanding of public opinion. There is little evidence to indicate that oil companies in the Middle East have carried out or are carrying out organized examinations of public opinion in the area of their operations. The illiteracy rate makes this task more difficult but more urgent since imprinted opinions may be no less important and more dangerous. There is little evidence to indicate that oil companies particularly in Iraq and Iran either know how they are regarded or the reasons for local resentment until perhaps their concessions come up for debate. In order to improve the powers of examination and diagnosis, the following recommendations for improved general intelligence are suggested: ( a ) The U.S. Government should help Posts maintain and increase contact with overt and covert public opinion affecting oil companies and should encourage oil companies to do likewise. ( b ) The U.S. Government should encourage the companies to institute intensive studies (opinion surveys, sociological or cultural anthropological studies, etc.) re the impact and impression of oil company operations on local populations, removal of basic tensions established therein, methods of making adjustments as painless as possible. ( c ) The U.S. Government should exchange information with U.K. officials on all phases of NE oil operations, except commercial secrets, on all levels at home and particularly in the field. ( d ) The U.S. Government should complement its company sources of information by increasing efforts to make direct contact with oil, press, labor, etc. officials of foreign governments. ( e ) The U.S. Government should maintain closest liaison at home and abroad with all oil companies operating in the area. It should specifically facilitate cooperation between Labor Attachés and important company labor officials and facilitate the exchange of labor reports. ( f ) The U.S. Government should seek to increase Financial and Treasury Attaché positions as well as Labor Attaché positions in the area. ( g ) Consulates should be established at Kirkuk, Kuwait, and S. Iran. ( h ) The U.S. Government should facilitate direct contact between U.S. Consul Representatives and Sheikhdoms of the Arabian Peninsula. ( i ) The U.S. Government should take advantage of schools run by oil companies for the training of field personnel. 3. Concession Contracts The outstanding problem affecting the stability of oil concessions in the area involves the financial provisions of concession contracts. As described earlier, Middle East states are demanding a greater financial return from their concessions. This pressure on the part of sovereign states is difficult to resist. Experience in other oil producing states of the world indicates that this movement towards increased national benefits and increased national control of oil operations is ubiquitous. If progress towards these national goals is obstructed by foreign companies, the process appears to become more accelerated or explosive. Like the history of labor agreements in the U.S., contracts however valid do not stand up or satisfy oil producing states indefinitely. Until it is possible to provide effective, objective and acceptable arbitration (probably international arbitration) on these issues which affect commercial, economic, political and strategic interests of nations, it appears these contracts will continue to be unilaterally modified in favor of producing states until oil companies lose business, withdraw or the relationship [is] broken abruptly. The latter development is actively encouraged by Communism. No absolute values are available in determining how the benefits from oil development should be divided. The problem is a philosophical one to determine in what proportion benefits should be divided between oil companies producing oil, people living over oil reservoirs, consumers using the products and governments of the three elements involved. Middle East states it appears are now aiming at the Venezuelan sharing of profits arrangement which results in Venezuela earning three times as much as all Middle East states combined. Oil companies argue with logic that the increased political risks in the Middle East are greater and that lower per barrel royalties encourage increased production and increased revenues. These arguments are probably effective only in delaying the date of paying at least the 50–50 Venezuelan arrangement. Since there is no guarantee that producing states would remain satisfied with the Venezuela type contract, if won, oil companies can be expected to oppose liberalization of concession contracts until pressures by foreign governments threaten the life of the concession. The key to successful oil operations abroad would seem to be the ability to recognize and evaluate these pressures. If calculations of critical pressures are in error, mistakes like the Mexican expropriation result, U.S. Government representatives at home and abroad provide an essential function in analyzing these pressures. Since the achievement of U.S. policy objectives are tied into the stability of oil concessions, U.S. officials have a positive responsibility to increase their attention to these pressures and to pass on their evaluations to companies concerned. Any efforts to encourage oil companies to mend fences in concessions should continue to be complemented by efforts to direct national requests into useful directions. Although the U.S. Government cannot insist that Mid East states refrain from new demands, it is believed that efforts to dissuade Middle East Governments from new rounds of royalty increases might be maximized at this time. This approach seems needed in view of the current international situation and the need for a period of relative stability in the Mid East. The timing seems propitious because of the alignment of basic royalties in the major producing areas of the Middle East. Furthermore, the ability of companies to increase payments has been adversely affected by recent ECA moves reducing prices of Middle East oil. If the choice is available, it would seem in general in the greater interest of the U.S. to see the benefits of Middle East oil spread to world consumers than to have benefits to single states increased. The U.S. Government might consider encouraging companies to counter requests for increased royalties by offering increased production and/or relinquishment of concession areas in which no development is contemplated in the near future. Such relinquishment should help minimize or delay pressures on contracts. It would indicate to producing states that the company cannot be accused of hindering development of the concession, that the company is not monopolistic, and that the company is not in a position to increase payments. These charges are familiar to oil companies operating in the Middle East. Such relinquishment would allow producing states to take advantage of the increased royalty market by offering these areas to new competition. If new competition is unwilling to pay increased royalties, it is indicative that present concessionaires are paying fair royalty rates. In turn, failure of concessionaires to reduce holdings is a strong indication to producing states that the value of the concession is greater to the companies than the royalties paid. Since Middle East states appear to be moving in the direction of Venezuela arrangement, pressures may be expected on Middle East concessions for income, corporation and other taxes from which oil companies are currently exempt. Possible tax credit by the U.S. Treasury would make it desirable from the oil company point of view to retreat in the face of demands for increased income in this direction. With the U.S. Government and public the loser in such action, however, this process might not be as favored as the lines mentioned above. Failure of oil companies to pay U.S. taxes while benefiting from U.S. protection and support has already been subject to Senate investigation which damaged the reputation of the oil industry. Reducing the size of concessions on the other hand might not only help stabilize concessions but would fulfill another policy objective of the U.S. Government, i.e. the promotion of competition. Since many new American companies are interested in the area and financially strong enough to enter the field, continuation of oil properties in U.S. hands would be almost assured. Middle East states prefer American companies to those of other nationalities. Such tactical efforts to “hold the line” at this critical moment of international affairs could not succeed over the long run. The Venezuelan situation and presence of 55¢ per barrel Pacific Western royalties and other special Pacific Western financial benefits would probably cause any “hold the line” efforts to fail, particularly if Pacific Western finds production in the Neutral Zone. However, if a short period of relative stability can be obtained and if major oil producing companies can be persuaded to give up parts of their concessions to new competition, major policy objectives will have been obtained. Since company retreat is inevitable, it would seem useful to make the retreat as beneficial and orderly as possible to all concerned. Benefits other than outlays of money should be maximized as another method of decreasing pressures on concession contracts. Nonfinancial benefits such as roads, railroads and housing decrease the opportunities for profligacy and instability and increase the company investment in the people in whom the long-term security of concessions rests. Aramco should be urged to facilitate Saudi Arab efforts to establish financial order by continuing royalty payments at a fixed dollar rate in place of gold sovereigns. Payment in gold provides an uncertain base for Saudi Arab financial stability and is used by other Middle East producing states to demand revision of their royalties. Low royalties in sparsely inhabited areas such as Qatar, Kuwait, Trucial Oman are of special concern only if major oil companies divert attention from their concessions in important Middle East states. Increased royalties in these sparsely inhabited countries contribute little to U.S. policy objectives. Other recommendations re concession contracts are: ( a ) The U.S. Government should urge oil companies to include in concession contracts provisions calling for automatic renegotiation of financial clauses every 5 to 10 years. ( b ) The U.S. Government should consider encouraging the adoption of general legislation rather than negotiated concession contracts. ( c ) The U.S. Government should consider support for an International Petroleum Council or some international instrumentality which could arbitrate differences between producing countries and companies. 4. Development The U.S. Government should seek the progressive development of Middle East oil resources in order to preserve Western Hemisphere reserves, to assure the Eastern Hemisphere of adequate oil supplies and to maintain political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. U.S. Government should discourage companies with different interests from concentrating on developing least important areas and should encourage greatest development in areas of population and states which have strategic importance to the U.S. and to the area, i.e. Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In general the U.S. Government should seek maximum development in U.S. owned concessions. However, the U.S. Government should, whenever serious internal dissatisfaction with retarded production jeopardizes the stability of individual concessions, encourage approximately equal development of the resources of these three countries at least until it appears that the potential reserves of these three countries are unequal. For this reason the Iraq big-inch pipeline to the Mediterranean and development of the Basra and Mosul concessions should be encouraged, while no special U.S. consideration would seem to apply to the big-inch pipeline project from Iran and Kuwait. Although development of Western Hemisphere production and reserves would be greater without increased development of Middle East production, active discouragement of Middle East development cannot be attempted. However, present ECA price cuts may indirectly work to this end by decreasing the relative profitability of Middle East oil development. The U.S. Government should urge companies to maximize the efficiency of their oil operations, including the utilization of natural gas, in order to safeguard the legitimate interests of all parties concerned. The U.S. Government should promote the entry of new competition into the Middle East, particularly the competition of U.S. companies and particularly U.S. independent companies. U.S. oil policy objectives in the area can best be fulfilled by and with American companies with American personnel and American methods. This does not counter the recommendation calling for replacement of American oil personnel with local personnel. The control of Middle East resources by the major international companies is subject to serious criticism by both friendly and unfriendly states. The successful participation of independent U.S. companies is a requisite to elimination of that criticism. As stated earlier, companies such as AIOC, IPC and Aramco holding huge concession areas of over 100,000 sq. miles each should be encouraged to relinquish all parts of these concessions which the companies do not plan to develop in the near future. Both IPC and Aramco concessions are approximately the size of the whole Mid-Continent oil region in the U.S. and contain as much oil. Although the analogy is imperfect, to have had the Texas–Oklahoma–Louisiana oil fields controlled by one company would have had obvious disadvantages. Each of these concessionaires has already disproved areas in their concessions which should not be retained. 5. Labor U.S. Government should encourage the U.S. companies and other foreign companies through their respective governments to increase the total benefits to the people in the country of their operations. Labor relations is the field for maximum efforts and attention. Oil companies should identify their oil operations with the peoples of the area concerned by equalizing conditions of work between foreign and local employees, by maximum utilization of local employees, etc. This should be effected by encouraging companies to educate at home and abroad, train at home and abroad, employ at staff and working levels, promote as quickly as possible a maximum number of locals. Companies should be encouraged to improve low-cost family housing, de-emphasize bachelor establishments, remove marked differentiation between housing built for foreign and local employees, etc. Oil companies should be cautioned against overdependence on contract labor in view of the widespread complaint against contract labor’s inferior conditions and practices. The U.S. Government should urge the establishment of grievance machinery to avoid the accumulation of unseen pressures, to prevent subversive movements from going underground, etc. Oil companies should be encouraged to apply to the Near East area other advanced programs regarding hospitalization, sanitation, health, pensions as employed in more sophisticated oil producing states, such as Venezuela. The U.S. Government should increase the Labor Attaché positions in the area. 6. U.S. Relations with Foreign Governments The U.S. Government should continue endeavoring to block foreign governments from making unreasonable demands on oil companies. The U.S. Government should always be prepared to point out the advantages gained by oil producing states from operations of foreign companies. The U.S. Government should continue to emphasize the necessity for respecting valid concession contracts. The U.S. Government should endeavor to discourage any moves by Middle East oil states to form cartels to increase royalty rates in the area or to control production. The U.S. Government should continue urging oil producing states to put royalties to capital formation. The U.S. Government should continue endeavoring to modify legislation unattractive to foreign enterprise and other restrictions to the expansion of the oil industry abroad. The U.S. Government should not engage in petroleum activities and should discourage in every appropriate way tendencies of Middle East states to engage in oil activities. The U.S. Government should continue to discourage any moves towards nationalization or expropriation of oil properties. The U.S. Government should assist operations of government oil organizations where such state organizations already exist while continuing to point out the disadvantages of government oil operations in general. The U.S. Government should admit exceptions to these rules in such cases as the Iran Oil Company and in other instances where government operations have special reasons for existence; e.g. Iraq refinery. The U.S. Government should endeavor to give non-producing states realistic evaluation of their oil potentialities. The U.S. Government should continue to urge the reopening of the Haifa pipeline and the Suez Canal tanker movements to Israel. The U.S. Government should continue to press for the earliest settlement of Persian Gulf boundary problems and the delimitation of Persian Gulf submerged area. 7. Distribution The U.S. Government should continue to make known to U.S. oil companies at every appropriate opportunity that the use of business practices which tend to divide markets, limit access to markets, fix prices, establish quotas or in any other way restrain competition or foster monopolistic control is contrary to U.S. policy. The U.S. Government should assure that oil supplies are made available to all countries on a non-discriminatory basis. The U.S. Government should discuss with oil companies at home and abroad the role played by the Gulf of Mexico Basing Point system in arousing antipathy of N.E. governments against Anglo-American oil companies, the incentive for governments to enter the oil business provided by such exaggerated prices, and the contribution to the viability of N.E. and West European estates which prices connected to Persian Gulf costs could make. The U.S. Government should discourage group company ultimata to countries behind in oil payments. 8. Management The U.S. Government should encourage Middle East oil companies to decentralize authority and place key officials in the field. Field officials should be always available for authoritative discussions with representatives of the country of their operations. The U.S. Government should point out the danger of having company officials of U.S. or allied oil interests in the field with the colonial approach to foreign oil operations. The U.S. Government should urge U.S. companies with Middle East interests to maximize use of Americans in the field, particularly during contract negotiations. The U.S. Government should continue urging companies to employ in Middle East operations techniques found successful in Western Hemisphere and to utilize in the field officials familiar with Western Hemisphere operations. 9. Security The U.S. Government should effect immediate completion of defense, evacuation, denial, demolition plans and disseminate necessary information to proper company and government officials at home and abroad. This information should be coordinated with plans of the U.K. and U.K. companies. Department officials should maintain closest liaison with Defense attachés in field, particularly with regard to organization and implementation of above plans. The U.S. Government should effect continual alert in the field for sabotage of oil installations and effect closest contact with company and country security officers. Companies and countries should continue to differentiate between Communists and those with legitimate complaints. draft Suggested topics for discussion: 1. Iran ( a ) What is the exact influence of the British Government in AIOC affairs? How can the company best be persuaded to liberalize its thinking? What would temporary shut-down of Iranian production mean to the UK? the US? World oil trade? ( b ) Would renegotiation of the 1933 Aramco concession be expected to force renegotiation of the AIOC Supplemental Agreement? What would be the effect on AIOC of an Iranian income tax? ( c ) Would AIOC agreement to pay now under terms of unratified Agreement stabilize or jeopardize the stability of the concession? How stable is the concession? ( d ) At what point will financial demands by Mid-East oil producing states stop? What might be considered fair royalties? Can Pacific Western live with 55¢ royalties? ( e ) Mid East states are demanding the Venezuelan sharing of profits arrangement. Will they be successful? Is this arrangement appropriate for the Middle East? 2. Iraq ( a ) How stable are the three I.P.C. concessions? ( b ) Does I.P.C. know how company operations are regarded by Iraqis? How can this opnion be sampled? Would increased attention to press and public relations in Iraq be useful? What useful moves could be made? ( c ) When will there be a chance of reopening the Haifa lines? Or sending tankers to Haifa from Tripoli or through the Canal? What can the company or the US–UK Governments do? How will continued closure affect I.P.C.? Iraq? Will diversion to Arab port be effected? ( d ) Will I.P.C. be able to unify the three concessions? What would be the result of such unification or the lack of unification to the company? to Iraq? ( e ) What would be the effect of denial of export licenses for the I.P.C. big-inch? Will Iraq ever allow passage of the AIOC big-inch? Will Syria allow passage of Iraq big-inch? ( f ) How do I.P.C. current royalties compare with others in the area? 3. Saudi Arabia ( a ) What developments can be expected from the Government’s demand for renegotiation of the 1933 contract? Can the company divert these demands into other channels keeping contract intact? What effect would payment of income tax have on other concessions? What effect does payment in gold have on other concessions? ( b ) What should be the role of U.S. Government in response to increased government demands on concession contracts? ( c ) How stable is the Aramco concession? What SAG action could be expected if increased payments were denied? ( d ) What development problems exist? 4. Kuwait and other Sheikhdoms ( a ) Do boundary problems constitute a source of serious instability in the area? Would it be advantageous for the SAG and Sheikhdoms to negotiate directly on boundary disputes, etc.? ( b ) Will lower royalties in Sheikhdoms seriously affect the competitive position of companies operating in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran? Will royalties in these Sheikhdoms be forced up to those existing elsewhere in the area? 5. Near East States ( a ) How can government moves to increase control of oil business be discouraged? What justification is there for this development? Did Jersey’s departure from Egypt have advantageous effect? ( b ) What will be the effect in the Middle East of latest ECA moves to reduce Persian Gulf product prices? Will completion of Tapline have any effect on prices? How useful is the application of U.S. prices to Middle East countries? ( c ) Is there any danger of expropriation of oil properties in Egypt? What would be effect of expropriation on other concessions in area? 6. Problems suggested by company representations . 1 An undated reference slip attached to a copy of this paper noted that it was prepared by Funkhouser for McGhee for the files, as requested. A summary of the September 11 meeting with oil company officials was prepared by Funkhouser for McGhee on September 18. That summary is printed in U.S. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy, 93rd, Congress, 2nd Session on Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy , Part 8, Appendix III, pp. 341 ff. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/9–750: Telegram [Document 37] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia ( Hill ) to the Secretary of State secret Jidda , September 7, 1950—4 p. m. 140. Deptel 80, August 31. 1 Garry Owen called this morning and reviewed fully recent developments connection SAG request for reexamination concession. He said President Moore returning States few days to report to his board. Believes Duce will keep Department informed. Owen added he learned that SAG instructed its Embassies Washington and London to employ legal and possibly other experts to come SA to advise SAG on these matters. Sent Department 140, repeated info London 8. Hill 1 Same as telegram 1157 to London, p. 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] . Memorandum by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Special Briefing Memoranda Prepared by Mr. Funkhouser [Document 38] Memorandum by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) secret [ Washington ,] September 14, 1950. Subject: Discussions with British on AIOC It is recommended that the whole question of the AIOC Supplemental Agreement 1 be explored with the Foreign Office with the following emphasis: (1) We have no doubt in our minds that Persian Gulf oil operations have been and continue to be exceptionally profitable from a commercial standpoint, particularly AIOC operations. It is sophistry to suggest oil companies can’t pay and do much more. ( a ) We know Aramco paid off its total investment in five years of operations. AIOC has been operating for 40 years with production costs under 10¢ a barrel and the price of crude oil at $1.00 to $3.00 a barrel. Greatest Iranian development took place chiefly during a period of lowest costs. (2) We recognize that Middle East states are demanding and cannot be prevented from obtaining an increased share of benefits (financial and otherwise) from foreign oil operations. ( a ) The 50–50 sharing of profits agreement in Venezuela, wherein Venezuela earns three times total benefits to all Middle East states, is well known in Tehran. ( b ) Saudi Arabia has been earning over the past three years royalties now promised but not yet paid by AIOC. ( c ) If Pacific Western finds production in the Neutral Zone, it seems apparent that royalty rates throughout the Middle East will again be revised upward. Oil consultants have advised the Department that there is little doubt but that Mr. Getty will be able to sell his oil. ( d ) In view of Saudi Arabian demands for renegotiation of the entire 1933 Aramco concession contract with special emphasis on a Saudi Arabian income tax, it might be to AIOC’s advantage to obtain early acceptance of the less onerous terms of the Supplemental Agreement before revision of the Aramco contract takes place. The income tax feature could involve as much as $45,000,000 a year which is the Aramco income tax in the U.S. and the sum paid by Creole to the Venezuelan Government on production equal to AIOC’s. ( e ) The strongly nationalistic tendencies of Near East states might be emphasized and some comment made about our inclination to treat seriously Razmara’s threatened cancellation of the AIOC concession. ( f ) The AIOC problem is simplified by disagreement over only non-financial terms. ( g ) The Department has in the past and will continue in the future to discourage excessive demands by the Iranian Government and other governments in the Middle East. It might be mentioned that our Petroleum Attaché, Lager, informally took an exceedingly strong position in favor of the Supplemental Agreement offered Iran by AIOC. We are trying to obtain a period of relative stability regarding financial terms of concession contracts. (3) Razmara has demanded: ( a ) Installment payment of royalties due under the new agreement. Purpose: implementation of 7-year plan, political stability, and improved atmosphere for Majlis ratification. ( b ) Four points to sweeten agreement in order to obtain Majlis ratification. (1) Ten-year Iranization program. (2) Examination of AIOC books in order to check on Iranian share of profits. (3) Oil prices in Iran equal lowest given any other customer. (4) Inspection of oil production exported. (4) AIOC has agreed to give Iran an advance of 8 million pounds and to study some means of sweetening the agreement. The advance amounts to merely paying royalties on a current basis (old rate) rather than when due at the end of the year. It is a small concession. The 8 million pounds will go a long way toward balancing the Iranian budget but will contribute little to the solution of the other major issues, i.e. implementation of the Seven-Year Plan, ratification of AIOC agreement, stability of Razmara Government. (5) Our position should be to urge the Foreign Office to accept Razmara demands. ( a ) Sums due under the Supplemental Agreement (as of January 1, 1949) amount to 23 million pounds. This advance or a large part of it would provide funds necessary for economic progress, political stability, would, if properly publicized, improve the atmosphere for ratification of the agreement. ( b ) None of the four non-financial points mentioned by Razmara seem, in our opinion, unreasonable or of a scale of importance which can compare with what new financial demands (such as an income tax) Iran might make or with the issues at stake, i.e. ratification of the agreement, life of the concession, stability of concession contracts in the area, economic progress and political stability in Iran, and stability in the world oil supply picture. (6) You should emphasize the world oil supply picture. According to our oil companies, loss of Iranian oil could not he replaced . The Korean war has already created shortages even with U.S., Venezuela, and Middle East production at record levels. Europe has only six weeks stocks and, as Ministry of Fuel and Power representatives told us, three months would be required to divert Western Hemisphere supplies to AIOC normal markets (if supplies could be found). Ministry of Fuel and Power representatives were alarmed at this situation and the lack of U.S. plans to supply Eastern Hemisphere markets in such an Iranian emergency. While admitting the need for and promising to speed up U.S. oil mobilization plans, we told these representatives in effect that we felt that (a) first responsibility lay with the U.K. Government to take corrective action in Iran, (b) the situation in Iran demanded exceptionally liberal treatment. (7) Mr. Loftus’ comment on our September 11 oil talks: “On the AIOC matter I think the most important conclusion that emerged from the oil discussion was that every sign points to the probability that the British Government is trying to ride two horses and is not really anxious to effect a settlement of the AIOC dispute on reasonable terms. The unanimous view of the company representatives that the Iranian position is reasonable and that compliance with it would be a sound commercial proposition indicates clearly that AIOC could not be holding out against a settlement unless it were not really being urged by the British Government to effect a settlement. This is perhaps the most important point for Mr. McGhee to have in mind in his London discussions.” 1 For further documentation on the interest of the United States in the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, see pp. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] ff. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 786A.022/9–1550: Telegram [Document 39] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State secret London , September 15, 1950—1 p. m. 1643. Deptels 1374 1 and 1364 September 13. 2 Embassy conveyed Department’s views reference markers Persian Gulf Islands to Foreign Office today. Rogers, Eastern Department, confirmed that markers had been removed and made clear UK felt action entirely justified. He said markers had been set up since SAG and UK had agreed discussions on disputed islands and that this action appeared be designed prejudice case in favor SAG. UK felt it could not allow action stand and notified SAG of British intention have markers removed. He appreciated Department’s concern and said Foreign Office would give consideration to our views. He thought that in fact there would be no more removal markers but admitted this pre-supposed SAG would not try install any more. He said that SAG August 30 note indicated SAG would not attempt restore markers pending discussions. Note, according Rogers, seemed admit SAG error by saying that Saudis realized islands were in dispute. UK trying keep jurisdictional issues with SAG in three separate and distinct categories: 1. Disputed islands. According Rogers, UK proposal is that sides present substantiation of claims by November 20 and that after allowing additional time for each study others position, there should be joint discussions. Saudis have already agreed in principle to discussions. 2. Land boundary disputes with trucial sheikhdoms. SAG has still not replied to British note this subject accepting suggestion fact-finding commission under certain conditions (Embdes 1159 September 8 3 and Embtel 239 July 11). 4 3. Division seabed between Bahrein and SAG. UK has prepared proposals which will probably be discussed with Department shortly prior submission SAG (Embdes 1159). Sent Department 1643, repeated info Jidda. Holmes 1 Not printed; it informed the Embassy the Department believed the best interests of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia would be served if no further removal of markers took place on the eve of discussions between those two parties (786A.022/9–1350). 2 Not printed; it was a repeat of telegram 62 from Dhahran, which reported destruction by demolition of some concrete pillars on the Persian Gulf islands bearing Saudi Arabian markers. (786A.022/9–1350) 3 Not printed; the Embassy reported the British still had not received a reply to their note (786A.022/9–1550). 4 Not printed; it reported on the British note to Saudi Arabia, in which Britain accepted the Saudi Arabian suggestion for a fact-finding commission, provided the Saudi Arabian Government produced a detailed statement in support of its claims and admitted the right of the British to negotiate for the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and Sultan of Muscat in areas claimed by them (786A.022/7–1150). Telegram 1894 from London, September 29, reported Saudi Arabia had replied to the British note on boundary negotiations, rejecting the British requirements for negotiations. Telegram 177 from Jidda, September 30, reported receiving a copy of the Saudi Arabian Government memorandum to the British rejecting the British claims, but stating the (Saudi Arabians were willing to have a commission discuss the facts of the matter without prejudice to either party. Documentation is in Department of State file 786A.022. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fred H. Awalt of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 886A.00/10–550 [Document 40] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fred H. Awalt of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs secret [ Washington ,] October 5, 1950. Subject: Visit by Aramco officials Participants: Mr. James Terry Duce—Vice President, Aramco Mr. Fred Davies—Vice President, Aramco Mr. W. Spurlock, Legal Counsel, Aramco Col. Wm. A. Eddy, Consultant, Aramco NEA—Mr. Burton Y. Berry NE—Mr. Fraser Wilkins NE—Mr. Richard Funkhouser Mr. Fred H. Awalt Summary Mr. Davies, Mr. Spurlock and Col. Eddy have recently arrived home from Saudi Arabia and called upon Mr. Berry to discuss Saudi Arabian problems. They expressed their collective opinion that the Saudi Arabian Government was becoming disillusioned toward the United States and the effectiveness of its interest in Saudi Arabia. They stressed the feeling of insecurity the King had in respect to the Hashemites and the vulnerability of the Persian Gulf area from Russia, as well as uneasiness toward British extension of power in the area in default of a positive American attitude toward Saudi Arabia. Mr. Davies mentioned military assistance as an important factor in our relations which had not been implemented as yet, failure of which was causing anxiety and impatience in the Saudi Arabian Government. He asked what prospects were for early action. Mr. Berry explained that it was difficult for the Saudis to appreciate how slowly democracies must move in important matters of state, but that we at long last obtained the necessary legislative action in July under which Saudi Arabia could be designated as eligible for cash reimbursable military assistance, 1 which was what they had asked us for two years ago. Mr. Berry added that we planned to begin our discussions with the Saudi Arabian Government soon after Ambassador Hare’s arrival at Jidda the latter part of this month. Mr. Davies inquired whether this aid would be free or extended on some favorable basis such as lend-lease. Mr. Wilkins explained that the act as passed by Congress allowed no terms other than full purchase, cash in advance or on delivery. Mr. Davies said that would be very unsatisfactory to the King, and Col. Eddy stated that it was not so much a question of money as much as it was a matter of pride. He said the Arabs were aware of our giving grant aid of hundreds of millions to other countries, and they believed their country was at least as deserving in point of vulnerability to Russian designs and extent of American investment. Consequently, Col. Eddy explained, it would be helpful if we could find a way to extend some grant aid, if only a million dollars worth and let them purchase the rest. Col. Eddy said that such a token grant would give them the feeling of partnership with us and our allies which would bolster their pride and create a feeling of good will far more valuable than the sum involved. Mr. Spurlock brought up the problem of boundaries and said that it would boost the Saudi Arabian Government’s morale enormously if the United States would take a friendly interest in the problem. He said that Saudi Arabia feels quite alone and at the mercy of the British in these disputes. Mr. Duce asked what we said to the UK regarding demolition of island markers, and Mr. Awalt replied that we expressed our concern and hoped nothing further would be done to upset the status quo until the UK and Saudi Arabia had an opportunity to discuss their claims on or after November 20. Mr. Wilkins added that we had also suggested to the British that they exchange with Saudi Arabia the bases for their respective claims to areas in dispute and also to cite the authority by which the UK was empowered to act for the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. Mr. Duce asked if we had told the Saudi Arabian Government we had done so, and Mr. Wilkins replied that we had informed our Jidda Embassy which would undoubtedly inform the Saudi Arabian Government informally. Mr. Davies asked if we could not give some assurances to Saudi Arabia for its territorial integrity. He said the tripartite declaration 2 had been received with some misgivings and that a unilateral public statement by us alone would be more reassuring to Saudi Arabia than anything else. Mr. Wilkins asked if a letter from the President to the King expressing friendship and interest in the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia would be satisfactory if it were made public. Col. Eddy thought it would serve the purpose most admirably. He also suggested that we offer some concrete gesture of friendliness. Mr. Berry asked if an invitation to the King to visit the United States would serve the purpose, and Col. Eddy said it would be deeply appreciated, although he would no doubt send a son instead. Col. Eddy suggested that Prince Mansour, the Minister of Defense, should be invited to come to the States to visit our military bases and schools and be sent home with a plan of cooperation both in Saudi Arabia and here, such as in the training of Saudi cadets. It was pointed out that we were already doing that and would do more but the availability of Saudi trainees with sufficient English was a limiting factor. It was agreed, however, that such a program was desirable and that a visit by the Defense Minister to the US would be useful. We had deferred inviting him heretofore since it would be pointless without a program of military assistance to offer. 1 For documentation on cash reimbursable military assistance for Saudi Arabia, see the editorial note, p. 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] . 2 The Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East was printed in the Department of State Bulletin , June 5, 1950, p. 886. For documentation on the declaration; see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. and pp. 122 ff. herein. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fred H. Awalt of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 886A.2553/10–2650 [Document 41] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fred H. Awalt of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] October 26, 1950. Subject: Conversation with Aramco officials. Participants: Mr. Fred Davies, Executive Vice President, Aramco, Dhahran Mr. J. Terry Duce, Vice President, Aramco, New York Col. W. A. Eddy, Aramco Consultant, Washington Mr. F. Wilkins—NE Mr. F.H. Awalt—NE Discussion: Mr. Davies stated that Aramco had discussed their position on the SAG demands with Ambassador Al-Faqih in the hope that he would interpret to his Government the oil company’s views in a more acceptable fashion and make the SAG more responsive to their arguments. Much to their surprise and consternation, however, the Ambassador seemed to be primed for the interview. He gave little regard to colored charts which Aramco had prepared in order to give graphic support to their position and he stressed that ability to pay must be the criterion for settlement with the SAG and not equality of payments in the PG area. He stated further that there was no doubt that Aramco could pay more and they must, therefore, do so. Otherwise, the Ambassador replied, his Government would make other arrangements for exploitation of its oil. He also indicated to Aramco consideration of a partnership arrangement with the SAG. Mr. Duce observed that they had rarely known Sheikh Asad to speak with such authority. Mr. Davies stated that the question of the conduct of the negotiations in the United States arose and Sheikh Asad has referred the matter to his Government. Mr. Davies had no doubt that SAG would reply indicating Mr. Davies should return to Saudi Arabia at once for talks there. Mr. Davies said that Aramco planned to talk to Sheikh Asad again on October 31 regarding their charts and to have a Board meeting about November 3. Before the latter, however, they planned to consult the Department regarding the latest developments. 1 Mr. Wilkins thanked Mr. Davies for his report on the talk with Asad Bey and observed that possibly Asad had been primed as a means of bringing pressure on Aramco prior to Mr. Davies return. Mr. Wilkins also believed that the conduct of negotiations in the US might be disadvantageous unless someone with authority such as the Crown Prince or Amir Feisal should come. Mr. Davies, Mr. Duce and Col. Eddy agreed. Mr. Duce added with respect to a partnership between Aramco and SAG that such an arrangement might force Aramco to withdraw from Saudi Arabia, that Middle East oil stability would be upset and that because total oil production would be reduced rationing might result in the US. Mr. Wilkins replied that he had discussed this point with Mr. McGhee previously and that Mr. McGhee did not believe developments would take such a pessimistic turn. 1 In telegram 259 from Jidda, November 1, the Embassy reported: “Aramco informs Davies, Executive Vice President, has decided following talks with SA Ambassador Washington to call another meeting Executive Committee Aramco board to discuss new aspects forthcoming negotiations. Since impossible convene meeting prior November 6, Davies arrival in Dhahran now postponed until November 9–10 and unlikely he will arrive Jidda for talks before November 15.” Telegram 273 from Jidda, November 4, reported Saudi Arabian Government officials had become increasingly impatient at the failure of Aramco officials to arrive and open negotiations. Documentation is in Department of State file 886A.2553. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 886A.2553/11–250 [Document 42] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] November 2, 1950. Subject: Aramco Exploration Activities Participants: Mr. Seager, Manager, Aramco Exploration Department, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia Mr. Eddy, Washington Representative, Aramco NE—Mr. Awalt NE—Mr. Funkhouser NE—Mr. Russell In discussions of Aramco exploration activities in Saudi Arabia the following points were made: (1) Aramco’s drilling program calls for seven rigs, three at Ain Dar and one each at Haradh, Abqaiq, Qatif and Safaniyah. (2) The Safaniyah location is 4–5 kilometers off the shore at Ras al Safaniyah. This rig will be spudded in before the end of the year and will be used to fulfill Aramco’s drilling obligations in the submerged areas. It is remembered that an Aramco shallow depth core drill struck an oil producing horizon at this location. Mr. Seager stated that seismic evidence indicated that the structure dipped off sharply to the northwest which would minimize the chances of its extension into the undivided and unconcessioned Kuwait Neutral Zone submerged area. (3) Abqaiq field is currently being pulled at a rate considerably in excess of its most efficient production. To relieve pressure on Abqaiq the Ain Dar structure is being developed. A 22-inch pipeline between the two fields is nearing completion. To date Abqaiq has shown no tendencies toward water encroachment which to Mr. Seager was unfortunate since the absence of this evidence indicated no water drive in the field. Mr. Seager stated that there were no plans for recycling the large amounts of waste gas at this time. (4) Latest production, week of October 8, amounted to 620,000 barrels a day; 15,000 of which came from Qatif, 100,000 from Ain Dar and the remainder from Abqaiq. The Haradh field now has five producing wells. However, Mr. Seager could not state what pipeline plans the company had in mind for this field. Mr. Eddy asked if the Department was still actively interested in having a pipeline directed toward the southeast part of the Arabian Peninsula for strategic purposes. Mr. Awalt answered that to his knowledge this subject had not arisen since he had been on the Saudi Arabian desk and had no knowledge that any other Department agency was actively interested in any such project. Mr. Eddy seemed interested in developing the point and expressed the thought that the Department of Defense was the agency interested in this matter. (5) Mr. Awalt discussed in some detail latest developments with respect to boundary problems. Mr. Seager stated that the Saudi Arabian Government had not placed a marker on the Island of Farsi since it was well known that the island was an Iranian possession. Mr. Awalt stated that this was the first indication that had been made to him indicating that the Saudi Arabian Government respected Iranian claims to this island, and expressed the belief which later proved correct that the Saudi Arabian Government had placed a marker on Farsi. (6) Mr. Seager emphasized the point that Aramco was only carrying out orders from the Saudi Arabian Government in its research on boundary claims, taxation, tribal allegiance, etc. in disputed areas. Regarding islands and submerged areas, Mr. Seager stated that Aramco had no commercial desire to extend limits of their concession, that it was much more costly to drill in the water than on land and that Aramco had more land structures than they could develop in a great many years. Mr. Awalt evinced some surprise at this statement and asked if Aramco did not desire to extend the area of their concession into new oil producing zones, why did they take out the concession covering submerged areas. Mr. Eddy stated that, “as anyone in Aramco will tell you, the only reason the submerged area concession was taken was in order to keep others out”. (7) Mr. Seager, in answer to a question, stated that Aramco’s relinquishment program called for 33,000 sq. miles to be given up every three years. This article was confirmed at the time the submerged area concession was signed. Aramco had already given up 33,000 sq. miles in the Yemen area, the location of which Mr. Seager was vague about. Mr. Funkhouser asked if the company contemplated publicity on these relinquishments. Mr. Eddy replied that this was a question for top management and that he would endeavor to get an answer from Mr. Duce. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs 886A.2553/11–2250 [Document 43] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard Funkhouser of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs secret [ Washington ,] November [ 6? ], 1 1950. Subject: SAG Demands for Renegotiation of Aramco Contract Participants: NEA—Assistant Secretary McGhee Mr. Fred Davies, Aramco Executive Vice President Mr. J. T. Duce, Aramco Vice President Mr. Spurlock, Aramco Legal Counsel Colonel Eddy, Aramco Adviser NEA—Ambassador Childs NEA—Mr. Loftus NE—Mr. Funkhouser NE—Mr. Kopper 2 PED—Mr. Moline 3 Problem: To inform Aramco of Government’s position regarding Saudi Arabian demands for changes in the concession contract. Assistant Secretary McGhee initiated the discussion with a detailed exposition of the Department’s thinking with regard to latest Saudi Arab demands on Aramco, the nature and legal aspects of concession contracts in the Near East and the political and economic forces involved in adjusting the Aramco contract to the situation in Saudi Arabia. In essence, he stated ( a ) that, while true as a basic proposition, that the United States Government must be concerned with the non-impairment of valid contracts, the government must recognize that long-duration contracts by their nature result in inequities which cannot be approved by the Government and which should be removed by adjustments to changing circumstances and ( b ) that such adjustments must not be allowed to destroy basic principles and that if a situation developed which threatened the ability of the company to operate or concession cancellation, the United States Government would be forced to take strong preventive action. It was conceded that the Aramco case was in the ( a ) rather than ( b ) category or stage at this time. Aramco officials appeared to be in complete agreement with Assistant Secretary McGhee’s development of the problem and together with him arrived at the following conclusions: ( a ) increased benefits were necessary, ( b ) Aramco could afford to pay more, ( c ) the Department could not oppose substantive change in the concession contract at this stage, ( d ) the Department would endeavor to prepare as favorable a stage for the negotiations as possible by pointing out to SAG the extraordinary performance of Aramco in developing Saudi Arabian oil resources, ( e ) the Department would continue to urge financial reforms, ( f ) the Department would be prepared to consider strong action should Saudi Arabian demands threaten the continuance of company operations. Other points developed included: (1) Re an income tax, Assistant Secretary McGhee stated that the Department could not take a position on this matter and that the problem was a legal one which could only be handled by the Treasury Department. Mr. Duce stated that the company had spoken to Treasury officials who did not seem “particularly concerned” with any difficulties in this problem but that the Bureau of Internal Revenue would not take a position on a theoretical case. It was evident that Aramco officials preferred retreating in this direction since it might involve no additional expense to the company. Department officials expressed some concern over what in effect would amount to a subsidy of Aramco’s position in Saudi Arabia by U.S. taxpayers. Aramco officials expressed the point of view that Saudi Arabia was justified in their continued objections to a situation in which the United States Government and Saudi Arabian Government received equal benefits from Saudi Arabian resources. Ambassador Childs in response to a question stated that this view had never been conveyed to him by Saudi Arabs, although admittedly the subject more properly belonged in company-Saudi Arabian Government channels. Aramco officials were unable to answer at this time how their parent companies, with concessions in other parts of the Near East, would view payment of income tax in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Davies confirmed that Aramco’s U.S. tax amounted to approximately 25¢ a barrel. Mr. Funkhouser confirmed that Pacific Western had in their concession contract a clause allowing SAG to levy additional taxes for which the company could receive tax relief in the United States, but in answer to a further question stated that this contract was, as in the case of the Aramco contract, given to the Department without request for approval of its contents. (Not mentioned to Aramco was the fact that this Pacific Western clause was brought to the attention of the Treasury Representative in Cairo who expressed concern and apparently referred the problem to Treasury in Washington where the matter died.) Aramco officials were unable to report on any conclusions reached by the U.S. Tax Specialist recently in Saudi Arabia in the employ of the Saudi Arabian Government. Aramco officials responded affirmatively to the assumption that the company might still find itself subjected to an income tax even if Aramco were to agree to an increase in basic royalties, a share of profits, etc. (2) Assistant Secretary McGhee stressed the desirability of meeting SAG demands for additional benefits within the present contract, for example, by promising increased development and production, by increased expenditures for public works, wages, social amenities, education, health, etc. and by acceleration of Aramco’s relinquishment program. “Rolling with the punch” in this way could result in the attainment of U.S. Commercial Policy objectives, satisfaction of SAG demands for increased benefits, increased benefits for the people of Saudi Arabia, minimization of the impact of the concession contract revision on Iraq and Iran, and minimization of the opportunities for SAG financial mismanagement. However, it was the emphatic view of Aramco representatives that although Saudi Arabian demands included such issues, the situation demanded much more drastic and direct financial concessions. It was thoroughly impressed upon the Department that the SAG was determined to obtain large increases in cash payments immediately. Colonel Eddy stated his view that the situation was so serious that the United States Government should be prepared to protect U.S. citizens in Saudi Arabia, claiming Sulaiman might shut down company operations on the Persian Gulf if his demands were not met. In view of this situation Department officials were inclined to agree that changes in the Saudi Arabian contract, would be of a scale which would remove possibility of preventing strong reverberations throughout Near East concessionary countries. (3) There was lengthy discussion on what concessions would satisfy the SAG and how long such satisfaction would continue. Mr. Spurlock stated that Saudi Arabs in his experience had always basically favored some sort of “partnership” relationship with Aramco and that any agreement would have to take this principle into consideration if it were to last. It was stated that increasing production under fixed royalties only whet Saudi appetites for more money whereas a sharing in the profits or income might give the Saudis a feeling of participation which would better withstand the test of time, particularly bad times. The consensus was that it would also be fairer from a company point of view that further financial benefits should be based on income rather than a basic royalty increase. Mr. Spurlock indicated that by partnership Saudis would not demand stock partnership or participation in management but partnership in profits. Mr. Funkhouser agreed that partnership, particularly the Venezuelan concept of 50–50 sharing of profits, had, thanks principally to a visiting Venezuelan Diplomatic group, strong appeal for all Near Eastern officialdom. Aramco officials agreed with Assistant Secretary McGhee’s observation that it would be wise to discuss settlement at less than 50–50 at this time. Re the end point of Saudi demands, the point of view was expressed that only when oil companies lost business and ability to pay might oil producing states relax demands for increased financial payments. (4) Re means of bringing order out of financial chaos, Aramco officials felt that it was impossible to bring the King to make needed changes, such as reducing the authority of Abdullah Sulaiman. It was stated that the King was quite cognizant of the extra-curricular actions of his family and officials. Aramco officials felt the King fully supported Sulaiman in his demands for earliest renegotiations. Mr. Oligher had just been summoned to Jidda and impressed with the King’s impatience with the delay in negotiations. Aramco officials were particularly perturbed because Prince Feisal would head the Saudi Arab negotiating committee. Assistant Secretary McGhee reiterated that the Department would endeavor to set as favorable a stage for these discussions as possible by making it clear that the U.S. Government believed Aramco had done an extraordinary job in developing Saudi Arabian oil resources. The Department would also continue to press for optimum use of the considerable funds currently paid by Aramco. Ambassador Childs stated that this had been his line with the Saudis. He stressed, however, that it would greatly help Ambassador Hare to have something in writing from the Department to hand SAG in order that these points be more fully impressed on the Foreign Office and the King. It was decided that an informal memorandum would be prepared for delivery by Ambassador Hare before the negotiations began. Assistant Secretary McGhee stated that the memorandum should not be too strong, since it might be necessary to deliver a further note if the company got into serious trouble. It was the consensus that the mere delivery of a memorandum on this subject should make an adequate impression on the Saudis at this time. Aramco officials expressed their satisfaction with this support and warmest appreciation for the Assistant Secretary’s frank and helpful discussion of these issues. 1 The conversation reported here presumably took place on November 6. The memorandum of conversation carries a drafting date of November 8–13, 1950. 2 Samuel K. C. Kopper, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs. 3 Edwin G. Moline, Assistant Chief, Petroleum Policy Staff. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. Earle Russell of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs 886A.2553/11–650 [Document 44] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. H. Earle Russell of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] November 6, 1950. Subject: Visit of Sheikh Asad al Faqih Participants: Sheikh Asad al Faqih—Saudi Arabian Ambassador Mr. Fred H. Awalt, NE Mr. H. Earle Russell, Jr., NE Summary: Sheikh Asad called to discuss SAG–Aramco relations. He reviewed the position he had taken with Aramco officials on October 26, 1 stressing that his government was serious in its demands for revision of the Aramco concession. He suggested the formation of a partnership arrangement between the Company and the SAG. He pointed out that the elaborate charts and figures which Aramco officials had presented to him in support of their resistance to concessions failed to indicate the Company’s known ability to pay more. Mr. Awalt stated that the Department could appreciate that a 66-year agreement could reasonably be expected to need modification during its life as circumstances changed. He added that the Ambassador’s strong stand in his conversations with Aramco officials had undoubtedly been very useful in convincing the Company’s Board of Directors that the SAG was serious in its demands. He also expressed satisfaction that the negotiations would be held with the Company at Jidda. The Ambassador stated that that was necessary for ready reference to the King and other authorities, and also because holding them outside Saudi Arabia would create a poor impression at home. Mr. Awalt reviewed the Department’s views by saying that we had no objection to the negotiations, but emphasized that we should like to see the SAG regularize its financial practices before making far-reaching demands for more money. He noted in this connection that there were recent indications that the SAG desires to undertake a real financial reorganization. (Jidda Telegram No. 274 of November 4) 2 He also expressed the hope that both sides would maintain a reasonable attitude throughout the negotiations. The Ambassador was asked if there was any news concerning the proposed SAG–UK conference scheduled for some time after November 20 to discuss; island claims. Sheikh Asad replied that he has been unable to follow this subject very closely due to his current activities in the UN. In conclusion, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador brought up the subject of the Arab refugees which will soon be discussed in the UN. He pointed out that Arab interests are closely allied to those of the United States and of the West and cited as an example Saudi Arabian support of the United Action for Peace resolution. He also cited our common interest in the support of Arab refugees toward which both the United States and Saudi Arabia had made such material contributions. He said that Saudi Arabia advocated the implementation of the GA resolution permitting the return to Israel of those refugees who desired admittance. Mr. Awalt inquired if the Ambassador had been in touch with Mr. Rockwell of the USUN delegation. Sheikh Asad stated that he had, but asserted that he believed it was sometimes useful also to deal directly with the Department. Mr. Awalt asked the Ambassador whether he personally believed many refugees would return to Palestine if permitted to do so. The Ambassador said that he believed that only a few would wish to return but stated that it was a question of principle and that the GA resolution should be supported on that ground. 1 Information on the meeting between Aramco officials and the Ambassador is in the memorandum of conversation of October 26, p. 103 [ Pg. 103 is part of Doc. 41 ] . 2 For text, see p. 1192 [ Pg. 1192 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 886A.2553/11–750: Telegram [Document 45] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1 secret Washington , November 7, 1950—7 p. m. 161. Aramco parent cos meeting Nov 6 to decide position re renegotiations. Duce, Davies expressed to Dept Nov 3 belief only major financial contract change such as profit sharing, income tax, increased basic royalty wld satisfy SAG. Aramco reps believe such increased payments necessary retain concession. Eddy believes anti-co-sentiment so serious Dept shld be prepared protect US citizens, claiming Sulaiman might shut down co operations in order obtain demands. Dept took position it cld not in present circumstances effectively oppose SAG pressure for increased benefits but wld endeavor prepare as favorable stage for negots as possible. If no objection perceived, fol memo with any appropriate modifications shld be transmitted FonOff before negots: 2 “USG has welcomed at all times spirit of complete frankness with which SAG has approached USG in matters common interest. This frankness has been appreciated as reflection of close ties existing between two countries and desire maintain them on most cordial basis. “It is in that spirit that USG is moved to approach SAG in present instance and to present informally expression of its great interest and concern in forthcoming negots understood contemplated with reps Aramco concerning Aramco concession. USG believes that SAG shares views this Government re extraordinary performance achieved by this American enterprise since its inception in Saudi Arabia. Development since war has resulted for SA in more rapid rise in oil output and in revenues to SAG than has ever been experienced by any oil-producing country anywhere in world. “Also view this Government that Aramco has at all times displayed most enlightened spirit and outlook in its dealings with SAG and its desire take into account interests of people and Government Saudi Arabia. It is understanding this Government that as result co has enjoyed real confidence of SAG. “So far as USG can ascertain, Aramco intends continuing best efforts in this partnership undertaking. Major problem which unfortunately continues arise concerns division pecuniary benefits between SAG and Aramco. With respect to this USG can only note that funds out of which benefits SAG can come are not inexhaustible and that there must be point beyond which Aramco or any commercial co cannot expand its production costs (in the form of benefits to SAG) without impairing its competitive position and thereby reducing or destroying its ability contribute joint task of developing SA’s oil resources. It is in development of these rich but exhaustible resources and through wise use of considerable funds which such development makes available that greatest benefits to govt and people of SA can be realized. “In consequence USG expresses hope that SAG will take carefully into consideration mutuality of interest between co and SAG and is confident SAG will approach negots with same spirit of friendship and cooperation which has marked relations between co and govt in past.” Acheson 1 Repeated to Dhahran by air. 2 Telegram 311 from Jidda on November 18, p. 113 [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] , reported delivery of the message. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/11–1250: Telegram [Document 46] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Jidda , November 12, 1950—1 p. m. 296. ReDeptel 161, November 7. 1 1. Reftel received here November 10 crossed Embtel 284, November 8 2 reporting my comments Salha along same line. 2. In reviewing proposed message reftel we consulted with Owen who informed us of further delay Davies departure until November 17 in order permit discussion with Department November 13. 3. In view this unexpected development we intend withholding action until learning outcome Department’s conversation with Davies proposed message. 4. Owen raises question whether our proposed intervention is advisable prior initiation negotiations because ( a ) it might give impression of exerting undue pressure on Saudi’s ( b ) might give Saudi’s idea Aramco seeking USG support in maintaining inflexible position (which he gathers may not be case) and (c) might exhaust ammunition which we might want to use later. He suggests this question of timing be specifically discussed with Davies. We have no particularly strong view on subject and can see that there might be certain utility in atmosphere—creating representations to SAG along lines proposed memo prior negotiations. However, we do not feel argument for doing so is so strong as to justify over-riding such judgment as Aramco may reach. 5. Believe if approach made it should be direct to Prince Feisal not only as Foreign Minister but as probable head SAG negotiators, although unconfirmed report from Mecca source has it Feisal endeavoring retire from leadership SAG negotiators. Understand Feisal now in Riyadh and no information re expected arrival here. 6. Withholding any action pending further information and instructions from Department. Hare 1 Supra . 2 Not printed. It read, in part: “Najib also expressed impatience at delay of Aramco negotiations and said SA Ambassador Washington denied having been cause. Added he hoped I would be able help in reconciling difficulties which might arise. I said wanted, of course, give any appropriate assistance but would not want success judged by ability to persuade Aramco accept fantastic bill of particulars presented by SAG. Only reasonable proposals can serve as basis for satisfactory negotiation.… Najib admitted list contained some items which would be pressed and some which could be modified or dropped but did not say which.” (611.86A/11–850) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/11–1850: Telegram [Document 47] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Jidda , November 18, 1950—10 a. m. 311. Deptel 169, November 14. 1 Memo delivered yesterday afternoon to Prince Feisal who came especially from Mecca for purpose. After I had orally summarized contents of memo Feisal expressed thanks for message and spirit in which sent. So far he had only heard one side of case but he had to admit that what he had heard was disturbing because it reflected an attitude of deliberate noncooperation by Aramco, in matter of concern to the country. Perhaps the company had its reasons but, if so, they had failed to make their position clear and bad impression had been created. Past relationship with Aramco had been characterized by friendship and, on that basis, SAG had been very easy-going with Aramco but latter had reacted in letter-of-the-law attitude. As consequence, situation had arisen which presents real problems but which could have been avoided if difficulties had been talked out reasonably as they arose. His position in matter was like that of judge and he would keep open mind until he had heard all evidence. As far as he personally was concerned he had known many Aramco officials and had found them good people with whom to deal and he hoped present difficulties could be worked out satisfactorily. Foregoing is distillation of fifty-minute conversation in which I went over usual arguments on subject with particular emphasis on necessity of not regarding problem as merely domestic but as related to complex competitive distribution system. Feisal said that as good judge he would feel obligated to consider all aspects of problem. I said that was all we asked. At end of conversation, Feisal expressed hope Davies would come with full negotiating powers and not have to refer anything back to New York. Feisal was in good humor throughout discussion and I believe that, at least as far as he concerned, memo achieved purpose. Hare 1 Not printed; it requested the Ambassador, unless he and Owen perceived strong objections, to deliver the memorandum transmitted in telegram 161, preferably before November 17 so that it would precede the arrival of Davies and Spurlock in Jidda. It reported that at a November 13 meeting Aramco and parent company officials agreed with Department of State officials that the memorandum offered important advantages in setting the tone of the negotiations. (886A.2553/11–1250) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/11–2050: Telegram [Document 48] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Jidda , November 20, 1950—2 p. m. 318. Returned from Riyadh yesterday. Reason for summons was desire King discuss recent developments Persian Gulf boundary dispute, particularly situation resulting from British note of November 11 (summary being telegraphed separately) 1 and reestablishment of petroleum development oil camp in Abu Dhabi area claimed by SAG. British note found objectionable by Saudis because: (1) It regarded as indicating further procrastination in setting up fact-finding commission on grounds of need for further detailed study; (2) it placed on SAG the responsibility for establishing claim to territory which King regarded as his beyond dispute; (3) it expressed unwillingness to subscribe to general policy of mutual restraint, and (4) it specifically refused to restrain activity of oil companies in area in question. In discussion with King and Yusuf Yassin many old members were raked over but nothing new of factual nature brought out unless reestablishment of oil camps regarded. What was evident was that King [quite?] steamed upon subject (with YY, 2 I feel sure, making certain that fuel was not lacking) and central theme of discussion was that British were imposing will by force and guilty of “active aggression.” What should SA do to meet this violation of its sovereignty? What was its friend the US going to do? Were our pledges of support only applicable when unfriendly states were involved or would we also intervene when friends guilty of wrongdoing? Should SA meet force with force? Should it refer case to Security Council? I reiterated our position as being not that of party to dispute but as a friend concerned in satisfactory solution by agreement between SAG on one hand and British and Shaikhs on other. We had accordingly not undertaken to pass on substance of matter both as confined our efforts to suggesting procedures conducive to agreement. What did SAG see as constructive steps to resolve difficulty? YY said and King agreed two steps necessary: (1) to activate fact-finding commission immediately and get to work; (2) to exercise mutual restraint in meantime on all aspects of problem (presumably this stipulation would involve insistence on withdrawal of British oil camp but this not specifically stated). I asked if SAG had said as much to British. King said no reply made to November 11 note since had thought best consult us first. I expressed opinion SAG should carry on directly with British. We could then, as we had done in past, see if we could do anything as friend of both parties to facilitate negotiations. King agreed this best procedure and that reply to British would be undertaken without delay. Following this discussion YY dictated outline salient points in Saudi position which being telegraphed separately. Text of British note of November 11 and supplemental details being airmailed. Saw British Ambassador last night and outlined foregoing to him. He said he had not played much of role in matter but had acted largely as “Post Office box” for transmission of messages, for drafting of which legal experts of Foreign Office largely responsible. I suggested desirability his taking more active interest and made two specific suggestions: (1) that he recommend to London activating fact-finding commission as soon as possible since impasse in that regard was having frustrating effect; (2) that an effort be made to talk over matter frankly with Saudis with view to removing misunderstanding re basic attitudes. Continued exchange of formal notes could hardly be expected to effect this much needed clearing of air. Trott expressed appreciation for information given, said he thought we had taken correct attitude in obviously difficult situation and expressed intention give our recommendations serious consideration. Foregoing of course does not face up to government fundamental aspect of problem, i.e., oil. It was clear from discussion with both King and Trott that, although both British and Saudis feel prestige at stake, each feels oil basic motivation of other. In circumstances, negotiation which excludes this factor must necessarily be limited in scope but promises be more productive than continued exchange of recriminatory notes. Sent priority Department 318; repeated info London 20. Hare 1 Telegram 320 from Jidda, November 20, not printed, listed the main points of the British letter. The British letter said a detailed reply to the Saudi Arabian memorandum of September 22 on frontiers was under preparation, but expressed regret that Saudi Arabia had not produced any evidence in support of its boundary claims and stated until that was done the United Kingdom would continue to exercise its rights in the area. (786A.022/11–2050) 2 Yusef Yassin. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/11–2250: Telegram [Document 49] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State confidential London , November 22, 1950—7 p.m. 3022. Furlonge 1 said today Foreign Office now drawing up reply to Saudi note of September 22 and present plan is to take more lenient line than heretofore. He said UK anxious avoid further delay in establishing fact-finding commission. He indicated Foreign Office might modify its request that Saudis provide statement explaining basis their claims by waiving this requirement on claims prior 1938. He said also that presentation reply would probably be handled somewhat differently by instructing Trott deliver note to King in Riyadh. Furlonge said Foreign Office attached importance obtaining fuller justification Saudi claims at least since 1938 because ( a ) Foreign Office thought they were completely unreasonable and ( b ) it felt UK members commission needed clearer idea Saudi pretensions before they were competent begin investigation. Cranston in another conversation today said UK wished be accommodating as possible and he otherwise also made clear UK considering softer line. Cranston said that oil survey on Trucial coast in area claimed by SAG had now been completed and camp to which Saudis had protested had been removed. Only operations in this area now are from launches off coast. Trott has informed Foreign Office of Saudi displeasure over UK attitude as conveyed in Riyadh to US Ambassador (Jidda’s 318, November 20). 2 Cranston said this information was being taken into consideration in preparation of UK reply to September 22 note. Sent Department 3022, repeated information Jidda 22. Holmes 1 Geoffrey W. Furlonge, Head of the Eastern Department, British Foreign Office. 2 Supra . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 786A.022/10–950: Airgram [Document 50] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 confidential Washington , November 30, 1950. A–845. In the interest of advancing settlement of the boundary disputes between the Saudi Arabian Government and the United Kingdom in behalf of the Sheikhdoms, the Department has several observations to make regarding the British position on certain points as briefly outlined in the Embassy’s telegram No. 2075 dated October 9. 2 It is believed that areas of dispute should be kept to a minimum and that progress toward a solution would be better served if exaggerated claims were not advanced. Similar observations have already been made to Embassy Jidda for informal discussion with the Saudi Arabian Government, reference Department’s instruction No. 7 dated March 3, 1950, 3 a copy of which was sent to Embassy London. The Department has also made like comment to Aramco officials on several occasions. It is believed that the United Kingdom contention in paragraph 1 of the telegram referred to ignores the reality of Ibn Saud’s continuous control in al Hasa since May 1913. Citation of Ibn Saud’s acknowledgement of Turkish sovereignty presumably refers to his acceptance of the title of Vali of Nedj and al Hasa in June 1914. This would seem to offer no support to the British position regarding the 1913 blue line demarcation, however, because the subsequent treaty between the United Kingdom and Ibn Saud signed December 26, 1915 and ratified July 18, 1916, acknowledges that al Hasa belongs to Ibn Saud. It is recalled, moreover, that the convention establishing the blue line in the first place was never ratified by either the United Kingdom or Turkey. In regard to paragraph 2 of the referenced telegram, it is difficult to understand why there should be any reluctance to cite the instrument by which the Sultan of Muscat and Oman asked the United Kingdom to negotiate on his behalf, and the British reply. It would so easily settle the question beyond further dispute. You may, at your discretion, discuss the views expressed above with the Foreign Office on an informal basis. Acheson 1 Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran. 2 Not printed; it reported the Foreign Office considered the Anglo-Turkish agreements of 1913 and 1914 a legal basis for its claims and stated the burden of proof for extravagant claims rested on Saudi Arabia. The United Kingdom also maintained it had the right to negotiate for the Sultan of Muscat, and considered itself bound by treaty to defend Abu Dhabi’s claim for Buraimi. (786A.022/10–950) 3 Not printed; it advised the Embassy that the Department of State considered much of the Saudi Arabian documentation not convincing as support for its claims; but advised the Embassy not to communicate that position to the Saudi Arabian Government, nor to indicate that the Department had taken any position with regard to the claims. (786A.022/3–350) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/12–650: Telegram [Document 51] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State confidential Jidda , December 6, 1950—3 p. m. 356. Aramco–SAG conversations resumed Monday. 1 Discussion has revolved around following SAG demands: 1. Guarantee from company that proposal would result in substantial per unit increase over present basis. Aramco representatives have categorically refused such guarantee. 2. SAG equal share in net profit should be in addition to and without credit for basic royalty and other payments to SAG. This being similarly refused by Aramco representatives who point to previous fact that acceptance such a demand would result in SAG receiving disproportionate share. 3. Same condition by SAG was in paragraph 2 re possible tax deductions. Situation is that discussion remains on basis principle of Aramco proposal. Feisal has submitted report of proceedings to Riyadh for comment, pending receipt of which no meetings scheduled. Aramco representatives report Feisal has been friendly and open minded. Finance Minister has also appeared well disposed but has been insistent on positive assurance increased reserve. Such difficulty as has arisen appears to stem from Ahmed Tewfik and Salha. London pass Cairo for Lager, sent Department 356, info Cairo 72. Hare 1 Telegram 345 from Jidda, December 1, not printed, reported that meetings between Aramco and Saudi Arabian Government negotiators began on November 28. In the first session Saudi Arabian negotiators wanted their 10-point demands discussed, but “Aramco representatives replied not here to discuss these points but to submit proposal based on equal participation net profits after foreign taxes and withdrawal outstanding SAG demands.” Aramco representatives said it was impossible to give specific guarantees about the actual benefits that would accrue to Saudi Arabia, but said if Saudi Arabia was interested in their proposal they would bring tax and financial experts to go over the details. (886A.2553/12–150) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/12–1250: Telegram [Document 52] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State secret Jidda , December 12, 1950—4 p. m. 379. ReEmbtel 356, December 6. 1 Aramco meetings resumed Saturday with apparent acceptance by SAG principle equal participation but with reluctance completely to waive previous SAG demands on Aramco and also to accept principle of official exchange rates at 4 shilling level pending demonstration advantages to SAG. Further subcommittee meetings indicated progress being made all these points and prospects early conclusion this phase negotiations seemed slight but in private meetings with Davies 10th and 11th Feisal reversed field, apparently on basis word received from Riyadh, by refusal to confirm agreement supposedly reached on sharing principle, at least without concessions SAG demands on other points. Feisal, however, did not close door and in circumstances Davies thought advisable request Aramco financial experts proceed here soonest from New York in hope that further factual evidence would satisfy Saudi misgivings. Embassy suggests Department support if Aramco hesitant. Yesterday afternoon at ceremony inaugurating beginning construction Medina Road by British firm, Finance Minister invited me return with him “to have a cup of coffee” at his home. In course conversation he brought up Aramco negotiations and covered following points: 1. He favored profit-sharing principle but on condition that SAG would be guaranteed increase in revenue indicated by Aramco representatives. They had made estimate of 40 or 50%. If he could be sure of 40% per bbl. he would accept immediately and undertake persuade Prince Feisal to accompany him Riyadh to convince King. What was desired was agreement which would represent real settlement and not be subsequent difficult matter. 2. Negotiations lagging. Aramco insisted on acceptance profit-sharing principle. SAG wanted proof what this meant. Aramco said such facts could only be furnished by experts. SAG said then bring experts. Aramco said could not do so unless agreement reached in principle. And so it went with much talk and no progress. Prince Feisal was reaching point where considering asking King to be relieved further responsibility in matter. 3. At first Finance Minister spoke in terms of “guarantee” but in course of discussion in which I pointed out such a burden on one partner hardly consistent with joint sharing principle he agreed he would be satisfied if he could just be convinced, regardless of means. At conclusion of discussion I observed that from Finance Minister’s remarks it appeared groundwork for agreement clearly existed and both parties desired understanding but difficulty arose in failure so far find appropriate means. Finance Minister agreed. I later relayed foregoing to Davies. In second meeting with Finance Minister this morning to discuss Embassy building plans he again raised subject Aramco negotiations and said he would like to have private meeting with Davies to see if they could not clarify situation. I advised Davies and he was to see Finance Minister without delay but as yet have no report meeting. 2 1 Supra . 2 Telegram 392 from Jidda, December 13, not printed, reported on a meeting between Davies and the Finance Minister. When Davies reaffirmed the estimated increase in Saudi Arabian income, the Finance Minister stated he was personally prepared to accept the proposal without reservation, and would try to convince Prince Feisal. (886A.2553/2–1350) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/12–2950: Telegram [Document 53] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Jidda , December 29, 1950—11 a. m. 409. Owen, Aramco, informs company–SAG negotiations now proceeding satisfactorily. Following developments reported Embtel 392, December 13, 1 Shaikh Abdullah accompanied by Feisal proceeded Riyadh where they remained about week to discuss matter with King. As result discussions with Aramco officials following their return December 19 it appeared parties were on threshold agreement but at last moment, negotiations were suddenly stalled by Feisal’s insistence following extreme SAG position: (1) 50 percent profits not enough; (2) SAG wanted receive all US tax credit; (3) SAG unwilling reverse official exchange rate (1 sovereign equal $8.25). Early December 26, however, Finance Minister again flew Riyadh, returning December 28 apparently with instructions conclude agreement, since SAG today published tax decree dated December 27 in form agreeable Aramco (although not applicable Aramco until agreement concluded). In last 36 hours company officials have had five meetings with Salha and Suroor, who doing spade-work for SAG, and Salha informs us negotiations should be concluded in day or two. Owen states chief SAG obstructionists in past days have been Feisal and Najib with Suroor remaining very friendly. Believes Finance Minister, Salha and Suroor now have agreed Aramco proposals are acceptable SAG. In this theory hurried visit Finance Minister Riyadh represents going over head chief SA delegation to get approval King which it assumed Finance Minister now has, view tax decree publication. Since least obdurate Saudi has been Suroor, and relatively moderate councils appear to have prevailed, it likely he again in inner councils Finance Ministry. Recent designation Suroor acting Minister Agriculture and Chief Mecca offices Ministry Finance lend credence foregoing. Hare 1 Not printed, but see footnote 2, supra . The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 886A.2553/12–3150: Telegram [Document 54] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State confidential Jidda , December 31, 1950—noon. 417. From Brewer. Aramco–SAG negotiations concluded late last night December 30th, with agreement signed between Finance Minister and Davies in which profit sharing principle put forward by company accepted by SAG and outstanding SAG demands officially withdrawn. Company officials appear pleased with results, which they terming “the December 1950 agreement”, stating that they gave in to SAG on a few minor points only to obtain agreement. Entire Aramco party, including Owen, left by plane for Luxor this morning, making it impossible obtain details agreement, but George Hay and Bob Brougham proceeding directly Cairo and New York with signed original. New York and Washington offices should have copies by January 3–4 and have been asked communicate details Department soonest. 1 For [Parker?]: Brougham hopes be in Cairo New Year’s Day and to see you. Sent Department 417; repeated information Dhahran 214, Cairo 91. [Brewer.] Hare 1 Further documentation on the agreement is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations . General policies of the United States with respect to the Near East and South Asia: General policies of the United States with respect to the Near East and South Asia: Contents A. Proposed military and economic aid to the Near East and South Asia A. Proposed military and economic aid to the Near East and South Asia [55] Memorandum by the Chief of Program Staff, Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Bray) to the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance in the Department of State (Ohly) [Washington,] January 25, 1950. [56] Memorandum by Mr. F. Garner Ranney of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs to the Director of That Office (Labouisse) [Washington,] January 30, 1950. 780.00/1–3050 [57] Editorial Note [58] Memorandum of Conversation With Various Congressmen, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 28, 1950. 786.56/3–2850 [59] Draft Report by the National Security Council [Washington, March 28, 1950.] [60] Report Prepared in the Department of State [Washington,] April 20, 1950. CFM Files: Lot M–88: May FM Meeting, C & D Series, Box 149 [61] Report Prepared in the Department of State [Washington,] April 28, 1950. CFM Files: M–88: May FM Meeting, C & D Series, Box 149 [62] Editorial Note [63] The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State London, May 2, 1950—noon. 396.1 LO/5–250: Telegram [64] The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State London, May 3, 1950—2 p. m. 396.1 LO/5–350: Telegram [65] The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State London, May 3, 1950—5 p. m. 396.1 LO/5–350: Telegram [66] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Robertson) [Washington,] May 5, 1950. 780.5/5–550 [67] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, May 8, 1950—4 p. m. 396.1 LO/5–850: Telegram [68] Report Prepared in the Department of State Washington, May 11, 1950. CFM files: M–88: May FM Meeting, C & D Series, Box 149 [69] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State London, May 11, 1950—2 a.m. 396.1 LO/5–1150: Telegram [70] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State London, May 12, 1950—1 p. m. 396.1 LO/5–1250: Telegram [71] Editorial Note [72] Report to the President by the National Security Council [Washington,] May 17, 1950. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 65 Series [73] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices Washington, May 20, 1950—1 a. m. 484A.008/5–2050: Circular telegram [74] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] June 7, 1950. 890.00 TA/6–750 [75] Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] June 13, 1950. 890.00 TA/6–750 [76] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran [Washington,] July 15, 1950—3 p. m. 880.00/7–1550: Telegram [77] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 20, 1950—11 a. m. 888.00/7–2050: Telegram [78] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) [Washington,] August 7, 1950. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 65 Series [79] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, Smith Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the President Washington, August 28, 1950. 890.00/8–2550 [80] Memorandum of Conversation With the President, by the Secretary of State Washington, [August 28,] 1950. [81] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs [Washington,] September 1, 1950. 890.00/9–150 [82] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [Washington,] September 1, 1950. 890.00/9–150 [83] Editorial Note [84] Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) [Washington,] January 24, 1951. S/S–NSC files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 65 Series Memorandum by the Chief of Program Staff, Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Bray) to the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance in the Department of State (Ohly) S/ISA files: Lot 52–26: Middle East General 1 [Document 55] Memorandum by the Chief of Program Staff, Mutual Defense Assistance Program ( Bray ) to the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance in the Department of State ( Ohly ) top secret [ Washington ,] January 25, 1950. [Subject:] Military Interest in NEA Area. In the course of a conversation on other matters, Mr. Jernegan of GTI 2 mentioned to Mr. Wolf 3 of my staff that Mr. McGhee 4 had lately been discussing the general question of the NEA area with JCS. In the course of a session between Mr. McGhee and the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of recent date, Mr. McGhee was orally informed that the military strategic interests in the NEA area were now viewed as being almost negligible in light of interests in other areas. It is doubtful that these views will be expressed in writing by JCS, and it is impossible to exactly repeat at third hand the connotation of the statement in light of the conversation which gave birth to it. However, the implications thereof appear to be in conflict with such JCS decisions as we are aware of. It was stated that Mr. McGhee believes that if the military interest in these areas is diminished to this extent, then military assistance which the United States would offer to this area should be predicated not upon the strategic aims of the United States but rather upon meeting the political and psychological desires of the recipient countries. It might be added that Turkey was surprisingly included in the reported general statement by JCS. It is recommended that you explore this matter informally and orally with General Lemnitzer 5 to determine whether there is present a diminution of interest by JCS in the NEA area. Such a diminution of interest could be stated in terms of priority or in other ways which would convey the same concept and yet not indicate a “writing off” of the area. Guidance as to Defense’s thinking along these lines appears essential if we are to shake the water out of the political, military and economic needs for military assistance in the NEA area. 6 1 The S/ISA lot files contain records of the Office of the Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State, covering the years 1949–1951. They form a part of FRC Acc. No. 62 A 613. 2 John D. Jernegan, Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. 3 Joseph J. Wolf of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. 4 George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. 5 Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense. 6 In a memorandum of February 6, Mr. Ohly informed Mr. Bray that he had taken up the question of military interest in the Near East with General Lemnitzer “who confirms this trend in JCS thinking. This trend does not represent a change in JCS evaluation of the importance of the area but rather results from the fact that higher priorities in other areas make it impossible to devote any very substantial portion of our limited military resources to this particular area.” Mr. Ohly added that this trend in military thinking would not be reflected in any special written document “but will be indicated in the general policy and objective paper for FY 1951 programs” (ISA/MDAP Files, Lot 52–26, Middle East General). Memorandum by Mr. F. Garner Ranney of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs to the Director of That Office (Labouisse) 780.00/1–3050 [Document 56] Memorandum by Mr. F. Garner Ranney of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs to the Director of That Office ( Labouisse ) secret [ Washington ,] January 30, 1950. Subject: Anglo-American Cooperation in the Near East. Anglo-American cooperation in the Near East has been a recognized policy objective of the two Governments for some years. In the Spring of 1944, British and American interests in the area were reviewed in informal conversations held in London between Mr. Wallace Murray, Director of NEA and officials of the British Foreign Office. Pursuant to these conversations, parallel instructions were transmitted by the Foreign Office and the Department of State to the British and American diplomatic Missions in the Near East in April 1944. 1 These instructions called upon the respective Missions at each post to arrange for the conduct of Anglo-American relations throughout the area in the spirit of cooperation based on mutual frankness and good will. The subject of British and American interests in the social and economic affairs of the Near East and in raising the living standards of that area was raised again in a memorandum transmitted by Mr. Bevin 2 to the Secretary of State at Moscow in March 1947. Further informal conversations on this matter were held in Washington in October 1947 in conversations with Mr. Greenhill of the Foreign Office. 3 The memorandum of these conversations states, “… it was the expressed view of the British and American representatives that in a matter of such importance to both the United States and Great Britain, both Governments should endeavor to prevent any other foreign countries, or commercial interests, or any other influences from making capital for themselves by playing Great Britain and the United States off against each other. Great Britain and the United States should each follow the general principal that each country endeavor to strengthen the other’s position in the Middle East on the basis of mutual respect and cooperation. It should be contrary to their respective policies for either country to make efforts to strengthen itself or to increase its influence at the expense of the other.” In March 1948, instructions were sent to all our posts in the area setting forth these views, which had already been transmitted by the British Foreign Office to their representatives. 4 The importance of continued cooperation was again fully recognized in the discussions between Mr. McGhee and Mr. Wright of the British Foreign Office in November 1949. 5 As a result of these talks, the British Government suggested parallel instructions to our Missions in the area to reiterate our belief that “over-all interests of both countries will best be served by close cooperation”. The British suggested that these views should be communicated not only to diplomatic and consular personnel but also to British and American commercial interests and businessmen in the Near East. We have informed London of our intention to send such a message, stating that we prefer to leave to the discretion of the heads of missions, the manner of communicating such advice to the business communities. Garner Ranney 1 For documentation on the Anglo-American conversations and agreements of 1944 regarding the Middle East, see Foreign Relations , 1944, vol. v , pp. 6–7. 2 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July 1945–March 1951. 3 For documentation on the Anglo-American Middle East talks of 1947, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 485 – 626 . 4 For documentation on the March 1948 instructions to the Middle Eastern posts, see ibid. , 1948, vol. v , pp. 69 ff. 5 For documentation on the Wright–McGhee talks of November 1949, see ibid. , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 50 ff. Editorial Note [Document 57] Editorial Note General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army, departed Washington on March 20, 1950 for visits to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. He returned to Washington on April 8, 1950. Upon his return he held a conversation with Assistant Secretary McGhee at the Pentagon on April 10, portions of which are printed on pages 362 and 1248. A copy of General Collins’ Report to the Secretary of the Army entitled “Inspection by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army of the Middle East Covering the Period 20 March to 8 April 1950”, together with a covering memorandum of transmittal from Lieutenant Colonel S. W. Downey Assistant Secretary, Army General Staff, to Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, is in Department of State file 780.5/4–1750. Annex 5 of this Report, dealing with Iran, is printed on page 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] . Memorandum of Conversation With Various Congressmen, by the Secretary of State 786.56/3–2850 [Document 58] Memorandum of Conversation With Various Congressmen, by the Secretary of State 1 top secret [ Washington ,] March 28, 1950. Subject: Near Eastern Armament Situation Participants: S—The Secretary G—Mr. Rusk H—Mr. McFall NEA—Mr. Hare MD—Mr. Elliott DRN—Mr. Glidden 2 ANE—Mr. Rockwell 3 I received the Congressmen at their request. The meeting lasted about an hour. Representative Tauriello, as spokesman of the group, said that many members of Congress had received mail and visits from constituents who were concerned by the sale of arms by the United Kingdom to the Arab states, particularly Egypt. The Congressmen present in the room were interested in Israel and believed that anything that happens there affects the US. They moreover feared that arms being acquired by Egypt were seeping into the other Arab states. The Congressmen recalled what had happened in Palestine in the past and were afraid that this bloody history would be repeated. Mr. Tauriello added that there were many people in Congress who believed that those who control the purse containing the money destined for England under the ECA program should have something to say about this situation. Israel was in no condition to stand an arms race. The Congressmen would, therefore, like to find out what the Department’s policy on this problem was. Another Congressman observed that the relationship between Israel and the Arab states was only that of an armistice. He added that the United Kingdom was supplying Egypt with offensive weapons and said he understood that an Israeli application for armaments was being “kicked around” in Washington. This application had to be acted on, he said. A third Congressman declared that he believed that Israel was the one state in the Near East upon which the US could rely. He understood that the UK was shipping US surplus military material to the Arab states. Another Congressman stated that he understood that Israel had applied for training facilities in this country for certain Israeli officers, and that no action on this had been taken. Why was this so? Still another Congressman said that the contention had been offered that arms were being furnished to the Arab states for internal security reasons. This, he thought, did not hold water. Any over-armed country will use its arms, and the victim would be Israel, not the Soviet Union. The Congressman added that if the UK could use its own funds to send arms to the Arabs, it obviously needed no further help from the US. At this point Representative Tauriello declared that there was a growing sentiment in the House that if the UK continued to arm the Arabs an amendment should be offered in the House to cut the ECA funds destined for the UK. I said that there was a great deal of misinformation being spread about concerning the question of arms for the Near East. We had received from Israeli and Arab sources inaccurate and exaggerated reports concerning the quantities and types of arms either possessed by, or on their way to, one side or the other. The Department found itself in the middle of these contradictory recriminations. I said that our policy, as long as the United Nations Palestine arms embargo was in effect, had been to ship arms to no country in the Near East. We had influenced the United Kingdom not to ship arms either. When the arms embargo was lifted, 4 Ambassador Austin in the Security Council had stated the US position that the US did not wish to see an arms race take place in the Near East. The US would only permit the exportation to the Near East of such arms as it considered necessary for internal security and legitimate self-defense. I continued by saying that there were two problems involved. One was the Arab-Israeli relationship. The other was the problem of the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, which was a matter of gravest importance to the US and UK. The British had fought two wars in the Eastern Mediterranean, and were well aware of the importance of the vital oil supplies in Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Suez Canal, the route to India, also played an important role in British strategic planning. The above factors applied equally well to the US. Therefore, the US and the UK were convinced that it was necessary to have in the Near East some kind of defensive forces which might do their best to hold on to the territory as long as possible. We realized that no Near Eastern state could counter a major Soviet thrust, but perhaps the Soviet satellite nations would be used to invade the Near East. A strong Egyptian army would in this case certainly be much better than no Egyptian army. Under the circumstances, the UK had a modest program of providing the Near Eastern countries with arms to repel an attack. These arms were not in very great amount. I said that if there were no Soviet threat to the Near East, it would be best for the states in the area not to be in possession of heavy military equipment. However, under the circumstances, we had to see that Egypt could do something. If Egypt had no arms, we would have to occupy the country in case of a war. These were the main considerations of our policy. I then emphasized the close cooperation between the US and the UK on this matter. I said that we were well informed concerning British plans, and that our military people believed the British plans to be desirable. With regard to Arab-Israeli relations, I stated that we were following this matter closely, both through our own representatives in the Near East and through United Nations observers in the area. Our information was that the Near Eastern trend was away from war toward peace. The Israeli-Jordan conversations were a good example of this. I added that we had been having conversations with Egyptian representatives and were convinced that Egypt, as well as Israel, had no aggressive intentions. None of the other Arab states were in a position to make war. At this point I said that we might have to work out some special arms arrangement with Saudi Arabia, because of our interests in Dhahran. However, there was no question of any aggression by Saudi Arabia. I mentioned Saudi fears of a Hashemite attack. I then turned to the Israeli application for arms. I said that we had sent to Israel more arms than we had sent to any Arab state, and perhaps more than we had sent to all the Arab states together. In no case had we sent aggressive equipment. I said that the Israelis had recently made two applications. One was for arms they could obtain commercially. We were not “kicking around” this application, but were in close consultation with the National Military Establishment, which before making a decision desired a full picture of the military situation in the Near East and full information concerning availability of equipment from commercial sources in this country. There was some possibility of favorable action on parts of this Israeli application. The other Israeli application, I continued, was for arms which were only available out of US Government stocks. This was a difficult problem. We had prior commitments to the MDAP countries, Saudi Arabia, and the Chinese Nationalists, all to be filled from a reserve of arms which was far smaller than that necessary to fill any one of these requests. I thought that there was not much hope that the Israelis would get anything substantial on this application. Here again the Defense Department had to make a determination. I emphasized that the above was confidential and that I hoped there would be no talk about it. I then said that some Israelis did not seem to be concerned with the military situation. One high Israeli official had recently told me that he was more preoccupied with the economic problems facing Israel and hoped very much that it would be possible to obtain another US loan. This official had added that it was not desirable to give assistance only to Israel, but thought that the Arab states should also be aided since Israel’s prosperity depended upon that of the whole area. At this point I asked Mr. Rusk if he had any additional comments. Mr. Rusk said that what happen to North Africa and the Near East was of overriding importance to the US in terms of the security situation vis-à-vis the USSR. It was essential to maintain communications with the Far East, and the bases in the Near East were of vital importance in any effort to deny the Near East to the USSR. It was also important that the attitude of the people in the area not be hostile to the US. Mr. Rusk thought it was essential to remember the scale of the military situation in the Near East. The UN had made its arms embargo effective as far as the Arabs were concerned, but not regarding the Israelis. It had not taken the Israelis long to establish military superiority over all their neighbors, even without a great quantity of arms. The Israelis had qualitative superiority over the Arabs. Basically, this situation had not altered. Mr. Rusk mentioned that General Riley had reported that no state in the Near East wanted to resume the war or was in a position to do so. Mr. Rusk thought that the US and UK could take pretty effective action to prevent any attempts to resume the war. I then asked Mr. Hare if he had any comments. Mr. Hare said that in some quarters it had been contended that the UK had not been helpful in encouraging peace negotiations in the Near East. The Department knew that the British had energetically urged King Abdullah to come to terms with the Israelis. With regard to the Israeli officers who desired to train in this country and who had been mentioned earlier in the meeting, Mr. Hare stated that some were here and others would be coming. The exact number was determined by the National Military Establishment. A Congressman then asked if Mr. Bevin’s policy toward the Palestine question had changed. He recalled Mr. Bevin’s previous hostile attitude toward the Jews in Palestine. I said that the British had been very helpful concerning Jordan. There the situation was difficult. Off the record, I said there were three forces in Jordan—the King, the Cabinet, and the people. The desire of these elements for peace with Israel descended in strength in the same order. I said that I believed Mr. Bevin was as concerned as we were for peace in the Near East. There was no advantage to the US or UK in continuing an uneasy situation. Representative Roosevelt inquired whether at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers’ meeting 5 the three representatives could not frankly state the reasons why their countries were shipping arms to the Near East, and declare that their nations would take every possible step to prevent the resumption of the war in Palestine. I said that I thought this was an interesting suggestion which I would be glad to consider. Another Congressman inquired whether I had had discussions with Mr. Bevin on Near Eastern arms since the Palestine arms embargo had been lifted. I said that I had. Still another Congressman asked what quantity and categories of arms were being shipped to the Arabs by the UK. I replied that we had this information but that I could not make it available. I added that the only important shipments were going to Egypt. A Congressman asked why the UK did not ship arms to Israel. I said that the Israelis seemed to look to us for arms. I added that the UK was not shipping to the Arabs anything which we were sending to the UK. The Egyptians, moreover, were paying for the arms they acquired. Representative Roosevelt inquired whether the balance of power was shifting in favor of Egypt. I replied that our military authorities had informed us that it was not. The question was then asked whether any funds being provided the United Kingdom by the United States were being used to facilitate the manufacture of arms destined for Egypt. I said that my impression was that this was absolutely not the case. Broadly speaking and off the record, our difficulty with the UK was in just the opposite direction. We were having trouble persuading the UK that they must help us share the responsibility of defending the free world. The UK was naturally concerned with its own economic situation and had asked us whether we preferred to see it become self-supporting or help us with world responsibilities. They could not do both. I had told them that they had got to do both. Representative Tauriello inquired why the UK had recognized Communist China. I said that I thought that I might soon be in a position to say “I told you so” to Mr. Bevin on this, but that, of course, I would not do so. A Congressman stated the opinion that the Israelis must have had some basis for their protest to the Department on the rearming of the Arabs. I replied that as I had said before, there was much misinformation on the Near Eastern arms situation. The Israeli protest had in my opinion been exaggerated. Dean Acheson 1 Drafted by Stuart W. Rockwell, Officer in Charge, Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. 2 Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs; John C. Elliott, Acting Chairman, Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments; Harold W. Glidden, Division of Research for Near East and Africa. 3 Also attending were Democratic Representatives Hugh J. Addonizio (N.J.), William A. Barrett (Pa.), Andrew J. Biemiller (Wisc.), Edward Breen (Ohio), Chester A. Chesney (Ill.), Earl Chudoff (Pa.), L. Gary Clemente (N.Y.), Harry J. Davenport (Pa.), James J. Delaney (N.Y.), Isidore Dollinger (N.Y.), Herman P. Eberharter (Pa.), William T. Granahan (Pa.), William J. Green, Jr. (Pa.), James J. Heffernan (N.Y.), Louis B. Heller (N.Y.), Raymond W. Karst (Mo.), Augustine B. Kelley (Pa.), Edna F. Kelly (N.Y.), Arthur G. Klein (N.Y.), Christopher C. McGrath (N.Y.), John McSweeney (Ohio), Abraham J. Multer (N.Y.), Barratt O’Hara (Ill.), Harry P. O’Neill (Pa.), T. Vincent Quinn (N.Y.), Peter W. Rodino (N.J.), John J. Rooney (N.Y.), Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., (N.Y.), Anthony F. Tauriello (N.Y.), Sidney R. Yates (Ill.), and Republican Representatives Jacob K. Javits (N.Y.) and Henry J. Latham (N.Y.). 4 For documentation on the United Nations Security Council resolution of August 11, 1949 lifting the embargo on arms shipments to the Palestine area, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. 5 Reference is to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France at London in May 1950; for documentation, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. For text of the Tripartite Declaration on arms shipments to the Near East, see p. 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] . Draft Report by the National Security Council S/S–NSC files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 65 Series 1 [Document 59] Draft Report by the National Security Council 2 top secret NSC 65 [ Washington , March 28, 1950.] United States Policy Toward Arms Shipments to the Near East the problem 1. To define the policy the United States should follow with respect to shipment by the United Kingdom of arms to certain Near Eastern states within the framework of United Kingdom plans for joint defense of the Near East by the United Kingdom and the states concerned. analysis 2. Certain important developments have occurred affecting the arms export policy set forth in paragraph 17 of NSC 47/2, “United States Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States”. 3 It will be recalled that in view of the UN Security Council resolution of August 11, 1949, lifting the embargo on arms shipments to the Palestine area, it was decided that the United States should permit the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states, but considering our desire to avoid being drawn into an arms race in the Near East it was also decided that these shipments should be limited to such equipment as we might consider necessary for the maintenance of internal order and for legitimate defense. The United States view with regard to the export of arms to the area was expressed by Senator Austin in the UN Security Council, August 4, 1949, as follows: “So far as the United States is concerned, it does not intend to allow the export of arms which would permit a competitive arms race in the area. Export of arms to this area of the world should be strictly limited to such arms as are within the scope of the legitimate security requirements, again as recommended by Dr. Bunche. We hope that prudence will prevail not only among the parties but among all nations of the world which are in a position to supply arms and that they will pursue a policy similar to that which we intend to pursue.” 3. The first progress report on NSC 47/2, February 27, 1950, 4 reported that under the above general policy the United States has been granting export licenses for arms shipment to Israel and to the Arab states, and that an unfavorable development in this connection has been the strong criticism of this Government by the Israeli Government, which has alleged that the United States, in not attempting to prevent the shipment of arms to the Arab states by the United Kingdom since the lifting of the Palestine arms embargo, is fostering an arms race in the Near East and encouraging the Arabs to resume hostilities. The Israeli Government has been particularly disturbed by reported British shipments of heavy military equipment to Egypt. The United States Government has received no evidence of any serious preparations by the Arabs to begin the war again, and believes, in fact, that the trend in the Near East is toward peace rather than toward war. 4. Top secret consultation between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States has revealed plans of the British Chiefs of Staff for a form of Anglo-Egyptian military partnership to assist the defense of the Near East in case of Soviet aggression. These plans call for the strengthening of the Egyptian army with British military equipment, including heavy items. It is foreseen that one of the results of this development will be the increasing dependence of the Egyptian army upon the United Kingdom for military supplies and replacements, a fact which will enhance the prospects of continued British presence in the Suez Canal zone. Main supply and maintenance bases for the whole Near Eastern theatre will, in fact, be developed on an Anglo-Egyptian basis, as will plans for the whole field of air defense. By direct control of spare parts and replacements, the British believe they will be able to restrain the Egyptians from military adventures not connected with the regional defense purposes for which British arms are being furnished. The British estimate that it will be two or three years before the Egyptian army can be regarded as trained and equipped up to the standards desired. They plan eventually to draw the other Arab states and Israel into the projected general Near Eastern defense arrangement. By such means the strategic position of the West in the Near East will be improved. It is essential, of course, that this process not involve the resumption of hostilities by the parties to the Palestine dispute. 5. The British Chiefs of Staff have approved an order of battle for the Egyptian army including the following major units: 1 infantry division 12 heavy anti-aircraft regiments 2 infantry brigades 4 light anti-aircraft regiments 1 light armored brigade 2 coast artillery regiments Plans for air units have not yet been finalized. 6. United States military experts report that the amount of heavy equipment which the British plan to supply for these major units, including a number of jet planes and tanks, is not excessive for the joint defensive purposes envisaged. 7. The United States Government is informed that the British Chiefs of Staff, in considering the question of arms shipments to the Arab states and particularly to those Arab states with which the United Kingdom has special treaty relations, have considered the following factors: a . The internal security requirements of the states concerned. b . The contributions such states could make in event of war. c . The undesirability of an arms race developing in the Near East. d . The undesirability of the states spending more on armaments than their local economies could bear. 8. As a result of a study based on these principles, the British Chiefs of Staff have arrived at an assessment indicating the size of the forces which they believe the Arab states should reasonably have. This will enable the United Kingdom to set a ceiling on arms shipments. The Arab states have furnished the UK with detailed information concerning their military positions, and have given assurances that they would not use any of the arms supplied against the Israelis. The UK, in considering Israeli requests for military equipment, has been hindered by the fact that the Israelis have not supplied the British with information concerning the military material now in their possession, or their plans for future military organization. 9. In the light of the above considerations the shipment of arms by the UK to the Near East within the framework of the plans for Anglo-Egyptian and other Anglo-Arab military cooperation is consistent with United States security interests and with the continuation by the United States of the policy set forth in NSC 47/2. However, it is desirable that the United States remain alert to the danger of an arms race in the Near East, particularly to the possibility that Israel, as a result of its anxieties regarding Egyptian import of heavy military equipment, might turn to the communist states for additional arms. It is also desirable that the United States impress upon the British the latent danger of the renewal of Palestine hostilities, and be prepared at any time to take vigorous diplomatic action, alone or with the UK, both within the United Nations and outside, to prevent any attempt at renewing the war, should continued close observation of developments in the Near East indicate that such an attempt will be made. Moreover, the relative advantage of the use of Near Eastern resources for armaments as compared with their use for works of peace, for economic development, for the resettlement of refugees, and for the achievement of higher standards of living, is a factor to be taken into account in assessing measures for strengthening the defense of the Near East. conclusions 10. It is in the security interest of the United States that: a . The Near East be militarily strengthened for defense against communist aggression, and that the countries concerned obtain their arms from friendly sources. b . The position of the United Kingdom in the Near East be maintained and strengthened by such arrangements as those envisaged in the current plan for Anglo-Egyptian military cooperation. 11. The United States should, therefore: a . Interpose no objection to the shipment by the United Kingdom of the arms destined for Egypt and the other Arab states within the framework of the plans for Anglo-Egyptian and other Anglo-Arab military cooperation. b . Continue the close consultation with the British which has enabled us to be kept fully informed on the amount of military equipment actually shipped or to be shipped to the Near East by the UK. c . Continue the policy of exporting to Israel and the Arab states only such military equipment as the United States considers necessary to help those states maintain internal order and provide for legitimate defense. d . Continue to avoid being drawn into any arms race in the area. [The Department of State Consultant proposes the inclusion of the following additional subparagraph e . The Department of Defense and NSRB consultants do not concur. 5 [ e . Recognize the peculiar defense situation in Israel deriving from the lack of stability in its relations with the Arab states, and Israel’s consequent uneasiness.] f . Remain alert for any developments unfavorably affecting the present trend from war to peace in the Near East. 6 1 Lot 63 D 351 is a serial master file of the National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 A covering note to the National Security Council by Acting NSC Executive Secretary S. Everett Gleason, dated March 28, 1950, states that the source text was prepared by the NSC Staff with the advice and assistance of representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, and of the Chairman, National Security Resources Board and the Director of Central Intelligence on the basis of an initial draft submitted by the Department of State. Mr. Gleason’s note, the source text, and a title page were submitted to the NSC as NSC 65. 3 For text of NSC 47/2, dated October 17, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1430 . 4 For text, see p. 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] . 5 In a memorandum of March 30 informing the Secretary of State that NSC 65 would be the subject of a National Security Council meeting on April 6, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs Raymond Hare noted that the military and National Security Resources Board staff members “thought that this paragraph was not warranted in view of Israel’s present favorable military position vis-à-vis the Arab states” (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 65 Series). In a memorandum of April 5, circulated that day to the NSC at the request of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed him that they perceived no objection to the conclusions and recommendations of the report, “subject to the non-inclusion of subparagraph 11 e . Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate that political considerations are involved in this matter, they regard the area of the Near East-Eastern Mediterranean, from the United States military point of view, as a strategic entity in which they recognize no fundamental difference between the defense situation in Israel and in other Near East states.” (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 65 Series). 6 As a result of the objections to paragraph 11 e raised by both the JCS and NSRB, NSC 65 was amended at the Council meeting on April 6. Paragraph 11 e was omitted in its entirety, and the report was then forwarded to President Truman as NSC 65/1. At a Cabinet meeting on April 14, the President said he thought the paper was much too one-sided and that it would cause trouble. Secretary Acheson added that he thought there were three points to consider: the military necessity for arming the Egyptians; the fact that we were not doing what we should to arm the Israelis properly; the possibility of resolving the problem “if the British, French and the United States could get non-aggression declarations from the Middle East countries which could be announced.” Acheson added that the President “was much interested in this idea” (Memorandum by Lucius D. Battle, April 14 (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 65 Series)). Report Prepared in the Department of State CFM Files: Lot M–88: May FM Meeting, C & D Series, Box 149 [Document 60] Report Prepared in the Department of State 1 top secret [ Washington ,] April 20, 1950. Subject: Arms Shipments to Arab States and Israel Problem: To obtain British and French agreement to a course of action designed to minimize the possibility of harmful developments arising out of the shipment of arms to the Near Eastern states. Background: When the United Nations Security Council on August 11, 1949 lifted the embargo on arms shipments to the Palestine area, representatives of the United States, France, and Great Britain in the Council said that their respective countries did not wish to see an arms race take place in the area. The United States subsequently decided to permit the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states, but in view of our wish not to be drawn into an arms race, it was also decided that these shipments should be limited to such equipment as we might consider necessary for the maintenance of internal order and for legitimate defense. Under the above policy the United States has been granting export licenses for arms shipments to Israel and to the Arab states. The British Government, which is governed in its Near Eastern arms export policy by principles similar to those underlying American policy, has been permitting the shipment of military equipment to the Arab states and in particular to those Arab states with which the United Kingdom has treaty relations. In the case of Egypt, the United Kingdom has plans for a form of Anglo-Egyptian military partnership to defend the Near East in case of Soviet aggression. These plans call for the strengthening of the Egyptian army and the shipment to Egypt of a certain amount of heavy military equipment, including heavy tanks and jet planes. We are not well informed concerning French arms shipments to the area. The British shipments of arms to the Arab states have become generally known, and the Israeli Government has charged that this action is encouraging the Arabs to resume hostilities against Israel. In particular, the Israeli Government has strongly criticized the United States Government for not attempting to prevent the shipments. In view of the acquisition by the Arabs of additional military equipment, the Israeli Government has formally requested the Department to facilitate the acquisition in this country by Israel of a considerable amount of heavy military equipment, to be used for defensive purposes. Discussion: Reports we have received from responsible sources in the Near East have led us to the opinion that in the area there is a gradual trend away from war toward peace and that no party is making preparations to resume hostilities. Moreover, we believe it to be in the security interests of the United States that the Near East be militarily strengthened for defense against possible Soviet aggression, and that the countries in the region obtain their arms from reliable and friendly sources. It is also in the security interests of the United States that the position of the United Kingdom in the Near East be maintained and strengthened by those arrangements set forth in the current plan for Anglo-Egyptian military cooperation. Therefore, we have interposed no objection to the principle of the shipment by the United Kingdom of arms to Egypt and the other Arab states within the framework of the plans for Anglo-Egyptian and other Anglo-Arab military cooperation. The British are going forward with their plans to set up the system of Anglo-Arab military cooperation. The French are apparently shipping some arms to Syria. Although we believe that no party to the Palestine dispute is preparing to resume hostilities, and although we think that the trend in the Near East is away from war toward peace, the situation in the area continues explosive because of the high passions which were aroused during the Palestine conflict, and there is the remote possibility that some spark might set off warfare. Although the strengthening of the Near East through Anglo-Arab military cooperation is the element of the greatest importance in the present situation, the relationship between the Arabs and the Israelis is also important. This latter element also figures prominently in the American domestic political scene, since there are many active sympathizers with Israel in this country who believe that if the Arabs receive new arms they will resume war with Israel. These sympathizers have accused the Department of encouraging the Arabs to resume hostilities by not persuading the British to cease their military shipments. They are also conducting a campaign to persuade the United States Government to facilitate the acquisition by Israel of heavy military equipment in this country. The Department does not believe that this Government should be placed in a position of being expected to furnish to any one state in the Near East a piece of military equipment to match every piece of military equipment acquired by any other state in the Near East as this in effect would be participating in an arms race. In order to lessen the remote possibility of an outbreak of hostilities and reduce the present tension over this issue, the following recommendations are made. Recommendations: It is recommended that the Secretary discuss this subject with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman, as follows: A. Tripartite Discussions: 2 1. The Secretary might wish to impress upon Messrs. Bevin and Schuman the latent danger of the renewal of hostilities in Palestine and the explosive nature of the Near Eastern situation in general. 2. He might also suggest to Messrs. Schuman and Bevin that the US, UK and France make public declarations that they will not permit the shipment of arms to any Near Eastern country unless the purchasing country give to the supplying country formal assurance to undertake no aggression against any other Near Eastern state. B. Discussions with Mr. Bevin: 1. The Secretary might wish to suggest to Mr. Bevin the desirability of a review of the arms program planned for Egypt in order to make absolutely certain that it does not exceed that required for the attainment of the UK’s political and military objectives. C. Discussions with Mr. Schuman: 1. The Secretary might wish to point out to Mr. Schuman the desirability of a US-French exchange of information on the quantities of arms both nations have permitted to go to the Near East since the UN Palestine arms embargo was lifted on August 11, 1949, and which they may subsequently permit to go. We have already approached the French Embassy here with this suggestion, but we have the impression that the French reaction is not favorable. We already have a reasonably satisfactory arrangement for exchanging information with the British on this subject. 3 1 This report, FM D D–2a, was drafted by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs and fully cleared within the Department as a statement of policy in preparation for the May Foreign Ministers meeting in London. It is a slightly revised version of an earlier draft, dated April 3, which may be found in CFM Files, Lot M–88, May FM Meeting, C & D Series, Box 149. Lot M–88 is a consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancilliary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center. 2 The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense on May 2, 1950, that they concurred in this position paper but thought it desirable to enlarge the scope of the suggested tripartite discussions by including all the basic propositions underlying U.S. policy toward Israel and the Arab states listed in paragraph 15 of NSC 47/2, which the President had approved on October 20, 1949 ( Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1436 . Of particular interest was the subparagraph therefrom that stated: “The difference between the new Israeli State and the neighboring Arab states should be reconciled at least to the extent that Israel and the Arab states would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically recommended that the following words be added to the first paragraph of Section A of the Recommendations: “In this connection it would be well to stress the importance of concerted action on the part of the three Governments in the Near Eastern situation.” They also suggested the following addition to the second paragraph: “Such public declarations further should point out the need for Israel and the Arab states to act in concert to oppose any aggression from outside the Near East.” (Memorandum of May 2, 786.56/5–250) 3 On April 24, Secretary Acheson proposed to President Truman that the United States, United Kingdom, and France issue a joint declaration on arms shipments to the Near East. When the State Department’s plans for a joint declaration were described to the President, he replied that he believed such a declaration would remove the objections which he had to the draft NSC report on United States Policy Toward Arms Shipments to The Near East, NSC 65/1 (see footnote 6, p. 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] ). (Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State McGhee to Acting Secretary Webb, May 17 (484A.118/5–1750)) The subject of arms shipments to the Arab states and Israel was subsequently placed on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers meeting at London in May; see editorial note, p. 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] . Report Prepared in the Department of State CFM Files: M–88: May FM Meeting, C & D Series, Box 149 [Document 61] Report Prepared in the Department of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] April 28, 1950. Subject: Near Eastern Security Problem: To obtain British and French agreement to a course of action designed to promote stability in the Near East. Background: Although armistice agreements are now in effect between Israel and some of the Arab states, the return of peace and stability in the Near East is impeded by the fact that the Arabs and Israelis are deeply suspicious of one another. The Arabs fear that the continued Jewish immigration into Israel and the aggressiveness of the Israelis will inevitably result in an expansionist move to incorporate within Israel part or all of the Arab Palestine, and perhaps even parts of the neighboring Arab states themselves. The Israelis on the other hand are afraid that the Arab states, smarting under their defeat in the Palestine war, are planning a “second round” against Israel. The Israelis have particularly developed this thesis in connection with the British shipment of arms to the Arab states. Even though peace treaties might eventually be concluded between Israel and its Arab neighbors, uncertainty regarding the motives of the Israelis on one hand and the Arabs on the other would undoubtedly persist. In these circumstances, the Department has for some time been considering the possibility that the United States might make some kind of reassuring declaration concerning the Israeli-Arab relationship which might discourage aggressive moves and contribute to the security and stability of the Near Eastern area. British Embassy representatives have recently informally raised with Departmental representatives the possibility that the United States might make a declaration of the sort mentioned above, and it is possible that Mr. Bevin will raise this question at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. British Embassy representatives have also specifically mentioned a joint US–UK guarantee of frontiers in the Palestine area. The British Government believes that it is already exerting a stabilizing influence in the Near East through its treaties with Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. On March 30 a group of American citizens disturbed by the shipment of arms to the Arab states, including representatives of the American Federation of Labor, the Quakers, and several American Jewish organizations, informally suggested to the Department that the American representatives in the United Nations should make a statement to the effect that the United States would not countenance aggression in the Near East. In a recent meeting with the Secretary, Representative Roosevelt asked that the Department consider the possibility that at their forthcoming meeting the US, UK, and French Foreign Ministers might make some sort of a reassuring declaration concerning the relations between Israel and the Arab states. On April 6 the British Embassy informally suggested the possibility that a US–UK statement designed to discourage aggression in the Near East might be made at the time King Abdullah of Jordan proclaimed the constitutional union of Jordan and Arab Palestine. The King is expected to do this some time after the Jordanian elections on April 11. The British also suggested that the US might wish publicly to declare its approval of the union. Departmental representatives reacted unfavorably to these suggestions, believing that the occasion in question would not be a suitable one for a US–UK declaration on Near Eastern security. The Departmental officers considered that the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan would raise several problems, such as the effect upon the negotiations being conducted by the Palestine Conciliation Commission and the Jordan-Israeli relationship expressed in the Jordan-Israeli armistice agreement. Although the Department believes the eventual incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan to be desirable and has so informed the British, the Departmental representatives were doubtful that the US would wish to make a public declaration of approval of the union at the present time. Discussion: It is believed that it might be helpful in promoting peace and stability in the Near East if the US, UK and France were able to make reassuring declarations upon the occasion of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Such declarations might reduce the suspicions and uneasiness prevailing in the Near East, both as regards the relationship between the Israelis and the Arabs and that between the Arabs themselves. They might also facilitate the realization by the countries of the Near East that their real security problem lies in the Soviet threat. The British reception of the above idea would probably be favorable, and it is believed that the French reception might be the same. Recommendations: Accordingly, it is recommended that the Secretary suggest the following procedure to Mr. Bevin, and that after Mr. Bevin and the Secretary have reached agreement, they together seek to obtain the agreement of Mr. Schuman. 1. Upon the termination of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting the US, UK, and French Foreign Ministers would, on behalf of their Governments, separately make statements conforming, insofar as the policies of the three countries may permit, to the following suggested declaration. The Government of _____________________________, deeply interested in the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the Near East, reaffirms its policy of constant support of the political independence and territorial integrity of the states in that area. It continues unalterably opposed to the violation of the frontiers of states through external force. The Government of ________________________, should it receive reliable information that any Near Eastern state was preparing to violate existing frontiers or armistice lines, would immediately take action consistent with its obligations as a member of the United Nations, both within and without the United Nations, to prevent such violation. 2 1 This report, FM D D–3a, was drafted by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs and fully cleared within the Department as a possible course of action for the Secretary of State to follow during the May Foreign Ministers meeting in London. It is a slightly revised version of an earlier draft dated April 24 which is in CFM Files, Lot M–88, May FM Meeting, C & D Series, Box 149. 2 In anticipation of tripartite discussions at the London Foreign Ministers meeting on limitation of arms shipments to the Arab states and Israel, Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup suggested in telegram Secto 70 from London, May 1, that the Report on Near Eastern Security be circulated to the Near Eastern, Missions on a strictly confidential basis in order to obtain “view our chiefs on anticipated reaction their countries. Such information would be useful in continuing discuss matter here.” (396.1 LO/5–150) The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not concur with the recommendation contained in this report. In a memorandum of May 4 to the Secretary of Defense they reviewed certain implications from the military point of view and recommended that “the United States neither suggest nor approve a declaration regarding the security of the Near East which implies employment, either within or without the United Nations, of military enforcement measures.” (780.5/5–450) Editorial Note [Document 62] Editorial Note Near Eastern and South Asian matters were extensively discussed, both in preparatory meetings and during the formal meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France at London, in May 1950. The United States Delegation to the preparatory meetings was headed by Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup; the United States Delegation to the Foreign Ministers meetings was headed by Secretary of State Acheson. For a comprehensive record of both the preparatory meetings and the formal meetings of the Foreign Ministers regarding the Near East and South Asia, see volume pages 828 ff. The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State 396.1 LO/5–250: Telegram [Document 63] The Ambassador at Large ( Jessup ) to the Secretary of State secret London , May 2, 1950—noon. Secto 75. 1 From Jessup. First meeting subcommittee on Near East took place yesterday afternoon with Wright, Furlonge, Evans, Sheringham for UK 2 and Hare, Palmer, and Utter for US. 3 Wright opened meeting by referring international situation as developed previously in conferences with Jessup. He then referred to US–UK conferences in 1947 and 1949) 4 which had accomplished for NE area what current talks designed develop for all geographic areas. He assumed basic objectives set forth during those conferences still obtain and Hare confirmed they did. [Here follows a discussion of specific problems relating to Iran and Turkey.] 3. Palestine. Wright observed there were several questions which might be discussed, including the supply of arms and a reassuring statement with reference security area. UK representatives in field expressed doubt regarding possibility any stable arrangement in area without UK-US guarantee of frontiers. There was also question of statics quo in area and whether any change would result instability. Hare stated that we particularly wished discuss these subjects. With regard to arms question, we would like to assure ourselves both US and UK are proceeding from same premises in their consideration of this problem. This question not only important from point of view future peace and stability of area, but delicate from public relations angle. Particularly we wish to inquire whether our analysis to effect that trend in NE away from war and toward peace is in conformity British estimate and also to assure ourselves that British shipments of arms to NE, particularly to Egypt, were clearly directed to fostering security of area. Wright replied UK view chances of resumption hostilities in NE as remote in foreseeable future. He discounted military capabilities any Arab state. While intentions present government of Israel not aggressive he thought influence of extremist elements, pressure generated by unrestricted immigration and economic unviability of Israel combined to make more likely possibility Israeli expansion than Arab aggression. Nevertheless, he saw no danger in foreseeable future. Regardless of potentialities, it was important recognize mutual fears and suspicions prevailed on both sides. Hare agreed that question of fear was important factor and stated that we had two specific suggestions to make to assist allaying those fears: ( a ) address statement to arms question itself (which he outlined along lines contained D–2) 5 and ( b ) general reassuring statement along lines D–3. 6 Wright seemed generally interested in and receptive to these suggestions, but in discussion that followed other members of Foreign Office raised series of objections and doubts including following: ( a ) They doubt desirability of French participation, stating that French influence in area at low ebb and that their participation would have weakening effect. Wright inquired whether we were irrevocably decided on tripartite declaration and whether choice is between this and no declaration at all. Hare replied his instructions call for tripartite statement but for discussion question with French only after prior conversations with UK. If Foreign Office opposed French participation, we would like have their reasons. Wright observed if French not included it would be necessary delay issuance statement until after conference in deference French sensibilities. Statement, as presently worded in our draft, might be interpreted as freezing status quo in NE. Some members of UK staff felt that some territorial change in NE inevitable and that use of force inherent in situation, mentioning specifically possible sucession difficulties in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Hare took strong exception this attitude arguing that its acceptance would constitute turning clock back in resolution of problems in Arab world. We stressed effort being made in UN and otherwise to develop concept peaceful and orderly solution of international difficulties. He mentioned as example US attitude on Iraqi-Syrian union. We don’t oppose change per se but feel it should be by orderly process. Wright stated these questions not being raised because UK disagreed with principle of suggestions but merely to bring out some of the problems inherent in situation and which they thought we should consider before deciding issue of such statement. He said Foreign Office representatives would consider our suggestions which would be taken up at subsequent meetings. Regarding British policy of withholding arms shipments to Israel, Wright said British chiefs-of-staff and Foreign Office sympathetic to idea of making appropriate sales of arms but it had been found inadvisable thus far to modify policy due primarily special British relation with certain Arab countries. Here again Wright seemed more open-minded on this subject than his colleagues who could see only adverse considerations in any relaxation of present policy. Wright said that British were particularly concerned re shipment of potent items such as jets and tanks which he said were what Israel really wanted. We asked whether relaxation which would indicate British impartiality would be helpful and observed would be extremely undesirable to be placed in position of British being regarded as purveyors to Arabs and US to Israel. Wright agreed wholeheartedly. Some Foreign Office representatives also took attitude that any type of declaration or statement valueless since would not be credited by either Arabs or Israel. Hare took position that if this defeatist policy were accepted, there was no hope for stability in NE. It was true that words not backed by intentions would be valueless, but if UK and US really made up their minds and could take firm stand, none of NE states would be likely to flaunt it. Following is summary of foregoing: 1. Both sides reaffirmed basic points on which agreed 1947 and 1949. 2. Both sides agreed possibility counteract impression which might be created in NE and also other areas regarding exclusive character of NAT. 3. UK would study our suggestions re recommendations D–2 and D–3 including question French participation. 4. UK felt it would be desirable to study possibility some form NEA regional arrangement. We said we would be glad to have any ideas they may have regarding this suggestion. Group will consider Saudi Arabia and PEA tomorrow morning and Egypt, Libya, and Eritrea afternoon. Would appreciate receiving soonest information re proposed action Iran, since British desire discus as matter of urgency. [ Jessup ] 1 Series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State when absent from the Department; also used as a series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the May Foreign Ministers meeting in London, the September Foreign Ministers meeting in New York, and the NATO Council meetings. 2 Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office; Geoffrey W. Furlonge, Head, Eastern Department, British Foreign Office; T. E. Evans, Head, Middle East Secretariat, Eastern Department, British Foreign Office. 3 Ely E. Palmer, United States Representative, United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine; John E. Utter, Second Secretary of the Embassy in France. 4 See memorandum by Mr. Ranney, January 30, p. 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] . 5 Reference is presumably to the Report on Arms Shipments to the Arab States and Israel, April 20, p. 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] . 6 Reference is presumably to the Report on Near Eastern Security, April 28, p. 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] . The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State 396.1 LO/5–350: Telegram [Document 64] The Ambassador at Large ( Jessup ) to the Secretary of State secret London , May 3, 1950—2 p. m. Secto 98. Secto 75. 1 From Jessup. Second meeting Subcommittee on Near East took place yesterday morning with same participants as [reported] yesterday. Meeting covered following points: 1. Regional arrangements. Wright reverted question of examination possible alternative forms of regional arrangement which had occupied group yesterday as British initiative. Specifically, he said UK had been examining idea of getting Near East countries themselves to make statement along lines of NAT. Wright admitted FonOff did not really feel such arrangement feasible for NE and then reverted suggestion made at yesterday’s meeting regarding statement which would give some reassurance to NE and perhaps other areas as well re nonexclusive nature NAT. We again suggested this was far-reaching question with implications extending beyond NE and that we felt it should be discussed with those responsible for NAT negotiations. 2. Arms and stability. Group reverted questions of arms shipments and reassuring statement re security area. Wright stated FonOff had considered on working level points which we had made yesterday. FonOff representatives then developed following points: a . In considering arms shipment we need firm facts. UK chiefs of staff have recently made survey of relative strengths of NE states. It might be useful for US and UK to consider common arms policy and to transform present UK study into joint study, pooling information re present arms on hand and current applications. This would be reviewed periodically and would enable us assess rather wild statements being made by both sides. b . Re our suggested statement on obtaining assurances from NE states (paragraph A 2, recommendations D 2 a ) 2 FonOff wondered whether this could be adopted and carried further by adding that US and UK (and perhaps France) had decided institute joint consultations re arms applications and would issue arms to countries in accordance their needs. Hare questioned feasibility foregoing, pointing out UK has treaty arrangements with number of states in area. He wondered whether we both could work from identical pattern. While we desire exchange information and may in practice consult jointly, he questioned advisability saying so publicly and thereby place ourselves in position where we publicly either had uphold or disapprove action of other. UK group, on Wright’s suggestion, produced draft statement embodying following elements: paragraph A 2 of recommendations D 2/ a ; paragraphs a and b above; and recommendation one of D 3. 3 After considering this draft, it was agreed delete section containing suggestion re exchange information and joint consultation. Resulting draft declaration being telegraphed separately and we would appreciate Department’s comments. FonOff is sending text to UK chiefs of mission in NE for their comments on substance, timing and question French participation. We suggest Department may wish take similar action. In group’s consideration of question of obtaining assurances from each NE state that it would not undertake aggression against any other state, FonOff representatives felt it might be preferable for UK obtain renewed assurances from each state immediately and then note fact in joint declaration that such assurances had been obtained. Hare pointed out that while we did not wish to be against virtue, nevertheless he thought that certain undesirable speculation might result among Arabs if UK suddenly made simultaneous approaches at this time all Arab state capitals in endeavor obtain such assurances. There would be suspicions UK motives, and subsequent joint action UK, US and possibly France might be prejudiced. Moreover, there might be difficulty obtaining such assurances from states to which UK has no present plans for shipping arms. On further reflection, Wright felt it would be preferable for FonOff consider obtaining assurances at present time from Iraq, Jordan and Egypt only. [Here follows discussions on the Palestine Relief Agency and Saudi Arabia.] [Jessup.] Douglas 1 Supra . 2 Reference is to the Report on Arms Shipments to the Arab States and Israel, April 20, p. 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] . 3 Reference is to the Report on Near Eastern Security, April 28, p. 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] . The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State 396.1 LO/5–350: Telegram [Document 65] The Ambassador at Large ( Jessup ) to the Secretary of State secret London , May 3, 1950—5 p. m. Secto 106. From Jessup. Following is text draft declaration on arms and stability referred Secto 98: 1 “The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, having had occasion to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Near East, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to the states in that area, have resolved as follows: “1. The two governments are agreed that the shipment of arms or war material from the United Kingdom or the United States to any country of the Near East will be permitted only on the understanding that the purchasing country has given formal assurances of its intention not to undertake any act of aggression against any other state of the Near East. “2. The two governments recognize that all the states in question need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self defence and to permit them to play their part in the defence of the area as a Whole. All applications for arms or war material from these countries will be considered in the light of this principle. The two governments wish, however, to reaffirm their opposition to the development of an arms race between any of these countries. “3. The two governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in the establishment and maintenance of the peace and stability of the Near East and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force, in a manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, between any of these states. It is their intention to use their influence both within and outside the United Nations to prevent any such development and to promote, so far as lies within their power, the peaceful settlement of any dispute which may arise in the area.” Final paragraph still under consideration with British with view to bringing it into closer conformity our draft. 2 [ Jessup ] 1 Supra . 2 In telegram Secto 186 from London, May 6, Ambassador Douglas reported that during the fourth and final US–UK bipartite subcommittee meeting on the Near East, Mr. Hare inquired about the present status of British thinking on the “Arms and stability statement”. Mr. Furlonge replied that the “text had been referred to various NE posts and to” Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin “who is considering question. Meanwhile, reactions coming in from field, some of them questioning wisdom such statement” (CFM files, Lot M–88, Secto telegrams, London FM). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Robertson) 780.5/5–550 [Document 66] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( Robertson ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] May 5, 1950. Subject: Military Aid Legislation for NEA Countries Participants: NEA—Mr. George C. McGhee NEA—Mr. David A. Robertson ANE—Mr. Burton Berry ANE—Mr. Frazer Wilkins 2 H—Mr. Ben H. Brown, Jr. 3 S/MDA—Mr. John H. Ohly 4 S/MDA—Mr. A. G. Vigderman 5 Maj. Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, OSD, Department of Defense Problem: Consultation with Congressional leaders concerning: ( a ) Legislation other than MDA Act of 1949 under which aid may be extended to NEA countries; and ( b ) Need for expanding Section 408( e ) under new legislation. 6 Action Required: Consultation with Congressional leaders. Action Assigned to: NEA—Mr. McGhee H—Mr. Brown S/MDA—Mr. Ohly Defense—General Lemnitzer Discussion: The meeting was arranged in Mr. McGhee’s office at 2:30 p. m., May 5, 1950, as an orientation discussion preliminary to conversations with Congressional leaders to ascertain their sentiment concerning: (1) The use of existing legislation other than the MDA Act of 1949 as the basis of providing equipment to certain NEA countries; (2) The modification of Section 408( e ) so that military assistance might be provided on a reimbursable basis to certain NEA countries. Mr. Ohly stated that legally sales from government excess stocks could be made under legislation other than the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 to countries such as India and Pakistan. There was legislation providing for transfer of excess stocks to a manufacturer in return for other equipment, and the manufacturer would in turn sell the equipment to one of these countries. There was the President’s War Powers Act and other legislation. However, there might be some question of whether Congress intended that such other legislation be used as a result of its enactment of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the deletion from that legislation of the broad authority relating to reimbursable aid. Legally, transfers could be made under other legislation. However, it was felt that Congressional leaders should be consulted so as not to jeopardize our efforts to obtain an expansion of the terms of Section 408( e ) and other provisions in the legislation which is to be presented on May 24 to the Congress covering the FY 1951. The other item regarding which we desire to consult the Congressional leaders deals with the possibility of expanding the terms of Section 408( e ). Mr. Ohly stated it was planned to mention the situation with which we are confronted in Saudi Arabia and the Union of South Africa to demonstrate the need for expanding this section. Mr. McGhee observed that Liberia was a clear-cut case which could also be used because of the special relations we enjoyed with this country, their complete dependence on the U.S., the lack of any internal security forces in the country, the need for protecting Liberia against communist infiltration from adjoining countries and for the maintenance of order against such events as the recent violence in connection with a strike at the Firestone Plantation. On that occasion the President of Liberia made it clear he had no force with which order could be restored. Mr. Ohly asked if Israel should be used as a case to justify the need for the expansion of Section 408 ( e ) because of the Congressional interest in this country. Mr. McGhee replied that if the case of Israel were used we would also have to include the Arab states, particularly Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, which had also requested military aid. Since no policy decision on military aid had been made as regards any of these countries it would be premature to use them as type cases. Mr. McGhee recognized that an interest might be shown in Israel as a result of discussing the Saudi Arabian case. However, he pointed out that we should follow the line set by the Secretary in his recent discussion with the 30 Congressmen, i.e., that Saudi Arabia is a special case and we propose to provide this country with military aid. Pie stated that the Congressmen accepted the position set forth by the Secretary. The justification of it being treated as a special case rests on the existence of the airbase, the large American investment in oil resources, the strategic location of Saudi Arabia, the special relations we have enjoyed with this country and the negligible participation of that country in the Palestine conflict. Mr. Robertson pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had authorized a token shipment to Saudi Arabia of 5000 rifles if this were essential to negotiating an extension of the Airbase Agreement and provided assurance were obtained from Congressional leaders as to the approval of legislation authorizing military aid for Saudi Arabia on a reimbursable basis. Mr. Brown doubted that this kind of assurance could be obtained in the proposed discussion with members of Congress. It was alternatively suggested that we might inform the Congressional leaders of our intention to provide the rifles to Saudi Arabia. It was the consensus that the President’s war powers could not be appropriately used for this case and it would be difficult to make the riflles available under other laws as excess equipment because of the great demand for Garand rifles. Mr. McGhee then stated that he had recently returned from a trip to Saudi Arabia and Liberia, that he was well acquainted with the situation in both countries and their need for arms, and asked to be informed when it was planned that the Congressional leaders be contacted in order that he might accompany the group. Mr. Brown agreed to keep him posted. Mr. Brown indicated that the Saudi Arabian aid problem should be raised with the EUR Senate Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee group as that would be the proper channel for handling military aid matters. Mr. McGhee concurred with, the advisability of consulting that group and stated in addition he would discuss the matter with the NEA Senate Sub-Committee. Mr. Brown stated that Senator Pepper was back in town and would continue to serve as Chairman of the NEA Sub-Committee until the end of the present session of Congress. Mr. Brown will make arrangements for the necessary contacts at the earliest possible date. Mr. McGhee then turned to the subject of the 303 river patrol boat project for Burma, stating that our proposal had been under consideration for some six months, and inquired of the status of the program. Mr. Ohly stated that a Memorandum to the President requesting the allocation of funds had been initialled by him and presumably sent to NEA for concurrence. Mr. McGhee stated that there were strong political reasons for getting action on this case without any further delay and hoped that the funds would be made available in the next two or three days. He inquired if all necessary arrangements with the Navy could be made to provide the river boats promptly. General Lemnitzer stated that he could act promptly upon receipt of a directive from the State Department but there may be some delays occasioned by the conversion of the boats from gasoline to diesel motors as he understood the Burmese were interested in the latter. Mr. McGhee replied that the time element could only be met by offering the gasoline boats on an as-is basis and he felt confident that our offer would be accepted. General Lemnitzer stated that there was also the problem of training and indicated that the Navy preferred the training to take place in this country. Mr. McGhee suggested that a naval officer be sent to Burma for the purpose of looking into this and any other technical aspects of getting action on the program. He inquired as to who would have responsibility once the money is available and was informed that Mr. Ohly had this responsibility. In reply to an inquiry General Lemnitzer was informed that should the Burmese refuse to accept gasoline boats we could then discuss with them other types of aid which could be made available in a prompt fashion. Furthermore, in the absence of a naval attaché at Rangoon Mr. McGhee offered to iron out any difficulties that may arise through the communications channel between the Department and Embassy Rangoon. 1 Copies to S/S, Coordinator of Programs, Frederick E. Nolting, Donald D. Kennedy, Deputy Director, Office of South Asian Affairs, Jidda, Rangoon, Monrovia, New Delhi, Karachi. 2 Acting Deputy Director, Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, March 30–August 9, 1950. 3 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. 4 Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance in the Department of State. 5 Office of Mutual Defense Assistance in the Department of State. 6 Reference is to Section 408( e ) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended by Public Law 621, 81st Cong., 64 Stat. 373, approved July 26, 1950, which authorized the President to transfer, or enter into contracts for the procurement for transfer of, equipment, materials, or services to nations already eligible for assistance under Titles I, II, and III of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 or to other nations who had entered into collective defense or regional arrangements agreements with the United States or nations whose ability to defend themselves or their regions had been demonstrated, provided such nations offered sufficient proof that the equipment provided was to be used for internal security or national or regional defense and that in the case of such transfers, the President notify the appropriate Committees of Congress (82d Cong., 2d Sess., Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Mutual Security Act of 1951 and Other Basic Legislation with Explanatory Notes , Washington, January 1952, pp. 78–94). For documentation on overall aspects of the U.S. Military Assistance Program, see vol. i , pp. 126 ff. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 396.1 LO/5–850: Telegram [Document 67] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret niact London , May 8, 1950—4 p. m. Secto 194. At Wright’s suggestion Hare and Palmer had informal discussion this morning re statement on NE arms and security. Wright said unable make any firm observation since papers on subject in hands Bevin and no indication as yet his reaction. He said, however, comments from British missions in NE had raised certain questions particularly with reference apparent conflict between paragraph 1 of draft joint declaration (Secto 106, May 3) 1 and British treaty commitments. Speaking personally, Wright said he had also been thinking of possibility some general statement which would cover not only Arab states and Israel but also Greece, Turkey and Iran. Ensuing conversation covered following points re proposed declaration: (1) Geographical scope of statement or statements. (2) Countries participating in issuance. (3) Content of statement or statements. (4) Timing. Re (1). Wright noted we had been thinking terms several types of statements re NE area, i.e., ( a ) some phraseology in NAT declaration 2 to remove stigma of exclusivity, ( b ) statement on Iran and ( c ) statements on arms shipments and Near Eastern security or a combined statement covering both. He observed that any statement under ( a ) would probably be of such general character as not to conflict with more specific statements contemplated. He thought, however, that instead of making completely separate statements re Iran and the Arab states and Israel it might be desirable to think in terms of combining these statements and extending them to include appropriate references to Turkey and Greece. His thought was that by so doing it would be possible to make clear area security concept and thus put various subjects treated, especially arms shipments, in proper context. We said we had been thinking more in terms of separate statements directed to specific points but that we would take idea of generalization under advisement. Wright made clear that in absence some indication from Bevin he was putting this idea forward purely on informal and exploratory basis. Re (2). Wright said that here again in absence reaction Bevin he could say nothing specific re French participation. If scope joint statement enlarged question French participation became even more problematical. British also referred here again to their special treaty commitments and trend of discussion was toward return to original US idea of separate statements conforming to extent possible to policies of countries making declaration. British indicated separate statements might remove some of their doubts re French participation. Re (3). Reference was made to general area agreement reached re Iran (Secto 186, May 6) 3 and to unresolved question re strengthening paragraph 3 of draft declaration. We told Wright reaction from both Department and field favored paragraphs 1 and 2 of draft declaration but found paragraph 3 insufficiently strong to achieve desired result. We again urged treatment third paragraph along lines D–3 a (Deptel Tosec 93). Re Greece and Turkey it was consensus that such statement, if made, would merely be reaffirmation of previously announced policy. Re (4). Wright said British felt strongly no statement on arms or NE security should be made until conclusion meetings Arab League Political Committee on Jordan question. He assumed, however, that this obstacle would probably be eliminated by conclusion of league meetings before end London conference. Re Iran, both sides saw difficulty including in general statement at end London conference in view their common feeling that statement on Iran in order carry desired weight should be linked with specification some definite line of action. No particular difficulty was foreseen from timing angle in inclusion Turkey and Greece if such action were in fact decided.Since this question now scheduled for discussion by Secretary with Bevin Wednesday any comments of Department should be expedited in order permit review with Secretary before Bevin meeting. Douglas 1 Ante , p. 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] . 2 For documentation on the Declaration issued at the London Foreign Ministers meetings regarding the North Atlantic Treaty, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. 3 For text, see ibid. , p. 986 . Report Prepared in the Department of State CFM files: M–88: May FM Meeting, C & D Series, Box 149 [Document 68] Report Prepared in the Department of State 1 top secret Washington , May 11, 1950. Regional Security Arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean and Near Eastern Areas the problem 1. To discuss with the French and British the various positions the United States has taken as regards regional security arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East if the subject is raised with the Secretary at the May Foreign Ministers meeting. background 2. The creation of the North Atlantic Pact, in which the United States has joined in a collective defense arrangement with such countries as France and Italy to the exclusion of the other Mediterranean and the Near Eastern countries, has tended to increase the feeling of insecurity and exposure on the part of the peripheral countries of Greece, Turkey and Iran. These countries, already suffering throughout the post war years from the Cold War tactics of the Soviet Union, have repeatedly expressed their keen desire for a regional security association of which the United States would be a member. Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon have approached us unilaterally with reference to possible security arrangements with this country. So far, we have declined to be associated with these countries in such arrangements. In the case of the GTI countries, the Secretary has established the line, and has informed their representatives that we could not consider pacts with them because we could not yet tell whether we were over-committed in Europe. He has said repeatedly that only an increase in Europe’s own defensive strength, resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty and the Military Aid Program, would permit us to consider further security arrangements. 3. Greece, Turkey and Iran have been and are definitely unhappy about our attitude on this point despite our attempts to reassure them by pointing out what we are doing for them in the field of military and economic assistance, and our argument that the North Atlantic Treaty itself constitutes a strengthening of the Western world and therefore an added element of protection for the whole free world, including the Near East. 4. The creation of a Pacific security pact, currently under consideration within the Department, would increase the pressure for a Near Eastern Pact and might well underscore the vulnerability of the Near East vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Our promotion of a Pacific pact would constitute a reversal of the position we have taken hitherto and, in the absence of a disposition to review our policy regarding Near Eastern regional arrangements, would most certainly lead the governments of that area to conclude that we regard them as being at the bottom of our list in the world picture. discussion Greece, Turkey and Iran . 5. The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East is stated, in the NSC memorandum “Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East—Basic U.S. Position”, approved November 24, 1947 (subsequently quoted in NSC 5/2, February 12, 1948, NSC 42/1, March 22, 1949 and NSC 47/2, October 17, 1949) 2 to be critical to the security of the United States, to the extent that any potentially hostile power should be denied a foothold in these areas. The National Security Council has found that the United States should as a matter of policy assist in maintaining the territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey and Iran and be prepared to make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power for this purpose. 6. The loss of Greece either directly to the Soviet Union or through the satellites or through a Greek puppet government would increase the Soviet domination of the Balkans and pose an actual threat to both the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean thereby outflanking the Dardanelles and endangering the Suez Canal. The loss of Turkey as a buffer against the expansion of the Soviet Union into the Mediterranean and the Near East would pose an even more serious threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the highly valuable oil resources of the area. The loss of Iran would deny our most important ally, Great Britain, a highly important source of oil and open a further route for the penetration into the vast oil producing areas of the Persian Gulf. Our security requirements and interests in these areas are similar to those of our potential allies and closely interwoven with those of Great Britain. 7. The foregoing discussion must be considered in light of the fact that the primary security interests of the United States outside the Western Hemisphere lie in the North Atlantic area. This fact is reflected by the North Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual Defense Act of 1949. 3 Greece, Turkey and Iran are included in the latter but not in the former. Nevertheless, the political and territorial integrity of the Near Eastern area as a whole and particularly certain countries in that area are of such importance to United States security as to justify strenuous efforts in the political, economic and military fields. 8. The United States has provided Greece over a period of the past three years almost every possible form of political, economic and military support for the purpose of preserving the independence of that country and of preventing it from succumbing to the onslaught of the communist-supported guerrilla forces and becoming another Soviet satellite. The United States has provided technical advisers to many sections of the government and military experts in almost all branches of the Greek National Forces. As a direct consequence of our aid, the Greek Government has been able to defeat the guerrilla forces and drive them from Greek soil. 9. The United States regards the maintenance of Turkish independence and security as a matter of strategic importance to its own security and has provided political, economic and military assistance to this end. It is the United States objective in Turkey to provide a military establishment of sufficient size and effectiveness to ensure resistance against Soviet pressure and to develop combat effectiveness to the extent that any overt Soviet aggression can be deterred or delayed. Great Britain has treaty obligations with this country providing for mutual defense and should Britain become involved as a result of any Soviet aggression, it is not unlikely that the United States would also become involved. 10. The United States has publicly manifested great interest in the security of Iran and by its strong support of the Iranian case before the Security Council was largely instrumental in bringing about the evacuation of Soviet forces from Azerbaijan in Northern Iran. 4 In 1948 it extended credits for the purpose of assisting Iran in obtaining badly needed military equipment. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 authority has been extended to provide Iran with grant and reimbursable military aid. The United States long-range security objective should be to supply the Iranian army with sufficient equipment and support as would reasonably ensure maintenance of internal security, a stabilized government and the prevention of interference from outside forces, other than direct invasion. 11. It seems unlikely that Greece, Turkey and Iran will join together in any new regional security arrangement with each other or with other countries of the Near East except on the basis of participation by the United States. Israel and the Arab States . 12. Three regional pacts already exist in this area. One is the Pact of the League of Arab States (May 22, 1945) between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. It provides methods for settling disputes between the members and for their cooperation in political, economic and social matters. Another is the Saadabad Pact (July 8, 1937) in which the Arab State of Iraq is joined with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. This Pact provides for non-interference, non-aggression and consultation regarding all international conflicts affecting the members’ common interests. Another is the Saudi Arab-Iraqi Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance of 1936, to which Yemen subsequently adhered, and Syria may join in the future. The treaty was aimed at Saudi Arab-Iraq diplomatic and military collaboration for the prevention of aggression. The weakness of the key provisions of these Pacts reflects the weakness of the members, singly and in combination. It follows that no important results for the security of the Near East from external aggression can be expected to flow from the existence of these Pacts. 13. The creation of a regional arrangement, pure and simple, of the Near Eastern countries offers no solution, not only because of the discord among them which has been created by the Palestine question, but also because of the deep-rooted suspicions which antedate that question and have been intensified by it. Moreover, and this is a fundamental difficulty, the area lacks a power center on the basis of which a pact could be built. 14. The creation of a regional pact in the Near Eastern area linked to the strongest members of the North Atlantic Treaty—the U.S. and the U.K. in present circumstances—would probably place too heavy a commitment at this time on these two countries which must be entirely free to be the judges of what, if any, resources they can devote to the security of the area and to select the recipient countries. While admittedly the United States attaches great importance to this area, and the U.K. attaches a strategic importance to the Near East as an area second only to that of the homeland, it nevertheless seems preferable that, should the question be raised, the Secretary should follow the line that we shall be unable to enter any new regional association pending development of European strength under the North Atlantic Treaty and the Military Aid Program. 15. The Arab countries, while having a pervading fear of the Soviet Union have a closer and more immediate problem in Israel. They feel, in fact, that they require protection from threats from three sources: Israel, the Soviet Union and each other. Similarly, Israel has a deep sense of insecurity in its exposed position surrounded by unfriendly Arab states and according to statements of its own government is fearful of the beginning of the second round of hostilities on the part of the Arab states. 16. The latest regional proposal is based on the agreement of the Arab League Council in October 1949 to conclude a regional collective security pact. If the proposed pact consisting of the Arab League members should involve extensive integration of military policies and military forces, it may well be doomed to failure since the Arab states would probably be reluctant to relinquish sovereign control over their armed forces to this extent. On the other hand, if the pact should be formulated as a series of interlocking mutual defense treaties, its formal conclusion might be feasible, although its enforcement would be very doubtful at the present time. The proposed pact is stated to be directed not against Israel or against any other potential aggressor, but, like the Atlantic Treaty, against any aggression as such. However, one of its primary motivations is undoubtedly the feeling of the Arab states that they require protection against Israel. A second important motivation of the pact is that of protection against Soviet aggression. 17. It would appear that the proposed Syro-Iraqi union has little chance of implementation in the foreseeable future. We have taken the position that we would look with disfavor upon any modification of the status of the present sovereign entities of the Near East which was accomplished by force or external intervention. However, since it is a cardinal principle of our policy to respect the right of peoples freely to choose their own form of government we would not oppose unions of peoples brought about by the freely expressed wish of the peoples concerned. While we might view with favor some form of Arab union after reviewing the information available to us, we have reached the conclusion that the U.S. should not at this time adopt an attitude either favoring or disfavoring the present Syro-Iraqi union proposals. This conclusion was based on the considerations: (1) that there is insufficient evidence on which to gauge the degree of popular support such a union would obtain in Syria and Iraq, and the general effects of the proposed action on Near Eastern stability and peace; (2) that we should not express an opinion in advance of consideration of the proposed move in an open and constitutional way within the two countries and before the latter have consulted with other states which may consider themselves affected; (3) that before expressing any judgment, we would expect Syro-Iraqi assurances that the proposed union would safeguard legitimate U.S. interests, would carry out existing international obligations of both states and would undertake to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the neighboring states. 18. A separate paper deals with the possibility of some form of assurances or guarantees that might be given by the United States and/or the United Kingdom coincidental with the conclusion of peace treaties or non-aggressive pacts between Israel and the Arab States. 5 recommendations 19. It is recommended that, in the event the Secretary is requested by French and British representatives to discuss regional security arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean area, he indicate our present position as follows: ( a ) We are not in a position to consider any security pacts with Greece, Turkey, Iran or other Near Eastern countries at the present time because we cannot tell whether our capabilities at this time are adequate to defend our vital interests in Europe. Only an increase in Europe’s own defensive strength, resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty and the Military Aid Program, would permit us to consider further security arrangements. ( b ) That we neither encourage nor discourage the spontaneous creation of any Eastern Mediterranean grouping for defensive purposes, provided it does not depend directly or indirectly on the support or association of the U.S., and provided it is non-provocative in character. ( c ) That if we are approached concerning the proposed Arab League Pact we might point out that the United States could not oppose or discourage formation of any regional grouping which was conducive to the maintenance and improvement of security in the Near East, non-provocative in character, and of a nature which would strengthen the ability of the states concerned to resist Soviet aggression. Conversely, it would be contrary to the best interest of the Near Eastern states to make any regional arrangement which would serve further to aggravate existing tensions and frictions in the area by creating the impression that it was being formed against Israel, any Arab state, or any combination of states within the Near East. ( d ) If we are approached for our views on Syro-Iraqi union we might indicate that we would look with disfavor on any such union if accomplished by force or external intervention, but would not object if brought about by the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned and if we received Syro-Iraqi assurances that the proposed union would safe-guard legitimate U.S. interests, would carry out existing international obligations of both states and would undertake to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the neighboring states. ( e ) We should seek to emphasize that the present armistice agreements are binding upon the Arab states and Israel and that the most effective measures which both sides could take towards the strengthening of collective security consists in making concrete progress toward the conclusion of final peace settlements. 1 This report, FM D D–1c, was drafted by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs and fully cleared within the Department. It was for use as a possible course of action for the Secretary of State to follow during the May Foreign Ministers meeting in London. Source text is the third draft of this report, the first being prepared on April 13 and the second on April 18. The comparatively late date of this draft, when Secretary Acheson was already engaged in discussions with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France at London, suggests that it may have been prepared not only in response to earlier JCS comments and criticisms, but also as a result of regional security discussions at London during the preparatory meetings leading up to the Foreign Ministers meetings as reported in telegrams Secto 98 of May 3, p. 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , and Secto 194, supra . There is no indication from Department of State files that this report was used by the United States Delegation at London nor that it was the subject of discussion by the Foreign Ministers. 2 For documentation on the November 24, 1947 NSC memorandum, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 575 – 576 , 623 – 624 . For text of NSC 5/2, see ibid. , 1948, vol. iv , p. 46 . For texts of NSC 42/1 and 47/2, see ibid. , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 269 and 1430 , respectively. 3 For documentation on the North Atlantic Treaty, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff.; for documentation on the Mutual Defense Act of 1949, see ibid. , vol. i , pp. 249 ff. 4 For documentation on the Azerbaijan crisis of 1945–1946, see Foreign Relations , 1945, vol. viii , pp. 359 ff.; and ibid. , 1946, vol. viii , pp. 289 ff. 5 Report entitled “Near Eastern Security”, April 28, p. 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] . The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 396.1 LO/5–1150: Telegram [Document 69] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret London , May 11, 1950—2 a.m. Secto 218. US–UK ministerial conversations late yesterday morning and during afternoon covered Items 8, 14, and 12 of agenda in that order. 1. Following question discussed under Item 8 Near East: a . Arms and stability. Secretary emphasized importance to US of question of arms shipments to Near East. He stated we appreciate importance of military steps which are being taken in area from point of view of strengthening area security from external aggression. He understood US and UK military in agreement this question. However, arms shipments have caused public excitement, which should be alleviated both at home and Near East. He suggested we should examine situation from point of view of assuring arms shipments not in excess of those required for attainment area security objectives and that we should also consider possibility of making public declaration expressing our opposition to arms race and to aggression, asking states in area at same time for assurances re non-aggressive use of any military items supplied. If such declaration made it would then be possible to go forward with necessary steps to make Near East secure. Bevin replied that he appreciated attitude which US Government had taken toward this problem which presents so many complications for UK. He mentioned risk that states in area would turn to USSR and satellites for arms if they could not get them from us. This question reverted to during afternoon session. Bevin stated he thought proposed declaration re arms and stability was good idea and said he wanted agree in principle if he could. He suggested question be considered further at officials’ level. He said proposal raises certain complications for UK, particularly in connection UK treaty obligations with Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. UK cannot tell Arab states with which it has treaties that it will unilaterally alter or interpret treaties as it sees fit. He thought only thing to do was to go to four states in area principally concerned (Egypt, Jordon, Iraq and Israel), tell them frankly what we are considering and ask them if they would comply by giving assurances. We would have their reactions by end of meeting and could then make our decision re declaration in that light. On question assurances, Bevin in off-record statement, said he had always been in difficulty with Egypt which UK had sometimes treated rather shabbily in past by furnishing it with “junk” in way of arms. Intensification of Egyptian nationalism had resulted in growing feeling for proper army in hope Egypt and UK would become Allies on equal terms. A great deal of disparagement of Egyptian as a soldier is unfair. Egypt is key point in Middle East. If we ask for assurances what would we say to Egyptian charges that we were limiting their army? Similarly, if Soviets began stirring up Kurds, would Iraq be able to say UK withholding from it weapons required to cope with situation? Secretary replied that nothing we had suggested would have any limiting effect on complying with security needs of area. We should go right ahead with plans to strengthen security, if such plans are right. Need is for something to quiet intra-Near East unrest. States most vitally concerned already bound by armistice agreements. Moreover, they have told us they didn’t want to attack. If we can announce that everyone has given us assurances re non-aggressive intentions by series unilateral declarations, these declarations would add up to something short of, but having similar effect to, a non-aggression pact. US and UK could then follow up by saying our sole purpose in furnishing arms is to strengthen security of area. He then read paragraph 2 suggested declaration as revised by Department (Tosec 153). 2 We would make clear at same time that if anyone violates assurances it has given we would immediately take action both within and without UN. This should have quieting effect on area and on public opinion in US. Bevin said he thought UK could agree in principle and [ Secretary ] then suggested words and procedure be considered at working level. He gave Bevin copy our revised draft and suggested possibility reversing order paragraphs 1 and 2 in order place emphasis on area security aspect. Bevin asked whether we should discuss proposed declaration with Near East states, but at Wright’s suggestion, it was agreed that question would also be pursued on working level. Bevin said he thought it important consult Jews and Arabs on subject since we did not want them to think we were sitting in London and deciding questions in violation of treaties. He felt, however, we must get this whole arms supplies question settled. Secretary observed that proposed draft declaration has not been mentioned to French. He said he thought it would be useful to include French. They were supplying arms to Syria and this loophole should be plugged. Wright here interjected suggestion which he had made to us May 8 (Secto 194) 3 re possibility widening scope of declaration to include Greece, Turkey and Iran but both Bevin and Secretary agreed problem these countries irrelevant to situation towards which proposed declaration directed. Question reassuring statement GTI should be considered separately from declaration on Arab states and Israel in view different problems involved. It was also agreed that any draft declaration should make absolutely clear it was directed only toward Arab states and Israel. Secretary then reverted question French participation and Bevin said he agreed in principle that they should participate. (After meeting, Wright took occasion observe that whereas Bevin agreed in principle French participation, he wasn’t certain whether Bevin had in mind participation in joint statement. He said he would try clear this matter up and let us know.) 4 [Here follow discussions on the Palestine Relief Agency, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Eritrea, Libya, and economic matters.] Acheson 1 Acheson had arrived in London to attend meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France. 2 For text of telegram Tosec 153, May 9, 1950, see footnote 4, vol. iii , p. 1029 . 3 Dated May 8, p. 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] . 4 In telegram Secto 256 from London, May 14, summarizing the highlights of the tripartite meetings to date, Acheson reported that Foreign Secretary Bevin had “agreed in principle” to a US–UK–French initiative to forestall any threat of aggression within the Near Eastern area. “Now working out drafting and procedure with British after which French will be approached.” (CFM files, Lot M–88, Secto telegrams, London FM) The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 396.1 LO/5–1250: Telegram [Document 70] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State secret London , May 12, 1950—1 p. m. Secto 233. Following is suggested revision draft tripartite statement on arms shipments and security NE received from FonOff: “The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States, having had occasion to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Near East, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to the states in that area, have resolved to make the following statement: “1. The three governments recognise that Israel and the Arab states all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defence and to permit them to play their part in the defence of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection the three governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on 4th August, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between Israel and the Arab states. “2. The three governments declare that assurances have been received from all the countries of the Middle East to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries that the purchasing country does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state in the Middle East. “3. The three governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the Near East and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of these states. The three governments should they find that any state in the area was preparing to violate existing frontiers or armistice lines would, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation.” Following is preliminary comment: 1. Revision in the order of presentation of points accords with suggestion of Secretary (Secto 218, May 11). 1 2. Revision in paragraph 2 to indicate necessary assurances already received is designed to meet British treaty complications and also is in accord discussion between Bevin and Secretary (Secto 218). Paragraph as drafted, however, does not cover except possibly by implication countries other than those to which arms being currently shipped. We are discussing this further with the British. 3. There are also certain minor drafting points, such as the use of term Middle East in paragraph 2 which should be changed so as make clear application is only to Arab states and Israel. 4. Basic elements in text approved by Department in Tosec 153 2 retained unimpaired in above draft. 5. Method of prior approach to Arab states and Israel still under discussion. Wright indicated yesterday FonOff felt obligated immediately make preliminary and informed approach to Egypt and Jordan (but not Iraq at this point) without reference deliberations here in hope stimulate “voluntary” assurances and clear way for subsequent approaches these and other states by countries sponsoring statement. Fact that AL Political Committee is currently meeting in Cairo presents difficulty this connection since would probably be disastrous if approaches to Arab states and Israel became matter collective discussion there. 6. French are not being brought into discussions pending further clarification with British. 7. British also submitted draft identic statement which conforms mutatis mutandis exactly to the tripartite draft quoted above. Acheson 1 Supra . 2 See footnote 2, supra . Editorial Note [Document 71] Editorial Note In a memorandum of April 17, NSC Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr., informed the National Security Council that the President had returned NSC 65/1 (see footnote 6, page 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] ) for reconsideration and that with the concurrence of the Secretaries of State and Defense “NSC 65/1 is accordingly being referred to the NSC Consultants for the preparation of a revised report for Council consideration” (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 65 Series). Pursuant to the President’s action, the Report on United States Policy Toward Arms Shipments to the Near East was revised by representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board and was transmitted to the National Security Council for reconsideration on May 10 as NSC 65/2 (Draft Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council, May 10, S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 65 Series). Substantial alterations had been made in the conclusions of NSC 65/1; the conclusions as they appeared in NSC 65/2 remained unchanged in the final report, NSC 65/3, submitted to the President on May 17 ( infra ), except for a sentence at the end of paragraph 12 e added at the request of the Secretary of Defense. A copy of NSC 65/2 is in S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 65 Series. Report to the President by the National Security Council S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 65 Series [Document 72] Report to the President by the National Security Council 1 top secret [NSC 65/3] [ Washington ,] May 17, 1950. United States Policy Toward Arms Shipments to the Near East the problem 1. To define the policy the United States should follow with respect to shipment by the United Kingdom of arms to certain Near Eastern states within the framework of United Kingdom plans for joint defense of the Near East by the United Kingdom and the states concerned. analysis 2. Certain important developments have occurred affecting the arms export policy set forth in paragraph 17 of NSC 47/2, 2 “United States Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States”. It will be recalled that in view of the UN Security Council resolution of August 11, 1949, lifting the embargo on arms shipments to the Palestine area, it was decided that the United States should permit the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states, but considering our desire to avoid being drawn into an arms race in the Near East it was also decided that these shipments should be limited to such equipment as we might consider necessary for the maintenance of internal order and for legitimate defense. The United States view with regard to the export of arms to the area was expressed by Senator Austin in the UN Security Council, August 4, 1949, as follows: “So far as the United States is concerned, it does not intend to allow the export of arms which would permit a competitive arms race in the area. Export of arms to this area of the world should be strictly limited to such arms as are within the scope of the legitimate security requirements, again as recommended by Dr. Bunche. We hope that prudence will prevail not only among the parties but among all nations of the world which are in a position to supply arms and that they will pursue a policy similar to that which we intend to pursue.” 3. The first progress report on NSC 47/2, February 27, 1950, reported that under the above general policy the United States has been granting export licenses for arms shipments to Israel and to the Arab states, and that an unfavorable development in this connection has been the strong criticism of this Government by the Israeli Government, which has alleged that the United States, in not attempting to prevent the shipment of arms to the Arab states by the United Kingdom since the lifting of the Palestine arms embargo, is fostering an arms race in the Near East and encouraging the Arabs to resume hostilities. The Israeli Government has been particularly disturbed by reported British shipments of heavy military equipment to Egypt. The United States Government has received no evidence of any serious preparations by the Arabs to begin the war again, and believes, in fact, that the trend in the Near East is toward peace rather than toward war. 4. Top secret consultation between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States has revealed plans of the British Chiefs of Staff for a form of Anglo-Egyptian military partnership to assist the defense of the Near East in case of Soviet aggression. These plans call for the strengthening of the Egyptian army with British military equipment, including heavy items. It is foreseen that one of the results of this development will be the increasing dependence of the Egyptian army upon the United Kingdom for military supplies and replacements, a fact which will enhance the prospects of continued British presence in the Suez Canal zone. Main supply and maintenance bases for the whole Near Eastern theatre will, in fact, be developed on an Anglo-Egyptian basis, as will plans for the whole field of air defense. By direct control of spare parts and replacements, the British believe they will be able to restrain the Egyptians from military adventures not connected with the regional defense purposes for which British arms are being furnished. The British estimate that it will be two or three years before the Egyptian army can be regarded as trained and equipped up to the standards desired. They plan eventually to draw the other Arab states and Israel into the projected general Near Eastern defense arrangement. By such means the strategic position of the West in the Near East will be improved. It is essential, of course, that this process not involve the resumption of hostilities by the parties to the Palestine dispute. 5. The British Chiefs of Staff have approved an order of battle for the Egyptian army including the following major units: 1 infantry division 12 heavy anti-aircraft regiments 2 infantry brigades 4 light anti-aircraft regiments 1 light armored brigade 2 coast artillery regiments Plans for air units have not yet been finalized. 6. United States military experts report that the amount of heavy equipment which the British plan to supply for these major units, including a number of jet planes and tanks, is not excessive for the joint defensive purposes envisaged. 7. The United States Government is informed that the British Chiefs of Staff, in considering the question of arms shipments to the Arab states and particularly to those Arab states with which the United Kingdom has special treaty relations, have considered the following factors: a . The internal security requirements of the states concerned. b . The contributions such states could make in event of war. c . The undesirability of an arms race developing in the Near East. d . The undesirability of the states spending more on armaments than their local economies could bear. 8. As a result of a study based on these principles, the British Chiefs of Staff have arrived at an assessment indicating the size of the forces which they believe the Arab states should reasonably have. This will enable the United Kingdom to set a ceiling on arms shipments. The Arab states have furnished the UK with detailed information concerning their military positions, and have given assurances that they would not use any of the arms supplied against the Israelis. The UK, in considering Israeli requests for military equipment, has been hindered by the fact that the Israelis have not supplied the British with information concerning the military material now in their possession, or their plans for future military organization. 9. In the light of the above considerations the shipment of arms by the UK to the Near East within the framework of the plans for Anglo-Egyptian and other Anglo-Arab military cooperation is consistent with United States security interests and with the continuation by the United States of the policy set forth in NSC 47/2. However, it is desirable that the United States remain alert to the danger of an arms race in the Near East, particularly to the possibility that Israel, as a result of its anxieties regarding Egyptian import of heavy military equipment, might turn to the communist states for additional arms. It is also desirable that the United States impress upon the British the latent danger of the renewal of Palestine hostilities, and be prepared at any time to take vigorous diplomatic action, alone or with the UK both within the United Nations and outside, to prevent any attempt at renewing the war, should continued close observation of developments in the Near East indicate that such an attempt will be made. Moreover, the relative advantage of the use of Near Eastern resources for armaments as compared with their use for works of peace, for economic development, for the resettlement of refugees, and for the achievement of higher standards of living, is a factor to be taken into account in assessing measures for strengthening the defense of the Near East. conclusions 10. It is in the security interest of the United States that: a . The Near East be militarily strengthened for defense against communist aggression, and that the countries concerned obtain their arms from friendly sources. b . The position of the United Kingdom in the Near East be maintained and strengthened by such arrangements as those envisaged in the current plan for Anglo-Egyptian military cooperation. 11. The United States should, therefore: a . Interpose no objection to the shipment by the United Kingdom of the arms destined for Egypt and the other Arab states within the framework of the plans for Anglo-Egyptian and other Anglo-Arab military cooperation. b . Continue the close consultation with the British which has enabled us to be kept fully informed on the amount of military equipment actually shipped or to be shipped to the Near East by the UK, and endeavor to develop similar consultation and exchange of information with France. c . Continue the policy of exporting to Israel and the Arab states only such military equipment as the United States considers necessary to help those states maintain internal order and provide for legitimate defense, bearing in mind the undesirability of increasing the instability and uneasiness in the Arab-Israeli area. 12. It is also in the security interest of the United States that peace be maintained within the Near East-Eastern Mediterranean area, and the United States should, therefore: a . Continue to avoid being drawn into any arms race in the area. b . Remain alert for any developments unfavorably affecting the present trend from war to peace in the Near East. c . Give sympathetic consideration to Israel’s application for export licenses for defensive military equipment sufficient to discourage attack from beyond its borders. d . Solicit British and French support for public declarations by the US, UK and France that they will not permit the shipment of arms to any Near Eastern country unless the purchasing country give to the supplying country formal assurance to undertake no aggression against any other Near Eastern state. e . Continue to impress upon the British and French the importance of avoiding any danger of a renewal of Palestine hostilities and seek their agreement to the issuance of parallel public statements of determination to take vigorous action both within and without the United Nations should it appear that an attempt to renew hostilities will be made. Such action would not involve the use of U.S. military forces. 1 A covering note by Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr., states that the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury reconsidered, by memorandum action on May 17, a revision of NSC 65/1 (NSC 65/2) and adopted NSC 65/2 “subject to an additional sentence at the end of paragraph 12– e proposed by the Secretary of Defense as indicated herein.” In a memorandum to the National Security Council of May 19, Lay reported that “The President has this date approved the conclusions contained” in the source text “and directs their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State” (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 65 Series). 2 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1430 . The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 484A.008/5–2050: Circular telegram [Document 73] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1 secret Washington , May 20, 1950—1 a. m. Verbatim Text . For ur advance info, there follows text proposed declaration re Near East arms and stability as agreed US–UK. 2 French agreement expected shortly. Dept expects issue about May 25. Will inform. Meanwhile you should treat as highly confid matter and not discuss with local authorities. “The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statements: “1. The three governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection the three governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on 4th August, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel. “2. The three governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in questiton, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances will be requested from any other state in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future. “3. The three governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.” 3 Webb 1 Sent to Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda (quotation section only). 2 In telegram Secto 263 from London of May 15, Secretary Acheson reported that further US–UK discussions had taken place on the “proposed NE; arms and security statement” and that this statement “has now been approved in general by Prime Minister”. Secretary Acheson dispatched the text of the statement in telegram Secto 264 from London of May 15, and in telegram Secto 274 of the following day he recommended that as it had now been approved “in general by Bevin and Attlee subject to legal and military review, I believe we should now clear in substance with President in order to have firm understanding with British and possibly broach to French before breaking up here” (396.1 LO/5–1550, /5–1650). In a memorandum for the President dated May 17, Acting Secretary Webb enclosed a copy of the declaration “as drafted in London by US and UK representatives” which “is now sufficiently firm to be presented to you for clearance in substance”. The President approved the draft declaration that day (484A.118/5–1750). The only change in the Statement as incorporated in the source text from that sent to the Department from London on May 15 in telegram Secto 264 was the addition in paragraph 2 of the sentence “Similar assurances will be requested from any other state in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.” 3 In telegram Secto 303 from London, May 18, Acheson reported that at the close of the special tripartite meeting preceding the North Atlantic Treaty Cornell meeting that day, he had approached French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and had “referred to criticism to which both British and ourselves had been subjected in connection with arms shipments to Arab States and Israel” adding that in studying the matter it had “occurred to us that French, in view of their interests in area and their being suppliers of arms, might wish to join with us in issuance of declaration.” Schuman replied that the suggestion “was new and caught him unprepared, but he would be glad to consider sympathetically.” M. Schuman added that French deliveries of arms to the Near East had always been conducted openly (396.1 LO/5–1850). In telegram 2412 from Paris of May 21, Ambassador Bruce informed the Acting Secretary of State that “Schuman’s agreement to joining US and UK in NE arms and security declaration obtained after receiving strong support Levant Section Foreign Office, including Boisanger, French representative PCC [Palestine Conciliation Commission].” Bruce added “that Syrian and Lebanese Ministers Paris would be summoned May 22 and requested obtain assurances their governments” to support the declaration. “French do not intend approaching other NE groups now” (780.56/5–2150). In an unnumbered circular telegram sent to all diplomatic missions in the Near East and to London and Paris on May 22, Acting Secretary Webb reported that (the text of the proposed arms and security declaration had been agreed upon by the United States, United Kingdom, and France and would be issued in Paris, London, and Washington at 1500 hours Greenwich mean time, Thursday, May 25. The final text of this declaration, which is identical with that printed in the source text, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin , June 5, 1950, p. 886. See also documentation on the Tripartite Declaration in vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. The reaction of Israel and the Arab States to the Tripartite Declaration ranged from enthusiastic (Egypt, Syria, Israel) to noncommittal (Lebanon) to sceptical (Iraq). Documentation on the response of the Near Eastern states to the Declaration is in Department of State files 480.00, 684A.85, 784A.02, 784A.56, and 780.00. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 890.00 TA/6–750 [Document 74] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] June 7, 1950. Subject: Economic Aid to South Asia and the Near East. I believe it essential that we develop a more positive policy of economic development assistance to the countries in South Asia and the Near East, and am anxious that you be informed of our preliminary thoughts at this early stage. Most of these states have newly achieved their independence, have non-Communist governments, and face grave internal political and administrative problems; they are weak financially and are underdeveloped. All are exposed to Communist pressures. India, Pakistan and Afghanistan constitute the only countries on the borders of the USSR and its satellites for which there is no program of United States economic assistance. Experience has shown that countries in such close proximity to the USSR orbit need the stiffening and confidence provided by the United States economic assistance. In the Arab countries there is added to their general weakness the internal pressures arising out of the emergence of Israel. Economic aid, which only we can provide, is necessary if we are to assure increased stability of the non-Communist governments of this region and maintenance of and increase in their western orientation. ECA grant aid has been furnished Greece and Turkey on the west, and is now planned for the Southeast Asian countries starting with Burma on the East. Except for the limited Arab refugee program and small Export Import Bank loans to Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Israel and Egypt, no direct United States assistance has, however, been provided for the half billion people in the intervening Near Eastern and South Asian area. Funds provided under Point Four are not adequate to make an impact on the needs of the area. Private capital has not been nor is likely to be available in sufficient quantities. Loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Export Import Bank should be taken into consideration and will be helpful, but it is now evident that they will not be adequate to meet the need; they do not meet the basic problem of deficiency in local currencies for development purposes, and of inability to meet interest and amortization charges out of available foreign exchange on the volume of capital needed. It does not appear that the need in question can be met by any solution of the sterling balance problem yet considered. I believe we should begin now to plan a program to enable the countries of South Asia—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Afghanistan—beginning in FY 1952, to carry out developmental projects which would provide the basis for long-term progress in the economic sphere, particularly in agriculture. NEA has estimated, on the basis of present inadequate information, that at the outset the maximum amount required would be about $200,000,000 annually. Provision should be made, where absolutely necessary, for local currency requirements. Such assistance should be supplemental to that from the country’s own and, where applicable, Commonwealth sources, and should not be designed to meet balance of payments deficits. Execution of this program should be closely related to that of the proposed program for aid to Southeast Asia by use of Japanese yen counterpart. Consideration should be given to the advisability of having these programs administered by ECA or a parallel organization through country missions. I hope that early reduction in the yearly amount will be possible as projects are completed and other economic and political factors improve. Concurrently with our planning, we will, of course, continue efforts to improve political conditions in South Asia. With respect to the Arab states and Israel, a Palestine Rehabilitation Program is presently under way and a Point Four program is now in process of formulation. After some experience with these programs we will be in a better position to make additional recommendations for this area. I hope that Point Four operations can be conducted with our political ends in mind. Point Four survey missions to the sub-continent, working closely with the Embassies, could lay a sound foundation for a Technical Assistance program. They also would be studying and assessing this proposed program. It is believed that the best strategy in the development of an economic assistance program for South Asia and the Near East is to lay a foundation through properly timed public statements by Department officials. Since there is already a Southeast Asian ECA program which was largely the result of Congressional initiative, this new program might be considered as an extension of a request for a continuation of Southeast Asia aid. An increase in the funds requested for South Asia and the Near East would be required. By this extension, provision would have been made for possible programs of assistance to all areas peripheral to Russia. Indeed, if one excludes the Western Hemisphere and Africa as being relatively stable regions, all world areas of instability or potential instability would have been covered, if and when they need help of an economic character. A program of long-range development aid to Southern Asia is a major step in the formulation of our post-ERP foreign economic policy. It is desirable that this step be taken in a way that will make a maximum contribution to our objectives in other areas as well as in Southern Asia. For example, it would be desirable that the development programs to be financed in Southern Asia be of a type which, both during their execution and upon their completion, would, insofar as consistent with our objectives in Southern Asia, reduce the need for U.S. aid to Western Europe. These considerations are, I understand, receiving considerable emphasis in the study that Mr. Gordon Gray is making, as part of his current assignment, of the possible need for a major program of U.S. aid to under-developed Asiatic areas. It would be desirable that such programs as the Department may now begin to plan for these areas be consistent, insofar as possible, with the recommendations that Mr. Gray will make on this subject to the President and to the Public Advisory Committee to be appointed by the President. Recommendations: 1. That the above tentative program be accepted as a basis for planning, and that NEA, E, and S/P, and R establish a working group under NEA chairmanship to study economic assistance that might be provided South Asia and the Near East in FY 1952 and immediately succeeding years. 2. That steps be taken through the Diplomatic Missions in India, Ceylon and Pakistan for the purpose of obtaining either prompt establishment of Joint Commissions contemplated under the Point Four Act to plan the use of Point Four funds, or for a preliminary Point Four survey by a strong U.S. mission. Incidental to this function, the American Members of the Joint Commission of the Point Four mission would consider, with the Embassy staffs, which might be expanded for this purpose, the justification and nature of needs which may later be embraced by the prospective assistance program. Afghanistan, now being studied by a UN economic mission, would probably not be included in this proposal. 3. That P consider the timing of statements by the Secretary and other officers of the Department laying the foundation of the South Asia program in the public mind, and with Congress. 1 A note at the bottom of the source text reads: “S/P is presenting a memorandum of comment. TCD’s views are also presented in a separate memorandum attached.” The S/P memorandum of June 13 by Paul Nitze is printed infra . The memorandum by Capus M. Waynick, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Technical Cooperation and Development, dated June 6, is not printed. Waynick, replying to an earlier draft of this memorandum, dated June 3, stated that although he was impressed by the great considerations which McGhee advanced for a positive and immediate program of Point IV aid for the area, he could not agree to the recommendation that a Point IV mission be sent because, among other considerations, “I question the propriety of my approval of a Point IV mission specifically intended to develop a case in favor of a large grant-in-aid” (890.00 TA/6–750). Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze) to the Secretary of State 890.00 TA/6–750 [Document 75] Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff ( Nitze ) to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] June 13, 1950. Subject: Comments on Mr. McGhee’s Memorandum of June 7, 1950 1 on Economic Aid to South Asia and the Near East S/P generally supports the point of view put forward in Mr. McGhee’s memorandum. It believes, however, that: (1) A program should be developed for the Near East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia as a whole. The problems are similar enough, both in fact and in the public view, that it would be a mistake to make the program conform to the geographical division of responsibilities within State. (2) The memorandum under reference does not adequately present the need for this program, i.e., the need is stronger than the memorandum indicates. (3) The development of the program should be more closely tied in with the work of Gordon Gray 2 than the memorandum appears to provide. (4) The problem of laying a foundation in public opinion for the program should be deferred until the character of the program is more definitely established. (5) The conception of the program, as developed in the memorandum, is not adequate to justify accepting the memorandum as the basis for planning. S/P therefore recommends that: (1) A working group be established to study what program of assistance to the Near East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia is needed to support the achievement of U.S. objectives in this area. The group should consist of representatives from NEA, FE, E, S/P and E under a chairman selected by NEA and FE. (2) The working group should immediately develop an outline of the information needed to elaborate the program and take steps to obtain this information, using the Diplomatic Missions and such other sources as may be available. (3) The working group should establish a relationship with Mr. Gray which will ensure that the Department’s work will fit into the work being done by Mr. Gray. (4) The working group should develop a program designed to supplement and reinforce the efforts of the countries themselves, either independently or under the Commonwealth program. (5) The working group include in its report recommendations on the development of public support for the program, and that for this purpose P should designate an officer to work with the group. 3 1 Supra . 2 Reference is to the Gordon Gray Report to the President on foreign economic policies; for documentation, see vol. i , pp. 831 ff. 3 In a memorandum of June 15, not printed, Under Secretary of State James Webb informed McGhee that his memorandum of June 7 together with Nitze’s comments had been received. “While I have not tried to go into the question in detail,” Webb added, “I agree with Mr. Nitze’s analysis and recommendation as to the method of procedure.” Recommendations 2 and 3 of the McGhee memorandum, he felt, should be considered by the proposed working group as part of the broad problem, and when the working group developed a coordinated plan, “it should be processed upward through the Under Secretary’s Staff Meeting” (890.00 TA/6–750). At the Under Secretary’s Meeting of August 2, McGhee “reported that he had furnished the Secretary a proposed aid program to South Asia and wondered whether it would be appropriate for him to talk to his Congressional subcommittees about this program in a very general way. Mr. McFall stated that he thought it would be advisable to obtain clearance from the White House before any Congressional consultation takes place. The Secretary agreed with Mr. McFall. Mr. Webb stated that a meeting would be set up to discuss this proposed program after the Secretary has studied it.” (Under Secretary’s Meetings, Lot 53 D 250, “Under Secretary’s Meetings, 1949–1952, UM M–227”) Jack K. McFall was Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 880.00/7–1550: Telegram [Document 76] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran top secret [ Washington ,] July 15, 1950—3 p. m. 89. For Ambassador Grady from McGhee. Fol tel sent Henderson, 1 New Delhi, July 14, 1950: “Particularly in view recent events Dept reviewing possible courses action on all fronts to strengthen key areas which may be threatened by or can play important role in present or larger conflict. Specifically are considering possibility extension Far Eastern grant aid programs to include assistance to South Asian and NE countries, by action which conceivably could be presented to Congress before adjournment. Purpose this cable inform you present tentative thinking here and to elicit ur comments and suggestions prior to action of any kind. I. Purpose of aid will be to strengthen orientation of key areas to Western Democracies and assist them build economic and indirectly military strength. Justification to Congress and US public would be based on necessity encourage populations defend independence and build defensive and offensive forces against Commie threats. Limitations available US resources call for careful consideration of priority areas. As ECA presently operating in Greece, Turkey and Southeast Asia, appears necessary now give immediate attention possibility assistance to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Iran; and possibly Arab States. Present tentative thinking in NEA Bureau aid of order $250 million annually shld be sought. II. View nature problem believe aid might take fol form: A. Administered by ECA missions under policy guidance Chiefs Diplomatic Missions, including all US Govt technicians operating in relevant fields. B. Assistance to be limited specific projects connected with betterment basic economies: For example power and reclamation, major transport, and agricultural projects. Projects wld be designed bolster weakest points local economies quickly and achieve maximum impact. To provide local currencies needed, where necessary, program could include essential saleable commodities. Proceeds sale to be earmarked for local costs. Aid cannot be extended on balance payments deficit basis or as underwriting or increasing supply of consumable commodities determining standard of living. C. Program would be coordinated with and supplementary to other proposals such as Point IV, commonwealth aid and bank loans. Understand difficulties assuring other sources fully tapped before drawing on ECA grant aid. D. Not intended relate program to sterling balance problem unless later events demonstrate such course wise and acceptable in countries aided. E. Minimum stipulations wld be active participation by ECA mission to assure resources made available are effectively used for intended purposes, and that other available resources are being used to advantage. III. In justifying aid to Congress and US public obviously necessary relate to issues of cold war. Indeed important consideration will be indirect effect assistance on building of military potential through contribution to supporting economy and relief govt budgets. IV. Timing of appropriate contacts abroad to assure that aid will be sought if authorized by Cong is problem. If later so instructed, cld you safely make top level approaches on which we cld determine that aid wld be sought by India [ Iran ], at same time leaving relations unaffected if we failed secure early affirmative action from Cong. V. Your views on these or any other aspects awaited with great interest.” Wld also appreciate receiving ur telegraphic views not only in relation Iran but, in light your broad experience, in regard program as a whole. [McGhee.] Acheson 1 Loy W. Henderson, Ambassador to India. The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State 888.00/7–2050: Telegram [Document 77] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State top secret   priority Tehran , July 20, 1950—11 a. m. 164. 1. I agree that it is important to inaugurate aid program in this area along lines proposed Deptel 89. 1 These countries are clearly in precarious position and they feel American aid has skipped over them. An aid program will have material effects and even more important, it will give confidence and raise morale. 2. Iran: ( a ) Such a program is almost essential here supplement Eximbank loans now under consideration since Point Four funds for this year are likely to be small. Funds are needed cover certain projects in fields of health, sanitation and agriculture which might not qualify under Eximbank loan requirements, and it is necessary provide more of much needed technical assistance and supervision. Under seven year plan there are number desirable projects qualifying under your 2(B) which are ready for early initiation. ( b ) Such aid program, if properly administered, could enable us bring about more effective and integrated use other resources available Iran Government. It would also give greater force our advice and suggestions re essential fiscal and other reforms. ( c ) On basis our investigations to date, including consideration internal financial capacity and development projects, we believe that $50,000,000 capital imports financed by US loans or grants is maximum that could be effectively used in first year. ( d ) Need for aid is great enough in Iran so that we must accept risk Iranian chagrin which would follow denial by Congress. No doubt about Iranians accepting aid, and would probably accept mission in order get aid. ( e ) We assume that valuable assurance of continuance program over several years which was granted Europe would also be given here so that plans could have realistic timing. Also assume that program would be flexible enough permit use foreign exchange and local currency for technical assistance in education, health, and other fields of Point Four nature. This type assistance is primary need here. ( f ) There is one point in your proposal about which I have reservations. I fully agree that all US technicians in country must be coordinated by single authority but am doubtful about use of mission independent of Embassy. I do not think independent ECA mission can operate in country like Iran without causing friction between itself and Embassy. Small size of country, weakness of government and dominant position of mission having this relatively large amount of money give it de facto equal, if not superior status to Embassy. I think Ambassador should have top executive powers in carrying out ECA/W directives as well as giving policy guidance. Relationship would be that planned for Greece just prior my arrival there. 3. My comments re other countries this area: ( a ) Afghanistan; believe funds could be spent there advantageously; Afghan Minister to Iran discussed related matter with me, pointing out that Afghans position very much like that of Iran and just as apt to be object of interest to Russia as means of reaching Persian Gulf, India and southern Asia. ( b ) Pakistan; believe funds could be effectively spent there for development. Could be loans from Eximbank, IBRD, ECA (or whatever organization is set up to give economic aid) and grants. I feel that loans should be made wherever practicable and grants in remaining cases. ( c ) India; in particular, have serious doubts about grants here. They have resources not adversely affected by war. Actually they built up large funds in London and manufacturers made much money during war. When there I tried to persuade them employ American dam building firms on basis of my endeavoring get loans covering dollar expenditures from Eximbank. This, I understood, would be about half total cost of dams. 4. The more I see of grant aid to countries, the more convinced I am that it can be fruitless if we are overgenerous. Our lending policy on other hand, through whatever agency loans are made, can put aid program on firmer and better basis if it is both liberal and intelligent. While I recognize that there are good arguments for grant aid, in general I feel that loan principle is preferable wherever it can be used. 5. Your message delayed in transmission to here. 2 Grady 1 Supra . 2 In telegram 222 from Tehran of July 26, Ambassador Grady reported that Iranian officials and press were conducting “rather persistent pressure campaign on us” for a large American aid program. Should such a program be decided upon, Grady continued, “it is important that I be given some advance notice so that I can reverse my tactics with Iranian officials prior announcement from Washington.” Grady closed by restating his aversion “to a large handout program here” and his preference for Export-Import Bank and International Bank loans as part of any program decided upon (888.00/7–2650). Acheson replied in telegram 187 to Tehran of July 26 that “Even in event early Dept policy decision grant aid shld be extended countries in question, congressional action this session may not be possible and by no means certain in future.” There was thus no need for any change in the line taken with Iranian officials on finance and loan matters (888.00/7–2650). Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 65 Series [Document 78] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Webb ) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] August 7, 1950. Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 65/3, “United States Policy toward Arms Shipments to the Near East.” NSC 65/3 was approved as Governmental policy on May 19, 1950. It is requested that this Progress Report, dated August 7, 1950, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information. 1. Important Action and Developments Affecting NSC 65/3: On May 25, 1950, the United States Government took an important step in line with NSC 65/3, particularly with reference to Conclusions 12d and 12 e thereof. On that date the United States Government, together with the Governments of the United Kingdom, and France, issued the declaration set forth below. The declaration was drafted during the course of the London Foreign Ministers Meeting. [Here follows a verbatim repetition of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950; for text, see page 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] .] In the Arab states and Israel, official reception of this important step in implementation of NSC 65/3 has been generally favorable. Responsible Israel and Arab Government leaders have recognized that the declaration was a move to provide the Near Eastern states with confidence in future security, and to promote a sense of stability in the area. However, immediately after the declaration was issued there was a certain amount of criticism of it in the Arab states, particularly in press circles, on such grounds as that the declaration represented an unwarranted interference by the Great Powers in the affairs of the Near Eastern states; that it “froze” the territorial status quo and would prevent future amendment of the Palestine armistice lines; that it indicated a division of the Near East by the Great Powers into spheres of influence; and that it favored Israel and would permit Israel to acquire as much arms as it wanted. Diplomatic representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Near East set to work to dispel these misapprehensions and misunderstandings, and on June 12 the Council of the Arab League issued a joint commentary on the declaration which was generally favorable. The Israeli Government, as well as the Israeli press and Zionist elements outside of Israel, were pleased with the declaration. Criticism by pro-Israeli elements in this country of the US Near Eastern arms export policy has greatly lessened. There has been general satisfaction in Israel, as well as in the Arab states, with the assurances given by the three powers that they would take action to prevent aggression by any party in the Near East. In Israel the declaration was particularly welcomed as revealing the conviction of the three powers that Israel was now established as a permanent element in the Near East. In the United States the three power declaration was hailed in press circles as being an important and necessary step to bring unity to the policies of Great Britain, France, and the United States in the Near East. The American press likewise considered the declaration to be a major contribution to Near Eastern stability and security. It is apparent that the declaration has had a beneficial effect in reducing tension in the Near East. It is hoped that one of the results of the declaration will be that the Near Eastern Governments will in the future place less emphasis upon the necessity for acquiring large amounts of arms, and will feel able to devote more of their energy to productive ends. Thus the trend toward peace will be strengthened. The US will remain alert for any developments which may unfavorably affect this trend. 2. General Implementation of NSC 65/3: The US is supporting the military position of the United Kingdom in the Near East, including the current plans for Anglo-Egyptian and other Anglo-Arab military cooperation. There continues the close consultation with the British Government which has enabled us to be kept fully informed on the amount of military equipment actually shipped or to be shipped to the Near East by the United Kingdom. In addition, arrangements have been made with the Government of France for similar consultation and exchange of information. The US Government continues to base its Near Eastern arms export policy on the principle of allowing the shipment to the Near East of only such military equipment as the US considers necessary to help the states there to maintain internal order and provide for legitimate defense. Under this policy shipments of military equipment of appropriate categories are being permitted to go forward to Israel and the Arab states. The US Government continues to seek to avoid being drawn into any arms race in the area. 3. Evaluation of Policy: The policy set forth in NSC 65/3 continues to be valid. In following this policy the US is contributing to the security and stability of the Near East and is taking action which is of benefit to the strategic interests of the US. James E. Webb 1 Drafted by Rockwell of ANE. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, Smith Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the President 890.00/8–2550 [Document 79] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, Smith Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the President 1 secret Washington , August 28, 1950. Subject: Possible Aid to South Asia and the Near East. A prime object of policy, now and for the next few years, must be to create situations of political and economic strength in critical areas. An exceedingly critical area is that which includes the subcontinent of South Asia and the Near Eastern states. The viability of a non-Communist Asia hinges upon the chance of maintaining, in this area, free institutions, stable governments, and the right orientation of men’s minds. These things cannot be maintained—indeed they are gravely threatened now—if the countries in question are unable to grapple effectively with hunger and a general deterioration of economic conditions. They are unable to do so without external assistance. This area, with the exception of Turkey, is getting no assistance. We have had no economic aid program of any kind except extremely limited loan assistance from the Export-Import Bank, a limited relief and public works program for Palestine refugees, and, prospectively, a few million dollars of Point IV funds. It is therefore proposed that necessary first steps be taken immediately to develop a constructive and practical assistance program for South Asia, the Arab States, and Iran. The purposes of the program would be: a ) to arrest a process of economic deterioration which, if not checked, would produce the unavoidable defection of these countries and their hundreds of millions of people; and b ) to build up those elements of economic strength which would enable these countries to make some effective contribution, of resources and effort, to the common struggle for freedom. Intensive study has been made within the Department ( a ) to determine, both in real and in money terms, what are the minimum requirements for these countries if they are to be effective partners with us in the struggle against Communist aggression and ( b ) to determine how economic assistance could most effectively be programmed and administered. These studies are rapidly nearing completion and are already far enough along to substantiate four general statements: 1. Instead of a situation of strength in these countries we shall have a situation of dangerous weakness unless we embark promptly on an economic assistance program. It is presently believed that the cost of such a program might be as low as $300 million a year over a 5-year period. 2. In all the countries concerned the first emphasis of the program would be upon prompt and substantial improvement in the indigenous food supply, thus directly and immediately strengthening the will and patience of the peoples and meeting their most fundamental needs. Projects will, insofar as possible, be selected with regard to their contributions to economic strength, and thus to military potential. 3. The manner of administration of the program would have to be somewhat different as between, say, South Asia on the one hand and the Arab States on the other hand; but in all the countries concerned it will be possible so to administer an aid program as to ensure demonstrable reciprocal benefit to the U.S. 4. While P.L. 535 2 might provide the requisite authorization for a minor part of the proposed program, both new authorization and new appropriations will need to be sought. Since no substantial foundation already exists upon which expanded program activities can be based, it is felt that a beginning should be made immediately, which involves taking certain definite steps. If a first step is not taken now, the last step may come too late. It is recognized that other areas besides those specifically mentioned herein will need our prompt and earnest attention. A report is coming forward to you shortly from the National Security Council, in response to your request of April 12, setting forth the concerted judgment of the interested executive agencies about the probable cost of programs that might be required of us. The findings embodied in previous paragraphs of this memorandum are substantially the same as the estimates, with respect to this particular area, contained in the National Security Council’s report. They are put forward separately at this time, in advance of the overall report, because of the urgency (as stated above) of taking preliminary steps now. It is, therefore, recommended that you authorize this Department to take the earliest opportunity to discuss with Congressional leaders the problems in this area and the general character of the programs proposed, looking toward discussions with the countries concerned. 1 The source text was accompanied by a covering memorandum of transmittal from McGhee to Secretary of State Acheson dated August 25, which read, in part: “In accordance with previous discussions, I attach a Memorandum to the President with respect to possible aid to South Asia and the Near East. I believe it is a matter of great urgency that we proceed with further discussions on this important problem, and I consider it most desirable that the President concur in our presenting to Congressional leaders our tentative and entirely preliminary views.” The August 25 memorandum noted that the memorandum to the President had the concurrence of G, E, FE, S/P, and H. 2 Public Law 535, the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, became law on June 5, 1950. It is printed in U.S. Statutes At Large , volume 64, part 1, pp. 198–209. Memorandum of Conversation With the President, by the Secretary of State Secretary’s Memoranda: Lot 53 D 444: Secretary’s Memo’s, Aug–Sept 1950 1 [Document 80] Memorandum of Conversation With the President, by the Secretary of State 2 Washington , [August 28,] 1950. Item No . 3. 3 Aid to South Asia and the Middle East I did not leave the memorandum 4 with the President, because I had not had time to read it through. However, I discussed the situation with him, and the following conclusions emerged: 1. It would be utterly impossible to get this Congress, certainly at this time or in the immediate future, to consider, much less to enact, substantial economic aid measures for South Asia and the Middle East. 2. The President is inclined to believe that such measures are sound and probably should go in the program for next year. They will take some time to work out. 3. He sees no objection, and some advantage, in our beginning discussion with appropriate people on the Hill if they understand clearly that we are not going to face them with the measure this fall, but are exploring with them in accordance with the desirable consultation procedures. 1 Lot 53 D 444 is a comprehensive chronological collection of the Secretary of State’s memoranda and memoranda of conversation for the years 1947–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 A handwritten notation on the source text indicates copies of this memorandum were sent to McGhee, Matthews, and Lucius D. Battle for McFall. 3 Secretary Acheson discussed a number of items with the President this day including the coming visits of Ambassador Douglas and High Commissioner McCloy, representation at the Vatican, and the Ambassadorship to Israel. Documentation on these items is in Lot 53 D 444, Secretary’s Memo’s, Aug–Sept, 1950. 4 Memorandum by McGhee, August 28, supra . Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs 890.00/9–150 [Document 81] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs 1 restricted [ Washington ,] September 1, 1950. Subject: Near East and South Asia Aid Program Participants: Mr. McGhee—NEA Mr. E. G. Mathews—SOA Mr. Gardiner—NEA Mr. Claxton—H Mr. Moreland—H Reps Bolton (Ohio) Burleson (Tex.) Carnahan (Mo.) Chatham (N.C.) Chiperfield (Ill.) Zablocki (Wise.) Javits (N.Y.) Mr. McGhee indicated that the Department of State welcomed the opportunity to consult House leaders before making any commitments on a new program of great importance. Mr. McGhee began his presentation by referring to the previous meeting of the NEA Subcommittee when he had mentioned that the economic situation in various South Asian and Near Eastern countries was seriously deteriorating. In support of this statement, he referred to the food situation in India, where there was an overall shortage of 4 to 5,000,000 tons of grains, and famine threatened in West Bengal, Madras, and Bihar. In Iran the crop failure in 1949 had resulted in grave food shortages and a generally deteriorating economic situation. In Pakistan also, while grain supplies were plentiful, other food imports were necessary, and the economy of Pakistan, threatened by the impasse in trade relations with India, was scarcely able to afford adequate importations. A second focus of economic deterioration was indicated in the price structure in various countries. Prices were rising dangerously at the rate of 3% monthly in India and in Pakistan, and India was also facing deterioration in its industrial plant (dis-investment). New private investments since the war in India had amounted to only a total of $20,000,000 from abroad, of which only $1,000,000 had come from the United States. A third indicator in the deterioration of the economic situation was indicated in studies of balances of payments. India’s balance since April 1950 had become unfavorable, and the drafts that India can make on sterling balances were insufficient to cover the gap in Indian requirements. Pakistan had an adverse balance of trade, and Iran for the year ending 1950 had shown a deficit of $30,000,000. Unemployment figures which were available showed a very heavy burden on local economies, and concealed unemployment through surplus agricultural workers was prevalent through the whole area. Finally, it was estimated that there were 10,000,000 refugees on the subcontinent as a result of partition, only half of whom had been settled, and 750,000 destitute Arab refugees as a result of the Palestine conflict. Such were the underlying conditions that called for remedy. Mr. McGhee then turned to the significance of the area as a whole in view of the United States’ national interests. He pointed out the extent of aid that had been furnished to Western Europe, and that as a consequence of events in the Far East, aid programs had been instituted in Far Eastern countries as far west as Burma. The area stretching from Egypt through the Arab States and Iran to India and Pakistan was receiving no significant aid from us. The Korean War may well mean that the struggle of the USSR and the free world has been transferred to Asia. We could not dismiss from our plans and calculations the consideration that the Chinese Communists might move next in extended aggression to the South Asian areas. The South Asian countries, in particular India and Pakistan, represent a nucleus of strength. They have had a military tradition which was fostered when they were a part of the British Empire and an ardent nationalism, both of which indicate an ability to resist outside aggression unless such an aggression was forthcoming on an overwhelming scale. He mentioned the manpower contribution of India in the last war. Mr. McGhee indicated the great value of Nehru’s support of our policy in Korea and the possibility that India and Pakistan would fight effectively in the event of armed Communist aggression in states on their borders. These countries have free middle-of-the-road governments which it is in our interest to support. Turning to the question of how to remedy the present situation, which clearly was headed in the wrong direction and might lead to anarchy and Communism and the loss of this vast population to the Communists by default, Mr. McGhee pointed out that resources presently available to bolster local economies were inadequate. The list included British sterling balances, resources from Governmental bank loans, Point Four, and private capital. None of these resources are adequate to meet the pressing needs of most of the countries in the area in question. On the other hand, grant aid on the scale to which we have become accustomed in the European aid programs are not required in the area. Mr. McGhee referred to the findings of Mr. Gordon Clapp in the Near East, which related to the obstacles in the way of the development of technical rather than a financial nature. He stated that a program, involving grants ranging between 3 and 5 hundred million dollars annually, might well suffice to meet the needs of the area. This money, plus a core of administrators and technicians who would obtain necessary leverage in local situations through their authority to allocate funds, would meet the case. He emphasized that what we need is an economic aid program, and not a program of military aid, for reasons arising from the suspicions and susceptibilities of the countries in question. The program is not another Marshall Plan. It is not directed toward restoration of shattered economies and not involved with the many financial technicalities of the sophisticated European economy. It is not an UNRRA, as we will make terms regarding the use of our aid. What is proposed is a series of individual country programs composed of specific projects primarily related to the development of indigeneous food production and the basic resources of water and power, related as far as possible to the building of local economic and as a corollary, local military strength. There would be agreements with the countries concerned on the general lines of the ECA agreements, but it would not be a regional program with the local equivalent of an OEEC. The program certainly could involve India, Pakistan, and Iran with at least token programs in Ceylon, Nepal, Afghanistan, and also embrace several Arab States. During the discussion Mr. Mathews and Mr. McGhee brought out the importance of the role of Nehru in weaning China from the influence of the Kremlin. Throughout the presentation questions were raised by various members of the House from time to time. Mr. Chiperfield questioned the attitude of India in the Korean crisis, but appeared satisfied at Mr. McGhee’s summary of the Indian position and the unreality of expecting military aid from India at such a distance from her bases. Mr. Chiperfield also wished to know why existing financial facilities were not adequate to cope with the plans for development. Mr. McGhee pointed out that the funds available to IBRD were limited, and that the IBRD necessarily operated very cautiously as it must look to the United States money market for its funds. The Export-Import Bank operations were also restricted. Mrs. Bolton questioned whether the British could not do more in releases of sterling, but was told that in NEA’s view the British were releasing all the sterling that they reasonably could without danger to their economy, which it was to our advantage to avoid. Mrs. Bolton also inquired whether we were suggesting immediate legislation at this session of Congress. She was told that we were merely seeking consultation at this point and would require some time for consultation with foreign governments, before we could present an effective plan to Congress. Mrs. Bolton remarked at this point that she considered action imperative. Mr. Chiperfield raised the question of the India wheat deal and wondered why action had not been taken during Nehru’s visit to this country. The reasons for lack of action were explained, principally on the grounds of our reluctance to appeal to Congress on an ad hoc basis for the $80,000,000 required to give this wheat to India. Mrs. Bolton brought up the question of the Egyptian market for long staple cotton. She also inquired about the status of Tibet and it was explained that our policy regarding Tibet was dependent on Indian attitude, and that Nehru was raising the issue of Tibet with the Chinese. In conclusion Mr. McGhee explained that the President had authorized discussion with the Congressional committees and that the Department of State sought the judgment of the committee on this whole subject. The response from all members of Congress present was most favorable, and Mr. McGhee was requested to present the case again before a full meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee on September 14. Mrs. Bolton requested Mr. McGhee to keep the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Chairman of the NEA Subcommittee informed as to progress during the Congressional recess. The question regarding publicity arose and Mr. McGhee took the line that action by the individual Congressmen in making their views as to the need for aid to this area and the significance of the area to our global interests would be most welcome and effective. 2 It is clear that a program of this magnitude requires informed support from the public if it is to receive formal legislative approval. The fact that the Department of State has the matter under study can hardly need to be kept secret, but commitments must be carefully avoided and it is hoped that the program can be presented to the American people and to the American Congress in such a way that the necessary emphasis on our own national interests need not cause offense abroad. 1 Copies to H, S/S, S/P, FE, EUR, SOA, NE, AF, GTI, A, NEA. 2 A handwritten notation in the margin reads “Mrs. B[olton] will talk to Mme P[andit] says E. G. M[athews]”. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 890.00/9–150 [Document 82] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 1 restricted [ Washington ,] September 1, 1950. Subject: Near East and South Asia Aid Program Participants: NEA—Mr. George McGhee   Mr. A. Z. Gardiner SOA—Mr. E. G. Mathews Senators:   Pepper (Fla.)   Ferguson (Mich.)   Smith (New Jersey) Representatives:   Poage (Texas) Mr. McGhee introduced the subject with the statement that the President had authorized consultation with Congressional leaders on a program for the Middle East and South Asia, and that he was pleased to consult with the group assembled, who were considering a trip to this area. In his judgment their trip could make a most useful contribution to the development of the program. Their observations would be most valuable, both to the Department and the Congress. The case was presented along lines identical with those used before the House Subcommittee in the morning. (See attached Memorandum of Conversation of meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee.) 2 The reaction of this group was principally one of acquiescence. There was no enthusiastic affirmative support of the program, which is, it is believed, largely explained by the fact that they considered the meeting more a briefing for their trip than a consultation. Mr. McGhee offered what assistance he could make available with the military authorities in order to assure adequate air transportation. He also promised that an officer representing NEA would accompany the Congressional group. It was tentatively planned that they should visit the capitals of the countries which are involved in the program and should in the first instance go to New Delhi, working back to the United States by way of Karachi and Tehran, so that adequate attention could be given to the three countries so closely involved in the program: India, Pakistan, and Iran. An excursion of five or six weeks is contemplated. Senator Smith decided that in the light of the contemplated schedule he could not go. The others, however, and Congressman Cooley have firm plans, and they hope to interest others. 3 1 Copies to S/S, H, S/P, FE, EUR, NEA, SOA, NE, AF, GTI, A, L. 2 Supra . 3 Documentation on the journey of Senator Pepper and Representatives Cooley and Poage to the Near East and South Asia in October 1950, is in Department of State file 033.1100. Editorial Note [Document 83] Editorial Note Although the Department of State abandoned efforts to secure a significant economic aid program for the Near East and South Asia in 1950, the Bureaus of Public Affairs and Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs continued to draft plans and proposals on information policy regarding economic assistance to the area in order to stimulate Congressional and public interest in the subject. Documentation on this activity may be found in Department of State file 890.00. Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) S/S–NSC files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 65 Series [Document 84] Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Matthews ) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] January 24, 1951. Subject: Second Progress Report on NSC 65/3 “United States Policy Toward Arms Shipments to the Near East.” 2 NSC 65/3 was approved as Governmental policy on May 19, 1950. It is requested that this Progress Report, as of November 24, 1950, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information. 1. Important Action and Developments Affecting NSC 65/3: On September 11, 1950, the British Government informed Egypt that it was suspending the shipment of jet planes, tanks, and certain types of radar which the Egyptian Government had on order and which were to constitute part of the armament of the Egyptian army as projected by the British Chiefs of Staff. This action was taken as a result of increasing demands for arms in other areas, and in order to induce a more cooperative attitude on the part of Egypt, particularly with respect to the latter’s demand for withdrawal of British troops from the Suez area, although the Egyptian Government would permit their re-entry in time of war. Later, the British Government moved to release some of the tanks, but opposition in the British Parliament temporarily forestalled this plan. Until very recently, the British Government would not consider applications from Israel for the export of arms from the United Kingdom, despite the fact that in the US–UK–French declaration of May 25, 1950, 3 concerning security in the near East it had recognized the need of Israel for arms for legitimate security purposes. On November 29, 1950, the Department was informed by the British that henceforth the United Kingdom will accept applications from Israel for military equipment with the exception of tanks and jet planes. Another event which has not as yet affected the implementation of the subject policy to any significant extent, but which presents additional possibilities for future implementation, is the recent amendment to Section 408( e ) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 which provides for extension of cash-reimbursable aid to any country “whose ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, is important to the security of the United States.” This amendment makes possible the provision of arms to countries in the Near East, on a cash-reimbursable basis, upon the determination that such countries fulfill the requirement stated in the amendment. At the present time Saudi Arabia is the only state in the area to be so designated. 2. General Implementation of NSC 65/3: The United States has continued to support the military position of the United Kingdom in the Near East, with particular respect to Anglo-Egyptian relations. This Government is also continuing its policy of permitting the export to the Near East of only such arms as are considered necessary for the legitimate requirements of defense and internal security of the countries in that area, and is continuing exchange of information with the British and French Governments regarding such shipments. 3. Evaluation of Policy: This policy, as manifested in the shipment of military equipment and in the US–UK–French declaration of May 25, 1950, regarding the security of the Near East, has been generally successful in lessening the tension in the area and reducing the danger of an arms race. Now that the danger of an outbreak of hostilities within the Near East region has lessened considerably, and at the same time the possibility of external aggression appears to have increased, it is more than ever in the security interest of the United States, in accordance with the conclusion of NSC 65/3, that the Near East be militarily strengthened for defense against communist aggression and that the countries of the area obtain their arms from friendly sources. To this end it is essential that the U.S. and U.K. relations with these countries be strengthened through such measures as increased military training, military equipment that can be made available, and other manifestations of U.S. and U.K. security interests in the region. Matthews 1 Drafted by A. R. Day of NE, cleared with S/A. A handwritten notation in the margin of the source text reads: “S/ISA advised, but did not wish to see this.” 2 For text, see p. 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] . 3 For text, see the circular telegram of May 20, p. 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] , and footnote 3 thereto. B. United States–United Kingdom military and political talks on the Near East and South Asia B. United States–United Kingdom military and political talks on the Near East and South Asia [85] Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 25, 1950. [86] Editorial Note [87] Record of Informal United States-United Kingdom Discussions, London, Monday Morning, September 18, 1950 London, September 18, 1950. 780.00/9–1850 [88] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Monday Afternoon, September 18, 1950 London, September 18, 1950 780.00/9–1850 [89] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Thursday Afternoon, September 21, 1950 London, September 21, 1950 780.00/9–2150 [90] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Friday Afternoon, September 22, 1950 London, September 22, 1950 780.00/9–2250 [91] Record of the Under Secretary’s Meeting, October 16, 1950 [Washington, undated.] [92] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) [Washington,] October 19, 1950. 780.00/10–2050 [93] Paper Drafted by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo–Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) [Washington,] October 24, 1950. 780.00/10–2050 [94] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Regional Planning Adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Howard) [Washington,] October 24, 1950. 780.00/10–2450 [95] United States Minutes of United States–United Kingdom Political Military Conversations, Held at Washington, October 26, 1950 Washington, October 26, 1950 [96] Memorandum by Mr. Charles W. Yost of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) Washington, November 14, 1950. 780.00/11–1450: Memorandum Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 32 1 [Document 85] Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large ( Jessup ) to the Secretary of State 2 [Extract] top secret [ Washington ,] July 25, 1950. Subject: US–UK Talks—July 20–24, 1950 3 The attached memorandum contains the summary of the main points covered in the US–UK talks which General Bradley and I conducted with Sir Oliver Franks and Lord Tedder. 4 I attach also the summary notes made by Mr. Yost which cover the matters in greater detail but which it is probably unnecessary for you to take the time to read unless you wish to do so. 5 The following are my conclusions concerning the utility of the talks, the most important points which emerged, and the further steps along the same lines which remain to be taken. I. Utility of the Talks These talks were the latest in a series of similar exploratory conversations. The talks in 1947 and 1949 dealt with the Middle East. 6 The talks in London in May of this year covered Europe, the Middle East and the Far East including the Pacific area. The talks in London resulted in a common conclusion concerning the identity of interest of the U.S. and the U.K. generally throughout the world. The corollary of this conclusion was the view that our policies should be coordinated so far as possible. The talks just concluded in Washington have carried this a step further. We have identified the chief danger spots and have examined them in the light of the Korean aggression. These talks did not reach the point of agreed common plans of action in specific situations but laid the groundwork for such joint planning. II. Most Important Points Which Emerged … B. The Middle East The U.K. representatives at first shied away from a reiteration of the previous understanding that they had the “primary responsibility” in this area. A frank discussion, however, swept away the semantic difficulty of defining the term “primary responsibility” and they agreed that this was an area in which we should look to them to take the initiative in regard to any steps which needed to be carried out. At the same time they registered the hope that we would study the question whether we could not give them more support in case of need. It was interesting to me that both Lord Tedder and General Bradley believed that the Israeli army would be the most effective force south of Turkey which could be utilized for delaying action.… Philip C. Jessup [Attachment] Agreed United States–United Kingdom Memorandum of Discussions on the Present World Situation 7 [Extract] 8 top secret [ Washington , July 25, 1950.] U.S./U.K. Discussions on Present World Situation 1. Following is a summary of discussions held in Washington between July 20 and July 24, between General Omar N. Bradley and Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, representing the United States, and Sir Oliver Franks and Lord Tedder representing the United Kingdom. Mr. Charles W. Yost, Colonel L. K. Ladue, Mr. M. E. Dening, Major General Redman and Captain R. D. Coleridge, R.N. were also present. Terms of Reference 2. The conversations were purely exploratory and involved no commitments by governments. It was understood that there would be no definitive or detailed discussion of areas in which third parties have a primary interest.… . . . . . . . . . . . . . . middle east 20. The British representatives pointed out the difficulties considering the forces now available, of their assisting, other than to a certain extent with air forces, in the defense of the outer ring of the Middle East, that is, primarily Iran and Turkey. In spite of the fact that the loss to the Soviets of either of these countries might have a fatal effect on other countries, such as Iraq, the U.K. would be obliged, in case of general war, to concentrate on the defense of the inner core which is centered in and about Egypt. They stated that satisfactory agreement with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa was now in prospect for the use of Commonwealth forces in the Middle East in case of war, subject of course to final approval by governments at the time. The United States Representative recalled the common view expressed in previous U.K.–U.S. conversations that in this area the U.K. would take the initiative in regard to any action which would be taken. The U.K. Representative, while not dissenting from this view, expressed the hope that the U.S. would give consideration to what further steps it might be able to take in case of need. Iran 21. The U.K. representatives emphasized the vital importance of Iran in the entire Near East strategic picture and stated the view, both that they consider there is risk of a Soviet attack on Iran, and that such an attack would infringe a stopline. It was agreed that an overt Soviet attack on Iran would raise an immediate question of general war. While the U.S. pointed out that the defense of Iran must be primarily a British responsibility, it was agreed that the U.K. and the U.S. should consult together in regard to a means of meeting this problem. 22. The U.S. and U.K. should, insofar as possible, assist the Iranian Government to strengthen its position and should consider what steps should be taken in the event of an uprising in Azerbaijan or a coup d’état by the Tudeh Party. It was agreed that the U.S. and U.K. should study the question of whether the loss of Azerbaijan alone to the Soviets would be fatal, and at exactly what point in Iran the stopline should be laid down. 23. The question of demolition of Iranian oil wells in case of Soviet attack was discussed and the U.K. representatives stated that their government is examining ways and means of dealing with this matter. Turkey 24. It was agreed that the only serious threat to Turkey is an overt Soviet attack and that such an attack would raise an immediate question of general war. The view was expressed that the Turks could deal with an attack by Bulgaria alone but that this matter should receive further study. It was pointed out that, since France as well as the U.K. has a treaty of alliance with Turkey, these questions should be discussed with the French.… [Subattachment] top secret [ Washington , July 25, 1950.] Actions To Be Recommended 9 1. A comprehensive study of the effects of overt large-scale Chinese communist intervention in Korea or attack upon any other state or territory, particularly with a view to determining whether or not such intervention or attack could be localized or would lead to general war. 2. An examination, within the UN framework, of the eventual disposition of the Korean problem, including the maintenance of UN forces in South Korea, possible reoccupation of North Korea by the Soviets, and the problem of ultimate unification of the country. 3. An examination of the whole Middle East problem, covering both political and military aspects, without prejudice as to what nations should provide the forces required in the various eventualities. 4. An urgent study of the Iranian situation in order to determine where a stopline should be laid down, what forces might be utilized in the area in case of a Soviet attack, and where those forces might be obtained. This study should include the problem of conservation or denial of the oil areas in the event of Soviet invasion. 5. A study to determine the capability of allied forces in West Germany and in the western sectors of Berlin to withstand an attack by the East German forces. Such study should include an estimate as to whether such an attack could be successfully resisted without involving the Soviets. 6. A study of the capability of Bulgarian forces, without Soviet participation, successfully to invade Greece and defeat the Greek Army. This study would involve a determination of what assistance could be given to Greece in case of such an attack. 7. A planned Joint Intelligence conference with the object of arriving at an estimate on Soviet capabilities and intentions, to be followed, if appropriate, by a meeting between the U.K. and U.S. Chiefs of Staff for discussions in regard to global strategy. 8. A conference between U.S. and U.K. military representatives concerned with the problem of cover and deception to be held in Washington. Note: Details concerning the manner and timing of any consultations or conferences on the foregoing matters will be arranged through the usual channels. 1 Lot 59 D 95 is a collection of documentation on certain official visits of European heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences, including North Atlantic Council sessions, attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 The source text bears the handwritten interpolation “Sent to Sec pm 7/26/50.” 3 The US–UK political-military talks of July 20–24 at Washington were part of a broad Anglo-American consultation on world problems relating to the outbreak of the Korean conflict, documented in vol. iii , pp. 1654 ff. The source text is printed in full, ibid. , p. 1657 ; the portions herein omitted deal with the Far East and Europe. 4 Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador to the United States; General Arthur William (Baron) Tedder, Marshal of the Royal Air Force and British Permanent Representative to the NATO Standing Group. 5 Not printed; copies of the notes of the four meetings, taken by Charles W. Yost, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, are in Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 32. 6 For documentation on the 1947 and 1949 exploratory talks at Washington on the Middle East, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 485 ff., and ibid. , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 50 ff. 7 No agreed memorandum was found attached to Jessup’s memorandum. However, the source text was found in the Conference Files in the folder containing the notes of the four meetings between the U.S. and U.K. delegates. 8 This document is printed in full in vol. iii , p. 1661 . The omitted portions concern the Far East, Europe, and a section entitled “General Topics.” 9 Attached to Jessup’s memorandum was a two-page list containing 13 items for further study. In addition to the eight listed below, it included the following topics: a discussion of Indochina with the French, consultations on the Japanese Peace Treaty, Turkish capabilities of dealing with an attack by Bulgaria, withdrawal of Allied forces from Trieste in ease of a successful Soviet or satellite attack on Yugoslavia, and consultations on propaganda and psychological warfare. (Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 32) Editorial Note [Document 86] Editorial Note Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and several officials of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs travelled to London in September for informal discussions with members of the British Foreign and Colonial Offices between September 16 and 23 concerning problems in the Near East, South Asian, and African regions. Conversations ranged from regional political, economic, and military matters, which are documented below, to specific topics including Cyprus, Greek-Yugoslav relations, the Greek political situation, and Greek-Turkish security, which are documented in pages 335 ff.; the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute and convertability of sterling for Iranian dollar loan repayments, which are documented in pages 445 ff.; Libya and Eritrea, which are documented in pages 1600 ff.; Anglo-Egyptian relations and the Suez Canal, documented in pages 284 ff.; Arab refugees and the Palestine question, documented in pages 658 ff.; and Communism in Africa, British colonial policies in Africa, economic questions concerning Africa, all of which are documented in pages 1503 ff. Documentation on preparations for these discussions including agenda items, briefing papers, travel arrangements, etc., is in Department of State file 120.4371. From London, McGhee and his party journeyed to Paris for talks between September 25–26 with French officials concerning the Near East and Africa, and from there to Tunis (September 27), Tripoli (September 28), Casablanca (September 29), and Rabat (September 30). The McGhee party then proceeded to Tangier for the North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference, October 2–7. For documentation on the Paris North African talks and the Tangier Conference, see pages 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] ff. Documentation on the Paris talks concerning the Near East has not been found in Department of State files. For information on McGhee’s visit to Tunis, see page 1786 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] ; for the record of his audience with the Sultan of Morocco in Rabat, see page 1747 [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] . McGhee’s conversation with the Mufti of Tripolitania, Sheikh Mohammed Abul As’ Ad Alam in Tripoli is in Department of State file 611.73/9–2850. Record of Informal United States-United Kingdom Discussions, London, Monday Morning, September 18, 1950 780.00/9–1850 [Document 87] Record of Informal United States-United Kingdom Discussions, London, Monday Morning, September 18, 1950 1 top secret London , September 18, 1950. Subject: Security of Middle East and Iran Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Mr. D. P. Reilly, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Lt. Col. C. S. Godwin, British Chiefs of Staff Secretariat Mr. G. W. Furlonge, Counsellor, Commonwealth Liaison Dept. Honorable George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer 2nd, First Secretary of Embassy Mr. Wright opened the meeting by stating that the Foreign Office was anxious to take advantage of the current conversations with Mr. McGhee to discuss certain strategic aspects of the Near Eastern situation. In particular, the Foreign Office wished to inform Mr. McGhee of the politico-military papers on Iran and the Midle East area which had been prepared by the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff for the Bradley–Tedder conversations in Washington. 2 The Chiefs of Staff have already approved the papers, which are now being reviewed in New York by Mr. Bevin. Mr. Wright hoped that the Department would agree with the Foreign Office that there should be political as well as military discussion of the two documents. Mr. McGhee expressed his agreement with this principle and promised to recommend this course to the Department. [Here follows a discussion of the British paper on Iran. For a record of this discussion, see page 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] .] At Mr. Wright’s request, Mr. Furlonge then proceeded to outline the main lines of the paper on the defense of the Middle East, in the following terms: 1. The paper begins by reaffirming the vital nature of the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean and renews the conclusions of the US and UK Chiefs of Staff made in 1947. 3 2. The Paper then proceeds to summarize the various Allied commitments in the area, including the treaties of the UK and French with the states in the area. 3. The paper emphasizes the importance of strategic points in the region including Suez and Cyprus. 4. It analyzes the internal position in each country and particularly the administrative and economic stresses which constitute sources of weakness in the countries in the area. It also analyzes such external stresses as the Arab–Israeli and Hashemite problems. 5. The paper considers it essential that all of the Middle Eastern states be kept in the Western camp. Toward this end, it should continue to be UK policy to improve relations with the states in the area; to conserve existing strategic facilities and create an atmosphere favorable to the attainment of new ones if needed; and to improve economic and social conditions. 6. However, the foregoing are long range measures and the paper proceeds to examine what short term measures can be taken. It recommends the following: A. The continuance of arms aid to Turkey. B. The promotion of a settlement of the Palestine question. C. Military cooperation with Israel, which is considered vital. D. The retention of bases in Egypt (the key to the area) which is indispensable. Efforts should be intensified to obtain a satisfactory defense arrangement with Egypt. E. The redeployment of military forces throughout the area to create positions of strength. In this connection, it is considered that even a small US ground force at Dhahran would have a good psychological effect. (Mr. Wright, at this point also suggested the possibility of stationing ground troops in Tripolitania.) F. The continuation of economic and financial aid, including increased contributions to PRA. G. Inducement of the Arab states to accept assistance with respect to strengthening their security forces (CID and police) to combat Communism. H. Persuasion of the Arab states to accept military training assistance where this is not being done at the present time and to intensify it where it is being done. I. Consideration to increasing size and armament of the Arab Legion which could make a significant contribution to the defense of the area. J. Visits by the Commander in Chief of the Middle East Land Forces to all the Arab states and Israel in order to discuss defense measures, thus giving those states the feeling that they are being taken into consultation on questions affecting their security. (In point of fact, the C in C has already made plans to visit Jordan and Iraq in the near future for such discussions). K. The drawing up of joint Anglo-American arms policy, but deliveries should be contingent on the cooperation in general defense matters of the states concerned. L. Examination of the possibilities of RAF cooperation in Syria, as informally suggested by the Syrians, particularly in the construction of air fields. 7. On the military side, the paper reviews the past history of operational planning in the Middle East and discusses the various defense rings from the most to the least ambitious. 8. The paper recommends that positive action should be taken along the lines of ponts 6 A–L inclusive. It also recommends an examination of the defense ring which would be held by the allies in various contingencies. Mr. McGhee spoke of the US effort in the area. He pointed out that this year we are putting an additional $193 million into Greece, Turkey and Iran beyond that already appropriated. So far as Turkey is concerned, our military authorities tell us that we are already putting in practically everything which can be absorbed. As for possible military assistance for the other states in the area, we run into the problem of priorities. It is unlikely that much in the way of additional military assistance could be made available to the other states in the area, except possibly for Saudi Arabia, where such assistance may be necessary to obtain the 20 year lease which we require at Dhahran air field. Our total arms commitments at the present time do not leave very much for non-priority countries. The Arab states and Israel derive considerable security from our assistance to Greece, Turkey and Iran and he wondered whether it was worthwhile diverting, for example, equipment from Greece, Turkey and Iran to help the Arab states. Mr. Furlonge felt that a comparatively small outlay of military equipment in the Arab states would have a disproportionately greater return by enhancing the feeling of security of those states. Mr. McGhee indicated that we felt that this was largely the UK’s responsibility, but that we might be able to help to a limited extent. Mr. McGhee stated that he had noted with interest that in the British paper on the Middle East, considerable importance seemed to be attached to the pro-western orientation of Israel. We also considered this to be of importance and we now believed that when the chips were down Israel would be basically with us. Col. Godwin said he wished to emphasize very strongly the importance which the British attached from a military point of view to cooperation with Israel. 1 Drafted by Palmer. 2 Regarding the Bradley–Tedder conversations at Washington, see extract of US–UK Talks—July 20–24, p. 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] . Copies of the draft papers under reference have not been identified further; however they seem to have been earlier drafts of the papers handed to the State Department in October 1950 in anticipation of the meeting of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington on October 23, 1950. For information on these papers, see the memorandum by Mr. McGhee, October 19, “British Review of Middle East Policy and Strategy”, p. 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , and footnote 1 thereto. For the approved summary of conclusions and agreements reached at this meeting, see vol. iii , p. 1686 . 3 For documentation on the 1947 US–UK military talks on the Eastern Mediterranean, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 485 ff. Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Monday Afternoon, September 18, 1950 780.00/9–1850 [Document 88] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Monday Afternoon, September 18, 1950 1 London, September 18, 1950 secret Participants: Foreign Office R. H. Scott, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs J. D. Murray, Head, South-East Asian Department S. J. L. Olver, South-East Asian Department D. P. Reilly, Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department Commonwealth Relations Office J. J. S. Garner, Assistant Under-Secretary of State General Sir Geoffrey Scoones, Principal Staff Officer to the Secretary of State U.S.A. Mr. McGhee, Mr. Mathews—Department of State Mr. Thurston—American Embassy, Moscow 2 Mr. Palmer, Mr. Ringwalt, Mr. Root—American Embassy, London General Survey of Indo–Pakistan Relations 3 After Mr. Scott had welcomed Mr. McGhee and the other representatives of the Department and stated that the UK side was glad for the opportunity to discuss problems of mutual interest in South Asia, Mr. McGhee said that he would like to preface the discussions by stating what it was hoped to achieve from them. Recent events in Asia have intensified our interest in the area and we are anxious to examine with the UK how, within the context of the greater interest and responsibility to which the UK is best fitted, we can supplement its efforts to preserve political and economic stability. We wish to come closer to grips with the problems of the subcontinent in conjunction with the UK and to establish with it the same close understanding and working relationship that we now enjoy with respect to other geographical areas, such as the Near East. Mr. Scott said he was sure that the British side would fully agree that this close liaison was desirable. Affairs on the subcontinent had assumed enormous proportions. The rift between India and Pakistan presented us with some hideous problems, not only for the dangers implicit to the subcontinent itself but for the repercussions they would have in a much wider sphere of international relations; and, as a third factor, it was clear that India and Pakistan were destined to play a much larger role on the international political scene. Mr. Garner reviewed briefly the major developments in Indo-Pakistan relations since partition, enumerating the points of danger which now existed between the two countries. It was a gloomy situation, indeed, which faced us and the problem of course was what to do. We could agree, he said, that it was our primary aim to promote the settlement of Indo-Pakistani differences in every way possible, but the real difficulty which the UK for its part found was to see just how we could assert our influence. From past experience, the UK was inclined to feel that open intervention could do more harm than good. We had learned that interference from the US and the UK was almost as likely to be resented as appreciated. Mr. McGhee thought it was of fundamental significance that both India and Pakistan had supported the two Security Council resolutions on Korea 4 and the UK officials agreed there had been in recent months a hopeful change in India’s attitude towards events in Asia. So far as the disputes between India and Pakistan were concerned, it was felt on both sides that these were not so much causes in themselves as the symptoms of an underlying bitter distrust between the two countries. Mr. McGhee mentioned that Sir Owen Dixon 5 had seemed to think Kashmir 6 was kept alive by the Indians as an issue on which to hang other aims, providing them, for example, with an excuse for maintaining a large army. It was possible that India still had in mind the eventual elimination of Pakistan. There was then some discussion of the extent to which Nehru 7 might be forced by the internal political situation in India into a more intransigent position than he himself would like to take. Mr. Garner recognized this as a possibility but said that he personally was still inclined to feel that the whole idea of Pakistan was anathema to Nehru. Where Kashmir was concerned, he wondered whether the situation was not reversed and, whereas the majority would be willing to see a settlement, the issue was kept alive by a small but powerful minority. Mr. McGhee said we hoped that Britain and the Commonwealth would continue to take the lead in trying to bring about agreement between India and Pakistan. He realized the difficulties which this posed for the Commonwealth but said that there seemed at the same time to be a limit to what the Security Council can do. It was difficult to see what clear line of action it could take. A solution depended largely on the parties themselves and there was still no proof that India at least really had the will to compose its differences. Mr. Scott emphasized that the time factor had assumed the utmost importance. The UK had already endeavored to bring India and Pakistan together in cooperative effort. This was one of the primary purposes of associating them in Commonwealth aid to Burma through the Ambassadors Committee set up in Rangoon. 8 However, the pressure of the world crisis no longer left us with the time to work out a gradual solution along these lines. He too felt that if the parties had the will to settle their differences, there were a half dozen formulas which could be used for this purpose, but in view of the persistent failure of our efforts so far to heal the breach, he was seriously concerned whether mediation or intervention could any longer succeed. Mr. McGhee then underlined the important defense role the two countries could play if they were to join their efforts for this purpose. We would at least like to see them in a position to defend themselves. Unfortunately, as matters now stood their military potential represented a threat to the peace of the subcontinent rather than a guarantee. Military Needs of Area—and in particular coordination of US–UK policy General Scoones summarized British assistance with respect to the defense efforts of the countries of South Asia. He said Ceylon is important as a communication center. The UK is able to supply its military needs, but there is not a great deal which it can absorb. Ceylon is conscious of the threat to its security and is constantly urging the UK to keep the largest possible forces there. The UK is in close touch with the situation and has good contacts there, but Ceylon is outside the primary area of danger and there are limits on the role it can fill. In India and Pakistan the forces are organized along British lines and use British equipment. The UK had continued to supply their armed forces within the limits of its capacity, these efforts being limited mainly to furnishing necessary maintenance requirements for the present establishments. Now, however, the UK was being forced to cut down its assistance to India and Pakistan in view of its obligations in the present crisis to North Atlantic Treaty countries and other members of the Commonwealth. The supply of jet aircraft, for instance, was being stopped; India and Pakistan would for the present get only a very few at best. The military picture on the subcontinent was deeply affected by the political problem. The two countries seemed to be more preoccupied with the threat from each other than any from outside and there was always the danger they might go to war. The UK, of course, did not wish inadvertently to encourage this prospect in any way. The priority of India and Pakistan on the military availabilities of the UK had gone down in the general picture and it was doubtful whether they would be supplied with anything beyond limited needs for maintenance. In Afghanistan the regular army was of low standard and the important factor was that it was made up largely of recruits from northern Afghanistan who were racially akin to inhabitants across the border in the USSR. Moreover, this same region, the area north of the Hindu Kush, was the richest area of Afghanistan. It should not be difficult for the Russians to take it over and if they did Afghanistan would face destitution and the disintegration of its regular forces. The army had some British equipment and the air force was almost entirely equipped from British sources. As for the prospect of sending further supplies through to Afghanistan, even small arms, he thought the simple fact here was that there would be the greatest difficulty in getting Pakistan to agree to their shipment. Summing up, General Scoones said that the crux of the military supply problem was that there was no guarantee that the equipment we might furnish the subcontinent would be used for the ends we desire. Answering Mr. McGhee’s question, he thought it would be possible to develop an effective military potential, as indeed had [been] the case with British India, but only if the present political difficulties could be surmounted. It seemed to him that we were miles away from this objective. Mr. McGhee elaborated a little further on the thought that India and Pakistan might collaborate on some territorial guarantee of the non-Communist countries of South and South East Asia. Could they not, for example, make clear they would come to the aid of Burma in the event of Chinese Communist threat? General Scoones thought that for this particular problem Pakistan could not be of much practical help and that the burden would fall on India. Generally speaking, he was quite skeptical of realizing any effective coordination in defense while Indo-Pakistan differences remained. Mr. McGhee explained that US policy has been to grant export licenses for only a very limited amount of military equipment for India and Pakistan. With the crisis in Korea, however, our policy has become somewhat more positive and we have taken an increased interest in their military strength. We hope to give them increased help in the procurement of supplies and we now have legislative authorization permitting them to buy from military stocks. Both countries had presented us rather comprehensive programs. Mr. Mathews said the US might also be of some assistance in supplying spare parts and facilitating the transfer of certain lend-lease equipment needed for maintenance. Mr. McGhee went on to say that, nevertheless, with the present increased demands on our availabilities from other more critical areas, the relative priority position of India and Pakistan has probably gone down and their prospects of getting any considerable amount of supplies is definitely limited. General Scoones said the Pakistanis were anxious to build up an arms industry which, in contrast with India, they are completely without at the moment. The UK could be of only limited help in this respect and probably none at all financially. Mr. McGhee said that funds now available for building up the defense capacity of our overseas friends could conceivably be used for this purpose but that this use would have a very low priority. Mr. McGhee said he had the impression from what had been discussed that the UK has no wish to press us to divert any greater flow of military aid at this time to the subcontinent. This view was confirmed by the UK side. There was then some discussion of the possible help Pakistan might provide in stemming any military advance towards the Persian Gulf and in the Near East generally, and it was agreed Pakistan might provide some help in this respect if it were ever free from internal worries on the subcontinent. The consensus was that we should lend every encouragement to India and Pakistan to be strong enough to protect themselves but that before they could represent any strong and certain defensive element in the area, their political problems would have to be overcome. For the time it was undesirable to divert military supplies from other important areas beyond those which might be used for internal security. Kashmir and other disputes Mr. McGhee referred to his recent conversation with Sir Owen Dixon in which the latter indicated his feeling that the Kashmir problem should be separated into the question of demilitarization, with which the Security Council should deal, and the territorial aspects, which should be left to the initiative of the two parties. Both sides mentioned their doubts that this was desirable or even possible. Mr. Garner felt that if the two aspects were separated the practical effect would be that the present cease-fire line would become the frontier. He pointed out, however, that Dixon would probably not present his views in a manner to tie the Security Council’s hands but would merely indicate what he personally thought might constitute an ideal settlement. Mr. Garner felt there was no hope of separating the political problem from demilitarization. If the Indian troops were withdrawn they might merely go to reinforce the elements on the Punjab frontier and thus constitute an even greater threat than at present. Both sides agreed there was no prospect of demobilization of the main forces in sight. There was considerable discussion of timing and tactics in dealing with Dixon’s report 9 and there was some feeling on both sides that it might be wise to defer Security Council action until some further progress could be made privately in reconciling the views of the two disputants. Mr. Mathews felt we must keep in mind the possibility we might be faced with the peculiar situation where India was supporting Dixon’s ideas on partition-plus-plebiscite while Pakistan opposed them. It was the unanimous view that Pakistan objections to giving up overall plebiscite promised to be a serious problem and that we must give careful consideration to Pakistani reactions at the present delicate stage of the Kashmir problem. Mr. Garner pointed out that Dixon’s efforts did, after all, break down on a rather narrow point and that, if there were really a will on the part of the two sides to settle the problem, it should not be impossible to devise a formula that would, on the one hand, avoid the complete withdrawal of the Abdullah Government, and, on the other, allow proper UN supervision of the plebiscite. Mr. McGhee, pointing out that partition-plus-plebiscite seemed to be the most likely solution ultimately, thought we might use Dixon’s report as the basis for consolidating efforts in this direction. Admittedly, however, we might lose bargaining power with India if we proceed too quickly. As for administration in the plebiscite area, he believed it was inevitable that we would have to rely to some extent on the local administrative facilities. Mr. Mathews suggested that, since the Indians have indicated previously to both of us their interest in partition-plus-plebiscite, we might go to them now and ask why there was a breakdown in the negotiations and what it is they really do want. This approach could be made by the UK, with the US in the background to make substantially the same points if asked, or it might be made simultaneously. The big question remaining, of course, would be what to do about the Pakistanis. Mr. McGhee said that Dixon’s report was not yet available for him to read before his departure from New York and we would have to wait to examine the report before we could decide more precisely what we would do now. It was agreed that Mr. Mathews would consult during the remainder of the week with UK officials dealing with Kashmir in an effort to devise the most suitable plan of procedure for the US and UK from this point. Mr. Mathews mentioned his concern over indications that the water rights question might come before the Security Council. Mr. Garner, however, informed the group that a recent personal letter from Liaquat 10 to Nehru had a somewhat more temperate note. Liaquat was now suggesting submission of the issue to the International Court, holding reference to the Security Council for the time in reserve, and the UK had some hope that Nehru might accept the suggestion, at least to the extent of agreeing to some form of arbitration. Both US and UK officials believe it was undesirable for the dispute to come before the Security Council. India’s attitude toward recent events in Asia Mr. Scott reviewed the increasingly important role India was playing in Asia’s politics. The effects were already in evidence. Tibet was a good illustration. He thought India was largely due the credit for the relaxation in tension there. 11 Above all, in India’s policy, was the desire to get on with China and to view its development within the context of Asian affairs. Mr. Scott then referred to the problem which was giving the UK much concern: India’s attitude toward the United States. He felt it was, in this connection, of the utmost importance to realize the importance to us of Indian support whatever the future held in the way of war or peace for us in Asia. Mr. McGhee said the US fully recognized the importance of having India’s cooperation. It was clear that in the last analysis Asia could be rid of Communism only by Asians themselves and it was to our best interest to build our hopes on India. Circumstances had, unfortunately, led us to divergence with India over the Chinese question. This situation was really forced on us by the attitude of Communist China itself and by military necessity in the case of Korea and Formosa. It was to be regretted that in Indo-China and elsewhere we might find ourselves on the opposite side of the fence with the Indians and he recognized that our different interpretation of events in Asia constituted a running sore. The factor of main importance, however, was Nehru’s support for the original two Security Council resolutions on Korea. We appreciated the importance of a closer understanding with India and we were now attempting to work out a more effective arrangement for prior consultation with India where Asian problems were concerned. We were also studying how we could be of greater assistance to India and satisfy its complaints on this score. At the moment, for example, we were trying to arrange to supply India with a certain quantity of milo at a concessional price. Mr. McGhee went on to say that in the best of possible worlds the Asians would be left to decide their own fate but that under present conditions the Asians must first realize the threat that international Communism represents before cooperation can be fully effective. Both sides agreed that it was highly desirable to place greater responsibilities for Asian developments on our non-Communist friends, particularly India, and to encourage them to face up to the problems to be settled there. Mr. Mathews mentioned in this connection the role that India, for example, might play in reconstruction in Korea. This should be more to its liking than supplying military aid. The UK officials agreed that we should not relinquish our position on the Asian mainland or abdicate to a political vacuum. They were fully in accord with our views on the desirability of passing along all the responsibility possible to India and our other Asian friends. There were definite signs that the Indians were becoming more and more realistic about Asian developments. They would probably respond favorably to consultation. We should not forget, however, the hurdles to be overcome. India’s outlook would be dominated by its relations with Peking. This could, of course, serve to our advantage, as, indeed, it appeared already to have done. But it was clear that India would want to see greater satisfaction given to Communist China. In this connection, Mr. Scott felt it was significant there was now some suggestion India might withdraw from its participation in investigating the Yalu River bombing incident because of the Security Council vote denying the Chinese Communists the right to be represented. Mr. McGhee thought India’s desire to get along with Communist China was, in general, a good thing and said we would like to encourage it. The relationship had already produced its benefits. Mr. McGhee wanted to know whether the UK felt there was at this time any prospects of a regional association in South and South East Asia Mr. Scott thought that such a development would be a very slow growth. The UK’s objective now was to build up cooperation on an economic basis, which in his view was the only approach. Mr. McGhee wondered whether the program of economic and technical aid now being initiated by the Commonwealth 12 would promote a closer political association. Would not the participation of European members in this endeavor arouse the suspicions of the Asians and hinder fully effective cooperation? Mr. Scott did not think so. He felt the Commonwealth program had a chance to be successful. Cooperative arrangements of this order, of which the rice conference in Singapore was an example, had already been made to work. He pointed out that the Commonwealth aid program was not being played up as an anti-Communist effort and that the emphasis was on its constructive economic aspects. However, it was the Indian delegate at Sydney himself who had indicated an awareness of the political significance it might have. Pakistan’s attitude toward recent events in Asia Mr. Scott said that with respect to the Far East Pakistan did not like to follow in India’s footsteps but that this had generally been the case so far. The countries of Southeast Asia tended to look to India rather than Pakistan. This was true even of Indonesia in spite of its Moslem population. Turning to the Near East, Mr. McGhee said that the US was inclined to welcome Pakistani initiative in the Moslem world. We had no confidence in the effectiveness of Egypt’s influence and, looking elsewhere for leadership, we were bound to think of Pakistan, which was the most progressive and capable of the Moslem countries and was in a good position to point out the inconsistency of backward economic and social conditions with Moslem principles. While the UK officials were skeptical that Pakistan would ever emerge as the head of an effective political association of Moslem countries, feeling that the language difficulties and its different historical associations largely ruled out such a prospect, they did agree that Pakistan might set an example and its leaders exercise a useful influence. Mr. McGhee mentioned the Korean issue as one instance of this already. Mr. Garner says we should keep in mind, of course, that a close attachment between Pakistan and the rest of the Moslem world might have adverse consequences if the Pakistani ever felt we let them down and reaped the sympathy of their Moslem neighbors. It was agreed that, generally speaking, the Pakistan attitude toward the UN, Korea and other problems of concern to us had been on the whole helpful. As for the possibility of a rapprochement between Pakistan and the USSR, it was thought that while there was always the risk of flirtation, in which Pakistan might feel there were useful tactical advantages, the Pakistan leaders had no desire or inclination to move towards the Russian camp. Mr. McGhee thought we should keep in mind the useful role Islam might be playing with respect to the Moslem minorities in Central Asia. Mr. Thurston agreed there were at least a few indications that this attachment might work to our advantage. Afghan-Pakistan dispute on Pushtoonistan 13 Mr. Mathews said it appeared there had been an increase rather than a decrease in agitation and that meanwhile efforts at mediation had gotten us nowhere. He had been considering whether there was any new approach to the problem and he wondered whether the following plan might not be worth considering: (1) Try to get the parties to agree to stop all propaganda during a cooling off period; (2) propose that following this they hold a conference without an agenda. This at least might give some encouragement to the moderate elements in Kabul and provide some opportunity for an exchange of views on the welfare of the tribes. While both sides were skeptical that this arrangement would bring about any appreciable progress towards the eventual solution of the Pushtoonistan problem, it was felt that it might reduce the tension and was worth studying. Mr. Mathews agreed to discuss it further with Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations officials later in the week. Mr. Scott said the UK felt that it had shot its bolt with the Afghans and that further intervention on its part would be useless. He was also afraid that the sort of concerted pressure from outside powers which had already been tried would be dangerous to repeat. Mr. Mathews said that he appreciated these factors and he thought perhaps the US could take the initiative in suggesting the approach he had in mind. He agreed with the UK that the proposals might include the exchange of ambassadors between Pakistan and Kabul. The consensus was that the Pakistanis had been quite reasonable in their relations with the Afghans. Mr. McGhee said that the US had generally accepted the British position that Pakistan had succeeded to the treaty responsibilities of the UK and that the legal position it maintained was a correct one. We had in fact made it pretty clear to the Afghans we saw little or no validity in their case. Mr. McGhee wondered about the motivation behind the Afghan position. Mr. Scott felt there was no proof that the Indians were responsible and General Scoones pointed out that the present Afghan dynasty owed its position largely to the support which had been given it by the tribes. As a consequence there was always the fear that Pakistan might wean away the tribes. He felt the Afghan contention that the tribes were dissatisfied was entirely artificial. If the tribes were dissatisfied, he said, they certainly would not have remained quiet for so long. In answer to a question, General Scoones said the Pakistani subvention to their tribes was not a very considerable one. He believed the Pakistanis estimated it cost them about 40 million rupees per year. To meet the Afghan charges, Mr. McGhee wondered whether it would not be feasible to set up a mixed commission to study the facts about the treatment of tribes and such incidents as occurred. General Scoones doubted this would be effective. He felt the tribes would not accept such interference. Consideration of arrangements for later full US–UK review of respective policies towards South Asia Mr. McGhee said there would probably be considerably more to consider in this connection later in the week when there was a discussion on the economic situation in South Asia 14 and on plans for economic and technical aid. As for future US–UK meetings of the present sort, he said he hoped to hold a meeting of US Chiefs of Mission in South Asia in February of next year and that this might provide an opportunity to pass through London for a continuation of the present exchange of views. Mr. Scott said continued understanding was of the greatest importance. He warned that the siuation in the subcontinent might deteriorate to the point where we were faced not simply with preventing an outburst but of containing it. 1 Drafted by John F. Root, Second Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom. 2 Ray L. Thurston, Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union. 3 For documentation on United States relations with India, see pp. 1461 [ Pg. 1461 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] ff.; on United States relations with Pakistan, pp. 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 837 ] ff. 4 Documentation on the Korean conflict is in volume vii . 5 United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, appointed by the Security Council on April 12, 1950 in accordance with the Resolution of March 14, 1950 (UN doc. S/1461). 6 For documentation on Kashmir, see pp. 1362 [ Pg. 1362 is part of Doc. 758 ] ff. 7 Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India. 8 The Committee under reference here cannot be identified further in Department of State files. 9 Reference is to the Report submitted by Sir Owen Dixon to the United Nations Security Council in September 1950 stating that no agreement had been reached between India and Pakistan for the demilitarization of Kashmir or on any other outstanding problems relating to that area, and requesting formal termination of the position of United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan (UN doc. S/1791). 10 Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan. 11 For documentation on Tibet for 1950, see vol. vi , pp. 256 ff. 12 Reference is to the meetings of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and Southeast Asia which on November 28, 1950 published a report, the so-called Colombo Plan, calling for the economic development of those areas. Documentation on United States interest in the Colombo Plan is in Department of State file 890.00. 13 For documentation on Pushtoonistan, see pp. 1446 [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 815 ] ff. 14 See Record of Informal US–UK Discussions… September 22, p. 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] . Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Thursday Afternoon, September 21, 1950 780.00/9–2150 [Document 89] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Thursday Afternoon, September 21, 1950 1 London, September 21, 1950 secret Participants: Foreign Office Mr. M. R. Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Mr. G. W. Furlonge, Head, Eastern Department Mr. T. E. Evans, Head, Middle East Secretariat Mr. L. A. C. Fry, South-East Asia Department Mr. L. Barnett, Eastern Department Department of State Hon. George C. McGhee (Items 12 and 19) Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper (All Items) Mr. W. Sands (All Items) American Embassy, London Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd (Items 12 and 19) Kurds ( Item 1 under Near East ) We said that while we were not alarmed, there seemed to be signs of increasing unrest among the Kurds in all the countries in which they are located, and that the situation was perhaps potentially dangerous. We felt therefore that it should be watched and that it might be desirable for the US and UK to exchange information in order to keep fully abreast of the situation. The UK representatives indicated that they were not particularly disturbed by the Kurdish problem. They pointed out that the Kurds were always unstable and divided, and that, while the UK was aware that there was some unrest at the present time, it did not take the matter too seriously. The British representatives said, however, that they were always glad to exchange views and information with us and they agreed that the situation should be watched. We informed the British that we were in the process of setting up additional consulates throughout the Near East and hoped that through these we could establish closer contacts with the Kurds and other tribesmen. It was agreed by both delegations that all approaches to the Kurds should be through the established governments of the countries concerned and that care should be taken not to build up the Kurds too much, as such action would lead to unrest. It was further agreed that the exchange of views and information between ourselves should be through normal channels, and that there is no need at this time to have special conversations on this subject. Means of Encouraging Development of Progressive Government in Near East ( Item 19 ) Mr. McGhee said that the US has been hoping that the activities of the Palestine Refugee Administration 2 would give the US and the UK a lever to bring about needed reforms in the Near East, especially in the case of land. As the situation is now, the governments in the area have no desire to make political, economic and social improvements and there is insufficient pressure by the inhabitants, who have neither the political consciousness nor the ability to force more progressive measures. While the US has no ambitions in the area arid while it is difficult for it to intervene in such matters, nevertheless the US is interested in seeing progress made toward progressive government in the area. Mr. McGhee regarded the Islamic Economic Conference which was held at Karachi last year 3 to be an encouraging step in the right direction. He felt that both the US and the UK should encourage the Pakistanis to take initiative in matters of this kind, since they can express points of view in the Moslem world which the US and UK can not. Although much of the Pakistani interest in matters of this kind is admittedly political in motive, nevertheless any influence which they can bring to bear in the interest of reform is all to the, good. The UK representatives agreed that the influence of Pakistan should be encouraged. Mr. McGhee went on to say that the US has considered other measures to promote progressive government. In Greece, considerable success was achieved by having American officials make public speeches. However, this does not appear to have as much application in the Near East, where suspicions against the US are such that public utterances of this kind would probably not have the desired effect. Mr. McGhee also outlined other media through which the US hopes that a progressive influence on the area may be exercised, notably through Point Four, through US universities in the area and perhaps through US private foundations, such as the Ford Foundation. He felt that such private enterprises should eschew the political and concentrate on the economic and social aspects of the problem. While he was not too optimistic regarding the prospects for bringing about more progressive government in the Near East, he nevertheless felt that both the US and UK should recognize that they have responsibilities in that direction. Mr. Wright stated that the UK has this particular problem in the forefront of its thinking on the Near East and wants to try to contribute in every appropriate way to the development of progressive government in the area. There is, however, no panacea for the problem which can only be worked on gradually through the number of channels which are open to us. In this connection, the UK has paid particular attention to the calibre of its diplomatic representatives in the area. There are many opportunities for the right kind of representative to exercise hot only influence on the governmental level, but also direct personal influence in a given situation. He mentioned British Minister Kirkbride in Amman as a successful example. The UK was not enthusiastic about public speeches of their officials. He did not think anti-corruption speeches were particularly effective and felt that they gave rise to nationalistic reaction. Mr. McGhee felt that a program of economic assistance for the area might give the required lever to obtain greater reforms. Mr. Furlonge pointed out, however, that the intense nationalistic and anti-imperialist views of the governments in the area represented limiting factors. Mr. Wright added that while, of necessity, we were backing reactionary regimes in the area, changes often led to worse situations. Jordan and Saudi Arabia, for example, which in some ways are perhaps the most absolute states in the area, are also perhaps essentially the most structurally sound. In the last few months, the UK has pressed the Jordanian Government for a diminution in absolute power. While these efforts have been successful, the continuance of a more absolute regime in Amman might have led to peace with Israel by this time. Mr. McGhee felt that Syria might present a good opportunity to try out a program of economic assistance which might give us the necessary leverage to encourage progressive reforms. He felt that in many ways there was greater scope and opportunity in Syria than elsewhere in the area. Mr. Wright agreed, but he felt that the intense nationalistic and anti-imperialist sentiment within Syria would constitute a barrier. While the UK was in favor of economic assistance for the area, it was not sure that it gave the necessary lever for reform. He reiterated his conviction that it was necessary to work through all channels available to us in order to achieve the desired results. He thought the oil companies had a large role to play. Also, the UK attaches great importance to the British Middle East Office, which has worked quietly in the economic and social field. Moreover, there are some 500 UK experts in the Middle East which exercise a progressive influence. The IBRD could play an important role in the area. Unfortunately, however, the Bank’s requirements were too rigid, since it tended to apply Western European Standards to Middle East conditions. He hoped that both the US and the UK could express this point of view to the Bank to help persuade it that it must adopt a more flexible approach to the area. Mr. McGhee agreed that the Bank’s limitations were a barrier to progress in the area. Additional Near Eastern Economic Assistant Needs ( Item 12 ) Mr. Evans opened the discussion by giving a résumé of the progress which has been made in the field of economic assistance to the Near East during the past year. With the exception of Egypt, all states in the area still had need for additional capital. However, many of the states in the area have received or have in prospect some form of assistance from the US, UK or IBRD. Ethiopia has an IBRD loan of seven million dollars in sight, which was granted in almost record time, Iraq has received both an IBRD loan and one from the UK; in addition, there has been a considerable increase in Iraq’s oil royalties. In Iran a US Eximbank loan is in prospect and the UK is also studying means of extending assistance. Saudi Arabia has also received an Eximbank loan. In Syria, the Lebanon and Jordan, considerable funds are being expended through PRA. However the needs of these three states are particularly acute and the UK would like to encourage an IBRD loan in Syria while Qudsi, who is receptive to the idea, is in power. The situation in Jordan is serious. Unless a program for the encouragement of exports can be successfully developed, Jordan will be bankrupt within the next few years. Jordan is anxious to join the Bank and the UK feels that it should be encouraged, although it is admittedly not a good bank prospect. Mr. McGhee said that the US has the impression that the economic situation in the Near East is deteriorating. If true, this is most serious, and the Korean situation would seem to lend importance to the necessity of doing something about it. He felt that the IBRD methods for granting assistance in the area were too slow and that the amounts of capital which the IBRD could bring to bear upon the situation were too small to have the desired effect. For these reasons, the US has been giving consideration to the possibility of a grant program for the area. This is being studied at the present time and certain preliminary conversations with Congress have taken place. Although there were many justifiable developmental projects which had been worked out for the Near East, very little progress has been made in implementing them. Was the limiting factor funds, lack of desire, or what? Mr. Wright felt that lack of funds was one of the limiting factors but that if the funds were provided, the other limitations, such as lack of desire, might diminish. He expressed the point of view that a three pronged program was necessary for the US and the UK to establish and maintain their influence in the area. (1) To maintain positions of strength in order to make clear to the states in the area that they would be defended and not liberated; (2) to view sympathetically their legitimate nationalist aspirations; and (3) to provide economic assistance. Regarding (1), he felt that the US could best assist by stationing token forces in the area and by participating in a minority role in any Korea-type action. Regarding (2), he felt that we had sometimes in the past paid insufficient attention to the legitimate nationalist aspirations of the area, but that there would be many more future instances in which the states in the area would come to us and in which we could lend a sympathetic ear to such aspirations. Regarding (3), he felt that grant aid should probably be given to at least some of the Near Eastern countries. Mr. McGhee inquired what contribution the UK might be able to make in any grant aid program for the area. Mr. Wright replied that the UK is already doing practically all that it can in the area by providing experts, assisting Iraq and Jordan financially, and making up the deficits of the former Italian Colonies. In the case of the latter, it wants to go beyond the present care and maintenance basis. Moreover, it is proceeding with the Owen Falls project and hopes to proceed with other of the Nile projects. The UK intends to go on making its maximum contribution, but doubts that it could do much more than its present obligations. Role of Arab League in Future Area Programs ( Item 10 ) Mr. Kopper said that it seemed to have developed from previous conversations that the British were not enthusiastic about the future prospects of the League as a constructive force in the Arab East. Mr. Kopper agreed that the recent history of the League was not such as to encourage enthusiasm but that it was the hope of the Department that League activity might be channeled into some useful sphere of activity. We had particularly in mind its usefulness in area economic development. Mr. Wright replied that the British were indeed not enthusiastic about either the history or the prospects of the League and that while nothing should be done to “kill it, we should not regret to see it die”. He admitted that perhaps there might be some economic activity in which the League could be useful. Mr. Furlonge interjected at this point that he was afraid there was a danger that whatever the League concerned itself with, it was likely to make as great blunders as it had in the political sphere. Mr. Sands stated that Ambassador Blandford of the PRA had recently been encouraged by his talks in Cairo with Azzan Pasha on the possibility of the League’s cooperation in development matters. It was agreed that careful study would be given on both sides to ways in which the League might be useful in social-economic relationships in the area. Arab Unity ( Item 11 ) Mr. Kopper asked for the views of the British side on the subject of Arab unity. Mr. Wright replied that there had been no change in the British attitude on this subject since last year, when the position was established that, while HMG would do nothing to encourage activity of any of the plans for unity of the northern Arabs, they would equally do nothing to discourage such plans. Mr. Wright did not know of anything that had happened since then to change this point of view at all. Mr. Kopper stated that there did not seem to be any divergence in the views of the two sides and that there did not seem to be recent events which made it necessary to reconsider our positions. Mr. Kopper remarked that while political unity was a highly controversial subject that perhaps there was something which could be done to encourage more identity of economic interest among Arab countries. Mr. Wright agreed that such identity was altogether to the good and that HMG had always encouraged it. It was agreed that the tripartite declaration had done much to allay the fears of Ibn Saud, the Syrians and the Lebanese that plans for political unity would not be forced on unwilling countries. Point Four for Near East ( Item 13 ) Mr. Sands opened the discussion by giving the tentative figures which the Point IV office and NEA have allocated to NE, AF, SOA and GTI (Iran). He gave a general breakdown of the other allocations and emphasized that all these figures were subject to revision. Mr. Sands gave a résumé of the technical operation of bilateral agreements and mentioned the spheres in which they would operate, i.e., sending American experts to participating countries, training of local personnel, and use of limited amounts of demonstration equipment. It was agreed that the procedures outlined would not conflict with British interests in Iraq, where satisfactory local arrangements had been made between the two Embassies. It was also agreed close consultation among US, UK and UN organizations of technical assistance in the area, to avoid duplication of requests, was necessary, and that PRA provided an ideal point of reference in this respect for the Near East, by personal arrangement, without identification of Point IV with the refugee question. 1 Authorship not indicated in the source text. 2 For documentation on the Palestine Refugee Administration, see pp. 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] ff. 3 Reference is to the International Islamic Economic Conference held in Karachi, Pakistan from November 25 to December 6, 1949. The Conference was convened by a group of Karachi businessmen and was attended by delegate from Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Libya, Oman, Afghanistan, Algeria, Tunisia, the Maldive Islands, and Spanish Morocco Although the delegations represented commercial interests rather than governments, the conference was characterized as having a semi-official status and several official observers were present, including one from the Arab League ( Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1948–1950 , p. 10504). Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Friday Afternoon, September 22, 1950 780.00/9–2250 [Document 90] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Friday Afternoon, September 22, 1950 1 London, September 22, 1950 secret Participants: Foreign Office R. H. Scott, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs J. D. Murray, Head, South-East Asian Department J. O. Lloyd, Assistant, South-East Asian Department Roger Jackling, Assistant, Economic Relations Department Treasury R. W. B. Clarke, Under-Secretary Commonwealth Relations Office J. Thomson, Assistant Secretary U.S.A. Mr. McGhee, Mr. Mathews—Department of State Mr. Ringwalt, Mr. Palmer, Mr. Moore—American Embassy, London South Asia ( Item 1 ): Mr. Clarke opened the discussion by summarizing the status of Commonwealth consideration of the problems of development in South-East Asia. He emphasized that the tone of the Report 2 which the Commonwealth countries hoped to publish would be to place the problem of development in this area in its world-wide setting and not to lead up to a bill to be placed on the plate of the US Congress. He pointed out that this problem is a long-range problem which will require a number of years to solve, and contributions from a number of countries and different sources will be necessary. It is the general view of the British representatives who are participating that the programs which have been tabled at this meeting by the Asiatic Commonwealth countries are sensible and realistic. The countries have scaled down the size of the development programs to a point considerably below what they would originally have desired to undertake. They have recognized that the limiting factor is the amount of external financial assistance likely to be available, and have tried to keep their requirements for this purpose within reasonable limits. It appears that the effect of the proposed programs in raising living standards will be limited, at least during the six-year period for which programs have been worked out. In response to a question by Mr. McGhee, the British participants generally emphasized that failure to provide external assistance to enable programs of the general magnitude under discussion to be carried out would have very serious adverse political consequences. Mr. Clarke pointed out that the total amount of external assistance required by all countries over six years would be approximately £1,000 million. There were a number of alternative sources of funds available to these countries to aid them in meeting this requirement. These included the International Bank, releases from sterling balances, and the long-term commercial money market of London, as well as private investment generally. Mr. McGhee asked what proportion of this total could be identified as the equipment and materials directly related to development projects. Mr. Clarke replied that it varied by country, depending upon the degree of industrialization already obtained. Approximately 20% of the Indian program represented capital goods, while for the others it might run as high as 40%. India needs primarily more imports of consumer goods in order to permit the undertaking of development without inflation. The Report assumes, Mr. Clarke pointed out, that the value of private investment from overseas will be small, at least during this initial six-year period. He stated, however, that the Report would reflect an improvement in the attitude toward private investment on the part of the governments of the countries concerned. As a result of an increasing awareness of the difficulties of obtaining a large volume of funds through government finance, they have generally recognized that private investment is an essential feature of any large-scale development program which they may reasonably expect to undertake. They are ready to provide conditions more favorable to overseas private investors than those which have hitherto prevailed in these countries. Mr. McGhee asked what proportion of the development projects contemplated would be carried out under government auspices. Mr. Clarke replied that the bulk of them would be, because of the nature of the projects to be undertaken and the heavy emphasis which the projects placed on large development projects in the fields of agriculture, power, and transport. Mr. Thomson discussed the technical assistance aspects of the South-East Asian development programs. He emphasized the need for technical assistance which would provide the “missing component” which limited development in all these countries, i.e., trained foremen. He pointed out that all the countries participating in the Conference were agreed on the establishment of a Council for Technical Cooperation, with headquarters at Colombo. The objectives of this Council would be to assist the countries of the area in developing their requests for technical assistance by eliminating over-lapping in the various agencies conducting technical aid programs. The Council should be able to assist countries in getting proper technicians and in extending technical training programs in Asia. It would maintain close liaison with the UN and the specialized agencies. Mr. Thomson expressed the view that what was needed in the field of technical assistance was competent people who would be willing to go into undeveloped countries and stay several years, and hoped that Point IV would emphasize this objective and not place too much reliance upon surveys and missions. The Council for Technical Cooperation has a budget of £8 million, to be expended over a three-year period. Mr. Thomson expressed the hope that the US officials responsible for the Point IV program would also establish close liaison with the Colombo organization. 1 Authorship not indicated in source text. 2 Reference is to the Colombo Plan discussed in footnote 12, p. 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 88 ] . Record of the Under Secretary’s Meeting, October 16, 1950 Under Secretary’s Meetings: Lot 53 D 250: Minutes of Meetings 1 [Document 91] Record of the Under Secretary’s Meeting, October 16, 1950 2 secret UM M–256 [ Washington , undated.] Oral Report on Trip to London, Paris, and Tangier 3 1. Mr. McGhee stated that the purpose of his trip was two-fold. First, he wanted to consult with the British and the French regarding mutual problems involved in the Near East area, including those relating to South Asia. In addition, a meeting of the Consular Officials was held in Tangier. 2. In London the results of the talks with the British were most helpful. Problems involving South Asia were discussed and it was agreed that closer consultation with respect to Asia would take place with the British. The British had no jurisdictional bias with respect to India. Mr. McGhee felt that the Commonwealth organization offered the only regional basis for the development of an aid program for South Asia. Probably $500 million a year will be needed for this area. The British have made a similar estimate of need. The British probably could make arrangements for $200 million through sterling balance arrangements. Another problem which was discussed was India’s attitude toward Asia and the United States. Also the problem of Pakistan was reviewed. The only hopeful approach on Kashmir appears to be through an informal British approach. There needs to be some assurance given of a fair election in Kashmir. Problems of Greece, Turkey, Iran, as well as Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were discussed. Mr. McGhee reviewed with the British their colonial policy with respect to the African territories, and he was satisfied with their explanation. As a mater of fact, the British may be pushing too hard toward the independence of certain of the African territories. 3. Talks with the French were satisfactory but could not be on so frank a basis as with the British. The French were defensive regarding their policy in North Africa and appeared to be ashamed of their colonial policy. When the question of the Moroccan trade control policy was raised, the French indicated that it was our own political problem to solve. Mr. McGhee felt that it would be wise to hold on to our old trade rights but not to attempt to enforce them strictly. 4. The Consular Meeting was held at Tangier and was attended by our consular officers in North Africa. There were service representatives present including Admiral Connelly [ Conolly ], 4 who attended the meeting for one day. The French and the Spanish feel that they have valuable property in North Africa and they have assured us that it is well controlled. It is believed that now is not the time to urge the French to do something with respect to political concessions in this area. If they attempt to make any moves in this direction their entire control and strategic position might be lost. For the present, we need short-term stability and so it was suggested that the French not be pressed to grant political concessions to the natives in this area. There is no immediate danger in this area of native uprisings or communist takeover. In the event of war, it is believed that the French could maintain stability in this area. The Communists are somewhat active in trade unions and could cause some damage in time of wary but it is felt that the Communists could be controlled properly if it became necessary. There is very little opportunity for increased trade in this area. ECA, through the French, has assisted North Africa. This has aroused some bitterness on the part of the Arabs because it strengthened the French position. It should be noted that the French are reluctant to have Point IV introduced in this area because it would advance the native position. We must be extremely careful in our USIE program. We should not attempt to press for political independence or political concessions in this area through the USIE program. We have the good-will of the native peoples and we should make every effort to maintain it and at the same time not alienate the French. 5. With respect to Libya, it is anticipated that we will have to pay something in order to maintain our rights there. The British are not in a position to pay for all that is necessary. It is felt that Libya will not be fit for political independence by 1952, since no native leaders are available. With respect to the problem of Eritrea, this issue should be fought out within the General Assembly. It is apparent, after a visit to this area, that none of the peoples here are ready for self-government. 1 Lot 53 D 250 is a master file of records of meetings, documents, summaries, and agenda of the Under Secretary’s meetings for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 The principal officers of the Department of State, or their alternates, met regularly, often several times a week, under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary of State, to consider important foreign policy problems. This record was presumably prepared by officers of the Executive Secretariat. McGhee’s oral report was the only order of business at this meeting. There is no indication on the source text as to who attended. 3 For another account by McGhee of his visits to London, Paris, and Tangier, with particular emphasis upon the African aspects of his discussions, see the summary of his remarks on October 25, p. 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] . 4 Adm. Richard L. Conolly, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, attended the meeting on October 5. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) 780.00/10–2050 [Document 92] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Ambassador at Large ( Jessup ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] October 19, 1950. Subject: British Review of Middle East Policy and Strategy There is attached a British review (Tab A) of Middle East policy and strategy 2 which the British Chiefs of Staff intend to use as a basis for the proposed U.S.–U.K. discussions commencing on October 23. This review, as indicated in the title, deals with two main subjects: 1) policy; 2) strategy. We have general and specific comments with regard to the parts of the review dealing with policy, but we have made no comments on the part dealing with strategy as we understand that the Department of Defense will deal with this section. Those parts of the British review dealing with policy analyze in Part I the importance of the Middle East in Allied global strategy and, in Part II, review the present situation in the Middle East countries (Arab states and Israel, plus Turkey and Cyprus) and recommend the measures required to retain them within the Western orbit. Part III outlines the strategic plans. Part IV of the British review concludes with a recommendation that the United Kingdom and the United States should concert measures for the retention of the Middle East countries within the Western orbit and should (in view of their limited capabilities) adopt as the basis for Anglo-American strategy in the Middle East the defense of the so-called “Inner Ring” in war. Our general and specific comments relate to the policy recommendation and not to the strategic recommendation. To the British review there are attached summaries of existing strategic plans and a map showing the defense positions discussed in the strategic plans. General Agreement . We are in general agreement with the British conclusions as stated in Parts I and II, with respect to the importance of the Middle East in Allied global strategy and with respect to the present situation in the Middle East countries including the recommended measures required to retain them within the Western orbit (as summarized in paragraph 38 of Part II) subject to such comments as are stated below. It is observed that, even if there should be a radical revision of the British strategic plan outlined in Part III, we would be in general agreement with the recommended cold war measures required to retain the Middle East countries within the Western orbit as outlined in Part II. It seems to us that these measures are sufficiently general and far-reaching to be applicable under a wide variety of circumstances and should be pursued with the objective of retaining the Middle East countries within the Western orbit. Specific Comment: With respect to Part I, paragraph 2, the British review states that “to retain the countries of the Middle East within the Western orbit is a vital cold war objective and the Allies must be prepared to make military sacrifices to that end”. As already stated, we agree that it is a vital cold war objective to retain the countries of the Middle East within the Western orbit. We consider it necessary, however, to clarify the question of military sacrifices which the Allies must be prepared to make. If the military sacrifices are those cold war measures summarized in Part I, paragraph 38, we are in agreement. We understand that the JCS are opposed to any measures which would commit or tend to commit U.S. forces to the Middle East in the event of global war. With respect to the review of the present situation in the Middle East countries outlined in Part I, we are attaching our own analysis (Tab B) of the attitudes and reactions which may be expected from the Arab states and Israel in the face of a number of eventualities related to the U.S.S.R. 3 This analysis was prepared following the original conversations between Bradley–Tedder and yourself. 4 With respect to the summary of recommended cold war measures, in Part I, paragraph 38, we have the following comment on the alphabetically numbered British paragraphs: (a) Assistance to Turkey . This task is already well under way. It will be necessary, however, for Turkish priority for arms deliveries to be worked out in relation to U.S.–U.K. commitments elsewhere. No new course of action seems indicated beyond those presently under consideration in the U.S. Government with regard to strengthening Turkish military capabilities. (b) Settlement between Israel and the Arab States and Arab State Economic Development and Social Reform . We have these subjects under continuing consideration with the objective of action. Regarding a settlement, the U.S. has played an active role as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and in frequent diplomatic conversations with the Arab and Israeli Governments. We favor the continuation of the PCC and ad hoc diplomatic approaches and will be continually alert to take advantage of any situation which might lead to a partial or full settlement between the Arab states and Israel. Regarding Arab State development and social reform, we plan to continue to urge the Arab States to take action in these fields through such means as Point TV, aid to Arab refugees and Export–Import Bank loans. (c) Military essentiality of Israel . The attitude of Israel and its military essentiality is further described in paragraph 22, Part II. We are in general agreement with the British view that there are indications that Israel’s policy may be evolving in the direction of the West. We observe that if the British have in mind the defense of the Cairo-Suez area only, it might logically follow that the friendly cooperation of Israel is militarily essential in order to secure the strategic facilities required in that country in war. On the other hand, if the British have in mind the defense of the Middle East, as a whole, it might more logically follow that the friendly cooperation of all of the Middle East States would be militarily essential in some degree. In any event, we believe, as pointed out in Tab B, that the Israeli position in the face of Soviet intervention in the Middle East would follow the same negative pattern anticipated among the Arab States. (d) British position in Egypt . We have consistently supported the British objective of retaining base rights in the Suez area in time of peace and the right of further entry in time of war. We have hoped that Britain and Egypt could reach agreement directly and have as occasion offered urged progress and moderation on both. (e) Deployment of a brigade . We agree that a detailed examination should be made of the possibility of deploying advanced elements of the British forces earmarked for Southern Persia sufficiently far forward to enable them to move into the Abadan area. Such deployment would, in our opinion, increase the confidence of the Middle East countries. The detailed examination contemplated should include further consideration of the area, such as Iraq, Kuwait or Bahrein, to which such deployment would be made. We believe the United States Government should give consideration to the possibility of stationing forces at the Dhahran Air Base. 5 We believe that such action would also increase the confidence of the Middle East countries, even if such forces should be limited. Such action would be particularly helpful in reassuring King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia and in strengthening U.S. relations with that country. Furthermore, the United States Forces at Dhahran would be reassuring to the American personnel of American oil companies in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and would prove helpful in implementing the oil denial program under NSC 26/2. 6 (f) Financial aid to the Middle East countries: The United States has already provided for extending limited financial aid to Middle East countries through such agencies as Point IV, Aid to Palestine Refugees, and the Export–Import Bank. We plan to continue such assistance as opportunity offers. Furthermore, we are presently studying the possibility of grant aid to selected countries of the Near East and South Asia. Such programs must, however, be related to programs in other areas of the world and must be approved by the Congress. It must be remembered that U.S. resources are not inexhaustible and that no program will, in the last analysis, be effective in promoting economic development unless the Arab States and Israel are willing to cooperate. (g) Arab police and security forces . We believe we might contribute to such assistance through a survey in the United States of technicians available for such assignments. With information as to individuals available and with funds to pay them, we should be in a position to generate Arab requests for such assistance. (h) Training of Arab and Israeli Armed Forces . We believe that the British should continue to assist Israel and the Arab States, particularly Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, with which the U.K. is in treaty arrangement, in building up or training their armed forces, both in the Near East and in the United Kingdom. We also believe that the United States should continue its present policy of accepting members of the Arab and Israeli armed forces for schooling in the United States. We doubt the desirability at the present time of providing American officers to Israel and the Arab states, except Saudi Arabia, for such activity in the Near East, unless they proceed in a civilian capacity. (i) Omitted in British paper. (j) Arab Legion . We believe that the Arab Legion is a force for stability in the area, but consider that an increase in its strength and efficiency is a matter for military determination. (k) British discussion with Arab and Israeli military representatives . We believe that such action should prove reassuring to the Arab and Israeli Governments and provide further evidence of British military interests in the Middle East. We could support by independent visits of U.S. officers. U.S. officers will, in any event, be visiting in Saudi Arabia because of the Dhahran Air Base and because of our intention to extend cash-reimbursable military assistance to Saudi Arabia. (l) Anglo-American arms policy . We believe that the present arms policy of the United States, United Kingdom and France, as outlined in the Tripartite declaration (Tab C) 7 should be continued. This policy provides for the export of arms to the Near East on a restricted basis for the purposes of internal security, self defense and defense of the area as a whole. Shipments of light material should continue as an indication of our interest in the area. The U.S., U.K. and France should continue consultations and exchange of information regarding shipments. The U.S. is planning at the present time to extend cash reimbursable military assistance to Saudi Arabia in connection with the continuation of the Dhahran Air Base. The U.S. has no plans at the present time for extending such assistance to the other Arab States or to Israel. (m) Syrian Air Fields . We believe that reconnaissance projects such as this can be arranged without great difficulty not only in Syria, but in the other Arab States. General . We believe that the British and the United States Governments should keep in close touch with regard to each of the foregoing on a regular basis with the objective of taking ad hoc action along the foregoing lines as the situation develops and warrants. 1 Drafted by Fraser Wilkins, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. The source text, along with the Paper drafted by Mr. Stabler regarding various attitudes and reactions, to be anticipated from the Arab States and Israel, dated October 24 and printed infra , were two of four memoranda prepared in NEA and transmitted to Mr. Jessup by Frederick Nolting, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. The two memoranda not printed are entitled “Study Papers on Iran”, dated October 24, and “British Paper entitled ‘Persia’”, dated October 19. For information on the British paper entitled “Persia”, see pp. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] ff. A copy of the Study Papers on Iran is in Department of State file 780.00/10–2050. In his memorandum of transmittal dated October 20, not printed, Mr. Nolting informed Mr. Jessup that he was sending copies of these four memoranda to the Office of the Secretary of Defense with the request that they be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comments, if possible prior to the US–UK political-military talks set for October 26. Mr. Nolting added that Mr. John Howard, of NEA would discuss with Mr. B.A.B. Burrows, Counselor of the British Embassy, the State Department’s comments on the British paper regarding Persia and on the source text in advance of the October 26 meeting (780.00/10–2050). The conversation between Mr. Burrows, Mr. McGhee, Mr. Howard, and other State Department officials on October 24 is printed, p. 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] . 2 Not printed. 3 Infra . 4 Reference is to the United States–United Kingdom political-military talks of July 20–24, p. 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] . 5 The sentence regarding the Dhahran Air Base was underscored in pencil and a notation at the side of the source text reads: “ask Bradley”. 6 NSC 26/2, not printed was a Report to the National Security Council by Executive Secretary James S. Lay, Jr., December 30, 1948, entitled “Removal and Demolition of Oil Facilities, Equipment and Supplies in the Middle East.” A copy of this Report is in NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351. 7 Not found attached; reference is to the Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East, issued after a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France in London in May 1950. For documentation on the meetings and the Declaration, see vol. iii , pp. 828 if. For text of the Declaration, see the Department of State Bulletin , June 5, 1950, p. 880. Paper Drafted by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo–Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) 780.00/10–2050 [Document 93] Paper Drafted by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo–Egyptian Sudan Affairs ( Stabler ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] October 24, 1950. This paper covers the attitudes and reactions which may be expected from the Arab States and Israel in the face of the following eventualities and suggests possible lines of action which might be adopted: 1. Soviet invasion and occupation of the Near East. 2. Limited Soviet attacks on certain key points in the Near East. 3. Soviet supported minority uprisings. 4. Soviet-inspired aggression in other parts of the world, similar to Korea. 5. USSR–US hostilities not immediately involving the Near East. Background Strategic The Near Eastern area comprising the Arab States, the independent Arab Sheikhdoms and Israel forms a vast land bridge between the East and the West and is the center of communications, both in terms of land, sea and air, between Europe and Asia. This area borders on Turkey and Iran, which in turn have common frontiers with Russia. On the other side the Near East stands as a shield protecting the African Continent. While it would be possible for Russia to invade Africa through Europe, the operation would presumably be more difficult than an invasion through the Near Eastern countries. It is assumed that the principal Soviet effort will be in Europe. However, it is also assumed that a secondary effort of importance will be made against Turkey, Iran and the Near East in order to deny to the Western Powers the strategic facilities available in the Near East, such as bases, Suez Canal and oil. During World War II Egypt, Palestine, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and later Iraq, Syria and Lebanon were of extreme importance to the Allied Powers, not only in denying that area to the Axis Powers but also as a base for European operations. When Rommel moved across Libya and almost half way across Egypt, the Allied Powers would have been in serious difficulties if they had not had room to maneuver in Sinai Peninsula, Palestine and Jordan. The loss of the Near Eastern area to Russia would adversely affect the plans of the Western Allies for the conduct of the war. Political With respect to political considerations it must be recognized that at the present time the prestige and position of the US in the Near Eastern area is at a low ebb. Such friendship and esteem as the US held at the end of World War II were quickly dissipated through our Palestine policy which in Arab eyes represented the antithesis of everything which they believed the US represented. Our support of the UK in its relations with Iraq and Egypt and our support of the French in North Africa have done nothing to increase American prestige. The bitterness engendered by these policies is deeply rooted and the attitude of the Arab States towards the US, in fact the Western world, have increasingly reflected their belief that the US support of Israel and the UK in the Near East will govern US policies, even when these are to the detriment of what the Arabs believe to be their legitimate interests. While Communism and Mohammedanism are mutually incompatible and while there is among the Arab States a degree of fear and hatred of Communism, it is necessary to realize that the attitude of the Arab States toward Communism is not based on an understanding of the ideological conflict involved, but on considerations which are more or less those of expediency. Arab public opinion is formed by the Arab leaders and these leaders would be the ones who would have the most to lose in the event that their countries should fall under Communist domination. Certain Arab statesmen have made statements to the effect that an alliance with Russia is possibly a lesser evil than indirect control by Zionist dominated US policies. These statements must be viewed in the light of current Arab bitterness towards the US. However, constant repetition of such statements may result in a form of psychological persuasion that some kind of a deal with Russia is preferable, especially if the belief spreads that there can be no fundamental change in what is considered our inimical policies toward the Arab world. Despite the fact that Arab orientation to the West, in terms of a shift toward Russia has not fundamentally altered, cool area reaction to the Korean situation stands as a warning signal. It is also important to bear in mind, as of political importance, that the Arabs have a traditional admiration for strength and that consequently they will constantly compare East vs. West strength for the purpose of determining the course of action most advantageous to them. In the case of Israel the situation is somewhat different. After many years of struggle the Zionist movement succeeded in founding a state in the Near East. Present evidence points to a fairly stable political scene, though unlimited immigration and limited resources present danger signals for the future. Largely because of the existence of large Jewish groups in both Eastern and Western blocs and its economic and military dependence on the sources within both blocs Israel at first followed an official policy of neutrality between the East and West in the cold war. Subsequent to the invasion of Korea this policy has been modified to the extent that Israel can react against aggression and cooperate with the UN in its attempts to block aggression. Israeli relations with the US are close and are based upon the strong political, economic and financial support which was given by the US in the creation and development of that State. It is becoming increasingly evident that Israel’s sentiments are in the final analysis with the West. While the Communist party in Israel is of insignificant proportions, its affiliation with Left-Wing groups of some strength actively sympathizing with Russia provides the Eastern bloc with the support of 18% of the population. However, notwithstanding certain Communist-inspired disorders the present Government appears to hold the confidence of the country and appears capable of controlling the situation. Military The Armed Forces of the Near East, although totalling over 200,000 men, are generally weak and are not in a position to do more than police duty for internal security and offer token resistance to invasion by modern army. Some of them could serve as effective auxiliaries to Western armed forces in the defense of their territories, in particular the forces of the small but well trained and equipped army of Israel, the Jordan Arab Legion and the reorganized Egyptian army. However, the armed forces of the Arab States and Israel could not operate under local combined command, nor could the Israeli Army operate in the Arab States. At the present time the US maintains an air base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which is equipped to handle long-range bombers. US naval units are present in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The UK maintains in Egypt’s Canal Zone the following forces: 20,700 UK troops, 8,700 Colonial troops, 5 fighter squadrons, 1 photo-reconnaissance squadron, and 5 transport squadrons. Airfields are capable of handling long-range bombers. The UK also maintains small forces at Akaba, Jordan as well as insignificant units of the RAF in Amman and Mafrak, Jordan. In Iraq air bases at Habbianiyah and Shaibah are maintained with small forces. Other British bases exist in the Mediterranean area and British naval units are also present. Discussion 1. Soviet invasion and occupation, of the Near East. ( a ) Attitudes and Reactions—Assuming that Western Forces would not be able to move in force and hold positions in the Near East for any length of time, it is believed that the Arab States and Israel would be unable or unwilling to resist and would be obliged to submit to the USSR. Most of the Government leaders and some members of the upper classes would attempt to flee their countries and form governments in exile. Some may take to the desert and throughout the area, and especially on its fringes some more or less temporary islands of resistance may be established. The people could be expected to adopt a passive attitude toward occupation. With ruthless measures the occupation authorities, are likely to wipe out the power of present vested interests of sectarian and clan loyalties which might threaten to remain or become elements of resistance. In as much as these are regarded by many people in the area as selfish interests and divisive forces, such measures could be described as progress by the new regime which could ultimately secure wide cooperation, especially if it initiates land reform, other basic improvements, and makes an effort to appease religious antipathies. Even if the levelling off of the present economic inequality meant Russian exploitation and generally poorer standards of living, the appeal it would hold for the masses might constitute an obstacle to Western liberation of the area after a prolonged Soviet occupation. This would be particularly true if the West had to offer little more than the return of the present regimes. This might apply to Israel too if the Russians destroyed active pro-Western and recalcitrant elements. ( b ) Courses of action—There are a considerable number of individuals and organized groups in the Arab States and Israel, including military personnel who would remain adamantly opposed to Communism and sympathetic to the Western cause. We should inquire what plans the British have made for the formation of groups for desert-raiding, sabotage and general harassment purposes. Covert canvassing of key personnel, terrain, and other studies should be made while we have free access to the area. It is believed that in the event of war such groups could be contacted even under Soviet occupation and formed in all countries. Consideration could be given at a later stage to the organization of an area uprising, depending upon the success of the smaller groups and on the general reaction of local populations to continued Soviet occupation. Consideration should also be given to the formation of governments in exile, but great care should be taken to support only those groups which might still have the confidence of the people. Even if most of the Near East were invaded special efforts should be made to retain strongholds on the fringes especially in areas which occupation forces could not effectively control such as the vast Arabian peninsula. 2. Limited Soviet attacks on certain key points in the Near East . ( a ) Attitudes and Reactions—In the event the USSR should attack limited objectives, (e.g. air and/or sea operations against the Dhahran Airbase, Aden, Suez Canal, the oilfields, etc.) the final attitude of the Arab States and Israel would depend on the success which Allied Forces had in repelling these attacks. In the early stages the assistance of local armed forces could be expected. To the extent Allied action was not successful, considerable instability throughout the area could be expected and there would be agitation for pro-Russian alignment. Left-Wing groups, Communists, and some Kurds could be expected to increase their activities and call on the people to abandon the Allies. Pro-Western leaders would be discredited. To stave off Russian aggression the governments would try to assert their neutrality or, if the Soviet attacks looked like a prelude of invasion, to make deals with the USSR. Soviet aggression in the Near East or in its immediate vicinity which would look like a prelude to a full-scale invasion and which would not be countered by effective military action by the West would demoralize the local governments and people and would convince them that the West is unable or unwilling to protect the area. Regardless of their feelings toward East and West, Israel and the Arab States would feel helpless and seek means of survival. In any state which could not count on effective Western protection, some leaders would be found to work either for a neutral position or to make a deal with the USSR. In the eventuality of Soviet occupation, internal resistance forces are likely to be insignificant in hampering Soviet operations fronting on the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The ruthless organization by the Soviet of the resources of the area is likely to make Allied reoccupation an extremely costly undertaking. ( b ) Course of action—Immediate military action by the British would be required. In addition to strategic considerations this would prevent a complete demoralization of pro-Western elements who otherwise would conclude that the West is unwilling or unable to defend the area. The U.S. should of course support UN action taken against Soviet aggression. 3. Soviet supported minority uprisings. ( a ) Attitudes and Reactions—Although the USSR has fostered grievances among most minorities, the Kurds represent the only compact group which are in a position to stage an uprising. But the solidarity of the Kurdish tribes is not great and many of their influential leaders are in and allied to the central governments and their armies. Furthermore, there is little evidence that either the weak Kurdish nationalist movement or tribal leaders capable of rising against the government have a definite pro-Soviet orientation. However, Mulla Mustafa, leader of the 1945 Kurdish revolt in Iraq is harbored by the USSR in the Caucasus and is reportedly being groomed to stage a comeback. The Iraqi and Syrian armed forces are in a position to deal with a local Kurdish uprising even if this were sponsored and supported by Russia with only limited quantities of small arms. In such a case the role of the Iraqi air force, especially if supported by units loaned by the RAF, would be decisive. Israel could be expected to view such uprisings with alarm but would probably adopt a “watch and wait” policy unless its security was directly affected. Certain of the extremist groups might take advantage of the situation to further their own ends vis-à-vis the Arab States. However, the Armed Forces of Iraq and Syria would be incapable of dealing with a major attack by Russian irregulars operating under the guise of a popular Kurdish uprising. In such a, case only effective Western military intervention could stop the Soviet incursion which otherwise under one guise or the other might extend to other areas of the Near East. ( b ) Course of action—Immediate and effective Western military assistance to Iraq and Syria would be required in the form of UE forces and US military equipment. 4. Soviet-inspired aggression in other parts of the world similar to Korea. ( a ) Attitudes and Reactions—It is believed that in the event of remote incidents—Formosa or possibly French Indo-China—the Arab States and Israel would adopt attitudes similar to those that were adopted in connection with the Korea situation. In the event of closer incidents—Iran, Turkey—the reaction would be immediate and would be accompanied by demands for UN–US action and for immediate arms assistance. In the case of an invasion of Iran the governments of Iraq and Syria could easily fall and might be replaced with governments desirous of making the best peace possible with the Soviet force. ( b ) Courses of action—It is essential that the United States continue to build up the UN to deal with aggression and emphasize the stake which all the states of the world have in prompt and effective action to suppress aggression. Prompt UN armed assistance should be given to the area against which the aggression took place. 5. USSR–US hostilities not immediately involving the Near East . ( a ) Attitudes and Reactions—If such conflict was sufficiently far removed from the Near East area in order that the Arab States and Israel could adopt a “watch and wait” attitude, it is doubtful that full public support to the West would be given, although Government leaders would probably express their identification with the West. ( b ) Courses of action—Increased programs for economic and arms assistance would be required. At the same time the information and psychological warfare program should be accelerated. Conclusions 1. Soviet invasion and occupation of the Near East. —Israeli and Arab Armed Forces would be incapable of defending their countries even with the aid of Western Forces presently in the area. The Governments and some members of the upper classes would flee and attempt to form governments in exile. The people would seek survival by a passive attitude, but with the probability that passivity would change to cooperation, especially if the Soviet occupation involved land reform and other basic improvements. Some opposition under occupation might, however, be expected to occur. 2. Limited Soviet attacks on certain key points mtheNear East .—If Allied action were immediately effective in countering these limited attacks the support of Israel and the Arab States could be expected. If Allied action was not immediately effective considerable instability could be expected throughout the Near East and agitation for pro-Soviet alignment would increase. Some Governments might fall and there might be a tendency to establish opportunistic governments who would make a deal with the USSR or at least be neutral. 3. Soviet supported minority uprisings .—The Armed Forces of Iraq arid Syria, where minority uprisings are most likely, are in a position to deal with a Soviet inspired but local uprising by the Kurds who, in any event, are neither organized nor generally pro-Soviet. However, the Armed Forces of Iraq and Syria would be incapable of dealing with a major attack by Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians from the Soviet Union and other Russian irregulars operating under the guise of a popular Kurdish uprising of the Near Eastern minorities and traveling via Iran. If, as in Korea, as in Korea, UN action and effective Western military assistance is brought to bear in such a case, the Arab States would solidly support the West. However, if Western assistance were not forthcoming or were not effective it is believed that Iraq and Syria would have no choice but to accept the resulting state of affairs. Furthermore, with the establishment of such a stronghold in the Near East it is likely that the USSR would make every effort to gain control of the rest of the area. Israel could be expected to view such uprisings with alarm but would probably adopt a “watch and wait” policy unless its security was directly affected. 4. Soviet-inspired aggression in other parts of the world, similar to Korea .—It is believed that the Arab States and Israel would in the case of remote events such as in Formosa or French Indo-China adopt the same attitude as they have with respect to Korea, though with increasing concern over the spreading theater of war and their probable involvement therein. In the case of closer events such as in Iran or Turkey the reaction would be immediate and would be accompanied by demands for Western military action and for immediate military assistance. If the Soviet advance were not effectively checked and if reparations for area defense were not immediately forthcoming the leaders would lose faith in the willingness or ability of the West to oppose Soviet invasion and would seek ways to ingratiate themselves with the USSR. 5. USSR–US hostilities not immediately involving the Near East .—The Arab States and Israel would probably await developments and not declare themselves for either side in the event of USSR–US hostilities not immediately involving the Near East. While privately Government leaders might be disposed toward the West, they would take no formal action until allied strategy for the area and the role of the Near East were determined. Proposals Courses of action discussed in the above section relate to situations involving hostilities and are, therefore, essentially military in character. It is recognized that at the present time US military commitments in other areas of the world as well as the political situation in the Near East preclude any major effort at this juncture to establish or increase Western military potential in the Near Eastern area. Consequently the principal effort must necessarily be of a diplomatic character, designed to achieve and stabilize pro-Western orientation, and to obtain certain limited objectives of a military character. The principal concern in the Near Eastern States is whether the US and the Western Allies intend to defend that area against Soviet aggression. These States are conscious that Western strategy is focused on Europe and the Far East, and it appears to them that little attention, from the military point of view, has been paid to the Near East area. Doubts are, therefore, inspired that these States are to be left to their own fate, and since such doubts could generate a serious attitude of despair and defeatism, major efforts must be made to counteract them. The following suggestions are not all inclusive but are indications of what can and should be done to maintain friendship and support of the area as well as to obtain military requirements: 1. At the present time authorization exists only for the extension of cash reimbursable military aid to the Near Eastern area. Since it is conceivable that it might be necessary and desirable at some point to give military aid on a grant basis, consideration should be given to seeking authorization for grant aid. At the same time consideration should be given to providing cash reimbursable aid to the Arab States and Israel. 2. The US should provide material assistance on a grant basis to contribute to the development of area stability along economic, social and political lines, contingent upon the willingness of these countries to apply the maximum of self-help. 3. The US and the UK should collaborate closely in all matters relating to the Near East, particularly the development of area armies. Agreement should be reached on appropriate strengths and on the division of responsibility between the US and the UK for providing necessary assistance. Consideration should be given to sending US military missions and to increasing the rate of training of Near Eastern officers in US service schools. 4. The US and the UK should develop plans for establishing bases in such areas of the Near East as might remain available even though portions of the Near East were under occupation. 5. We should enquire of the British what their plans are for covert canvassing of key personnel, terrain and other studies while we have free access to the area in order that at the appropriate time groups for desert raiding, sabotage and general harassment could be formed. It is believed that in the event of war such groups could be contacted even under Soviet occupation and formed in all countries. 6. The USIE program of psychological warfare should be accelerated so as to stimulate greater understanding in the Near East of the oppressive intention of international communism and to counteract Soviet propaganda. 7. With respect to the UN we should keep in close touch with the Near Eastern States on our plans to strengthen UN against aggression. We must make these States feel that we genuinely want their views and that they have a stake in the success of the UN in combating aggression. 1 A typed notation on the source text reads: “Third Draft, 10/24/50” and a pencilled notation reads: “Given to UK Oct 24”. The origins and purposes of this paper are discussed in footnote 1, p. 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Regional Planning Adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Howard) 780.00/10–2450 [Document 94] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Regional Planning Adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( Howard ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] October 24, 1950. Subject: The Middle East and Iran Participants: British Embassy Department of State Mr. B. A. B. Burrows, Counselor Mr. George C. McGhee, NEA Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE Mr. William Rountree, GTI 2 Mr. C. V. Ferguson, GTI Mr. Lewis Jones, S/P Mr. Charles W. Yost, S/P Mr. John B. Howard, NEA The meeting was held at the request of Mr. Burrows who had expressed an interest in having an exchange of views in advance of the U.S.–U.K. political-military discussions commencing October 26. Mr. McGhee said that we welcomed the opportunity to have an advance exchange of views. He handed to Mr. Burrows copies of papers prepared in NEA, as a result of the earlier U.S.–U.K. discussions, on the subjects of Iran and the attitudes of the Arab States and Israel. Mr. McGhee said that although these papers did not represent final Department papers, Mr. Jessup and he thought they would be helpful to the British in connection with the forthcoming discussions. Mr. McGhee then proceeded to give Mr. Burrows our comments on the British papers on Persia and the Middle East along the lines set forth in the memoranda of October 19 from Mr. McGhee to Mr. Jessup on these subjects, 3 a procedure which Mr. Jessup had earlier approved. The highlights of the ensuing discussion were as follows. British paper on Middle East Policy and Strategy. It was noted that the U.K. and U.S. assessed differently the strategic importance of the Middle East and that the U.S. was not planning any military sacrifices to retain the countries of the Middle East within the Western orbit whereas the U.K. was proposing the additional military sacrifice of sending a brigade of British forces into Iran which they felt would make a significant contribution to the achievement of Western cold war objectives in the Middle East. It was noted that the military essentiality of Israel and the Arab States would depend upon the strategic concept adopted in planning for a global war. Mr. Burrows indicated that under present conditions the U.S. would be better able than the U.K. to gain access to military facilities in Israel, in particular the strategic port of Haifa. Mr. McGhee indicated that the primary U.S. objective should be to support the U.K. in its command responsibility in the Middle East and that if Israel could feel assured that the U.S. would supply its minimum needs in time of war this might make Israel more amenable to cooperating with the U.K. Mr. Burrows restated the British position that the U.K. regards it as essential to maintain a base in Egypt, but no solution has yet been found which would meet the objectives of both the U.K. and Egypt. The British forces in Egypt had an important role both in the cold war and in the event of global war. The British base in Egypt was needed in order to move a brigade forward into Iran as proposed in the British paper. The Egyptian base would also be essential in the event of a localized Korean type of conflict in the Middle East. The British did not believe that the Egyptians would be able to defend the Cairo–Suez area without British forces nor were the British trying deliberately to keep Egypt’s military potential down in order to ensure that Egypt would continue to be unable to defend itself. Mr. McGhee said that under the Point IV program approximately one and one-half million dollars was allocated for the Arab States and one-half million dollars for Iran. The proposed program of grant aid to selected countries in the Middle East was still under consideration. The countries most in need of aid under this program were, Mr. McGhee believed, Iran and Syria and to a lesser extent Lebanon. Iraq and Saudi Arabia had considerable revenue from oil and Jordan was presently being helped under PRA. Mr. Burrows said that one of the U.K. objects in the current discussions, with the U.S. was to try to persuade the U.S. to give the Middle East a higher priority, particularly in the cold war stage. Apart from its oil resources and strictly military potentiality, the Middle East as a bridge to Asia had assumed even greater importance in the eyes of the British. If the Middle East should be lost before the outbreak of a general war the probability of losing Asia would be considerably increased. Only Western Europe and the Americas would remain. For these reasons the British felt that it was a good calculated risk to use in the Middle East during the cold war stage military resources and other resources which on purely military estimates of the importance of the Middle East would be concentrated in other areas. Thus U.K. plans to send a brigade into Iran went beyond former British plans for allocation of its military resources to the Middle East. The U.K. had interesting promises of Commonwealth help. To complete the picture the U.K. wanted the U.S. to come into a Korea like situation in the Middle East quickly. For this purpose the U.S. would need forces stationed in the area. In this way a strong area reaction could be assured against a possible Korea type situation which would help to prevent such a situation from arising and help to prevent the outbreak of global war and the loss to the West of the Middle East. Mr. McGhee pointed out that U.S. planning had concentrated more heavily upon the strengthening of Turkey. In response to his inquiry whether Commonwealth forces could be made available in time, Mr. Burrows replied that it was hoped that the three months required for South African forces could be shortened and that should the Kashmir dispute be settled the Pakistanis could probably be counted on for substantial help. Mr. McGhee said that it was his understanding that the possibility of sending U.S. forces to the Middle East was remote. Mr. Burrows commented on the tremendous psychological benefits which U.S. forces would bring about in the Middle East as well as the importance of their presence there in time of war. Mr. McGhee replied that we had not thought the situation unstable enough to require the presence of U.S. forces. Mr. Burrows said that we should not be guided by the present situation alone and should consider the type of situation which might arise when the Soviets really put the heat on the area. Mr. McGhee said that we would, of course, take another look at the situation if the possibility of a shooting war increased, that we want to keep our plans for the area under constant review, but that for the time being limitations on our equipment and armed forces were the determining factor. Mr. Burrows said that there was a “trend of opinion” that it may be essential in the event of a general war to have Middle East oil and that if this were the case it would of course profoundly affect military plans for the defense of the area. Defense of the Outer Ring would then become essential. Mr. McGhee observed that it was his understanding that the present plans to do without Middle East oil were based not so much on an estimate of oil requirements as on the fact that whichever side might hold the area the oil fields would be neutralized through air bombardment. [Here follows discussion of the British Paper on Persia.] 1 Copies to Jessup and Nolting. 2 Director, Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. 3 See Memorandum from McGhee to Jessup, October 19, entitled “British Review of Middle East Policy and Strategy” and footnote 1 thereto, p. 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] . United States Minutes of United States–United Kingdom Political Military Conversations, Held at Washington, October 26, 1950 PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: NEA Iran 1 [Document 95] United States Minutes of United States–United Kingdom Political Military Conversations, Held at Washington, October 26, 1950 2 Washington, October 26, 1950 [Extract] 3 top secret Participants United States United Kingdom General Bradley Ambassador Franks Ambassador Jessup Marshal of the Royal Air Force, The Lord Tedder General Vandenberg General Collins Field Marshal Slim Admiral Sherman Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Slessor Admiral Lalor Colonel Ladue Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser Mr. Yost Air Marshal Elliot Captain Coleridge, RN Brigadier Price, BA Mr. Burrows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Bases in Egypt While considerable doubt was expressed by both U.S. and U.K. representatives as to whether U.S. participation in a U.S.–U.K.–Egyptian tripartite arrangement for bases in Egypt, including one U.S. base, would change the attitude of the Egyptian Government toward the base question, it was agreed that there is a possibility that this might be the case and that this possibility should be thoroughly explored. Ambassador Jessup suggested that the matter be examined jointly by the U.S. and U.K. and Ambassador Franks expressed agreement. General Collins raised the question as to whether there would be advantage to making U.S. equipment available to the Egyptians. He emphasized that we had no desire to dissipate valuable equipment in this way but that, since the Egyptians appeared to feel that the British are preventing them from buying arms wherever they wish, a demonstration that this is not the case might be useful. Marshal Slessor suggested that it would be preferable that such a suggestion come to the Egyptians from the U.K. rather than from the U.S. Ambassador Jessup suggested that there might be joint U.S.–U.K. consideration of an Egyptian arms request and General Collins added that any tripartite arrangement might deal with arms as well as with bases. Field Marshal Slim pointed out that the U.K. had told the Egyptians that it can provide arms only for those nations who stand with us and that it is important that the Egyptians receive arms only in so far as they cooperate with us. It was agreed that this subject also would be given further joint study. 3. Cyprus Ambassador Jessup declared that the U.S. has informed the Greek Government, and will continue so to inform them, that the present world crisis is not a proper time in which to raise the question of the status of Cyprus. 4 Ambassador Franks said that the U.K. would appreciate it if the U.S. continues to take this line. Air Marshal Slessor urged that both the U.K. and the U.S. point out to the Greeks that Cyprus will be of great importance for operations in the next war, since the Greeks are inclined for their own purposes to play down its military importance. 4. Middle East and Iran General Bradley pointed out that there are some political aspects of the question discussed by the U.S. and U.K. Chiefs on October 23 in regard to a communist revolt in Iran or a tribal incursion over the frontier. 5 What U.S. action would be in these circumstances would depend on the situation at the time, on the attitude of the U.N., etc. He raised a question as to whether it would be more useful for the U.S. to send a carrier to the Persian Gulf in such a time of crisis, as had been suggested, or rather to send carriers on periodic visits during normal times to indicate our continuing interest. Ambassador Franks declared that any situation calling for U.N action was one thing but that in a case failing short of obvious U.N. concern the U.K. felt that the dispatch of a small U.K. force to southern Iran would have a steadying and not a provocative influence. The U.K. felt that the dispatch of a brigade to Basra in 1946 had perhaps had as much to do with Soviet withdrawal from Azerbaijan as had the U.N. action. He felt that a small U.S. contribution to a force of this kind would be useful as a demonstration. Ambassador Jessup indicated that the U.S. agreed that the dispatch of a U.K. force to Iran would have a steadying influence in certain cases such as the re-entry of Soviet forces into Azerbaijan, or a communist seizure of power in Tehran, or such widespread disorders that such a seizure seemed imminent. He questioned, however, whether it would be desirable to dispatch such a force into Iran in case of an ostensibly local uprising in Azerbaijan without intervention of Soviet forces. This might merely give the Soviets an excuse for sending in such forces under the 1921 treaty. In a case of this kind, the U.S. would feel that the dispatch of British forces to a nearby area such as Iraq would be preferable. Admiral Sherman pointed out that this would have the additional advantage of facilitating a later withdrawal of these forces without loss of face if that should prove desirable. It was agreed that there should be further consultation between the U.S. and U.K. in regard to appropriate action in case of a tribal uprising in Azerbaijan without Soviet overt intervention. General Vandenberg suggested that the difference in point of view on this point might reflect the difference in the U.S. and U.K. estimates of the readiness of the Soviets to risk general war in the near future. Air Marshal Slessor pointed out that it is characteristic both of the Soviets and of the Russians under any regime to conduct probing operations outside their borders but to pull back if confronted by force. General Vandenberg agreed but wondered how many times the Soviets would feel they could “bump their noses” in this way without irreparable loss of face. Ambassador Jessup referred to the steps which the U.S. Government is taking to strengthen the position of the Iranian Government in the cold war and pointed out the important contribution which a favorable AIOC settlement 6 could make to this end. Ambassador Franks replied that he could not comment on this point but that he took note of it. Ambassador Jessup raised the question as to the exact meaning which should be attached to the word “vital” as applied to the Middle East, pointing out that we used this word freely in planning but that in practice we seemed to question whether a large part of the area at least can be held. Ambassador Franks replied that it is the U.K. view that whoever controls the Middle East controls the access to three continents. Whether or not this area is held will determine whether or not we have a “big free world” or a “little free world”. From the political point of view the U.K. attaches the greatest importance to the joint strategic study on the spot which the U.S. and U.K. Chiefs have agreed is to go forward. General Collins emphasized that the U.S. Chiefs consider that the Middle East is a British responsibility in case of a hot war, at least during the first two years of such a war, and that our activity and interest in the area during the cold war period should not give rise to any misunderstanding on this subject. He felt that in case of hot war even our tactical naval air would be required in Italy, where we would endeavor at least to hold the Piave line. Our Military Mission would, however, stay in Iran in case of general war and we are hopeful that, if time is available, an effective Iranian force may he brought into being. Admiral Sherman added a footnote to the effect that, if the Russians were not attempting to break into Italy, we might be able to provide some tactical naval air assistance against them in the Aegean or Middle East. Ambassador Franks replied that the U.K. is quite clear on the distinction between U.S. aid in the cold and in the hot war periods. It continues to hope, however, that circumstances will enable the U.S. to change its mind in regard to its contribution to this area in a general war. There was considerable discussion of the question of the demolition of oil wells and refineries in the Middle East, particularly in Iran. The U.K. representatives were unable to state exactly what is the status of planning for such demolition but they did state that it is planned that such demolition will take place if it appears that the areas are to be overrun and that the demolition will be carried out not by the military, but by civilian experts from the oil companies. General Bradley reported his understanding that the wells will be plugged with cement but that the refineries will not be destroyed before evacuation. The Air representatives expressed full confidence that the refineries could be easily destroyed by bombing operations. Grave doubt was expressed as to whether the Russians could in fact, because of the very unsatisfactory communications, get much oil back to the Soviet Union. If the refineries were destroyed, they could not even supply their own forces in the Middle East from these fields. Both U.S. and U.K. representatives laid emphasis on the harmful effect on morale in Iran’ and other Middle Eastern countries which would result if it became known, as it very likely would, that we are making detailed plans for demolishing the oil facilities The discussion resulted in the conclusion that there as serious doubt whether, in light of the unlikelihood that the oil can be useful to the Russian and of the serious effect on our cold war position which could follow knowledge that we are planning to demolish, we should in fact proceed, with our plans for demolition. It was agreed that there should be further joint study on this problem. Ambassador Franks raised the question as to whether there should not be further study on the importance to us of Middle Eastern oil in case of general war. The results of such a study would have an obvious effect on our strategic planning in the Middle East. It was suggested that the appropriate technical authorities should give further study to this question. General Vandenberg reported that there are such wide differences of opinion among the oil experts in the oil companies that he doubted that any firm conclusion could be reached. It appeared to him, however, that Middle Eastern oil would be needed at least after the first two years of war. 5. Satellite Attack on Greece or Turkey Referring to the discussion of this subject in the July U.S.–U.K. meetings, 7 General Bradley said that it had been the U.S. military opinion that the Bulgarians are not in a position to conduct a successful offensive against Greece. Ambassador Jessup pointed out that, regardless of Bulgarian capabilities, they might be launched against the Greeks for reasons of over-all Russian strategy. Should this occur we are not at all clear as to who does what. While the U.N. would presumably recommend help for the Greeks, who would take the initiative in supplying that help? The British military representatives agree that since British forces are nearest to Greece they would have to act under such circumstances. The Korean situation would be reversed in that the U.K. would have to put in troops and the U.S. would help with ships. The question was raised of Turkish assistance to the Greeks in case the Greeks alone were attacked and the view was expressed that the Turks would not in these circumstances be likely to act. As to Bulgarian capabilities, it was pointed out that, while the Bulgarians could probably not defeat the Greek Army, they could without difficulty occupy Eastern Thrace and move down to the Aegean. The question was raised as to whether U.S. and U.K. Military representatives in Greece should, like those in Turkey and Iran, be instructed to make a fact-finding review of the strategic position there. It was decided that Greek problems should be more carefully thought through in Washington and London before our missions on the spot were asked to make a re-examination. After the fact-finding on Turkey and Iran has been completed it would be easier to judge how Greece fits in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The meeting adjourned with expressions on the part of both the U.S. and U.K. representatives of the usefulness of the conversations. 1 Lot 64 D 563 is the master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence for the years 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. 2 There is no indication on the source text as to whether these were agreed minutes. They were prepared by Charles Yost. 3 This document is printed in full in vol. iii , p. 1689 . The omitted portions, deal with a French proposal of October 24 on European defense and German participation, with Berlin, and with various Far Eastern matters. 4 For documentation on United States relations with Greece, see pp. 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 130 ] ff. 5 See Item 6 of the approved summary of conclusions and agreements reached at the U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Staff meeting on October 23, printed in vol. iii , p. 1688 . 6 For documentation on the outstanding issues between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Government of Iran, see pp. 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] ff. 7 See extract of memorandum by Jessup to Secretary Acheson, July 25, and “Agreed United States–United Kingdom Memorandum of Discussions on the Present World Situation”, July 25, pp. 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] and 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 85 ] . Memorandum by Mr. Charles W. Yost of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) 780.00/11–1450: Memorandum [Document 96] Memorandum by Mr. Charles W. Yost of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) top secret Washington , November 14, 1950. Subject: Follow-up on U.S.–U.K. Conversations of October 26. I received a phone call this morning from Colonel Ladue, who acted as military secretary of the joint U.S.–U.K. politico-military conversations which were held in Washington on October 26. He said that he was following up on action being taken pursuant to the agreements reached at that meeting and that he wished to be certain that the Departments of State and Defense had a common understanding as to the action responsibilities assigned to State. He said that it is his understanding that the following three matters were assigned to State for action: 1. Consultation with the British in regard to the desirability of including the U.S. with the U.K. in any arrangements which might be made for base rights in Egypt; 2. Approach to the Greek Government, as occasion arises, to endeavor to dissuade it from agitating the question of Cyprus at this time; and 3. Consultation with the British in regard to the desirability of moving British troops into southern Iran in the event of an internal uprising limited to Azerbaijan alone. Colonel Ladue said that he also presumed that we were continuing to press the British to conclude a favorable AIOC agreement with Iran, though it had not been definitely decided at the October meeting that we should pursue this matter further. I told Colonel Ladue that the three numbered topics listed above are those on which it had been Mr. Jessup’s and my understanding that the Department of State had action responsibility, I said that it was my belief that action is going forward on these matters but that I would in any case once more advise the appropriate Bureau of the Department that the Defense Department is expecting State to take the initiative on these matters. C. Policy statements and proposals regarding the Near East and South Asia C. Policy statements and proposals regarding the Near East and South Asia [97] Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs [Washington, March 6,?] 1950. 780.5/4–1150 [98] Memorandum by Mr. Alton W. Hemba of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) [Washington,] April 10, 1950. [99] Policy Statement Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs [Washington,] October 9, 1950. 780.00/10–1750 [100] Paper Prepared in the Office of Greek, Turkish mid Iranian Affairs Washington, December 28, 1950. 780.00/10–1750 [101] Policy Statement Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] December 28, 1950. 780.00/10–1750 Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs 780.5/4–1150 [Document 97] Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs 1 confidential [ Washington , March 6,?] 1950. Inventory of Problems, Programs and Questions in the NEA Area Affecting National Security a. conditions favorably affecting our national security 1. The basically favorable attitudes and dispositions of most of the governments and peoples of the NEA area toward the United States as evidenced: ( a ) By the friendly reception accorded American nationals and diplomatic representatives, ( b ) By numerous and repeated requests of many of these governments for a closer and more binding relationship with the U.S. either in the form of a regional pact or bilateral arrangements with us alone, ( c ) By the granting of military air rights to us in such countries as Greece, Turkey, French Morocco, India, and Pakistan and air base rights in Saudi Arabia and Libya, and ( d ) By the overwhelming majority of the NEA countries voting with us in the UN General Assembly on almost all issues, including the resolution on the Essentials of Peace, on the continuation of UNSCOB and on the disposition of the Italian Colonies. 2. The natural economic pattern of the flow of international trade, communications, shipping, investments being such as to suggest a continuing trend of strengthening ties, between the countries of the area and the U.S., the Commonwealth and other friends. One of many examples is the oil concession extended by Saudi Arabia to American interests and the repeatedly expressed desire of that country to have its resources developed only by American capital. 3. The orientation of Greece, Turkey and Iran toward the western democracies, preventing the extension of Soviet control to the Near East, barring Soviet access to the Mediterranean, and largely protecting India and Pakistan from direct Soviet penetration. 4. The potential value of the NEA area, particularly those countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union as possible bases or routes for counterattacks against the Soviet Union in the event of hostilities. 5. Coordination of our common strategic interests in the area with the British deriving therefrom the benefits of their long established Cultural, economic, strategic and political ties with the several countries in the NEA area. 6. The inclusion in the Commonwealth of India, Pakistan and Ceylon and the recently demonstrated willingness of the Commonwealth to accept responsibilities in the South Asian 7. The existence in the United Nations of machinery for reaching peaceful settlements for the numerous conflicts arising in the area such as: ( a ) Influencing the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Azerbaijan in Iran; ( b ) The establishment of a truce and conclusion of armistice agreements between Israel and the individual Arab states; 2 and, ( c ) The negotiation of a cease fire agreement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. 3 8. The Soviet’s inept handling of its relations with certain of the NEA countries, particularly at the governmental, diplomatic levels b. problems and conditions unfavorably affecting our national security 1. The basic problem posed by the upsurge of nationalism among the peoples of the area and the withdrawal of the former metropolitan powers from direct control of their former dependencies, resulting in the creation of numerous political and military power vacuums. Many of the independent states of the area are weak and, consequently, attract Soviet attentions in the form of attempted subversions, and, rarely, direct intrusion. 2. The suspicion in many NEA countries, particularly marked in India and Burma, of our objectives in the cold war and of our insistenee on private investment as the principal base of economic development. As capitalism is closely associated with imperialism in the minds of many of the peoples of the area, they are apprehensive that territorial imperialism on the part of the European powers is apt to be replaced by economic imperialism on the part of the United States. 3. A failure on the part of most of the countries in the area to think and act in terms of their own responsibilities, combined with an inclination on their part to look unduly to external sources for solutions to many of their own problems. When unreasonable demands are made for American assistance, difficulties are created in our mutual relations, by our refusal or inability to extend aid sought. 4. A resentment against our apparent discrimination in providing Western Europe with vast amounts of economic and military aid as contrasted with the relative trickle flowing to the NEA area, particularly the Arab states, Iran and the South Asian countries. 5. The conviction of the Arab states that our support of Israel is inimical to their interests. 6. The poverty, lack of industrial and agricultural development and social backwardness in the area, resulting in varying degrees of internal weakness in all the NEA countries and making them susceptible to communist penetration. 7. The existence of numerous situations within the area which might lead to the outbreak of hostilities, such as the possibility of renewal of communistic supported warfare in Greece, the continuing pressures and threats of the Soviet Union against Turkey and Iran, the dispute between Israel and the Arab states over Palestine, the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and other problems, the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the border tribal area, and the internal strife in Burma complicated by the possibility of Chinese communist encroachment. 8. The conflict between our normal political, social and economic policies and those of the metropolitan powers in Africa, both for furthering the aspirations of the African peoples toward economic betterment and the encouragement of democratic institutions directed ultimately toward self-government. 9. A lack of appreciation and knowledge of the factual situation in the NEA countries on the part of the American public complicating the problem of winning public support for constructive programs in the area. 10. The lack of a basis for constructive regional associations in the NEA area. In the case of South Asia, India would be the natural leader for such grouping but its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, distrust by Ceylon, and the differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the tribal border area 4 render difficult for the time being any such association. 11. The difficulty of improving basic economic and social conditions in many countries of the NEA area where the governments and ruling classes are corrupt and inefficient and reluctant to attempt reforms which would affect their own selfish interests. 12. The repugnance with which most of the peoples and governments in the NEA area regard racial discrimination as practiced within the United States. c. programs in effect or planned to improve tede above conditions 1. Political support through normal diplomatic channels and the United Nations to assist the NEA countries in realizing their legitimate objectives. 2. In virtually all of the NEA countries first emphasis being laid on assistance in economic and social development. In Greece and Turkey, ECA is the principal instrument in this field. In Iran, reliance is placed on Iran’s own seven-year plan of development, which is expected to draw on its own resources and those of the International Bank. In Turkey, Israel, Liberia, Ethiopia, Egypt and Afghanistan Ex-Im Bank loans are currently available for developmental projects. In India, two IBRD loans have been approved for railroad and agricultural projects and a third is being considered for a power project. An irrigation and flood control program for Iraq is being considered by the International Bank. 3. USIE programs in the entire NEA area for the wider dissemination of information so that United States policies and actions may be better understood. 4. Mutual Defense Aid Programs for providing military equipment and training in Greece, Turkey and Iran. 5. Scientific and cultural cooperation programs for the provision and exchange of scientists and technicians in the fields of minerals, research, agriculture, labor, irrigation, harbor development and child and women’s welfare. Educational advancement is being provided under the Fulbright programs. 6. Proposed Point Four programs for technological development of backward areas having primary application to the NEA region. 7. The proposed continuation and improvement of the Palestine refugee program to reintegrate some 750,000 Arab refugees into the economic life of the area by providing for employment in irrigation and other works projects. 8. Proposed projects under section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 for Burma, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan including military, economie and informational programs. 9. Proposed request for congressional authority to furnish procurement assistance to Saudi Arabia, Burma, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Liberia to provide, on a cash basis, legitimate requirements of military equipment. 10. A study in respect of possible United States action regarding a large part of the sterling balances of the NEA countries. d. important questions which might be raised or previous answers confirmed 1. What importance is attached to continuing the U.S. military bases in the area such as at Dhahran? Tripoli? 2. What importance is attached to the acquisition of additional U.S. military bases or rights in the NEA area? 3. What are the short and long range definitions of United States strategic interests in the GTI area? Africa? Near East? South Asia? 4. Should the United States associate itself in security arrangements bilaterally or multilaterally with Greece, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia or other countries of the NEA area? 5. Should the United States undertake military staff talks either as participant or observer with Greece, Turkey or Iran? 6. What is our present strategic interest in acquiring stockpiles of strategic materials from the individual NEA countries where such materials are available? 7. What Congressional and public reaction could be expected if Burma were to be lost to the communist bloc? 8. In the event of demonstrated need, should the United States extend economic grant aid to Iran, India, Pakistan, Burma, or other countries of the NEA area in addition to assistance presently contemplated? 9. In the event general authority is not obtained to broaden section 408( e ) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 so that reimbursable aid might be extended to any country whose increased security is in the national interest, should authority be sought to extend reimbursable aid to Israel and the Arab states in addition to that presently contemplated for Saudi Arabia? 10. As regards the balance of power in Asia, is it in the national interest of the United States that India or Japan or both should be built up to positions of ascendancy? 11. As regards many of the countries of the NEA area, what devices are available and how far should we go to penetrate the crust of inertia, incompetence and selfishness at the top in order to bring about changes in the whole national picture which would provide a solid foundation for continuing resistance to communist pressures and penetration? 12. From the standpoint of our security interests, what policies should be adopted toward countries such as India and Israel which are following an official policy of neutrality? 13. What policy should be adopted with reference to the British shipment of arms to the Arab countries, particularly to Egypt, in the light of protests made to the United States Government by Israel and sources in this country? 14. To what extent and by what means can emergent nationalism In the NEA area be made a constructive force against communism? 15. Have we adequately foreseen the consequences of Point Four? In particular, are we preparing for obviously anticipated economic and financial follow through? Additionally, are we prepared for the short range impact, in terms of social unrest, of United States technological programs on the several NEA countries? 1 Presumably the same document referred to in subsection 1 of the memorandum by Alton W. Hemba, April 10, p. 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] . The undated source text was accompanied by a covering letter of transmittal, dated April 11, from David A. Robertson of NEA to certain Diplomatic Offices in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa summarizing the paper and requesting comments on or proposed additions to it. The paper and memorandum were sent to Addis Ababa, Amman, Ankara, Athens, Baghdad, Bangkok, Beirut, Cairo, Colombo, Damascus, Jidda, Karachi, Kabul, Monrovia, New Delhi, Rangoon, Tel Aviv, and Tehran. The Embassy in Saudi Arabia responded at some length in Despatch 281 from Jidda, May 13, and the Embassy in Egypt responded briefly in Despatch 1573 of July 3. Both of these despatches, neither printed, are in Department of State file 780.5. They are the only two responses to the source text found in Department of State files. 2 For documentation on the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab States, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. 3 For documentation on Kashmir, see ibid. , 1947, vol. iii , pp. 179 ff,; ibid. , 1948, vol. v , pp. 265 ff.; ibid. , 1949, vol. vi pp. 1686 ff.; and pp. 1362 ff. 4 For documentation on the Afghanistan–Pakistan dispute over the tribal border regions, see pp. 1446 [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 815 ] ff. Memorandum by Mr. Alton W. Hemba of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: General 1 [Document 98] Memorandum by Mr. Alton W. Hemba of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Berry ) 2 top secret [ Washington ,] April 10, 1950. Subject: Area Policy Papers You will recall that in the Staff Meeting on Thursday, April 6, Mr. McGhee requested that meetings be held to block out area policy papers which are needed and to isolate critical situations which need priority handling. The first meeting has been set for Wednesday, April 12 at 3:30 p. m. in Mr. McGhee’s office. 3 It has been requested that you review the following documents prior to this meeting: 1. Memorandum of March 6, 1950 from NEA to S/P—Mr. Butler, subject “Inventory of Problems, Programs and Questions in the NEA Area Affecting National Security. 4 (Previously distributed by Mr. Robertson) 2. Conference Document No. 13, “United States Policy toward Africa”. 5 (Attached) 3. Area Policy Statement: South Asia. 6 (Attached) 1 Lot 53 D 468 contains copies of memoranda and correspondence of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs George C. McGhee for the years 1949–1951. 2 Also sent to John D. Jernegan, Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, David A. Robertson, Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Arthur Z. Gardiner, Refugee Adviser, Department of State, and William W. Cleland, Intelligence Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. 3 A memorandum prepared by Mary E. Hope of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, dated April 12 and entitled “NEA Meeting To Discuss Preparation of Regional Policy Statements”, notes, inter alia , that at the April 12 meeting it was “agreed that the following territorial units should be given regional treatment in policy statements”: Black Africa, the “general area south of the Sahara”; North Africa excluding Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; Israel and the Arab states, including Egypt and the Sudan: Greece, Turkey, and Iran; and South Asia (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Afghanistan). Thereafter the statements were drafted and revised periodically. They were intended to record policy which was already formulated, as well as to raise policy questions on which a comprehensive position was needed. It is evident from Department of State files that a number of draft policy statements on each of the five regions were prepared during the course of 1950. For documentation, on those dealing with Africa, see pp. 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] ff. Those dealing with South Asia, Greece, Turkey and Iran, and the Near East, printed infra and pp. 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] and 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , are the only drafts of these statements for 1950 to have been found in Department of State files. Additional documentation on the preparation of these statements, including the memorandum prepared by Mrs. Hope on April 12, is contained in Department of State file 780.00/10–1750. 4 Supra. 5 Not printed; it is part of the Official Record of the West and East African Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers held at Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, February 27–March 2, 1950, found in Department of State file 120.4353C/5–450. 6 Not found in Department of State files. Policy Statement Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs 780.00/10–1750 [Document 99] Policy Statement Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs 1 [Extracts] top secret [ Washington ,] October 9, 1950. Regional Policy Statement: South Asia estimate of the situation Stability in South Asia All the South Asian countries have non-Communist governments, and the region enjoys an uneasy stability. The existence of popular political leaders and trained administrators enabled India, Pakistan and Ceylon to establish effective national governments upon their recent attainment of independence. The great majority of the peoples of these three countries and of the older independent nations, Afghanistan and Nepal, acquiesce in the rule of the present governments. The region faces serious threats to stability inherent in mass illiteracy, communalism, poverty, disease and, in large areas of India and East Pakistan, hunger. These threats are the more serious in India and Pakistan in view of the widespread popular expectation that economic and social betterment would follow independence. Moreover, the region’s natural resources are incompletely surveyed and underdeveloped, and it is industrially and technologically retarded. The improvement of these conditions requires large capital expenditures. As the low productivity of the region affords little margin for capital formation even under the most peaceful conditions, and as indigenous savings are traditionally solidified in land or precious metals and jewels, or dissipated in speculative ventures, a significant part of the required capital must be sought from extra-regional sources. In the short term, the communal tensions and the numerous political and economic disputes between India and Pakistan constitute the greatest danger to the stability of South Asia. Progress toward the settlement of these disputes remains discouragingly slow, and the possibility that the two major powers of the region may resort to war cannot be excluded. Other important dangers are the Afghan-Pakistan dispute over the status of the Pathan tribesmen and India’s serious food shortage. Foodgrain production in India falls some ten percent short of subsistence requirements, and the sizeable imports required to narrow the gap impose a severe drain on inadequate foreign exchange resources. Communism does not immediately threaten the governments of South Asia. The USSR is not exerting in this region the direct pressure evident in Iran and Indochina. The Kremlin apparently considers that the economic and social difficulties confronting South Asia are such that it can in time bring the region under its sway through propaganda and subversion directed at labor and the peasantry. It utilizes for these purposes internal Communist elements in all the South Asian countries. However, in Afghanistan and Nepal these elements are a negligible force, due in no small part to the vigilance exercised by the two governments. Ceylon harbors three small Communist parties—two Trotskyite, one orthodox—but their doctrinal and other differences prevent effective opposition to the government. In Pakistan the Communists, aided by the Soviet Embassy in Karachi, have acquired considerable influence in press circles, among the intellectuals and in certain labor unions. Although a small but aggressive Communist Party exists in India, the government has taken vigorous and reasonably effective steps to limit its activities and influence. The prospect for the period 1950 to 1955 is that, barring intraregional warfare or widespread famine in India, the non-Communist elements now governing in South Asia can be expected to retain power. Their position will, however, become increasingly precarious if foreign economic aid is not forthcoming to assist them in containing the region’s inherent threats to stability. The alternatives to the present ruling elements appear to be extremists of the revolutionary left or of the chauvinistic right. International Posture of South Asia Despite the sovereignty of Afghanistan and Nepal, South Asia was for all practical purposes a part of the British Empire until the United Kingdom recognized the independence of India, Pakistan and Ceylon in 1947 and 1948. The region is still closely associated with the British as India, Pakistan and Ceylon remain within the Commonwealth, and the United Kingdom has special treaty relationships with Nepal. The British retain large investments and commercial interests in the region, and the South Asian governments have accepted military, economic and other assistance from the United Kingdom. Sterling balance releases have enabled India and Pakistan to maintain an inflow of essential imports. These two countries and Ceylon have joined the other Commonwealth members, except the Union of South Africa, in the preparation of a Commonwealth program to facilitate economic rehabilitation and development in South and Southeast Asia. The close ties between the region and the United Kingdom have not, however, resulted in the open alignment of South Asia with the Western democracies in opposition to Soviet imperialism. The South Asia countries, particularly India, publicly avow their wish to remain neutral in the cold war and to develop friendly relations with the Soviet bloc as well as the Western democracies. They attempt to avoid giving offense to the USSR, and all except Nepal have recognized the Communist regime in China. The Soviet bloc has vacillated from truculence to flattery in its relations with the South Asian governments. The South Asian position derives from its preoccupation with internal problems and its determination to prevent foreign interference in its affairs. The region suspects the Western European nations and the United States of attempting to maintain an imperialist position in Asia and of discriminating against non-white peoples. Thus, India, which is discreetly eager to head a South and Southeast Asian regional association, regards the natural bases of such an association as anti-colonialism and neutrality in the cold war. There is little immediate prospect that a regional association will develop in South and Southeast Asia. Ceylon and Nepal fear India’s size and potential power, and would be reluctant to enter into regional arrangements which might pave the way for Indian domination of the region. Pakistan is unwilling to accept a position subordinate to India and seeks to counter-balance India’s greater strength by developing close relations with its Moslem neighbors to the West. South Asia’s suspicions of the United States and its predisposition to neutrality notwithstanding, the governments of the region have in practice recognized a closer affinity of interests with the United States than with the Soviet bloc. On crucial issues in the United Nations, the South Asian members—Nepal and Ceylon are not yet members owing to Soviet vetoes—usually find themselves in opposition to the Soviet bloc. In the economic sphere, fears of foreign capital as the supposed instrument of economic imperialism have not prevented the South Asian countries from looking to the United States, sometimes impatiently, for economic aid. They have also sought continuing sources of military matériel in the United States, thus far with meager success. It is significant that India, Pakistan and Ceylon accord transit and landing rights to United States military aircraft. For the period 1950 to 1955, assuming a continuation of the cold war, the international posture of South Asia offers the possibility of bringing about a gradual strengthening of the association between the region and the Western democracies. Should the cold war become hot in that period, the Western democracies would be faced at worst with neutrality in the region as the United States Government has received top secret, informal assurances from high officials of all the South Asian governments that their countries would not be found on the Soviet side in the event of war. Domestic Limitations on United Stales Policy toward South Asia Certain domestic factors limit the nature and effectiveness of United States policies with respect to South Asia. We cannot, first of all, assume by ourselves the responsibility of maintaining or raising the living standards of the region or defending it against aggression. Our resources, great though they may be, are not equal to this burden. In the second place, the existence of racial discrimination in the United States will constitute a constant impediment to our winning the full understanding and confidence of the South Asian peoples. Thirdly, the United States public still has only a limited interest in the region and is only gradually developing some conception of its problems. Such public attitudes as exist are typified by a warm-hearted desire to assist the underprivileged peoples of the region on a humanitarian basis or by impatient demands that South Asia adopt forthwith an aggressive anti-Communist posture. During the period 1950 to 1955 some increased public understanding of South Asian problems may be anticipated. united states objectives The United States national interest requires with respect to South Asia: 1. Development of sound enduring friendly relations between the United States and the various countries of the region. 2. Continuance in power of non-Communist governments in the countries of South Asia and their strengthened ability and determination to maintain peace and resist Communist imperialism in Asia. 3. Increased South Asian participation in and responsibility for the solution of problems arising in Asia. 4. Development of an attitude in South Asia which would assist the United States and its allies to obtain the facilities required in time of peace or in the event of war, and which would prevent the USSR from obtaining military support or assistance from these nations, either directly or through the use of their facilities. 5. Access by the United States and friendly countries to the resources and markets of the region and the creation of conditions which would lead the governments of South Asia to cooperate in denying resources to the Soviet bloc. 6. Voluntary association of the countries of South Asia with the United States and like-minded countries in opposition to Communism. united states policies United States objectives with respect to South Asia can best be pursued by: 1. Pressing for the early settlement of intra-regional disputes; 2. Developing closer consultative relationships with the South Asian governments on world issues, particularly those arising in Asia; 3. Maintaining an impartial position between the several countries of South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, by positive evidences of friendship to all; 4. Providing technical assistance to the South Asian governments in their efforts to develop the human and material resources of the region; 5. Reaching an early decision to extend financial aid to the South Asian countries for projects which have a popular appeal in the region and promise early and obvious results; 6. Cooperating with the South Asian governments in their efforts to maintain internal stability; 7. Supporting non-Communist, pro-democratic elements in the region; 8. Stimulating a fuller understanding in the region of the aggressive objectives of international Communism and the constructive aims of the United States and the other Western democracies; 9. Conducting a vigorous domestic information program to acquaint the American people with the aspirations and problems of the region; 10. Working closely with the United Kingdom in the attainment of our mutual objectives in South Asia; 11. Coordinating United States, United Nations, United Kingdom and Commonwealth programs for assistance to the region; 12. Encouraging cooperation among the countries of the region for constructive purposes, at the same time avoiding any appearance of inspiring the establishment of an Asian regional organization to include the South Asian countries; and 13. Enlisting increased participation of the South Asian countries in international efforts to promote world peace and economic progress. lines of united states action Political 1. Encourage and support UK and Commonwealth initiative to expedite equitable settlements of the Indo-Pakistan disputes over Kashmir and other political issues. 2. Take the initiative in attempts to facilitate a settlement of the Afghan-Pakistan dispute over the status of the Pathan tribes, discouraging as long as possible the submission of this issue to the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly. 3. Should India, Pakistan or Afghanistan continue unresponsive to further efforts to improve Indo-Pakistan and Afghan-Pakistan relations, consider withholding diplomatic support and material assistance as a penalty for intransigence, or offering such support and assistance as an inducement to cooperation. 4. Should the Indo-Pakistan or Afghan-Pakistan disputes lead to serious hostilities in the region, initiate action in the United Nations Security Council calling for an immediate cease-fire and take such unilateral non-military steps in support of the Security Council action as the circumstances indicate. Care should be taken to avoid Security Council action which could be construed as sanctioning unilateral Soviet military intervention. Should any belligerent disregard the cease-fire order, endeavor to mobilize the full weight of United Nations sanctions and pressure against the offending country. 5. Undertake on an informal basis more intimate consultation with South Asian governments on our foreign policies and contemplated actions in the foreign field, and encourage those governments to consult more frankly with us. 6. As part of the foregoing consultations, at appropriate times explore with the South Asian governments possible solutions, where practicable within the UN framework, of such problems as the future of Korea, the future of Formosa, a peace treaty with Japan and arrangements for Japanese security, Chinese representation in the UN and the future of Indochina. 7. Include from time to time in speeches and other public pronouncements of the President and of the Secretary and other ranking officers of the Department friendly expressions of support for the present South Asian governments. In view of the anachronistic oligarchies existing in Nepal and Afghanistan, expressions of support should be directed toward governmental efforts to improve the lot and meet the nascent democratic aspirations of the people rather than toward the Afghan and Nepalese governments as such. 8. Maintain where practicable discreet and friendly contact with non-Communist, pro-democratic elements in South Asia in opposition to or otherwise not associated with the present governments. 9. Maintain close liaison with the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand looking toward the maximum practicable coordination of US, UK and Commonwealth policies and actions directed toward mutual objectives in South Asia. 10. Support the applications of Nepal and Ceylon for membership in the UN. 11. 11. Initiate or support the selection of South Asian governments and their nationals for appropriate important UN organs, agencies and positions. 12. Expand the training program for South Asian language and area specialists. 13. Widen the scope of Foreign Service observation in South Asia by increasing the mobility of personnel at existing posts or by establishing new posts in localities now inadequately covered. Economic 1. Exert our influence in the International Monetary Fund and directly with the parties to bring about a settlement of the Indo-Pakistan exchange rate dispute. 2. Direct technical assistance to the region under the bilateral Point Four program toward ( a ) the specific requests of the South Asian governments, ( b ) the amelioration of regional food problems, and ( c ) the removal of other impediments to economic development. Emphasis should be placed on the training of indigenous personnel rather than the assumption of operational responsibility by experts from the United States. 3. Extend all appropriate assistance to such private United States investors as may show an interest in the region. 4. Conclude treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation with India and Pakistan, and subsequently with other South Asian countries, making such departures from the “standard draft” treaty as may be required by the special circumstances of the region and as do not controvert fundamental principles of United States foreign economic policy. 5. Encourage the South Asian governments to develop tax and other economic regulatory structures which do not inhibit private investment, foreign or domestic. 6. Support reasonable loan applications of the South Asian governments to the International Bank or to the Export-Import Bank. 7. Endeavor as a matter of urgency to obtain Congressional authorization and appropriations for a program of economic grant aid to the countries of the region, particularly to India and Pakistan, directed toward meeting the capital requirements of essential projects to increase, in order of priority, agricultural, mineral and industrial production. 8. Should it become clear that the foregoing program will not materialize before July 1, 1951, seek funds during the 1951 fiscal year to finance the sale of an additional 573,000 long tons of grain sorghum (milo) to India at the concessional price of $1.40 a hundred-weight. 9. Utilize every opportunity to support indigenous efforts to bring about agrarian reform by democratic methods. 10. Maintain close liaison with the Commonwealth organization for technical and developmental assistance to South and Southeast Asia. 2 11. Encourage the development of trade and other economic relations between the region and Japan. 12. Take a more active and constructive part in the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Military 1. Meet as far as possible in the light of other demands of higher priority the requirements of the South Asian countries for military matériel not available from other sources and required to maintain internal stability and to strengthen resistance to Communist imperialism. Unless the Kremlin should adopt a more aggressive posture toward South Asia and the countries of the region should close ranks to meet this threat, materiel should be provided to the South Asian countries only on a reimbursable (non-grant) basis. 2. Provide adequate opportunity for qualified South Asian armed forces personnel to receive specialized training in United States Defense training centers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [Annex] 3 January 10, 1951. Intelligence 1. Keep under continuing review the objectives, activities and strength of the Hindu Mahasabha, its para-military affiliate, the RSSS, and related groups. 2. Keep under continuing review the objectives, activities and popular followings of the leaders of dissident political factions in Pakistan. 3. In following Communist activities in South Asia, give particular attention to developments in rural areas, especially the formation of para-military organizations among the peasants. 4. Undertake, with the assistance of non-official research organizations, comprehensive surveys of: a . The importance and urgency of agrarian reform as a factor contributing to the political stability of South Asia, b . Hindu society to determine the basic values and motivations of Hindu culture, and c . Pakistan society to determine the basic values and motivations of Islamic culture in Pakistan and the resistance of that culture to Communist ideological penetration. Informational-Cultural 1. Focus foreign informational output and cultural activities on those ambitions and hopes of the South Asian people toward which progress might be made in the reasonably near future. As a corollary, avoid parading United States prosperity. 2. Stress parallels of outlook and interest between the United States and South Asia and, conversely, divergences of outlook and interest between South Asia and the Soviet bloc. 3. Stress factual evidence of Soviet imperialism, Kremlin control of the Chinese Communists, and the aggressive intentions of the Peiping regime. 4. While focusing informational output and cultural activities on strategic segments of the South Asian population owing to the impracticability of a program directed at the masses, bear in mind that the ultimate target is the South Asian peasantry. 5. Among the strategic elements of the South Asian population, give special attention to non-Communist labor leaders and labor unions. 6. Step up domestic informal output to the United States public on South Asia, its problems, hopes and policies, and on United States objectives, policies and action with respect to the region. Admmistrative 1. Widen the scope of Foreign Service observation in South Asia by increasing the mobility of personnel at existing posts and by establishing new posts in localities now inadequately covered. 2. Give continued attention to the improvement of housing, health services and other amenities at the South Asian posts. 3. Expand and improve the training program for South Asian language and area specialists. 1 This statement was drafted by Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs. 2 The Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and Southeast Asia published on November 28, 1950, a report known as the Colombo Plan which called for the economic development of the area. Documentation on U.S. interest in the activities of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee, not here printed, is included in Department of State file 890.00. 3 Drafted by E. G. Mathews. Paper Prepared in the Office of Greek, Turkish mid Iranian Affairs 780.00/10–1750 [Document 100] Paper Prepared in the Office of Greek, Turkish mid Iranian Affairs 1 [Extracts] top secret Washington , December 28, 1950. Regional Policy Statement: Greece, Turkey and Iran 1. estimate of the situation A. General The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States. The maintenance of the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece, Turkey and Iran is an essential element in the security of that area. * Greece, Turkey and Iran constitute a barrier between the Soviet world on the one hand and the vital oil lands and strategic communication routes of the Middle East on the other. Consequently, these countries which, with the exception of Turkey, are inherently weak are the object of constant Soviet pressure. Inasmuch as none of the three is capable of resisting this Soviet pressure unaided, the United States has extended to these countries political, economic and military assistance in varying degrees proportionate to their needs and absorptive capacity, and consistent with our commitments elsewhere. The growing military potential of the Balkan Soviet satellites, particularly Bulgaria, constitutes a threat to Greece and a source of concern ta Turkey. Soviet forces in the Caucasus and in Soviet Turkestan possess the capability of military domination of Iran whenever international political factors make such a development feasible from the Russian standpoint. Greece, Turkey and Iran will continue to be threatened by Soviet imperialism until the power of the anti-communist world becomes superior to that of the USSR and its satellites or until the aggressive policies of the USSR are changed. To date American policy has helped to prevent Soviet domination of Greece, Turkey and Iran. Greece and Turkey have adopted a militant anti-Soviet, pro-American policy. The United States, however, is faced with a serious immediate problem of reconciling United States policies, commitments and resources with the desire of Greece and particularly Turkey for full military alliance with the United States or with all of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers. The development of internal economic resources is a primary task; in each of the three countries. Economic development is essential both, in order to improve the abilities of these countries to maintain a military force appropriate to the present lack of international security and to develop a standard of living for the indigenous populations, which will provide greater resistance to communist ideology and subversion. This problem is more critical in Greece and Iran than in, Turkey. Greece cannot maintain its present standard of living or achieve, economic self-sufficiency without continued American economic assist ance, probably at least until 1954. Recent analysis suggests that future economic assistance to Greece should be provided in somewhat smaller annual increments in keeping with the limited capacity of Greece to provide sufficient internal investment capital, public or private, to permit a substantial increase in its productive capacity. The United States has consistently urged the adoption of political, social and administrative measures which would insure effective utilization of United States assistance and serve as a deterrent to communist subversion. These efforts have been only partially successful, and the traditional partisanship of Greek politics and the inefficiency of the Greek Government continue to constitute a grave weakness in the Greek state. The Greek army, strengthened by United States equipment and advice, has restored internal security in Greece. Nevertheless, a continuing threat to the security of Greece derives from the growing military potential of Greece’s Cominform neighbors (particularly Bulgaria), from the presence of approximately 20,000 Greek guerrillas in eastern Europe, and from the activities of the Greek Communist, Party as an agent of Soviet imperialism. Among the principal problems regarding Greece are: a . The development of a stable, democratic and efficient government; b . The development of a viable Greek economy; c . The maintenance of a Greek military establishment which is capable of maintaining internal security, of defending Greece against a satellite attack, of causing maximum delay to an attack involving direct Soviet participation, and, in the event of hostilities, of conducting guerrilla warfare in Greece and contiguous areas; d . The encouragement of more cordial relations with Yugoslavia and the implementation of policies designed to bring about the defection of Albanian and Bulgarian elements from the Cominform; e . In view of the strategic considerations involving Cyprus, agitation for enosis (the union of Cyprus with Greece) must be discouraged. However, continued examination of this question is essential in order to provide a long-range solution mutually satisfactory to all parties in interest. In Turkey the principal problems are: a . To develop Turkish military capabilities in order to insure continued Turkish resistance to Soviet pressure and, in the event of attack, to provide maximum effective military opposition; b . To develop, at the same time, Turkish natural resources to the extent possible without undue inflationary effect. In Iran a serious economic depression exists despite the substantial natural resources of the country. This depression has resulted from the incapacity of Iranian leadership, from crop failures, from a growing budgetary deficit, and from frustration over belated American action on Iranian requests for economic assistance. It is aggravated by external political pressures and intensified communist activity. Among the principal problems concerning Iran are: ( a ) The need for an early settlement of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company agreement, the increased income from which would do much towards stimulating a healthy development of the economy; ( b ) Increased activities of the Tudeh Party and growing support for its communist doctrines; ( c ) The attitude of certain Iranian leaders who seem to think they can successfully indulge in the dangerous game of playing off the Soviet Union against the United States and the United Kingdom. B. US Attitudes Affecting Implementation of Our Objectives (1) Recognition of the vital importance to the US of maintaining the GTI barrier to Soviet expansion. (2) Recognition that the attainment of our objectives in these countries, especially in Greece and Turkey, requires the material support of the US Government. (3) Recognition that our Greek-Turkish aid programs have been highly successful elements of American foreign policy. (4) Strong ties of friendship between a large segment of the American population and the people of Greece, and the absence of important group animosities toward any of the three countries. (5) Little knowledge of Iran or of the problems confronting that country, but general appreciation of the fact that Iran has stood firm against Soviet aggression. 2. statement of area objectives in terms of vital american interests It is in the interest of the United States to achieve the following objectives in Greece, Turkey and Iran: A. Maintenance of the political independence and territorial integrity of each of the three countries and their continued orientation toward the West. B. Achievement by each country of political stability and economic viability with improved social standards. C. Achievement of more friendly and cooperative relationships between the three countries in all fields. D. Assumption by Turkey of more interest in and influence among the Near Eastern countries as a stabilizing force in the area and as a means of strengthening their orientation toward the West. E. Assure access by the Western democracies, and particularly the United States, to the resources of the area and, as circumstances may require, to cooperation of the countries in denying the area’s resources to the Soviet bloc. 3. united states policies In pursuance of the foregoing objectives the following should be United States policies in the area: A. Maintain and strengthen the conviction of the three countries that collaboration with the Western Powers, in particular the United States, carries with it the best assurance that they will be able to maintain their independence, and at the same time will provide material and spiritual benefits in the development of their national life. B. Assist in building a firm foundation for the continuation of anticommunist governments in the three countries, especially through assistance in the improvement of economic, social and demographic conditions. C. Encourage the countries, particularly Iran and Greece, to improve government administration. D. Through military aid and advice, assist the countries in the maintenance of armed forces essential to assure internal security and to build confidence, and, to the extent possible in light of economic, political and other conditions prevailing in each country, to resist foreign invasion. E. Considering the desire of these and other friendly countries to have closer formal security arrangements with the United States, take advantage of every opportunity which tends to lead toward practical realization of this goal, recognizing that this will depend upon American capabilities to defend our vital interests, the extent of our commitments elsewhere, and the defensive strengths of our allies. F. Give the three countries intensive diplomatic support within and outside the United Nations against Soviet pressures, however applied, and at the same time continue to exert an active influence to prevent them from wavering in their determination to resist external pressures. G. In all three countries, but particularly in Iran, intensify the application of the “grass roots approach” through information and cultural activities and contact between Americans and the local peoples, endeavoring to bring about a better popular understanding of and support for United States objectives. H. Encourage better relations between Greece and Yugoslavia and, eventually, with Albania and Bulgaria should those countries also defect from the Cominform. I. So long as this policy conforms with our general trade policies, refrain from instituting impediments to the natural and normal commercial exchange of non-strategic materials between Iran and the Soviet bloc. J. Recognizing the interest of the British in the area and their primary responsibility for providing armed forces to the area in the event of hostilities, cooperate to the fullest possible extent with the British to assure that the objectives, policies and programs of the two powers are not in conflict and are carried out within the framework of overall western political and strategic interests. 4. lines op action On the assumption that the threat of aggression from the Soviet-controlled world may continue for several years, the lines of action listed below are suggested: I. Political 1. Support vigorously the GTI countries, with the cooperation of British and other western powers as appropriate, in their efforts to resist Soviet and satellite pressures and assist in building up their prestige at the United Nations. 2. As appropriate from time to time, encourage better Greek-Turkish and Irano-Turkish relations. 3. By appropriate means, exert constant pressure to replace in Greece and Iran ineffective and often corrupt officials with progressive and competent elements. 4. Encourage as may be appropriate the GTI countries to strengthen their diplomatic representation and develop closer ties with all Middle East countries. 5. Encourage a higher standard of public service by appealing to and carefully cultivating men who are disposed to devote their lives to their countries. 6. Encourage GTI countries to continue to adhere to the policy of Civil Air Containment of Soviet Russia and the satellite states. 7. Work in closest cooperation with the British at key levels in Washington, London, and GTI countries and strive for a consistent though separate approach to local GTI economic, political and security problems. In this connection we might in a frank and friendly manner urge the British to drop the remaining vestiges of 19th century colonialism in Iran. Political—Greece A. Internal 1. Continue the policy of encouraging the development of a strong and united political center group. 2. Attempt to influence the King to “reign and not rule”, to eschew a partisan approach to political matters, and to depend upon more mature and impartial advisers than is now the case. 3. Support the monarchy and discourage the raising in any form the question of the regime, which has previously plagued Greek political life. In this connection, obtain an invitation for the Greek King and Queen to make an official visit to the United States as soon as practicable. 4. Press the Greek Government to carry out administrative reform measures and encourage the development of an efficient professional and non-political civil service. 5. Urge the Greek Government to carry out its announced plans for the decentralization of government responsibility, emphasizing the element of giving adequate authority to local officials to make final disposition of purely local matters. 6. Encourage the Greek Government to adopt the majority system in future Greek national elections and continue the holding of free and honest elections. 7. Encourage the Government to provide for the selection of mayors by elected councils in an attempt to prevent the election of a communist or a fellow-traveling mayor in some municipality where this might occur through ( a ) concentration on one candidate by a fairly strong leftist element and ( b ) dispersal of strength among rival candidates by the non-communist elements. 8. Encourage American labor unions and the ICFTU to develop closer relationships with the Greek Panhellenic labor movement and assume a more active effort further to reorganize and eliminate political interference in the Greek labor movement. 9. Continue the present efforts of the Labor Attachés to give close cooperation to the Greek labor movement to prevent the rise of either communist or extreme rightist domination in the unions. B. External 1. So long as the situation in Greece requires, urge continuation of UNSCOB to report any threats to Greek political independence and territorial integrity. 2. Continue to emphasize to the Greeks on appropriate occasions the advantages of strengthening relations with Yugoslavia and developing closer ties with Turkey. 3. Utilize whenever practicable the United Nations to improve diplomatic relations between Greece and her neighboring states. 4. Encourage more extensive United Nations welfare assistance in Greece upon the diminution of United States aid to that country. 5. Cyprus enosis problem: ( a ) Urge the Greeks at least to maintain their announced official attitude, namely that while they support Cypriot claims for enosis , they believe that the problem can be settled within the framework of British-Greek relations but that the time is not now propitious for such negotiations. ( b ) Discourage consideration of this problem in international bodies; discourage Greek and Cypriot agitation and conspicuous discussion of this problem. ( c ) As a means of removing the pressures for enosis , encourage the British to undertake further economic improvements in Cyprus, to make further approaches to the Cypriots to assume self-government, and in general, without affecting the question of Cyprus’ sovereignty, to take such action as is feasible to create closer ties between Cyprus and Greece. Political—Turkey 1. Encourage Turkey to play an increasingly active and responsible role in international organizations, and, to this end, support its membership, whenever feasible, on important United Nations committees and commissions. 2. Encourage Turkey, which is able to understand and interpret western views, to take a more active interest in promoting closer relations with the Middle East neighbors and to assume a role of leadership among the Moslem states. 3. As soon as practicable after the Greek King and Queen visit the United States, invite the Turkish President to visit this country. 4. Support the growth of sound democratic institutions in Turkey and the development of efficient and honest government. Political—Iran 1. Give such support as may be possible to Iranian leaders who initiate and execute reform measures designed to develop political stability and economic viability. 2. In supporting reform measures, attempt to make the Iranians realize that totally aside from the threat of Soviet aggression Iran’s chronic misery can only be relieved by basic social and economic reforms. 3. Gradually and carefully encourage the development of real political parties in Iran based on ideas rather than individuals. Only then can really free and honest elections be expected. 4. Support Iranian administrative reforms, particularly decentralization. 5. Encourage Iranian leaders to work out a fair land reform, including land owned by institutions, though recognizing that this is a problem which will require many years to solve. 6. Encourage the Iranians to combat illiteracy. The Latinization of the alphabet would help greatly. 7. Urge the Iranian Government to relax its present rigid regulations governing the movement of official United States personnel. This is essential for our Eximbank, Point IV, etc., officials and most desirable for our regular Embassy staff. 8. Should the Iranians raise their claim to Bahrein Island, urge them to drop it and if necessary to accomplish this, advise them that the United States believes their claim totally unfounded. II. Economic Planning—General 1. Continue ECA economic assistance programs in Greece and Turkey, and initiate grant assistance to Iran. 2. Support, as may be required to supplement direct aid, well justified Greek, Turkish and Iranian requests for IBRD loans and Eximbank credits to the extent their economies can effectively use and service such loans and credits. 3. Assure that Greece and Turkey have access to expanded United States technical assistance upon the conclusion of the ECA program, under which such assistance is now being received; continue Point IV aid to Iran in such fields as needed and to the maximum extent possible. 4. Finalize with Greece and negotiate with Turkey and Iran treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation with such revisions in the standard text as local conditions may require and as will not nullify the effectiveness of our treaty program. 5. Encourage American investment in the GTI countries; as circumstances warrant attempt to induce GTI government leaders to take economic and financial measures, including passage of appropriate legislation designed to stimulate private American investments in private and public enterprises of the countries concerned. 6. Encourage GTI governments to explore with each other the means by which a greater degree of economic collaboration can be developed, consistent with their international commitments as a means of developing closer economic ties. 7. Urge Turkey and Greece to participate fully in the European Payments Union and to collaborate with the OEEC in its efforts to promote among the member countries the multilateralization of payments and the liberalization of trade. 2 8. Support ECA efforts in Greece and Turkey to relate Near East petroleum prices to Near East costs. Emphasize to oil companies at home and abroad the role played by the Gulf basing point system in arousing antipathy against Anglo-American oil companies, the incentive for governments to enter the oil business provided by such exaggerated prices, and the contribution to the viability of Greece which prices connected to Persian Gulf costs can make. 9. Consider the desirability of requesting the assignment of a Treasury representative in one of the GTI countries to cover financial intelligence and reporting for the GTI area. 10. Maintain existing US civil and military air rights in Greece and Turkey, the gateway for air transport operations between Europe, the Near and Middle East and Asia. Economic Planning—Greece 1. Consider the extent to which United States economic aid to Greece will be required after termination of ECA, and lay the basis for any program which might be needed. 2. Continue to emphasize to the Greek Government the need to utilize fully American aid by frequent and public review of Greek action taken, both praising accomplishments and pointing out shortcomings. 3. Continue to urge Greek Government action in the fields listed below leading to economic development: a . Increase exports; b . Development of light industry; c . Conservation of foreign exchange; d . To the fullest practicable extent, restriction of imports to essential items; e . Increasing the contribution of the Greek merchant marine to Greek economy; f . Preventing rises in the cost of living; g . Instituting a more efficient taxation system and shifting emphasis from indirect to direct taxation; h . Pressing for expansion of the tourist industry; i . Vigorous execution of ECA development projects under way; j . Eliminate unnecessary budgetary expenditures. 4. Press for increased trade between Greece and Yugoslavia as a means of benefiting the economies of both, in which there is a strong United States interest. 5. Encourage the Greek Government to adopt a more suitable educational system in Greece in which secondary schools would offer an increased proportion of instruction devoted to trade and skill education and decreased instruction in classical education; and encourage the strengthening of American schools in Greece as experimental centers for better methods of training. 6. Emphasize the Greek overpopulation problem in any United Nations consideration of demographic matters as a problem requiring international attention. 7. When appropriate encourage the establishment of semi-autonomous national agencies free from political interference, such as those envisaged for the projected power program, to supervise development and operations of public utilities. 8. Encourage the formulation and adoption of a rational internal air transport policy and technical development adequate to maintain essential domestic and international air transport facilities. 9. Encourage the Greek Government to eliminate overlapping surface transportation services and develop a well-coordinated system. Economic Planning—Turkey 1. Encourage the Government in Turkey in its efforts to stimulate the development of private enterprise. 2. Extend such further support as is feasible to make possible the economic development of Turkey along sound lines to the end that Turkey can finance its own further development without recourse to extraordinary financial assistance. 3. Urge the Turks to establish a Governmental body to coordinate economic planning. 4. Encourage the Turks to revise the present rigid civil service system to provide greater incentive to civil servants to take initiative and responsibility, particularly in state economic enterprises. 5. Emphasize to the Turks the necessity of limiting their economic development program to one of such magnitude as can be accomplished without harmful inflationary effects. 6. Continue to impress on the Turks the necessity of maintenance of their plants and equipment, and the development of skilled and technical personnel. 7. Encourage the Turks to participate actively in international economic organizations, particularly the GATT and ICAO. 8. Support reasonable requests by the Turkish Government to United Nations specialized agencies for technical assistance in the fields of public health and education. 9. Encourage, whenever appropriate, the Turkish Government to take necessary steps to turn the exploration and development of Turkish petroleum resources over to private companies. Encourage the adoption of liberal petroleum legislation designed for this end. 10. Encourage and continue to assist the Turks, to the extent feasible, to develop their civil aviation facilities, including the completion in accordance with ICAO standards of the international airport now under construction in Istanbul, and to improve civil air operations. Economic Planning—Iran 1. Seek legislative authority to extend grant economic assistance to Iran. 2. Encourage an economic program which will create such conditions as would stimulate the investment of Iranian capital in Iranian projects. 3. Use our influence in every practicable way, upon the Iranians as well as the British, to effect early agreement upon the AIOC concession problem. 4. Press the Iranian Government when appropriate to introduce fiscal reforms, and to implement with the least possible delay specific projects to increase the productivity of the country. 5. Encourage the Iranian Government to join GATT and FAO, adhere to the International Wheat Agreements, and participate actively in the ICAO which it has recently joined. 6. When the Helmand River Commission 3 submits its report, urge the Iranian and Afghanistan Governments to reach an agreement upon an equitable distribution of the waters of that River. 7. In the field of public relations, caution AIOC, whenever appropriate, against concentrating public relations efforts on high government officials alone and encourage the company to continue to direct such approaches to the public. Encourage, whenever appropriate, fullest company use of press and public relations staffs in the field to assure fullest local understanding of benefits received from company operations. Endeavor to minimize publicity of Anglo-American collusion on oil in the Middle East while at the same time avoiding Anglo-American conflicts over oil, i.e., no oil publicity mentioning the US and UK together. 8. In the field of intelligence, help posts maintain and increase contact with public opinion media affecting oil companies. Exchange information with UK officials on all phases of oil operations except commercial secrets on all levels. Complement company sources of information by increasing efforts to make direct contact with Iranian oil officials. 9. Regarding labor, encourage AIOC whenever appropriate to identify their oil operations with the people of the area concerned by increased Iranization of management and dismissal of non-Iranian workers. Encourage AIOC to train at home and abroad, employ at staff and working levels, promote as quickly as possible the maximum number of locals. 10. Regarding relations with Iranian Government, continue endeavoring to dissuade governments from making unreasonable demands on AIOC, continue to assist operations of government oil organization, continue to press for early settlement of Persian Gulf boundary and delimitation of Persian Gulf submerged area. 11. Regarding management, encourage AIOC whenever appropriate to place key officials in the field and decentralize authority. Continue emphasizing United States view that Middle East oil companies must increasingly accommodate oil operations to rising nationalism in area and that great profitability of Middle East oil operations makes increasing liberality essential. 12. Regarding security, maintain closest liaison with British and AIOC officials connected with security and defense plans. III. Military Programs—General In consonance with recommendations of US military authorities: 1. Continue military assistance to Greece, Turkey and Iran to assure no weakening in their determination to resist communist aggression, and to improve to the extent feasible their ability to do so. 2. Maintain military missions in Greece, Turkey and Iran for the purpose of supervising the employment of military assistance, and advising the local military authorities with regard to plans and training. 3. Encourage the fullest possible participation by Greece and Turkey in appropriate phases of military planning in the NATO relating to the defense of the Mediterranean; consider periodically whether development of the NATO and the defensive capability of the western powers has progressed to the point where Greece and Turkey can be invited to participate as full members of the Organization. 4. Encourage the British to maintain military missions in Greece and Turkey. 5. Encourage and assist, within the limit of authority of the military missions, in revision and improvement of war plans of the three countries. 6. Continue to encourage Greece, Turkey and Iran to modernize and keep under review their mobilization plans and maintain intensive military training in the armed forces. 7. Under military assistance programs, support, and whenever feasible help in the development of projects of strategic importance and of possible future use to the US, such as airports, docking and repair facuities, etc. 8. Continue to encourage the Turks to enter into staff talks with the Greeks and Iranians. 9. Consider the desirability of encouraging an exchange of military officers between the Greek, Turkish and Iranian armed forces in order to increase the effectiveness of any military collaboration that may become necessary. 10. Develop with the British strategic plans for possible allied military action in the area in the event of Soviet aggression or subversion. Military Program—Greece 1. To the extent possible, attain a level of equipment in Greece adequate for an immediate and effective mobilization of Greek armed forces reserves in case of an emergency. 2. Support continuation of the British Police and Prisons Mission to help develop an efficient and non-political gendarmerie system in Greece. 3. Continue to exert pressure on the Greek Government to assume the widest measure of responsibility for the production of items used by the Greek military forces, in order to reduce the foreign exchange cost of the maintenance of these forces. Military Program—Turkey 1. Determine the cost and time required to complete the modernization of the Turkish armed forces on the scale now contemplated and take the necessary action to complete such part of this program as the JCS may consider desirable. 2. Urge the Turks to continue to devote no less than the present percentage of their over-all budgetary expenditure to national defense so long as the Soviet threat continues and so long as Turkey receives US military assistance. 3. If Turkey’s essential defense requirements exceed the above budgetary percentage, find some formula to enable the Turkish Government to finance such requirements. (For example, the US might finance the NCO 4 program by providing Turkey’s military requirements of POL, thereby releasing budgeted funds to the NCO program.) 4. Initiate a study of the annual local and foreign exchange cost of maintaining the Turkish military establishment upon completion of the modernization program. Initiate subsequently a study to determine ( a ) whether Turkey can ultimately bear these costs without external assistance, or ( b ) whether its military establishment can safely be reduced to a level which it can support. 5. Encourage the Turks, at such time as our Military Mission feels they are competent to do so, to supply, on a small scale, military training groups to other Middle Eastern states which may request them. (The Turks now have a military mission in Afghanistan.) Military Program—Iran 1. Encourage the Government to improve the fighting qualities of its troops by providing them with more incentive through better food, perquisites, etc. 2. Endeavor in cooperation with the British to develop a practicable plan for arming the tribes against enemy occupation of Iran. 3. Make sure that the present advice and equipment we are giving the Iranians to effect proper demolitions in the event of a Soviet invasion are adequate. Demolitions are of the utmost importance in any delaying action the Iranians may fight and, if necessary, the American or British Government should be prepared to send demolition teams into Iran in advance of hostilities. 4. Consult as appropriate with the British to arrive at an agreed position in relation to the circumstances under which British troops would be sent to Southern Iran. 5. Offer the British such help in the form of equipment and technicians as they may require to ensure the proper destruction of AIOC facilities should that become necessary. IV. Intelligence 1. Using available counterpart funds in Greece and Turkey under an intelligence program already designed for this purpose, conduct appropriate studies of United States propaganda opportunities. 2. Analyze the strength of pro-Soviet groups and individuals in the GTI area and the attitude of the respective national governments toward them. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V. Informational and Cultured—General 1. Continue and expand as necessary informational and cultural programs through news bulletins, libraries, visual media, VOA programs, and exchange of persons. 2. Continue to design our informational programs in Greece, Turkey and Iran to support and further United States political, economic and military objectives in those countries. 3. Develop more effective means for reaching the “grass roots” by dissemination of information in simplest form possible. Publish booklets, pamphlets and magazines in local languages, using to the fullest possible extent material produced, adapted and edited in the field. 4. Vary the program adequately in each of the countries to appeal to the entrenched and sophisticated intellectual elite as well as to the illiterate mass concerned with little beyond the struggle for bare existence. 5. Emphasize to the Greeks, Turks and Iranians American determination to achieve world peace through the cooperation of freedom-loving people and within the UN framework. 6. Expose the cynical mendacity of Cominform propaganda and demonstrate the evil effects of the Soviet brand of communism elsewhere. 7. Select leader grantees to cover as varied fields as possible, and utilize these contacts to obtain the most benefit for US interests. 8. When appropriate, show the strong and increasing industrial and military strength of the United States. 9. Render all practicable assistance to worthy American educational and philanthropic institutions in Greece, Turkey and Iran. 10. Strengthen cultural ties between the United States and Greece, Turkey, and Iran. 11. Foster the teaching of the English language in Greece, Turkey, and Iran through the creation of bi-national cultural societies for which the USIE program would provide teachers and equipment. 12. Spread useful technical knowledge as widely as possible among the people throughout the area. 13. In putting into effect its program, USIE should endeavor to make maximum use of indigenous channels and should emphasize matters of tangible benefit to the local population. Direct contact between the USIE American staffs and the peoples of the countries should be emphasized. Further integration of the cultural aspects of the program with media such as press, radio, and films should also guide USIE activity. Care should be taken, however, not to arouse the deeply ingrained distrust and suspicion of foreign influence. 14. Continue the policy of informing the American public to the fullest extent possible by speeches, statements, press releases, etc., of problems and actions being taken regarding these countries. 15. Encourage official and non-official Americans who go to GTI countries for extended periods to make an effort to learn languages, political history, economic and cultural affairs of countries involved. When appropriate opportunities arise, encourage American schools of higher learning to establish or expand courses in such subjects. 16. Take pictures and movies of “before and after” projects in which American aid and personnel are rendering important assistance. Commentaries and titles should be made by natives in the principal languages of the areas involved. Informatiorial and Cultural—Greece 1. USIE activity in Greece should continue at a high level as long as the international situation remains critical and reconstruction and economic recovery move further along. 2. Efforts should be directed toward influencing the following “priority target groups”: a . Publishers, editors and government officials, civilian and military. b . Organized labor. c . Intellectual leaders in educational, religious and other fields. d . Doctors, scientists, technicians, specialists. e . Refugees and inhabitants of areas formerly occupied by guerrillas. f . Industrialists, businessmen and bankers. g . The population of rural areas. 3. Urge the Greeks to balance sound military preparedness with determined social and economic reconstruction. 4. Wherever possible, Fulbright grants should be used to promote instruction in English teaching techniques and actual language classes. 5. USIE should assist in the establishment of an information center at Piraeus to reach the pro-Left laboring groups, and a dozen branch reading rooms in provincial centers. 6. ECA counterpart funds should carry an increasing share of the costs of general press work, motion picture distribution and exhibits so that USIE can concentrate more effort on cultural fields, on contacts with Greek institutions and Greek channels and on the preparation of materials for the particularized needs of Greece. Informational and Cultural—Turkey 1. Show the extent, firmness and effectiveness of US support of the security and independence of Turkey. 2. Reassure Turkey of the wisdom of its Western orientation and show that the US provides sincere, firm and determined leadership in the cooperative effort of free nations to halt Soviet aggression. 3. Efforts should be directed toward influencing the following “priority target groups”: a . The upper classes of the 25 to 40-year age group. b . The older generation of politicians and officials. c . The army. d . Provincial population centers with 5,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. e . Larger villages. f . The various minority groups in the Istanbul area. 4. Upon implementation of the present expanded USIE program, consider the feasibility of further expansion, such as opening new outposts, in addition to the presently contemplated outposts in Adana and Trabzon. 5. Continue US participation in the annual Izmir Fair. Informational and Cultural—Iran 1. Make clear US support for Iran’s security and independence—“Iran does not stand alone”. 2. Encourage firmness toward the USSR by public realization of the United States’ determination to prevent encroachments on free nations. 3. Encourage belief in the economic potential of Iran and in the ability of Iran to develop this potential and to improve social conditions through its own efforts and particularly through practical and basic rather than pretentious and showy projects. 4. Efforts should be directed toward influencing the following “priority target groups”: a . The Shah, the Court, and the few hundred families who dominate economic life and control the government. b . Leaders of the illiterate masses—mullahs (priests), village headmen and tribal chiefs. e . The army. d . Labor. e . Intellectuals, particularly those in the educational field, and civil servants of potential prominence. f . Men and women of western education. g . Literate ten percent as a whole. h . Leaders of Turkish and other linguistic and religious minorities. 5. Combat the concept of Anglo-American rivalry in Iran without identifying the United States with British policy, oil or other commercial interests in Iran. 6. Create in the Iranian people an attitude toward the United States which will make them want to be aligned with the United States, determined to resist communism and, in the event of war, friendly and cooperative toward the United States. 7. Give fullest publicity to the work of American technicians in Iran and to visits of Iranians to the United States, particularly in fields of agriculture, health, sanitation and education. 8. When circumstances warrant, assist and strengthen the Iranian radio network by providing technical personnel and facilities to the limit of available funds. VI. Administrative—General 1. Continue our strong and aggressive representation in the GTI countries. 2. Consider in the selection of personnel for key positions in GTI missions their capacity and ability to work in harmony with the British. 3. Encourage political and economic officers of the embassies and consulates to travel extensively in their districts, and provide adequate funds for this purpose. 4. Encourage officers assigned to the GTI missions to acquire a speaking knowledge of French during their tour of duty, and encourage the study of the local languages. 5. Build up a reservoir of GTI area specialists through continuance of the FSI program. 1 Authorship not indicated in source text. * Approved policy: NSC decision of November 24, 1947. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NSC decision and explanatory material, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 575 and 623 .] 2 For documentation on United States involvement in the formation of the European Payments Union and in the decisions of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, see vol. iii , pp. 611 ff. 3 See the editorial note, p. 1459 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 824 ] . 4 Noncommissioned officer. Policy Statement Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs 780.00/10–1750 [Document 101] Policy Statement Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs 1 top secret [ Washington ,] December 28, 1950. Regional Policy Statement: Near East (Third revision) 2 1. estimate of the situation A. Stability and Orientation NSC memorandum “Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East—Basic US Position”, approved November 24, 1947, 3 states: “The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States.” The report to the President by the NSC entitled “United States Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States”, dated October 17, 1949 (NSC 47/2) 4 states that the political and economic stability of Israel and the Arab States are considered to be of critical importance to the security of the United States. The Arab States are all oriented towards the West in varying degrees, opposed to communism, and generally successful at present in minimizing or suppressing existing communist activities through restrictive measures. Their governments are conservative and generally stable from the short-term point of view. The Communist Party is non-existent in Yemen and Saudi Arabia; outlawed in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, and apparently unorganized in Jordan. There are influential groups such as the National Democratic Party of Iraq and the group associated with Akram Hawrani in Syria which are leftist but not sympathetic to communism. Throughout the Arab States, at the present time, extreme rightist * or ultra-nationalist elements may exercise greater influence and form a greater threat to maintenance of a pro-Western orientation than the communists; for example, the presently outlawed Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt; the organization of the same name, active in Syrian political affairs as the Islamic Socialist Party; the Independence Party in Iraq and the Arab Higher Committee and other groups centering around the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem. In addition to the influence of rightist and ultra-nationalist groups, the degree of ease with which military groups have seized and manipulated power in Syria threatens stability since it may encourage similar recourse to military coups elsewhere in the Arab States. The political foundation in all the Arab States is weak, because of serious deficiencies in their economic and social structures, the incompetence or apathy of leadership, and the weakness or absence of popular support for the governments in power, although elections in Syria, Jordan, and Egypt during 1949–50 indicate some advance towards more representative government. The continuation of the present internal situation in the Arab States, in which mass poverty and a low level of productivity prevail, will render them increasingly susceptible to exploitation and manipulation by extremist forces of the right or left. Although the communists are endeavoring to penetrate discontented minorities, laborers, peasants, the poor white collar class and the intelligentsia in the Near East, and to exploit the anti-Western orientation of ultra-nationalist elements, at the present time the Soviet Union does not appear to be exercising direct pressure upon the governments of these states, nor to be taking full advantage of the considerable opportunities which exist for effective communist penetration and subversion. The diminution of direct Soviet pressure or propaganda against the Near Eastern states together with the increasingly sharp criticism of the West is undoubtedly a Soviet tactic to wean the Near East away from the West. The Soviet Union may well believe that, without making a maximum effort, conditions in the Near East are such as to favor the ultimate attainment of its objectives, namely, to bring about abandonment of the area’s pro-Western orientation and replacement of the governments now in power by governments amenable to Soviet influence. Israel, although it continues to maintain an official policy of non-identification with the East or West, is favorably disposed toward the United States. Its moderate socialist government, dominated by the Mapai Party, is stable and energetic, and pursues a progressive program. The Communist Party is numerically small and has little influence. The Mapam left-wing pro-Soviet socialists, constituting the chief opposition to the present government, have also suffered some decline in strength and internal solidarity. The rightist groups, such as the General Zionists, in recent municipal elections gained considerable strength. Rightist extremist groups are no longer of major significance on the immediate political scene. However, the necessity on the part of the government of maintaining an internal policy of compromise in order to reconcile the demands of leftist and rightist extremists with the more moderate tendencies of the government party makes it more difficult for the government to adopt a forthright Western orientation. Israel’s stability is threatened by the lack of a peace settlement with the Arab States. The almost complete dependence of Israel on external assistance, both public and private, for meeting its import and other payment requirements makes it apparent that Israel has little capacity to service loans from its current foreign exchange receipts. Israel requires greatly increased imports for economic development to sustain its immigration program, but the results in increased production will only ameliorate Israel’s balance of payments difficulties. The large-scale immigration program which Israel continues to pursue increasingly weakens its economic structure, exceeds the country’s absorptive capacity, and aggravates Arab fears of Israeli expansion. Despite relinquishment of her mandates in the Near East, Great Britain continues to exercise considerable influence in some of the Arab States, through close diplomatic relations with these states; the presence of British advisors in key ministries; and the mutual defense treaties with Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, although the latter two treaties are now being subjected to strong criticism, particularly in Egypt. Great Britain also enjoys special political and economic relations with the Persian Gulf states, Muscat and Oman through its system of treaties with these states and through its position in Aden Protectorate and Aden Colony. There are also extensive British commercial, petroleum, and investment interests in the Near East. With termination of the French mandates in Syria and Lebanon, French influence has been limited to a measure of control of the Syrian and Lebanese currencies and to cultural and economic ties, particularly with Lebanon with the passing of French authority, Syria and Lebanon lack the stabilizing influence of a close attachment to any Western power. Syria, because it has been weakened by a succession of military coups, constitutes a particularly sensitive danger spot in the Near East, although constitutional government has been, reestablished and there is hope that Syria may be entering a more stable period. The United States enjoys an especially close relationship with Saudi Arabia, and Yemen is seeking closer ties with the United States. However, despite the general pro-Western orientation of the Arab States, a factor which affects achievement of our objectives is the tendency of these states to regard United States policies and actions as motivated by Zionist pressures or as efforts to strengthen Israel. Arab suspicions derive also from a conviction that American interest in the Near East arises only from a desire to contain communist expansion. With the decline of British influence and the extension of United States interests in the area, there is also a growing tendency to blame us, along with or in place of Great Britain, for the difficulties confronting the Arab states, and to accuse us of adopting our policies to conform with those of the United Kingdom and France, who are regarded as imperialistic, or of preoccupation with Europe’s needs while ignoring those of the Near East. The latter attitude will become aggravated in proportion to the increase in US aid to South and Southeast Asia. Among increasing numbers of Arabs, there is also a conviction that we are backing the corrupt governments now in power, without regard to the welfare of the masses. Through United States governmental and private aid to Israel, the increase of American investment capital therein, and the close ties between Israel and the American Jewry, a closer affinity of interests is developing in practice between the United States and Israel than exists between Israel and the Soviet Union and we should be in position increasingly to strengthen Israel’s ties with the West. The process of strengthening these ties may well be limited, however, by the continuing immigration of peoples, particularly from Eastern Europe. In Israel there is considerable belief that our major policy interest in that state is to bring about its participation in a power bloc in which it, like other small countries, will be merely a pawn of the United States. Israel’s desire to maintain a position of outward neutrality is also motivated by its efforts to obtain Soviet permission for the emigration to Israel of Jews in the Soviet and satellite countries; by its desire for the support of the Soviet bloc in the United Nations on matters affecting Palestine; by consideration of the position of a considerable segment of the population which is opposed to an anti-Soviet policy; and possibly by a desire to obtain further arms from that source if the necessity should arise. A prevailing impression which has vitiated the effectiveness of our policy in the past is the Israeli view that there is a sharp diversity of attitude or of policy between the White House, which is regarded as friendly to Israel, and the Department, which is considered pro-Arab. In addition, there is a conviction in Israel that the United States supports British policy, which is regarded as strongly pro-Arab. Although the atmosphere of insecurity which prevails among the Near Eastern states has been heightened by the Korean situation, an indirect source of strength lies in application of the Truman doctrine to Greece and Turkey, 5 our material assistance thereto, and the Anglo-French defense guarantees to Turkey. However, it is doutful whether these factors have contributed to the relaxation of tensions in the neighboring Near Eastern states and to an increase in their sense of security. The peoples in the Levant states and Egypt are impressed with the importance of the side which shows strength. The success of our proposed aid program for Iran in enhancing its ability to resist Soviet and communist penetration or subversion would further strengthen the Western orientation of the Near Eastern states. Conversely, failure of our Iranian program or submission of Iran to Soviet pressure would greatly increase the feeling of insecurity and exposure on the part of the Near Eastern states and might cause them to attempt to pursue a neutral course or to effect a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The weakness in operation of existing regional groupings, the Saadabad pact (to which Iraq adheres), the Saudi-Iraqi-Yemeni Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, and the Arab League, 6 reflects the weakness of the members, singly or in combination, and no important results for the security of the area against external aggression can be expected to result from them. Moreover, the activities of the Arab League up to the present time have included no political achievements of lasting benefit to the Arab states, and very limited achievements in the economic and cultural fields, according to information presently available. At the same time, Arab League activities, with regard to Palestine, have worked to the detriment of United States and British objectives of stabilizing the area. There is little immediate prospect that a constructive regional association will develop in the Near East, because the area lacks a political and military power center around which it could be built, and because of inter-Arab rivalries and competing nationalisms, and Israeli-Arab animosities engendered by the Palestine situation. While the Arab states may successfully work out the details of a collective security pact, it is difficult to believe that this will be a pact of strength for some time to come. On the other hand, should the United States in concert with the United Kingdom clearly demonstrate to the Near Eastern states that we are interested in their survival and intend to help them strengthen themselves, it is quite possible that within a comparatively short time the situation could be vastly improved to the benefit of US national security. In the light of the general adherence of the Arab states and Israel to the United Nations armistice agreements, and the anticipated stabilizing effect of the US–UK–French declaration on Near Eastern arms and security, 7 the trend, although slow, has been towards peace in the Near East. However, settlement of the Palestine problem as a whole, including the grave refugee problem, and the full restoration of services and commerce interrupted by the hostilities, will take place only gradually and over a relatively long period of time. There is an additional factor in the form of the serious situation in the Far East. That the Arab States will seek to capitalize on the deteriorating international situation is becoming clear. It is doubtful whether the people of the United States appreciate the extent of latent and open antipathy towards the United Kingdom and France in the Arab and Asian world. The issues of nationalism and communism become muddled when the Arab and Asian leaders believe that European 19th century imperialism is involved in Indo-China. 8 They have great difficulty in believing that Nationalist aspirations can be realized when there is any remnant of European domination regaining. B. Factors in the United States Affecting American Objectives and Policies Certain factors in the United States influence the implementation of our objectives in the Near East. The first is Zionist pressure and domestic political considerations. Second, articulate public opinion is generally sympathetic towards Israel on most Arab-Israeli matters in dispute, both because of (1) Nazi persecution of the Jews; (2) Israel’s successful stand against the Arabs; and (3) The Israel side on Near Eastern matters is given more publicity. On the other hand, public opinion, ill-informed on the Arabs in general, is normally apathetic towards them, or critical of what it regards as a backward, feudal, undemocratic people who pursue an anti-Jewish or aggressive course with respect to Israel. A third factor, of more restricted effectiveness, is the long history of American cultural, religious and charitable interests in the Arabs. A new element, the outcome of which cannot as yet be predicted, is the fact that groups in the Protestant churches in the United States are studying the Near East this winter. 2. area objectives in terms of united states national interests The United States national interest requires with respect to the Near East: a . Maintenance and strengthening of the orientation of the Arab States and Israel towards the Western democracies; development of an attitude of confidence and respect on the part of the peoples of the Near East, Arabs and Jews alike, towards the United States which would facilitate the maintenance and extension, where necessary, of existing United States and British strategic rights and facilities in the Near East; and prevention of Soviet domination of the area. b . Strengthen where possible the ability of the Near Eastern states to maintain internal security and protect themselves against aggression from whatever source it may come; c . Encouragement of economic development programs in the area, including the increase in production of Near Eastern oil resources, as a means to raise the standard of living and increase the stability and pro-Western orientation of the area. d . Continuation in power of moderate governments having an increasing measure of popular confidence and support. e . Prevention of Arab-Israeli hostilities, in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and the tripartite declaration on Near Eastern arms and security of May 25, 1950; f . Reconciliation of Arab-Israeli differences at least to the extent necessary to facilitate the preparation for and carrying out of military operations in the Near East by the Western democracies in the event that the USSR precipitates general war. g . Maintenance of our present economic, cultural, and commercial interests in the area, and continued access by the United States, along with the other Western democracies, to the resources and markets of the region, including the preservation of nondiscriminatory treatment for United States nationals; and the creation of conditions which would lead the Near Eastern governments to cooperate with the Western democracies, if circumstances required, in denying the region’s resources to the Soviet bloc. 3. united states policies In the light of the foregoing objectives, United States policy towards the Near East should be: a . To maintain an attitude of impartiality as between the Arab States and Israel, including where appropriate the equitable extension of assistance and support, rather than the withholding thereof; b . To provide advice, guidance, and material assistance to contribute to the development of area stability along economic, social, and political lines, contingent upon the willingness of these countries to apply the maximum of self-help, and to encourage wherever appropriate the liberalization of laws and of political and social institutions; c . Within the limitations of our world-wide responsibilities and in cooperation with Western powers to undertake to strengthen the Near Eastern states militarily, and to take whatsoever steps are now possible to make the maximum use of the manpower of the area in the event of general hostilities; d . To encourage regional cooperation along constructive political, economic, social, and cultural lines, including restoration of services disrupted by the recent hostilities, such as commercial intercourse, the flow of petroleum products, and operation of and access to internal and international surface and air transport facilities; e . To carefully appraise the desirability of entering into or giving impetus to the formation of any regional association with any of the Near Eastern states, to subject that policy to continuing review, taking into account American capabilities to defend our vital interests, the extent of our commitments elsewhere, and the defensive strengths of our allies; f . To pursue a course of close United States-United Kingdom cooperation wherever possible to achieve our basic objectives, with particular reference to the planning and conduct of assistance programs and the maintenance or extension of strategic facilities, and to refrain from action which might tend to undermine the position of the United Kingdom in the Near East; g . To pursue a course of close cooperation with France, wherever it still retains a measure of influence, to attain our basic objectives, bearing in mind that the principal value of French influence in the Near East lies in the cultural and educational fields; h . To take into account, in so far as it is possible, the national aspirations of the peoples of the area and to make known our views to the Western powers as occasion may require; i . To encourage Turkey, Pakistan, and possibly other Moslem non-Arab states, through the bonds which they enjoy with the Near Eastern states, to exert a constructive influence upon the latter, with particular reference to the reconciliation of Arab-Israeli differences, the strengthening of the area’s non-communist orientation, and the attainment of constructive area cooperation, while refraining from encouraging any tendencies such as pan-Islamism which might adversely affect the relations of Turkey or Pakistan with the non-Moslem countries; j . To stimulate greater understanding in the Near East of the aggressive intentions of international communism and the constructive aims of the United States and the other Western democracies; k . To utilize the United Nations and/or the medium of direct negotiations between the parties concerned as the primary means of effecting a Palestine settlement wherever possible, to limit to a minimum direct United States participation in achieving such a settlement; and to support actively the settlement of the problem of the Arab refugees through peaceful reintegration into the life of the Near East. l . To discourage where possible continued immigration into Israel. 1 Drafted by Samuel K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director of the Onice of Near Eastern Affairs. 2 Early drafts of this Statement have not been found in Department of State files. 3 See undated memorandum prepared in the Department of State entitled “The American Paper”, Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , p. 575 , and letter from the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, November 24, 1947, ibid. , p. 623 . 4 Ibid. , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1430 . * The term “rightist” is used herein primarily to designate a general political orientation, and does not necessarily apply to the economic or social programs of the various groups mentioned. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 For documentation on the Truman Doctrine and United States economic aid to Greece and Turkey, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 1 – 484 . 6 These treaties are discussed in the Report on Regional Security Arrangements in the Eastern Mediterranean and Near Eastern Areas, May 11, p. 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] . 7 Reference is to the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, documentation on which is in pp. 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] ff. 8 For documentation on Indochina, see vol. vi , pp. 690 ff. The Point Four program in the Near East The Point Four program in the Near East [102] Editorial Note [103] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices Washington, September 12, 1950—9 a. m. 880.00 TA/9–1250: Circular telegram [104] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices Washington, November 30, 1950—8 p. m. 886.00 TA/11–3050: Circular telegram [105] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices Washington, November 30, 1950—8 p. m. 886.00 TA/11–3050: Circular telegram Editorial Note [Document 102] Editorial Note The origins of the Point Four program may be traced back to President Truman’s Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949. At one point in that address, the President stated: “Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of undeveloped areas” (Department of State Bulletin , January 30, 1949, page 125). The legislative framework of the program was established by Title IV of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, approved on June 5, 1950. Its financial base, for fiscal year 1951, was provided for to the extent of $34,500,000 by the appropriations bill enacted on September 6, 1950. For documentation on these phases of the Point Four program, see Foreign Relations , 1949, volume I, pages 757 ff.; and volume I, pages 846 ff. Egyptian Ambassador Mohamed Kamil Abdul Rahim, on July 15, 1949, called on Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, to discuss the Point Four program in its relationship to Egypt. Mr. Thorp, who had been designated to assume responsibility in the Department of State for developing the program, informed the Ambassador that it “had been conceived as assistance in increasing the productivity of a country and thereby raising its standard of living, Mr. Thorp said that the program would have to be adapted to each country individually, and that if Egypt could submit a survey of its development needs and resources, together with its plans for economic development, the program could get under way more expeditiously. … “Mr. Thorp explained that the assumption of local costs by the recipient government would be expected. … “Mr. Thorp then continued by explaining that capital guarantees administered by the Export-Import Bank, or other measures, would perhaps be necessary to encourage private investment, which was needed in most areas to supplement technical assistance. …” (Memorandum of conversation by Stuart D. Nelson of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs and Samuel P. Hays, Special Assistant to Mr. Thorp, 800.50 TA/7–1549) The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 880.00 TA/9–1250: Circular telegram [Document 103] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1 confidential Washington , September 12, 1950—9 a. m. Pres sig of $34,500,000 appropriation for Pt IV technical cooperation program fiscal year 51 enables you now inform Govt you accredited that you prepared receive proposals for bilateral technical cooperation projects and give all possible assistance in preparing them for transmission to Dept in sufficient detail to permit prelim appraisal here. For your guidance but not necessarily for disclosure to local Govt, FY 1951 appropriations suffice for reasonably firm allotment for respective Near Eastern countries as fols: Egypt, $250,000; Iraq, $200,000; Saudi Arabia, $150,000; Syria, $150,000; Lebanon, $100,000; Israel, $100,000; Yemen, $50,000; and Jordan, $50,000. In discussions with local Govt, you may translate this into terms of services to be supplied, counting annual cost one Amer expert at $15,000 and NE trainee to US at $4,000 and NE trainee to Amer colleges in NE at $2,000. Indicate that modest amts machinery, equipment can be made available only in connection demonstrations or training projects. Local Govt, of course, is expected to bear certain local costs that may be paid in local currency. Emphasize that real measure of significance any program is its promise of encouraging econ development, stimulating investment and furthering other objectives of Point IV Statute rather than dol allocation. You are authorized open conversations with Govt and forward project proposals with indication of your judgment well as that of Govt as to priorities. Dept wishes emphasize “Grass Roots” type activity under Pt IV. Individual projects comprising proposed program shld be listed or at least grouped in accordance with priority, but program shld be comprehensive, even if clearly exceeding dimensions above indicated. This wld not preclude prompt consideration individual high priority TA projects urgently desired by local Govt and strongly supported by US Mission if such projects are closely related to country’s own development program. Dept suggests you welcome initial proposals for a program from each country that might cost twice as much as above allotment to that country, first, because such info needed to shape requirements for next fiscal; second, because possibility that delays in requests from other countries and delays in recruitment and appointment this year might permit eventual allocations for NE countries later in fiscal 1951 larger than present allotments. Dept will, of course, approve projects only up to amount of funds clearly available at given time. Since more time will be needed to obtain Amer experts than to select local trainees, you might over-program more heavily in respect experts than trainees. Trainee grants may be committed in full before close FY for subsequent disbursement through two more fiscal years. Pt IV law requires all Amer experts have FBI clearance which usually takes about three months. You shld emphasize that UN TA program, because of large US contribution, may be double that of US bilateral program. US Pt IV law emphasizes that a country shld use UN aid wherever feasible. Further instrs re (1) relationship between UN technical asst and US Pt IV programs, (2) formal bilateral agreement with local Govt, (3) possible estab of joint comm, (4) your previous project recommendations, those of Dept and other agencies, and (5) other matters will fol, but steps outlined here shld be taken immed. Inform if you need additional copies PL 535 (Pt IV enabling legis). To facilitate area coordination, in accordance with policy outlined in Unrap 29 of June 28, 1950, 2 copies of Mission recommendations and Dept decisions concerning Pt IV policies and operations in countries to which this cable addressed shld be repeated to Amb Blandford and where appropriate to other US Missions in area. Dept also interested in possibility using bilateral funds for coordinated projects in the Arab States under auspices of Arab League. To this end believe advisable initiate discussions with League officials looking to specific proposed projects consistent with Ft IV policy. Sums made available for AL programs might be deducted on pro rata basis from Arab States intended to benefit from project. Hoskiris 3 has suggested advisability studies by League of trade obstacles between members, and other fields might be those of social welfare and housing. For info Fed Housing Agency preparing project proposals covering NE technical institute. 4 Webb 1 At Arab capitals and Tel Aviv. The message to Beirut was sent to Ambassador John B. Blandford, United States Representative on the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 2 Not printed. 3 Presumably Harold B. Hoskins, a private business consultant, who, in 1945, had been Regional Economic Counselor at Cairo and other Near Eastern posts. 4 The Department of State, on September 12, 7 a. m., sent a, circular telegram along broadly similar lines to New Delhi, Karachi, Colombo, and Kabul, informing them of target figures for Point IV assistance to various South Asian countries during fiscal year 1951, as follows: $1, 200,000 for India; $600,000 for Pakistan; $100,000 for Ceylon; and $50,000 each for Afghanistan and Nepal. For the text of the circular telegram, see vol. i , p. 865 . The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 886.00 TA/11–3050: Circular telegram [Document 104] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1 confidential Washington , November 30, 1950—8 p. m. 213. During recent visit Azzam Pasha 2 Sec Gen Arab League raised question possibility USG providing Pt 4 aid to assist economic social programs League. He indicated US experts wld be welcomed by League to carry out under League auspices broad surveys area economic requirements. Azzam visualizes surveys as comprehensive thorough efforts produce plans, programs some for execution by individual Arab Govts and others by private Arab investors. He thought surveys might also point solutions to tariff difficulties between Arab States and study legislation in individual countries detrimental social economic development. Arrangements made for Azzam discuss his proposal with Pt 4 Administrator two occasions. Latter has given informal approval in principle project and indicated funds might be available. Dept suggested Azzam might wish consult League members re his idea with view possible further talks Wash prior departure US Azzam. Azzam currently studying report US, Brazil Joint Commission for Econ Development as possible prototype. Although Azzam proposal extremely vague this stage Dept believes it might offer occasion help Arabs help themselves on cooperative basis and as such it seems worth exploring. Dept desires telegraphically preliminary reaction addressee posts Azzam’s idea and indication fields in which studies by US technicians under Arab League aegis might be fruitful. Estimate desired also re degree enthusiasm cooperation local govt likely vouchsafe such League surveys and political pros and cons US Pt 4 connection with League this manner. Aid to League wld be in addition Pt 4 allotments individual Arab States: programs wld operate simultaneously. 3 Acheson 1 At Arab capitals and Tel Aviv. The circular telegram was also sent to Beirut for Ambassador Blandford and to London and USUN, the latter two for information. 2 For documentation on Azzam Pasha’s visit, see pp. 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] ff. 3 The reaction of American diplomatic missions in the Near East toward the proposal to provide Point IV aid through the Arab League was a mixed one. Embassy Cairo, on December 4, advised that such aid would be most useful as a political gesture and might also stimulate the League’s Economic Section which had been “extremely weak” (telegram 568). Embassy Tel Aviv, on December 4, expressed its contrary belief that political considerations made a program of this sort “not desirable”. It also expressed its views that the League was dedicated to perpetuating the antagonism between the Israelis and the Arabs and to working against a peaceful settlement; that American funds would probably forestall the disintegration of the League; and that resuscitating the League in this way would contribute to instability in the area (telegram 324). To Embassy Jidda, the utilization of the Arab League as a vehicle for Point IV aid had a “natural appeal” (telegram 370). Legation Damascus, on the other hand, thought that current emphasis should be placed on constructive national plans, considering the limitations on available funds (telegram 288, December 13). Embassy Baghdad, on December 15, presented the views of Under Secretary of the Iraqi Foreign Office Rawi that better results would be achieved by allocating funds to individual governments (telegram 339). All telegrams cited in this footnote are filed under 886.00 TA. The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 886.00 TA/11–3050: Circular telegram [Document 105] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1 confidential top priority Washington , November 30, 1950—8 p. m. 214. Dept contemplating asking Congress for grant aid program totaling $500 million for FY52 of which Asian states to receive greater proportion. Dept urgently requests by Dec 15 comments and suggestions Embs and Legs for programs Arab States and Israel. Dept meanwhile developing first draft program on basis material at hand. Decision taken request $25 million grants for Arab States and Israel for tech assist, including supplies and equipment. Latter expected constitute much larger proportion total than in FY51 Pt 4 program. Capital improvements contemplated only ( a ) where security and polit factors require very rapid development and ( b ) other means financing not immed available. For NE countries capital improvements admissible only where tightly justified under these criteria. Expenditures probably to be concentrated where optimum benefits to be expected. Emphasis to be on “grass roots” projects to raise standards greatest number population. Emphasis to be placed on urgency of needs balanced by capacity bear local costs, and on this basis some countries may receive proportionately larger share aid. Data required include project description, costs and realistic appraisal ability willingness Govt implement such projects. Programs to be feasible and appropriate as, for example, plans already developed by Govt to which you are accredited or by private orgs but not active because of lack wherewithal. Missions shld not discuss amts money possibly available in sounding local officials re projects and shld not create impression program firm. Acheson 1 At Arab capitals and Tel Aviv. Egypt Egypt Contents Interest of the United States in the proposed revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and in the future of the Sudan; development of a program of military assistance to Egypt; concern over Egyptian restrictions on the use of the Suez Canal (Documents 106-129) Interest of the United States in the proposed revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and in the future of the Sudan; development of a program of military assistance to Egypt; concern over Egyptian restrictions on the use of the Suez Canal Interest of the United States in the proposed revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and in the future of the Sudan; development of a program of military assistance to Egypt; concern over Egyptian restrictions on the use of the Suez Canal 1 1 For previous documentation concerning United States policy toward Egypt, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 186 ff. [106] Memorandum by Mr. Stuart D. Nelson of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Director of That Office (Berry) [Washington,] February 24, 1950. 774.00/2–2450 [107] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb) [Washington,] April 3, 1950. 641.74/4–350 [108] Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) [Washington,] June 1, 1950. 641.74/6–150 [109] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] July 10, 1950. 774.56/7–1050 [110] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) [Washington,] July 17, 1950. 641.74/7–1750 [111] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, September 13, 1950. 774.56/9–1350: Telegram [112] Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussion [London, September 19, 1950.] 780.00/9–1850 [113] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, October 3, 1950. 474.418/10–350 [114] Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] October 12, 1950. 611.74/10–1250 [115] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] October 17, 1950. 641.74/10–1750 [116] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] October 19, 1950. 611.74/10–1950 [117] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt [Washington,] October 23, 1950. 911.534/10–2250: Telegram [118] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, October 26, 1950. 974.531/10–2650: Telegram [119] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, November 9, 1950—5 p. m. 774.00/11–950: Telegram [120] The Ambassador in the united Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, November 9, 1950—5 p. m. 641.74/11–950: Telegram [121] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt Washington, November 20, 1950. 780.5/11–2050: Telegram [122] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, November 22, 1950. 641.74/11–2250: Telegram [123] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, November 25, 1950—1 p. m. 641.74/11–2550: Telegram [124] Editorial Note [125] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) [Washington,] December 6, 1950. 711.56374/12–650 [126] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices Washington, December 7, 1950. 641.74/12–750: Circular telegram [127] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, December 11, 1950. 641.74/12–1150: Telegram [128] Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] December 14, 1950. [129] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, December 31, 1950. 641.74/12–3150 Memorandum by Mr. Stuart D. Nelson of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Director of That Office (Berry) 774.00/2–2450 [Document 106] Memorandum by Mr. Stuart D. Nelson of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to the Director of That Office ( Berry ) 2 confidential [ Washington ,] February 24, 1950. Subject: Problem Summary for Egypt I. Egyptian Relations with Great Britain ( a ) Both Britain and Egypt have expressed a desire to revise the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance of 1936. In this regard, the Egyptians claim that they will not negotiate in regard to a new treaty unless they are given assurances by Great Britain that the latter government will withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal zone and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Egyptians claim that there is no further need for British troops in the Canal Zone and that the presence of such troops on Egyptian soil constitutes a violation of Egypt’s sovereign rights. It is now anticipated that discussions in regard to a revised treaty may be initiated som Although the Egyptian Government has denounced the Treaty of 1936, the Department has continued to look upon it as still being in effect. It is expected that the Department will assume a neutral position during any negotiations for the revision of this Treaty. ( b ) The British and Egyptians are currently holding discussions in Cairo in regard to a financial and trade agreement. Negotiations have been proceeding slowly since the British are reluctant to release large volumes of sterling to the Egyptians and are even more reluctant to allow the Egyptians to convert any large amount of sterling into dollars. It is quite possible that the British may stiffen their attitude concerning dollar conversion due to the recent action of the Egyptian Government in purchasing $47,000,000 worth of gold and U.S. bonds as backing for the Egyptian pound. Lengthy discussions have also been held in regard to the enormous sterling balances held by the Egyptians (slightly under $1,000,000,000). The British would like to see a part of this debt canceled by the Egyptians or to arrange for a long term funding program supplemented by the inducement of an exchange of U.S. dollars by the U.S. for a portion of the Egyptian held sterling. The Department is interested in the negotiations of an Anglo-Egyptian financial accord but it has followed a hands-off policy pending a review of our position in regard to the sterling balances. It is possible that the United States may seek a solution to the sterling balance problem by assuming a portion of the sterling debt held by many countries against Britain. II. Egyptian Relations in regard to Israel On February 24, 1949 the Egyptians signed an Armistice with Israel. 3 During the last year, Egypt’s willingness to negotiate a final peace settlement with Israel seems to have increased considerably. Both Governments have intimated that they are willing to enter into direct negotiations for a final peace settlement. However, the situation remains extremely touchy in Egypt and the Egyptian Government is proceeding with extreme caution so as not to arouse the ire of the Egyptian people. Officials of the Egyptian Government have stated recently that they do not have any intentions of opening a “second round” against Israel. The Foreign Office has declared that the Armistice Agreement which was signed with Israel on February 24, 1949 will remain in effect until a final peace is concluded. The Department should continue to follow its present policy of encouraging direct negotiations or a settlement via the Palestine Conciliation Commission. III. Syria-Iraq Unification 4 The Egyptian Government has been bitterly opposed to the unification of Syria and Iraq. The Egyptians have announced that although they are opposed to the unification of Syria and Iraq, they will raise no objections if it is accomplished by the freely expressed will of the people. However, it should be noted that Egypt supported General Zaim 5 who was opposed to the unification of Syria with Iraq, and, in addition, Egypt has made loans to Syria in the past and is currently holding discussions with the Syrian Minister of National Economy 6 in regard to a contemplated loan to Syria of £3,000,000. Egypt has also proposed a plan for an Arab League Security Pact in order to counteract the unification plans of Syria and Iraq. The present policy of neutrality followed by the United States in regard to unification of Syria and Iraq should be continued. IV. Economic Factors involving Political Considerations ( a ) Suez Canal—Although several approaches have been made to the Egyptian Government by the large maritime powers during the last six months in regard to allowing complete freedom of shipping through the Suez Canal, Egypt has remained extremely adamant in regard to the lifting of restrictions on Suez Canal shipping. The Egyptians particularly refuse to allow oil to be shipped through the Suez Canal to the refinery at Haifa. They refuse to allow such shipments unless the Iraqi reopen the pipeline to Haifa prior to or simultaneously with the Egyptian opening of the Suez Canal to such oil traffic. The Egyptians fear that if they were the first to take such action they would lose considerable face with the other Arab states. The United States should continue to press for the removal of these restrictions. ( b ) Proposed restrictions on visas—Although the Egyptians have removed most of the restrictions which had been imposed upon visas, there is a danger that the Egyptian Government will be forced to reapply the ruling that no passport containing an Israeli visa can be accepted in Egypt. This danger exists due to a proposal made by Lebanon in one of the committees of the Arab League. It was proposed that the Arab States should have a unified policy in regard to the acceptance of Israeli visas and the Committee favored the ruling of not accepting any passport containing an Israeli visa. This action has not as yet been clarified. The United States should attempt to prevent a return to the former restrictions on visas by approaching the Egyptian Government and pointing out the disadvantages to Egypt of such a position. ( c ) Cotton quota For several years the Egyptian Government has been urging the United States to remove its quota on long staple cotton since such a removal would provide far greater dollar revenue for Egypt. The Department has continually expressed itself as being in complete sympathy with the Egyptian Government’s desire but has also pointed out to the Egyptians that there are many domestic political considerations which have stymied the removal of the cotton quota. However, the Department has this matter under serious consideration and is endeavoring to have the removal of this quota once again placed under consideration by the U.S. Tariff Commission. Although it is somewhat doubtful that the elimination of this quota would result in a substantial increase in cotton imports from Egypt, it is very desirable that the quota be removed if possible since it only serves as an irritant to our relations with Egypt. It is possible that the U.S. Government may stockpile long staple cotton in the near future and this would mean large sales outside the quota for Egypt. V. Military Developments The Egyptian Government now plans to build an army which will be one of the most formidable in the Near East. For fiscal year 1949 the Egyptians appropriated some £52,000,000 for military expenditures. Possibly 40% of this amount has recently been spent in Britain by an Egyptian purchasing mission which placed large orders for jet planes, tanks, armored cars, and other military equipment. Initial delivery dates on most of this material will start some 2 or 3 years hence. It, therefore, appears that the Egyptians are not in a position to initiate an aggressive move against Israel. The Egyptians have also expressed an intense interest in training officers in both Great Britain and the United States. To date, only a token number of officers have been admitted to courses in the United States. Some months ago, the Egyptians made an unofficial approach to Embassy Cairo in regard to a U.S. training mission for Egypt. They were not encouraged in regard to such a mission at that time and no further approaches have been made. The Israeli have expressed great dismay at the recent acquisitions by the Egyptians of British arms which they claim will be used against them in a “second round” by the Arabs. Although they have been officially assured that the United States and the United Nations are both keeping a very close eye upon the situation, the Israeli continue to express grave concern about those arms. It would perhaps be advisable for the United States to make a survey of what this Government considers to be an adequate military force for Egypt. In the meantime, the United States should encourage Israeli-Arab negotiations for peace treaties in order to create stability in the area. 7 2 Burton Y. Berry. 3 For documentation concerning the Armistice, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. 4 For documentation concerning plans for the unification of Syria and Iraq, see ibid. , pp. 180 ff. 5 Colonel Husni Zaim, former President of Syria. 6 Ma’ruf al-Dawalibi. 7 The following handwritten note, presumably by Burton Y. Berry, appeared on the last page of this memorandum: “Egypt’s policy among the Arabs: ‘divide and conquer’. The ruling class is doing something for the fellahin because of the fear of Russia—this is an approach that we can use to bring the Egyptians our way. Many officials according to their lights are doing their best for the country. You have all over the Moslem world an unhealthy situation but you can not sail into it unless you eliminate the element that is now in control which is a risk that we can not take as the reaction would take the form of an anti-foreign movement. “We can not endorse an Arab pact, as it seems to be directed against Israel, but we favor any pact that brings peace, stability, prosperity and general wellbeing to the area.” Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb) 641.74/4–350 [Document 107] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Webb ) top secret [ Washington ,] April 3, 1950. Subject: British Relations with Egypt It is my understanding that the President recently expressed his concern to you regarding the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, in the light of current telegrams from our Embassy in London. It is believed that the President is referring to telegrams from our Embassies in London and Cairo with respect to a recent letter from Nahas, the Egyptian Prime Minister, to Mr. Bevin (Tabs A and B) 1 and the British reaction thereto (Tabs C and D). 2 Nahas’ letter deals with the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 which is valid until 1956. Briefly, the Egyptians now wish to revive previous conversations about the Suez and Sudan and desire early evacuation of both areas by the British. On the other hand, the British believe, that there is no great hurry and that the important problem is to choose the right moment for the negotiations. Meanwhile, the British feel that King Farouk will be able to exert a moderating influence on the fairly strong nationalistic position which the Wafdist Government, headed by Nahas, feels it must take. 3 During a general conversation on this subject on March 20, between representatives of our Embassy in London and the British Foreign Office, the British hoped we would make it clear to the Egyptians that there was no use in attempting to play off the United States against the United Kingdom (with specific reference to arms shipments) and that General Collins would be able during his present visit to the Near East to talk frankly with King Farouk regarding the present world situation. 4 (Tab C) As these suggestions appeared reasonable and in line with the present policy of U.S.–U.K. cooperation in the Near East, Ambassador Caffery was authorized (Tab E) 5 to comply with regard to the first suggestion, leaving the question of timing and method to his discretion. With regard to the second suggestion, Ambassador Caffery was informed the Department had no objection provided General Collins was agreeable and Ambassador Caffery was of the opinion that a useful purpose would be served. Ambassador Caffery subsequently informed the Department (Tab B) that he would again approach the Egyptian authorities as suggested and that he approved a frank talk between General Collins and King Farouk. Recommendation: It is recommended that you discuss this matter with the President along the foregoing lines. 6 1 Neither printed. Tab A was telegram 257 and Tab B was telegram 276, from Cairo, March 17 and 22 (641.74/3–1750 and 3–2250). 2 Neither printed. Tab C was telegram 1530 and Tab D was telegram 1611, from London, March 20 and 24 (641.74/3–2050 and 3–2450). 3 The Wafd Party, led by Prime Minister Nahas, came to power in Egypt after an overwhelming victory in the general elections of January 3, 1950. 4 The main theme of Gen. J. Lawton Collins’ discussions with Egyptian officials and with King Farouk was to stress the necessity of the British retaining rights for military bases in Egypt. A copy of his report to the Secretary of the Army is in Department of State file 780.5/4–1750. 5 Not printed. Tab E was telegram 239 from the Department of State to Cairo, March 22 (641.74/3–2050). 6 An attached memorandum by James E. Webb recorded that this information was given to the President on April 18. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) 641.74/6–150 [Document 108] Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs ( Stabler ) 1 to the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Berry ) top secret [ Washington ,] June 1, 1950. Subject: Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations Background and Present Status On March 21 the Egyptian Ambassador in London presented a letter from the Egyptian Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary Bevin regarding Anglo-Egyptian negotiations for the revision of the 1936 Treaty. In this letter Nahas Pasha requested the early opening, of conversations about the Suez and the Sudan, and expressed the Egyptian desire for an early evacuation of both areas. It is also understood that the letter expressed willingness to discuss future negotiations only after evacuation. At the same time the Egyptian Ambassador, apparently prompted by the King, suggested that Field Marshal Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, pay another visit to Egypt. Mr. Bevin thanked the Egyptian Ambassador for the letter and stated that while he regarded it as a personal communication and not as an official note, he would be glad to consider the points raised. This line was followed since the British Government did not wish the Egyptian Government to claim that official notes were being exchanged on this question. It appears, however, that the Egyptian press has been informed in general about both the March 21 letter and the subsequent British reply. On May 17 Foreign Secretary Bevin sent a message to the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs through the Egyptian Ambassador in London. This message indicated that the UK desired a settlement of the Treaty question on the basis of mutual trust and equality, and suggested that as a first step Field Marshal Slim should visit Cairo on his way to Australia to discuss certain military aspects of the problem. The British Foreign Office has informed us that Field Marshal Slim’s line will be to impress upon the Egyptians their inability to defend themselves and the necessity for joint Anglo-Egyptian military collaboration. Slim will not discuss any political aspects of the question. The Egyptian Foreign Minister has informed our Ambassador that the British reply makes no reference to the Egyptian desire for early evacuation and unification of the Nile Valley and that, on the contrary, it insists that military questions are now more important than political questions. The Egyptian Foreign Minister has prepared a reply which is to be given to Foreign Secretary Bevin by the Egyptian Ambassador in London, in which he will state that the Egyptian Government will agree to military talks and will welcome the visit of Field Marshal Slim. He will also state that military talks, however, cannot take the place of political talks. Finally he will inquire whether the UK is ready to commence political talks on the basis of evacuation of both the Canal and the Sudan. It appears that the Egyptian Foreign Minister is upset by Bevin’s failure to reply directly to the March letter and to mention the points on which Egypt wishes to negotiate. British Attitude The UK is faced with two alternatives: 1) permit the Treaty to run until 1956 without making any effort to obtain a longer term agreement and then face the problem at that time; or 2) negotiate a new agreement now. The British consider that the most important step at this time is to prepare a favorable atmosphere for the talks. They believe that King Farouk is favorably disposed to a satisfactory solution and that the present Egyptian Government, which is in a strong position, must reach some agreement if it is to live up to its campaign pledges. They also feel that time may modify some of the extreme and unrealistic views held by the Egyptian Government. It also is interesting to note that the British are wondering whether it might be advisable to scrap the agreement entirely and have some sort of multilateral agreement instead providing some ad hoc arrangements with a “political umbrella”. With respect to the Sudan, the British are thinking of a time table which would result in the Sudan eventually negotiating its own future with Egypt and the UK. Egyptian Attitude Although there is evidence that the King and some of his close advisers are favorably disposed to a settlement of this problem, the Nahas Government continues to demand complete evacuation of Egypt and the Sudan before it will discuss any future arrangements. Recently the Foreign Minister has stated that there are four ways of dealing with the problem: 1) Negotiations with the British; 2) Appeal to the Security Council; 3) Appeal to the General Assembly; or 4) Appeal to the International Court. The Foreign Minister said that if necessary Egypt would in turn employ all four of these methods. The Egyptian Government has also approached the US Government with a view to obtaining support of the Egyptian position. United States Attitude We regard this question primarily one between the UK and Egypt. However, we have taken action recently to make quite clear to the Egyptian Government that there is no use for it to try to play off the US against the UK, and that we strongly support the maintenance by the UK of strategic facilities in Egypt. We have also pointed out that a satisfactory and reasonable solution is in Egypt’s own interest since Egypt can only stand to lose by instability in the Near East area, which would inevitably result from the military vacuum created by UK abandonment of its bases in Egypt. 2 Conclusion It would appear that the UK and Egyptian positions are still too far apart for successful political negotiations in the immediate future The British are unwilling to discuss evacuation of their bases unless some agreement is reached in advance regarding future arrangements. The Egyptians, on the other hand, will not discuss future arrangements until the evacuation has been completed. The most that can be hoped for is continued and increased military collaboration between the UK and Egypt. However, it is important that the Egyptians not be permitted to bring the political aspects to a head too soon and proceed with some ill-advised action such as referring the question back to the UN. Should it appear that the Egyptian Government is contemplating, for domestic political reasons, bringing the matter before the UN again, it might be advisable for the US to counsel moderation and patience. There is also the danger that the Wafd Government will inspire a violent press campaign on this issue against the US and the UK in order to cover up its inefficacy. 1 Wells Stabler. 2 On May 2 the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Egypt to inform the Egyptian government that the United States strongly supports the United Kingdom on the grounds that: “1. A satisfactory and reasonable solution is in Egypt’s own interest since Egypt can only stand to lose by instability in NE area which wld inevitably result from military vacuum created by UK abandonment of bases in Egypt. “2. It is extremely important in interest security of NE and preservation world peace that UK have certain strategic facilities in Egypt particularly in Suez Canal Zone area. “3. UK shld have right to maintain these facilities during peace time in such condition that they can be effectively and speedily used in case of immediate threat to security in NE.” (Telegram 367 to Cairo; 641.74/5–2450.) Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) 774.56/7–1050 [Document 109] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Berry ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) top secret [ Washington ,] July 10, 1950. Subject: Lend Lease Retransfer of Ammunition to the Egyptian Army Discussion: Last February and March the British requested our approval for the retransfer of 164,000 rounds of 75 mm and 2,100,000 rounds of 37 mm ammunition from lend lease stocks to the Egyptian Army. 1 No action could be taken on these requests pending determination of our policy on arms shipments to Israel and the Arab States. However, as it has been decided that limited quantities of low potential military equipment will be made available to the Arab States and Israel, 2 conversations were held with the British with respect to the ammunition for the Egyptian Army. Since the quantities requested appeared to be entirely out of line with Egyptian training needs, we compiled jointly with the British figures on the number of Egyptian armored vehicles using 75 mm and 37 mm guns as well as figures on the amount of ammunition, according to US-UK training standards, used per year by each armored vehicle. On this basis it was decided that an appropriate amount of ammunition for the Egyptians for one year’s training would be 84,000 rounds of 75 mm and 50,000 rounds of 37 mm. It seemed that the only logical way of proceeding would be to agree on a formula, such as training requirements for one year, which could be readily used in order to defend any criticism regarding these arms and ammunition shipments. It is proposed that we use the same formula for requests from Israel. It should be added that the British have suggested that since the Egyptians have received no 75 mm ammunition for two years and since 75 mm ammunition is the more important item, we might be willing to release the full amount of 75 mm ammunition requested, i.e. 164,000 rounds. The attached telegram, however, is drafted to approve only 84,000 rounds of 75 mm ammunition as we believe that only one year’s training requirement can be legitimately defended. Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign the attached telegram to Cairo. 3 1 The initial British request was transmitted to the Department of State on February 28 in despatch 952 from London. (774.56/2–2850) The request was changed on April 28 to that of seeking blanket permission to retain and dispose of certain lend-lease military supplies without further reference to United States authorities. (Despatch 2546 from London, May 24; 780.56/5–2450) The Department of State, after consultation with the Department of Defense, decided not to grant blanket permission. (Airgram 43 to London, July 13;750.56/5–2450) 2 For documentation concerning this decision which culminated in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, see pp. 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] ff. 3 Not printed; this telegram, sent to Cairo by the Department of State on July 10, informed the Embassy of the Department’s decision as noted in the source text and instructed its officers not to reveal to the Egyptians the basis upon which the Department arrived at its decision about the approved quantity of ammunition. (774.56/7–1050) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) 641.74/7–1750 [Document 110] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs ( Stabler ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] July 17, 1950. Subject: Korea, Palestine and Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations. Participants: Mr. Mohamed Kamel Bey Abdul Rahim, Ambassador of Egypt Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Wells Stabler, ANE Problem: To receive the views of the Ambassador on Anglo-Egyptian negotiations and other problems. Action Required: To determine whether the U.S. could appropriately be of assistance in connection with the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Action Assigned to: ANE Discussion: [Here follows discussion concerning Egypt’s attitude toward the Korean War and Palestine.] 3. Anglo-Egyptian Negotiations —Abdul Rahim Bey said that while the Palestine situation was a sore point with the Egyptians, it was only secondary to the much more important question of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Egyptian public opinion was unanimously against Great Britain because of the latter’s determination to maintain troops in Egypt. This situation could not continue. The British Ambassador and Field Marshal Slim had discussed certain questions with Egyptian officials, but so far no concrete results were apparent. 2 The Ambassador wondered whether the U.S. could not give some friendly advice to Great Britain to agree to evacuate its troops from Egypt. The Ambassador pointed out that such an evacuation could not take place under 1½ to 2 years and, therefore, the withdrawal would not be precipitate. Future arrangements would be based on a treaty with a Common Defense Board and the troops could withdraw to Cyrenaica, Cyprus or Jordan where they would be readily available in the event of war. The Common Defense Board might even be expanded to include other countries in the Near Eastern area and might also lead to American participation. Mr. McGhee immediately interposed that the U.S. would not be prepared to participate in such an arrangement. The Ambassador said that he understood this but hoped that the U.S. would give such a plan its blessing. Abdul Rahim Bey pointed out that under the Sidky-Bevin formula of 1946 3 the British had agreed to withdraw their troops within 2 years and to replace the 1936 Treaty with a treaty along the lines of the British treaty with Turkey. This arrangement had fallen down because of the Sudan question. The Ambassador emphasized that he was not requesting us to mediate between Egypt and the U.K. but rather that we should give friendly counsel to the British. He felt strongly that the only way in which we could preserve friendship with Egypt would be for the Anglo-Egyptian question to be arranged in a manner which would satisfy Egyptian aspirations. Mr. McGhee pointed out that it did not seem wise to consider evacuating British troops from Egypt under present circumstances. Russian aggression in the Near Eastern area was entirely possible and it would be essential to our common strategic plans to have the British on the spot. He felt that Egypt could only lose by the instability in the Near Eastern area which would inevitably result from the military vacuum which would be created by the abandonment of British bases. Moreover, in the event of aggression it would not be so easy, from the military point of view, to bring back the troops to bases which had not been kept in operating order. Mr. Stabler pointed out that the Sidky-Bevin formula had been reached in 1946 at a time when the world situation looked better than it does now. Consequently the new situation had to be taken into consideration in connection with the demand that the British should evacuate its troops. The Ambassador said he appreciated these points of view but felt that since evacuation could not possibly take place in less than 2 years, it would be possible to agree in principle to evacuation without having any serious effect on military planning. He again expressed the hope that the U.S. might put in a good word to the British. Mr. McGhee said we very much hoped that Egypt and the U.K. would be able to reach a satisfactory and reasonable solution of their problem. We had considered the matter principally one for determination by the two parties and had not given consideration to the approach the Ambassador had in mind. However, as a result of what the Ambassador had said, we would give consideration to this question and see if there was anything we might appropriately do. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation to Mr. McGhee and took his departure. 1 Copies sent to London and Cairo. 2 Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, visited Egypt on June 5–6 on his way to Australia. On his return trip to London, he again visited Cairo on July 12–13 and held conferences with the King and the Foreign Minister (despatch 1374 from Cairo, June 12, 974.5301/6–1250, and despatch 51 from Cairo, July 14, 774.00/7–1450). The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published their record of these conversations in 1951 in a “Green Paper” entitled Records of Conversations, Notes and Papers exchanged “between the Royal Egyptian Government and the United Kingdom Government ( March 1950–November 1951 ), pp. 10–22 and 29–33. 3 For documentation concerning this formula and the related negotiations of 1946, see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. vii , pp. 69 – 78 . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 774.56/9–1350: Telegram [Document 111] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State top secret London , September 13, 1950. 1584. According Edmonds, 1 African Department Foreign Office, British Ambassador Cairo 2 informed Egyptian acting Minister Foreign Affairs Monday that in light present international situation UK Government had been obliged review priority given arms shipments (Embtels 1163 August 24, 795 August 8) 3 and to give first consideration to needs of countries with which UK had “working defense agreements”. (Comment: This means primarily NATO and Commonwealth; it does not mean Egypt.) As consequence, UK would have cancel delivery on remaining 65 jet fighters which Egyptians had ordered and might have do same for 16 Centurion tanks already ordered and for radar equipment. However, in view fact Egyptians have already paid for tanks ordered it might be possible make delivery by end of year. Acting Foreign Minister asked that nothing be said publicly about UK decision in view embarrassing interrogations this bound raise in Egyptian Parliament. Accordingly, UK ministers have been carefully briefed avoid any reference in Commons. However, story leaked in press today through error Foreign Office NE Department which discussed decision with Daily Telegraph diplomatic correspondent. Telegraph presented report of UK decision as coming from “unnamed Egyptian Cabinet Minister” in Cairo who is cited as saying that Britain has decided to reimpose ban on arms deliveries. Edmonds said decision would definitely eliminate prospects any more jets going to Egypt and he thought it was doubtful, in view needs Korea, whether UK would be able ship any tanks, with possible exception 16 Centurions. As for radar of type used for intercepting aircraft, he thought at best there would be none available for Egypt for at least 18 months. It might be possible, however, send type used as directional aid for firing ground weapons. While criterion giving first preference on British availabilities to NATO and Commonwealth countries will apply to all types arms, he thought foregoing three items would be principal ones of which Egypt and rest of NE would be deprived. Edmonds said 65 jet fighters whose delivery now cancelled had been contracted but not yet paid for. 4 Sent Department 1584, repeated Cairo 27. Holmes 1 R. H. G. Edmonds. 2 Sir Ralph G. Stevenson. 3 Neither printed. 4 As British Assistant Under-Secretary of State Wright subsequently revealed to Ambassador Douglas in London on October 5, this decision by the British Foreign Office was made for several reasons. First, increasing world tension and demands from allies forced the British to review their priorities. Second, Egypt’s uncooperative attitude on defense matters led to the Foreign Office’s conclusion that the suspension of arms might have a beneficial effect by making the Egyptian government realize that its uncooperative attitude carried its penalties. (Telegram 2013 from London, October 5; 774.56/10–550) Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussion 780.00/9–1850 [Document 112] Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussion 1 top secret [ London , September 19, 1950.] Participants: Foreign Office: Mr. Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Mr. Roger Allen, Head, African Department Mr. R. H. G. Edmonds, African Department Mr. K. J. Simpson, African Department Department of State Hon. George C. McGhee Mr. Samuel Kopper 2 Mr. Elmer Bourgerie 3 American Embassy, London Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd 4 Miss Margaret Tibbetts 5 Mr. John F. Root 6 Anglo-Egyptian Relations (Item 8 under Near East) Mr. Allen reviewed briefly the recent discussions with the Egyptian Government on defense problems and the Sudan: The results had been almost entirely negative. There appeared to be almost no realization on the part of the Egyptians that the defense of their country was more important than political aspirations. The British Ambassador has concluded that there is no chance for agreement on defense arrangements without a time limit on the evacuation of the Canal Zone. The Egyptians have in mind a limit of about one year and in any event will certainly insist upon evacuation in less than the three years specified in the Bevin-Sidky draft treaty of 1946. The Foreign Office hopes that the Egyptian Foreign Minister’s visit to Lake Success 7 may help him to appreciate something beyond the parochial interests of Egypt and that representatives of other countries there will take the opportunity of speaking frankly to him about security considerations in the Middle East. (Mr. Wright said later in the discussion that the UK hoped to encourage approaches of this nature by the French, Turks, Greeks and Commonwealth countries. He indicated he hoped the US would also join in.) However, the British Ambassador was not optimistic that even this pressure would be really effective. He feared the Foreign Minister was too much a prisoner of Wafd aspirations. The picture, then, was one of complete deadlock. Egypt was in a vital area and the Canal Zone provided the most suitable base, for which there appeared to be no immediate satisfactory alternative. Mr. Wright said the problem had three aspects: (1) the joint defense of Egypt, particularly air defense; (2) the location of the main supply and administrative base; and (3) the location of a striking force. It was this last question which was the most difficult and if it could be settled he thought it would be possible to work out an agreement on the other two. Mr. Allen said the UK was now looking for some face-saving formula under which the UK would, in principle, evacuate British troops from the area while at the same time obtaining Egyptian acquiescence in some sort of arrangement for a base. Mr. Wright said the UK legal advisers had studied the problem and had concluded it would be legally impossible for the UK to claim any right to stay in Egypt after 1956. This, then, was the problem and he would like to know whether the US agreed that the withdrawal of the British forces would leave a vacuum. Mr. McGhee replied that we did agree and pointed out that we had supported the British position as far as we were able to do so. We had turned down all Egyptian efforts to get us to intervene and had emphasized that this is not the time to jeopardize the security of the area. Mr. McGhee went on to say, however, that, in our concern for the problem, we had become interested in the possibilities of the “Gaza strip” proposal and would like to take the opportunity of examining the proposal further with the UK. It seemed to us that it might be the answer to satisfy the Egyptians and that Israel might accept it if it were coupled with an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The territory is of no particular advantage to the Egyptians but the presence of Egyptians there is disturbing to the Israelis. The Israelis badly want a peace treaty and might well agree to have the UK in the Gaza strip as the price. Egypt on the other hand could balance a peace treaty with evacuation of British troops from the Canal Zone. Through this proposal can we not, perhaps, visualize the pieces of our puzzle gradually fitting together and achieve the dual objective of satisfying defense considerations and breaking the Arab-Israeli impasse at an important point? There was, to be sure, the added problem of the refugees, but this would have to be dealt with eventually in any case. 8 Mr. Allen agreed that the Gaza idea might provide a key to the overall problem but wished to emphasize certain considerations from a military point of view. First of all, the transfer of troops to Gaza could not be carried out if Israel opposed it and as a consequence might refuse to permit the transit of troops across Israeli territory in time of war. More than this, the arrangement must have the cooperation and agreement of the Israeli Government. There is very little room for training and maneuvering and the plan would not work if there was the constant danger of incidents with a hostile or unfriendly Israel. Mr. Allen added that the British Minister in Tel Aviv felt there was no possibility of getting the Israelis to accept the Gaza proposal without a peace treaty with Egypt. Mr. McGhee said we, too, assumed this to be an essential. He thought, in fact, the advantages of such a bargain might be played up with Israel. Mr. Wright explained that there was not yet unanimity of view within UK circles on the Gaza proposal. To him personally it was attractive and he was inclined to agree with the US on its advantages. In answer to Mr. Wright’s question, Mr. Allen said that, according to the British Ambassador in Cairo, the Egyptians would count the removal of British troops to Gaza as evacuation. Mr. Wright then went on to caution that the whole idea, if adopted, would have to be taken up very carefully with the Egyptians so that we would not lose the tactical advantages we hoped to derive from it. We would not want them to think it was something we wanted too badly or they might raise the price of agreement. There were also the legal difficulties. The Egyptians now administer Gaza but, if British troops were to be evacuated there, the Egyptians would have to be able to say that it was not Egyptian territory. If it was not Egyptian, asked Mr. Wright, whose was it to be? Mr. McGhee emphasized again that a peace treaty would have to lay the legal basis for the arrangement. Answering Mr. McGhee’s question, Mr. Wright said he saw no particular conflict arising between Britain’s obligation under the Tripartite Agreement and the presence of British troops so close to the Israeli border. He thought their presence there would, in fact, represent an even greater guarantee of security than the Tripartite Agreement alone. Mr. Wright said he was willing to have us sound out our representatives in Israel about the probable Israeli reaction to the Gaza proposal, provided we did not let the Israelis know in any way that it was under consideration. The UK, he said, would be very glad to learn what we thought about the prospect of Israeli agreement. Mr. McGhee wondered whether the UK was giving thought to other alternative bases, such as Iraq and Cyrenaica. Mr. Wright said that he believed the UK and US Chiefs of Staff had already agreed these areas would not be suitable for bases in wartime. One was too far north, the other too far away. This, of course, did not apply in the same way to the present location of a striking force and the UK was looking at all the alternatives, including Libya. He thought the lesson in Korea showed that we must strengthen the Middle East militarily in peace time and he felt that this could most effectively be done if, again using the Korean example, the burden did not fall on any one nation alone, but instead we applied the principle of coordinated effort in the Middle East. This led him to ask whether it would be possible to work out some arrangement of this kind in Libya. Just as the UK had provided a contingent for our major effort in Korea, would the US be prepared to station a land contingent in Tripolitania to supplement the UK forces in Cyrenaica? If this were done, it would substantially increase the attractiveness of Libya as a UK base and give the presence of the UK troops there a wider character. He thought that, even if our forces were only small ones, their presence would be particularly beneficial psychologically. Mr. McGhee agreed to discuss this question with officials in Washington. He believed the latest thinking of our defense authorities was that we did not have such forces available but on the basis of Mr. Wright’s inquiry he would pursue the matter further on his return to the US. He suggested that a similar benefit would accrue if US forces were stationed, for example, in Dhahran. Mr. Wright agreed that this was so, especially with regard to defense of the Persian Gulf. Mr. Allen again reminded the group of some of the difficulties from the military standpoint in the way of working out satisfactory arrangements. The difficulty of stationing a striking force in Cyrenaica, for example, was that this was a long way from the likely danger zone. As for a joint defense arrangement with Egypt which would give the semblance of Egyptian control, he was not at all sure it would be easy to work out an arrangement satisfactory to both Egypt and the UK. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, he said, is very insistent oil a time limit for evacuation, but there are considerable administrative problems in carrying this out. Furthermore, the UK would still need in the Canal Zone very considerable numbers of administrative and technical personnel. Mr. Allen said that we had no doubt noticed that the UK was now taking a tougher line with the Egyptians. Recently it had put an embargo on the supply of jet aircraft and certain other military items to Egypt. With regard to the Sudan, there was relatively little attention focussed on it in the recent negotiations between the British Ambassador and the Egyptian Foreign Minister and, on the whole, the UK had been fairly successful in keeping this issue separate from the defense problem. He believed the Egyptian Foreign Minister had envisaged a transitional period of about two years, following which the UK would evacuate all British officials and troops. At this time the Sudan would take some autonomous position under the Egyptian crown. The British Ambassador, said Mr. Allen, had made it clear that the UK considered these suggestions entirely unrealistic. Mr. Allen said that the UK would be interested in any views we might have on the UK’s program of political development in the Sudan. Mr. Kopper said that we had little information concerning the Sudan upon which to make an evaluation. As far as we knew things seemed to be going satisfactorily. Suez Canal (Item 9 under Near East) Mr. Allen said this question fitted into the discussion on Egyptian-Israeli relations which had gone before. He noted the positions we both had adopted regarding the Egyptian restrictions on Canal traffic and the protests we had made, which, unfortunately, had so far failed to budge the Egyptians. 9 The Foreign Office, he said, has been under considerable pressure from Parliament to take some decisive action in the matter and has been deeply concerned about what it might do. It had sought the advice of its legal advisers on the legality of the Egyptian restrictions and, while their views were not entirely conclusive, in general it appeared that the arguments were fairly nicely balanced and that on the whole the Egyptians were entitled to their 1 present course of action. Mr. Wright pointed out that the Egyptians had not denied passage through the Canal to any ships, but had merely specified that certain cargoes must be removed. The UK had given some thought to referring the question to the International Court, but it now appeared that an international tribunal judging the dispute on its legal merits would probably support the Egyptian position. There was the further complication that the UK could not compel the Egyptians to appear before the International Court since they had not signed the “optional clause” and were therefore under no obligation to accept the Court’s jurisdiction. With this the prospect, the Foreign Office felt it had to proceed very cautiously and to do nothing premature which might prejudice the whole position, not only for itself but for other maritime powers as well. Mr. Allen added that the UK legal advisers did feel that as time went on and the threat from Israel diminished, it became increasingly difficult for the Egyptians to justify their restrictions. Mr. McGhee said that the opinion of the Department’s legal advisers was substantially the same as that just described. However, our advisers did feel we were justified in protesting any Egyptian restrictions which could be considered unreasonable and impracticable. We had used this argument, for example, in protesting the requirement that the Egyptians be furnished a Certificate of Destination on tanker cargoes. There was then some discussion of the possibility of joint action by the maritime powers using the Canal. It was felt this might, for example, provide a means of dealing with the requirement for a certificate of destination, but that at the same time if joint action were used it would have to command wide and wholehearted support to be effective. Both the UK and US officials agreed that we should not go beyond our present efforts in pressing the Egyptians on legal grounds, except to the extent that their requirements were “unreasonable and impracticable”, and that, in general, it would be unwise to take a tougher line with the Egyptians and attempt to force the Suez Canal issue with any threat of retaliation. It was felt that in dealing with the problem we were brought back to the whole question of relations between Egypt and Israel and that the ultimate solution would probably have to fit into the context of this wider problem. Mr. Allen suggested the possibility that the Egyptians might be encouraged to use the relaxation of the Suez Canal restrictions as a gesture to Israel preliminary to peace negotiations. [Here follows a discussion of two items from the agenda dealing with African affairs.] 1 A series of discussions concerning Middle Eastern, African, and South Asian problems took place when Assistant Secretary of State McGhee visited London between September 18–23. On September 19 they discussed two items from their agenda dealing with the Near East; in addition they analyzed two African questions. Regarding McGhee’s trip which took him to Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, see the editorial note, p. 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] . 2 Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs. 3 Director, Office of African Affairs. 4 First Secretary. 5 Attaché. 6 Second Secretary. 7 Lake Success, New York, was a temporary site for the meetings of the United Nations pending completion of permanent headquarters. 8 The “Gaza Plan” was first discussed by the British and Egyptians during a conference held on July 10 between Sir Ralph C. Stevenson, the British Ambassador in Egypt, and Mohamed Salaheddin, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. (Telegram 54 from Cairo, July 12; 641.74/7–1250) 9 On July 19 the Egyptian Government increased their restrictions on the use of the Suez Canal in order to prevent oil supplies from reaching Israel. Masters of north-bound tankers using the Canal were required to furnish a guaranteed declaration concerning the destination of their cargoes and, upon delivery, had to obtain certification from tan official of the Egyptian Government verifying that their cargo was discharged there. (Telegram 129 from Cairo, July 31; 974.531/7–3150; and despatch 23 from Port Said, Augusts 7; 974.53/8–750) The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 474.418/10–350 [Document 113] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State top secret No. 820 Cairo , October 3, 1950. Subject: British Negotiations re Suez Base Referring to numerous recent reports having to do with the British negotiations re the Suez base and especially recent reports having to do with the suspension of arms shipments, I would like to point out that the British should not permit their present resentment at the Wafd to rush them into impetuous acts or activities. As Department will recollect, before the recent elections the British Embassy was enthusiastic about the chances of a Wafd success, believing that a Wafd Government more readily than any other Government would be willing to come to an agreement with them regarding Suez and the Sudan. They were right about the Wafd chances of success, but dead wrong about the Wafd disposition to come to terms with them. On the contrary the Wafd, in view of their previous British associations, and especially in view of the well-known Abdin Palace tank incident 1 were and still are afraid of being tagged with pro-British paint and have been very recalcitrant in their conversations with the British representatives. The British are resentful at this and resentful moreover because the Government has encouraged the Egyptian press to stir up public feeling against them, and British prestige has suffered grievously since the Wafd advent to power. I say that at this time in view of their suspension of arms shipments, as in my opinion it behooves the British to handle this matter with extreme care because it seems to be boomeranging against them. Jefferson Caffery 1 For documentation concerning this incident of February 1942 during which the British forced the King to appoint Nahas Pasha as Prime Minister and to accept a new government formed by the Wafd Party, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 63 – 71 . Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State 611.74/10–1250 [Document 114] Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( Berry ) 1 to the Secretary of State top secret [ Washington ,] October 12, 1950. Subject: Egyptian Foreign Minister’s conversations with you and Secretary Marshall Tentative arrangements have been made for the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Dr. Mohamed Salaheddin Bey, to call upon you on October 17. Salaheddin Bey is at the present time in charge of his country’s delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. He will see General George Marshall, the Secretary of Defense, on October 18. There is attached a summary of United States views and policies with respect to the various questions which the Egyptian Foreign Minister is expected to raise (Tab A). It is believed that we should continue to adhere to these views and policies in our conversations with him. In view of the desirability of adopting a uniform position on these matters in the conversations with the Foreign Minister, there is also attached a proposed letter to Secretary Marshall (Tab B) 2 transmitting a copy of the summary of United States views and policies for his guidance. General Marshall’s comments and suggestions have been invited. Recommendation: It is recommended: 1. That you discuss the matters which the Egyptian Foreign Minister may raise as outlined in the summary of United States views and policies (Tab A); 2. That you sign the attached letter to Secretary Marshall transmitting a copy of the summary (Tab B). [Tab A] The Department of State’s Views and Policies Concerning Certain Problems With Regard to Egypt top secret [ Washington , October 11, 1950.] The following is a summary of the views and policies of the Department regarding questions which it is expected the Egyptian Foreign Minister may wish to raise in his discussions with Government officials: 1. Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Relations 2. Possibility of Egypt’s Association with NATO 3. Arms Shipment to Egypt from the United Kingdom 4. Arms from the United States 1. Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Relations There have been indications that the Egyptian Foreign Minister may request this Government to mediate between Egypt and the United Kingdom in their dispute regarding the stationing of British troops in Egypt and the administration of the Sudan. The Egyptian Ambassador in Washington has stated that his Government would be happy to receive the suggestions of the United States regarding this matter, and the press in Cairo has carried reports that a request for mediation would be made. Background: In 1936 the United Kingdom and Egypt signed a Treaty of Alliance which permits the former to maintain bases and troops in Egypt and which confirms the arrangement by which Egypt and the United Kingdom jointly administer the Sudan. This Treaty is to terminate in 1956 unless revised earlier by mutual agreement. Immediately following World War II, Egypt indicated its desire to revise it, and negotiations with the United Kingdom were begun, only to be broken off in 1947 by Egypt. The Egyptian Government took the question before the Security Council, claiming that the presence of British troops in Egypt was a threat to the peace, but the Council action was inconclusive. The Treaty has been discussed again, over the past few months, by the parties on an informal level. No solution has been reached. Egypt insists upon the evacuation of British troops, and has gone so far as to state that it considers evacuation more important than the defense of Egypt. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, has refused to withdraw its forces until the Egyptian attitude has modified to the extent that discussions on future arrangements are more advanced. The matter of the Sudan has also been brought into the discussions by the Egyptians, who insist that the whole Nile Valley, including the Sudan, be controlled by Egypt alone, without the United Kingdom. The Egyptians have suggested that some arrangement might be worked out whereby the British would remove their combat troops to the Gaza strip, while maintaining the Air Force and certain technical and administrative troops in the Canal Zone area. The United Kingdom is considering the proposal but believes that there are a number of serious objections to it, arising from the nature of the Gaza strip (it is very small and overpopulated) and from the fact that Israel, which surrounds the strip on two sides, might object. The United States believes that it is extremely important in the interests of the maintenance of the security of the Middle East and the preservation of world peace that the British have certain strategic; facilities in Egypt. We believe that the British should have ( a ) the right to maintain these facilities during peacetime in such a condition that they could be effectively and quickly used in case of immediate threat to the security of the Middle East and ( b ) the right of reentry in order to make full use of these facilities. We, therefore, hope that the United Kingdom and Egypt will be able to work out a reasonable solution, and to this end that it will be possible to convince Egypt that it is in its own interest to arrive at such a solution. The Department and the American Ambassador in Cairo have made clear to Egyptian officials that we strongly support the United Kingdom in its desire to maintain strategic facilities in Egypt. We have also indicated that insistence on evacuation would seem undesirable and dangerous in the light of present world conditions. We have, however, pointed out that we consider this question as one primarily for solution by the two parties concerned. With regard to the Sudan, the Department believes that the eventual status of that area should be decided by the Sudanese people. Meanwhile we approve the British policy of bringing Sudanese into the government of the area. Recommendation: In view of the importance which the Department attaches to the maintenance of British troops in Egypt for purposes of defense, it is recommended that this matter be discussed with the Foreign Minister along the following lines: 1. While the Department appreciates the point of view of the Egyptians on this question, it believes that under the conditions presently existing in the world the evacuation of British troops from Egypt would be dangerous. 2. If Egypt would reach an agreement with the United Kingdom by which substantial numbers of British troops could remain in the country, the presence of these troops could no longer be said to constitute an infringement on Egyptian independence, but would instead represent part of Egypt’s contribution to the defense of the area. 3. If the Foreign Minister raises the question of United States mediation, it is suggested that it be emphasized that we consider the problem primarily as one for solution between the United Kingdom and Egypt. 2. Possibility of Egypt’s Association with NATO The Egyptian Government, through the Embassy in Washington, has informally raised with the Department of State the question of possible Egyptian association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 3 In discussing the question with the Department, the Ambassador indicated that the desire of Egypt for some such association was prompted by the invitation recently extended by the NAT Council to Turkey, suggesting that that country cooperate in such appropriate phases of the military planning of the NATO as concern the maintenance of the security of the Mediterranean. The Egyptian Government has expressed its disappointment at being left out of the planning for the area of which it is a part, and may possibly press this Government and the NAT Council for an association similar to that offered Turkey and Greece. Background: Turkey has been anxious for some time to become a member of NATO. However, it was the view of this Government and of the NAT Council that it was undesirable to extend the Treaty to Turkey because of the military commitment it would entail and the precedent it might create, and because the NATO was itself in the early formative stages. The Turkish Government was, therefore, informed that at the present stage of development of NATO it would not be feasible to extend the treaty to Turkey. In view, however, of the difficult domestic position in which the Turkish Government had placed itself by openly requesting membership, some form of association was considered, particularly in the light of certain military advantages which would accrue from associating Turkey with such appropriate phases of military planning as are concerned with the defense of the Mediterranean. There was no question of admitting Turkey to membership in the NAT, although as a European state it was eligible for membership, since this would involve the disadvantages set forth in the preceding paragraph. Therefore, an arrangement was worked out whereby Turkey could be associated with certain phases of military planning on a limited basis without becoming a member. The precise nature of this relationship is to be determined by the NAT Defense Committee. A similar arrangement is also to be made for Greece. In the September, 1950, discussions of the NAT Council there was general agreement that no further extension of the Treaty should at this time be made, whether through membership or special association. 4 Recommendation: If the Foreign Minister should raise the question of Egypt’s possible association with NATO, it is recommended that the following reply be made: 1. It is the belief of the NAT Council that it would be undesirable to extend the Treaty further, since the NATO is still in the process of formation and development and since in any event its primary purpose is the maintenance of the security of the NAT area, particularly Western Europe. The Treaty itself is limited to European states. 5 2. Greece and Turkey are European powers both of which have had a long and active association with the West in its economic and security efforts. They are recipients of ECA aid and are members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the Council of Europe. With regard specifically to security factors, Greece and Turkey represent what might be termed the right flank of the noncommunist states of Europe. 3. Greece and Turkey have not been invited to become members of the NATO, but only to associate themselves, in a limited way, with certain aspects of its military planning. 4. If Egypt desires to cooperate in the defense of the Near East area, there are a number of ways open to it to do so. In particular, it could adopt a more conciliatory attitude in its discussions with the the United Kingdom, and it could cooperate more fully in the efforts of the United Nations to develop an effective security system, including for example, efforts which have been directed toward the restoration of Korean independence. 3. Arms Shipment to Egypt from the United Kingdom The United Kingdom has suspended the shipment to Egypt of certain military equipment which had been promised to Egypt and some of which had been partially paid for. It is expected that the Foreign Minister may request this Government to intercede on behalf of Egypt, and urge the United Kingdom to recommence the shipments. The Acting Foreign Minister has addressed such an appeal to the American Ambassador in Cairo who replied informally that he believed the action to have been dictated by military necessity. Background: Following the lifting of the United Nations embargo on arms shipments to the Near East on August 11, 1949, the British Government began the shipment of armaments to the Arab States, particularly those, like Egypt, with which the United Kingdom has treaty relations. In the case of Egypt, the United Kingdom planned to form an Anglo-Egyptian military partnership to defend the Near East in the event of Soviet aggression. These plans called for the strengthening of the Egyptian army, partially through the shipment to Egypt of a certain amount of heavy tanks and jet planes. On September 11, 1950 the British Government informed Egypt that it intended to suspend the shipment of jet planes, tanks, and certain types of radar which the Egyptian Government had ordered. The British Government stated that this action was necessitated by military considerations involving increased arms requirements in higher priority areas. It was thought possible, however, that some of the tanks, which Egypt had partly paid for, could be supplied before the end of the year. A great deal of bitterness resulted in Egypt, where the move was generally interpreted as retaliation for Egypt’s uncooperative attitude with respect to treaty negotiations with the United Kingdom. The Egyptian Government protested vigorously to the British Ambassador in Cairo and requested the British Government to reconsider its decision. The Department believes that it is in the security interests of the United States that the Near East be militarily strengthened for defense against possible Soviet aggression, and that the countries in that area obtain their arms from reliable and friendly sources. However, this Government appreciates that other areas are at the present time of greater military importance than the Near East, and does not desire to question the decision of the British Government that this fact required diversion elsewhere of equipment destined for Egypt. Recommendation: If the Foreign Minister raises this question, and suggests that the United States intercede with the British Government on behalf of Egypt, it is recommended that he be informed that, while this Government is in general sympathetic to the desire of Egypt for defensive arms, it is aware of the urgent need for arms in other areas. Therefore, we do not believe it desirable to question the diversion of these arms by the United Kingdom to areas of more immediate concern. If the Foreign Minister expresses the belief that the British Government is withholding arms in retaliation for Egypt’s position on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty negotiations, it might simply be stated that we understand the action was taken on the basis of military priorities. 4. Arms from the United States The Egyptian Foreign Minister may request that this country supply Egypt with quantities of arms in lieu of the shipments from the United Kingdom, which have been suspended. It has been rumored in the Egyptian press that he would make such a request under the terms of the Tripartite Declaration on arms and security of the Near East, issued by this Government, the United Kingdom and France on May 25, 1950. Background: When the United Nations Security Council, on August 11, 1949, lifted the embargo on arms shipments to the Near East, representatives of the United States, France and the United Kingdom in the Council stated that their respective countries did not wish to see an arms race take place in the area. The United States subsequently decided to permit the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab States. In view of our desire not to be drawn into an arms race, it was decided that these shipments should be limited to such equipment as we might consider necessary for the maintenance of internal security and for legitimate defense. In May, 1950, the Government of the United States, the United Kingdom and France issued the Tripartite Declaration, in which they recognized the need of the Near Eastern states to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. The Department has examined each application for the export of arms on its individual merits in the light of the policy originally set forth following the lifting of the arms embargo and as stated in the Tripartite Declaration. From time to time the export of certain military equipment has been authorized to Egypt and other Near Eastern States. Egypt has recently received eighteen AT–6 trainer aircraft, heavy calibre ammunition for training purposes and a considerable quantity of 75 and 37 mm guns for the armament of tanks and other vehicles already in the possession of Egypt. Recommendation: It is recommended that, if the Foreign Minister requests that the United States supply Egypt with larger quantities of military equipment, the following line be taken: 1. Egypt is not at the present time authorized to receive military equipment from this country on a grant or cash reimbursable basis. Any arms which it desires it must obtain on the domestic commercial market. 2. At the present time, the supply of military equipment is extremely limited in this country due to extensive domestic requirements and to large-scale commitments to countries in more immediately vital areas. 3. With regard to such equipment as Egypt may locate on the domestic market, the Department will consider applications for its export in the light of the policy set forth above. Certain material has already been exported to Egypt in this manner, as described above. 1 Berry was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State on August 30. 2 Not printed. 3 The Egyptian Government also raised the question of possible NATO membership with the British. (Telegram 444 from Cairo, November 3, 641.74/11–350, and telegram 466 from Cairo, November 9, 641.74/11–950) 4 For documentation on this subject, which relates to Turkish and Greek requests for membership in NATO, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 5 On November 17 the Department of State sent telegram 450 to London instructing the Ambassador to inform the British Foreign Office that the Department did not believe that Egypt’s association would be feasible or desirable at this time. (740.5/11–1050) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 641.74/10–1750 [Document 115] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] October 17, 1950. Subject: Egyptian attitude regarding the following: 1. Uniting for peace resolution 2. Defense of the Near East 3. Relations with the U.K. Participants: Mohamed Salaheddin Bey, Foreign Minister of Egypt Mohamed Kamil Bey Abdul Rahim, Egyptian Ambassador The Secretary NEA—Mr. McGhee 1 NE—Mr. Day 2 The Foreign Minister opened the discussion with a reference to certain amendments which his delegation had proposed for the Uniting for Peace resolution in the General Assembly. 3 Some of them had been accepted, he said, but the most important one had not. This amendment was to the effect that sensitive areas should be given priority in the supply of military equipment. He contended that some of the sponsoring governments had blocked it, in particular the United Kingdom. The U.K., he said, wished to keep Egypt weak so that it could maintain its troops there. I said that I had not been informed as to the positions of the other sponsoring states on this question. Dr. Salaheddin then stated that Egypt was anxious to do its part in the defense of the Near East, in cooperation with the United Nations. However, so long as British troops were present in the country Egypt could never become strong enough, nor indeed would it be willing, to share in the common defense. The U.K. was assuming the responsibility for the defense of the area, and Egypt was not being permitted to play its part. I asked if Egypt would care to see the British abandon their responsibility in this respect. The Foreign Minister replied that it would be happy to see this. Upon my expression of surprise at this view, he qualified it by stating that he had offered the U.K. very generous terms by which British troops could defend the area in time of war. These terms were: 1. The right of reentry for British troops in the event of war. 2. The use of British personnel to train the Egyptian army, during a transition period, to maintain the bases. This period would be about a year in duration, and throughout it British forces would be gradually decreased as Egyptians took their place. The British, said Dr. Salaheddin, would not accept such terms either because they did not trust Egypt or because they wished to keep it weak. He could not understand any distrust in view of Egypt’s loyal cooperation in the two World Wars. I asked if he was satisfied that Egypt could maintain the highly technical installations with its own personnel, and he replied that he was. He said that he had had a study made of all the jobs performed by British troops, and that Egyptians could fill all of them at once with the exception of several hundred. These they could fill after a year’s training. The Foreign Minister said that the best way to achieve the security of the Near East was to arm the countries themselves. Maintenance of Western forces there was dangerous from the security point of view. Communists played upon it to good advantage, and the people resented it to the extent that they would be much less inclined to cooperate with the West. He said that they saw little purpose in defending one imperialism against another. Mr. McGhee said that it might constitute a danger over the long-run, but that the immediate situation was serious and even a temporary power vacuum in the Near East would be dangerous. Mr. McGhee then asked in what way the U.K. was blocking the efforts of Egypt to become strong, except that it was not at the present time supplying arms. Dr. Salaheddin replied that the U.K. was the only Western country to which Egypt could turn for arms. France and the U.S. needed their arms elsewhere, though he hoped that Egypt would eventually receive substantial quantities of arms from the latter. Mr. McGhee said that he could not see that the U.K. was doing any more than any other country to block Egyptian military development since the British Government was now unable to supply arms for the same reason that other countries were unable to do so, namely a greater need elsewhere. The Foreign Minister said Egypt might be forced to turn to the Soviet bloc, which was anxious to provide arms. He remarked that if the U.K. was interested in arming Egypt it could turn over the arms of British troops in the Canal area to Egyptian forcés, and then the British could go home. He then turned to the question of the Sudan, stating that he desired to see a plebiscite taken there regarding the eventual disposition of that country. Such a plebiscite could only be taken under the auspices of the United Nations, however, since the Sudanese Government was in fact British and, he implied, could control an election. The U.K. did not wish a plebiscite under these conditions, he said. The Foreign Minister concluded by apologizing for having taken up so much of my time. I replied that quite to the contrary, I appreciated very much the opportunity of learning Egypt’s views on these important questions directly from the Foreign Minister. 1 George C. McGhee. 2 Arthur R. Day. 3 For documentation concerning this resolution, see vol. ii , pp. 303 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) 611.74/10–1950 [Document 116] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) secret [ Washington ,] October 19, 1950. Subject: General Discussion regarding Points of Interest to Egypt and the United States. Participants: Mohamed Salah Bey El-Din, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Kamil Bey Abdul Rahim, Egyptian Ambassador Ali Hosni Zein El-Abedine, Counselor of the Egyptian Delegation to UNGA George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary—NEA Fraser Wilkins, Acting Director, NE The Egyptian Foreign Minister accompanied by the Egyptian Ambassador and their Aide called on me this afternoon for the purpose of exchanging views regarding the important questions in which both Egypt and the United States are interested. Our conversation covered the following matters: (1) Anglo Egyptian Relations: I commenced the conversation by expressing appreciation for the assistance which Egypt had thus far been able to give in supporting the West with respect to outstanding international problems. I pointed out what a vital position the territory of Egypt occupied in the Near East and how important it was that this area be properly defended. It seemed to us that the presence of British troops in Egypt represented a stabilizing factor in world peace and at the same time consituted an element in the defense of Egypt. I added, however, that we considered the question of British troops in Egypt as one for settlement by Egypt and the United Kingdom. The Foreign Minister replied that Egypt was willing to take over British responsibilities in Egypt and was able to fulfill these responsibilities with matériel assistance from the West. He described in considerable detail, by references to previous Egyptian experiences with the British with respect to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, his belief that the British had no intention of withdrawing from Egypt and even in 1956 would point out that Egypt was not in position to take over its responsibilities and, for that reason, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty could not be terminated on that date. This led him into the next point: (2) Arms from the U.K. and the U.S.: The Foreign Minister said that the British were deliberately cutting off shipments of arms to Egypt with the intention of keeping Egypt weak so that the British would not have to withdraw in 1956. He added that it almost seemed that there was a “conspiracy” between the UK, US and France to restrict the shipments of arms to Egypt. I immediately contested his thesis and said that I could assure him there had been no arrangement whatsoever that might be termed a “conspiracy”, that I was convinced that the British, as was the case with the US, had been unable to ship all of the arms which Egypt desired because of military priorities elsewhere. I pointed out that the West was no less interested in the Near and Middle East, but that because of the international situation in Europe and in the Far East and the position of Greece, Turkey and Iran, it was necessary to place the latter in a higher priority for military assistance than the countries of the Near and Middle East. I pointed out that we had been and would continue to grant export licenses for light matériel which could be found in our commercial market for export to Egypt and to other countries of the Middle East. (3) Anglo Egyptian Sudan: The Foreign Minister asked if I had anything further to say in respect to the Sudan, observing that it was the Egyptian view that the British had no intention of withdrawing from the Sudan and were making no effort to bring the Sudanese into the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. I recalled that we considered the question of the Sudan one for settlement between Egypt and the UK; that we believe the eventual status of that area should be decided by the Sudanese people, and that we understood the British were pursuing the policy of bringing the Sudanese into the government of the area. (4) Point IV: I informed the Foreign Minister that we were gratified recently to learn that the Egyptian Council of Ministers had approved the plans’ of the Minister of Social Affairs for technical assistance under Point IV. I felt sure that trainees in rural welfare should prove most helpful to the Egyptian Government. The Foreign Minister replied that his government was endeavoring to progress along these lines and appreciated the assistance of the United States Government. (5) Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation: I expressed the hope that the Egyptian Government would shortly find itself in a position to include [ conclude? ] a treaty of establishment and commerce. I added that I understood agreement had been reached with respect to the establishment provisions, but that discussions were still taking place with respect to the commercial provisions. The Foreign Minister did not seem acquainted with recent developments, although both he and the Ambassador indicated they were in favor of the conclusion of a treaty at an early date. They remarked in passing that our treaty structure was complicated and that for this reason time was required. This led me into discussion of the next point. (6) Egyptian Restrictions on Foreign Oil Companies: I noted that the Egyptian Government had imposed restrictions upon foreign oil companies in Egypt, such as the ceiling price on locally produced oil below that of the world market price and that all companies operating in Egypt must have 51% Egyptian ownership. I pointed out that such restrictions not only might deter the continued operation of foreign oil companies in Egypt, but would undoubtedly prevent American companies in oil and other fields from investing in Egypt. I described in considerable detail the limited structure of the Egyptian oil fields, comparing them with the more productive oil fields of the Middle East and stressed the point that this factor made it necessary for American oil companies in Egypt to have a greater understanding of their problems on the part of the Egyptian Government. The Foreign Minister said that he had not realized this was the case and that in view of my remarks he would look into the problem on his return to Cairo and see what could be done. (7) MATS Landing Rights: I noted that during recent months we had not been able to reach agreement with respect to MATS flights through Egypt and pointed out how difficult it was for MATS to plan its service if permission had to be received for each separate flight; that I hoped the Egyptian Government would shortly see its way clear to some form of blanket permit. The Foreign Minister replied that he was not familiar with the details of this matter, but would look into it on his return to Cairo. (8) Peace with Israel: I asked the Foreign Minister if he had any views with respect to a possible peace between Israel and Egypt and whether in determining present Egyptian policy he had weighed the long-term dislocations in the Near East which would result from it. The Foreign Minister replied that relations between Egypt and Israel were now governed by an armistice agreement and that Egypt considered itself at peace. The Egyptian Foreign Minister said that he could categorically assure me that Egypt had no intention of attacking Israel. As for normal relations with Israel, it was out of the question—Egypt desired to have nothing to do with Israel. (9) Re Appointment of Secretary General Trygve Lie as Secretary of the UN: I remarked that we understood that: (1) the Security Council on October 12 had voted to recommend to the General Assembly that Mr. Lie be reappointed but that Soviet Russia had vetoed this proposal; (2) an Indian resolution providing for a secret ballot was being circulated; (3) we understood the Soviet Union was maneuvering to prevent the reappointment of Mr. Lie. I expressed the hope that the Egyptian Delegation would support the reappointment of Mr. Lie at the next meeting of the Council on October 20. The Foreign Minister said that they had been in favor of the Indian resolution but that he would get in touch with Fawzi Bey, their Delegate at the United Nations, and discuss the matter further with him. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 911.534/10–2250: Telegram [Document 117] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1 secret [ Washington ,] October 23, 1950. 358. Analysis legal position Egypt in imposing contraband control on movement vessels Suez Canal as well as position USG as non-signatory Suez Canal Convention now completed. 2 Conclusions fol: (1) Art X of Convention gives Egypt right interfere with free use Canal when necessary in defense Egypt. (2) Arts I and XI require this interference be as limited as possible. (3) Interference with free use Canal may be exercised only when reasonably required. (4) Rights of US as a non-signatory of Convention not clearly defined. (5) Even if legal argument cld be advanced as to rights US under Convention, to do so might have adverse effect upon legal position US that Hay–Pauncefote Treaty does not confer rights upon third parties with respect to use Panama Canal. (6) In view present circumstances existing in Near East protest to Egypt on grounds measures not required in defense Egypt wld appear reasonable. With respect to Egypt tanker reg, masters of vessels unable certify as to end use of cargo. Dept understands however no serious practical difficulty being encountered by operators. This indicates Egypts apparently not enforcing reg to ltr. Dept has requested further info from US shipping interests how reg now being applied and difficulties being encountered thereunder, as well as info re difficulties likely be encountered in event vessel blacklisted and denied port services. View above Emb requested as matter of record formally reject Egypt reply of Sept 5 3 and reiterate US view reg unreasonable and impracticable. Emb shld concert its action with Brit, Nors, Neth and Fr Missions. Emb London, Hague, Oslo, Paris authorized inform govts to which accredited Dept’s conclusions except No. 5 above and to inform them of instrs to Emb Cairo outlined above. Missions shld also inform other govts that in view conclusion number 6 above, Dept prepared consider desirability raising gen issue Egypt measures interfering with normal shipping and air transport eastern Medit area but believes few concrete results likely be achieved unless concerted and properly timed approach made. Dept wld welcome views other interested govts. 4 Acheson 1 Repeated to London as 2079, The Hague as 483, Paris as 2104, and Oslo as 303. 2 For documentation concerning the Department of State request for an opinion from its Legal Adviser and the final memorandum by Departmental lawyers on this question, see file 974.5301. 3 Egypt’s reply rejected protests against the latest restrictions on Suez shipping made by the united Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, Norway, and France on August 25. 4 These instructions were modified on October 31 when the Department of State informed the Embassy in Egypt that it “did not intend that unreasonableness of regulation wld be tied to legal view as stated in numbered conclusion 6. Dept intended that phrase ‘unreasonable’ wld be left open ended and for time being at least we wld contend that regulation unreasonable in terms of the burden it places upon ship operators.” (Telegram 384 to Cairo; 911.534/10–3150) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 974.531/10–2650: Telegram [Document 118] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , October 26, 1950. 2384. Embassy conveyed substance Deptel 2079, October 23 (repeated Cairo 358, Hague 483, Paris 2104, Oslo 303) 1 to UK FonOff yesterday. Bendall 2 Egyptian desk African Department said FonOff appreciated receipt Department’s views and would now doubtless also instruct British Ambassador Cairo to formally reject Egypts reply to original protest against Suez regulations and reiterate that UK considered regulations unreasonable and impracticable. FonOff also plans encourage similar action by government Saturday capitals listed above. Bendall said he would inform us as soon as FonOff instructions sent off. He says that UK will, however, probably avoid use argument that regulations unreasonable because they are not required for defense of Egypt. He thinks UK will avoid direct or indirect reference of any sort to position under Suez Canal convention (in original protest UK reserved its position on legality of regulations). Instead UK will contend that regulations impracticable from point view shipping operations. If necessary UK will also point out regulations are in any event useless in denying oil supplies to Israel, which it can obtain from other sources. Bendall says FonOff would use term “unreasonable” mainly in sense that shipping master can not be expected know or verify end use his cargo. FonOff will probably also make special point of protesting denial of Egypt port facilities to blacklisted ships, which as reported Embdes 1643, October 6, 3 is matter particular grievance to British shipowners. FonOff has asked us emphasize to Department importance UK attaches to endeavoring assure uniformity of procedure among ship operators using Suez, particularly in making no effort obtain certificate of actual end use. UK Government Department’s and British shipping industry have already agreed that such certificates will not be produced and that masters will as matter of practice comply with Egyptian requirement only to extent obtaining ordinary discharge document (known in UK as port entry certificate) on arrival UK ports. FonOff has already given guidance to this effect to UK customs authorities. Document produced is simply extra copy foregoing certificate signed by customs and verified by Egyptian consul. FonOff inclined agree with Department’s information that Egyptians will probably not enforce regulations to letter. However, Bendall says that if Egypt should at any time reject type certificate now being presented, British ship agents would simply reply they had done best comply with Egyptian regulations and that it was impossible do more. FonOff particularly anxious know what US ship owners likely do in foregoing respect and whether Department thinks it necessary advise them against providing more than ordinary arrival document. We have already given FonOff information in Deptel 1125, August 30 3 to effect that US customs authorities say that, if asked by ship masters, they would provide landing and clearance certificate for port of arrival but no further evidence of destination or consumption. FonOff has promised reply to suggestion in last paragraph Deptel 2079 shortly. Bendall’s preliminary reaction was that this is not opportune time raise matter and in any event there is probably little that can be accomplished toward general settlement even by joint action until broader question Egyptian-Israeli peace solved. 4 Sent Department 2384, repeated information Cairo 49, The Hague 121, Paris 702, Oslo 68. Douglas 1 Supra . 2 D. V. Bendall, Officer for Egypt and the Sudan in the African Department of the British Foreign Office. 3 Not printed. 3 Not printed. 4 On November 15 the British Foreign Office informed the Embassy in London that it “does not consider this opportune time raise general issue, either separately or through concerted approach. It strongly doubts such action would have desired effect on Egyptians, and cites complete failure efforts British Ambassador Cairo in several recent approaches to Egyptians to warn them about effect of SC airing of Suez problem and to urge relaxation restrictions. According Bendall, Egypt refusal this suggestion was in such strong terms as to make clearer than ever that economic blockade is cardinal policy which it has no intention abandoning.” (Telegram 2856 from London, November 16; 974.531/11–1650) Caffery, the Ambassador in Egypt, agreed with the British view that any concerted general approach would not be effective and “might well put the Egyptians backs up and further harden their position.” (Telegram 502 from Cairo, November 20; 974.534/11–2050) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 774.00/11–950: Telegram [Document 119] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , November 9, 1950—5 p. m. 2717. During course conversation yesterday with Wright, we asked him if there were any new developments with respect present UK arms policy towards Egypt. Wright indicated policy now being relaxed and that Stevenson has now been authorized inform Egyptians: 1. That HMG has now been able proceed further in the review of its arms commitments which was necessitated by events in Korea and which had led UK to suspend shipment certain types of equipment. 2. That as result this progress, UK is ( a ) releasing to Egypt 16 Centurion tanks partly paid for; ( b ) considering sympathetically Egyptian request for 6 obsolete Halifax bombers, but is unable at present to say whether these items will be released; and ( c ) informing Egyptians of release of lend lease items mentioned Deptel 2176 October 26 1 (Embtel 2569 November 3). 2 3. That apart from foregoing, however, other items desired by Egypt are pretty much in short supply at present and required for UK’s own defense effort, Commonwealth and NATO. Comment: For Department’s and Cairo’s own strictly confidential information Wright told Embassy Office with great candour that decision re suspension arms shipments to Egypt taken at time he was on leave and that he has always had grave reservations as to wisdom of decision. He further indicated that Stevenson, who was in London at time decision taken, strongly favored suspension. Although he felt it hard gauge net effect of suspension in Egypt and thought it easy mistake surface for subconscious reactions, he nevertheless was inclined agree with Ambassador Caffery’s assessment that effect not salutary. This is first Foreign Office admission this fact which we have had (Embtel 2571 November 3) 3 and Wright’s views undoubtedly account for decisions outlined above. Sent Department 2717, Cairo 61. Douglas 1 Not printed; it informed the Embassy in London that the Department of State had decided to approve the retransfer to Egypt from the United Kingdom of 100 75-mm. guns and 121 37-mm. guns, both lend-lease equipment that could be used for mounting on armored vehicles. (741.56/10–2650) 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed; it reported to the Department of State Ambassador Douglas’ view that the postponement of the British arms shipment had no identifiable beneficial effect in Egypt. (774.00/11–350) The Ambassador in the united Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 641.74/11–950: Telegram [Document 120] The Ambassador in the united Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State top secret London , November 9, 1950—5 p. m. 2718. Wright yesterday gave us following information re latest Anglo-Egyptian treaty developments: 1. He recalled meeting in New York on September 28 between Bevin and Egyptian FonMin, which resulted in no progress and in which Egyptian FonMin presented Egyptian proposals as follows: a . Egypt prepared agree to base remaining in Egypt provided it is maintained by Egyptians. b . In event of war, UK should re-enter and take over base. c . Present treaty to be replaced by treaty of friendship (probably for 20 years). d . Complete evacuation to take place within one year if possible. e . Joint defense arrangements in war time, but not in peace time. 2. During course foregoing conversation, Egyptian FonMin said “There might perhaps be place for Egypt within extended Atlantic Pact or some similar arrangements which would provide solution for Anglo-Egyptian differences.” (Quotation from UK record of conversation). 3. There were no new developments after return of FonMin, PriMin and King until recently although Stevenson has had intermittent and inconclusive conversations on treaty problem and King has advised UK proceed slowly on theory that perhaps time will work in favor satisfactory agreement. Recently FonMin stated that speech from throne being prepared for delivery November 16 and requested statement UK position on points contained paragraph 1 above for inclusion in speech. 4. Bevin called in Amr November 7 and took following line: a . He had been reflecting on his conversation in New York with Egyptian FonMin and, among other points, had been turning over in his mind FonMin’s remark re possibility Egyptian association in Atlantic Pact. He asked if Amr could obtain from his government elucidation of what FonMin had in mind. Amr replied he was familiar with FonMin’s remark and had already asked Cairo for clarification. He understood, as result his inquiries, that FonMin had in mind possibility Egypt might be admitted to full membership Atlantic Pact or, alternatively, that it might be associated with certain aspects of NATO planning in same way as Greece and Turkey. However, Amr did not think his government had any firm views on this question, and that it was casting about for possible solution to present deadlock, particularly solution along multilateral lines which would enable government to state publicly that old bilateral link with past was broken. b . Bevin thanked Amr for explanation and said he would like think matter over. He then gave him written statement, which Amr said he would transmit his government with recommendation there should be no controversial statements on treaty problem in speech from Throne. Amr has also reported UK thinks it preferable that statement should not be published, but that if Egyptian Government nevertheless wishes do so, publication should be by pre-arrangement with UK. Abbreviated text statement follows: “On 14 October Egyptian Acting Minister Foreign Affairs asked HM’s Ambassador Cairo for statement of HMG’s views on possibility of Anglo-Egyptian defence agreement in light of exchanges of views which have taken place between two governments during last six or seven months. HMG are glad take this opportunity of saying it is their aim that Anglo-Egyptian relations should be based on complete equality and full sovereignty and inspired by mutual confidence. It is in this spirit they are now examining situation which has arisen from rejection by Egyptian Government of principle of joint defence preparations in peace-time which has been freely accepted by NATO, British Commonwealth and other peace-loving powers as only possible basis of adequate resistance to aggression. Defence of ME is issue which directly affects peace and safety of many other countries besides GB and Egypt, and HMG do not consider it can be settled solely on basis of national interests or aspirations of two parties directly concerned. HMG regret they are not yet in position to make any further pronouncement on matter.” Comment: Wright indicated he was anxious inform us frankly of these developments, but equally anxious we should not interpret them as meaning that UK attention focused exclusively or even hopefully on Atlantic Treaty possibility. FonOff regards this as merely one in series of developments in fluid situation and is desirous leaving no stone unturned. UK completely aware, of course, that any association Egypt with Atlantic Pact would be decision for all members NATO and does not wish Department to gain mistaken impression UK running away with ball on this question. UK anxious keep Egyptians talking and therefore does not wish closed door to any possibility at present. Neither does development mean Gaza proposal dead; it is merely dormant for present. On other hand, Wright seemed attracted to Atlantic Treaty idea and speculated somewhat hopefully on possibilities which it might offer for creation NATO bases (which concept Brownell, Special Assistant to Secretary of Air Force, had discussed informally with Wright during former’s recent visit here) which would also enable US share facilities at Abu Suweir. Sent Department 2718, repeated info Cairo 62. Douglas The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 780.5/11–2050: Telegram [Document 121] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1 top secret priority Washington , November 20, 1950. 460. For Amb’s eyes only. During recent NATO mtg Wash US and Brit Joint Chiefs met Top Sec consider mutual defense problems including Near East defense. Dept and FonOff reps participated later stage. 2 US stressed and UK acquiesced in concept UK primarily responsible NE defense. US agreed Brit facilities Egypt utmost importance area defense. Both agreed consider possibility presenting common front Egypt re bases there. Both US and UK reps doubted whether US participation in US-UK-Egypt tripartite arrangement for bases in Egypt including one US base wld change attitude Egypt Govt towards base question but agreed possibility might exist and shld be examined jointly. US emphasized had no desire dissipate valuable mil equipment but indicated that if clear advantage to US and UK wld flow from some US deliveries US wld consider such action. Fol substance agreed Minute: Dept and FonOff wld conduct further discussions re advisability joint approach to Egypt pointed towards tripartite agreement on bases and equipment. Question was raised re positive results obtainable but it was observed proposed course action wld at least give Egypt opportunity say end result is joint defense agreement with two great world powers and Egypt all on equal basis. If tripartite approach were agreed upon concensus was that agreement use Egypt terr as base (including airfield facilities for US) and equipment for Egypt shld all be in same package. End Minute. Underlying foregoing is idea Egypt dissatisfaction with bilateral arrangement with UK might be mitigated or obviated if US wld enter picture under tripartite agreement even though agreement wld not involve extension US security commitment to Egypt in exchange US air facilities in Egypt. Before discussing with UK ways and means by which US might assist UK retain facilities Dept desires ur counsel re alternative courses open US in this matter and ur appraisal success likelihood each. Request ur specific comment re attitude Egypt likely adopt toward US request for facilities roughly comparable Dhahran and price Egypt likely demand for such arrangement. For Depts reaction any form NATO status for Egypt this time see Depts 450, Nov 17. 3 Acheson 1 Repeated for information only to London as 2636. 2 The U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Staff met in Washington on October 23 and again on October 26 with representatives of the Department of State and the British Foreign Office. For the approved summary of conclusions and agreements reached at the meeting of October 23, see vol. iii , p. 1686 . For an extract of the U.S. minutes of the politico-military meeting of October 26, see p. 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] . 3 Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] . The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 641.74/11–2250: Telegram [Document 122] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority Cairo , November 22, 1950. 513. I concur doubts US–UK representatives re efficacy tripartite approach Anglo-Egyptian problems (second paragraph Deptel 460 November 20, received November 21, 5 p. m.) but also believe possibility exists if US prepared pay price involved. This price particularly difficult assess off-hand, view Palestine problem and effect of possible tripartite agreement as well as price to be paid on American Jewry, which obviously require fullest high level coordination. Assuming strategic importance NE area, US has no alternative but to seek ways and means British remaining in Egypt. Therefore, possibility British evacuation is “out” and we must, in exploring alternatives, consider only those which would permit British and perhaps ourselves to have bases in Egypt. In order to offset overly publicized xenophobic stand Wafd government it is essential from practical politics point of view that we offer alternative Wafd can sell its vociferous public. Such alternative might be three-party pact with Egypt as full sovereign participating member. Anything less would be unrealistic and continuation current profitless cycle. Even this arrangement would require most careful handling to be acceptable present Egyptian thinking. Best sales approach would seem to be that of convincing Egyptians that US participation is in their favor, and perhaps as result “successful Egyptian diplomacy” Lake Success and London. The price to be paid would undoubtedly be high and would include arms and at least a facade of military consultation which would give outside appearance of a full exchange of views on a sovereign basis, as well as something on Palestine. If basic decision importance Egypt in NE strategic picture once made so far as US is concerned, I would recommend agreement with British re approach Egypt along lines Bevin response. Egyptian speech from Throne working gradually towards tripartite agreement concept. Re last paragraph my despatch 1096 November 9, 1 in this case we can buy but the price will be very high. I shall comment further in a day or two. Sent Department 513 repeated London 76 for Ambassador’s eyes only. Caffery 1 Not printed; it described the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nahas Pasha, as “primarily a street politician who has risen to the top of the ladder; has never materially widened his horizon; and is now partially senile.” In the opinion of Ambassador Caffery, “we can get anything which we want from him if we are willing to pay for it. Whether we can afford the price depends on how badly we want a given object.” (Despatch 1096 from Cairo, November 9; 774.13/11–950) The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 641.74/11–2550: Telegram [Document 123] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority Cairo , November 25, 1950—1 p. m. 529. Mytel 513 November 22 repeated London 76. Recent goings on in House of Commons 1 have resulted in definite setback for chances of success of negotiations regarding retention of Suez strategic base, with or without US. British Ambassador, who fully understands Bevin’s difficulties, protesting mightily to London against sacrificing given word as well as strategic defense this region to political expediency. British influence in Egypt is at this juncture at an all-time low. US prestige is higher than it has been for years. As Department is aware, US was target for most of mud that was slung (and there was plenty slung) since the beginning of Palestine war and prestige was at an all-time low on publication Life and Saturday Evening Post articles. There has been a radical change in our regard during past few months in press and among public. From public we have received many favorable comments, and press has not contained a real attack against us for long time and on occasion favorable comment. However, although we are riding high now we could easily fall off or be pushed off, if we are not able to maintain our present attitude: on one hand, neither flattering Egyptians and never telling them that we favor their so-called nationalist aspirations (we have repeatedly told them we favor retention of British base for instance) but on other hand convincing them that we are fair and just and inherently interested in their economic welfare; helping them raise their standard living, etc. In other words if we are to be any use in helping to retain Suez base we can only do it if we make Egyptians believe that our intervention is helping their long time interests, bolstering up their sovereignty and even soothes their national pride. Obviously this is not easy. In other words again what is needed is a new look and obviously the British alone cannot create it; and we can create it only if we carry on along the lines just set out. As to price and (it will be higher since the recent Commons goings-on) it will include armament, Egypt participation in any pact on an ostensibly full sovereign basis, some sort of security guarantee, at least a facade of military consultation, and something on Palestine. I repeat that what we offer must be something Wafd can sell to ite clamorous clients. For obvious reasons Stevenson and I both are apprehensive under prevailing circumstances about London conversations. Another failure there would set back the clock again and time may be running out if we are to avoid serious disturbances. Sent Department 529, repeated London 81 for Ambassador’s eyes only. Caffery 1 See the editorial note, infra . Editorial Note [Document 124] Editorial Note On November 16 Prime Minister Nahas delivered the traditional “speech from the throne” that normally accompanied the opening of a new session of Parliament. With King Farouk observing the proceedings, Nahas vehemently demanded the total and immediate evacuation of Egypt by British forces and the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian crown. He also declared that the 1936 treaty was no longer a suitable basis for Anglo-Egyptian relations and claimed that his government would not hesitate to declare it void. While the Prime Minister spoke, widespread rioting occurred in the streets of Cairo to protest British policies in Egypt. Bevin responded to this speech in a statement before the House of Commons on November 20. Although his comments were conciliatory in nature, Bevin declared that the treaty could only be revised or annulled by mutual consent of both countries. Once again, Egyptian students held massive demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria, and Port Said to protest the British refusal to evacuate their country. Documents concerning these speeches and the ensuing demonstrations can be found in Department of State files 774.00 and 641.74. In light of these events, the British Labor government, under severe pressure from both the opposition and its own members, announced on November 22 that the shipment of sixteen Centurion tanks would be postponed until Bevin completed his pending discussions with Mohamed Salaheddin, Egypt’s Foreign Minister. The British Ambassador in Cairo strongly protested this decision and pointed out that “one of the most frequent Egyptian charges against Britain was that of bad faith and that in this case the charge would seem justified.” He informed the Foreign Office that he deplored the use of “political expediency at this delicate stage Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.” (Telegram 519 from Cairo, November 24; 641.74/11–2450) As preparations were being made for the Bevin-Salaheddin negotiations in early December, the question of the future of the Sudan became a matter of urgency. Most political factions in the Sudan had carefully followed Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning evacuation but were generally disappointed that the question of the Sudan played such a minor role in the bilateral conversations. (Despatch 361 from Cairo, August 15; 745W.00/8–1550) On December 15 the Sudan Legislative Assembly passed a resolution requesting that the Sudan be granted self-government by the end of 1951. The Umma Party, which led the pro-independence forces, introduced the resolution because they feared that the current Anglo-Egyptian talks in London might result in the British making concessions to Egypt’s position of “unity of the Nile Valley”. In Caffery’s opinion, the resolution was “primarily a defensive anti-Egyptian reaction rather than a positive step.” (Despatch 1431 from Cairo, December 18; 745W.02/12–1850, and telegram 625 from Cairo, December 15; 745W.02/12–1550) The pressure from the Sudan contributed to the tensions that surrounded the London talks that were held between December 4 and December 15. The discussions proved to be unproductive as both sides largely reiterated previous positions. Documents concerning the Bevin-Salaheddin talks were published by the British Foreign Office in British Cmd. 8419, Egypt No. 2 (1951): Anglo-Egyptian Conversations on the Defence of the Suez Canal and on the Sudan. December 1950–November 1951 . In response, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published their documents relating to these negotiations, Records of Conversations, Notes and Papers exchanged between the Royal Egyptian Government and the United Kingdom Government ( March 1950–November 1951 ), and attached a special Foreword which specifically refuted “the allegations and inaccuracies contained in the [British] White Paper.” Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) 711.56374/12–650 [Document 125] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Matthews ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] December 6, 1950. Subject: Letter to the Secretary of Defense regarding the Anglo-Egyptian question. Discussion: At a meeting on October 26 between the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff at which Ambassador Jessup represented the Department and the British Ambassador the British Foreign Office, it was agreed that the Department and the Foreign Office should discuss further the advisability of a joint approach to Egypt pointed towards a tripartite agreement on bases and equipment with Egypt. 2 It is believed desirable to request the Defense Department to indicate whether a price should be paid, and, if so, how high a price, having in mind that this “price” might be the deciding factor as to whether the British retain their strategic facilities in Egypt. As you will recall this letter was originally sent up to the Secretary for his signature, but it was decided that because of the urgent developments in Korea, it would be inadvisable to present this matter on a high priority basis. However, in view of the discussion of October 26, we believe that it is essential that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the problem as soon as conveniently possible. Recommendation: That you sign the attached letter (Tab A) to Secretary of Defense Marshall. 3 [Tab A] Draft Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Matthews ) to the Secretary of Defense ( Marshall ) 4 top secret [ Washington , undated.] My Dear General Marshall : I quote the following agreed minute regarding the meeting of October 26, 1950, between the United States and British chiefs of staff. On this occasion Ambassador Jessup represented the Department and the British Ambassador the British Foreign Office. “ Egyptian Base Facilities ” “It was agreed that the State Department and Foreign Office would conduct further discussions on the advisability of a joint approach to the Egyptians pointed towards a tripartite agreement on bases and equipment with Egypt. The question was raised as to the positive results which might be obtained, but it was further observed that, at the least, the proposed course of action would give the Egyptians opportunity to say that the end result was a joint defense agreement with two great world powers and Egypt, all on an equal basis. “It was generally the concensus of opinion that if the tripartite approach were agreed upon, the agreement itself, the use of Egyptian territory as a base, including airfield facilities for the United States, and equipment for the Egyptians should all be in the same package.” In preparation for further discussions with the British Foreign Office, with whom the initiative now lies, we requested the views of Ambassador Caffery in Cairo (enclosure 1) and now have his reply (enclosures 2 and 3). 5 You will note that although Ambassador Caffery is cautious as to the outcome of any US-UK approach to Egypt he feels that “a possibility exists if the United States is prepared to pay the price involved.” Although he indicates that “the price is particularly difficult to assess offhand,” he is certain that it would be “high” and would include “armament, Egypt participation in any pact on an ostensibly full sovereign basis, some sort of security guarantee, at least a facade of military consultation, and something on Palestine.” Since the announcement at the opening of the Egyptian Parliament on November 16 that the Egyptian Government was considering the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, popular feeling in Egypt against the presence of British troops has run high and there have been a number of anti-British demonstrations. While the Egyptian Government has banned further demonstrations, at least during the period of the talks between Foreign Secretary Bevin and the Egyptian Foreign Minister in London, it is undoubtedly true that the demand for the immediate evacuation of British troops has a widespread and genuine popular basis and in our opinion this demand will continue to gain momentum. The tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations was recently further increased by the action of the opposition in the British Parliament in forcing the British Government to halt the shipment of 16 Centurion tanks which had already been contracted and partially paid for by Egypt. The present international events may have a sobering effect on the Egyptian Government in connection with the Treaty question. However, this effect may well be transitory and we believe that if the demand for evacuation is pressed, the British will be unable much longer to withstand it, unless a new element is injected into the picture. A tripartite agreement with Egypt along the lines indicated in the minute quoted above is one of the alternatives which might constitute such a new element. In view of this situation we believe that there is an added urgency to the need for definitive discussions with the British. We fully understand that urgent needs elsewhere in the world dictate that we keep any investment in Egypt to the bare minimum necessary to insure our security requirements there. As a basis for these talks, however, we need an indication from the military point of view, of whether a “price” should be paid, and, if so, how high a “price”, having in mind that this “price” might be the deciding factor as to whether British troops remain in Egypt. In all candor I must tell you that we are not optimistic that exchange of United States arms for base rights will be sufficiently appealing to the Egyptians to cause them to forego their “national aspirations” to be free of foreign troops. We also recognize that on our side there will be other difficult problems which would have to be faced in reaching a final determination of this question. Among these problems would be the availability of arms, the ability to obtain authority to transfer such arms on a basis acceptable to Egypt, the Palestine question and the attitude of Congress. I hope that you will have attention directed to this question and that you can arrange to let me have your views at an early date. Sincerely yours, For the Secretary of State: H. Freeman Matthews 1 Drafted by Stabler. 2 For information concerning this meeting, see telegram 460 to Cairo, November 20, p. 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 121 ] . 3 Attached to the source text was a note which read: “This was signed by Mr. McGhee today. 12/8/50.” The letter to Secretary Marshall was subsequently signed by Matthews and sent to the Pentagon on December 11. 4 Drafted by Stabler and Jones. 5 Enclosure 1 is telegram 460, November 20, p. 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 121 ] ; enclosure 2 is telegram 513, November 22, p. 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] ; and enclosure 3 is telegram 529, November 25, p. 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] . The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 641.74/12–750: Circular telegram [Document 126] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1 top secret Washington , December 7, 1950. 242. Fol is for your info and for comments and suggestions as you may care to offer. On Nov 29 Dept had informal exchange of views with Allen, head FonOff African Dept and Brit Emb Reps re Anglo-Egypt Treaty question. Dept outlined its tentative thinking as fols: 1. UK cld continue handle problem as they have done since World War II on “business as usual” basis. Recent info indicates FonOff believes this policy still correct one and that by “playing by ear” Egypts can be kept talking, and Treaty will thus be kept in full effect. Chances this traditional policy succeeding depend on Brit assumption Egypt agitation is transitory emotionalism which wld either wane by itself or cld be bought off. We felt, however, this assumption of doubtful validity and cld foresee possibility that continuance traditional UK policy might add fuel to fire Egypt nationalism and might deepen bitter sentiment of kind still plaguing Anglo-Irish relations. Allen indicated Brit policy re Egypt is in large measure dictated by requirements Brit mil who assert inflexibly that minimum Brit requirements in Canal Zone is a ( a ) striking force, ( b ) base org requiring approx 11,500 technicians and service troops, and ( c ) cooperative Anglo-Egypt air defense org. Allen stated that even if Brit mil cld be persuaded to agree to transfer from Egypt of striking force there was no place in sight for it to go. 2. Dept suggested that among alternatives open UK might be along lines of successful Brit policy re India-Pak-Ceylon, where equal-to-equal cooperation has produced friendship in unexpected measure. We thought some such handling (without evacuation we wld hope) wld have at least a sporting chance of succeeding in Egypt and might result in creation atmosphere in which Egypts wld voluntarily collaborate with UK and Western powers in peacetime defense arrangements. Another possibility might be development area defense arrangements by Arab States in which UK striking force cld cooperate as “respectable” partner on basis freely-given invitation of all Arab League members. Possibility of some form multilateral arrangement involving US participation and US-UK security guarantee to Egypt was also raised by Brit. While Dept did not exclude such possibility, we emphasized that thinking here wld have to progress considerably further than at present to envisage such arrangement. Dept agreed present internati tension made boat-rocking dangerous this juncture but expressed thought that Egypt feeling this time may be so strong that standard Brit treatment may not meet situation. We made clear to Brit that above thoughts in no way altered our policy of strong support for Brit position in Egypt and necessity for maintenance strategic facilities there in state of readiness. This policy recently restated in our talks Egypt FonMin and Azzam Pasha and by US support Brit approach SAG (Deptel 505 Nov 30 to Cairo). 2 Acheson 1 The diplomatic offices at Jidda, Baghdad, London, Paris, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Beirut, Damascus, Jordan, and USUN. 2 Not printed; it described the British Foreign Office suggestion that United States officers in Jidda approach Ibn Saud and suggest that he counsel moderation in Egypt’s relations with the United Kingdom when he spoke with Farouk. (741.56374/11–2850) The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 641.74/12–1150: Telegram [Document 127] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State top secret Cairo , December 11, 1950. 603. ReDeptcirtel 242 of December 7. Basic problem Anglo-Egyptian question is that Egpyt has thus far shown no willingness accept idea of peace-time occupation of canal area by foreign troops regardless whether new Anglo-Egyptian treaty, Mediterranean Pact, or any other type international agreement involved. Until this stumbling block removed, prospects for satisfactory solution problem are frankly nil in my opinion. Refusal FonMin Salah-el-din Bey make any specific proposals to Bevin (London telegram 3377 December 8) 1 indicates he realizes no basis for agreement now exists. Although I agree that British policy of simply “keeping Egyptians talking” may not be adequate stave off Egyptian denunciation of 1936 treaty indefinitely, I cannot see what better course British can follow until Egypt agrees permit foreign troops occupy canal area during peace-time. As present Wafdist Government not likely make such concession of principle, British can do no better than prepare to ride out the storm. In meantime, talk of multilateral agreements involving US and UN serves useful purpose of keeping conversations going. Bare possibilities exist that (1) some type of multilateral arrangements might eventually tempt government to agree to peace-time occupation of canal area, or that (2) government might be persuaded adopt realistic interpretation of what meant peace-time conditions so that present type situation would be considered war-time emergency justifying “temporary” occupation by foreign troops. Negotiations could then for first time have some hope success. Sent Department 603, repeated London 109. Caffery 1 Not printed. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Egypt 1 [Document 128] Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs ( Stabler ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) top secret [ Washington ,] December 14, 1950. Subject: Anglo-Egyptian Relations Problem: The Egyptian Government insists that the UK withdraw its troops from the UK bases in the Suez Canal Zone and relinquish its share of control over the Sudan, both of which rights are enjoyed by the UK under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Discussion: Since the present Egyptian Government came into office last January the UK and Egypt have been carrying on a series of conversations on possible modification of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. This Treaty permits the UK to maintain bases in the Suez Canal Zone with 10,000 troops, 400 pilots and service and technical units and confirms the 1899 Condominium arrangement for the Sudan. The Egyptians have insisted that the UK should evacuate its troops from the Canal Zone as soon as possible and in any case not over a year, and that the Sudan should be united with Egypt under the full sovereignty of the Egyptian Crown. In the Speech from the Throne on November 16, 1950 the Egyptian Government threatened to abrogate the 1936 Treaty if Egyptian national aspirations were not satisfied. This statement brought a prompt reply from the British Government to the effect that the Treaty remained in force until 1956 and that it would not recognize unilateral abrogation. At the present time Foreign Secretary Bevin and the Egyptian Foreign Minister Salaheddin Bey, are holding discussions in London, but no progress has been recorded to date. It is understood that the talks will be adjourned shortly to be resumed some time later in January in order that both Governments may have time for further thought on the problem. We have been informed that the Foreign Office is anxious to give Salaheddin Bey some proposal based on principles which have the weight of UK Cabinet approval and which Salaheddin Bey could submit to his Government for consideration. Our London Embassy believes that Mr. Bevin may be thinking along the lines of a possible compromise on the evacuation time element, i.e. he might suggest a progressive, real or apparent evacuation after 1953 but prior to 1956. At one point the UK considered the possibility of Egypt’s association in some form or another with NATO as a method of reducing Egyptian pressure for evacuation. While the Department did not close the door completely to this idea, we did indicate to the British our lack of enthusiasm for this idea on the grounds that it would overburden the NATO structure and lead to demands for similar treatment from other states without changing the Egyptian “national aspiration” to be rid of foreign troops in time of peace. At a meeting on October 26, 1950 between the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff, at which Ambassador Jessup represented the Department and the British Ambassador the British Foreign Office, it was agreed that the Department and the Foreign Office should discuss further the advisability of joint approach to Egypt pointed towards a tripartite (US-UK-Egyptian) agreement on bases, including one U.S. base, and, if necessary, equipment for Egypt. In preparation for these talks the Department is awaiting the views of the Defense Department as to the price, if any, it is willing to pay for such an arrangement. The crux of the problem is UK-Egypt defense collaboration during peacetime. The Egyptians have already stated, both to the UK and to us, that they would find no difficulty in permitting Egyptian territory to be used during time of war by the UK and its allies. Recommendations: 1. In the event that Mr. Bevin indicates that the UK has been unable to propose any compromise plan and intends to carry on “business as usual” with Egypt, it is suggested that you reiterate our basic attitude toward this problem along the following lines: As the British have primary military responsibility in this area, we believe that it is in the joint interest of the U.S. and UK that they should have the right to maintain their strategic facilities in Egypt during peacetime in such a condition that they could be effectively and speedily used in case of an immediate threat to security in the Near East. We shall continue to give strong support to the UK position in Egypt. At the same time we earnestly hope that the UK and Egypt will be able to come to a satisfactory and reasonable solution of this problem which will take into account both the security requirements of the area and the national aspirations of Egypt. We consider that in the long run both the UK and the U.S. will stand to lose if a compromise solution is not found which will give some satisfaction to Egyptian national aspirations. In this connection we have in mind the possibility of a hostile population in Egypt during the time of war. We believe that an inflexible stand on this question will exacerbate passionate Egyptian sentiments and in the long run create an Anglo-Irish type of situation to the detriment of US-UK interests. 2. In the event that Mr. Bevin indicates that the British are considering a compromise solution along the lines described above or similar lines, it is suggested that you offer appropriate encouragement, indicating at the same time that you would like to refer the matter to Washington for immediate consideration. 1 Lot 53 D 468 contains copies of memoranda and correspondence of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs George C. McGhee for the years 1049–1951. The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 641.74/12–3150 [Document 129] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret No. 1521 Cairo , December 31, 1950. The return of Sir Ralph Stevenson, British Ambassador, from the London talks on current Anglo-Egyptian problems has passed by with relatively little attention locally. The current calm in Cairo political life is illustrative of the control which the government can exercise when it is so determined. The local focus on the Jubilee Celebrations in connection with the Fouad I University has almost completely eclipsed the political issues which were so important in the weeks past. The following summarizes current British Embassy thinking following the return of the British Ambassador from London: The British now feel reasonably confident of being able to keep things on an even keel until February. They are not sure of exactly what the locale or circumstances of the adjourned talks will be. They have found Salaheddin slightly less difficult in London than in Cairo. They are not completely unaware of the fact that Salaheddin’s exposure in the United States to the “actualities” may have been at least partially responsible for a more reasonable attitude. Salaheddin and Amr Pasha 2 have entered into a pact to keep their own government uninformed on British thinking until Salaheddin’s return on or about January 10. Then Nahas and Seraggedin 3 will be the only two Cabinet Ministers to be informed. Until that time, the British feel reasonably secure that their proposals will not be broadcast to the public. This may well be the crucial period in Anglo-Egyptian relations. The reactions of Nahas and Seraggedin to Bevin’s “tentative” thinking on possible lines of settlement will be the determining factor on the future course of the Anglo-Egyptian conversations. The British feel that the critical point will be the manner in which Salaheddin describes his conversations. If he paints them in a favorable color (i.e. that the British have shown a more reasonable attitude and are ready to make a deal) there is a good chance that Nahas and Seraggedin will “buy the package”. On the other hand, if he quickly succumbs to the native air of Egypt and damns the British from right to left, this may well jeopardize the entire future of the negotiations. While educating the Egyptians, Mr. Bevin has also been talking to his own Chiefs of Staff. These conversations have taken the line that in 1956 Britain is through in Egypt, come what may. Therefore the COS should begin to adjust their thinking to this basic fact. Concessions might well be made with this in view. 1952 is to be the critical year, in Mr. Bevine’s thinking , therefore concessions should be geared to take this into account. Nothing substantial to be given until after 1952 but full scale evacuation plans should be laid with 1956 in view. The Chiefs of Staff are also being urged to take into consideration the serious manpower shortage developing in Great Britain and the fact that the labor reserve of Egypt (estimated up to one million) might well be tapped under favorable local circumstances. There is the possibility that serious training of Egyptians in administrative and technical skills could be used to the ultimate advantage of the British. One of the many obstacles to complete evacuation is the British Treasury which estimates the total cost of evacuation at £200 million, and says that there is no possibility of obtaining the money. In many ways it would be cheaper to sell the base, lock, stock and barrel, to the Egyptians, except for the fact that irreplaceable materials are stored there. The British now believe that more thought must be given to Turkey’s position vis-à-vis defense and the Canal (with perhaps some wishful thinking that Turkey might help out in current negotiations). Jefferson Caffery 1 Copy sent to London. 2 Egyptian Ambassador in the United Kingdom. 3 Minister of Interior and Finance. Greece Greece Contents United States military and economic assistance to Greece; the Greek question at the United Nations; offer of a Greek armed forces contingent for the United Nations command in Korea (Documents 130-202) United States military and economic assistance to Greece; the Greek question at the United Nations; offer of a Greek armed forces contingent for the United Nations command in Korea United States military and economic assistance to Greece; the Greek question at the United Nations; 1 offer of a Greek armed forces contingent for the United Nations command in Korea 1 For previous documentation on these topics, see Foreign Relations, 1949 , vol. vi , pp. 227 ff. See also vol. iii , pp. 1 ff., for documentation on the association of Greece with Mediterranean defense planning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. [130] The Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (Grady) to the Greek Prime Minister (Theotokis) Athens, January 17, 1950. 881.10/1–3050 [131] The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State Athens, January 30, 1950—4 p. m. 781.55/1–3050: Telegram [132] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) [Washington,] February 3, 1950. 357.AE/2–350 [133] The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State Belgrade, February 10, 1950—6 p. m. 868.00/2–1050: Telegram [134] Editorial Note [135] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb), to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) Washington, March 6, 1950. [136] The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State Athens, March 15, 1950—10 a. m. 781.00/3–1550: Telegram [137] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, March 16, 1950—2 p. m. 781.00/3–1550: Telegram [138] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ben F. Dixon, of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs [Washington,] March 17, 1950. 681.82/3–1750 [139] Memorandum of Conversations, by the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson) Athens, March 22, 1950. 357.AE/3–2250 [140] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, March 23, 1950—7 p. m. 781.00/3–2350: Telegram [141] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, March 24, 1950—4 p. m. 781.00/3–2350: Telegram [142] The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State Athens, March 27, 1950—6 p. m. 781.00/3–2750: Telegram [143] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, March 28, 1950—6 p. m. 781.00/3–2850: Telegram [144] Editorial Note [145] The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State Athens, March 31, 1950—11 a. m. 781.00/3–3150: Telegram [146] The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State Athens, April 3, 1950. 881.00R/4–350: Telegram [147] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs (Cromie) [Washington,] April 4, 1950. 881.00R/4–450 [148] The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State Athens, April 5, 1950. 881.00(R)/4–550: Telegram [149] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Robertson) [Washington,] April 10, 1950. 033.1100/4–1050 [150] The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State Athens, April 17, 1950—noon. 781.02/4–1750: Telegram [151] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] April 18, 1950. 781.00/4–1850 [152] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Herbert D. Brewster, Special Assistant to the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Mission to Greece (Porter) [Athens,] April 21, 1950. 781.00/4–2150 [153] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, May 8, 1950—6 p. m. 781.00/5–850: Telegram [154] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, May 11, 1950—4 p. m. 781.02/5–1150: Telegram [155] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, May 13, 1950—1 p. m. 781.00/5–1350: Telegram [156] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson), at Athens Washington, May 13, 1950—1 p. m. 357.AE/5–1350: Telegram [157] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, May 18, 1950—1 p. m. 781.00/5–1850: Telegram [158] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, May 18, 1950—1 p. m. 781.00/5–1850: Telegram [159] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, June 9, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AE/6–950: Telegram [160] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, June 27, 1950—8 p. m. 781.00/6–2450: Telegram [161] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson), at Geneva Washington, June 29, 1950—8 p. m. 357.AE/6–2950: Telegram [162] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, July 17, 1950—7 p. m. 781.00/7–1750: Telegram [163] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, July 19, 1950—2 p. m. 781.00/7–1950: Telegram [164] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy under Secretary of State (Matthews) [Washington,] July 22, 1950. [165] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, July 26, 1950. 781.13/7–2650 [166] The Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece (Jenkins) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Athens, July 26, 1950. [167] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, July 27, 1950—11 a. m. 781.11/7–2750: Telegram [168] Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans August 27, 1950 U.N. doc. A/1307 [169] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Peurifoy) [Washington,] July 31, 1950. 781.00/7–2850 [170] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs (Anschuetz) [Washington,] August 4, 1950. 781.00/8–450 [171] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance (Ohly) [Washington,] August 10, 1950. NEA Politico–Military Adviser Files: Lot 484 [172] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, August 18, 1950—6 p. m. 781.00/8–1850: Telegram [173] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, August 19, 1950—2 p. m. 781.00/5–1850: Telegram [174] Editorial Note [175] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, August 26, 1950—4 p. m. 781.5–MAP/8–2650: Telegram [176] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, August 28, 1950—7 p. m. 781.00/8–2750: Telegram [177] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, September 14, 1950—7 a. m. 881.00R/9–1450: Telegram [178] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chief of the Joint united States Military Aid Group to Greece (Jenkins) Washington, September 15, 1950—5:35 p. m. NEA Politico–Military Adviser Files: Lot 484 [179] The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State Athens, September 16, 1950—noon. 881.00R/9–1650: Telegram [180] Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom London, September 19, 1950 780.00/9–1850 [181] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) Washington, September 19, 1950. [182] The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State Athens, September 27, 1950 [—8 a. m.] 781.00/9–2750: Telegram [183] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, September 27, 1950—7 p. m. 881.00R/9–2750: Telegram [184] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stephen T. Calligas of the Embassy in Greece Athens, 27 September 1950. Athens Embassy Files: Lot 58 F7: 350 Greece (Sept.–Dec.) [185] The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State Athens, September 28, 1950—9 a. m. 681.82/9–2850: Telegram [186] The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State Athens, October 3, 1950—3 p. m. 781.5/10–350: Telegram [187] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Athens Washington, October 4, 1950—8 p. m. 681.82/9–2850: Telegram [188] The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State Athens, October 5, 1950—4 p. m. 781.5/10–550: Telegram [189] Editorial Note [190] Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece Monthly Report for September 1950 ( R –41) Athens, October 20, 1950. 881.00R/10–2350 [191] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, October 26, 1950—8 p. m. 781.5/10–2650: Telegram [192] The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State Athens, November 4, 1950—3 p. m. 781.00/11–450: Telegram [193] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece Washington, November 9, 1950—8 p. m. 781.00/11–450: Telegram [194] Editorial Note [195] The Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece (Lapham) to the Prime Minister of Greece (Venizelos) Athens, November 21, 1950. Athens Embassy Files: Lot 58F6: Box 45: 500 ECA [196] Editorial Note [197] The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 12, 1950—1 p. m. 611.81/12–1250: Telegram [198] The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 15, 1950—1 p. m. 681.82/12–1550: Telegram [199] The Embassy in Greece to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Athens, December 22, 1950. Athens Embassy Files: Lot 5SF7: 420 Greek Army [200] The Secretary of State to the United States Special Representative on the united Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson) Washington, December 23, 1950—1 p. m. 357.AE/12–2350: Telegram [201] The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 23, 1950—6 p. m. 781.00/12–2350: Telegram [202] The United States Representative on the united Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson) to the Secretary of State Athens, December 31, 1950—1 p. m. 357.AE/122–3150: Telegram The Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (Grady) to the Greek Prime Minister (Theotokis) 881.10/1–3050 [Document 130] The Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece ( Grady ) 2 to the Greek Prime Minister ( Theotokis ) 3 confidential Athens , January 17, 1950. Excellency : In my letter of October 23, 1949 to Prime Minister Diomedes, 4 a copy of which I am enclosing for your convenience, 5 I recommended a reduction of 50,000 men in the Greek Army by January 1, 1950 and mentioned subsequent additional reductions in all the Greek Armed Forces as well. I have been pleased to learn that the demobilization during the months of November and December has progressed satisfactorily and that the recommended reductions in strength will be completed this month. In the carefully considered opinion of American and, I believe, British military advisers and Greek military leaders as well, the current situation permits a continued gradual reduction in the strength of all three components of the Greek Armed Forces. I agree with this opinion and think that a reduction in man strength will have an overall beneficial effect on the country. If the resources of Greece could support the present large Armed Forces it might be reasoned that they should be maintained as an additional safety factor, but under the present financial circumstances Greece has no alternative but to reduce her defense expenditures. In another letter I am communicating to you my concern over the continued high, level of Government expenditures and particularly of those for defense. 6 If Government expenditures are not reduced, there will be insufficient funds to carry out the planned reconstruction program and this in turn may cause a cut back of the American economic aid. I therefore strongly advise that the following maximum strengths for the Greek Armed Forces and Police be established for June 30, 1950: Greek National Army 114,000 Royal Hellenic Navy 10,000 Royal Hellenic Air Force 6,100 Gendarmerie 23,200 Civil Police 8,000 Category “C” –0– These strengths would be reached by a continued gradual demobilization in accordance with plans drawn up by Greek military authorities with the assistance of American advisers. I emphasize that these are maximum strengths and that I am in favor of any further reductions which military authorities find necessary in order to bring expenditures within the present budget. In my opinion the Greek Government should also look forward to making continued reductions in the strength of the Greek Armed Services during the second six months of 1950 with the objective of attaining the following strengths by December 31, 1950: Greek National Army 80,000 Royal Hellenic Navy 7,000 Royal Hellenic Air Force 5,700 Gendarmerie 23,200 Civil Police 8,000 I believe Your Excellency will agree that in democratic countries like yours and mine, while military authorities give advice on matters such as this, the initiative and responsibility for decisions of this nature rest with the civilian government. Although decision on the reductions for the second half of 1950 may be deferred until a postelection Government has taken office, I think that the responsibility for the reductions for the first half of 1950 necessarily lies with Your Excellency’s Government. I wish finally to point out that the plans of my Government for continuing military aid to Greece are based on the expectation that the reductions suggested above will be realized. The position taken by the Greek Government on this matter will, therefore, be of the utmost importance in determining my Government’s policy with regard to the amount of military assistance to be finally allocated to Greece during this fiscal year. I urge Your Excellency to communicate this letter to members of the Government with the aim of reaching a firm and early decision regarding the recommendation contained herein. I cannot emphasize too strongly my feeling that the Greek Government has a responsibility in this matter to its people, and indirectly to the American people who have provided so much assistance to Greece. I should very much appreciate receiving at your earliest convenience the Government’s decision on these recommendations. 7 Please accept [etc.] Henry F. Grady 2 Henry F. Grady also served as Ambassador in Greece. 3 The source text was transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 3 to despatch 113 from Athens, January 30, not printed. John G. Theotokis was Prime Minister and Minister of War, of the Navy, and of the Air Force. 4 Alexander Diomedes, former Prime Minister. 5 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 440 . 6 Not printed. 7 In a letter to Ambassador Grady dated January 27, not printed, Prime Minister Theotokis agreed to a reduction of 33,000 men in the strength of the Greek Army by June 30, subject to a reexamination of the situation in March (Athens Post Files: Lot 58F6: Box 45: 500 ECA). In a letter to Prime Minister Theotokis dated January 29, not printed, Ambassador Grady replied that he was “deeply disappointed in the very limited assurances” given by the Greek Government regarding reduction of military personnel and expenses and he stated that the American program for reequipping Greek Armed Services was based on a force level below the 92,700 ceiling recommended for December 31, 1950 ( ibid. ). The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State 781.55/1–3050: Telegram [Document 131] The Ambassador in Greece ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , January 30, 1950—4 p. m. 213. Tomap. ReDeptel 159. 1 1. In my letter of December [ January ] 17 to Greek Government, 2 copy of which was forwarded to Department, I recommended maximum military strengths for June 30 and December 31, 1950. These are figures proposed by JUSMAP[ G ] last summer. 3 I think the recommended figure of 92,700 for December 1950 is satisfactory as temporary goal, but we should bear in mind that a force less than 75,000 must eventually be our goal if we are to continue to give military aid to Greece. Consequently, if there is to be reopening of question of strength ceiling, I think we should lower rather than raise it. I do not think that difference of a few thousand men in armed service will break Greece financially or that they will make Greece secure, but my statements below show you my general reason for recommending reduction rather than increase, no matter how slight. 2. In rough figures Greek Government expenditures for FY 1950 are 6 trillion drachmae. Revenues will amount to only 4 trillion drachmae, leaving a deficit of 2 trillion which must be made up with ECA counterpart funds. In addition to this almost 1 trillion ECA counterpart funds are being spent for reconstruction. Of the 6 trillion normal expenditures, one-third are military. Economic and military aid in FY 1950 constitute over 25 percent of national income. This unsound economic position is due in large part to actual war expenses and dislocating effect of war on economy. However, it is also due in large part to chronic poverty of country, which is accentuated by tendency of government to spend large share of its income on relief, subsidies and other benefits to the many people who might otherwise not have a subsistence income. Steady progress has been made in improving production and I think that ECA aid will continue to improve the economy. Nevertheless, I think it may be some years before Greek wealth and income will be great enough to support her government and give her people decent standard of living. (In order to force Greeks to make best use of present aid we are, of course, publicly maintaining that ECA aid will end in 1952.) 3. On strictly economic grounds, I therefore am inclined to think that Greece cannot afford more than a small armed service. I realize, of course, that national security comes first and that there must be an adequate armed service. We are thus faced with decision as to how large an armed service we should recommend for country which, on its own resources, can afford only a token armed service. 4. In American eyes the primary purpose of Greek armed forces is to maintain internal security and repel guerilla invasions. Secondary purposes might be to build confidence, to delay a full-scale invading force or to provide evacuation means. First purpose can be regarded as absolutely essential one, whereas the others are of so little importance that they should be fulfilled by the forces set up for first purpose. In Greek eyes, large armed service is necessary not only to maintain internal security but also for the repelling of full-scale invasion, no matter how hopeless this may be. 5. I know of no indications that Communists intend to renew guerrilla warfare in coming summer, and in fact there are reasons why the time is inopportune. For example, successes in the Far East, recent defeat in Greece, increasing strength of Greek nation. Despite this, we can expect continued resistance from Greeks to our recommendations for military personnel reductions. 6. My visit to Washington about February 1 to 10 will give us an opportunity to discuss this further. Grady 1 Dated January 25, not printed; it requested Ambassador Grady’s reasons for recommending lower Greek force levels (781.55/1–2550). 2 Supra . 3 See telegram Amag 62, June 28, 1949, from Athens; text in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 360 . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) 357.AE/2–350 [Document 132] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Rusk ) secret [ Washington ,] February 3, 1950. Subject: Future Activities of UNSCOB. Participants: Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State Jefferson Patterson, Newly Appointed United States Representative to UNSCOB Harding F. Bancroft, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs 1 Leonard J. Cromie, Greek Affairs 2 Mr. Patterson called at 4:00 p. m. by appointment at his request prior to his departure for Athens to take up his duties as the new United States Representative on UNSCOB. In wishing Mr. Patterson success in his new assignment, I pointed out that UNSCOB has been a complicated operation but a fruitful one. It has, for example, been the impression of our Missions at Athens that it has served as a “padding” between Greece and her northern neighbors. While the Soviets appear to have withdrawn guerrilla pressure from Greece, it will be most important for the observers to increase rather than relax their vigilance and remain alert for any reports on the movements or positioning of the guerrillas in adjacent countries or other developments which might indicate Soviet intentions regarding the resumption of guerrilla operations against Greece or in other areas such as Yugoslavia or Germany. Despite the guerrilla withdrawal, the Soviets may well regard their Greek venture as a profitable one, since it caused, at slight cost to the Soviets, considerable American expenditures and involvement in an area of secondary strategic significance to the United States.… In reply to my question as to whether the interruption of diplomatic relations between the United States and Bulgaria would have any effect on UNSCOB or Greek relations with Bulgaria, Mr. Patterson answered that these relations could hardly be worse and that Bulgaria, according to latest intelligence reports, was still permitting small guerrilla bands to cross the Greek border. Mr. Bancroft concurred and pointed out that there will still be some western diplomatic representatives at Sofia through whom contact could, if desired, be effected between UNSCOB or the Greeks and the Bulgarian authorities. At the conclusion of our interview, I asked Mr. Patterson to maintain contact with the Department and to let us know if we can be helpful in any way to him. Mr. Patterson expressed his appreciation of the cooperation already extended by the Department and his feeling that his consultations here had been helpful and would enable him correctly to interpret and carry out United States policy with respect to UNSCOB. 1 Mr. Bancroft was the Director of the Office of united Nations Political and Security Affairs. 2 Mr. Cromie was the Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs. The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State 868.00/2–1050: Telegram [Document 133] The Ambassador in Yugoslavia ( Allen ) to the Secretary of State secret Belgrade , February 10, 1950—6 p. m. 162. Deptinstr 93, November 16, 1949. 1 During conversation today, I asked Deputy Foreign Minister [Srdja] Prica regarding status Greek guerrilla elements in Yugoslavia. Prica said he thought only small number are still in Yugoslavia majority having gone on to other countries. I asked what policy Yugoslav Government took toward remaining guerrillas here. He thought they would be allowed remain in Yugoslavia or depart if they preferred. I asked whether Yugoslav Government considered Markos 2 pro-Cominform. Prica replied “do you think Markos still alive? We are inclined to believe he is dead”. He said Yugoslavs thought Markos last public statement after his removal as chief GDA, when he allegedly made pro-Cominform speech, was also his last statement. Sent Department 162, repeated Athens 6. Department pass Moscow as 19 and Department of Defense. Allen 1 Not printed; it transmitted Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research Report No. 5073, October 26, 1949, entitled, “Estimate of Greek Guerrilla Strength and Disposition Outside Greece,” and it requested the Officer in Charge of the American Mission in Belgrade to comment on the report as he wished and to transmit additional information on the subject available to him (868.00/11–1649). 2 Markos Vafiades, former Premier and Minister of War of the Provisional Greek Democratic Government and Commander of the Democratic Army of Greece, establishments of the Communist-led Greek guerrilla movement, and former member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), was removed from these positions at the Fifth Session of the Central Committee of the KKE, held January 29–30, 1949 in the Grammos Mountains. Editorial Note [Document 134] Editorial Note Elections for the Greek Parliament of 250 seats were held on March 5. An intricate system of proportional representation resulted in a distribution of parliamentary seats to candidates of the following political parties (names of party leaders are in parentheses): Populist Party (Constantine Tsaldaris), 62; Liberal Party (Sophocles Venizelos), 56; National Progressive Union of the Center (General Nicholas Plastiras and Emmanuel Tsouderos), 45; Party of George Papandreou, 35; Democratic Camp (coalition of the extreme left) (Alexander Svolos, John Sofianopoulos, and Neokosmos Gregoriades), 18; PAP ( Politike Anexartetos Parataxis —Independent Political Array, a coalition of the extreme right) (Constantine Maniadakis, Theodore Tourkovassilis, and Constantine Kotzias), 16; MEA ( Metopon Ethnikes Anademiourgias —National Regeneration Front) (Panayotis Kanellopoulos and Vice Admiral Alexander Sakellariou), 7; National Party of Greece (General Napoleon Zervas), 7; Agrarian and Labor Party (Alexander Mylonas and Alexander Baltadzis), 3; and the New Party (Spyridon B. Markezinis), 1. Compared with the previous general election of 1946, the results indicated a shift of the electorate from the conservative Populist Party to the center parties. The extreme left Democratic Camp received about 9.6 percent of the votes cast, which was about the same as the extreme left’s assessed strength of 10 percent of the electorate in 1946 (Walter H. Mallory (ed.), Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press as of January 1, 1951 (New York, Harper and Brothers for the Council on Foreign Eclations, Inc., 1951), pages 96–97). Ambassador Henry F. Grady sent letters dated March 14 to Prime Minister John G. Theotokis and to Field Marshal Alexander Papagos, congratulating them for the way in which elections were held under conditions of order and calm permitting freedom of speech and movement (enclosures 1 and 2 to despatch 441, March 22, from Athens, not printed, 781.00/3–2250). Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb), to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 42 1 [Document 135] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Webb ), 2 to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay ) 3 [Extract] 4 top secret Washington , March 6, 1950. Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 42/1, 5 “United States Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to United States Security”, approved as Governmental Policy on March 23, 1949. It is requested that this report be circulated to the members of the Council for their information. A. Greece i policy implementation The following important actions have been taken pursuant to the conclusions set forth in NSC 42/1: Military Aid By the end of fiscal 1949, the program of United States military aid to Greece initiated two years earlier had involved expenditures of approximately $345 million and had brought the Greek forces to a peak of combat efficiency in preparation for a final campaign against remaining communist guerrilla strongholds in northern Greece. Military aid to Greece has been continued during fiscal 1950 under statutes appropriating $256 million for Greece and Turkey. Slightly over $55 million thereof has been allocated under Public Law 329 6 to the Defense Department, as well as allocations covering remaining funds under Public Law 75. 7 Further allocations will be made upon the bases now under study in the Department of State and the Department of Defense with respect to goals, objectives and troop and equipment levels required for Greece in the light of the cessation of major guerrilla action. In the interim, items unquestionably needed under any revised program are being programmed. It is estimated that the Greek military aid allocation for fiscal 1950 may be in the order of $160 million. Final determination of the exact figure is being expedited in order to make possible the obligation of available funds before June 30, 1950 and the adequate equipment of the Greek forces. Over 300 members of the Greek forces received training in United States service schools during the first five months of fiscal 1950, and this program is being continued. Planning for fiscal year 1951 is commencing in the light of paragraph 32, NSC 42/1. The Department of State has currently under review the planning figure of $75 million for Greek military aid, which was incorporated in the global budget request for foreign military assistance in fiscal 1951 with the understanding that the planned Greek program for fiscal 1950 would be completed and the procurement of common-use items (estimated about $40 million) would be assumed by ECA. United States military aid and advice enabled the Greek forces to defeat the communist guerrilla movement in the Fall of 1949. The number of guerrillas in Greece has been reduced from a one-time high of 28, 000 to under 700, a normal police problem for that country. Combat-fit guerrilla reserves outside Greece may total as high as 25, 000. Those in Bulgaria, variously estimated in the vicinity of 2,500–5,000, constitute the most immediate potential threat to Greece. Greek Army strength was reduced from 196,000 on November 1, 1949 to 150,000 on January 1, 1950. Present plans call for reducing the Army to 80,000 and the present total of all uniformed services (200,000) to 124,000 by December 31, 1950. Substantial reduction is also planned in the present strength of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (600). The British service missions will likewise be reduced. Withdrawal of the British combat garrison from Greece has been completed. Economic Aid The ECA allocation for Greece for 1949–50 calls for the provision of $156.3 million in direct aid and $107.3 million in indirect aid. Of the former figure, $109.3 million had been allocated as of January 25, 1950 and purchase authorizations issued in the amount of $93 million. Between 60 and 100% of Greece’s drawing rights on other ECA countries for the current period have been utilized. ECA assistance, American and British technical advice, and other developments such as the drachma devaluation of September 22, 1949 have kept the Greek economy on a reasonably even keel and permitted some reconstruction to go forward despite the guerrilla warfare. The termination of large-scale fighting has activated planning for further economic development. By OEEC decision, the Greek ECA allocation for 1950–51 will be approximately equivalent to that of the present year. However, the ECA appropriation may be increased to provide for financing the procurement of certain common-use items heretofore supplied under the Military Assistance Program. Although the Greeks are not being encouraged to expect further financial assistance after June 30, 1952, it is improbable that Greece will have achieved economic viability by that date. United Nations and Diplomatic Efforts The United States has taken all feasible steps in the United Nations in support of Greek independence and territorial integrity and has continued to play an active role in the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans. Resolutions on the Greek case and on the repatriation of Greek children, jointly sponsored by the United States and three other Powers, were adopted on November 18, 1949 by the General Assembly by respective votes of 50 to 6 (with 2 abstentions) and unanimously. The United States has endeavored to foster improved relations between Yugoslavia and Greece without, however, making the extension of limited assistance to Tito conditional upon specific political commitments on his part with respect to Greece. We have likewise encouraged more cordial relations between Greece and Italy and the Near Eastern States, while avoiding any expressed or implied commitment with respect to proposed conventional security arrangements in that area. Greek Internal Situation Without directly intervening in Greek politics, we have endeavored to encourage stable, democratic and efficient government in Greece and fair judicial practices. The Coalition Government was maintained in office until January 10 [6], 1950, when it was replaced by a Service Cabinet in preparation for regular parliamentary elections scheduled for March 5, 1950. Termination of the guerrilla warfare enabled the Greeks to adopt broad clemency legislation. There have been no executions in Greece since September 30, 1949 and martial law has been lifted. With American advice, substantial progress has been made toward administrative decentralization and fiscal and civil service reform. We have encouraged the development of free trade unionism in Greece, both through Embassy and ECA officials and through AFL and CIO channels. Through these developments grounds for legitimate criticism of the conduct of Greek internal affairs have been lessened, although the functioning of the Greek governmental apparatus is likely to remain below western standards and to pose continuing problems. ii policy evaluation The action taken by the United States with respect to Greece, together with related developments, has so far prevented Greece from falling under communist domination and the ensuing adverse psychological and political results outlined in NSC 42/1. The principal related development was, of course, the Tito-Cominform rift, which led to the cessation of Yugoslav aid to the Greek guerrilla movement and contributed to its internal demoralization, and it may well have been this development which tipped the scales of victory in our favor. While this is a possibility, it is on the other hand a probability that Tito could not have undertaken or made good his defection had the United States adopted a less firm position in Greece and permitted the communists to take over that country. In this respect, United States policy in Greece has been successful beyond expectations. It is improbable that the Cominform bloc has the immediate capability of resuming guerrilla operations against Greece on the former scale, and the reported dispositions of the guerrillas outside Greece indicate that such operations are not contemplated, at least pending resolution of the Tito defection. On the other hand, the Cominform would seem to retain the capability of instigating guerrilla forays into Greece from Bulgaria and Albania and might well consider it advantageous to do so in order to retard normalization and recovery. Abrupt or excessive curtailment of the American program of aid to Greece would tend to encourage both external communist pressure against Greece of this nature and internal communist maneuvers, and it would simultaneously undermine the moral and physical capacity of the Greeks to resist these pressures. Collapse of Greek morale and the Greek economy are the internal factors which would be most likely to bring about communist domination of Greece. The external factor most likely to threaten such communist domination would be the overthrow of Tito by the Cominform. On the other hand, rising living standards in Greece and any further defections from the Cominform bloc, particularly of Albania or Bulgaria, would greatly strengthen the Greek position. American policy should be guided by these considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . James E. Webb 1 Lot 63 D 351 is a serial master file of the National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 James E. Webb. 3 James S. Lay, Jr. 4 For text of the omitted portion of this report, see p. 1236 [ Pg. 1236 is part of Doc. 688 ] . 5 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 269 . 6 Approved October 6, 1949; 63 Stat. (pt. 1) 714. 7 Approved May 22, 1947; 61 Stat. (pt. 1) 103. The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State 781.00/3–1550: Telegram [Document 136] The Ambassador in Greece ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , March 15, 1950—10 a. m. 549. I saw the King 1 today at his request. He said he wished to inform me of his thinking and probable action with regard to the formation of the new government. He outlined his conception of a solution which was identical to that suggested to me last Friday by Metaxas 2 and the day before by Metaxas to Minor. 3 It is the “solution” that the Populist Party and the Palace have been seeking to effect, that is, the giving of the mandate to Venizelos who would seek the assistance of Papandreou and Canellopoulos in the formation of a government which Tsaldaris would support in Parliament and which he (the King) understood Plastiras would also support. He said, further, that he had seen Venizelos yesterday, and Venizelos, despite his agreement with the other three members 4 of the proposed center government, was prepared to throw them over and form a government if he thought he could succeed in doing so. According to the King, Venizelos is endeavoring to do so at this time. I then spoke very frankly to the King and said that Venizelos was probably the most likely of the center group to give trouble as evidenced by his willingness to betray them by what he said to the King. I explained our position to the King and said that I felt the center solution under Plastiras as Prime Minister was logical and reflected the will of the people as shown in the election. 5 I said that any other attempted solution would not be stable and would bring criticism on the Palace because it would be known that the instigation had come from there. We would consequently be faced by a period of political confusion. King said that he feared my government would become disgusted with the Plastiras regime and withdraw aid. I told him that on the contrary my government fully approved the policy we here had been following and would be disturbed more at political confusion than it would at a solution which made Plastiras Prime Minister. I pointed out that I felt the long-term effects on the country and the King of the by-passing of Plastiras would be to force him into the arms of Sofianopoulos and the result would be a strong leftist group which might ultimately take over political control in the country. He seemed to be influenced by what I said, but commented that if he did accept the Plastiras solution, he would exact two conditions: first, that there be no slanting of foreign policy toward Russia, and second, that there be no effort to harm the army. I remarked that on both points they had given their assurances and that specifically with the powers he has, General Papagos could protect the army’s interests. I said that we had had assurances indirectly from Plastiras and others in the center group that they would work with the Western Democracies in foreign policy and that they had no intention of endeavoring to destroy the army. My discussion with him was most cordial, but completely frank. I hope that he will not make what I would regard as a serious blunder by toying with alternative solutions which would tend to frustrate the will of the people as expressed in the elections. I pointed out further the dangers of delay in the forming of the government. Grady 1 Paul I, King of the Hellenes. 2 No record of a meeting on March 10 between Col. Aristides S. Metaxas, Chief of the King’s Political Bureau, and Ambassador Henry F. Grady was found in Department of State files. 3 No record of a meeting on March 9 between Col. Aristides S. Metaxas and Harold B. Minor, Counselor of Embassy in Greece with rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, was found in Department of State files. 4 Gen. Nicholas Plastiras, Emmanuel Tsouderos, and George Papandreou. 5 See the editorial note, p. 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/3–1550: Telegram [Document 137] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece confidential priority Washington , March 16, 1950—2 p. m. 488. At ur discretion you may inform HM Dept strongly endorses views expressed urtel 549 Mar 15 1 and trusts they will receive most serious consideration. We are not competent or qualified at this distance to judge what particular coalition might be best for Greece from local viewpoint. It is clear, however, that public opinion in this country, which most favorably impressed by freedom Grk elections, regards outcome as reflecting swing Grk opinion toward moderate Left and desire Grk people for “new faces” in Govt. Whether wisely or not, great majority Americans have welcomed this trend, which corresponds their own sentiments, and greeted with satisfaction public announcements planned formation centrist Cabinet under Plastiras. US opinion might well have accepted formula suggested by HM if Plastiras proposal and declaration principles had not already been formally made and widely publicized. 2 To eliminate Plastiras now, even though alternative coalition might command parliamentary majority, wld be interpreted here as obviously contrived effort frustrate expressed will of Grk people and wld be likely create more “disgust” than any subsequent possible disillusionment over Plastiras Govt. Dept fully appreciates personal considerations which might motivate HM’s reluctance work with Plastiras and Tsouderos and was consequently impressed by his statement to Sulzberger 3 he intended adhere to correct constitutional line. 4 Dept also impressed by declaration principles this group, which accepts Monarchy despite Plastiras’ life-long republicanism and appears otherwise acceptable. US public, on other hand, is not aware of historical background Grk regime controversy and wld be mystified and disturbed if it shld appear that personal rancors were standing in way of implementation along constitutional lines of Grk electorate’s mandate, especially since regime now accepted by former republicans. Webb 1 Supra . 2 Telegram 533, March 13, from Athens, not printed, summarized a communication of March 12 to King Paul in which Gen. Plastiras and Messrs. Tsouderos, Venizelos, and Papandreou stated, inter alia , that their agreement for cooperation being final there would be no further individual statements to the press; that they unreservedly recognized the regime of the constitutional monarchy; that Greece stood at the side of the western democracies to which it owed the maintenance of its independence; that the work of the army in the national struggle was recognized; and that they considered the effective use of American aid as a main objective (781.00/3–1350). 3 C. L. Sulzberger, foreign correspondent of the New York Times . 4 Telegram 514, March 9, from Athens, not printed, reported that “Sulzberger spoke yesterday to King who off record said while Plastiras solution dangerous and unpalatable he would have to accede if Liberal front approaches him to form government. He said he would simply have to eat his own words but it would be difficult to bring himself to shake hands with Plastiras.” (781.00/3–950) Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ben F. Dixon, of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs 681.82/3–1750 [Document 138] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Ben F. Dixon, of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs secret [ Washington ,] March 17, 1950. Subject: U.S. Observer Participation in Greek-Turkish Staff Talks. Participants: Vassili G. Dendramis, Ambassador, Greek Embassy John D. Jernegan, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs Ben F. Dixon, Greek Affairs In the course of a call to the Department principally concerned with other matters, Mr. Jernegan referred to a previous talk Ambassador Dendramis had had with Assistant Secretary McGhee 1 concerning the participation of United States observers at the prospective Greek-Turkish staff talks. 2 At that time Mr. McGhee had said that we were not inclined to participate in the talks, but, at the Ambassador’s request, had agreed to consider the matter further. Mr. Jernegan said that we had now discussed this matter with officials in the Department of Defense and had come to the conclusion that while we did not wish in any [way] to discourage these staff talks, the United States would not participate in them. 1 George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 2 It was understood that the Turks had made the holding of Greek-Turkish military staff talks, proposed by the Greeks, conditional upon the presence of an American observer. Such talks, however, did take place at Ankara in December. No evidence of the presence of an American observer at these talks was found in Department of State files. (See telegram 1932, December 15, p. 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] .) Memorandum of Conversations, by the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson) 357.AE/3–2250 [Document 139] Memorandum of Conversations, by the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans ( Patterson ) secret Athens , March 22, 1950. Participants: (in successive conversations): Ambassador George Allen, 1 American Ambassador to Yugoslavia; Mr. Adrian Colquitt, 2nd Secretary at American Embassy, Belgrade; Mr. Constantine Tranos, Deputy Chief, Greek Liaison Service with UNSCOB; Mr. Jefferson Patterson, U.S. Representative on UNSCOB. Subject: Greeks detained in territories of northern neighbors, with especial reference to Yugoslavia. Ambassador Allen held the opinion that, if the prospective Greek Government (to come into office following the elections of March 5, 1950), which promised to be a combination of elements not distasteful to the Yugoslav authorities, would boldly make an unconditional gesture of amity toward Yugoslavia with the announcement of appointment of an outstandingly able personality as Minister or, preferably, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, the chances are that Yugoslavia would be prepared to return many of the children now detained in Yugoslav territory. 2 In relation to other categories of Greeks who might be detained in Yugoslavia, Ambassador Allen expressed the belief that there were few, if any, military of the Greek National Army among these, so that the problem of their repatriation would hardly arise in connection with improved Greek-Yugoslav relationships. He wondered if the Greeks really cared very much about the return of guerrillas, and indeed was inclined to hold that, if the Greeks actually knew how thoroughly indoctrinated with Communist tenets the children were becoming (information supplied the Ambassador by a UNICEF representative in Yugoslavia who was in touch with the children), the authorities at least, as distinguished from the parents, might not be so eager to have them back. On my inviting the Ambassador’s attention to the interest shown by UNSCOB in expediting the release of the children from Communist clutches, and their removal to third countries such as Switzerland or Italy under safeguards provided by UN agencies, the Governments of those countries or perhaps the International Red Cross Committee, the Ambassador replied to the effect that, in view of the expected rather rapid improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relationships, it would be well to let the two principals argue the matter of international refugees out between themselves rather than to interpose any other machinery immediately. If the two parties could not get together, then the intervention of third parties, and suggestions regarding the removal of the children to third countries, would seem to be in order. On my mentioning a suggestion informally made in the Department to the effect that, if all else failed, recourse might be had to the “Angus Ward 3 technique”, 4 Ambassador Allen felt that it would be a last resort, agreeing that this technique, while effective in the case of the American Consul-General at Mukden, would lose its force if employed too frequently. Mr. Colquitt, whom I saw on another occasion during Ambassador Allen’s brief pause in Athens, felt that UNSCOB, in view of the attitude of the Yugoslavs toward the Special Committee, should carefully refrain from appearing in the picture, and that the Greeks and Yugoslavs could probably be allowed to discuss their problems without outside intervention at the present time. Mr. Tranos, who had spoken to Mr. Aglion 5 following the latter’s return from Geneva, was more depressed on the subject of the children than either of the Americans consulted. He hoped—although from his manner of speaking hardly expected—that the prospective visit of a Red Cross representative to verify the bona fides of the applications for return of 136 Greek children now in Czechoslovakia would result in their repatriation. As for the camps of international refugees now in Greece, the IKO would presently withdraw its support. He did not know what would happen to the “hard-core” inhabitants of these camps, but supposed that some UN organization would take care of them. He did not seem to feel that it was the responsibility of the Greek Government. I understood from a recent talk by Mr. Stevens of the IRO, 6 before the Special Committee, that aged and ill persons in the camps would continue to receive support from the UN if not from remaining IKO funds. Mr. Tranos evinced more anxiety over the steady infiltration of refugees from the Soviet-dominated portion of eastern Europe. These people had drifted across many frontiers and had finally come to Greece. While their number was not large, there seemed to be a steady trickle of persons from Eastern Europe who were becoming a burden for the Greek Government. Mr. Tranos stated that, when such refugees could not enter Greece, he understood that the Yugoslavs undertook to expel them in the direction of Italy via Trieste. These eastern Europeans were accordingly becoming a burden for Italy, as they threatened to become for Greece. J. Patterson 1 Ambassador Allen visited Athens from March 19 to March 22. 2 Documentation concerning the exchange of Ministers by Greece and Yugoslavia and on the repatriation of Greek children detained in Yougslavia is scheduled for publication in volume iv . 3 Former Consul General at Mukden. Documentation on problems of the United States consulates general in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists is presented in Foreign Relations , 1949, volume viii , and the Department of State Bulletin , November 28, 1949, p. 799. 4 Leonard J. Cromie, in a conversation with Paul Economou-Gouras, Minister of the Greek Embassy in Washington, on January 9, said “he had thought in a preliminary way” about trying the “Angus Ward technique” whereby all diplomatic missions in countries harboring Greek children would appeal to the foreign ministries concerned for the repatriation of the children (memorandum of conversation, January 11, by Mr. Cromie; 781.00/1–1150). 5 Raoul Aglion, Principal Secretary of the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans. 6 Reference is to a statement before the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans at Athens on March 3, by David C. Stephen, Chief of the International Refugee Organization Mission to Greece (U.N. doc. A/AC.16/SR.184). The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 781.00/3–2350: Telegram [Document 140] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State secret niact Athens , March 23, 1950—7 p. m. 639. Entire political situation altered by Venizelos’ breaking his pledge to support Plastiras government. Venizelos is now engaged in forming straight Liberal government which Metaxas claims is assured majority by support rightist parties. This has come as considerable shock to us since we had regarded Plastiras government as having been approved by King and Venizelos. In fact, we have recently been discussing policies and make-up of Plastiras government. In view imminence of unexpected and illogical Venizelos solution and fact that Ambassador Grady would not return here for 48 hours, I called in Metaxas today to make American attitude crystal-clear to him and to King. I told Metaxas of Department’s endorsement of views expressed to King by Ambassador Grady and of point made in Deptel 448. 1 I said it was regrettable that our views had been disregarded and that alternative solution has been found which could only (1) be regarded as aimed by right to exclude Plastiras and Papandreou from government, (2) make it appear that King has brought about this arbitrary solution, and (3) usher in unnatural government representing 20 percent of electorate and tolerated by parties of right only as long as they see fit. I said we would have no objection to government of this character if it had developed normally out of elections but that unfortunate impression would inevitably be gained that this is an imposed solution to frustrate freely expressed will of people. Further, I asked Metaxas whether he thought Americans here could have confidence in government headed by man like Venizelos who has upset every Cabinet he ever entered and who now callously repudiates his pledged word. He replied that, of course, no confidence can be imposed in Venizelos. Metaxas rather took line that Venizelos’ solution is not good one but there was no alternative. He said King had acted constitutionally to which I replied that for written record this was case but that Venizelos is saying that he took this course of action at King’s request and because King thinks it will be received better by foreigners than Plastiras government (which I pointed out was contrary to advice given King by Ambassador). I added that I was embarrassed to speak so frankly on this subject especially in absence of Ambassador but I felt I would be doing injury to Greece by failing without delay to make clear how we feel. He replied that he did not take my remarks amiss but rather appreciated our being frank. He assured me in conclusion that our views will be given serious consideration. Sent Department 639, repeated Geneva 24 for Ambassador Grady. Minor 1 Dated March 9; not printed. It stated in part the following: “Dept is cautioning [John A.] Phrantzes [Counselor,] Grk Emb [in the United States] (who believed have close palace ties) re dangers of direct intervention by Crown in polit affairs, especially implementation by King of his stated intention refuse appoint Plastiras or Tsouderos PriMin under any circumstances.” (781.00/3–850) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/3–2350: Telegram [Document 141] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece secret niact priority Washington , March 24, 1950—4 p. m. 542. Amb Dendramis called on Jernegan this morning before receipt Embtel 639 Mar 23 1 re Minor comments to Metaxas and Pipinelis 2 on Venizelos Govt. Said he was instructed by King and Pipinelis say that former “very annoyed” and latter “found strange” Minor’s reported observation that Venizelos Govt 3 “not agreeable” to US Govt. Also instructed point out dangers for Greece and US of Plastiras Govt including “very advanced leftist elements” and inconsistency of Plastiras advocacy of amnesty with his alleged anti-commie position. Added that Pipinelis, who now private citizen, wished do nothing which wld support communism and that King had acted only in accordance his concept Greece’s best interests. Emphasized alleged fickleness and limited intelligence of Plastiras and expressed view US shld adhere to announced policy non-intervention Grk internal politics. Dendramis concluded by asking whether Minor was acting on Dept’s instruction. Requested assurance by Jernegan that this not the case and suggested public statement by Grady that US will work with any Grk Govt which has parliamentary support. Jernegan replied impossible for him to comment on Minor observations before receipt Emb’s report. It was possible there had been some misunderstanding and that Minor’s point was that Venizelos Govt, involving repudiation by Venizelos of previous much-publicized agreement with Papandreous and Plastiras, wld not be agreeable to US public opinion. Said we do not question King’s patriotism, regret any disturbance HM may feel, and will look into matter to see if there has been some misunderstanding. On two specific requests, Jernegan expressed confidence Minor acted in full cognizance US policy but said he cld not comment further without knowing exact nature Minor’s remarks. Added he personally saw no need of public statement by Grady to correct any private statements to King and Pipinelis, but decision this matter up to Grady. Asked by press for comment on Athens story that Venizelos Govt viewed “as slap at Amer policy by King Paul and Grk rightists”, Dept spokesman commented today as follows: “It has been repeatedly stated that US has not sought to influence formation Govt fol recent free Grk elections. This is internal Grk matter to be worked out in accordance usual Grk constitutional procedures. US position remains that we look forward to cooperating with any Grk Govt which enjoys support Grk people expressed thru their duly elected Parliament and which is desirous and capable of carrying out objectives of US aid program.” Acheson 1 Supra . 2 Panayotis Pipinelis was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Prime Minister John G. Theotokis which left onice on March 23. 3 Formed March 23, with Sophocles Venizelos, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State 781.00/3–2750: Telegram [Document 142] The Ambassador in Greece ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State confidential Athens , March 27, 1950—6 p. m. 666. Mytel 660, March 26. 1 Venizelos called on me yesterday. He gave long explanation his action in agreeing form his own government in spite agreement with center group which he said first broken by Plastiras unauthorized and embarrassing press statements. Venizelos said he had acted under request from King and that he felt this patriotic duty to endeavor form own government. He was extremely worried as to stability his government and effects within his own party. I replied that we have been concerned with recent turn of events since we had supposed Plastiras government which arose normally out of elections, was in process of formation. I assured him we are not interfering in Greek political affairs and will support any government which is broadly based, has mandate from people, is able to obtain support in Parliament, and is able and willing carry out energetically ECA program. Our policy is neither laissez faire on one hand nor direct interference on other but we must consider probable stability and effectiveness of any Greek Cabinet. I said frankly that I could not see that his narrow government based almost entirely on his own party (which is itself split) and without any real assurance of continuing support from any outside quarter could provide this essential stability. I added that we had thought and still think Plastiras government might offer new hope. I made clear, however, that we are not interfering for or against any government—that we are not interested per se in any party or political personality. I think Venizelos was impressed with my remarks. Said he wished to appear before Chamber and see what support he could get before relinquishing mandate. However, I have feeling that he may before Chamber meets return mandate to King and offer support to Plastiras in behalf [ belief ] that voluntary action now would help save his prestige and that of party. Kanellopoulos 2 called and made strong attack on Plastiras, stating that latter’s criticism of army voting and developments of last few days make him impossible choice for Prime Minister. I commented that notwithstanding, Plastiras center coalition government seemed to reflect will of people as expressed in elections. To Kanellopoulos and also to Venizelos I warned against endeavors suspend Parliament. I pointed out that Greece has already had long moratorium on lawmaking, that much legislation now required facilitate general recovery, and that sudden dissolution Chamber might be interpreted as step toward dictatorship. I also told both these leaders that any general talk now of new election would have bad effect on morale people and stability of government and might be interpreted as negation of democratic procedures. Grady 1 Not printed; it communicated to the Department of State Ambassador Grady’s endorsement of the Embassy’s actions regarding the Greek political situation during his absence in Geneva and it suggested that the Department make a statement that the entire matter was in Ambassador Grady’s hands with the Department’s full confidence and that the Embassy was acting in accordance with Department policy (781.00/3–2650). 2 Panayotis Kanellopoulos, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, of the Navy, and of the Air Force. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/3–2850: Telegram [Document 143] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece secret Washington , March 28, 1950—6 p. m. 564. Embtel 673 Mar 28. 1 Dendramis reed today by Jernegan who confirmed identity Dept’s and Emb’s views on Grk Govt situation and that Grady acting with full confidence of Dept. Jernegan reviewed our thinking at length, stressing importance of Greece’s return to normal parliamentary procedures after completely normal elections. We had thought this wld involve centrist coalition under Plastiras as announced by centrist parties and were disturbed that last minute change of mind by Venizelos popularly attributed to Palace and US influence. Also emphasized our fear prolonged recess parliament wld be regarded as “trick” by US opinion. Concluded he was not asking Dendramis take any special action but merely wished make clear to all concerned that US was neither opposing nor supporting Venizelos Govt and that Dept fully behind Amb Grady. Dendramis in reply stressed dangers of Plastiras, who had violated original agreement by comments on Army vote. Also emphasized King had acted constitutionally and wld continue to do so. Added parliamentary recess authorized by constitution and might be practical necessity to enable Mins fulfill exec functions and expedite US program. Fol this conversation, Dendramis telephoned Venizelos who reportedly denied he ever pretended his Govt formed with US support. Venizelos also reportedly said that after talk with Grady he has decided not ask for parliamentary recess. Acheson 1 Not printed; it stated that Ambassador Grady appreciated the statement in Department of State telegram 559, March 27, to Athens, not printed (781.00/3–2650), that “we prefer to leave ur discretion and initiative any further public statements on Grk governmental situation” (781.00/3–2850). Editorial Note [Document 144] Editorial Note On March 31, Ambassador Grady sent a letter to Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos which called attention to the “less than satisfactory performance of the Greek Government in its conduct of economic affairs” and to the need for “a stable and efficient government, supported by the people and the Parliament” and capable of using American assistance to the fullest degree. The letter also held that “irresponsible talk of adjourning Parliament or of new elections” could “only create a climate of political and economic uncertainty.” It stated that Ambassador Grady and Paul R. Porter, Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece, could not approve the commitment of American funds for new projects, including the construction of four electric power plants, until the Greek Government assured the successful use of these funds for the purposes intended. Specifically, the letter proposed adoption of a financial plan involving reduction of military expenditures, establishment of a ceiling on government debt, more efficient operation of the state-owned railways and the Agricultural Bank, a simplified and efficient tax system with collection of past taxes due, and encouragement of private investment. In addition, a reduction in the number of government ministries, delegation of responsibility to local officials, the holding of local elections, and the establishment of a nonpolitical agency to administer the electric power program were suggested. Ambassador Grady concluded his letter with the statement that it was “in the hands of the Greek Government and the Greek Parliament to decide whether or not they wish to continue to receive American aid and hence to accept the responsibilities which will attain its purpose.” Finally, he expressed his “trust that this clear statement of the American concern in the Greek recovery will receive the earnest consideration of the Greek people and their representatives and that decisions to proceed boldly with an ambitious reconstruction effort will be taken quickly by the new Parliament.” (Telegram 702, March 31, from Athens, not printed, 781.00/3–3150; also, the Department of State Bulletin , April 17, 1950, page 600; and the New York Times , April 1, 1950.) The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State 781.00/3–3150: Telegram [Document 145] The Ambassador in Greece ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , March 31, 1950—11 a. m. 703. King seems so determined to destroy Plastiras politically that inherent weakness of Government being set up under Venizelos does not seem to concern him at all. I, and later Minor, gave him our views as to kind of government needed in present emergency and stated center coalition seemed to come nearer to meeting requirements, looked at from every standpoint. I have restated this to Venizelos and twice in last few days to Canellopoulos. They asked me if I wanted government to resign and I have replied that I would ask nothing of government. It is easy to see what would happen if they could say American Ambassador had caused fall of Government. I kept saying we are giving advice but not dictation. For this reason we have denied responsibility for newspaper statements even though they pretty accurately reflect our views. Venizelos regularly seeks word from Dendramis who advises him that Department in effect is behind Venizelos regime. Our own correctness here is being taken advantage of and we are drifting into political confusion. We can be neither dictatorial nor laissez-faire but “gentle persuasion” does not seem to be effective with irresponsible politicians and stubborn monarchs. We are all, particularly Porter, deeply concerned about effect on ECA program of political drift during interval of six months or so that it will take King to accomplish his very definite objective of getting Papagos in as Prime Minister. Hence, by agreement with Porter and concurrence of most of top staff I have sent a letter to Venizelos and issued it to press (mytel 702, March 31 1 gives text) setting forth what is expected of his government if our ECA program is to have a real measure of success. This letter may result in government resigning but if it does it will be a confession of weakness and inability to do job we expect. There are some risks but some form of positive action is clearly called for. Grady 1 Summarized in editorial note, supra . The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State 881.00R/4–350: Telegram [Document 146] The Ambassador in Greece ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State plain Athens , April 3, 1950. 727. Remytel 702, March 31. 1 There follows text letter dated April 1 from Prime Minister in response to my communication of March 31. Prime Minister’s letter published here 2 with my consent: “It is with the greatest interest that I read your letter received yesterday and referring to the question of giving full value to the American aid for this aid to give the best results. “The Government considers it to be its duty to assure you that it feels all its responsibility towards giving its full value to the American aid because it firmly believes that if this aid is not adequately used during the next two years, Greece will not be able to survive as an independent economic entity. We believe, that Your Excellency is of the same opinion considering that together with the delivery of your letter to the Prime Minister it was conmmunicated through the press to the Greek people. “I do not think necessary to answer in detail regarding all the points of the economic program referred to in your letter, but I declare without any reticence that the Government[,] as long as it remains in power, is firmly decided to give full value, in collaboration with the American Mission, to the aid so generously offered by the American people and this to the extreme limits of possibilities. “Proofs that this spirit of economy and of full understanding of the present critical circumstances inspire the policy of the present government have already been given during the short time of its existence in two instances—firstly, when at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers it was decided to stop every new appointment and, secondly, to sign the unpopular measure of curtailing grants to families of reservists. I hope that has been brought to your notice that the Government has begun to licentiate many civil servants. I am proud to believe that the Government acted in these matters with courage and unusual speed. “Regarding the political questions I agree, and wish to emphasize that the essential conditions for giving full value to the American aid is the stability of the Government. But such stability is difficult to secure with the present composition of the Chamber of Deputies and I am of the opinion that more can be expected in this matter from a homogeneous government with wide parliamentary support than by a concentration government counting on its own forces but with only a small majority and which government would have moreover the fault of not being homogeneous, this entailing delays in reaching decisions. To substantiate this contention may I refer to your own judgment, as expressed in your letter that[,] notwithstanding the numerical strength of governments in the last Parliament, results regarding the administration of economic [al] questions were far from satisfactory. “There are only two points in Your Excellency’s letter of yesterday on which I must express some surprise. These are the questions regarding the suspension of the work of the Parliament and its dissolution. [Both during a] meeting between us a few days ago and in my specific declaration to our Ambassador in Washington who forwarded my views to the State Department, as also in my repeated declarations to members of the press, I made known explicitly and categorically that there is no question of suspending the work of the Parliament. Regarding its dissolution, I fail to understand why this question found place in Your Excellency’s letter considering that I declared to the press again yesterday that the Government had never thought of submitting such a measure to the Chief of State, alone competent in the matter according to our Constitution. “I should be obliged if Your Excellency kindly informed me if there is any objection to my communicating to the press the text of this letter.” In conjunction with Prime Minister’s letter all local papers carried the following comment by me: “May I say that this letter was sent not merely to the Greek Government, but also to the Greek Parliament and to the Greek people in general. As regards the points about the suspension and dissolution of Parliament, they have been stressed not because it has ever been felt by the Embassy that they have been the aims of the present government; they have been mentioned just because of the widespread rumors both in the press and among public opinion”. Grady 1 See the editorial note, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . 2 °H Kαθημεριυή (Daily), April 2, 1950. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs (Cromie) 881.00R/4–450 [Document 147] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs ( Cromie ) confidential [ Washington ,] April 4, 1950. Subject: Greek Governmental Situation and ECA Aid to Greece Participants: Vassili G. Dendramis, Ambassador of Greece George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary John D. Jernegan, Director, GTI Leonard J. Cromie, Officer in Charge, Greek Affairs Summary Ambassador Dendramis inquired as to the truth of reports that ECA aid to Greece would be cut off unless the Greek Government were reconstituted. He also suggested by intimation that Ambassador Grady request Plastiras and Tsouderos to participate in and support a Venizelos Government without making difficulties about the Premiership. In reply it was stated that there appeared to be no new developments on the ECA aid situation, which was very clearly set forth in Ambassador Grady’s letter to Venizelos. 1 Mr. McGhee emphasized that this letter was written in accordance with Ambassador Grady’s responsibilities to the American Congress. He further stated that Ambassaor Grady was following, in all of these matters, the course of action which he believed to be most effective and that the Department deferred to his judgment and was fully behind him. Ambassador Dendramis called at noon by appointment at his request. He stated that he had received a telegram from Prime Minister Venizelos according to which opposition press circles in Athens were saying that ECA aid to Greece would be cut off unless the Greek Government were modified in the sense desired by Ambassador Grady. A UP story from Athens of April 3 carries the same report. Ambassador Dendramis stated that he also had a last-minute press clipping of Mr. Paul Porter’s denial of these reports, but he nevertheless wished to ascertain whether they had any substance and whether the Department was satisfied with Venizelos’ reply of April 1 2 to Ambassador Grady’s letter of March 31. It is most important, Mr. Dendramis said, to avoid any misunderstandings between Greeks and Americans and any appearance of undue American pressure on the Greek Government which could be misinterpreted and exploited by hostile propaganda. Mr. Jernegan stated that we knew of no developments since the Grady letter which changed the situation with respect to ECA aid to Greece from that clearly set forth in the Grady letter. As to Mr. Venizelos’ reply, the Prime Minister seemed to agree with Ambassador Grady’s opinion on the requirements of the Greek situation, and his letter thus seemed satisfactory. Mr. McGhee observed that he did not feel we were exercising any great pressure on the Greek Government. On the contrary, he thought, most objective observers would agree we were acting with exceptional restraint, considering the extent of American aid to Greece, and that we had always been most scrupulous in avoiding intervention in Greek internal affairs. Mr. Cromie concurred, pointing out that Ambassador Grady’s letter did not make any specific demands regarding the composition of the Greek Government. At the same time, Mr. Cromie said, Ambassador Grady had made it clear to Mr. Venizelos and others that in his opinion a very narrow single-Party Government, supported only by a portion of the Liberal Deputies and dependent on right-wing toleration for its existence, was not the kind of Government which would be able to carry out the American aid program objectives. Mr. McGhee said this was obvious. Any observer of government could see that. Ambassador Dendramis explained that the King had merely followed constitutional procedures, calling first on Tsaldaris and then on Venizelos to form a Government. If that Government can obtain a majority in the Parliament, the King must not intervene. However, he understood that negotiations are now proceeding between Venizelos and Plastiras with a view to broadening the Government. It seems to be merely a question of who is to be Premier, and they will find a solution to that. Meanwhile we must avoid creating misunderstandings, and in this connection, it had perhaps been unfortunate that the Grady letter was given to the press simultaneous with its delivery to Venizelos. Mr. Cromie said Ambassador Grady had explained that. His letter was intended for the Greek Parliament and people as well as for the Prime Minister. It was really a message to the Parliament and people in the form of a letter to the head of the Government. Mr. McGhee underlined that Ambassador Grady, in publishing the letter, was merely following a customary practice of making public statements with regard to the Greek aid program. To do so was in fact in accordance with his responsibilities and obligations to the American Congress as administrator of American aid in Greece. Mr. Jernegan added that the Grady letter was simply an elaboration of what had previously been stated on several occasions. At this point, Ambassador Dendramis raised the question of whether it would not be desirable for Ambassador Grady, instead of urging reconstitution of the Government, to endeavor to persuade Plastiras and Tsouderos to participate in and support the Government. (The Ambassador did not say so, but his suggestion implied that Plastiras and Tsouderos should be asked not to make difficulties over the Premiership.) He was confident that Plastiras and Tsouderos would go along if Ambassador Grady spoke to them privately and made clear the necessity of supporting the essential and perhaps unpopular legislation which will be needed to carry through the reconstruction program. Mr. McGhee replied that this was a question of judgment, that Ambassador Grady was in the best position to make that judgment on the spot, and that we would have to defer to his opinion. Ambassador Grady, Mr. McGhee said, considers that he is following the most effective line of action and the Department is fully behind him. The interview concluded with some discussion of Mr. McGhee’s observations in Africa (see separate memorandum) and an expression by Mr. McGhee of his confidence that the Greek political situation would work itself out. 1 See editorial note, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . 2 Summarized supra . The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State 881.00(R)/4–550: Telegram [Document 148] The Ambassador in Greece ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State plain Athens , April 5, 1950. 776. For McGhee. According to afternoon papers Prime Minister told press this morning that he had just received telegram from Dendramis re conversation with McGhee April 4. Dendramis reports McGhee stated: (1) No suspension of aid to Greece contemplated; (2) US did not wish to interfere in Greek domestic affairs; (3) Grady letter to Venizelos 1 dictated by great American interest in Greece. Prime Minister concluded that Dendramis had received similar assurances from Jernegan and Cromie. Prime Minister also announced today that Dendramis will retire from diplomatic service on May 9. In view widespread speculation here re possible reduction or suspension of US aid to Greece, Embassy and ECA/G have informed recent inquirers that no projects now underway would be abandoned, but that no new projects would be approved by ECA until present confusion in political situation is corrected and Greek Government shows definite intention and capacity to proceed along lines outlined in my letter to Prime Minister. Grady 1 See editorial note, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Robertson) 033.1100/4–1050 [Document 149] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( Robertson ) [Extract] top secret [ Washington ,] April 10, 1950. Subject: General Collins’ Visit to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Participants: General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary for NEA Mr. David A. Robertson, NEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Discussion: Mr. McGhee called on General Collins at the Pentagon on Monday, April 10, 1950 at 3 p.m. to discuss the General’s recent trip to Greece, 1 Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Mr. McGhee opened the discussion by observing that the reports we had received on General Collins’ visit to the various capitals indicated the warmth with which General Collins had been greeted and the fine impression he had made on foreign government officials he had seen. General Collins stated that he was delighted to find, wherever he went, the friendliness and warmth with which Americans were greeted, diplomats, military men and private individuals alike. He then proceeded to review the highlights of his visits, country by country. Greece: As a result of discussions in Greece it had been decided that General Van Fleet 2 would be transferred at an early date and placed in command of one of the armies in the United States. General Van Fleet would be replaced by General Jenkins, 3 his present Deputy. Mr. McGhee agreed that it was timely for the transfer of General Van Fleet. He pointed out that while General Van Fleet had done an excellent job his services as a top notch strategist were no longer required and his talents were being wasted in Greece where the guerrilla warfare had been brought to a successful conclusion. The appointment of General Jenkins as General Van Fleet’s successor, having a lesser rank, would help us in our efforts to deflate the Greek thinking in terms of their own importance. General Collins indicated that in his opinion the United States Military Mission (perhaps this applies only to the army mission) should be reduced to 40 by the end of 1950. Also he saw no reason why the Greek armed forces should not be reduced to the 93,500 level recently agreed on by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Collins further pointed out that we should pull our military missions out of Greece, Turkey and Iran as soon as they have completed their assignments as, according to present estimates, we will have no forces to commit to these countries in the event of hostilities and it may be a source of embarrassment to us to leave our missions in these countries. He indicated that according to our plans we would leave the defense of this area to the U.K. and whatever forces it may be in a position to commit in support of these countries. General Collins agreed with Mr. McGhee that it was most unfortunate we had not been able to commit in the first 8½ months some $95 million appropriated for Greece. When General Collins indicated he understood that the delays were due to difficulties with the Bureau of the Budget, Mr. McGhee stated that he had been informed in discussions with Mr. Ohly 4 that considerable delay had been occasioned by the inability of State to get lists of equipment from Defense on the basis of which funds could be requested. General Collins asked General Gruenther to look into this situation promptly and see what could be done. General Collins indicated that he was very much impressed with the integrity and ability of General Papagos in his discussions with the latter as well as with the charm, beauty and modesty of Queen Frederika. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 March 24–26. 2 Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece. 3 Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, Deputy Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece. 4 John H. Ohly, Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance. 5 Queen of the Hellenes. The Ambassador in Greece (Grady) to the Secretary of State 781.02/4–1750: Telegram [Document 150] The Ambassador in Greece ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , April 17, 1950—noon. 852. Pass to ECA. Resignation of Venizelos government was due primarily to its innate weakness and to likelihood that it would not get from Parliament a vote of confidence. Venizelos and those behind him, however, have stated privately and certain of the press have published the charge that we demanded the resignation of the government. They also have charged that Porter and ECA refused cooperation. There is absolutely no truth in either charge. Outside my letter 1 we have officially kept silent and I asked Porter to make every effort to get whatever things done he could by Venizelos government. He has done so but government officials have tried by public statements and by approaches to him to assume that the power projects were approved with no qualifications. They have sought to ignore the conditions attached to the approval. This he has not allowed them to do. Hence the accusations of non-cooperation. On Embassy side we have in private conversations frequently restated our original position that the center coalition was the logical outcome of elections. My letter was to call to attention of a weak and irresponsible government “trying to get by” its serious obligations. Greece has an agreement (a contract) with US which we expect her leaders to live up to. It may be “unprecedented” for an ambassador to write a government to which he is accredited urging certain administrative and legislative measures, but it is also entirely unprecedented for a government to offer to another government freely and without quid pro quo plants to double its electric power capacity yet not to mention all the rest represented by ECA expenditures. The same coterie are also circulating stories that we are trying to force a Yugoslav alliance on them. This is a very important factor in the confused situation and the people seem to believe it. Of course, it arose from the unfortunate activities of Allen, 2 and his talks with the King, Pipinelis, Venizelos, and the Yugoslav Chargé. He wanted to see Plastiras also, but Minor drew the line. Returning, he stopped in Salonika for several hours and inspected the erstwhile Yugoslav Free Zone there. Sunday papers state Allen will renew his efforts with incoming Plastiras government. 3 I do not say we excercise[d] no influence in the matter of the government’s resignation. We got positive results by negative methods. Officially we were absolutely correct. But every effort Venizelos (and the brain trust) made to get American Government blessing failed. Of course, those against the Plastiras government will stop at nothing. Metaxas says we and the British will be responsible for whatever the Plastiras government may do. I am afraid the King and his brain trust consisting of Pipinelis, Metaxas, and Ventiris will sulk and try to embarrass the new government with the help of their lackey press. Venizelos is playing “hard to get” and has gone to South Africa for 45 days but his party is cooperating in Plastiras government. The new government has much talent and has a good chance to succeed despite the “saboteurs” who will endeavor to protect their selfish interests. The Greek people who are so fine and have fought so valiantly will suffer if this “coterie” goes on with its line of rule or ruin. Grady 1 See editorial note, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . 2 See memorandum by Patterson, March 22, p. 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 139 ] . 3 Formed April 15, with Gen. Nicholas Plastiras as Prime Minister and provisional Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Press and Information. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 781.00/4–1850 [Document 151] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] April 18, 1950. Subject: Activities of Ambassador Grady in connection with the Formation of new Greek Government The returns of the Greek elections, held on March 5, resulted in an almost even division between the Right and the Left. The Conservative Populist Party of Tsaldaris obtained a plurality with approximately 25 percent of the votes. Five other political groups received a substantial vote ranging down to 10 percent. In this situation the Centrist Liberal Party headed by Sophocles Venizelos, with approximately 20 percent of the vote, became the pivotal element. The early returns of the election coming from the metropolitan areas gave the impression that Centrist and Left elements had won the election. As a result an agreement was signed between Venizelos, Papandreou and the moderate Left party of General Plastiras to form a coalition Government. The King had strong objections to Plastiras becoming Prime. Minister, since Plastiras had been responsible for abolishing the monarchy in 1923 and exiling members of his family. The Rightist elements strongly objected to Plastiras because they believed his party to have been infiltrated by “fellow travellers” and that Plastiras himself was dangerously to the Left. When the Populist Party failed to find a majority the King offered the mandate to Venizelos. In the meantime pressure had been brought to bear on Venizelos by both the King and the Right to form a Government. The plan was for the Venizelos Government to be drawn only from his party, thus not having a Rightist stigma, but receiving the support from all Rightist elements. Venizelos, a weak and wavering character, repudiated the agreement with Plastiras and Papandreou and formed a Government on March 23. Ambassador Grady and Paul Porter, head of the ECA mission, after a complete exchange of views with the leaders of the previously proposed Centrist coalition and giving mature consideration to the matter, in no way shared the King’s apprehensions concerning the coalition. On the contrary they felt that the proposed coalition represented more closely the expression of the people’s will, that of reaction from the previous Rightist Governments (The 1946 elections had given the Right 70 percent of the vote and the Left 30 percent). Furthermore, Ambassador Grady felt that the King’s action in bringing about an artificial Government with no firm support in Parliament and subject to the wiles of three other parties, endangered both the Greek state and the monarchy. The Venizelos Government was subject to great criticism and seemed incapable of maintaining itself in power. The logical sequence should the Venizelos Government fall would have been the formation of the orginally planned Centrist coalition or possibly an ecumenical Government. In order to catalyze the almost imminent fall of the Venizelos Government, Ambassador Grady wrote a letter 2 to the Prime Minister in which he pointed out the objectives to be accomplished by the American Aid Program in Greece and what would be required of a Greek Government in order to carry the program out. This letter caused much discussion and speculation in the Greek press. Venizelos reopened negotiations with his erstwhile collaborators and then resigned. The originally planned Centrist coalition was formed under General Plastiras on April 15. In writing the letter to the Prime Minister, Ambassador Grady did not exceed the Department’s policy of technical “non interference” in Greek internal political affairs, although he did go to the limit in this direction. The Department has approved Ambassador Grady’s stand and has left matters largely in his hands because of the swiftly changing political picture in Greece. Just as the King’s action in putting in the Venizelos Government was “correct” in accordance with constitutional practices, so was Ambassador Grady’s letter “correct”, though somewhat leading, in stating the objectives of the American program in Greece and what was required to effect it. According to our reports, public opinion in Greece has generally accepted the American “intervention” in good spirit, and the majority has welcomed the formation of the Plastiras Government. Ambassador Grady considers that the Plastiras Government contains excellent men, should have the necessary stability and be able to carry out the Aid Program successfully. However, it is expected that the Palace and the Right will take every opportunity to hamper the work of the Government. Recommendations: 1. That we continue to back up Ambassador Grady in the policy line he has taken in the present Greek political difficulties. 2. That we see that he continues to pursue a technically “correct” approach. 3. That we ignore criticisms and direct appeals from the monarchy or rightest elements to force Ambassador Grady to alter his present policy line. 1 This paper bears the notation: “I agree. D[ean] A[cheson].” 2 See editorial note, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Herbert D. Brewster, Special Assistant to the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Mission to Greece (Porter) 781.00/4–2150 [Document 152] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Herbert D. Brewster, Special Assistant to the Chief of the Economic Cooperation Mission to Greece ( Porter ) confidential [ Athens ,] April 21, 1950. Subject: First Meeting between General Plastiras and Mr. Porter Participants: General N. Plastiras, Prime Minister P. R. Porter, Chief of the ECA Mission Mr. J. Kallerghi, 1 Interpreter, Ministry of Foreign Affairs H. D. Brewster, Special Assistant, ECCH The Prime Minister opened the meeting by stating that he and his Government wished to work rapidly towards accomplishing the reconstruction of Greece and the improvement of the Greek standard of living; this, he felt, was the best way to fight Communism. He believed that all Greece’s efforts towards reconstruction would make an excellent impression on the western world and especially the United States. They should also impress countries behind the Iron Curtain with the superiority of western democratic methods. He asked Mr. Porter to come to him immediately, and at any hour, if any shortcomings in the efficiency of the Greek Ministries or delays were called to Mr. Porter’s attention, since it was vital to get reconstruction under way promptly in order to create employment. He specifically asked whether the studies had been made so that immediate execution of the works could take place, and secondly whether the Greek Services handling reconstruction effort were adequate. Mr. Porter expressed his gratitude at having the opportunity to meet General Plastiras for the first time, and stated that the Plastiras Government was well received in the United States because it was considered a Government based on the will of the people. He hoped that with a firm majority in Parliament, this Government would be long lived and stable inasmuch as this was a most important period for the reconstruction of Greece. The Prime Minister responded that he fully recognized that fact and was conscious of his responsibility. Specifically as to the Prime Minister’s earlier question concerning the plans for execution of the program, Mr. Porter stated that most plans were well prepared, and their execution depended on prompt decisions of the Government to permit their enactment. As to the adequacy of the Greek Services for reconstruction, Mr. Porter stated that on the whole they had been satisfactory. Mr. Porter emphasized that it would be necessary to move forward rapidly with the financial and administrative reforms set forth in the Ambassador’s letter to Mr. Venizelos of March 31 2 in order to effect the necessary drachma savings to permit proceeding with the electric power program. The Prime Minister stated that he hoped Mr. Tsouderos 3 would capably handle this economic problem. He asked further whether the power program would be started all together provided the necessary drachmae were available. Mr. Plastiras then described a hydro-electric and irrigation project which he considered of importance on the Megdova River, a tributary of the Acheloos. He stated that in 1929 he had made a survey of this river and had projected a dam with a capacity of 130 million cubic meters, and a fall of 500 meters. He felt this dam alone, which could be completed in 2 years, would make a “garden” out of 200,000 stremmas in western Thessaly. He stated that Mr. Pezopoulos 4 had fuller details on the project and he hoped that Mr. Porter would study them with him. With a twinkle in his eye he added that the reason the project had never moved forward was that the lake created was to have been called “Plastiras Lake”, and the succeeding Government didn’t approve the name, in fact had forced him into a 12-year exile. Mr. Porter stated briefly that two of the reasons for not including the Acheloos power development in the program at this time were that according to the findings of the American engineering firm which had made the power survey this project would be extremely costly and would take 4 years to complete. The Prime Minister again insisted that Mr. Porter call on him at any time that there was a problem, and re-emphasized that it was his aim to give the Greek people “a piece of bread”, thus fighting Communism most effectively. Mr. Porter endorsed the General’s views that the Greek peoples’ desires were increased work and hope in the future. He hoped that great steps forward could be made within the next six months, and pointed up that not only work on the dam sites themselves but work on the transmission lines, and in the factories, dependent on cheap power, would provide thousands of new jobs. Mr. Porter then asked when the Prime Minister thought legislation could be brought to Parliament. The Prime Minister responded that after the Government’s policy statement before Parliament on Monday, April 24, two or three days would be devoted to a discussion of the program, and the vote of confidence. Thus, he hoped that by Thursday, April 27, legislation could be brought before Parliament. The Prime Minister regretted the 40 days which had been lost since March 12, and said that the Ambassador had been right in preparing the letter to Mr. Venizelos. Mr. Porter stressed the need for making up for lost time. He added that the Mission would never ask the Greek Government to do anything unreasonable, and assured the Prime Minister that any recommendations made would only be in the interest of assuring the most effective use of American aid for permanent improvements. The Prime Minister concluded the meeting by stating that this was an epoch making period for Greece. H. D. Brewster 1 John D. Kallergis, Chef de Cabinet with the rank of Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 See editorial note, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . 3 Emmanuel Tsouderos, Minister of Coordination. 4 George Pezopoulos, Electrical Energy Adviser of the Ministry of Coordination. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/5–850: Telegram [Document 153] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 1 confidential Washington , May 8, 1950—6 p. m. 838. Embtel 1011 May 3. 2 On appropriate occasion you may inform Palace of Dept’s gratification over opportunity graciously accorded by King and Queen to clarify misunderstandings that have apparently arisen. As Palace presumably aware, King’s magnanimous gesture in calling to Premiership oldtime republican Plastiras has been almost universally welcomed by US press and public as demonstration Grk attachment to fundamentals of constitutional democracy as opposed to mere appearances. You may also convey to Venizelos Depths appreciation his statesmanship in yielding Premiership to make possible broader and thus presumably more stable coalition and our hope that he and Liberal Party which he heads will play full and vigorous role within Govt for promotion econ reconstruction and polit stability. (Embtel 1016 May 4) 3 In Dept’s opinion, major dangers confronting Greece now come from within rather than from abroad, which fact highlighted by Commie Politbureau proclamation May 1. These dangers are: 1) Break-up of centrist coalition Govt which wld create polit chaos and prevent or disastrously retard launching reconstruction program. Essential therefore that Venizelos and Liberals take full and active role this Govt. 2) Polit interference with Army which wld undermine its morale and efficiency. Accord essential between Plastiras and Papagos. 3) Internal squabbling over Grk fon policy which wld weaken Greece’s internati position. Both opposition and Govt shld forego temptation seek polit advantage from fon policy controversy. Effort shld be made put fon policy on nonpartisan basis, as in US, by establishing procedure for consultations between Govt and nationalist opposition before major decisions taken. 4) Recreation of commie org and capture of TUs and municipal Govts by disguised commies in scheduled conference and elections. In Dept’s opinion this danger cannot be met by police measures alone, though reinforced police vigilance and careful screening of detainees before release certainly necessary. Equally important that Grk public shld clearly understand commie design and learn recognize commies and fellow travelers despite misleading labels. Effort shld be made thru polit tactics and publicity expose rift and drive deeper wedge between cominformists and noncominform leftists. Finally, where commie challenge likely be serious in municipalities or TU Conference, all nationalist parties from Eight to Left Center shld seek unite on single ticket. Other more general countermeasures are of course TU reorganization and early progress econ rehabilitation. Grady now Calif has not seen this tel but ideas discussed with him and correspond his thinking. At ur discretion you may use in any effective and appropriate manner. Dept has already talked along these lines to Grk Emb and will find early occasion for public airing these views unless you have negative comment or reservations. FYI Dept has just recd personal ltr Venizelos to McGhee dated Apr 26. 4 Verbatim text being cabled. Consideration being given to reply in light Embtel 1016 May 4. Webb 1 Repeated to Moscow as 389. 2 Not printed; it transmitted a report by Harold B. Minor, Chargé of the Embassy in Greece, on his meeting with King Paul and Queen Frederika at the Palace on May 2. Mr. Minor reported that the King and Queen “seem unable to understand our ‘opposition’ to late Venizelos Cabinet” and that “they continue regard Plastiras with suspicion, and feel his ‘fellow traveling tendencies’ will intensify Communist threat.” (781.00/5–350) 3 Not printed; in it the Chargé, Mr. Minor, reported that Greek Liberal Party Member of Parliament Gregory Kasimatis “told Emb officer yesterday that unless early action is taken by U.S. to assuage Venizelos’ hurt feelings, Liberal Chief will withdraw his ministers from Plastiras Govt.” Mr. Kasimatis suggested a statement by the Secretary of State at his next news conference as the means of achieving this objective. (781.00/5–450) 4 Not printed; see telegrams 901 and 902, May 18, pp. 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] and 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] . The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 781.02/5–1150: Telegram [Document 154] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State confidential Athens , May 11, 1950—4 p. m. 1081. Venizelos called on me at noon today. I read him excerpts from Deptel 838 May 8 1 and urged on him necessity full cooperation himself and Liberal Party in this critical year of reconstruction. He replied that he is fully behind government and has no intention of overthrowing it. To this I answered that impression prevails here and abroad that without his personal participation there is only half a government without assured stability. Venizelos then took view that it is better for him to be outside government since he cannot work with Papandreou 2 who is completely impossible. Government, he said, would be more stable without him for this reason. I replied that since coalition government is essential under present conditions, it would appear that leaders have duty to cooperate with each other and not consider personal preferences. I asked him about his plans and he said he is leaving on 20th and will consider entering government on his return. I replied frankly I did not think this was good enough and hoped he would heed Department’s advice that it is essential for him and Liberals to take full and active role in this government. After this further reiteration of our views he said he would like a little time to think the matter over. Our conversation, which was entirely pleasant ended on this note. Minor 1 Supra . 2 George Papandreou, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior. The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 781.00/5–1350: Telegram [Document 155] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , May 13, 1950—1 p. m. 1098. I was received again last night by King and Queen, arriving at Palace in time to participate in tail end of garden party given for Members of Parliament. This party, together with dinner for Plastiras, marks resumption by palace of formal entertaining. Party obviously was great success and was attended by all leftist deputies except Gregoriades. We went over carefully and at length contents Department’s 838, May 8. 1 Both King and Queen expressed appreciation for friendly sentiments expressed in first paragraph. Re second paragraph I described my two interviews with Venizelos and asked Their Majesties’ support in endeavoring bring about his full participation in government. King agreed use his influence to this end but Queen said this may prove difficult since Venizelos and his deputies in government are incensed at attitude of Papandreou who is “lording it over everyone”. King said he intended to speak to Maccas 2 in hopes of quieting down Papandreou and I said I would likewise on appropriate occasion. Re Department’s point 1, both King and Queen reassured me in warm terms that they will give full support to government. Queen said laughingly that she is accused of charming Plastiras and that she warned him to his face of this danger. I said I had heard this story and added that Plastiras had expressed to Porter his satisfaction at friendly attitude of court. Queen repeated that danger lies now in attitude Papandreou. I replied that first requisite it seemed to me was to get full and active participation Venizelos in government, then endeavor to control Papandreou. King said he had just had talk with deputies on much discussed plan to have Chamber take on revisionary character for one session to ratify laws and constitutional amendments made by last Chamber and that he is willing go along with this idea providing all parties including opposition agree and constitutional lawyers and judges hold that such action is not outright constitutional violation. Queen, however, expressed doubt and thought there is real danger that courts might later hold such action to be unconstitutional with resultant blame resting on King. Re point 2, King declared there is no immediate cause for worry since things are going well between Papagos and government. On point 3, also, King was not especially preoccupied and saw no policy issue at moment susceptible of causing rift. Queen added that she would, however, expect government to take strong line with Yugoslavs on Greek children. I replied that I thought Politis 3 understood question and could be depended on to protect Greek interests. Point 4 they both found especially valid. Queen expressed worry over reports of recrudescence Communists activities but said they are awaiting further report from Papagos who is going into question. I replied it is inevitable with end of arbitrary measures based on war conditions that Communists should resume efforts penetrate Greek trade unions and official life. The answer would seem to be constant police vigilance plus measures to remove causes of popular discontent. Queen expressed opinion that police are not on alert mainly because of fear of not being supported if they take action. King and Queen agreed fully on need to watch trade union situation but wondered how this could be accomplished. I said we in Embassy are following situation closely and hope to come up with some ideas. They also agreed on dangers inherent in forthcoming municipal election. I replied that [t]here seems to be considerable hope and merit in Papandreou’s new plan to remove this danger by getting out vote of nationalist women and by having mayors elected by municipal councils rather than by direct vote. I appreciate good support given Embassy by Depreftel and will be able use it to advantage in various ways. Believe Department’s idea publicizing these views entirely sound. Such publicity should be given positive orientation to suggest Greeks aware of and facing up to dangers and there are no policy or personal rifts within government. Sent Department 1098, Department pass Moscow. Minor 1 Ante , p. 369 [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] . 2 Leon Maccas, Minister Without Portfolio, exercising the functions of Deputy Minister of the Navy, and a member of the party of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior George Papandreou. 3 John Politis, Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson), at Athens 357.AE/5–1350: Telegram [Document 156] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans ( Patterson ), at Athens 1 secret Washington , May 13, 1950—1 p. m. 870. Balcom 358. Re Combal 573, 2 Dept has given further consideration to proposal that GA take action this fall discontinue UNSCOB in its present form in light comments from Embs Belgrade (#577), 3 Moscow (#1292), 4 London (#2469) 5 and from UNSCOB reps (Combal 566 6 and 569). 7 Dept adheres to general position that if situation unchanged at time of GA, GA shld take appropriate action discontinue UNSCOB. Exact nature of GA action wld depend on consultations with other UN Membs especially Greece and Membs UNSCOB; alternative methods discontinuance include (1) outright discontinuance wiping matter off GA books entirely; (2) discontinuance UNSCOB in present form but maintaing skeletal machinery which cld spring into action if occasion necessitated, or (3) express provision in GA res of discontinuance providing for method of taking required emergency action in future with or without special GA session. Underlying basis Dept’s reasoning is that situation has in fact changed even though potential danger to Greece not eliminated. Because no guerrillas fighting in Greece, no help is coming across northern borders in aid of guerrillas. Even though suspension of guerrilla activity and of assistance from Alb and Bulg may be only temporary Sov tactical move, Dept is of opinion that greatest UN strength can be marshalled against renewal of Commie activity by new UN action. If threat against Greece is resumed, convocation of special GA session and imme GA action dispatching new commission to Greece wld have greater psychological and propaganda impact in free world and vis-à-vis Sov than wld mere resumption activity by theretofore dormant UNSCOB. Accordingly, Dept favors alternatives (1) or (3) above. As to timing, special GA session can be called and action taken with dispatch nec to meet emergency. In Dept’s view special responsibility of SC under Charter for maintenance of peace need not delay GA action. For example, GA cld by its res of discontinuance maintain its jurisdiction over case by express provision for special session, or by use of IC procedures. It must be borne in mind also that if quiet continues until GA convenes this fall we can anticipate that many Dels GA wld be reluctant vote continuance UNSCOB in present form on basis same reasoning as Dept’s and also in mind some Dels because of expense involved. It cld be made clear in statements by US and other friendly powers in GA that discontinuance UNSCOB in no sense represented withdrawal or suspension of UN interest in territorial integrity and political independence of Greece, nor does it indicate any lessening US interest. Dept concerned by Dalietos comments (Combal 569) that Dept “determined extinguish UNSCOB” and Dept’s “zeal in promoting extinction”. It is essential that Greeks be impressed that proposed position takes fully into account Greek interests in most effectively combating renewed threats and is in no way motivated by desire to appease Slav bloc. On contrary Dept’s proposal designed provide for utilization maximum UN resources in event resumption activity by northern neighbors constituting threat to Greece. Re Combal 566 Dept still prefers UNSCOB make recommendation of discontinuance itself but will be guided by ur views on that point in light further consultations with UNSCOB Dels. Webb 1 Repeated to Belgrade as 380, Moscow as 415, London as 2278, and Paris as 2197. 2 Telegram 1078 (Combal 573), May 11, from Athens, from Jefferson Patterson, U.S. Representative on the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), not printed, requested Department of State views on the question of the future of the Special Committee for use by Mr. Patterson in meetings with Greek officials (357.AE/5–1150). 3 Dated May 3, not printed; it expressed the agreement with the view stated in Department Embassy’s telegram 797 (Balcom 353), May 1, to Athens, repeated to Belgrade in Department’s telegram 341, not printed (357.AE/3–2950), that the Special Committee recommend its own discontinuance to the U.N. General Assembly if the situation remained unchanged by the end of July (357.AE/5–350). 4 Dated May 5, not printed; it conveyed Ambassador in the Soviet Union Alan G. Kirk’s opinion that “in light of many signs of increased Soviet aggressiveness on all fronts, I cannot refrain from feeling that this is psychologically an inopportune time to effect U.N. withdrawal from Greece” (357.AE/5–550). 5 Dated May 5, not printed; it stated that British “Foreign Office wonders … whether some solution short of complete discontinuance [of the Special Committee] cannot be found” (357.AE/5–550). 6 Telegram 1025 (Combal 566), May 6, from Athens, from Jefferson Patterson, not printed, stated that “all [representatives on the Special Committee] agreed … that present moment was too early for anything approaching final decision re UNSCOB’s future” (357.AE/5–650). 7 Telegram 1029 (Combal 569), May 6, from Athens, from Jefferson Patterson, not printed, stated that Alexander Dalietos, Chief of the Greek Liaison Service with the Special Committee, had “expressed view that it was premature to reach such decision [on discontinuance of the Special Committee] since no known change in attitude toward Greece on part of Soviets or satellites existed” (357.AE/5–650). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/5–1850: Telegram [Document 157] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece secret Washington , May 18, 1950—1 p. m. 901. Immed fol tel contains message, 1 approved by Grady, 2 from McGhee to be delivered Venizelos in reply his ltr Apr 26 (Deptel 837 May 8) 3 unless you perceive some objection. Dept has no objection to publication message by Venizelos if he desires. Reply drafted in light urtel 1065 May 10 4 and several other messages re unsatisfactory relations with Venizelos, and attempts strike balance between giving Venizelos excessive and unwarranted encouragement on one hand and, on other, alienating him to extent that Liberal Party support might be withdrawn from Govt with disastrous consequences. As result Venizelos’s capriciousness and manifest incompetence and his feud with Papandreou, we are coming to question whether it desirable press him accept important post of FonMin where he wld be hopelessly weak rep of Greece and probably cause daily difficulties. It might well be preferable, if at all feasible, that this post be taken by another Liberal of greater stability and talent with Venizelos occupying merely titular position of Deputy PriMin. In fact best solution wld seem removal of Venizelos as Liberal Leader by his own Party. If you agree and if you see any possibility work towards this objective without undue danger to present Govt, presume you will do so. Webb 1 Infra . 2 Ambassador Henry F. Grady left Athens on April 23 for home leave in the United States. 3 Not printed. See footnote 2 infra . 4 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/5–1850: Telegram [Document 158] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece restricted Washington , May 18, 1950—1 p. m. 902. Fol is from McGhee for Venizelos 1 in reply his ltr Apr 26: 2 “Wish to assure you that US attitude during recent post election period Greece was definitely not motivated by any unfriendliness towards you or other distinguished personalities participating in or supporting ur Govt. We have worked with you in spirit of cordial understanding in past and look forward to doing so in future. The question was whether a Govt more closely reflecting trend of popular opinion as expressed in Mar 5 elections wld not be in better position carry through vigorous and far-reaching measures outlined Grady ltr 3 as essential for effective utilization ECA funds. I interpreted ur decision relinquish Premiership and participate broadened coalition as indicating you had urself come to believe this the case. “Important thing at present time and for future is, in our opinion, that Grk people and their leaders, who have gloriously preserved their freedom against external commie pressure, do not fall victim to renewed commie conspiracy from abroad or from within Greece. This will require vigilance, unity and determination not only at high polit levels but also among the people lest they be beguiled by false promises and deceitful labels of local commie agents. Wage earners must be especially alert to safeguard development of genuinely free trade unionism as progressive and dynamic force in nati life. Above all[,] it must be remembered communism thrives in atmosphere of econ frustration and polit strife. ECA program offers unique opportunity for revitalization Grk economy [,] but this will require hard work by all and sufficient cooperation to ensure reasonable governmental stability. We hope and expect that historic Liberal Party which you head and other patriotic polit elements will play full share in this common effort in accordance with their respective traditions and the mandates entrusted to them by the Grk electorate. “It is the firm purpose of the US to respect absolutely the sovereignty of Greece and to avoid any improper interference in Grk internal affairs. At same time, our reps in Greece have the responsibility to see that best possible use is made of funds provided by Amer taxpayers to aid Greece. Friendly and frank relations between the Amer officials in Athens and Grk leaders are thus essential if we are to cooperate successfully for attainment our common goals.” Webb 1 Transmitted to Mr. Sophocles Venizelos by the Embassy in Greece on May 19. 2 Text in telegram 837, May 8, to Athens, not printed; in it Mr. Venizelos stated his views on the attitude of the Embassy in Greece and the Department of State toward the Greek political situation following the elections of March 5th (781.00/5–850). 3 See editorial note, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 357.AE/6–950: Telegram [Document 159] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State confidential Athens , June 9, 1950—6 p. m. 1360. Foreign Office note 1 today requests US Government seriously consider Greek Government’s desire continue Balkan Commission using following arguments: 1) Approximately 17,000 bandits now located Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria; 2) Bandits partially armed and constantly harassing Greek frontier guards; 3) Intelligence reports indicate all bandits in satellite countries will be concentrated Bulgaria by end July for resumption warfare against Greece; 4) Central Committee KKE has ordered party leaders Northern Greece create highly mobile armed groups; 5) KKE making strenuous efforts penetrate important positions within Greece. Note continues that if UNSCOB, set up after many difficulties, is now disbanded at time when danger bandit activity not disappeared, but contrarywise becoming more threatening, following might result: 1) No Balkan Commission could again be sent to Greece failing extensive bandit activity brought to attention UN. 2) If large bandit forces attack Greek frontier from Albania or Bulgaria convincing proof for public opinion abroad could not be secured, while today UNSCOB performs this for even minor incidents. Moreover, bandits could attack locality near frontier withdrawing to neighboring countries before Greek Army able interfere. Bandits and supporters could then ascribe this to bandits residing in Greece who, however, represent no danger unless provisioned from abroad. 3) If bandits adopt such tactics which most likely after dissolution UNSCOB morale of repatriated refugees will again receive severe blow causing new flight. Unnecessary stress disastrous consequences such circumstances for country’s morale and reconstruction efforts. 4) In event bandits intensify activity, progressive reduction armed forces must be stopped with added financial burdens country. Foregoing obviously inspired by and almost identical with May 25 memorandum from Papagos to Foreign Office. 2 Identical Foreign Office notes sent missions Athens other interested countries. Despite objections listed above and other arguments advanced, Embassy on balance considers termination UNSCOB advisable this year. Minor 1 No. 34049, June 6; text in Despatch 941, June 15, from Athens, not printed (357.AE/6–1550). 2 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/6–2450: Telegram [Document 160] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 1 secret Washington , June 27, 1950—8 p. m. 1292. Embtel 1535 June 24. 2 While it is understandably irritating to Grks that Yugos consider it necessary allude to Grk slavophones and that Brit consider it necessary adopt obdurate position on Cyprus, fact is that neither Yugo nor Cyprus constitute immed problems for Greece. Under existing circumstances there is no likelihood Yugos cld oblige Grks yield territorial or other concessions against their will. There is also little likelihood that Grks wld be able induce UK yield sovereignty over Cyprus or that Greece wld be stronger externally or internally if they did so. There is however likelihood that USSR efforts acquire effective sovereignty over Greece will be furthered if Grks persist in concentrating on non-essentials which facilitate Russ propaganda and tend to alienate actual and potential allies. In our opinion, Grks wld be exceedingly well advised to formulate all aspects their fon policy in terms of their number one problem, which is survival of Greece as a free nation. In present critical position, Greece cannot afford luxury of fon policy directed towards future nationalist goals and dictated by current popular emotions. Dept will not be impressed, moreover, by references to Grk “public agitation” until it sees more evidence of Govt effort to calm that agitation and put Grk public in more realistic frame of mind. Govt statements on Yugo have, for example, not served to put matter in proper perspective but rather to fan flames of popular indignation. Similarly, there is no info that Grk Govt has exercised undoubted influence over Cypriot ethnarchy to check enosis 3 agitation at its source (and, FYI, we suspect it has done contrary). While Grks are certainly free to discuss privately with Brit any matter of mutual interest, effect of public approach at this time wld be excite Grk opinion still further with corresponding greater let down when no results forthcoming. US is trying to keep Grks afloat in sea of current difficulties and guide them into relatively safe harbor. It cannot do so if Grks continue to exhaust themselves and embarrass us by heading for such distant shores as Cyprus. At ur discretion you may bring substance foregoing to attn Politis. Acheson 1 Repeated to London as 3151, Nicosia as 41, and Belgrade as 512. 2 Not printed; in it the Chargé in Greece, Harold B. Minor, reported that John Politis, Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had told him on June 23 about his concern with problems relating to Yugoslavia and Cyprus (781.00/6–2450). 3 Union of Cyprus with Greece. The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson), at Geneva 357.AE/6–2950: Telegram [Document 161] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans ( Patterson ), at Geneva 1 secret Washington , June 29, 1950—8 p. m. Bagen 2. In light internati uncertainties resulting Korean developments and reports Balkan troop movements, Dept now agrees it wld be unrealistic and premature for UNSCOB recommend abolition UN observation activities in report currently being drafted, particularly since such action might unduly alarm Grks and provoke undesirable reactions that country. Dept accordingly concurs with USDel 89 June 19 2 and Brit and Fr suggestions (Paris tel 3105 June 26) 3 that specific recommendations be deferred or left to discretion GA. UNSCOB might meanwhile confine itself to pointing out that while abatement acute threats to Greece permits reconsideration organizational pattern UN vigilance Grk situation, residual problems Grk guerrilla warfare require that such vigilance in some adequate form be maintained. Draft Departmental instr 3 carried by Howard 4 shld thus be disregarded, although attached draft conclusions and recommendations may still provide useful working basis for prelim discussions with colleagues of eventual specific measures to be considered by GA or UNSCOB. Acheson 1 The U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans went to Geneva to draft its report. This telegram was sent to the Consulate there, and repeated as telegram 1327 to Athens, 3222 to London, and 3103 to Paris. 2 From Jefferson Patterson in Athens; in it Mr. Patterson suggested that the Special Committee’s report draw “a tentative conclusion … that the Committee has substantially fulfilled as much of its mandate as circumstances permit. Recommendations concerning the future of UNSCOB should remain in suspense, such action to he taken by the GA only.” (357.AE/6–1950) 3 Not printed. 3 Not printed. 4 Harry N. Howard, U.N, adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State, went to Geneva, June 27, to help draft the Special Committee’s report. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/7–1750: Telegram [Document 162] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece top secret Washington , July 17, 1950—7 p. m. 167. Fol text L 576, July 17, 1950, from Van Fleet: 1 “Before leaving Greece this date, I feel I shld report that the present Greek Govt is dangerous. Ever since the Plastiras govt was formed the Communists and fellow travellers have gradually regained their morale and influence and many are now in important positions. A worsening of the situation was evident to me upon my return from East Africa on 5 July. My recent tour of A, B and C Corps and conferences with Papagos confirm many alarming moves by the Plastiras govt such as amnesty for dangerous war criminals and the relief of police and gendarmerie offs. It is shocking to me that we support a govt which permits red infiltration so soon after so much blood and money has been spent here to suppress Communist aggression.” Van Fleet’s comments source considerable concern to Dept. Ur comments requested after appropriate discussion Porter and Jenkins. 2 Acheson 1 Lt Gen. James A. Van Fleet, Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece, departed from Athens on July 17 for reassignment as Commanding General, Second Army, Fort George G. Meade, Md. 2 Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins assumed the position of Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece on July 17 upon the departure of Lt. Gen. Van Fleet. The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 781.00/7–1950: Telegram [Document 163] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State top secret Athens , July 19, 1950—2 p. m. 222. Embtel 209, July 18, 1 which was despatched prior receipt Deptel 167, July 17, 2 contained our views on general question dangerous proclivities Plastiras government as raised in Van Fleet’s L–576 3 which was shown us here only after latter’s departure. As for specific comment I feel I must first of all emphasize that Van Fleet never once raised this question with me or so far as I know with Ambassador Grady. 4 I am therefore surprised as well as disturbed that Van Fleet should send such a message on a subject within field of my responsibility without discussing matter with me, especially since I have been uninterruptedly on spot and following all aspects of political situation closely ever since establishment Plastiras government. Had he consulted Porter and me we would have of course gladly explained to him our current thinking of which he was obviously not aware and could have brief ed him on steps we have taken and are contemplating to meet situation. During past two months or so while Van Fleet generally absent, General Jenkins has brought to my attention reports reaching him concerning moves by Plastiras supporters and other politicians tending to undermine Papagos’ position and our policy toward Greek Army. On basis these reports we have taken corrective action within our power (Embdesp 54, July 10). 5 Despite best efforts, Embassy cannot identify “many (Communists and fellow-travelers) now in important posts” as specific information rather than vague accusations this subject would be most helpful. As Department aware, these terms are used extremely loosely and freely by Greek rightists who tend so identify anyone who disagrees with them. In following situation closely Embassy and ECA/G have been concerned at possibility of appointment dubious persons to key posts and government-sanctioned fellow-traveler activities in certain fields, especially labor. This connection we took strong stand against Pistolakis appointment (Embtels 65, July 6 and 70, July 7) 6 and successfully. We have also prevailed on Prime Minister’s office to withdraw its support from leftist-inspired attack on GSEE (Embtel 1352, June 9). 7 Available facts concerning changes in gendarmerie and police have been subject several Embassy reports, but we have felt this situation insufficiently clear to warrant our intervention and we have had no recommendations for any such action from Van Fleet or anyone else. We have recently and forcefully warned Prime Minister’s office our apprehensions its fellow-traveling activities (Embtel 65, July 6) and against any further clemency measures under prevailing circumstances. We shall continue follow this question closely in cooperation JUSMAG and other interested agencies. Crux of matter is this. When Plastiras government formed Embassy, like Department, believed time had come for Greek Government to attempt pacification and reconciliation to degree compatible with national security; to correct some wartime injustices such as those repeatedly brought to our attention by Department; to accord first priority to effort to unify country in rehabilitation tasks; in a word, to take the road to peace. These may still be Greece’s internal needs, but external situation has so drastically and dangerously altered past three weeks that Greece now, like every other country, must give its first attention to Communist menace. It is possible Plastiras government is not best instrument to carry out this policy and may not be able to face up to altered external circumstances. Our views on this latter question and the obvious alternative of Papagos solution are subject of separate telegrams. General Jenkins, Porter and I have no differences. We are firmly agreed that any differences we might have as to future methods and means of carrying out US policy here will be discussed fully and frankly and that Embassy, ECA/G and JUSMAG must work as one team. General Van Fleet can be reassured that all of us will continue to do our utmost to prevent situation developing which could seriously jeopardize victory gained over communism in Greece to which General Van Fleet and his officers contributed so immensely. Porter suggests that Department may wish inform Foster 3 our views on this question. Minor 1 Not printed. 2 Supra . 3 See supra . 4 His service as Ambassador in Greece had ended on June 28. 5 Not printed; in it the Chargé in Greece Harold B. Minor reported that Field Marshal Alexander “Papagos has been assured of American understanding and appropriate support with regard to the foregoing questions [on internal developments affecting his position as Commander in Chief of Greek Armed Forces] in line with our general policy of endeavoring to keep politics out of the Greek armed forces.” This despatch also enclosed a copy of a memorandum presented on June 26 to Field Marshal Papagos, setting forth a request for limitation of the Greek armed forces budget to 900 billion drachmae. (781.5/7–1050). 6 Neither printed. Telegram 70, July 7, from Athens, reported that at the July 6 meeting of the Greek Parliament Prime Minister Nicholas Plastiras announced that “he had decided to accept [Sylianos] Pistolakis’ resignation” as Governor of the Agricultural Bank of Greece (781.00/7–750). 7 Not printed. 3 William C. Foster, Deputy Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy under Secretary of State (Matthews) S/P–NSC Fites: Lot 61D167: Greece, U.S. Position with Respect to NSC 103, 103/1 1 [Document 164] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Deputy under Secretary of State ( Matthews ) 2 top secret [ Washington ,] July 22, 1950. Problem: To determine United States action in the event of an attack against Greece by Soviet satellite forces. Discussion Attached hereto is a paper setting forth our analysis of a possibility of attack by Soviet satellite forces against Greece. It is our conclusion that, in the event of an attack against Greece, the United States should initiate and support United Nations police action to the maximum extent consistent with the overall demands against United States military resources. Recommendation That this paper be processed for ultimate consideration by the National Security Council. [Attachment] Problem: To determine United States action in the event of an attack against Greece by Soviet satellite forces. Analysis 1. Greece is one of the areas on the perimeter of the Soviet world in which the Kremlin might consider that an aggression on the Korean pattern (an attack involving only satellite troops) might be successfully repeated. It is impossible to determine at this time whether the Soviet satellite forces will resort to hostilities in the Balkans or, whether, in the event hostilities do occur, they will be directed against Yugoslavia, Greece or both. Known troop dispositions in Bulgaria do not appear to indicate an imminent attack against Greece. However, available information is fragmentary and it is recognized that a dangerous situation could exist or develop without adequate warning to the United States. This paper is limited to a consideration of the situation which would result from an attack on Greece by Bulgarian forces, possibly in conjunction with other Soviet satellite forces. Participation of Soviet forces in such an attack would involve consequences which are outside the scope of this paper. 2. Since June 30 Cominform propaganda agencies have vehemently charged that the “Athens–Belgrade Axis”, under American and British direction, is preparing for aggressive action against Albania and Bulgaria and is menacing the peace of the Balkans. 3 This Cominform propaganda line taken in conjunction with the unsatisfactory internal situation in Bulgaria and the fact that the USSR may be prepared to accept the possibility of general war, has produced a very disturbing situation. 3. On the one hand, the alleged threat to Bulgaria resulting from the “Athens–Belgrade Axis”, may serve as a pretext for a request from the Bulgarian Government to the USSR to send Soviet troops into Bulgaria. No Soviet combat troops are known to be located in Bulgaria at this time. It may be that the Kremlin is genuinely disturbed at the prospect of Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement which would provide a significant anti-Soviet force in the Balkans and, in the event of war, a possible avenue of approach to eastern Europe. There are increasing signs of dissension within the Bulgarian Communist Party, while Bulgarian Government officials openly acknowledge the hostility of the peasant population. The presence of Soviet troops in Bulgaria would serve to stabilize conditions within the country and would constitute an imminent threat to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, thus intensifying present anxieties and unrest. 4. On the other hand, the present Cominform propaganda campaign may also represent an attempt to prepare a foundation for a Bulgarian attack against Greece. Such an attack might perhaps occur in support of some action by the Greek guerrillas presently in Bulgaria who are estimated to number between 5–15,000. Bulgarian forces are estimated to be the best trained and best equipped among the Soviet satellite forces. The Soviets have for some months been stockpiling war materials in the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria, in excess of the needs of the indigenous forces. It is estimated that Bulgaria has more than 600,000 men who have received “complete” military training. Reports indicate that Bulgaria has completed plans for mobilization in the event of an emergency. Estimates of Bulgarian military strength remain at approximately 90–100,000, but it is impossible to determine to what extent this figure may have been augmented. Estimates of the reliability of Bulgarian troops vary, although it is clear that the Bulgarian Government has been developing a war psychology among the population and it is believed that some enthusiasm could be whipped up for an attack on Greece, particularly in view of Bulgarian irredentism in western Thrace and Macedonia. 5. The USSR would, without involving Soviet troops, place an additional demand on the already strained military resources of the United States by sanctioning an attack against Greece by Bulgarian forces alone or in conjunction with other satellite troops. Nowhere outside the North Atlantic Treaty is United States prestige more deeply committed than in Greece. Failure of the United States to provide adequate support to prevent Greece failing within the Soviet orbit would produce a tremendous impact on the will to resist of the non-Communist world. The position of Yugoslavia would be made extremely dangerous and probably untenable. Under these circumstances the USSR might also expect that subsequent threats of direct Soviet action against Turkey and/or Iran would find the United States powerless to respond and that those Governments and the Governments of western Europe would in time be forced to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union. 6. In few areas of the world have the aggressive aims of international communism been more clearly revealed than in Greece. The United Nations has been seized of the problem of the threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece continuously since 1946. On July 18, 1950 the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) took cognizance of the current Cominform propaganda campaign and informed the United Nations that the Greek Army represents only a legitimate defense force and that there has been no evidence of aggressive intent or preparation by Greece. 4 The United States will advocate the retention of UNSCOB in Greece in order to deter aggression and to authenticate to world opinion the true nature of the aggression should it occur. 7. In the event of an attack by the satellites, the Greek Army, strengthened by American advice and equipment, could be expected to respond sharply. Assuming the continuation of the status of Yugoslavia as an independent anti-Soviet nation, and that it is not attacked, the present estimate is that, with continuation of United States and United Kingdom assistance and appropriate support from the United Nations in the form of supplies, air and sea cover and specialized weapons, the Greek Army is capable of resisting such Bulgarian and Albanian forces as are likely to be thrown against it. This estimate must, of course, be revised if appreciable numbers of other satellite or Russian troops are involved. 8. In view of the extent to which United States prestige has been committed in the maintenance of a free and independent Greece, and of the far-reaching consequences of a communist domination of that country, it is considered that the United States must, in event of invasion by satellite forces, strongly support United Nations’ action in Greece similar to that in Korea, and furnish such military assistance in support of such action as is available in the light of other commitments. Failure to do so would undermine the confidence of the noncommunist world in the United States and tend to isolate the United States from its present and potential allies. Conclusions 9. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece not fall under communist domination (NSC 42/1). 5 10. In the event of an attack against Greece by Soviet satellite forces, the United States should urge United Nations action similar to that taken against North Korea, and should, to the maximum extent consistent with the overall demands against its military resources, provide support for such action. 11. If the United Nations action requires non-Greek ground forces, the United Kingdom and Turkey should be requested to provide a major part of such forces in view of ( a )the direct interest of these countries in the security of the area involved and ( b ) the proximity of their forces to Greece. 12. The United States and United Kingdom should at the earliest possible moment come to an agreement upon the question of primary responsibility as between themselves for assistance to the Greek government in the event of an invasion of Greece. 13. The United States should promptly develop tentative plans for participation in a possible United Nations police action in the event of an attack against Greece by Soviet satellite forces, and should coordinate these plans with the United Kingdom. 1 Lot 61 D 167 is a serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. 2 H. Freeman Matthews. On this paper there appears a note which states that it was sent to the NSC staff on August 3, 1950. 3 Reference is to an article by Nicholas (Nikos) Zachariades, Secretary General of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), in the Cominform weekly newspaper, For a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy! , June 30, 1950, p. 6, extracts in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Margaret Carlyle (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950 (London, Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 239, and to a KKE Politbureau announcement of July 5, mentioned in Department’s telegram Bagen 4, July 13, to the U.S. Representative on the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, Jefferson Patterson, at Geneva, not printed, 357.AE/7–1350. 4 The Department of State opposition to, and the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans refutation of the Cominform propaganda campaign are respectively set forth in telegram Bagen 4, July 13, to the U.S. Representative on the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, Jefferson Patterson, at Geneva, not printed (357.AE/7–1350), and in despatch Genoa 14, July 19, from Jefferson Patterson, at Geneva, not printed (357.AE/7–1950). The Special Committee’s resolution of July 18 refuting the propaganda campaign was issued as U.N. doc. SCA.142/01. 5 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 269 . The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 781.13/7–2650 [Document 165] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State confidential [No.] 147 Athens , July 26, 1950. Enclosed is a memorandum 1 of my recent conversation with the Greek Prime Minister, General Nicholas Plastiras. 2 The Department may be as discouraged as I was to learn that the Greeks are again thinking of additional foreign assistance as the only way out of Greece’s economic difficulties. 3 We will make quite clear on every appropriate occasion our disagreement with this attitude. It will be noted that although the Greek Prime Minister emphasized his personal conviction that widest possible leniency measures should be adopted, he also stated that this development would probably not occur as the other government leaders disagreed with him on this point. Later the same day, Plastiras issued a press release indicating that international developments precluded any considerable extension of leniency measures. (Embassy despatch 146 of July 26.) 1 In general, I must remark that the Prime Minister’s views on both economic and security questions indicated a lamentable lack of realism. Harold B. Minor 1 Not printed. 2 Also present at this meeting, held on July 24 at Prime Minister Plastiras’ request in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were John Moatsis, Chef de Cabinet of the Prime Minister, Stephen T. Calligas of the Embassy in Greece, and Robert G. Miner, Second Secretary of Embassy and Consul at Athens. 3 Chargé in Greece Harold B. Minor reported that Prime Minister Plastiras “thought that the economic difficulties of Greece might be alleviated by a loan of 50 to 60 million dollars by the International Bank” (enclosure to source text, not printed). 1 Not printed. The Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece (Jenkins) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff NEA Politico–Military Adviser Files: Lot 484: Telegram 1 [Document 166] The Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece ( Jenkins ) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff top secret priority Athens , July 26, 1950. L–612. This is 6 part cable. Subj is “Policy Review in Greece in Light of Recent World Developments”. 2 Part 1 . Our governing policy for Greece is that during the period of ideological conflict, support should be given to a Greek mil estab which would be capable of maint internal security in order to prevent Communist domination of Greece and of affording the Greek nation, thru certain limited accessories, a modicum of prestige and confidence and which, in the event of global war, would be capable of causing some delay to Soviet and/or satellite state advance and of assisting, within its capabilities, in the overall war effort. Success has been achieved in the internal security field. As the mil objectives were reached in late 49 drastic reductions in Greek Nat Army were effected to assist economic programs. Stress was placed on quality instead of quantity and equip programs submitted provided for the reasonable modernization and maint of a small peace-time army of 80,000 and reserve supplies for a 147,000 mobilization army to maint internal security, give the Greeks a reasonable feeling of confidence and prestige and to improve their potential for a major war. Thus our re-equipment program is comparatively small, Some badly needed equip is not sched for del until 51 and 52 and events in the Far East raise serious doubts among the Greeks concerning the adequacy and timeliness of our equip program. C in C Papagos has urged me to increase firepower of divs and increase AT defense means rapidly. In light of recent world developments Greeks feel strongly that there may be a resurgence of large scale guerr activities from Bulgaria and internally and possibly a sudden external aggression from Eastern European countries. In either case several conditions need urgent review: First the supply estimates of 51–52 on many major equip items are not satisfactory for the timely preparation of even a drastically reduced force; second a 147,000 man mobilization army only partly equipped is woefully inadequate for its possible major role; third in view of widely publicized success of Soviet armor over Korean terrain against inadequate AT defenses and ineffective AT guns, it is apparent that with AT equip on hand and programmed, envisaged Greek Nat Army capability for causing some delay has been materially lessened. This is causing grave concern—Greek Gen Staff has repeatedly warned of Russian T–34 tanks in Bulgaria and have requested advice as to how to plan to meet an armored attack with their present AT means which consist of a limited number of 2.36 bazookas, a few six pounders, 8 recoilless rifles 75 mm and a limited number of AT mines. Part 2 . Greece has aval, in add to forces now under arms, a reserve of approx 200,000 recent battle experienced men the bulk of whom are reasonably well trained. Over half of this reserve was demobilized since 49 summer campaigns, and the remainder since the summer of 48. Another est 200,000 untrained men of mil age can be called up in an emergency. For these reasons, C in C Papagos thinks only in terms of a Greek Nat Army of at least 200,000 in first 7 days of mobilization and an expansion of this force to at least 400,000 as rapidly as tng facilities and equip permit. He also plans a territorial ME A force of approx.90,000 armed with a various assortment of rifles and a few automatic light weapons for rear area security. C in C Papagos has not been offered any encouragement in his thinking beyond his plan for an initial 200,000 Greek Nat Army for which arty and basic inf equip are aval and the approx 60,000 MEA now equipped with rifles and some Bren and tommy guns. For this initial force, equip and supplies now on hand and programmed FY 50 will provide as fols: [Here follow subparagraphs A, B, C, and D indicating the equipment and supplies which could be provided.] Part 3 . Greeks have proven themselves good allies in 2 wars and in present situation. The army today will fight. Its training has improved tremendously with each training cycle. Present middle and higher level leadership is adequate and determined. Its lower level leadership is courageous and is learning rapidly and anxiously. This Greek Army is a good investment and a going concern. The Greeks have the moral and physical courage and the will to resist. They have a reasonable reserve of trained manpower immediately aval and a potential of untrained manpower sufficient possibly, in my opinion, to hold central and certainly southern Greece against any invader unless they are overrun by a combination of armor arty and airpower. This latter can only be prevented by adequate equip being made aval to the Greeks in time to enable them to exploit their capabilities. This is the problem confronting us. Whether the cost of providing this equip is justified by our already large investment here and by the advantages to accrue to overall US strategy is beyond the ability of JUSMAG to determine. Application of our present policy appears to be based on idealism while today we are confronted by cold realism. Hence, from this distance it appears to me that application of our policy for Greece viewed in the light of current events needs prompt and effective revision. The first local rqmt of JUSMAG to this end is guidance on your planning for utilization of add MDAP funds reportedly being made aval by Congress as they pertain to Greece. Will you please furnish this soonest? Part 4 . I recm that we revise immediately our policy for Greece. Active financial support by US of Italy-Greece-Turkey-Iran estabs primary US strategic interest and responsibility these areas. This chain should not be broken by a weak position in Greece. A strong position in Greece will (1) Assist in maint control of Eastern Med and North African base areas; (2) Protect east flank of Italy; (3) Protect west flank of Turkey and the Dardanelles; (4) Provide a potential secondary front for diversionary activities in event of Soviet opns against Western Europe; (5) Facilitate, as a factor the continued defection of Tito; 3 (6) Provide an active and partly trained reserve manpower of approx 400,000. I further recm that: ( a ) Urgent steps be taken to speed up del of all armor, arty, engr equip, AT weapons, mortars, machine guns, AA–AW arty, signal, ammo, and bulk of motor vehicles incl in our FY 50 program. ( b ) JUSMAG be authorized to program immediately and estab priority for the essential equip needed for a 200,000 initial mobilization army and the supplies nec to estab a 90 day level of opal reserves for this force. ( c ) JUSMAG be dir to determine, for JOS planning purposes, the add equip and supp needed within the first 6 months of a possible major conflict to expand the Greek Army to a force of 400,000 men. Part 5 . I recm that Lt Gen Van Fleet Army Two my predecessor be required to appear before the Joint Staff planners and comment upon the above views. Part 6 . Chiefs Navy and Air Forces sections concur. Due to absence today-Chargé d’Affaires Minor his views not definitely known; they will be fwdd upon his return Athens. 1 Lot 484 contains the files of the Politico-Military Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs for the years 1946–1950, including records and documents of the Foreign Military Aid Coordinating Committee; Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee; State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee; and the Military Assistance Program. 2 In telegram 324, July 29, from Athens, Ambassador John E. Peurifoy commented favorably on Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins’ fundamental recommendation herein that U.S. military policy needed to be restudied. Ambassador Peurifoy went on to suggest a United States proposal that Greece and Turkey be invited to participate in meetings of members in the Mediterranean section of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, if it was not possible to extend the treaty to include Greece and Turkey. (740.5/7–2950) For documentation on the question of Greek and Turkish association with the Mediterranean defense planning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 3 Marshal (Josip Broz) Tito, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Yugoslavia; Secretary General of the Yugoslav Communist Party. The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 781.11/7–2750: Telegram [Document 167] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State confidential Athens , July 27, 1950—11 a. m. 302. Yesterday King spoke to me at Petalia where I went to spend day on occasion call USS Salem on King and Queen, about possibility his formal visit to US. He realized that visit this year did not seem to be practical, but he would very much like to visit US, accompanied by Queen about May 1 next year. I was noncommittal and confined myself to saying these arrangements, of course, are difficult and take a great deal time to work out, but that I would give matter consideration here and bring it to attention Department. I note from memo conversation May 26 1 Department has discouraged visit this year, but has not closed door to visit in 1951. It seems to me that visit King and Queen next spring would be beneficial in Greek-American relations. In addition I hardly see how, without being downright rude, we can discourage an official visit suggested so far ahead. It would be help to Ambassador Peurifoy 2 in relations with King and Queen, if he could when he comes bring definite word of Department’s approval such a visit. 3 King said he realized fully that visit would depend upon Greek and world situation. Minor 1 Reference is to a memorandum of conversations of May 26 between Leonard J. Cromie, Officer in Charge, Greek Affairs, and Vassili G. Dendramis, Greek Ambassador in the United States, and of May 29 between Mr. Cromie and George Economou-Gouras, Greek Chargé in the united States, not printed (781.11/5–2650). 2 Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration John E. Peurifoy was nominated to serve as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Greece on July 11; confirmed by the Senate on July 29; commissioned with the advice and consent of the Senate by the President on July 29; and sworn in and entered on duty on August 11, on which date he also retired from his position as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. 3 A letter of December 7, 1950, from William M. Rountree, Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, to Ambassador Peurifoy, not printed, stated that the President wished to defer the decision on further issuance of invitations to heads of state for visits to the United States in 1951 apart from those already decided on for Vincent Auriol, President of the French Republic, Queen Juliana of the Netherlands, Achmed Sukarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia, and Gaio Plaza Lasso, President of Ecuador (Athens Post Files, Lot 58F7, 361.1). Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans U.N. doc. A/1307 [Document 168] Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans 1 August 27, 1950 [Extract] Chapter V conclusions 206. In conformity with the terms of General Assembly resolution 288 (IV) of 18 November 1949, 2 the Special Committee has consistently endeavoured to promote the establishment of normal diplomatic and good-neighbourly relations between Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the one hand and Greece on the other. The Government of Greece has continued to co-operate with the Special Committee, while the Governments of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as in the past, have refused either to co-operate with it or to recognize it. 207. Diplomatic and good-neighbourly relations between Greece on the one hand and Albania and Bulgaria on the other do not exist. Diplomatic relations between Greece and Yugoslavia exist and an agreement was reached between the two Governments on 21 May 1950 for an exchange of Ministers. 208. In view of the elimination of large-scale guerrilla activity along the northern frontiers of Greece, as a result of the operations of the Greek Army in 1949, the Special Committee believes that the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece has altered in character. The organized guerrilla movement within Greece now consists of the activities of scattered bands. Nevertheless, many thousands of Greek guerrillas fled beyond the northern frontiers of Greece; the disarming and disposition of these guerrillas have not been verified by any international agency; and the Greek guerrilla leaders themselves claim that their forces still exist. While the guerrilla leaders have of necessity suspended, at any rate for the time being, their effort to dominate Greece by armed force, their aims have not been abandoned. The Greek guerrilla radio continues to operate from Romanian territory. Apart from the fact that guerrillas are being harboured outside Greece, the remnants of the movement within Greece have not been dissolved. 209. While Yugoslavia has maintained the policy, announced in July 1949, of closing her frontier with Greece, and frontier relations between the two countries have, for the most part, been correct, there is evidence to indicate that Bulgaria, in particular, has continued to give moral and material assistance to guerrilla raiding and sabotage parties on and near the Greek border. Aid of this nature to the Greek guerrillas on the part of Bulgaria and also Albania has necessarily been considerably reduced because of the flight of the bulk of the guerrillas from Greek territory, but it has not ceased. The Special Committee is of the opinion that the continuing potential threat to Greek political independence and territorial integrity is to be found at present chiefly in Bulgaria. 210. Large numbers of Greek guerrillas are known to be present in various countries of eastern Europe as a consequence of the guerrilla retreat. The States harbouring them have failed to give effect to the General Assembly’s recommendations with respect to the verification by an international agency of their disarming and disposition. 211. With regard to the repatriation of Greek nationals at present in countries to the north of Greece as a result of the military Operations and subsequent retreat of Greek guerrilla forces, the Special Committee has consistently endeavoured to assist in achieving a solution of the problem. It has noted that the amelioration of the situation in Greece has given rise to conditions which would facilitate the peaceful repatriation to Greece of those Greek nationals who desire to return and live in accordance with the law of the land. 212. Likewise, the Special Committee has given serious consideration to the important problem of the repatriation of Greek military personnel captured by the Greek guerrillas and removed by them to the countries to the north of Greece. Despite repeated requests by the Government of Greece, and in violation of international practice, no lists of these prisoners have been circulated by the Governments concerned and all efforts made by the Special Committee to assist in their repatriation have proved futile. 213. The Special Committee has viewed with the gravest concern the fact that no Greek children have yet been repatriated to their homes in Greece. The Special Committee has noted the definite proposals of the Yugoslav Government indicating that it intended to fulfil the terms of the resolution of the General Assembly regarding this question, and that seventeen Greek children from Yugoslavia had been sent to their parents in Australia. But apart from this, the two unanimous resolutions of the General Assembly calling for the repatriation of the children removed from Greece during the course of the guerrilla warfare have had no practical results, despite the untiring efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the international Red Cross organizations. The failure of the States concerned to return these children to their homes has given rise to widespread indignation and sorrow. The basic failure to resolve this problem constitutes a continuing source of international friction, as well as a standing challenge to the United Nations and to the most elementary humanitarian principles. 214. The problem of international refugees in Greece has continued to develop during the course of the past year. In view of the movement of political and other refugees across the northern frontiers into Greece, the Special Committee is convinced that an international body should remain in charge of the work being accomplished in Greece at present by the International Refugee Organization. The Special Committee also believes that it would be advantageous that these refugees should be resettled outside Greece. 215. The Special Committee considers that the vigilance of the United Nations with respect to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece has been, and remains, a significant factor in maintaining peace in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the remaining problems of the Greek guerrilla warfare and outstanding international difficulties with regard to the Greek question still constitute a source of danger, if of a modified nature. 216. Among the problems still remaining, the urgent solution of which constitutes a prerequisite for the restoration of normal relations between Greece and its northern neighbours are: international verification of the disarming and disposition of Greek guerrillas outside Greece; the repatriation of Greek children—a problem which has done much to perpetuate bad relations between Greece and its northern neighbours; the repatriation of detained Greek soldiers and other Greek nationals; and conclusion of conventions for the regulation and control of the common frontiers between Greece and its northern neighbours. Only when these problems have been solved, in compliance with the General Assembly’s recommendations, will conditions in the Balkans be such as to permit the re-establishment of normal relations between the four Governments. Chapter VI recommendations 217. In the light of the evidence before the Special Committee and its conclusions drawn therefrom, and subject to the right to submit supplementary or revised recommendations prior to the opening of the fifth session of the General Assembly, if deemed advisable: The Special Committee Recommends: 1. That the General Assembly take note of the assistance given to the Greek guerrillas by Albania, and by Bulgaria in particular, in disregard of the Assembly’s recommendations, as being contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and endangering peace in the Balkans; 2. That the General Assembly call upon all Member States and all other States, and especially Albania and Bulgaria, to do nothing which would encourage or permit a renewal of armed action against Greece; 3. That the General Assembly once more call upon Albania, Bulgaria and Greece to establish diplomatic relations and to renew previously operative frontier conventions or conclude new ones providing effective machinery for the regulation and control of their common frontiers and for the peaceful adjustment of frontier incidents along the lines suggested by the Special Committee; 4. That the General Assembly again call upon all States concerned, and in particular Albania and Bulgaria, to permit international verification of the disarming and disposition of the Greek guerrillas who have entered their respective territories; 5. That the General Assembly again recommend to all Members of the United Nations and to all other States: ( a ) To refrain from the direct or indirect provision of arms or materials of war to Albania and Bulgaria until the Special Committee or another competent United Nations organ has determined that the unlawful assistance of these States to the Greek guerrillas has ceased; ( b ) To take into account, in their relations with Albania and Bulgaria, the extent to which those two countries henceforth abide by the recommendations of the General Assembly in their relations with Greece; 6. That the General Assembly again call upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and all other States harbouring or detaining Greek nationals, as a result of the guerrilla operations against Greece, to facilitate the peaceful repatriation to Greece of all such individuals who may desire to return and live in accordance with the law of the land; 7. That the General Assembly, in a humanitarian spirit, detached from political or ideological considerations, make every possible effort to find some means of restoring the Greek children to their homes; 8. That the General Assembly consider the advisability of maintaining an appropriate United Nations agency on the Balkans, in the light of the current international situation and of conditions prevailing along the northern frontiers of Greece. Done at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, in the English and French languages, this thirty-first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and fifty. Representative of: ( Signed ) Australia B. C. Ballard 3 Brazil S. Rangel de Castro 4 China Wen Yuan-ning France Émile Charvériat Mexico F. Castillo Najera 5 Netherlands P. C. Visser 6 Pakistan Ali Haider Abbasi Poland Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland W. L. C. Knight 7 United States of America Jefferson Patterson The Principal Secretary Raoul Aglion 1 This report, U.N. document A/1307, covering the period from mid-September 1949 to July 1950, was released for publication on August 27, 1950. 2 See editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 456 . 3 Bertram C. Ballard. 4 Sylvio Rangel de Castro. 5 Dr. Francisco Castillo Najera. 6 Philips C. Visser. 7 William L. C. Knight. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Peurifoy) 781.00/7–2850 [Document 169] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration ( Peurifoy ) top secret [ Washington ,] July 31, 1950. Subject: Views of General Van Fleet on the Greek Government Thank you for sending along Ferris’ 1 letter 2 to Travers, 3 which is returned herewith. Harold Minor has also written me about Van Fleet’s views, 4 which Van Fleet cabled direct to the Army Department. 5 Ambassador Grady 6 has reacted violently to Van Fleet’s telegram to the Army Department which was repeated to Grady for comment. Ambassador Grady believes that Van Fleet’s statement that we support a Government which permits Red infiltration is an absolutely unwarranted criticism of Department policy, the policy of the Embassy, and of himself personally. In Grady’s opinion, Van Fleet has wittingly or unwittingly lent himself to an effort on the part of the Palace to discredit the Plastiras Government. We also believe Van Fleet’s charge that we are “turning Greece over to the communists” and backing a “traitor” (Plastiras) probably reflects the opinion of the Palace, and especially of the Queen. It is generally recognized that Van Fleet cultivated close social relationships with the King and Queen. Van Fleet’s statements of course misrepresent the Embassy’s and the Department’s position. An important factor in the strength of Plastiras in the March elections was his advocacy of a policy seeking to reunite Greeks and to remove the scars of internal strife. We consider that this approach continues to hold a strong basic appeal to many moderate elements in Greece. If Plastiras can be kept free from the dangerous influence of the extreme left wing of his own party, he could continue to be useful in encouraging the development of a moderate liberal element. Plastiras’ consistent record has been that of a patriotic, non-communist Greek. He does tend, however, to be fuzzy-minded, impetuous and emotional in his traditional liberalism, and this led him to pursue a lax and sometimes rash policy towards the communists and fellow-travelers. There are indications that this policy has facilitated some recent resurgence of communism within Greece. This is a factor we are taking into account in considering whether, if the threatened disintegration of the Plastiras Cabinet materializes, we should not support some stronger type of Government, presumably headed by Marshal Papagos. Thus, while no final decision has yet been made, we do not exclude the solution which the Palace and Van Fleet advocate, although we believe they overstate its urgency. I sent Van Fleet a welcome-home cable to the ship, 7 expressing the desire to see him as soon as he returns to Washington. I have attached a clipping from the Times of a press interview with Van Fleet. 7 1 Walton C. Ferris, Foreign Service Inspector with rank of Counselor. 2 Not filed with source text. 3 Howard K. Travers, Director, Foreign Service Inspection Corps. 4 See telegram 222, July 19, p. 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] . 5 See telegram 167, July 17, ibid [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] . 6 Ambassador Henry F. Grady terminated his service as Ambassador in Greece on June 28 when he departed for Tehran. He presented his credentials as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Iran on July 2, 1950. 7 Not printed. 7 Not printed. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs (Anschuetz) 781.00/8–450 [Document 170] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs ( Anschuetz ) top secret [ Washington ,] August 4, 1950. Subject: General Van Fleet’s Impressions of the Current Greek Situation Participants: Mr. McGhee—Assistant Secretary, NEA Lt. General Van Fleet—Commanding General, Second Army Mr. Rountree—Director, GTI 1 Lt. Colonel Ford—Greek Desk, Operations Division, G–3, Department of the Army 2 Mr. Anschuetz—Officer in Charge, Greek Affairs 3 Summary General Van Fleet agreed that in light of the current international situation, Greek authorities should be permitted to call up additional military classes without further demobilization of existing forces. The General was confident of the effectiveness of the Greek forces in the event of a Bulgarian attack on Greece. He suggested that in this event the US should provide only logistic support and that the UK should be prevailed upon to provide additional forces if necessary. The General expressed frank dislike for the Plastiras Government which, in his opinion, is being infiltrated with communist sympathizers. He believes that Venizelos, although weak, might be the man to head a new government, and that Marshal Papagos is competent to solve the political problems which would confront him if he were Prime Minister. Mr. McGhee said that the Department had approved Ambassador Grady’s policies in Greece. The Korean attack, however, had now altered the situation. The Department has developed serious reservations concerning the activities of the Plastiras Government and is presently considering alternative solutions. The conversation opened and closed with Mr. McGhee’s congratulating the General for his outstanding performance in Greece. 4 1 William M. Rountree was the Acting Director of GTI. 2 Lt. Col. Blair A. Ford. 3 Norbert L. Anschuetz was the Acting Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs. 4 Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson sent a letter of commendation dated August 24 to Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, Second Army, thanking him for his “outstanding services … as Chief of the United States military mission in Greece.” Lt. Gen. Van Fleet’s reply of September 19 to Secretary of State Acheson expressed appreciation for “your kind and generous words thanking me for my recent services in Greece.” In addition, a memorandum of August 24 by Secretary of State Acheson for the President recommended that the President also send a letter of commendation to Lt. Gen. Van Fleet for his services in Greece. (091.81/8–2450) No indication was found in Department of State files of the President’s action on this recommendation. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance (Ohly) NEA Politico–Military Adviser Files: Lot 484 [Document 171] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance ( Ohly ) top secret [ Washington ,] August 10, 1950. Subject: Reexamination of the Greek Mutual Defense Assistance Program We have examined the memorandum dated August 2 from the Department of Defense on the above subject. 1 We have also noted cable L–612 from General Jenkins in Athens, subject: “Policy Review in Greece in Light of Recent World Developments”. 2 It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece not fall under communist domination (NSC 42/1). 3 We continue to believe that the USSR may consider that Greece affords a suitable opportunity for attack by Soviet satellite forces without the direct participation of the USSR. Grave strategic results would ensue if Greece, or even the northern Greek provinces of Macedonia and Thrace, were to fail under the control of the USSR. Yugoslavia would be virtually encircled, the Turkish Straits would be flanked and the USSR would have gained an access to the Mediterranean. In light of the vigorous and unequivocal support which the United States and the United Nations have accorded Greece, a successful attack there would undermine the confidence of the non-communist world in the United States and the United Nations and would tend to isolate the United States from its present and potential allies. The implications of this situation, particularly in Western Europe, would be extremely dangerous. We have noted that the Department of Defense concludes that the Greek Army is extremely vulnerable to a formal Bulgarian armored attack. We have also noted that General Jenkins has reported the Greek Army could be raised to the strength of 200,000 within seven days and has an ultimate potential mobilization strength of 400,000. We are under the impression that the Greek forces, although limited in size, are among the best trained and most effective in Europe. So long as Yugoslavia and Greece remain outside the Iron Curtain, a potential anti-Soviet military force of a least a million men (exclusive of the Turks) will remain in the Balkans. In the event of an attack against Western Europe, this force would have to be neutralized by the Soviets in order to deny a possible avenue of approach through the Balkans to the Western powers. In light of the already considerable United States investment in the Greek armed forces, the estimated high potential effectiveness of the Greek armed forces and the possibility that the USSR will further exploit opportunities for the extension of Soviet power through the use of satellite forces, we believe that the Greek armed forces should be strengthened to enable them successfully to resist such satellite forces as are likely to be thrown against them. This would, in effect, establish an additional objective for the Military Assistance Program in Greece. Objective ( c ), cited in paragraph 3 of the Department of Defense memorandum, i.e., “causing some delay to Soviet and/or satellite state advance, and assisting, within its capabilities, in the overall war effort”, would seem to obtain only in the event of a general war. In March 1950 military estimates concluded that Greece was able successfully to defend an attack from Bulgaria. It is considered unlikely that the language cited above, framed as it was before the attack on Korea, was intended to apply in a situation in which Bulgaria, without overt USSR participation, possessed the capability of executing a successful attack upon Greece. It seems to us, therefore, that both political and military considerations justify the following actions which we strongly recommend: 1. Minimum essential equipment to resist satellite armored attack (such as tanks, bazookas, mines, demolition and engineering equipment) should be provided to the Greek forces as a matter of urgency. 2. Action should be taken immediately to establish the Greek Military Assistance Program on the basis of a mobilization force of 200,000. 3. An estimate should be made to determine, for planning purposes, the additional equipment and supplies needed to expand the Greek Army to a force of 400,000. 1 Not found in Department of State files. 2 See telegram L–612, July 26, p. 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] . 3 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 269 . The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 781.00/8–1850: Telegram [Document 172] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State confidential Athens , August 18, 1950—6 p. m. 549. I saw Plastiras this morning at his request. He asked for American advice and guidance and suggested that I propose some solution to present Government crisis. 1 I declined, stating that crisis purely affair of Greek internal politics. I expressed hope three conditions could be met in working out solution: Crisis be of short duration; solution found within constitutional framework; any new Government would enjoy Chambers support. To his question, I said I had no views regarding elections near future. Shortly thereafter Cabinet met and sensing reluctance Papandreou followers to carry on, Plastiras proposed government resign in principle but remain technically in power until Papandreou and Tsouderos return, 2 probably in very near future. Cabinet accepted this proposal which will be communicated to King by Plastiras this afternoon. Palace views as expressed by Metaxas whom I saw shortly after my call on Plastiras are as follows: Plastiras government should be succeeded by wide coalition government for which Palace has been laying groundwork. Such government would be headed by Venizelos or some other parliament leader and would include in addition to obvious Palace choices such as Pipinelis and Canellopoulos, certain Populists such as Stephanopoulos 3 and Karamanlis, 4 Liberals such as Rendis 5 and Averof, 6 Tsouderos and one or more Papandreou deputies. Palace feels such government would have good prospect of success and would postpone necessity to call in Papagos or have new elections. Metaxas believes easy to obtain cooperation all parties mentioned except Populists, but that latter will ultimately come to terms because they fear alternatives. I am seeing Venizelos at his request tomorrow morning. One of his emissaries states Venizelos preferred solutions are in order: (1) All-party government under his premiership (although he seemed unaware Palace backing for this solution); (2) reconstitution of center government headed by Venizelos but with economic support secured through American assistance; (3) new elections within 45 days. To all queries concerning American position we are making reply along same line as my remarks to Plastiras contained in first paragraph this telegram. I hope avoid necessity any press statement on subject. Minor 1 Department of the Army telegram MID–175, August 18, from Athens, not printed, reported that Sophocles Venizelos, leader of the Liberal Party, withdrew Liberal support of the Plastiras coalition government on August 17, ostensibly because Prime Minister Plastiras favored a more extensive program of leniency toward former Communists and their supporters (718.00(W)/8–1850). 2 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Order George Papandreou and Minister of Coordination Emmanuel Tsouderos were in the United States on a visit which took place contrary to the advice of the Embassy in Greece. Charge in Greece Harold B. Minor saw “no useful purpose” in their visit with the “possible exception of Tsouderos” if he confined himself to the problem of exporting Greek tobacco, the “ostensible purpose” of his journey. Chargé Minor failed to dissuade Deputy Prime Minister Papandreou from making the trip and so he recommended to the Department of State that neither visitor be received by the Secretary of State [or any other Cabinet member], let alone by the President, because the “Greeks have time and again complicated and confused our economic and military aid programs by attempting bypass American missions here [in Greece] by carrying their problems and invariable requests for additional aid direct to Washington” (telegram 448, August/9, from Athens, 781.00/8–950). The Department of State concurred with Chargé Minor’s views and informed the Embassy in Greece that “it wld be impossible arrange interviews and appts with personages whom … Grk Govt leaders wld desire to see” (telegram 438, August 11, to Athens, 781.00/8–950). 3 Stephen Stephanopoulos, Member of Parliament. 4 Constantine Karamanlis, Member of Parliament. 5 Constantine Rendis, Member of Parliament. 6 Evangelos Averof, Member of Parliament. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/5–1850: Telegram [Document 173] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece secret Washington , August 19, 1950—2 p. m. 513. Dept approves line set forth Embtel 549, 1 particularly conditions that crisis be of short duration and solution be found within constitutional framework with parliamentary support. Dept gratified apparent willingness Palace develop solution through normal parliamentary means. Proposed representation outlined by Metaxas appears to be as good as might be expected. There is apparently no thought that Plastiras cld head new govt, and Dept believes any new govt under Plastiras wld, in fact, be undesirable. Any allegation US intervention will be minimized if Emb can avoid press statement as suggested last para Embtel 549. If no satisfactory solution evolves from Parliament as constituted, we wld find no insuperable objection prompt elections which might provide new and firmer parliamentary base for effective governmental action in uncertain times ahead. In this connection if elections inevitable it wld seem desirable, in Dept’s tentative view, to use strongest possible Emb influence secure adoption majority system. We feel any new elections under proportional representation system might tend produce some polarization to right and left, but that no one party or effective coalition wld emerge to form stable Govt. Although Plastiras Govt demonstrated certain laxness in security matters, it appears this has been exploited out of all proportion by opposition for polit purposes and that extraordinary measures, such as “Papagos solution” cannot be justified at this time. We consider that Papagos can make greatest contribution at present through continued firm leadership in maintaining and increasing efficiency Grk armed forces. If, however, Palace eventually decides Papagos shld enter polit arena this, in our opinion, shld be effected through participation in elections. Even though Papagos were accepted as supra-party premier, he wld be identified with Palace and his principal advisers wld undoubtedly be ardent royalists. Under these circumstances there wld be tremendous temptation to effect any subsequent change in Govt through leverage of an appeal to latent anti-royalist sentiment within Greece. Obviously KKE in position profit most shld issue of Crown again become paramount in Grk politics. Resort to Papagos in extra-parliamentary solution wld tend divorce support from liberal republican elements which may in long run represent best hope for Greece. We suspect Papagos Govt might be least well-recd in northern border areas where reconstruction so necessary and subversion easy. Although public opinion here and abroad might accept emergence Papagos Govt more readily at this time in light present internati circumstances, we feel propaganda reaction of Cominform and possible reaction certain left liberal elements in US opinion should not be underestimated. Moreover Emb reports indicate lack broad popular support in Greece this course. Dept interested in fate of EPEK deputies in any new coalition and to what extent Tsouderos, if he adheres to new coalition, cld bring EPEK deputies with him. We hope any new solution wld not throw left center republican sentiment represented by EPEK into arms of Democratic Camp. We suspect Plastiras policy attempting reunite Grk people has considerable appeal and shld, in fact, to extent consonant with security requirements, be cardinal element in any attempt to eliminate conditions under which communism thrives. Papandreou and Tsouderos have not yet visited Dept officials. 2 Secy and Under Secy were unable accept luncheon invitation Grk Emb Aug 23 and although Papandreou has requested an appt with Under Secy in next few days, is unlikely this can be arranged. 3 McGhee, however, will undoubtedly see Papandreou and Tsouderos. Ur comments any foregoing Dept views invited. Acheson 1 Supra . 2 On August 18, Minister of Coordination Emmanuel Tsouderos met with Francis F. Lincoln of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Carter N. De Paul, Jr., Chief, Greece, Turkey Branch, European Program Division, Office of the Assistant Administrator for Program, Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and with other ECA officials, to discuss the Greek budget for fiscal year 1951 (memorandum of conversation, August 18, by Mr. Lincoln, not printed, 881.10/8–1850). 3 No record of such a meeting was found in Department of State files. Mr. George Papandreou left New York on August 22 for Athens because of the Greek Government crisis. Editorial Note [Document 174] Editorial Note NSC document 73/4, “The Position and Action of the United States With Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation,” August 25, 1950, printed in volume I, page 375 , recommended that in the event of an overt attack by organized Soviet military forces against Greece or Turkey, the United States should provide accelerated military assistance to either country and deploy such United States forces to their support as could be made available without jeopardizing United States national security. The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 781.5–MAP/8–2650: Telegram [Document 175] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , August 26, 1950—4 p. m. 637. General Jenkins in L–684 1 discussed question size cost GAF revised to meet altered international situation. ECA/G’s telegram 1411 1 discussed question from angle of reconstruction with particular reference JUSMAG estimate additional budgetary drachmae cost of 466 billion involved and indicated various alternatives for meeting this situation. I should like to offer following comments: I recognize fact that military considerations at this time must be given priority. However in view most serious effect increase GAF on reconstruction effort and consequent more long range danger Greece will go Communist as result economic collapse I would wish to see matter most carefully considered and feel we should have firm policy guidance from Washington. If it be agreed that any increases in GAF as proposed by Papagos and agreed by JUSMAG are essential we should go ahead with this without delay and without regard to budgetary situation. If this decision is taken I should like to suggest however that instead of announcing that reconstruction will consequently be curtailed Ave should make clear to Greek leaders and public our firm belief that cost of larger armed forces should be met by better collection of taxes and increase in direct taxation. This is how emergency is being handled in our country and I see no reason why it should not be tried here. We are well aware that tax collection in Greece is inefficient; the time has come to make a major drive in this direction. Surely the Greeks should be expected increase total revenues by 10 percent in national emergency. We must of course be realistic in our own minds and hold back on construction commitments sufficiently so that reconstruction can in fact be curtailed later in year if efforts collect additional revenue are not successful. I believe however that appeal on patriotic grounds for higher taxes to support armed forces should be tried as nationalistic consideration involved give more hope of success on this basis than would increased taxation to provide for continuation reconstruction. Porter will be in Washington August 28 and will be prepared discuss this subject with Department officials. Minor 1 Not found in Department of State files. 1 Not found in Department of State files. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/8–2750: Telegram [Document 176] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece secret Washington , August 28, 1950—7 p. m. 608. Re Embtel 641. 1 In call today on McGhee, Tsouderos 2 mentioned, inter alia , Plastiras had telephoned Aug 26 stating EPEK wld support Venizelos Govt 3 but wld not participate. This morning Tsouderos recd cable from Kartalis 4 expressing view at least Kartalis and Tsouderos shld participate. Tsouderos further said Lambrakis, 5 “a close personal friend”, had recommended EPEK not participate in Govt. Tsouderos said he wld attempt persuade Plastiras agree participation EPEK members in Govt, but in any event he planned remain with Plastiras in order prevent Plastiras falling into hands of extreme left, and hold EPEK in readiness if Venizelos’ Govt shld fall. McGhee pointed out that if EPEK held itself aloof in anticipation fall Venizelos Govt, such attitude wld in itself accelerate that contingency. One weakness Plastiras’ Govt derived from failure Venizelos participate. McGhee said Dept had recd excellent reports contributions Tsouderos and Kartalis and he hoped Tsouderos wld see his way clear join Govt. Dept considered highly desirable EPEK be preserved as center force. If, in so doing, Govt wld lose services Tsouderos, that price must be paid. He was confident nevertheless, Tsouderos cld persuade Plastiras permit participation EPEK members. Tsouderos said Plastiras was eager visit US as “tourist” at earliest possible moment and suggested we arrange keep him here as long as possible. Meanwhile Tsouderos wld be active leader of EPEK. In reply query whether other Grk polit leaders might not misinterpret Plastiras’ activities here, Tsouderos laughed and said there wld be much more difficulty if Plastiras stayed behind. In response to inquiry Tsouderos said he did not fear new elections; that in his opinion new elections were only solution. Amb Politis 6 also present during interview. If, as indicated, EPEK does not in fact participate new Govt, ur views requested desirability holding elections now. Acheson 1 Not printed. 2 Emmanuel Tsouderos, joint leader with Gen. Nicholas Plastiras of EPEK, the National Progressive Union of the Center, was Minister of Coordination in the government of Gen. Plastiras which left office on August 21. 3 Formed August 21, with Sophocles Venizelos as Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and provisional Minister of National Defense and of Interior. 4 George Kartalis, EPEK Member of Parliament. 5 Demetrius Lambrakis, publisher of the Athens newspapers, Vima and Nea . 6 Athanase G. Politis, Greek Ambassador in the United States. The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 881.00R/9–1450: Telegram [Document 177] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , September 14, 1950—7 a. m. 859. Porter has telegraphed Hoffman, 1 with request to pass to State, statement he wishes released this week when 1950–51 ECA allotments are made public. It is planned that aid to Greece, including indirect aid, be reduced from $274,000,000 last year to $218,000,000 this year. This statement may come as shock to Greeks and might conceivably bring about fall of new government which, 2 however, is regarded as a weak coalition and intended only as a stop-gap until elections can be held. In spite of these factors Porter and I feel that Greek people entitled to know reasons why American aid has not been fully utilized. Such a shock coming at this time we hope will bring about conditions under which American aid can be utilized for benefit of Greek people so that we may eventually withdraw our aid from a Greece which has become reasonably self-sufficient. A series of Greek governments (we are on our sixth this year) have simply not taken actions necessary for full utilization of our aid. The proposed statement explains these facts to Greek people and suggests means by which they themselves can put Greece on her feet with aid of Americans. It is not intended as an ultimatum and is not in nature of a “Grady letter”. 3 It is a simple and in my opinion necessary statement stating the amount of American aid for present year, explaining reasons why a reduction is necessary and indicating measures which should be taken by the Greeks. Minor 1 Telegram Toeca 1493, September 13, from ECA Athens, to the Secretary of State, personal for Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration, repeated as telegram Torep 1562 to Paris, not printed (Athens Post Files, Lot 58F7, 500 ECA). 2 The Government of Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos failed to get a vote of confidence on September 9 and was replaced on September 13 by a three-party coalition Cabinet consisting of 10 Liberals, 10 Populists, and 8 members of the Party of George Papandreou. Sophocles Venizelos remained Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. 3 See editorial note, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chief of the Joint united States Military Aid Group to Greece (Jenkins) NEA Politico–Military Adviser Files: Lot 484 [Document 178] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chief of the Joint united States Military Aid Group to Greece ( Jenkins ) top secret priority Washington , September 15, 1950—5:35 p. m. JCS 91678. From JCS. 1. JCS have reviewed your recommendations for revised strengths and orders of battle of Greek mil establishment and approve the following as temporary Greek Armed Forces which JCS believe will accomplish United States objective regarding Greece during present international situation. Total strength ceiling for this temporary Greek mil establishment should not exceed 164,400 to consist of: a . Greek National Army of 147,000. Order of battle as recommended by you. b . Royal Hellenic Navy of 10,000. Present order of battle will be augmented by 1 additional United States destroyer for total of 60 ships. Delivery of United States destroyers and destroyer escorts will be expedited. Consideration has been given to letter of 25 July 50, CinC Greek Armed Forces to Chief, JUSMAG, subject: “composition of Royal Hellenic Navy”. 1 c . Royal Hellenic Air Force of 7,400. Order of battle to be augmented by aviation engineer unit and provide for training of sufficient reservists to man additional Helldiver Sqdn in emergency. 2. United States support of increased forces, any additional equipment and establishment of operational level of reserve supplies will be dependent upon funds made available within FY 51 and subsequent MDAP appropriations. 3. You are authorized to inform Chief, AMAG that you can concur in but cannot suggest the expansion of the Greek Armed Forces within the strength ceilings and fund limitations above. 1 Not found in Department of State files. The Chargé in Greece (Minor) to the Secretary of State 881.00R/9–1650: Telegram [Document 179] The Chargé in Greece ( Minor ) to the Secretary of State confidential Athens , September 16, 1950—noon. 899. At close[d] meeting yesterday Porter gave Greek Government prior warning reduction ECA aid to Greece explaining action due to inadequate Greek utilization previous US aid. Amount of cut not disclosed. Immediate reaction not particularly strong, Coordination Minister Stephanopoulos 1 inquiring whether improved performance would result in restoration of cut. ECA/G still plans release prepared statement (Embtel 859 September 13) 2 probably early next week. All Athens papers this morning report news of cut[,] stating ECA action based on US opinion political instability responsible for unsatisfactory progress of reconstruction. Press adds Porter stated that cut not political action specifically aimed at present government. However left-center opposition paper Eleftheria asserts government circles inclined believe Porter announcement similar to Grady letter. 3 No editorial comment has yet appeared. Local AP correspondent filing story on Porter announcement probably taking line reduction expresses general American dissatisfaction with Greek use US aid and does not indicate any specific American objection to present government. Minor 1 Stephen Stephanopoulos. 2 Record copy dated September 14, p. 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] . 3 See editorial note, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom 780.00/9–1850 [Document 180] Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 London, September 19, 1950 [Extract] 2 secret Memorandum of Informal US–UK Discussion in Connection With the Visit to London of the Honorable George C. McGhee Tuesday Afternoon, September 19, 1950 Topic for Discussion: GTI—Items 1 (except Iran) 2 and 3 Participants: Foreign Office: Mr. M. R. Wright, Assistant Under Secretary of State Sir Anthony Rumbold, Head, Southern Department Lord Talbot de Malahide, Assistant Head, Southern Department Mr. H. S. Stephenson, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Trieste Miss R. M. B. Chevallier, Yugoslavia and Greece Mr. I. D. Adams, European Recovery Department of State: Hon. George C. McGhee Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper 3 American Embassy, London: Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd 4 Mr. Edwin A. Willard 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cyprus (Not on Agenda) The subject of Cyprus and enosis was then raised. Mr. McGhee said that although we did not wish to see this problem placed on the UN agenda, it was his opinion that we cannot stifle discussion on the union of Cyprus and Greece and that the question will in all likelihood, inevitably be raised. There are indications that the matter will be introduced by either Czechoslovakia or Egypt. Sir Anthony said that he thought the matter was not so pressing now as it had been and that his Government hoped to kill the question before it reached the point of debate. He admitted that debate might pacify the Greeks; but he added that we must keep in mind both the effect enosis would have on the Turks and the fact that Cyprus continues to have considerable importance as a military base. Exchange of Views on Greek Political Situation (Item 3) Both Sir Anthony and Mr. McGhee agreed that the present Greek Coalition Government was parliamentarily strong; but they also felt that if it fell, it would be necessary to hold majority elections. Mr. McGhee said it was not the US policy to intervene in Greece; but in the event that the Liberalists, the Nationalists, and the EPEK all were to secure relatively equal positions as the result of elections, it might be necessary for the American and British Ambassadors to intervene with the King if he were to show a tendency to keep EPEK out of power when all other indications were that this should not be the case. Greek-Yugoslav Relations (Item 2) The question of an exchange of diplomats between Greece and Yugoslavia was touched on briefly. Mr. McGhee agreed that both countries are highly dependent upon each other and that a substance of cooperation is required in order to build up strength against the Russians. On the face of it, the resumption of diplomatic relations is a good thing, but it is more important to see that trade relations are re-established. Sir Anthony pointed out that Mr. Ernest Davies 6 had almost been successful in helping to effect an exchange of diplomats and that his efforts had been interrupted by the Yugoslav position on Macedonia and the resignation of the Plastiras. Mr. McGhee said it is the US policy to desire an improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relations, but an active pursuit of this objective should wait until the chances of success appear more auspicious. Both Mr. McGhee and Sir Anthony agreed that UNSCOB should continue to exist with its present terms of reference as the simplest and most effective way of maintaining vigilance over the Greek situation; and, additionally, everything should be done to resolve the question of the 10,000 Greek children who are now in Yugoslavia. Sir Anthony noted that in this respect as well as in respect to trade relationships, a resumption of diplomatic relations would be of great help. The question of a Bulgarian invasion of Greece was discussed; and Sir Anthony said that if this occurred, he believed that the Greek army could resist successfully. On the other hand, if Bulgaria should invade Yugoslavia, Sir Anthony did not believe that Greece would declare war on Bulgaria. If Bulgaria were to invade Greece, it was Mr. McGhee’s opinion that a pattern of UN forces, similar to those now in Korea, would have to be employed, once it had been determined by UNSCOB that Bulgaria was, in fact, the aggressor. Both Sir Anthony and Mr. McGhee agreed that there would appear to be three possibilities of action within Greece: (1) the guerrilla threat, with which Greece herself could cope; (2) an open Bulgarian attack upon Greece, in which event the UN would probably be called upon to act; and (3) a Russian attack upon Greece, in which case the whole issue of war and peace would arise. However, both agreed that none of these eventualities is likely, for the moment at least, to occur. Any such activity is closely linked to the military question of who is responsible for taking action; and beyond taking the matter to the Security Council, any assistance would largely depend upon what forces were available in the area. 1 The authorship and date of preparation of this memorandum are not indicated on the source text. It is one of a set of memoranda covering the various agenda items discussed by Mr. McGhee during his visit to London, September 16–23; regarding that visit, see the editorial note, p. 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] . Copies of this paper were sent to the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, as well as to the Embassies in Greece and Turkey. 2 For the remainder of this memorandum, see p. 1316 [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 735 ] . 3 Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs. 4 First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom and Consul at London. 5 Attaché at the Embassy in the United Kingdom. 6 Ernest A. J. Davies, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) S/S–NCS Files: Lot 63D351: NCS 42 1 [Document 181] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay ) 2 [Extract] 3 top secret Washington , September 19, 1950. Subject: Second Progress Report on NSC 42/1, “United States Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to United States Security.” 4 NSC 42/1 was approved as governmental policy on March 23, 1949, on the basis of the considerations set forth in NSC 5/4 of June 3, 1948. 5 It is requested that this report, as of August 25, 1950, be circulated to members of the Council for their information. I Policy Implementation—Greece Military Aid By the end of fiscal 1950, approximately $458.7 million had been committed in equipping, maintaining, advising and training the Greek armed forces under the program of aid to Greece and Turkey inaugurated in 1947, about $112.9 million of this sum having been committed during fiscal 1950. Guerrillas in Greece now number about 300, as compared to a one-time high of 28,000 and thus constitute only a normal and insignificant police problem. With the defeat of the guerrilla movement, the current specific objectives of the military aid program are to provide certain basic capital equipment, replacements, spares and general supplies for Greek forces “of a size and composition sufficient ( a ) to maintain internal security, ( b ) to deter a resumption of satellite-based guerrilla activity, and ( c ) in the event of such resumption, to provide adequate resistance until a general mobilization could be completed and additional supplies furnished.” Pursuant to these objectives, it is now contemplated that $52.5 million will be allocated to Greece out of the $131,500,000 authorized for military aid to Greece, Turkey and Iran under Title II of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1950, 6 and it is likely that this amount will be substantially increased by supplementary legislation. Additional assistance for the Greek military establishment will likewise be afforded by about $36 million for the procurement of commonuse items under the Greek ECA program. To effect savings and to foster Greek economic rehabilitation, a program was initiated following the defeat of the guerrilla movement for the reduction of the Greek armed forces, exclusive of the Gendarmerie , from their top strength level of 217,000 in October 1949 to a target figure of 124,000 by December 31, 1950, with provision being made for 90-day remobilization to a strength of 147,000 in the event of a significant resumption of guerrilla activities. This process of reduction, which had brought the Greek forces down to a level of 135,400 on May 31, 1950, has been arrested as a result of the Korean aggression and consequent Balkan uncertainties. The Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece (JUSMAPG), which numbered 527 persons as of June 30, 1949, had been reduced to 266 persons (authorized by Joint Chiefs of Staff) as of June 30, 1950, and its Commander, Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, has been succeeded by Major General Reuben E. Jenkins. 7 The personnel requirements of the Military Group are currently under review. Apart from the danger of direct military aggression by the USSR, the external threat to Greece lies in the Bulgarian and Albanian Armies and in the Greek guerrilla forces concentrated in those countries. It is understood that the Bulgarian forces number between 85,000–150,000 well equipped and well trained men with capability of expansion of a mobilized strength of about 600,000 trained men. Albanian forces are understood to number some 45,000 men of undetermined fighting capabilities. Combat-fit Greek guerrillas in Bulgaria are estimated at between 3,000 and 12,000 and in Albania at between 300 and 3,000. There are no known Soviet combat organizations in either Bulgaria or Albania, although it is estimated that there are at least 2,000 Soviet military “technicians” in Bulgaria and a much lesser number in Albania. Intelligence reports provide no concrete evidence of imminent military action by Bulgaria or Albania against Greece (or against Yugoslavia, which would likewise gravely imperil the security of Greece). On the other hand, disturbing factors are ( a ) continued minor frontier provocations against Greece, ( b ) reports of Soviet stock-piling and of somewhat unusual troop movements in Bulgaria, and ( c ) persistent Cominform propaganda designed to stimulate a war psychosis in Bulgaria and to depict the “Athens-Belgrade Axis” as an instrument of aggressive Anglo-American policy. In light of the foregoing, a reexamination is being made of the capabilities of the Greek Armed forces to meet the various possibilities of hostile action with a view to determining the advisability of making changes in the strength, organization, and equipment of those forces wih the resulting changes which would be reflected in our military aid program as to size, composition, and priority. Economic Aid In fiscal 1950 Greece received $158.3 million of direct ECA aid and drawing rights, as adjusted, of $127.5 million, or a total of $283.8 million. For fiscal 1951, direct aid is likely to be between $100 million and $120 million, and Greece has an initial position in the European Payments Union of $115 million. This would accordingly represent a total of between $215 million and $235 million. With the economic aid given Greece and the end of large-scale guerrilla warfare, the Greek economy was kept on a reasonably even keel during fiscal 1950 and the reconstruction of the nation’s capital assets continued. With peace restored and the refugees back in their villages, there is a real increase in acreage of important crops, and farm production should exceed that of the pre-war years. Industrial production is at about pre-war levels, but neither industrial nor farm output are as yet adequate for a self-sustaining economy. Previously it had been estimated that the fiscal year 1951 budget operating deficit would be reduced to $40 million as compared to $130 million in fiscal year 1950, but the proposed increasing of the armed forces would impose an additional budgetary load of approximately $30 million. Fear generated by the warfare in Korea resulted in a heavy demand for gold sovereigns for about three weeks and some increase in the price level, a condition which if continued could retard Greek recovery. However, it will be noted that the demand for gold sovereigns and price levels will inevitably remain closely related to international developments in face of what have been steadily improving economic conditions in Greece. Two other basic difficulties are the problem of expanding foreign markets for Greek tobacco and the problem of industrial development, particularly in the Athens-Piraeus area, to provide productive employment. The prospect of large stocks of tobacco remaining unsold presents both an internal economic and political problem for which there is no easy solution. However, the matter is being given serious study. An agreement concluded in July between ECA and the Greek Government for a major electric power development project will provide an essential basis for industrial expansion. However, despite these developments, it is unlikely that Greece will have made sufficient progress to be able to stand on its own economic feet by June 30, 1952. Greek Foreign Relations The United States has continued to lend all feasible political support to Greece in the United Nations forum and through direct diplomatic action. One vexing residual problem of the Greek guerrilla warfare has been the failure of the communist countries of eastern Europe to act upon the General Assembly resolutions calling for the repatriation of some 20,000 children removed from Greece by the guerrilla forces. We have continued to exert pressure for the return of these children by all available means. A strong note on the subject was, for example, addressed to the United Nations Secretary General on May 30, 8 and the matter has been repeatedly taken up direct with the Yugoslav authorities. While the problem is essentially humanitarian and the outlook for its solution discouraging, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia, our action in this matter serves at least as a powerful counterweight to Soviet propaganda charges regarding American “imperialism” in Greece, and it may therefore be considered indirectly helpful to Greek and United States security interests. Of more direct effect from the viewpoint of security is the continued vigilance of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), which will again report to the Fifth General Assembly in the fall on the threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. The usefulness of UNSCOB, even in the absence of guerrilla activities, was demonstrated by its special report of July 19, 9 which was prepared on United States initiative and which exposed the falsity of the Cominform propaganda campaign regarding alleged Greek aggressive designs sponsored by the Anglo-Americans. Plans for putting UNSCOB on a stand-by basis and for further reducing, or eliminating, the observer corps in Greece have been indefinitely postponed as a consequence of the Korean development. The Korean events highlight the community of Greek and Yugoslav security interests under the potential threat of similar Cominform military action against either or both states. Tension between the two countries which relaxed progressively after Yugoslavia’s break with the Cominform, turned into a definite promise of rapprochement with the advent to power of the Plastiras Government in Greece in April. Unfortunately, preliminary steps encouraged by the United States for an exchange of ministers and the resumption of economic relations were frustrated by subsequent misunderstanding over the issue of the small Slavic minority in northern Greece. We shall continue when suitable opportunities occur to endeavor to liquidate the ensuing impasse through diplomatic action at Belgrade and Athens. The Greeks continue to seek inclusion in the Atlantic Pact or some similar regional arrangement. While we have avoided any expressed or implied commitment in this respect, consideration is being given to the effects of the inclusion or indirect association of Greece, along with Turkey, in the Pact. Meanwhile we have taken every appropriate opportunity to assure Greece of our continued support to quiet their fears. For example, on May 19, at the termination of the London Foreign Ministers’ Conference, the Secretary of State reiterated American determination to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey and Iran, 10 and reference to the same theme was made in the President’s message of July 19 to Congress on Korea. 11 The Greeks have likewise derived great encouragement from the United States and United Nations action in Korea, which they have offered to support by providing six transport planes with crews. Greek Internal Situation National elections held in Greece on March 5 showed a distinct trend of sentiment toward the center and left-center, but political machinations nevertheless led to the setting up of a narrow Government headed by the Liberal leader, Mr. Sophocles Venizelos. While centrist in appearance, this Government was still dependent on rightwing parliamentary support. Under pressure from Ambassador Grady, the Venizelos Cabinet was succeeded on April 15 by a broader and presumably more representative and effective coalition headed by the moderate leftist, General Nicholas Plastiras. This development was generally well received in Greece and by Western opinion. While the Plastiras Government registered some progress along the lines advocated by American advisers, notably in the economic field, its general record of accomplishment was not impressive. In some respects its actions and attitude have facilitated communist resurgence within Greece. Disintegration within the coalition gradually set in due to the traditional centrifugal forces of Greek politics and divergencies between the principal coalition leaders, leading to the Government’s fall on August 18. A new Government was formed by Venizelos on August 21 drawn only from the Liberal party but with the promise of expanding it into a more widely based coalition upon the return of principal leaders abroad at that time. The Greek Communist Party remains illegal, but many of its members have benefited by a program of broad though not total amnesty designed to promote internal pacification, to correct individual injustices, to relieve congestion in the political detention centers, and generally to eliminate grounds for legitimate criticism of Greek judicial practices. Their freedom thus regained, these communists are now active in reforming the Party cadres and in their endeavors, through the popular-front technique, to foment unrest, to win control of the trade unions, and to capture certain municipal Governments in local elections scheduled for September 3. Although the situation is not yet alarming, the communist internal effort in Greece is meeting with some success and will always be a threat in this country of abysmally low living standards. This and the persistent problem of governmental efficiency and stability in Greece thus require close and continuing American attention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III. Policy Evaluation The American policies with respect to Greece and Turkey, inaugurated in 1947 and aiming at the objectives formulated in NSC 42/1, have so far saved Greece from otherwise certain collapse and have enabled Turkey appreciably to strengthen its defense posture. The Greek and Turkish economies have been sustained and reenforced. Turkey has made marked progress towards a fuller democracy, and the breakdown of democratic government in Greece has been averted. The Soviet threat which hung over these two countries and cast its shadow over the broader neighboring areas has thus been held in check. It has even been pushed back through the not unrelated defection of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless the threat, if somewhat blunted, is still poised, and its balance has been rendered more precarious by the aggression against the Republic of Korea. Both the improved situation of Greece and Turkey and the new world situation arising from the aggression in Korea call for reappraisal of United States objectives and policies with respect to Greece and Turkey. There are possibly new opportunities to be exploited; there are certainly new questions to be answered. NSC 42/1 was prepared at a time when Greece was still in the throes of guerrilla warfare, and it was addressed primarily to the problem of preventing the domination of Greece and Turkey by communist pressures short of outright aggression. This problem has been met successfully with the help of existing United States support policies and can, it would seem, be kept under control by intelligent projection of these policies into the future. On the other hand, the willingness of the USSR to resort to force in Korea, at least indirectly, makes clear the possibility of similar outright aggression, which might take one or more of several forms, against Greece and Turkey. Under these circumstances a new series of problems has arisen which are now under consideration. Among them are: ( a ) the possibilities and means of discouraging in advance Soviet or satellite aggression against Greece and Turkey; ( b ) the means of countering such aggression if it occurs; ( c ) the integration of United States planning regarding Greece and Turkey with similar planning regarding other countries of the same area, such as Yugoslavia and Iran, which have closely related security problems; ( d ) the integration of United States planning regarding this area with that of the United Kingdom and other North Atlantic Pact members. James E. Webb 1 Lot 63 D 351 is a serial master file of the National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 National Security Council (NSC) Action Number 366 taken at the 69th meeting of the NSC on October 12 “noted and discussed” the progress report transmitted by this memorandum, “with particular reference to the desirability of assisting the Greek Army in improving its ability to defend against external aggression;” noted that the NSC Staff was preparing a new report on U.S. policy toward Greece, which would take account of the above point; and agreed that the NSC Staff should prepare a new report on U.S. policy toward Turkey (Committee Secretariat Staff, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66D95, Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1950). 3 For the remainder of this memorandum, see p. 1317 [ Pg. 1317 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] . 4 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 269 . 5 Document NSC 5/4, June 3, 1948, “The Position of the U.S. with Respect to the Use of U.S. Military Power in Greece,” not printed, was a revision of NSC 5/3, May 25, 1948, approved by President Harry S. Truman. For the text of NSC 5/3 and the amendment constituting NSC 5/4, see ibid . 1948, vol. iv , pp. 93 and 99 . 6 Reference is to “An Act to amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949,” approved June 26, 1950; 64 Stat. (pt. 1) 373. For documentation on the overall U.S. military assistance program, see vol. i , pp. 126 ff. 7 The Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 11, with the approval of the Department of State and the Secretary of Defense, had directed the inactivation of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece and the establishment of the Joint U.S. Military Aid Group (JUSMAG) to Greece. 8 This communication, dated May 29 and delivered May 30, from the Acting Representative of the United States at the United Nations, expressed the hope “that the countries of Eastern Europe … will be reminded of the right of Greek children involuntarily in their midst to return to … their own country” (telegram 279, May 29, to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, 781.00/5–2950, also, U.N. doc. A/1284). 9 Reference is to the resolution of July 18 by the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, cited in footnote 4, p. 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] . 10 See the Department of State Bulletin , June 5, 1950, pp. 883–884. 11 ibid. , July 31, 1950, pp. 163–169. For documentation relating to Korea, see volume vii . The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State 781.00/9–2750: Telegram [Document 182] The Ambassador in Greece ( Peurifoy ) 1 to the Secretary of State secret Athens , September 27, 1950 [—8 a. m.] 1055. My wife and I were received afternoon Sept 25 by Their Majesties at Tatoi. We expected remain only thirty minutes, but at their insistence stayed for hour and half. After usual preliminaries, Queen launched into discussion of various Greek political leaders, some of whom she berated in strong terms, particularly Plastiras, Lambrakis, and Tsouderos. At that point I said that one of my first official acts after appointment as Amb was to request Tsouderos to remain in Govt. She stopped almost in mid-air and seemed taken aback. I then turned to King and told him that I understood Tsouderos was able and that ECA and Emb were pleased with his work as Coordination Min and that I thought that if the King had any doubts about Tsouderos but at same time recognized his ability, lie might wish to bring him into Govt rather than leave him outside. He pondered this for a moment and then turning to Queen said he thought I was absolutely right. Both King and Queen indicated desire to work more closely with Emb and to pay more heed to its suggestions. There was then discussion concerning rights of constitutional monarchs and where they should draw line. I informed Their Majesties that I came to Greece with no preconceived prejudices and that I intended to support King and Queen because people of Greece had already spoken on subject and because I thought any revival of royalist issue would be harmful. I said that I thought that King Paul was a great symbol and one which we would endeavor to support. I assured him of my desire to work with both of them and also with Greek political leaders and that I hoped petty issues between them would be put aside as we all worked toward a stable govt for Greece. Queen commented that perhaps there had been mistakes in the past and that maybe the Americans had been right in urging a govt of the Center. This appears decided change for the better in their attitude. King and Queen expressed wish for passage of law providing for elections on majority system. They felt, however, that this should not be done until there was an agreement between Govt leaders. Otherwise, Queen said, she was afraid that they would dissipate their strength and that Communists or leftists would hold theirs; and while no party would have majority, Communists would have their solid little bloc. Atmosphere was extremely cordial throughout visit. I had impression that both King and Queen were making every effort to be affable. Peurifoy 1 John E. Peurifoy, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Greece and concurrently Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, arrived in Athens on September 22, presented his credentials to King Paul on September 25, and assumed charge of the Mission on September 26. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 881.00R/9–2750: Telegram [Document 183] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece confidential Washington , September 27, 1950—7 p. m. 994. Amb Politis called with Gouras 1 Sept 22 re ECA cut. Politis said while felt personally that cut had no specific reflection on present Govt, announcement so soon after formation new Govt wld seem imply US disapproval. Any case this impression widespread Athens. Dept pointed out announcement had come from Grk sources but had it come from US spokesman wld have been put in proper context and non-polit nature confirmed. Politis stated in view fact present Govt first one of “stability” since elections, unfortunate must bear brunt of cut and concomitant destabilizing effects. He inquired if possible to stay cut giving present Govt chance undertake required action and reforms which if not satis by later date cut wld then be made. Politic was told that in Dept’s view unlikely ECA wld temporarily restore cut and state that restoration done for polit reasons. Econ considerations in decision were stressed. Grk reps then inquired if amt cut cld be put in reserve to be restored contingent upon adequate progress by set date. Said he felt sure this wld be strong inducement for Govt to take necessary measures. Although suggestion stated as personal believe it emanated Grk Govt Athens. Dept agreed take reserve fund idea under consideration and discuss with ECA. Assume similar approach has been made Athens. Before giving serious consideration to proposal would like Embassy’s opinion. Specifically would appreciate views as to polit advisability fol this course and whether this would stimulate govt to accomplish more effectively objectives set forth in proposed Porter-Minor statement. ECA states Bissell 2 will discuss this subj with Porter at Mission Chiefs meeting as well as general subject of timing of announcement of annual aid estimates. Webb 1 Paul Economou-Gouras, Minister of the Greek Embassy. 2 Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Assistant Administrator for Program, Economic Cooperation Administration. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stephen T. Calligas of the Embassy in Greece Athens Embassy Files: Lot 58 F7: 350 Greece (Sept.–Dec.) [Document 184] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stephen T. Calligas of the Embassy in Greece [Extracts] Subject: Interview with the Prime Minister, Sophocles Venizelos The P.M. called, at his request, on the American Ambassador at 10 a. m. today. The P.M. said he wished to discuss certain subjects with the Amb. personally, as he felt this would be in the interest of the cordial relations which he hoped he would have with the Amb, He was very anxious to avoid any misunderstanding with the Amb. whom he regarded with much sympathy and friendship. Mr. Venizelos said that he had heard from an American source that it was generally believed in American official circles that he did not like Americans and that he does not look upon them as friends. He wished to assure the Amb. most categorically that this rumor is perfectly untrue. On the contrary, he firmly believes that without American moral and financial support Greece cannot exist. It was he who caused the Porter Mission to come to Greece in 1947, 1 after his visit to the U.S. at the head of a delegation sent by the then Tsaldaris Cabinet. 2 He added that even as far back as 1944 and 1945, he earnestly believed in the necessity of American interest in Greece, and had always been a champion of that idea. The Amb. expressed his surprise, assured the P.M. that he himself had never heard of this rumor, and that he knew it was not the belief of anyone in this Emb. The P.M. said he was relieved to hear of this, and reiterated his firm conviction that it is impossible for Greece to get along without the moral friendship and material support of the U.S. Mr. Venizelos then gave the Amb. a brief summary of the events of the last few months and explained that he had been prompted to form his first Cabinet in March 1950 because of the refusal of the King to give the mandate to General Plastiras. In so doing, Mr. V. thought he was actually saving the situation. He mentioned that he had told Amb. Grady at the time that he was perfectly willing to hand in his resignation if it was felt that his Cabinet was following a policy which was contrary to American policy in Greece. Amb. Grady had said that he was not suggesting that the Venizelos Cabinet resign. 3 The P.M. said that another matter to which he wished to draw the Ambassador’s attention was the method used by the Embassy in transmitting important communications to the Government. He referred to the famous Grady letter 4 back in March which had caused such a commotion. He remarked that while he received the letter at about 12:30 of that day, the Greek press has been informed in the morning that such a communication would be addressed to Mr. V. As a matter of fact, the press were given copies of the letter at almost the same time as the P.M. received it. He referred to a further example, and said that the newspaper Vima had carried information on a Saturday morning about the cut in U.S. aid to Greece, while the Government was not officially notified of this until the following week. The P.M. concluded that there must be a serious leak somewhere in the Mission. He explained that this situation had caused considerable embarrassment to the Government and could only result in the loss of its prestige in the eyes of the people.… The P.M. said he would be grateful if, in the future, any communication coming from the Embassy or the Mission were addressed to the Government before information is revealed outside. He went on to say that in accordance with democratic custom, it is only just that the press be kept informed of current events, but there are ways and ways of doing that. The Amb. assured the P.M. that he understood his position perfectly. It is the Amb.’s desire and intention that all official communications be addressed to the Government. The Amb. does not intend to have information reach the P.M. in a roundabout way; on the contrary he wishes to communicate with the P.M. personally every time there is reason for it. The P.M. expressed great satisfaction at the assurance given him by the Amb. 5 The P.M. then referred to the reasons which had led to the fall of the Plastiras Government. He said that the General’s chief concern was how to release as many communists as possible. The P.M. said that he, too, was very much in favor of clemency, but this was definitely not the time to release communists, particularly after the Korean events. He pointed out that if in this rapidly deteriorating situation, all communists were to be released, Greece might eventually have to fight both an internal as well as an external war. At this point, the Amb. asked how many communists were under detention at present. The P.M. said he did not know the exact figure since there were many bandit prisoners who are also detained, but he believed there were some 16 to 17,000 in all. The P.M. then referred to the present Cabinet and said that he was quite pleased with his collaboration with Messrs. Tsaldaris 6 and Papandreou. 7 He believed and hoped that this close collaboration would continue in the future. The Amb. added that he, too, had gained the impression from his first contacts with the two Vice Premiers that they were both anxious to make a success of this Government and that they looked forward to political stability. The P.M. assured the Amb. that no effort would be spared to that end, and that he hoped this Government would remain in office for the next three years. The Amb. remarked that this was the hope of the American Government. He added that both official circles as well as the people in the U.S. were quite worried at the rapid succession of so many governments in Greece since the war. The P.M. replied that it was in this spirit that he wished to bring a question to the attention of the Amb., since he feared it might be the cause of future friction in the Cabinet, and even bring about the resignation of the Govt. He said that a law had been passed by the Plastiras Govt, granting extraordinary powers to the then Minister of Coordination, Mr. Emmanuel Tsouderos. Furthermore, Mr. Tsouderos was assisted in his work by a Coordinating Committee, or a “brain trust” as Mr. V. called it, the purpose of which was to coordinate the work of the various Ministries, particularly on matters relating to the reconstruction effort, and to pass the laws which it considered necessary. The chief reason for granting Mr. Tsouderos such powers was that the General himself understood very little of economic matters. He, therefore, quite willingly gave his Minister of Coordination carte blanche in a surprisingly large number of sectors. The American Mission was very much in favor of such a Committee, and had strongly recommended that it be formed, with the exception, however, that it come under the immediate jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and not of the Minister of Coordination. As things stand now, the Committee still functions under the chairmanship of the Minister of Coordination, Mr. Stephen Stephanopoulos (a Populist, possibly Mr. Tsaldaris’ successor), and enforces decisions without the consent, or, very often, even the knowledge of the P.M. Mr. Venizelos added that this was hardly just since many of these decisions did not affect reconstruction or coordination questions only, but very often major economic problems as well. This was a question which would inevitably lead to discord. The P.M. had suggested that the Committee continue its normal functions but under the chairmanship of the P.M. The Amb. replied that he was glad to know of this, and that he thought the P.M.’s suggestion was fair and reasonable. 8 The P.M. then referred to the actual size of the Greek Army. He said that it had been agreed between the Mission and the Govt. that by the end of 1950 the Greek Army would be reduced to 80,000 men. It has recently been decided, however, by both Marshal Papagos and General Jenkins that the Army should be increased to 120,000 men. Even counting for the fact that the Greek budget would not be burdened with the cost of the equipment of the Army, the extra expense in drachmas for this increase is estimated at some six hundred billions, which would necessarily have to come out of reconstruction funds. This, according to the P.M., is one of the unlucky aspects the present Govt, has to face. The Amb. said he was aware of this problem, and presented the P.M. with a letter 9 which he had ready for him and which dealt with this question. The Amb. asked if this additional expense could not be procured through taxation. The P.M. replied that he was perfectly willing to increase taxation, but that he was afraid that additional taxes might have unfortunate effects. The Amb. pointed out that more taxes were again being demanded of the American people, and mentioned to the P.M. his own salary as an example. A full 20% of that salary never came to him. The Amb. added that he had not yet had the time to examine the financial side of this problem, but that he would do so as soon as possible. Mr. Venizelos said that a possible solution to the problem might be some kind of a military accord with Turkey and Yugoslavia. An understanding with Yugoslavia still presented great difficulties, but with Turkey seemed almost feasible. The P.M. had already instructed the Greek Ambassador at Ankara 10 to approach the Turkish General Staff on the subject. The Turks did not seem to be displeased with the idea, but their reply as to whether they are disposed to begin negotiations with the Greek General Staff has not yet been received. The P.M. was hopeful that some arrangement could be reached, as a result of which it would not be necessary for Greece to increase her army. The Amb. said he was pleased to know of this démarche of the Greek Gov. and would appreciate being kept informed of further developments. Another “unlucky” point which the P.M. raised was the Greek Brigade for Korea. Though this decision had been taken unanimously by the Greek Cabinet, it would, nevertheless, burden the budget with an extra thirty billion drachmas. The Amb. said that this decision had been received in the U.S. with great gratification, and that President Truman had expressed his appreciation of the gesture of the Greek people. He remarked that this question had still to be discussed with General Jenkins, and presented the P.M. with a communication on this subject. 11 The Amb. assured the P.M. of his fullest cooperation at all times, for which Mr. Venizelos expressed sincere thanks. The interview terminated at 11:15 a. m. S[ tephen ] T. C[ alligas ] Athens , 27 September 1950. 1 For documentation on the activities of Paul A. Porter as Chief of the American Economic Mission to Greece with rank of Ambassador, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 1 ff. 2 For documentation on the activities of the special Greek Economic Mission to the United States, headed by Sophocles Venizelos, see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. vii , pp. 180 and 190 . 3 For Ambassador Grady’s views in this regard, see telegram 703, March 31, p. 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . 4 See editorial note, ibid [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] . 5 After this point this paper bears the notation: “I also said this arrangement must work both ways.” 6 Constantine Tsaldaris, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister Without Portfolio. 7 George Papandreou, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister Without Portfolio. 8 This paper bears a notation at this point which changes the period to a comma and reads as follows: “provided the Gov’t really made decisions.” 9 Dated September 27; enclosure 1 to despatch 547, October 4, from Athens, not printed (781.5/10–450). 10 Alexander Contournas. 11 Note No. 97 of September 27 from the Embassy in Greece to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not printed, is partly quoted in the editorial note, p. 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] . The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State 681.82/9–2850: Telegram [Document 185] The Ambassador in Greece ( Peurifoy ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , September 28, 1950—9 a. m. 1073. Venizelos told me yesterday that he had instructed his Ambassador at Ankara to inform Turkish Government that Greeks would welcome early staff talks which they hoped would lead to much closer military cooperation between Turkey and Greece. Later in day, Tsaldaris called to ask if I would request Department to instruct Ambassador Wadsworth 1 to inform Turks that US would welcome immediate tightening of economic, political and military ties between Greece and Turkey. I assured both Venizelos and Tsaldaris that matter would be given due consideration. Department will recall proposal close Greek-Turkish cooperation particularly in military field has been indicated several times previously by Greeks especially Tsaldaris, with no useful result since Turks have apparently insisted on American endorsement and indeed participation, in any Greek-Turkish staff talks. Further in view Depcirtel September 22, 2 Department may not consider time propitious for Ambassador Wadsworth to use his and Department’s influence in bringing Turkish and Greek armed forces into closer accord. However, in view over-all importance of strengthening relations between Greece and Turkey, an improvement in economic cooperation seems particularly desirable, I am submitting Greek request for whatever action if any, Department deems appropriate. Sent Department 1972 [ 1073 ], repeated info Ankara 20. Peurifoy 1 George Wadsworth, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Turkey. 2 This telegram repeated telegram Tosec 35, September 22, to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, not printed, which read in part as follows: “It was agreed [at the Tripartite Meeting, Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and United States, New York, September 1950] to direct Defense Committee [of the North Atlantic Council] to take steps to enable Turkey, should she so desire, to become associated with such phases of NAT planning for defense of Mediterranean as Defense Committee deems appropriate. Should this proposal be acceptable to Turkey, then and only then would same proposal be made to Greece.” (396.1NE/9–2150) (For documentation on the Tripartite Meeting, Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and United States, New York, September 1950, see vol. iii , pp. 1108 ff.; for documentation on the association of Greece and Turkey with North Atlantic Treaty Organization planning on the defense of the Mediterranean, see ibid. , pp. 1 ff.) The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State 781.5/10–350: Telegram [Document 186] The Ambassador in Greece ( Peurifoy ) to the Secretary of State top secret Athens , October 3, 1950—3 p. m. 1147. Re Deptel 1028 September 29 1 and Embtels 1133 2 and 1134 October 2. 3 Porter, Jenkins and I discussed yesterday at length question size GAF. It is obvious to us that Greek attitude on subject has been far from clear. Venizelos has expressed contradictory views to me and to Greek public. It is also not clear to what extent Papagos shares Venizelos’ alleged desire reduce GAF. In our opinion, reduction GAF without full concurrence Papagos and General Staff could bring about serious political situation or even result in more serious happenings. To seek clarification I discussed question with Prime Minister today preparatory requesting Jenkins discuss with Papagos details of military assistance to Greece on basis of reduced troop level. I emphasized necessity of re-evaluating military program at reduced army level which Greek Government felt essential as result of proposed ECA cut of approximately 50 million dollars this year. I pointed out necessity of military assistance bearing close relationship with number troops actually under arms. Prime Minister reversed position he took in letter September 29 4 and declared that for time being size of armed forces should remain at present strength of 122,000 with reconsideration this problem at later date when international picture becomes clearer, specifically referring Korean problem. I assured Prime Minister that General Jenkins would discuss military program with Papagos and that every care would be exercised to see that no publicity be given this matter. Aside from clarifying Greek view, we will express no further American views on subject pending directive from Department. Our views on this subject remain same as expressed in three parallel telegrams (L 684 August 19; 5 Toeca 1411 August 26; 6 Embtel 637 August 26). 7 I recommend these telegrams be reread carefully before decision is made in this matter which so vitally affects future of Greece. Peurifoy 1 Not printed. 2 Not printed; it reported among other things on Note No. 47574 of September 29 from Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sophocles Venizelos to Ambassador in Greece John E. Peurifoy (enclosure 2 to despatch 547, October 4, from Athens, 781.5/10–450, not printed) which stated that the Greek Government had decided to reduce Greek armed forces to 80,000 men in view of the Economic Cooperation Administration’s decision on a reduction of aid to Greece (781.5MAP/10–350). 3 Not printed; it reported that the Greek Government Coordination Council meeting of September 29, at which Field Marshal Alexander Papagos, Commander in Chief of Greek Armed Forces, was present, and decided that the provision in the Greek budget for the current fiscal year for a reduction of armed forces to 80,000 men “does not appear possible under existing international conditions” (781.5MAP/10–250). 4 Cited in footnote 2, above. 5 Not found in Department of State files. 6 Not printed. 7 Ante , p. 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Athens 681.82/9–2850: Telegram [Document 187] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Athens 1 secret Washington , October 4, 1950—8 p. m. 1088. Re Embtel 1072 [ 1073 ]. 2 US reps in Ankara have on nr occasions raised subj Grk-Turk coop. Gen McBride 3 in conversations here reported improved attitude on part Turk mil leaders concerning usefulness Grk-Turk staff talks. Dept presumes Amb Wadsworth will continue place emphasis on desirability such coop in his conversations with Turk officials. Dept not inclined, however, suggest any extraordinary representations by Amb Wadsworth at this time, particularly since Turks may well resent Grk efforts exercise pressure thru US. Dept hopes mil coop, which unquestionably desirable, will evolve naturally from arrangements to be created permitting Grk and Turk assoc in NATO mil planning work for Medit area. 4 Moreover, US wld not be prepared participate in Grk-Turk staff talks outside NAT planning org. Dept perceives no objection if, when subj raised again, you advise Grk Govt that since US officials have from time to time mentioned to Turk auths desirability closer Grk-Turk mil coop and since Dept hopes mil planning work in assoc with NATO will meet Grk objectives Dept questions usefulness further US representations at this moment. Dept, however has no desire discourage any further Grk initiative in this regard. Efforts within recent years improve econ coop between Greece and Turkey have foundered for lack specific fields of proposed coop. Unless Grks have developed certain fields in which closer coop might usefully be advanced Dept sees little advantage in raising this issue again at this time. Webb 1 Repeated as telegram 172 to Ankara. 2 September 28, p. 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] . 3 Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride, former Chief, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey. 4 For documentation on Greek and Turkish association with North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense planning for the Mediterranean area, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State 781.5/10–550: Telegram [Document 188] The Ambassador in Greece ( Peurifoy ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret Athens , October 5, 1950—4 p. m. 1182. Accompanied by General Jenkins I attended meeting Greek War Council yesterday noon discuss size of Greek Armed Forces. Papagos supported by Defense Minister Karamanlis 2 emphasized importance of security of country even over economic recovery and maintained position of increasing armed forces from 122,000 to 147,000. Papagos expressed reported strength of neighboring countries and felt as responsible officer in Greek Government that chances should not be taken during trying times with the security of the country. General Jenkins shared view of larger army. Prime Minister felt size should remain 122,000. I took position that my government vitally interested in entire problem particularly question obtaining funds for maintenance either existing or larger armed forces. I expressed view that question of armed force strength was basically for decision by Greek Government. As previously pointed out current size of Greek Armed Forces is greater than country itself could support at present time and sufficient strides not taken in Greek economy to produce common use items, et cetera, to offset economic impact of maintaining such large force. Present force or even reduced strength sufficient to maintain civil order and internal security; however problem of establishing or building additional defensive strength sufficient to serve as bulwark to aggression from outside or provide military assistance to other countries which may be engaged, viz Korea, requires broader consideration. Therefore request immediate guidance in view of over-all decision to be made soon by Greek Government which is meeting with Porter in steering committee today. Peurifoy 1 Text printed from corrected copy. 2 Constantine Karamanlis. Editorial Note [Document 189] Editorial Note Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson handed to Greek Ambassador in the United States Athanase G. Politis in New York on October 3 a note verbale of that date extending to Greece a North Atlantic Council (NAC) invitation to participate in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planning on the defense of the Mediterranean area (Department of State Bulletin , October 16, page 633). A similar invitation had been conveyed to Turkey on September 19 ( ibid. , page 632), which was accepted on October 2 ( ibid. , page 633). Greek Ambassador Politis delivered to the Department of State on October 5 a note verbale dated October 4 by which Greece also accepted the NAC invitation ( ibid .). (For documentation on the question of the relationship of Greece and Turkey to NATO, see volume iii , pages 1 ff. and 1108 ff.) Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece Monthly Report for September 1950 ( R –41) 881.00R/10–2350 [Document 190] Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece Monthly Report for September 1950 ( R – 41 ) 1 [Extract] confidential Athens , October 20, 1950. I. Greek Government A. Greek Aid Cut 1. The Chief of Mission, on September 15, informed the Greek Government’s Economic Policy Committee that there would be a reduction in the amount of American aid to Greece for the current year. The Economic Policy Committee consists of the Prime Minister, the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the Ministers of Coordination, Finance, National Economy and National Defense. This reduction was not to be attributed to the decrease in the Congressional appropriation. The decision to reduce the aid was taken only after considerable deliberation which yielded the conviction that present conditions in Greece were not such as to guarantee a prudent and effective use of the previously anticipated amount of American assistance. The amount of the reduction was not disclosed at the September 15 meeting. 2. On September 27, the Mission was notified by OSR that the amount of direct aid to Greece for the current year had been reduced to $91.8 million. This sum combined with the credit equivalent to $115 million established for the account of Greece by the European Payments Union, brought the total of ECA aid to Greece for the current year to $206.8 million instead of $271.3 million as had originally been planned under the Snoy 2 –Marjolin 3 formula 4 adjusted in favor of Greece. The Mission communicated to the Government a formal notification of the exact amount of aid for the current year. This notification was in the form of a letter from the Chief of Mission to the Prime Minister, 5 explaining why the Mission had recommended that the aid be reduced and setting forth the specific steps which the Mission believed the Government should take to make proper and effective use of the reduced amount of aid. 3. The letter was delivered to the Prime Minister on September 27. All Greek newspapers carried rumors of its contents for the next two or three days, but the Government did not release the text until October 2. 6 4. The letter presents a comprehensive view of conditions in Greece for the whole period since the beginning of American aid in 1947. It refers pointedly to a provision in the note of the Greek Government to the American Government on June 15, 1947, 7 pledging certain reforms as a condition of receiving American aid granted under Public Law 75 of the 80th Congress 8 (the AMAG Program). This note provides as follows: “The Greek people realize that ultimate solution of their problem requires great and continuous effort by themselves. They are aware that the extensive aid of the United States will not alone be sufficient to meet the large costs of restoring public order and reconstructing productive facilities over a period of years. The Greek Government will lead its people in their effort to achieve these ends. This responsibility entails the composing of internal differences, the collection of more revenues, the rebuilding of foreign trade, the conservation of foreign exchange, the reconstruction of public works, the improvement of Government administration, assistance and guidance to agriculture and industry, establishment of protective labor measures, encouragement of democratic organizations among economic and social groups, measures to control inflation and assure equitable distribution of supplies and services, and the restraint of excesses and extravagances on the part of any segment of the population. The Greek Government will undertake these and all other necessary measures to marshal Greece’s own resources to the fullest extent in attaining the ends for which American assistance may be extended.” 5. After observing that fulfillment of these conditions is still essential, the Mission’s letter outlines the measures which the Greek Government should adopt to increase its foreign exchange earnings, to reduce its expenditures and generally to improve conditions for the most effective utilization of American aid. Briefly, the letter suggests the following: (1) a more satisfactory execution of American assistance in investment projects, including a more complete use of existing materials and stocks and an improvement in competent administration of the projects; (2) a rigorous adherence to the adopted budget and an avoidance of new expenditures; (3) an increase in revenues, derived from more effective tax assessments and collections, a simplification and revision of the existing tax system and the enactment of measures, such as the registration of the ownership of capital shares, necessary to permit the tax authorities to detect evasions, and the elimination of useless and obsolete taxes; (4) an increase in foreign exchange from exports, shipping and tourism; (5) a vigilant conservation of the existing foreign exchange resources of the country, precluding their use for the import of luxury items; (6) the stabilization of prices and the elimination of monopolistic practices; (7) encouragement of private capital, both foreign and domestic, to induce local capital to invest in the more productive enterprises in the country, as opposed to non-productive projects, such as the erection of luxury apartment houses; the attraction of foreign capital by establishing a “climate” that would induce foreign capital to come to Greece through expectation of proper treatment and a fair return on its investment; (8) enforcement of controls on credit to assure a maximum use of bank credit; (9) enactment of administrative reforms necessary to good management and the effective utilization of American assistance. 6. The Government inquired what particular steps the Mission would recommend to accomplish the above objectives. Accordingly, the Office of the Chief requested each Division in the Mission to submit a list of the legislation it regarded as essential to the maximum utilization of American assistance. From this list, a final compilation was made. The Mission delivered to the Minister of Coordination, on October 2, a memorandum describing the particular proposals which the Mission believed would accomplish these objectives. 9 7. These proposals fell into two general categories: proposals on which action was urgently required; and those which were of a less immediate nature but nevertheless had been agreed upon between the Mission and the Government and on which action was desirable. 8. The first category of proposals relate to fiscal reform and effective administration of the government. The Mission believes that the Government should undertake a revision of income tax legislation and enact measures necessary to improve tax enforcement. Compulsory registration of the ownership of capital shares should be provided. There should be a revision of the basic income tax laws permitting the tax burden to shift to those most able to pay and assuring a simplification of the tax system. There should be a vigorous assessment and collection of income taxes, equitably, and without discrimination, for past years as well as for the current year. Unjustified exemptions from income and other taxes should be eliminated. Miscellaneous indirect taxes which burden productive enterprises and which are uneconomical to collect should also be eliminated. Third party taxes which cannot be justified should be abolished. Public funds and accounts outside the budget should not be tolerated but should be assimilated into the budget. The budget itself, as adopted by the Government, should be adhered to rigorously and new revenues should be provided from acceptable sources to meet any additional necessary expenditures. 9. With respect to the effective administration of the Government, the Mission believes that certain measures are required to improve the Government machinery to facilitate a more effective administration of the recovery program. Certain of the Government Services should be reorganized. The Ministry of National Economy should be reorganized and, at the same time, the Ministry of Supply and Distribution should be abolished, and its principal functions transferred to the Ministry of National Economy. A new and independent Tourism Service should be established. The Port of Piraeus Authority should be completely reorganized. The Royal Decree establishing the structure of the new Ministry of Coordination should be issued. The Civil Service Code should be-ratified, but with certain necessary amendments. The Government should take immediate steps to enact the General Statistics Law. In continuation of the program of Administrative Decentralization, measures should be adopted for the revitalization of local governments, and steps should be taken to delegate to them local taxing authority. The Royal Decree establishing the structure of the new Power Agency should be completed and issued at an early date. There should be prepared and enacted a Law designed to attract foreign capital. The Government should take steps to secure the ratification of the Emergency Laws relating to the Recovery Program, the validity of which has been challenged. 10. The second general category of proposals consisted of a list of certain other recommendations which, while not of the same high priority, are nevertheless directly related to the efficient execution of certain sectors of the recovery program. Certain of these proposals, which were agreed upon between the Mission and the Services of the Greek Government, were listed in a letter from the Mission to the Minister of Coordination on May 17, 1950 (see Mission Report for May, R–26, paragraph 2). 10 This letter stated that the proposals had been agreed upon and were in final form, ready for legislative action. The letter listed proposals for the creation of a Directorate of Labor Statistics in the Ministry of Labor; the creation of an apprenticeship training service in the Ministry of Labor; the establishment of a nutrition service in the Ministry of Agriculture; the establishment of an agricultural extension service in the Ministry of Agriculture; the establishment of a tuberculosis directorate in the Ministry of Hygiene; and a Law providing Army commissions to Greek Army nurses. In addition to these proposals, there are two recommendations which are ready for final action and which may now be added to this list—the establishment of a veterinary college at Salonika and the creation of an automotive directorate in the Ministry of Transport. 11. The Government has specifically agreed to most of the above proposals listed in the memorandum of October 2 and has agreed “in principle” with the balance of the proposals. At the Government Economic Policy Committee meeting held on October 6, the Prime Minister stated that the Government would enact all these measures within thirty days. If this were to be done, it would represent the most significant effort made by any Greek Government in over three years to carry out the commitments contained in the note of June 15, 1947. 12. Dating from the first rumors of the reduction in aid, the Greek press had been sharply critical of the Mission in particular and Americans in general—to the point that the Prime Minister felt it necessary to issue a sharp rebuke. The revised spirit of cooperation between the Mission and the Government, after the October 6 meeting, was hailed on the front page by all papers except “Dimokratikos”, the hardly disguised mouthpiece for the Communist Party in Greece. 13. The most important accomplishment to date in implementing these proposals has been the signing of the Royal Decree setting up the structure of the Ministry of Coordination. Discussions on many others are proceeding. 14. The Mission has suggested that discussions on the content of the Royal Decree establishing the Power Agency should be accelerated and that a Decree should be drafted as soon as possible, not only to permit the Agency to come into being but also to enable EBASCO 11 to fulfill important obligations. Representatives of EBASCO are now participating with the representative of the Mission and with a representative of the Ministry of Coordination in meetings on this draft proposal. 15. The memorandum of the Mission on the attraction of foreign capital, which had been transmitted to the Plastiras Government in August, had never been discussed with that Government, and copies of it have now been communicated to the Minister of Coordination and the Minister of National Economy for their study and comments. The Government has expressed a desire to enact such a law at the earliest possible opportunity. 16. Clearly, the Mission’s success in securing such a large measure of cooperation from the Greek Government is not free of implicit risks. For one thing, the local press is fostering the belief that no action may be taken by the government without active Mission concurrence. ECA will certainly bear the brunt—in the minds of most Greeks—of any and all future failures. Moreover, should the present government fall when Parliament reconvenes, ECA will be accused of interference. In the final analysis, this only means that the Mission must be prepared to be criticized for every unpopular move taken by the Greek Government, and must be doubly vigilant for signs of future shortcomings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Copy transmitted to the Department of State by Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, David M. Maynard, in his despatch 632, October 23, from Athens. 2 Baron Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers, former Chairman of the Council, Organization for European Economic Cooperation. 3 Robert E. Marjolin, Secretary General, Organization for European Economic Cooperation. 4 The Greek share under the Snoy-Marjolin formula was 5.088 percent of total direct country economic aid to Europe. 5 Not found in Department of State files. 6 Athens newspaper ‘H’ Καφήμερινή (Daily), October 3, 1950. 7 See Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 182 and 204 . 8 Approved May 22, 1947; 61 Stat. 103. 9 Not printed; text in Athens Embassy Files, Lot 58F6, 500 ECA. 10 Not printed. 11 EBASCO Services, Inc., a company of engineers, constructors, and management consultants, with headquarters in New York. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.5/10–2650: Telegram [Document 191] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece top secret Washington , October 26, 1950—8 p. m. 1387. Tomap. Deptels 1126, Oct 6; 1026 Sept 29 and 903 Sept 21. 1 FYI FMACC meeting Oct 23 approved proposed increase GAF 2 but with distinct understanding you express approval only when and if Greek Govt makes firm request such increase and gives firm undertaking will meet internal costs. Request you do not indicate in any other way this action taken. Action based on JUSMAG, JCS, Def, and State recommendations and on ECA/W assurance drachmae cost can be met. Endeavoring work out details for exchange financing common use items involved increase. May be necessary use part FY 51 supplemental funds this purpose at expense matériel program. Request you continually keep Dept advised position Greek Govt this matter. Acheson 1 None printed. 2 The proposed strength of Greek Armed Forces approved by the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee is set forth in Joint Chiefs of Staff telegram 91678, September 15, to the Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Aid Group to Greece (Jenkins), p. 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] . The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State 781.00/11–450: Telegram [Document 192] The Ambassador in Greece ( Peurifoy ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , November 4, 1950—3 p. m. 1503. At King’s request I called on him at Tatoi late yesterday afternoon. No one else was present. His Majesty opened conversation by saying that he had been doing a lot of thinking since we last met and wished to know if I had any objections to the following. He said that he had given mandate to Venizelos at his request, that Venizelos cabinet 1 would probably get votes of confidence from score or more dissident Populists and from sufficient other deputies to remain in power for brief period. However he does not consider present government real solution to Greek political ills. Consequently King declared that when Venizelos-Papandreou government falls (and if it surprises by carrying on firmly and successfully he will be quite content) he had decided to appoint service government under George Ventiris to carry out elections in 45 days and to ask Field Marshal Papagos to form and lead a Nationalist ticket. Here King stressed and with absolutely no prompting from me that he would assure Papagos that he could form his own electoral group without hinderance [and] conduct his campaign in any manner he desired. King added that he believed that majority of Greece’s best men would flock to Field Marshal’s banner and mentioned specifically Tsouderos as the type of able citizen who would sever his present political ties to campaign with Papagos. King concluded that he had not yet discussed matter with Papagos and would need several days to do so. He consequently asked me to keep our talk in strictest confidence. His Majesty appeared to have no doubt that Papagos would be willing to enter race for Parliament particularly when King assured him he could write his own ticket. For conditions which Papagos would be likely to impose [see] Embtel 721, September l. 2 I told His Majesty that I believed he had arrived at best solution for Greece and that he could count on Embassy’s full cooperation. I am pleased indeed that King has at last apparently decided to give Papagos a free hand (Embtel 1482, November 3) 3 and believe that results thereof will be immensely beneficial. As I see it we will either have elections from which we are confident a really strong, able and honest Papagos government will emerge, or when word of the King’s plan leaks out as it must eventually we will have the present Parliamentarians cooperating to the hilt among themselves and with our missions here. I should much appreciate Department’s authorization to tell His Majesty that our government fully supports his views and thus strengthen his determination against advice he is likely to receive from his more conservative advisers. Peurifoy 1 Formed November 3, with Sophocles Venizelos as Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and provisional Minister of National Defense, excluding the nine Populist members of his previous Cabinet. 2 This telegram, dated September 2, not printed, reported that Field Marshal Alexander Papagos “would demand agreement” of the political leaders to the following three conditions for his leading a national front in elections: “(1) That after elections Papagos be free to select his ministers on basis of capabilities and without respect former party affiliations. (2) That Papagos have right veto candidacy on his ticket of any party man offered if in Papagos’ opinion said candidate was untrustworthy. Party which had candidate vetoed would have right to nominate replacement on ticket. (3) That Papagos have right to name 30 percent of candidates on his list in each district and thus inject badly needed new blood into Greek political life.” (781.00/9–250) 3 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece 781.00/11–450: Telegram [Document 193] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece secret Washington , November 9, 1950—8 p. m. 1547. Embtel 1482. 1 Dept concurs position taken by you that US will support any govt willing cooperate with US which enjoys approval Grk people and Parliament, but agrees attempt form parliamentary govt under Ventiris might have unfortunate repercussions. Dept also agrees if no effective coalition can be developed from present Parliament most wholesome development wld be new elections (Embtel 1503) 2 on majority system at earliest possible moment, thereby enhancing possibility for stable govt more directly reflecting popular will. Although Papagos unknown quantity in political field we would of course have no objections if he came to power in this way. Dept recognizes Palace’s sincere desire advance welfare of Greece and Papagos’ reported intention participate in elections only with support broad coalition. If elections held and Papagos elected it is to be hoped he would resist undue influence by his present advisers and that King wld be able resist temptation work for elimination influences in such govt unsympathetic to Palace. Dept has noted effort Papagos gain control gendarmerie , thereby concentrating in hands of mil auths considerable additional power which presumably cld be exercised by Palace if required. Dept agrees Monarch can make an important contribution stability of Greece (Embtel 1055) 3 provided propensity of Palace impose its own solution does not in end again raise issue of regime. However, inability Palace treat all non-commie parties on same impartial basis gives cause for some concern. In this connection Dept continues interested in fate of EPEK: strategic and growing segment in Grk polit society. It seems unfortunate King has not seen fit include Plastiras in prelim conferences involved in formation of new govt. Dept questions whether Tsouderos wld, in fact, support Papagos, and whether Tsouderos support desirable at price leaving EPEK in opposition and in hands of Plastiras alone. Current KKE propaganda, including decisions so-called Third Conference of KKE, and recent attack on Sofianopoulos tend indicate KKE efforts form popular front in Greece have so far been thwarted. Any action which may result in throwing growing number EPEK supporters into marriage of expediency with communists and tending split nation between Right and Left must be carefully considered. Dept keenly appreciates importance ur efforts deliver King from influence inexperienced and partisan advisers as well as impress upon King fact US believes inadequacy present Grk polit leadership cannot be corrected by resort authoritarian solution. You are authorized bring such of foregoing considerations to attention of King as you believe desirable. Dept hopes you will continue encourage democratic solution present polit problem without in fact allowing Palace or any other particular group enlist influence US Govt impose its own solution. The foregoing constitutes Dept’s tentative views on exceedingly complex situation which it is recognized cannot be adequately appraised in Wash. Acheson 1 Dated November 3, not printed; it reported that Ambassador Peurifoy told Aristides S. Metaxas, Chief of King Paul’s Political Bureau, that “while George Ventiris was well and favorably known to Embassy as able and honest, he was regarded by many thousand Greeks as being strictly ‘King’s man’ whose conduct of government would largely be determined by wishes of the Palace. Secondly he had never been elected to public office and it would seem unfortunate to many that so soon after elections the King found it necessary to go outside of Parliament to find a satisfactory PriMin.” (781.00/11–350) 2 Supra . 3 Dated September 27, p. 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] . Editorial Note [Document 194] Editorial Note A cablegram of July 14 from United Nations Secretary-General Trygve H. Lie to certain member states of the United Nations, including Greece, requested assistance, including combat forces, for the Unified Command in Korea (United Nations document S/1619). In reply Greece offered on July 14 “to place at the disposal of the Unified Command six [subsequently the offer was increased to eight] transport ‘Dakota’ aircraft of the Royal Hellenic Airforce, with their crews” (United Nations documents S/1612 and S/1854). In addition, a cablegram of September 1 from Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos to Secretary-General Lie informed him that the Greek Government had decided to send a unit of combat forces to Korea, leaving the details of executing this decision to be settled by a joint agreement with the Command of the United Nations forces (United Nations document S/1755). Regarding the implementation of the Greek offer of armed forces for duty in Korea, Note No. 97 of September 27 from the United States Embassy in Greece to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated the Embassy’s “understanding that the Greek Government’s offer of armed forces is not made to the Government of the United States but to the United Nations” and the Embassy “emphasized that the United States Government has no authority or obligation to furnish supplies and services in support of the offer of the Greek Government … except on a reimbursable basis” (Athens Embassy Files, Lot 58F7, 321 Korea, 1950). In reply, Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note Verbale No. 48272 of October 6 to the Embassy in Greece expressed the Greek Government’s agreement that the United States Government had “neither the authority nor the obligation to assist the Greek Government … in carrying out this offer … except on the condition of being reimbursed” ( ibid .). Ambassador Peurifoy’s Note No. 148 of November 14 to Prime Minister Venizelos specified that the United States agreed “to furnish the Greek Government supplies, equipment, transportation and services required for the maintenance of the revised Greek Expeditionary Force [one battalion of approximately 1,000 men] for Korea from date of departure from Greece and return thereto.” According to Ambassador Peurifoy’s note, it was also “understood that the Greek Government shall reimburse the United States Government for all expenses incurred in connection with this operation, and that such reimbursement will be the subject of a negotiated settlement at some future time in a manner to be determined at that time, but in no event later than June 30, 1952, unless otherwise provided.” (Athens Embassy Files, Lot 58F7, 321 Korea, 1950) The Greek reply, Note No. 31975 of May 2, 1951, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the agreement regarding maintenance of Greek armed forces in Korea, was not found in Department of State files (enclosure 2 to despatch 1725, May 3, 1951, from Athens, 795B.5/5–351). Greece contributed initially an infantry battalion of 873 men. Approximately 200 replacements arrived in Pusan on May 7, 1951. In addition, the Greek contribution included seven Royal Hellenic Air Force C–47 transport aircraft (Dakotas), with 69 men (memorandum, May 23, 1951, by David W. Wainhouse, Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, to John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, 795b.5/5–2351). Documentation relating to Korea is presented in volume VII . The Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece (Lapham) to the Prime Minister of Greece (Venizelos) Athens Embassy Files: Lot 58F6: Box 45: 500 ECA [Document 195] The Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Greece ( Lapham ) 1 to the Prime Minister of Greece ( Venizelos ) 2 Athens , November 21, 1950. Excellency : I have for acknowledgment your letter to Mr. Porter of October 30, 1950, 3 which is in response to Mr. Porter’s letter of 27 September 4 to your Excellency on the subject of the more effective utilization of American aid to Greece. Your Excellency’s letter reviews, in order, each of the points raised in the Mission’s letter to the Government and expresses the affirmative attitude of the Government with respect to each proposal made by the Mission. I welcome your Excellency’s assurances that the Government is prepared to take action in the areas recommended by the Mission. I am particularly pleased to note that the previous government headed by your Excellency had already moved to enact into legislation many proposals which the Government felt were necessary for the proper utilization of American assistance. As your Excellency is aware, many of these proposals have been under discussion for months and the Mission has been impressed by the decision of the Government to take final action with respect to them. I understand that these measures were enacted as Emergency Laws; I welcomed the assurance recently given by your Excellency that the Government proposes to secure speedy ratification of these Laws by the Parliament in order to complete the necessary legal action. While the Mission has not had an opportunity to review the final text of the Laws proposed and enacted by the Government and published in the Government Gazette , I am sure that the successful implementation of the measures agreed upon by the Government in your Excellency’s letter will go a long ways toward assuring the effective and maximum utilization of American assistance; I believe it will also counterbalance the reduction in American aid which the Mission felt compelled to recommend, as indicated by Mr. Porter’s letter of September 27. Accept [etc.] Roger D. Lapham 1 Roger D. Lapham assumed responsibility as Chief of the ECA Mission to Greece, on November 18, the date of departure from Athens of Paul R. Porter who was formerly in charge. 2 A copy of this letter was also transmitted to George Papandreou, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister Without Portfolio, and provisional Minister of Coordination. 3 Not found in Department of State files. 4 Not found in Department of State files, but see report for September, p. 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] . Editorial Note [Document 196] Editorial Note The United States Alternate Representative, Benjamin V. Cohen, in Committee I of the United Nations General Assembly on November 10, asked for continuance of the mandate of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans for another year, unless the Special Committee could finish its task earlier. Even after dissolution of the Special Committee, Mr. Cohen said, its observation function should be continued in a limited way. He stated that the Interim Committee of the United Nations General Assembly should be able to arrange for the observation function to the extent deemed necessary with observers still in the area reporting to the United Nations Peace Observation Commission established by General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) of November 3 on “Uniting for peace.” (See United Nations document A/C.1/SR.392, paragraphs 18–22; the Department of State Bulletin , February 26, 1951, pages 346–347; and volume II, pages 303 ff.) The proposal for extending the mandate of the Special Committee on the Balkans was one of three draft resolutions recommended by Committee I on the question of “Threats to the Independence and Territorial Integrity of Greece” (United Nations document A/1536). The General Assembly adopted the three recommended resolutions on December 1: Resolution 382 A (V) on the repatriation of Greek military personnel detained in countries north of Greece excepting Yugoslavia; Resolution 382 B (V) on the continuance of the Special Committee on the Balkans until the sixth session of the General Assembly in 1951; and Resolution 382 C (V) on the return to their parents of Greek children from the countries harboring them (United Nations document A/1584; the Department of State Bulletin , February 26, 1951, page 348; and United Nations document A/1775, pages 14–15). The General Assembly rejected two Soviet draft resolutions on granting general amnesty by the Greek Government and discontinuing the Special Committee (United Nations documents A/C.1/623 and A/1560), and on repeal by the Greek Government of death sentences on 19 Greek nationals (United Nations document A/1569). The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State 611.81/12–1250: Telegram [Document 197] The Ambassador in Greece ( Peurifoy ) to the Secretary of State top secret Athens , December 12, 1950—1 p. m. 1879. According to Bucharest Greek language broadcast December 8, latest issue Cominform Journal 1 contains” article by Zachariades in which following statement appears: “There now exists a multitude of indications proving that the Americans have chosen the Balkan area for their adventurous plans: of the immediate future.” Article goes onto allege US setting up “two triangles”, first, Athens-Belgrade-Ankara aimed against Bulgaria and, second, Athens-Belgrade-Rome aimed against Albania, and that for this purpose Greek army being increased to 500,000. Article refers to visit of American Ambassador to “Greek-Albanian frontier” 2 and compares visit to that of Dulles 3 to 38th parallel “on the eve of the aggression against the People’s Republic of Korea”. 4 While this theme is not new, its reiteration with increasingly elaborate embroidery appears to Embassy of sufficient significance to warrant careful attention. Department well aware Communist practice alleging aggression intent by West at precise points where they themselves contemplate aggressive action. While theme often played over long period before action materializes, contemporary military buildup in Bulgaria and Rumania lends potential substance to propaganda warnings. Moreover, risks Communists are running to prevent loss North and perhaps South Korea indicate lengths they are prepared to go to retain territories they once held or in which they had foothold. Extent to which Kremlin considers Greece such territory uncertain, but there can be no doubt failure guerrilla campaign rankles deeply and is not accepted as final. This consideration, coupled with great strategic advantages flowing from conquest of Greece and political effect throughout Near East analogous to effect in Far East of Communist victory in Korea, could induce Kremlin to launch satellite attack here at propitious and not too distant time. Department is of course fully aware of all these possibilities and Embassy has no new evidence that they might materialize soon, other than demonstration of calculated recklessness being afforded by Communists in Korea. Nevertheless, we believe accumulation of indications suggesting possible aggression against Greece sufficiently substantial to justify redoubled effort to prepare for this contingency. Concretely, Department may wish to do all within its power (1) to expedite delivery additional military equipment, particularly anti-tank, to GAF, and (2) to concert further with British character and extent of military aid, including forces, which might be promptly furnished Greece in case of attack. 5 Sent Department 1879, repeated information Belgrade 45, Ankara 34, Rome 27, London 31. Peurifoy 1 Entitled, For a Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy! 2 Ambassador In Greece John E. Peurifoy left Athens by airplane for Ioannina on October 21 to meet with the people of that city and to visit the various military departments of Epirus. He returned to Athens on October 22. (‘H Καφήμερινή (Daily), October 22, 1950) 3 John Foster Dulles, consultant to the Secretary of State and personal representative of the President for the Japanese peace treaty, with rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. 4 For documentation relating to Korea, see volume vii . 5 Telegram 2020, December 28, to Athens, eyes only for Ambassador John E. Peurifoy, not printed, informed him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had authorized the Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece to enter into military discussions with Greek authorities at their request on the subject of war planning of guerrilla activities. This telegram authorized Ambassador Peurifoy to designate a representative to establish liaison with these discussions. (781.00/12–2850) The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State 681.82/12–1550: Telegram [Document 198] The Ambassador in Greece ( Peurifoy ) to the Secretary of State top secret Athens , December 15, 1950—1 p. m. 1932. Tomap. Re Embtels 1836 and 1844 December 8. 1 Venizelos reported to Embassy officer results of conversations Kitrilakis 2 with Turkish C-in-C 3 and other military leaders concerning closer military cooperation between two countries, as follows: emphasized warm reception by Turks, their willingness to discuss military state of preparedness, planning, exchange of intelligence, and inter-relationship of military with political leadership in Turkey. Turks seemingly have less influence in direction and control of country’s affairs than exists in Greece. Kitrilakis favorably impressed with Turkey’s military leadership and manner in which known Communists are kept out of public office and military ranks. On military cooperation Turks unwilling to enter into bilateral agreement, insist on being included in regional security arrangement guaranteeing western allies military support in event of aggression against them. Turks expressed appreciation and gratitude for US military assistance. However, felt need for further assurances of increased military aid. Turks indicated interest in resuming military discussions in Greece in event undertaking on government to government level produces more formal security commitment with western allies. Embassy fully aware question of Turkey’s membership in NATO decided for present by NAC in extending Greece-Turkey invitations to be associated with appropriate phases of NATO planning for Mediterranean. 4 We hope, however, character of this association, or alternative security arrangements for Greece and Turkey, can be reviewed at frequent intervals. Nature of Turkish response to current Greek proposal emphasizes well-recognized fact that essential Greek-Turkish coordination in preparation for either satellite or Soviet aggression can be obtained only within framework of broader security arrangement. Would appreciate any instructions from Department including recommendations from Ankara, concerning possibilities of further negotiations along lines already taken or appropriate alternatives. Sent Department 1932, repeated info Ankara 36. Peurifoy 1 Neither printed. 2 Lt. Gen. Stylianos Kitrilakis, Deputy Chief of the Greek National Defense General Staff. 3 Gen. Nuri Yamut, Chief of the Turkish General Staff. 4 For documentation on the association of Greece and Turkey with North Atlantic Treaty Organization planning for the Mediterranean area, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. The Embassy in Greece to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs Athens Embassy Files: Lot 5SF7: 420 Greek Army [Document 199] The Embassy in Greece to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs confidential No. 205 Aide-Mémoire The Embassy acknowledges the unsigned Aide-Mémoire dated December 18, 1950, 1 requesting increased U.S. military aid to defray partially the drachmae costs for the maintenance of the Greek military establishment. The Embassy is aware of the many hardships suffered by the Greek people in her effort to stem communistic aggression, and of the great spirit shown in her contributions to the cause of the UN in Korea. Moreover, the United States government is cognizant of the requirement to curtail the reconstruction program, and the development in international affairs necessitating an augmentation of the military establishment in order to maintain security. Nevertheless, it must be appreciated that conditions similar to these exist in many parts of the world, and that the U.S. Government has assumed tremendous responsibilities, financially and otherwise, to assist the peoples of these nations. In this connection, it is unnecessary to belabor the question of exorbitant expenditures made by the U.S. Government during this period of world need to bring relief and assistance to so many countries less fortunate. The question of singling out any one country for special consideration or treatment, as proposed, does not afford full recognition of the worldwide problem, although it is believed Greece is now receiving special treatment among the nations receiving financial assistance from the U.S., and the question of further increasing aid to Greece must be considered as a part of an overall financial plan. Subsidiary to the larger plan must be considerations of self-help, and it is unrealistic to take any one segment of the problem, such as military assistance, without analyzing the total problem. In other words, military aid, ECA aid, and the Greek government’s own tax returns must be combined to present an analysis of the problem having to do with the cost of maintaining civilian and military establishments. With this basic principle in mind, the financial plan which has been prepared, based on the current level of ECA and military aid, provides appropriate allowance for the military strengths 2 mentioned in your Aide-Mémoire . It is not seen that the situation has changed to a degree which would justify an upward revision of assistance from the U.S. It is believed that Greece should pursue its best efforts to obtain revenue through the medium of tax assessments and collections to fully assume its responsibility in this respect. Reference is made to the serious concern of the American tax-payer and the pressure under which he is presently subjected by virtue of the extraordinarily high taxes imposed on him to meet the U.S. government’s commitments throughout the world. Please be assured, however, that the interests of the Greek people are constantly before the attention of the U.S. government in connection with the determination of further assistance which may be forthcoming. Athens , December 22, 1950. 1 Not printed. 2 i.e., Greek Army, 147,000; Navy, 10,000; and Air Force, 7,400 (Athens Embassy Files: Lot 58F7: Box 3345: 500 Greece). The Secretary of State to the United States Special Representative on the united Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson) 357.AE/12–2350: Telegram [Document 200] The Secretary of State to the United States Special Representative on the united Nations Special Committee on the Balkans ( Patterson ) 1 secret Washington , December 23, 1950—1 p. m. 1994. Balcom 400. Dept believes latest rash Cominform propaganda charging inter alia US and UK preparing Greece to attack Albania and Bulgaria spearheaded by Zachariades article Cominform Journal, Dec 8, seems have three gen objectives. 1. Briefing KKE on latest Cominform version contemporary Grk history. In view internal strife, denigration Siantos, 2 newly announced militant party orientation, Zachariades rationalization essential as part efforts reorganize and strengthen KKE and possibly retain own position. 2. Propaganda device to counter defeat sustained in Grk-Yugo rapprochement and imputing hostile and aggressive character to event. 3. Most menacing is indirect threat to Greece. This inherent particular Zachariades statements cited Athens Embtel 1879, Dec. 12. 3 Corollary aspects are Free Grk radio, Cominform radio, and press on theme Greece preparing for war and encouraging incidents on Albanian-Bulg frontiers: Resumption Grk-Yugo relations called “nothing but US imperialist plan for aggression” (Moscow Radio, Dec 7) and “step toward legal sanction of aggression” (Tirana Radio, Dec 5). Czech article Dec 9 in official Ital commie organ Unita citing Grk preparations “aggression” against Bulg and Albania. Although Zachariades art cld presage Cominform attack on Greece, Dept has little corroborative evidence and inclined agree that, while this possibility exists and Sov buildup of Bulg mil potential continues, situation in gen is unchanged. Similar likelihood art cld provide excuse some other aggressive move short of war such as entry Russian troops Bulg “to guarantee her independence”. Obvious propaganda meant to sustain Albanian and Bulg popular support aggressive move against Greece or Yugo under pretext defense. Most probable short term object create further unsettled conditions and heighten tension in Balkans with resulting disintegrating effect on stability in Greece and Yugo. Dept concerned possible effect on opinion some areas of constant reiteration these and similar charges in absence formal denial from some respected and informed source. Believe report similar UNSCOB’s July 18, 1950 statement 4 denying previous Zachariades charges, 5 somewhat reoriented, wld be effective this time. Dept believes statement shld emphasize deliberate efforts sabotage peace by making accusations known to be untrue in order create atmosphere conducive to hostilities. Furthermore fact of sanction of and participation in this propaganda by Cominform states in itself constitutes unjustified threat to Greece and cannot but endanger peace in Balkans. If you and Emb concur Dept strongly suggests that UNSCOB immed report these threats to SyG. Acheson 1 Repeated to Belgrade as 589, Moscow as 435, and Athens. 2 George Siantos, Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece and member of its Politburo, died on May 20, 1947. 3 Not printed. 4 See footnote 4, p. 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] . 5 See footnote 3, p. 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] . The Ambassador in Greece (Peurifoy) to the Secretary of State 781.00/12–2350: Telegram [Document 201] The Ambassador in Greece ( Peurifoy ) to the Secretary of State confidential Athens , December 23, 1950—6 p. m. 2027. Lapham and I saw PriMin 1 and Deputy PriMin 2 this morning at their request. Obvious purpose was to secure our commendation and congratulations for Parliament’s ratification of emergency reconstruction laws we have long been urging. Greek Government leaders pointed out all measures in which we have been interested have either already been ratified by Parliament or will be during the two sessions Parliament holding today before adjourning for Christmas recess. I remarked that Americans were indeed glad to see that Parliament’s action on these measures had finally been taken but that it seemed to me this could just as well have been done six weeks ago. I further stressed that passage such measures insufficient since all required promulgation directives and regulations and above all actual implementation. I added that in addition legislative responsibility government had another and most serious task at present: to develop means to face crucial economic situation and threatened inflation. So far as I was aware, government had no such plans and after holidays Greece likely be confronted with danger of widespread strikes and other manifestations of economic discontent and disorder. Deputy PriMin stated he was in complete accord with view I had expressed. He promised that within a week he personally would bring forth concrete proposals for meeting economic dangers. Peurifoy 1 Sophocles Venizelos. 2 George Papandreou. The United States Representative on the united Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (Patterson) to the Secretary of State 357.AE/122–3150: Telegram [Document 202] The United States Representative on the united Nations Special Committee on the Balkans ( Patterson ) to the Secretary of State secret Athens , December 31, 1950—1 p. m. 2094. Combal 708. From Patterson. Balcom 400 1 received noon December 30. Delay attributed to services. On consulting Embassy officer designated by Ambassador am informed Ambassador approves UNSCOB action. Accordingly will introduce resolution based on telegram’s final paragraph at next meeting special committee January 3 following interim consultation with colleagues. However see Combal’s 703, 705 and 706. 2 Moreover a brief consultation with British colleague revealed that since British Foreign Office (as distinguished from British delegate UNSCOB) was never enthusiastic about UNSCOB’s telegram to Secretary General July 18 last, 3 he in absence of evidence of change in attitude his government which preferred ignoring Zachariades and Cominform blasts would be obliged to abstain should resolution in the sense desired by the Department be presented by USDel to special committee. I personally feel that since general reaction to UNSCOB’s July 18 above-mentioned telegram was favorable no harm and possibly much good could result from communication to the Secretary General 4 such as advised by the Department even though as indicated in telegrams cited above I have been unable to obtain any expression of belief in Athens that current free Greece and Cominform propaganda foreshadows imminent renewal of hostilities Balkan area. [Patterson.] Peurifoy 1 Same as telegram 1994, p. 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] . 2 None printed. 3 Reference is to the U.N Special Committee on the Balkans’ resolution of July 18, cited in footnote 4. p. 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] . 4 On January 3, 1951, Jefferson Patterson presented to the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans in Athens a draft telegram to U.N. Secretary-General Trygve H. Lie on the menace of Cominform propaganda to peace in the Balkans. The Special Committee modified the U.S. draft text considerably before transmitting it as a letter dated January 3, 1951, to the Secretary General of the United Nations from the Chairman of the Special Committee, Paschoal Carlos Magno. (Despatch Usdel 163, January 4, 1951, from Jefferson Patterson in Athens, 357.AE/1–451) Negotiation of United States military, financial, and technical assistance for Iran; the question of extending the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession; the desirability of close cooperation by the United States and the United Kingdom in matters of common interest in the Near East Negotiation of United States military, financial, and technical assistance for Iran; the question of extending the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession; the desirability of close cooperation by the United States and the United Kingdom in matters of common interest in the Near East 1 1 For previous documentation on relations with Iran, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 471 ff. [203] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, January 8, 1950—10 p. m. 788.00/1–850: Telegram [204] Editorial Note [205] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, January 24, 1950—3 p. m. 788.11/1–2450: Telegram [206] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) [Washington,] January 26, 1950. 788.5 MAP/1–2650 [207] The Department of State to the Iranian Embassy Washington, January 26, 1950. 788.5 MAP/1–2650 [208] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, January 30, 1950—3 p. m. 788.5 MAP/1–3050: Telegram [209] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, January 30, 1950. 788.00/1–3050: Despatch [210] Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [Washington, undated.] [211] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 14, 1950—11 a. m. 788.5 MAP/2–1450: Telegram [212] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 15, 1950. 611.88/2–1550 [213] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 16, 1950—noon. 788.5 MAP/2–1650: Telegram [214] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) [Washington,] February 16, 1950. NEA Politico–Military Adviser Files: Lot 484: Greek–Turkish Staff Talks [215] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) to the Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State (Bruce) Washington, February 16, 1950. S/ISA Files, Lot 52–26, MDAP–Iran [216] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 25, 1950—11 a. m. 888.131/2–2550: Telegram [217] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 27, 1950—9 a. m. 888.131/2–2750: Telegram [218] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, February 27, 1950—11 a. m. 788.00/2–2750: Telegram [219] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (McWilliams) [Washington,] March 1, 1950. [220] The Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) Washington, March 6, 1950. Tehran Embassy Files: Lot 59 F 17: 400 MDAP [221] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, March 13, 1950—11 p. m. 788.5 MAP/3F–1350: Telegram [222] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State (Ohly), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) Washington, March 18, 1950. 788.5 MAP/3–1850 [223] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, March 23, 1950—4 p. m. 788.00/3–2350: Telegram [224] The Deputy Director (Rountree) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) Tehran, March 23, 1950. 788.00/3–2350 [225] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) [Washington,] March 24, 1950. 788.5 MAP/3–2450 [226] The Representatives of the Government of the United States to the Representatives of the Government of Iran Washington, March 24, 1950. 788.5 MAP/3–2050 [227] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, March 25, 1950—2 p. m. 788.13/3–2550: Telegram [228] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, March 25, 1950—2 p. m. 788.00/3–2550: Telegram [229] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, March 25, 1950. 607.1141/3–2550: Airgram [230] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) Washington, March 29, 1950. Tehran Embassy Files, Lot 59 F 17, 400 MDAP 1950 [231] Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins), to the Secretary of the Army (Gray) [Washington,] 10 April 1950. 780.5/4–1750 [232] Paper Prepared in the Department of State [Washington, undated.] [233] Memorandum for the File, Prepared in the Department of State [Washington, undated.] Under Secretary’s Meetings: Lot 53 D 250 [234] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] April 25 [26], 1950. 788.00/4–1950 [235] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) [Washington,] April 26 [24?], 1950. 888.00 TA/4–2650 [236] Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [Washington,] April 27, 1950. [237] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) [Washington,] April 27, 1950. 611.88/4–2750 [238] The Iranian Ambassador (Ala) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) Washington, April 28, 1950. 888.00/4–2850 [239] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] May 1, 1950. 601.8811/5–150 [240] Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) [Washington,] May 3, 1950. CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 149, May FM Meeting C, D Series [241] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph J. Wolf of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State [Washington,] May 9, 1950. 788.5 MAP/5–950 [242] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices Washington, May 17, 1950—2 a. m. 700.00(S)/5–1750: Circular information telegram [243] The United States Delegation at the London Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Acting Secretary of State London, May 16, 1950—6 p. m. 396.1–LO/5–1650: Telegram [244] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 22, 1950—3 a. m. 888.2553–AIOC/5–2250: Telegram [245] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, May 22, 1950—6 p. m. 788.5–MAP/5–2250: Telegram [246] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, May 22, 1950—7 p. m. 396.1–L0/5–1550: Telegram [247] Editorial Note [248] The Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece (Van Fleet) to the Secretary of State [Athens,] May 23, 1950. 788.5/5–2350: Telegram [249] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 26, 1950—3 p. m. 788.13/5–2650: Telegram [250] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 26, 1950—1 p. m. 788.00/5–2650: Telegram [251] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 26, 1950—4 p. m. 788.00/5–2650: Telegram [252] The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Ala) Washington, May 26, 1950. 888.00/4–2850 [253] The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State Tehran, May 31, 1950—3 p. m. 788.00/5–3150: Telegram [254] The Chargé in Iran (Richards) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 21, 1950—2 p. m. 788.00/6–2150: Telegram [255] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, June 23, 1950—7 p. m. 788.00/6–2350: Telegram [256] The Chargé in Iran (Richards) to the Secretary of State Tehran, June 29, 1950—1 p. m. 795.00/6–2050: Telegram [257] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 3, 1950—3 p. m. 795.00/7–350: Telegram [258] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State Washington, July 7, 1950. 788.00/7–750 [259] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 13, 1950—3 p. m. 888.2553–AIOC/7–1350: Telegram [260] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, July 14, 1950—1 p. m. 888.2553/7–1450: Telegram [261] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, July 18, 1950—7 p. m. 888.2553/7–1850: Telegram [262] Editorial Note [263] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State Washington, July 21, 1950. 661.88/7–2150 [264] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State Tehran, July 25, 1950—2 p. m. 661.88/7–2550: Telegram [265] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State Tehran, August 3, 1950—3 p. m. 788.5–MAP/8–350: Telegram [266] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, August 7, 1950—7 p. m. 888.2553–AIOC/7–2450: Telegram [267] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, August 10, 1950—8 p. m. 888.2553–AIOC/8–1050: Telegram [268] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, August 12, 1950—2 p. m. 888.2553–AIOC/8–1250: Telegram [269] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Tehran, August 15, 1950—3 p. m. 888.2553–AIOC/8–1550: Telegram [270] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, August 17, 1950—7 p. m. 611.88/8–1450: Telegram [271] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Embassy in Iran London, August 18, 1950—4 p. m. 888.2553–AIOC/8–1850: Telegram [272] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State Tehran, August 23, 1950—2 p. m. 740.5/8–2350: Telegram [273] Editorial Note [274] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow, September 14, 1950—7 p. m. 888.00/9–1450: Telegram [275] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Acting Secretary of State Tehran, September 17, 1950—8 a. m. 888.10/9–1750: Telegram [276] Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Palmer) London, September 18, 1950. 611.41/9–1850 [277] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Thursday Morning, September 21 London, September 21, 1950 780.00/9–1850 [278] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Saturday Morning, September 23 London, September 23, 1950 780.00/9–1850 [279] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Europeam Affairs (Perkins) Washington, October 2, 1950. 888.10/9–2950 [280] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, October 6, 1950—8 p. m. 888.10/10–650: Telegram [281] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 12, 1950—noon. 888.10/10–1250: Telegram [282] The Ambassador in Iran (Greedy) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 21, 1951—4 p. m. 888.00/10–2150: Telegram [283] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, October 24, 1950—8 p. m. 888.10/10–2450: Telegram [284] Editorial Note [285] The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State Tehran, October 31, 1950—2 p. m. 888.10/10–3150: Telegram [286] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, November 18, 1950—3 p. m. 888.10/10–3150: Telegram [287] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran Washington, November 20, 1950—6 p. m. 511.884/11–2050: Telegram [288] The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) Washington, November 20, 1950. 888.00/10–2550 [289] The Chargé in Iran (Richards) to the Secretary of State Tehran, November 30, 1950—4 p. m. 611.88/11–3050: Telegram [290] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) Washington, December 8, 1950. 788.5–MAP/12–550 [291] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) Washington, December 11, 1950. 888.00R/12–650 [292] The Chargé in Iran (Richards) to the Secretary of State Tehran, December 14, 1950—11 a. m. 788.00/12–1450: Telegram [293] The Charge in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, December 14, 1950—4 p. m. 888.2553/12–1450: Telegram [294] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) to the Assistant Secretary of State of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) Washington, December 20, 1950. 611.41/12–2050 The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.00/1–850: Telegram [Document 203] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , January 8, 1950—10 p. m. 37. Please pass to Armed Forces. Saw Shah 2 yesterday. Though in appearance very tired he is full of energy. He plans to have new Majlis convene soonest. This was later confirmed to me by Prime Minister who believes this should be accomplished within a week. Shah delighted with trip to US. 3 He was most impressed by President Truman and clearly was handled with greatest tact and understanding both by Department and Pentagon. Believe impact of US on Shah has had most beneficial influence. He seems in a very short time to have matured greatly. He seems genuinely determined now to proceed vigorously on anti-corruption campaign, and reorganization of govt on more effective lines with emphasis on correcting present over-centralization. He gave no inkling of whom he has in mind as next Prime Minister but seemed to feel that Saed 4 would step out. He indicated that the aged Hakimi 5 would remain on for the present as Minister Court. Understand Chief of Staff General Razmara 6 will press Shah for complete absorption gendarmerie into army. Shah indicated that he would not accede but would consider reorganization of gendarmerie as new and separate entity. Only sour note was displeasure manifested over list of requirements for Iran army 7 prepared by Gen. Evans, 8 Chief Army. Presumably because it falls short of his expectation. On economic matters he indicated seven year plan would proceed with his full support and that Prince Abdorreza 9 (Harvard honor graduate) would be his “right arm”. Shah seemed unperturbed by thorny problem AIOC renegotiation. Shah indicated continued interest in reinforcement Saad Abad pact and in enquiring re recent elections in Egypt described King Farouk as a “definitely criminal type.” Apparently Shah is not marrying Miss Ala. Wiley 2 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran. 3 For documentation on the Shah’s visit to the United States, November 16–December 30, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 589 ff. 4 Mohammad Saed, Prime Minister of Iran. 5 Ibrahim Hakimi, Iranian Minister of Court. 6 Lt. Gen. Ali Razmara, Chief of the Iranian General Staff. 7 For previous documentation of the question of U.S. military aid for Iran, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 471 ff. 8 Maj. Gen. Vernon Evans, Chief of the United States Military Mission with the Iranian Army. 9 Prince Abdor Beza Palilavi, half-brother of the Shah of Iran. Editorial Note [Document 204] Editorial Note In conformity with the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs request of September 20, 1949, the agreement of October 6, 1947, for the employment of the American Advisory Mission to the Imperial Ministry of War was extended for one year to March 20, 1951, by notes exchanged at Tehran November 28, 1949, and January 10, 1950 (TIAS No. 2068, printed in United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), volume 1, page 415). The purpose of the Mission, consisting of officers and enlisted men of the United States Army and Air Force, was to cooperate with the Ministry of War of Iran and with the personnel of the Iranian Army with a view to enhancing the efficiency of the Iranian Army. A similar agreement, effected by notes exchanged at Tehran September 17 and November 18, 1950, extended the agreement covering the employment of the United States Military Mission with the Iranian Army for one more year to March 20, 1952. The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.11/1–2450: Telegram [Document 205] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , January 24, 1950—3 p. m. 134. Pass Armed Forces. In conversation with Shah last evening he expressed deepest concern over developments in China. It is clear that he is most apprehensive of British and other recognition Communist regime China. States Afghanistan is flirting with Russia and that attitude of Nehru vis-à-vis Russia is more than obscure. He expressed himself as most apprehensive of Communist encirclement of Iran, with possible disastrous consequences for this country. He went on to say that a very important part of Iranian budget was dedicated to military expenditures. But without US assistance these expenditures were fruitless; no effective military force to resist aggression could be built up. He repeated that his military views had received complete agreement on his visit to Pentagon. 1 It was now time, he thought, that US should decide whether or not Iran constituted integral part in defense program. If so, planning should be worked out on a constructive basis and the plan should be executed. He attaches greatest importance to proposed visit General Collins 2 to Tehran. General Collins was absent when Shah was in Washington. Suggest General be given background before he comes here, which should be after March 15, re Embtel Tomap 133, January 24, 2 p. m. 3 Wiley 1 Regarding the Shah’s assertion that his military views had received complete agreement on his visit to the Pentagon in 1949, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Iran as follows: “In connection Iran milit plans we note Shah’s insistence on ‘approval’ given his strategic plan at time of his call on JCS at Pentagon (urtel 134 Jan 24 second para). FYI, ‘approval’ consisted of perfunctory statements by Gen Bradley and others that Shah knew conditions in Iran better than we cld but that on basis our limited knowledge it appeared Shah’s plan was sound and probably best that cld be devised under circumstances. See Memo of Conversation on Nov 18, 1949. There was no question of formal JCS approval or any commitment, even implied, for US support of plan.” (Telegram 109, January 30, to Tehran; 888.10/1–3050) For a report on the meeting of the Shah with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon on November 18, 1949, see the editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 581 . 2 Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. 3 Not printed. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) 788.5 MAP/1–2650 [Document 206] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs ( Ferguson ) secret [ Washington ,] January 26, 1950. Subject: Economic Assistance to Iran Participants: The Iranian Ambassador, Mr. Ala Mr. G. A. Aram, Counselor, Iranian Embassy Mr. Mohammad Nemazee, Commercial Attaché, Iranian Embassy NEA—Assistant Secretary George C. McGhee GTI—John D. Jernegan, Director C. Vaughan Ferguson Jeffrey C. Kitchen Problem: To make the position of the United States regarding repeated Iranian requests for economic as well as military assistance understood to the Iranians who have to date shown a chronic unwillingness even to listen to our explanations. Action Required: Telegram to Tehran 1 summarizing the conversation and the text of the Aide-Mémoire 2 handed Ambassador Ala at its conclusion. (The Department’s Aide-Mémoire was dated January 26, 1950.) Action Assigned to: GTI Discussion: The Iranian Ambassador called at Mr. McGhee’s request to receive a reply to the former’s Aide-Mémoire of November 29 3 concerning Iran’s desire for greater military and economic assistance from the United States. Mr. McGhee told the Ambassador he had asked him to call since it seemed the Iranian Government by its repeated requests for assistance had completely failed to understand the position of the United States. Mr. McGhee said he knew he could talk to the Ambassador in complete frankness and felt relations between the two countries must be based on a policy of complete understanding of each others’ points of view. He said the receipt of the Ambassador’s Aide-Mémoire so soon after American policy had been explained by the President and the Secretary to the Shah had caused a feeling of irritation in high levels of the United States Government. Mr. McGhee explained to the Ambassador the basic criteria governing the various United States foreign assistance programs. He said that aid to a given country must be granted in accordance with world wide U.S. policies and not merely on the particular needs of that country without any relation to the rest of the world. Nor, he said, was aid rendered to one country simply because others had received it. Mr. McGhee told the Ambassador that the frequency with which aid was requested had no bearing on the amount it received and, indeed could serve as an irritant in relations between the requesting country and the United States, and make more difficult favorable consideration of assistance. Mr. McGhee added that the NEA area which was his responsibility in the Department contained some 680,000,000 people in eighteen countries. Of these countries, economic aid is now being extended only to Greece and Turkey and military aid only to Greece, Turkey, and Iran. He said that the Iranian requests for assistance outnumbered those of all of the rest of the countries in the NEA area put together. Mr. McGhee explained to the Ambassador that such repeated requests for aid, many of which were ambiguous, overlapping and not well justified, could only make a very unfavorable impression on United States officials and were therefore not in Iran’s best interests. Mr. McGhee told Mr. Ala that it was the understanding of the United States Government that at the time the International Bank was organized it was intended to be of assistance in cases such as Iran’s, and that the Export-Import Bank, concerning which the Iranian Government had inquired on many occasions, should be called in only where assistance by the International Bank was not practicable. He said that from all information available to this Government, Iran’s foreign exchange position was exceptional and that its position could not be compared with those countries receiving direct American economic help. He mentioned to the Ambassador that the United States could not accept the claim of the Iranian Government that it had not fulfilled its obligations under the Tehran Declaration 4 which in the opinion of this Government had no bearing on the question of post-war economic assistance. It would not be profitable for Iran to continue to press this point. Mr. Ala replied that he was surprised to be given such a categoric statement and considerably concerned since he had only recently received new instructions from Tehran to explore again the possibilities of direct American financial assistance. He said that he understood the United States was or was about to render economic aid to several countries outside of Western Europe, particularly India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Israel. Mr. McGhee replied that no assistance was contemplated for India or Pakistan and Israel had received help in the form of an Export-Import Bank loan. Mr. Ala explained that the Aide-Mémoire had been submitted as part of the Shah’s discussions since it was designed as a working paper for the Joint Declaration 5 by the Shah and the President which was then under discussion. Mr. Ala went on to say that his information concerning the economic situation in Iran was at variance with Mr. McGhee’s. He was informed that a large increase in the military budget appeared to be regarded as essential, that the diversion of the oil royalties to the Seven Year Plan was leaving a gap in the revenues of other branches of the Government, and that the International Bank was being so difficult that it might not be possible to utilize that source of funds. The latter fear arose, he said, from the complex formalities required of Iran and some apparently stringent conditions the Bank had set. Mr. McGhee replied that regardless of Iran’s internal budgetary difficulties, its external financial position was good in comparison with other countries and under no circumstances could either military or economic aid be rendered to assist the local currency problems of the country concerned. Mr. Jernegan pointed out that it was not our policy anywhere to assist foreign countries to increase the size of their armed forces. The most we were doing was to help some countries maintain their existing forces. With reference to the reported difficulties with the International Bank, he observed that any other source of financial assistance, including the United States Government, would in all probability impose equally difficult conditions. Mr. McGhee expressed the opinion in this connection that it could be assumed the Bank would not take an unreasonable position. Mr. Ala then said he understood that Mr. Thornburg, 6 the representative in Iran of Overseas Consultants, Inc., was due in Washington in the near future and that he had hoped to explore with Mr. Thornburg and the Department the steps the United States could take in helping solve Iran’s acute economic problems. He said that he was thinking of suggesting to his Government the employment of an American financial expert, either Governmental or private such as Dr. Nourse. 7 Mr. Jernegan expressed the opinion in the latter connection that such a person hardly seemed necessary in view of the presence in Iran of the Overseas Consultants as well as such competent Iranians as Mr. Ebtehaj, 8 the Governor of the National Bank. Mr. Jernegan told the Ambassador that the Department did not intend closing the door in Iran’s face forever and that should there be a marked change in the present situation, this Government would; always be glad to reexamine Iran’s needs. Mr. McGhee agreed and said that the door would always remain open but that the Iranian Government must understand that the policy of the United States was as he had outlined it and would probably so remain for some time to come. Mr. Ala inquired whether Iran could expect to continue receiving military assistance to which Mr. McGhee replied that, as the Iranians had been previously informed, their needs would be taken into consideration in any future military assistance program that might be enacted by Congress. Mr. Ala said that he had been under the impression that the executive arm of the United States Government had always been sympathetic to Iran’s needs and that the principal task confronting the Iranian Government in obtaining greater assistance was to make Congress more “Iran-minded”. He mentioneds a conversation with Mr. Dooher 9 of our Tehran Embassy last September in which it was indicated Iran was faced with a problem of tactics rather than policy and Mr. Dooher had said Iran’s chances were not enhanced by the statements of Mr. Ebtehaj at that time that Iran did not need a loan. Mr. Ala pointed out that all Mr. Ebtehaj had intended to convey was that if the United States relieved the drain on the Iranian budget of maintaining its military establishment, Iran could proceed with its economic development without assistance. Mr. McGhee replied that the Department had clearly understood Mr. Ebtehaj’s position which was as the Ambassador had described it. He explained that it was neither the remarks of Mr. Ebtehaj nor the attitude of Congress which prevented the adoption of a special program of aid to Iran. The Executive Branch was not thinking of such a program because it would not conform to the basic criteria of our national policies. The mere passage of time or an increase in Congressional interest would not change this situation. Mr. McGhee concluded the conversation by pointing out that the remedies for the difficulties presently being encountered by Iran in the economic field were internal in nature and within the competence of the Iranian Government to resolve without assistance from abroad. He said, however, that he would always be glad to talk the situation over with the Ambassador. The Ambassador as he left indicated that he would reply to the Department’s Aide-Mémoire handed him by Mr. McGhee at the close of the conversation in answer to his Aide-Mémoire of November 29. 1 Telegram 106, January 28 (888.00 TA/1–2850), not printed. 2 Infra . 3 The aide-mémoire under reference here is printed in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 585 . 4 Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646. 5 The joint statement under reference here, released on December 30, 1949, is in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 592 . 6 Max W. Thornburg, Vice President in Charge of Operations in Iran of Overseas Consultants, Inc. 7 Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, 1946–1949. 8 Aboi H. Ebtehaj, Governor of Bank Melli Iran (National Bank of Iran) 9 Gerald F. P. Dooher, Attaché of the Embassy in Iran. The Department of State to the Iranian Embassy 788.5 MAP/1–2650 [Document 207] The Department of State to the Iranian Embassy 1 Aide-Mémoire The Department of State has read with great care and interest the Aide-Mémoire left at the Department by His Excellency, the Iranian Ambassador, on November 29. 2 Since this Aide-Mémoire raises questions of great importance and since it appears from several of the statements it contains that the position of the United States has not been understood, it has been felt desirable to go into the various points raised in the Aide-Mémoire at some length. With regard to the dollar amount of military assistance which may be provided to Iran during the current fiscal year, it is recalled that the President and the Secretary of State told His Majesty, the Shah, that the United States Government would give consideration to this question, although the heavy demands being made upon the limited resources of the United States from all sides and the restrictions written into the Military Assistance Act would make substantial readjustments difficult. The Department wishes also to recall previous discussions with the Ambassador in which it was pointed out that the dollar amount is not so significant as the amount and practical utility of the military equipment itself, which may be provided. The quantity and types of equipment, of course, will depend in part on the specific needs of the Iranian armed forces, in part on the physical availability of items in the United States, and only in part on the amount of money which may be available. Whether or not any large proportion of the equipment to be furnished Iran can be provided from excess stocks or at prices lower than present manufacturing costs will, again, depend upon the exact types of equipment involved. If American excess stocks do not contain items of the type required by the Iranian forces, these items could only be obtained from new procurement at consequent higher costs. The reference by the Ambassador to extension of the Truman Doctrine 3 to Iran indicates that there is some misunderstanding as to the nature of that Doctrine. In his Message to Congress of March 12, 1947, 4 the President stated that: “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. “I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.” This statement of policy which has become known as the Truman Doctrine is clearly directed toward all free nations of the world, including Iran, which may find themselves in danger of losing their independence as a result of aggression. It has been with this end in view that the United States has been endeavoring to furnish certain military assistance to Iran and to utilize its facilities and good offices to further Iran’s economic and social development. The present attitude of the United States toward the creation of a regional arrangement among Middle Eastern nations on the order of the North Atlantic Treaty arrangement was explained to His Majesty by the Secretary of State. Insofar as such an arrangement, involves only the nations included within the region itself, the United States Government considers that it is a matter exclusively for those states to decide. The United States would not wish to be in a position of either encouraging or discouraging such a development. At the present time, however, this Government is not in a position to associate itself with any new regional group. The Department also wishes to clarify its understanding of the Declaration of Tehran of December 1, 1943, 5 signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. That Declaration was of course a statement of the policies of the three Governments. Its primary purpose was to assure the Iranian Government and people of the desire of the three Great Powers for the maintenance of the sovereignty, independence and integrity of Iran. The United States has given ample evidence of its sincerity in this regard. Secondarily, the purpose of the Declaration was to assure the Iranian Government and people that the three Great Powers would continue to do their best to assist Iran in the economic difficulties which it faced at that time, along with every other nation in the world, as a result of the then existing conditions of world-wide conflict. It should be noted in particular that the Declaration said that the three Governments would furnish assistance to the extent possible in the light of their world-wide military operations and the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials and civilian supplies. This circumstance, coupled with the fact that the Declaration was issued at a time when the War raged unabated on every major front with the end not in sight, makes it clear that the promised assistance related exclusively to the Wartime period and not to the then distant postwar period. The United States did, in fact, continue to assist in making available to Iran the shipping space and the essential goods necessary to preserve the Iranian economy from collapse during the Wartime period when circumstances made it impossible for nations and individuals to obtain such goods and services in the ordinary way. Thirdly, the Declaration was intended to assure Iran of full participation along with all other members of the United Nations, in post-war international conferences and organizations which might be established to assist in the restoration of normal economic conditions. So far as the United States Government is aware, Iran has been afforded the opportunity to participate in every conference and international organization in the economic field which was of interest to the Iranian Government. Therefore, the Department hopes the Ambassador will agree that there is no unfulfilled promise of economic assistance contained in the Tehran Declaration. Quite apart from any question of the Declaration, however, this Government has on a number of occasions indicated its interest in the economic problems of Iran. Any specific assistance rendered is of course dependent on the specific needs of Iran in relation not only to its own resources but also to the relative needs of other countries. In this framework, the Department wishes to make the following observations on the five specific forms of economic assistance suggested by the Ambassador in his Aide-Mémoire under reference: 1. The inclusion of Iran in the Act for Aid to Greece and Turkey, Public Law 75, 80th Congress, would not be practicable nor useful at the present time. Since July 1, 1948, all economic aid to Greece and Turkey has been furnished under the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, known as the “Marshall Plan” or “European Recovery Program”. The Congressional authority and appropriations under Public Law 75 have been confined to purposes of military aid to Greece and Turkey. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act has provided additional funds to carry out the purposes of this law. With respect to the inclusion of Iran in other legislation to provide economic assistance to foreign countries, the Department had hoped that the position of the United States was made clear in its Note of September 22, 1949, 6 in which it was pointed out that the favorable balance of payments enjoyed by Iran and its consequent apparent ability to obtain and repay credits from appropriate institutions, such as the International Bank, would not warrant the American Government in extending direct grants of assistance to Iran for economic purposes. It is the established policy of the American Government that grant assistance from this Government should be extended only to such countries as could not reasonably be expected to meet their minimum needs for dollar exchange from older sources. 2. In furtherance of the Iranian Economic Development Plan, this Government believes that every effort should be made by Iran to enlist the cooperation of private investors from abroad. It recognizes, however, that the nature of some of the development projects will require public financing. It is desired to recall the previous suggestion made by officers of the Department that in these circumstances Iran should look to the International Bank for foreign exchange requirements in excess of those supplied through Iran’s current earnings, since that institution has been established for the purpose of assisting in the economic development of underdeveloped or devastated nations. As the Iranian Government has been previously informed, the Department of State will endeavor to arrange for the United States Government, through its representatives on the Board of Governors of the Bank, to support Iranian requests for credit assistance in carrying out sound economic projects. It is the hope of the Department that the International Bank will be able to provide the assistance needed to permit Iran to progress rapidly in its economic development. The question of loans from the United States Export-Import Bank was discussed in recent conferences with His Imperial Majesty and the Ambassador by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and it is believed that this Government’s position was made clear in the course of these conversations. With respect to guarantees for United States private investment in Iran, the Department calls to the attention of the Iranian Government that authority for making such guarantees has not yet been secured from the Congress, and that therefore no procedures or requirements have yet been established. 3. The Department had not been aware that Iran still finds itself in need of additional imported wheat supplies to meet the conditions of scarcity created by the relatively short wheat crop in Iran during the past season. It had been understood that the Iranian Government had purchased a substantial amount of wheat from various sources and that this amount was considered sufficient to make up the domestic deficit. With respect to a possible barter or lend-lease agreement for the supply of additional wheat, the United States Government is of course prepared to consider any suggestions made by the Iranian authorities for a barter arrangement, subject to the rather rigid limitations imposed by law on the authority of the Executive Branch of the United States Government to engage in such transactions. It will be recalled that negotiations for an exchange of wheat against opium were undertaken but could not be brought to conclusion because of inability to agree on a price at which the two commodities were to be exchanged. In addition, the quantity of opium which the United States Agency concerned could accept was relatively limited, owing to the limiting nature of its appropriations and the necessity for stockpiling many other commodities in addition to opium. The lend-lease authority was, of course, a wartime measure and has long since expired. A loan of wheat to be repaid in kind at a later date, as was suggested at one point, would seem to offer insuperable difficulties from the point of view of the United States Government. 4. The Department has long had in mind the desirability of furnishing technical assistance to Iran, when and if requested by the Iranian Government, under the provisions of the proposed “Point IV Program” 7 as well as through whatever other mechanisms may be available. Although the proposed program still awaits Congressional approval and no concrete action can be taken until such approval is given, the appropriate agencies of this Government are already studying the ways in which technical assistance might best be furnished to Iran. If the Iranian Government desires, it is possible that a small beginning in the field of technical assistance can be made under the authority of the Smith-Mundt Act, Public Law 402, 81st Congress, which authorizes the detail to foreign countries of United States Government technicians under certain conditions. It is suggested that discussions might well be initiated with the American Embassy in Tehran. It is desired to emphasize, however, that any program of American technical assistance should be carefully coordinated with technical assistance received through other Governments, through international agencies and through private sources. It is hoped that the Iranian Government itself will establish machinery for reviewing and coordinating all requests from all Iranian sources for assistance of this nature. 5. It is understood that numbered paragraph 5 of the Aide-Mémoire refers to the speech delivered by the President on November 8, 1949 before the Women’s National Democratic Club 8 in which he suggested that the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers could be developed in order to turn it once again into the “Garden of Eden”. As the Ambassador is aware, this statement was made in connection with the discussion of the “Point IV Program”, and the possible development of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley was cited merely as an example of the benefits which could be obtained by the proper use of technical assistance in conjunction with the application of available capital. The plan in question is one which has long been projected by the Government of Iraq, which is understood to be interested in obtaining financial assistance for it through the International Bank. The United States Government hopes that the project can be successfully carried out but has not itself participated in the plans. So far as the Department is aware, there is no reason why similar development plans could not be executed in Khuzistan under the auspices of the Iranian Seven-Year Plan Organization, and the United States Government would of course be prepared to furnish technical assistance in this connection just as it is prepared to do so in connection with other Iranian projects. Whether any advantage would be gained by linking such a project for Khuzistan with the development scheme for the Tigris-Euphrates would seem to be a matter for consideration first by the Iranian and Iraqi Governments and secondly by such technical advisers as they might wish to consult. Should the position of this Government as set forth above still not be clear, it is earnestly requested that the Ambassador so inform the Department. 9 Washington , January 26, 1950. 1 This paper was handed to Iranian Ambassador Hussein Ala by George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on January 26; see supra . 2 The aide-mémoire under reference is printed in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 585 . 3 For documentation on the origin of United States military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 (Truman Doctrine), see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 1 ff. 4 Department of State Bulletin Supplement , May 4, 1947, p. 829 or Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 176. 5 Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 646. 6 For text of the note under reference, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 558 . 7 For documentation on the genesis of the Point Four Program, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. i , pp. 757 ff. 8 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949 , p. 555. 9 In a conversation with Department of State officials on February 7, Mr. Ala raised the question of the Department’s aide-mémoire of January 26, which he said he had transmitted to his Government. He stated that while the letter of the Tehran Declaration of 1943 did not commit the United States to assist Iran in the postwar period, the spirit did. He stressed the fact of Iran’s exclusion from the Marshall Plan. Mr. Jernegan replied that “the United States had lived up to the spirit of the Declaration and its interest in and support of Iran had been demonstrated on several occasions in the past and continued in the present.” He also said that the purpose of ERP was to alleviate the dollar shortage in certain countries. Since Iran possessed an adequate supply of dollars, its inclusion was not warranted. (Memorandum of conversation, February 7, by Mr. Ferguson, 788.5 MAP/2–750) The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.5 MAP/1–3050: Telegram [Document 208] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , January 30, 1950—3 p. m. 163. Tomap. Following is résumé my two hour audience with Shah Saturday: 1. While Shah started off firmly decided both bilateral MAP discussions and negotiations take place Tehran, after long conversation he finally acquiesced that both discussions and negotiations should take place Washington (ReDeptel 77 January 24). 1 2. Re conduct discussions and negotiations, I mentioned that Prime Minister Saed had suggested he might head brief mission to US (Embtel 114, January 21 and Deptel 90, January 25). 2 Shah was most unenthusiastic. Name of Razmara then came up (Embtel 124, January 23) 1 and Shah made it clear he is entirely disinclined have Razmara visit US at present. He added three very good intelligent younger senior officers being sent to US on a look-see mission and it was feasible have one or more these officers take over discussions and negotiations. Names of officers will be sent later. 3. Shah indicated he has no intention permit General Mazhari 3 conduct MDAP discussions or negotiations. 4. I promised, provided Department approves, send Secretary Embassy Wagner 4 to Washington since he is entirely cognizant point of view here. 5. During conversation Shah emphasized and re-emphasized necessity bilateral agreement should be formulated in such a manner that it would not require submission to Majlis. He believes requirement Majlis approval would afford only a sounding board for demagogic, subversive oratory and recalled difficulties in Majlis when surplus arms program was presented. I agree entirely matter must be kept out of Majlis and I acquiesced his request we seek good legal advice how this may be achieved. This we are doing. 6. With regard to general question military aid to Iran, Shah again brought up question of Turkey. He said IIS was handing out a billion dollars, of which Turkey was receiving a great deal. He was very curious to know why Iran was in such a different and minor category. He quoted figures on the Turkish military budget and compared these with Iranian military budget, emphasizing great disparity between the two. At same time he emphasized complete inutility of Iranian military expenditures under present circumstances and stated Iranian army was utterly useless to defend Iran against foreign aggression or to enter into any formal strategic plan. He thought NME of US should make up its mind whether it was taking Iran seriously or not. If things were as serious as billion dollar aid would suggest he felt Iran should occupy more important place in US strategic thinking 7. I showed Shah radio bulletin 5 summary North Atlantic bilateral agreements signed January 27. He questioned only provision regarding supply to US of raw and semi-processed materials available in sigNATOry country and in short supply in US. He inquired whether we would demand petroleum and stated US Navy in Mediterranean was now obtaining oil from AIOC and indicated US Government was somehow involved in AIOC. I assured him US Government had no connection whatsoever with AIOC and if Navy was gettting oil from AIOC it was through purely commercial channels. His remarks this regard were indicative widespread misapprehension which exists in Iran. 8. Shah stated that Ambassador Ala had recently been called to Department and told that he, Shah, intended double army and greatly increase military budget and that Department emphasized to Ala its great interest in economic development Iran rather than primary importance being attached to military. Shah stated Department had been misinformed. I assured Shah most definitely Department had not been misinformed by Embassy, nor had NME been misinformed by either General Evans or Colonel Drury. 6 Shah went on to say present TO of army was 150,000 and actually it had about 138,000. He hoped bring army up to 150,000 then, add to, and under army force of frontier guards of about 30,000. (Significant ARMISH not consulted or even informed this regard.) As for army budget he was thinking in terms of 3.5 billion rials as compared with present 2.4 (approximately) billion rials. Latest military budget figures mentioned by Shah is sizeable reduction from General Razmara’s original estimate 4.5 billion rials (Embtel 55 January 11). 7 Reduction appears to be result strong pressure brought on Shah and Minister Finance Golshayan 8 by Prince Abdorreza who told Dooher last night he will continue efforts to bring military expenditures more in harmony with Iran’s limited resources. Wiley 1 Not printed. 2 Neither printed. 1 Not printed. 3 Brig. Gen. Mohammad Mazhari, Military Attaché of the Iranian Embassy in the United States. 4 Joseph J. Wagner, Second Secretary of Embassy in Iran. 5 Department of State Wireless Bulletin, January 27, 1950, p. 1. For documentation on the signing of Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements between the United States and eight other NATO countries on January 27, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 6 Col. Frederick W. Drury, Senior Military Attaché of the Embassy in Iran. 7 Not printed. 8 Abbas Qoli Golshayan. The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.00/1–3050: Despatch [Document 209] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 45 Tehran , January 30, 1950. Subject: General Foreign and Domestic Political Situation of Iran. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department’s recent instructions 1 and to submit a brief review of the general foreign and domestic political situation of Iran. Foreign Affairs: The overshadowing cloud in the foreign political situation continues to be the USSR. Russo-Iranian relations are marked by constant frontier incidents and Soviet territorial encroachment, which in some areas averages about two miles a year. All this is accompanied by thundering propaganda, subversive infiltration and by pressures which, since I have been here, have included strong Soviet notes and vigorous diplomatic representations. At the moment, the Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Vassilievitch Sadchikov, after a prolonged absence in the Soviet Union, has returned, presumably with new instructions. His staff is being strongly reinforced. Particular attention has been attached by the assignment here of Daniel Simonovitch Komisarov, who is an area specialist with previous service in Iran. He is described as “brilliant”, and a Soviet Svengali. It is clear that his presence here is most unwelcome to the Iranian Government. The Embassy has had very conflicting reports with regard to the assignment here of Mr. Komisarov; first, that his visa had been refused. Then Mr. Komisarov arrived. The Embassy was thereafter informed that the Iranian Government would request Mr. Komisarov’s recall. Mr. Komisarov remains, but the Prime Minister has told me that Mr. Komisarov must depart. 2 Russian policy towards Iran reflects as ever the urge to the sea. The Soviet Union denies the validity of the rejection by the Majlis of the oil concession 3 negotiated with Qavam. 4 Certainly, the Soviet Union would like to deny to the Western world the oil of Abadan and, eventually, to reach the Persian Gulf. A happy feature of the situation is that Iran has succeeded so far in staying outside the iron curtain and has not, as yet, shown any indication whatsoever of being intimidated by frontier incidents or diplomatic pressures. Iranian relations with Great Britain are in a delicate and difficult stage. The petroleum concession with the AIOC was renegotiated but, though not rejected, was not ratified by the Majlis. It is the concensus in Iran that, though the renegotiation would perhaps double the revenues of the Iranian Government, the renegotiation does not go far enough. It contains clauses and conditions which remain unpalatable to the Persians. The British Ambassador, Sir John Le Rougetel, who is about to depart for another post, is of the opinion that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has already gone too far in yielding to Iranian demands. It is his decided opinion that neither the British Government, which holds the majority of the stock of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, nor the Board of Directors of the Company will budge an inch. In other words he maintains that the agreement 5 must be submitted to the Majlis as it is, or should not be submitted at all. On the other hand the two counselors of the British Embassy, Lawford 6 and Pyman, 7 do not seem to be in agreement with the Ambassador. I have also suggested to the Ambassador that a “take it or leave it” policy might be too inelastic. Moreover, in the relations with Great Britain, there is the question of the British Bank of Iran and the Middle East, formerly known as, the Imperial Bank of Iran. Agreement with regard to the renewal of its concession has been held up by Mr. A. H. Ebtehaj, Governor of the Bank Melli (National Bank of Iran), who for 17 years was an employee of the aforesaid British Bank. It is believed that the question of this concession, in spite of the opposition of Mr. Ebtehaj, can be satisfactorily worked out. The fly in the Iranian-British ointment really centers in the question of the Oil Company; not the Bank. Relations of Iran with the United States are at the moment very good. The visit of the Shah to America was a resounding success in its repercussions in Iran. There has been, of course, excessive optimism that on the return of the Shah from the United States miracles would ensue. Moreover, we must foresee the possibility of deep disappointment when it is finally realized in Iran the extent to which American military and economic aid will be limited. Domestic Political Situation: The domestic political scene for the last fourteen months has been marked by a curious contrast of violence and tranquillity. Five bullets touched the person of the Shah in an attempt at assassination. 8 Later his Minister of Court, Hajir, 9 was murdered in a mosque. Sa’ed who, when he took office as Prime Minister 14 months ago, was awarded a political life of a few weeks only, is still in office. He has kept the Government on an even keel; at least a negative accomplishment of no small merit under the circumstances. The political structure of the country now heads up to the Shah who, with a revised constitution and a senate, will exercise much greater powers than heretofore. I shall revert to the position of the Shah later. The weakness of the political structure in Iran is the great poverty of competent public men. There is a stratum of age and then one of youth. There is not very much in between. Strong men are not numerous. Age is respected; youth is suspect. Qavam, a political leader who indeed was strong, is now in France. He is, I think, the victim of anno domini and, according to his medical counselor, he will be obliged to submit to a very serious operation which, in view of his general physical condition and the infirmities of advanced years, may be quite dangerous. He still remains, according to my best information, very ambitious politically. He would like to regain the post of Prime Minister and rule Iran. I think anno domini will win. To continue with the roster of other old political leaders: Mohammad Sa’ed Maragheh’i, the Prime Minister, has had 44 years of public service, is now 68 years of age, and suffers from high blood pressure. He was educated in Russia; served in Batum, Baku and Moscow and knows the Russia of old and of the present most intimately. He is honest, adaptable and predictable. I feel that his earnest desire is to find a foxhole in the not too distant future; either an Embassy or a place in the Senate. There is a possibility, however, that the Shah may insist that he remain on as Prime Minister; at least until the question of the oil concession comes to a head in the Majlis. The role of Sa’ed would be most valuable to Iran if he could be preserved by the Shah as Counselor or elder statesman; perhaps as Minister of Court, but relieved of administrative burdens and Majlis strife. Taqizadeh, 10 a man of proven integrity, is likewise the victim of anno domini . He is ultra-conservative and, though he has quite a following, is not an inspiring leader. From him I expect very little, except perhaps a restraining influence. Seyid Zia ed-Din Tabatabai is competent, energetic and much younger than his years. However, he is somewhat the Elbert Hubbard type of food-faddist but, in spite of his fluffy hair, he is too wise to aspire to the post of Prime Minister at present. He will probably be incapable of achieving it later. Seyid Zia, however, is not a bad person, and if he so desired could have considerable British backing. Ali Mansur, ex Prime Minister and ex Governor General of Azerbaijan, is the Persian version of Uriah Heep. He has notoriously sticky fingers and at the present moment is head of the High Council of the Seven Year Plan which apparently is overcommitting itself financially at a most rapid rate. Ali Mansur has soaring political ambitions and until recently has had, I think, the support of the British Ambassador for the Prime Ministership. This support, I understand, has been withdrawn. The Overseas Consultants Incorporated is, I believe, eager that he be ousted from his present post. His political though not his private fortunes seem to be in the descendant. In my thinking there are three personages who merit great attention and scrutiny. I shall revert first of all to the Shah. He is Swiss educated, very Europeanized, and is 30 years of age. He is fearless but gentle and a man of good will. He is sincerely dedicated to social justice, an improved standard of living for the people, and good works. I have never quite made up my mind about the Shah, although I know him very well. He has been under strong pressure from his mother, the entourage of the Court and others, to step into the authoritative shoes of his late father, Reza Shah Pahlavi. These pressures he has so far resisted. There is no doubt that he has a very great streak of stubbornness. Whether this stubbornness represents merely weakness or a strength of will reflecting a desire to do things in his own fashion and time, I do not know. It might, of course, be that he is a little too Westernized for an Oriental country. I wish to mention particularly the Shah’s half brother, Prince Abdorreza. The Prince is a Harvard graduate, where he majored in government and economics. He is now 26 years of age. After a distinguished University career in the United States he returned to Iran two years ago, convinced that he could reorganize the economic life of the country. He collided with intrigue and some months ago, during the reorganization of the Seven Year Plan, found himself frustrated and humiliated. He has been, however, resilient and started at once forming his own cadres. After a break, almost complete, with the Shah, he and the Shah seem to have reestablished a fairly close relationship. The Prince returned to Iran determined to dedicate himself to the economic side only of public life and to abjure politics. He is still determined to concentrate on economic affairs but has, so he has told me, decided that it was essential that he enter the political field. Though immature, Prince Abdorreza has intelligence, personal charm and much energy. He is inclined to be very outspoken in private conversation and his comments on General Razmara are unprintable. To put it mildly, he considers him “a snake in the grass”. However, they have been meeting recently and apparently a “cordial” working relationship has developed. My fingers are crossed. I shall now come to the subject of General Razmara. As the Department knows, General Razmara is a Saint Cyrien. He is a soldier who impresses soldiers as a soldier. He is very lean and a young 49. He has been at the top of the military ladder for a long time. This is his second tour of duty as Chief of Staff. As nearly as I can make out, he holds the Iranian Army in the palm of his hand. Before the ejection of the “Democratic Regime” from Azerbaijan, he did not enjoy the confidence of the Shah. Then he gained it. But the Shah intends, if he can, to keep him on the leash. However, any officer who does not have the confidence of General Razmara is removed from contact with troops. The one exception I can think of is General Shahbakhti, 11 in Azerbaijan, and apparently General Razmara will shortly be able to separate him from the Army. General Razmara lives in a modest, bourgeois manner. There are no indications of affluence. Rumors are always rife that he, like others in Iran, is accumulating great wealth. There has never, as yet, been confirmation of any of these rumors. It is known that on one occasion the Qashqais sent Razmara a large bribe and that after a few days he returned it. A notable factor is, however, that his tribal relationships are now of the best and that he works in close harmony with the four Qashqai brothers. Information regarding Razmara’s possible entry into political life has come to the Embassy from at least four good sources and has been confirmed by General Razmara himself. In conversation with Colonel Drury he has indicated that, if requested, he would not refuse the post of Prime Minister. The present Prime Minister, Sa’ed, in conversation with me, refused to taire this very seriously (the Shah likewise), though the Prime Minister suggested that Razmara might be a little like de Gaulle. It is, I think, quite clear that General Razmara does not intend to enter the political arena until the question of the AIOC agreement has been solved. If he should become Prime Minister, he would want to change the “system”. Just what he means by this, I do not know. It could mean very much; or very little. As Prime Minister, I am inclined to believe that he would not emulate Reza Shah Pahlavi; that he would not want to become Shah. He would probably want to play the role of a Richelieu. He is ambitious, utterly cold-blooded, ruthless and cinquicento . To come back again to Prince Abdorreza, he is somewhat the same type as General Razmara. In spite of his Harvard background, he might be ruthless in the pattern of his father. The situation boils down to a constellation revolving around three stellar figures, namely the Shah, Razmara, and Abdorreza. The sharp blade of which Machiavelli wrote in “The Prince” may flash before the fifth act of this Persian tragedy. There is in Iran an underlying psycho-political factor of great significance; the Iranian people from top to bottom much prefer to be governed by a strong hand, even if wrong, than by a weak one, even if right. Respectfully yours, John C. Wiley 1 The instructions under reference are not herein further identified. 2 Mr. Komissarov served as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Iran from December 1949 until March 16, 1950. 3 For documentation on the Soviet-Iranian impasse over the agreement of April 1946 regarding the exploitation of oil resources in northern Iran by the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 890 ff. 4 Ahmad Qavam, Prime Minister of Iran, 1946–1947. 5 Reference is to the Supplemental Agreement between the Imperial Iranian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, made at Tehran on July 17, 1949; text in British Cmd. 8425, Persia No. 1 (1951): Correspondence between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Persian Government, and Related Documents concerning the Oil Industry in Persia, February 1951 to September 1951 , p. 19. 6 Valentine G. Lawford, Counselor of the British Embassy in Iran. 7 Lancelot F. L. Pyman, Oriental Counselor of the British Embassy in Iran. 8 For documentation on the assassination attempt, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 471 ff. 9 Abdol Hosein Hajir was assassinated in Tehran on November 4, 1949. 10 Seyed Hasan Taqizadeh, President of the Iranian Senate. 11 Brig. Gen. Mohammad Shahbakhti, Inspector of Azerbaijan Forces. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs NEA Politico–Military Adviser Files: Lot 484: MAP—Country Statements FY 1951 1 [Document 210] Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 2 secret [ Washington , undated.] Political and Economic Factors Involved in Military Assistance to Iran in FY 1951 The primary objective of our policy toward Iran is to prevent its domination by Soviet Russia, and to strengthen its orientation toward the West. Our policy lays first emphasis on economic and social development to strengthen the country’s resistance to communism. Principal reliance in this connection is placed upon the Iranian seven-year program which is expected to draw largely upon the country’s own financial resources for its implementation. American aid to Iran in the economic and social fields, as now planned, will be confined to technical assistance under the Point Four, Smith-Mundt and Fulbright program. A second facet to the implementation of our policy is to develop Iranian self-confidence and power to resist by providing military assistance under MAP. The third element is diplomatic support, when and where required, principally through the mechanism of the United Nations. Politically, Iran is extremely important to the security of the United States in the cold war. Its fall under Soviet control would have a tremendous moral effect on other friendly nations, and would render it quite probable that most of the other Near Eastern countries would soon fall under communist domination. The consequences of such an eventuality are obvious to anyone familiar with the strategic and political importance of the area and of its resources. problems of internal security The object of Soviet policy in Iran is to replace the government with a Soviet puppet regime so that complete domination—political, economic and military—could prevail, and to incorporate large segments of Iranian territory forcibly into the Soviet Union. Access to the Persian Gulf is a historic Russian objective, and in accomplishing this the USSR would acquire advance bases for subversive activities or actual attack against the vast contiguous area; obtain a base hundreds of miles nearer potential US–UK lines of defense in the Middle East than any held at present; control part and threaten all of the Middle Eastern oil reservoir; control continental air routes across Iran and threaten those traversing adjacent areas; be in a position to menace shipping in the Persian Gulf; and undermine the will of all Middle Eastern countries to resist Soviet aggression. The stakes, therefore, are extremely high and it is obviously to the interest of the United States that any such development be precluded. Russian attempts to subvert Iran have taken almost every conceivable form of pressure, threats and subversive operations. It is known that numbers of Soviet agents are operating within Iran. The Tudeh (communist) Party, now outlawed by the Iranian Government, continues to exist as an underground movement, and with Soviet support represents a substantial threat to the internal security of the country. Iranian communists and Russian agents play heavily upon the economic and social inequities within the country and the inability of the present regime to improve the condition of the population. The greatest threat to Iranian independence, assuming that Russian forces will not overtly attack the country under present world conditions, lies in the economic problems confronting the mass of the people. The Shah and the Iranian Government recognize this to be the case, and realize that the best defense against communism lies in the implementation of an effective program to improve the welfare of the people. The energetic seven-year program has therefore been inaugurated with the advice and assistance of an organization of experts from American technical firms, under which Iranian resources, mainly those derived from operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, will be employed in projects of considerable magnitude. One of the principal difficulties in implementing the economic and social program will be in the selection by the Shah and the Iranian Government of able leaders to see it through. The proponents of the plan and most Iranians are enthusiastically behind it, but it remains to be seen whether they will in fact be able to carry it through within the period contemplated. We shall, of course, continue to encourage the Iranians to devote their attentions to progress in this field. The maintenance of internal order and the Shah’s strategic plan of having an army capable of fighting a delaying action of sufficient duration to permit the Shah and some of his forces to retire to the south where they could carry out guerrilla warfare, requires an Iranian army presently numbering approximately 130,000 men, but with an authorized strength of 150,000 men. While the maintenance of this force imposes a considerable burden upon the resources of the country, it is considered necessary for direct security purposes and to give to the people a degree of confidence so that they will not give way to Soviet pressures short of all-out attack. problems of external security In 1945, while the area was occupied by Soviet troops, the Soviet Union sponsored the creation of a puppet regime in Azerbaijan which it supported by force against the attempts of the Iranian Government to restore order. The Soviets also refused to fulfill their treaty obligation to withdraw their troops on a specific date and remained in occupation of Azerbaijan. It was largely because of the strong position taken by the United Nations and particularly by the United States that these forces were withdrawn, and it is probably only because of Russian fear that such precipitous action might result in war that the USSR refrains from armed invasion at the present time. The Iranian forces now under arms or any potential force which might be mobilized could do no more than briefly delay overt Russian aggression. The Iranian Government has steadfastly resisted Russian demands. It has brought before the United Nations problems relating to its security and has received the overwhelming support of non-Soviet countries. iranian assistance to other countries in the area friendly to the united states The Iranian Government has repeatedly requested that Iran be included in the North Atlantic Pact or in some other regional arrangement underwritten by the United States, under which Iran would participate with other countries in maintaining security. As in the case of similar requests by Greece and Turkey, however, we have taken the position that the United States Government is not prepared at this time to extend its commitments in further regional pacts of this type. It is believed that in time of crisis Iran would render to the United States and other friendly countries whatever support it could provide. action recommended The attainment of American objectives in Iran will require the continued extension of effective United States military assistance to that country; the extension of technical and advisory assistance under Point Four, Smith-Mundt and Fulbright programs; support of Iranian requests for economically justified International Bank loans for development purposes; and continued diplomatic support before the United Nations and otherwise as may be needed. The Iranian Government and people consider themselves closely aligned with the West and have shown no tendency to weaken in their resistance to communist pressures. It is considered certain that any military aid rendered by the United States to Iran would, so long as Iran remains independent, be used to achieve American objectives in that country. Military aid authorized for Iran in FY 1950 represents only a small amount, sufficient only to provide items of the highest priority required by the Iranian forces. The program contemplated for FY 1951 likewise will be confined to relatively few essential items. To the extent that these programs materialize they will avoid a drain upon Iranian foreign exchange resources which otherwise would be required in obtaining necessary items of military equipment. The program as contemplated would not be prejudicial to economic and social progress. The supply of military equipment to Iran will have an extremely beneficial psychological effect as it will provide evidence of the determined attitude of the United States in giving material as well as moral support. general nature and extent of proposed military assistance The small military program proposed for Iran will have greater psychological results than the accomplishment of appreciable improvement in the military potential of the country. While, therefore, it is largely justified on the basis of its morale effect, the equipment is needed to enable the army effectively to prepare against possible internal disorders precipitated by Russia. The program would improve the confidence of the Shah and of the Iranian leaders in the ability of the army to resist, at least temporarily, anything short of an all-out attack. It is probable that this assistance would have an appreciable effect on the Iranian Army’s resistance even in the event of a direct attack, since knowing it has proper equipment and that the United States is interested in its success, it would have a will to resist not in evidence in the past. It is considered essential that military aid to Iran be continued in the FY 1951, as the probable result of failure to do so would be extreme Iranian disappointment and fear that the United States has little interest in preserving Iranian integrity. Such action, coupled with our refusal to include Iran in any regional security arrangement underwritten by the United States and our refusal, thus far, to consider the extension of financial aid requested by Iran, would have extremely serious consequences. While it is difficult to predict the probable duration of the proposed military aid program, it is considered likely that some quantities of aid during the course of the next several years will be recommended, or at least for the period during which general military assistance programs are in effect for Western Europe, Greece and Turkey. nature and extent of U.S. involvement if military aid is provided The extension of military aid to Iran involves no new policy, but represents inclusion of Iran in a supply program similar to those which have been in operation in Greece and Turkey for some time. It is consistent with the principle of the Truman Doctrine, established in early 1947, which provides that the United States will extend assistance to free peoples resisting aggression wherever that assistance can be effective. As has been pointed out, military aid is considered necessary to support the forces deemed by Iran to be essential, and to bolster Iranian morale and determination. The military program proposed should involve no United States commitment in relation to the economic situation in the country, but on the contrary it will make it possible for Iran to devote her own foreign exchange resources to the implementation of the seven-year program. Termination of the Iranian program during a period when other countries are receiving substantial aid would have an extremely serious and possibly disastrous effect upon the attainment of our objectives in that country, as it would imply an American interest in Iran less than in the case of other countries which have manifested their friendship toward the United States. estimate of reactions to united states efforts to furnish military aid The reaction of the Iranian Government to the announcement of United States intentions of including Iran in the military aid program 3 has been an important factor in developing Iranian-American cooperation. The program represents the first material assistance which we have given to Iran to supplement the strong moral and diplomatie support extended for some time. The reaction of other friendly countries in the area has been and continues to be favorable. On the other hand, this new demonstration of American interest in Iran will serve further to dissuade Russia from infringing upon Iranian territorial integrity by providing more concrete evidence of the American position vis-à-vis Iran. 1 Lot 484 contains the files of the Politico-Military Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs for the years 1946–1950, including records and documents of the Foreign Military Aid Coordinating Committee; Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee; State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee; and the Military Assistance Program. 2 The source text is Tab D attached to the memorandum, February 10, by Assistant Secretary McGhee to James Bruce, Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, not printed. The paper on Iran was part of NEA’s response to a memorandum, February 4, by Mr. Bruce to Assistant Secretaries Butterworth (FE), McGhee (NEA), Miller (ARA), and Perkins (EUR) on the military assistance program for fiscal year 1951. Regarding needs for military assistance of countries in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa in fiscal year 1951, NEA submitted statements on Greece, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Liberia with the qualification in Mr. McGhee’s covering memorandum of February 10, that “the information contained in these statements should be considered as raw material for use in justifying legislative programs since the limited time allotted for their preparation has not permitted a careful examination of all the factors involved nor consultation with the diplomatic missions concerned.” Copies of Mr. Bruce’s memorandum (undated), Mr. McGhee’s reply of February 10, and ‘the statement on Iran were transmitted by Instruction 17, February 14, to Tehran, with a request for any comment deemed appropriate (788.5 MAP/2–1450). No comment by the Embassy in Iran on this paper has been found in Department of State files. 3 For text of the joint statement issued at Washington on December 30, 1949, following discussions by President Truman and the Shah of Iran, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 592 . The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.5 MAP/2–1450: Telegram [Document 211] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , February 14, 1950—11 a. m. 259. Embtel 222, February 8. 1 Department inform Army, Navy, Air. In talk with Shah February 12 he spoke most emphatically of need of US to decide role expected of Iran in event of war and of necessity that he be informed of place of Iran in US strategic planning. Shah stated he could handle internal security with relatively small force but that it was very costly and under present circumstances useless maintain present size army. Therefore, if US expects Iran to oppose possible Soviet invasion he should be so informed without delay. Shah expressed sense of considerable urgency re foregoing. This conversation with Shah strengthens my belief it would be most valuable were senior US Army spokesman to visit Iran, Embtel 243, February 13. 1 Wiley 1 Not printed. 1 Not printed. The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 611.88/2–1550 [Document 212] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State top secret Tehran , February 15, 1950. Dear Dean : Daily there are reports that the American cornucopia is gushing; the latest news is that great sums are going to Indonesia. 1 But so far not a nickel has reached Iran in the form either of grants or credits for economic aid. As yet nothing has come to Iran in the form of direct military aid. What is in the offing in this respect seems to have the dimensions of a bag of peanuts. Psychologically this is of course very bad for Iran. In the matter of military aid, Iran is being condemned to obscurity on grounds that are illogical; namely that (1) the financial position of Iran is so good that Iran should not receive much in the way of direct aid. (Actually the financial position of Iran is dubious, if not bad.) And then, (2) that the economic situation of Iran is so bad that to increase the military establishment of Iran would be a disastrous drain on the resources of the country. This to me is as weird as the Eleusinian Mysteries and as unintelligible as the Epic of Gilgamesh. I think it advisable that on a very high level there be reconsideration of our policy towards Iran. Iran so far has stayed outside the Iron Curtain. A very great part of the credit for this is due to Iran itself. That Russia does not intend to lie dormant with regard to Iran, where poverty is abject, is more than evident. The Tudeh Party, driven underground, has been refinanced and resuscitated into new, vigorous and dangerous vitality. General Razmara, the Chief of Staff, now tells us that the Army is no longer able to cope with subversive Communist activities. 2 This, from him, is startling. I recommend first that something effective be done to remedy the economic situation of Iran. Iran is crumbling away. The Seven Year Plan will not save the situation soon enough. Immediate economic aid is most urgently required. Time is of the essence. Then, I am strongly opposed to our present policy of “token” military aid. We fool only ourselves. “Token” aid is provocative but not preventive and Iran remains a most vulnerable spot on the periphery. Once I had a friend who saved up enough money to buy a dress suit to take the girl of his choice to a dance. The great moment arrived. But he had forgotten to buy the white tie; everything, therefore, went askew. In our policy towards Greece, Turkey and Iran, Iran is, I think, the white tie we forgot to buy. Yours sincerely, John 1 Indonesia had received a $100 million line of credit from the Export-Import Bank of Washington in February 1950. For documentation on economic assistance to Indonesia, see vol. vi , pp. 964 ff. 2 Reference is to a conversation, February 13, of General Razmara with Mr. Dooher, reported in telegram 268, February 14, from Tehran, not printed (788.00/2–1450). The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.5 MAP/2–1650: Telegram [Document 213] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , February 16, 1950—noon. 275. Tomap. Drafts note exchange and secret minute of negotiation 1 given Ardalan, 2 UN Secretary Foreign Office. He was also informed re necessity Iran payment dollar cost living allowance and local rial expenses MDAP personnel. He is studying texts and will advise re legal obstacles, avoidance parliamentary action soonest. Re part 4 Deptel 140, General Evans and I think that to obtain proper immunity and to divorce ARMISH entirely from MDAP, noncommissioned officers as well as officers should be assigned to Embassy. Officers would be accredited as attachés and NCO’s same as FSS employees. ARMISH should be responsible for supply and administration. I still think it unwise to have Iran Government pay allowance of MDAP Embassy staff members and that it would be much wiser to take such dollar expenses out of MDAP funds. However, we have presented proposal as instructed. Re part 5 Deptel 140, no way seen how Iran could provide funds without Majlis approval. Assuming transportation costs 20 percent of total, it appears that about two million dollars involved, with Iran’s proposed share about one million. Such funds not in military budget for next year, which is about to go to Majlis for approval. Army could not absorb any such sum with budget. It would constitute additional charge upon Iran for military establishment, and at expense economic development country. As regards possible Majlis action, it is well to recall difficulties and delays encountered in connection payment transportation costs of arms program. If Iran pays 50 percent transportation charges and Turkey does not, feeling in Iran re discrimination will be intensified. General Evans and I strongly urge that all transportation charges be met from MDAP funds, which was procedure envisaged when survey team was here and is basis upon which Iran program was worked out. Shah adamant in insistence upon avoidance parliamentary action, fearing opportunity for demagogic and subversive demonstrations thus afforded. Ardalan does not believe real difficulty would be encountered in obtaining ratification. He thinks that perhaps best procedure would be to negotiate a bilateral having in its preamble statement that it would become effective upon signature but would require subsequent ratification. Such procedure under Iranian legislation would give legality to all acts performed from date signing to that ratification. However, Ardalan, pursuant Shah’s wishes, is exploring all possibilities concluding matter through simple exchange notes. I share Shah’s belief that matter should be kept out of Majlis. It is still intended to hold discussions and negotiations in Washington. Wiley 1 The draft note and secret minute of negotiation are quoted in telegram 140, February 8, to Tehran, not printed (788.5 MAP/2–850). 2 Ali Gholi Ardalan, Iranian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) NEA Politico–Military Adviser Files: Lot 484: Greek–Turkish Staff Talks [Document 214] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs ( Jernegan ) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Rusk ) top secret [ Washington ,] February 16, 1950. Subject: Iranian Bequest for Discussion of War Plans Problem The Shah and the Iranian Chief of Staff, General Razmara, have urged that the United States send a high-ranking general officer to Iran to discuss the proper utilization of Iranian forces in the event of war against Russia. In connection with this, they would like to know what assistance they could expect from the United States after the outbreak of hostilities. We must decide what reply to make to this request. Background and Discussion The Iranians have made several similar requests in the past, to which we have always replied that we could not discuss our own war plans with anyone. The present approach, however, differs from the others in that General Razmara says he would not expect us to reveal our own plans in such a discussion but is anxious to get an expression of opinion from us on the Iranian plans. There are, he says, a number of operations the Iranian forces could undertake in case of Soviet attack, including such things as demolition of communications, defense of certain strategic passes leading to the Persian Gulf and the Iraqi plain, defense of the southwestern portion of Iran adjacent to Pakistan, and defense of the Straits at the entrance to the Persian Gulf. In the event of Soviet occupation of the country, Iranian forces could operate as guerrillas against the railway system, the oil fields and other strategic targets. However, General Razmara does not consider that the Iranian Army is capable of carrying out all of these operations, and he would like to know which we consider of the highest priority so that Iranian activities would be coordinated with the overall strategy of the anti-communist nations. Ambassador Wiley supports the request that a top level general officer be sent to Iran to spend perhaps three weeks in discussions along the foregoing lines. He believes this would have an excellent psychological effect by relieving the present feeling of frustration and doubt on the part of the Shah and his top military advisors. On general principles, it would seem undesirable to involve ourselves in any closer relationship with the Iranian military authorities, even by implication. So far as the Department of State is aware, the Department of Defense is not prepared to plan on giving any military assistance to the Iranian forces in time of war and does not have a very high opinion of the potential effectiveness of those forces. Furthermore, we are not prepared to enter into any political defense arrangement with Iran. At the same time, I understand from Mr. Halaby 1 that the Defense Department is presently attaching greater importance to the potential strategic bombing bases in the Dhahran-Cairo-Suez area, which I take to mean that it would also attach greater importance to the possibilities of defense in Iran as the first line of defense for Dhahran. If we intend to attempt to hold Dhahran, even for a short period, it is obviously desirable to have the Iranian forces put up the most effective response of which they are capable. Since General Razmara now appears to be thinking in very realistic terms, it might be worthwhile to encourage and guide this tendency by giving the Iranians concrete advice as to the best use they could make of their forces in delaying Soviet access to the Persian Gulf. There are attached a set of recent telegrams from Tehran 2 giving the full story of the Iranian request and our Ambassador’s attitude. Recommendations It is recommended that you discuss this question at your meeting with General Burns next Monday morning 3 for the purpose of getting at least a preliminary reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense, which we could use to guide us in preparing a reply to the messages from Tehran. You might point out that we have three possible alternatives: (1) To accede to the Iranian request and send out a general officer of the type of Lieutenant General Wedemeyer 4 or Major General Maddocks, 5 who could go over the Iranian war plans and make informal suggestions for their modification in the light of Iranian capabilities and type of operations which would fit best into our strategic planning. (It would be simplest to authorize General Evans, head of our Military Mission in Iran, to give this kind of advice, but this is forbidden by the terms of his “contract” 6 with the Iranian Government. Also, he could not provide the psychological effect, desired by Ambassador Wiley, which would result from a special mission by an officer from Washington.) (2) To accede to the Iranian request in principle but state that no qualified officer can be spared from Washington and to suggest that the Iranian Chief of Staff or his Deputy pay a visit to this country for discussions of the type desired. (General Razmara has repeatedly expressed a desire to visit the United States and it is quite probable that he would be glad to make a trip for this purpose.) (3) To inform the Iranians that, since we are not in a position to enter into a political defense arrangement, we cannot commit ourselves even to the extent implied in giving them military advice on their own war plans. We could state that this action would imply a commitment to assist Iran in carrying out whatever plans might be adopted, and that the Executive Branch of the Government could not do this in the absence of a political arrangement approved by the Congress. In discussing the question, it is recommended that you explain the continuing unhappiness of the Shah and Iranian military leaders at our unwillingness to commit ourselves more clearly to Iran’s defense in time of war and at the limited nature of the military assistance we propose to furnish under MDAP. Although these psychological factors are not decisive, they should nevertheless be taken into consideration in determining whether or not to give a favorable response to this latest Iranian démarche . 1 Najeeb E. Halaby, Jr., Director of the Office of Military Affairs, Department of Defense. 2 Attachments, not with the source text, were the following telegrams from Tehran: telegram 187, February 2 (711.5888/2–250); telegram 222, February 8 (788.5 MAP/2–850); ARMISH telegram S–1151, February 9 (S/ISA Files, Lot 52–26, MDAP–Iran); telegram 243, February 13 (788.5 MAP/2–1350); telegram 259, February 14 ( ante , p. 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] ); and telegram 264, February 14 (788.5 MAP/2–1450). The S/ISA lot files contain records of the Office of the Director, International Security Affairs, Department of State, covering the years 1949–1951. They form a part of FRC Acc. No. 62 A 613. 3 No memorandum of conversation, February 20, by Dean Rusk with Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, USA (retired), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, has been found in Department of State files. 4 Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, Sixth Army, Presidio of San Francisco, Calif. 5 Maj. Gen. Ray T. Maddocks, Army Member, Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 6 Article 8 of the agreement between the United States and Iran respecting a military mission to Iran, signed at Tehran on October 6, 1947, excepted the giving of advice and assistance on tactical and strategical plans from the duties of the Mission (Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1666, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3306). Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) to the Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State (Bruce) S/ISA Files, Lot 52–26, MDAP–Iran [Document 215] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense ( Lemnitzer ) to the Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State ( Bruce ) top secret Washington , February 16, 1950. Subject: Iranian Program 1. Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. John H. Ohly, dated 14 December 1949, 1 subject “Iranian Program,” regarding the provision of medium tanks to Iran. 2. The points raised in the reference memorandum have been carefully considered and it is the view of the Department of Defense that from the military point of view, medium tanks should not be furnished under the MDAP to Iran because: a . The Iranian Army now experiences great difficulty in maintaining and supplying the armored cars, light tanks, and tank destroyers which have already been received from the United States. The furnishing of heavier and even more complicated combat vehicles at this time would therefore be providing equipment beyond Iranian capability to operate and maintain. b . In the event of war, it would be feasible and highly desirable for the Iranian Army to utilize light tanks for hit-and-run operations to delay a Soviet advance. The medium tank is not as suitable as the light tank for this type of operation. c . The materials to be provided the Iranian Army in the immediate future should be such as to improve the present organization in order that it may more effectively accomplish its primary mission of maintaining internal security. 3. If it is determined by the Department of State that, for political reasons, medium tanks are to be furnished to Iran, the Department of Defense will accept such a political decision and could provide fifty medium tanks mounting 76 mm guns. Such an undertaking would necessitate a major revision of the proposed Iranian program and the deletion of items indicated in paragraph 5 below, unless additional funds are made available for the Iranian program. 4. With specific reference to your memorandum of 14 December 1949, the Department of Defense capabilities are as follows: a. Provision of medium tanks with 75 mm gun . Fifty tanks are available from excess at estimated costs as follows: Rehabilitation $600,000 PHC&T 382,500 Spare Parts 500,000 Ammunition   200,000 Total— $1,682,500 b. Provision of medium tanks with 76 mm gun . (1) These tanks could not be furnished from new procurement since to tool up for so small a number would make the cost per tank prohibitive. No new U.S. procurement is contemplated. (2) If modification is undertaken to convert fifty tanks from the 75 mm gun to 76 mm gun, the cost would be between $60,000 and $90,000 per tank. Total cost of fifty as follows: Rehabilitation $600,000 Conversion at $75,000 3,750,000 PHC&T 382,500 Spare Parts 500,000 Ammunition   1,050,760 Total— $6,283,260 (3) If these tanks are supplied from below minimum requirement level at rehabilitation cost, the cost of fifty is as follows: Rehabilitation $600,000 PHC&T 467,000 Spare Parts 500,000 Ammunition   1,050,760 Total— $2,617,760 c . Spare parts can be provided for delivery with the tanks and will cost approximately $10,000 per tank for one year’s supply. The future supply of spare parts will depend on whether other countries are supplied with the same type tank supplied Iran. If not, the cost of supplying spare parts for only fifty tanks of one type will be extremely high. d . To decide appropriately what support equipment would be required for fifty tanks requires a detailed knowledge of the contemplated organization and employment of such a tank unit (dispersion into small groups or employment as a unit). The minimum heavy support equipment for a modified battalion of fifty tanks or less is believed to be: Item Delivered Cost 2 Heavy wreckers $60,543 4 Tank transporters 90,944 10 Personnel carriers, HT, M3 or M3A1 101,540 30 Special tool sets (armored command, separate battalion, general mechanics, welders, artillery mechanics, etc.) 9,000 Total— $262,027 e . It is not considered advisable to provide Iran with additional tank destroyers or light tanks. They already have available 160 light tanks and 55 tank destroyers received from the U.S. supplemented with 9 heavy wrecking trucks which are deemed adequate for their requirements. f . Although it is possible to make off-shore purchases for MDAP requirements, it is considered desirable to push local manufacture of the 7.9 mm ammunition since adequate facilities for such manufacture exist in Iran. It is felt that assistance to Canada, by purchase of ammunition for Iran, is of doubtful value to the U.S. in view of the small quantities entailed. The Department of Defense does not contemplate standardizing small arms weapons in Iran with U.S. weapons. g . It is not considered practical to provide the suggested 6 recoilless 75 mm rifles to the Iranian Army. 5. If the decision is taken by the Department of State, from the political point of view, to provide medium tanks, it is believed that medium tanks equipped with the 76 mm gun should be provided and the estimated cost would be as indicated in paragraph 4( b ) (2) or (4) ( b ) (3) above. It should be realized that the total cost ($2,617,760 for tanks and ammunition, plus $262,027 for supporting equipment) amounting to $2.88 million is over one-third of the $8.6 million programmed for Iran. If the procedure in paragraph 4 ( b ) (3) is followed, the cost of this additional equipment cannot be met from the $8.6 million without unbalancing the presently planned program for Iran. The Department of Defense considers that the only items which can be deducted from the Iranian program to offset the cost of the tanks and related equipment are 424 2½-ton trucks, and this substitution is not recommended from the military point of view. 6. Since discussions with the Iranians are planned for a date in the near future, it is essential that the Department of Defense be advised as a matter of urgency of the political decision made by the Department of State on this matter in order that the necessary reprogramming may be accomplished. L. L. Lemnitzer Major General, U.S. Army 1 For text, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 590 . The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 888.131/2–2550: Telegram [Document 216] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tehran , February 25, 1950—11 a. m. 324. Under Secretary Foreign Affairs Ardalan has informed Embassy representative of Iranian Government desire obtain suspension for some years of principal and interest payments due under 26 million dollars arms credit agreement. 1 He stated that dollar shortage necessitated such a suggestion and said Iranian Ambassador and Military Attaché Washington instructed similarly approach US Government. In final terms Iranian dollar position largely depends upon extent to which British will convert sterling into dollars under monetary agreement. 2 Outside of oil revenues convertible into dollars it seems apparent Iranian dollar needs much exceed dollar earnings. According to US customs figures, Iranian imports from US during first eight months 1949 amounted to 53 million dollars while exports to US only amounted to 12 million dollars. Further, although Ardalan did not say so, Iranians are undoubtedly facing a situation at present, with renegotiation oil concession still pending, in which they might be very disinclined ask British for such a considerable conversion. Embassy’s initial feelings are that in view present political and economic situation, it would be beneficial to US interests and policy objectives if some means could be found to grant the desired moratorium. Embassy suggests foregoing be handled on highly classified basis and Iranian Embassy cautioned to be most reticent. A misunderstanding of factors involved could easily lead to unfavorable publicity at a time when it is essential Iran retain good will created in US by Shah’s visit. Wiley 1 Reference is to the agreement signed at Washington, July 29, 1948; see Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , p. 166 . 2 In the memorandum of understanding between Bank Melli Iran and the Bank of England, effective November 6, 1947, and extended to November 20, 1950, the Iranian Government intimated its intention not to ask for transfers from the sterling accounts of Bank Melli Iran and the Imperial Bank of Iran to American accounts except insofar as essential goods could not be obtained as cheaply from the sterling area or purchased elsewhere for pounds sterling and had to be purchased in countries to which American accounts apply (appendix A to the memorandum, March 14, 1950, by George Woodbridge, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, GTI, to Mr. Jernegan (GTI), 888.131/3–150). The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 888.131/2–2750: Telegram [Document 217] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , February 27, 1950—9 a. m. 329. As reported Weeka February 24, 1 government resigned Thursday night. 2 As expected Prime Minister Sa Ed was charged by Shah with formation new government. Yesterday in Majlis, four deputies, including Sa Ed’s ex-political under secretary, Keshavarz Sadr, opened strong attack on Prime Minister charging him with violation of constitution by postponing opening of Sixteenth Majlis beyond three months from date of closing of previous Parliament. Deputy Abbas Islami then introduced impeachment motion against Prime Minister which was placed on agenda by Majlis President Hekmat. 3 It is not impossible impeachment may have been instigated by Sa Ed himself. He operates smoothly, and I am sure he has little desire form new government in view Shah’s decided attitude that AIOC renegotiation must be presented to Majlis forthwith and as is. Talked with outgoing Minister National Economy, Dr. Taqi Nasr, at length yesterday. He apparently expects reenter government. 4 He said that Minister National Economy would become head seven-year plan organization. Present head Iran’s Supreme Council Ali Mansur, would, he thought, go to Ankara as Ambassador replacing Dr. Ghani. He regarded this as most unfortunate since he feared Mansur would leave nothing undone to undermine US position in Turkey. Nasr went on to intimate that Dr. Mosharraf Nafici is playing very dubious role as managing director of plan. He also was critical of what he called “Ebtehaj–Ala 5 axis”. He thought Ebtehaj would be obliged to leave Bank Melli. Re overseas consultants, Nasr asserted their work is being sabotaged right and left, and that their recommendations are being scoffed at and disregarded in ministries. He stated very bluntly that if collaboration between foreign advisers and Iran Government is desired, only means of obtaining such collaboration would be to invest advisers with executive authority. Same belief was expressed to Dooher yesterday by Prince Abdorreza and to me a few days ago by Foreign Minister Siassi. 6 I discussed with Nasr proposal by Foreign Office that US Government grant moratorium on arms credit payments (Embtel 324, February 25). 7 I suggested that such proposal, if officially made at this time, would be most unfortunate. 8 Moreover, if such request coincided with large capital expenditures of foreign exchange for exploiting unknown oil resources, Iran might find justification difficult. During discussion of general inadvisability of raising oil question here at this time, Nasr strongly insisted that in its economic development planning Iran should place immediate and primary emphasis on alleviation of condition of masses rather than on long-range projects. He too expressed great concern over progress being made by Tudeh Party and indicated that only immediate economic measures could relieve situation. Sent Department 329; repeated Moscow 25, London 24, Department pass Moscow; Department inform Army, Navy, Air. Wiley 1 Not printed. 2 February 23. 3 Reza Hekmat, President of the Iranian Majlis. 4 Dr. Taqi Nasr was retained as Minister of National Economy in the Cabinet presented to the Shah by Prime Minister Saed on February 26. 5 Hussein Ala was named Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ali Gholi Ardalan Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet presented to the Shah by Prime Minister Saed on February 26. 6 No record has been found in Department of State files of this conversation between Ambassador Wiley and the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Siassi. 7 Supra . 8 No explanation has been found in Department of State files of the Embassy’s change of attitude toward a moratorium; cf. supra . The Department strongly endorsed the Embassy’s discouragement of a request for a moratorium (telegram 224, March 2, to Tehran, 888.131/2–2550). The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.00/2–2750: Telegram [Document 218] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , February 27, 1950—11 a. m. 330. Department inform Army, Navy, Air. The situation in Iran is bad, deteriorating, and dangerous. I do not believe that Razmara (Embtel 268, February 14) 1 or Eqbal 2 (Embtel 289, February 19) 1 or our many other top level contacts, all unanimous, are being unduly pessimistic. Iran is dominated economically by archaic feudalism, tempered only by corruption. Within the ruling hierarchy there is notable lack of coordination. Economic conditions involving hunger and despair among the masses are an obvious invitation to subversive activities. This invitation is not being “declined.” We cannot counteract this by VOA, Smith-Mundt, or Point Four. More is needed. Point Four, for example, with money, will not accomplish very much because the necessary governmental and financial support and preconditions for investment do not exist; in any event not enough to meet the immediate situation. Iran is a light-weight matched against a heavy-weight. Under no circumstances can we be very optimistic. However, our investment for peace in the world is so vast that I question whether we can justify, either to ourselves or to Iran, aid to Iran, both economic and military, that is only “token.” We should face the facts and on the highest level re-evaluate the position of Iran in the mosaic of our strategic planning and thinking. We should then decide either to let Iran go down the drain by default or else to attempt something effective. By effective, I mean economic measures based on adequate financial support through grants and credits which under American control and direction could alleviate any crushing distress of the masses. This in turn would facilitate military collaboration since the army is recruited from the masses. While one may have no illusions that Iran could successfully resist Russian invasion, it is true that Iran if given the will to resist could very greatly impede such invasion, thus augmenting in considerable measure the logistic and manpower burden on the invading army. Telegraphic evaluation of the increase in subversive activities under the direction of Tudeh will follow shortly, 3 also analysis economic situation by despatch. 4 Sent Department 330; repeated London 25, Department pass Moscow 26. Wiley 1 Not printed. 2 Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal, Iranian Minister of Roads and Communications. 1 Not printed. 3 Telegram 341, February 27, from Tehran, not printed (788.001/2–2750). 4 Despatch 87, March 6, from Tehran, transmitted a memorandum prepared by the Embassy for Department of State consideration, analyzing the situation in Iran and suggesting a reexamination of the Department’s policy on economic aid to Iran (888.00/3–650). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (McWilliams) Secretary’s Daily Meetings: Lot 58 D 609: March 1950 1 [Document 219] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Executive Secretariat ( McWilliams ) secret [ Washington ,] March 1, 1950. Subject: Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary Participants: The Secretary Mr. Nitze 2 Mr. Webb 3 Mr. Merchant 4 Mr. Rusk Mr. Humelsine 5 Mr. Barrett 6 Mr. Hare 7 Mr. McFall 8 Mr. Battle 9 Mr. Perkins 10 Mr. McWilliams 11 Item 1. Iran [Action: Mr. Reber 12 ] The Secretary asked for an explanation of the situation in Iran as reported in Telegram 330. 13 Mr. Hare said that undoubtedly the situation was not good but that we periodically receive cries of “wolf” from that area and we are never quite sure when there is a genuine cry. In this case he explained the cries of “wolf” have been received before the facts of the situation. The Secretary asked if this was not a case of corrupt and incompetent government which no matter how much equipment or money we put into it it would be doomed to fail. Mr. Hare said this was somewhat the case and that we think the seven year plan gives the best promise for helping Iran. He explained our assistance in this plan although it is to be carried out and financed by the Iranian government. Mr. Rusk said he thought Mrs. Pinchot 14 might help on this. Note to Mr. Reber: I asked Mr. Peurifoy 15 to see Mrs. Pinchot and see about giving her a job. I think we had better check up on this to see what, if anything, has been done. 16 [Here follows summary of discussion on items other than Iran.] 1 Lot 58 D 609 is a chronological collection of the records of the Secretary of State’s daily meetings with top Department of State officials for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the special Assistant to the Secretary of State. 2 Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State. 3 James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State. 4 Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. 5 Carlisle H. Humelsine, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. 6 Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. 7 Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 8 Jack K. McFall, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. 9 Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. 10 George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. 11 William J. McWilliams, Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State. 12 James Q. Reber, Chief of the Committee Secretariat Staff of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State. Brackets in the source text. 13 February 27, from Tehran, supra . 14 The Department offered Cornelia Bryce Pinchot, widow of Gifford Pinchot, former Governor of Pennsylvania, an assignment as a Foreign Service reserve officer at the Embassy in Iran for three or four months to develop contacts with Iranian labor and peasant groups (letter, March 7, by Mr. Hare to Mrs. Pinchot; 123.1/1–1150). The editors have not found records in Department of State files to indicate she accepted and carried out this assignment. 15 John E. Peurifoy, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. 16 This paper bears the notation: “Assignment made Mar. 2. J[ames] Q. R[eber]. Hare asked by A to follow up.” The Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) to the Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) Tehran Embassy Files: Lot 59 F 17: 400 MDAP [Document 220] The Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs ( Jernegan ) to the Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) secret official–informal Washington , March 6, 1950. Dear Mr. Ambassador : For the past several months GTI has been working very hard to have some medium tanks made available to Iran under the Military Aid Program. After much study, the Department of Defense has reported that 50 such tanks will be physically available. 1 The earlier model, with a 75 mm. gun, could be provided relatively quickly at a cost of about $1.5 million, while the later 76 mm. gun model would cost about $2.5 and would be available about a year later than the 75’s. However, Defense does not consider that either tank, or any other medium tank, would have any military utility in Iranian hands. Consequently, they are willing to include this item in the program only if the State Department considers it absolutely necessary for political reasons. Our own military assistance unit, under Ambassador Bruce and Jack Ohly, is dubious about the whole matter but has agreed to include the 50 medium tanks if the Iranians absolutely insist on having them. As a sort of compromise I have agreed with Ohly and General Lemnitzer (head of the Defense Department’s military aid unit) that the program initially presented to the Iranian negotiators shall not include medium tanks but that this is to be a bargaining position rather than a final position on our part. If the Iranian representatives ask for the tanks, our people will advance all the military arguments they can think of against the idea: for example, that they would not be suited to the realities of warfare in Iran, that they would be difficult to operate and expensive to maintain, that spare parts might not be available after a year or two, that they are expensive and later models will be much more expensive still, etc. If this fails to shake the Iranian determination, we will then discuss the possibility that other parts of the Iranian program will have to be cut down, eliminating items such as trucks which we consider would be much more useful to the Iranian forces than medium tanks. However, if all of these fail to discourage them, it seems virtually certain at this stage that the military aid people will agree to provide the 50 tanks. (No one is willing to consider the Shah’s request for 150.) 2 The major question remaining unresolved among our own people here is whether, if the tanks are furnished, their cost should be covered by a corresponding reduction in other items programmed for Iran or by transferring additional funds to the Iranian program from the Greek program. We expect to save a fairly substantial amount in the Greek program this fiscal year, but there are other, high priority claimants for these savings in addition to Iran. At this point I am somewhat uncertain as to just how important the tanks are in the Iranian picture. Since the Shah’s visit here, we have heard little or nothing from Iranian sources on this subject. The latest word is a recent telegram from you quoting General Razmara as describing the Shah’s desire for jet planes 3 and medium tanks as “fantastic”. 4 This would seem to imply that it is only the Shah who feels strongly on the subject and that even he may be talked out of it. This is one of the main reasons that I have agreed to the type of bargaining and delaying tactics outlined above. We could not justify the provision of these tanks, even to ourselves, unless their refusal would have definitely bad repercussions in Iran. I should be very glad to have your latest thinking on this subject. Sincerely yours, Jack 1 See the memorandum, February 16, by Major General Lemnitzer to Mr. Bruce, p. 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] . 2 Regarding the Shah’s request for 150 medium tanks, see footnote 1, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 557 . He again stated that Iran needed tanks at a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon on November 18, 1949; see the editorial note, ibid. , p. 581 . 3 Regarding the Shah’s desire for the supply of jet planes to Iran by the United Kingdom, see telegram 282, March 12, 1949, from Tehran, and telegram 1355, October 22, 1949, from Tehran, ibid. , pp. 488 and 565 respectively. 4 Telegram 267, February 14, from Tehran, not printed, reported that Lt. Gen. Razmara made this statement in a conversation with Mr. Dooher on February 13, 1950 (788.00/2–1450). The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.5 MAP/3F–1350: Telegram [Document 221] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , March 13, 1950—11 p. m. 432. Tomap. Lunched today with Ardalan acting Foreign Minister and informed him of excerpts Deptel 265 March 10, 1950 1 re Iran Emb Washington remarks on MDAP agreement. He expressed amazement and said statements (first paragraph urtel) were not in accord with the instructions sent by the FonOff to Washington Embassy. He indicated clearly that agreement can be effected on basis exchange of notes without submission to Majlis. He then handed me a “proposed draft for an exchange of notes” which he said should be considered only as working paper, though it already had the approval of the Prime Minister. He hopes to airpouch his draft to Washington Embassy Monday. If his proposed draft meets with Department’s approval Ardalan would like to submit draft to Shah on latter’s return and to the Council of Ministers. He stated that the draft was practically identical with the Department’s draft except for Iranian objection to accepting commitment to future legislation enacted in US. He also said he thought it would be necessary to excise the financial clause from the secret minute. 2 Following is text Ardalan’s draft: “Upon the instruction of my Government I have the honor to refer to the conversations which have recently taken place between the representatives of our two Governments concerning the military assistance (handing over of equipment and materials as well as services needed for use or repair of such equipment and materials) by the Government of the US of America to the Government of Iran pursuant to US Public Law No. 329 (81st Congress) and to confirm the understandings reached as a result of those conversations as follows: 1. The Government of the US, recognizing this principle that economic recovery is essential to international peace and security and must be given clear priority, undertakes to make or continue to make available to the Government of Iran on a grant basis such equipment materials and services as the Government of the US may authorize. The furnishing of any such assistance as may be authorized hereto shall be consistent with the charter of the UN and shall be subject to all of the applicable terms and conditions and termination provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions of this paragraph. 2. The Government of Iran undertakes to make effective use of assistance received pursuant to paragraph 1 for the purposes for which such assistance was furnished and will not devote such assistance to purposes other than those for which it was furnished. 3. In the common security interest of both Governments, the Government of Iran undertakes not to transfer to any person not an officer or agent of such Government or to any other nation title to or possession of any equipment, materials or services received on a grant basis pursuant to paragraph 1, without the prior consent of the Government of the US. 4. The Government of Iran, after giving due consideration to reasonable requirements for domestic use and commercial export of Iran, agrees to facilitate the production, transport, export and transfer to the Government of the US, for such period of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon, of raw and semi-processed materials required by the US as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, and which may be available in Iran. 5. ( a ) The Government of Iran will take appropriate measures consistent with security to keep the public informed of operations pursuant to these understandings. ( b ) Each Government will take such security measures as may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified military articles, services or information furnished by the other government pursuant to these understandings. 6. The Government of Iran except as may otherwise be agreed between the two Governments, grants duty-free treatment and exemption from internal taxation on importation or exportation to products, property, materials or equipment imported into its territory to equip the armed forces of Iran in connection with this understanding. 7. The Government of Iran agrees to receive personnel of the Government of the US who will discharge in its territory the responsibilities of the Government of the US under these understandings and to make available to them the necessary facuities. 8. The two Governments will, upon request to either of them, negotiate appropriate arrangements between them respecting responsibility for patent or similar claims based on the use of devices, processes, technological information or other forms of property protected by law in connection with equipment, material or services furnished pursuant to paragraph 1. In such negotiations, consideration shall be given to the inclusion of an understanding whereby each Government will assume the responsibility for all such claims of its nationals and such claims arising in its jurisdiction of nationals of any country not a party to these understandings. 9. The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult re any matter relating to the application of these understandings or to operations or arrangements carried out pursuant to these understandings. 10. Nothing herein shall be construed to alter, amend or otherwise modify the agreements between the US of America and Iran, signed at Tehran November 27, 1943, and October 6, 1947, as amended or extended. This letter and the reply of the Government of Iran thereto indicating acceptance thereof will be considered an agreement between the Government of the US of America and the Government of Iran, entering into force upon receipt of the reply of the Government of Iran, and will be registered with the Secretariat of the UN”. Our comments follow: Preamble: Since it merely puts us on record as having discussed the “services needed for use and repair of such equipment and materials”, the changes proposed appear harmless. Paragraph 1: Ardalan draft does not commit Iran to provisions of future and hence unforeseeable legislative acts of US as he indicated to me (see above). This change appears reasonable. Ardalan draft also clearly indicates that material furnished is to be given, not merely made available, to Iran. Unless contrary to legal provisions, see no objection to acceptance this idea. Omission of phrase “under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the Governments” does not appear vital since the terms and conditions are stated in the paragraph. Paragraph 2: Though it makes the provision even more restrictive, the omission is not detrimental to US and probably face saving to Iran. Paragraph 4: Ardalan draft states that Iran’s reasonable requirements shall be considered before agreeing to “facilitate production”, etc., not merely that, as in US draft, arrangements for transfer itself shall be given due regard etc. This appears reasonable. Paragraph 6: Omission word “will” believed typographical error. Paragraph 7: Ardalan version could perhaps deny US representatives facilities to observe the progress of the assistance furnished, etc. Recommend adherence to US version. Ardalan has, I think, tried sincerely and well to work out things in order to permit solution without necessity Majlis ratification. Department inform Army, Navy, Air. Wiley 1 Not printed; it reported that the Iranian Embassy informed the Department of State that the Embassy believed any agreement committing Iran to a definite course of action required ratification by the Majlis. The Department instructed the Embassy in Iran to obtain Ardalan’s oral views on the U.S. draft MDAP agreement, if he was unable to provide a counterdraft. (611.88/3–850). 2 The Department of State draft note and secret minute of negotiation are quoted in telegram 140, February 8, to Tehran, not printed (788.5 MAP/2–850). Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State (Ohly), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) 788.5 MAP/3–1850 [Document 222] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State ( Ohly ), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense ( Lemnitzer ) top secret Washington , March 18, 1950. Subject: Theory of Ensuing Equipment List Discussions with Iranian Representatives. As informally agreed upon between our respective staffs, it is believed desirable to reduce to writing the theory which should govern the impending discussions of the end item lists in the Iranian Program with the Iranian representatives. Specific instructions for the United States representatives are concurrently being forwarded under separate cover. 1 It is believed desirable that a representative of this office should act as chairman of the United States group and of the discussions. However, as the majority of the discussions will deal with technical military matters, it is anticipated that a large part of the burden of setting forth the military concepts upon which the United States positions are based will naturally devolve upon the senior representative from the Department of Defense. The Department believes it essential, in view of the fact that no bilateral agreement has yet been negotiated with Iran, that there be no possibility of the Iranians construing these discussions to be other than exploratory. It is therefore intended that the chairman will clarify this point at the outset of the meeting, and that an aide-mémoire expressing this concept will be given to the Iranian representatives. 2 This aide-mémoire will also emphasize the secret nature of these discussions. Should the question of the United States views on either joint staff talks, or of the views of the United States as to the role which Iran should play in any major war be interjected by the Iranian representatives, it will be indicated that those matters are totally separate and apart from the instant discussions, and should be dealt with accordingly. The theory upon which the discussions should be pursued is that there should be full exploration to seek to obtain the minimum Iranian desires which are consonant with the views of this Government as to the composition of the equipment program. To this end, it is believed desirable that at the outset of the conversations we should solicit from the Iranians their proposal, in writing, as to absolutely all of the items which should be included in the Program. We should simultaneously, upon receipt of this information from them, tender to them our proposal as to the equipment which we believe should be, in their best interest, contemplated.… It will probably ensue that an adjournment will be indicated at this stage in order to permit both sides to study the respective proposals. It is anticipated that the Iranian proposal will include a request for medium tanks and for destroyers, and possibly will also seek other equipment not included in the United States proposal. In consonance with the general theory of the discussions, every appropriate effort should be made to fully portray to the Iranians all of the military reasons upon which we base our conclusion that medium tanks are fully unsuited to the Iranian needs. This should be explored most thoroughly in an effort to convince the Iranian delegation of the good faith of the United States in differing with their position, and in a thorough attempt to persuade them to depart therefrom. Such a thorough discussion of the fitness of the medium tank for the Iranian Program would also constitute the groundwork for the necessary further exploration of the strength of the desire of Iran to receive these tanks. Should the Iranian representatives still persist in seeking to obtain the tanks, it might be indicated that the inclusion of the tanks might possibly cause serious damage to the transfer to Iran of considerable military equipment which in the opinion of the United States warrants a higher priority as indicated by the United States list. This should lead, if appropriate, to suggesting that the Iranians should obtain reconsideration of their instructions in light of the views expressed by the United States, ere the United States delegation seek a change in their instructions. The reaction of the Iranian Government to these steps will provide evidence upon which final determination of the political necessity of including the tanks in the Program can be made. Should the efforts to dissuade the Iranians from their desires prove fruitless, and upon final determination that an offer of tanks should be made, efforts should be made to persuade the Iranians to accept the medium tank armed with the 75 millimeter gun. Advantages of time of delivery, more efficient motor assembly, suitability for use in light of anticipated enemy action, and all other aspects thereof should be fully explored. Should the Iranians indicate a desire to further explore the 76 millimeter tank, every opportunity to give them full facts should be presented, at the same time stressing the United States belief that the tank with the 75 millimeter gun might be adequate, if indeed not preferable, in view of the early delivery date. Final choice of the item again will depend upon the strength of the Iranian view and the political need to meet the Iranian desires. The United States representatives should seek to avoid reference to specific financial limitations upon the Iranian Program, although general allusions to the undefined limitations would be in order. The necessity of seeking funds from Titles I or II of the Act in order to meet the request for tanks should not be referred to. Other additional items which might be included in the Iranian list should be dealt with, after indication of due contemplation, upon the general basis that the Program cannot, within its limitation, support them. It is believed that pursuit of this general line of discussion should permit final determination of the equipment list appropriately to be made after conclusion of the bilateral agreement. John H. Ohly 1 Not printed; the present memorandum covers the substance of the instructions (788.5 MAP/3–1850). This memorandum was initialed by Mr. Jernegan and Mr. Ferguson of GTI as well as Mr. Wolf and Germaine B. Angle of S/MDA. 2 Aide-mémoire of March 24, p. 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 226 ] . The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.00/3–2350: Telegram [Document 223] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tehran , March 23, 1950—4 p. m. 520. Inform Army, Navy, Air. Yesterday Shah told Prime Minister Saed and ministers fight against corruption must be postponed “for reasons of state”. He then accepted collective resignation of Saed government and a few hours later appointed Ali Mansur to form next government. This morning Dooher had three hour talk with Prince Abdor Reza, Dr. Taqi Nasr and Prop. Chief Shahrokh. 1 Dooher on my instructions endeavored to avert by discreet suggestions abrupt and dangerous reaction on their part. He was successful to following extent: (1) Prince Abdor Reza will develop diplomatic ailment and withdraw from active participation in economic affairs. He will not however openly oppose Shah or even Mansur. (2) Dr. Nasr will decline post already offered him in next Cabinet. He will make statement of his reasons for doing so but will not attack Shah. He will not leave Iran for time being. (3) Shahrokh will remain in post of Prop. Chief. He will, however, develop serious attack of writers cramp and produce no propaganda for new Prime Minister. His function, from Abdor Reza’s standpoint, will be to keep Prince informed of developments in government, including expect misappropriations and possible intrigues with Soviets. Shahrokh has seen Mansur twice since appointment. Prime Minister had long talk with Shah last night at which it was reportedly agreed Shah would choose half of Cabinet and Mansur remainder. Mansur apparently wants Bader, Ex-Minister Finance and currently head of Meshed Shrine Foundation, as Minister Finance. Bader has unsavory reputation in financial matters and presumably would fit into Mansur’s plans. However, Shah may insist on Golshayan for reasons of AIOC policy. Nasr expects Ebtehaj now to execute about face on credit policy and pour money into Bazaar in order to give Mansur government economic shot in arm. If this is done, Nasr believes, Ebtehaj, despite background of patriotism and honesty will have hitched his wagon to most corrupt and self-seeking elements in country. Immediate mass reaction to Shah’s appointment has been one of bitter disappointment and, if possible, deepening of general feeling of frustration. Shah’s reputation as crusader against corruption, tenuous though it was, has been diluted. Curiously enough strongest reaction against Mansur’s appointment is within court itself. Sent Department 520, repeated Moscow 58, Dhahran 41 for McGhee, Department pass Moscow. Wiley 1 Bahram Shahrokh, Director General of Propaganda. The Deputy Director (Rountree) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) 788.00/3–2350 [Document 224] The Deputy Director ( Rountree ) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs ( Jernegan ) secret official—informal Tehran , March 23, 1950. Dear Jack : My few days in Tehran 1 have not, needless to say, converted me into a Persian expert, although they have been extremely helpful. I have of course spent long hours with the Ambassador, Richards, 2 and all other Embassy officer personnel, and I have met with our military officers, OCI representatives, the British, and a substantial number of leading Iranians. The claims and counterclaims, accusations and counter-accusations, undercurrents and overtones—encountered everywhere in the Iranian picture—make exceedingly difficult an objective appraisal of the situation in such a short stay, although I have formulated certain views. Major emphasis in my talks has been in the economic field, the main subject of this interim report which I hope to expand considerably upon my return. The combination of three primary factors leads virtually everyone with whom I have talked to the conclusion that the immediate situation in Iran is dangerous and explosive. They are (1) increased activities of the Tudeh Party, (2) the current internal economic depression, and (3) the incredible disorganization, confusion and uncertainty among the Government leaders. There appears to be no question that the reorganized Tudeh Party is considerably more effective than it has been, at least since 1946. Statistical or other precise information as to its activities is lacking, but from the best informed sources of several nationalities with whom I have talked, I conclude that primary activity has been in the publication and dissemination of literature, mainly in the larger urban areas of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan and Abadan. Party members come largely from those areas and particularly from AIOC’s 70,000 employees, railway workers, and other large industrial professions, although the Party seems to be concentrating at the moment on the intelligentsia. British studies have led them to estimate Party membership at about 12 to 14 thousand, of which 4 to 5 thousand are in Tehran and 3 to 4 thousand in Azerbaijan, with the bulk of the remainder in Abadan and Isfahan. There are no estimates—or even guesstimates—as to the number of followers. The Party has not infiltrated into the Army to any perceptible extent, and General Razmara’s concern in this connection is related entirely to a situation which might develop rather than having been based upon an existing condition. Not much is known as to the Tudeh organization itself, although it obviously is well-organized (thanks largely to Komissarov) and is under extremely tight discipline. It is the existence of this effective organization—the only real political party in Iran—that intensifies the concern of practically everyone here, it being felt that the present public psychology would provide an extremely fertile field for rapid expansion and even an attempted coup d’état if an incident occurred which would establish a good opportunity. Whatever its chances of success, the dangers inherent in such an eventuality are evident. Concerning the current internal economic situation, the British Embassy recently obtained information from all British consulates throughout Iran comparing the present picture with that of September 1949 and a year ago. These reports, which conform to information and impressions which I have gained elsewhere, indicate in general, and relatively, that consumer prices are lower, consumer stocks, particularly food items, are considerably up, and plantings and crop prospects are 20 percent higher than last year; but that business turnover has shown a marked decrease, and unemployment has risen. The economy appears to be in a state of depression which stems largely from last year’s sharp decline in agricultural production. Producers, principally agricultural, were deprived of earnings which normally would have been turned into commodity purchases. While the note issue has remained the same (7.8 billion rials), a larger percentage (1.8 billion rials at present as compared with 1.2 billion rials a year ago) has been held in the Bank Melli reserve, and the velocity of circulation has been reduced to the point where consumption goods in the hands of merchants are not moving, notwithstanding lower prices. Taqi Nasr told me that No-Ruz buying this year is only 60% of last year’s. Large quantities of imports (in Khorramshahr alone more than 200,000 tons) have remained at the docks for several months due to the inability of importers—lacking rials to buy foreign exchange and to cover internal absorption costs, and deprived of credits by tight Bank Melli policies—to take them up. As indicated, the generally reduced price structure results from plentiful supplies on the market and the low velocity of circulation. Large imports during the past year (170 per cent of 1948) far exceeded the absorptive capacity, but were permitted primarily in order to convert foreign exchange held by the Bank Melli into rials to cover Government and Plan Organization expenditures without an increase in the note circulation. The circumstances have presented a real problem for manufacturers, importers and merchants, and unquestionably a large number have been forced into bankruptcy. “While worthwhile estimates are not available, evidence points to a great increase in bankruptcies in 1949 as compared with 1948. Bankruptcies and reduced business activity have thrown more people out of jobs. The main unemployment problem centers largely in Tehran, where an estimated 40,000 persons are without work, in Tabriz and in Isfahan. Unfortunately these are the centers of the most effective Tudeh Party activities. Underemployment (reduced number of work days) is as serious as unemployment. The immediate situation could be improved by putting more money into circulation and liberalizing credit policies, and if the expenditures by which this were done were of a productive nature the dangers of undue inflation would be minimized. A few work relief projects are under way and some expenditures are being made by way of implementing the Seven Year Program. However, a limiting factor is the existing currency regulations which ( a ) restrict rial circulation to its present level, and ( b ) provide that the note issue (in effect) must be covered by 77 per cent gold and foreign exchange. Enactment of Ebtehaj’s bill, which soon will be presented to the Majlis, would authorize increased note circulation and reduce the coverage requirement to 50 per cent. This would mean that up to $60,000,000 additional currency could be issued without further backing. The prospect of this bill soon passing the Majlis seem dim, however, notwithstanding optimism which Mr. Ebtehaj expressed to me. More about this later. The third primary factor which I mentioned in connection with the current crisis is the almost unbelievable dissension among the Government leaders, who provide no program or direction for meeting the situation. Elaboration upon this point is, I think, unnecessary. You are aware of the Taqizadeh–Ebtehaj conflict, Abdorreza versus Ebtehaj, Ebtehaj versus Sa’ed, almost everybody versus Mansur, Razmara versus Yazdanpanah, etc. ad nauseum. As an example of the problem, the currency reform bill which I have mentioned (the enactment of at least part of which—liberalization of issue—all economists seem to agree is essential before anything really effective can be done with or without American aid) appears at the moment to have little chance simply because it is Ebtehaj’s bill. Substantive arguments against it have, of course, been advanced. The Seven Year Plan is being disrupted because of dissension among the members of the Supreme Council, which recently, without even the knowledge of OCI, committed substantial sums of money for projects not included in the program. OCI is, I believe, doing a good job under the circumstances, but insofar as real progress is concerned it will be butting its head against a stone wall until some order comes out of the present chaotic Government structure, or at least until some of the obstructionists on the Iranian side, such as Mansur, are removed. Everyone in Iran would, I am sure, agree that things are bad. Perhaps that is a principal reason why they are bad. The pessimism reflected by the Shah, the Government, the Majlis, manufacturers, merchants, landowners, and the bourgeoisie in general, has intensified the discouragement and disillusionment of the small people throughout the country who are the very objects of communist propaganda. Nevertheless, for whatever reason, the situation appears to be serious and dangerous and something should be done about it. The problem is, what can be done. As Ebtehaj put it to me, if his currency bill is enacted; if a reasonable AIOC agreement is concluded, and if military expenditures are not increased above their present level, Iran would not need American economic aid except of the Point IV type. Other informed sources here generally agree with this conclusion, adding the further qualification that if a brace and bit could be placed upon Ebtehaj. Materialization of all “ifs” in time to meet the present crisis within a reasonable period, however, is quite unlikely. On the basis of the present AIOC agreement, foreign exchange resources for the year 1329 (beginning March 21, 1950) are tentatively estimated by OCI at 84,506,875 pounds, including 28,000,000 pounds presently fully available for expenditure purposes (this excludes the note cover, but obviously is considerably less than we had thought to be the case. Recent Embassy despatches have explained the situation in this regard); 17,000,000 pounds in estimated trade returns; 24,000,000 pounds in AIOC rial purchases; 14,500,000 pounds in royalties; and 1,006,875 pounds in the AIOC dividend for the 1328 account. Total charges upon the foreign exchange account would, in the absence of a new AIOC agreement, indicate a deficit of 9,300,000 pounds. The liability side of the ledger consists of 60,000,000 pounds for imports on current account, assuming (as I think for planning purposes we must) the same level as 1328; outstanding obligations of 15,500,000 pounds; fixed foreign exchange deposits of 5,000,000 pounds; and a blocked asset of 6,300,000 pounds representing the British payment for wartime use of the Iranian railway system. As you know, the AIOC royalties (under present circumstances 14,500,000 pounds) are allotted to the Plan Organization for use in both foreign exchange and rial expenditures. To the extent that this fund is used for foreign exchange expenditures, the 9,300,000 pound deficit would be increased. (The portion converted into rials is, of course, available to the Bank Melli for sale to importers under the import program). There are several possible sources for meeting this deficit. The Plan Organization is soon submitting to the International Bank an application for loans for four projects totalling $15,400,000, a small portion of the rial expenditures of which is included in the Plan Organization’s own program. It is understood that a Bank mission is due to arrive in Tehran the middle of April to study this matter, and the prospects appear to be good that at least half of this sum will be granted. OCI hopes to increase the amount of loans to be discussed by suggesting additional projects, engineering for which has not been undertaken by the Plan. These would be principally agricultural settlement schemes. Secondly, ratification of the new AIOC agreement, soon to be submitted to the Majlis, would make immediately available to Iran an additional 31,458,550 pounds, representing reserve payments and royalty increments from 1947 through 1950. If the agreement is ratified (which is unlikely in its present form) the only financial limitation upon implementation of the Seven Year Development Program of the magnitude now anticipated would be the internal rial problem which can be solved only by the Iranians themselves, and the solution of which should be relatively simple if it were not for the enormous problem of politics and personalities. A third possibility lies in the enactment of the currency bill. As I said, reduction of the cover requirement to 50% would, on the basis of present circulation, release the equivalent of $60,000,000 which could be used in part to cover new currency issues and in part—perhaps $30,000,000—for imports and foreign expenses. Turning more particularly to the question of the Plan Organization budget, the program with estimated costs for 1329 is in the process of preparation but is not yet available. Preliminary figures obtained from OCI, however, indicate that 2,790 million rials (the equivalent of 31 million pounds) will be needed for justifiable Plan Organization projects. This includes, in millions of rials, 550 for railways, 490 for water projects, 250 for Industrial Bank factories, 350 for other factories, 300 for commitments for new industries, 300 for agriculture, 100 for public health and miscellaneous programs, 100 for Plan Organization administration, and 350 for “flash plan” projects chosen to demonstrate immediate and impressive progress. As against this total estimated program, funds available include the estimated 1.3 billion rials (14,500,000 pounds) in oil royalties and 203 million rials representing the book balance at the end of the year 1328. Under these calculations the Plan Organization program would run a deficit of about 1.3 billion rials. In addition, about 1.1 billion rials would be needed to meet applications for loans to private industries under the aegis of the Plan, but the portion of these applications which are approved (perhaps half) would be financed by the Bank Melli; and some 250,000 tons of imports now being held up at the docks need to be financed by Bank Melli credits. The present tight credit policies of the Bank, however, indicate that neither the deficit of the Plan Organization nor the credits for other necessary industrial expenditures would be extended unless the currency legislation is enacted. I necessarily must exclude consideration of credit arrangements to meet normal government expenditures since no estimates of the regular government budget are available. It is generally assumed, however, that the budget will add considerably to this general problem. The government budget for 1328 was out of balance at least 420 million rials, and it is believed (but not confirmed) to have been even more. The deficit was financed by Bank Melli advances. Present estimates place the 1329 deficit at an even higher figure. An analysis of the foregoing would demonstrate in theory at least that it is within the Iranian capability not only to meet the current economic crisis, but to carry out the Seven Year Development program without American financial aid, and, if the new AIOC agreement is signed and other effective measures taken, with relatively small International Bank loans. In terms of the Secretary’s recent policy statement, 3 American aid is not the principal missing component in the situation, speaking from a purely economic point of view. Nevertheless, I have concluded that some form of American financial assistance on an emergency basis should be granted. This can and should be justified on political grounds. It can only be rationalized on economic grounds. There are three main reasons why American financial aid should be extended to Iran immediately: 1. For psychological purposes. Rightly or wrongly, the Iranians have been led to expect American assistance, and they attribute the present deplorable state of the economy to the fact that the United States has done nothing. The Iranian people do not know the intricacies of their economy and are not aware of the capabilities which they have of meeting their own problems. They only know that the economy has deteriorated and that the United States’ help has consisted of nothing more than promises of some “specialists” in due time. Rightly or wrongly, they compare American treatment of Iran with our programs in Greece, Turkey and Western Europe, and recent announcements in regard to other Asian countries, and almost universally conclude that we are less interested in Iran. I am impressed with the effectiveness of Russian and Tudeh propaganda in this regard in light of the visibly deteriorating economy. I am also impressed with reports of the loss of prestige of the United States in recent weeks. I believe that an announcement of some form of American financial aid to tide Iran over this particular critical period would provide the best means of arresting this unfortunate trend. 2. To assist in the immediate short-term economic situation. As I have said, it is highly unlikely under existing circumstances that necessary measures will be taken by the Government itself to remove the causes for the present economic depression. I believe that things soon can be worked out so that American financial aid will not be needed. However, a great contribution to the present situation could be made by immediately authorizing the financing of projects within the general framework of the Plan Organization program, but over and above those which can be undertaken with that organization’s financial resources at the present time. Unemployed could be put to work on projects chosen to show results immediately; increased purchasing power could be created to inject new life into the business commmunity. (This obviously is not as simple as I am putting it. Certain problems involved will be referred to later.) 3. As an instrument of American policy. The Ambassador has said to me that we are playing in a big game without a single white chip. We are currently trying to influence the Iranian Government in matters of absolutely vital importance to the interests of the United States; yet the principal tool of persuasion that we now have is the tone of our voices. He feels, and I am inclined to agree, that the instrument of American aid to Iran under the control of an American authority would greatly strengthen our hand. That aid, properly used, not only could help to relieve the general problems of the moment, but could be used to influence the Government in taking other steps which we consider necessary under the circumstances. The precise form in which American aid should be given presents a problem. Time is an essential factor, and any assistance should be extended through a mechanism immediately available. I assume that Congressional action, even if recommended by the Administration, would take months, and we could not announce an aid program to the Iranians before Congressional approval is assured. It seems, therefore, that the Export-Import Bank provides the best, and perhaps only, opportunity of meeting this particular situation. (Even this must be worked out with the International Bank to preserve its potential position here.) Moreover, it would be difficult to justify a grant to Iran, since all factors, assuming continued convertibility, point to the ability to repay. And, also, loans are considerably easier to end than the extension of grants while the latter are being authorized for other countries. The mere extension of an Export-Import Bank loan, however, would not in itself solve the problem since the principal dilemma of the moment is concerned with the internal rial difficulty. Foreign exchange expenditures for emergency projects would be useless in the absence of some agreement by which internal expenditures could be provided for. This means, of course, that we would have to work out carefully with the Iranians an arrangement by which any such Export-Import Bank loan could be made effective. I feel that long distance negotiations on this point would be hopeless. It occurs to me that, if the Department and the Administration agree that aid must be extended to Iran, a high level official of the Export-Import Bank and a Departmental officer of suitable caliber might head a small mission to proceed immediately to Tehran to work out the details. Even before they depart, however, the agreement in principle to extend aid to Iran should be sufficiently definite to enable the Ambassador to announce to the Iranians that such assistance will be forthcoming. Even this is a delicate matter and should be handled carefully to avoid the impression that any undesirable element (i.e. Mansur) is responsible for our decision. As to the amount of any such loan, I personally think it extremely doubtful that more than $20,000,000 could be used effectively over the course of the next twelve months; indeed, the figure is likely to be very substantially less than that sum. However, to be really useful politically the amount announced to the Iranians should be higher though, as in the case of several other countries, it may not be used. It could be in the form of a line of credit for expenditure if and when justified by individual projects, and, moreover, the expenditure upon justified projects should be authorized piecemeal by an American authority to provide maximum control. Let me recognize parenthetically at this point that my assumption that immediate direct aid other than an Export-Import Bank loan would be impossible may be invalid. If there are means (unknown to me) by which we could do so on an urgent basis, a partial answer may be to send certain types of consumer goods not in plentiful supply here, for example cotton seed and seed wheat, for directed distribution in problem areas such as Azerbaijan. Another possibility would be agricultural tools which could be distributed at low cost in connection with a comprehensive welldrilling program. The field for this type of aid is, however, limited unless we were to find American financed goods in competition with indigenous production or already overstocked markets, thus adding to the problems of local producers and sellers. For example, the prospects are that wheat production this year will approach normal, and any influx of foreign wheat would have a depressing effect upon the already low return to the farmers, who even now are threatened by the effects of the business depression in the urban areas. Such a program would therefore require considerable administrative flexibility, and would not substitute fully for the major capital expenditures needed to be undertaken under the plan. The foregoing obviously is not an attempt at an exhaustive study of the Iranian situation, but merely outlines such ideas as I have developed during my stay here, which may be of use to you in your own consideration of the problem. Many angles, of course, have not been considered in this brief résumé, and I know from recent telegrams that concentrated thought is being focused upon the matter by you in Washington. I will not undertake, for example, to suggest how we should get around the complication of reversing the position that we have so strongly taken with the Iranians, in the absence of any further justification for American aid presented by the Iranians themselves. That is a detail that should be handled carefully, especially since I do not believe that we can expect the Iranians to come up with an adequate justification before a decision on our part is required, although OCI could develop a case for a good many projects on relatively short notice. All the best to GTI. Sincerely, Bill 1 Mr. Rountree arrived in Tehran on March 15 and departed to Istanbul on April 1. This letter was received in the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs on April 4. 2 Arthur L. Richards, Counselor of Embassy in Iran. 3 Possible reference to an address by Secretary Acheson at San Francisco on March 15 (Department of State Bulletin , March 27, 1950, p. 467). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) 788.5 MAP/3–2450 [Document 225] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs ( Ferguson ) secret [ Washington ,] March 24, 1950. Subject: Call of Ambassador Ala on March 24, 1950. Participants: The Iranian Ambassador, Mr. Ala NEA—Mr. Hare GTI—Mr. Jernegan Mr. Ferguson S/MDA—Mr. Wolf 1 Discussion: The Iranian Ambassador called on Mr. Hare at his own request to reiterate, he said, previous Iranian arguments for effective military assistance and to give the Department further information on Iranian military objectives. Mr. Ala said that the four officers who would conduct the discussions on military assistance with us were well qualified and would explain all of Iran’s needs and requirements in full frankness. The Ambassador said that he believed the American Military Mission in Iran had cooperated with the Iranian Army in preparing its lists and had sympathized with the Iranian aims, but he did not know whether General Evans had actually seen the lists the delegation had brought with them. He also said that he understood that General Koenig 2 who had made a special trip to Iran was in full agreement with the Iranian program. Mr. Ala expressed the hope that the meeting on March 24 would consist primarily of a preliminary get-together and would not resolve itself into a cut and dried presentation of demands on one side and “refrigerating restrictions” on the other. He said the Iranian Army, if properly equipped, would be able to offer an initial effective resistance to an invading army. Then, by strategic retreat, it could cut the invader’s lines of communication, etc., and play an important role in any world outbreak. He said that to carry out this program a minimum army of 150,000 was required equipped with the most modern and effective weapons. Mr. Ala said it was not logical to look at each country in the Middle East separately; that there must be a coordinated plan with all the other countries of the area. He made particular reference to Turkey. “A chain,” he said, “is as strong as its weakest link”. He hoped in the discussions the American negotiators would be able to go outside the limits imposed by Congress 3 and take into consideration the real requirements of Iran and not merely talk dollars. General Amini, 4 Mr. Ala said, would develop the Iranian strategic plan in the discussions. Mr. Jernegan informed the Ambassador that there was no intention to confine the discussions to merely one meeting and that there would probably be several, but none of the Americans present would be authorized to discuss war plans. Mr. Hare said it was difficult in any discussion of this nature to avoid being guided by the limitations set by Congress since if it had not been for the law enacted by Congress there would not be occasion for any discussions at all. Mr. Ala replied that the Shah while in this country had discussed his plans with the Secretary and with General Bradley 5 and had expressed the hope that the present program was merely a beginning and that future years would see an increased program of military assistance for Iran. He said the Shah had understood that under the legislation enacted by Congress the President had authority to divert to particular countries certain funds allocated for others and that it might be possible for Iran to get a larger share than what would normally be allotted it by the division of the Title 3 funds. He mentioned the figure of 5 percent. 6 Mr. Jernegan explained that we could not conduct the discussions in terms of dollars since the goal of the program was to give Iran what it could use most effectively and a great deal would depend upon whether the equipment furnished was surplus or had to be purchased new. Mr. Wolf said that it would be indeed helpful to know Iran’s complete needs. He explained to the Ambassador that it is beyond the capabilities of the United States to give every country receiving military assistance everything they need and that therefore it has to be reduced to a question of priorities and how the equipment furnished will be used. He expressed the opinion that “too much too soon” could be as harmful as “too little too late”. The Ambassador expressed the opinion that the Shah believes that to be in any way effective, our military assistance program must be sufficient for Iran’s very real needs. 1 Joseph J. Wolf, Foreign Affairs Officer. 2 Presumably Brig. Gen. Egmont Francis Koenig, USA (Ret.). The editors have found no documentation in Department of State files on a special trip to Iran by Brigadier General Koenig. 3 Sec. 302 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 authorized appropriation of $27,640,000 in fiscal year 1950 for assistance to Iran, Korea, and the Philippines; Public Law 329, 81st Cong., 1st sess., approved October 6, 1949 (63 Stat. 714). 4 Brig. Gen. Mahmoud Amini, member of the Iranian military mission to the United States to discuss the military aid program. 5 Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 6 Sec. 407 ( c ) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 provided for the use of 5% of any of the amounts available for any title of that Act for the purposes of any other title by Presidential determination communicated to the appropriate committees of Congress. The Representatives of the Government of the United States to the Representatives of the Government of Iran 788.5 MAP/3–2050 [Document 226] The Representatives of the Government of the United States to the Representatives of the Government of Iran secret Aide-Mémoire 1 At the outset of the exploratory discussions with reference to the items of military equipment which might be supplied by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of Iran, pursuant to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which discussions were held in Washington, D.C., the representatives of the Government of the United States of America advised the representatives of the Government of Iran of certain premises upon which these exploratory conversations were had. It was stated, first, that all of the details of the discussions must be treated as secret, and must not be disclosed to anyone except appropriate members of the respective governments without the permission of the other government concerned. It was further stated that the conversations about to be entered upon must be considered exploratory only, and that no definitive engagement with respect to the identity of the matériel to be included under any proposed Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Iran could be arrived at. It was pointed out that one of the prerequisites to pursuing any such program would be the entry into force of an appropriate agreement between the Government of Iran and the Government of the United States of America, pursuant to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. The exploratory conversations with respect to items of equipment which might be furnished pursuant to such an agreement should not be considered either as the basis for the consummation of such an agreement or as a final determination of items which actually would be furnished under such an agreement once it became effective. However, the Government of the United States of America will give every consideration to meeting the definitive requests of the Government of Iran evolved as the result of the exploratory conversations embarked upon. Washington , March 24, 1950. 1 Handed to Brig. Gen. Mahmoud Amini, member of the Iranian delegation, by Mr. Wolf, Chairman of the U.S. delegation, at the opening session of exploratory discussions on the equipment list of the military defense assistance program for Iran. For the minutes of the opening session of these discussions in Washington on March 24, see ISA/MDAP Files: Lot 52–26: MDAP—Iran. The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.13/3–2550: Telegram [Document 227] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State top secret Tehran , March 25, 1950—2 p. m. 533. ReDeptel 334, March 24. 1 Selection Ali Mansur for Prime Minister has been received with consternation and stupefaction even by royal family and inner circle court entourage. Shah after several days extreme vacillation suddenly made choice of Mansur with little or perhaps even no consultation with anyone. His motives entirely obscure and are probably directed against someone rather than for any positive purpose. A political leader who has my confidence and who is loyal to Shah tells me he feels Pahlevi dynasty may be on way out like Kajars. If Mansur, as is rumored, succeeds in making Bader, currently keeper of the Meshed shrine, Minister of Finance, new government will be gallery of rogues. General consensus is that Mansur will encounter great opposition in Majlis and will have very hard row to hoe. However, he is a smooth operator and is tied in with much that, although corrupt, is influential. Although he has notoriously sticky fingers, he is openhanded in furthering operation his political machine. He has emissaries all over country. For example, he sent emissary within last two days to my personal physician, a deputy, to find out what his price would be for support. Response was negative. It may be he will successfully form government and remain in power some time. This is unfortunate since months spring to autumn in Iran this year will be of crucial importance. Ali Mansur is not pro-Soviet. He has much accumulated loot and would be among first to suffer grievously from Communist usurpation power in Iran. He belongs, however, I fear, to category of deluded who believe they can outsmart Russians. He has, however, a daughter who is an outspoken Communist and who has just married Secretary Iran Embassy Paris who is Tudeh. I do not regard situation with dismay. A firm policy with adequate material support on our part could bring situation back in line. As previously reported and as Department is aware, we have been sitting here in game of high stakes without even having any white chips. Reporting fully by airpouch. 2 Sent Department 533; Department pass Moscow 61, and inform Army, Navy and Air. Wiley 1 Not printed; it requested the Embassy in Iran’s views on the appointment of Ali Mansur as Prime Minister (788.13/3–2350). 2 Airgram A–65, March 24, 1950, from Tehran, not printed (788.00/3–2450). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 788.00/3–2550: Telegram [Document 228] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran top secret us urgent Washington , March 25, 1950—2 p. m. 342. Although there has not been time receive ur reply Deptel 334 Mar 24, 1 because time for action may be short you are authorized, if you think it useful, 2 speak frankly to Shah along fol lines (reurtels 509, 510, 3 520 of Mar 23): 4 1. You have heard Shah has said fight against corruption must be postponed. You wld naturally be interested to know whether this report is correct and what it signifies, especially in view his assurances to you Mar 21 re determination continue press for reform. If true, this change in attitude by His Majesty will cause deep disappointment and concern to Amer Govt and people, who had been greatly cheered by firm statements Shah made during US visit and after return. US Govt will be especially concerned at discouraging effect changed attitude will probably have on Irans sincerely working for benefit their country. 2. Although we continue our policy non-intervention internal Iran political affairs, you believe it your duty point out that in view outside world as well as patriotic Irans failure of Shah in near future to appoint key Govt officials who wld symbolize in public minds policies of progress and reform wld be taken as confirmation of report re postponement anti-corruption struggle and wld contribute to discouragement of Iran people as well as friends of Iran abroad. (FYI in speaking of need to appoint progressive officials “in near future” we have in mind possibility Shah may have valid reason, unknown to us, for choosing Mansur as PM at this particular time in order to perform particular task. We might not complain of appointment if dictated by sound reasons practical politics, but we wld wish to impress on Shah that less questionable political leadership shld be brought forward without too much delay. You shld of course refrain from raising specific objection to Mansur appointment.) 3. You have heard reports from several sources that secret negotiations with Russians are in progress and that they were undertaken because Iran failed receive what it considered adequate Amer assistance. You wld be glad to know whether these reports correct. If so, you wish point out history has shown neither Iran nor any other country can expect anything but disaster from enlisting aid of Russian bear. This does not mean US opposes Iran attempts satisfy just claims against USSR, such as gold balance improperly withheld by Moscow, or to establish normal, equitable trade and economic relations with USSR. However, you consider it wld be foolhardy to expect that Russians wld give special assistance of sort Iran apparently desired, except in return for far-reaching and ultimately fatal concessions. You are also obliged to point out development of any close relationship between Iran and USSR, involving real or apparent realignment of Iran polit attitude, wld have worst possible effect on Amer public opinion, including Congress. 4. Essential need of Iran, in view of US Govt, is progressive, courageous leadership, which only Shah himself can provide. With such leadership, progressive, patriotic, and competent Irans will rally in support and all national problems can be solved in time. Without it, we fear no amount of assistance from any source cld be effective. You regret that Shah’s recent attitude and actions, if correctly reported, have given impression he has faltered in his previous determination to show his people road to progress. Acheson 1 Not printed. 2 No evidence was found in Department of State files indicating that the Embassy in Iran acted on these instructions. 3 Neither printed. 4 Ante , p. 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 607.1141/3–2550: Airgram [Document 229] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 [Extract] secret Washington , March 25, 1950. A–104. Reference is made to the Department’s Instruction No. 23 dated March 27, 1948 2 enclosing a copy of a “Summary Memorandum of Informal Conversations Relating to Social and Economic Affairs in the Middle East”, 3 which was drawn up in Washington in October 1947 by American and British officials, concerning the desirability of close cooperation with your British colleague in matters of common US–UK interests in the Near East, The Department, as a result of the McGhee–Wright talks in Washington in November 1949 4 and discussions of the Chiefs of Mission at Istanbul in November 1949, 5 wishes again to reiterate its belief that the over-all interest of both countries will best be served by close cooperation between the Foreign Office and the Department of State and between US and UK missions in the Near East. The Department considers it desirable, therefore, that there be a continuing exchange of information and views between you and your British colleague. The Department believes that cooperation between British and American business communities in the Near East is also desirable. However, foreseeing that a direct general approach to local business communities might not have the desired effect and on the contrary might lend itself to misrepresentation and misunderstanding, the Department feels it preferable to leave the manner of communicating such advice to appropriate American individuals to your discretion in the light of circumstances prevailing in Iran. The desirability of cooperation by American and British business men in your area has also been stressed at the political and economic conference at Cairo early this month. 6 The Department is informed that the British Foreign Office has sent similar instructions to all British Missions in the Near East, as follows: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Acheson 1 Similar instructions were sent by airgram to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Addis Ababa, and Amman. The question of issuing such instructions was raised in January 1950 by the British Foreign Office which contemplated issuing similar instructions to its missions in the Near East as well (telegram 238, January 16, from London; 607.1141/1–1650). 2 Similar instructions were sent to U.S. Missions in the Near East; see instruction 20, March 27, 1948, to Baghdad, Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , Part 1, p. 74 . 3 Ibid. , 1947, vol. v , p. 614 . 4 For documentation, see ibid. , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 50 ff. 5 For documentation, see ibid. , pp. 165 ff. 6 For documentation, see pp. 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] ff. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) Tehran Embassy Files, Lot 59 F 17, 400 MDAP 1950 [Document 230] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) secret Washington , March 29, 1950. Dear John : I have received your letter dated February 15, 1950 1 in which you recommend that there be a reconsideration of our policy regarding Iran on a very high level and that the United States be prepared to offer Iran much greater assistance, both economic and military than is contemplated at present. I have discussed the Iranian situation with the appropriate Department officers 2 and I would like to assure you that the question of United States policy towards Iran is under constant and urgent study. I understand that the Department’s position regarding our aid programs for Iran has been fully reviewed for you in several communications during the past few weeks and I do not believe I have anything further to add at present. We are aware of the delicate situation in Iran and have examined and shall continue to examine what the United States can do to help within the limits set by Iran’s reasonable requirements and our own resources. While the amount of military assistance to Iran is not as great as the Department would have desired for either the present or the coming fiscal years, it is a continuing program susceptible to enlargement and the Department does not look upon it from a long range point of view as “token aid”. The question of other forms of assistance to Iran is under constant review and, as you were recently advised, we are exploring the possibility of an Export-Import Bank loan to Iran should the need arise. 3 The possibility of extending grant aid to Iran creates, as I am sure you will agree, an extremely difficult problem since, despite its internal budgetary and currency difficulties, Iran at the moment still appears to possess sources of foreign exchange which would make it extremely difficult for the Department to justify aid of this nature much as it might like to do so for purely political reasons. This possibility, however, is also receiving the attention of the Department and you may be confident we shall not overlook any reasonable opportunity of accomplishing our aims in Iran. Sincerely yours, Dean Acheson 1 Ante , p. 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] . 2 For documentation on the Secretary’s discussion of Iran with Department of State officers) see the memorandum of conversation, March 1, by Mr. McWilliams, p. 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] . 3 The editors have not found documentation on the Department of State advising Ambassador Wiley about exploring the possibility of an Export-Import Bank of Washington loan to Iran. The possibility of such a loan was set forth in the letter, March 23, from Tehran by Mr. Rountree to Mr. Jernegan (p. 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] ), This possibility may have been discussed with Ambassador Wiley during Mr. Rountree’s visit to Tehran; see footnote 1, ibid. [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins), to the Secretary of the Army (Gray) 780.5/4–1750 [Document 231] Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army ( Collins ), to the Secretary of the Army ( Gray ) top secret [ Washington ,] 10 April 1950. Annex 5 1 iran 1. Upon arrival in Iran 2 General Collins was briefed on the economic and political situation by Ambassador Wiley and on the military situation by General Evans, Chief of the US Military Mission with the Iranian Army (ARMISH); Colonel Pierce, 3 Chief of the US Military Mission with the Iranian Gendarmerie (GENMISH); and Colonel Drury, Senior Military Attaché. In addition, he conferred with the persons indicated below. Records of these latter conversations are attached as appendices: 4 a . Audience with the Shah of Iran, 29 March 1950—Appendix 1. b . Conference with General Razmara, Chief of Staff, Iranian Army, 30 March 1950—Appendix 2. c . Second Conference with the Shah of Iran, 30 March 1950—Appendix 3. d . Reconnaissance Flight to Azerbaijan with the Shah of Iran, 31 March 1950—Appendix 4. e . Final Conference with Ambassador Wiley and Members of his Staff, 31 March 1950—Appendix 5. 2. Ambassador Wiley expressed serious concern over the current economic condition in Iran and the consequent instability of the Iranian Government. He feels that there is an immediate threat of communist infiltration unless prompt steps are taken to aid Iran. Both economic aid, possibly through ECA, and continued military aid are essential if the country is to be saved from communist domination. 3. The Iranian Army of 10 divisions and 4 brigades, totalling 150,000 troops, is disposed generally along the borders with its weight principally in the north and west. About one third of its strength is necessarily engaged as frontier guards to prevent the infiltration of foreign agents and to control the movement of the nomadic tribes some of which are common to two or three countries and hence of dubious loyalty to the central government of Iran. 4. The Army is also responsible for internal security of the country. To accomplish this, General Razmara, the Chief of Staff, has taken over a large part of the Gendarmerie and organized it into a special force, the Neghabani. He firmly believes that the entire Gendarmerie , including the 5000 which presently remain under the Minister of Interior, should be under the Army’s control. Ambassador Wiley feels as strongly that the entire Gendarmerie , including that portion now organized as the Neghabani, should be under the Minister of Interior. 5. The plan of defense for Iran outlined by General Razmara and the Shah envisages a delaying action, making maximum use of mines, demolitions and other defensive means, with a final withdrawal to a defensive area in the rugged mountains in the southwest. The plan appears basically sound though much remains to be done in the way of refinement. In discussing their plans, both General Razmara and the Shah expressed a strong desire to have General Evans’ Mission assist them in their war planning. General Evans is now restricted, through the terms of the contract with the Iranian Government, from discussing the subject of Iranian war plans. General Collins made it clear that it would be impossible, in any case, to discuss American war plans but that he would endeavor to obtain a relaxation of the restrictions which prohibit General Evans from assisting in Iranian planning. Both the Shah and General Razmara accepted the fact that the US could not divulge its plans stating that they wished primarily to be certain that their plans are sound and would contribute to overall allied strategy. They were gratified with the possibility of General Evans’ assistance in their planning which likewise had the full approval of Ambassador Wiley. 6. Ambassador Wiley, General Evans, Colonel Pierce, and Colonel Drury agreed with General Collins that, in the event of an emergency, all US military personnel in Iran, other than Military Attachés, should be under the control and direction of the Chief of ARMISH and should take to the mountains with the Iranian Army; and that only US civilians and dependents of US military personnel should be evacuated. 7. The principal current problems are the necessity for: a . Economic as well as continued military aid in order to stabilize the government and prevent communist domination. b . Relaxation of the restrictions which prevent the Chief of ARMISH from assisting the Iranians in their war planning. c . A decision by the Iranian Government as to the disposition of the Gendarmerie (under the Minister of Interior or Minister of War) and the resulting disposition of GENMISH. d . An agreed State–Defense decision that, in the event of emergency, only US civilians and dependents of military personnel would be evacuated from Iran; that military personnel would remain, under the direction of the Chief of ARMISH, to assist the Iranian Army. 1 This is Annex 5 to the memorandum of April 10, by General Collins to the Secretary of the Army on the subject, “Inspection by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, of the Middle East Covering the Period 20 March to 8 April 1950,” not printed, a copy of which was transmitted to Mr. McGhee by memorandum, April 17, from Lt. Col. S. W. Downey, Assistant Secretary, General Staff, Department of the Army. An editorial note with references to information on General Collins’ trip is printed, p. 124. For an excerpt of his report, see p. 1158. 2 On March 28. 3 Col. James R. Pierce, USA, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission with the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie . 4 Appendices not printed. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Under Secretary’s Meeting: Lot 53 D 250; UM Documents, No. 6, 86–113 1 [Document 232] Paper Prepared in the Department of State 2 secret UM D–97 [ Washington , undated.] The Present Crisis in Iran a. the political situation Since the failure of the abortive Azerbaijan revolt of 1945, which owed its temporary success to the intervention of the Red Army, the Soviets have played a waiting game in Iran, apparently content to wait for the Iranian regime to collapse from its own inherent weaknesses helped along by sporadic Soviet pressure and threats. Recent events in Iran have indicated that the time of collapse may not be far away. All traces of effective leadership have virtually disappeared; the Shah, who for a while showed signs of being a force for progress and reform, has exhibited that he has neither the character nor the ability to offer his people guidance; the top Government officials are still unable or unwilling to break away from age old traditions of corruption and inefficiency; the Parliament is composed of obstructionists and opportunists, and the people, thoroughly disgusted with a regime which offers prospects for a still bleaker future, are excellent targets for the clandestine but well-organized and well-financed Communist (Tudeh) Party, whose influence appears to be expanding at an alarming rate. In part, the present crisis is attributable to basic, organic weaknesses in the body politic, such as the absolute and senseless centralism of the government, the feudal land-holding system with its concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few selfish persons, and the fact that an undeveloped country such as Iran with a vast, totally illiterate peasant population, and without any sort of democratic tradition, is not suited in times of crisis for parliamentary government on the European model. On top of these inherent defects in the Iranian system are a number of contemporary factors, part psychological, part economic, and part political, which have joined to bring on a crisis which places Iran under the immediate threat of disappearing behind the iron curtain. 1. Psychological Factors ( a ) The Leaders The Shah and most influential officials of the Iranian Government appear to believe they have taken great risks in opposing the Soviet Union and have not received from the West sufficient compensation for what they believe to have been a significant contribution to the world-wide resistance to the spread of communism. Some of them, bitterly disappointed at the failure of Iran to receive assistance from the United States on a scale comparable to that furnished other countries, particularly Turkey, to which they contend they are entitled as a matter of right, believe Iran is not justified in taking further risks and should endeavor to reach a modus vivendi with the Soviets. There have been reports that conversations have, in fact, taken place between highly placed Iranians and Soviet officials looking to some sort of revamping of the relations between the two countries. The visit of the Shah to the United States, successful as it was, has boomeranged. Despite repeated explanations by this Government that the visit was purely a normal good will tour, the Shah expected that he could return to Iran with some tangible evidence of United States support for his country in the form of economic or increased military assistance. While he appeared to understand the United States position as outlined for him by the President, the Secretary and other United States officials, he had no sooner returned to his country than he began making remarks such as “American aid stops at Iran’s frontiers.” The Iranian people expected even more, and the popular disappointment has been profound. While “lack of American aid” had to some extent already replaced “British intrigue” as the whipping boy of Iranian politics, the Shah’s return empty-handed accentuated Iran’s lonely position and served to convince many responsible Iranians that they had, in fact, been left alone to face the Soviets. Should this belief persist, it seems certain that the Iranian Government will seek some sort of arrangement with the Soviet Union since traditionally Iran has never dared resist any great power unless it was confident it enjoyed the support of another. For many years Iran survived by playing one power off against another and it is entirely possible that the present government will revert to the traditional Iranian foreign policy. ( b ) The People Even more alarming than the possibility of the present regime seeking a modus vivendi with the Soviets, is the possibility that Iran may be completely and suddenly taken over by a native revolt led, organized, and financed by the Soviet Union. All reports reaching the Department indicate a feeling of disgust with their rulers on the part of the Iranian people which cannot help but play into the hands of the Tudeh Party. While a feeling of this nature is by no means a new sentiment for the Iranian people, the Tudeh Party is a new tool for converting this disgust into action. Detailed reports on the total membership, organization, and finances of the Tudeh Party are not available but it is entirely clear that it is now making a concerted effort to perfect its organization and greatly increase its propaganda work. The Iranian Chief of Staff, General Razmara, has expressed the opinion that, should matters be allowed to drift, he could not count on the army, conscripted from the poorest classes, to put down a communist-inspired revolt. Most observers believe that what the great mass of the Iranian people require in order to enable them to resist communist blandishments (Communism as a doctrine holds little or no interest) is some tangible sign that forces are at work in the country to assure the people of a future, if not better than the past, at least no worse. The present Iranian regime, which has let its ambitious Seven Year Plan founder in a morass of politics, is incapable of providing this sign without outside assistance and direction. 2. Economic Factors of the Political Crisis While the current political crisis has sufficient reasons for existence without the addition of economic difficulties, the current business depression in Iran with its increasing unemployment has served to accentuate the inability of the Iranian Government to solve the most ordinary problems and has filled the leaders with a sense of frustration and the people with increased disgust. There are obvious measures, which will be discussed below, which the Iranian Government could take to alleviate the present economic situation but which its weaknesses, political and psychological, prevent. Although there might be contempt for the ruling classes on the part of the people even if times were good, when there is not enough bread and when many workers are idle this contempt can become dangerous. The economic difficulties now being encountered have definitely alarmed the Iranian Government but not to the point where it will adopt measures to resolve them without pressure from the outside. The economic situation has made the political situation much worse than it ordinarily would have been and has contributed in large measure to the frustration which pervades the Shah and his government. 3. Purely Political Factors The Shah, an earnest young man full of good intentions, cannot make up his mind whether he should reign or rule, and consequently does neither. While sincerely believing in the aims of the Seven Year Program and the need to reform the Iranian Government, the Shah is fair game for every self-seeking sycophant, of which there are many in the royal palace, who comes near him. His indecision is monumental and his moral courage debatable. He has recently exasperated all reform-minded and progressive Iranians, as well as most foreign observers, by appointing as Prime Minister Ali Mansur, a notoriously corrupt politician with a record of dallying with the Soviets which is rather disturbing. The motives behind this appointment are obscure and, while the Shah by a devious oriental reasoning may have intended it to show the entrenched classes they are incapable of coping with the situation, it could be disastrous for Iran. Reports from Tehran indicate that a general feeling of disgust and despair greeted the appointment, and it seems unlikely that Mansur would be able to govern effectively even if he so desired. Although it is possible that Mansur may be able to obtain a vote of confidence from the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) it seems unlikely that his Government will long survive. Iran will probably continue its unhappy record of a succession of ineffective governments. This situation linked with the inherent weaknesses in the organic structure of the country described earlier makes the task of the local communists a great deal more simple and prevents effective remedial action on the economic front. It is also possible that, even if his tenure of office is short, Mansur can by seeking an arrangement with the Soviets create a situation which would prevent succeeding governments from reverting to Iran’s present western political orientation without facing a serious threat of Soviet aggression. Mansur has publicly denied that he is pro-Soviet but his record as Governor General of Khorassan, the northeastern province of Iran, during the war shows that he will play the Soviet game when it serves his own interests. He is no intellectual giant and could be manipulated by clever Soviet agents without too much difficulty. The Parliament, divided among cliques rather than principles, seems incapable of anything but obstruction. Deputies have never learned the proper functioning of the legislative branch of a representative government and their policy has been selfish and destructive. Some sincere, patriotic men are, of course, found in the Parliament as in the government but they are seldom understood and rarely capable of attracting others to their side or taking vigorous action. Little help may be expected from this quarter in resolving the present crisis. b. the economic situation Iran is suffering from an economic depression. While this depression has not yet reached catastrophic proportions, if unchecked it might easily result in the political collapse of the country. The depression stems from the extremely bad harvest of the year 1328 (1949–50), which so reduced the meager purchasing power of the farm population of the country—about eighty percent of the people—that the peasants could no longer pay for even irreducible necessities. This destruction of rural buying power on the one hand ruined the business activities of the merchants, whether selling home-manufactured or imported goods, and on the other placed a considerable burden on the government which had to give some aid to the most seriously affected areas, at a time when it could least afford to assume additional financial commitments. Industry was, of course, adversely affected by the inability of the peasants to purchase. This in turn led to urban unemployment and to a still greater reduction in national purchasing power. At the same time the Plan Organization (the government agency for operating the Seven Year Development Plan) had to divert its attention from its long range development operations to immediate relief activities. This depression has been fed and intensified by political uncertainty and unrest, and by fears and doubts concerning Iran’s position in the world and its future. Knowledge that the situation is bad has in turn contributed to discouragement bordering on hopelessness, which has magnified the seriousness of the problem. The economy of the country now needs what might be called “shock treatment” to break the deepening deflationary spiral which if unchecked could lead to national disaster. The elements of the depression are: 1) increasing unemployment; 2) reduced purchasing power; 3) falling prices (but not falling as fast as purchasing power); 4) increasing bankruptcies; 5) accumulation of excessive stocks of merchandise (for example, nearly one year’s supply of imported textiles in the Tehran region and about 250,000 tons of miscellaneous goods unremoved from the ports of the country); 6) declining industrial activity and an almost complete cessation of investment in new enterprises; and 7) a growing tendency for capital to flee the country. This situation could be substantially improved by: 1) a satisfactory to good harvest in 1329 (1950–51); 2) renewed investment programs; and 3) restored confidence. There is some evidence that the forthcoming harvest will be good, thus establishing a base from which to start an investment program and to restore confidence. Some outside assistance—a stimulus to the economic system—is, however, almost certainly needed. The investment program could be stimulated—and confidence restored—if certain economic reforms were introduced and if the Seven Year Plan were pushed vigorously ahead. To do the latter, some assistance in the way of foreign exchange (or loan tied to a reform program) is necessary. Based on the best available estimates the foreign exchange prospects for 1329 (1950–1951) are as follows: Foreign Exchange Receipts Exports $35,000,000 AIOC expenditures 60,000,000 * Oil royalties 36,400,000 Sundry   3,000,000 Total $134,400,000 Foreign Exchange Expenditures Government requirements 12,200,000 Imports 115,000,000 5 Sundry   7,200,000 Subtotal 134,400,000 Plan requirements   35,000,000 6 Total 169,400,000 Foreign Exchange Deficit $35,000,000 At the commencement of 1329 (March 1950) the nation had free foreign exchange reserves of about $45,000,000 (not including gold and foreign exchange held as part of the legal coverage of the outstanding notes). While some of this reserve could be drawn upon to meet current requirements, it is probably already at a dangerously low level and additional excessive reductions (this reserve was very substantially reduced in the year 1328) might well further reduce or destroy confidence. Furthermore, one of the requirements for an active successful investment program is more rials, the lack of sufficient quantities of which explains to a large extent the accumulation at ports of large stocks of goods, which act as a serious deterrent to local production. The present gold and foreign exchange coverage of notes outstanding is 78 percent. A reduction of this degree of coverage in an unsophisticated economic system and in the present state of uncertainty would very likely add considerably to the existing atmosphere of pessimism. Some of the free foreign exchange reserves may therefore be needed as additional coverage for an additional note issue. A United States loan to support and stimulate the investment program (from which arises the potential foreign exchange deficit) would, if accompanied by certain reforms, be of immediate economic benefit and would restore confidence by indicating that Iran had the sympathy and support of the United States. The reforms should include: 1) More effective import and foreign exchange controls to prevent the waste of foreign exchange resources on luxuries and to check the tendency of capital to flee the country; 2) A somewhat more flexible monetary system; 3) More effective and realistic government budgetary practices; 4) More effective tax practices (beginning with improved collection of taxes falling on the rich and a start towards substituting a more effective income tax for heavy import, excise, and turn-over taxes which hamper business activities, raise prices, and reduce purchasing power). The International Bank is contemplating relatively small loans to Iran at the present time. While this should be encouraged, the loans, even if made, would not take care of the present emergency situation. They are expected to be made for such long-term projects as the development of the port of Khorramshahr, construction of a cement plant, and water well drilling. They would be made by an international organization and could not, therefore, have the same psychological impact as assistance given directly by the United States. The factor of psychological impact indicating interest and support by the United States is undoubtedly one of the most important elements in any program to prevent the possible collapse of Iran. c. conclusion and recommendations It is clear that a crisis of a very real nature exists in Iran at the moment, a crisis which if continued might well lead to the complete disintegration of the country and its absorption immediately or eventually into the Soviet bloc. The crisis is of Iran’s own making and the remedies inherently are in Iran’s own hands; however it is also clear that the Iranian regime as it is presently constituted is incapable of resolving the situation. It is worthy of note that Iran is the only free country on the periphery of the Soviet world not receiving or about to receive direct United States economic assistance designed to keep it outside of the iron curtain. The situation in Iran has reached the point where, whatever its causes and whatever the Iranians technically could do themselves to correct it, the United States cannot take the chance of seeing Iran surrender to communism and must take every reasonable step within its power to make sure that another country directly exposed to the threat of Soviet aggression, internal or external, does not fall into the Soviet orbit. Aid to Iran is not recommended primarily because Iran needs economic aid, but because it offers the most effective means of forcing the Iranians in spite of themselves to put their house in order. It is believed that the following program would offer the best possibilities of meeting the present crisis: 1. A survey mission headed by a prominent and experienced American should be sent to Iran at once to investigate the most practicable means of extending financial and/or other assistance. This mission should include representatives of the Eximbank and Treasury. The mission should be empowered in advance to announce, should it find it advisable to do so, that the United States Export-Import Bank is prepared to extend a line of credit not exceeding the amount of $50,000,000 for carefully selected projects to be implemented within the general framework of the Seven Year Development Program. The projects selected would be those which the mission considers practicable and most likely to reassure the Iranian people that they have not been left alone, and which would provide the best leverage for prodding the Iranian Government into immediate action to put its house in order. 2. To obtain the desired effect it will be necessary to impose certain rather rigid conditions upon any economic assistance the United States extends. While the exact nature of these conditions can be left to the survey mission, they might include some or all of those listed on page 7 [ 9? ] 3 above, and must include an agreement as to the method of financing internal costs in rials. The aid should be administered and controlled by a United States official sent to Iran for that particular purpose. 3. The Department should take immediate steps to strengthen its representation in Iran. These should include the opening of a consulate at Isfahan under a Foreign Service Officer not lower than Class 4; the appointment as consuls at Tabriz and Meshed of Foreign Service Officers with political experience at least of Class 4 and preferably Class 3; and the augmentation of the staff of the Embassy at Tehran to include at least three officers in the economic section and four officers in the political section exclusive of the Counselor. 4. The Department should immediately expand its informational program in Iran to make sure that the American position in the “cold war” is made clear not only to the Iranian ruling class but also to wide segments of the population. To this end information offices should be established in the consulates at Tabriz, Meshed, and Isfahan and the USIE staff in Tehran should be strengthened. The Voice of America programs should be redesigned to meet more effectively and dramatically the needs imposed by the present unfortunate psychological trends. 5. Since the success of the aid program will depend to a large extent on the character of the Iranian cabinet in power, the United States should express to the Shah its concern over events in Iran, should describe to him the reforms the Iranians could put into effect themselves, and should indicate United States assistance will be forthcoming only if a government comes to power willing to and capable of using this assistance to strengthen Iran’s internal defenses against communism. If necessary, the United States should be prepared to name the Iranian official who it believes most effectively could meet these requirements. 6. If at all possible, the Iranian MDAP program authorized for FY 1951 should be not less than $20,000,000. The actual sum to be released, however, should be used as an added lever for persuading the Iranians to accept American advice. 7. Once the status of Point Four is clarified, the United States should proceed at once with the recruitment of a technical aid mission concentrated in one or two fields, such as public health and roadbuilding, which should proceed to Iran, accompanied by suitable publicity, at the earliest possible moment. A decision should be reached in the Department at once on the field of activity desired. 1 Lot 53 D 250 is a master file of records of meetings, documents, summaries, and agenda of the Under Secretary’s meetings for the years 1949–1952, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 This paper and a covering memorandum on the subject, “The Iranian Crisis,” April 19, by Mr. McGhee to the Secretary of State, not printed, constituted document UM D–97, April 21, which was considered at the Under Secretary’s meeting, April 26; see infra and the memorandum, April 25 [ 26 ], by Mr. McGhee to the Secretary of State, p. 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] . * Likely to be lower, since expenditures during the last few months of year 1949–50 showed a marked decline. [Footnote in the source text.] 5 In 1949–50, about $165,000,000. [Footnote in the source text.] 6 Based on 1/6 of total requirements as estimated by OCI. [Footnote in the source text.] 3 Reference presumably is to the four numbered reforms listed above, beginning with “1) More effective import and foreign exchange controls …” Memorandum for the File, Prepared in the Department of State Under Secretary’s Meetings: Lot 53 D 250 [Document 233] Memorandum for the File, Prepared in the Department of State top secret [ Washington , undated.] Under Secretary’s Meeting April 26, 1950 1 secretary’s attendance at the um Mr. Webb observed that the Secretary’s participation in the meetings on Wednesdays provides an opportunity for members to bring problems before Mr. Acheson and receive his comments. Simultaneously, these meetings give the Secretary a chance to discuss matters with the group and to offer his criticisms or indications of approval. mdap Mr. Ohly announced that the final draft legislation for MDAP for fiscal 1951 will go to the Bureau of the Budget tomorrow afternoon. It has been pretty well cleared. The only “open issue” is the possible Iranian program of $20 million contained in today’s paper. 2 He said he would like Mr. Acheson to go over the draft as soon as he could fit it into his schedule. the iranian crisis (UM D–97) 3 Mr. Webb pointed out that the Secretary would make the final decision on the proposals of this paper and talk to the President about it when appropriate. He cautioned all members against any public reference to the Iranian problem. Any possible decision to release comment on the subject would have to be made expressly by the Secretary or Mr. McGhee. The Secretary indicated that he was in general agreement with the paper but asked whether we have brought in the British as far as we can and whether the program will meet the evil which it is intended to meet. It was his feeling that government weaknesses constitute the primary problem, with the economic distress following in second place. He approved of the selection of Ambassador Grady 4 but asked whether the proposal would provide him with enough tools to handle the situation. (See Tab A 5 .) Mr. McGhee said we cannot be sure whether we are proposing “enough” and commented that Ambassador Wiley has had to operate with insufficient resources. He added that a substantial effort will be required, and that dollars alone will not be enough. The Shah would like to accomplish the things we want but he desires something tangible to show his people, who were disappointed when he returned from the United States without tangible evidence of U.S. economic aid. Ambassador Grady is unusually strong in financial and economic qualifications. Although he might not need a large amount of money, it is important that he be able to produce something substantial if the Iranians move on the necessary reforms. The country is in a basically good economic position, despite difficulties, because of the prosperous oil business, for one thing. There are various development projects already under consideration which would be good credit risks. It is expected that we could work with both the World Bank and the Exim Bank. The psychological impact on Iran of U.S. support is important but it was agreed that we must not over-extend ourselves in that country in such a manner as to risk the collapse of our prestige. This is essentially a problem of degree. We have earlier given substantial political assurances; the present proposal is essentially financial. It should be handled discreetly, gradually, and without fanfare. It was observed that there is a fair chance of finding a satisfactory middle course, and that the risk is worth taking in view of the gravity of the situation. Certain developmental projects have already been investigated by OCI. An Exim Bank loan might not be necessary after the arrival of Mr. Grady. But if it should prove to be, we could begin by reviewing these surveys, which might possibly be accepted by Exim Bank instead of a full new investigation. Iran needs developmental projects rather than balance-of-payments loans. The seven year plan is important to the prestige of the government. Mr. Webb indicated that this whole problem should be reviewed by the NSC. Defense representatives have raised questions as to whether we should increase the MDAP program for Iran, in comparison to areas accorded higher priorities. It is recognized that military assistance aspects will have to be negotiated through the MDAP machinery. It was noted that NEA is undertaking a revision of the last NSC paper on Iran. 6 Mr. Webb emphasized the importance of selecting the right men to represent us in foreign trouble spots, and suggested a broad study of how we can help to strengthen foreign government operations in which we are interested, in ways other than spending our dollars. He mentioned the University of the Philippines as one example. He was informed that A has a paper nearly ready on this subject. Mr. Webb added that one of the projects under the President’s management improvement program relates to this same problem. It was suggested that the transfer of Ambassador Grady should be studied by P, SA–M, and other interested offices, in an effort to keep down public interest. It was pointed out that no new funds will be available to NEA for the proposed activities and that the moneys must be shifted from other NEA areas. Mr. McGhee, Mr. McFall, and Mr. Dulles, 7 were requested to consider a program of consultation on this subject with new consultative groups of both Houses. It was noted that the question should not be taken too far on the Hill until it can be determined what military priorities will permit. Mr. Armstrong felt that the paper is sound from the intelligence viewpoint. Mr. Barrett will work with Mr. McGhee on an information program shift in Iran and also give attention to the U.S. domestic information problem. One of the jobs of the Ambassador will be to impress upon the Iranians the grave consequences which would result from a failure to institute reforms. It was explained that it would not be feasible for the British rather than ourselves to take the lead in this situation, but that we intend to consult fully with them. sterling balances Mr. Webb mentioned that it is important to establish a position on this problem. Recent press stories on the subject were of London origin. We will have no position until the Secretary has discussed the matter with Administrator Hoffman 8 and Secretary Snyder. 9 He added that it is extremely important that this situation not complicate our relations with India and Pakistan. Serious interests of the U.S. Government are involved. We are concerned about reactions around the world, which have already begun to manifest themselves. Mr. McGhee, Mr. O’Gara, and Mr. Thompson will review this problem and consider whether we should transmit diplomatic notes on the situation. It is difficult to go ahead on this problem without knowing what international discussions the British have already had. Mr. McGhee said that a paper has been prepared for discussion at the London meeting with the British on this subject. 10 He said that the effect of the proposed Anglo-Iranian agreement would be to raise oil royalties accruing to Iran. Delay has been caused by difficulties over minor concessions, which we would like the UK to make for the sake of getting on with the agreement. 1 The principal officers of the Department of State attended this meeting. 2 Regarding the memorandum of conversation, May 4, by Secretary Acheson with President Truman, see footnote.1, p. 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] . 3 Supra . 4 Henry F. Grady, Ambassador in Greece, was recommended by Mr. McGhee in his memorandum, April 19, on the “Iranian Crisis,” to serve as Ambassador to Iran and head the proposed survey mission to Iran to investigate the need for economic assistance. For the text of Mr. McGhee’s revised memorandum, April 26, see infra . 5 Not printed. 6 For the text of document NSC 54, July 21, 1949, “Report of the National Security Council on the Position of the United States With Respect to Iran,” see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 545 . The National Security Council did not issue a revision of this paper in 1950. 7 John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State and Personal Representative of the President for the Japanese Peace Treaty. 8 Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration. 9 John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury. 10 Position paper on Iran, April 27, p. 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] ; see also supplement to position paper on Iran, May 3, p. 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] . Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 788.00/4–1950 [Document 234] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret [ Washington ,] April 25 [ 26 ], 1950. Subject: The Iranian Crisis The following is a revision of my memorandum of April 19, 2 amended to reflect the views expressed in the staff meeting of April 26. You will recall that the recommended program was approved at that meeting subject to the submission of a revised paper to you. 3 Problem To decide upon a course of action for meeting the current Iranian crisis which seriously threatens the security of that country. Background A combination of three primary factors has resulted in a critical situation in Iran which, if unchecked by positive American action, might well result in a collapse of the present political structure and its domination by the Soviet Union. These factors are ( a ) a current economic depression which has resulted in substantial and growing unemployment, business bankruptcies and, in some areas, actual starvation; ( b ) increased activities of the well-organized clandestine Communist (Tudeh) Party, which has made substantial inroads into many elements of the Iranian population; and ( c ) disorganization, disunity and confusion among the government leaders, who are unable to offer an effective program for meeting the situation. Aside from the credit of $26 million for the purchase of surplus military supplies in 1948, direct American aid to Iran has thus far been confined to relatively small military assistance under MAP and a promise of technical advisers under the Point Four program when it becomes operative. The Iranians have made repeated appeals to the United States for economic and financial assistance, but these have been refused on the basis that the Iranian foreign exchange position is relatively good and that the lack of progress in economic development could not be attributed to the inadequacy of foreign currencies. While this remains substantially the case, the favorable exchange position has during the past year been somewhat reversed and there is now a demonstrable need for some form of foreign aid, at least until a new agreement covering the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession is ratified under terms which would provide increased royalties and benefits to the Iranian economy. The failure of the United States to extend aid to Iran at a time when substantial assistance is being rendered to Western Europe, Greece, Turkey and certain other Asian countries, and in light of the announced program for south Asia, has intensified the feeling of Iranian leaders and the Iranian people that the United States is not concerned with their welfare. Indeed, Iran is the only country on the Soviet periphery which is not now receiving or about to receive some form of American economic assistance. Under these circumstances, American prestige in Iran has dropped sharply, and the Iranians ignore American advice and counsel. There is at present a considerable body of influential opinion in Iran which believes that Iran has taken great risks in its firm opposition to Soviet threats, which included armed intervention in 1945–46, and that these risks have been neither appreciated nor rewarded by the West. Lacking any sign of a real American interest in Iran, many important Iranian officials believe that further risks of this nature are no longer warranted. General Collins was impressed with the seriousness of the situation during his recent visit to Iran. Following his return to Washington he expressed these views in the report of his trip: 4 In my judgment, the strategic position of Iran and its vulnerability to Russian pentration and subversion make it imperative that adequate action be taken by the United States in order to insure that a “second China” does not develop in Iran . . . . G–3 should initiate action through the JCS to bring strongly to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State the importance of prompt economic assistance and adequate MDAP aid to Iran. The attached memorandum 5 outlines the current political and economic situation and sets forth a proposed program designed to meet the imminent threat of the loss of this strategic and politically important country. The principal element of the recommendations is that United States aid, under competent control and administration, would provide a lever for prodding the Iranians to take administrative and economic measures absolutely essential to bring any order out of the present chaos. There is of course no proof that Iran would in fact collapse in the absence of the measures recommended; on the other hand, I am firmly convinced that the dangers are so great and the stakes are so high as to make it most unwise to take any chances. The proposed program is outlined on page 8 of the memorandum. In summary, it is: ( a ) The early dispatch of a survey mission to Iran to investigate the need for economic assistance and to recommend the terms and conditions under which such aid should be extended; ( b ) Obtaining from the Export-Import Bank a commitment to provide, if recommended by the mission, funds to finance selected development projects. While no overall sum should be announced to the Iranians, the mission should know in advance of its departure the amount (perhaps from $25 to $50 million) which the Bank would be prepared to support; 6 ( c ) Consideration, subject to negotiation with appropriate Departmental and Defense officials, of the establishment of an Iranian MAP program for 1951 of approximately $20 million, although the actual sum to be released should be under the close control of American representatives in Iran; 7 ( d ) Strengthening of United States representation in Iran by opening a new consulate at Isfahan, the assignment of more experienced officers to Tabriz and Meshed, and the augmentation of the economic and political sections of the Tehran Embassy; ( e ) Expanding and improving the Department’s informational program in Iran, including the assignment of USIE staff to Tabriz, Meshed and Isfahan; ( f ) Dispatching as soon as possible a technical aid group to Iran under Point IV. ( g ) Establishing a policy of more direct advice to the Shah concerning Iranian administrative, political and economic matters, using American aid as a lever of persuasion. It should be made clear that this program does not make or imply any further commitment with respect to United States political or military support of Iran. Although it should be carried out in such a way as to inspire confidence in the Iranian people and government through American financial and economic assistance, it will in no way imply to Iran or the rest of the world any United States guarantee of Iranian independence or integrity. It is desirable to avoid further engagement of the prestige of the United States in such an uncertain area which is so far removed from the bases of United States power. Another reason for avoiding dramatization of the program is to minimize any Iranian assumption that we will resolve their problems for them. We must assure an Iranian realization that failure to carry out the necessary political and economic reforms will not only lose them the benefits of American economic assistance but may also cost them their independence. 8 I believe that the best qualified person to head the mission recommended in the first point of the program would be Henry F. Grady, now Ambassador to Greece. His extensive experience, particularly in economic matters, and his background in dealing with similar political problems in Greece would make him ideally suited for this difficult task. Moreover, since the major problems in Iran at this point appear to be fundamentally of an economic nature, I believe that there would be great advantages in the designation of Mr. Grady as Ambassador to replace John C. Wiley, who has served for two years in that difficult and often exasperating post, as long as any previous Ambassador has served, and who in any event would shortly be due for reassignment. I think that Mr. Grady could be persuaded to accept both designations, assuming that Tehran can, in light of its critical importance at the moment, be raised to a Class I post. Recommendations ( a ) That you approve in general the program as set forth; ( b ) That you authorize immediate negotiations with the Export-Import Bank to obtain a commitment for the extension of loans to Iran, within an agreed-upon total 9 and as may be recommended by the survey mission; ( c ) That you approve the proposal that, subject to his acceptance, Henry F. Grady be designated to head the survey mission to Iran and concurrently to serve as Ambassador to Iran, replacing John C. Wiley; and that the Embassy in Tehran, in light of the present situation, be raised at that time to a Class I post. ( d ) That you discuss with the British in London the proposed program and solicit their cooperation in presenting a united front to the Iranians, suggesting in addition that they could make a positive contribution by resolving the dispute over the AIOC contract. (A background paper on this subject has been prepared for the London meetings.) 10 1 Attached to this memorandum were the following notes: 1) April 26, by Mr. McGhee to the Secretary of State which reads as follows: “The attached paper and the question of his assignment to Iran has been discussed informally with Ambassador Grady. It is believed that his initial reactions are favorable. It is urged that you discuss this question with him at an early opportunity, preferably this week, and urge him strongly to accept the assignment. It would, of course, be more effective if you could indicate the strong desire of the President that he accept, and arrange a meeting with the President.” The editors have found no record of a meeting of Ambassador Grady with President Truman on the questions of Ambassador Grady’s assignment to Iran. 2) April 27, by Aaron S. Brown, Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat to Mr. Battle, transmitting this memorandum with a copy of the original paper of April 19; and 3) May 3, by Mr. Battle to Mr. McWilliams which reads as follows: “The Secretary has read the attached paper on Iran and has discussed the matter with Ambassador Grady. I do not know what was said in this conversation. “I think the next move is to put this in the book for tomorrow. “While the Secretary did not indicate approval of the paper, he made no criticism and I think this is tantamount to an approval of it, as drafted.” On May 4 Secretary Acheson discussed with President Truman the line of action proposed in the present memorandum by Mr. McGhee. Secretary Acheson’s memorandum of this conversation reads as follows: “I explained very briefly to the President what we had in mind, including the change in Ambassador Grady’s assignment and also Ambassador Grady’s interest in going to Japan whenever an ambassadorial post was created there. “I told the President that Mr. Webb would go into the matter with him in greater detail next week, but today I only asked whether the proposal in general seemed to him along the right lines. I received his assurance that it did. “I told the President that I was not asking to commit himself in regard to any future assignment for Ambassador Grady, but that I had told Mr. Grady that I would be prepared to recommend it to the President when the time occurred.” (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, Lot 65 D 238, memoranda of conversation with the President, 1950) Regarding Secretary Acheson’s statement that Mr. Webb would go into the matter in greater detail with the President, Mr. McGhee thought this unnecessary and suggested that Mr. Webb “merely tell the President that we have been discussing the matter with the [Export-Import] Bank and we expect some word from them today. You might also say that Grady has agreed to this assignment and that the papers will be forthcoming.” (Memorandum, May 18, by Mr. McWilliams to Mr. Webb ( ibid. )) Mr. Webb did not discuss the “Iranian Crisis” with the President at their meeting of May 18th. The editors have not found a record of such a discussion between Mr. Webb and the President in Department of State files. A memorandum, May 18, by Acting Secretary Webb to the President formally recommended the appointment of Henry F. Grady as Ambassador to Iran (Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444). Ambassador Grady was nominated by the President on June 5; the Senate gave its advice and consent to his appointment on June 26; and he was appointed by the President as Ambassador to Iran on June 29. 2 The memorandum, April 19, by Mr. McGhee to the Secretary of State (788.00/4–1950) constituted part of document UM D–97, April 21, 1950, considered at the Under Secretary’s meeting of April 26; see supra . Amendments to the original paper of April 19 are indicated in footnotes below. 3 This paragraph is an amendment to the memorandum of April 19. 4 Memorandum of April 10, by General Collins to the Secretary of the Army, not printed. For Annex 5 of that memorandum, see p. 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] . 5 Reference is to the undated paper, prepared in the Department of State and entitled “The Present Crisis in Iran,” p. 509. 6 In the original memorandum of April 19, this paragraph read as follows: “Obtaining from the Export-Import Bank in advance of the mission’s departure a commitment to provide, if recommended by the mission, a line of credit not exceeding $50 million, only a portion of which probably will be used.” 7 This paragraph originally read as follows: “Establishing an Iranian MAP program for 1951 of not less than $20 million, although the actual sum to be released should be under the close control of American representatives in Iran.” 8 This paragraph is an amendment to the memorandum of April 19. 9 The original memorandum of April 19 specified that this total was not to exceed $50 million. 10 This paragraph is an amendment to the original memorandum of April 19. The background paper referred to is printed, p. 529. In addition, the memorandum of April 19 contained the sidehead “ Concurrences ” and a final paragraph which read as follows: “Messrs. [Philip C.] Jessup, Peurifoy [Willard L.] Thorp and Nitze concur. However, Mr. Thorp wishes to study further the procedures and amount in connection with the proposed Export-Import Bank loans. Actual figures for mUitary aid remain to be worked out with S/MDA.” Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) 888.00 TA/4–2650 [Document 235] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs ( Ferguson ) confidential [ Washington ,] April 26 [ 24? ], 1950. Subject: Aid for Iran Participants: The Iranian Ambassador, Mr. Ala Mr. Aram Mr. Nemazee Mr. Vahid 1 NEA—Mr. McGhee GTI—Mr. Woodbridge GTI—Mr. Ferguson The Problem: The constant desire of the Iranian Government to obtain some tangible form of United States support in the form of economic and greater military assistance. Action Required: To consider all means of helping the Iranians in their present critical situation either by actual assistance or by constant advice and encouragement. Action Assigned to: NEA and GTI Discussion: The Iranian Ambassador called on Mr. McGhee at his own request to say good-bye. After an exchange of amenities centered around the Ambassador’s service in this country and his elevation to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador said he would like to raise again the question of the critical situation in Iran and the need of that country for some sort of United States assistance. Mr. Ala said he had not forgotten what he had been told at his last meeting with Mr. McGhee two months ago 2 when he was advised that mere repetition of Iranian requests for assistance would have no effect on the policy of the United States in this matter and that only a changed situation would warrant reconsideration. Mr. Ala said the situation had now changed and the situation in his country was a matter of great concern. Mr. McGhee replied that the Department would always be interested in new aspects of the situation. Mr. Ala said it was a matter of deep regret to him that he felt obliged to raise this question again but the fact remained that a severe crisis exists at present in Iran involving a large Government deficit, an unfavorable balance of payments, merchant bankruptcies, closing of factories, unemployment, crop failures, loss of livestock, and the tense situation created by the herding of refugees from starvation areas in the larger cities. The Ambassador remarked that the only aid Iran had been promised to date had been under MDAP and this, while greatly appreciated, was insufficient to relieve the strain on the budget caused by essential military expenditures. Mr. McGhee pointed out to the Ambassador that Iran’s problems were of an internal financial nature which are not susceptible to outside assistance programs. He said that no United States assistance program anywhere contemplated a program of this nature. Mr. Ala said that his Government, with the coming to power of Ali Mansur, was trying very hard to effect the necessary reforms but was laboring under great difficulties since its assets were all earmarked for development projects and it was confronted by the vital need of maintaining its army in a state of readiness and efficiency. The exigencies were such, he said, that he must appeal again for American support. The Ambassador stated he would like to be able to carry back with him to Tehran a message of hope—some tangible sign of good will at this time of crisis. The Ambassador then referred to a conversation he had had on April 12 with Mr. Hare 3 in which he had offered certain specific suggestions as to the form United States assistance might take. He repeated some of these suggestions: 1. Direct, grant aid to finance projects designed to increase production to permit an increase in exports in order to pay for American goods and services. 2. Encouragement of American private investment in Iranian enterprises. 3. A United States Government credit to be used as cover to permit an increase in the note issue. 4. American good offices in the AIOC negotiations to ensure a fair deal for Iran and to increase royalties to a 50–50 basis. 5. Increased military aid to relieve the strain on the Iranian budgets. 6. Development projects in the Province of Khuzistan. 7. A relief program for the Province of Azerbaijan. 8. The inclusion of Iran in any aid program for Southeast Asia. Mr. McGhee replied that the Department was aware that the situation in Iran had been deteriorating for some time and that it was a matter of some concern to the United States. The difficulty, he said, seemed to lie in the problem of internal finance since Iran was still not short of foreign exchange. Mr. McGhee remarked that he understood Iran was undergoing a severe depression but that this was the type of problem which required internal measures. He said the Department was disappointed that the Iranian Government had not taken decisive measures called for by the situation and that the American consultants with the Iranian Plan Organization were very pessimistic. Mr. Ala expressed surprise that the OCI consultants were pessimistic since reports reaching him had indicated that the Plan was proceeding in good order. He said that the Plan Organization was busily engaged in preparing projects for the IBRD Mission now in Iran but that the numerous conditions and requests for information attached to IBRD loans made it difficult to get started. Mr. Nemazee mentioned that the preparation of these projects seemed to be a bottleneck at the moment. Mr. McGhee said he understood that the OCI had forty projects ready but had been totally unable to obtain their approval by the Supreme Council of the Plan Organization. He said the OCI was very discouraged. Mr. McGhee added that Iran might reach the point where it needed outside assistance but for the moment it refuses to take the internal steps which are obvious and necessary to see whether outside help is required. He pointed out the obstructive tactics of the Iranian Majlis and said that there is a limit to what external assistance can accomplish while the Iranian Government does nothing. He cited as an example the refusal of the Majlis to enact the currency reform desired by Mr. Ebtehaj and Mr. Ala replied that it was psychologically impossible to expand the note issue without additional coverage. Mr. McGhee said that the Department had looked into the possibility of stabilization loans to foreign countries but had found them not to be feasible. Reverting to the Ambassador’s suggestion concerning the AIOC negotiations, Mr. McGhee said it would be invidious for the United States to intervene and that the 50–50 royalty basis desired by the Ambassador existed only in Venezuela and that concessions in such countries as Saudi Arabia had no such provisions. Mr. Nemazee remarked that he understood 50–50 splits were customary on traditional concessions and that since the Saudi concession was relatively new, it was not a pertinent example since only those with long established concessions such as that of the AIOC could be expected to grant such royalties. Mr. Nemazee said that public opinion in Iran would never accept anything less than a 50–50 arrangement, Mr. Ala said that he believed that the AIOC must at least concede the principle of an equal distribution. He said the British Government now receives more in taxes from the concession than the Iranian Government does in royalties. Mr. Nemazee suggested that if the British could be induced to grant greater royalties, these could be used as cover for an increased note issue. He asked if it would not be possible in this connection to obtain a short term credit in this country with which gold would be left on deposit here and the currency expanded against this cover. Mr. McGhee replied that he was sure such an arrangement would be possible through commercial channels and that the Department would look into the matter. Mr. McGhee concluded the economic part of the conversation by telling the Ambassador that he could be assured that the Iranian situation was receiving constant and serious consideration and that should Iran find itself in real difficulties, it would not find the United States wanting. In the past, he said, there had been no need and at present most of the difficulties were within the competence of the Iranian Government to solve since there was no question of a shortage of dollars. 1 Gholam Ali Vahid, Counselor of the Iranian Embassy. 2 For a record of this meeting, see the memorandum of conversation, January 26, by Ferguson, p. 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] . 3 A memorandum of conversation, April 12, by Mr. Ferguson on this meeting is in Department of State file 888.00/4–1250. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs CFM Files; Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting C, D Series 1 [Document 236] Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 2 secret [FM D D–8] [ Washington ,] April 27, 1950. May Foreign Ministers Meetings 3 Position Paper on Iran i. problem The Department would like first to review with the British delegation the Iranian picture as a whole, describe its present plans, obtain the British reaction thereto, and solicit British support for certain of the steps the Department contemplates taking. Secondly it is felt desirable to express to the British our concern over the failure of the Iranian Parliament to ratify the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession, a failure the Department believes attributable in large measure to a too rigid stand by the Company and the British Government. ii. background A. General Reports reaching the Department during the past three months have reflected a situation in Iran which in the opinion of the Department requires prompt and rigorous action by the Iranian Government if Iran is not to become an easy prey for Communism. Unfortunately the Iranian Government has shown conclusively that without outside assistance and prodding it cannot take any effective action to meet the situation. The present critical situation arises from a number of factors: 1. A business depression of some magnitude arising out of the crop failures of last year, overstocking of consumer goods on the pait of merchants, and lack of foresight on the part of the Iranian Government. This depression has resulted in increasing unemployment, numerous bankruptcies of small businesses, and a growing feeling of fear on the part of Iran’s leaders. It offers a fertile field for Communist exploitation and the illegal “Tudeh” Party has not been slow in taking advantage of it. 2. Increased Communist activity throughout the country has shown that the clandestine Tudeh Party has perfected its organization since its banning in February 1949 and is now prepared to exploit general Iranian discontent to the fullest. While accurate information is lacking on the total membership of the Party, and the gains it has made among the lower classes in Iran, it seems certain as shown by its increased propaganda activities that the Party is well financed and has embarked on a carefully planned and vigorous campaign to convert the Iranian people to Communism. 3. Those who might be naturally resistant to the blandishments of the Tudeh Party have no one to turn to for leadership and there are no political parties in Iran that would normally be able to attract followers and offer hopes for a better life. The leadership of the Shah and the Iranian Government is totally unsatisfactory. For a while the Shah had symptoms of being able to offer the Iranian people effective leadership but in recent months he has shown rather conclusively that he cannot follow a consistent course and that his lofty statements of principle seldom, if ever, become translated into action. 4. There is a definite belief in Iran that that country has been left alone to face the Soviet threat without outside assistance or support. The Iranians believe they have taken great risks in openly placing their country in the Western camp and are coming to feel very strongly that further risks of this sort would be most dangerous without some tangible sign that the West is willing to assist Iran. The Shah has made the remark that “American aid stops at Iran’s borders” and his countrymen share this belief. American aid to date has consisted of a $26,000,000 surplus arms credit, a commitment to give Iran a small amount of grant military assistance, and a tentative promise of technical assistance under the Point Four program, if approved by Congress. 5. The Iranian political system is unable to adapt itself to meet a critical situation both because of basic organic defects and selfishness and incompetence on the part of most Iranian officials. Confronted with the factors outlined above, it has shown itself almost helpless and the Iranian Government clearly cannot be expected to take remedial action by itself. B. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Question An important factor is the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company agreement, a revision of which has been approved by the Government but not ratified by the Majlis. The Iranians are pressing for further concessions by AIOC and Company thus far has refused to concede any of the remaining points, the principal one of which concerns the amount of funds allocated to the general reserve from which 20 percent are payable to the Iranian Government. We feel that there is considerable justification in the Iranian demands. In the meantime, royalties are being paid to the Iranian Government on the basis of the old agreement, which provides considerably less than the amount required to implement the Iranian Seven Year Development Program. The Iranians have informally suggested that the United States use its good offices to bring about an agreement to satisfy the Majlis and clear the way for implementation of the Development Program. iii. discussion A. The General Situation To meet the situation described above, the Department is presently considering the following: 1. When requested by the Iranian Government, it will despatch a mission to Iran to study the situation and be prepared to recommend to the United States Export-Import Bank loans to finance economically justifiable projects in Iran’s Seven Year Program. 2. Any loans thus granted will be dependent on Iran’s agreeing to and putting into force certain basic and obvious reforms designed to improve its economic situation. These probably will include a relaxation of its currency cover requirements, a more liberal credit policy, a more rigid foreign exchange control, and a more effective tax program. 3. The Mission will remain in Iran for as long a time as may be required to stabilize the situation and will have rigid control over the use of the loans granted by the Export-Import Bank. 4. The United States will, if possible, moderately increase the limited amount of military assistance presently contemplated for Iran. 5. The Department will strengthen its diplomatic, consular, and informational personnel in Iran in an effort (1) to obtain more accurate information on conditions in that country and (2) to make clear to broad segments of the Iranian people the issues at stake in the “Cold War”. B. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company In response to the desire of the Iranian Government for the United States to use its good offices, the Department’s position has been that this is a matter between the Iranian Government and the AIOC into which the United States Government could not properly inject itself although it is extremely anxious that a solution be found. While the foregoing should continue to represent the Department’s position, the London taite should be used to emphasize the Department’s concern over the general Iranian economic situation and its hope that the United Kingdom will energetically pursue the matter to bring about a settlement of this long standing dispute. iv. recommendations A. The General Situation It is recommended that the above problems be discussed with the British delegation (there is no need to discuss Iran with the French) and in the event that the proposals outlined above have been approved at the time of the conversations, that British comments thereon and support therefor be solicited on a strictly confidential basis. The British could be especially helpful in seconding the United States requests for the reforms mentioned in III A 2 above and in convincing the still appreciable circle of Iranians who look to the British for leadership of the need for such reforms. Should the proposals not have been approved, it is suggested that the Iranian situation merely be reviewed with the British and that both sides explore what measures, in principle, could help ease the situation. B. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company It is recommended that in discussing the serious economic situation in Iran that the United States delegates take occasion to point out the need for a prompt ratification of the AIOC concession agreement by the Majlis and to express the hope that the United Kingdom will do everything in its power to bring the matter to a speedy conclusion. 1 Lot M–88 is a consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancilliary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center. 2 The substance of this paper was widely cleared within the Department of State through the medium of the Under Secretary’s Meeting; see the memorandum for the file on the Under Secretary’s Meeting of April 26, 1950, p. 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] . 3 For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, at London, May 1950, including discussion on Iran with the British delegation, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) 611.88/4–2750 [Document 237] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs ( Ferguson ) confidential [ Washington ,] April 27, 1950. Subject: Call of the Iranian Ambassador on the Secretary Participants: The Secretary The Iranian Ambassador Also Present: C V. Ferguson, GTI The Iranian Ambassador called on the Secretary on April 27 to Bay goodbye prior to his departure to assume his duties as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary said that he was sorry to see the Ambassador leave but wished to congratulate him on his new appointment and welcome him to the “Union” of Foreign Ministers. The Ambassador traced his mission in the United States from the days in 1945 and 1946 when his country was directly threatened by Soviet aggression which it was able to resist with the greatly appreciated support and assistance of the United States. He said that his country was profoundly grateful. He went on to say that Iran is once again confronted with a grave crisis, this time economic rather than political. Mr. Ala described the present situation in Iran briefly mentioning the crop failures of last year, the shortage of money, rising unemployment, business failures, and increasingly unfavorable balance of trade. He said that the Iranian Government was doing everything within its power to remedy the situation but it was now certain it must have outside assistance. Mr. Ala stated that the situation as he had described it was being exploited fully by the Communists and the danger of a Communist inspired disturbance of major proportions was very real. In this connection he referred to the masses of agricultural workers who had been forced in droves into the cities looking for food who could very easily become the pawns of the Communists. He also mentioned the intrigues of former Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam in France, where he was actively conniving with Iranian Communist exiles to overthrow the regime. The Ambassador said he would like to be able to take back to his people some expression of United States good will for his country and concern over the present situation there. The Secretary told the Ambassador that he certainly could take back a message of good will and sympathy from the United States. He said that the Iranian situation was being actively studied in the Department and that United States policy on the question of Iran’s needs was by no means frozen. He remarked that he had been following events in Iran with great interest and expressed the hope that Iran would soon be in a position to sign the MAP bilateral agreement. Mr. Ala replied that this would be finished any day now. The Secretary added that he would like to point out that foreign assistance is never of any value to a country which lacks the internal organization necessary to make use of the assistance. He said he was sure the Ambassador would agree that the Iranian Government up to the present moment had not given any evidence that it was prepared to institute the necessary reforms and that he was confident the Ambassador would on his return use his very great influence on the Shah to head matters in the proper direction. Ambassador Ala assured the Secretary he would do his best to do as he desired. He said he understood that the question of Iran would be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London and he hoped that Iran’s interests and needs would be given full consideration. He mentioned Iran’s dispute with the British over the Anglo-Iranian Oil concession and said Iran had not received fair treatment. The Secretary replied that it was probable that he would discuss Iran with Mr. Bevin 1 and that the Ambassador could be assured that Iran’s best interests would be taken into full consideration. 1 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France at London, May 1950, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. The Iranian Ambassador (Ala) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 888.00/4–2850 [Document 238] The Iranian Ambassador ( Ala ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) Washington , April 28, 1950. Dear Mr. McGhee : Two days after our conversation of the 24th, 1 I received a cable from the Prime Minister 2 of which I venture to send you the substance in translation. It practically corroborates the points to which I drew your attention. These are incorporated in the précis of my talk with Mr. Raymond Hare of which I handed you a copy. 3 The emphasis is on the deteriorating economic situation and the need for urgent American assistance. What do you think of the suggestion I made to you early in January about a survey of the situation by an outstanding American economist designated by the United States? 4 This might be a way to determine the real need of Iran and the best way to cope with the crisis. The Secretary of State has, on various occasions, issued statements which have acted as a deterrent to any contemplated foreign aggression or machinations against Greece, Turkey and Iran. Might it not be opportune at the present critical juncture, to have recourse to the same salutary procedure? Yours sincerely, Hussein Ala [Enclosure] Substance of Cable Received From the Prime Minister on April 26 th , 1950 5 The Military budget, allocated this year on a minimum basis, amounts to 327 million tomans ( = approximately 100 million dollars). Next year it will reach the figure of 400 million tomans. Any smaller appropriation for the existing forces would be false economy and therefore wasteful. In view of this and considering the existing weakness of our financial and economic situation, in order to enable us to bear the burden of this Military expenditure, assistance from the United States is essential, not only by way of furnishing arms and material, but also by way of financial and economic grants in aid, to enable us to expend our available limited resources for economic development. Every effort must be made to secure such aid. If the importance of Iran’s military role and preparedness in the Middle East and in global security is not taken into consideration, the situation of Iran will become acutely dangerous, as His Imperial Majesty the Shah has already pointed out in his conversations in America. With all the insidious propaganda and subversive activities now going on, the slightest spark in Iran will set the whole of the Middle East ablaze. As regards loans from the World Bank, the Seven-Year Plan Organization has done its utmost, in conjunction and in consultation with its advisers, the O.C.I., to prepare useful projects. Up to now several projects, such as the construction of a dam and Hydro-electric plant on the river Karadj, the establishment of two cement factories in Shiraz and Doroud, etc., have been completed and are ready for examination by the representatives of the International Bank, who have recently arrived. 6 Projects connected with other technical aspects of the Seven-Year program are being studied and will be gradually submitted to the Bank as they become ready. Our request is that the Bank should not raise obstacles by demanding detailed statistics and unnecessary formalities; rather, we expect that if the Bank sees that the proposals are essentially sound, they will adopt a policy of assisting and facilitating the execution of the projects submitted. Having authority under Law to negotiate loans up to $250 million dollars during a period of seven years on the basis of projects to be submitted, we desire to borrow up to this amount and together with our own resources execute a program of Development and Reconstruction in Irrigation, Agriculture, Industry, etc. The economic Grants-in-Aid we need are apart from this and apart from such aid as Point 4 etc. With reference to the news lately appearing in articles published in the American press, the facts are that our Economic and Financial situation is bad, the budget shows a huge deficit; there is no question that subversive elements are active, also that local incidents of border aggression have taken place, and that clandestine radio transmitters are busy spreading unfounded rumours calculated to incite sedition and to accentuate the crisis. The news published in this connection is however in some respects exaggerated and in some respects false such as the information published by Drew Pearson with a reference to the American Ambassador which the American Embassy absolutely denies. 7 It appears that certain elements are endeavouring to engender difficulties in the relations between America and Iran, in order to make America and Iran lose hope and confidence in each other, and, as a consequence, to aggravate the crisis so that the situation will get out of hand which is the aim of those who desire disruption and revolution. 1 No memorandum of conversation, April 24, has been found in Department of State files, but see the memorandum of conversation, April 26 [ 24? ], by Mr. Ferguson, p. 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] . 2 Ali Mansur. 3 A memorandum of conversation of Ambassador Ala with Mr. Hare, April 12, by Mr. Ferguson is in Department of State file 888.00/4–1250. 4 Reference is presumably to the conversation between Ambassador Ala and Mr. McGhee on January 26 which is reported in the memorandum of the same date by Mr. Ferguson, p. 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] . 5 The source text bears a handwritten change of date from April 27th to the 26th. 6 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development sent a mission to Iran at the request of the Iranian Government to survey the general economic and financial situation and to study four specific projects for possible IBRD financing (telegram 427, April 13, to Tehran; 398.14/4–750). 7 Drew Pearson’s column of April 19 stated that Ambassador Wiley had cautioned the Department of State that Iranian Prime Minister Mansur might be a “Russian stooge and must be watched closely” ( Washington Post , April 19, 1950). The Department reassured the Iranian embassy but declined to issue a public denial as the Iranian Embassy suggested since it would only draw attention to the story and provoke Mr. Pearson into more such reporting on Iran. It also authorized the Embassy in Iran at its discretion to inform the Iranian Government that the story had no basis in fact and to explain the Department’s reluctance to issue a public denial in the United States. (Telegram 468, April 19, to Tehran; 888.00/4–1250) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 601.8811/5–150 [Document 239] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) secret [ Washington ,] May 1, 1950. Subject: Meeting with Ambassador Ala Participants: His Excellency, Hussein Ala, Ambassador of Iran Mr. George C. McGhee—NEA I received Ambassador Ala alone at luncheon on the occasion of his departure from Washington to assume his new position as Foreign Minister. Ambassador Ala bad declined any formal entertainment in his honor because of the press of personal affairs. Ambassador Ala stated that he had received a message from Tehran which was in response to the statements which I had made to him at his call in the Department on April 24, 1950. 1 He gave me what he stated was a rough translation of this telegram, a copy of which is attached. He said that he also had received a personal communication from Mr. Ebtehaj, in which Mr. Ebtehaj had stated that Iran’s present financial problems could be solved if three conditions could be met: 1. The budget was balanced. 2. A new Anglo-Iranian oil contract was entered into. 3. The United States provided budgetary assistance to the Iranian Government for any increased internal military expenses. In response to these communications, I pursued the usual argument that we still felt that Iran’s problems could be met by action within the competence of the Iranian Government. With respect to the telegram attached, we felt that the symptoms of the financial difficulties in Iran at the present time were those of an economic depression or deflation, and that there were various financial means, many of which we had employed during our own depression, for counteracting such a situation. With respect to the Iranian statement that delay in getting on with the seven-year economic development program was not caused by failure of the high council to approve projects, but because of the failure of the American experts to submit projects, this was a point of fact which we could not profitably discuss but would seek to clarify. I stated that we would seek, through our Embassy in Tehran, to arrive at a better mutual understanding of the facts involved in the present situation in Iran. I explained to the Ambassador, as I have many times before, the reason why we cannot, as Mr. Ebtehaj suggests, give the Iranians budgetary support for internal military expense. I also explained why, on the basis of our loan and financial policy, we could not give Iran grant economic assistance. I said, however, that this did not mean that we were not deeply interested in Iran. We have, in fact, always followed the Iranian situation closely, with the view of determining what, if any, action we might take which would be effective in assisting Iran. I assured the Ambassador that we had become more and more disturbed, within recent months, with the situation in Iran, and that we wished to do something to help. Within the framework of what I had previously stated with respect to our policies toward such assistance, I asked him what suggestions he had to make. He replied that he felt that we should on the request of the Iranian Government send a mission to Iran to survey the economic situation. Such a mission, he said, could clarify such points as those we had discussed previously concerning which there was disagreement. I asked him whether or not Iran would be prepared to follow recommendations of the mission no matter how much they cut across vested interests in Iran and whether or not they involve U.S. financial assistance. He replied that in his opinion the recommendations of the mission would be accepted, although he did not wish to preclude the possibility that they would include U.S. financial assistance. I mentioned specifically recommendations such as tax policy, loan policy, land tenure and the administration of the seven-year economic development program as being questions that the mission might address itself to. The Ambassador felt in each case that weight would be given to the recommendations of the mission no matter what they were. I then developed some general discussion of the question of whether or not the vested interests in Iran—whom the Ambassador admitted, by and large, control the Majlis and have positions of importance in the Iranian Government—could be kept from blocking reforms which are required in Iran if the country is to make progress. He replied that in his judgment the influence of the Majlis could be overcome. He said that there are men in Iran who had the courage to combat them. He said that he himself would be glad to contest such interests for the good of Iran. He also rather lamely classified Prime Minister Mansur as being willing to combat these interests. He didn’t mention Razmara. I then queried him as to whether in his view the Shah should attempt to run the country, and whether or not his attempt to do so might not create a vacuum in the government to the end that no one ran it effectively. He said that he had always counseled the Shah not to assume responsibility for governing the country, nor to associate himself with individual policies. He should be above individual policies, so that his prestige is not harmed by their failure. He had urged the Shah on numerous occasions to get a strong man as Prime Minister, give him full power to run the country, and back him up 100 percent as long as he was able to retain his confidence. The Ambassador stated that he attached the greatest importance to the candidacy of Entezam 2 for president of the General Assembly, pointing out how much it would mean to Iran if he were successful. I was noncommittal. Upon parting, I expressed appreciation to the Ambassador for the fine cooperation that Ave had enjoyed during his stay in Washington, complimented him on the way in which he had fulfilled his responsibilities here, and passed on to him commendations which I had heard from other sources. I expressed great satisfaction that he was assuming the position of Foreign Minister, and felt it would mean that our two governments would continue to work closely together. I stated that Iran and the United States were bound by firm ties of common interest in the present world struggle and that he must never forget, that no matter what disappointments they may have had in the past with respect to failure to receive United States assistance, that we did at all times stand ready to help Iran in the event of emergency. He reaffirmed his solidarity, and that of all Iranians, with this country and the free world and assured me that he would as Foreign Minister seek to develop this relationship. [Attachment] Copy of Rough Translation of Telegram Handed to Mr. McGhee by Ambassador Ala Mr. McGhee’s opinion based on reports from the Embassy in Teheran that the present crisis is commercial and due to excessive imports is not quite accurate; in fact, the slump in the market and the unsaleability of the existing stocks is due more to lack of productive activity and consequent drop in the purchasing power of the individual consumers. Therefore, assistance from America to create productive activity and thus to increase purchasing power will solve the crisis. It is necessary to draw the attention of the State Department especially to this point that in carrying out the 7 Year Plan, if sufficient consumer goods be not available within reach of the public to absorb their increased purchasing power, inflation will certainly result. Nevertheless, this point (excessive imports) has been taken into consideration, and during the current year a reduction of 600 million rials ($20 million) has been made in the import quotas. The alleged delay in the approval of projects by the High Council to which Mr. McGhee has referred is definitely denied. Not only has the consideration of any projects not been delayed in the High Council—on the contrary, the High Council has approved of more productive projects than the financial means at its disposal justified. It is also to be noted that no projects have yet been submitted by the American experts; so far they have only studied and approved the projects proposed and submitted by the Iranian experts. Regarding the statement by Mr. Ebtehaj regarding loan to be made for currency backing, it is necessary to point out that the proposal was first suggested in the course of a private conversation by Mr. Wiley. Mr. Ebtehaj considers this only a stopgap solution. In conclusion, it is necessary to draw the attention of the State Department to the fact that some of the reports of the officials of the Embassy in connection with economic matters and the 7 Year Plan are based on inaccurate information and incorrect evaluation which is unfortunate as it may give rise to misunderstandings between the two governments. 1 No memorandum of conversation, April 24, has been found in Department of State files; see the memorandum of conversation, April 26 [ 24? ], by Mr. Ferguson, p. 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] . 2 Nasrollah Entezam, Iranian Permanent Representative at the United Nations; for documentation on his candidacy for President of the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly, see vol. ii , pp. 87 ff. Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 149, May FM Meeting C, D Series [Document 240] Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs ( Ferguson ) 1 secret [FM D D–8/1] [ Washington ,] May 3, 1950. May Foreign Ministers Meeting Supplement to Position Paper on Iran 2 problem Subsequent to the preparation of the position paper on Iran for discussions with the British delegation at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting, the British Embassy in Washington informed the Department that it had received from the British Embassy at Tehran a suggestion that at the conclusion of the meeting a communiqué be issued on the Iranian question designed for Iranian consumption. Our Embassy at Tehran has made a similar suggestion as has the Iranian Ambassador here. discussion The British suggest that this communiqué repeat the interest of the two countries in the independence and territorial integrity of Iran and go on to take note of and endorse the general expression of opinion in Iran that the Seven Year Program must be prosecuted urgently, that the administrative practices of the Iranian Government be modernized, and that steps be taken to improve the living conditions of agricultural workers. The Department’s thinking is that such a statement would do little good and might do some harm. If we can include in it some reference to the United States assistance to Iran which has been decided upon and if the British could include some reference to their willingness to reach a final understanding with the Iranians on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Concession question, it would be most valuable and could serve as a useful lever in effecting the reforms we both so desire the Iranians to take. However, without such sweetening such a statement will be regarded as (1) a mere repetition of earlier general statements which the Iranians believe identify them with the Western camp in the cold war without their receiving adequate compensation for the risks involved in such an association and (2) an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of Iran. recommendation It is recommended that a statement not be issued unless it contains a reference to our intention of rendering economic assistance to Iran. Should the British find it possible also to offer something in exchange for the reforms demanded of the Iranians, it would be even more valuable. This need not be any commitment to give the Iranians greater oil royalties but could be merely a statement that in full awareness of the serious situation in Iran, HMG is willing to discuss with the Iranians on a frank and equal basis any and all points at issue between the two countries whose resolution could help improve the situation in Iran. It is also recommended that any communiqué that may be issued contain British support for the expressed aims of the United States aid programs. 3 1 This paper was prepared to cover suggestions from the British and Iranian Embassies in Washington and the U.S. Embassy, Tehran, that a communication designed for Iranian consumption be issued at the conclusion of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, at London, May 1950. For documentation on these meetings, including discussion on Iran with the British Delegation, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. 2 Position paper on Iran, April 27, p. 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] . 3 Regarding the statements, May 19, by Secretary Acheson and Foreign Secretary Bevin following the London Foreign Ministers meetings on their interest in the security of Greece, Turkey, and Iran, see footnote 2, p. 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph J. Wolf of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State 788.5 MAP/5–950 [Document 241] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph J. Wolf of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State secret [ Washington ,] May 9, 1950. Subject: List Discussions MDAP FY1950 for Iran 1 Participants: Mr. Aram, Chargé d’Affaires, Iranian Embassy Mr. C. V. Ferguson, Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs Mr. P. Halla, GTI Mr. J. J. Wolf Mr. Aram, on May 8th, had telephone [d] Mr. Wolf and said that he would like to speak with him concerning the issue of the tanks before the next session between the two delegations. He indicated at that time that he would prefer to have the U.S. state whether or not it was impossible for the U.S. to give the tanks as it was difficult for the Iranian Generals to be put in the position of having to say that they insisted on them. The appointment was made for 11:00 A. M. May 9th, but Mr. Aram called Mr. Ferguson prior thereto, said that the Generals had now received their instructions, and that there was no need for the conversation before the delegations met. At about noon on May 8th, he again called Mr. Ferguson and asked that the meeting he had originally sought be held, and it was set for 4:30 P. M. The meeting opened with Mr. Aram stating that he had sought from his Government instructions which would permit him to accept the English phraseology of the Bilateral Agreement, 2 rather than having the English text follow the Persian. Mr. Ferguson indicated that we would cable our Embassy at Tehran along similar lines. Mr. Aram then said that with respect to the tanks he would like to know whether or not the U.S. found it impossible to include them in the list. Mr. Wolf stated that Mr. Ferguson and himself had spent many hours in conference with Defense officials in an attempt to insure that every effort was made by the U.S. to meet the last Iranian list. As a result of these conversations, Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Wolf were confident that the list that would be presented at the next meeting of the delegations would go a good way toward including most of the items sought by the Iranian Government in their last list, although it was not one hundred percent in accord therewith. However, all items of armor are necessarily omitted from the FY 1950 Program. Mr. Wolf stated that although the word “impossible” could have several meanings, it could truly be said that in order to meet the Iranian desires in any other aspect, to provide a balanced program, to present a program which could stand on its own feet and not jeopardize possible future programs for Iran, and in view of fiscal limitations, it might sincerely be said that the inclusion of armor in this program was an impossibility. Mr. Aram asked whether this included all tanks or just the medium tanks, and he was told that it included all tanks and armored vehicles. Mr. Ferguson emphasized the fact that we had to be in the position to report to Congress that we were providing a program which we ourselves believed to be sound, and we were really not able to do that if the tanks were included. Mr. Wolf referred to the fact that the new program which would be presented was well rounded, well balanced, and contained a good deal of infantry support and antitank weapons of the most efficient and modern type. He indicated that the new list would include some of the 3.5 bazookas which the Shah had expressly requested, and further indicated that we had broken our backs to include some of the very new and extremely powerful recoilless rifles which, subject to high level consideration, he hoped would finally be included. Mr. Aram emphasized that the medium tanks were the particular desire of His Majesty, the Shah, and that one of their major purposes was to bolster the morale of the Iranian Army by the visible display of such heavy power. Mr. Ferguson emphasized that we had given every consideration to the psychological problem involved therein, but felt that these tanks were bound to become deadlined, and would not be a positive morale factor in such case. Mr. Wolf referred to General Duff’s statements 3 with regard to the enormous expense of upkeep of these tanks, and to the fact that we could not insure that spare parts for these tanks would be available. He said that he was confident that demonstration of the anti-tank power contained in the mobile weapons we had under consideration would have a tremendous morale value amongst the Iranian troops. Mr. Aram wondered what these tanks cost. Mr. Wolf replied that if we were to include only 50 of the medium tanks requested, together with necessary maintenance, support and recovery vehicles, we would more than exceed the value of the original list which we had tendered to Iran, and that to provide the tanks would of course mean that all anti-tank weapons would have to be dropped. Mr. Aram indicated that he believed that if Iran had the choice, they would probably choose the tanks over the other weapons. It was stated that such an unbalanced program would be very difficult to support here, that the program we did propose would be so well balanced, so much along the lines of General Collins’ conversations when he was in Iran, 4 so mobile and useful in connection with Iran’s strategic plan of withdrawal to and protection of a national redoubt, that we felt it impossible to prejudice such an excellent program. Mr. Aram repeated several times throughout the conversation that of course we would have to convince his Generals of the military aspects of this program. He also asked whether we would provide all of the bazookas and recoilless rifles which Iran had requested. He was informed that there would be delays on delivery of these items, which were so new and modern that there were none available on hand for immediate delivery. He was also told that for this first fiscal year 50 program, only a beginning was made to meet the net Iranian requirement, but that our people believed that there was sufficient numbers included to permit thorough training in the applied tactical use of this weapon. Mr. Aram then asked about the fiscal year 51 program and whether armored vehicles might not be included therein, particularly medium tanks, but not them, at least more light tanks which we appeared to approve. He was told that it was impossible to make a commitment in view of the fact that Congress had not yet approved any figure for 1951 and in view of our increasing world-wide commitments. He then indicated a concern on the part of Iran with respect to our increasing commitments elsewhere, referring to the press report that it has been indicated in London that we would be sending arms to Indochina. 5 Mr. Wolf noted that the situation in Indochina was one of active warfare which fortunately was not the case in Iran. Mr. Aram repeated his concern at the share the other nations were getting and was reminded that a quick reading of the MDAA indicated that Iran was one of the most preferred nations of the whole world, inasmuch as all of the nations were seeking grant aid from us and very few were receiving it. He asked whether Pakistan had, as reported in the press, requested us to sell arms, 6 and was informed that we were not sure, but that almost every nation in the world had presented such a request to us. Mr. Aram then indicated that he would cable this general information to Mr. Ala in Paris so that Mr. Ala would be in a position to discuss it with the Shah on his arrival in Iran. A meeting was arranged for May 11th at 3:00 P.M. of the Iranian-United States delegations, 7 and a further meeting with Mr. Aram at 10:00 A. M. on May 10th, concerning the Bilateral. 8 Comment: It was apparent that Mr. Aram was seriously concerned at the absence of armor in the FY 1950 Program; but his reaction was not, at that time, indicative of the presence of a major obstacle to a successful conclusion of the discussions on the proposed basis. 9 1 The terms of reference of these discussions, held at Washington, March 24–May 16, by representatives of the Governments of the United States and Iran are given in the aide-mémoire , March 24, p. 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 226 ] . 2 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States and Iran, effected by exchange of notes at Washington, May 23; see the editorial note, p. 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] . 3 For a statement by Maj. Gen. Robinson Earl Duff, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of the Army, on the question of supplying medium tanks to Iran, see the minutes of the United States-Iranian meeting, April 25 in ISA/MDAP Files, Lot 52–26, MDAP—Iran. 4 See Annex 5 to the memorandum, April 10, by General Collins to the Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray, p. 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] . 5 For documentation on the extension of U.S. military assistance to French Union Forces, see vol. vi , pp. 690 ff. 6 For documentation on Pakistan’s interest in obtaining military equipment from the United States, see the policy statement, April 3, with respect to Pakistan, p. 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 837 ] ; telegram 629, May 5, from New Delhi; telegram 460, May 9, to New Delhi; and the memorandum of conversation, June 15, by Secretary Acheson, pp. 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , and 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] . 7 The editors have not found a record of this meeting in Department of State Files. 8 For documentation on the meeting of May 10, see the memorandum of conversation, May 12, by Mr. Wolf in Department of State file 788.5–MAP/5–1250. 9 At the United States-Iranian meeting of May 16 on the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Iran for fiscal year 1950, Mr. Aram expressed “the formal gratitude of the Government of Iran at the equipment list proposed by the United States at the meeting of May 11, 1950, and stated that, under instructions from the Iranian General Staff, General Mazhari would be able to advise the United States that the list was acceptable to the Iranian General Staff. General Mazhari then read a short prepared statement, repeating the position stated by Mr. Aram and setting forth certain general concepts of the Government of Iran with respect to the Program.” (Minutes of the United States-Iranian Negotiations, May 16, 1950; ISA/MDAP Files, Lot 52–26, MDAP—Iran). A copy of the agreed equipment list is attached to the memorandum of May 18 by Mr. Only to Major General Lemnitzer, neither printed (788.5 MAP/5–1850). The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 700.00(S)/5–1750: Circular information telegram [Document 242] The Acting Secretary of State 1 to Certain Diplomatic Offices 2 secret no stencil—no distribution Washington , May 17, 1950—2 a. m. In US–UK subcomite mtgs London UK reps called Iran a soft spot in defense against Commie NE expansion which may constitute increasing temptation to Soviet. UK agreed with our appraisal situation (infotel) but stressed that despite Shah’s failure exercise effective leadership people still loyal to institution of throne. Hare outlined our views re remedial measures, urged UK support and asked what UK aid we eld expect. Said we felt early conclusion AIOC negots wld speed solut Iran’s present difficulties, suggesting UK give special attention to question of reserves. UK reps said Iranians had never requested specific modifications concession. If they did so, AIOC wld have to consider prob but wld not take initiative. While UK agrees polit factors inherent, it believes concession shld also be on fair commercial basis, but promised to note and consider our views. While UK thinks long term objectives shld be pursued thru seven-year plan, declining morale necessitates short term measures. UK considering urging Shah take action on redistribution crown lands; interference with free trade unions; absentee landlordism; better labor legis; anti-corruption campaign. In FonMins mtg Bevin agreed with See’s appraisal gravity Iran situation. Sec outlined steps we considering re improvement, raised question ratif AIOC concession, emphasizing importance getting agreement settled. UK FonOff official reported new UK Amb Tehran 3 not pessimistic re passage and suggested to Bevin that UK make maximum effort by explanation and pressure on Iranians. Webb 1 Secretary Acheson was in London for meetings with Foreign Ministers Bevin and Schuman; for information on Acheson’s talk with Bevin on Iran and the work of the subcommittee referred to below see Secto 218, May 11, Foreign Relations , 1950, vol. iii , p. 1027 . 2 Sent to Tehran. 3 Sir Francis Shepherd. The United States Delegation at the London Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Acting Secretary of State 396.1–LO/5–1650: Telegram [Document 243] The United States Delegation at the London Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Acting Secretary of State secret London , May 16, 1950—6 p. m. Secto 276. Further discussions Iran held at meeting this morning between Hare and Palmer for US and Wright, Furlonge and Leavett for UK. 1 Referring to our previous talks on this subject (Secto 186, May 6 2 ) Furlonge said Foreign Office had asked for comments British Ambassador Tehran on proposed line of action. Re suggestion economic mission, British Ambassador thought Iran already over-surveyed and doubted wisdom tying any proposed statement on Iran to announcement of economic mission. Hare explained we did not regard this as just another economic mission, but one which would be headed by well known personage and would concentrate on immediate concrete achievement. British Ambassador did not think step-up in informational activities would do very much good. What Iranians need is not more information but general “gingering up”. Hare said not our intention merely concentrate on conventional informational activity but to develop new tactics which would have real impact on existing situation. Re AIOC supplementary agreement, Foreign Office representatives stated they had given careful consideration our suggestions. Agreement had been reached with Iranian Government after much careful preparation, during course of which Mr. Bevin had talked to AIOC officials to emphasize from political standpoint necessity reaching equitable agreement. Foreign Office feels present supplemental agreement is fair one. From standpoint of positive assistance to help Iran thru her present difficulties, Foreign Office feels ratification agreement in present form would be big contribution. Everything therefore seems to point to desirability early ratification in present form. If, on other hand, parties start tinkering with agreement at present time, it may take months before matter can be sewed up and Iran receive increased benefits which it needs so badly to undertake developmental program. Hare said there seemed to be differences in UK and US assessment of possibility of agreement getting thru Majlis. We had doubts re prospects ratification in present form and have been somewhat worried by UK take it or leave it attitude. We recognize that agreement offers good deal, but we wondered if it had not gotten into too rigid framework. Wright said Foreign Office appreciated force our arguments. UK has considered question very carefully from all points of view, including political and is sure it is taking right stand in pressing for ratification in present form. He would draw up for our information list of points in agreement which UK considers strong and beneficial to Iran. In light our joint appraisal Iranian situation and need proffer economic assistance, he felt it would be to benefit of everyone concerned to bend our efforts toward getting present supplemental agreement thru Majlis. In order assist in this, he suggested our Ambassador in Tehran might, in informal conversations with Iranians, take line that we feel that supplemental agreement contains very solid benefits for Iran and that after talking to UK, we are convinced that there is no chance of UK agreeing to increase those benefits. UK representatives noted that we were both in agreement re desirability economic assistance to Iran in order bolster morale, give us peg on which to hang statement and create favorable atmosphere for urging reforms. They were somewhat apprehensive, however, that, if we proffered Eximbank loan prior ratification AIOC supplemental agreement, Iranians might be less anxious proceed with ratification. Hare emphasized critical nature of Iranian situation and need for speedy action. If AIOC difficulty could be ironed out soon it would be great help but, since immediate prospect not encouraging, we should endeavor press on with many other practicable steps. Wright agreed re urgency and wondered whether there was any way in which two forms of financial assistance might be linked together in order to bring maximum combined contribution to bear on Iran’s present problems. Specifically, would UK find it possible take line with Iranians that we were studying possibility financial assistance to Iran, but that meanwhile Iran has prospect obtaining substantial benefits from AIOC agreement and that we feel they should go ahead with this form of self help immediately. Moreover, he wondered whether it would be preferable to approach Shah re desired reforms after announcement financial assistance or whether it would be preferable to make such financial assistance conditional on compliance with reform suggestions. We agreed put these points to Department and to Embassy Tehran. UK is also putting them to their Embassy Tehran and it was agreed that it would be useful if two Ambassadors Tehran could, after consulting together, give us their views on following two points: 1. Desirability linking together questions Eximbank loan to ratification AIOC agreement; and 2. Question of linking two forms of financial assistance to question social and financial reform. Suggest Department repeat this telegram to Tehran together with section on Iran contained Secto 186 and any other appropriate background material. Also suggest Tehran’s reply should be reviewed by Department prior discussion with Foreign Office. Sent Department Secto 276, repeated Tehran 18. 1 Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; Joseph Palmer 2d, Second Secretary of Embassy London; Michael: R. Wright, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Geoffrey W. Furlonge, Head of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office: and Alan Leavett of the same Department. 2 For text, see vol. iii , p. 986 . The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 888.2553–AIOC/5–2250: Telegram [Document 244] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , May 22, 1950—3 a. m. 931. Department inform Army, Navy, Air. The Shah has informed me that AIOC renegotiation should be ratified by Parliament and that it would be the task of the Ali Mansur Government to see that this went through. This is contrary to stories which have reached the Embassy that the Ali Mansur Government was to be replaced in nearest future. The Shah stated that he did not desire that a Government in Iran should fall merely of its own weight; it should fall for a specific issue or reason and on a basis of responsibility which the Government had assumed, not because of political capriciousness Parliamentary intrigue. It is evident that Shah has been formulating his thoughts and it seems to me he has decided to take energetic decisions regarding Government and public affairs. Shah believes strong leadership in US is greatest deterrent to dictatorship. In conversation yesterday a. m., Razmara 1 estimated Mansur’s Cabinet would last two months. He believed Mansur will be succeeded by Minister Interior Ardalan whom he considered a “weak” personality. Although he disclaimed any ambitions on his own part to become Prime Minister, I rather think that the Chief Staff is merely biding his time until he feels the moment is ripe for him to assume power. With present muddled political and economic situation, there is growing sentiment for Razmara premiership even among some of his former political enemies. Wiley 1 Lt. Gen. Ali Razmara, Chief of the Iranian General Staff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 788.5–MAP/5–2250: Telegram [Document 245] The Acting Secretary of State 1 to the Embassy in Iran top secret Washington , May 22, 1950—6 p. m. 594. Deptel 539 May 5. 2 Eyes only Wiley and Richards. Dept’s prospective program for Iran contemplated, if necessary to secure essential cooperation and reforms on part IranGov, suggestion to Shah he bring to power Govt capable of fulfilling these requirements. No such action however was envisaged until sufficient time had passed evaluate situation fol arrival survey mission. However, recent reports including urtels 873 May 15 and 884 May 16 3 have given rise to serious concern over Mansur Govt. Further, danger exists that he will be pictured in US press as Sov appeaser at very moment US aid to Iran is announced, and added consideration is that announcement US aid while Mansur in power wld in all probability strengthen his position considerably and econ and finan control Iran by Ebtehaj-Mansur-Naficy family group wld be tightened. While Dept wld leave to ur judgment any US action which might influence Mansur’s removal, it may be that mere hint of US attitude in proper palace quarters wld be sufficient. If not, suggestion cld be made that repeated requests for US aid made by Shah and Amb Ala are difficult to consider while IranGov has reputation of association with vested interests and with seeking arrangement with Sovs, and has shown no signs whatsoever of attempting either correct present econ situation or proceed with Seven Year Plan. Surprise cld be expressed Mansur shld undertake undermine Shah’s attempts explore Iran situation with US and UK (urtel 873) and hope put forward that PriMin can be found who, fully aware of great issues at stake in present situation, can proceed with efficiency, honesty, and vigor. If such action is taken, it shld be made entirely clear US has with greatest reluctance reached decision to make its views known on such a question but its serious concern over recent events in Iran and its desire see Iran prosperous and strong in face of Commie threat have brought it to conclusion Iran is in all fairness entitled to frank opinion of US Govt. To have free hand in future, Dept wld prefer not to be pinned down by specific indication preferred successor to Mansur but if direct question is asked re Ardalan or Razmara, you might reply US has no objection to either. Tel immed whether you perceive objection to foregoing course and views concerning timing of approach. Do not proceed with plan pending further word. Webb 1 Following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Secretary Acheson had remained in London for the fourth session of the NATO Council; for documentation on this session, see vol. iii , pp. 100 ff. 2 Not printed; this telegram read as follows: “On basis ur reports and recommendations, Dept has formulated program for Iran which it is hoped will be fully approved in near future. Program contemplates survey and advisory mission to Iran, extension under US control of loan assistance for selected development projects, somewhat increased military aid, intensification informational activities, and more direct US advice in political and administrative fields. Upon completion arrangement for Eximbank commitment Dept plans informally suggest Iran Govt it request despatch mission to Iran to look into economic situation and ( a ) recommend measures which Irans shld take themselves and ( b ) consider extent to which US aid needed. Pending further word this shld not be discussed with Irans.” (888.00TA/5–550) 3 Neither printed; the former reported that although the Shah had made a firm decision to “resist any orientation by Iran toward Soviet Union”, Mansur gave the impression that he still believed it was “possible to get along with USSR;” while the latter indicated that an Associated Press correspondent who had just left Tehran appeared convinced after an interview with the Prime Minister that Mansur was a “dangerous Soviet appeaser.” (788.00/5–1550 and 5–1650) The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 396.1–L0/5–1550: Telegram [Document 246] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret Washington , May 22, 1950—7 p. m. 2463. Secto 276 May 16. While Tehran’s views not yet reed, Dept has given careful consideration points raised by Brit Del re Iran situation. Fol for use further discussion UK Reps: 1. Contemplated US Mission will be far broader in scope than mere survey mission and it is our intention it remain in Iran for as long as may be necessary to relieve present critical situation. It will have responsibility for recommending projects to be financed by Eximbank, for observing expenditure of funds loaned and for recommending to IranGovt measures it cld take on its own to improve situation. 2. Dept’s proposed expanded informational program contemplates as one of its basic objectives giving to broad segments of Iran people confidence in their future and in ability their Govt to offer them life better than they cld enjoy under Communism. It is not intended as mere propaganda campaign and Dept confidently hopes it can have beneficial effect on Iran morale. 3. We feel any pressure by us on IranGovt to ratify AIOC agreement, or effort to bind aid program to AIOC agreement which we consider normal business arrangement, not “aid” to Iran, wld be most undesirable for polit if for no other reasons. US Govt has consistently taken position when pressed by Irans for intervention AIOC dispute was UK-Iran matter not subj to fon intervention. We have made our views known to Brit alone in complete frankness only as part of our gen analysis serious Iran situation and in spirit of closest US-UK cooperation. To reverse our position by interceding with IranGovt and putting pressure on Irans at this time to ratify agreement which we are not prepared to endorse eld, in Dept’s opinion, jeopardize chances success Iran program. 4. Dept further believes binding aid program to AIOC concession agreement wld in view latters admitted unpopularity in Iran start program off on wrong foot and reduce substantially any chance of inducing Irans to effect reforms both we and Brit desire. Also time factor seems to preclude such a step. Opinion both here and in UK is that something must be done now and from all info available to Dept it seems certain it will be at least several months before AIOC agreement ratified. 5. Dept intends using possible fin assistance as lever to obtain essential reforms and it will be made quite clear to Irans that in return for US assistance they will be expected take measures help themselves and that individual loans may possibly be held up if essential measures are not taken. Our feeling is it wld be best confine original public statement in this connection to gen pledge by Irans when they request mission that IranGovt will stand ready take action on Mission’s recommendations. Dept does not contemplate in original approach to Irans promising any sort of finan assistance; they will be told only that Mission will go to Iran, survey situation and make recommendations as to what, if any, action US Govt shld take to meet critical situation. Tying question of finan assistance to reform at outset wld for this reason seem unwise. We believe it better for such reforms as may be necessary to be result advice from competent outside experts rather than some quixotic Iran scheme which wld have little more chance success than Shah’s abortive “Holy War” against corruption. Webb 1 Repeated to Tehran. Editorial Note [Document 247] Editorial Note On May 23 the United States entered into an agreement for mutual defense assistance to Iran by an exchange of notes between Acting Secretary Webb and Chargé Aram. The agreement provided, inter alia , that the United States would make available to Iran “such equipment, materials and services as the Government of the United States of America may authorize.” For the text of the agreement, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2071. In the course of the negotiations for the agreement a secret minute was recorded which read as follows: “In the course of discussions on the exchange of notes under the United States Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the representatives of the Government of the United States of America proposed the inclusion of the folio wing provisions: ‘The two governments recognize their mutual interest, consistent with mutual security and recovery objectives, in effective controls over the export of war-potential materials, equipment, and, in so far as practicable, technical data; and the two governments will consult with a view to taking measures for the accomplishment of these ends.’ The representatives of the Government of Iran have stated that the government of Iran is in full accord with the terms of this provision, and have also given assurances, on behalf of their government, of the intention of the Government of Iran of cooperating with respect to the development of satisfactory controls over such war potential exports. In view of the assurances of the representatives of the Government of Iran of the intention of the Government of Iran to cooperate in the development of such controls, and to establish such consultative procedures, the representatives of the two governments believe that it is unnecessary to include the above quoted provision in the text of the exchange of notes under the United States Mutual Defense Assistance Act.” (788.5 MAP/5–2450) The Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece (Van Fleet) to the Secretary of State 788.5/5–2350: Telegram [Document 248] The Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece ( Van Fleet ) to the Secretary of State top secret [ Athens ,] May 23, 1950. 1410. From Van Fleet to CSGPO and to State Department info Ambassador Wiley Tehran. Reference State Department cable 905 dated 19 May 1950, 1 following summary submitted State Department, information to US Ambassador, Tehran. While in Iran I attended three conferences of interest to State and Defense Departments, all requested by Iranians and coordinated with US Embassy. A brief verbal account was given at the time to US Chargé d’Affaires. First conference Tuesday 9 May, 1000 hours at office Minister of War. Present—General Yazdanpanah, Minister of War, General Razmara, Chief of Staff, Lt. General Van Fleet and Colonel Drury, Army Attaché. The Minister of War covered the strength and organization of the Iranian Army, including the major portion of the gendarmerie which operates under the army. He then covered the strategic position of Iran in the Middle East and of its great importance. General Razmara covered the topography of the country emphasizing the military value of the mountains along the northern frontier. He covered more in detail the organization of the army into 10 divisions and 3 independent brigades and of a light frontier force along the northern border. He emphasized the great extent of their border with Russia and the inability of the Iranian Army to effectively control any deliberate advance. He then covered the type of fighting that they would employ, stating that the army would fight a delaying action and when overrun, take to the mountains; that he himself would command the resistance movement in the northern part of the country and the Shah would take personal command of the resistance in the south. General Razmara stated there were excellent tribal army relations and that he felt certain the tribes would be loyal to the Shah and army. He expressed satisfaction with the American equipment which was being received and stated its great value to the army. He expressed desire to send Iranian officers to military schools in America. General Van Fleet expressed his thanks for the information conveyed to him and reminded them that he was in Iran solely in the capacity of representative of the President at the funeral of the Reza Shah, and had no authority as regards the military situation. When asked for an opinion General Van Fleet expressed favorable opinion as to what they had told him and stated that he would be glad to report the subject matter of the conference to the US Embassy in Iran and to officials in Washington. Second conference Tuesday 9 May 1730 hours at Bank Melli, Iran. Present—Mr. A. H. Ebtehaj, Governor Bank Melli, Iran and Lt. General Van Fleet. Mr. Ebtehaj stated he was particularly anxious to talk to me because he was out of the country at the time of General Collins’ visit and therefore unable to speak to the US Army Chief of Staff. He wanted particularly to outline the difficult economic position which Iran was now facing which has been made worse by last year’s crop failure. He mentioned a seven year program for the economic and social development of Iran and stated that he had great hopes that this plan would soon be placed into effect. He said that it was his responsibility to put over this plan financially but that the country could not carry the load for both an economic program and an increased military program. He emphasized repeatedly that Iran could carry either the military or the economic load but not both and therefore, he wished to express the urgent need for adequate military aid from the United States. He used a figure of 50 million dollars, making a point that the aid must be adequate to be effective. He stated that Iran had made a big mistake in asking for so small a loan for the purchase of military equipment and that he was now embarrassed that the total cost, including preparation and shipment, was much more and he spoke of their present financial difficulty in making the first payment. However, he said this would be solved; that it was his problem and that he was sure he could cope with it. General Van Fleet advised Mr. Ebtehaj that his discussion was all very interesting; that he Was not familiar with the situation but that he would, of course, be glad to convey his views to the US Embassy and to the officials in Washington. Mr. Ebtehaj went on to state that military aid needed in Iran included clothing and shoes as well as military equipment. General Van Fleet then explained to him that while shoes and clothing had been supplied to Greece in the early days, they were no longer being supplied, and that it was the policy of Washington and the ECA that Greece should manufacture her own shoes and clothing and that this policy is now being placed in effect in Greece. Therefore, it seemed logical that the same plan should be adopted in Iran. The third conference took place on Wednesday 10 May at 1730 hours at the Shah’s house. Present—His Majesty the Shah of Iran, Governor Ebtehaj, Lt. General Van Fleet and Lt. Van Fleet, Jr. The Shah reviewed the position of his country in the Middle East, emphasizing its great strategic position and the fact that its oil fields and those of Irak would be the Russian target. He expressed the view that it would be needless to strengthen Turkey in the middle or Greece on the western flank as long as the Russians could envelop the eastern flank most readily and go directly to the oil fields and on to both the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. He stated that there were three main routes through Iran plus an envelopment through Irak. He covered the war plans briefly by stating that the border troops would fight and fall back giving maximum delaying action through the passes to permit the mobile troops to counterattack and if the Russians have over-extended themselves and for the mountain tribes to inflict maximum resistance on supply routes. He stated that his army needed armor and artillery and adequate supplies placed at strategic locations in support of the mobile army in its counterattack and for the resistance movement to be carried on in the mountains. He stated that his country was, of course, very backward and needed many reforms and a much better social and economic condition for the people as a whole. He stated that he was hoping that these reforms would be passed but that he was meeting with opposition from some of the large landowners. The Shah stated that the overwhelming majority of the people are against Communism and will fight a Russian infiltration or invasion. He mentioned that there was a very hostile but small opposition which was continuously stating that Iran should be incorporated with their big, close neighbor to the north and not with the west. He said they were constantly broadcasting the fact that England and the United States had not given any assistance and that he, himself, had recently come home from a visit empty-handed. He stated he hoped that some aid would be announced at an early date so as to put a stop to this hostile propaganda. The Shah stated that Iran could not financially support a large military establishment and at the same time give an economic uplift to the people. He said that the people must be given a better life or some of them might be induced to side with the north. At the same time they need more military assistance or the country could not adequately resist the Russians, that both the economic and the military program could not be done at the same time by Iran and therefore, he hoped that the United States would grant effective aid to Iran the same as they had done for Turkey and for Greece. Mr. Ebtehaj reminded the Shah that he had already covered this matter with General Van Fleet and that Iran could carry either the economic or the military program but not both. General Van Fleet asked the Shah if the people would make effective use of the aid as the Greeks have done. He replied that he was absolutely certain that every piece of equipment would be wisely and effectively used and that his people, including the tribes, could be counted upon to remain loyal. He stated that the situation along the border was generally quiet and that the Russians had withdrawn when it was made clear to them that Iran would fight for her independence. General Van Fleet asked if the Russians infiltrated agents across the border into the mountains and Shah replied that had been tried and most of them had been detected and executed and that he was certain that any future attempt would also be detected because the tribes are quick to recognize strangers who come into the areas. Shah requested that I convey to the United States Government the urgent need of military assistance and the great importance which Iran plays on the eastern flank of the Middle East. General Van Fleet advised the Shah that his views would be conveyed to the US Embassy and to Washington but that he was in Iran solely in the capacity of representative of the President at the funeral of his father. The Shah expressed the hope that he had witnessed the devotion of the people to his father and had become acquainted with the great good which his father had accomplished during his reign. General Van Fleet replied that the spirit and devotion of the people to the Crown was very evident. The US Embassy in Tehran is making formal report of the funeral of the late Reza Shah, the Great. I have not deemed it necessary to duplicate this report but will submit a further report upon receipt of copies of the Tehran report. 1 Not printed (telegram 9 from Tehran to Athens); in it Wiley asked Van Meet for summaries of his conversations with the Shah and other Iranian officials during his visit to Iran for the funeral of Reza Shah on May 7. (788.00/5–1950) The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.13/5–2650: Telegram [Document 249] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State top secret Tehran , May 26, 1950—3 p. m. 967. Deptel 594, May 22. I am in entire agreement with Department’s attitude of reserve towards Mansur. However I do not believe moment is opportune to “pull the plug” on Mansur. That operation, however, could be successfully accomplished on short notice at any time. As separately reported, British Ambassador has cryptically intimated there may be deal between Mansur and AIOC to put agreement through Majlis (Deputy Radji tells me no possibility whatsoever present Majlis will ratify. Dr. Azmara made identical statement to Dooher). 1 Therefore as Shah insisting Mansur submit revision, chances are that his Government will fall on issue. If, however, he should be successful, this thorny problem will be out of way and we can then review situation and plot our course. In other words, I think that to avoid crossing wires with British we should for moment pursue policy of negative politeness toward Mansur. This involves probably a question of weeks at most. Actually, from what I am told by Shah and others, Mansur is in state of trepidation and is looking for mousehole in order flee thorny problems which confront him. I believe that when he took office he believed that AIOC question could be postponed for many months, but Shah is adamant that that shall not be case. I too have expressed to Shah importance early action. With regard to all military and economic assistance we may accord to Iran, I think emphasis should be made that assistance forthcoming has been result recent trip of Shah and endeavors Ambassador Ala. Moreover by following “eye dropper policy” we can maintain constant and effective control. I do not think that there is great danger that Mansur can put a conspicuous feather in his cap if we follow such a line. 2 Wiley 1 Ambassador Wiley had reported on his conversation with Ambassador Sheppard in telegram 969, May 26, not printed (888.2553–AIOC/5–2650). 2 At 7 p. m. on May 26 the Department of State telegraphed its concurrence with the views expressed in this cable and stated that it would leave the matter “in abeyance for time being.” (Telegram 616; 788.13/5–2650). The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.00/5–2650: Telegram [Document 250] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , May 26, 1950—1 p. m. 968. Saw Shah last night and infomed him of President’s designation Ambassador Grady to succeed me here. 1 I emphasized Ambassador Grady had great knowledge Middle East affairs, had done superb job in Greece under most difficult conditions, and that I believed there would be an immediate meeting of minds and establishment of mutual sympathies between him and Shah. Discussing internal Iranian situation I referred to rumor Ali Mansur had wanted to resign previous day. Shah said that was not quite true but stated Mansur was frightened of Mossadeq, head of National Front. Shah then followed with strong attack against Mossadeq, pointing out that latter’s policies and negative program of that politician are disruptive, destructive and encouraged subversive influences. Continuing, Shah next attacked Seyid Zia-Ed-Din stating that if he were made Prime Minister he could accomplish nothing. He made no comments re Razmara or Minister Interior Ardalan. He indicated that he would insist Mansur submit AIOC revision to Parliament and stand or fall on issue. He had no reply when I inquired re future Mansur Government if successful on AIOC. Shah painted depressing picture of financial position of Government mentioning probable budget deficit of five billion rials adding Iran was reaching state of anarchy. However, he affirmed that entire country stood behind him. I told him it was obvious to me entire country respected him but that there was constant criticism that he was indecisive. I added I did not sympathize with such criticism but pointed out that if situation Iran is as bad as he portrayed, strong leadership and prompt decisions were needed to prevent subversive infiltration from abroad or movement for dictatorship from within. Shah then mentioned British, saying that while he was sure of American support, British position was to him obscure. In particular, he asked if US and British Governments were working entirely together in Iran. I answered that our relations were most cordial and harmonious without conflict in Iran of any sort. He referred to anti-corruption campaign indicating that he is still convinced of necessity of such campaign to root out some 40,000 corrupt or surplus functionaries but present economic and political state of country makes it imperative to move carefully and he felt it prudent to proceed slowly; he did not wish to throw an additional 40,000 into Communist ranks. Throughout conversation Shah seemed most pessimistic over whole situation in country but has his chin up and evidently intends to pursue energetic policy. Wiley 1 Following the resignation of Ambassador Wiley, President Truman designated Henry C. Grady, U.S. Ambasssador in Greece, to be the new Ambassador to Iran. The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.00/5–2650: Telegram [Document 251] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , May 26, 1950—4 p. m. 970. Department inform Army, Navy, Air. Shahrokh, who now sees Shah almost daily, informs Embassy Shah has made up his mind that unless British Embassy raises objection he will ask General Razmara form strong government composed nearly as possible of new elements. Such government would probably take office as soon as Mansur either successfully pushed AIOC legislation through Majlis, failed to do so, or refused to present bill. Dooher saw Razmara last night and latter confirmed in general what Shahrokh had reported. Chief Staff sees as only obstacles in his path to premiership ( a ) possible British Embassy interference, ( b ) opposition of certain members Shah’s family, ( c ) advice of Minister Court Hakimi who wants no change in Iran’s political status quo , and ( d ) intrigues of Prime Minister Mansur who has been inciting national front to agitate against Army and Chief Staff. Razmara then gave Dooher general outline of program he intends put into effect if he is made Prime Minister. Following are main points thereof: (1) In economic matters he felt he could not work without collaboration Dr. Taqi Nasr whom he would want to assume responsibility for general economic and financial planning. (2) He would institute anti-corruption campaign to eliminate elements such as Mansur, Nikpur and other “anti-national” members of old guard. Asked how he would bring about elimination this group, Chief Staff remarked that Iran might have to send various “trade missions” abroad in near future. (3) If AIOC could prove their pending offer equal to or better than other mid-east concessions from commercial standpoint he could guarantee its passage. AIOC would be obliged however, he added, to reduce Indian labor force to absolute minimum and replace Indian workers with Iranians. (4) Chief Staff repeated his program for decentralization of government administration. Referring to security forces, he explained he envisages gendarmerie and police as civilian organizations under direct control popularly elected district governments. (5) In view of fact most of present parliament not elected freely, Razmara believes that non-cooperative attitude deputies and seNATOrs would be sufficient excuse to dissolve parliament and call new and free elections. (6) Under system he proposes Shah’s powers would “naturally” be limited to broad supervision governmental affairs. Razmara believes Shah should be exploited as Iran’s most valuable asset from standpoint public relations. (7) Razmara stated Shah asked him would not changes he proposed be regarded as “dictatorship”. Chief Staff said he replied what he has in mind is antithesis of dictatorship; that instead of wishing to accumulate more power he wishes to place it in hands of people through decentralization of government. Embassy believes Shah close to taking decisive step and that this step is appointment Razmara to form government and making such decision is his fear British might indicate Razmara unacceptable to them. Shah appears to be placing great importance on lunch he is having with British Ambassador tomorrow at which time he hopes receive clear statement British support. Sent Department 970, repeated info Moscow 93. Department pass Moscow. Wiley The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Ala) 888.00/4–2850 [Document 252] The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs ( Ala ) Washington , May 26, 1950. My Dear Mr. Minister : I have received your note dated April 28, 1950 in which you enclose a copy of a telegram you have received from the Prime Minister of Iran on the present serious situation in that country. I regret that my reply did not reach you before your departure from Washington and I am therefore transmitting it through our Embassy in Tehran. I have taken careful note of the remarks of His Excellency, the Prime Minister, and of the suggestions made by you in your note that an outstanding American economist be sent to Iran to survey the situation and that the United States might wish to issue a public statement at this time as a deterrent to Soviet aggression in Iran. You may be assured that the Department has the situtation in Iran under careful study. I am confident that if developments should call for additional action by the United States in the economic field, the Department will do whatever may be within its power. Please accept my very best wishes for a most successful tenure of office as Foreign Minister of your country where your high qualifications will be of inestimable service in strengthening the friendly ties that exist between our two countries and in promoting the cause of international peace. Sincerely yours, George C. McGhee The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State 788.00/5–3150: Telegram [Document 253] The Ambassador in Iran ( Wiley ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , May 31, 1950—3 p. m. 995. Saw Shah this evening. Shah reiterated that Ali Mansur Government must stand or fall on an issue, meaning fall. Shah stated then there must be a strong government under influence of the monarchy. I inquired what would he foresee in way of composition of such government. Shah was unable to clarify his ideas on subject. We then spoke of General Razmara. Shah stated Razmara had, when “democratic regime” was ejected from Azerbaijan, won his confidence while many other generals had proven weaklings but he made it entirely evident that he has not as yet made up his mind to make Razmara Prime Minister. He stated that should he decide to make Razmara Prime Minister he would not go in as a general but would go in as a civilian, that there would be a clear-cut division between army and government. Moreover he stated that the gendarmerie would be reconstituted and would be under him and not under army. I queried Shah re possible connection between attempt on his life, murder of Minister Court and assassination of Dehqan and Shah seemed to be singularly uninformed. Iran government intelligence re domestic affairs seems to be lamentably bad. Wiley The Chargé in Iran (Richards) to the Secretary of State 788.00/6–2150: Telegram [Document 254] The Chargé in Iran ( Richards ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , June 21, 1950—2 p. m. 1168. Department inform Army, Navy, Air. The progressive deterioration in both political and economic conditions in Iran has been reported by the Embassy and is well known to the Department. However, in view of Department’s plans for military and economic aid and as conditions have become worse rather than better during the past few months, I consider it advisable to review situation. Evidence of deteriorating conditions are: national budget bankruptcy, severe and increasing business depression, stubborn dispute with British re AIOC renegotiation, recognized ineffectiveness of 7–year plan, impotence of both government and Majlis, intensified Communist activities, irresponsible press and increasing loss of faith in government. While difficult to define, there has been a noticeable reaction to the foregoing manifested in a general and rising popular demand for decisive action toward reform. Responsible segments of the public have come to believe that Razmara is emerging as the man most capable to deal with this situation, and earlier opposition to him appears to be giving way to a feeling that only Razmara has the necessary capacity and courage to head positive reform government. In anticipation that he may be called upon to form a new government, Razmara has, at the Shah’s request, and in collaboration with selected colleagues of recognized qualifications, prepared tentative program embodying principles designed to meet Shah’s reform objectives. This program, details of which are being worked out, and which is to be based on time and priority schedule, embraces following principal features (not necessarily listed in order of importance): First as to civil administration the following: (1) A functionally competent “nonpolitical” cabinet; (2) electoral reforms enabling more truly popular representation in Majlis; (3) centralization of policy and program formulation, and of execution of national undertakings; (4) decentralization of local administration and of execution of local undertakings; (5) adequate and authoritative public information service; (6) new and revised social and economic legislation and positive enforcement of the law, including tax laws, generally following OCI Dulles recommendations; 1 (7) judiciary reforms corresponding to 6 above. Second as to economic administration the following: (1) Reorganization of ministries as functional executive units; (2) extensive training programs; (3) progressive assimilation of present plan organization into reformed ministries without change in objectives of 7–year plan; (4) local and national taxes to finance corresponding projects; (5) reorganization of Customs Department and tariffs; (6) scheduled program of high priority works for immediate execution; (7) use of foreign experts for supervision and training; (8) realistic and rigorously controlled budget based upon actual revenues and approved expenditures; (9) other needed reforms in basic economy, monetary and fiscal practices. Because the foregoing program will conflict with past and present practices and special interest, vigorous opposition is to be expected including possible hazards to program as follows: (1) Local press attacks inspired by opposing interests; (2) Russian subversion; (3) British resistance if new conditions appear to affect their position adversely; (4) opposition of wealthy landowners and present beneficiaries of administrative corruption which may require legal but robust measures to control including possible temporary incarceration of few oppositionists; (5) possible adverse American public opinion if initial implementation program represented as trend toward dictatorship; (6) lack of Iranian public confidence in reform program if US and British official support is not proclaimed; (7) opposition by reactionary religious groups; (8) organized public disorder inspired by certain of foregoing. The achievement of stability in Iran with restoration faith in Government would be in US interests and is essential if our military and economic aid is to be effective. It is realized Razmara’s political emergence may have lasting effect upon course of events in Iran. Nevertheless no other political figure has yet emerged who appears to have the qualities necessary to implement effectively any reform program. Any support for Razmara is a calculated risk which we feel must be taken if he is called upon to be Prime Minister. Accordingly, in our own interests and after consideration of hazards to program enumerated above, we urged Department give serious consideration taking following measures: (1) Advance indication to Shah of official US Government understanding of situation and that it regards reform program with favor; (2) public statement at appropriate time by Secretary of State or Department spokesman along lines of foregoing and to forestall misrepresentation by irresponsible or self interested persons; (3) definite understanding on high level between Department and British FonOff that British will support reform program and facilitate prompt settlement of AIOC dispute. Army Att concurs. This telegram being repeated to Athens for Ambassador Grady and I suggest Ambassador Grady and Wiley may wish comment. 2 Sent Department 1168; repeated info Athens 16. Richards 1 The recommendations under reference here have not been identified further. 2 Wiley left Tehran on June 18 and conferred with Grady in Athens on his way back to Washington. Grady was confirmed as Ambassador on June 26. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 788.00/6–2350: Telegram [Document 255] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 secret Washington , June 23, 1950—7 p. m. 763. Urtel 1168 June 21. Dept appreciates ur excellent analysis Iran situation, description Razmara program and possible obstacles. Fol is Dept’s reaction ur three recommendations: 1. You may indicate to Shah US in gen is sympathetic to reforms proposed by Razmara and wld welcome any attempt start Iran on road progressive, efficient and democratic Govt. Dept wld not wish at this time, however, to comment on any specific proposal since this cld tie hands Grady in recomemnding corrective measures to IranGov fol completion econ mission’s work. 2. While Dept is willing consider issuance public statement shld it become necessary, it will depend entirely on circumstances existing fol Razmara’s accession to power and no definite assurance this connection can be made this time. 3. Dept has obtained impression as result FM meeting and subsequent conversations London and Wash, UK in full agreement need major reforms in Iran and, in fact, desired go considerably further than US in putting pressure on Shah to institute land reform, anticorruption campaign, freedom for trade unions, etc. Dept prepared discuss Razmara’s proposals with Brit if you see no objection and on basis present info believe Brit will be receptive. Advise soonest. Dept reluctant press Brit any further on AIOC since it has now gone considerably further in this direction than contemplated six months ago and has made its views thoroughly known to high UK officials including Bevin. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Athens for Ambassadors Wiley and Grady. The Chargé in Iran (Richards) to the Secretary of State 795.00/6–2050: Telegram [Document 256] The Chargé in Iran ( Richards ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tehran , June 29, 1950—1 p. m. 1242. Dept inform Army, Navy, Air. Initial reaction President Truman’s statement re Korea 1 is one of mixed approbation and concern. No press comment to date due to complete absorption local press with Razmara appointment. 2 Most officials with whom we have spoken feel US support of Korea has called Soviet bluff. Minority feels Soviets not bluffing and that Iran is next on Soviet list. Department pass Moscow. Sent Department 1242, repeated info Moscow 125. Richards 1 For the text of the President’s statement, issued on June 27, see vol. vii , p. 202 . 2 Razmara had been appointed Prime Minister on June 26. The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State 795.00/7–350: Telegram [Document 257] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tehran , July 3, 1950—3 p. m. 16. Prime Minister Razmara told Embassy official Saturday he considers UN–UNs action re Korea “splendid” and thinks that Soviet bluff has been effectively called. Razmara’s opinion generally reflected Iran officialdom and press. Shah told me yesterday Iran heartened by evidence US prepared support small nations when confronted by armed Communist aggression. He obviously had idea in mind that time might come when he would need such assistance. Department inform Army, Navy, Air. Department pass Moscow. Sent Department 16, repeated Moscow 3. Grady Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 788.00/7–750 [Document 258] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret Washington , July 7, 1950. Subject: The Present Situation in Iran A. Summary The Iranian internal political situation has been stabilized to a considerable extent by the appointment of Lieutenant General Ali Razmara as Prime Minister with a cabinet of young, progressive and professionally competent officials. Reports of Soviet military activity on Iran’s frontiers have been too fragmentary to evaluate and not much credence is placed in them although the Soviets are believed militarily ready for action against Iran at any time. The Iranian Government has not so far replied to the most recent Soviet protest against alleged American oil drilling and aerial mapping in Iran but will do so in a firm manner in the near future. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession dispute remains a major source of trouble both politically and economically in Iran. B. Discussion I. Interned On June 26 the Shah asked Lieutenant General Hajeb Ali Razmara, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Army, to form a Government, succeeding the inept and timid Government of Ali Mansur. Razmara rapidly assembled a cabinet which had been picked well in advance and presented it to the Shah on June 26 and to the Parliament the following day. The Cabinet is composed of young, reportedly honest and professionally competent officials who represent a refreshing contrast from the traditional Iranian cabinet minister, usually an aged politician of little ability seeking only to benefit himself. Prime Minister Razmara announced an ambitious program for his Government which included a number of entirely new proposals which could be of considerable benefit to the country if carried out as well as the usual platitudes about social justice and “reform” in general. Perhaps the most interesting proposal made by Razmara was one calling for decentralization of the Government, a long overdue reform which may correct a situation that has been a major contributing factor in the helplessness of previous Iranian Governments. Razmara also promised immediate action to improve the economic condition of the country, to lower the cost and raise the standard of living, to reform the judiciary, education and public health, and to work in accordance with parliamentary, constitutional, and democratic traditions. The reaction to the appointment of General Razmara in Iran was favorable. There had been some fear that the so-called “opposition”, a group of nationalistic deputies and reactionary religious leaders, would incite their followers to rioting. Outside of one minor disturbance outside of the Parliament building in which some stones were thrown, nothing of this sort has materialized and the opposition in the Parliament has been extremely weak although violent in tone. Razmara on July 5 received an overwhelming vote of confidence, 94 deputies voting in his favor, 7 opposing, and 3 abstaining. Although such votes of confidence in a new Government in Iran are by no means unusual, that Razmara who has been denounced by his opponents as a would-be dictator and an Anglo-American hireling should obtain such an expression of confidence is both surprising and reassuring. II. External As was to be expected with the outbreak of the Korean War, 2 there have been a number of reports of Soviet military activity along the Irano-Soviet frontier. These include reports of the arming of refugee Iranian elements as well as maneuvers by the Red Army. These reports have been too fragmentary to evaluate but it is not considered likely there has been any significant increase in military activity. However the Soviets have an estimated 210, 000 troops in the Trans-Caucasus, 80,000 in the North Caucasus and some eight divisions east of the Caspian and they are believed militarily ready to invade Iran at any time. The principal danger to Iran, however, still appears to be the chance of internal rather than external Communist aggression and for this reason the Department has welcomed the appointment of General Razmara and his cabinet of professionals. At the moment, it is believed the Iranian security forces are capable of coping with any internal disturbance that may arise provided the economic deterioration of the country is halted and provided the activities of the outlawed Communist (“Tudeh”) Party can be held in check. If Prime Minister Razmara is able to hold the support of the influential leaders of the country and of the people in general, it is believed the Communists can be controlled. No Iranian reply has yet been made to the most recent Soviet protest against alleged petroleum drilling by Americans and aerial surveys of the border regions but it is understood that the Iranians will this time make a strong reply, maintaining that such matters are purely internal Iranian affairs not subject to protest by outside powers. The Iranian Embassy in Washington has sought legal advice on the matter and its counsel has asked the Department’s opinion concerning the advisability of transmitting the exchange of notes to the Security Council for its information. This matter is now under consideration. Another source of potential trouble in Iran is the continuing impasse over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession. The matter is presently on the agenda of the Iranian Parliament but all reports indicate there is no chance that it will pass unless further concessions are made by the Company. If the Prime Minister insists on Parliamentary action upon the bill in its present form, he may fall, and if it is rejected either by the Government or the Majlis there will be needless delays in renegotiation which we consider most undesirable since there can be neither economic nor political stability in Iran until this issue is settled. Accordingly we are again raising the question with the British Government in an attempt to convince both the Government and the management of the Company that the present situation cannot be permitted to continue much longer. III. Progress of Special Iranian Program Ambassador Henry F. Grady assumed charge of the Embassy after presenting his credentials to the Shah on July 2. He has the assistance of a special economic staff of five officers who have already arrived or will reach Tehran shortly, and we are gong ahead with the program which was approved at the Under Secretary’s Staff Conference on April 26. 3 Steps are being taken to strengthen the regular complement of the Tehran Embassy and the Consulates in Tabriz and Meshed; an office will be opened in Isfahan in the near future. Our plans to increase and improve the effectiveness of USIE activities are also being implemented. 1 The memorandum was drafted by Ferguson, Rountree, and Halla and was initialed by McGhee and Secretary Acheson. 2 Documentation on the outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25 is presented in volume vii . 3 For a record of the Under Secretary’s Staff Conference on April 26, see UM D–97, and the memorandum for the file, pp. 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] and 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] . The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State 888.2553–AIOC/7–1350: Telegram [Document 259] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , July 13, 1950—3 p. m. 111. Have had informal discussion with Northcroft, 1 Thornburg, PriMin, and Shah on prospects Majlis ratification of supplementary agreement to AIOC concession. Have made clear our interest is in (1) internal political stability which is largely dependent upon relations between government and AIOC and (2) availability for use by government in its economic development plans of minimum of 24 million sterling, which supplementary agreement provides to be paid by AIOC when agreement becomes effective. Draw following conclusions from conversations: (1) PriMin feels supplementary agreement should not have provided for Majlis ratification. Was political mistake for Ali Mansur to submit agreement to Majlis since never any real chance of passage. Impossible withdraw ratification bill once submitted, unless AIOC extends additional benefits and concessions as basis for new Majlis bill with which Razmara could identify himself and defend. He suggested not prepared do this until he has a new Majlis which he proposes to secure sometime within three to six months. (2) Razmara insisting AIOC advance to Iranian Government entire amount accumulated difference between old and new royalty rates for past two years, plus additional amounts due from 20% of undistributed reserves. Furthermore AIOC must immediately begin pay royalties on new basis. (3) Shah agrees supplementary agreement must be modified in some respects which he considers minor and doubts wisdom extreme position as outlined above. Shah proposes AIOC agree to increase total number Iranian employees and extend to Iranian Government right of audit AIOC books to extent accounts relate financial benefits to government. Even though in Shah’s view these points are minor, such concessions seem to be equivalent renegotiation. I personally doubt that AIOC would submit to even limited audit. (4) Discussion with Northcroft and statements by British Ambassador to member my staff suggests AIOC officials might be willing agree another advance of 6,000,000 pounds which would be within amount due by next February from royalties at present rates. This amount could probably be of only limited assistance to extremely difficult budget position of government. The program for economic development and recovery requires funds from three sources: ( a ) Additional credits from Bank Melli which rough estimates indicate could be as much as rials 2.5 billion; ( b ) US loan or loans; and ( c ) AIOC payment under supplemental agreement. US Government assistance alone in magnitude presently considered can have only limited effect. Protracted delay in payment funds available from AIOC under supplemental agreement or even partial payment of only 6,000,000 pounds will leave government ordinary budget and financing of airy recovery program in continuing serious position. We have not as yet had a budget statement from the government which means anything. At the suggestion of the PriMin some of my group and I are meeting tonight with Dr. Taqi Nasr, the FinMin, who has just returned from Geneva, and we may get a clearer picture of the financial problem together with more specific and meaningful budget statement. ( g ) The PriMin plans shortly approach Northcroft to urge necessity of modification of supplemental agreement along lines indicated to me. Possible this overture could lead to a negotiated settlement acceptable to both parties. However, if AIOC are to accept even modified revision supplemental agreement, it seems to be important that someone come to Tehran from London office AIOC who has not previously participated in negotiation and who could be more effective than persons now on scene in dealing with this complicated and difficult problem (as the PriMin put it, the British look on this matter purely as an oil question, whereas Iranians have come to regard it as political issue.) PriMin feels on other hand that AIOC should be sufficiently concerned with economic future of Iran as to be more conciliatory and flexible. AIOC has heretofore been adamant in refusing even to consider modification agreement signed July, 1949. I have heard highest commendation of Basil Jackson, one of the AIOC directors. I suggest Department consider asking our Embassy London informally to discuss basic problem with Jackson asking that he be appraised seriousness of situation as we see it. Northcroft and local AIOC officials have been unduly optimistic past year of action by Iranian Government and are still counting heavily on financial necessities of government to force action. In effect this would force PriMin to seek ratification from the Majlis at great poltical hazard. Such a view entirely misjudges the temper of Iranian officials, particularly Razmara. Furthermore, developing controversies between other Persian Gulf Oil Companies and concessionary governments will serve only to increase difficulties of ratification present supplemental agreement in future. I have stressed in my talks with those here, and stress now, that we are not attempting to aid either side in the impasse, but that we have a very definite and vital interest in the Iranian Government’s obtaining funds agreed by AIOC in supplemental agreement at an early date, if economic program is to gain momentum and the atmosphere here is to be cleared by solution this problem. It is conceivable that a continued inflexible position by AIOC might, by depriving the government of funds for essential activity and future initiation of the development and recovery programs to which it is committed, would result in the overthrow of the present government with all that this implies at this particular moment. Sent Department 111, pouched Cairo unnumbered (for Lager). 2 Grady Note: Paragraphs not numbered or lettered consecutively. 1 V. J. Northcroft, Resident Manager of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 2 Albert F. Lager, Attaché of the Embassy in Egypt. On July 15 the Department of State repeated the text of this message to London. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 888.2553/7–1450: Telegram [Document 260] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret Washington , July 14, 1950—1 p. m. 225. Dept concerned UK attitude AIOC dispute and believes failure UK to take positive action re AIOC intransigence inappropriate to current internal Iran and world conditions. Conversations with UK officials including Bevin at FM mtg indicated UK well informed internal situation in Iran and equally concerned about possibility collapse Iran with resulting loss to West. 2 Iran has now installed Govt which appears capable of bringing some sort of order out of traditional chaos and UK has indicated approval installation this Govt. New PriMin Razmara is confronted at outset by all important question of AIOC agreement and in his first approach to AIOC has encountered usual inflexibility. Dept at loss understanding AIOC attitude in view seriousness present situation and fact that most observers agree some slight face-saving gesture needed secure ratification present agreement. If Razmara is obliged to press present agreement he may fall which is in interest of neither US nor UK and if agreement is withdrawn from Majlis AIOC can contemplate endless delays before new agreement is signed. Dept fears AIOC not sufficiently concerned about delay and is content let matters slide making royalty payment under old agreement. Such an attitude can only be disrupting force politically and is of advantage to no one except possibly the Sovs. If situation in Iran is to be stabilized, agreement must be reached in immed future. Iran will be unable proceed with seven year plan, resolve present econ crisis or correct age-old abuses. Responsibility rests on both AIOC and on Brit Govt and Dept believes they shld give serious consideration to making gesture to Irans such as mentioned previous cables including specific requests by Ebtehaj for renegotiation in ten years and by Razmara for advances on new royalties (Weeka No. 23, June 9 3 ). Dept wld particularly favor application of 5–10 year royalty review clauses to all Near East concessions. Accordingly Dept wld appreciate Amb’s raising matter on highest level pointing out again if necessary we are not attempting interfere with UK–Iran commercial affairs but are stating our views solely because of our serious concern that stakes are too high in Iran permit matter drag any longer. Acheson 1 Repeated to Tehran. 2 Regarding the Foreign Ministers meeting, see the circular information telegram, May 17, p. 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] . 3 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 888.2553/7–1850: Telegram [Document 261] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , July 18, 1950—7 p. m. 399. Deptel 225, July 14. Preparatory to my raising question UK attitude AIOC supplemental agreement with Younger, 1 I deemed it was considered desirable for Embassy officer to make preliminary approach Wright 2 in order that Younger might be briefed re situation and thus contribute to more productive discussion. Accordingly, Embassy officer saw Wright yesterday afternoon and discussed question along lines Department’s 225, emphasizing particularly situation in Iran and necessity obtaining early and satisfactory solution this problem. Wright recalled UK position at time Foreign Ministers meeting, emphasizing insatiability appetites of Near East states in matters of this kind. He felt position Foreign Office had taken at that time was quite correct and that if AIOC had made concessions with Mansur government and agreement had not gone through before that government’s downfall, Razmara would have found excuse request fresh concessions on acceding power. Nevertheless, Wright agreed present situation in Iran serious and reiterated UK desires early conclusion AIOC problem. Foreign Office had not yet received any information from Sheppard re specific Iranian request mentioned paragraph 3 Department reference telegram. Foreign Office would, however, give careful consideration views we had expressed, but before making up its mind, it would wish views British Embassy Tehran. Wright particularly hoped US and UK Ambassadors Tehran could make joint appraisal present situation re AIOC for information Department and Foreign Office. He would instruct UK Ambassador to this effect and hoped Department would similarly instruct US Ambassador. During conversation, Wright, while expressing understanding our interest in problem, said he hoped we had not given Iranians encouragement re their desire modification. We assured him this not case and that we were sure Department and Embassy Tehran had been most correct in any conversations with Iranian Government. Wright also asked whether in event AIOC made some gesture which Razmara considered satisfactory at time but later regarded as insufficient to secure passage, we would again urge further modification. We replied we felt sure that if Razmara showed signs resorting tactics which we considered unfair, Department would endeavor dissuade him. Subsequent to foregoing conversation, Wright telephoned Embassy officer to say letter had just been received from Sheppard giving his appraisal of situation. Wright said he was not yet aware contents of letter, which Foreign Office has not yet had opportunity to study. Despite receipt Sheppard’s appraisal and concurrent with its consideration, Wright reiterated hope US and UK Ambassadors would make joint appraisal referred to above. 3 Comments: 1. We recommend Department agree to Wright’s suggestion re joint appraisal which we feel would further reinforce our efforts here. 2. We also feel we would strengthen our case if we gave undertaking to use our influence with Razmara, in event AIOC agrees make further concessions, to counsel moderation and to restrict face-saving gesture to minimum necessary to secure ratification. 3. We question advisability our raising matter contained penultimate paragraph Tehran’s 261, July 15 4 with either company or Foreign Office at this time in view status talks described above. In light Wright’s suggestion re joint appraisal, we feel it would be more effective and appropriate if Grady endeavored incorporate in such appraisal his suggestions made in Tehran’s telegram under reference. 5 Sent Department 399, repeated info Tehran 4. Douglas 1 Kenneth G. Younger, British Minister of State. 2 Michael R. Wright, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 3 On July 20 Douglas reported that Sheppard’s communication had relayed Razmara’s request for advance oil royalties, and had asked what could be done to avoid further delay on passage of the supplemental agreement or having to consider the request for advance royalties. Douglas also reported that his conversation with Wright had alerted the Foreign Office to the United States views, and in view of this fact he suggested postponing raising the Iranian question at higher levels until he saw which way the wind was blowing. (Telegram 435; 888.2553/7–2050). 4 Same as telegram 111, July 13, p. 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] . 5 On July 20 Ambassador Grady expressed his agreement with most of the views expressed in this telegram, but felt any joint appraisal of the AIOC situation should be postponed until he had a clearer picture of the Iranian reaction to the United States injecting itself into the negotiations. (Telegram 176;888.2553–AIOC/7–2050). Editorial Note [Document 262] Editorial Note From July 20 to July 24 representatives of the United Kingdom, led by Lord Tedder, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, and Sir Oliver Franks, Ambassador in the United States, met at Washington with representatives of the United States, led by General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, to discuss the world situation. Iran was among the issues discussed with both sides agreeing that they “should insofar as possible assist the Iranian Government to strengthen its position” and that “an overt Soviet attack on Iran would raise an immediate question of general war.” For further documentation on these meetings, including the summary of the discussions quoted from above, see volume III, pages 1654 ff. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 661.88/7–2150 [Document 263] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret Washington , July 21, 1950. Subject: The United States Position in the Event of a Soviet Attack on Iran Background Although the Department has no information to support recent press speculation that an overt Soviet invasion of Iran is imminent, it is possible that the Soviets, using the 1921 Treaty with Iran as justification, will invade Iran on the grounds that it is being turned into a United States base directed against the Soviet Union. It is known that the Soviet Union is militarily prepared for an Iranian adventure at any time. Alternate forms of Soviet aggression in Iran are also possible, including internal revolution and the use of “free Iranians” in the Soviet Union. Discussion The 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship gives the Soviet Union, under certain conditions, the right to introduce troops into Iran if that country is used by the armed forces of a third power as a base for aggression against the Soviet Union. It is the opinion of the Legal Adviser that Article 6 of the Treaty which gave the Soviet Union this alleged right has been superseded by the United Nations Charter which provides machinery for the amicable settlement of disputes. The Soviets, however, in their protests to the Iranian Government in 1948 against the presence of two US military missions, and again last month over the alleged petroleum drilling and aerial surveys of border regions by American companies, have obliquely referred to the Treaty with the statement that the alleged American activities were not consistent with the friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union envisaged by the Treaty. It seems reasonably certain that should the Soviets decide on overt aggression in Iran, they would use the Treaty as justification in the eyes of the world. Of the alternate forms of Soviet aggression, that of internal revolution still seems the most likely although the installation of the strong Razmara Government has greatly lessened any chances for success. The use of “free Iranians” would appear difficult since they are few in number and would have to be logistically supported and led by the Soviet Army to such an extent that it would lose its “free” character. Since a Soviet aggression in Iran under the cloak of alleged treaty rights is definitely a possibility, it is considered desirable that the Government decide now on the course of action it would follow in such a contingency. Action Taken 1—We have prepared for consideration by the National Security Council a suggested revision of NSC 54 2 dealing with a number of contingencies which might arise in Iran short of open Soviet aggression. 2—We are initiating action within the Department looking toward NSC consideration and approval of a specific course of action in the event of a Soviet attack on Iran. In this connection we shall consider the advisability of participating in a United Nations police action similar to that in Korea. In any consideration of this point it must be borne in mind that an action of this type would bring troops of the United States and the United Nations in direct conflict with the armed forces of the Soviet Union since there is no convenient satellite, and it would therefore not be an easy task to keep the conflict localized. 3—We are exploring with the appropriate authorities the question of responsibility as between the United States and the United Kingdom in their relationship with Iran (as well as other Near East countries) in the event of hostilities, to make certain that there is a complete meeting of the minds on this subject. In this connection, it is understood that the British already have plans relating to Iranian oil fields and that our military authorities consider that they have the capacity at least to neutralize the fields in the event of hostilities. 4—We and the Department of Defense have examined the strategic Iranian war plan…. At the request of the Iranian Government, the Chief of our Military Mission in Iran, General Vernon Evans, has been authorized to advise the Iranians on these plans and we have, under the cover of our Military Assistance Group, sent military experts to assist the General in this work. 5—The Department of Defense has authorized General Evans and his group to remain with the Iranian Army in the event of a Soviet invasion and to retire with it to the southwest. Another Government agency however has been unable to prepare full “stay behind” plans inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed them not to discuss this with the British indicating that the question of primary military responsibility mentioned in paragraph 3 above has not been settled. Final determination of this problem will enable another Government agency to proceed with its plan for “stay behind” operations. 6—We have obtained the opinion of the Legal Adviser on the applicability of the 1921 Treaty and are now coordinating our views with the British. 7—We are initiating action to make certain that we are receiving all available intelligence on Soviet activities in Iran and along the frontier and to coordinate all United States intelligence activities in the area. 1 The memorandum was drafted by Ferguson. The source text was initialed by Secretary Acheson and bears the handwritten notation “Sec[retary] saw L[ucius] D. B[attle]”. 2 NSC 54, “Report of the National Security Council on the Position of the United States with Respect to Iran”, dated July 21, 1949, is printed in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 545 . The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State 661.88/7–2550: Telegram [Document 264] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , July 25, 1950—2 p. m. 216. Prime Minister told me yesterday that he had had yesterday morning a visit from the Russian Ambassador 1 at the latter’s request. Russian Ambassador stated that he had come to say on behalf of his government that they were most anxious to be of any assistance possible to Iran. This statement of good will came as a considerable surprise to the Prime Minister because he has been in office four weeks and had received no courtesy call from Russian Ambassador; in fact Russian Ambassador has not called on any Prime Minister of Iran for as long as anybody can remember. Prime Minister replied that he was glad to hear that the Russian Government was anxious to be helpful to Iran and said that he would at once suggest two things: first, that Russia release the officer and eight soldiers now held prisoners in Russia and, second, that the gold which belongs to Iran and is now held in Russia be sent to Iran. Russian Ambassador made no comment with regard to these two points, but went on to say that Russia was anxious to resume normal trade relations with Iran, stating that two years ago a memo had been left with Iran Government on this matter but no action had resulted. Prime Minister stated that Iran was willing consider trade with Russia but that it would be impossible for Iran to pay Russia in foreign exchange for purchases made in that country; that if there was to be any trade it would have to be on a barter basis; that Iran had certain products in surplus in its northern provinces which could be made available to Russia; that these are rice, fresh fruits, and cotton in limited quantities. In exchange, she would want iron ore, cement and certain manufactures. The Prime Minister asked me how I interpreted this démarche of the Russian Ambassador and I said that it was the peace offensive tactic. 2 Grady 1 Ivan Vasilyevich Sadchikov. 2 Documentation on the United States attitude and response to the Soviet sponsored peace offensive is scheduled for publication in volume iv . The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State 788.5–MAP/8–350: Telegram [Document 265] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , August 3, 1950—3 p. m. 300. Department inform Army, Navy, Air. In informal conversation with Richards last evening Shah displayed familiarity with and great interest in President’s message to Congress in which additional military aid requested for Iran. 1 Shah stated he was gratified to see in President’s message evidence of increased awareness strategic importance Iran and of realization military aid to Iran hitherto inadequate. Shah discussed a parallel with what might occur in Iran “at any time”. In reply to question Shah stated he had no indication of any immediate threat to Iran from north, but added it should be apparent to any strategist Iran probably weakest link in containment Russian expansion and it not unreasonable expect Soviets would strike where they considered possibilities success greatest. Shah reviewed recent history US policy in Korea and commented especially on fact that South Koreans were encouraged build up armed forces for internal security only and that these forces were equipped with light arms only. Shah attributed great initial successes of North Koreans to the fact that ROK had not been supplied with more heavy equipment and from this he indicated that decision supply Iran with military equipment useful primarily maintain internal security would be, as in Korea, completely inadequate withstand any armed Soviet aggression. Shah stated in event of armed invasion or in event establishment puppet regime or regimes in northern provinces he and his army would resist to utmost. He stated, however, he was not so foolish as to think that with present equipment and size of army he could keep Russians from overrunning a good part of country should they choose to do so. He stated his hope was that he could retreat slowly to south central part of Iran and to southern provinces and that there Russians could be held until outside aid arrived. At this point Shah remarked outside aid would take longer arrive in Iran than in Korea because of geographic factors. Shah was not specific regarding nature additional heavy equipment he feels is essential. He did, however, make following points: 1. He is convinced that with proper US guidance and assistance Iran Army could absorb much additional heavy equipment. 2. He spoke at length of his great interest arrange for more Iranian officers train in the US. Shah stated he had at first thought of addressing personal letter to President Truman along foregoing lines but later decided request Embassy transmit message. Grady 1 For the text of President Truman’s letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, August 1, transmitting a supplemental estimate of appropriations for military assistance, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 , pp. 564–566. The estimate for Greece, Turkey, and Iran was $193,000,000. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 888.2553–AIOC/7–2450: Telegram [Document 266] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret priority Washington , August 7, 1950—7 p. m. 683. Dept fully endorses Amb Grady’s recommendations para 4 Tehran’s 204 July 25, 2 and, despite Fraser 3 statement that co. unable advance sums due under supplemental agreement, is stressing these recommendations with Brit Emb and AIOC reps at this end. You shld do same at top level in London with all contacts in and out of FonOff who cld be instrumental in effecting desired results. Dept’s views on importance of settlement this issue to political stability Iran given in previous cables. Dept not inclined to disregard Razmara threat of concession cancellation which would have most direct impact on UK interests and which it is believed wld have almost total Iranian support. Dept still does not understand Brit Govt failure exercise control of govt co. at this time. Fraser’s vacation appears to reflect continued disregard for Brit Govt views and treatment of issue as commercial proposition without economic, political and strategic considerations important to outside world. It is hoped that despite vacation Fraser can be contacted at all times and that full examination is made of means bypassing legal obstacle raised by co. Emb shld emphasize Grady’s suggestion that Jackson 4 or other high ranking AIOC official visit Tehran immediately. Since US and UK Govts appear completely in accord, Dept wld welcome other suggestions aimed at overcoming last remaining obstacle, AIOC. Dept believes imperative press on all possible fronts for immediate payment at least greater portion amounts due under supplemental agreement. It is understood AIOC has already received full tax credit for these sums from Brit Govt and money only awaiting transfer to Iranian Govt. For sake UK and AIOC prestige, payments shld be supported by combined US–UK publicity facilities. Interim period before next meeting Majlis shld be used to develop Brit Amb points a and c of Tehran’s 204 5 with fullest publicity possible but without ref to renegotiation. Above approach designed to assure Iran sums necessary for internal situation, to increase UK and AIOC prestige and to prepare Iranians for agreement ratification at next meeting Majlis. 6 million pound loan being considered by Fraser wld, in Dept’s view, completely miss these objectives, particularly since Brit Amb indicates that AIOC already owes 7½ million pounds under old royalty agreement. Acheson 1 Repeated to Tehran and Cairo. 2 Not printed; in paragraph 4 Grady suggested that the AIOC should announce that it was making funds available to Iran unreservedly. This would clear the atmosphere, strengthen the Razmara Government, and avoid the danger of reopening the supplemental agreement for negotiations. (888.2553–AIOC/7–2450) 3 Sir William Fraser, Chairman of the AIOC. 4 Basil R. Jackson, Deputy Chairman of the AIOC. 5 Points a through c of telegram 204 read as follows: “( a ) The finding of formula satisfactory to Government here for gradual Iranianization of staff of company located in Iran. ( b ) The advance of funds that would be due under old rates (about 7½ million pounds) plus an advance in form of loan (with or without interest) sufficient meet present pressing needs national budget. Alternatively a loan for whole amount needed without any advance royalties. The Ambassador has up to now, however, been unable get from Prime Minister any budget figures indicating what present financial needs Government are. He cannot press his proposal on London until he had such data. ( c ) AIOC to form subsidiary exclusively for its Iranian operation and add Iranian director to management of subsidiary company. This is variation Shah’s proposal for audit of company books by Iranian Government.” Points a through c represent Grady’s summary of a memorandum which Ambassador Shepherd had sent to his Government on July 10. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 888.2553–AIOC/8–1050: Telegram [Document 267] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , August 10, 1950—8 p. m. 839. Deptel 683, August 7. I am requesting early appointment with Bevin to discuss question AIOC agreement. I wish, however, express my serious doubts re wisdom our pressing on either foreign office or AIOC the suggestion that the company make immediate payment of all or at least the greater portion of the amounts due under the supplemental agreement particularly in the light of the company’s reluctance to concede this point because of what it considers to be its obligations to its stockholders. While I appreciate the fact that the British Government is the majority stockholder and that the risks which it would incur would presumably be no greater than those involved in any government loan made on political grounds, I think it also important not to lose sight of the minority stockholders, and particularly due 22 percent public subscription. I cannot perceive how it is possible for us to press a suggestion of this nature without assuming a large degree of moral responsibility in the event that the company complies with our urging. And if the net result, despite the concession by the company of this and other points, is still no ratified agreement and consequently further demands for further concessions, how do we discharge the responsibility we have assumed? Despite the foregoing, I entirely appreciate the seriousness of the present situation and agree that we should press vigorously on all fronts here for immediate and effective reaction by the company on a scale sufficient to achieve the desired results. I will take this line with Bevin. But I feel that the nature of the action should be lent to the British themselves to work out. This may well (and undoubtedly should) include a loan, perhaps guaranteed by UK Government, but the responsibility for the decision should be, in my opinion, entirely on the British without pressure from US. In the light of the foregoing, I do not propose in my first meeting with Bevin on this subject to press for any specific line of action. There is a further aspect of this problem which I think deserves the Department’s urgent consideration. While I agree that the attitude of the company, and probably the British Government for that matter, leaves much to be desired, nevertheless, as I view the situation from here, I feel that there is much more the Iranians could do to facilitate a solution to this problem. It is not the British who are objecting to an agreement made in good faith and while I entirely appreciate the fact that the present Iranian Government has inherited a difficult political situation not of its own making, nevertheless as a succesor government it cannot escape a large degree of responsibility and certainly has an obligation to exert every effort to get this agreement ratified with the minimum possible change. I have noted carefully both Department’s and Ambassador Grady’s views in recent telegrams about the undesirability of renegotiation of the supplemental agreement and I entirely concur with those views. If I understand the situation correctly, however, renegotiation is precisely what Razmara is demanding as indicated in point two of his demands as reported in Tehran’s 215 July 25. 1 It seems to me, therefore, that there is a considerable divergence of views as between the Department and Razmara as to what is required to get the agreement through. It seems to me that we should give serious consideration to talking as frankly to Razmara on this question as we have to the British and to try to persuade him that it is necessary for him to present to the company an impression of moderation and reasonableness and assurance that present concessions by the company will not lead to demands for further concessions at a future date. In this general connection, I was glad to see Deptel 686, August 7. 2 I consider this matter important, not only because of the effect on Razmara, but because of the effect here as well. There is a definite impression here that our approaches have been too one-sided and that Razmara is aware of this fact and thereby encouraged in what is regarded as his intransigence. I feel that our intervention in this problem should extend to Razmara as well and that we should make every effort to induce moderation and good faith on his part, making the British fully aware of our efforts. I think that this would advance considerably the prospects of a more forthcoming British attitude. I would like to make two further observations on Deptel 683: 1. Re last sentence paragraph 2, I regret US and UK Government not completely in accord this question. Although we feel we have made at least some useful progress in Foreign Office, there is not yet identity of views between us as to the required action. Picture now complicated further by entry Treasury and Ministry Fuel and Power into picture and particularly by Treasury sharing concern of AIOC re economic consequences large scale loan on Iranian economy (paragraph 2 Embtel 792, August 8 3 ). 2. Re final sentence final paragraph, according explanations here, government will probably realize 13 and one-half million pounds in royalties this year under old agreement. Of this amount 6,000,000 has already been paid as an advance. Greater part of remaining 7,500,000, from which company might make further 6,000,000 advance, not due until end company’s fiscal (which is calendar) year and therefore is not presently “owed” by company. Sent Department 839, repeated info Tehran 16. Douglas 1 Not printed; in it Grady reported that Razmara would insist on the following items with regard to the AIOC agreement: “(1) Payment all royalties due under new rates and application of new rates immediately. (2) He will withdraw present supplementary agreement and seek modification on following points before re-submitting to Majlis: ( a ) Iranization to be completed within period ten yrs. ( b ) Audit by Iranian Govt of books of AIOC pertaining business in Iran. ( c ) Lowest prices to be charged for petroleum products sold in Iran as are charged anywhere else (this means rate given Brit Navy). ( d ) Check by Iranian Govt of oil exported by company.” (888.2553/7–2550) 2 Not printed; in it the Department of State advised Grady that, if he believed there was any danger that Razmara’s extreme statements about the AIOC agreement would result in the alienation of the British, then the Ambassador should suggest to the Prime Minister that he take no action which would result in serious friction between the United Kingdom and Iran. (888.2553–AIOC/8–750) 3 Not printed; it reported that the question of the supplemental agreement had been reviewed on August 8 with Wright and Furlonge who, inter alia , questioned the justifiability of a loan which might be used at least in part to balance the Iranian budget. (888.2553–AIOC/8–850) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 888.2553–AIOC/8–1250: Telegram [Document 268] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , August 12, 1950—2 p. m. 888. Embtel 839, August 10. I saw Bevin this morning and discussed with him AIOC problem. I stressed critical political and economic situation in Iran, hazardous consequences of prolonged delays etc. in resolving AIOC supplemental agreement, need for supporting Razmara, inflexibility of company re further concessions without renegotiating contract and need for early solution problem in order that Iran may get on with seven year plan. I took line that I thought nature of action should be left to UK to work out and that I merely wanted at this point to make clear our concern and to urge the UK to use its influence with the company to promote a more flexible attitude with the Iranian Government. I suggested Jackson might go Iran immediately to explore solution with Iranian Government on spot. Bevin indicated awareness problem, recalling prominent role he had played in assisting supplemental agreement negotiations. He felt generous offer had been made Iranian Government, but seemed appreciate seriousness present situation. He said at one point UK does not want Iranian Government run out of money and indicated willingness consider some form of assistance. He was concerned, however, with Iranian propensity keep opening their mouths wider and seemed particularly concerned lest Iranians play off US vs. UK. As very tentative and nebulous thought, he said he had been turning over in his mind whether, in view Iranians seeking dollars from US, it might not be possible for both US and UK, in a coordinated way, to make Razmara generous but realistic offer of assistance to furnish him with funds to get on with solving his problems. He was not making this as suggestion at this point, but merely thinking it over. He would give whole matter further consideration, talk to company and discuss matter with me again soon. I consider Bevin’s thought re joint US–UK action in question assistance worthy close consideration in order assure most efficient application funds and obviate an Iranian tendency play off one of us against other. 1 In discussions Iran re Exim Bank credit, 2 suggest we ask attitude towards AIOC supplemental agreement. So far, according to British, Razmara has not indicated support for agreement even if 25 million pounds were advanced and other non-financial concessions made. Sent Department 888, repeated Tehran 17. Douglas 1 On August 22 Douglas was informed that the Department of State was unable to comment on Bevin’s idea of joint assistance pending receipt of further details, but it did not believe the linking of United States aid with the AIOC concession would be in the best interest of any of the countries involved. At the same time the Ambassador was told that he could assure the British that the United States was not adopting a one-sided approach and would continue to urge moderation on Iran. (Telegram 978 to London; 888.2553–AIOC/8–1250) 2 On July 14 Ambassador Grady had reported that he had received from Prime Minister Razmara a formal request for credits from the Export-Import Bank for irrigation, road building, rehabilitation of industry, and agricultural improvements. The text of Razmara’s request, dated August 13, was transmitted in telegram 118 from Tehran, July 14, not printed (888.10/7–1450). The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 888.2553–AIOC/8–1550: Telegram [Document 269] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret priority Tehran , August 15, 1950—3 p. m. 16. (1) Your continued efforts re AIOC outlined Embtels 792 and 839 2 appreciated here since I feel no substantial progress can be made on total Iranian problem until this settled. I trust your conversation with Bevin will get things moving. 3 (2) I have several observations on recent messages. It seems to me responsibility AIOC to its 18 percent private stockholders not appreciably different from responsibility to government stockholder. Lawyers should be able devise formula insulating company against minority stockholders suit in event loss results from non-ratification. Even more fundamental is fact that private stockholders, as well as UK Government will lose total investment if continued failure to reach agreement results collapse of country or confiscatory action by Iranians. (3) I understand how impression that our approach AIOC problem one-sided could be gained if our efforts judged solely by outgoing telegrams, but should be realized these telegrams necessarily deal primarily with one side of problem. Our arguments here to Iranians are other side. Just how London Embassy knows what we have said to Razmara on this matter or on what is basis its impression that we have “encouraged his intransigency”, I cannot understand. (4) Razmara not our primary problem here. He is intelligent, reasonable person who realizes oil settlement must be made if he is to proceed with his development program. Real problem is irrational, nationalistic Majlis which has stand-off attitude toward Razmara. In fact, after giving him vote confidence has denied him legislation on government decentralization and other matters he regards as important. He thought introduction AIOC supplemental agreement into Majlis sure to cause incendiary speeches and ultimate defeat. His tactics are to strengthen his government in eyes of people by material improvements before winter, perhaps have new elections and send supplemental agreement Majlis only after he has strength put it through. Essential element of tactics is giving Razmara means to make material improvements (balancing budget, starting development projects, et cetera). (5) I can think of no better tactics. To lump Razmara and Majlis as “Iranians” and hope that need for funds will eventually force acceptance as [ an? ] agreement is, I think, a mistake. This tactic more likely lead to deeper trouble. Our best chance is help Razmara get strength to settle matter. (6) I welcome UK interest seeing that any sterling loan be properly used by Iranians. We all share aim that oil payments be used for development, but development cannot:-be undertaken while budget seriously out of balance. Loan or payment of total sum would permit balancing budget and development expenditures, but small loans will probably have to go primarily for balancing budget. (7) I do not agree that an addenda on certain points like Iranianization of employees, desired by Razmara and necessary for him in resubmitting supplemental agreement, need in any sense involve or necessitate a renegotiation of the whole supplemental agreement. Sent priority London 16; repeated info Department 395. Grady 1 The source text is the copy in the Department of State files. 2 Telegram 792, not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] . 3 Regarding Douglas’ conversation with Bevin, see telegram 888, supra . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 611.88/8–1450: Telegram [Document 270] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 secret Washington , August 17, 1950—7 p. m. 305. Urtel 381 Aug 14. 2 Dept appreciates ur analysis present Sov activities Iran and concurs. We do not believe present Sov activities in Iran form part any global policy but are designed solely as part ceaseless attempt by one means or another wean Iran away from west and eventually create new satellite. Sov policy towards Iran since end of war has been alternatively hard and soft accompanied by continuous propaganda, border incidents and internal subversion. Assumption arises confusion of Sov pol is deliberate and designed keep Iran in constant state turmoil with little chance internal stability. Furthermore Iran now has for first time Gov which cannot be intimidated by dipl notes and Sovs have probably reached conclusion bullying tactics will not work while ostensibly friendly offer help Iran may, as is certainly possible, be welcomed by many Irans fearful of future and skeptical of US assistance to such an extent that no Govt eld stay in office which pursued pol openly hostile to Sovs and aligned with US. Acheson 1 Repeated to Moscow. 2 Not printed; in it Grady reported that Russian eagerness to appear as the friends of Iran was primarily part of the peace offensive, but also, to a large degree, a response to the activities of the United States in Iran which were “beginning to disturb the Russians a great deal.” (611.88/8–1450) The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Embassy in Iran 888.2553–AIOC/8–1850: Telegram [Document 271] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Embassy in Iran 1 secret priority London , August 18, 1950—4 p. m. 20. 1. I should like to assure you we are very conscious of difficult task which you are facing in Iran and of your strenuous efforts to strengthen situation there, which is in everybody’s interest. You may be sure that in your task you can as in all matters count on complete cooperation of this Embassy and that we will continue do everything within our power to be of assistance to you in the achievement of your objectives. 2. I regret very much that Embtel 839 August 10 should have been interpreted as conveying idea that this Embassy had impression Embassy Tehran has been encouraging Razmara in his intransigence (Tehran’s 16 to London August 15 repeated Department as 395). What I intended convey is that Foreign Office officials concerned with problem have formed impression, in absence any evidence of which they have knowledge that we are taking as strong a line with Razmara as we are with them, that our approach seems to be one sided, that Razmara knows it, and that he is thereby indirectly and involuntarily encouraged in his intransigence. But neither this Embassy nor anyone in it holds this view. Nevertheless, there is evidence that view is held among Foreign Office officials. Whenever any aspect of it has come up, we have tried hard to disabuse Foreign Office. See, for example paragraph 3 Embtel 399 July 18. But only way in which we will effectively allay suspicion and remove it as factor complicating to some extent present situation is to be able convince Britain we are exerting comparable efforts to encourage Razmara adopt conciliatory and understanding attitude. Since, as indicated by Tehran’s 16, we are doing more along this line than has appeared in telegrams previously sent this Embassy, we would appreciate receiving more details in order that we may be more convincing with HMG than we have been able to be in past. 3. I should also like to clarify further the doubts expressed in my 839 regarding the wisdom of our pressing the suggestion that the company make immediate payment of all or most of the amounts due under the supplemental agreement. Probably, as pointed out in paragraph 2 urtel 395, the lawyers could find formula for protecting company against small stockholders’ suits, but I feel that initiative and responsibility for this or any other type of remedial action should lie clearly and squarely with UK. I suggest in this connection that there is essential moral difference between our pressing on UK Government course of action which might result in loss private funds. So far as I am aware, there are no facts in present situation known to us which are not also known to Britain, including possibilities of Iran’s collapse and confiscatory action. We have pressed on them in strongest terms US estimate of nature and requirements of situation. From everything which we have been able to ascertain, they recognize the seriousness of situation and the need for some as yet undetermined action. I continue to feel the nature of this action should be left to them and that our representations should be confined to urging early and effective action without specifying what it should be. 4. Re paragraph 7, I am sorry if anything in our telegrams may have implied a need for renegotiation which we agree is not case. In fact we have told Britain we feel any concessions which are made by company should be outside the framework of the present supplemental agreement. 5. It would be of greatest aid to us in our efforts here to have Tehran’s and Department’s early views on following questions bearing on points which are bothering UK: a . When will Shepherd’s appraisal of the need for funds and the use to which they will be put be completed? (Embtel 933 August 14 2 ) As of yesterday, appraisal still not received from Foreign Office. b . What, beyond certain general indications in paragraph 6 of Tehran’s 395, are detailed answers to preliminary points made by UK Treasury and AIOC? i. That any large scale loan or advance would probaly be dissipated one way or another. ii. That alternate sources of funds can and should be found to balance budget instead of using external loan. iii. That 7 year plan projects are not in sufficiently advanced state of readiness to absorb large amount of funds at present time. iv. That large loan would have undesirable inflationary effect on Iranian economy. c . Given Razmara’s tactics as outlined paragraph 5 of Tehran’s 395, what effective assurances is he willing to give Britain re getting agreement through Majlis without demands for further concessions at later date, if they meet him satisfactorily now on question financial aid and other gestures? d . In view US and UK of position renegotiation, which Razmara appears have in mind (Tehran’s 215 July 25 3 ), would Razmara be willing yield on this point if company made satisfactory gestures outside terms agreement? 6. I wish repeat that I am terribly sorry there has been misunderstanding. If after reading this message there are any points requiring further explanation, I hope you will let me know. Sent Tehran 20; repeated information Department 1048. Douglas 1 The source text is the copy in the Department of State files. 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 267 ] . The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State 740.5/8–2350: Telegram [Document 272] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , August 23, 1950—2 p. m. 457. Deptel 302, August 17 received August 21. 1 Shah and Iranian Government would certainly react most unfavorably inclusion Turkey in NAT, if clear commitment in form of promise of immediate assistance in event attack not made Iran at same time. Iranians would undoubtedly believe they were being militarily abandoned by US with no assurances of security beyond whatever action UN might take in emergency; opportunity for Soviets to propagandize theme of complete abandonment Iran by US obvious. There are already strong influences in Iran pressing view that rapprochement with USSR and adoption policy neutrality is only hope for country’s survival. These forces would gain in vigor and public acceptance, if, as in case of large scale and effective MDAP and ECA assistance, US defense commitment again stopped at Iran-Turkish border. One of tasks of Chief of Mission here is continuous stiffening of Iranian will vis-à-vis Soviets, and any action along lines being contemplated would destroy larger part of whatever will to resist has been created and up to present sustained here. On the other hand I do not believe that NAT should be extended to Iran. Neither do I believe that it should be extended to Turkey. (Presumably if Turkish pressure is not acceded to Greece will not press to be included). The UN charter sanctions the establishment of regional defense pacts, and I believe NAT should be maintained as a North Atlantic regional pact and not extended into an encircling coalition against the USSR. To do the latter would play into Soviet hands to some extent without any apparent advantages to US, especially when it is considered that the principle of concerted UN action against aggression seems to have been established in Korea. That principle certainly could again be applied in the case of aggression against either Iran or Turkey, and it would be more advantageous for US than to act under cover of UN rather than under cover of a treaty which basically not related to region. Further, I believe question extending any US defense commitment to Iran should be very cautiously approached. There are too many intangibles in situation here. Soviets might occupy part or all of Iran under treaty of 1921, throwing incident into legal mill of UN, in which event, based upon informal discussions of early 1949, it might be that British would not support our contention that appropriate provisions that treaty no longer applicable. The instability of Iranian politics, with possibility always present of change in policy toward USSR, must be considered. Also, commitment to defend Iran might prove to be an undertaking which could not be properly balanced with force available to US. 2 Grady 1 Not printed; it advised Ambassador Grady that the United States was under pressure from Turkey for inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and asked for his analysis of the reaction of Iran to the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the pact without some clear commitment, connected with NAT or not, to Iran. (740.5/8–1750) For further documentation on the question of Greek and Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 2 Subsequent to the transmission of this telegram Ambassador Grady lunched with the Shah who expressed his opinion that “it was not in any sense appropriate for any or all of the GTI countries to be members of the NAT.” The Shah stated many of the views which Grady outlined in telegram 457 and thought Turkey should be given no encouragement in her campaign for membership. Grady reported on his lunch with the Shah in telegram 467 from Tehran, August 24, not printed. (740.5/8–2450) Editorial Note [Document 273] Editorial Note National Security Council document 73/4, “The Position of the United States With Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation,” August 25, 1950, printed in volume I, page 375, recommended that in the event of overt attack by organized Soviet military forces against Iran: “The United States should initially rely on the United Kingdom for principal responsibility to assist Iran in meeting the aggression, should endeavor to induce Pakistan and India to take a leading role, and should deploy such forces to the Near and Middle East and the Persian Gulf areas as can be made available without jeopardizing United States security or its ability to implement emergency war plans.” Regarding possible nonmilitary moves by the Soviet Union with respect to Iran, National Security Council document 73/4 recommended that “In the event of internal subversion leading toward the establishment of a communist-dominated government in Iran, the United States should: a . Accelerate its assistance to the legitimate Iranian Government, b . Consider seeking an agreement in the UN on charging the USSR with direct responsibility for conditions in Iran.” (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63L351, NSC 73 Series) The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State 888.00/9–1450: Telegram [Document 274] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Kirk ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 top secret Moscow , September 14, 1950—7 p. m. 702. Tehran telegram to Department 631, September 12. 2 In past we have expressed view that strongest ally of Soviets in implementation their aim of transforming Iran into role of satellite is long-term continuation of disaffection resulting inter alia from economic backwardness and poverty (Embtel 2701, October 28, 1949). We have also been of opinion that for strategic and other reasons Iran occupies vital point in defense of free world against Soviet aggression (Embtel 601, February 20) and that we should exercise the initiative we retain by means of economic aid implemented through flexible system of grants and loans (Embtel 833, March 13). 3 We believe that basic reason for Soviet opening trade discussions with Iranians, and manifesting what on surface appears to be disposition to settle frontier-guard problem and impounding of Iranian gold and foreign exchange stems from their realistic evaluation of potential strength of Razmara regime. In this sense, Soviet offer of trade pact may be regarded as attempt to counteract expected alleviation of Iranian politico-economic situation, and alignment of Razmara government on side of west. We take it that successful conclusion trade pact, in absence some real measure economic assistance from west (principally US) would be calculated to strengthen Iranian elements favoring pro-Soviet orientation of country. It is perhaps typical of Soviet policy that friendly overtures can be made at same time as Tudeh party is fostered in Azerbaijan, and Iranian Kurds are urged to revolt by radio station located Soviet territory. For reasons indicated above, we have felt that Ambassador Grady’s recommendation that appreciable US loan or grant-in-aid, to be made available to Iran near future, would be important step in bolstering of Iranian economy, at same time offsetting Soviet efforts to draw Iran into position in which active support west would be to some degree inhibited. Prompt offer of such loan also would serve to strengthen Iranian Government’s bargaining position when firm Soviet trade offer made (Tehran telegram to Department 630, September 12 4 ), allowing time for exploration alternative trade possibilities. Re this last point, third numbered paragraph Tehran’s telegram to Department 631, September 12 suggests possibility that export-import agreement with Iran might be made either with West Germany or Italy, or with both. Imports desired by Iran presumably could be supplied by either these nations (thereby easing their unemployment situation and utilizing idle plant capacity), while products available for export from Iran should be marketable in European area without undue difficulty. Another possibility would be purchase certain of export items, particularly foodstuffs, by US for use for relief in Korea. Along longer term, settlement of AIOC agreement with Iran would, we believe, immeasurably assist Razmara in establishment economically-stable regime, and thereby would strengthen his hand in resisting Soviet blandishments. If, as we understand to be the case, UK Government-controlled AIOC is withholding badly needed “advance” against Iranian concessions in final agreement, US loan might convince British that bait has lost some of its efficacy. Certainly British should be aware of broad implications of oil settlement, and dangers to Iran (and thus to free world generally) of permitting this matter to drag on indefinitely. Early agreement between AIOC and Iran would be major obstacle to expansion Soviet influence in Near East and hence should, we feel, occupy joint attention of US and UK Governments. Department pass Tehran, London, sent Department 702, repeated information Tehran 14, London 133. Kirk 1 Secretary Acheson was in New York for meetings with Foreign Ministers Bevin and Schuman; for documentation on these meetings, see vol. iii , pp. 1108 ff. 2 Not printed; in it Grady emphasized that the proposed Soviet trade agreement “would be of substantial and immediate economic importance to Iran and would offset appreciably significance of pending US aid.” Grady stressed that it would be “extremely important” if the United States “could promptly suggest Iran Government realistic prospects of export alternatives to Russia and US good offices in developing them.” (461.8831/9–1250) 3 None of the telegrams under reference in this paragraph is printed. 4 Not printed; in it Grady reported that the Soviet Ambassador would present to Razmara at the end of the week a reply concerning the trade negotiations. (461.8831/9–1250) On September 14 Grady reported further that the Soviet reply indicated that they would take unlimited quantities of rice and large amounts of wool, tobacco, oil seeds, dried fruits, and raw cotton; and he concluded “Am confident Department will appreciate propaganda victory which would be gained by Russians by conclusion agreement before any US aid received by Iran.” (Telegram 656 from Tehran, not printed; 461.8831/9–1450) The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Acting Secretary of State 888.10/9–1750: Telegram [Document 275] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Acting Secretary of State confidential priority Tehran , September 17, 1950—8 a. m. 677. (1) Iran application for Export-Import Bank credit of 25 million dollars being sent Washington with Dooher September 17. (2) Documents consist of copy of application from Prime Minister and four attachments. ( a ) Project for highway improvement and maintenance program includes 5 million dollars for road construction and maintenance machinery and repair shop equipment, and 1 million dollars for supervisory and training services of US Bureau of Public Roads. Construction roads under supervision of Bureau to administrative program. Local contractors to do construction. American firm to purchase machinery, some of which will be retained by Minister and some rented or sold to contractors. US technicians and regional repair shops will ensure proper maintenance of equipment. Rial cost of program including normal work of Ministry about 500 million per year. ( b ) Project for agriculture development in three major parts involving nearly 19 million dollars: (1) Equipment and services for supply and improve use of ground water for agricultural purposes; (2) Introduction and demonstration of appropriate agricultural machinery; (3) Storing, processing, and packaging equipment for agricultural products. Equipment to be purchased by American firm and handled in Iran through special corp with American chief engineer controlling selection, use, operation, maintenance, rental, sales etc. of equipment and services. Rial cost about 25 millon first year, 60 second year. ( c ) Engineering survey by American firm of Tehran electric power facilities and requirements. Survey to be used as basis for construction raising power capacity from 12,000 to 76,000 kw. Cost of survey $200,000 6 million rials. Loan to municipally-owned Tehran Power Company. ( d ) Statement by Minister Finance on total foreign exchange revenue and total government budget rial revenue. This statement will be supplemented by making available completed copy of International Bank detailed questions and answers and by guarantees at time of negotiations. (3) Letter of application states government ready negotiate terms of loan as soon as possible in Washington or Tehran. (4) Iranians are naive in expectations from America and inept in presentation of needs for specific loans, but this should not be permitted to cloud our appraisal of this application. In banking terms all three of these projects are sensible and modest when judged by Iranians needs and ability to repay. In terms of our national interest, loan is highly beneficial to US. Because of its internal instability and because it is a juicy plum bordering directly on Russia, Iran lives in constant danger from Russia. Yet she has up to now received not a single dollar of economic grant or loan out of the billions we have poured out to strengthen the non-Communist countries of the world. (5) I am not advocating large amounts of aid for this country because I do not think it needs it. I am, however, strongly urging that this particular loan, which is of token size compared to our programs elsewhere, be cleared in Washington in a matter of days if possible. I am fully aware that this may mean disregard for many of the administrative and legal niceties of matter but if we are to gain desired psychological benefits from this loan, this is necessary. Delay over details will lose for us primary benefits we wish to attain but no amount of delay will lessen basic risks that are necessarily involved in loan to a country situated as is Iran. Grady Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Palmer) 611.41/9–1850 [Document 276] Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Palmer ) 1 top secret London , September 18, 1950. Subject: Security of Middle East and Iran Participants: Mr. Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Mr. D. P. Reilly, Assistant Under-Secretary of State 2 Lt. Col. C. S. Godwin, British Chiefs of Staff Secretariat Mr. G. W. Furlonge, Counsellor, Commonwealth Liaison Dept. 3 Honorable George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer 2nd, First Secretary of Embassy Mr. Wright opened the meeting by stating that the Foreign Office was anxious to take advantage of the current conversations with Mr. McGhee to discuss certain strategic aspects of the Near Eastern situation. In particular, the Foreign Office wished to inform Mr. McGhee of the politico-military papers on Iran and the Middle East area which had been prepared by the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff for the Bradley–Tedder conversations in Washington. 4 The Chiefs of Staff have already approved the papers, which are now being reviewed in New York by Mr. Bevin. Mr. Wright hoped that the Department would agree with the Foreign Office that there should be political as well as military discussion of the two documents. Mr. McGhee expressed his agreement with this principle and promised to recommend this course to the Department. At Mr. Wright’s request, Mr. Furlonge gave the following outline of the paper on Iran: 1. The paper first emphasizes the importance of Iran to the allies and the adverse results of the loss of Iran. 2. The paper then proceeds to analyze alternative threats to Iran which it enumerates as follows: I. A direct Soviet invasion. II. The establishment of a Communist regime in Azerbaijan, by subversion, with the result that Azerbaijan became in effect a Soviet satellite. III. The establishment of a Communist regime in the whole of Iran. Under this heading, the paper considers two possibilities: a . That the Shah and Government were unable to escape. b . That the Shah and the Government were able to escape long enough to lodge an appeal for assistance with the United Nations or the allies. IV. The fomentation of serious trouble in the oil fields, with the result that the Government lost control of the situation and the oil was thereby denied to the Allies. 3. The paper then considers four courses of action which might be taken in the foregoing contingencies: A. That no counter measures should be taken, which the paper dismisses as an unacceptable course of action. B. That troops be stationed in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi Government. C. That troops be stationed in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi Government and that troops also be moved into Southern Iran to protect the oil fields. D. That the US and UK should go to war with the Soviet Union. 4. The paper then proceeds to relate courses of action to threats as follows: A. Case I does not exclude course D, which, however, is not militarily essential and represents a major decision which only be taken in the light of the world circumstances pertaining at the time. Consideration meanwhile should be given to the desirability of giving a prior indication to the USSR that an attack on the USSR will mean war by means of a unilateral guarantee of frontiers or a statement going further in the case of Iran than the US and UK declarations regarding the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey and Iran. Failing Course D to meet Case I, the paper recommends Course C, provided the consent of the Iraqi and Iranian Governments were obtained. The paper also considers the possibility of Security Council action and concludes that if it is found impossible to obtain a resolution on the Korean line, it would be possible for the US and UK to take action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The paper also makes the point that if the Soviet Union adheres to its present intention not to permit its own troops to come into combat with those of the allies, Course C might be an effective deterrent to Soviet occupation of the oil fields. B. In Case II, there could be no recourse to Course D, but action should be taken along the lines of Course C. C. In Case III, Course C should be adopted if the Shah and his Government were still free to make an appeal. If the Shah and his Government were captured, Course C would probably be inexpedient and it would be necessary to have recourse to Course B. D. Regarding Case IV, recourse should be made to Course C. 5. The paper dismisses the argument that recourses to Course C in Case I would constitute provocation to the Soviet Union by concluding that this is an acceptable risk. In the ensuing discussion, Mr. McGhee stated that he found the British study most interesting, especially the possibility of stationing troops in Iraq. [Here follows a discussion of the British paper on the defense of the Middle East. For the record of this discussion, see page 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] .] 1 Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and a small party of advisers visited London, September 16–23, en route to the North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, Morocco, October 2–7. While in London, McGhee and his party held discussions with British officials on a lengthy, previously-agreed-upon agenda of topics covering South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. This conversation was among the earliest of these discussions. For additional information on the McGhee trip, see the editorial note, p. 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] . 2 D’Arcy Patrick Reilly was Superintending Under-Secretary of the Security Department, British Foreign Office. 3 Geoffrey Warren Furlonge, Head of the Eastern Department, British Foreign Office. 4 Regarding the Bradley–Tedder conversations at Washington, July 20–24, under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] . The two documents mentioned here, both dated October 2 as completed, are not printed. Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Thursday Morning, September 21 780.00/9–1850 [Document 277] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Thursday Morning, September 21 1 London, September 21, 1950 secret Topic for Discussion: Greece, Turkey and Iran—Items 4, 5 and 6 on agreed agenda. Also remainder of Item 1 (Iran). 2 Participants: Foreign Office: Mr. Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Mr. G. W. Furlonge, Head, Eastern Department Mr. L. Barnett, Eastern Department Hon. P. Ramsbotham, Economic Relations Department Mr. H. G. Gee, Labor Adviser Treasury: Sir Ernest Rowe-Dutton, Third Secretary Sir Herbert Brittain, Third Secretary Mr. Norman Young, Assistant Secretary Ministry of Fuel and Power: Mr. Victor S. Butler, Under-Secretary, Petroleum Division U.S.A . Mr. McGhee Department of State Mr. Kopper 3 Mr. Woodbridge 4 Mr. Parker, Financial Attaché, Cairo Mr. Palmer 5 American Embassy, London Mr. Willoughby Mr. Root 6 AIOC and IPC Problems (Item 4 on agenda) The British representatives opened the meeting by stating their understanding that the general objectives of our two countries in the Near East were identical: that, in carrying out these aims, we were agreed on the importance of avoiding unnecessary rivalry or friction between ourselves or between our respective oil companies, whose impact on the Near East we recognized to be of primary importance; and that each country should play its full part in helping developments in the Near East. Specifically, they believed we were agreed that: (1) The Near East countries should not be permitted to play one of us against the other; (2) The Near East countries should not be permitted to play our respective oil companies against each other; (3) Our oil companies should work in line with, not against, the policies of the US and UK Governments. We indicated our full agreement with these statements but added, that when the particular activities or policies of any of the oil companies, of whichever side, threatened to affect adversely the common objectives of our two governments, we thought each of us should feel free to criticize to the other these company activities or policies. There was then discussion of the serious situation now threatening Iran. There was complete agreement on both sides that Iran was the danger point in the Near East and that the problem there was one of the utmost urgency. Mr. McGhee reviewed the background of our own program for Iran, which we had already discussed with the British, and emphasized that financial assistance from us and ratification of the AIOC agreement were essential elements in strengthening the country and in maintaining the Razmara government, which both of us looked to as the one best suited to lead Iran out of the present crisis. Razmara must soon show tangible results or fail in his efforts altogether and time is running out. The need for funds is urgent and there is reason to feel that Iran should obtain new benefits which it will eventually receive under the supplemental agreement. It seemed to us of the greatest importance that this agreement be ratified without delay. Admittedly its financial provisions are fair ones. But the best political judgment in Iran felt there was no chance of ratification in the Majlis without the concession of something in the nature of the four points specified by Razmara. Mr. Butler then explained the company’s preliminary reaction on these points. The first was greater Iranianization. On this point Iran should be more explicit. Already the company was 97% Iranianized. What Iran probably had in mind were the more important executive jobs but the difficulty here was to find suitable persons to fill them. The second point was an audit of AIOC’s books. This the company found quite impossible to concede, nor did it feel it owed any obligation in this respect beyond that to any other normal stockholder. It must be remembered that the company had interests outside of Iran which were impossible to separate from activities in Iran. The company could not divulge the nature of its worldwide operations to Iran. He assumed, in this connection, that the Iranian Government would have no desire to give up its participation in outside profits. The third point was the local price of oil, which Iran wanted to obtain at the cheapest figure paid to AIOC. The country already had a very favorable position in this regard but nevertheless he did not think the company would refuse altogether to budge on this demand. Mr. Butler had not previously been familiar with Razmara’s fourth point, which Mr. McGhee explained Was the right to check exports, but said he would take it up with the company and he did not believe it would pose an insurmountable difficulty. The trouble on all these demands was that the Iranians had never been very clear about them. The company was now trying to learn from them just what it is they want, and the Iranian Finance Minister, who is due in London for talks on the AIOC problem, would probably have something further to say about them. Mr. McGhee then returned to the reasons why we felt it was so important that something be done immediately. He said we were disappointed that the company had not shown the same sense of urgency about the matter that we attached to it. It seemed to us essential that the agreement be put through the Majlis at this session. Before leaving the US he had talked with representatives of the principal American oil companies with operations in the Near East about Razmara’s demands. They felt these demands were not unreasonable ones and that there were none they themselves could not have met. Mr. McGhee observed that the question of accounting, for example, seemed elementary enough. Creole was obliged to present its accounts to the Venezuelan Government for examination. Mr. McGhee then contrasted the numerous advantages AIOC enjoys in its operations with the position of oil companies elsewhere in the world. The cost of oil to AIOC was by comparison extremely low and good profits were made. As for the argument that AIOC’s operations in Iran were tied up with interests elsewhere, Mr. McGhee indicated that Creole in Venezuela had somewhat analogous problems. The American representatives he had spoken with felt that so long as the company did not lose control of its board of directors there was little it could not afford to agree to. The advantage in negotiations today lay with the country where the oil properties were located and about the best the companies could do was fight a graceful rearguard action. Mr. McGhee mentioned the new demands that the Saudi Arabian Government was making on Aramco 7 and warned of the repercussions these would have when they became known to other Near Eastern Governments. He could assure the group that these demands were astounding and extremely sweeping, covering both financial and other concessions. Once known to the Iranian Government, he doubted whether there would be any longer the slightest chance of getting the present supplemental oil agreement ratified. He was not at liberty to disclose the details of the Saudi Arabian demands, but he could not emphasize too strongly the impact they would have when they become generally known, as inevitably they must. This new factor threw an alarming new note of urgency into the need for getting immediate ratification of the supplemental agreement. [Here follows a discussion of the labor problems of the Iraq Petroleum Company.] Convertibility of sterling (Item 5 on agenda) There was a lengthy discussion on the question of converting sterling to dollars to service US loans to Iran. The British position, which was propounded mainly by the Treasury representatives, was that it was not fair to place this additional burden on the UK and that loan servicing should be made a first charge on Iran’s own dollar earnings. Sir Ernest Rowe-Dutton, explaining the memorandum of understanding with Iran on the convertibility question, said that the agreement did not cover loan servicing. It was, he said, much easier for the UK to defend the conversion of sterling for essential imports than to open a sort of checking account on dollars for the Iranians. Further, he was concerned by the precedent which this would set not only in Iran but elsewhere throughout the world. The UK simply could not be drawn into such a dangerous commitment. He suggested as an alternative that, as the IBRD had done with the recent loan to Iraq, we include as part of our loan the sum which will be required for the first few years of servicing. In the meantime the UK and the US should do everything possible to get rid of the present Iranian decree covering foreign exchange which leaves the disposition of practically all of Iran’s export dollar earnings in the bazaar where they can be withheld as long as 16 months. The UK Government, he said, brings under its control the country’s dollar earnings and the Iranian Government should do the same. Mr. McGhee reviewed the factors in the Iranian picture which, for psychological reasons, made an immediate Export-Import Bank loan imperative. He said that Ambassador Grady was most emphatic on this point. However, the whole transaction was now being held up by the convertibility question, for the Export-Import Bank could agree to advance the loan only if the UK gave us an assurance to provide the dollar conversion necessary for servicing the loan. The simple fact was that British earnings in Iran represented the sole substantial collateral. Moreover, it might be argued that British agreement to conversion is in fact an obligation the UK could not avoid. AIOC was the UK’s biggest overseas asset and had been a tremendous dollar earner for the British; by contrast, Iran obtained very little. The UK, as we saw it, simply had no alternative to provide the Iranians with their dollar requirements. Conversion for loan servicing was itself, in effect, no more than an allocation of dollars for essential goods. Furthermore, it appeared that conversion requirements under the present understanding with Iran were diminishing appreciably and the inclusion of loan servicing should not extend the amount of the UK’s commitment. As for dollars available directly to Iran through exports, many of these were already being used for essential purposes. Sir Ernest Rowe-Dutton feared that British agreement to convert would be an “open-end” affair and would lead to similar demands in the future. Mr. McGhee replied that the assurances we were now asking were limited to the $25 million which the Eximbank was prepared to lend and for which the Iran Government had now made application. In answer to a question, he added that servicing of the arms credit was also part of the same problem. This, the Eximbank loan and the proposed IBRD loan would mean servicing requirements of perhaps $6–$7 million yearly. Sir Ernest again expressed his feeling that we should accomplish our objectives by pressing the Iranians to tighten their financial controls and make use of the dollars now available in the open market. Mr. Woodbridge explained that while US statistics indicated imports of some $10 to $15 millon were coming from Iran, actually much of this represented re-exports through third countries from which it was virtually impossible for Iran to obtain the dollar proceeds. In addition, many of the free dollars in Iran were already being used for essential imports and were furthermore a necessary factor in the import surplus which Iran required to finance its rial expenditures. In actuality, the amount of free dollars that might be available to Iran for loan servicing was much less than at first glance might seem likely. Sir Ernest Rowe-Dutton again urged that some strong action be taken by the US and UK to get the withdrawal of the present Iranian decree covering the distribution of dollar earnings from imports. Mr. Parker said the International Monetary Fund, which was now studying the problem, seemed to him to be the appropriate forum for taking up the question of modifications. It was impossible simply to revert to the original situation in Iran. What was now necessary was for the International Monetary Fund to sit down with the Iranians and discuss useful changes in the present controls to achieve the objectives the Iran Government had had in mind. Eventually, as the next step, it might be appropriate for the US and UK to make a unilateral approach, as in fact we had already done in a sense with respect to the retention of export proceeds. We intended to press as we could for a revision of the exchange regulations. The point now was that we did not have the time to await these developments before making a loan. Sir Ernest wondered whether the prospect of an International Bank or other loans might be used as an inducement to get the Iranians to withdraw the decree regulations, for he doubted the effectiveness of International Monetary Fund intervention alone. Mr. McGhee and Mr. Parker in answer again stressed the time factor. It was impossible to take the time to work this out. Furthermore, the main purpose of our loan was for the psychological effect it was hoped to have and any pressure prior to its granting would simply undermine the objective for which it was intended. It was certainly part of our thinking that the loan, once made, could be used as leverage to get the Iranians to improve their financial administration. However, it was out of the question to bargain on the granting of the loan itself. Mr. Parker explained briefly the implications of the present financial picture in Iran. The estimated budget deficit, together with rial requirements for investment and sales to AIOC, left the Iranians with nearly 7 billion rials less than needed for total rial expenditures. There was at the moment no adequate mechanism for credit expansion. By running an import surplus, he said, the Iranians can obtain an additional 4 billion rials for their internal needs, but in any event this still left a gap of 3 billion. Foreign exchange income and outgo about matched each other but this artificial import surplus materially altered the picture, 8 General Economic Assistance to Persia (Item 6 on agenda) Continuing the above discussion, Sir Herbert Brittain explained that the UK had hoped for some joint arrangement with the US for financial assistance to Iran, with the UK prepared to help as necessary with respect to sterling needs. By the same token, however, it was part of their hope that the US would take the responsibility for dollar requirements, including the question of loan servicing. He said the UK was prepared to consider providing Iran with the sterling needed for the financing of immediate development expenditures, but that the form this assistance would be given had not been worked out. He mentioned the £8 million which the AIOC had already advanced against royalties under the old rates but said the company felt it was unwise to make advances at this time on new royalties under the supplemental agreement. Mr. Wright explained that the company had not yet, however, closed the door to a direct loan. Alternatively, the UK Government itself was considering the possibility of sterling aid, either in the form of a loan or as a credit guarantee, perhaps for an AIOC loan. Sir Herbert Brittain said the tentative figure the UK had in mind was about £6 million. This was in addition to the £8 million on royalties which AIOC had already advanced. Also, the UK was considering the possibility of advancing £2 to £3 million under a “half shares” scheme for financing internal rial expenditures needed for Iran’s development program if the US provided dollar assistance for the same purpose on roughly a 50–50 basis. In closing, Mr. McGhee explained that it seemed to us that the UK already owed Iran something in the nature of £40 million (the amount accruing to Iran under the supplemental agreement, and that conversion for loan servicing was simply a part of this debt and could not be avoided. The Eximbank felt it could not lend money where the only asset available could not be used to retire the debt. Sir Ernest Rowe-Dutton observed that this, in effect, would amount to a “giltedged” loan. It was agreed that Mr. Woodbridge and Mr. Parker would continue discussions of this subject with Sir Ernest Rowe-Dutton and other UK Treasury representatives and that general discussion of the subject would be renewed Saturday morning, September 23. Question of Security for Iran (GTI—Item 1) We pointed out that if Greece and Turkey become in any way associated with the North Atlantic Pact, it might be necessary to make a reassuring statement regarding Iran. The UK representatives said that they would be glad to repeat the statement made last spring but were not prepared to go further. 9 We agreed with this view. It was further agreed that there was still some ambiguity regarding the extent of military responsibility in connection with Iran and that this should be settled. It was decided that Foreign Office and State Department representatives should press for an early solution in the proper quarters. (See also minutes for Saturday morning 10 ) 1 The authorship of this record is not indicated on the source text. Presumably prepared by an officer of the Embassy in London, it is part of a comprehensive collection of records of the American-British discussions in London, September 18–23 included in a single dossier under file 780.00/9–1850. 2 The agenda for the American-British discussions was agreed in advance of the arrival of the McGhee party in London. 3 Samuel K. C. Kopper, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State. 4 George Woodbridge, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs. 5 Joseph Palmer 2d, First Secretary of the Embassy in London. 6 John F. Root, Second Secretary of the Embassy in London. 7 For documentation on the Aramco discussions with Saudi Arabia on a new oil agreement, see pp. 9 ff. 8 At a meeting in the afternoon of September 21, Woodbridge told the British that their suggestion to withhold sufficient dollars to service any loan for two years was unacceptable. The British repeated their arguments in favor of this proposal and both sides reviewed many facets of the Iranian situation along the lines discussed in the source text. The British concluded the meeting by saying they would take the matter up with their ministers and inform the United States Embassy as soon as possible thereafter. A record of this meeting is in file 780.00/9–1850. 9 Presumably this is a reference to the statement made by Bevin on May 19 following the Foreign Ministers meeting. Secretary Acheson made a similar statement on the following day and it is quoted in part in footnote 2, p. 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] . 10 For a record of the Saturday morning meeting, see infra . Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Saturday Morning, September 23 780.00/9–1850 [Document 278] Record of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions, London, Saturday Morning, September 23 1 London, September 23, 1950 secret Topics for Discussion: Greece, Turkey and Iran (Items 4, 5 and 6) Participants: Foreign Office: Mr. M. R. Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Mr. G. W. Furlonge, Head, Eastern Department Mr. L. A. C. Fry, Eastern Department Mr. L. Barnett, Eastern Department Treasury: Sir Ernest Rowe-Dutton, Third Secretary Department of State: Mr. McGhee Mr. Woodbridge Mr. Parker American Embassy, London: Mr. Dickens 2 Mr. Palmer Convertibility of Sterling for Iranian Dollar Loan Repayments (GTI—Item 5 continued) Sir Ernest Rowe-Dutton reported on the conversations held on the subject of conversion of sterling to service Iranian foreign loans which had been held the previous day with Messrs. Woodbridge and Parker. He said that he understood that under present circumstances there was no other form of financial assistance the US could give to Persia other than Eximbank loans and that these could not be given unless there was some reasonable understanding on the subject of the conversion of sterling. In view of this he undertook to present the matter to the appropriate Ministers on Tuesday, September 26. He promised that a decision would be reached as soon as possible. Mr. McGhee stressed the lack of alternatives. He said that in some ways Iran was more of a UK than a US problem and that in view of the fact that the principal export of the country, i.e., oil, is handled exclusively by a British company, AIOC, he felt that the Iranians were entitled to receive dollars for this purpose. Mr. Wright stressed the fact that there was complete agreement on the situation in Iran and the need to act urgently. Question of Security for Iran (GTI—Item 1 continued) Mr. Wright said that if Turkey accepts the recent offer made regarding association with the North Atlantic Pact (he added that the UK had advised the Turks to accept) there remained the question of what should be done in respect to Iran. Three public statements had already been made by the US and UK covering Iran and he did not think that anything more could be usefully added. He thought instead that we should speak privately to the Iranian Government. However, the UK was still maintaining an open mind regarding a possible public statement depending on the reaction in Iran. Mr. McGhee agreed with the foregoing. In speaking privately to the Iranians he felt we should stress that the offer to Turkey is only consultative, that Iran is not on the Mediterranean and that Iran could not legally adhere to the Atlantic Pact. AIOC Problem (GTI—Item 4 continued) It was agreed that further discussion should be postponed until after the UK Government had had conversations with Dr. Taqi Nasr. Mr. Wright repeated that HMG was considering guaranteeing a loan that AIOC might make to Iran or some other form of financial help. They had some question in their minds as to whether this help would weaken the bargaining power of AIOC and suggested that the granting of an Eximbank loan might likewise strengthen the Iranian position and increase resistance of that Government to making any agreement. It was pointed out that the Eximbank assistance would hardly have this effect since the immediate crisis in Iran related to the internal financial situation and the Eximbank loan would not be available to alleviate that. 1 The authorship of this record is not indicated in the source text. It is part of the collection of records cited in footnote 1, p. 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] . 2 Not further identified. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Europeam Affairs (Perkins) 888.10/9–2950 [Document 279] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Europeam Affairs ( Perkins ) 1 secret Washington , October 2, 1950. Subject: Export-Import Bank Loans to Iran Participants: The British Ambassador Mr. Perkins, Assistant Secretary, EUR Mr. Rountree, Director, GTI Mr. Perkins stated that he had asked Ambassador Franks to call in order to discuss with him a difficult problem which has arisen in connection with our program to extend Export-Import Bank loans to Iran. He recalled that during the Secretary’s visit to London last May, United States and British representatives had exchanged views concerning the political and economic situation in Iran, and the Secretary had outlined to Mr. Bevin a program which the United States had developed for the purpose of contributing to Iranian stability. A principal segment of this program was the extension of Export-Import Bank loans to Iran, and we subsequently have been working with the Iranians in preparing plans for this purpose. Mr. Perkins said that we had assumed there was no question of the ability of the Iranians to service the Export-Import Bank loans by conversion of sterling received from the British under the AIOC concession. However, the Iranians recently applied to the British Government for permission to convert for the purpose of servicing the surplus property credit extended by the United States, and the position taken by the British, that such conversions did not fall within the terms of the UK-Iranian financial agreement, had raised the question of whether servicing of Export-Import Bank loans likewise would be excluded. While Iranian dollar earnings run in the neighborhood of $18 million per year, only a small portion of that sum—about $2 million—is actually captured by the Government, and this is used for such purposes as diplomatic missions, etc. From the point of view of the Export-Import Bank, there did not appear to be an immediate ability on the part of the Iranians to service the proposed new loans in the absence of British assurance that they would be prepared to convert if necessary. United States representatives, Mr. Perkins continued, had therefore discussed with the British Government in London the possibility of an assurance that such conversions would be permitted in order that the Export-Import Bank loans could go forward. 2 The British representatives replied that they would permit such conversions for servicing of interest for one year only, during which time the United States would have to seek alternate methods to meet future obligations. 3 This arrangement was not considered by the Export-Import Bank to be adequate, and we are now confronted with the problem that further assurances will be needed before the loan can be announced. The Secretary had therefore discussed this matter with Mr. Bevin in New York on September 28, and the Foreign Minister indicated that he would despatch a telegram to London on the subject. 4 We wished also to ask Ambassador Frank’s assistance in meeting the problem. Mr. Rountree added that we had hoped, and the Iranians expected, that an announcement of the Export-Import Bank loans would be made in the immediate future. Ambassador Grady has asked that this be done within the next few days as a political necessity. It was therefore urgent that the British reply be made as soon as possible. Ambassador Franks said that he would report the matter urgently to London and state that the Department attached great importance to British agreement. He said that he frankly did not know what the British reply would be, but commented that what we are in effect doing is “clamping down on the British Government rather than the Export-Import Bank”. He thought that London officials might be unwilling to assume obligations in relation to the American loan which we ourselves were not prepared to undertake. The agreement which we were asking, he continued, was in effect to guarantee repayment of obligation installments over a period of many years, while it is difficult now to foresee what the British dollar position will be in the future. Mr. Perkins pointed out that the purpose of the loans to Iran was to increase Iranian productivity, which would mean less dollar requirements in the future. Moreover, an important part of our program in Iran is to persuade the Government to obtain control of their own dollar earnings, most of which now go into flight capital and imports of luxury goods. To the extent of their success, these efforts likewise should reduce Iranian dollar requirements under the Anglo-Iranian agreement. The Ambassador repeated that he would take the matter up urgently with London. 5 George W. Perkins 1 The meeting took place on September 29. Drafted by Rountree. 2 Memoranda of the meetings at which Iran was discussed during McGhee’s visit to London are printed supra and p. 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] . 3 Embassy London had reported this British proposal in telegram 1820, September 26, not printed (888.10/9–2650). 4 A brief memorandum of Secretary Acheson’s conversation with Foreign Minister Bevin is in file 888.10/9–2850. 5 On September 30 the Department of State informed the Embassy in London that it too should “pursue matter at highest appropriate levels.” (Telegram 1708 to London, not printed; 888.10/9–3050). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 888.10/10–650: Telegram [Document 280] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran secret Washington , October 6, 1950—8 p. m. 615. Board of Directors Eximbank authorized estab credit $25 million in favor Iran Govt to finance US purchases of equipment, materials and technical services to be used for agricultural, highway, electric power and other development projects in Iran to be approved by the Bank. 1 Bank’s commitment is made on two gen conditions, that ( a ) exec and legislative branches of Iran Govt take necessary steps to authorize borrowing of funds and make provision for dol repayments and attendant rial expenditures on projects, and ( b ) plans for implementation of projects be worked out to mutual satisfaction of Iran Govt and Eximbank. Credit wld be repayable over period of 12 years beginning approx three years after disbursements under credit. Interest will be payable semi-annually at rate of 3½.% per annum. Board of Directors of Bank suggests necessity that Iran Govt designate financial and technical reps with auth to work out with Bank here details of credit agreement and plans of implementing projects. Foregoing may be conveyed by you to Iran Govt. Dept not yet received Brit answer conversion question, expected momentarily, and believes unwise at this juncture inform Brit reps decision grant loan already taken as such info might prejudice favorable reply. 2 Fol FYI and informal use at ur discretion. In requiring Iran Govt action on authorizing credit and giving assurance of dol repayment and rial expenditures Bank has in mind that Majlis shld authorize borrowing of funds, make provision in annual budget for sums sufficient to cover dol service on loan and rial expenditures, institute any necessary exchange restrictions for recapturing dols by Govt and Iran Govt shld make overtures to Brit Govt for sterling dol conversion which might be necessary to service loan in event other dols available to Iran Govt not sufficient. Suggestion that Iran Govt designate financial and technical reps to work with Bank here not to be construed as meaning Bank will not consult Emb and Dept on proper procedures for implementing credit but rather to facilitate Bank’s working out and preparing necessary loan agreement. Might be that Taqi Nasr wld be appropriate financial man and possible OCI personnel wld be most satis technical reps. Bank wld appreciate being advised who Iran financial and technical reps will be before names are made public. If credit conditions acceptable to Iran Govt Bank wld issue press release here simultaneously with release in Iran. Upon word from your Bank will cable proposed text of release. Webb 1 According to a memorandum of a telephone conversation, dated October 6, not printed, Secretary Acheson had talked with Herbert Gaston, President of the Export-Import Bank, during the day and expressed “his feeling of a need for speedy action on the part of the Bank on the loan to Iran.”Gaston had said that “he would relay to the other members of the Board what Mr. Acheson had said and they would be glad to see what they could do.” (888.10/10–650) 2 On October 7 Embassy London was informed along lines similar to these about the loan and instructed to obtain, “if at all possible”, a reply from the British concerning the question of convertibility before the loan was announced. (Telegram 1812, not printed; 888.10/10–750) The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State 888.10/10–1250: Telegram [Document 281] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , October 12, 1950—noon. 851. 1. In view of completion of Exim application and continued reports that Department considering aid program for Asia, I wish to offer some thoughts on future aid for Iran. 2. US military aid to Iran comprises material delivered under $25,000,000 surplus arms loan and material planned under $65,000,000 MDAP grant. This aid is necessary to lift Iranian army from half-armed outfit to a reasonable well-equipped army which the Russians must be prepared to fight if they wish to take Iran. It has, furthermore, given Iranians confidence as our allies. However, we have reached the point of diminishing returns. We must continue to show interest in the country by giving some aid each year, but it is futile in the next few years to attempt to mold by increased equipment the Iranian army into a force which can stop or even slow for long time Russian invasion. 3. Economic aid consists of a proposed Exim Bank loan of $25,000,000 for road construction equipment, agricultural equipment and an electric power survey, and a proposed International Bank loan of $10,000,000 for port equipment and cement mills. In addition, a $0.5 million Point Four program for agriculture—health, education centers in the provinces is under way. 4. We are now faced with the question whether there should be more aid for Iran and, if so, what type of aid this should be. Future military aid has been disposed of above. 5. If the criterion of aid is the balance of payments deficit or the effectiveness of the country’s use of its present exchange revenues, the answer is the same we have been giving Iran for some years, namely no aid is necessary. But application of the tests we applied to the more advanced European countries misses the point. Iran’s international payments are in balance if one counts as an account receivable the increased oil revenues which the oil company has offered in the pending negotiations. However, while achieving this balance in her international payments her people live in animal-like poverty without many commodities which cost foreign exchange. Even so, Iran is living beyond her means since she is using her wasting resource, oil, for the purchase of items of current consumption rather than for capital investment. Though her poverty makes her obvious prey for Russia, she does not have competence, energy and moral stamina to push ahead with a program of capital investment and exchange training. It is of vital interest to US to prevent Iran from falling into Russian hands as a result of its sins of mismanagement. Part of the case for American aid is that it is a means of supplying Iran with the direction and discipline required for its survival and the financial value of the aid must be great enough to induce Iranians to accept such discipline and direction. 6. Assuming that there is to be aid, the next question is whether it should be loan or grant. As I have said before, loans have advantages. Demands tend to be more moderate, and we can more easily channel the funds into sound capital investments and away from current consumption. However, acceptance of loans which cannot or will not be serviced is an unhealthy business. Iran’s failure to service the surplus arms loan and her difficulty in obtaining dollars to service the arms and Exim loans raise questions about Iran’s further borrowing capacity. For these reasons and because grants will give us leverage, the conclusion is that further aid to Iran should be in the form of grants. 7. If grant aid is to be given, it can be used for continuation of either of the types of programs we are now inaugurating, namely, capital investments (power and irrigation dams, transportation, and city water systems) or technical training along Point Four lines. Iran needs both. Under Reza Shah and under the present government, the emphasis has been placed upon capital investments, and particularly upon those which have been thought by Iranians to be indications of an advanced state of civilization. Unfortunately, Iranian minds and hands have not kept pace with these material improvements. The splendid railroad completed over a decade ago is operated in a grossly inefficient manner. The magnificent new government buildings house civil servants untrained to perform their duties. 8. It is assumed that any aid program will be largely for capital investment, but emphasis must also be placed on training of people in mechanics, modern agriculture, preventive medicine, and other fields which must be developed if this country is to move out of its semi-feudal state. Much can be done here to increase productivity merely through technical assistance; in fact the great lack of technical knowledge, training and personnel in Iran constitutes at present a limitation on the extent to which Iran can beneficially avail itself of aid to be used for capital investments. Therefore, every effort should be made to include as much technical training as possible in whatever aid is granted. 9. In the long-term we must assist this country to improve its productive facilities and standard of living so that the blandishments of Communism and the country’s inner weaknesses will not cause it to fall into the Russian orbit. In the short-term, however, we must give the country a psychological lift. Through our aid we must give it assurance that we have faith in it and that we consider it an ally. While the long-term aim is basic, the psychological aim is of tremendous importance now while Iran is in a precarious position. Consequently, we should tailor our programs to get the maximum psychological benefit for Iranians and maximum credit for ourselves. 10. In summary, there must be grant aid. None should be used for current consumption. It should be used for capital investment and, to the maximum extent possible, for technical training. Grady The Ambassador in Iran (Greedy) to the Secretary of State 888.00/10–2150: Telegram [Document 282] The Ambassador in Iran ( Greedy ) to the Secretary of State top secret Tehran , October 21, 1951—4 p. m. 946. For McGhee from Grady. Five things are first essentials for economic progress this country and for continuance and increased strength of Razmara Government and its ability to carry out essential reforms. These are: (1) Eximbank loan; (2) IBED loan; (3) Point Four; (4) AIOC agreement; (5) Trade problem. Two of these have been achieved and I hope will be effectively implemented in near future. I hope also that three Iranian representatives going to Washington (Embtel 921, October 19 1 ) will be effective in getting full IBRD loan. Problem of AIOC agreement is still difficult one and the interpellations in Majlis are resulting in extremely bitter statements against AIOC and the British and threats of cancellation of concession. London telegram 45, October 18, sent Department as 2238 states that AIOC will not consider points a , b and d , but will consider c and e. 2 Latter two seem to have minor importance especially e which asks for turning over to Iranian Government, if it has use for it, gas which otherwise would be destroyed. It will not take great magnanimity on part AIOC to make such concession. Attitude AIOC in view seriousness of situation to company and to Iran is quite incomprehensible. Unfortunately there seems to be little we can do about it, but if by various means AIOC can jam agreement through Majlis bitterness on part of Iranians will continue to increase. Trade problem is primarily agricultural surpluses in northern areas of Iran which are already under fairly complete propaganda control of Russia. If Russians succeed in making agreement which will in effect give them a monopoly for their immediate years ahead over the surpluses of this area, it, together with their propaganda monopoly, will give them an increasingly strong position in matter taking over that area by some device or other. I have urged (Embtel 701, September 21; Embtel 716, September 22; Embtel 795, October 3 3 ) that War Department endeavor to divert purchases to Iran to lift 30,000 tons rice and 30,000 tons dried fruit while the Russians are attempting to get terms of agreement favorable to their general political objectives here. Reply from Department stated that the Army cannot purchase these surpluses and that we should endeavor to develop trade agreements with other countries, particularly of Western Europe. A West German delegation has made an agreement and we shall shortly have a copy. Italians are also negotiating for purchase of cotton and some other products. Action in both these matters is bound to be slow. The situation calls for some extraordinary measures. With 100,000 prisoners of war in Korea and with large numbers of refugees needing aid, it would seem that there would be some way for our government to take advantage of the extremely great opportunity here. For us to be able to state that we were diverting purchases to Iran of food needed in Korea in order to help Iran in its problem of surpluses would be of incalculable benefit to US and chagrin to Russians. It would be on small scale like strategy of landing in Inchon. I can hardly tell you how much I hope that some way can be found to do this and to do it quickly. The stakes are great indeed. Please give your personal attention to this matter and see if you can get Army to take action. Grady 1 Not printed; it reported, inter alia , that Grady had been consulted in the selection of the Iranian delegation which would go to Washington to discuss the Export-Import Bank loan. (888.10/10–1950) 2 Telegram 2238 is not printed; the points under reference, transmitted in telegram 2023 from London, October 6, not printed, were as follows: “ a . Royalties to be equated with those obtained by Iraq in such way that Iranian royalty would never be less than Iraquis; b . Iranian Govt to receive free of charge oil equal in quantity to that used by company itself in Iran; c . Some form of control (in rating sense) of export of oil …; d . Complete Iranianization of AIOC in 10 years except for certain chiefs of dept and other high posts, and necessary experts and technicians; e . Gas now destroyed by fire to be made available free to Iranian Govt when it has use for it.” (787.00/10–650) 3 None printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 888.10/10–2450: Telegram [Document 283] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , October 24, 1950—8 p. m. 2349. For State, Treasury and Eximbank. A. Wright and Furlonge today read to us personal message from Bevin to Secretary re convertibility sterling for service dollar loan to Iran which will be communicated to Secretary by British Embassy Washington. 1 (Embtel 2083, October 9 2 ) Message contains following points: 1. After referring Secretary’s conversation with him in New York, Bevin states that, upon return to UK, he went into whole question of assistance to Iran and is convinced that US and UK between them should do all they can to get 7-year plan quickly and effectively started. Although Bevin would have liked to meet Secretary’s point re convertibility to service Eximbank loan, he agrees with decision which had previously been taken by HMG (namely that UK will guarantee convertibility for 1 year only. 2. US and UK between them should try to see plan through first 3 years or so, with Iranians playing their part financially as soon as they can. Position would be easier if supplemental oil agreement were ratified, but meanwhile immediate help required. 3. Assuming supplemental agreement not ratified near future, UK contribution could take shape immediately sterling loan of 2 to 3 million pounds to back additional issue local currency required for expenditure on plan projects. 4. It is hoped expenditure on equipment required from sterling area would be financed from 8 million pound advance recently made by AIOC. 5. UK prepared, if Iranians desire and would thereby be assisted, to make up to 6 million dollars available over next 2 years for essential agricultural and other machinery from US not available from sterling sources. UK has no reason believe Iranians will have difficulty in finding sterling to buy 6 million dollars. However, conceivable that Iran Government might be short of funds and if need arises, UK would assure that within 6 million dollar limit, Iran can secure essential dollar requirements. Meanwhile this will give US opportunity establish appropriate machinery for aiding Iran. B. Following interpretative comments are based on subsequent conversations with interested FonOff and Treasury officials: 1. Previous UK undertaking provide dollars for first year’s servicing unaffected by foregoing. This undertaking was incorporated in exchange of letters between UK and Iran at time of negotiations re memorandum of understanding. 2. However, UK unwilling go beyond foregoing commitment. UK looks upon Point A–5 above as enabling Iran to proceed with projects until such time as other means of financing or other arrangements with respect to Eximbank loan can be made. UK action probably based on feeling that US rejection of earlier commitment for 1 year precluded advance under Eximbank loan. 3. UK Ambassador Tehran being instructed inform Razmara of 2 to 3 million pound loan, but not, pending US reaction, of assurance re availability of 6 million dollars for essential development needs. 4. Re Point A–3 above, consideration of possible further pounds 5–10 million loan (which is latest working figure for assistance mentioned paragraph 4 Embtel 2023 October 6 3 ) being held in abeyance pending further indications likelihood supplemental agreement being ratified. Sent Department 2349, repeated information Tehran 35, Cairo 47 for Parker. Douglas 1 A copy of the message as transmitted to Secretary Acheson by Ambassador Franks on October 25, together with a copy of a message from Bevin to Prime Minister Razmara dealing with the loan referred to in paragraph B3 below, is in file 888.00/10–2550. 2 Not printed; it reported that the British decision on convertibility would be forthcoming in the next few days (888.10/10–950). 3 Not printed. Editorial Note [Document 284] Editorial Note At the end of October representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, led respectively by Ambassador Jessup and General Bradley and Ambassador Franks and Marshal Tedder, held a series of political-military discussions at Washington. On October 26 they reached the following conclusions with regard to the Middle East and Iran: “ Item 4 — Middle East, particularly Iran ( a ) The U.S. will continue vigorous cold war action in Middle East. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, while agreeing that the Middle East in war is of importance second only to Western Europe, consider the area to be a British Commonwealth responsibility and will be unable to commit forces to that area during, at least, the first two years of war. U.K. understand this U.S. view but hope developing circumstances may enable U.S. to alter it. ( b ) The U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Staff will instruct their representatives in the Mediterranean-Middle East, and specifically in Turkey and Iran, to undertake jointly a fact-finding review of present and projected capabilities for the defence of the outer ring, with specific reference to the fighting value of the Turkish and Persian forces. Decision in regard to a similar review in Greece should await the results of that in Turkey and Iran. ( c ) Despatch of British forces to Iran, on invitation of Iranian Government, would be useful in case of entry of Soviet troops into Iran or in case of seizure, or clearly imminent seizure of power in Tehran by Communists. U.S. is doubtful whether despatch of British force would be useful in case of uprising in Azerbaijan without overt Soviet involvement. U.K. and U.S., on the political level, will jointly reexamine this particular point. Despatch of British force to Iraq in event of Azerbaijan uprising would certainly be useful. Periodic visits of U.S. carrier to Persian Gulf or appearance of carrier there in case of crisis in Iran will be considered. ( d ) U.S. representatives urged U.K. to expedite, as important cold war measure, favorable AIOC settlement. ( e ) U.S. and U.K. should give further study after conclusion of review mentioned in ( b ) above to question whether or not it would be desirable, in case of war, to demolish Iranian and other Middle East oil installations. In view of unlikelihood Soviets could utilize Middle East oil on large scale, more might be lost during cold war period by knowledge we contemplated evacuation and demolition than would be gained by demolition. There is growing evidence pointing toward the requirement for at least a portion of the Middle East oil throughout the war. Further study should also be given to this question. As prospective NATO forces become more firmly established, a stronger base will be found on which the study can be completed.” For further documentation on the discussions, see volume III, pages 1686 ff. For a record of the talks as they applied to the Near East, see pages 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] ff. The Ambassador in Iran (Grady) to the Secretary of State 888.10/10–3150: Telegram [Document 285] The Ambassador in Iran ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , October 31, 1950—2 p. m. 998. Re London’s 2349, October 24 (repeated Tehran 55, Cairo 47), our comments as follows: 1. UK guarantee convertibility one year only is, of course, virtually no concession at all since repayment does not begin until after three years and, assuming interest due only on credit actually used, first year’s interest will amount to not more than one or two hundred thousand dollars. 2. Re paragraph 3: Present coverage requirement would necessitate 60 percent gold coverage for new currency issue. Gold in Banking Department March 20, 1950, was about 5 million pounds sterling which (if none required for banking reserves) would, together with proposed 3 million-pound loan, produce only 720 million rials of new currency, very little compared to the 1.7 billion worth rial notes already held by Banking Department. Furthermore, in addition currency issue would require legislation which government not likely to undertake for currency increase on only 720 million rials. 3. Re paragraph 4: Most AIOC 8 million pound advance being used to balance budget and to finance plan organization rial expenditures and questionable whether much will ever be available for purchase sterling capital equipment. 4. Re paragraph 5: As indicated London’s 2415 October 27 (repeated Tehran 54, Cairo 51), 1 UK provision up to 6 million dollars for purchase US machinery not available sterling sources means nothing unless it means UK loan, need for which highly unlikely under supplemental oil agreement. 5. UK in far better position than US to aid Iran. Had it really wanted to do so, it would have more actively encouraged AIOC to sweeten supplementary oil agreement with some concessions to make possible for Prime Minister to get it ratified by Majlis but has shown little inclination to do so, prolongation of dispute offers prospect of small advantages compared to risk involved. 6. UK well aware importance we attach Export-Import loan and apparently assumes (London’s 2349 paragraph b 2) its refusal to guarantee convertibility to service loan for more than one year precludes, at least for time being, consummation loan and such refusal obviously designed to do so. UK cannot control Iranian purchases under US loan but can retain its position to control Iranian purchases, when it so desires, by making Iran dependent on sterling convertibility or UK loan for purchase US goods. Furthermore, in order to maintain its prestige and economic and political influence in Iran, it is apparently attempting to force us, if US aid cannot be stopped to admit UK as an equal partner in our program. For instance, if revision of Iran’s exchange and import control necessary for such aid, it desires to advise regarding such revision. 7. It can only be concluded that UK bent on sabotaging our efforts to strengthen Iran in order to preserve its dubious supremacy and control here. Not only is such course inconsistent with our mutual interest, as reflected in ERP and NAT (to which we are making staggering contributions) to stem Communist and Soviet aggression, but it jeopardizes the global position of the Western democracies. 8. Not only for these reasons (including fact that UK proposals to facilitate US loan to Iran amount to less than nothing), but also because of strong anti-British feeling here, UK association with US in aid program would be a serious liability. Therefore, we must proceed independently. Sent Department 998, repeated information London 56, Cairo 32. Grady 1 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 888.10/10–3150: Telegram [Document 286] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 secret Washington , November 18, 1950—3 p. m. 867. Dept has given careful consideration to opinions expressed in Tehran’s 998 Oct 31, 1015 Nov 3, 2 and London’s 2564 Nov 3 3 and has the fol comments and suggestions: 1. It is entirely clear Brit feel very strongly about giving assurances sterling convertibility to service loan, and no useful purpose will be served by further discussion with them at this time. US Govt proceeding arrangements for Eximbank loan without Brit assistance in thought Iran will be able capture sufficient dols from exports to service Eximbank credits. 2. Continued firm UK attitude re AIOC supplemental agreement indicates possibility of basic difference opinion not only re ( a ) inherent dangers of Iran sit, but ( b ) responsibility of US and UK to exhaust all possibilities of creating in Iran strong stable govt and prosperous econ as best insurance against communist inroads, ( c ) strength of NE demands for increased share of profits, and ( d ) methods best suited to achieve our objectives. 3. Dept believes Brit are still concerned over UK econ and fin sit and that this factor, together with commercial considerations, leads them to place different emphasis than we do on polit and strategic necessities in Iran. Therefore believe that having in mind overall UK fin and econ position and likelihood of increasing econ burden from accelerated defense effort, evidence does not warrant conclusion UK policy as such directed at sabotaging our efforts to strengthen Iran. 4. Our present effort must be difficult twofold task of attempting seek parallel although not identical UK–US approach Iran problem which will further our aims in Iran without undermining Brit position and at same time taking every appropriate action disabuse Iran’s impression basic pol cleavage exists. Briefly basic US position on Iran is: (A) Iran directly exposed to internal and external communist aggression must be strengthened economically, must have stable polit situation which can only come through relatively strong central Govt supported openly by both US and UK, and must have confidence west interested in its independence and territorial integrity. (B) Absence other western powers able or willing to furnish needed assistance prompts US render mil and econ assistance within limits Iran’s capacity to absorb and our ability in light worldwide commitments provide. This action taken in behalf western world to prove west doing everything possible support continued freedom in Iran. (C) AIOC dispute continues create polit instability and retard Iran’s econ development. Since its prolongation jeopardizes objectives we and Brit desire to obtain in Iran, US has repeatedly expressed its view to UK, not with intention of intervening in Iran-AIOC dispute but with view to convincing UK seriousness of question and of necess AIOC increasing liberality. AIOC apparently still convinced it can get agreement through parliament without making additional offers and recent appointment Forouhar who is known to be most friendly to UK as Fin Min will probably stiffen their thinking in this direction. Dept does not believe it likely agreement will go through in present form and is convinced that even if it does, bitterness of such nature may be engendered that conclusion of agreement may not only have no polit benefits but may even damage long-range UK interests in Iran. Dept has made clear its views that Near East producing states no longer isolated from knowledge of greater royalties elsewhere and that in view great value Near East oil resources foreign cos can and must if necess be prepared pay more to hold concessions. In this connection we will endeavor keep UK informed on developments in Saudi Arabia which portend important financial concessions considerably in excess of AIOC Supplemental Agreement. New Saudi income tax if applicable wld alone increase Aramco payments 50 to 100% (details being forwarded by air pouch). FYI Brit Emb informed of Aramco development without ref to AIOC. Dept of opinion once Irans learn details of Saudi Arabian situation, they will probably not accept present agreement even on basis non-financial requests AIOC is now refusing. Dept also fears however, supplemental agreement if ratified with or without such sweetening might not last long in view anticipated Saudi Arabian developments. (D) US and UK must work together in Iran but we must be in basic agreement our objectives if there is to be any hope successful outcome. UK efforts assist Iran have been and will be most welcome although some recent suggestions have in Dept’s opinion been rather unrealistic. Acheson 1 Sent also to London. 2 Not printed; in it Grady reported that Razmara believed he could get the AIOC supplemental agreement ratified if he got “some real concessions”, but was “absolutely positive” he could not get ratification as the agreement stood. (888.2553–AIOC/11–250) 3 Not printed; in it Douglas estimated that the negative British reply on convertibility was motivated fundamentally by the “open-endedness” of the proposed commitment. The British also saw Iran’s economic situation differently from the United States and did not appreciate the pyschological aspects of aid to the country. Douglas further stated the “Embassy does not concur in thesis that UK bent on sabotaging our efforts to strengthen Iran in order to preserve UK’s own supremacy and control.” (888.10/11–350) On November 9 Grady responded to telegram 2564 as follows: “The highly charitable attitude in the interpretation of British motives by our London conferees though most edifying and inspiring is, in my opinion, possibly somewhat misplaced. The record is pretty clear. I strongly urge: (1) that a complete report on this matter be placed in the hands of the ECA officials who are now considering grants for next year to the countries of Europe and Asia; (2) that we seek as soon as practicable the dissolution of the sterling block. … Iran’s royalties by every right belong to her to use as she chooses, not to serve the purposes of British economic policy. Neither can the British nor we assume to dictate through the use of the conversion club the internal economic policy of a sovereign state like Iran. We can give advice, but we cannot dictate.” (Telegram 1070, not printed; 888.10/11–950) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran 511.884/11–2050: Telegram [Document 287] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran secret Washington , November 20, 1950—6 p. m. 873. For Amb Grady. Embtels 1135 and 1140 Nov 17. 1 While by itself, IranGov termination VOA relay matter serious, Dept particularly concerned lest it reflect part of calculated IranGov pol appease USSR and revert traditional Iran tactics of playing one power off against other. Arbitrary action of this sort without any advance notice shows Irans misunderstand (1) issues at stake in world today, (2) US pol, and (3) US public opinion. While conclusion Sov-Iran trade agreement 2 was bound to stimulate some reaction in Iran favorable to USSR and adverse to West, Dept disturbed at extent to which this development appears to have affected pro-Govt press and Razmara’s policies. Razmara’s explanation BBC primarily responsible difficult to understand in view widespread attacks on VOA in Iran press including pro-Govt papers as well as remarks of Shahrokh. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe Razmara wld expect US to accept such explanation. Dept knows you are fol matter personally and that you will do everything in ur power to restore relay. Dept wld apprec, in ur discretion, ur having fall and frank discussion with Razmara, and, if deemed advisable, the Shah on question of US-Iran-Soviet relations pointing out US finds difficult to understand abrupt action such as relay termination and gen anti-Amer tone of pro-govt press in recent days. They might be told, while Dept fully realizes relay of VOA was special privilege granted us by IranGov because it helped counter Sov propaganda activities, manner of its termination lacking all normal standards diplo conduct can only be interpreted as act designed to promote appeasement SovUnion at risk of damage to existing close friendship with US. In requesting Razmara restore relay at once, assurance may be given every precaution will be taken in broadcasts by VOA to prevent any embarrassment to his Govt. 3 Acheson 1 Neither printed; in telegram 1135, Grady reported that the Iranian Government had stopped the VOA and BBC relays on Radio Tehran on November 12. The Propaganda Director explained to the United States Embassy that this had been done because a former Director had displayed too great a friendliness to foreign governments, particularly the United States; and in order to avoid heavy anti-foreign attacks that were expected in the Majlis over special broadcasts dealing with Iranian internal affairs. In telegram 1140 Grady reported that Richards had discussed the cancellation with Razmara who said it “was caused primarily by BBC slanting news articles to favor oil concession and that Russian annoyance over VOA remarks was secondary.” The Prime Minister felt arrangements could be made to resume the relay, “but evaded direct answer when questioned re nature of arrangements.” (511.884/11–1750) 2 The Soviet-Iranian Trade Agreement had been signed at Tehran on November 4. Embassy Tehran transmitted an analysis of the agreement in despatch 349, November 16, not printed (461.8831/11–1650). 3 On November 21 Assistant Secretary of State McGhee reiterated this position to the Iranian delegation which had just arrived in Washington to discuss the Export-Import Bank loan, stating “that the Department was disturbed over the abrupt manner in which the Iranian Government had terminated its relay of the Voice of America programs.” A memorandum of this conversation is in file 511.884/11–2150. By December 8 Richards could report that any resumption of the relay appeared extremely unlikely, and that any overtures at that time to the Iranian Government concerning renewal were inadvisable. (Telegram 1292, not printed; 511.884/12–850) The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) 888.00/10–2550 [Document 288] The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Bevin ) 1 secret Washington , November 20, 1950. I have received and read with great interest your message to me concerning the situation in Iran and I appreciate the careful attention you have given this very important matter. 2 I think our two Governments are in basic agreement on the need for a positive program in Iran to convince the Government and people of that country that their future depends on their continuing their association with the free world and at the same time taking every step within their power to develop their country economically and socially in order that it may resist the threat of communism. Cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom in trying to assist Iran is most desirable and for that reason I welcome the suggestions put forth in your note and the general position the British Government has taken on the need for a positive program in Iran. The views of our two Governments are, however, to some extent divergent on the exact means of carrying out our aims in Iran, and it is a matter of sincere regret that you have not found it possible to agree to the suggestion relating to conversion of sterling for debt service. Since representatives of both Governments have had exhaustive conversations on the subject, I will not pursue the matter here. However, we may wish to bring this subject up again as time goes on. As I believe you may know, developments in Iran made it necessary, in our opinion, to take urgent and extraordinary action in agreeing with Iran to negotiate loan agreements without awaiting your reply. I am confident you will understand why the United States must proceed with the loan program. This will entail difficult negotiations with the Iranians but we shall make every effort to arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problem of servicing the loans. While the United States is, as I have indicated above, proceeding with the Export-Import Bank loan and all of the alternate suggestions contained in your note may not therefore materialize, I realize that your Government’s suggestions are in the nature of a stop-gap until the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Export-Import Bank questions are settled. In that light, therefore, I would like to offer the following comments on them in view of the care and effort that has gone into their preparation and the obvious interest in the problem which they reflect. 1. Your suggestion of our two countries seeing the Iranian Seven Year Plan through its first three years or so is most welcome and we shall be most happy to discuss this suggestion with your experts at any time. 2. I welcome your action in offering a two to three million pound loan to the Iranian Government which I am sure could have a beneficial effect not only economically but would also increase the political stability of that country provided it forms part of a larger program. 3. I note that, if need be, you are ready to provide up to $6 million over the next two years to Iran for the purchase of agricultural and other machinery in the United States. I am not entirely clear as to what you have in mind on this point but presume you mean that if Iran is unable to find sterling for conversion under your regular arrangements you will provide these dollars through other means. Regarding the note which your Ambassador in Tehran has delivered to Prime Minister Razmara, 3 we are, of course, disappointed that your Government has not been able to take a different position on the question of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company supplemental agreement. As our views on this matter have been discussed in detail with your officials, I need not go into them at this time, but I should greatly appreciate your giving further personal consideration to this problem, which we agree is an important one, with a view to seeing whether some compromise cannot be found. In addition to the very serious current political aspects of this matter, may I mention in utmost confidence that the Saudi Arabian Government’s recent financial demands upon the Arabian-American Oil Company may, as your officials have been informed, require considerable concessions by the company which may, when they become known to the Iranian Government, make the position of AIOC in relation to financial terms of the proposed agreement far more difficult. Sincerely yours, Dean Acheson 1 The source text, which was drafted by C. Vaughan Ferguson, the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, and Henry R. Labouisse, the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, was transmitted to Ambassador Franks on November 29 for delivery to Bevin. The source text also includes a brief introductory message to Ambassador Franks explaining that it was a reply to Bevin’s message of October 25. 2 Not printed; but see telegram 2349, October 24, from London, p. 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] . 3 Presumably this is a reference to the message from Bevin to Razmara referred to in footnote 1, p. 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] . The Chargé in Iran (Richards) to the Secretary of State 611.88/11–3050: Telegram [Document 289] The Chargé in Iran ( Richards ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , November 30, 1950—4 p. m. 1220. Please pass Ambassador Grady. 1 Embtel 218, November 29. 2 Following are main points given to Reuter’s correspondent by Shah for publication: 1. Shah said, “Persian people and I myself are fully aware of the importance of American friendship to Persia but I would like the Americans to realize as well how much Persia’s friendship, Persia’s integrity and Persia’s independence mean to them. So far American aid has in no way justified early expectations despite wide publicity regarding the extent of the aid which was to be given. This may change in the future. As matter now stands we have spent $3,500,000 during the past 2 and ½ years on the salaries of American advisers working here. Also we have paid our full share to the International Bank which amounts $25,000,000. What have we received so far? a . One consignment of arms for which we have paid and another consignment free of charge. Most of these arms out of date and quite inadequate for defense against a well-equipped force. b . $500,000 under President Truman’s Point IV program. c . A $25,000,000 loan which has been offered to us after considerable delay by the Export-Import Bank under terms of 3½ percent. 2. No occasion has been missed by certain sections of the US press to accuse our country of corruption. What is the corruption in Persia in comparison with corruption elsewhere, particularly in those countries which have already received substantial free American aid?” 3. Speaking of Persia’s position in the world, Shah said country did not expect “carping criticism and idle gossip of dictatorship in Persia. We have no need of dictatorship. My people need the guidance of a strong Monarchy and continuance of the work of my father by other methods.” Embassy has learned in confidence Shah’s original statements were much more anti-American but were subsequently approved in milder expurgated form for publication. He reportedly concentrated, in his off-the-record remarks, almost entirely upon US failure to give promised aid to Iran and contrasted most unfavorably treatment received by Iran when compared with aid given others, particularly Greece and Turkey. He also said, off-the-record, that he could not understand why Americans accused him of flirting with Soviets when the northern provinces were in a dire condition while only aid US had offered was loan at high interest and under onerous conditions. He reportedly inquired of Renter’s correspondent at one time, “do you think that our dealings with Soviets are cause of Ambassador Grady’s return to US?” Interview has been widely distorted in local press and over Tehran radio. Universal feeling in Tehran is that Shah has given vent to strong anti-American feelings [and Renter’s?] correspondent got impression that Shah thought interview would assist Ambassador Grady’s present mission. Local result of incident will be to cause further deterioration in already greatly weakened US position here. Press and radio versions Shah’s interview will undoubtedly be adopted by Government officials and public as guide to relations with us. For example, last evening ⅔ members Iran-American relations society failed appear at meeting reportedly because of interview. 3 Richards 1 Ambassador Grady had left Iran on November 27 for consultations in Washington. 2 Not printed; it reported that the Shah had given to a Renter’s correspondent; an interview that was critical of United States policy, and that further details would be telegraphed. (611.88/11–2950) The interview was given to Leopold Herman at the Green Palace in Tehran on November 27. He gave a copy of the interview to Richards who subsequently transmitted it to the Department of State in despatch 398, December 1, not printed (788.11/12–150). 3 On December 2 Richards reported that Razmara “deplored Shah’s action” and pointed out that many times the “Shah is emotionally hasty”. Razmara asked Richards to tell Ambassador Grady that the interview reflected no change in Iranian policy. Richards commented: “Obviously, regardless of what PriMin says, Shah’s action has done considerable damage our position here. It has reinforced prevalent belief US is not carrying out promises of aid to Iran and in addition has created unfortunate impression US military aid consists of junk.” (Telegram 1235, 611.88/12–250) On December 4 Richards reported that Razmara was still concerned about the incident and that the Prime Minister had talked to the Shah to indicate the unfortunate outcome of the interview. On the same day in a telegram approved by Ambassador Grady, Richards was sent the following: “FYI only. As we see it from here Shah’s remarks primarily motivated by his desire to increase his personal popularity now that anti-Americanism is vogue in Tehran and are accurate reflection basic weakness of character which has been apparent for some time. Dept does not contemplate raising matter with him at least until Amb Grady’s return when desirability of conveying Dept’s views to him can be considered in light of situation prevailing at the time.” (Telegrams 1250 from and 946 to Tehran, neither printed; 611.88/11–3050) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) 788.5–MAP/12–550 [Document 290] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs ( Ferguson ) 1 secret Washington , December 8, 1950. Subject: Military Assistance to Iran Participants: Ambassador Grady 2 S/MDA—Messrs. Ohly and Emery GTI—Messrs. Dorsz and Ferguson Defense—General Scott 3 and Lieut. Col. Osborn ECA—Mr. Paul The Problem: Ambassador Grady’s desire for an increased allocation to Iran under the Supplemental MDAP appropriation for the Fiscal Year 1951. Action Required: To explore the possibilities of meeting Mr. Grady’s desires. Action Assigned to: S/MDA and GTI. Discussion: Ambassador Grady began the discussion by stressing the strategic position of Iran, particularly as regards petroleum, pointing out that (1) the USSR and satellites furnish 8% of oil production with Iran currently producing as much oil as the USSR or about 6%, and (2) the Persian Gulf area contains 46% of the world’s known oil resources. The Ambassador said that Iran should not be allowed to go by default and that in his opinion the United States should provide military equipment sufficient at least to slow down any Soviet aggression in that country. He pointed out that the Soviets were now rather popular in Iran in the wake of the recent commercial agreement and while this would probably not be permanent, it was essential that the United States show a real interest in Iran. Territorial factors inhibit the Russians from exploiting Iranian oil resources but they could be neutralized to our detriment. If Iran goes, Mr. Grady said, so does Iraq and probably Saudi Arabia. Mr. Grady said that while he did not wish to be placed in the position of a special pleader for the country of his assignment, he felt very strongly that the allocation of Title II funds were out of balance to the detriment of Iran. As an example of this, the Ambassador cited the building up of Greece on strategic considerations which are primarily geographic while Iran with its resources has received meagre assistance. Furthermore, Mr. Grady said, the great effort we have made, to arm Turkey without a strong program in Iran may very well result in the Soviets seeing a “detour” sign pointing in the direction of Iran. The Ambassador said it was dangerous to assume that the Iranians would not fight and that the amount of aid proposed to Iran under the supplemental appropriation virtually serves to write Iran off. As matters now stand, he said, it is the old story we saw in Korea of tanks vs. rifles. He said the Iranians were eager to learn and he did not see how we could proceed on the assumption that the Iranian Army would not fight if properly equipped. He added that our training program, for Iranian officers was quite inadequate and out of balance in that we were training 500 Turkish officers to 100 Iranians. Mr. Ohly replied that he was delighted Mr. Grady was here to consult with the Department and the Department of Defense since Mr. Grady was conversant with the problems of the whole GTI area, rather than merely one particular country. He said there were certain questions in connection with the tentative Title II allocations which he thought should be mentioned: 1. The outbreak of the Korean War had made necessary a change in our policy towards Greece. Before Korea, a reduction in the Greek armed forces to 95,000 had been planned but once the international situation became more serious, it had been necessary to readjust our thinking to the point that armed forces of 165,000 are now considered desirable. 2. While there had been no basic change in the Turkish situation, certain unforeseen difficulties arising out of the strain on the Turkish economy of supporting armed forces in the strength we believe necessary had materialized. He referred in this connection to the need for a corps of non-commissioned officers. 3. In the case of Iran, the Department’s original objectives when military aid was planned a year ago had been largely political and designed to fill in deficiencies to a point where the Iranian armed forces could maintain internal security. Mr. Ohly said that our thinking had changed as a result of General Collins’ visit to Iran last spring. 4 General Collins, he said, had been impressed by the possibilities for a delaying action and the 1950 program therefore had been altered to include a certain amount of equipment to this end. Mr. Ohly added that there had been no change in our Iranian objective since General Collins’ visit but he would like Ambassador Grady’s opinion as to what our objectives there should be. Mr. Ohly said that objectives in Iran are probably sound to which Ambassador Grady agreed. Mr. Ohly then asked what additional equipment is needed taking into consideration political, psychological, and morale factors. Mr. Grady said that the high morale in the Greek Army created by the arrival of modern heavy equipment from the United States had enabled them to clean up the war there. He said the morale factor was equally important in the case of Iran and that General Collins had been impressed by that fact. He referred to the fifty medium tanks originally requested by Ambassador Wiley as an example of the type of military assistance which would be of great morale building power not only as regards the army, but the Iranian people as well. The Ambassador said that we must assume that something can be done with our military assistance and we must show the Iranians that we are really behind them. The Iranians, he said, are intelligent and realize that in the event of a general war, we could not give them much direct help and it is therefore essential we give them the tools with which to help themselves. He said that our total aid to Iran so far had consisted of the $500,000 Point Four allocation and the delivery of one million dollars worth of FY 1950 military aid out of the total FY 1950 allocation of $11,500,000 with the result that the Iranians looked on our aid program as little more than meaningless promises. Mr. Grady said that the cold fact of the matter is we must “buy” such countries to our side and either show them something tangible or get out completely. Mr. Ohly said that from purely military objectives, the tentative allocation to Iran was probably sound but that the real issue is how much additional equipment is needed for political and psychological reasons. It would be extremely difficult, he said, to justify a larger program on purely military grounds. Ambassador Grady said recent events in Korea show that time is running against us and we must act fast where the need is greatest. He said that Greece has been receiving military aid from us since 1947 and should be pretty well equipped by now. The Iranians, he said, will know the approximate amount they as well as the Greeks and Turks will receive and that it will be extraordinarily difficult to explain the disparities to them. General Scott said that percentagewise, the request for Iran submitted by General Evans had fared better than either of the programs for Greece and Turkey. Iran was tentatively scheduled to receive about 50 percent of the amount requested while the percentage figures for Greece and Turkey were 45 and 20 percent respectively. Ambassador Grady then referred to the Air Force allocation of $500,000 which he said had shocked him and that he and his staff had at first assumed the figure was a mistake. He said that our failure to provide air force items was resulting in the Iranians looking to the British to the point where they were actively engaged in the purchase of jet aircraft. He said he found it extraordinary that we should be providing military aid to both Great Britain and Iran on one hand and finding the two of them engaged in buying and selling equipment of the type we are furnishing. Colonel Osborn said that the small air force allocation was due to a number of factors including the non-arrival of the requests in time for a decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the fact that it is extremely difficult for a country the size of Iran to maintain a modern air force, and the lack of trained personnel. He pointed out that when consideration is given to the fact that the Greek and Turkish programs contain heavy allocations for their navies and air forces which the Iranian program does not, the discrepancy between the three does not look so pronounced. Furthermore, both Greece and Turkey have a terrific maintenance problem not present in Iran since they must take care of the equipment they have been receiving since 1947. Colonel Osborn said that the tentative Iranian program included 42 medium tanks (M 36) which in part at least meet the Ambassador’s political requirements. These, he said, would have to come largely from new procurement. Colonel Osborn said that all of General Evans’ priorities #1 and #2 would be met and some of #3 but that it would be impossible to include anything under priority #4 and that General Evans himself had recommended that priorities #5 and 6 not be furnished at this time. 5 General Scott asked what the difficulties were in arranging a training program for Iranian officers in this country since he had understood there were no major obstacles in this program. Mr. Ohly added that the Iranians had received every training space they had requested. Ambassador Grady replied that the Iranians had received no encouragement to seek more places and probably had been reluctant to request more in view of the arguments they had heard about space limitations, etc. He said he would look into the matter on his return to Iran. In reply to Mr. Ohly’s question about the ability of the Iranian Army to absorb military equipment in the amount Mr. Grady and General Evans had recommended, the Ambassador replied that this can be done. General Scott said he realized that the Iranians will fight if properly led and equipped but that in view of the fact that they were starting at the bottom, the equipment should be as simple and uncomplicated as possible. 1 The conversation took place on December 5. 2 Ambassador Grady had returned to Washington for consultations. 3 Maj. Gen. Stanley L. Scott, Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Office of the Secretary of Defense. 4 Regarding General Collins’ visit to Iran at the end of March, see Annex 5 to the memorandum by Collins, April 10, p. 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] . 5 The priorities under reference in this paragraph have not been identified further. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Ferguson) 888.00R/12–650 [Document 291] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs ( Ferguson ) 1 secret Washington , December 11, 1950. Subject: Economic and Military Aid to Iran Participants: Ambassador Grady S/MDA—Mr. Ohly E—Mr. Dort OFD—Mr. Stinebower NEA—Mr. McGhee Mr. Loftus GTI—Mr. Rountree Mr. Woodbridge Mr. Ferguson The Problem: The critical situation in Iran which requires urgent U.S. action to restore its lost prestige and to counteract the current trend there towards neutrality. Action Required: To reach Departmental decisions on (1) the amount of grant aid to be recommended for Iran under the new program now under discussion and (2) to decide whether Iran should be considered a “Task Force 1” or “Task Force 2” country in the contemplated new approach to foreign aid programs. Action Assigned to: NEA, E, S/MDA Discussion: Mr. McGhee opened the discussion by saying he had arranged the meeting so that Ambassador Grady could present his views to the persons in the Department concerned with the question of the nature of future economic aid programs to Iran should take and with the question of the inclusion of Iran in the group of nations considered for package aid by “Task Force 1”. Mr. Rountree outlined the course of the discussions in the Department, citing the difference of opinion between NEA and E on the question of $25,000,000 grant aid for Iran. NEA believed this entire figure should be grant aid, he said, while E was of the opinion $10,000,000 should be grant aid and the balance in the form of loans. Mr. Rountree pointed out that the uncertainty of the NEA grant aid program, particularly as regards South Asia made it desirable to treat Iran in the same manner as Turkey as it was therefore preferable that Iran be included in the “Task Force 1” countries rather than “Task Force 2”. Ambassador Grady said that he was strongly in favor of the Task Force 1 approach. He said that comparisons between the amounts of U.S. aid accorded various countries frequently arose and while not particularly logical and often annoying they are a very real consideration to the countries concerned. Turkey, for instance, amounted to an obsession with the Iranians. This factor, the Ambassador stated, was of utmost importance and it was essential if the Task Force 1 vs Task Force 2 approach materialized that Iran be included with the ECA nations even if it meant a reduction in the aid figure. A $20,000,000 program in association with Turkey and the rest was preferable, Mr. Grady said, to a $50,000,000, without them. Turning to the question of loans vs grants, the Ambassador said that grants gave much more elasticity and that the loan approach in Iran had definitely not been successful. Mr. Grady said that he was very disappointed by the exacting requirements and red tape of the loan approach, which admittedly has some advantages, but these are outweighed by the hazards of delay. The Ambassador expressed the belief that the Iranian Majlis might reject the Export-Import Bank loan, especially if it were presented to it for approval after the ratification of the AIOC supplemental agreement. The Iranians, the Ambassador stated, feel very bitterly about the fact that many other countries receive grant aid while they are offered only bank loans on what they consider rigorous conditions. This psychology was most apparent in the sale of military surpluses to Iran at a time when neighboring countries were receiving military aid gratis. Mr. Grady said that he was not too keen, however, on any irrevocable commitment to furnish Iran grant aid beyond a one year period although he said he realized that because of the need for capital equipment it might still be necessary even after Iran receives the increased royalties due it under the AIOC supplemental agreement. The Ambassador said that he felt obliged to stress the political factors involved since the overall question is to make the Iranians feel that we are their friends. Our prestige, he said, is already low and will go much lower in the wake of the present situation in Korea and the urgency is therefore very great. Even if the United States should lose money, it would be a very small price to pay for Iranian good will. The Ambassador said that this of course means we are “buying” Iran but at the same time we will be raising the wretched standard of living and helping Iran towards economic prosperity thus keeping that country on the side of the democracies. A grant of only $10,000,000 would, Mr. Grady said, be worse than nothing. Mr. Rountree said that he and Ambassador Grady were in agreement that $10,000,000 for technical assistance would do more harm than good. The main focus of the Iranian attack on the United States aid programs at the moment, he said, is that we have consistently given the Iranians advice but never any real aid. Mr. Grady said that there would be no difficulty in finding proper ways of expending grant assistance and that he had with him a list of worthy projects he would be willing to discuss. Mr. McGhee said that the Iranians feel that they were the first to be subjected to Soviet pressure in the post-war period and can see no real reason for our discrimination against them vis-à-vis Turkey. Ambassador Grady warned that great caution should be exercised in making statements regarding our intentions which the Iranians could interpret as promises. He said the Iranians had no inkling that we were even thinking of a grant aid program and that if it materializes it will come as a most pleasant surprise to them. Not only will it give us political advantages, he said, but it will also give the United States the leverage it now lacks to get the Iranian economy moving. Loans, he said, cannot give us this but grant aid in Iran might very well give us the opportunity to make more progress in Iran than had been possible in Greece. Nothing, of course, he added, can be done in this direction until the goods start arriving. Mr. Stinebower inquired concerning the present source of the Soviet appeal to the Iranians since they are not promising the Iranians anything. Ambassador Grady said this was hard to explain. In the case of Iran the Soviet bullying tactics of last spring suddenly were replaced by a policy of friendship and it is usually true that when the bully shows signs of moderation, his victim is unduly impressed. Mr. Grady said that the recent Irano-Soviet trade agreement had definite Economic advantages for the Iranians but that these were less of a factor in the present Iranian attitude than the sudden switch to a policy of ostensible friendship. The Soviets, he said, always make an enormous fuss over their gestures towards other countries even though in many cases they are only giving those countries their just due. The Ambassador cited in this connection the return of the seven kidnapped Iranian soldiers. Mr. McGhee said that in Iran we are confronted by a power relationship and that the Iranians are only justified in standing up against the pressures and threats of the Soviets if fully backed by the West. If Soviet power were suddenly removed, the Iranians would naturally choose us as their friends. Ambassador Grady expressed the opinion that the propaganda the Soviets will let loose over any minor concessions they may make in connection with the present Irano-Soviet frontier Commission will more than outweigh the value of the small amount of land the Iranians will recover. The odds in this propaganda war, Mr. Grady stated, are against us and our propaganda is frequently minimized by Soviet gestures such as the border rectification. Turning to strategic considerations, the Ambassador said that Iran is undoubtedly high on the list of Soviet priorities and that the Soviets are probably hoping they can build up the present situation to the point where Iran will fall into their laps. Mr. McGhee explained to Ambassador Grady that there was always resistance in Washington to foreign aid programs justified solely by political and psychological factors. He said there had been a widespread impression here that Iran’s oil royalties were or would be such that dollar aid would not be required and that, while the Department now realizes that this is not the case, the fact remains that an Iranian program must be justified on economic grounds. Ambassador Grady said that he was aware of this and stressed the political need since it points up the urgent need for American assistance. The standard of living in Iran, he said, is deplorable and there is no difficulty in justifying an Iranian program on economic grounds. Mr. McGhee stated that even if the Iranian balance of payments were satisfactory, which it is not, there would be a real need for economic development through foreign aid. He said that we have the ability to buy staying power to help drain off Soviet strength. 100,000 properly equipped troops in Iran could, he said, be much more helpful to us than a similar number in, say, Denmark. We are, Mr. McGhee stated, aiming at building our position throughout the entire Soviet periphery not merely in Iran which we do not claim can withstand the Soviets by itself. Mr. Dort said there is no sharp distinction between the programs considered by Task Forces #1 and #2 regarding ECA type aid. The Task Force #1 program is designed for countries already organized together in OEEC and it would be difficult to fit an outsider into a going organization at this time. The legislative distinction, he said, is not very sharp. Mr. Ohly said there were three distinct titles under discussion in Task Force #1: ( a ) Military aid for NATO coupled with economic assistance under ERP; ( b ) Military aid for Greece, Turkey, and Iran; ( c ) Military assistance for the Far East. Mr. Ohly said he foresaw strong Congressional objections to any attempt to include economic aid to Iran in this program. Mr. McGhee doubted that there would be any undue Congressional objections to the inclusion of Iran and cited the example of the MDAP appropriation of last spring where Congress insisted that Iran be included in Title II instead of III where it had been placed because of anticipated Congressional objections to its inclusion in Title II. Mr. McGhee expressed the fear that Congress would look on the Task Force #1 vs. Task Force #2 distinction as a question of priorities with the possibility that with the world situation being what it is, the Task Force #2 program would have rough sledding. Mr. Ohly admitted that there was such a danger and said that in presenting the program, Iran will have to be considered as a separate entity, not merely included in a general grouping. Mr. Dort expressed the opinion that the inclusion of Iran in Task Force #1 would present many complications since it would in fact add Iran to the European community of nations involving such organizations as OEEC, EPU, etc. He said that the problem for the Task Force #1 countries was now primarily one of military rather than economic assistance. Mr. McGhee said that it may be that events will move beyond the Department’s present thinking and that our entire foreign aid program will have to be based entirely on the security considerations. Mr. Loftus said that he feared the Task Force #2 approach would not have the flexibility necessary to accomplish our aims in Iran. Mr. Stinebower disagreed with Mr. Loftus on the question of flexibility and said it was impossible to allot ERP money to Iran. If Iran were included in Task Force #1, he said the illusion would be created it was to be included in ERP. Mr. Ohly said there would be difficulty for Congress to understand the inclusion of Iran in Task Force #1 since it was intended for the ERP and NATO countries, aid to whom was justified on the grounds of unfavorable balances of payments. Mr. Woodbridge pointed out that Iran does, in fact, have a balance of payments problem, the present deficit being more than $20,000,000. Mr. McGhee expressed the fear that the Task Force #2 program would not be considered essential for U.S. security and if the funds requested are attacked in Congress, Iran will suffer. Mr. Rountree said the Task Force #2 approach for Iran was bad since it discriminated against Iran vis-à-vis Greece and Turkey. He said that he doubted that Congress would be at all receptive to the Task Force #2 approach. Mr. Dort said that in presenting both programs to Congress the security angle would be stressed. He added that E had not looked on the $10,000,000 grant aid it had proposed for Iran as technical assistance and had proposed the ten million-fifteen million division since Iran had plenty of bankable projects making it difficult to justify any greater amount of grant aid. Mr. Woodbridge said that recent experience had shown the Department that it was much more difficult to obtain loans from the Export-Import Bank than Mr. Dort seemed to think. Mr. McGhee said that there were any number of projects in Iran that could meet the objectives of a grant aid program. Mr. McGhee said that he felt that the fear of Congressional reaction to grant aids to Iran was unjustified since under prevailing world conditions, it is not easy for banks to make loans. Mr. McGhee said he believed it essential the Department reach an early decision on the amount of grant aid we are to propose for Iran. Ambassador Grady reemphasized the need for elasticity which could be found in the Task Force #1 but not the Task Force #2 approach. Turning to the general problem of aid to Iran, Mr. Grady said that the time had passed when we could get by with token programs and that we must now make a real effort. Mr. Dort said that the Task Force #1 concept is that of a group of European countries sitting down and jointly planning what they are to do. Iran would not fit into this concept. Mr. Stinebower , turning to the amount of grant aid to be rendered Iran, asked if there would not be unfavorable reactions in the countries stretching from Libya to Iraq if Iran alone were to be accorded the same amount of grant aid as all of them combined. Ambassador Grady doubted that there would be any significant reactions since the countries in question realized that Greece, Turkey, and Iran stood as buffers between them and Soviet aggression. He mentioned that this had been discussed last year at the Istanbul Meeting of the Chiefs of Mission 2 from the area and they had agreed that there would not be any really significant resentment. Mr. Rountree pointed out that this issue had been faced before in connection with military assistance and that there had been no reaction in the Arab states when Iran had been given aid. The whole policy of the United States, he added, in Greece, Turkey and Iran is to strengthen those three countries in order that the entire area may be protected. Ambassador Grady said that it was difficult to understand the attitude towards Iran that he encountered in some quarters. He said that the Iranians look on our policy as one of treating Iran as a stepchild; writing it off. He said he personally deplored defeatism of this sort and felt that Iran constituted a dangerous weakness in the security belt we have attempted to build. Thwarted in Greece and Turkey, the Soviets could run through Iran without difficulty. The Iranians, he said, do not expect anything extraordinary from us, merely the knowledge that we are doing everything we can. Mr. Loftus expressed the opinion that the 50–50 balance between Iran and the NE area was justifiable. Ambassador Grady said that he did not believe that Congress would be hostile and that when he had testified recently before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, he had found the members most sympathetic to Iran’s problems. He said that the courage with which Iran resisted Soviet aggression in 1946 should appeal to Congress and they would think it logical that Iran should be included in ERP. 1 The conversation took place on December 6. 2 For documentation on the Conference of American Chiefs of Middle Eastern Missions at Istanbul, November 26–29, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 165 ff. The Chargé in Iran (Richards) to the Secretary of State 788.00/12–1450: Telegram [Document 292] The Chargé in Iran ( Richards ) to the Secretary of State secret Tehran , December 14, 1950—11 a. m. 1339. Eyes only Ambassador Grady, GTI. We believe consideration several aspects present political and economic situation Iran, particularly developments since your departure, may be helpful connection your conversations in Department. What follows is staff study and addressed to you personally for whatever use you may care make of it: First as to political developments: Intrigues against Razmara increasing. Sources of opposition now seem include ( a ) Shah and court, ( b ) old guard, ( c ) Majlis and ( d ) British oil interests. Rumors of early fall Razmara Government persist. We do not believe Cabinet change is imminent. However it seems clear elements in opposition are greasing skids in hope of Razmara’s eventual removal. Shah undoubtedly important factor in foregoing. Razmara seems never to have had his wholehearted support. On contrary there is evidence of continual sniping at him on part Shah and court and there certainly has been no let-up in recent weeks. Shah’s apparent objective has been deprive Razmara of sources potential strength which might make him menace to dynasty. Due traditional influence of Shah, no PriMin has been nor can be effective or even last long without Shah’s support. Old guard influence continues increase. For example, Razmara has informed me today Esfahanak [ Esfandak? ] Point IV project would have to be transferred to another village because of pressure from nearby land owners, some of whom are Majlis deputies, who insisted they too should benefit directly from similar projects. Majlis is another difficult problem. Since your departure PriMin became involved in open dissension with Majlis. Peace was restored through face-saving formula, although PriMin’s stated intention discipline Majlis failed completely. Majlis is just as recalcitrant as ever. 21 major bills presented by Razmara now stymied by Majlis inaction. Razmara has relied mainly upon three things maintain his position: ( a ) Soviet trade treaty, ( b ) settlement oil question, and ( c ) US aid. Some of popularity which he gained as result Soviet trade agreement now shows signs being lost as (1) people starting ask why treaty continues largely unimplemented and (2) apprehension beginning be expressed over possible increase Soviet influence largely as result of treaty. Solution oil question as distant as ever. Oil commission has recommended rejection supplementary agreement and all quarters anticipate Majlis will act accordingly. 1 Exim Bank loan now seems destined for rough treatment in Majlis. Shah’s Reuter interview not helpful this regard. 2 We are also concerned over possible effects Korean reverses upon future trend political thought here. Fear of third world war and feeling they could not count on immediate US military support tends make them wary of open allegiance with US and might well lead to adoption even softer policy towards Soviets. While we do not believe Razmara’s fall is imminent, yet there are signs that powerful forces are working for that end. Razmara is ambitious and may not yield gracefully. If real show-down occurs it is not entirely impossible Razmara might, in absence any other immediate tangible support, even look to Russia indirectly to help him retain power. Certainly from Soviet viewpoint he is most cooperative PriMin in recent years. Second, as to economic developments: Re financial situation and relation to US aid, Carr 3 has just completed preliminary statistical study (being forwarded by despatch) leading to following tentative conclusions: ( a ) View annual budget deficit possibly over 1 billion rials and balance of payments deficit over 4 million pounds, country facing serious financial difficulties to which, in absence oil settlement, inflation apparently only out. Strain of rials financing over period of time of continued aid program in this case would accentuate inflationary pressures. ( b ) Even if supplemental oil agreement accepted and all additional sterling sold to meet rial needs, rial financing of such aid program would possibly still require additional rials and result in some inflation, ( c ) Therefore, in absence balanced budget or at least substantial deficit reduction (of which no prospect in sight), US aid may require considerably more generous oil settlement than offered by present supplemental agreement. ( d ) US economic aid in Iran, without full and positive British support, likely end in frustration. Conclusions: 1. We have necessarily, for lack alternative, tied our hopes to Razmara. It is therefore disturbing that there are so few political forces working in his favor at moment. 2. Country seems headed for serious budgetary difficulties. 3. It is increasingly evident that US policies in Iran (political and economic) can be carried out only if we have positive and wholehearted support of British. Only prospect obtaining such collaboration is understanding arrived at London or Washington at highest level. 4. We believe Shah is key to present situation and as long as he sulks over what he considers meagerness military and economic aid and continues undercutting Razmara, needed vitalization of national spirit and restoration faith in government will be frustrated. We all hope this résumé will be helpful to you in portraying changing situation facing you here. Richards 1 On November 25 the Majlis Oil Commission had unanimously rejected the AIOC supplementary agreement. 2 Regarding the Shah’s interview, see telegram 1220, November 30, p. 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] . 3 Robert M. Garr, Counselor of the United States Embassy in Iran. The Charge in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 888.2553/12–1450: Telegram [Document 293] The Charge in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State secret London , December 14, 1950—4 p. m. 3450. 1. Furlonge told us last evening that for present UK simply marking time pending further developments in Majlis re AIOC agreement. He said conversations between Razmara and Northcroft re further concessions which company might make have shown two parties are “poles apart”. Comment: As in number recent occasions, we have informally urged FonOff exercise ingenuity in trying to find some solution this unsettling problem. Furlonge, however, doubts there is will on Iranian side to settle matter without further major financial concessions, which company apparently not prepared concede, at least at present. Furlonge has also indicated further difficulty is that Razmara keeps changing his mind as to what is required to get agreement through. 2. Furlonge commented most favorably on Razmara’s plan to negotiate trade agreements with Germany, Italy and other countries, which FonOff feels will have beneficial effect on Iranian economy. He felt that prosperous trading community will be strong political bulwark for Razmara and that his efforts to bring about trade revival were highly commendatory and contrasted them especially with more cautious policy of Ebtehaj. 3. Furlonge volunteered that FonOff not disturbed re Razmara’s recent conclusion trade agreement with Soviets and suspension VOA and BBC broadcasts neither of which he felt was any indication Razmara orienting his policy toward Soviets. Re broadcast suspensions, Furlonge felt measure was only transitory and would shortly be relaxed, FonOff consequently taking no action and merely awaiting developments. All in all, Furlonge felt that Razmara had played his hand with Soviets rather well. 4. In general Furlonge felt situation in Iran looking up. There were already indications of increased prosperity which he stated, confirmed his belief that situation in Iran not perhaps as bad as we had hitherto estimated. He therefore questioned whether there was really need for large scale financial assistance. We took opportunity to say that it appeared to us that although increased prosperity undoubtedly would have short-term beneficial effect, nevertheless in long-run, dissatisfaction among lower classes could only be effectively allayed by bringing them greater benefits through development of country. This plus need for psychological reasons to give Iranians indication Western interest had always been motivation behind our loan program. It has, moreover, been cardinal point in our urging early settlement AIOC problem. Sent Department 3450, repeated information Tehran 68. Holmes Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) to the Assistant Secretary of State of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 611.41/12–2050 [Document 294] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs ( Rountree ) to the Assistant Secretary of State of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 1 secret Washington , December 20, 1950. US–UK Divergencies on Iran Despite our repeated efforts over the last six or seven months, we are not only getting no closer to reaching an understanding with the British on Iranian matters, but have actually lost ground. The two attached telegrams, one from London and the other from Tehran, show fairly clearly how far apart our thinking is. There is also attached a despatch from our Embassy in Tehran describing the political activities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. 2 To me it seems crystal-clear that the traditional British policy in Iran has not changed one iota despite the present world situation. They are still determined to let AIOC come first and to permit the Iranian internal situation to remain in a constant state of turmoil since that will (1) create such a need for increased royalties that the Iranian Government will be obliged to accept the supplemental AIOC agreement as it now stands, and (2) permit the AIOC to operate as it has in the past, bribing deputies and Government officials and being able to operate as it wishes in the absence of a strong Government. It seems to me incredible that the British would expect us to believe the nonsense put forward in the attached telegram from London and I can only suspect that they are taking this attitude in order to discourage our activities there and to keep us from interfering with any political changes they may wish to make in Iran. This Foreign Office attitude, which is of course actually an AIOC attitude, is even more difficult to comprehend in view of the recent military discussions with the British where there seemed to be a considerable meeting of minds both on the need for keeping Iran strong during the Cold War period and on the action to be taken in the event of an emergency. While the results of our efforts have to date been most discouraging, I feel it essential that we keep trying. I am inclined to doubt that any further high level talks at this time will really solve our problems since they usually result only in assurances of a general nature which are never implemented in actual British operations in Iran. We have been toying with the idea in GTI of proposing to the British the setting up of a working level study group which could spend some time exhaustively exploring the Iranian situation and preparing a report for the higher level which could then attempt to reach a general agreement. Such a group on our part might include Messrs. Rountree, Ferguson, and Funkhouser, 3 and possibly someone from DRN. If it should take place in London, I would not expect to stay more than a week but the others might remain as long as a month if necessary. This is only a very tentative idea, but I think it may offer some possibilities. If nothing else, we may by this approach be able to introduce a note of realism into British thinking regarding Iran which might lead to some control over the activities of AIOC. At the moment it seems entirely clear that the AIOC dominates British policy in Iran and anything we can do to induce the British Government to escape from its bondage is worth trying. I would appreciate your views on this suggestion as soon as conveniently possible. 4 1 The memorandum was drafted by Ferguson. 2 None of the documents under reference was found attached to the source text; however a reference at the end of the memorandum indicates that they were telegrams 1339 and 3450, p. 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] and supra , respectively, and despatch 404, not printed. 3 Richard Funkhouser, international economist in the Department of State. 4 No reply to this memorandum has been found in the Department of State files. Agreements between the United States and Iran Agreements between the United States and Iran [For text of agreement revising and extending the agreement of October 6, 1947, effected by exchange of notes dated at Tehran November 28, 1949, and January 10, 1950, entered into force January 10, 1950, operative from March 20, 1950, see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), volume 1, page 415 .] AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN CONCERNING MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE [For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington May 23, 1950, entered into force on that date, see 1 UST 420.] MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION ON RURAL IMPROVEMENT [For text of memorandum signed at Tehran October 19, 1950, entered into force on that date, see 1 UST 727.] Iraq Iraq Contents Response of the United States to Iraqi requests for technical assistance and military aid; joint Anglo-American cooperation in Iraq (Documents 295-303) Response of the United States to Iraqi requests for technical assistance and military aid; joint Anglo-American cooperation in Iraq Response of the United States to Iraqi requests for technical assistance and military aid; joint Anglo-American cooperation in Iraq 1 1 For documentation concerning the policy of the United States toward the possibility of a Syrian-Iraqi union, see pp. 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 665 ] ff. [295] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] January 11, 1950. 887.00/1–1150 [296] Memorandum by the Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) Baghdad, January 30, 1950. 641.87/2–250 [297] Memorandum by Mr. Francis O. Allen, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iraq Baghdad, January 31, 1950. 787.00/2–1450 [298] The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, February 21, 1950. 887.00 TA/2–2150: Telegram [299] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) [Washington,] June 28, 1950. 887.00 TA/3–850 [300] The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, August 16, 1950—12 a. m. 787.56/8–1650: Telegram [301] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) Washington, August 23, 1950—11 p. m. 787.56/8–1650: Telegram [302] The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Secretary of State Baghdad, September 5, 1950. 611.874/9–550 [303] Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State Washington, November 9, 1950. 611.87/11–950 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 887.00/1–1150 [Document 295] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 2 confidential [ Washington ,] January 11, 1950. Subject: Iraqi Complaint that USG is Discriminating Against Iraq by Withholding Economic Aid, and is Supporting Israel in its Disregard of the General Assembly Resolution of December 9. Participants: Mr. Abdullah Ibrahim Bakr, Chargé d’Affaires of Iraq Mr. Abdul Jalil Rawi, Counselor of Embassy of Iraq Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State Mr. H. B. Clark—ANE Problem: 1. The Iraqi Chargé declared that there is a deep-seated feeling among Iraqis that the US is discriminating against Iraq in the matter of foreign economic aid. 2. Mr. Bakr also stated that the US appeared to be supporting Israel in its disregard of the December 9 General Assembly resolution concerning the internationalization of Jerusalem, and cited a press statement on January 5 by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, US Delegate to the Trusteeship Council, as evidence of this alleged attitude. 3 Action Required: 1. To consider whether further steps should be taken to remove Iraqi misapprehensions concerning US economic policy towards Iraq. 2. To inform Mr. Bakr further concerning Ambassador Sayre’s reported statement to the Press. Action Assigned to: NEA Discussion: Mr. Bakr called at his request and presented Mr. Rawi, the new Counselor of the Embassy of Iraq. He stated that he wished to pay his respects upon my return from my recent trip and to say that he was sorry that I had not been able to remain longer in Baghdad. I explained that my tight schedule did not permit me to visit both the Arab Capitals and the SOA countries, and since I had never visited the latter, it was essential for me to spend a greater portion of my time there. Mr. Bakr said he was sorry to say that the impression was current in Iraq that the US was discriminating against it in the matter of foreign aid programs. It was plain that the US had been pouring out many billions of dollars in Europe and in Greece, Turkey, and Iran and had likewise sent millions to Israel, but Iraq had been “denied” any economic help whatever. I stated that I refused to recognize failure to give aid as “discrimination” and outlined to Mr. Bakr once again, as I had done in the past, the bases of American policy in the ECA program and the Greek-Turkish aid program and pointed out that our extensive commitments prevented us from extending these programs further to include, for example, the American republics and such countries as Iraq, who had not been devastated by the War. I said that in the past it was also true that the United Kingdom had assumed primary responsibility for economic guidance and assistance to Iraq. Mr. Bakr denied that the British had contributed anything to Iraq and, on the contrary, extended economic assistance only in those lines, such as railway construction, which would benefit the British in time of war. He accused the British of insisting that an elaborate railway station be constructed in Baghdad, which he assumed could only be of full utility in case of another war. I said that we had never “denied” economic aid to Iraq and we certainly wished to encourage Iraq’s economic development in every way possible. That desire was reflected in our planning under the proposed Point Four program and we were also giving full support to Iraq’s application to the World Bank for a development loan. Mr. Bakr said that even here it was doubted in Iraq that the US had a bona fide desire to support Iraq’s application, since otherwise why had it taken more than a year to consider the loan, and there was no assurance even now that it would be granted. I assured Mr. Bakr that the Department had lent all appropriate support to the Iraqi application and Mr. Clark expressed the view that the delays which had occurred were due to technical difficulties, the majority of which were the responsibility of the Iraqi Government alone. I said we understood that the Bank was considering the Iraqi application sympathetically and would reach a decision at an early date. Mr. Bakr reiterated his charge that we had lent considerable economic support to Israel, and I replied that the US Government had not given Israel so much as a penny on a grant basis. It was true that the Israelis had obtained a loan from the Export-Import Bank, as had two other countries in the area, but this was on a straight business basis, and the same opportunity existed for other states, including Iraq, to apply for Eximbank loans. I said that to my knowledge Iraq had never applied to the Eximbank for such a loan, and Mr. Bakr agreed that this was so. He inquired whether the Export-Import Bank would lend Iraq money for an oil refinery. I replied that I understood it was not the policy of the Eximbank to make loans for this purpose in the belief that ample private sources of funds existed for this type of operation. In response to his further inquiry, I stated that each loan was made for specific projects or programs whose economic feasibility had been fully demonstrated to the Bank. Mr. Bakr referred to Iraq’s new cabinet and said that the younger members of the cabinet were among his classmates in college. He believed that the generation they represented was the hope of Iraq; if these representatives failed to achieve the liberal objectives they had in mind for the development of Iraq and the betterment of its people’s living conditions, the next step would probably be catastrophic for both Iraq and other countries in the Near East. He felt that should there not be an early improvement of economic conditions there might even be a sudden swing to Communism. The Government had earnestly endeavored to stamp out Communist cells in Iraq, but the Communist movement had, nevertheless, continued to make headway there. Iraq had been devastated by many wars, beginning with the invasion of the Tartars who destroyed Iraq’s great irrigation system, never rebuilt. Iraq could make a tremendous contribution to the Near East should the US grant it adequate economic aid. Such aid must be forthcoming at an early date or conditions would deteriorate still further. It was essential to be able to show the people that the West really intended to give the Iraqis substantial help. [Here follows a brief discussion of the General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949, concerning the internationalization of Jerusalem.] As Mr. Bakr was leaving, I said I was personally disturbed that some of our Arab friends continued to express doubt as to the sincerity of our desire to assist them in every way possible. He said he believed in the good faith of the United States, but what was needed was “deeds, not words.” 2 Drafted by Harlan B. Clark. 3 For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. Memorandum by the Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 641.87/2–250 [Document 296] Memorandum by the Ambassador in Iraq ( Crocker ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 1 secret Baghdad , January 30, 1950. Subject: Forthcoming Discussions Between the Department and the British Regarding Iraq (Department’s telegram No. 22, January 24, 1950) 2 Most educated Iraqis, and many foreign observers, believe that it can be demonstrated that the British through their acknowledged special political position have in the past, and do now, control many aspects of Iraq’s economy,—and that in their economic operations they have been more interested in developing profitable enterprises than in ensuring that the Iraqis, who have been for years under their tutelage, should themselves receive a fair share of the wealth accruing from the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. I believe, however, that no useful purpose would be served, in the forthcoming discussions, by bringing up the past either in a general way,—or by enumerating debatable examples of such exploitation. I recommend that the Department’s approach be concentrated on five matters of outstanding importance,—all of them crucial to the basic problem of furthering Iraq’s economic and social development: 1. The question of foreign exports; 2. The IBRD loan; 3. The Iraq Petroleum Company; 4. The attitude of ruling class Iraqis toward economic development and social reform; and 5. British-American cooperation in Iraq. 1. The Question of Foreign Experts I heartily concur in the Department’s suggestion (Department’s telegram 22 of January 24) that in the forthcoming discussions the proposal be made that our relations with the British in Iraq should be in accordance with the more liberal spirit of the Portsmouth Treaty rather than the existing Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. In particular, the relevant new factor, for present purposes, is the absence in the Portsmouth Treaty of the stipulation which limits foreign officials and experts in Iraq to those of British nationality. On page 4 of the enclosure to our London Embassy’s despatch No. 72, January 12, 1948, 3 the Embassy’s note commenting on Article 5 of the Portsmouth Treaty concerning the Railway Agreement of 1936 states that “The Railway Agreement provides for the employment of British railway experts by the Iraqi Government. It was dropped because, in Wright’s words, ‘things like that are out of date’”. I believe that it should be made crystal clear to the British that we feel that the whole conception of limiting foreign experts to those of any one nation is now out of date. The sole criterion now, when our joint efforts are directed to encouraging Iraq’s development should be the experts’ technical and personal fitness for their jobs. As Iraq development plans go forward, and “Point IV” becomes a reality, the Iraqis, with advice from ourselves and the British, should be free to seek qualified experts from any member state of the United Nations. Oral assurances have been given both by Michael Wright 4 to you, and by British Embassy officers here to officers of my staff, that Britain’s exclusive right under the existing Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to provide such foreign experts as the Iraq Government may need will be waived with respect to United States citizens, provided that prior notification in each case is given by the Iraqis. I believe this oral understanding should be put in writing, deleting the requirement of prior notification,—perhaps by exchange of letters—and that if possible it should be expanded to cover citizens of all other member states of the United Nations. 2. The IBRD Loan I believe it needless to review past difficulties encountered in the course of the IBRD loan negotiations but recommend strongly that every possible pressure be brought to bear to ensure that the British Government (and IPC) facilitate the carrying out such conditions of the IBRD loan (Department’s telegram 24, January 25 5 ) as they control. I regard the successful conclusion of the IBRD loan at this time as of the utmost importance,—if Iraqi economic and social development plans are to go ahead. The British, if they are hesitant, should be persuaded to back the loan in every way, both through fulfilling the bank’s conditions relevant to the British Government and IPC, and through emphatic advice to the Iraqi Government to accept the bank’s conditions and to conclude the loan. 3. The IPC Oil Concession It would be difficult to find an Iraqi citizen educated in economic matters who does not believe that Iraq does not receive a fair share of the wealth resulting from the development of Iraq’s oil resources. Although I realize that matters of oil concessions and royalty rates are touchy subjects, it seems to me indisputable that the Iraqis (and the Communists who never miss a chance to harp upon the theme) have every reason to believe that their greatest natural resource is being exploited more for the benefit of foreigners than for themselves. If the “Anglo-Americans” (as we are frequently called in the leftist press) are sincere in their statements that they wish to help backward areas develop their natural resources primarily for the benefit of the peoples inhabiting them, the development of Iraq’s oil resources seems to be a notable case when this principle has not been carried out (I refer to pp 6–11 of the Istanbul Conference working paper D.2, “current Petroleum Problems” 6 ). Although not qualified to make recommendations in matters of international oil politics, I feel strongly that the British, Dutch, United States and French interests concerned should, for the sake of the whole Western position in this area, and emphatically in their own interests, give the Iraqis a better deal in the matter of their oil. I understand (from p. 2 of Istanbul Working Paper, D.2) that IPC royalty rates are $1.60 per ton as compared to $2.40 paid by Aramco, $3.20 offered by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to Iran in current negotiations—and $5.65 received by Venezuela. Could it possibly be made joint Anglo-American governmental policy to persuade IPC to give Iraq a larger share of the returns from her oil wealth, perhaps under some agreement whereby the additional returns are earmarked for Iraq development schemes? 4. The Attitude of Ruling Class Iraqis Toward Economic and Social Development Impartial critics of the British record in Iraq observe that it is sins of omission rather than of commission which mar the record in contrast to what it might have been. Though in all fairness it must be admitted that there has been considerable progress in Iraq since the British occupation in 1917, still the statistics on literacy, standard of living, national income, and its equitable distribution are not impressive. The British answer, when criticized in this regard, is that in the early 1920’s they withdrew their armed forces and from that date they have had to work with the existing local political forces, and have not been in a position to force the pace of modernization and social development. While admitting that a reasonable defense of the British record can be made in this sense, I nonetheless feel strongly that the British have been, and still are—if they put their hearts into it—in a position to persuade Iraq’s ruling elements that their own best interests will be served if they embark seriously on a thorough going program of economic development and social reform. This is no doubt a delicate matter. Nevertheless, we should urge the British to use the leverage of their influence with the controllers of Iraq—the Regent, Nuri Said and the Baghdad politician-landlords, and the tribal Sheikhs—( a ) to secure the firm implementation of a positive development program; and ( b ) to include in Cabinet positions some of the younger, UK or US-educated men who are clamoring for an opportunity to implement a progressive economic and social program. Without such pressure on Iraqi decision-makers (who if left to themselves will in all probability feel their own interests adversely affected by social reform) it is doubtful if needed changes in the land tenure system, taxation, et cetera, and elimination of extreme economic inequalities will ever take place. I therefore recommend that it be suggested to the British that the possibility of putting strong and constant pressure on the Regent and the Government in this sense be seriously considered. With the example of China before the eyes of all, it may be possible by argument and pressure, to get Iraqis in the seats of power to undertake, as a matter of urgency, a realistic economic development and social reform program. 5. British-American Cooperation in Iraq In view of the special British position in Iraq, which it is our policy not to undermine, our role in this matter should be an ancillary one. However, it is essential at least in matters into which we will perforce directly enter, such as the IBRD loan, and the application of the Point IV program to Iraq, that there be the fullest, friendliest and frankest cooperation between the British and American Embassies in Baghdad. Edward S. Crocker 1 Transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 86 from Baghdad, February 2, not printed. (641.87/2–250) 2 Not printed; it requested the Embassy in Baghdad to recommend to the Department of State particular points which should be discussed with the British in order to arrive at a common policy regarding Iraq. (641.87/1–2450) 3 Not printed. For information concerning the Portsmouth Treaty, see Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , Part 1, pp. 202 ff. 4 British Under-Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs. 5 Not printed; it described the requirements that Iraq would have to meet in order to receive an IBRD loan of $8.4 million. (887.10/1–2550) 6 Not printed. For documentation concerning the Conference of American Chiefs of Mission held in Istanbul from November 26–29, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 165 ff. Memorandum by Mr. Francis O. Allen, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iraq 787.00/2–1450 [Document 297] Memorandum by Mr. Francis O. Allen, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iraq 1 secret Baghdad , January 31, 1950. A Summary Analysis of Basic Political Forces in Iraq as Background for the Formulation of United States Policy [Here follow the first two sections of this memorandum which provide a general survey of the main political groups within Iraq.] iii. conclusions relevant to the formulation of united states policy in iraq Our basic policy objective is to secure economic and social development in Iraq and to raise the standard of living of the masses of the population, both through increased productivity and a more equitable distribution of national income. 2 In view of the political structure of the country as analyzed above, I suggest that the only way we can get the Iraqis to take the steps we believe they should take is to work through and with the conservative political forces which are now in control and will be in control for as far ahead as we can see. Because these forces are so firmly in the saddle it would be impossible by backing more progressive elements to make basic changes of which they did not approve. Therefore, the method by which we should attempt to implement our policy must be to convince the dominant conservative elements that in their own best interests they themselves should strongly back a general movement for social and economic development. If they can be convinced, and actually embark on such a program, they would be forced to use the services of the progressive Western-educated officials and give this element far more backing than they now receive. [The next paragraph discusses various Conservative personalities and their attitudes towards social and economic development.] Because of the paramount position of Great Britain in Iraq and its special relations with the Palace, the dominant Conservatives and the tribes, the most effective instrument of persuasion would be to bring the force of British Government policy to bear upon the Regent. Since any British Government, at the London level, would no doubt be in sympathy with such a program I believe that there is a good chance that basic steps in the sense outlined above could be taken as a result of high level Anglo-American consultations regarding policy in Iraq. 1 Transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 141 from Baghdad, February 14, not printed. (787.00/2–1450) 2 For documentation concerning the formulation of a joint Anglo-American policy regarding economic and social development in the Near East, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 485 ff., and ibid. , 1948, vol. v , Part 1, pp. 69 ff. The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Secretary of State 887.00 TA/2–2150: Telegram [Document 298] The Ambassador in Iraq ( Crocker ) to the Secretary of State confidential Baghdad , February 21, 1950. 117. Deptel 44 February 15. 1 Dr. Moore’s Point Four Mission in conjunction with Embassy has just completed weeks intensive discussion Point Four possibilities with Iraqi authorities and Embassy is now in better position than heretofore to comment on Department’s illustrative tables re use Point Four funds. 1. In course past weeks discussions, Iraqi technical departments submitted written requests for 64 technical experts. Although these requests represent only planned departmental programs and are not formal government decisions, they reflect Iraqi eagerness to absorb as much Point Four aid as we can give. 2. Iraqi Government stated its willingness to pay its share of program expenses, but current financial crisis may curtail percentage of Iraqi contributions. 3. Embassy does not anticipate insurmountable difficulties in arranging necessary bilateral agreements. 4. Iraqi requests for experts (like Department’s illustrative table) have stressed primarily fields of public health and agriculture. Embassy believes tentative allocations for agriculture, reclamation, transportation, health, education, public administration and finance projects as set up in Department’s table are sound (assuming reallocations can be made later if necessary as between various fields and as between expert and trainee categories). Embassy would put all fields in Department’s table in priority class A except housing, industry and telecommunications, which could be deferred. 2 5. Over-all dollar total appears adequate for time being. 6. Embassy inclined to agree with Dr. Moore’s opinion that no general survey should be made prior to beginning work in specific fields. At earliest possible moment we should get program under way by sending small team of experts for actual work in agriculture, public health, and other fields headed by top Point Four administrator who could deal directly with proposed development board. Team of experts, after actual experience Iraqi conditions, could recommend specific projects to development board. Sent Department 117, repeated London 41. Crocker 1 Not printed. Dr. Ross E. Moore, an agricultural specialist from the Department of Agriculture, visited Iraq from February 13 to 18 to examine possible future uses of Point IV funds. For documentation concerning the origin of the Point Four Program, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. i , pp. 757 ff. 2 On February 28 the Department of State sent a reply to Baghdad stating their pleasure with the Iraqi’s cooperative attitude and progressive planning but pointing out that no commitments could presently be made for Point IV funds. (Telegram 60, 887.00 TA/2–2150) Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) 887.00 TA/3–850 [Document 299] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Berry ) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) 1 confidential [ Washington ,] June 28, 1950. Subject: Proposed Procedure for Submission of Requests for Point IV aid by Iraqi Government. Discussion: Dennis Greenhill 2 of the British Embassy called on Mr. Burns and Mr. Clark on June 26 and left a copy of a Note (Tab A 3 ), dated June 14, 1950, addressed by Mr. Bromley of the British Embassy at Baghdad to the Iraqi Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, confirming an informal agreement between the British Ambassador and the Iraqi Prime Minister 4 as to the procedure whereby the Iraqi Government should submit requests for Point IV aid to the US Government. Mr. Greenhill stated that this question, which arose out of the British treaty position in Iraq, had been discussed in general by Mr. McGhee with Michael Wright during his visit to Washington last November, and had been in the subject of a letter, dated February 17, 1950, addressed by Mr. McGhee to Mr. Wright following the latter’s departure to London (Tab B 5 ). He recalled that the British and American Embassies in Baghdad had, in consultation with Iraqi officials, tentatively and informally agreed some time ago on a procedure under which the Iraqi Government would submit its requests for Point IV aid to the British Embassy in writing with a copy to the American Embassy (Tab C 6 ). Mr. Greenhill stated that Iraqi officials had expressed some dissatisfaction with this procedure and that as a result of consultation between British Embassy officials and Iraqi officials the agreement in the attached Note of June 14 had been arrived at, whereby the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in future would send Notes Verbales containing requests for experts both to the British Embassy and to the US Embassy at Baghdad. Mr. Greenhill said that he hoped this arrangement would be satisfactory to the Department and would appreciate receiving an informal oral indication as to our attitude in this regard as soon as possible. He said that it was the desire of the Foreign Office to facilitate the handling of Point IV requests and to avoid any appearance of placing obstacles in the way of the transmission of such requests by the Iraqi authorities. It will be noted that an exception is made in the reference Note to “posts such as those in the Ministry of Defense and those in the Ministry of Education where teachers would be expected to work on a curriculum similar to the British. …” Mr. Clark inquired whether the words “post such as …”indicated that there were other lines of activity in Iraq in which only British technical experts would be expected to be employed. Mr. Greenhill replied that he did not know of any other, save possibly the police force where he knew a British officer was serving. Mr. Clark also inquired whether it was contemplated that American professors, for example, should not be selected for Iraqi Government schools, and Mr. Greenhill replied in the negative, saying that he understood only those schools operating exclusively on British curriculums and furnished with British equipment were referred to. Any private American school in Iraq would likewise not be affected by the arrangement. He then gave Mr. Clark an excerpt from a letter from the British Embassy in Iraq to the Foreign Office describing in fuller detail the understanding arrived at between the British Ambassador and the Iraqi Prime Minister (Tab D 7 ). ANE perceives no objection to the procedure outlined in Mr. Bromley’s Note of June 14, and regards it a considerable improvement over the procedure previously proposed. The proposal appears to correspond with Mr. McGhee’s suggestion to Michael Wright in his letter of February 17 that “our relations should be along the lines of and in accordance with the more enlightened spirit of the Portsmouth Treaty rather than the existing Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.” You will note that in a despatch just received our Baghdad Embassy concurs in this view (Tab E 8 ). Recommendation: It is recommended that, if you concur, ANE be authorized to inform Mr. Greenhill orally that the Department perceives no objection to the above-outlined procedure which is proposed to be followed in connection with requests for Point IV assistance in Iraq, and that we appreciate the co-operative attitude of the British Government which has made the establishment of this procedure possible. 9 1 Drafted by Harlan B. Clark and Norman Burns of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs. 2 First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington. 3 Not printed. 4 Tawfig Suweidi became Prime Minister of Iraq on February 5, four days after the resignation of Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi and his Cabinet. 5 The letter under reference was not attached to the source text. 6 Tab C, not printed, was a copy of despatch 221 from Baghdad, March 8. 7 Not printed. 8 Tab E, not printed, was a copy of despatch 733 from Baghdad, June 17. 9 Handwritten at the top of this memorandum was “OK—R[aymond] A. H[are].” The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Secretary of State 787.56/8–1650: Telegram [Document 300] The Ambassador in Iraq ( Crocker ) to the Secretary of State secret Baghdad , August 16, 1950—12 a. m. 105. Embtel 61, July 27. 1 Air Attaché (SMA) and Army Attaché called Monday upon Defense Minister at latter’s request to discuss question Iraq needs for military equipment. They were handed informally detailed list copy of which we have made available to British Embassy. British Charge and Military Attaché inform me no approach has yet been made to them by Iraq Government. British and our military Attachés agree this list represents equipment sufficient for two divisions, one armored brigade and two jet squadrons at full war strength plus training, transport aircraft and equipment; would cost between 5 and 10 million pounds and is generally extravagant and unrealizable. We, however, agree that Iraqi approach represents an earnest of their wish to participate seriously in war if it comes; it also would form basis for possible future request to be included in MDAP program which they wish extended to include Iraq and Syria in addition to GTI. Department will recall Prime Minister’s reference to “defense in depth” reported in reftel. We feel greatest care must be exercised show sympathetic concern Iraqi request short of any commitments and I propose see Prime Minister shortly inform him ( a ) we have discussed Iraqi request fully with British Embassy, ( b ) list is being forwarded Washington, ( c ) Prime Minister will, of course, recognize that all questions dealing with Iraqi defense have been subject UK–US consultation and that ( d ) matter will continue be dealt with on that basis. British will not approach Iraq authorities until after they have been told I have informed Prime Minister of foregoing. We assume this whole matter will be discussed between Washington and London. I would appreciate and await Department’s instructive comment on foregoing before asking see Prime Minister. Air and Army Attaché concur. Sent Department 105; repeated info London 22, unnumbered Arab capitals, Tehran, Paris, Moscow. Crocker 1 Not printed: in a conversation with Ambassador Crocker on July 27, Prime Minister Suweidi requested military equipment which the British could not furnish and suggested that discussions between military officials be initiated, (787.00/7–2750) The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) 787.56/8–1650: Telegram [Document 301] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Iraq ( Crocker ) 1 secret Washington , August 23, 1950—11 p. m. 76. Urtel 105, Aug 16. Dept sympathetic Iraqi desire improve defense and agrees you shld exercise great care to show US concern short of commitments. You shld point out that under current US policy as set forth Austin’s statement SC on Aug 4, 1949 2 and Tripartite Declaration May 25, 1950 3 US prepared consider export license applications for arms purchased this country if required for internal security or self-defense. Although Dept and Dept of Defense will be glad consider Iraqi list, Iraqis must locate arms themselves on US commercial market. Iraqis need not await evaluation list before filing applications for such items as they are able procure. You shld also point out to Iraqis limitations USG arms supply in view extensive and increasing world commitments and endeavor persuade them be more conservative in light their budgetary stringencies. For your guidance in discussion with Iraqis armaments of high combat potential, e.g., artillery, tanks, jet aircraft, are probably not available commercially due to high priority USG procurement. Certain defensive weapons and items of lower combat potential, e.g., radar equipment, AT–6 aircraft, propellent gunpowder, practice bombs, half tracks, machine guns, other small arms, may be available either from present commercial stocks or from new manufacture. Emb quite correct in discussing Iraqi arms requests with Brit Emb and in assumption that at some time Dept will wish discuss matter with UK in Washington or London. 4 However, Dept wld prefer you not mention US–UK consultations to Iraqis. Observance Iraqi obligations under Anglo-Iraqi treaty not USG responsibility and Dept believes there no reason at this stage to irritate Iraqis by interjecting reference to consultation with UK. Acheson 1 Repeated to London. 2 For the text of this statement, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Fourth Series, No. 26 , pp. 23–27. 3 For documentation concerning the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, see pp. 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] ff. 4 The Iraqi arms request was the subject of a discussion between Dennis A. Greenhill, First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, and John R. Barrow of NE on September 19. Mr. Greenhill said that his Government “wished to state emphatically that it was very sympathetic to Iraq’s desire to improve its defense and that there was no question of the UK obstructing Iraqi efforts to equip its forces.” (Memorandum, September 19; 787.56/9–1950) The Ambassador in Iraq (Crocker) to the Secretary of State 611.874/9–550 [Document 302] The Ambassador in Iraq ( Crocker ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 251 Baghdad , September 5, 1950. Subject: Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation The Department’s instruction No. 5 of August 9, 1950, 1 referring to negotiations for a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation currently being conducted between representatives of the United States and various other countries, including Near Eastern countries and transmitting for the Embassy’s information, two copies of a typical standard draft of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, has been received. The Embassy has noted that the United States Government is currently conducting a world-wide program of negotiating treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation; 2 such treaties being designed to replace outmoded and inadequate treaties such as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation entered into between the United States and Iraq, on December 3, 1938, 3 which it is felt should eventually be replaced and modernized. In compliance with the Department’s instructions in the premises, the Embassy has endeavored discreetly to elicit the views of the Minister of Finance, Abdul Karim Al-Uzri, by discussing with him, in general terms, the economic development of Iraq and the possible steps which his Government might be prepared to consider to encourage the flow of United States private capital in Iraq by granting to American investors the usually required minimum guarantees necessary to safeguard their capital. The Minister eventually asked what types of guarantees or assurances other Moslem countries, such as Pakistan for example, may have given or may be expected to give to private American investors. The reporting officer said he did not know, however, he thought that several treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation recently concluded between the United States of America and various other countries, might contain clauses appertaining to assurances in the premises, which probably could be considered adequate to safeguard private American investments in those foreign countries. Adding that, if his memory served, the existing treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which was concluded between the United States and Iraq in 1938, does not have such a clause and, therefore, may be outmoded in that respect. At the Minister’s request, a second meeting was arranged, following perusal of the 1938 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which, of course, was found to be inadequate for the purpose of the discussion. This realization prompted Abdul Karim Al-Uzri to informally express his views to the Embassy’s representatives, substantially as follows: 1. We are most anxious to avail ourselves to the fullest extent possible of assistance to under-developed countries under the Point IV program and/or its corollaries therefore, 2. It is unfortunate that a document more comprehensive than the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with the United States, which we have just considered, does not exist because, 3. Owing to the political climate now prevailing in Iraq, I think I am expressing the feeling of my colleagues in the Cabinet in saying that it would be highly inadvisable for any Government in Iraq, at this particular time, to re-negotiate any existing treaty or to enter into any new treaty with “certain foreign powers.” The “potential” political opposition to any one agreement, such as a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, may not necessarily stem from an objection to the proposed treaty itself, but rather to the word “treaty”, which has an unhappy political connotation, in the minds of Iraqis, with another and altogether unrelated treaty, i.e., the Portsmouth Treaty, negotiated in 1947, to replace the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, but which had to be abolished (owing to political demonstration and bloodshed) shortly after its publication. At this time, the mere mention or reference to The Portsmouth Treaty is an anathema to some of our people. 4. An added consideration is the fact that a basic policy of the Iraqi Government is to strictly enforce our economic boycott of Israel, therefore, we could not consider the possibility, at this time, of entering into any treaty of any kind which might even remotely weaken our position in that respect. 5. I think you will find this cabinet, or any subsequent cabinet, willing to give any specific individual guarantee required for the protection of American capital which may eventually be invested in Iraq, but the possibility of entering into a formal agreement in the premises based on broad rather than specific principles is, in my opinion, out of the question at this time. Embassy Comments: Abdul Karim Al-Uzri is intelligent, capable, honest, sincere and sensitive to public opinion and needs. His views, which were elicited indirectly, have the merit and value of spontaneity. The Embassy, therefore, does not propose to continue to explore the possibility of negotiating a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Iraq, unless otherwise instructed by the Department. Edward S. Crocker 1 Not printed. 2 For documentation concerning the program of the United States to modernize its treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. i , pp. 631 ff. 3 For text, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 960, or 54 Stat. 1790. Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State 611.87/11–950 [Document 303] Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State 1 secret Washington , November 9, 1950. Iraq a. objectives Iraq is important to the United States and the western democracies because of its strategic location, its vast petroleum reserves, its control of the potentially fertile Tigris-Euphrates valley, and its control of Basra, the largest seaport on the Persian Gulf. The United States also has an important, if indirect, interest in the special treaty position and the strategic military facilities which the UK currently maintains in Iraq. Our objectives are to bolster Iraq against Soviet penetration from within or without, to assist Iraq in economic and social development generally, to encourage progressive government, to protect western petroleum and other commercial interests in the area and to give effective support to the legitimate desires of the Iraqi people for national expression and development without prejudice to Iraqi defense or the British strategic position. A further important objective is to encourage harmonious relations, and cooperation in economic and social development among Iraq and other countries of the Near East. b. policies The worsening international situation and oil-rich Iraq’s proximity to the Soviet Union and to Iran, have greatly increased Iraqi apprehensions of a Soviet thrust in one form or another. Among the conceivable contingencies are: (1) a direct military onslaught by the Soviet Union through northern Iran; (2) subversion of Iraq by the Communist Party; or (3) a Soviet subterfuge by which irregulars in the guise of Kurdish, Assyrian or Armenian exiles would attempt to “liberate” their dissident kinsmen in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and possibly Turkey and form a Kurdish national state. Unless the Soviet Union is prepared now to risk a major war, contingency (1) seems for the present unlikely, though plans should be made now to meet such a contingency should it arise. Contingency (2) is also remote despite discontent with the semi-feudalistic social system prevalent among peasants and low-income groups in Iraq. If, however, the Soviets wish to start a Near Eastern conflagration of serious proportions without assuming direct responsibility themselves, contingency (3) would be a natural choice. The Kurdish tribes of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey are not well organized and local security forces could probably cope with any uprising of purely internal origin and direction. The situation would be changed completely, however, if merely a small well-equipped force of Soviet “Kurds” infiltrated across the inadequately guarded frontiers into Iran, Iraq and Syria as the nucleus and striking force of a general Kurdish uprising. To meet such a contingency Iraq would definitely need better armament and some military technical assistance and would possibly require support from outside military forces. Since the UK enjoys special strategic facilities in Iraq, we are discussing the foregoing problems on a continuing basis with the UK, emphasizing that we would expect the UK to assume the primary role in providing Iraq with such military assistance as it required. If we should become convinced the Iraqi security situation was sufficiently serious and that the UK alone could not provide all the support necessary, we should consider extension of limited timely assistance to Iraq, in whatever manner might there be feasible. Both the UK and US should also assist Iraq in minimizing the causes of disaffection in the Kurdish areas by encouraging better provincial administration and by providing technical assistance to help solve economic and social problems in the Kurdish areas. A further urgent need is better UK and US political and military intelligence coverage of sensitive areas, and a greater exchange of information between the UK and US. We should open a small consulate in Northern Iraq to serve primarily as a political listening post. The US and UK should also coordinate their propaganda services in the area, and information activities—especially Kurdish language broadcasts—should be increased. Although solution of Iraq’s military problems is an urgent, immediate aim we should emphasize to the Iraqis that the long-range battle against Communism depends upon enlightened economic and social development and progressive government. The trend toward more progressive government was advanced in Iraq, albeit on a very small scale, when the Government began tribal settlement projects, such as at Dujaila and Hawijah, on state lands, and enacted a law to encourage cooperatives. Progress in economic development has also been made in the past year. A $12.8 million IBRD loan for the Wadi Tharthar flood control project was granted and the IBRD is sending a mission in October to consider further projects; a 50% increase in Iraq’s oil royalties was granted by the Iraq Petroleum Company; the Iraqi Government enacted a law providing for the creation of an autonomous central development board and assigning oil royalties in totality for development purposes. We have also succeeded in bringing a number of Iraqi leader-specialists to this country under the Smith-Mundt Act. We have notified Iraq that we are ready to implement the Point Four program and that the Iraqi Government has already submitted a considerable number of requests for various technical experts including a request for an American engineer to serve as a full member of the Iraqi Central Development Board which we have accepted in principle. Substantial progress is being made in negotiating a Fulbright Agreement providing for exchange of persons between Iraq and the US. If these successful beginnings can be expanded, Iraq’s future looks bright. Of particular importance, however, is to increase the number of progressive leaders in the Iraqi Government and gradually to eliminate reactionary elements. The western democracies should avail themselves of every opportunity discreetly to encourage the development of more liberal government and improvements in the social system such as progressive taxation and better land distribution. The feudal land tenure system constitutes one of the greatest single obstacles to economic progress in Iraq. We should encourage the activities of American cultural institutions in Iraq such as Baghdad College and give encouragement and cooperation to the several progressive American-trained leaders serving in technical and administrative positions in Iraqi Government. We should urge Iraq to expand its world trade on a non-discriminating multilateral basis by adherence to GATT and by improving its tariff, exchange and trade practices consistently with the principles set forth in the ITO Charter. We should especially encourage Iraq to conclude a modern Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the US to replace the outmoded 1938 Treaty. The US Government should avoid the appearance of being an instrumentality of the oil companies. However, in view of the world significance of oil and the role it plays internally in Iraq, the US discreetly should continue to encourage increased development of Iraq oil resources from each of the three concessions at Kirkuk, Mosul and Basra or the relinquishment of territories the companies do not intend to develop; should continue to encourage the Iraq Petroleum Company to improve its public relations and labor practices and conditions; should increasingly identify the development of Iraq oil resources with the people of the country by encouraging the training, education and employment in company positions at all levels of the maximum number of Iraqis; should encourage the US partners in the Iraq Petroleum Company to place Americans in other than technical positions; and should maximize oil intelligence in the area by maintaining closest liaison with company and government oil officials and with other Iraqis involved in oil operations. It is also an important objective to restore normal operation of the Haifa pipeline which has been shut off as part of the Arab economic boycott of Israel. However, it is unlikely that representations on the Haifa question would be successful until a more favorable political atmosphere develops. We should take an early opportunity to resume negotiations for an air transport agreement with Iraq based on the standard Bermuda pattern with full fifth freedom rights. We should be sympathetic, however, to the problems of Iraqi Airways in connection with competition along the routes it serves. c. relations with other states We support the British treaty position in Iraq and believe the British should have primary responsibility in working out with Iraqi authorities arrangements for that country’s defense. At the same time we are aware of Iraqi resentment of vestiges of British imperialism in their country, and we should encourage the UK to continue to seek a suitable means to place its relations with Iraq more nearly on a basis of cooperation between equal partners, continue its policy of interpreting liberally the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty regarding technical assistance and, whenever practicable, to modify its treaty position in the direction of the unratified Portsmouth Treaty. We should also counsel the Iraqis to be moderate in their attitude toward the UK and emphasize the importance to Iraq’s security of maintaining effective working arrangements with the UK in matters of defense. We recognize a strong desire among the Arab peoples for greater unity and we believe that this aspiration should be encouraged so long as it does not develop chauvinistic or aggressive characteristics. For the present, however, a political approach to Arab unity, such as the Syro-Iraqi Union plan which Iraq has espoused, appears to have little chance of success in view of the widely divergent attitudes toward and interests in this subject prevailing among current Arab leaders and political groups. On the other hand, we see fruitful possibilities in an economic, social and cultural approach to Arab unity which would leave the political aspects to develop by evolution. We should, wherever practicable, point out the advantages of the economic and social approach to the Iraqis. We should not, however, give the impression that we would oppose peaceful political unions which might emerge from the spontaneous will of the Arab peoples. If necessary, we should recall in this connection the attitude of the US, UK and France set forth in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950: “The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.” This policy applies as well to Iraq’s relations with Israel. While Iraqi attitudes have an influence among Arab League members, Iraq’s involvement in the Palestine dispute is for the most part only indirect. Iraq does, however, maintain an interest in two of the three important aspects of the Palestine problem: the refugee question and Jerusalem. Iraq, like the other Arab States, maintains an economic boycott of Israel which has a special application in the problem of the Haifa pipeline and refinery. Having no boundary contiguous to Israel, Iraq is not involved in territorial questions. With respect to refugees, Iraq holds the position that the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948, should be carried out. This Resolution provided that refugees who wish to return to Israel should be permitted to do so and that those not returning should be compensated for their property. Iraq has not thus far agreed to resettle refugees in Iraq, pointing out that Iraq has a sizeable number of its own tribes to settle and that Palestinians have a difficult time adjusting themselves to the Iraqi climate, terrain and means of livelihood. It thus seems improbable that Iraq can be counted upon at present to assist greatly in the current problems of the refugees. However, in view of the fact that Iraq has a basic population shortage, the time may well come when Iraq will welcome additional manpower, especially if given assistance such as contemplated in the UN Relief and Works Administration report in assimilating it. We should lose no opportunity to give all possible encouragement to such a trend. With regard to the status of Jerusalem, Iraq, a member of the Trusteeship Council, has taken the lead in pressing for the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution of December 9, 1949, providing for full internationalization of the city. This has been opposed by Israel and by Iraq’s sister Hashemite state, Jordan, who jointly occupy the city. We should continue to make clear to the Iraqis that although we originally opposed the General Assembly Resolution of December 9, 1949, on the basis that it was unworkable, we have loyally cooperated with the Trusteeship Council in trying to implement the resolution and in drawing up a satisfactory statute for Jerusalem. We believe, however, that any plan to be successfully implemented must have the substantial support of Jordan and Israel and at the same time the support of a necessary majority of the international community and in the present General Assembly we will support any proposal for this resolution of the Jerusalem problem which satisfies these criteria. We deplore Iraq’s economic boycott of Israel and its recalcitrant attitude on the Haifa question, but any representations we might make would probably meet a negative response and undermine Iraqi good will toward the United States. Accordingly, action on this question should await greater likelihood of a more favorable response. It is of utmost importance to our relations with Iraq that we maintain a policy of strict impartiality between the Arab States and Israel and that our public officials refrain from giving the impression that United States policy favors either party. So long as Iraq’s present leadership remains in power and provided the western democracies retain the initiative in helping Iraq solve its security and economic problems, there is little chance of the Soviet Union’s attaining major diplomatic successes. The western democracies, therefore, should concentrate on assisting Iraqi leadership to solve its internal problems and to combat Soviet subversive activities among dissident groups. d. policy evaluation The Arab grievances against the US because of its Palestine policy, which has overshadowed all other aspects of our relations with Iraq for the past several years, fortunately appear to be sinking into the background, though they are by no means forgotten. This improvement in our relations can in large part be attributed to the progress made in the past year in the field of economic and social development, and to the fact that the Iraqis have been won over to the logic of concentrating on their own internal problems rather than dissipating their resources and energy in futile altercations over Palestine. However, it is imperative that we recognize that a larger and far graver issue is developing, which may determine the success or failure of our policy in Iraq. Iraq will expect as a quid pro quo for aligning itself and cooperating with the western democracies concrete evidence that the western democracies will effectively assure its security in the present international crisis. So far Iraq has not been given such evidence and although understanding the reasons why the major effort of the western democracies has been directed to improving security in Europe and latterly in the Far East, it is naturally most apprehensive over the inadequacy of the defenses of the Near East. Whatever our ultimate security needs in the area, the western democracies will at all stages need Iraqi good will. The latter will be difficult to retain if the western democracies allow themselves to appear unmindful of Iraqi security problems now. Despite the undoubted strain on our resources and the undesirability of spreading ourselves too thin, the UK primarily, the US and other like-minded western democracies should urgently explore every practicable means of improving the defenses of Iraq and of the Near Eastern area as a whole. 1 Department of State Policy [Information] Statements were concise documents summarizing the current United States policy toward, the relations of principal powers with, and the issues and trends in a particular country or region. The Statements were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad. They were generally prepared by ad hoc working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department of State and were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions abroad, under cover of formal instructions from the Secretary of State, for comment and criticism. The Policy Statements were periodically revised. Interest of the United States in the Arab-Israeli controversy over the future status of Palestine Interest of the United States in the Arab-Israeli controversy over the future status of Palestine 1 1 For previous documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. [304] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 2, 1950—1 p. m. 784.02/1–250: Telegram [305] President Chaim Weizmann of Israel to President Truman Rehovoth, Israel, January 3, 1950. 784.02/1–350 [306] Memorandum by Messrs. John W. Halderman and James W. Barco of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs [Washington,] January 3, 1950. 357.AC/1–550 [307] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, January 3, 1950. 684A.85/1–350: Telegram [308] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 4, 1950—1 p. m. 784.02/1–450: Telegram [309] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 4, 1950—5 p. m. 784A.02/1–450: Telegram [310] The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State Amman, January 5, 1950. 784A.00/1–550: Airgram [311] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 5, 1950—9 p. m. 357.AC/1–550: Telegram [312] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 9, 1950. 784A.00/1–950 [313] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) [Washington,] January 9, 1950. 784A.00/1–950 [314] The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State Amman, January 9, 1950. 784.00/1–950: Airgram [315] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, January 9, 1950—4 p. m. 780.5/1–950: Telegram [316] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 9, 1950—4 p. m. 357.AC/1–950: Telegram [317] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, January 10, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AC/1–1050: Telegram [318] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] January 11, 1950. 784.00/1–1150 [319] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] January 11, 1950. 887.00/1–1150 [320] The Secretary of State to Representative Jacob K. Javits Washington, January 12, 1950. 784.56/1–1250 [321] Memorandum by Mr. Leonard C. Meeker of the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs (Wilkins) [Washington,] January 13, 1950. 784.00/1–1350 [322] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva Washington, January 14, 1950—4 p. m. 884.02/1–1450: Telegram [323] The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State Amman, January 16, 1950. 784.00/1–1650: Telegram [324] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart D. Nelson of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] January 17, 1950. 784.02/1–1750 [325] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 17, 1950—4 p. m. 780.5/1–950: Telegram [326] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, January 18, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/1–1850: Telegram [327] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 20, 1950—6 p. m. 684A.85/1–1850: Telegram [328] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] January 24, 1950. 784A.00/1–2450 [329] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 25, 1950. 674.84A/1–2550 [330] The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State Amman, January 25, 1950—11 p. m. 784.00/1–2550: Telegram [331] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, January 26, 1950—5 p. m. 484.418/1–2650: Telegram [332] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, January 26, 1950—7 p. m. 784A.02/1–2050: Telegram [333] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, January 28, 1950—noon. 357.AC/1–2850: Telegram [334] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 29, 1950—3 p. m. 674.84A/1–2950: Telegram [335] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President Washington, January 30, 1950. 320.2AA/1–3050 [336] Editorial Note [337] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, January 30, 1950—4 p. m. 774.54/1–3050: Telegram [338] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 31, 1950. 486.418/1–3150 [339] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, January 31, 1950—noon. 350/1–3150: Telegram [340] The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State Amman, February 1, 1950—4 p. m. 785.00/2–150: Telegram [341] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva Washington, February 3, 1950—6 p. m. 350/1–3150: Telegram [342] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, February 3, 1950—6 p. m. 350/2–350: Telegram [343] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, February 3, 1950—7 p. m. 674.84A/2–250: Telegram [344] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan Washington, February 3, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/2–150: Telegram [345] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, February 5, 1950—5 p. m. 784A.00/2–550: Telegram [346] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] February 6, 1950. 484A.118/2–650 [347] Editorial Note [348] The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State Amman, February 7, 1950—10 a. m. 684A.85/2–750: Telegram [349] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva Washington, February 7, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AC/2–750: Telegram [350] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, February 7, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/2–750: Telegram [351] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] February 8, 1950. 357.AC/2–850 [352] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, February 9, 1950—9 p. m. 350/2–950: Telegram [353] The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State Amman, February 10, 1950—4 p. m. 684A.85/2–1050: Telegram [354] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, February 12, 1950—10 a. m. 357.AC/2–1250: Telegram [355] The Israeli Ambassador (Elath) to the Secretary of State Washington, February 13, 1950. 484A.118/2–1350 [356] The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State Amman, February 13, 1950—3 p. m. 785.21/2–1350: Telegram [357] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) [Washington,] February 15, 1950. 884A.00/2–1550 [358] The Consul General in Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, February 16, 1950—3 p. m. 684A.85/2–1650: Telegram [359] The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Lebanese Minister (Malik) Washington, February 17, 1950. 983A.531/2–850 [360] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, February 17, 1950—noon. 684A.85/2–1750: Telegram [361] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, February 17, 1950—7 p. m. 350/2–1750: Telegram [362] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva Washington, February 18, 1950—1 p. m. 350/2–1850: Telegram [363] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, February 18, 1950—6 p. m. 784A.56/2–1850: Telegram [364] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, February 19, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/2–1950: Telegram [365] The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State Amman, February 20, 1950—1 p. m. 684A.85/2–2050: Telegram [366] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, February 21, 1950—7 p. m. 350/2–2150: Telegram [367] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, February 22, 1950—5 p. m. 350/2–2550: Telegram [368] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, February 23, 1950—2 p. m. 350/2–2350: Telegram [369] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [Washington,] February 24, 1950. 320.2AA/2–2450 [370] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, February 26, 1950—6 p. m. 684A.85/2–2650: Telegram [371] Extract from the Department of State Wireless Bulletin, February 27, 1950 February 27, 1950 [372] Mr. James W. Barco to the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft) [Geneva,] 27 February 1950. 357.AC/2–2750 [373] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) [Washington,] February 27, 1950. [374] Editorial Note [375] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, February 27, 1950—4 p. m. 350/2–2750: Telegram [376] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva Washington, February 27, 1950—7 p. m. 350/2–2750: Telegram [377] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, February 28, 1950—4 p. m. 350/2–2850: Telegram [378] The “Palestine Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs” to the Foreign Ministries of the Arab States March 1, 1950. 786.00/3–2250 [379] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 1, 1950—5 p. m. 350/3–150: Telegram [380] The Secretary of State to the Israeli Ambassador (Elath) Washington, March 2, 1950. 484A.118/2–1350 [381] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, March 2, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/3–250: Telegram [382] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, March 3, 1950—1 p. m. 684A.85/3–350: Telegram [383] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt Washington, March 3, 1950—7 p. m. 784A.56/3–250: Telegram [384] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva Washington, March 3, 1950—7 p. m. 350/2–2850: Telegram [385] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, March 5, 1950—10 a. m. 684A.85/3–550: Telegram [386] The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Department of State Damascus, March 6, 1950. 784A.561/3–650 [387] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, March 6, 1950—3 p. m. 684A.85/3–650: Telegram [388] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, March 6, 1950—6 p. m. 684A.85/3–650: Telegram [389] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, March 7, 1950—11 a. m. 684A.85/3–750: Telegram [390] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, March 7, 1950—2 p. m. 684A.85/3–750: Telegram [391] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 7, 1950—10 p. m. 357.AC/3–750 [392] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices Washington, March 8, 1950—3 a. m. 684A.85/3–850: Circular telegram [393] Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 8, 1950. 684A.85/3–650 [394] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 9, 1950. 684A.85/3–950 [395] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] March 9, 1950. 784.02/3–950 [396] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Munitions Division (Elliott) [Washington,] March 9, 1950. 484A.118/3–950 [397] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 9, 1950—1 p. m. 357.AC/3–950: Telegram [398] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt Washington, March 9, 1950—3 p. m. 684A.85/3–950: Telegram [399] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, March 9, 1950—4 p. m. 784A.00/3–950: Telegram [400] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan Washington, March 9, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/3–550: Telegram [401] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 9, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/3–650: Telegram [402] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 10, 1950. 474.418/3–1050 [403] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva Washington, March 13, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AC/3–750: Telegram [404] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, March 14, 1950—4 p. m. 684A.85/3–1450: Telegram [405] The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State Damascus, March 14, 1950—6 p. m. 684A.85/3–1450: Telegram [406] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 15, 1950—6 p. m. 350/3–1550: Telegram [407] The President to the Secretary of State Washington, March 16, 1950. 357.AC/3–2450 [408] The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria Washington, March 17, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/3–11450: Telegram [409] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 17, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AC/3–1750: Telegram [410] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, March 18, 1950—noon. 774.56/3–1850: Telegram [411] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 22, 1950—8 p. m. 350/3–2250: Telegram [412] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva Washington, March 24, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AC/3–2450: Telegram [413] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva Washington, March 24, 1950—7 p. m. 350/3–2450: Telegram [414] Editorial Note [415] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Dhahran, March 25, 1950—3 p. m. 684A.85/3–2550: Telegram [416] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, March 27, 1950—8 p. m. 784A.56/3–2750: Telegram [417] Editorial Note [418] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 28, 1950. [419] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 28, 1950—noon. 350/3–2850: Telegram [420] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt Washington, March 28, 1950—6 p. m. 684A.85/3–2850: Telegram [421] The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Department of State Damascus, March 28, 1950. 684A.85/3–2850 [422] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 30, 1950—2 p. m. 357.AC/3–3050: Telegram [423] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 30, 1950—5 p. m. 350/3–3050: Telegram [424] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, March 31, 1950—2 p. m. 357.AC/3–3150: Telegram [425] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva Washington, March 31, 1950—8 p. m. 350/3–3050: Telegram [426] The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Barco) to the Secretary of State Geneva, March 31, 1950—9 p. m. 357.AC/3–3150: Telegram [427] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, April 2, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AC/4–250: Telegram [428] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices Washington, April 3, 1950—1 a. m. 357.AC/4–350: Circular telegram [429] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, April 3, 1950—noon. 786.00/4–350: Telegram [430] The United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council (Sayre) to the President Geneva, April 4, 1950. 350/4–450 [431] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 4, 1950—2 p. m. 784A.02/4–450: Telegram [432] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, April 4, 1950—3 p. m. 357.AC/4–450: Telegram [433] Editorial Note [434] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] April 5, 1950. USUN Files [435] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 6, 1950. 784.00/4–650 [436] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt Washington, April 6, 1950—2 p. m. 784A.5/5–3150: Telegram [437] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt Washington, April 7, 1950. 774.562/2–950: Airgram [438] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, April 7, 1950—1 p. m. 357.AC/4–750: Telegram [439] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, April 7, 1950—2 p. m. 784A.56/4–750: Telegram [440] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan Washington, April 8, 1950—1 p. m. 684A.85/4–850: Telegram [441] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, April 10, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AC/4–1050: Telegram [442] The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State Damascus, April 11, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AC/4–1150: Telegram [443] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syriar–Iraq Affairs (Clark) [Washington,] April 12, 1950. 611.86/4–1250 [444] The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State Beirut, April 13, 1950—1 p. m. 357.AC/4–1350: Telegram [445] Editorial Note [446] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, April 14, 1950—4 p. m. 357.AC/4–1450: Telegram [447] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, April 17, 1950—6 p. m. 611.84/4–1750: Telegram [448] Editorial Note [449] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 19, 1950. 357.AC/4–1950 [450] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 19, 1950. 884.00/4–1950 [451] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, April 19, 1950—8 p. m. 357.AC/4–1930: Telegram [452] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, April 22, 1950—3 p. m. 357.AC/4–2250: Telegram [453] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 24, 1950. 785.022/4–2450 [454] The Consul General at Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Department of State Jerusalem, April 24, 1950. 784.02/4–2450 [455] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, April 25, 1950. 684.85/4–2550: Telegram [456] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, April 26, 1950—1 p. m. 684.85/4–2650: Telegram [457] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations (McDermott) of the Press and Radio News Conference of the Secretary of State on April 26, 1950 April 26, 1950 [458] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) [Washington,] April 26, 1950. 785.022/4–2650 [459] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, April 27, 1950—5 p. m. 684A.85/4–2750: Telegram [460] The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State Rome, April 28, 1950—8 p. m. 784.00/4–2850: Telegram [461] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, May 2, 1950—3 p. m. 611.86/4–2650: Telegram [462] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, May 3, 1950—8 p. m. 684.85/5–350: Telegram [463] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt Washington, May 4, 1950—1 p. m. 474.418/5–250: Telegram [464] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, May 4, 1950—6 p. m. 784A.5/5–450: Telegram [465] Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in Egypt (Ireland) [Cairo, undated.] 674.84A/5–650 [466] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, May 11, 1950—10 p. m. 357.AC/5–1150: Telegram [467] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Acting Secretary of State [Washington, undated.] 784A.5/5–2550 [468] The Legation in Lebanon to the Secretary of State Beirut, May 16, 1950. 320.2AA/5–1650 [469] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, May 16, 1950—4 p. m. 357.AC/5–1650: Telegram [470] Memorandum by the Department of State to the President [Washington, undated.] 784.02/5–1150 [471] Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Seventh Session of the Trusteeship Council [Washington,] May 19, 1950. [472] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, May 19, 1950—6 p. m. 684A.85/5–1950: Telegram [473] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, May 19, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AC/5–1950: Telegram [474] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, May 19, 1950—8:30 p. m. 350/5–1950: Telegram [475] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, May 20, 1950—3 p. m. 811.86/5–2050: Telegram [476] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, May 21, 1950—1 p. m. 611.86/5–2150: Telegram [477] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, May 23, 1950. 674.00/5–2350 [478] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, May 23, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AC/5–2350: Telegram [479] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the United Nations Washington, May 24, 1950—7 p. m. 350/5–1950: Telegram [480] The Acting Secretary of Slate to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) Washington, May 25, 1950. 784A.5/5–2550 [481] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, May 30, 1950—4 p. m. 357.AC/5–3050: Telegram [482] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, May 31, 1950—6 p. m. 780.56/5–2450: Telegram [483] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, June 2, 1950—8 p. m. 684A.85/6–250: Telegram [484] Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington], June 5, 1950. 784A.00/6–550 [485] Editorial Note [486] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State Cairo, June 6, 1950. 674.84A/6–650 [487] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, June 6, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/6–550: Telegram [488] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, June 6, 1950—7 p. m. 350/6–550: Telegram [489] The United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council (Sayre) to the Secretary of State New York, June 8, 1950—8:07 p. m. 350/6–850: Telegram [490] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, June 9, 1950—9 a. m. 684A.85/6–950: Telegram [491] The United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council (Sayre) to the Secretary of State New York, June 12, 1950—7:43 p. m. 357.AC/6–1250: Telegram [492] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt, Adviser to the United States Mission at the United Nations [New York,] June 13, 1950. USUN Files: Jerusalem, 1950–1958 [493] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, June 13, 1950—midnight. 357.AC/6–1350: Telegram [494] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, June 14, 1950—9:59 p. m. 310.5/6–1450: Telegram [495] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Barrow of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] June 17, 1950. 396.1–LO/6–1750 [496] The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State Damascus, June 19, 1950—2 p. m. 357.AC/6–1950: Telegram [497] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, June 19, 1950—4 p. m. 784.02/6–1950: Telegram [498] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, June 20, 1950—2 p. m. 357.AC/6–2050: Telegram [499] The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Barco) to the Secretary of State Geneva, June 21, 1950—1 p. m. 357.AC/6–2150: Telegram [500] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, June 21, 1950—4 p. m. 357.AC/6–2150: Telegram [501] The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Barco) to the Secretary of State Geneva, June 22, 1950—5 p. m. 357.AC/6–2250: Telegram [502] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, June 24, 1950. 480.008/6–2350: Telegram [503] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, June 27, 1950. 785.00/6–2750 [504] The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State Washington, 28 June 1950. 486.118/6–2850 [505] The Consul General at Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, June 30, 1950—11 a. m. 684A.85/6–3050: Telegram [506] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, June 30, 1950—1 p. m. 884A.85/6–3050: Telegram [507] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, June 30, 1950—2 p. m. 684A.85/6–3050: Telegram [508] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, July 1, 1950—1 a. m. 785.11/7–150: Telegram [509] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 6, 1950. Secretary’s Memoranda: Lot 53 D 444 [510] Ambassador John B. Blandford, Jr., to the Secretary of State Beirut, July 8, 1950—noon. 320.2AA/7–850: Telegram [511] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John W. Halderman of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs [Washington,] July 11, 1950. 357.AC/7–1150 [512] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, July 11, 1950—3 p. m. 357.AC/7–1150: Telegram [513] Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner to Mr. James Terry Duce, Vice President of the Arabian-American Oil Company Washington, July 13, 1950. 786.00/7–1350 [514] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, July 15, 1950—2 p. m. 357.AC/7–1550: Telegram [515] Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) Washington, July 15, 1950. [516] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) [Washington,] July 25, 1950. 357.AC/7–2550 [517] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) [Washington,] July 26, 1950. 357.AC/7–2650 [518] The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to Dr. Francis Wilcox, Chief of Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Washington, July 26, 1950. 320.2AA/7–2650 [519] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, July 31, 1950—11 a. m. 784A.13/7–3150: Telegram [520] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State tel Aviv, August 1, 1950. 784A.00/8–150 [521] The Secretary of State to Ambassador John B. Blandford, at Beirut Washington, August 3, 1950—7 p. m. 320.2AA/7–2850: Telegram [522] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan Washington, August 3, 1950—8 p. m. 684A.85/8–150: Telegram [523] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, August 7, 1950—7 p. m. 784.13/7–3150: Telegram [524] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, August 8, 1950—1 p. m. 784A.11/8–850: Telegram [525] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines Washington, August 8, 1950—2 p. m. 784A.561/7–1750: Telegram [526] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) [Washington,] August 12, 1950. 684A.85/8–1250 [527] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices Washington, August 14, 1950—1 a. m. 357.AC/8–1250: Circular telegram [528] Memorandum by Mr. James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Director of That Office (Bancroft) [Washington,] August 17, 1950. 357.AC/8–1750 [529] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, August 17, 1950—2 p. m. 357.AC/8–1750: Telegram [530] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, August 18, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/8–1450: Telegram [531] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, August 21, 1950—4 p. m. 357.AC/8–2150: Telegram [532] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, August 22, 1950—7 p. m. 784A.00/8–1450: Telegram [533] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, August 24, 1950—11 a. m. 357.AC/8–2450: Telegram [534] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] August 28, 1950. Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444 [535] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Clark) [Washington,] August 28, 1950. 320/8–2850 [536] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) [Washington,] August 29, 1950. 320/8–2950 [537] The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, August 29, 1950—1 p. m. 784A.00/8–2950: Telegram [538] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to Ambassador John B. Blandford, at Beirut Cairo, August 30, 1950—3 p. m. 320.2AA/8–350: Telegram [539] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) [Washington,] August 31, 1950. 784A.00/8–3150 [540] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, August 31, 1950—10 a. m. 357.AC/8–3150: Telegram [541] The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, August 31, 1950—1 p. m. 784A.02/8–3150: Telegram [542] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, September 1, 1950—6 p. m. 784A.02/8–3150: Telegram [543] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt Washington, September 6, 1950—6 p. m. 320.2AA/9–650: Telegram [544] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 9, 1950—noon. 357.AC/9–950: Telegram [545] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, September 9, 1950—1 p. m. 684A.85/9–950: Telegram [546] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, September 10, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/9–1050: Telegram [547] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Jordan Washington, September 10, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/9–950: Telegram [548] The Consul General at Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, September 11, 1950—6 p. m. 684A.85/9–1150: Telegram [549] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt Washington, September 11, 1950—8 p. m. 674.84A/9–1150: Telegram [550] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, September 12, 1950—1 p. m. 684A.85/9–1250: Telegram [551] The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Cairo, September 12, 1950—8 p. m. 320.2AA/9–1250: Telegram [552] The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan Washington, September 12, 1950—8 p. m. 684A.85/9–950: Telegram [553] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) Washington, September 13, 1950. S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: NSC 47 Series [554] The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, September 14, 1950. 611.84A/9–1450 [555] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, September 15, 1950—5 a. m. 684.86A/8–2950: Telegram [556] The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, September 15, 1950—1 p. m. 684A.85/9–1550: Telegram [557] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, September 18, 1950—7 p. m. 320.2AA/9–1550: Telegram [558] The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria Washington, September 19, 1950—3 a. m. 684A.85/9–1750: Telegram [559] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, September 19, 1950—6 p. m. 684A.85/9–1950: Telegram [560] The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, September 20, 1950. 784A.02/9–2050: Telegram [561] Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] September 21, 1950. 784A.00/9–2150 [562] The Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador John B. Blandford, at Beirut Washington, September 21, 1950—6 p. m. 320.2AA/9–1550: Telegram [563] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, September 22, 1950. 320.2AA/9–2250 [564] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, September 30, 1950—5 p. m. 684A.85/9–3050: Telegram [565] The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, October 2, 1950—6 p. m. 684A.85/10–250: Telegram [566] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, October 3, 1950—7 p. m. 320.2AA/10–350: Telegram [567] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices Washington, October 4, 1950—6 p. m. 700.00(S)/10–450: Circular telegram [568] Editorial Note [569] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) Washington, October 6, 1950—7 p. m. 320/10–650: Telegram [570] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler [New York,] October 9, 1950. [571] The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, October 9, 1950—5 p. m. 684A.85/10–950: Telegram [572] Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly [Washington,] October 10, 1950. 320/10–1050 [573] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, October 13, 1950—8 p. m. 320/10–1050: Telegram [574] Editorial Note [575] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] October 20, 1950. 320.2AB/10–2050 [576] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, October 24, 1950—2 p. m. 784.00/10–2450: Telegram [577] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler [New York,] October 26, 1950. IO Files, Lot 71 D 440 [578] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle) [Washington,] October 26, 1950. Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444 [579] The Chargé in Syria (Jones) to the Secretary of State Damascus, October 26, 1950—noon. 357.AC/10–2650: Telegram [580] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria Washington, October 27, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AC/10–2650: Telegram [581] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President Washington, November 1, 1950. 320.2AA/11–150 [582] Editorial Note [583] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, November 2, 1950—2:55 p. m. 320/11–250: Telegram [584] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, November 3, 1950—7:36 p. m. 320/11–350: Telegram [585] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations [New York,] November 6, 1950. 357.AC/11–1550 [586] Revised Joint Draft Resolution Introduced on November 7, 1950 in the “Ad Hoc” Political Committee by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Document A/AC.38/L.28/Rev. 1) November 7, 1950 [587] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James M. Ludlow [New York,] November 15, 1950. 357.AC/11–1550 [588] Editorial Note [589] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] November 20, 1950. 786.00/11–2050 [590] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, November 21, 1950—6 p. m. 320/11–2150: Telegram [591] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] November 22, 1950. 357.AC/11–2550 [592] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) [Washington,] November 22, 1950. 786.00/11–2250 [593] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) [Washington,] November 24, 1950. 786.00/11–2450 [594] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President Washington, November 24, 1950. 320.2AA/11–2450 [595] Editorial Note [596] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, November 28, 1950—7 p. m. 320.2AA/11–2850: Telegram [597] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan Washington, November 28, 1950—7 p. m. 320.2AA/11–2550: Telegram [598] Editorial Note [599] The Consul General at Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Secretary of State Jerusalem, November 30, 1950—10 p. m. 684A.85/11–3050: Telegram [600] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, November 30, 1950—midnight. 320.2AA/11–3050: Telegram [601] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 1, 1950—7 p. m. 684A.85/10–950: Telegram [602] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, December 2, 1950—8:23 p. m. 320/12–250: Telegram [603] The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State Amman, December 5, 1950—5 p. m. 684A.85/12–550: Telegram [604] Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State Washington, December 6, 1950. 320.2AA/12–650 [605] Editorial Note [606] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [Washington,] December 11, 1950. 357.AC/12–850 [607] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, December 14, 1950—7 p. m. 320/12–1350: Telegram [608] The Secretary of State to the United States Represertative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, December 13, 1950. 320.2AA/12–1350 [609] The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, December 13, 1950—6 p. m. 784A.00/12–1350: Telegram [610] Editorial Note [611] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, December 19, 1950—7 p. m. 320/12–1950: Telegram [612] Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State Washington, December 20, 1950. 320.2AA/12–2050 [613] The Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sharett) to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) New York, 23 December, 1950. Department of Defense Files [614] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) [Washington,] December 27, 1950. 784A.00/12–2750 [615] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) [Washington,] December 28, 1950. 611.84A/12–2850 [616] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) [Washington,] December 28, 1950. 784A.5/12–2850 [617] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel Washington, December 29, 1950—4 p. m. 790.5/12–2950: Telegram The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 784.02/1–250: Telegram [Document 304] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State top secret Cairo , January 2, 1950—1 p. m. 1. In the past Egyptian representatives have rebuffed several Israel suggestions for direct informal top secret conversations. The King 2 has now agreed (mytel 1166 December 23) 3 that at next Conciliation Commission 4 meeting at Geneva he will have a special representative who, if approached by Israel delegate, will agree to enter into such conversations. Only Egyptians who know about this are Hassan Youssef 5 and Prime Minister. 6 Caffery 2 Farouk, King of Egypt. 3 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1558 . 4 The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, more commonly referred to as the Palestine Conciliation Commission or the Conciliation Commission. 5 Acting Chief of the Egyptian Royal Cabinet. 6 Hussein Sirry. In telegram 2 of the same date, not printed, Ambassador Caffery advised of the assurances given to him by Hassan Youssef that the King and the Egyptian military authorities had “given up all and any idea of aggression against Israel.” (784.02/1–250) President Chaim Weizmann of Israel to President Truman 784.02/1–350 [Document 305] President Chaim Weizmann of Israel to President Truman 1 Rehovoth, Israel , January 3, 1950. Dear Mr. President : I am very happy that Mr. Ewing’s 2 visit to Israel gives me an opportunity to send you a personal letter. We spent a very pleasant hour together and although his visit to this country is of short duration, I am sure he will be able to convey to you a picture of the situation as it is and of the problems which are uppermost in our minds. I cannot begin this letter without expressing to you our deep gratitude for the lead taken by the United States delegation at the recent session of the U.N. Assembly in opposing the disastrous resolution adopted by the Assembly on the internationalization of Jerusalem. 3 The view expressed by the spokesman of the United States that the resolution is both “irresponsible and impractical” will, I feel sure, be shared by all when calmer counsels come to prevail. This will provide an opportunity for reconsidering the whole question on more constructive lines and may possibly open the way for a solution acceptable to all parties. We are anxious to work with the Government of the United States towards that inevitable turning point. Anyone familiar with international affairs knows that international régimes of this kind have invariably proved unworkable and produced nothing but insecurity, friction and economic decay. In the case of Jerusalem, landlock city wedged in between Israel and Transjordan, with no economic life of its own and no direct contact with the outside world, all these disastrous effects would be multiplied ten-fold. The only significant concern which the world at large has in Jerusalem is the protection of its holy shrines and the provision of free and secure access to all who wish to visit them. In actual fact, the area containing these holy shrines represents not more than two percent of the whole of Jerusalem, and the bulk of this sacred area is not in our possession, but in that of King Abdallah. 4 Is it then not the height of absurdity and injustice to force an artificial and unwanted international regime upon the whole of modern Jerusalem—with its hundred thousand Jews, its Hebrew University, and all its other great Jewish institutions—merely because these holy shrines and places are situated in a small area of the city which is not in Jewish possession? We are all in favor of providing special safeguards for the protection of these holy shrines and we are willing to give adequate guarantees for their free accessibility. But we cannot agree, and we cannot be expected to agree, that our ancient Mother-city be severed from the new commonwealth of Israel. Jerusalem has been our capital since the days of David and Solomon. It was the center of our ancient glory, as the Psalmist described it, “beautiful in elevation, the joy of the whole earth, the city of the Great King.” Jerusalem was the tribune from which the Prophets of Israel sent forth their eternal messages to mankind: “Out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem.” When Jerusalem was destroyed, our exiled fathers by the waters of Babylon took the awesome oath:—“If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its cunning.” Throughout the long ages of our exile, Jerusalem was the lodestar of our hopes. To countless generations of Jews, ascent to Jerusalem and residence within its precincts was the highest that life could offer. During the eighteen centuries this attachment and aspiration formed the central theme in our life and literature. And now that our national hopes have been realized and we have again become a free nation in our ancient land, is it conceivable that Jerusalem, the home and heart of our people, be detached from the State of Israel? It was an Archbishop of Canterbury who, a few years ago, commented on the absurdity of “realizing Zionism without restoring Zion” to the Jewish people. To all this has now been added the tragic experience of last year. How can any right-thinking man demand that the Jews of Jerusalem, who last year went through hunger, thirst, and deadly peril in defense of their city, should now be placed under alien rule? It was not the thirty-nine nations who recently voted to turn Jerusalem into an international regime, but the soldiers and engineers of Israel, who last year saved Jerusalem from utter destruction. No wonder that the Jews of Jerusalem are determined to remain part of Israel, as they always have been. We are most anxious to uphold the authority of the United Nations and we shall be glad to cooperate in any solution which safeguards Christian and Moslem religious interests without depriving us of our Mother-city. Such a solution can be worked out on the common sense principle that the holy places be placed under supervision of the United Nations, while the city is governed in accordance with the wishes of the people who live in it. That was the spirit and the intent of the proposals we submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, by which we still stand. I hope that the United States will wield its unrivalled influence in the United Nations for helping towards such a solution. In my conversation with Mr. Ewing, I referred to another matter which is causing us great anxiety: the large-scale rearmament that is going on in the neighboring Arab States with the help of Great Britain. Mr. Ewing will be able to convey to you some of the facts and the dangers which are inherent in these warlike preparations. It is essential that effective steps be taken to put an end to this one-sided rearmament. We are desperately anxious for the peace of the Middle East and the peace of the world. We want to rebuild our ancient country and provide homes and security to the many thousands whom we are bringing over from Europe. We are trying to live up to the hopes which you placed in us when you gave us your generous support during these trying years, but to fulfil that task we need peace. I pray that you may do what you can to help preserve it. 5 With kindest regards, and all the good wishes for a happy New Year. Yours very sincerely, Chaim Weizmann 1 Referred to the Department of State on January 25 “for appropriate handling” by William D. Hassett, Secretary to President Truman. 2 Oscar E. Ewing, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency. 3 Resolution 303 (IV) of December 9, 1949, restated the General Assembly’s intention that Jerusalem be placed under a permanent international régime; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1530 . 4 Usually rendered as Abdullah, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan. 5 Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs telephoned Mr. Hassett on January 27 concerning President Weizmann’s communication. The latter informed him that “the President did not wish to answer this letter himself and that as far as the White House was concerned, the Department could file the letter if it thought it desirable to do so. He also stated that he thought it very inappropriate of Mr. Ewing to have brought the letter to the President and that he (Mr. Hassett) had so informed the President, who agreed. Mr. Ewing also brought another letter from Dr. Weizmann to the National Security Resources Board asking that steps be taken to prevent the British shipment of arms to the Arab states.” (Memorandum by Mr. Rockwell, 784.02/1–350) Mr. Rockwell subsequently added a marginal notation on his memorandum, in which he stated that after consultation on January 29 with Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, it was decided to file the letter. Memorandum by Messrs. John W. Halderman and James W. Barco of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs 357.AC/1–550 [Document 306] Memorandum by Messrs. John W. Halderman and James W. Barco of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs 1 confidential [ Washington ,] January 3, 1950. Future Work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission When the Palestine Concilation Commission moves to Geneva in January, it will enter upon a new phase of its work. Prior to the Fourth Regular Session of the General Assembly the Commission’s principal achievements were the drafting of a proposal for internationalization of Jerusalem and the holding of a series of meetings with representatives of Israel and the Arab States in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948. The Commission’s draft instrument for internationalization of Jerusalem was presented to the General Assembly, but failed to obtain favorable consideration. Instead, the Assembly adopted a new resolution on Jerusalem calling upon the Trusteeship Council to draft a statute for an international regime as a corpus separatum and to implement it immediately. This aspect of the Commission’s work has consequently been completed for the present at least. The Commission’s meetings with the representatives of Israel and the Arab States were concerned largely with the questions of repatriation of Arab refugees and the revision of Israel’s present boundaries with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt. These meetings served principally to emphasize the differences between the parties and to clarify their viewpoints. They were characterized by the Arab representatives during the meetings of the Commission in New York as of little practical value, since they considered the method followed by the Commission as being one of simply transmitting the proposals of one side to the other. They urged the Commission, therefore, to submit its own suggestions or proposals and they stated that they were not prepared to enter into direct negotiations with the representatives of Israel. The Israeli Delegation, on the other hand, re-affirmed its desire to open direct negotiations with each of the interested parties and regarded the refusal of the Arab States to meet representatives of Israel as rendering continuation of the Commission’s efforts at conciliation fruitless. The Israeli Delegation felt, moreover, that for the Commission itself to formulate specific proposals would call in question the whole method of conciliation and the terms of reference of the Commission. In its Fifth Progress Report, dated 14 December 1949, 2 the Commission stated that it considered it had received from the General Assembly the powers and obligation to undertake in the present circumstances a procedure of mediation and in consequence to submit compromise proposals to the parties concerned. The Commission stated that it hoped to undertake this task and thereby bring to a successful conclusion the mission entrusted to it by the General Assembly. Under these circumstances the role of the Commission when it returns to Geneva would appear to be equivocal. It is apparent that a continuation of the procedures followed in Lausanne will not be productive. On the other hand, in view of the attitude of the Israeli Government, the Commission is not at present in a position to embark upon a procedure whereby it would make recommendations to the parties on matters of basic importance. Whatever the Commission’s authority may be, it can be successful only insofar as it receives the cooperation of the parties. As a conciliation commission it is in fact at the disposal of the parties. Two of the parties, at least at the present time, are preoccupied with direct negotiations and it is unlikely that they would be favorably disposed to receiving independent proposals from the Commission on basic issues. There are subsidiary issues, however, on which the Commission can resume its work and as to which the parties are disposed to cooperate. These matters involve the questions of reunion of separated refugee families, blocked Arab accounts, and arrangements to enable Arabs living in Arab territory close to the armistice lines to cultivate their lands lying within territory under Israeli control. Similar questions may from time to time arise and prove to be matters in which the Commission can play a useful role. On the more basic issues, however, the Commisson should be careful to avoid a situation where one or other of the parties might be led to refuse further cooperation or ignore the Commission altogether. With these considerations in mind, the United States Delegation on the Commission should be guided by the following considerations: (1) The Delegation should take the position that at the outset at least the Commission’s role should be one of availability to the parties. The Commission should make clear that it is at the disposal of the parties to perform such functions as the parties may wish, to facilitate a final settlement. If the parties desire the Commission to make suggestions, the Commission should do so, but for such suggestions to be at all effective there must be a mutual desire that such a procedure be undertaken. Exploratory suggestions by individual members of the Commission made informally from time to time to representatives of the parties would, of course, be entirely appropriate. (2) The Commission’s consideration of the second report of the Economic Survey Mission 3 should give the Commission the necessary time to explore the possibilities of its future work. The attitude of the U.S. Delegation to the ESM report and possible comments by the Commission in forwarding it to the Secretary-General should be guided by instructions from the Department. In the absence of such instructions the Delegation should favor forwarding the report without comment by the Commission. (3) The Commission should take advantage of any opportunity to promote direct negotiations between the parties either in a conference under the auspices of the Commission or separately. Such direct negotiations may be given impetus by the current negotiations between Israel and Jordan, and there is some evidence that Egypt is looking for an opportunity to come to a direct agreement with Israel. (4) The Commission should continue consideration of the questions of reunion of separated families, blocked accounts and cultivation of lands on the Israeli side of the demarcation lines by Arabs living in adjoining Arab territory. Technical committees with which representatives of the parties can undertake limited direct negotiations, as well as fact-finding groups, should be encouraged and continued. (5) Further study by the Commission of the question of compensation for refugees can be undertaken by the Commission as indicated in paragraph 5 of the Fifth Progress Report. This study should at the outset be limited to ascertaining the amount of compensation due the refugees rather than procedures for collection and payment. A separate memorandum on this subject is in preparation. (6) The General Assembly Resolution of December 8, 1949, 4 directs the Conciliation Commission and the Palestine Refugee Agency to consult in the best interests of their respective tasks. After the Relief Agency is established, probably in April, 1950, the principal foreseeable requirement will be that each of the two agencies be kept informed of developments in the area of the other. Because of Arab opposition to the resettlement of the refugees as part of a political settlement of the Palestine question, it is not desirable to give unnecessary publicity to contacts between the Conciliation Commission and the Refugee Agency. Communications should therefore not be made public unless in exceptional circumstances it may be desirable to do so. The United States Representatives on the Conciliation Commission and the Advisory Commission of the Refugee Agency should, however, keep each other informed through the Department of State. If, in the light of developments, further procedures for consultation between the two agencies seem desirable, this should be arranged after consultation with the Governments which comprise their membership. (7) It would not appear advisable at the present time for the Commission to undertake a tour of the countries involved. It might be appropriate to send out one or more fact-finding bodies or perhaps a team of advisors to consult with officials of the Governments concerned to explore possibilities of additional matters on which useful work can proceed. (8) However, the first step should be to ascertain what representatives are available for consultation in Geneva, and to see what suggestions may result from private consultations with them. In summary, it appears that an impasse exists on basic issues following a year’s effort by the Commission. From the Commission’s point of view, there is lacking the essential element of a peaceful settlement, that is, a desire by the parties to find a solution by compromise. What is needed is a “break” in the impasse, and it now appears that this is more likely to come through direct negotiations than through the Commission. On these basic issues the Commission should make clear to the parties its readiness to be of service whenever and however the parties themselves wish and of course remind the parties that the Commission will be ready to undertake to make suggestions whenever the parties are ready to receive them. Developments may occur which will lead the parties to seek the Commission’s assistance. The Commission should avoid doing anything which might make more difficult the parties turning to the Commission under such circumstances. In the meantime the Commission can perform useful work during the next month or two in Geneva in certain limited fields with the active cooperation of the parties concerned. Such work would be largely of a technical character. 1 Transmitted by Mr. Halderman in a memorandum of January 5 to John D. Hickerson, the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs. The memorandum noted that the Halderman-Barco memorandum had been approved in NEA and by Ely E. Palmer, the U.S. Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine. In a marginal notation, Mr. Hickerson stated that a copy of the Halderman-Barco memorandum was forwarded to Mr. Palmer on January 6. 2 See the editorial note in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1541 . 3 Dated December 18, 1949; see the editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1548 . 4 See the editorial note in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1529 . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/1–350: Telegram [Document 307] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State secret London , January 3, 1950. 25. Furlonge, 1 Head Eastern Department, commented today that Israeli-Jordan joint talks seem to have bogged down at least temporarily over corridor question. 2 He reiterated UK has scrupulously maintained hands-off attitude during negotiations, but he wondered whether time may not arrive when it might be desirable for US and UK to help talks along with both parties. We informed him that we did not know Department’s latest thinking on this question, but recalled that at Istanbul Conference 3 it had been consensus that while US Government should encourage direct talks, it should refrain from taking direct part in them and from suggesting nature of settlement. Furlonge stated that he felt, for present at least, both US and UK should continue to refrain from intervening, but that time might arrive in future when it would be desirable assume more active role. Furlonge stated Foreign Office has thus far refrained from giving any advice to Jordan, although it has given Kirkbride 4 certain background information and advice for his guidance in event he were asked for advice by Jordan Government. We asked Furlonge whether he was referring to comments re corridor, which he had mentioned to us in earlier conversation (see final paragraph Embtel 5079, December 22). 5 Furlonge confirmed this to be true but added Foreign Office comments covered other matters as well. He then gave following details: (1) Foreign Office told Kirkbride for his background information that there seem to be fair indications Israel anxious effect settlement with Jordan, particularly in order reach de facto agreement on Jerusalem question in view Israel’s current difficulties with UN. (Furlonge stated that although this appeared to be true at time telegram sent to Kirkbride, he now felt perhaps Jerusalem motive was overemphasized. Nevertheless, he still felt it fair to say Israelis seem most anxious obtain general settlement with Jordan.) In view Israeli eagerness, Foreign Office feels Abdullah should not be in too much of hurry to make concessions merely for purpose reaching early settlement, but should use his bargaining power to obtain most favorable settlement possible even if negotiations thereby protracted. (2) Foreign Office does not feel corridors are ever satisfactory arrangements. Egyptians have been insistent. Israel should not have access to Gulf of Akaba and Foreign Office not completely convinced Israelis might not be willing make concessions southern Negev in order reach settlement with Jordan. If Israel not willing, Foreign Office felt Jordan would do better ask for corridor terminating north of Gaza which would give it direct access to Mediterranean, rather than corridor to Gaza which would result in later protracted negotiations with Egypt re access to sea. (Furlonge noted with satisfaction Jordan has taken former line in subsequent conversations with Israel.) (3) Foreign Office feels Jordan should take present opportunity to endeavor to obtain concessions in Jerusalem which would include within Jordan’s sector certain of Arab quarters now held by Israel. If Jordan were successful in obtaining agreement to redraw Jerusalem boundaries to accomplish this, it would help make separate Jordan-Israeli settlement more palatable to other Arab states and would provide additional areas for resettlement of refugees. Furlonge emphasized Jordan has not as yet requested UK advice and foregoing has therefore not been communicated to Jordan Government. 6 Holmes 1 Geoffrey W. Furlonge had been appointed Head of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office on December 9, 1949. 2 This refers to the Jordanian demand for a corridor to the Mediterranean Sea through Israeli territory. For documentation on Israeli-Jordanian talks in 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. 3 For documentation on the Conference at Istanbul of American Chiefs of Mission in the Near East during November 1949, see ibid. , pp. 165 ff. 4 Sir Alec S. Kirkbride, British Minister in Jordan. 5 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1556 . 6 The Department of State, in reply on January 4, expressed its continued belief that while the United States Government should encourage Israeli-Jordanian peace talks, it should refrain from intervening in them (telegram 28, 684A.85/1–450). A. David Fritzlan, the Charge in Jordan, inquired of King Abdullah of Jordan on January 4 concerning the peace talks. The King replied that the Israelis were being difficult and that he had decided that Samir Rifai, his Minister of Court, should attempt to reach basic agreement at Jerusalem with David Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Prime Minister. He also indicated that the Israeli offer of a corridor extending from 50 to 100 meters to give Jordan access to the sea was entirely unacceptable. During the discussion, Mr. Fritzlan presented President Truman’s message of December 30, 1949 (see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1564 ) to the King and noted that the King seemed greatly pleased (telegram 4, January 4, from Amman, 785.11/1–450); see also airgram 15, January 9, from Amman, p. 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] . The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 784.02/1–450: Telegram [Document 308] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret niact Cairo , January 4, 1950—1 p. m. 8. Egyptian authorities are very fearful of a leak especially in view Newsweek article December 26 1 and in case of another leak might run for cover (Tel Aviv telegram 924 to Department). 2 Egyptians assume that as in past Israel delegate will approach Egyptian delegate at Geneva and in that case Egyptians will, contrary to attitude in past, agree to talk. Egyptians particularly do not want Azzam Pasha 3 to know anything of this as he is bitterly opposed to direct talks. 4 Sent Department 8; Department pass Tel Aviv 1. Caffery 1 The article stated that top secret negotiations between Tel Aviv and Cairo were under way. 2 Not printed; but see footnote 1, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1558 . 3 Abdul Rahman Azzam, Secretary-General of the Arab League. 4 The Department of State relayed this telegram to Tel Aviv at 10:49 a. m., January 4. The American Ambassador in Israel, James G. McDonald, reported the visit to his residence of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett on January 5, at the Ambassador’s request, to discuss the telegram. Mr. Sharett was said to be “evidently pleased and promised prompt action at Geneva and pledged utmost secrecy” (telegram 10, January 5, from Tel Aviv, 784.02/1–550). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 784A.02/1–450: Telegram [Document 309] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 secret Washington , January 4, 1950—5 p. m. 4. Dept desires Emb Tel Aviv and ConGen Jerusalem be guided by fol in connection with Israeli moves to transfer seat of Govt from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 2 1. US does not recognize sovereignty of Israel in Jerusalem. 3 UN is seized of Jerusalem problem, and US attitude toward status of city will continue be framed in light UN situation. 2. US continues to support principle internationalization of Jerusalem along lines modified regime such as that proposed by PCC. 3. Dept does not desire Emb Tel Aviv to conduct official business in Jerusalem with Israeli Central Govt officials who may move there. FonOff in Tel Aviv provides normal means contact Israeli Govt for foreign dipls. If Israeli Govt shld seek persuade Emb reps carry on official business with Central Govt officials in Jerusalem, Emb reps shld state they not authorized do so. From time to time it will of course be necessary for Emb to deal with important Israeli officials whose offices have been transferred to Jerusalem, but Dept believes these officials will spend part of their time in Tel Aviv where official business can be conducted with them. If need arises Emb shld make clear to Israeli Govt that in present circumstances it can only conduct official business with Govt officials outside Jerusalem area. 4. Dept continues desire that Ambs visits to Jerusalem for unofficial purposes be restricted to absolute minimum. 5. No objection contact by ConGen Jerusalem with such Israeli ministries as may be in Jerusalem, on routine consular affairs affecting Jerusalem area only. If need arises both Emb and ConGen shld make clear to Israeli officials that Emb continues to be sole US dipl representation near Israeli Govt. Of course no objection to non-official courtesy and social contacts between Reps ConGen and Israeli Central Govt officials stationed in Jerusalem. UK Reps Tel Aviv and Jerusalem receiving similar instrs. You may inform Reps of other Govts of above position if they inquire re US attitude toward latest developments affecting Jerusalem. 4 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem for action and to London and Amman for information. 2 Mr. Hare had transmitted a draft of telegram 4 to Dean Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State, with his memorandum of December 23, 1949. The memorandum noted the desirability of providing the Embassy at Tel Aviv and the Consulate General at Jerusalem with instructions in case the Israeli Government attempted to persuade American representatives in those cities to conduct official diplomatic business at Jerusalem with Central Government officials. The memorandum also indicated the suggestions made to the Department of State by the British Embassy that American and British representatives at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem coordinate a common policy along the lines of the draft telegram and that the American and British Governments take the initiative in suggesting to other governments represented in Israel that they send similar instructions to their representatives. Mr. Hare recommended coordination with the British but opposed taking the initiative (784A.02/1–450). 3 Embassy Tel Aviv reported in Joint Weeka 1, January 6, that Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had closed the debate on foreign policy in the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) on January 4 by stating that “no legislative act was necessary to declare Jlem capital since Jlem was de jure capital from moment State of Israel was proclaimed in May 1947 [ 1948 ], and now, with transfer of offices which was delayed because of security conditions, lack of communications and other facilities, Jlem was de facto as well as de jure capital.” (784A.00 (W)/1–650) 4 Embassy Tel Aviv, on January 24, transmitted the text of the proclamation adopted the previous day by the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, that Jerusalem had resumed its status as the capital of Israel from the moment that the State was created and that the Government was now transferring its institutions to Jerusalem (telegram 53, 784A.02/1–2450). The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State 784A.00/1–550: Airgram [Document 310] The Chargé in Jordan ( Fritzlan ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , January 5, 1950. A–4. Reference Department’s telegram 82, June 17, 1949 1 regarding the desirability of establishing a special committee which should supersede the Jordan Mixed Armistice Committee [Commission] and should meet under the chairmanship of General Riley. On June 20, 1949, the Legation conveyed this proposal to the Jordan Government. On January 3, 1950, the Legation received a note from the Jordan Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicating that, although the Jordan Government has been generally in favor of the proposals set forth in the Legation’s note, the Israeli authorities have consistently refused to accept the chairmanship of General Riley. 2 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that this information be brought to the Department’s attention as a matter of record only. Fritzlan 1 Not printed; but see footnote 1 to telegram 375, June 17, 1949, Foreign Relations 1949, vol. vi , p. 1154 . 2 Maj. Gen. William E. Riley, United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commissions in Palestine. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 357.AC/1–550: Telegram [Document 311] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom confidential Washington , January 5, 1950—9 p. m. 52. Re Embtel 5147 [ 5149 ]. 1 Urtel disappointing to us and Dept fearful failure entire program unless UK will reconsider its position in light fol considerations. We do not wish imply any feeling that Wright 2 made even tentative commitment re UK contribution in talks here, but wish start afresh in approach to UK on subj. Fully appreciate manifold calls of similar nature on UK and burdens they represent on UK recovery program. However feel reasonable balance requirement to meet budget Relief and Works Agency for Pal Refugees—hereafter PRA 3 —against UK stake in polit and commercial matters in area. In presenting case again to FonOff pls review fol points. 1. In view attitude Cong and public gravely doubt possibility obtain more than 50% share from US. We are preparing legis with this sum in mind and cannot increase our request beyond $27,000,000. This was percentage contributed to UNRPR. 2. UK suggestion in reftel wld yield total sum of only $47,300,000 against requirement of $54,900,000; i.e. US $27,000,000 plus equivalent $20,300,000 represented by £7,250,000. 3. In testimony before Cong comites we shall be asked intentions other countries to contribute to program. Indication by Dept that UK will limit contributions to £2,250,000 may well be disastrous; proposal that UK will match others up to their limit will make it highly probable that US Congress insist on matching formula. In that case 50% matching formula wld yield maximum $40,600,000, i.e., US $20,300,000 matching UK and other govts $20,300,000 grant. 4. We will find it difficult arrange 100% US grant program if UK program partially loans. In view possibility UK will recoup Jordan £1,000,000 loan from profits of Palestine currency board due Jordanians, we will be hard put to justify this as properly Brit contribution. This £1,000,000 might better be considered Jordan contribution, over and above $6,000,000 considered by ESM to be reasonable share cost of Arab States. In that case, Brit proposal wld result in actual contribution of only £1,250,000. 5. We propose to use in exec sessions as argument in favor of program relation US contribution to profits and taxes oil cos. and importance Arab States involved in program to oil supply even if oil originates in countries not directly concerned PRA activities. Similar considerations by UK shld lead to conclusion larger contribution well worth while as insurance premium to assure continued flow oil supplies. 6. PRA program involves expenditure on relief of about 40% on works about 60%. Ref para 2 Embtel it seems unreasonable that any one contributor shld insist on earmarking part its contributions for especial purposes such as resettlement. Preferable that Director and Advisory Comm be given discretion in apportionment of funds. We will cooperate during operation of program to assure maximum of useful works, minimum of direct relief. 7. In view polit difficulties in PRA area believe that UK well advised to support PRA for ensuing 18 months on 25% basis even if this results deferral investments in Iraq and Egypt development plans which we understand are competing with PRA for available UK resources. Pls investigate facts in the matter fully and in your discretion do your best persuade FonOff and Treas take this view. Believe that it may be helpful to Emb to ascertain views Desmond Morton former Deputy Chairman ESM 4 who may be useful in converting other officials to back ESM. Acheson 1 Dated December 29, 1949, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1563 . 2 Michael R. Wright, Superintending Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British Foreign Office, with jurisdiction over the Eastern Department. For documentation on his talks with American officials late in 1949, see ibid. , pp. 50 ff. 3 The full name of this organization was the “United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” (UNRWA). The name of the Agency was often rendered informally as the “Palestine Refugee Agency” (PRA) for the convenience of brevity. UNRWA was to be assisted and advised by an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey. By late January, discussions were held by American and United Nations officials concerning the appointment of an UNRWA Director. The Department of State, on February 1, informed the United States Mission at the United Nations that the PRA Director should “if possible” be drawn from a country other than the four members of the Advisory Commission and instructed the Mission to suggest to Secretary-General of the United Nations Lie that he make no further approaches on the matter to Americans (telegram 48 to New York, 357.AC/1–3150). 4 For documentation on the activities of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 784A.00/1–950 [Document 312] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] January 9, 1950. Subject: Developments Affecting Israel Participants: The Secretary Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Jr. 2 ANE—Mr. Rockwell Discussion: Mr. Morgenthau called upon me at his request. He said that he was leaving within a week for Israel in connection with the fund-raising activities of the United Jewish Appeal and before his departure wished to exchange views with me. 1. Development of the Jordan Valley and Loan to Israel —Mr. Morgenthau expressed himself as being very interested in the peace and development of the Near East as a whole, and particularly in the development of the Jordan Valley. He said that he had heard that the negotiations between Israel and Jordan were going pretty well and wondered whether if peace were signed between these two countries it might not pave the way for a scheme of developing the whole Jordan Valley for the benefit of Israel and the Arab States bordering the river. Mr. Rockwell stated that in addition to the large amount of funds necessary for such a plan, the political agreement of all the states involved would be essential. Although talks were now going on between Israel and Jordan, there was a stalemate over the width of the corridor between Jordan and the Mediterranean, and political agreement between Israel and the Arab States would unfortunately probably not be reached in the near future. Mr. Rockwell added that the reports of the Clapp Mission 3 suggested certain development projects which might be forerunners to a much larger scheme, and which might show all the Arab States the benefits to be obtained from cooperation for large scale development. Mr. Morgenthau said that he had not seen the second Clapp Report but would be most interested to read it. He was disappointed to learn that the second report did not envisage development projects in Israel, but seemed satisfied when it was explained that one of the primary factors in the selection of areas for development was the presence of Arab refugees. Mr. Morgenthau then inquired whether I thought it would be possible for a United States Government loan to Israel and Jordan to be arranged in order to put an Israeli-Jordan development scheme into effect. He was certain Mr. Ben-Gurion would ask him this. I said that as he knew, the President was very much interested in the development of the Near East, particularly in the Tigris-Euphrates project, but that a political settlement in the area was first necessary. I did not know how such development might be carried out—perhaps it could be done through the United Nations. I said that the Department was now concentrating on United States participation in the program envisaged in the Clapp Reports, and on the Point Four Program. Mr. Rockwell mentioned the fact that Israel had not yet exhausted the $100,000,000 credit made available by the Export-Import Bank. Mr. Morgenthau then inquired whether I thought that if peace were restored in the Near East it would be possible for the United States Government to contribute to large scale development schemes in the area. I said that I thought such projects, if bankable, would probably be of great interest to such agencies as the World Bank, but that I could not say more at the present time. Mr. Morgenthau asked whether this Government would have any objection to efforts by the Israeli Government to raise money in this country by such means as the sale of Israeli Government bonds. I said that I saw no objection whatsoever to such a procedure. 2. Haifa Refinery —Mr. Morgenthau inquired whether any progress had been made on the question of reopening the Haifa Refinery. 4 I explained the background on this, saying that I had on several occasions discussed the matter with Mr. Bevin, 5 and added that at the present time a stalemate seemed to exist in view of the Iraqi refusal to permit oil to run through the pipeline. Mr. Morgenthau referred to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s previous offer to permit all the output of the pipeline to leave Israel for Europe over a period of several months if the pipeline could be opened. 3. Shipment of Arms to Egypt by Great Britain —Mr. Morgenthau commented that Britain seemed to be taking a helpful attitude in the Near East by pressing the Iraqis to open the pipeline and by encouraging negotiations between Israel and Jordan. For this reason he found it odd that the British were now shipping arms and heavy military equipment to Egypt, an action which did not contribute to the stability in the Near East because the Israelis felt obliged to spend large sums for armaments in order to keep up. Mr. Morgenthau felt that it would strengthen the stability of the Near East if the British, at least for the present, would cease shipping arms to Egypt. I outlined to Mr. Morgenthau the background of the British position, pointing out the treaty obligations of Great Britain to Egypt and the other Arab States and the criticism to which Mr. Bevin had been subjected because of failure to ship arms to Egypt as soon as the Palestine war was over. The Egyptians had particularly referred to the fact that they had received no arms while the Palestine embargo was on but that Israel had received large quantities from other sources, such as Czechoslovakia. I said that I felt that I could understand Mr. Bevin’s situation, and that we must realize that Egypt probably played an important role in the British plans for overall defense of Near Eastern security. Mr. Rockwell stated that the Department had been keeping a close watch on developments affecting Palestine and that no information had as yet been received which would lead to the conclusion that Egypt or any other of the Arab States had any serious intention or immediate plans for renewing hostilities. He added that the Department understood that plans for the delivery of heavy equipment to Egypt called for this delivery to take place over a period of three or four years. We thought that Egypt had so far received from Great Britain mostly light equipment. Mr. Morgenthau asked whether the Department thought that Egypt was planning to attack Israel and I said that we did not think so. Mr. Morgenthau said that Israel certainly did not plan to attack Egypt, and Mr. Rockwell and I agreed. Mr. Morgenthau commented that it was unfortunate that mutual suspicion was causing good money to be spent for unproductive purposes. 4. Jerusalem —I stated to Mr. Morgenthau that we had found very unfortunate the action taken by the Arab-Catholic-Slav bloc in the United Nations concerning Jerusalem. We felt that the resolution which was passed was unworkable. Although we thought the proposal of the Palestine Conciliation Commission was somewhat complicated, we felt that it provided the basis for a satisfactory settlement and believed that it should be possible to work out such a settlement, taking the Commission’s proposal as a starting point. One of the difficulties in arriving at an agreed solution was the rather unconciliatory attitude taken by the Israeli and Jordanian authorities, both in the United Nations and outside. I said that the Vatican had now strengthened its bargaining position, but that I thought that the Vatican realized that the resolution was a bargaining position and not something which could easily be put into effect. Under the circumstances, we hoped that the Israelis would resume their conversations with the Vatican. We do not think it would be difficult to work out a system of United Nations custodianship for the Holy Places, with Israel and Jordan administration of their respective areas of the city. I said that I had explained all this to Mr. Sharett when he was last here, but that I thought Mr. Morgenthau would be interested in having this Government’s point of view on the Jerusalem question. He said that he was most interested and while in Israel would bear in mind what I had said. Mr. Morgenthau then inquired whether the Department thought that the Israeli Diplomatic Mission in Washington was doing a good job. I said that I thought Mr. Elath was a very good Ambassador. Mr. Morgenthau mentioned reports that Ambassador Elath was to be transferred to India. I said that I also had heard these. Mr. Morgenthau then thanked me and took his departure. Dean Acheson 1 Drafted by Mr. Rockwell. 2 Prominent American Zionist leader and former Secretary of the Treasury. 3 The United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, the Chairman of which was Gordon R. Clapp. 4 For previous documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 91 ff. and pp. 594 ff. 5 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) 784A.00/1–950 [Document 313] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Berry ) 1 confidential [ Washington ,] January 9, 1950. Subject: (1) Israel request for postponement of PCC meetings and (2) Israel Ambassador’s views on Syrian-Iraqi union and alleged activities of Iraq in Syria. Participants: H. E. Eliahu Elath, Ambassador of Israel Mr. Berry, ANE Mr. Waldo, ANE Problem: 1. To determine the Department’s position relative to the request of the Israel Government for the postponement of the scheduled meetings of the PCC pending conclusion of a final agreement between Jordan and Israel through direct talks. 2. To note the Ambassador’s views on Syrian-Iraqi union. Action Required: As set forth in the Problem. Action Assigned to: ANE, NEA, UNA. The Ambassador called upon me this afternoon at 4:30 p.m. at his request. He informed me that he had been instructed by his Government to ask for a postponement of the meetings of the UN PCC, which is scheduled to reconvene shortly at Geneva. The Israel Government had determined to make this request of the US Government as a result of a discussion which had been held in Istanbul between Elias Sasson, 2 newly appointed Israel Minister to Turkey, and Hussein Yalcin, Turkish representative on the PCC. The Ambassador stated that Israel’s request was based on the fact that Israel was presently carrying on discussions with King Abdullah of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, looking towards the negotiation of a final settlement between the two countries. As a consequence of Sasson’s talk with Yalcin it was felt by the Israel Government that the resumption of negotiations with the Arab States through the Palestine Conciliation Commission might prejudice the success of the direct talks between Israel and Jordan. The Ambassador said that Yalcin had indicated that the Turkish Government strongly favored direct talks between Israel and the Arab States. The Israel Government was most anxious that the talks with Abdullah have a successful outcome. Agreement had already been reached on all major points at issue and it only remained to work out certain minor details. As an example, the Ambassador cited the fact that Jordan was desirous of obtaining a corridor to the Sea. Israel had agreed to give Abdullah this corridor. Unfortunately, however, Abdullah thought of the width of the corridor in terms of kilometers, while Israel was thinking in terms of meters. The Ambassador was certain that a compromise could eventually be reached on this point. The Ambassador said that his Government believed these talks would soon bear fruit, since both sides were eager for agreement. Meanwhile it would be most unfortunate if anything should occur to jeopardize their success. The Ambassador said that the British Government had put no obstacles in the way of negotiations and was indeed encouraging them. The Ambassador also expressed his gratitude for the position the US had taken on the discussions. He stressed, however, that past experience had shown that when the Arab States got together they tended to adopt a unified, unyielding, and uncompromising position towards Israel. It was the Israel Government’s view that once this front had been broken and agreement had been signed with one Arab State it would be a comparatively easy matter to negotiate settlements with the other Arab States. For these reasons the Israel Government believed that it would be preferable to postpone discussions of the PCC until after agreement had been reached between Jordan and Israel on all outstanding questions. In this connection he mentioned that Lebanon was most anxious to reach agreement with Israel on a number of subjects, one of which was the development of the Litani Valley, but would not do so until one of the Moslem Arab States had first concluded peace with Israel. I said that I would of course pass this infomation on to Mr. McGhee 3 for his comments. I pointed out to the Ambassador, however, that one of the first questions I would be asked would be the length of time the Israel Government thought it would require to bring the negotiations with Abdullah to a successful conclusion. The Ambassador replied that his Government had specified that the time required would be a month and a half or a little more. I also pointed out to the Ambassador that the US was only one member of the PCC. I inquired whether the Israel Government had made similar representations to the French and Turkish Governments. The Ambassador replied that he did not know whether the French and the Turks had been approached by his Government but presumed they had been. The Ambassador continued that he had received official instructions from his Government to discuss the foregoing matter with the Department. He now wished to discuss another matter on his own initiative. The Ambassador said he was much disturbed by recent reports concerning the activities of Iraqi agents in Syria. He said that these agents were working with the various tribes and other persons in Syria attempting to foment a revolution which might bring about conditions of chaos which would permit implementation of a Syrian-Iraqi union. 4 The Ambassador said that such a union could never be successful and would contribute to instability in the Middle East. The Abbasids and the Ommayads had never been able to get along together and it was doubted that they would be able to do so now. A centralized union of the two States would never work, since there would be a continual struggle between Baghdad and Damascus for control of the union. A decentralized union would likewise be unsuccessful, since no modern State can exist without a centralized government. The Ambassador also added that the establishment of such a union would create a new situation in so far as Israel was concerned. He stressed the fact that Iraq had never been willing to sign an armistice agreement with Israel. He said that if it became apparent that such a union might take place the extremists in Israel (the Herat) would claim that it threatened Israel’s security and would urge Israel intervention before an attack could be launched against Israel from the new unified State. The Ambassador also said that the Communists were working actively to foment trouble in Syria, not because they favored a Syrian-Iraqi union but because such a union would result in chaotic conditions in the Middle East which would be to the advantage of the Communists. The Ambassador said that he was well aware that the Communists in Israel constituted a Fifth Column which owed its loyalty to the Soviet Union. He said the position taken by the Communists on the Jerusalem question was ample proof of this fact. I told the Ambassador that I would pass on his remarks on these questions to Mr. McGhee. 5 1 Drafted by John A. Waldo, Jr., of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs. 2 Rendered also as Sassoon. 3 George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 4 See pp. 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 665 ] ff. 5 The Department of State summarized the discussion with Ambassador Elath concerning the meetings of the Palestine Conciliation Commission for Ambassador Palmer on January 16 (airgram 10 to Geneva, 357.AC/1–1650). The penultimate paragraph of this message read as follows: “The Department is informing the Israeli Ambassador that you are being apprised of the Israeli démarche . The Ambassador is also being informed of the Department’s understanding that the PCC does not intend immediately to begin substantive talks with the parties, but plans to devote some time to a study of the second ESM report. Furthermore, the Department does not believe that the Israeli-Jordan talks will necessarily be prejudiced by PCC meetings in Geneva, particularly in view of the fact that the conversations were not adversely affected by the meetings of the General Assembly on Palestine. Finally, the Department will state that in the light of the advanced preparations for the reconvening of the PCC, an attempt at this stage to postpone the meetings would be difficult to explain and would be likely to provoke unfavorable comment.” The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State 784.00/1–950: Airgram [Document 314] The Chargé in Jordan ( Fritzlan ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , January 9, 1950. A–15. Reference Department’s telegram 216, December 30, 1949. 1 The Legation is informed by a reliable Palace source that upon receipt of the text of the President’s message, King Abdullah presented it to the Prime Minister, 2 expressing much pleasure that the President should encourage him and other Arab States to settle the Palestine affair at an early date. The Prime Minister has been extremely doubtful regarding the feasibility of entering into direct negotiations with the Israelis at the present time and has expressed skepticism regarding the likelihood of achieving a suitable agreement. Undoubtedly the King, who has openly expressed his desire to come to an agreement soon with the Israelis, felt his position considerably strengthened vis-à-vis his Government as a result of the President’s message. Fritzlan 1 Not printed; it gave the text of the message from President Truman to King Abdullah; see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1564 . 2 Tewfiq Abd el-Huda. Tewfiq is also rendered as Tawfiq. The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 780.5/1–950: Telegram [Document 315] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret Tel Aviv , January 9, 1950—4 p. m. 16. Re Amman Legtel 4 to Department, January 5 [ 4 ] 1 reporting prospective Samir and Ben-Gurion meeting, Shiloah 2 at residence January 8 said Abdullah at end of January 2–3 talk had suggested next meeting be in Israel between BG and Samir, after latter’s return from Tehran. Shiloah replied Sharett would then be back. Abdullah assented Samir talk with Sharett. No date yet fixed. Dayan 3 may be Israel’s regular spokesman with TJ if Shiloah goes Geneva. Meanwhile, Shiloah has sent Samir letter 4 reporting Israel cabinet’s “firm refusal of kilometers-wide corridor” but expressing willingness continue talk. New subject: Shiloah questions wisdom of policy he attributes to UK of “rearming Arab states for domestic security”. He cited that French arms to Zaim 5 and his successors had not aided Syrian domestic security. He argued that tanks and jet planes supplied by UK to Egypt have “no relation to domestic security”. He deplored “seeming USG acquiescence if not support this policy”. Comment: Embassy position would be stronger such discussions if we knew more precisely Department’s present position. Depcirtel September 7, 6 a. m. 6 does not fully clarify. Would appreciate more precise statement. End comment. Pass Army, Navy, Air. Sent Department 16, repeated Baghdad 2, Beirut 1, Damascus 2, Jerusalem 1, Jidda 1; Department pass Amman 1, Cairo 4, Army, Navy, Air. McDonald 1 Not printed; but see footnote 6, p. 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] . 2 Reuven Shiloah, Political Adviser to the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 3 Brig. Gen. Moshe Dayan, Commander of the Southern Israeli forces. 4 Dated December 29, 1949; for text, see telegram 5, January 16, from Amman, p. 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 323 ] . 5 Husni Zaim, President of Syria, whose government was overthrown on August 14, 1949, by a military coup. For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1630 ff. 6 Not printed; but see editorial note, ibid. , p. 1365 . The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/1–950: Telegram [Document 316] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State top secret Cairo , January 9, 1950—4 p. m. Mytel 23, January 9. 1 Hassan Youssef tells me Sirry will give his representative appropriate instructions upon his departure for Geneva. However, with new government coming in 2 (which was neither foreseen nor expected by Sirry and Youssef), Sirry must make reservation that plans are subject to approval of new Prime Minister. Asking support plans, Hassan Youssef believes Nahas will approve them too. 3 Department pass Tel Aviv 3. Caffery 1 Not printed; it advised that Abdul Moniem Mustapha had been designated as the principal Egyptian delegate to the Palestine Conciliation Commission (357. AC/1–950). 2 General elections were held in Egypt on January 3 and 10, 1950, resulting in victory for the Wafdist Party. Mustapha Nahas and Mohamed Salaheddin became Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, respectively, in the new government. 3 The departure for Geneva of Abdul Moniem Mustapha was delayed in order for him to hold discussions with the new Minister for Foreign Affairs (telegram 30 from Cairo, January 11, 357.AC/1–1150). Ambassador Caffery reported on January 18 that the latter would review the files before making any decision on direct talks (telegram 50 from Cairo, 674.84A/1–1850). Two days later he informed the Department of State that the advisers who had persuaded the King to authorize direct talks still favored holding the talks and that the King was in accord, but that inasmuch as they were “uncertain as to attitude new Minister Foreign Affairs, they say they must proceed cautiously at this juncture (telegram 58 from Cairo, 674.84A/1–2050). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 357.AC/1–1050: Telegram [Document 317] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France confidential Washington , January 10, 1950—6 p. m. 103. Subj is proposed Fr contribution to UN Relief and Works Agency for Pal refugees. Emb is aware that of total program cost of $54,900,000 Dept and ESM based estimated contributions as fols: US, $27,450,000; UK, $13,000,000; Fr, $6,000,000; Arab countries, $6,000,000; leaving approx $2,500,000 to be sought from various other small contributors. It is Dept’s understanding that new Fr budget contains only 600,000,000 francs for NE and that Fr contribution to refugee programs will have to come out of this sum. Even if this approx $1,800,000 equivalent were used entirely for contribution to new agency, Dept considers this amount entirely inadequate. Great majority of $54,900,000 must obviously come from three major powers (US, UK and Fr) which have reps on new Advisory Comn in Agency. This Comn will have long-range responsibilities in area in which Dept understands Fr are eager to share. If Fr do not contribute substantial sum, commensurate with their declared interest in the area, whole program of relief and works stands in danger of failure, which none concerned dare risk. US contribution may be jeopardized if Dept cannot tell Cong that Brit and Fr appreciate gravity of needs as evidenced by substantial contributions despite their own problems of recovery. Pls seek early occasion to discuss amt of Fr contribution with appropriate officials, drawing attn to above, and report results. 1 Acheson 1 Embassy Paris discussed this message with Jean Binoche, the Deputy Director of Political Affairs for Africa, the Levant, and the Arab countries in the French Foreign Office. The latter stated that the figure of 600,000,000 francs reflected the original French participation as agreed to by Mr. Clapp and Eirik Labonne, the French Deputy Chairman of the Economic Survey Mission. He also expressed the hope that his Government would approve adequate supplementary credits (telegram 163, January 12, from Paris, 357.AC/1–1250). The Department of State replied on January 16, expressing its gratification at the French attitude but advised of information from Mr. Clapp that there had been no agreement between him and M. Labonne on the 600,000,000 figure (telegram 201). (Telegrams 163 and 201 are both filed under 357.AC/1–1250.) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 784.00/1–1150 [Document 318] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] January 11, 1950. Subject: Palestine Situation Participants: Dr. Yusuf Haikal, Minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan NEA—Mr. McGhee ANE—Mr. Berry Mr. Rockwell Problem: None (This was a courtesy call by Dr. Haikal prior to his return to Jordan). Action Required: None Action Assigned to: None Discussion: The Minister at his own request called upon Mr. McGhee. After an exchange of courtesies, Mr. McGhee inquired what Dr. Haikal thought of the future of the Palestine situation. The Minister replied that his attitude was based upon a mixture of optimism and pessimism. Mr. McGhee stated that the United States Government considered such conversations as those now going on between Israel and Jordan a very important factor in a final settlement. He said that we had the impression that a stalemate in the conversations had occurred, and inquired why Dr. Haikal thought this was so. The Minister believed that one reason might be that the Israelis were refusing to permit any refugees to return to their homes, and another that Israel was never ready to give anything in return for the concessions it demanded. Mr. McGhee stated that we had not understood that the question of the refugees had entered into the Israeli-Jordan conversations, and the Minister said that he had not been officially informed of the scope of the talks. Mr. McGhee expressed doubt as to the feasibility of a corridor to the sea under Jordan sovereignty. He remarked that such a corridor would be indefensible in times of war, and that in times of peace Jordan could obtain the same advantages that would accrue from a corridor by means of free port facilities on the Mediterranean coast with guaranteed freedom of access. Other corridors such as the Polish Corridor, had not proven to be successful arrangements. Mr. McGhee added that the final decision on this matter was, of course, something for Jordan to make and that the United States Government was not attempting to influence the conversations in any way. Dr. Haikal maintained that the only way Jordan could be sure of access to the Mediterranean was by having sovereignty over a corridor. He thought there were too many ways in which the Israelis could hinder access to the coast which was based only on the right of transit of Israeli-controlled territory. Dr. Haikal then said that he was returning to Jordan in several weeks and wondered whether Mr. McGhee had any particular message which he might bear to his King and his people. Mr. McGhee replied that he desired to assure Dr. Haikal of the continuing friendship for and interest in Jordan on the part of the United States. He said that the United States Government was prepared to seek from the Congress legislation authorizing the United States to assume its share of the expenses of the refugee relief and works program recommended by the United Nations. Jordan would be a principal beneficiary of this program, and would thereby receive concrete proof of the interest of the United States in Jordan. Mr. McGhee hoped that Dr. Haikal would convey to King Abdullah the appreciation of the United States Government for the cooperative attitude which Jordan has shown in connection with the Palestine problem, and the hope that; Jordan would continue to maintain this approach to the question. Mr. McGhee added that he would also appreciate it if Dr. Haikal would raise with the King and other Jordanian officials the point of whether it was desirable to endanger any progress toward a final settlement in Palestine because of issues which some people might be insisting upon largely out of such motives as revenge. He thought that local interests should be subordinated to the general need for peace felt throughout the whole Near East, and pointed out that no real progress in developing the area can be made until a political agreement is reached. The point which Mr. McGhee wished to make, of course, applied as well to Israel. A spirit of compromise was necessary on both sides. It was Mr. McGhee’s thought, however, that such things as the Israeli-Jordan conversations should not be permitted to fail because of stumbling blocks which in themselves were far less important than a final peace. Dr. Haikal said that he would be glad to convey this information to his Government. He pointed out, however, that it was very difficult for any of the Arab States to be reasonable vis-à-vis Israel when their leaders thought of the homeless refugees and the vast amount of Arab property taken over by the Israelis. If the refugees were not to return, what was to become of their property? Dr. Haikal estimated the total value of this property at twelve billion dollars, and said that it was obvious that Israel could not afford to pay this sum, despite the vague promises the Israelis may have made about compensation. Mr. McGhee said the twelve billion dollars seemed to be a very large sum for the value of the property in question, and the subsequent conversation brought out that Dr. Haikal was including Arab-owned desert areas in Palestine which he maintained had had a considerable price set upon them during the Mandatory regime despite the unproductive nature of the soil. After expressing his thanks for the interest taken by the United States in Jordan and his pleasure at seeing Mr. McGhee back in Washington, Dr. Haikal took his departure. 1 Drafted by Mr. Rockwell. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 887.00/1–1150 [Document 319] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 1 confidential [ Washington ,] January 11, 1950. Subject: Iraqi Complaint that USG is Discriminating Against Iraq by Withholding Economic Aid, and is Supporting Israel in its Disregard of the General Assembly Resolution of December 9. Participants: Mr. Abdullah Ibrahim Bakr, Chargé d’Affaires of Iraq Mr. Abdul Jalil Rawi, Counselor of Embassy of Iraq Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State Mr. H. B.Clark—ANE Problem: 1. The Iraqi Chargé declared that there is a deep-seated feeling among Iraqis that the US is discriminating against Iraq in the matter of foreign economic aid. 2. Mr. Bakr also stated that the US appeared to be supporting Israel in its disregard of the December 9 General Assembly resolution concerning the internationalization of Jerusalem, and cited a press statement on January 5 by Ambassador Francis B. Sayre, US Delegate to the Trusteeship Council, 2 as evidence of this alleged attitude. Action Required: 1. To consider whether further steps should be taken to remove Iraqi misapprehensions concerning US economic policy towards Iraq. 2. To inform Mr. Bakr further concerning Ambassador Sayre’s reported statement to the Press. Action Assigned to: NEA Discussion: [Here follows discussion of the Iraqi complaint that the United States Government was discriminating against Iraq by withholding economic assistance; for the text of this portion of the memorandum of conversation, see page 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] .] Mr. Bakr said that it also appeared the US was supporting Israel in its disregard of the General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949 concerning internationalization of Jerusalem. He referred in this connection to Ambassador Sayre’s statement to the Press on January 5, 1950 which Mr. Bakr said was an affirmation of US opposition to the internationalization of Jerusalem and that the US Government did not consider itself bound by the resolution. I said that I did not have a copy of Ambassador Sayre’s statement at hand but that I could assure Mr. Bakr that the US intended to abide by the majority decision and to cooperate loyally in the Trusteeship Council, of which we were a member, in reaching a solution to the Jerusalem problem. The US Government feels, however, that in its consideration of the problem, the Trusteeship Council should have due regard for the element of practicability. I said it was true that we had not voted for the resolution and that we in fact had opposed it since we did not believe that it was workable. We had instead supported the proposals formulated by the PCC. Now that the resolution had been passed in its present form we would, of course, respect it. I said that I would obtain a copy of the press account of Ambassador Sayre’s statement and communicate with Mr. Bakr further in this regard. Mr. Bakr said that as the strongest Member of the United Nations the US was in a position to enforce the decision of the United Nations by measures short of armed intervention. Economic pressure on Israel and the United Kingdom, for example, would be all that was needed to obtain compliance with the General Assembly Resolution of December 9. I said I did not share this view and that it was not true to say that all we had to do was to express a wish or to make a threat in order to get a foreign government to change its policy. This myth had long since been exploded. What would happen, for example, if we should attempt to “pressure” the Israeli Government to change its policy with respect to Jerusalem? In all probability there would be an immediate reaction on the part of the Israeli public and legislative body, and the net effect might well be to strengthen the Government in its present policy. Mr. Clark observed that in China we had a current instance where foreign governments did not follow the American lead. As Mr. Bakr was leaving, I said I was personally disturbed that some of our Arab friends continued to express doubt as to the sincerity of our desire to assist them in every way possible. He said he believed in the good faith of the United States, but what was needed was “deeds, not words.” 1 Drafted by Harlan B. Clark, Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria-Iraq Affairs in the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs. 2 See telegram 75, January 14, to Geneva, p. 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] . The Secretary of State to Representative Jacob K. Javits 784.56/1–1250 [Document 320] The Secretary of State to Representative Jacob K. Javits Washington , January 12, 1950. My Dear Mr. Javits : Thank you for your letter of December 28, 1949, 1 in which you were kind enough to make available to the Department certain impressions which you gained during your recent trip abroad as a member of the European Study Mission of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. You made special reference to the furnishing of arms by Great Britain to certain Arab States and to inflammatory statements against Israel in the Arab press. We are grateful for your views on these matters in relation to the Palestine problem, the lasting solution of which is of such importance to the peace and security of the Near East. The Department is in complete agreement with you that a renewal of the Arab-Israeli conflict would be a tragic development which the world community must bend every effort to prevent. This Government has been keeping a close watch on developments affecting Palestine and has carefully analyzed available information relating to the likelihood of renewal of hostilities. Our analysis does not lead to the conclusion that serious measures are being taken in preparation for a renewal of hostilities. There have most certainly been inflammatory and bellicose statements made in both the Arab and Israeli press concerning a renewal of the fighting. While such an attitude on the part of journalists is deplorable and harmful to the eventual establishment of good relations between Israel and the Arab States, under the circumstances, with bitter fighting only so recently terminated, it would probably be too much to expect that highly aroused passions should quickly cool. Some of the warlike pronouncements of officials of Near Eastern Governments may well have been made for the purpose of domestic consumption. The Department does not believe that in this case the remarks of individual radio and press commentators should be taken as a reliable indication of any serious or immediate intent on the part of the respective Governments to resume hostilities. The British Government has made no secret of the fact that it is furnishing certain categories of arms to Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt, under the treaty arrangements which bind Great Britain to those countries. Great Britain faithfully observed the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council on the shipment of arms to the Palestine area, and now that the embargo has been lifted, 2 it has resumed shipment of arms in accordance with its treaty obligations to the countries concerned. It should be recalled that the Arab States are but a part of the Middle East area, a region the security of which is of great importance to the West. It is desirable that the countries in this part of the world obtain from reliable and friendly sources such arms as they may need for their legitimate security requirements. At the time the Security Council arms embargo was lifted, the United States and Great Britain stated that they did not wish to see an arms race develop in the Middle East. The United States stands by this policy, as does the United Kingdom to the best of the Department’s knowledge. Arms shipments to the Arab States and Israel should be limited to those necessary for the purpose of maintaining internal law and order by the Government concerned in the legitimate exercise of constituted authority, and for the purpose of providing for reasonable requirements of self-defense. With regard to the shipment of planes and light naval vessels to Egypt, it should be recalled that Egypt is an important and strategically located nation of 20,000, 000 people. In considering the export of arms to the Near East from the United States, and from other countries, the Department has constantly kept in mind the danger of enhancing the possibility of a renewal of the Palestine conflict. As I have stated above, our analysis of all information available to us does not indicate any serious preparations to this end. Should such information be received, the United States Government would be quick to use all of its influence in an attempt to prevent such a tragic eventuality, both within the United Nations and outside. Sincerely yours, Dean Acheson 1 Not printed. 2 The arms embargo was lifted by the Security Council on August 11, 1949, when it adopted Resolution 73 (1949); for text, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1302 . The resolution contains no provision which explicitly repealed the embargo. The editors suggest that the nature of the Council discussion immediately prior to August 11, 1949, as set forth in ibid. , and the content of paragraph numbered 2 of Resolution 73, leave no doubt that the Council considered that it had repealed the embargo. Indeed, in his note of August 12, 1949, the Secretary of State informed the Egyptian Chargé that the Security Council had taken action “which in effect removed the arms embargo imposed by its resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948.” ( ibid. , p. 1304 ) Memorandum by Mr. Leonard C. Meeker of the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs (Wilkins) 784.00/1–1350 [Document 321] Memorandum by Mr. Leonard C. Meeker of the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs ( Wilkins ) [ Washington ,] January 13, 1950. Subject: Consular Exequaturs in Jerusalem A legal opinion has been requested by NEA concerning the position which the United States should take if the Government of Israel now requests this Government to apply to Israeli authorities for exequaturs for American consular officials in Jerusalem. In a memorandum to Mr. Rusk dated December 9, 1949, 1 Mr. Jernegan 2 recalled that the Turkish Embassy in Washington had received such a request from the Israeli Embassy concerning Turkish consular representatives “in Israel and in territory controlled by Israel”. In that memorandum Mr. Jernegan expressed the view, which he believed was probably shared by the Turkish Embassy, that an answer to the request of the Israeli Ambassador would be dependent on action taken by the General Assembly at its Fourth Session concerning the internationalization of Jerusalem. On December 9, 1949 the General Assembly in fact adopted a resolution on internationalization. In the light of this resolution, the United States, as a Member of the United Nations, should not take any steps with respect to the functioning of American consular officers in Jerusalem which would recognize the sovereignty of any national state in that area. However, it would not be inconsistent with the obligations of the United States as a United Nations Member to maintain consular officers in Jerusalem by agreement with the Israeli or Jordan Government, on a de facto basis and without exequaturs. It would also seem permissible to seek and accept exequaturs for such officials in Jerusalem if it were clearly understood that such action did not involve recognition by the United States of Israeli or Jordan sovereignty in Jerusalem. If, however, the national states concerned would not agree to issue exequaturs with such an understanding, but only on the understanding that recognition of sovereignty would be implied, then the United States ought not to apply for and obtain exequaturs for its consular officers in Jerusalem. The General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949, providing for a special international régime for Jerusalem, was based implicitly on the theory that the Assembly had the right to determine the status and future government of Jerusalem. The chain of reasoning would run somewhat as follows: ( a ) In the World War I settlements Turkey renounced all rights and title to certain areas including Palestine, “the future of those territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.” ( b ) Prior to the Treaty of Lausanne, in which this renunciation was made, the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers had met at San Remo and allocated Palestine to be placed under mandate (Class A), pursuant to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, with Great Britain as the mandatory power. ( c ) Under the mandate instrument approved by the Council of the League of Nations, the mandate was subject to modification with the consent of the League Council and could be terminated by the mandatory power. * ( d ) At the request of the mandatory power made early in 1947, the United Nations General Assembly made a recommendation concerning the future government of Palestine in the Assembly’s resolution of November 29, 1947. This recommendation, “accepted” by the mandatory power, contained provisions for an internationalized City of Jerusalem under United Nations control, apart from the Jewish and Arab States to be created in Palestine. ( e ) Although the Statute for Jerusalem which the United Nations Trusteeship Council drafted pursuant to the November 29 resolution was not placed in operation upon the termination of the British mandate for Palestine (May 14, 1949), † Jerusalem remained at the disposition of the United Nations. ( f ) Through its resolutions of May 6, 1948 and December 11, 1948, ‡ the General Assembly has perpetuated its interest and authority with respect to the future of Jerusalem. It is evident that the chain of reasoning just referred to is a complicated one, certainly not free from serious doubts and difficulties. It is noteworthy, for example, that the Israeli Delegation at the Fourth Session of the General Assembly took the position that “Jewish Jerusalem” had become integrated with the State of Israel. In a memorandum submitted to the General Assembly on November 15, 1949 the Israeli Delegation stated: “The Mandate unmistakably came to an end in the absence of a ‘specific link of any kind between the United Nations and Jerusalem.’” The memorandum went on to assert that no events after May 14, 1948 operated to confer legal authority on the United Nations with respect to Jerusalem. The memorandum concluded: “Moreover, it would be misleading to think of the present political relationship between Israel and Jerusalem as a provisional connection which could still be loosened. History knows no precedent of a population, having once achieved union with its own natural and kindred government, voluntarily turning back to mere semi-autonomy under outside control. The Charter provides for no contingency whereby an area of independence can become a non-self-governing territory.” § The General Assembly resolution of December 9, 1949 concerning Jerusalem provides as follows: [Here follows the text of the resolution; see Foreign Relations , 1949, volume VI, page 1530 .] This resolution assumes power in the General Assembly to make binding provision for the future government of Jerusalem. When the Assembly was discussing the Jerusalem question, it was of course open to Members of the United Nations to debate the issue of United Nations power in regard to Jerusalem. The view held concerning this issue by the Government of any Member would properly be a factor in determining that Member’s vote on a resolution such as the one finally adopted by the Assembly. Once, however, the General Assembly has made a recommendation, the recommendation is entitled to great weight and Members of the United Nations ought to respect it. In regard to the Jerusalem problem, United Nations Members are not free to attack collaterally and undermine the adopted resolution of the Assembly, even though they may disagree with the resolution or think it based on an erroneous conception of the Assembly’s authority. Considerations such as these were properly before the General Assembly when it adopted the December 9 resolution on Jerusalem and may be before the Assembly at a future session if it again takes up the Jerusalem problem. In the interim, while the December 9 resolution remains operative, the United States, as a member of the United Nations, should respect the General Assembly’s recommendation and should refrain from inconsistent action. Consistently with the General Assembly resolution, the United States and Israel or Jordan might agree that, pending final determination and actual establishment of a permanent Jerusalem régime, this Government should keep consular officials in Jerusalem who would exercise their functions in the absence of any exequaturs issued by Israel or Jordan. But the United States should not now accede to requests from any national state that this Government apply to it for consular exequaturs covering the Jerusalem area if such action were understood by the governments concerned to imply recognition of the national state’s sovereignty in Jerusalem. Nevertheless it would seem consistent with the position of the United States as a Member of the United Nations to apply for and receive exequaturs from the government of a national state if it were clearly understood that these steps did not involve recognition of the state’s sovereignty in Jerusalem. The past practice of the United States in analogous situations has not been uniform. In 1911 the United States sought and secured recognition from Belgium of American consular officials in the Congo, at a time when the United States did not recognize Belgian annexation of the Congo. The Department of State instructed the Minister to Belgium that such consular recognition was by the de facto authorities, “it not being a question of de jure determination.” See IV Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1942) p. 684. In 1924 the Department authorized American consular officers in Chile to accept exequaturs from an unrecognized régime on condition that the issuing régime understood clearly that acceptance did not imply recognition. See ibid . at 688. But under similar circumstances in Mexico and the USSR the United States declined to apply to unrecognized régimes for any official recognition of American consuls. See ibid . at 686–87. In the cases of Czechoslovakia and Danzig in 1939, the United States sought exequaturs from the German Government on condition that the position of the United States with respect to the status of these two territories should be considered preserved. Germany refused, and the American consulates were closed. See ibid . at 689–90. The United States for its part has declined to issue exequaturs in this country to the consuls of unrecognized foreign régimes. See ibid . at 694 (Ecuador). Leonard C. Meeker 1 Copy not found in Department of State files. 2 John D. Jernegan, Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs. * Such termination perhaps required the Council’s consent during the period of the League’s active existence. [Footnote in the source text.] † The Trusteeship Council completed its work on the Statute on March 10, 1948, but deferred the question of formal approval until the Third Part of its Second Session, to be convened in April. When the Council met again, it referred the matter of the Statute to the General Assembly on April 21, for such further instructions as the Assembly might see fit to give. The Assembly, then meeting in special session, did not reply, other than to adopt on April 26 a resolution requesting the Trusteeship Council to study measures for the protection of Jerusalem and report to the General Assembly. It was on the basis of the Council’s report that the Assembly adopted on May 6 a resolution recommending the appointment of a Special Municipal Commissioner for Jerusalem. A Commissioner was in consequence appointed (Mr. Harold Evans, of Philadelphia). Although he never reached Jerusalem, a Deputy Commissioner—Mr. Pablo Azcarate—has served in the post for over 18 months. The General Assembly has never revoked its resolution of November 29, 1947. On May 14, 1948 the Assembly adopted a resolution which in its third part merely relieved the Palestine Commission (established by the November 29 resolution) “from the further exercise of responsibilities.” On July 29, 1948 the Trusteeship Council adjourned indefinitely any further consideration of the Statute for Jerusalem. [Footnote in the source text.] ‡ In this resolution the Assembly instructed the Palestine Conciliation Commission to prepare proposals on a special international regime for Jerusalem to be considered by the Assembly at its fourth regular session. The Commission, in response, prepared a draft instrument for Jerusalem, the preamble of which stated: “ The United Nations … Hereby establishes , in the exercise of its full and permanent authority over the Jerusalem area, a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area in accordance with the following provisions: …” [Footnote in the source text.] § The argumentation to support the Israeli legal position concerning Jerusalem is given at pages 4–11 of the Israeli Delegation’s memorandum submitted to the General Assembly on November 15, 1949. [Footnote in the source text.] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 884.02/1–1450: Telegram [Document 322] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 1 secret Washington , January 14, 1950—4 p. m. 75. For Amb Francis Sayre. 2 Dept has recd a number of unfavorable comments, largely from Arab sources, on fol Herald Tribune account of statement allegedly made by you upon departure from Idlewild airport Jan 5. “The US opposed the resolution 3 for the internationalization of Jerusalem and that position remains unchanged today. We will, however, cooperate in seeking a solution of the problem, but we want a practical solution, and it would not be a practical solution if US troops are required to enforce the resolution”. Dept believes this is probably garbled or incomplete account of your statements. However, sources mentioned above are interpreting remarks as indicating US attempting “sabotage” majority UN decision. In discussions in TC and outside re Jerusalem you shld be guided by principle approved by Pres 4 that US as member of UN and of TC shld not give impression it is obstructing TC’s work in carrying forward a GA resolution adopted by a majority of UN, and shld make bona fide effort in TC’s work, of drafting a statute for Jerusalem. Dept spokesman will make the fol statement to press Jan 16: “The United Nations Trusteeship Council is scheduled to convene in Geneva on Jan 19 to consider the Jerusalem question in the framework of the instrs to the Council contained in the Dec 9, 1949, resolution of the General Assembly. Although it opposed this resolution in the Assembly, the US, consistent in its policy of respect for decisions taken in the United Nations by a majority of the members, abides by the decision and is prepared as a member of the Trusteeship Council to participate constructively when the Council undertakes the task concerning Jerusalem given it by the Assembly”. 5 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated for information to the United States Mission at the United Nations, at New York. 2 Francis B. Sayre, United States Representative at the Sixth Session of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. 3 For the text of the resolution of December 9, 1949, by the General Assembly, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1530 . 4 See Secretary Acheson’s memorandum of December 20, 1949, to President Truman, ibid. , p. 1551 . 5 The statement was made on January 16 by Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations, at an informal meeting with the press (memorandum of conversation by Harlan B. Clark, Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria-Iraq Affairs, 350/1–2350). Mr. Clark’s memorandum recorded that Faiz el-Khouri, the Syrian Minister, caned at the Department of State on January 23 on instructions from his Government to express concern over published reports that the United States would not support the resolution of December 9, 1949. Assistant Secretary McGhee replied that United States policy had been stated officially by Mr. McDermott and that reports to the contrary were untrue. He repeated to the Minister key points made by Mr. McDermott. He also advised him of a report from Ambassador Sayre that he had been misunderstood by the correspondents and misquoted by the press. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs George C. McGhee transmitted copies of Mr. McDermott’s statement of January 16 to the Iraqi Chargé on February 6 and to the Lebanese Minister on February 15, after conversations with the two diplomats on the position of the United States respecting the internationalization of Jerusalem (350/2–650, 357.AC/2–550). The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State 784.00/1–1650: Telegram [Document 323] The Chargé in Jordan ( Fritzlan ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , January 16, 1950. 5. Friday 1 night I dined at Shuneh with King who expressed disappointment re recent Israeli firm stand against acceptance his demands basis peace settlement and pessimism re agreement near future though he continues feel early peace highly desirable. Asked me talk with Samir Pasha who had just returned from Tehran re details. Following day I saw Samir who said he found letter from Shiloah awaiting him on return Amman. He lent me original of letter dated December 29 which stated: [Here follows the text of the letter, accompanied by a brief paragraph of comment on a detail of the text.] “Suggestion” re first paragraph is width and point access sea of proposed corridor. Last paragraph presumably refers Sassoon’s departure for Ankara. Letter from Sassoon to King reported to be same as Samir’s [ Shiloah’s? ] letter. Samir informed me latest Israeli move means indefinite postponement negotiations. Feels time has come for him withdraw and permit government continue if desires on official basis. Intends take no action reply Shiloah’s letter and strongly holds view next step up to Israelis. He counseling King be patient and avoid rash hasty action. Samir volunteered information that Prime Minister had categorically told him that while he does not disapprove negotiations and will not criticize, but rather will support, eventual agreement with Israelis provided Jordan obtains substantial advantages he will not be party to such agreement. Tawfiq Pasha recently officially denied rumors Jordan Government negotiating with Israelis and added government will resign after April elections to give King free hand selection suitable government. It thus seems most probable that in event basic agreement between Jordan and Israel reached before elections Samir will replace Tawfiq. Both King and Samir complained bitterly Israelis being “difficult and unreasonable”. They expressed hope US and UK could informally express to Israelis that Jordan position considered reasonable. I reiterated view that US desirous two parties reach agreement without intervention other parties as such agreement more likely to be durable. Comment: Though Tawfiq’s denial technically correct it left completely false impression and it will be difficult in face of it to prepare state of mind of people for any eventual settlement with Israelis. This seems unfortunate. King doubtless anxious reach agreement before elections after which it would be more difficult problem square matters with Palestinians. Israelis doubtless aware of this. End of comment . Sent Department 5. Pouched Arab capitals. Department pass London 2, Tel Aviv 2, Jerusalem 3, PCC 1. Fritzlan 1 January 13. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart D. Nelson of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 784.02/1–1750 [Document 324] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart D. Nelson of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 1 confidential [ Washington ,] January 17, 1950. Subject: The Internationalization of Jerusalem, Palestinian problems in general and other matters in which the Government of Egypt is interested. Participants: Egyptian Ambassador, Kamil Bey Abdul Rahim Assistant Secretary of State, George C. McGhee ANE—Mr. Stuart Rockwell ANE—Mr. Stuart Nelson Problem: An exchange of views on matters in which the Governments of the United States and Egypt are interested. Action Taken: A discussion of these matters by Mr. McGhee and the Egyptian Ambassador. Action Required: 1) A study by ANE/E of the problem of abolishing the quota for Egyptian long staple cotton. 2) A study by SA–M of the “bad press” which Egypt is allegedly receiving in the United States. Action Assigned to: ANE Summary: The Egyptian Ambassador opened the discussion by inquiring as to what had taken place at the Istanbul Conference in regard to the internationalization of Jerusalem. Mr. McGhee replied that not much had been done on this at the Conference since, at that time, the United Nations had not as yet taken final action in regard to a resolution on Jerusalem. He continued by stating that he wished to assure the Ambassador that it was, of course, the policy of the United States to abide by majority decisions of the United Nations whether or not this Government had supported them in the debate. As Mr. McDermott had stated to the press on January 16, 2 we would make a bona fide effort in the Trusteeship Council’s work of carrying out the task given it by the Assembly. The Ambassador said that the Egyptian Government had been very pleased by Mr. McDermott’s statement. Mr. McGhee added that the question of implementing a statute for the full internationalization of Jerusalem in the face of strong Israeli and Jordanian opposition would be a difficult one. The Ambassador replied that the régime could be established if the United States and the United Kingdom would fully support efforts to do so. Mr. McGhee then referred to the possibilities for creating stability in the Near East area through the mediums of the Economic Survey Mission and Point IV. 3 He said that it was now expected that the United States Congress would appropriate $27,000,000 for work relief projects in the Near East as outlined in the Clapp Report. Mr. McGhee said that since this was a United Nations program he hoped that the other governments concerned would make proportional contributions. In this connection he mentioned that it was hoped that the Arab States would contribute about $6,000,000. The Ambassador replied that the Arab States had contributed to refugee relief in the past and that he expected these States to make further contributions, in kind or otherwise. The Ambassador then declared that the Egyptian Government was very pleased by the Secretary’s letter to Congressman Javits 4 on the question of the arms being supplied to Egypt by the United Kingdom. He was able to give categoric assurance that these arms were for defensive purposes only. Nahas Pasha had only that morning requested him by telephone to assure the United States Government that the Government of Egypt had no intention whatsoever of renewing aggressive warfare against Israel. The Ambassador stated that Egypt, which really had never had one, desired to establish an effective army of its own. He continued by saying that his country had appropriated only about 25% or 26% of the National budget for military purposes, and that this did not seem to be out of line with general practice. Some of the equipment Egypt was obtaining from Britain was second-hand. Some was new and modern, but this was being supplied in exceptionally small quantities and the present supply program would extend over a two or three year period. The Ambassador recalled that the Egyptian Foreign Office had recently issued a statement to the effect that the Government of Egypt considered that the Israeli-Egyptian armistice would remain operative until a final peace settlement was concluded. This statement had been issued to refute a report which had appeared in the newspaper Al Ahram stating that Egypt would announce the termination of the Armistice on February 15, 1950. The Ambassador then questioned Mr. McGhee as to what took place in Istanbul in regard to the unification of Syria and Iraq. Mr. McGhee replied that this matter had been discussed and that the position of the United States Government was the same as it always had been; i.e., we would not oppose such unification if it took place through the freely expressed will of the people. The Egyptian Ambassador stated that the Egyptian and United States positions appeared to be the same. He then quoted former Prime Minister Sirry Pasha’s statement in regard to the fact that “Egypt would extend aid to any Arab State which was subject to external pressure.” He stated that this was still the position of his government in regard to the unification of Syria and Iraq against the will of the Syrian people. Mr. Rockwell inquired whether that statement meant that Egypt would take military action if other states intrigued to bring about the union. The Ambassador replied that this did not mean that Egypt would take military action. There were various forms of pressure which could be used. Mr. McGhee asked the Ambassador if Sirry Pasha had in mind pressure originating merely in Iraq or if he thought that Britain was also involved. The Ambassador said he really did not know. Mr. McGhee stated the opinion that Britain was not applying any pressure for the unification of Syria and Iraq. Ambassador Rahim then said that he thought the whole project was cooling off, and that the new Iraqi Government would probably not “pressure” Syria in a manner similar to that employed by former Prime Minister Nuri Said. He was of the opinion there were not as many differences between the Arab States as press reports would lead one to believe. He said that he felt that Iraqi-Egyptian relations were quite good, and that there was a well developed element of solidarity among all the Arab States. He expected the new Egyptian Government under Prime Minister Nahas Pasha to carry on friendly relations with Iraq. In his opinion it was quite possible that Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, might be replaced in the near future, a move which would please Iraq. The Ambassador then inquired as to whether Anglo-Egyptian relations had been discussed at Istanbul. Mr. McGhee stated that they had been discussed in a general sense, and then asked the Ambassador what he thought about the possibilities for the renegotiation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The Ambassador said that he felt that the Wafdist Government under Nahas Pasha will proceed immediately with treaty negotiations with Britain. He recalled that Nahas Pasha had recently stated that the British must evacuate the Canal Zone. Mr. McGhee then asked the Ambassador if the Egyptian people really wanted the British to depart from the Canal Zone. The Ambassador replied that this was a historical problem and that the Egyptian people ardently desired that the British should evacuate Egypt completely. He stated that the British could more efficiently defend the Canal Zone from Malta, Cyprus, Cyrenaica and Jordan. Mr. McGhee said that he wondered if sufficient consideration had been given to the fact that even though the British troops were small in number in the Canal Zone area, they were most certainly a symbol of strength and thereby lent a degree of stability to the area. He emphasized that he was not defending the British position but wished to bring out further all considerations in order to ascertain whether the Egyptians really felt that they wanted the British to evacuate the Canal Zone. The Ambassador reiterated his previous statements concerning the desire of the Egyptian people. He stated that the presence of the British reminded the Egyptians of past defeats by the British and produced a sense of “moral insecurity.” The Ambassador then inquired as to the United States Government’s feelings in regard to regional pacts in the Near East. Mr. McGhee said that the topic of Near East regional pacts had been discussed at Istanbul and that it had been decided that while military aid should continue to go to Greece, Turkey and Iran under the MDAP program, it was not necessary to extend such aid to the other Near East states or for the United States to associate itself with any regional security pacts. He added, however, that it was this Government’s policy to favor any regional grouping which would bring peace and prosperity to the people concerned. The Ambassador stated that he was happy to hear this opinion and that he wished to assure the United States Government that the Arab League Security Pact 5 was intended to be a mutual defense pact and not one of aggression toward any state. The Ambassador then stated that the Counselor of his Embassy had recently called at the Department in regard to the possibilities of increasing Egypt’s supply of dollar foreign exchange. He referred especially to the import quota on cotton and said that he hoped that the United States could find it feasible to eliminate this quota since long staple cotton which Egypt exported to the United States was not in competition with the cotton raised by United States growers. Mr. McGhee replied that the Department had this problem under consideration and realized that it was a matter of great importance to the Egyptian Government. He stated that this was an intricate problem which was complicated by the fact that many of our people misunderstood the situation and therefore opposed the elimination of the quota. Mr. McGhee told the Ambassador that the Department would make a very active study of this matter and do what was possible to remedy the situation. The Ambassador then handed to Mr. McGhee clippings from several magazines and newspapers relating to recent stories about King Farouk and his contemplated marriage. He stated that in his opinion Egypt was receiving a very bad press in the United States and he wondered if the Department could not make some semi-official approach to the press in an effort to avoid any repetition of such stories in the future. He stated that he had worked for 18 months in an effort to improve United States-Egyptian relations and he felt that such news stories as these were ridiculing Egypt in the eyes of the American people and undoing all his efforts. Mr. McGhee replied that this was a difficult situation to handle since if the matter were called to the attention of the American press in a reprimanding manner, there would most likely be an unfavorable reaction by the press and further stories in regard to this subject. He told the Ambassador that the best approach might be an informal one directly to the various publishers. He said that he would talk this matter over with the members of the press division in the Department to see if anything could be done about this situation. Mr. McGhee thought that if the stories about King Farouk were not true, a convincing denial would be given wide press coverage. 1 Drafted also by Mr. Rockwell. 2 See footnote 5, p. 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] . 3 For documentation on the latter subject, see pp. 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] ff. 4 Dated January 12, p. 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] . 5 For information on this Pact, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1486 ff. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 780.5/1–950: Telegram [Document 325] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 secret Washington , January 17, 1950—4 p. m. 16. Your 16 Jan 9. Depcirtel Sept 7 2 based on memo fully setting forth present US policy re arms shipments NE. Copy memo was forwarded Emb. Dept continues believe shipments arms to Arab States and Israel shld be limited to those necessary for maintaining internal law and order by Govts concerned and for providing for reasonable requirements self-defense. Dept does not desire see arms race develop in NE and will not permit arms shipments from US of nature likely affect adversely the maintenance of peace and security in area. Dept has received no info justifying conclusion Egypt or any other Arab State has serious intention or immediate plans for renewing hostilities. You shld assure Israelis that US Govt will continue keep close watch on NE arms situation and if convincing evidence received of preparations by any party renew conflict, US will not hesitate use its influence attempt prevent such plans from being carried out. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Cairo and London. 2 Not printed; but see editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1365 . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/1–1850: Telegram [Document 326] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State secret London , January 18, 1950—7 p. m. 289. Geneva for Sayre and Palmer. Furlonge, head Eastern Department, during course conversation on Jordan-Israeli talks yesterday, mentioned that at time he first took over Eastern Department, (about December 13) British Ambassador Cairo 1 was approached by Egyptian whom Foreign Office believes had palace connections, asking UK advice re desirability Egypt possibly undertaking direct talks with Jordan [ Israel? ], perhaps by joining current Israeli-Jordan conversations. Furlonge states Foreign Office felt that if Egypt desired undertake such talks, it would be better if Egyptian Government approached British Government more formally and that Foreign Office did not like sub rosa method of handling question. Foreign Office therefore told Campbell to break off conversations this subject and there have been no further developments since that time. Furlonge added Foreign Office had grave doubts re desirability Egypt joining Israeli-Jordan talks, since it felt Egypt and Jordan would, during course negotiations, slit each others throats. Furlonge said Foreign Office has no recent information re current status Jordan-Israeli conversations other than general understanding they are deadlocked, particularly over corridor issue. Furlonge then reverted matter reported Embtel 25, January 3, stating he personally (and he emphasized “personally”, since he has not consulted his superiors) had been giving great deal of thought as to whether time might not be approaching when it might be desirable intervene in negotiations in hope facilitating agreement. He stated Foreign Office has recently received message from Troutbeck BMEO Cairo 2 in which latter expressed following views: (1) present US–UK policy toward NE appears to be one of promoting economic and social development in hope that this would bring about political stability. Troutbeck felt this was putting cart before horse and that there was little hope for economic and social progress unless political stability could first be brought to area. (2) Biggest factor mitigating against political stability at present time is Palestine situation and it is therefore necessary that US and UK take more active role in promoting settlement that problem. (3) In order bring about Palestine settlement, it might be necessary for US and UK to guarantee frontiers. Furlonge commented last point extremely contentious. In effect, through treaty relations, UK already guaranteeing Egypt and Jordan boundaries with Israel (although, of course, not Arab Palestine at present time). Guarantee was one-sided and does not protect Israel against unlikely Egypt or Jordan aggression. He was certain, however, UK would not feel that it could extend general guarantee of frontiers in area. Leaving this aside, however, he personally wondered whether consideration should not be given to second Point which Troutbeck had raised. He wondered what our views would be. With regard to Troutbeok’s first point, we recalled present economic and social approach through ESM and PRA had been resorted to with result failure make any progress toward settlement on political side. Admittedly inter-relationship economic and social development to political stability rather like hen and egg. However, we still hope for much from economic approach, but by no means neglecting political settlement. In this connection we recalled we have consistently favored direct talks. Re second point, our attitude has been one of non-intervention in direct talks, preferring leave both sides free to use their respective bargaining positions in effort reach agreement. We did suppose that in event it appeared desirable and likely of success, Department might not reconsider its present hands-off policy, but we had seen no indications that Department felt that it would be desirable intervene at present stage negotiations. Re third point, we felt certain that US Government could not associate itself with any guarantee of frontiers in area. Furlonge stated that he did not think Foreign Office would alter its present policy re non-intervention at this time, although it would probably circularize its NE missions asking for their opinions re possible effectiveness UK and US intervention. Sent Department 289; repeated Cairo 6, Tel Aviv 6, Geneva 9; Department pass Amman 3. Holmes 1 Sir Ronald Ian Campbell. 2 Ambassador Sir John Monro Troutbeck, Head of the British Middle East Office, at Cairo. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 684A.85/1–1850: Telegram [Document 327] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom secret Washington , January 20, 1950—6 p. m. 268. Ur 289 Jan 18. Dept approves line taken by Emb reps in conversation with Furlonge. Fol specific comments reftel which Emb may use in conversations FonOff. (1) View PCC experience, Dept believes negots Israel with Arab states individually rather than with two or more Arab states at same time wld probably be more conducive successful outcome. (2) Dept adopted economic approach to Pal problem because active US efforts in polit field to bring about settlement (through US rep PCC and US Dipl reps) were unsuccessful. Dept still considers economic approach most hopeful one, and has no reason believe new intervention in polit field wld prove any more fruitful than previously. (3) Dept continues believe US intervention in Israeli-Jordan talks undesirable. (4) Dept continues strongly opposed to US participation in any guarantees. Acheson Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 784A.00/1–2450 [Document 328] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs secret [ Washington ,] January 24, 1950. Subject: 1. Status of Conversations between Israel and Jordan 2. Report that Israelis Preparing to Sell Sequestered Arab Refugee Property. Participants: The Jordan Minister, Dr. Yusuf Haikal NEA—Mr. McGhee ANE—Mr. Berry Mr. Rockwell Problem: King Abdullah very concerned by Israeli refusal to meet Jordan desires re land connection between Jordan and Mediterranean; also worried by report Israelis preparing to sell Arab refugee property in areas under Israeli control. Action Required: To ascertain whether Israel taking steps to sell sequestered Arab refugee property. Action Assigned to: ANE Discussion: Mr. McGhee received the Jordan Minister at the latter’s request. Dr. Haikal stated that he had been instructed by King Abdullah to take up the following points. 1. Status of Israeli-Jordon Conversations —Dr. Haikal reviewed the course of the secret conversations between Israel and Jordan, from the first approach to King Abdullah by Mr. Novomeysky 1 of the Palestine Potash Company to the present stalemate over the question of Jordanian access to the sea. The Minister stated that his King had instructed him to inform the Department of all these developments and to convey to Amman such statements as officials of the Department might care to make on the present situation. He maintained that Jordan, in making a request for a substantial section of the Negev in order to insure solid access to the Mediterranean, had been guided by President Truman’s message of last spring to King Abdullah 2 in which the President set forth the US policy that if Israel desired to retain territory beyond that granted to her by the 1947 partition resolution, Israel should make appropriate territorial compensation. Mr. McGhee expressed gratitude for the King’s courtesy in making available to the Department the information conveyed by Dr. Haikal. He said that the territorial policy which the Minister had referred to had been, and was still, the general policy of the United States Government concerning a territorial settlement in Palestine. He emphasized, however, that this policy was a general one and did not refer to specific pieces of territory or to the specific nations to which territory might be allotted. He further pointed out that this policy was an entirely unilateral one which unfortunately seemed to have had little effect on the Israeli Government. Mr. McGhee went on to say that the United States Government, through its participation in the Palestine Conciliation Commission and through American participation in the Economic Survey Mission, had sought to bring about conditions which might facilitate the establishment of peace between Israel and the Arab states. The recommendations of the ESM, in particular, were designed to alleviate the burden placed upon the Arab states by the refugees and to enable the Arab states to consider the question of a final settlement without having to place so much emphasis on the refugee problem. In general, however, the question of a final settlement in Palestine was a matter of which the United Nations was seized, and the United States Government could not take a unilateral role in bringing about a settlement. Mr. McGhee thought that the question of exactly what was involved in an Israeli-Jordan settlement was a problem which would have to be solved by Israel and Jordan alone, without interference from outside parties. Each of the two states knew best what it considered vital to its interests, and the important thing was not to allow the all-important issue of a peace settlement to be obscured by issues which were not vital. Mr. McGhee then inquired how large a strip of territory Jordan needed to assure access to the sea. The Minister replied that the King was asking for a substantial part of the Negev but that Israel offered only a narrow corridor. Jordan needed a real seacoast, said the Minister, not just a port. Mr. McGhee said that he personally did not consider a corridor to be a very feasible proposition but if Jordan desired a whole section of the Negev, he could understand the difficulty which Jordan and Israel were having in arriving at an agreement on this particular point. He wondered whether Jordan had given full consideration to the economic burden of establishing a seaport. The Minister maintained that while it would take a good many years for Jordan to build a port, this would eventually be done and a port was absolutely vital to Jordan. The Minister said that as usual the Israelis were trying to obtain an agreement by not giving up anything themselves. From the tone of the King’s letter he judged that the King, who really desired an agreement, was very much discouraged. The Minister said that if Jordan was not able to reach an agreement with Israel no other Arab state would dare to try to do so. He outlined the manner in which the present unsettled situation in the Near East was advantageous to the Soviet Union and to Communist agents, and expressed the personal hope that the United States Government would be able to do something with the Israelis in order to persuade them to change their attitude. Mr. McGhee said that the United States Government deeply appreciated the cooperative attitude taken by King Abdullah toward the Palestine problem. The United States Government also appreciated the courage the King had shown in beginning the talks. However, he did not think the situation was as discouraging as the Minister portrayed it. The fact that Jordan and Israel desired a peace settlement was an encouraging factor. So was the fact that Israel, which had always stated that it would not agree to a corridor, had offered Jordan one, even though it was very narrow. Mr. McGhee said that negotiations like this always take a long time. He felt that it was definitely possible that the talks would recommence and that a compromise position might be achieved. Perhaps there were other pieces of territory upon which agreement could be reached. Mr. McGhee said once more that the United States Government was not in a position to intervene, believing that the matter was one which would have to be worked out by Jordan and Israel alone. 2. Sale of Arab Refugee Property in Israel —The Minister said that King Abdullah was much disturbed by reports in the Arab press that the Israelis were preparing legislation which would authorize the sale of immovable sequestered Arab refugee property. He inquired whether we knew anything about this. Mr. McGhee said that he had heard no report of this nature and that we understood that the Israel Alien Property Custodian was authorized to rent sequestered Arab real estate, not to sell it. He added that we would inquire of our Embassy in Tel Aviv concerning this reported development, and would get in touch with the Minister as soon as we had received a reply. 1 Moses A. Novemeysky was founder and Managing Director of the Palestine Potash [Company?] Ltd. The editors have been unable to discover in the files of the Department of State any documentation concerning the nature of his approach to King Abdullah or the time of his approach. 2 For President Truman’s message of March 28, 1949, to King Abdullah, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 878 . The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 674.84A/1–2550 [Document 329] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret No. 73 Cairo , January 25, 1950. Foreign Minister Salaheddin Bey said, in informal conversation, that he could state his policy on Palestine in a few words: (1) Egypt would never attack Israel. The Army was being reorganized and reenforced to provide for national security in view of Egypt’s strategic position between the East and West. (2) Egypt would never make peace with Israel. (3) Egypt would never recognize Israel. (4) Egypt would never collaborate with Israel. He did not elaborate on these points but when it was suggested that the time had come to look upon the situation realistically: Israel was an established fact and that Egypt should now balance its books concerning Israel and get down to its major internal and external problems, he shook his head and said that any other policy on the part of Egypt would destroy the morale of all the Arab states which looked to Egypt for leadership. Any rapproachement with Israel by Egypt would further add to the morale of Israel. This intransigent stand on Palestine is believed to represent the Foreign Minister’s point of view. It is in keeping with his statements in the past and his record during the Palestine conflict. Whether he will stick to this view in the future is problematical. Nahas Pasha undoubtedly puts considerable trust in him. It is known, for example, that Salaheddin drafted most of the Throne Speech. Jefferson Caffery 1 This despatch was repeated to London and other Arab capitals. The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State 784.00/1–2550: Telegram [Document 330] The Chargé in Jordan ( Fritzlan ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , January 25, 1950—11 p. m. 7. This a. m., I had long talk with Samir Rifai re Jordan-Israeli meeting last night Shuneh. Following his version events: 1. Week ago King Abdullah received letter from Shiloah suggesting discussions re Jerusalem in view TC consideration problem and possible action implement international resolution. King responded favorably requesting Samir arrange meeting. 2. Samir declined saying he felt time for Government consider matter negotiations and if thought them advisable participate in them formal basis. King agreed asking Prime Minister consider matter. 3. Cabinet debated question and decided might be possible Government representative discuss Jerusalem question with Israelis. Samir’s suggestion Defense Minister Fawzi Mulki chosen represent Government. Samir consented accompany Fawzi. 4. Meeting took place with Shiloah and Dayan, King being absent perhaps in view recent indisposition due light attack flu. Outset Israeli suggested agree on procedural approach UN on Jerusalem. Both Fawzi and Samir expressed surprise stating they hoped discuss substantive questions. Samir expressed view Israel had committed itself re Jerusalem more heavily than Jordan and as UN member had more to fear from possible UN sanctions and that Israelis seemed quite naturally especially eager obtain agreement with Jordan on partition city. He asked how far Israel would go to defy UN and what Jordan might expect from agreement. 5. Reply to first question Shiloah replied Israel would leave UN before giving up Jerusalem. Re second Dayan said Israel would agree to rectification present armistice line but only on “meter for meter” principle. 6. Samir stated this principle entirely unacceptable and question one of interest each party recognizing Israeli interest obtain Jewish quarter, Wailing Wall and access Mt. Scopus though latter secondary (these concessions made December 13 meeting). In turn Jordan interested regain Arab quarters and Bethlehem Road though latter now minor interest view completion Bethany Road to Bethlehem. Felt if each recognized other’s interests suitable line could be drawn without difficulty. 7. Bawis [apparent garble] foregoing Jordan members at meeting proposed line running along Nablus and St. Paul’s Roads to Allenby Square thence along Mamillah Road to point between Terra Saneta College and Franciscan Convent and point on Bethlehem Road so as to embrace Talbiya, Greek Colony and Baqa quarters. In return for rectification line Jordan’s favor Jordan would give area around Palestine Police Headquarters between Nablus Road and Sanhedriya, give passage Jewish quarter and Wailing Wall and guarantee free access Mt. Scopus. 8. Israelis did not comment possibility solution along these lines but agreed consult their superiors and return for meeting January. Comment: Samir has somewhat modified position from that of December 13, when he did not demand Talbiya, Greek Colony and Baqa but was content compensation Arab quarters generally though he stated Jerusalem agreement must be part general agreement (Legtel 421, December 15 1 ). Though Samir would undoubtedly prefer tying Jerusalem question with general settlement he seemed consider discussions Jerusalem separate issue warranted now in view: ( a ) desirability agreement between parties in control city in face imminent UN action and (b) strong likelihood gaining Jordan Government’s approval widening base negotiations should satisfactory Jerusalem settlement result. Samir seemed fairly optimistic success discussions which related solely to Jerusalem question. Re likelihood King giving up corridor demand, mentioned in Tel Aviv 50, January 23, 2 it would be great mistake to take all King’s statements at face value. He might personally indicate willingness scale down his demands somewhat but he would have great difficulty persuade any government accept his view. Modification re corridor conceivable only if compensation territorially elsewhere demanded. 3 Sent Department 7; Department pass London 3, Tel Aviv 3, Jerusalem 4, Geneva 2, for USPCC 3 and USTC 1; pouch Arab capitals. Fritzlan 1 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1545 . 2 Not printed; it advised of information from Mr. Shiloah concerning reports of “UN visitors” to King Abdullah that he was willing to give up his demand for a corridor and accept frontier rectifications and free access to Israeli ports. The former also indicated that the King had been disappointed at Baghdad, receiving no support there for his position on Jerusalem or Syria and that he had been upset when the Egyptian Prime Minister received the Grand Mufti at Cairo instead of agreeing to a conference with him (684A.85/1–2350). 3 Ambassador McDonald, on January 28 reported on these talks as follows: “Re Israel-Transjordan talk January 24 Shiloah and Kollek my residence January 26 report following: Participants for Israel Shiloah and Dayan, for Transjordan Samir and for first time Minister Defense Fawzi el Mulki; King still slightly indisposed but present short time at dinner. King urged both sides make progress towards agreement. “Technical subject discussion limited Jerusalem but implications broader. Concentration was on possible partition Jerusalem. Transjordan conciliatory re Wailing Wall and Jewish Quarter but more firm re Scopus. Both sides agreed bring tentative [plan?] Jerusalem partition next meeting January 20.” (Telegram 63 from Tel Aviv, 684A.85/1–2850) The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 484.418/1–2650: Telegram [Document 331] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , January 26, 1950—5 p. m. 59. Following article headlined “US Warned on Arms to Arabs” appeared in Palestine Post January 26. “The far-reaching implications of the Dean Acheson letter to Mr. Javits 1 are such as to cause the Government of Israel grave concern, an authoritative source said at Hakirya 2 yesterday. The US Secretary of State had written to the New York Congressman asserting that British arms shipments to the Arab states were intended for ‘legitimate security requirements’. He also did not believe that ‘serious measures are being taken for a renewal of hostilities’. The Israel statement yesterday continued: Mr. Acheson defends the shipment of British arms to the Arab states on the grounds that they are being supplied under treaty obligations and intended merely for the maintenance of internal law and order in those states and for meeting reasonable requirement of self-defense. This explanation is hardly borne out by the types of arms which have recently been supplied to the Arab states. It is difficult to assert that for ‘purpose of maintaining internal law and order’, the Egyptian Government requires destroyers, submarines, dozens of Vampire and Meteor jet planes, large quantities of the heaviest types of tanks and artillery, as well as many tens of thousands of automatic rifles—much of this from American war surpluses in Europe. Nor can the establishment of highly mobile mechanized formations of considerable striking power, or the purchase of large armaments plants from Germany, France, Sweden and Italy be motivated by considerations of internal order and security. These heavy armaments can clearly be intended only for use in external war. It is equally evident on the other hand that in case of any attack by a major power, these arms would be entirely inadequate to defend Egypt. Thus, they are ruled out by the circumstances of the case from serving the two purposes indicated in Mr. Acheson’s statement. As against this, possession of these comparatively large quantities of modern arms may clearly facilitate renewed aggression against Israel. This danger is all the greater in the light of the numerous statements which have appeared in the Egyptian and Arab press generally indicate a scarcely veiled intention of resuming hostilities against Israel whenever circumstances are favorable for that course. Hardly a week passes without some new threat of the coming “second round” being uttered in the Arab press or radio, and these threats come from by no means negligible quarters. It requires little imagination to picture the effect which the arrival of these large consignments of modern arms must have on these hotheads. If, in addition, they now see the responsible head of American foreign policy giving his blessing to this large-scale armament, the consequences may be serious to a degree. This seems hardly the way to prevent a renewal of hostilities between the Arab states and Israel, which Mr. Dean Acheson rightly declares would be tragic development. For Israel, the statement of the American Secretary of State is fraught with grave consequences. He assures us, that should a resumption of hostilities be threatened, the US Government would use all its influence to prevent such a tragic eventuality. The experience of the Arab war of aggression against Israel offers conclusive evidence that Israel cannot rely for its defense on the moral influence of other powers. Indeed, conditions in this respect are liable to be even worse in future than they were then, because the ability of the US Government to exercise such moral pressure may have been gravely jeopardized by its having assented to the large-scale rearming of countries which make no secret of their intention to resume the fight. The situation created by this statement is very unfortunate. The heavy rearmament of the Arab states will clearly leave Israel no choice but to increase its own defensive capacity to the maximum of its ability. One can only hope that the American Secretary of State may not have been fully aware of all the facts and implications of this matter and that further reconsideration may lead him to revise his attitude and to take action to prevent this calamitous arms race.” Comment: MA’s and I believe above statement motivated by: (1) almost angry surprise at Department’s statement; (2) fear of being outdistanced in armaments race in preparation for “second round;” (3) desire of Army to secure public support for additional appropriations to expand defense forces. End comment . Sent Department 59, repeated London 10, Paris 4, Baghdad 8, Beirut 7, Damascus 8, Jidda 7, Department pass Moscow 1, Cairo 14, Amman 7. McDonald 1 Dated January 12, p. 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] . 2 A collection of buildings at Tel Aviv in which the chief units of the Israeli Government were housed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 784A.02/1–2050: Telegram [Document 332] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 secret Washington , January 26, 1950—7 p. m. 41. Pls reply to Eytan 2 along fol lines re inquiry urtel 44 Jan. 20. 3 In US view it is not consistent with present status UN consideration Jerusalem question for Israel to establish its capital in that city. US regrets note that Israel apparently does not share US view that no steps shld be taken which wld be prejudicial to final settlement Jerusalem problem, of which UN seized and with which UN vitally concerned. Recent action of Israeli Govt in obtaining Knesset approval of Govt-sponsored resolution concerning Jerusalem as capital of Israel will in US view make such settlement more difficult to reach. Since Jerusalem question sub judice in UN, USG unable accede Eytan suggestion. In US view, basic problem is to obtain solution of Jerusalem question by a settlement which will safeguard legitimate interests of parties most directly concerned and of international community. As it has done in PCC, US willing continue make efforts facilitate such settlement, but considers Israel has responsibility take leading role in spirit compromise and good will. This to Israel’s interest as present impasse prejudicial from long-range view Israel’s foreign relations. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated for information to London, Amman, Jerusalem, New York, and Geneva, the last for the American Delegations to the Palestine Conciliation Commission and to the Trusteeship Council. 2 Walter Eytan, Director General of the Israeli Foreign Office. 3 Not printed; it stated that on January 19, Mr. Eytan had approached Ambassador McDonald as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps with information that the Israeli Government was ready to cooperate with foreign missions in preparing for their offices and residences in Jerusalem. The Ambassador replied informally that his “categorical instructions re Jerusalem indicated that US Government would not be willing make any move now even of the most tentative kind in direction move Jerusalem.” (784A.02/1–2050) The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/1–2850: Telegram [Document 333] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Geneva , January 28, 1950—noon. 149. Palun 329. Pending arrival all Arab delegates, PCC this week and [ held? ] separate informal meetings with Egyptian, Lebanese and Syrian representatives. Statements each representative showed marked unity viewpoint and little or no change from positions taken previous meetings. Usual remarks made concerning primary importance refugee repatriation and opposition to direct talks with Israel. Abdel Moneim declared there could be no question direct conversations since for Egypt, Israel did not exist. Mikaoui emphasized Lebanon’s primary concern was repatriation refugees who wished return. Shoukairi, Syrian representative, in most cogent statement of Arab case reiterated points made by other representatives and stated Arabs would not abandon their moral position in favor empty agreement representing no concessions by Israel to equity and justice. He believed Israel had no intention meet any Arab demands in any degree, therefore, Arab participation PCC would be for purpose perfecting their record. He emphasized, as had others, that PCC’s failure obtain any results was not fault PCC. He hoped miracle would happen and progress towards just settlement could be made but this would depend upon persuasive power great nations, particularly US. Today Rafael, Israel representative, arrived from Tel Aviv and called on USDel privately to discuss procedure to be followed PCC. I told him we strongly favored direct negotiations between Israel and Arab states and would assist wherever possible to achieve that result. For this reason we believed that commission should proceed cautiously in its work. Rafael expressed great satisfaction this view and said Israel believes best chance for peaceful settlement outstanding differences was through direct negotiations. On Tuesday obstacles to resumption direct talks between Israel and Jordan had been removed and negotiations had now been resumed. It was slow business however and his government anticipated would be 2 or 3 months before accord could be reached. Meanwhile were indications other countries were receptive idea direct talks more difficult. He felt if PCC were to make proposals on fundamental issues in meetings here, this would stiffen Arab reaction to proposals made by Israel in direct talks. Commission assistance in promoting direct talks would be welcomed, but Rafael pointed out PCC might have difficulty with French member who he said would follow French anti-Jordan policy aid obstruct wherever possible direct talks. Israel delegate would cooperate with Commission in working out procedures and would be glad see Commission prepare studies questions at issue, such as compensation, which would be of assistance at later stage. He would suggest in his formal meeting with PCC thirtieth that Commission attempt secure agreement to direct negotiation, in presence of Commission, with representative of Commission presiding over talks or not as other party desired. If direct talks could thus be initiated, Israel was prepared increase its delegation with representation by Foreign Minister circumstances warranted. He did not believe would be any use meet all Arab delegation jointly. In event formal peace agreement could not be achieved, Rafael said only alternative was build peace in progressive stages which might take four or five years. Protocols and limited agreements on specific subjects would have be arrived at one by one over period time. Rafael then said most important to Israel conclude agreement with Jordan and Egypt. Egypt had now indicated to Israel Government readiness direct talks and his Government had been informed Abdel Moneim would be designated undertake these talks. Abdel Moneim had not yet received final instructions and this had delayed making contact. Rafael stated these remarks with certain obvious omissions would constitute his government’s reply PCC proposal re mediation when he meets with PCC. Following conversation with me, Rafael had apparently satisfactory talk with Azcarate, 1 who had informed me that he was surprised to learn that Rafael then gave press conference saying Israel was interested only in direct talks and mediation by PCC would be fruitless. Exact nature Rafael’s remarks will be reported when received. [ Palmer ] 1 Pablo de Azcarate, Principal Secretary of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 674.84A/1–2950: Telegram [Document 334] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State restricted Cairo , January 29, 1950—3 p. m. 93. Minister of Foreign Affairs has issued following communiqué: “Newspaper Haboar [ Hador ] of Tel Aviv has stated that the government of Nahas Pasha has decided to undertake direct talks with Israel in order to resolve the Palestine problem and that it has charged Abdel Moneim Mustafa Bey, Egyptian representative to Conciliation Commission, to go to Ankara to negotiate with Sassoon, the Israeli Minister. 1 The Minister of Foreign Affairs declares that this information is contrary to truth and has no foundation whatever. The present Egyptian Government has no intention of entering into direct talks with Israel; on the other hand it continues to cooperate with the Conciliation Commission for the execution of UN decisions and the Lausanne protocol. It works for the repatriation of Palestinian refugees in their homes, taking care to assure them of their existence and safeguard their property. It is this solution of the refugee problem which is in accordance with justice and right and which will produce peace and stability in the ME.[”] 2 Sent Department 93, Department pass Tel Aviv 14. Caffery 1 Embassy Tel Aviv transmitted the text of the Hador article to the Department of State in despatch 74, February 7 (674.84A/2–750). 2 Despite the nature of the communiqué quoted in telegram 93, Ambassador Caffery advised, on January 30, of assurances given to him in “pertinent quarters” that the plans for talks with the Israelis had not been discarded but that there might be a delay of two or three months (telegram 100 from Cairo, 674.84A/1–3050). Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 320.2AA/1–3050 [Document 335] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President Washington , January 30, 1950. Subject: Proposed legislation for Palestine Refugees. Attached is a draft of a proposed letter from you to the Vice President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 1 requesting early enactment of proposed legislation enabling the United States to participate in and contribute to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. You are already familiar with this program for which budgetary provision has been made. As hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are scheduled for January 31st, the submission of legislation is a matter of urgency. The Bureau of the Budget has approved the draft legislation, 2 copies of which are attached to this memorandum, and has also indicated its approval of an approach to the Congress along the lines of the enclosed draft. Dean Acheson 1 Undated draft not printed; President Truman, on January 30, sent the draft, with minor language changes, in the form of identical letters to Alben W. Barkley, President of the Senate, and Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House. The text of the letters is printed in the Department of State Bulletin , February 13, 1950, p. 260. The message contained the President’s recommendation that the Congress authorize and appropriate $27,450,000 for American participation in the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for an 18-month period. The proposed appropriation was to be one-half of the cost of the project. 2 The draft legislation was in the form of a joint resolution, dated January 3, not printed. Editorial Note [Document 336] Editorial Note The Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, at New York on January 30, began general discussion of the question of an international régime for the Jerusalem area and protection of the Holy Places. The members of the Council were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, the Dominican Republic, France, Iraq, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The focus of discussion was the resolution of December 9, 1949, which had provided for the placing of Jerusalem under a permanent international régime and had called on the Trusteeship Council to complete the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem and proceed with its implementation. The Council, at its second special session on December 19, by eleven votes to none with one abstention, had adopted a Mexican draft resolution which entrusted to the President of the Council the task of preparing a working paper on the Statute. (United Nations, Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Second Special Session, from the First Meeting ( 8 December 1949 ) to the Eighth Meeting ( 20 December 1949 ), page 69). The text of the Mexican draft resolution is printed ibid. , page 68. President Roger Garreau, the French Representative, presented a plan to the Trusteeship Council on January 30. The Plan provided for the Jerusalem area to be constituted as a corpus separatum . The area was to be divided into three parts, an Israeli zone under the authority and administration of Israel, a Jordanian zone under the authority and administration of Jordan, and the “International City” under the collective sovereignty of the United Nations and administered, under the supervision of the Trusteeship Council, by a governor of the Holy Places. Practically all the New City would remain under the sovereignty of Israel; the Arab quarters in the Old City and the connecting roads with Jericho, Nablus, and Hebron would come under Jordanian sovereignty (telegram 154, identified also as Tcdel 46, January 30, from Geneva, 350/1–3050). The text of the Garreau Plan is printed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 9 , page 3. The Iraqi Representative gave his first impressions that the Garreau Plan far exceeded the resolution of December 9 and would likely transform the Trusteeship Council into another political committee with full scale discussion required. The Philippine Representative also deemed the plan “at variance if not in conflict with GA directive.” President Garreau denied that “his interpretation corpus separatum went beyond resolution, insisting TC given wide powers to interpret.” (Telegram 160, identified also as Tcdel 48, January 30, from Geneva, 350/1–3050.) A summary of the Council’s discussions on January 30 is printed in United Nations, Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Fourth Year, Sixth Session, 19 January–4 April 1950 (hereinafter cited as TC (VI)), pages 48 ff. The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 774.54/1–3050: Telegram [Document 337] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential Cairo , January 30, 1950—4 p. m. 102. Foreign Office informed Embassy by aide-mémoire this morning that because of certain pretensions ( Velléités ) manifested by Israel authorities recently toward Tiran and Senafir Islands in Red Sea at the entrance of Gulf of Akaba, the Egyptian Government, in perfect accord with SAG, had occupied the islands. Aide-mémoire states that while action was taken as prevention against any eventual attacks or violations it was also based on Egyptian rights as well as those of Saudi Arabia since islands are less than three miles from Egyptian coast of Sinai and about four miles from that of SAG. Aide-mémoire also states that action was not taken to prevent innocent travel between islands and Egyptian coast of Sinai. The passage, which is the only practicable one, will remain free, as in past, in conformity with international practices and principles. Sent Department 102; repeated Jidda 4, pouched Arab capitals. Department pass Tel Aviv 17. Caffery Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 486.418/1–3150 [Document 338] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] January 31, 1950. Subject: British Arms Shipments to the Arab States and Israel’s Defense Needs. Participants: S—The Secretary The Honorable Eliahu Elath, Ambassador of Israel NEA—Mr. Hare ANE—Mr. Rockwell I received Ambassador Elath at his request. He stated that he had been instructed by his Government to take up with me the matter of British arms shipments to the Arab states. The Ambassador said that he had long been a student of the Arabs and felt that he knew them very well. He believed that the defeat of the combined Arab states by the tiny new state of Israel was an event which the Arab leaders would never forget and which they would do everything possible to avenge themselves for. Almost every day there were statements by responsible Arab personalities advocating the resumption of hostilities. People in Israel had made the same “stupid” kind of remarks, but the responsible leaders of the Israeli Government had never done so. The Israeli Government sincerely desired peace, and certainly wished to avoid the necessity of making large expenditures for military equipment. However, the shipment by the United Kingdom of arms to the Arab states when conditions in the Near East were still so delicate could have no effect but to encourage the Arab statesmen in their plans to recommence hostilities. The Ambassador added that the British shipment of arms, and my letter to Representative Javits 2 on this subject, would also give people in the Arab states the impression that the United Kingdom and the United States approved the resumption of hostilities. Never since the establishment of the State of Israel had the leaders of his country been so apprehensive for the security of the nation, the Ambassador continued. Information which the Israeli government had obtained showed that the Arab states now had ten times as much military equipment as they had had on May 14, 1948. Egypt, for example, had received 200 tanks from England, and 100 more were on order. Moreover, Egypt had acquired large naval vessels in the United Kingdom. In defensive military equipment Israel was now weaker than the Arab states, although Israel also had received new arms. No sensible person could believe that Egypt or any other of the Arab states could use this heavy equipment effectively to repel an attack by the Soviet Union. The only purpose to which the equipment could be put would be to attack Israel, and to place such arms in the hands of the irresponsible Arab leaders was only encouraging them to undertake such a venture. Israel was a small country, and especially vulnerable, at least in the coastal area, to tank attack. This latter point made the Israeli Government particularly apprehensive. The Ambassador wished to assure me that Israel did not have the slightest doubt that the United Kingdom was supplying arms to the Arabs with the best of intentions. England was not encouraging the Arabs to attack Israel, but unfortunately there was no way of fully controlling arms provided for domestic security purposes. The recent coup d’état in Syria 3 revealed this. The Israeli Government also knew that the United States Government sincerely desired not to see the present tranquility in the Near East disturbed. Israel was grateful, said the Ambassador, for my statement to Mr. Javits that the United States Government, should it learn of serious preparations by any party to resume the conflict, would be quick to use all of its influence in an attempt to prevent this. The trouble was that a lot could be done in a military way before the international community could effectively intervene. The Palestine war had revealed to the Near Eastern nations that the cynical policy of fait accompli was a very profitable one, and that resolutions of the United Nations could be safely violated. Mr. Elath said that Israel itself was at present violating a resolution of the United Nations concerning Jerusalem, with the intent of reaching a speedy agreement with Jordan and the Vatican concerning the Holy City. The Israeli Government was now very much concerned that the Arabs would try the policy of fait accompli themselves, and Israel desired to be in a position to defend itself against any surprise attack. Arming of the Arabs was particularly unfortunate at a time when peace talks with Jordan were going well, and there were prospects for similar talks with Egypt. Ambassador Elath wished to assure me that the Israeli Government in instructing him to make this approach, was motivated solely by a genuine concern for its security. There was absolutely no other purpose. In this background, the Ambassador continued, he had been instructed to ask me to do what I could to persuade the British not to ship any more arms to the Arab states, and to enable the Israeli Government to purchase in this country the military equipment it needed to defend itself. He did not know exactly what this equipment was, but was aware that his Government had a list of materiel it would like to acquire. The Ambassador said that Israel could not purchase arms in the United Kingdom and that the United States was the only source open. I inquired whether the Ambassador’s second request referred to applications which had already been made. The Ambassador replied that the request referred as well to these applications. He mentioned a request for anti-tank guns, a purely defensive weapon, which he said his people had been unable to obtain because Department representatives had informed them that a policy decision was necessary on military equipment of this nature. I then said that this whole subject was a very delicate one which had to be studied in a very calm atmosphere. I added that I regretted that this atmosphere did not seem to be present now, and I referred to the statements which were being made by Israeli officials on the armament situation. We thought it particularly unfortunate, I said, that the Israeli Embassy should have seen fit to circulate in an official press release in this country comments of the Israeli Government criticizing my letter to Representative Javits. I would not do such a thing in Israel, and I preferred not to see it done in this country, although the Israeli Embassy, of course, had a perfect right to circulate the comments if it so desired. I then said that I was not aware of the exact status of the applications made by the Israeli Government for export licenses for military equipment, but that I would ask the people in the Department concerned with this to let me know about it. As the Ambassador knew, our arms export policy as regards the Near East was to grant export licenses only for military equipment which we thought necessary for legitimate self-defense needs and for maintaining internal order. In general we thought that it was undesirable to have the standard established that any one country in the Near East would have to receive a piece of military equipment to match every piece of military equipment acquired by any other country. I said that we had no information which led to the conclusion that any party in the Near East was making active preparations to attack any other party. I personally did not believe that the Arab states were planning to begin the hostilities again. I did not think that they would be so foolhardy as deliberately to unleash upon themselves the disaster which such a move would surely bring. It seemed to me that the best insurance against the resumption of warfare would be the conclusion of peace settlements by the Israel and the Arab states, and I was glad to hear from Mr. Elath that progress was being made in this direction. With regard to the United Kingdom, I said that I had discussed the shipment of arms to the Near East many times with Mr. Bevin. The Ambassador was aware of the treaty commitments binding Great Britain to some of the Arab states, and the United States Government had persuaded the British not to furnish arms under these commitments until the Palestine arms embargo was lifted. I completely agreed with the Ambassador that the arms being supplied to the Arab states would not enable them to stand off an attack by the Soviet Union. For that matter, the arms we were furnishing the Western European states would not enable them to do this either. But I thought that I could understand the desire on the part of the Arab states to restore their self-confidence by strengthening their armies, and the necessity from the British point of view of having this self-confidence restored to strategic nations in the Near East. I reiterated that we had no evidence that the Arab states were planning to use these arms for aggressive purposes. In conclusion on this point, I said that the Ambassador must realize that our influence upon what the United Kingdom did or did not do was not unlimited. I added that of course I was anxious to do anything I appropriately could to help out the Israeli Government. The two requests made by the Ambassador would be given full consideration, and I would ask the appropriate people in the Department to give careful study to the question of the export licenses for military equipment desired by Israel. I then inquired whether Mr. Hare or Mr. Rockwell had anything to add to what I had said. Mr. Rockwell stated that since the Department desired to be as fully informed as possible on the military situation in the Near East, it would be interested to receive any information available to the Israeli Government indicating that the Arab states are making serious preparations to resume the war. Ambassador Elath said he believed such information was on its way from Tel Aviv, and that he would be happy to furnish it to the Department. The Ambassador then apologized for the Israeli Embassy’s press release on my letter to Representative Javits. He said that although he had not known of this release, he naturally accepted full responsibility for it. However, the Israeli Embassy was still a “young” one and had much to learn. I said that it was really not a very important matter and that there was no question of an official protest. However, I was sure Mr. Sharett would be surprised if I were to issue in Israel an official release criticizing an exchange of correspondence between himself and a member of the Israeli Parliament. After apologizing again for this incident and thanking me for receiving him, the Israeli Ambassador took his departure. Dean Acheson 1 Drafted by Mr. Rockwell. 2 Dated January 12, p. 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] . 3 For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1630 ff. The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/1–3150: Telegram [Document 339] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , January 31, 1950—noon. 162. Tcdel 49. USDel foresees that beginning February 6 TC will have several days general discussion on Jerusalem question which will include debate, fostered by Iraq, on whether Garreau Plan or any other plan not strictly within limits of GA Resolution December 9 should be considered by TC. USDel believes that in general it should refrain from taking part in these discussions and should merely listen to what other delegates have to offer. Once atmosphere is cleared we shall be better able to recommend course of action. However, in event that during initial debate strong sentiment is built up against Garreau plan on basis its legality vis-à-vis GA Resolution and formal motion against it is introduced, USDel recommends it be authorized vote for motion if appropriately worded. While Garreau plan appears to have some merit as basis for discussion, we believe we should be in a vulnerable position if we supported his plan against stricter interpretation GA Resolution. Re constitution TC as committee of whole or formation subcommittee to prepare statute. While fully mindful of instructions contained in paragraph seven Deptel 641, December 13, 1 USUN, USDel believes situation since has changed somewhat and that it might not contribute to successful action by TC on Jerusalem if we should endeavor persuade TC to sit as committee of whole. Such a committee would intensify danger of lengthy speeches and political maneuvering. While there are also number of disadvantages re formation subcommittee, USDel inclined on balance believe more can be accomplished by such small group working so far as may prove practicable in privacy. While we feel USDel should not in general participate in discussions re committee we would recommend authorization to go along with desire of majority of TC in this matter. We presume that in event subcommittee is formed US should seek to avoid membership on committee but should not press this to point where it might appear we are unwilling to assist in drafting statute. 1 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1538 . The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State 785.00/2–150: Telegram [Document 340] The Chargé in Jordan ( Fritzlan ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , February 1, 1950—4 p. m. 12. Discussed latest Jordan Israeli meeting of month with Samir and British Minister Kirkbride. Meeting attended by Samir, Fawzi Mulki and Khulusi Kheiri (latter two Jordan Ministers). Following seems to have been course of meeting: 1. Jordan delegation proposed discuss Jerusalem partition basis Fitzgerald line of 1947 1 but this naturally completely unacceptable Israelis. 2. Israelis proposed possible solution along lines radical change present armistice line which would make demarcation run NE to SW giving Israel Mt. Scopus and Jordan [ Jerusalem? ] Arab quarters. Unacceptable Jordan delegation as strategically important position Nablus road would be Israeli hands. 3. Alternative Israelis proposed minor rectifications present armistice lines basis “plot for plot and access for access.” They demanded absolute sovereignty over Wailing Wall and access to it and over Jewish quarter as well as access to and use of Mt. Scopus institutions. For those Arab quarters not restored Israel would give cash compensation. Pains taken point out this offer compensation independent of and without prejudice final settlement which would involve claims and counter claims for compensation. 4. Jordan delegation stated without authority accept Israeli proposal but would report matter to government. 5. Next meeting tentatively set February 3 [in] Israeli controlled Jerusalem. Comment: Prime Minister Tawfiq Pasha seemed determined February 3 meeting take place though he expressed strong unwillingness relinquish Jordan control over Wailing Wall and Jewish quarter. His sentiment seems dictated by probable adverse reaction other Arab states. From strategic standpoint Glubb 2 feels Jordan could afford relinquish control this area if it held Government House Ridge. Interesting facts emerging last meeting are Israeli offer cash compensation and apparent desire Prime Minister explore every avenue facilitate success of talks. Seems likely negotiations [re] Jerusalem will succeed but complete stalemate reached re general settlement. In recent conversation with King and Samir both expressed hope US could exert some pressure on Israel and I reiterated our desire keep hands off and permit settlement take place result interplay respective bargaining positions. In conversation with Kirkbride this morning he expressed view time approaching when serious consideration must be given desirability giving each party [a] prod, equally applied, in hope achieving early settlement. Without such pressure which he thinks should be joint US–UK, he sees no hope for settlement. Following seems clear: 1) US strongly desirous settlement Palestine problem and has given encouragement all parties liquidate affair, and 2) Israel, Jordan talks for general settlement have virtually broken down. Is US interest in settlement strong enough to warrant impartial application some form pressure to hasten settlement. Department’s comments will be appreciated. Sent Department 12; Department pass London 7, Tel Aviv 5, Jerusalem 5, Geneva 4; pouched Arab capitals from Amman, Geneva for USPCC 5, USTC 3. Fritzlan 1 Sir William Fitzgerald was Chief Justice of Palestine under the Mandatory Government. He was appointed in 1945 to inquire into the local administration of Jerusalem and to recommend a solution to the crisis occasioned by the inability of the Jerusalem Municipality to be governed because of Arab-Jewish non-cooperation. The Chief Justice made his report on August 30, 1945, and recommended that the Walled City be placed under a British administrative council and that the rest of the city be divided into autonomous Arab and Jewish boroughs. The plan was not implemented; see H. Eugene Bovis, The Jerusalem Question, 1917–1968 (Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1971), pp. 33–36. 2 Maj. Gen. John Bagot Glubb, Chief of Staff of the Arab Legion. The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 350/1–3150: Telegram [Document 341] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 1 secret priority Washington , February 3, 1950—6 p. m. 179. Deltc 20. Fol for guidance Del in further TC discussions Jerusalem question (Tcdel 46, 2 47, 3 49): 4 1. Memo of Dec. 20, 1949, 5 approved by President, remains basic instr for Del on Jerusalem. 2. Re Garreau Plan, Dept agrees with view indicated first para Tcdel 49 that plan is compatible with GA res Dec 9 only on broadest construction of res. However, Dept wld not wish discourage any suggestion which might form basis agreement between Israel and Jordan and at same time safeguard legitimate world interest in Jerusalem. Accordingly, Del might inquire of Garreau more specifically re reactions Israel and Jordan, perhaps asking him to consult with them further. If it appears Garreau Plan contains possibilities of agreement, Garreau shld be urged privately to continue discussions with Israel and Jordan outside Council. On other hand, if it becomes clear Garreau scheme offers no possibilities as basis of agreement, Council shld not become involved in considering it, since it wld be not only unacceptable to parties, but wld carry additional liability of being questionable as regards its compatibility with GA res. 3. From the foregoing it fols that it wld be preferable for Council not to engage in detailed discussion of Garreau Plan, but for Garreau himself to discuss it as fully as may be useful with Israel and Jordan. Dept hopes it will be possible avoid vote in TC on question compatibility with GA res. If, however, question is pressed toward vote, Del shld take position it is unnecessary and undesirable for Council to vote on question, noting that Garreau Plan is only a “suggestion”, that Garreau has not asked for Plan to be dealt with as an entity but rather that his points be taken to be in connection with reexamination draft statute (Tcdel 48), 6 and that what is needed is some indication of reactions Israel and Jordan as well as of world community. Del shld also point out that even if doubts may exist as to consistency of Garreau Plan in present form with GA res, further modification of Plan might eliminate such doubts; and that if Israel and Jordan shld find acceptable a plan along lines Garreau Plan, possibility of its being considered by TC for appropriate action should not at this stage be precluded. If, however, vote is taken, Del shld abstain, explaining position as above. 4. If no agreement can be reached between Israel and Jordan and if TC stalemate results, Dept believes no useful purpose wld be served by a special session GA. Best course wld then appear to be to carry over Jerusalem item to June session TC in order give time for additional negots and further efforts at settlement. 5. Re organization of TC to prepare statute, Dept concurs with suggestions contained second para Tcdel 49. 7 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to the United States Mission at the United Nations. 2 Dated January 30, not printed; but see editorial note, p. 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] . 3 Identified also as telegram 161, January 31, from Geneva, not printed; it stated that Gideon Raphael, Alternate Israeli Representative to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, had called on Ambassador Sayre the same morning on instructions from his government. He opined that the handling of the Jerusalem question would be expedited if a subcommittee were appointed to examine the Garreau and other plans and report to the Council. He stated that Israel, if invited, would participate in its work; and sought the support of the United States Delegation for creation of a subcommittee. Ambassador Sayre was noncommittal in reply (350/1–3150). 4 Identified also as telegram 162, January 31, from Geneva, p. 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] . 5 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1551 . 6 Dated January 30, not printed; but see editorial note, p. 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] . 7 American Delegation spokesmen, on February 6, inquired of President Garreau concerning Jordanian and Israeli reaction to his suggestions. The latter replied that he had received no Jordanian reaction. The Israelis, he said, had rejected the suggestions as they then stood but had not closed the door. He expressed the opinion that “Israel will eventually agree to some international regime which is between full internationalization and what Israel presently offers, provided Jordan will agree.” President Garreau advised also of a visit from a Vatican emissary, on February 4, who indicated that the Vatican continued to advocate full internationalization, did not accept the Garreau Plan, and would not consider a change in its position at this time. Nonetheless, he gained the impression that the Vatican might alter its position if some middle ground could be found on which all parties would agree (telegram 205, identified also as Tcdel 62, February 7, from Geneva (350/2–750). The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/2–350: Telegram [Document 342] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , February 3, 1950—6 p. m. 194. Tcdel 58. Raphael (Israeli Representative PCC) saw Sayre this morning (Tcdel 53, February 2 1 ) to report his telephone conversation earlier today with Sharett. 2 Raphael said he had discussed with Sharett conversation February 2 with Sayre during which Raphael mentioned desirability of at least two weeks delay in TC consideration of Jerusalem. Sharett informed Raphael that he felt good possibility existed that within two weeks: (1) Israel and Jordan could reach agreement on points at issue between them in Jerusalem, and (2) Israel and Jordan could agree on plan which would adequately protect third party and world interests. Sharett promised to hasten efforts this direction. Raphael reported Sharett particularly aware necessity reaching agreement with third party. Raphael asked whether USDel would use influence to postpone February 6 meeting and obtain two weeks delay. Sayre replied US basic position is achievement solution Jerusalem problem which will meet concurrence world community and be acceptable to parties directly concerned. Re delay he was noncommittal indicating US attitude would depend developments TC meeting February 6 which, he believed, should take place as announced. Seems likely Raphael will approach Garreau in endeavor obtain postponement Jerusalem discussions. USDel believes while February 6 meeting will take place as planned, there may be move on Monday to postpone further consideration for at least week, possibly longer. Depending on support such move should gain we believe we should support delay but should not take lead in discussion. 2. USDel understands from both Raphael and other sources that Garreau has been stating his plan has US support. He apparently bases this contention on conversation he had Washington with Rusk. USDel proposes indicate that it has not yet received any instructions on Garreau plan, but has considerable doubts as to whether plan falls within “four corners” GA resolution. Sent Department 194, repeated London 44, Jerusalem unnumbered. Department pass Tel Aviv, Amman, USUN. 1 Identified also as telegram 183, February 1, from Geneva, not printed; it advised that Mr. Raphael had informed Ambassador Sayre that “Israel considerably preoccupied by possibility that TC will defeat Garreau Plan and then proceed to draft statute which would be rejected by Israel and Jordan. This would lead to ‘showdown’ in special session GA.… Believed that if Israel and Jordan could reach agreement, TC on behalf world community could then negotiate with two parties, Israel would be willing accept functional international régime for Holy Places if Jordan also accepted.” (350/2–150) 2 Moshe Sharett, Israeli Foreign Minister. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 674.84A/2–250: Telegram [Document 343] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 top secret Washington , February 3, 1950—7 p. m. 52. Ur 70 Feb 2. 2 Dept notes you plan informal protest re Hador leak. Dept desires you orally inform FonOff Dept very much regretted learn that this info, so important from viewpoint future Israeli-Egyptian relations and conveyed to FonOff by Emb on top secret basis, shld have become public knowledge. Add that Dept fears leak may have same harmful effect upon possibility Israeli-Egyptian talks as similar revelations Lausanne and Lake Success 3 early last spring had upon PCC negots and possibility separate informal talks between Israeli and Arab dels at Lausanne. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Cairo for information. 2 Not printed; this message was actually addressed to Ambassador Caffery as telegram 18 and was repeated to the Department as No. 70. It stated that Ambassador McDonald shared Ambassador Caffery’s disturbance as conveyed to the Department in his telegram 93, January 29, p. 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , and that he would informally protest to the Israeli Government, “since Hador is Mapai Party organ and often voice Prime Minister.” (674.84A/2–250) Ambassador McDonald informed the Department on February 6 that he had given the message in telegram 52 to Mr. Eytan the previous day and that he had previously made informal protests to Foreign Office officials (telegram 79 from Tel Aviv, 674.84A/2–650). 3 The old Sperry Gyroscope plant at Lake Success in Long Island was used by the Security Council and Committees of the General Assembly for their meetings. Flushing Meadows, also on Long Island, was the locale of the plenary sessions of the General Assembly, on the site of the World’s Fair of 1939. The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 684A.85/2–150: Telegram [Document 344] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 1 secret Washington , February 3, 1950—7 p. m. 13. Dept continues believe that US intervention in Israeli-Jordan talks undesirable (last para ur 12 Feb 1) failing convincing indications that such intervention wld have beneficial results. Dept does not wish take sides in access to sea issue, which seems to be main stumbling block and upon which attitudes of both parties apparently rigid. Moreover, Dept unwilling propose to parties, either unilaterally or with UK, specific plan for final settlement. PCC appropriate organ to make such proposal if at some time action of that nature considered desirable. No evidence here that US approach to parties merely urging them to continue talks re general settlement in conciliatory atmosphere wld resolve impasse. US interest in settlement certainly strong, however, and Dept interested learn what kind of approach Leg considers might be productive. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and the U.S. Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva. The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 784A.00/2–550: Telegram [Document 345] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Cairo , February 5, 1950—5 p. m. 126. Foreign Minister handed me aide-mémoire 1 last night asserting that Israel has consistently violated clauses of Rhodes armistice agreement, 2 particularly by occupation on March 10, 1949, of villages Um Rash Rash and Bir Quatar in southern Negeb on Gulf Akaba. [ Aide -] Mémoire complains that although decision on this case by Egypt-Israeli MAC finally scheduled for tomorrow February 6, Egypt “has no illusions” re opinion of its President on subject and that Riley in talks with Egypt delegation has “given to understand that he would not be in a position to dislodge the Israelis from the place which they occupy” in this manner. [ Aide -] Mémoire asserts Israelis have constructed airport near Um Rash Rash and have also assembled fleet of motor boats there disguised as fishing boats which Israelis intend use for seizure islands in Gulf Akaba which lie within Egyptian and Saudi Arabian territorial waters. To prevent this Egypt was therefore recently forced occupy Pharaon Island, north of Gulf Akaba, and Tiran Island (Re-Embtel 102 January 31) at entrance Gulf. [ Aide -] Mémoire concludes that any Israeli attempt seize these or other Egyptian islands would be resisted by force and that presence of Israelis at Um Rash Rash and Bir Quatar constitutes threat to peace of region. 3 Text aide-mémoire will be forwarded immediately by pouch. 4 Sent Department 126, repeated London 10; pass Jerusalem 2; pouched Arab capitals. Department repeat to Riley if he is not at Jerusalem. Caffery 1 Not printed. 2 For documentation on the negotiations leading up to the Rhodes Armistice Agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 621 ff. For text of the Agreement signed on April 3, 1949, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1 . 3 On February 5, Ambassador McDonald informally raised with Mr. Eytan the question of the Israeli attitude toward the islands. The latter was said to have insisted that Israel had not the slightest interest in them. The Ambassador commented that his Military and Air Attachés and he himself doubted that Israel had so casually overlooked them (telegram 77, February 6, 774.54/2–650). 4 Raleigh A. Gibson, the Consul General at Jerusalem, reported on February 8 the ruling of General Riley that the Israeli occupation of Um Resh Resh was not a violation of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement. Rather, since the town was in the eastern Negev and Israeli occupation had occurred during the period of truce between Israel and Jordan, the Israeli action was a violation of the truce between Israel and Jordan (telegram 39 from Jerusalem, 674.84A/2–850). General Riley also ruled that Israeli occupation of Bir Qattar was a violation of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement, inasmuch as it was located in the western Negev and the establishment of the Israeli outpost took place after signing of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement (telegram 39 from Jerusalem, 674.84A/2–850). Telegram 39 also advised that during General Riley’s review of the Egyptian complaints, an Egyptian aide-mémoire was delivered to him to the effect that “unless Jews agreed to evacuate Um Resh Resh and Bir Qattar, Egyptians would under no circumstances open any direct political talks with Jews.” Mr. Gibson presented his view that the question appeared to be political in nature since the Egyptians insisted on evacuation of the two posts because the Israelis were holding the only land communication route between Egypt and the other Arab states. He concluded with his sincere hope that “Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not attempting to find a reason for avoiding direct political talks taking place. Jordan can only go so far. Do not believe that even Abdullah can come to terms with Israelis before Egypt has taken lead. Therefore consider any pressure that can be brought to bear on Egypt and Israel to open direct negotiations is timely and should pay dividends.” Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 484A.118/2–650 [Document 346] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs secret [ Washington ,] February 6, 1950. Subject: Arms Shipments to Arabs and Israeli Defense Needs. Participants: The Honorable Eliahu Elath, Ambassador of Israel Dr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel ANE—Mr. Berry Mr. Rockwell Problem: Israeli Ambassador will submit evidence that Arabs are preparing for second round and also list of defensive military equipment needed by Israel. Action Required: To give appropriate consideration to this information when received. Action Assigned to: ANE and MD Discussion: Mr. Berry received Messrs. Elath and Keren at their request. The following are the important points covered in the friendly and frank discussion, which lasted for an hour. 1. Evidence that Arabs are preparing for second round . Ambassador Elath said that in accordance with the promise he had made to the Secretary on January 31, 1 he would soon submit to the Department a list of the evidence which had led the Israeli Embassy to believe that the Arab states were preparing for a second round. 2 This evidence, said the Ambassador, was based largely upon official statements by important Arab personalities and broadcasts and newspaper comment from the Arab countries. It did not necessarily mean that the Arabs would attack tomorrow; but it did mean that they were planning at some time to renew hostilities. The Ambassador emphasized that no statements of similar nature had been made by responsible officials of the Israeli Government. Mr. Berry said that we would be interested to receive this information, since we believed, on the basis of reports and information available to us, that Israel had no reasonable cause for alarm in the matter of the arms being furnished the Arab states. The Ambassador said that he hoped this was so and that he was grateful for the United States’ offer to use its influence if there were convincing evidence that serious preparations were being made by the Arabs to resume the war. However, Israel needed defensive military material in order to be able to defend itself during the time elapsing between any Arab attack and the moment when the international community would be able to intervene. The Ambassador emphasized that there was no other motive in the Israeli request for arms, and that the Israeli Government did not wish to spend money for armaments or to brutalize the Israeli youth by overemphasis on militarism. The Israeli Government did not wish to see Israel turned into an armed camp, but the Government had to be able to convince the people that it was taking reasonable measures to provide for their security. 2. Israeli request for military equipment . The Ambassador said that the Embassy would soon submit a list of defensive military equipment needed by Israel. He hoped that the Department would be able to give favorable consideration to the granting of export licenses for this equipment. The Ambassador added that Israel did not seek to match every piece of military equipment acquired by the Arab states, but just to acquire enough to provide reasonable means of security. He stated that Israel was now weaker than the Arab states. Mr. Berry said that the list mentioned by the Ambassador would be given sympathetic consideration. Mr. Rockwell mentioned that ANE had received a report that the Israeli Government had requested military assistance under the MAP. The Ambassador and Dr. Keren said that they knew of no such request. 3. Iraq-Syria Union . The Ambassador mentioned the UP press report that the Department had warned Israel not to intervene in Syria and that this had been done because Ambassador Elath had stated in the Department that uncontrollable Israeli extremists would urge Israeli military action in Syria if the Syrian-Iraqi union took place. The Ambassador wished to give express assurances that the Israel Government had absolutely no intention of intervening in Syria and no aggressive designs whatsoever. He had not wished to give the impression that the Israeli Government could not control the extremists. 4. Arab reaction to acquisition of arms by Israel and continued Jewish immigration . Mr. Berry asked the Ambassador, as a person who had long studied the Arabs and knew them well, what the reaction of the Arabs would be should they see more arms going into Israel and at the same time a constant stream of Jewish immigrants entering this small and overcrowded country. The Ambassador replied that he perfectly well understood the Arab conviction that these factors could only mean that one day Israel would need more territory and would embark upon aggression against its neighbors. It was the job of Israeli Government officials, a job he was constantly attempting to carry out, to convince the Arabs and all other observers that aggression would be the ruination of Israel. What Israel needed was not more deserts but time and money to develop the territory now under Israeli control. Israel planned to develop an industrial society, not an agricultural one. The Arabs must learn that Israel is here to stay, and that Israel has no intention whatsoever of committing aggression against them. The Ambassador admitted that it was difficult to make effective use of this logic when there was so much suspicion on both sides. 5. Czech Arms for Israel . Mr. Rockwell noted that the Ambassador had on several occasions stated that the United States was the only source of arms open to Israel. He wondered why Czechoslovakia was not closed as a source. The Ambassador said that he was glad that this frank question was asked, and that the answer was that Israel did not wish to become too deeply entangled with the Czechs. Israel had in the past acquired arms in Czechoslovakia only as a last ditch measure in a time of desperate emergency. However, Israel knew that its future lay with the United States. It desired to pattern its army after the American army and to replace the arms acquired in Czechoslovakia by American arms. If further arms were acquired now in Czechoslovakia, it would mean continuing Israeli dependence on the Czechs for ammunition and replacements. 6. Possibilities of Peace Settlements . The Ambassador again mentioned the real desire of Israel for peace. He said encouraging progress was being made in the talks with Jordan and that there was some possibility of talks with Egypt. Mr. Rockwell asked whether there was any thought in Tel Aviv that Israel, in order to reach peace settlements with the Arabs, might be able to make any substantial territorial concessions. The Ambassador said that the Israeli offer of a corridor to the sea for Jordan, if accepted by Jordan, could cause a greater domestic political crisis for the Israeli Government than the Altalena incident. 3 The corridor offer was a very great concession and real proof of the desire for peace with Jordan. There was no possibility of territorial concessions to Syria and Lebanon. The states with which it was most important to make peace were Jordan and Egypt, and there was a possibility of territorial “adjustments” along the Egyptian frontier, but no question of giving away any sizeable pieces of the Negev. Israel found Abdullah reasonable and quite understood his desire and necessity to gain some territory in order to justify to the Arab world a settlement with Israel. 1 For Secretary Acheson’s memorandum of this conversation, see p. 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] . 2 The Israeli Foreign Office presented to Ambassador McDonald on February 9 an eight-page aide-mémoire of the same date, entitled “Arab Threats of a Second Round”. The aide-mémoire cited authoritative statements by prominent Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian leaders, which were said to throw an ominous light on preparations for war during the past year by the Arab countries, especially Egypt. It cited the steep rise of the Egyptian military budget under a three-year rearmament program, Egyptian purchases from Great Britain and other European sources of tanks, military aircraft and naval vessels, and the building up by Egypt of a domestic arms industry. The aide-mémoire concluded that the comprehensive rearmament activities of Egypt as well as those of Syria and Jordan were not to be explained by considerations of internal security and defense. Embassy Tel Aviv transmitted a copy of the aide-mémoire to the Department of State in despatch 89, February 14, neither printed (748.00/2–1450). 3 This incident, on June 22, 1948, involved the firing by Israeli Government armed forces on the Altalena , a vessel controlled by the Irgun Zvai Leumi. The IZL was attempting to disembark, near Tel Aviv, armed men and possibly arms and munitions. For additional information on this incident, see footnote 1, Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , Part 2, p. 1142 . Editorial Note [Document 347] Editorial Note The Trusteeship Council resumed its discussion of the Jerusalem question on February 6 and 8. Arab spokesmen objected to the Garreau Plan, which was denounced as cutting Jerusalem to pieces, and called for immediate preparation of the draft statute for the Jerusalem area within the framework of the resolution of December 9. At one point, in answer to the argument that the General Assembly decision for full internationalization could not be implemented, they suggested sanctions as a means of implementation. The Chinese Representative also expressed the view that the Garreau Plan fell far short of the resolution (telegrams 204 and 214, identified also as Tcdel 61 and 66, February 6 and 9, from Geneva, 350/2–650 and /2–950). A summary of the discussions on February 6 and 8 is printed in TC (VI), pages 109 and 126, each ff. The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/2–750: Telegram [Document 348] The Chargé in Jordan ( Fritzlan ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , February 7, 1950—10 a. m. 17. From instructions [ indications ], meeting Shiloah, Dayan, Samir and Fawzi in house Israeli Jerusalem Governor was apparently inconclusive. Fawzi attended, according Samir, with following instructions: ( a ) From King Abdullah: To make no move serving break off negotiations and make no final commitment without having consulted King. ( b ) From Government: Offer Israelis guaranteed free access Mt. Scopus, Wailing Wall and Jewish quarter but no surrender territory. At meeting Fawzi made this offer which Israelis ridiculed and said any agreement such basis could only be temporary modus operandi and what they wanted was permanent settlement. Fawzi agreed consult further with government. Samir apparently acted as observer up to this point but here, order keep discussions going, he recapitulated Israeli offers at previous meeting and asked exactly what Israelis would give in return for guaranteed free access Mt. Scopus and, supposing Jordan Government agreement, rectification armistice line giving Israelis Jewish quarters, Wailing Wall and small corridor connecting these with Israeli zone. Shiloah and Dayan agreed [in] return for these concessions Israel would give free access Bethlehem Road, restore certain Arab quarters equivalent value and importance to Jewish quarter and Wailing Wall, make monetary compensation for other non-restored Arab property, and make minor adjustments armistice line interest general convenience and practicability. Discussing Scopus, Israelis for first time stated they wanted absolute sovereignty over area but Jordan delegation categorically refused consider this. Comment: Foregoing based on conversation with Samir who states King determined reach agreement on Jerusalem and has so informed government though he is giving government great latitude and freedom explore all possible solutions. Does not seem at all likely Jordan would give up strategically important Mt. Scopus except possibly as part advantageous general settlement. Samir seemed confident next meeting, for which date not fixed, would result basic agreement Jerusalem. Obviously effect such Jordan Government must be willing relinquish Jewish quarter and Wailing Wall. Samir very concerned regarding possible effect Jordan-Israeli-Jerusalem agreement on UNTC and especially on US and UK Governments. I said US continues back idea international Jerusalem and would support any scheme which gained wide measure support including Jordan and Israel and which seemed workable. Samir expressed himself strongly against any form international and any derogation sovereignty resulting therefrom. Believes, however, both parties would be prepared give UN substantial guarantees regarding access to Holy Places, their protection, et cetera. End comment . Sent Department 17; pouched Arab capitals. Department pass London 9, Tel Aviv 7, Jerusalem 7, Geneva 6. Fritzlan The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva 357.AC/2–750: Telegram [Document 349] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva 1 confidential Washington , February 7, 1950—7 p. m. 198. Unpal 245. Following are Dept’s views on compensation questions raised Paluns 330 and 331. 2 Dept memo of Sept 6 3 states that determination claims not necessarily prerequisite negotiating preliminary lump sum payment. Modified postion our Jan 3 memo 4 recommending survey refugee property as first step based on assumption unwillingness Israel negotiate pending broader settlement. Boisanger proposal therefore correct in principle but Dept feels now not appropriate time attempt apply it. Dept agrees with position you have taken and approves idea establishing machinery for further study of problem. However, in interest harmonious relations with Boisanger, Dept believes wld be desirable not give him impression his suggestion rejected by Dept or USDel. You shld make further efforts persuade him agree USDel position. Following additional arguments may be helpful: 1. Arabs wld react unfavorably to lump sum payment as this might seem indicate PCC has given up hope repatriation. 2. If Israel agreed at all to pay lump sum, amount wld certainly not be large enough to satisfy Arabs. 3. Not desirable risk creating another impasse so soon in new series PCC meetings. 4. Reaction Arab public opinion to Israeli refusal might result serious stiffening Arab position. Dept disagreement first sentence Palun 331 set forth in Jan 3 memo. Fully agree compensation should not be linked reparation claims. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations in New York. 2 Dated January 28 and 31, neither printed. 3 See SD/A/C.1/261, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1362 . 4 Copy not found in Department of State files. The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/2–750: Telegram [Document 350] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , February 7, 1950—7 p. m. 86. Shiloah February 7 at residence during [ for an? ] hour reported on Israel-TJ meeting night February 3 in Jerusalem as follows. Absence of Palestine Arab “probably reflected desire of Samir and Mulki to make progress.” TJ expressed willingness accept “three-fourths’ Israel basic demands” by granting access (1) to Jewish Quarter and Wailing Wall through Dung Gate, and (2) to Scopus “provided Scopus remains TJ territory.” Israel answered that this “is not acceptable since TJ offer is in principle and substance already ‘granted under Article 8 of Armistice.’” Shiloah “argued for final settlement for own sake and to forestall political internationalization Jerusalem.” TJ offer “would satisfy neither Israel’s minimum demands nor avoid internationalization.” Samir replied he “would like to explore” Israel’s demands and added “what would Israel offer in return”. Shiloah then reiterated earlier three basic proposals (see Embtel 76 February 3 [ 4 ]). 1 Samir rejected Israel proposed “radical solution” by which North Jerusalem to be Jewish and South Jerusalem to be Arab. Samir said he “would consider combination of other two Israel offers” so that Israel should return some Arab quarters and pay financial compensation for quarters not returned. Shiloah indicated Israel acceptance “if clearly understood that territorial exchange would be merely nominal and if this exchange and financial compensation achieved settlement whole Jerusalem problem.” Shiloah argued that TJ’s offer was less than Garreau Plan which gives access to Jewish Quarter, Wailing Wall, Scopus and Mt. Olive. Shiloah “did not use Garreau argument as bargaining point but as means of clearing whole picture.” At end both sides agreed that procedure of intermittent inconclusive meetings was futile and that at next meeting, probably this week, both would agree explore possibilities finding basis for continuous sessions to try reach early settlement. After giving me above summary, Shiloah said his personal estimate situation was as follows: King and Samir see possibility basis for settlement but Palestine Arabs in Cabinet strongly against. King probably influenced by, ( a ) desire early settlement, ( b ) financial offer, ( c ) worried about alternate Garreau Plan. Shiloah thinks King could get representative Palestine Arab group to support settlement. On question I asked re desirability USG–UKG aid in negotiations, Shiloah seemed personally to favor such assistance, but added that any approach to USG would have to be made by Foreign Minister or Prime Minister. As to PCC possible assistance Shiloah spoke warmly of Palmer and Barco but otherwise was non-committal. Comment: In light Shiloah’s report, my earlier suggestion in Embtel 76 February 3 [ 4 ] and suggest that Department consider consulting with UKG re possible informal parallel appeals to King and USG separate informal appeal to Ben Gurion. ( End Comment .) Department pass Amman 9, Geneva unnumbered for USTC and USPCC, London 15, Moscow 2. McDonald 1 Not printed. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 357.AC/2–850 [Document 351] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 1 confidential [ Washington ,] February 8, 1950. Subject: United States Role in a Palestine Settlement; US Attitude Toward the Proposed Arab League Collective Security Pact and Lebanese Independence and Territorial Integrity. Participants: Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon Mr. George C. McGhee—NEA Mr. Burton Y. Berry—ANE Mr. J. R. Barrow—ANE Problem: To clarify the United States role in the Palestine settlement, including the Jerusalem question, and matters related to Lebanon’s security, independence, and territorial integrity. Action Required: 1. To send Dr. Malik a note regarding the United States position on Jerusalem. 2. To formulate the Department’s position regarding Dr. Malik’s request for a public declaration of support for Lebanese independence and territorial integrity. 3. To re-formulate the Department’s views on the proposed Arab League Collective Security Pact in the light of recent developments. Action Assigned to: ANE Discussion: Dr. Malik referred to the Department’s note of December 13, 1949 in response to a joint note submitted by the Arab diplomatic representatives dated November 14, 1949 2 (copies attached) on the subject of the Palestine settlement and the US role in advancing a settlement. Dr. Malik stated that the Arab governments were disturbed at the tone of the note, which seemed to indicate that the US Government was disassociating itself from the problem in favor of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Moreover, the United States seemed to be departing from its affirmations in support of the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947, from the Jessup statement at the third session of the General Assembly in Paris, from Mr. Ethridge’s repeated statements at Lausanne, and from the May 12, 1949 protocol drawn up under the auspices of the PCC. Dr. Malik referred to the fact that the Arab states felt the May 12 protocol had constituted an agreement to open negotiations for a Palestine settlement on the basis of the boundaries delineated on the map attached to the protocol. He said that the agreement had not been observed. I replied that although it was true, as Dr. Malik said, that the US had supported the November 29 resolution and as a Member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission had approved the May 12 protocol, it had never followed a policy, or stated an intention to follow a policy, of entering unilaterally into Palestine negotiations or discussions. The US had always participated through the UN and its agency, the PCC. The May 12 protocol was not an agreement providing reciprocal obligations for a settlement, but only a proposal by the PCC that the working document (map) attached to the protocol be used as a basis for discussion, which proposal had been accepted by the Arab representatives and those of Israel. Israel had subsequently indicated that it desired to retain the territory it held, and the Arab states had asked for certain extensive territorial compensations for the Palestine refugees. Each side had found the other’s position unacceptable and the PCC had been forced to report that prospects for a settlement at the time were poor. I said I therefore could not see that any agreement had been violated. Dr. Malik demurred to the extent of remarking that “When one agrees to use a certain map with various colors representing rights to certain territories as a basis for discussion, one does not completely erase the colors from mind; one makes modifications and adjustments but preserves the essential pattern.” Dr. Malik agreed that the PCC was the proper channel for the US Government’s participation in the Palestine settlement. He stated his Government was concerned, however, about the repeated “concessions” of the United States Government to Israeli demands. He cited as an example the fact that the Israelis were always seeking direct negotiations with the Arab states, and that now the US Government was sponsoring direct negotiations. He said his Government would not agree to direct negotiations because ( a ) it did not trust the Jews; and ( b ) direct negotiations would constitute recognition of Israel. His Government, therefore, would only agree to negotiate collectively with the other Arab states. I said that the US Government’s favoring direct negotiations was not a concession to the Israeli viewpoint. We had always been in favor—and had made it clear that we favored—direct negotiations, collective negotiations through the PCC, or any type of negotiations which would be effective in reaching a settlement. Moreover, although not an expert in international law, I did not believe that direct negotiations would prejudice the Lebanese Government’s position on ( de jure ) recognition of the Israeli Government. I said, however, that if the Arab states insist on approaching the Palestine problem from the standpoint that Israel does not exist, they were not being very realistic. Dr. Malik said that governments often took unrealistic positions for a time, and wondered whether the US was not doing the same in withholding recognition from communist China. I said that this was not the case; we recognized the existence of China as a state, but were not recognizing the communist régime since we felt that it had not complied with certain requirements essential to recognition. I believed the Arab states could well recognize the existence of the State of Israel as a fact and negotiate a Palestine settlement on that basis without prejudicing their position on ( de jure ) recognition of the Israeli Government. Dr. Malik did not press the point but said the Arabs had made many concessions in the Palestine controversy; they had come a long way from their original position of refusing to accept any Jewish political authority in Palestine whatsoever to the acceptance of the solution proposed in the General Assembly Resolution of November 29, 1947. The Jews, on the other hand, had made no concessions at all, and the US Government kept shifting its position toward the Jews. I stated that the United States Government, it was true, had taken positions with respect to solutions to the Palestine question but had never indicated that it would apply sanctions to enforce its viewpoint if the positions taken were unacceptable to the peoples and governments concerned. I knew of no means by which we could impose a solution on the Israeli Government any more than we could impose it on the Arab governments. I cited, as one obvious example that we were not controlling Israel, the fact that the Israeli Government was not voting with this Government on many important UN issues. If we were exercising control of Israel this would not be the case. Dr. Malik said that the Arab peoples found it difficult to believe that the US would let an entity it had taken such a decisive part in creating escape from its influence. If indeed we did not exercise such influence, the US Government should take steps to disabuse the Arab peoples of the illusion, for the Arab psychology on this point was a very serious matter for US interests in the Near East. Dr. Malik said that in line with his foregoing remarks, the Arab peoples felt that if the US was unwilling even to prevent the invasion of UN territory in Jerusalem by the Israelis, the Arabs could not be sure where we would make the Israelis stop. The Arabs wanted to know when we were going to say, “So far, and no farther.” I replied that, as Dr. Malik knew, we had originally supported the plan for Jerusalem proposed by the Palestine Conciliation Commission which, however, the General Assembly had voted to reject in favor of the Australian proposal. We had doubted the workability of the latter plan, and voted against it, but we abided by the General Assembly Resolution and were cooperating faithfully with the current efforts of the Trusteeship Council in Geneva to implement it. I agreed to send him a note affirming that fact. 3 I stated further that although, as I had mentioned previously, we had no intention of imposing a solution to the Palestine problem, we would react most sharply to any aggression, and, as Dr. Malik knew, we had made this unmistakably clear to all parties to the Palestine conflict, including the Israelis. Dr. Malik, turning to a new but related subject, said that at some future time he would like to speak to me about the US attitude toward the proposed Arab League Collective Security Pact. He also hoped to discuss a request for a demonstration of US support for the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon. In the latter connection, he had in mind the possibility that whenever a suitable opportunity arose, the US would make a public declaration of its support for Lebanon’s territorial integrity and independence. Such a suitable occasion, he thought, might be a definitive event in the Near East such as a final territorial settlement in Palestine, or, as an outside possibility, a unification of Iraq or Jordan and Syria. I thanked Dr. Malik for advising us in advance so that we could clarify our views on these matters. I fully realized that Lebanon would feel its position strengthened if we made a declaration of the type Dr. Malik had mentioned, and we would be glad to give the matter some thought. I also took up with Dr. Malik the question of Lebanese restrictions on shipping between Lebanon and Israel and movements of passengers, which will be made the subject of a separate memorandum. 4 1 Drafted by John R. Barrow of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs. 2 The exchange of notes is printed in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1488 and 1535 . 3 Assistant Secretary McGhee sent an appropriate note to Minister Malik on February 15 and included the text of the statement on Jerusalem made by Mr. McDermott on January 16 (357.AC/2–550); for the latter, see telegram 75, January 14, to Geneva, p. 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] . 4 Mr. McGhee’s second memorandum of conversation of February 8 is not printed; it noted the Lebanese Minister’s request for a note giving pertinent details (983A.531/2–850). For the note sent to him on February 17, see p. 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] . The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/2–950: Telegram [Document 352] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , February 9, 1950—9 p. m. 217. Tcdel 68. Following is text Chinese motion circulated today for consideration by TC February 10. “TC decides proceed immediately with completion of preparation of statute of Jerusalem in accordance with terms of Paragraph I (2) of GA resolution 9 December.” As motion does not specifically exclude consideration Garreau or other suggestions, USDel proposes vote affirmatively. If, however, motion is amended to raise question of compatibility Garreau’s suggestion with GA resolution, USDel will make statement along lines of Deltc 20 February 3 and abstain. If Chinese motion adopted, as seems likely, TC will probably commence draft statute early next week. 1 USDel has also learned that Australian delegation has agreed, on basis suggestion put forward by Eban (Tcdel 67, February 9) to propose February 10 that TC invite Jordan and Israel to participate in discussions. It seems probable this motion will be adopted. [Here follows the final paragraph dealing with the question of invitations to Jordon and Israel to participate in Council discussions.] Sent Department 217; repeated London 52, Jerusalem unnumbered, Tel Aviv unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, USUN unnumbered, Department pass Tel Aviv, Amman, USUN. 1 Ambassador Sayre, in a statement to the Trusteeship Council on February 10, gave his view that adoption of the Chinese draft resolution would not preclude the Council’s consideration of suggestions such as the Garreau Plan. President Garreau and the Chinese Representative appeared to accept this view (TC (VI), p. 147). The Council, on February 10, unanimously approved the Chinese draft resolution (telegram 233, identified also as Tcdel 71, February 12, from Geneva, 350/2–1250). Nevertheless, the Garreau Plan received a deathblow. A summary of the Council’s discussions on February 10 is printed in TC (VI), pp. 142 ff. The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/2–1050: Telegram [Document 353] The Chargé in Jordan ( Fritzlan ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , February 10, 1950—4 p. m. 20. Deptel 13, February 3. Legation appreciates comments Department’s present attitude re Jordan Israeli negotiations. Legation has never believed US should take hand negotiations extent assuming any responsibility eventual settlement. However, light recent events, it is felt some good might be accomplished by: (1) making strong appeal highest level both parties to resume negotiations general settlement in conciliatory spirit; (2) examining each stage any future negotiations order determine critical point at which if pressure in form strong encouragement both parties take final step was applied agreement might be reached; and (3) applying such pressure. Kirkbride informs Legation attitude Prime Minister against admitting Israelis old city Jerusalem hardening. Cabinet meeting due tomorrow and by Monday government policy should have crystallized. Abdullah continues strongly favor agreement Jerusalem. Government decision against conceding Jewish quarter and Wailing Wall might open way for change of government favor Samir. However King would undoubtedly hesitate take this step view coming elections and almost certain hostile reaction among Palestinians. No change apparent King’s strong stand against Jerusalem internationalization. Sent Department 20, Department pass London 10, Tel Aviv 9, Jerusalem 8, Geneva 7 for USPCC and USTC 6. Fritzlan The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/2–1250: Telegram [Document 354] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Geneva , February 12, 1950—10 a. m. 227. Palun 334. Continuing conversations with Arab delegations have elicited general reiteration that essential preliminary to direct negotiations is convincing evidence of Israel’s good intentions. Unanimous feeling is that negotiations will be fruitless unless Israel has changed position substantially and that until now there is no evidence such change. In US delegate’s talks with Israel representatives Eban and Rafael we have emphasized importance this Arab feeling and without suggesting specific steps Israel might take, have indicated our belief it is up to Israel convince Arabs they have something to gain by direct negotiations. Eban and Rafael seem to understand this need. They expressed satisfaction with publicity given by PCC to report of programs in reuniting families from Jordan and Lebanon as helping to establish better atmosphere. Rafael has reported agreement his government to principle of unblocking 100 pounds of every blocked Arab account regardless of size. He pointed out he had recommended agreement for very purpose of giving Arabs token of Israel’s sincerity. Arab member mixed committee experts, Labbane, has agreed to reconvening committee for working out details, but there is no reason to expect Arabs will regard this step sufficiently important to convince them of Israel’s good intentions. In long talk with US delegation Thursday Mikaoui went over old ground, but made one significant comment that key to refugee problem lay in territorial adjustments. He agreed repatriation of Arabs to Israel of questionable value either as subject for negotiation or ultimate benefit to refugees. PCC now considering, at Boisanger’s suggestion, procedure for establishing mixed committees to study all questions at issue, taking as precedent mixed committee on blocked accounts. US delegation has taken position we can support formula of this nature if it has approval of both sides. We have emphasized unfortunate effect a refusal might have, both upon current talks between Jordan and Israel and on subsequent work which PCC might undertake. PCC has agreed with our suggestion to sound out carefully Israel and Arab delegates in effort obtain general agreement to a formula for committee work. Eban has reported to US delegation on progress Jordan-Israel talks. His information follows closely that reported Department by American Embassy Tel Aviv. PCC has accepted invitation from Boisanger to visit French Foreign Office 20 and 21 February. US delegation will leave Geneva 18 and return 22. [ Palmer ] The Israeli Ambassador (Elath) to the Secretary of State 484A.118/2–1350 [Document 355] The Israeli Ambassador ( Elath ) to the Secretary of State No. 1240/50 Washington , February 13, 1950. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I have the honor to refer to our conversation of Tuesday, January 31, 1 and to your suggestion that I might further communicate with you in writing on the following two matters: The views of my government on the situation arising from Arab rearmament and from the propaganda in favor of a renewal of the war with Israel current in the Arab countries; and The request by my government for the granting of licenses for and assistance in its purchase of arms for defensive purposes. This letter deals only with the first subject. A list of arms required will be submitted separately. 2 As I had the honor to explain orally to you, Mr. Secretary, my government views with growing concern the rapid and large scale rearmament now in progress in all Arab states having common boundaries with Israel, especially in Egypt. For the reasons indicated below, this rearmament cannot, in relation to Israel, be considered as confined within the limits of legitimate self-defense. On the contrary, it constitutes a great menace to Israel’s security. Arab rearmament began almost immediately after the cessation of the war against Israel. It has continued without interruption. In addition to completed purchases, negotiations are under way for further large scale acquisitions of important armaments. The scale of Arab rearmament can best be measured by the vast increase in expenditures for military purposes. According to Radio Damascus, the Syrian Minister of Finance announced on February 9, 1950, that army expenses during 1949 amounted to 65,000,000 pounds sterling. He added that the Syrian Minister of Defense obtained a loan to cover this expenditure. In Egypt seventy-two million Egyptian pounds have been allotted for a three-year rearmament plan, of which ten million Egyptian pounds have been set aside for the establishment of an armament industry. According to official Egyptian sources, the sum allocated for national defense for the budget year 1949–1950, is fifty-two million Egyptian pounds, which is 28% of the total budget. It constitutes an increase of 220% over the budget of 1948–1949 which provided twenty-four million Egyptian pounds for the same purpose, and an increase of 900% over the year 1945–1946, when the national defense budget of Egypt amounted to 5.8 million Egytian pounds, or 8% of her total budget. It is not only the scale of Arab rearmament which is viewed with great apprehension by Israel. My government is especially perturbed by the formation of offensive units and by the character of arms being acquired. In Egypt a self-contained armored division has recently been set up. When completed, it will consist of three regiments, each one equipped with sixty-four heavy tanks, and of a mobile reserve. Some of its elements were paraded through the streets of Cairo in November 1949. For the equipment of this division, Egypt has purchased two hundred Sherman tanks, mostly in Italy and in other European countries. She is now negotiating in Belgium for the purchase of another sixty-five Sherman tanks. Great Britain is supplying one hundred Centurion tanks, of which forty have already been delivered. It should be noted that these Centurion tanks are most modern weapons, developed by Great Britain since the end of World War II. The purchase by Egypt of aircraft must be viewed in conjunction with the formation of this powerful striking force. The acquisition of jet fighters, appropriate for air support of tank formations, assumes special significance in this connection. Egypt ordered in Great Britain about a hundred deHavilland jet fighters, as well as a number of Gloucester Meteor VIII’s. In 1949 Egypt also acquired forty-six Spitfire fighter planes, eighteen Macchi, and four Fiat Italian fighter planes, and, from Switzerland, twelve four-engine Halifax bombers. The latter can certainly not be considered as defensive weapons. Egypt purchased at the same time considerable quantities of phosphorous triplex explosive bombs as well as incendiary, anti-personnel, and high explosive bombs. These forces represent the striking arm of a well-balanced army, the whole of which is being systematically developed and expanded. Egyptian agents purchased in Great Britain considerable quantities of twenty-five-pounder field artillery and seventeen-pounder guns. A plant for the production of small arms has been acquired from Krupp in Germany and a cartridge casing production plant from Manurhin in France. An explosives factory has been acquired from a Swedish firm. In addition, negotiations are under way with firms in these countries and in Italy for the acquisition of other arms production plants and for the establishment of a factory for aircraft bodies. Egypt is sending workers to Europe for special training in arms industries and is recruiting foreign craftsmen, military specialists, and instructors to serve in Egypt. The Egyptian navy too is being strengthened. On December 7, 1949, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty announced in the House of Commons that “six frigates have been transferred to Egypt during the last few months and the transfer of a seventh is under negotiation.” In reply to a supplementary question whether these frigates had been transferred unconditionally or whether any undertaking had been given that they would be used for defensive purposes only, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty stated that “that question will have to be put on the Order Paper.” Furthermore, Egypt purchased in Great Britain one destroyer, one sloop, and one corvette. Four one-man torpedo vessels (type Maialy) and four motor torpedo boats have been purchased in Italy. Negotiations are under way in Great Britain for the purchase of another twelve motor torpedo boats. These additions to Egyptian naval strength must be viewed in the light of the length and vulnerability of Israel’s coast line, with her dependence on the import of vital items of consumption and production. Egypt has made no secret of the fact that her military planning, in case of renewed war, includes a naval blockade against Israel. Rearmament by other Arab states, though on a smaller scale, shows characteristics similar to that of Egypt. While Egypt has set up an armored division, Syria is organizing an armored brigade, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is forming an armored regiment. Syria, which previously had no air force of her own, is acquiring jet planes and heavy tanks. Thirty Sherman tanks have already been purchased for the equipment of her armored brigade. In Great Britain she acquired fourteen Gloucester Meteor jet fighters although—it should be noted—Great Britain is under no treaty obligation to supply arms to Syria. Furthermore, Syria purchased twenty-two Fiat fighter planes and forty Staghound armored cars, the latter in addition to the eighty armored cars she possessed in 1949. Guns of all calibers up to 155 mm. were acquired in France. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has received, from Great Britain, two hundred seventy armored cars, most of them of the Marman Harrington type, and has ordered another two hundred. The above details of the reorganization and purchase of arms undertaken by Israel’s neighbors illustrate the scale of their present rearmament. There is no doubt that these armies will become incomparably stronger than those which attacked Israel in May 1948 and will acquire a far greater striking power. As an example, it may be mentioned that in 1949 Egypt owned twelve Sherman tanks. She now has two hundred twelve and another sixty-five on order. In addition, she ordered one hundred Centurion tanks. In 1949 she had one gunboat; she now has ten. Jordan, which in 1949 had one hundred twenty armored cars, has purchased two hundred seventy armored cars and ordered another two hundred. My government can therefore not agree to the suggestion that Arab rearmament does not at present exceed the requirements of legitimate self-defense. The pace, scale, and nature of present Arab armament bespeak its aggressive intent. My government contends further that this rearmament cannot be judged without consideration of the temper of Arab leadership and public opinion as reflected in public statements, official broadcasts, and in the press. At a time when the overwhelming consensus in Israel, as expressed in the Knesset, in the press, and in authoritative statements by political leaders, has been promoting the cause of peace and cooperation with Israel’s Arab neighbors, a systematic campaign has been conducted for months in the Arab countries to whip up the spirit of revenge and incite the masses to start the second round of a Holy War against Israel. Quotations from Arab propaganda material are so plentiful that only a small selection can be given here. They are appended to this letter. 3 It has been contended that these inciting statements should not be taken too seriously since they may well be for internal consumption only. However, a state of affairs where, in order to please public opinion, not only Arab journalists but Arab leaders and responsible officials use warlike language and incite to implacable hatred against the state of Israel is bound to give rise to grave anxiety. The Arab leaders are giving impetus to forces which might not later be controllable. It must be remembered that similar bellicose campaigns were the prelude to the first aggression against Israel. History shows only too clearly the fateful results of intertwined aggressive propaganda and armament programs. In conclusion, may I be permitted, Mr. Secretary, to sum up my government’s views: The government of Israel is deeply disturbed by the fact that the Arab states have begun an armaments race which endangers the security of Israel and jeopardizes the peace and stability of the Middle East. At the same time it deplores the expenditure for armament of huge sums urgently needed, in its opinion, for raising the standard of living and the general improvement of economic and social conditions in the entire area. My government has emphatically made clear and desires to reaffirm here that Israel has no intention of attacking any of her neighbors and that the achievement of a just and stable peace remains its primary concern. The government of Israel notes with satisfaction that the government of the United States “would be quick to use all its influence within the United Nations and outside in attempting to prevent any renewal of hostilities.” It desires, however, to draw attention to its past experience when, despite the expressed resolve on the part of the government of the United States and of the United Nations, the invasion of Israel territory by Arab forces was not prevented and resulted in a costly and lengthy conflagration. My government sincerely desires that an end be put to the armaments race in the Middle East and that the unchecked flow of arms to the Arab countries be stemmed. Conscious of the deep interest and concern of the United States in the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East, my government respectfully requests that the government of the United States use its good offices in order to prevent the continuation of the present arms supplies to the Arab states. The government of Israel, however, deems it inherently injust that while Arab countries are permitted to receive freely arms of all types from the United Kingdom and elsewhere, defensive armament is denied to the state of Israel. One-sided armament is not only discriminatory, it increases the temptation in the Arab states to embark upon aggressive campaigns. It may well be that no attack will come if the Arab states know that Israel is equipped to meet it. In view of the fact that Arab rearmament has already reached such a pitch as to constitute a serious and imminent danger to the security of Israel, my government has no alternative but to take all steps necessary for its protection. The government of Israel, therefore, respectfully requests that the government of the United States lend its assistance to enable Israel to acquire in the United States those legitimate means of self-defense urgently needed for her security. I avail myself of this opportunity, Mr. Secretary, to express renewed assurances of my highest consideration. E. Elath 1 See Secretary Acheson’s memorandum of conversation, p. 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] . 2 The list of arms required by the Israeli Government “for defensive purposes” was submitted by Ambassador Elath in his note 1239/50, also dated February 13, to the Secretary of State. It called for varying quantities of machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank guns, howitzers, tanks and armored cars, rifles, rockets, launchers, and radar and communication equipment. The list also contained a request for 18 jet fighters. 3 Some seven pages of “Quotations from the Arab Press and Radio” are not printed. The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State 785.21/2–1350: Telegram [Document 356] The Chargé in Jordan ( Fritzlan ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , February 13, 1950—3 p. m. 22. Legtel 20 February 10. Upshot Saturday Jordan Cabinet meeting was unanimous refusal concede territory admitting Israelis old city Jerusalem. Prime Minister and colleagues giving serious consideration Garreau Plan now tending view favor internationalization as means reach settlement Jerusalem without making direct concessions Israelis. This would serve save face with Arab world generally and Palestinians. Reliably reported Prime Minister announced Cabinet’s decision to King and stated government would willingly resign over issue if necessary. Kirkbride saw King Saturday and HM seriously pretended he had never favored admission Israelis old city despite his agreement at early stage negotiations (Legtel 421 December 15 1 ) and continued later acquiescence Israelis obtain Wailing Wall and Jewish quarter. Not impossible King (who frequently reverses his thinking) will ultimately persuade himself he never really opposed internationalization. Prime Minister has expressed to Kirkbride belief Israelis not in fact desirous agreement with Jordan. Believes they very anxious give impression UN bodies that agreement Jerusalem virtually reached order active consideration internationalization might be postponed and GA internationalization resolution might ultimately be rescinded. Glubb is understood, from defense standpoint, not to object international control old city provided: a . Such control not extend to strategic roads and b . Extradition agreement concluded precluding granting asylum old city to Arab criminals who have committed crimes elsewhere. Next move affecting Jordan-Israeli-Jerusalem agreement clearly up to Israel. Only way satisfy Abdullah’s strong desire achieve agreement would seem appointment new government, an extreme step which King very reluctant to take. Sent Department 22; Department pass London 11, Tel Aviv 10, Jerusalem 9, Geneva 8, for USPCC 9, USTC 7. Pouched Arab capitals. Fritzlan 1 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1545 . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) 884A.00/2–1550 [Document 357] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) secret [ Washington ,] February 15, 1950. Subject: Situation in Palestine; Arms Shipments to Near East Countries. Participants: The Secretary Mr. Henry Morgenthau NEA: Mr. Hare Mr. Morgenthau came in at his request to pass on to the Secretary certain impressions of his recent visit to Israel. Mr. Morgenthau first spoke briefly of the extremely difficult economic position in which Israel finds itself owing particularly to the large number of immigrants which is being brought in despite restricted facilities for their assimilation. He also mentioned additional difficulty caused by war damage, particularly to the orange groves, as well as recent hardship resulting from severe weather conditions. Without pursuing this general subject in detail he reached the conclusion that Israel is now faced by “just about as difficult an economic problem as could be imagined”. Mr. Morgenthau then turned to the question of the security of Israel which he said he had discussed at length with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and found to be his most serious preoccupation. Mr. Morgenthau said that, as a result of his talks with Mr. Ben-Gurion and other Israeli officials, he was convinced that there is no question that the present Government of Israel is definitely on our side in the present East-West conflict. Thus far, Israel had refrained from taking such a public position but Mr. Morgenthau said he had been given clear indication that Israeli leaders were thinking in terms of taking such a political plunge and that Mr. Ben-Gurion had even intimated that he might be prepared to take this step even though it might mean irretrievably prejudicing the prospects for Jewish immigration from behind the “Iron Curtain”. The fact that Mr. Ben-Gurion was thinking in such terms is very significant since Israeli leaders are imbued by what amounts to a religious fervor as concerns the fate of their coreligionists in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Mr. Morgenthau said that he had also received the impression that the Israeli Government might be receptive to the idea of extending base rights to the United States in the Negev. Additional evidence of the anti-Communist bias of the Israeli Government was seen in the strong statements made by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in the Knesset in refuting charges directed at Mr. Morgenthau by several communist deputies. In the face of this reassuring attitude of the Israeli Government, Mr. Morgenthau said that he was greatly disturbed by the situation being created by arms shipments to the Arab States, particularly to Egypt. He was convinced that Israel sincerely wanted peace and that peace in the Near Eastern area was very much in the interest of the United States. The arms currently being shipped to the Arab States, however, constituted a menace to Israeli security and, by arousing fear of a renewal of hostilities, resulted in an emphasis being placed upon arms procurement which would better be placed on more constructive effort. But if arms were to be furnished the Arab States the least that could be done was to give Israel the facility of commensurate armament by raising the present United States “embargo” on the licensing of arms shipments to Israel. The matter was pressing because it was the conviction of those with whom he had talked in Israel that, as matters were progressing, the Egyptians were planning the renewal of hostilities this Spring. Mr. Morgenthau seemed to entertain certain misgivings regarding the attitude of the British in this matter. He referred to a flight which he had made over the Gulf of Aqaba and to his having seen a British cruiser and several destroyers in the area. He felt that such a display of force was hardly conducive to the creation of a proper atmosphere for peaceful negotiation. The Secretary said that he was in entire agreement with Mr. Morgenthau regarding the necessity of preserving the peace in the Near East. Our efforts were constantly directed to that end and he had also discussed the matter on several occasions with Mr. Bevin. The Secretary suggested that Mr. Hare might have certain specific observations to make regarding the status of arms shipments to Israel, and intelligence available to us regarding the likelihood of the renewal of conflict. Mr. Hare referred to Ambassador Austin’s statement of last August setting forth American policy regarding the avoidance of an arms race in the Middle East 1 and said that this was the guide of our actions in this matter. Regarding the specific question of arms shipments from the United States, a considerable quantity of material had been shipped to Israel, in fact a relatively much greater amount than had been shipped to the Arab States. No applications by the Israeli Government had as yet been refused but decision on certain items was still pending in order that appropriate consideration could be given in the light of established policy. This matter had been under active discussion with the Israeli Embassy here and the Israeli Ambassador had discussed it recently with the Secretary. Pursuant thereto a new and comprehensive Israeli list of arms requirements had been submitted by the Israeli Embassy just the day before and would be actively examined. In the circumstances it was hardly consonant with the facts of the case to refer to an “embargo”. In replying to a question by Mr. Morgenthau whether in fact there was any hope that pending requests would be favorably considered, Mr. Hare replied that the first question of course would be whether the items mentioned were actually available; as far as licensing went, there was no question of any obstacle to fair and reasonable consideration but it was of course impossible to predict action which might be taken on specific items. Mr. Hare then observed that there was another angle to this question which had to be borne in mind; this was the general strategic situation in the Near East disassociated from the question of Arab-Israeli difficulty. If one could for the moment leave the question of Israel aside, it was obvious that the strengthening of the Near East could play an important role in maintaining desired general security requirements. It was also only natural that there should be a certain emphasis on the historically important Suez Canal area. What was difficult was a satisfactory evaluation of Arab-Israeli difficulty as related to the general strategic pattern of the area. On the one side, it was perfectly understandable that the Israelis should be perturbed by Egyptian rearmament. On the other hand, it was possible to misjudge the situation seriously if arms furnished Egypt were regarded entirely in terms of their potential threat to Israel. The question would seem to be resolved into one of basic intent and in this connection all of the reports which we had been getting from Egypt indicated that those in authority in that country did not have the intention of renewing hostilities with Israel. This information had been furnished by our Ambassador in Cairo, who had been in constant touch with the Egyptian Government on the subject. The Egyptian Ambassador had recently visited the Department for the specific purpose of conveying a similar assurance. General Riley, United Nations Observer in the area, recently expressed the opinion that a renewal of hostilities was not only improbable but in his opinion impossible. Furthermore, relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including Egypt, are covered by Armistice agreements and the Egyptian Government had recently taken pains to make it clear that these agreements should remain in force until such time as peace settlements were reached. A mistaken appraisal was always possible but information available to the Department did not lead to the conclusion that Egypt intended an early renewal of hostilities. The Secretary intervened at this point to emphasize the importance which we attach to this matter and said that he would give instruction that our intelligence efforts thereon be diligently pursued. [Here follows the last paragraph on the recent call of prominent American labor officials on President Truman in connection with arms shipments to the Near East.] 1 Regarding Ambassador Austin’s statement of August 4, 1949, on this subject, see the editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1283 . The Consul General in Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/2–1650: Telegram [Document 358] The Consul General in Jerusalem ( Gibson ) to the Secretary of State secret Jerusalem , February 16, 1950—3 p. m. 50. Shiloah had conversation this date with General Riley. With respect to Israel Jordan meeting, Shiloah stated he had discussed with Ben-Gurion on February 15 as to how far he was willing to go to secure an agreement with Transjordan. Ben-Gurion stated, according to Shiloah remarks to Riley, that Israel Government might have to give [up?] request for Jewish quarter in old city, due to King Abdullah stand. Shiloah discussed question of Israel offer to give Transjordan corridor, wide enough for road and possibly railroad, of some 200 to 300 meters in width. Corridor to be under control of Transjordan. Counter request of Transjordan of corridor of 8 to 10 kilometers was unacceptable to Israel. He stated that at meeting held February 7 there had been tacit agreement to hold one more meeting. To date no suggestion as to date of meeting has been received from Transjordan. Letter by Shiloah was addressed on February 15, inviting attention to plan of holding one more meeting and asked if date could be set for such meeting. There is discussion among Israel officials as to whether or not meeting between Ben-Gurion and King Abdullah would do good. Shiloah stated he was under impression that if Ben-Gurion was in position to make liberal proposal, it would be better to have junior delegation suggest such proposal, and if acceptable to Transjordan, meeting should be arranged and that it would be worthwhile. Sent Department 50, repeated Tel Aviv 4, Beirut 5, Damascus 4, Baghdad 3, Jidda 3; Department pass Amman 3, Cairo 10. Gibson The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Lebanese Minister (Malik) 983A.531/2–850 [Document 359] The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Lebanese Minister ( Malik ) Washington , February 17, 1950. My Dear Mr. Minister : You will recall that during our conversation of February 8, 1950 1 I mentioned the matter of regulations being applied by Lebanon which are adversely affecting American shipping, commerce and tourism in the Near East. I said that Lebanon, which has a long-standing tradition of hospitality toward foreign shipping, commerce and tourism, was applying restrictions even more stringent than certain of the other Arab states. The regulations to which I referred concern three interrelated questions upon which the United States Government has made known its views to the Government of Lebanon on a number of occasions. These are (1) restrictions on direct shipping services in the Eastern Mediterranean which normally include both Arab and Israel ports; (2) discrimination on grounds of race or religion in the issuance of Lebanese visas; and (3) prohibitions against issuance of visas to bearers of passports containing Israeli visas. Although other Arab states, notably Egypt, have relaxed these restrictions considerably, the American Legation at Beirut has thus far been unable to obtain a firm indication of Lebanese policy. Subsequent to our conversation of the other day it was reported that Lebanon had submitted these questions to the Arab League for adoption of a uniform Arab policy. In the meantime, it is understood from Lebanese authorities that:— (1) Lebanon will permit shipping operations between Lebanese and Israeli ports in both directions. The Lebanese Government is attaching such stringent restrictions and controls relative to bunkering of vessels, and embarkation and debarkation of passengers, crews and cargoes on such connecting services, however, as to render practical operations exceedingly difficult. (2) Lebanon favors a non-discriminatory policy in the matter of visa issuance but is awaiting confirmation that other Arab States are adopting such a policy. (3) Lebanon has eliminated the prohibition against issuance of visas to bearers of passports containing Israeli visas and will continue to follow such a policy unless a contrary uniform policy is adopted by the states members of the Arab League. On the latter two questions, however, this Government has received disturbing reports to the effect that a Lebanese-sponsored proposal in the Arab League to unify Arab policy has resulted in a declaration which aims at a reinstatement of the restrictive visa policies followed by the Arab States during the Palestine controversy. The United States Government sincerely hopes these reports are without foundation. As I mentioned during our discussion, the United States Government believes that in the light of the armistices in the Near East which have been in effect for over one year and the generally peaceful conditions prevailing, such restrictive policies are anachronistic and unwarranted. Moreover, the maintenance of restrictions and controls discouraging foreign shipping, commerce and tourism is, in this Government’s view, hardly in keeping with Lebanese traditions and is depriving Lebanon of considerable benefit in revenues, including scarce foreign exchange. The United States Government, therefore, hopes that Lebanon will shortly take concrete action to liberalize shipping and visa policies, and that if a uniform policy is to be adopted by the Arab states, Lebanon will exert its utmost efforts to influence such a policy in the direction of a removal of all the present burdensome restrictions preventing a restoration of normal freedom of movement and peaceful trade in the Near East. Sincerely yours, George C. McGhee 1 Regarding the memorandum covering this conversation, see footnote 4, p. 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] . The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/2–1750: Telegram [Document 360] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , February 17, 1950—noon. 119. At my request Shiloah with Kollek 1 at residence, February 16 said he and possibly Dayan to meet with Abdullah and Samir (Geneva for USPCC and USTC) night February 17 in Transjordan. Shiloah’s letter of “few days ago” to Samir recalling their agreement February 3 on another meeting was not answered; but Shiloah’s later indirect approach to Samir was promptly accepted. Shiloah said he is not optimistic. Confident King still wants agreement but fears he may not be able build Cabinet willing to take responsibility for agreement with Israel. Shiloah credits Samir with intelligent, earnest desire secure settlement and being willing risk much to get it. Information Shiloah gave me re Transjordan Cabinet meeting February 13 was similar that Amman Legtel 10 February 13. 2 Comment: I believe Shiloah as usual is telling truth but not necessarily whole truth. End comment . [Here follows the last paragraph, dealing with the health of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.] Sent Department 119, repeated Jerusalem 10, Department pass Geneva 1, London 29. McDonald 1 Theodore (Teddy) Kollek, Director of the North American Division of the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 2 This telegram was a repeat of No. 22 from Amman, p. 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] . The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/2–1750: Telegram [Document 361] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , February 17, 1950—7 p. m. 250. Tcdel 82. In preliminary statements to TC this week re Jerusalem Statute 1 Iraq and Philippine delegations declared that certain articles draft statute must be revised to take into account existing conditions in Palestine, particularly with respect to refugees. It seems probable that these delegations will introduce revisions and possibly new articles calling for return of Arab refugees to Jerusalem, restoration of Arab refugee property, compensation, etc. 2 1. US delegation recommends it be authorized to abstain on revisions or new articles specifically relating to refugee and related problems. We consider we should not support these revisions or new articles because they might have serious political implications vis-à-vis Israel and because they would be inappropriate in organic law of city. On other hand, we should not vote against them as negative vote would probably cause severe Arab reaction. We feel it would be desirable at first discussion with respect to return of refugees or restoration of refugee properties in Jerusalem to explain our abstention along following line: US earnestly desires solution refugee problem and in this connection US continues to participate in and support actively PCC and PRA. Having in mind unanimous adoption GA Resolution December 8, 1949 on the refugee question, US knows its desire for solution refugee problem is fully shared by most other UN members. However, US does not feel that TC which is acting under restrictive provisions of GA Resolution December 9, 1949 is proper body to deal with these problems of such wide ramifications and complexities. In our view, the task of the TC under the GA Resolution of December 9 is to frame constitutional status for Jerusalem and not to legislate on involved and complex matters which are of territory-wide extent. Moreover, other UN organizations such as the PCC and PRA are already seized with these problems. Please specifically instruct. 2. US delegation recognizes a possible distinction between articles such as above and such paragraphs as Article 8( a ) which primarily defines who are residents and, therefore, have voting rights and which only incidentally touches on problem of refugees. Under present wording subparagraph ( a ) persons ordinarily resident in Jerusalem prior outbreak hostilities but now refugees cannot be defined as “residents”. Since it seems clear GA Resolution 29 November 1947 3 intended that all persons residing in Jerusalem as of November 29, 1947 should be considered “residents”, unless they had voluntarily abandoned their residence since that date, subparagraph ( a ) might be revised to take account this situation by omission words “and have remained ordinarily so residents since that date”. If such resolution introduced should US delegation vote in favor without comment or abstain? 3. TC begins Monday with discussion and action on Jerusalem statute. Appreciate instructions soonest. 1 This refers to the Draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem which had been adopted by the Trusteeship Council on April 21, 1948; see editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , Part 2, p. 837 . The Council began its first reading of the Draft Statute on February 14. 2 During the discussion of February 14, the Philippine Representative suggested modification of Article 8 to provide that refugees from Jerusalem be included in the definition of inhabitants of the city. He also requested that property seized by the occupying authorities be returned to their lawful owners. His views were welcomed by the Iraqi Representative (telegram 240, identified also as Tcdel 77, February 14, from Geneva, 350/2–1450). The record of the Council’s discussion on February 14 is printed in TC (VI), pp. 161 ff. 3 See telegram 1271, November 29, 1947, from New York, Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , p. 1291 . It was this resolution that provided for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab States and for an international trusteeship over the Jerusalem area. The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 350/2–1850: Telegram [Document 362] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva secret Washington , February 18, 1950—1 p. m. 228. Deltc 24. Approve procedure suggested para 1 Tedel 82. 1 Re para 2 reftel, your suggested deletion Art. 8 ( a ) would appear to include as residents persons who have left city involuntarily and who continue absent. Should not category of residents be limited to those actually residing in city at any given time. Possible solution might be additional sub-para to include persons resident No. 29, 1947 who, having left Jerusalem as refugees, subsequently return for the purpose of residing there. 2 If foregoing suggestion adopted first para Article 9 should be appropriately amended. Acheson 1 Supra . 2 The Department of State’s instruction was carried out by Ambassador Sayre in the Trusteeship Council’s discussion during the afternoon of February 22. As reported by Geneva the following day, the Ambassador “sympathized with attempt avoid penalizing refugees but stressed they should be considered resident only if they returned to city. Otherwise absentee voting might be involved.” (Telegram 269, identified also as Tedel 95, 350/2–2350) His observations are presented in full in TC (VI), p. 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 94 ] . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 784A.56/2–1850: Telegram [Document 363] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State secret London , February 18, 1950—6 p. m. 963. In conversation with me yesterday at which Furlonge and Palmer were also present, Wright 1 raised subject supply of arms to Israel and Arab States. He referred to Chiefs of Staff study this question which was referred to in Embtel 903, February 16 2 and informed us that study now completed and was being reviewed by Foreign Office. Chiefs of Staff, in their study question, kept four factors in mind: (1) Internal security requirements of states concerned; (2) Contributions such states could make in event of war; (3) Undesirability arms race developing in NE; and (4) Undesirability states spending more on armaments than their local economies could bear. As result foregoing, Chiefs of Staff have now arrived at assessment in terms of size of forces which they feel Arab States should reasonably have. This will enable UK to set ceiling on arms shipments. Information on this subject will be exchanged with US service attachés by UK service departments here, but Wright felt it might be useful for Foreign Office to make this Information available Embassy as well. I replied that I was sure Department would be glad to have this information at such time Foreign Office was in position to make it available. Wright then went on to say that with regard Israel request for arms, Chiefs of Staff insistent that military items should be furnished Israel until there was a general Palestine settlement. Wright commented this was a political opinion which, it might be argued, Chiefs of Staff had no right to express. Nevertheless, they felt very strongly on subject. Major part of difficulty re Israeli request for arms is that UK has no exact idea what they possess at present time. This creates quite different situation from that of Arab States which have furnished UK with detailed information which has enabled UK to reach assessment their deficiency requirements. Moreover, all Arab States have at various times, given UK assurances that they would hot use any arms supplied against the Israelis. Wright said UK is considering telling Israelis that in all cases where Arab States have asked for arms, they have furnished lists of those presently in their possession and suggesting to Israelis that if they desire purchase in UK, they should do likewise. Meanwhile, UK, as indicated Embtel 903, February 16, has authorized sale certain non-service equipment to Israel. List of this equipment has been furnished Embassy by Furlonge and will be airmailed Department. UK hopeful this will partially satisfy Israelis and will enable UK point out that it has relaxed ban on shipments to Israel. Wright informed us that in requesting arms from UK, Israeli Ministry, London has emphasized Israel’s ability pay for them in dollars. Sent Department 963; repeated Baghdad 16, Cairo 28, Jidda 10, Tel Aviv 20, Beirut 1, Damascus 9, pouched Moscow and Paris. Department pass Amman 8. Holmes 1 Michael L. Wright, Superintending Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office. 2 Not printed. The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/2–1950: Telegram [Document 364] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , February 19, 1950—7 p. m. 123. At residence February 19 Shiloah with Kollek reported as follows: At Israel-Transjordan meeting night February 17 agreed between Shiloah and Samir and King that now impossible make peace because neither side can now [make] necessary concessions. As King put it, “now is too near period of war.” Towards end of meeting (Geneva for USTC and USPCC) King reappeared and proposed following: 1. Five year renewable non-aggression pact maintaining armistice lines. 2. Free intercourse between two countries with free zone at Haifa. 3. Setting up study committees to examine specific issues possible basis peace. 4. Mutual guarantees to UN re maintenance freedom access and protection holy places. Suggested some Israel concession to Arab property owners and said he reserves for future consideration his claim to sea outlet. Answering Israel representative question re access to Scopus, King indicated willingness to include provision providing access. February 1 Shiloah consulted Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. His impression is Israel Cabinet will accept King’s proposals “as basis talks”. He hopes these will be “continuous until agreement reached”. Comment: I have impression Israel is pleased, and hopes to secure agreement before TC acts on Jerusalem. End comment . Sent Department 123, Department pass Cairo 38, Geneva 3, London 31, Moscow 5, Paris 18, pouched other Arab capitals. McDonald The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/2–2050: Telegram [Document 365] The Chargé in Jordan ( Fritzlan ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , February 20, 1950—1 p. m. 28. Night February 17 Shiloah and Dayan at their request visited King Abdullah and Samir at Shuneh order reopen discussions general Jordan-Israel settlement. Legation informed by Kirkbride during talks King grew impatient lack of progress outlining his present terms for settlement as follows: 1. Demarcation lines to follow generally present armistice lines. 2. Nonaggression pact for five years during which period joint Jordan-Israeli committee to be set up under proposed agreement would make minor adjustments based mutual convenience. 3. Free port zone for Jordan in Haifa with guaranteed transit rights. 4. Previous Jordan claim corridor to sea reserved for possible future presentation. 5. Opening trade between two countries. 6. Israel is to have right access Scopus institutions and Wailing Wall but no sovereignty over them. 7. Israel is to restore certain Arab quarters Jerusalem and make cash compensation unrestored property. 8. Israel is [to] permit Arab property holders, or their agents, visit Israel to dispose of their property. 9. Jerusalem Holy places to be “demilitarized”. (Exact meaning this term unclear). Israel is reportedly greatly encouraged by this turn negotiations and stated King’s new terms constituted great contribution success talks. Agreed confer with superiors Tel Aviv and return with their reaction for further talks evening February 20. 1 Jordan Cabinet unaware this new development but will be informed if Israeli reaction favorable. Next step would be Cabinet decision whether negotiate formally on King’s terms. Legation doubtful Cabinet decision would be favorable. (Kirkbride agrees this view.) In such case King would have make difficult choice between dismissing government favor one more amenable to his wishes and continuing present stalemate vis-à-vis Israel. Sent Department 28, Department pass London 13, Tel Aviv 12, Jerusalem 11, Geneva 10, for USPCC 11 and USTC 9. Pouched Arab capitals. Fritzlan 1 Legation Amman advised, on February 23, that the meeting of Jordanian and Israeli representatives scheduled for February 20 had not taken place (telegram 30, 684A.85/2–2350). The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/2–2150: Telegram [Document 366] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , February 21, 1950—7 p. m. 262. Tcdel 90. At lunch today with USDel Eban and Rafael reported Jordan now proposes five-year non-aggression pact as practical half-way step between armistice and peace since peace treaty would place Jordan in embarrassing position vis-à-vis other Arab states. Also stated that during direct talks Jordan delegation much concerned about Christian interests in Jerusalem and Israel cannot press for protection these interests since most were in Arab part Jerusalem. USDel impressed upon Eban importance reaching, before completion and adoption statute by TC, some form agreement between Israel and Jordan acceptable to and protective of Christian and third party interests. Eban replied Israel in accord but unable to secure Jordan’s agreement and in absence of this for Israel to propose alone an arrangement protective of third party interests would only widen breach between Israel and Jordan. He hoped, therefore, some way could be found for bringing pressure upon Jordan. Eban again suggested publicly today in TC that Israel would be glad to work out some satisfactory arrangement for international protection Holy Places also with Jordan with cooperation of TC. Eban, in conversation with USDel, suggested that if negotiations between Israel and Jordan on international aspects Jerusalem could take place with some third party assistance representative of Christian interests, chance of bringing Jordan to agreement would be very greatly increased. We replied that he might care to get Israel Ambassador in Washington to discuss matter with Department. Sent Department 262; repeated London 65, Jerusalem unnumbered. Department pass Tel Aviv unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, USUN unnumbered. The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/2–2550: Telegram [Document 367] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State restricted Geneva , February 22, 1950—5 p. m. 267. Tcdel 91. Jamali (Iraq) informed USDel and UKDel before TC meeting February 21 that Arab states would not agree to any compromise regarding internationalization. They favored statute as it stands suitably amended. If they cannot obtain complete internationalization, they will then join with Jordan and demand that present actual position in Jerusalem be recognized as they feel Arab states can thus protect Holy Places. 1 Jamali realizes this will mean reference back to GA. In reply to USDel query Jamali said he speaking officially for his government, Syria and Egypt. Sent Department 267; repeated London 67, Jerusalem unnumbered; pouched Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad; Department pass Tel Aviv, Amman, USUN. 1 The discussion of the Trusteeship Council on February 21 centered on the question of the boundaries of the Jerusalem area. Mr. Jamali contended that the Council had no authority to modify the boundaries of Jerusalem. He stressed that Iraq “stood either for purely Arab Jerusalem or complete internationalization and anything between was unacceptable. If TC intended retreat from GA decision, Iraq would also retreat and join side of Jordan.” Mr. Eban disputed the repeated Arab argument that Jerusalem was a wholly Arab city and argued that “Arab representatives regarded internationalization as prelude to Arabization of city. TC, he added, had two alternatives: to embark on purely negative course or to regard protection of Holy Places as basic objective that could and should be retained.” (Telegram 265, identified also as Tcdel 92, February 22, from Geneva, 350/2–2050) For a summary of Council discussion on February 21, see TC (VI), pp. 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] ff. The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/2–2350: Telegram [Document 368] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , February 23, 1950—2 p. m. 268. Tcdel 94. Although consideration article 2 1 Jerusalem draft statute has been deferred for time being, USDel believes thought must be given to position it should adopt with respect to composition of boundary, provided article 2(2). Present subparagraph 2 is obsolete and TC will be under necessity of providing for new boundary. It is believed that considerable debate will take place on this point. At TC meeting February 21 French delegation made tentative suggestion that such commission could not demarcate boundaries without participation Israel and Jordan which are occupying authorities areas contiguous to Jerusalem. In opinion USDel such participation would imply de facto recognition of Israel and Jordan in those areas. While USDel is aware that during debates in last session GA US representative referred specifically to both Jordan and Israel as constituted authorities in territories touching on Jerusalem area, we feel that vote on inclusion Jordan and Israel on boundary commission has implied political connotations re US attitude on Jordan and Israel occupation of areas not allotted to them by partition. This situation also obtains with respect to other articles where reference is made to “Jewish state and Arab state”. In case of former, Israel is obvious substitution but substitution of Jordan for “Arab state” has political implications. Since US Government agrees in principle to incorporation Arab Palestine in Jordan and since authority Israel and Jordan in Jerusalem is presently exercised de facto , USDel is of opinion that it could support but not propose specific reference to Jordan and Israel as members boundary commission as well as substitution Jordan and Israel for “Arab state and Jewish state”. Department’s instructions will be appreciated. 2 Sent Department 268; repeated London 68, Jerusalem unnumbered; Department pass Tel Aviv unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, USUN unnumbered. 1 This article dealt with the boundaries of Jerusalem. 2 The Department of State, in reply on February 27, expressed agreement with the suggested position in the last paragraph of Tcdel 94. It stated that it “wld not regard support for participation Israel and Jordan in Boundary Comm as more than recognition of practical interest of these two states in Jerusalem settlements. If necessary, Del may state in TC that it does not regard this step as substantiation of any claims, gen or particular, which these two states may make re their position in areas adjacent to Jerusalem.” (Telegram 258, identified also as Deltc 27, 350/2–2350) Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 320.2AA/2–2450 [Document 369] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [ Washington ,] February 24, 1950. Subject: Payment of United States Contribution to United Nations Belief for Palestine Refugees 1. Public Law 25, 81st Congress, a Joint Resolution of March 24, 1949, authorized the appropriation of funds not to exceed $16,000,000 for the relief of Palestine refugees, in response to the message submitted by you to the Congress on January 27, 1949. Public Law 119, 81st Congress, appropriated to the President $12,000,000 for the relief of Palestine refugees, and an additional $4,000,000 for the same purpose, “to such extent as the President from time to time finds that other nations party to such United Nations agreement have met their obligations to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees …” 1 2. The amount of $15,377,930 has already been paid to the United Nations. Of this, $3,377,930 represents the amount paid from the $4,000,000 authorized to be paid to such extent as other nations have contributed. On August 10, 1949, you found that a payment of $1,377,930 could be paid, and on November 15, 1949, you found that an additional $2,000,000 could be paid. 3. The Secretary General of the United Nations has now certified to the Secretary of State 2 that as of December 31, 1949, $16,302,525 was received by the United Nations Belief for Palestine Refugees in cash, goods, and services from governments other than the United States. In view of this information, he requests that the United States make an additional payment of $622,070 to complete the authorized United States contribution of $16,000,000 to this program. 4. The Department of State believes that the certification of the Secretary General is sufficient evidence upon which the President may base a finding. The Department of State, therefore, recommends that the President find that, as of December 31, 1949, other nations party to the United Nations agreement have met their obligations to the United Nations Belief for Palestine Refugees in a manner and to an extent warranting a further payment of $622,070 by the United States, such payment to bring the United States contribution to the United Nations Belief for Palestine Refugees to the total of $16,000,000 authorized by Public Law 25, 81st Congress. 5. Inasmuch as the contributions of other nations certified by the Secretary General exceed the $16,000,000 required to support this payment, the Department of State has drawn up the attached schedule 3 which lists those certified contributions to be included in the $16,000,000 matched. This selection of contributions to be matched has been arbitrary and is not intended to reflect in any way upon the $302,525 in certified contributions not on the list. 6. The Secretary General has also informed the Secretary of State that additional contributions estimated at $789,702 in value have also been received from other nations, as of December 31, 1949. These were not included in the certification because there may be minor changes in valuation. Thus other governments have contributed an estimated total of $17,092,227 to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees. Dean Acheson 1 Ellipses in the source text. 2 In a note of February 3. A copy was transmitted by the United States Mission at the United Nations in despatch 101, February 6; neither printed (357.AC/2–650). 3 Not printed. The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/2–2650: Telegram [Document 370] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , February 26, 1950—6 p. m. 142. Further re Embtel 140, February 25. 1 Shiloah and Kollek at residence February 26 outlined meeting with Jordan night February 24 follow. Shilban [ Shiloah ] and Dayan for Israel and King, Samir and Fawzi Mulki of Cabinet for Jordan. Fawzi had learned King’s proposal only morning 24th and still had only general idea of it. At beginning 24th Shiloah announced Israel cabinet agreement in principle King’s five year nonaggression proposal and delegation’s authority to discuss details. Shiloah added that at PCC months earlier when Porter asked if Israel would agree peace through other form than treaty, Israel’s reply had been affirmative. Abdullah “showing joy” said he had “made up his mind would not go back on his word and if his present government would not approve he would get new government that would.” King suggested Shiloah read out text of agreement previous meeting “so that Fawzi would clearly understand and that they then proceed to item by item discussion in order to make his personal text more precise.” After pleasant social dinner there followed three hours more of discussion in which King was active. Finally, both sides initialled “agreed set of principles”. Next meeting is to be February 28. Meanwhile, both sides to prepare draft in legal form to be compared and agree on and to be finally signed at meeting few days after 28th. According to Shiloah following are chief provisions of “agreed principles.” 1. Does not supersede armistice agreement, but is “additional layer in process of peace-making.” King preferred this form of “a further step” to be termed “friendship and nonaggression” as advance over armistice because initiated by states themselves and not at injunction of UN. 2. Does not change existing armistice lines but sets up sub-committees to find solutions for all territorial and other issues. Jerusalem partition and outlet to sea specifically mentioned. First sub-committee attempt to be partition of no-man’s land, for example, Government House and Latrun areas without prejudice to final territorial settlements. 3. Initiation of normal trade and economic cooperation and, as part of this, grant of free zones for Jordan in Haifa. 4. Israel agrees to start payment immediately of financial compensation to Arab Jerusalem property owners. Freedom of access to Scopus and Bethlehem to be worked out. Israel to be free to use judgment whether this arrangement should be followed by re-opening of Hadassah hospital. 6. Access to and freedom of Holy Places to be provided by joint guarantee of two countries to UN and by their acceptance of international supervision. In explanation of above, Shiloah said he had made “many long speeches in previous meetings to bring Jordan to acceptance principle of international supervision Holy Places.” Shiloah had argued their two countries “must satisfy reasonable members of assembly.” 2 He says agreement should go “long way toward relieving doubts of good faith two countries toward Holy Places.” Hopes agreement will break ice and set pattern for other Arab states and Israel and meanwhile open commercial intercourse with Jordan. When leaving Shiloah concluded “It is not yet in the bag, but we are optimistic.” Comment: Shiloah obviously delighted with progress to date. End comment . Sent Department 142, Department pass Geneva priority 5, Cairo 41, London 33, Paris 21, Moscow 6, Jerusalem 13, pouched Arab capitals. McDonald 1 Not printed; it reported that Foreign Minister Sharett, in a “cheerful” voice, had telephoned Ambassador McDonald at 9:15 that morning that he had good news. A few minutes later, Mr. Sharett’s son arrived with a handwritten note from the Foreign Minister informing that Israel and Jordan had initialed a nonaggression pact the previous evening (684A.85/2–2550). 2 Presumably the United Nations General Assembly. Extract from the Department of State Wireless Bulletin, February 27, 1950 [Document 371] Extract from the Department of State Wireless Bulletin , 1 February 27, 1950 February 27, 1950 Israel has requested permission to buy arms and military equipment in the United States and the State Department is considering the request, according to Department officials. Israeli Ambassador Eliahu Elath made the request last week, 2 and presented a list of arms desired, State Department spokesmen told newsmen today. News dispatches from London reported that Israel has made a similar request of Great Britain. Officials in Washington pointed out that a relatively small amount of U.S. arms has gone to Israel in the past. Export permits are necessary for such shipments. U.S. policy generally permits shipments of arms if they are needed for the maintenance of order in the countries requesting them, the officials said. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The official news service of the Department of State. It was prepared by the Division of International Press and Publications in the Bureau of Public Affairs and transmitted daily by radio or wireless to foreign service posts abroad. It contained official texts of pronouncements by the President, the Secretary of State and the Department of State, proceedings of the United Nations, editorial opinion, and the like. The United States Information Service distributed foreign language editions in various foreign cities. 2 The request was actually made on February 13; see footnote 2, p. 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] . Mr. James W. Barco to the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Bancroft) 357.AC/2–2750 [Document 372] Mr. James W. Barco 1 to the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs ( Bancroft ) personal and confidential [ Geneva ,] 27 February 1950. Dear Harding : I think that by now you must feel that some sort of personal report from Geneva is due. Until the present there has not been a sufficiently clear overall picture to encourage me to furnish you with my impressions. Meanwhile I have tried to keep the telegrams to a minimum and to report therein only such facts as had some significance. I remember quite well that we erred on the other side both in Indonesia and in Lausanne by reporting every small conversation and every event which a few days later had lost the significance they may have once had. On the whole I think that by our stripping the telegrams to their essentials you should have received a fairly accurate impression of the situation here. USDel has in general followed carefully the outline of procedure contained in the memorandum which was prepared before we left Washington. 2 This has proved to be, I think, a very satisfactory guide. I discussed our views as soon as I arrived with Azcarate, the Turkish adviser and Boisanger and found that in general they appreciated this approach. Certainly in the case of Dr. Azcarate there has been very close understanding and cooperation. Boisanger has been somewhat more anxious to start off with definite proposals by the Commission to the parties, but with the passage of the last several weeks he has come more and more to view things as we do. Our position of course has been very satisfactory to the Israeli representatives, with whom so far we have been in quite close agreement and very cordial relations. Upon his arrival, Rafael, who showed a very reasonable and cooperative attitude within the limits of their policy with respect to the PCC, agreed with us that an indirect approach through the PCC to direct negotiations might prove most profitable in the end. This is the thing that we have been largely concentrating on in the last few weeks, but at the same time we have had frequent meetings with each of the representatives of the Arab States separately, both USDel and the Commission, and have kept our discussions largely on the question of direct negotiations. Discussion of this question has just about been exhausted, with no break in the Arab line. We took each one separately and avoided meetings with all the Arabs together in order in fact to increase the pressure slightly and to encourage frank discussion. Mr. Palmer was opposed to this procedure because he felt that the Arabs themselves did not like it and that they would hence feel less inclined to speak frankly. I felt on the other hand that the old approach of full Arab representation in all meetings had long since been proved barren of results and hence urged the separate meetings. The results did prove that this was in fact a desirable procedure and the resulting frank and fuller discussions I believe convinced Mr. Palmer. At the same time these discussions were being held we have been studying the question of a so-called indirect approach to direct negotiations. The relative success of the Mixed Committee on Blocked Accounts encouraged us to think that the best approach might be through additional mixed committees. We began discussing the question with the representatives of both sides several weeks ago when we were thinking of setting up, after our return from Paris, a series of committees to consider all questions outstanding. This would have been quite satisfactory to the Israelis on the theory that the work of such a series of committees would lead to a general peace conference. They hoped that each committee might in time be regarded as a national committee, that is, a committee for considering questions between Egypt and Israel, Jordan and Israel, etc. The Arabs on the other hand shied away from this more ambitious project and in the last two weeks we have been concentrating on a joint committee of Israel and Egypt to consider proposals made by Egypt in New York last October. This has several advantages in that it would be highly desirable to start off with Egypt in the hope that a committee of this kind might encourage those Egyptians who are thinking of a full-scale conference with Israel, and it has seemed to us it would be very difficult for Egypt to refuse, inasmuch as the Committee’s terms of reference will be based on Egypt’s own proposals regarding refugees in the Gaza strip. I am enclosing a copy of the recommendations to the Commission by the General Committee, which has had this question under study. The Committee’s draft may prove to be the actual terms of reference adopted. At this moment Eban and Rafael object to setting up a committee whose work will be concerned primarily with the three Egyptian proposals without having a provision for consideration of all other questions outstanding between Israel and Egypt. We hope to persuade them that Paragraph 3( b ) of the enclosed draft 3 provides a proper device for enlarging the agenda of the committee, but that to begin with, in order to obtain Egyptian consent, the terms of reference will have to be at least this restricted. Unless we can set up this committee there seems little hope at the moment for setting up anything else. I rather think the Israeli position on all these questions fluctuates with the ups and downs of the negotiations with Jordan. When things do not appear to be going well in Shuneh, Israel is much more anxious for the Commission to find a device which might lead to direct negotiations; when it appears that an agreement with Jordan is more likely, they are not so interested in help from the Commission, on the theory, I suppose, that if an agreement can be announced between Israel and Jordan, that will be encouragement enough to the others to do likewise. However, from the beginning we have emphasized to the Israeli representatives that the Commission can really be of help in bringing about direct negotiations and that our efforts will be concentrated in this direction. Israel will not be able to say that we have not cooperated fully with them and on the whole I think that the Commission is in a very strong position with its proposal for a joint committee on the Gaza question. If it is refused by the Israelis, they will refuse something that they have in effect asked us to do and which has been worked out in accordance with their own desires. If on the other hand the Egyptians refuse, it will not look well for them, since they will be refusing to cooperate in the Commission’s effort to give effect to their own proposals. I rather think that about the time you have this letter we will be able to report that the committee is to be set up. Some of this perhaps could have been put in telegrams, but again I felt that it would be better to report accomplishments or failures, as the case may be, rather than hypothetical situations. The question of compensation has been more or less in abeyance while we have concentrated on the joint committee on Gaza. If and when we are able to set up the Gaza committee, we will then give more attention to a similar procedure on compensation. Boisanger, as you know from the telegrams, was at the beginning anxious for the Commission to make an immediate proposal to both sides for the setting up of a fund for compensation, and to announce at the outset that the Commission regards the question of compensation as separate from reparations or the peace settlement. We discouraged this procedure and persuaded him to leave the question open for the time being. He is, however, anxious to return to the question and the French Foreign Office is definitely behind him in this respect. He has given us a memorandum from Parodi 4 which I will translate and enclose. You will notice that the Foreign Office agrees with Boisanger that the Commission should begin by taking up the question of separation of compensation from reparations and the peace settlement. This would, in my opinion, lead to a fruitless wrangle with Israel which would successfully prevent any more useful work being done on the question of compensation. On the other hand the Foreign Office agrees with us apparently that a committee to appraise the value of lost property and to study methods of payment would be useful. There are a good many more things I could tell you, but I really prefer to wait until we can talk together. The Commission’s work up to now has been, I think, entirely satisfactory, given the circumstances of so wide a gap between Israeli and Arab viewpoints. If and when the parties permit a more active role by the Commission, I may have a different opinion, but so far it has been largely a question of using tact, restraint and judgment. These are things which perhaps are easier to achieve in a situation like the present one than in the give and take of full-scale negotiations. We shall see if there will be a chance to display such sterling qualities in the latter situation. I am always anxious to have your views. Best Always, Jim 1 Attached to the U.S. Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. 2 Presumably the Halderman-Barco memorandum of January 3, p. 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] . 3 Entitled “Report to the Conciliation Commission on the question of the establishment of a Joint Committee on the Egyptian proposals concerning the Gaza refugees and on other related questions”. This report, not printed, was prepared by the General Committee of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and is identified as Com Gen./14. Paragraph 3( b ) reads as follows: “Either the Chairman or any member of the Joint Committee will be entitled to request that any related question whose examination, in his opinion, becomes necessary in the course of the work be placed on the agenda of the Joint Committee.” 4 Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The copy of the French memorandum was attached to the source text and bore no date; it is not printed. Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167 1 [Document 373] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay ) top secret [ Washington ,] February 27, 1950. Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 47/2, “United States Policy toward Israel and the Arab States,” approved as Governmental Policy on October 17, 1949. 2 There follows an account of important developments affecting the policy set forth in the report entitled United Slates Policy Toward Israel and the Arab States (NSC 47/2): 1. Despite United States representations Israel has not accepted the recommendation contained in subparagraph ( c ) of paragraph 16 of the report to the effect that Israel should accept the principle of maximum possible repatriation of refugees and should immediately begin actual repatriation on a reasonable scale. The implementation of this recommendation has been further adversely affected by the Israeli policy of fostering constant Jewish immigration into Israel and the settlement of Jewish refugees in houses and upon land belonging to the Arab refugees. Another unfavorable development in connection with this recommendation has been the fact that the Arab states rejected as insufficient the offer made by Israel to repatriate in the neighborhood of 100,000 refugees at a later date in connection with a general peace settlement. 2. The recommendation in subparagraph ( d ) of paragraph 16 that the Arab states should accept the principle of substantial resettlement of refugees in their territories has not been accepted by the Arab states, but has been favorably affected by a growing realization in the Arab states that the return to their homes of the majority of the refugees is physically impossible and the acceptance by the Arab states of the refugee relief and works program recommended by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission headed by Gordon Clapp. (See below.) 3. An important development affecting subparagraph ( f ) of paragraph 16 has been the adoption by the General Assembly on December 8, 1949 of a resolution establishing a Palestine Refugee Relief and Works Agency, as recommended by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission, to carry out a combined relief and works program to assist the refugees. This agency will be headed by a Director responsible to the General Assembly and will have an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The program envisages the gradual replacement of direct relief of Palestine refugees by a program of public works which will better the condition of the refugees and materially improve the areas in which the refugees are located. It is estimated that the program will also show the Near Eastern Governments the way to similar development projects for the improvement of the local economy. While the program envisaged by this resolution does not furnish a political solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute concerning repatriation and resettlement of refugees, it does foresee the end of international assistance for direct relief and, by assisting the Arab countries to integrate the refugees into the local Economy, it paves the way for future resettlement for many of these people. The President in a letter to Congress dated January 30, 1950, 3 has recommended that the United States contribute $27,450,000, which is one-half of the $54,900,000 estimated by the General Assembly as necessary to operate the relief and works program for the eighteen-month period recommended by the Economic Survey Mission. 4. A favorable development has occurred in connection with subparagrah ( h ) of paragraph 16; which states in part that the United States should assist the Israelis and the Arabs to achieve a final settlement of the territorial question in Palestine. Encouraged to do so by the United States Government, Israel and Jordan have entered into direct negotiations looking toward a final settlement of the problems outstanding between them. Although progress in these talks has been slow, the fact that they are being held at all is encouraging. The United States Government will continue its policy of urging the parties to enter direct negotiations with each other. The possibility of the full implementation of the territorial solution recommended in this subparagraph is becoming increasingly unlikely as the passage of time enables the parties in control of parts of Palestine to consolidate their positions. 5. The United States, as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, succeeded in incorporating into the proposals submitted by the Commission to the General Assembly the principles set forth in the recommendation concerning Jerusalem found in subparagraph ( i ) of paragraph 16 of NSC 47/2. However, the General Assembly decided, by its Resolution of December 9, 1949, to direct the Trusteeship Council to draw up a statute for the full internationalization of Jerusalem as a corpus separatum in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947. The United States opposed this move by the General Assembly, believing the resolution to be impracticable in the present circumstances. The United States will, however, cooperate with the Trusteeship Council in the drafting of a statute for Jerusalem in accordance with the General Assembly’s instructions. We continue to believe that an equitable solution could be based upon certain principles, including protection of and free access to the Holy Places under United Nations auspices, and shall continue our efforts to foster a solution which will meet with a reasonable degree of concurrence by the world community and by the two nations most directly involved. The United States will not support action in the Trusteeship Council looking toward the enforced implementation of a statute for Jerusalem against the wishes of Israel and Jordan. Meanwhile, Israel and Jordan are engaged in direct conversations concerning the future of Jerusalem, and it seems possible that they may reach an agreement on the issues involved. In this case an important question will be the necessity of satisfying the desire of the international community to see that its legitimate interests in the Holy City are safeguarded. 6. The recommendation in paragraph 17 concerning the export of military material to Israel and the Arab states is being carried out. The United States has been granting export licenses for shipments of military equipment both to Israel and the Arab states, but only for shipments of equipment considered necessary for maintenance of internal order and for legitimate self-defense needs. An unfavorable development in this connection has been the strong criticism of this Government by the Israeli Government, which has alleged that the United States, in not attempting to prevent the shipments of arms to the Arab states by the United Kingdom, is fostering an arms race in the Near East and encouraging the Arabs to resume hostilities. The United States Government has received no evidence of any serious preparations by the Arabs to begin the war again. 7. With reference to the recommendation in paragraph 19 that we should endeavor to prevent discrimination against Jews in the Arab states, the United States Government, upon receiving reports alleging discriminatory action against Jews in Iraq, pointed out to the Iraqi Government that such discrimination would have a most unfortunate effect on world public opinion. Although information subsequently received indicated that the original reports were considerably exaggerated, it is believed that the approach of the United States Government had a beneficial effect upon the attitude of the Iraqi Government toward its citizens of Jewish faith, whose situation has recently improved. With the exceptions noted, the policy set forth in NSC 47/2 is currently applicable and is being implemented so far as circumstances permit. James E. Webb 1 Lot 61 D 167 is a serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. 2 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1430 . 3 Not printed; but see footnote 1, to the memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, p. 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] . Editorial Note [Document 374] Editorial Note On February 27, the Legation in Jordan conveyed a report to the Department that Prime Minister Samir Rifa’i and Defense Minister Fawzi al-Mulqi, representing Jordan, met on February 24 with Ruben Shiloah of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and Brigadier General Moshe Dayan of the Defense Army of Israel. As a result of the meeting, both sides initialed a document intended to serve as a basis for formal negotiations between the two countries. Among the points agreed upon were measures involving mutual nonaggression, observation of armistice boundary lines, establishment of technical committees, freedom of access to Holy Places, compensation for appropriated property, and government arbitration in disputed cases of property rights. A close translation of the document was transmitted to the Department in telegram 33 from Amman, February 27, 1950, not printed (684A.85/2–2750). The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/2–2750: Telegram [Document 375] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret priority Geneva , February 27, 1950—4 p. m. 285. Tcdel 101. 1. On March 1 TC commences second reading Jerusalem draft statute with article by article vote. ( a ) USDel recommends that while continuing to cooperate with TC in technical drafting of statute we should in general abstain in voting on those articles which deal with principle or practice of complete internationalization of area included in GA Resolution of December 9. (We understand UKDel is instructed along foregoing lines). ( b ) Our present thinking would be to abstain on following articles: Preamble, 1 through 6, 8 through 29, 32 through 35, 37, 39 through 41, 43 and 44. We are concerned particularly with Article 2 which has been much discussed and vote on which will be regarded as particularly significant. Our thought is based on following reasons: (1) Affirmative vote on above articles would probably be interpreted as US giving its unqualified support to complete internationalization; (2) Affirmative vote would subject US to possible embarrassment and later difficulties re implementation; (3) Negative vote on other hand would more easily subject US to criticism on ground US disregarding GA Resolution; (4) Attitude of Belgium and Australia (who voted for GA Resolution December 9) re Article 2 (Tcdel 92, February 22 1 ). ( c ) Our present thinking is that we should vote in favor Articles 7, 30, 36, 38 and 42 in the belief that principles contained in these articles could well be introduced in any arrangement for Jerusalem which might ultimately be worked out. ( d ) In view foregoing reasons we recommend that we abstain on statute as whole. 2. USDel also requests guidance re question of form of approval or adoption of statute. Tcdel 96, February 23 2 set forth French belief that TC should appoint Governor immediately upon adoption statute. USDel, considering its general instructions 3 and Department’s desire avoid special session GA, believes this first step toward implementation should be avoided if possible and envisages possibility proceeding along lines TC action in April 1948, namely have TC decide, on completion preparation draft statute, that statute is “now in satisfactory form,” but postpone its formal approval, and ask TC President to submit it to Israel and Jordan as de facto authorities in Jerusalem for final consideration insofar as they concerned prior to formal approval by TC. If reply negative or qualified TC could at this or preferably at June session consider situation again and, if no alterations or other compromise acceptable, TC could then draw up report for GA next regular session stating inability implement and referring matter back for consideration. 3. Appreciate Department’s guidance soonest. Sent Department 285, repeated London 77, Jerusalem unnumbered, Department pass Tel Aviv unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, USUN unnumbered. 1 Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] . 2 Identified also as telegram 272 from Geneva, not printed. 3 This reference is presumably to the instructions incorporated in telegram 641, December 13, 1949, to the United States Mission at the United Nations, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1538 . The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 350/2–2750: Telegram [Document 376] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 1 confidential Washington , February 27, 1950—7 p. m. 261. For USTC. Dept Feb 27 discussed with Israeli Amb tel from Eban to Elath in which former suggested desirability US initiative in advocating consultations in Geneva between Israel, Jordan and TC on Jerusalem statute limited to Holy Places only. Elath had asked for Dept’s reaction this suggestion. Dept stated US welcomed informal discussions between parties interested in Jerusalem problem. However with regard to statute limited to Holy Places, recalled this was where US and Israeli positions had diverged in Fourth GA. US had believed PCC proposals best solution but had been defeated in GA and was now collaborating with TC in work of carrying out instrs given TC by GA. US had consistently encouraged Israel to undertake informal negots with interested parties, including Vatican, and hoped agreement cld thus be reached between Jordan and Israel and Christian world. Failing such agreement and view US position re Jerusalem regime and collaboration with TC in present task, US not in position to take initiative along lines suggested by Eban. This particularly so view fact Eban suggestion did not involve initiative in favor of an agreement reached among principal parties but only initiative in favor of discussions re possibility agreement on limited basis suggested in advance. Dept also suggested Eban proposal might involve formal action of some kind by TC, such as establishing subcomite for discussions with reps Jordan and Israel, and that this wld inevitably raise question whether discussions for purpose envisaged wld be compatible with TC terms reference. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Jerusalem. The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/2–2850: Telegram [Document 377] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , February 28, 1950—4 p. m. 294. Tcdel 103. USDel discussed with Garreau and French Delegation this morning line which might be followed in connection with future consideration of Jerusalem statute. Garreau said he and French delegation wished avoid special session GA on Jerusalem and also wished keep door open for negotiations with parties. They felt this could be done if Jerusalem question could be carried over to July session TC. In order achieve this end, French delegation had considered possibility that upon adoption statute this session, which is required by December 9 resolution, governor could be appointed (Tcdel 96, February 23) 1 with instructions negotiate with parties re implementation statute and to report back to June session TC. Garreau said in their view governor would be unable to do much this respect or possibly unable even to go to Jerusalem, and he would be obliged report these facts to TC in June for further consideration. USDel suggested that lengthy attempts to find suitable governor, possible failure in this connection, and if one were selected, his probable inability to carry out his functions, would subject UN and TC to further criticism for its unrealistic handling of situation. We suggested it would seem preferable for TC to avoid final adoption but upon completion of preparation statute to charge TC president with consulting two parties whose cooperation, notwithstanding provision of GA resolution December 9, essential for implementation of statute. President would report to TC June session either refusal of parties to cooperate or their suggestions for alterations which might make statute acceptable. On basis this report TC could then decide either to adopt altered statute agreeable to all parties or refer question back to next regular GA session. Garreau and French delegation appeared to concur with procedure but thought it might be advisable for TC during closing days of present session to “adopt provisionally” statute pending report President in June. Since USDel and French delegate felt president should carry on his negotiations between end of present session and June session and in order avoid substantial period of time between completion of statute and end of present session, it was considered desirable to turn next week to consideration West African reports as previously planned. While it is recognized that completion of statute would be lengthy process in view of probable discussions on certain article, it was nevertheless felt that after the three meetings Jerusalem planned for this week TC might suspend Jerusalem consideration for following week and take up other matters thus bringing provisional adoption of statute to near end of session. Garreau said he would consider tactics which might be used in order achieve above plan and would keep in touch with USDel. He believed support of Argentina and Dominican Republic as well as other countries could be counted on. Sent Department 294, repeated London 78, Jerusalem unnumbered, Tel Aviv unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, USUN unnumbered, Department pass Tel Aviv, Amman, USUN. 1 Identified also as telegram 272 from Geneva, not printed. The “Palestine Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs” to the Foreign Ministries of the Arab States 786.00/3–2250 [Document 378] The “Palestine Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs” to the Foreign Ministries of the Arab States 1 restricted No. H.A.F. 3/50 March 1, 1950. Note This Government has learned, with regret, that while invitations to the 12th Session of the Arab League Council were sent by the Secretariat General—by telegram—to the Foreign Affairs Ministries of the Arab States and confirmations forwarding the agenda were also sent through their respective missions, no such communications were addressed in this concern to Palestine Government. This Government, with the exception of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, is recognised by all member states of the League. It is the only body having the legal right to represent the Arabs of Palestine who still believe that the Arab States will fulfill their promise to liberate Palestine and allow them to return to and settle in their home. The recognition of these six states is still standing and it is not honorable for these states that a Government they have recognised is not invited to a session at which its case is to be examined and discussed. This Government considers her exclusion from attending and taking part in the League Council is a serious offense against the noble purposes on which was based the creation of the Arab League. It will assist those who have interest in erasing the name of Palestine from the map of the world. This Government appeals to the conscience of the Arab League and adjures the Arab nations to cease this unfair effort to keep her away from taking part in the 12th League Session. The exclusion of the Palestine Government means but the deviation from the high and noble aims of the League, and is inconsistent with the pacts concluded between the Arab League nations when their armies marched to liberate Palestine. Palestine Government has no alternative but to record here, with deep regret, that it deplores the unfair efforts to keep away the representative of Palestine Arabs—who have faithfully defended their country and made the noblest sacrifice—and to prevent them saying their word, expressing their opinon and taking an effective part in the examination of their proper case. While recording its regrets in the name of the faithful Arabs of Palestine, the Government trusts that the Arab States who recognised it and who have and are still taking a noble part in the strife for the success of Palestine case, will realize the serious consequences which may result from omitting its invitation to attend the Arab League Council sessions and from giving a favorable opportunity to those elements whose endeavor is to falsely and unlawfully represent the Arabs of Palestine and impose their policy giving no weight to the legitimate rights of this scattered and distressed nation which is now enduring such hardship, hunger and privation as no other nation has ever endured in history. This Government which had been recognised by six member states of the League and which, however, has not been given the chance to assume its functions owing to the failure of the responsible authorities to provide it with the necessary help and money, has not failed to do its utmost for the case of its country and is resolved to fight and strive for its country to the last breath. The Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Palestine Government takes this opportunity to express its deep respect to the Arab League. 2 1 This unofficial translation was forwarded to the Department of State by Embassy Cairo in despatch 515, March 22, not printed. For documentation on the establishment of the “Arab Government of Palestine” at Gaza, known also as the “Palestine Arab Government” and the “All Palestine Government”, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. 2 Embassy Cairo, on May 2, transmitted an unofficial translation of a note sent on April 8 by the “All Palestine Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs” to the Secretariat General of the Arab League. The note stated in part: “The condition of Palestinian refugees in Arab countries necessitates quick action to avoid all possible dangers. These refugees believe that all the help they may now expect is confined to the financial contributions which they receive from certain governments and organizations and which, though helpful, are not practical. It is therefore necessary to lay down a general plan by which the Arab States can help them. The All Palestine Government therefore submits to the Council the following two proposals: “1. To grant Palestinian refugees in Arab countries an unrestricted permanent residence to enable them to work and support themselves by legitimate means until their political status is finally settled. “2. To allow those of them who have crafts or professions to practice work in the Arab countries in which they reside.” (Despatch 970, 786.00/5–250) The “Palestine Arab Government” also submitted a memorandum on the annexation of Palestine, presumably by Jordan. The editors have not found a copy of this document in the files of the Department of State; but telegram 361, April 11, from Cairo, states that the League’s Political Committee took no action on the memorandum (786.00/4–1150). The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/3–150: Telegram [Document 379] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State confidential Geneva , March 1, 1950—5 p. m. 302. Tcdel 106. Eban and Raphael (Israel) informed USDel this morning that document re nonaggression pact and guarantees for Holy Places (Amman 33, February 27, and Tel Aviv 142, February 26) had been initialed last Friday by Israeli and Jordan representives. Eban said he now waiting hourly for information document formally signed last night. He said in view Jordan Cabinet difficulties he keeping “fingers crossed”. Eban considered reference in document to guarantees for Holy Places considerable step forward by Jordon and he hoped these developments, which he presumed would be made public after formal signature, would be taken into consideration by TC during second reading draft statute. He said TC president had indicated this morning that TC might complete its action on statute by end this week. USDel pointed out, however, this unlikely in view probable lengthy discussions on certain articles. It seemed more likely further consideration statute would have to be postponed until latter part March in order permit consideration other items TC agenda. Eban stressed reference to guarantees Holy Places in initial document was statement principle only and that form and details remained, to be worked out. He felt this would leave room negotiation at some later stage with TC. He indicated that when Jerusalem statute completed, his Government would not reject it outright but would reply with offer re international supervision Holy Places. He assumed Jordan would do same. USDel again impressed upon him necessity that offer should take fully into account Christian and third party interests in Jerusalem, otherwise arrangement would probably be unacceptable. Finally Eban expressed hope Jordan participation in TC would in future be more positive and thought it might be desirable for Jordan to send more qualified representative such as Fawzi el Mulki. 1 We indicated to Eban that Israel might well take this matter up itself with Jordan. Sent Department 302; repeated London 81, Jerusalem unnumbered: Department pass Tel Aviv unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, USUN unnumbered. 1 Jordanian Foreign Minister. The Secretary of State to the Israeli Ambassador (Elath) 484A.118/2–1350 [Document 380] The Secretary of State to the Israeli Ambassador ( Elath ) Washington , March 2, 1950. Excellency : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency’s notes Nos. 1239/50 1 and 1240/50 of February 13, 1950, concerning the armaments situation in the Near East and the desire of the Israeli Government to acquire defensive military equipment in this country. I wish to assure Your Excellency that the United States Government is deeply aware of the necessity that peace be established and stability be maintained in the Near East. It has been the policy of the United States Government not only to initiate but also to support, both in the United Nations and directly, these measures which would promote the establishment and maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area. It is essential that the present trend in the Near East away from war toward peace continue. As the Secretary informed you on January 31 2 the Department, within the framework of this Government’s policy on the export of arms to the Near East, will continue to receive and give sympathetic consideration to applications for licenses for the export of military equipment to the area. As you know, licenses have already been granted for the export to Israel of a considerable quantity of military material. In conclusion, I wish to assure Your Excellency that the United States Government fully appreciates the importance of the Near Eastern armaments situation, and will continue to devote the closest attention to developments affecting this subject. Accept [etc.] For the Secretary of State: Raymond A. Hare 1 Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] . 2 See Secretary Acheson’s memorandum of conversation, p. 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] . The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–250: Telegram [Document 381] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , March 2, 1950—7 p. m. 35. Further meeting Jordan-Israeli representatives took place February 28 at Shuneh. Fawzi Pasha and Jamal Bey Toukan (Jordan administrator Jerusalem) represented Jordan (first time since talks started Samir was absent). Both sides presented draft proposals based initialed document referred to in Legtel 33 February 27. Apparently Israeli proposals presumably for bargaining purposes defined in detail those points advantageous to Israel and glossed over concessions to Jordan in vague manner. This produced hostile reaction among Jordan delegation. King Abdullah who was present then allegedly flew into passion of rage saying he could influence Israelis but not control his own Government. Kirkbride informs me he saw Prime Minister following latest meeting and latter was “green with anger” and indicated determination not proceed further in talks. Kirkbride says he tried to calm him down saying that all negotiations require time and patience necessary, etc. Kirkbride believes Prime Minister stalling for time, hopes avoid making any agreement with Israelis but does not wish alienate King and lose job before April elections, after which he intends resign favor Said Pasha Mufti now Minister Interior and exert controlling influence as president upper legislative chamber. Samir, it appears, has lost King’s favor moment at least and in background of political picture. Next meeting with Israelis scheduled for March 3. Comment: It is clear Kirkbride doing all possible to encourage Prime Minister to continue negotiations and ultimately reach agreement. Despite reluctance Prime Minister and Palestine element Government, I feel that some progress at least has been made and picture, while complicated by many factors including internal politics, not entirely dark. Sent Department 35. Department pass London 16, Tel Aviv 15, Jerusalem 14, Geneva 13, for USPCC 14, USTC 12, pouched Arab capitals. Drew The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–350: Telegram [Document 382] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , March 3, 1950—1 p. m. 155. March 3 Shiloah with Kollek at residence [garble] Jordan meeting February 28. Next meeting night March 3, Shiloah said substantially: Leak of Wednesday “will probably not be serious”. Israel’s draft February 28 was “except for minor changes mere for malization” of agreed statement. In contrast Jordan draft “removed all meat from agreed statement.” It eliminated (1) “non-aggression pact” and substituted “modification of armistice;” (2) provision for five years agreement; (3) “freedom of commerce and trade.” This last elimination was excused by Jordan by its “fear to break Arab League boycott.” In contrast Jordan draft emphasized principle of right to corridor, outlet to sea, free port Haifa and committee to study these. After presentation two drafts followed three hours “vigorous argument” during which (King not present) chief Jordan spokesman was Fawzi Mulki with Samir as “observer” for King 1 and Jamal Tukan, Palestine Arab, mostly silent. Assisting Shiloah was Dayan. Fawzi argued Jordan draft was “progress;” Shiloah insisted it was “retrogression”. At midnight Shiloah said “no sense repeating ourselves and to prevent misunderstanding, I will leave note for King explaining impasse.” To this Jordans strongly objected and instead decided to “wake His Majesty”. King who had “not seen Jordan draft” was “very annoyed” and “told Jordans off.” “His plan was result considerable thought and he intended adhere to it.” Then he described Jordan’s difficulties and “suffering of both countries” due loss trade. “Only alternative to agreement is war and Jordan in no position resume war.” King’s criticism Jordan draft was so “forthright and strong as to be bit embarrassing.” King “emphatic” he would get new Cabinet if necessary. At conclusion King “commanded” both parties to come back “on Friday.” For first time he admitted “no possibility of delay” saying “position must be clarified.” He appealed to Israel to take account Jordan’s “difficulties” in revising Israel draft. Shiloah replying said his draft “not bargaining draft but also not Ten Commandants [ Commandments ].” In answer my question Shiloah said: (1) “As access to Wailing Wall is covered in Israel draft by broad pledge of access for all faiths to Holy Places;” (2) Latrun not specifically mentioned but covered by promise to divide “no man’s land.” Israel language “purposely vague” on Wall and Latrun “in order make Jordan acceptance easier”. Shiloah estimates chances of agreement depend upon strength of King. Shiloah thinks Kirkbride is being helpful. New subject: Shiloah interprets Eban’s account (Deptintel March 1, 6 a. m.) 2 talk with Munim as “encouraging.” He added that “little more direct influence from US in Cairo might be decisive.” (Caffery please note.) 3 Sent Department 155, repeated Jerusalem 14, Department pass Cairo 45, Geneva 6, Amman 12, London 36, Paris 25; pouched Arab capitals. McDonald 1 Note that Amman’s account of the Israeli-Jordanian talks in telegram 35, March 2, supra , indicates that Samir Rifai was absent. 2 This circular telegram not printed. 3 Ambassador Caffery, in reply on March 4, stated that he was trying to lead the Egyptians in the desired direction and requested Ambassador McDonald to “tell Israelis please, no more leaks.” (Telegram 28 to Tel Aviv, repeated to the Department of State as No. 216, 684A.85/3–450) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 784A.56/3–250: Telegram [Document 383] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt secret Washington , March 3, 1950—7 p. m. 175. Foll for your guidance re urtels 203 March 1 and 206. Mar 2. 1 Since SC lifted Pal arms embargo Aug 11, 1949, US has permitted export to Arab states and Israel of limited quantities non-offensive mil equipment, in accord US NE arms export policy of allowing shipment of material US determines to be necessary for maintenance internal law and order and providing for reasonable self-defense requirements. On Feb 14 [ 13 ] Israeli Amb submitted to Dept note 2 containing list of additional mil equipment which he stated his Govt wld like obtain for defensive purposes. Dept is currently studying this list and will act upon it within framework of above policy. No change in US views re NE armaments situation as set forth in See’s ltr to Rep Javits 3 (re Mideast WB No. 7, Jan 16) US Govt does not wish see arms race take place in NE or be placed in position of feeing expected to furnish to one NE state a piece of mil equipment to match every piece mil equipment acquired by any other NE state. Acheson 1 Neither printed; the former relayed the concern of the Egyptian Foreign Minister over press reports about Israeli requests to purchase arms in the United States and his hopes that the request would not be granted (784A.56/3–150). The latter advised that friendly feelings toward the United States were being menaced by articles in the press concerning the possibility that the United States would supply arms to Israel (784A.56/3–250). In an interview on February 28 with an Associated Press correspondent, Azzam Pasha sharply denounced Israeli efforts to secure arms from the United States (despatch 393, March 1, from Cairo, 784A.56/3–150). The same despatch noted the growing indignation and suspicion of the Egyptians over reports that the Arabs were preparing for a “second round” in Palestine. Apprehension was expressed that Israel was using a propaganda smokescreen to conceal her own aggressive intentions. Ambassador Caffery concluded that the news reports would probably increase Egyptian anxiety. 2 See footnote 2, p. 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] . 3 Dated January 12, p. 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] . The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 350/2–2850: Telegram [Document 384] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva secret priority Washington , March 3, 1950—7 p. m. 286. Deltc 29. Dept concurs in position taken by Del in discussion with Garreau re future TC consideration Jerusalem Statute (Tcdel 103 1 ). Del shld continue oppose Fr idea of appointing Governor at this time (Tcdel 103 and 101 2 ). Dept agrees Statute shld not be finally approved by TC at this session and that Jerusalem question shld be carried over in appropriate way to June session TC. Suggestion that TC ask Pres consult parties and report in June is considered sound. Re question of voting on draft statute (para 1, Tcdel 101) Del, consistent with US policy of cooperating with TC in drafting Statute, shld vote affirmatively on those Arts that are consistent with Dec 9 instrs. 3 It wld be preferable if prior to vote on Arts it is generally agreed by TC that document is being approved at this stage only on provisional basis for purposes of discussion by Pres with Israel and Jordan. If general agreement on TC to this effect is not possible Dept believes US shld make statement of our position in above sense and indicate that US affirmative vote on those Arts which involve more complete internationalization than we believe desirable, shld be considered as resulting solely from US participation in technical task of TC, as defined by GA terms of reference, in drafting Statute and on basis that we regard this as provisional approval draft. In view of comment para 1 ( a ), Tcdel 101, pls make basis US voting clear to UK Del. Acheson 1 Identified also as telegram 294, February 28, from Geneva, p. 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] . 2 The latter identified also as telegram 285, February 27, from Geneva, p. 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] . 3 This reference is presumably to the instructions incorporated in telegram 641, December 13, 1949, to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1538 . The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–550: Telegram [Document 385] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Amman , March 5, 1950—10 a. m. 38. Legtel 36, March 3. Official communiqué issued 9 p. m. March 4 stated in substance Samir Pasha having failed form Cabinet had renounced task and King consequently called on Tawfiq Pasha to withdraw resignation. Cabinet had complied with King’s request and agreed continue in office. In conversation with die-hard Palestine Cabinet member morning March 5, he told me Samir had been unable prevail on any member former Cabinet participate in new grouping with consequence that he had only been able obtain participation third rate individuals who had been unacceptable to His Majesty. He expressed admiration for courage of King in reaching decision defer Israeli negotiations which he has been directing personally for past several months. He recognized decision obviously very difficult one for King to make and while it will probably be widely interpreted as major political defeat for him my informant did not display gloating attitude. He expressed view that trouble had basically arisen from King’s insistence on speedy conclusion of settlement, suggesting that if given more time study proposals Cabinet might have found formula it could support. He explained Cabinet opposition understood to have centered around Palestine members with support Prime Minister as unwillingness offend members Arab League, mentioning that their press and radio particularly Egypt and Syria had already begun violent attacks on Jordan. He also believes public opinion both sides Jordan opposed negotiations and fears it might have resulted in boycott in Arab Palestine of April elections. He criticized King for failure keep public opinion better informed, pointing out it had received more news from Israeli sources than from local press which he claimed entirely subservient to King. Informant unable or unwilling predict when Israeli negotiations might be resumed, referred to them as indefinitely postponed. Presumably they will not in any case be resumed until after forthcoming elections. One rumor reaching us which was hinted at by my informant was that Cabinet members had also been influenced by threats of personal violence if they approved Israeli settlement. Comment: While too early evaluate this development definitively it is obviously major setback for King and victory for die-hard Palestine element both in and out of Cabinet. Comments of informant on public opinion received with reserve as we know Amman commercial circles were jubilant at prospective resumption trade with Israel. Although eventual resumption Israeli negotiations not precluded they will probably have been rendered much more difficult for His Majesty, although Israeli negotiators may be influenced accept terms more favorable to Jordan when negotiations resumed. Sent Department 38. Department pass Tel Aviv 27, Jerusalem 16, Geneva 15, for USPCC 6, USTC 14, London 18, Cairo 5, Damascus 3, Baghdad 2, Beirut 4, Jidda 2. Drew The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Department of State 784A.561/3–650 [Document 386] The Minister in Syria ( Keeley ) to the Department of State 1 confidential No. 126 Damascus , March 6, 1950. Subject: Syrian Inquiry re Possibility of Obtaining Arms from the United States Prime and Foreign Minister Khalid al ’Azm asked me to call today to discuss a number of matters, each treated in separate communications. With respect to the above subject he referred to recent press reports that the U.S. is considering Israel’s request for arms and asked me to define U.S. Policy in that respect. I referred to Counselor Harrison’s Aide-Mémoire of February 28, 1950 (Ref. No. 1 above) 2 and reiterated what he had said. The Prime Minister commented that he was unable to understand how the U.S. could on one hand contend that it favors peace in the Middle East and on the other supply arms to the Zionists who, despite any peaceful professions on their part, had in the past demonstrated their militant aggressive designs. I recalled Secretary Acheson’s letter to Representative Javits, 3 particularly the last paragraph thereof, and said that I felt sure we would not supply any one of the Middle Eastern states with arms beyond what we felt were necessary for the maintenance of internal order and national security. Khalid Bey replied that Israel already had more arms than necessary for both purposes and acquisition of more could mean only one thing, eventual resumption of hostilities against the Arabs. I assured him that we would deplore any breach of the current peace, however precarious it might be considered to be. The Prime Minister then asked if the U.S. was prepared to sell arms to Syria. I said that I couldn’t myself answer affirmatively or negatively. I recalled that when he had made similar inquiry in January (Legtel 20, January 10 4 ) I had not been optimistic because three military coups in the space of nine months not only indicated disturbing internal instability but might be interpreted by the United States as evidence that the Syrian Army is already too strong, especially as the traditional attitude in the U.S. is that the military establishment should be subordinate to civil authority. It didn’t seem to me that the situation had changed much since then so far as Syria is concerned, but if he wanted to have a more precise answer it could be gotten only from the United States Government itself. He then inquired whether he could seek an answer in principle or only by making a specific request for arms. I replied that the Department’s statement of policy following the raising of the arms embargo, to which Mr. Harrison had referred, might, I thought, be considered as stating the principle which applied to Syria as well as to other Middle Eastern States. I added that if he decided to seek arms, I felt there was more chance of a favorable response to any request he might make if his request were modest and represented only essential needs which could be readily substantiated. In the latter connection, I remarked that greater facilities to the Military Attaché to appraise Syria’s military situation would be helpful, referring to refusal of the Director General of Defense since the December 19 Coup to permit Colonel Mitchell to visit units in the field. Has Israel furnished such data and does Israel grant such facilities, asked the Prime Minister? I replied that I wasn’t aware what Israel’s practice is, but I knew from experience that the U.S. is not disposed to authorize the export of arms without full information concerning the need therefor and the peaceful purpose for which destined. I was merely trying to be helpful, I said, so that if such data were later requested, as I felt sure they would be if not furnished in the first place, he wouldn’t interpret a request therefor as a stalling tactic. Rightly or wrongly, I gained the impression, as I did during the Prime Minister’s similar though less extended query of January 10 that in the light of the Syrian Army’s interference in politics within Syria he is personally not too keen about strengthening its ability thus to “maintain order”, but that his hand is being forced by the military authorities and that in the face of Israel’s démarche , and the publicity already given it, he can no longer refuse to seek similar aid. I made it clear that the U.S. Government is not itself giving arms to Israel or even itself offering arms for sale to the Middle Eastern States but is concerned only in granting or withholding export licenses. The Prime Minister said he understood this, but the important consideration was that if the United States were permitting Israel to purchase arms in the United States, Syria had no choice but to try to follow suit. Unfortunately, Syria could, he said, ill afford the cost of arms competition with Israel which, he added, is able to divert funds to that purpose because of the substantial sums it receives for other purposes through so-called charitable contributions from the United States. At this point he digressed somewhat to point out that his Government is exerting its best efforts to develop Syria’s economy so as to raise the standard of living as a bulwark against communism, saying “arrests and other suppressive means serve only as propaganda for subversive agents.” The point I think he was here trying to make was that he regretted having to divert funds from such constructive ends to puerile arms competition. I did not labor the issue with the Prime Minister but, as indicated in my Despatch No. 123 of March 6, 1950, I consider it most unfortunate that an arms race between Israel and the Arab States is apparently beginning. Whether one or the other desires to renew hostilities, such an eventuality becomes almost inevitable once each tries to outarm the other. It might be otherwise if arms were granted only after formal peace is established and then only by way of assuring arms equilibrium under a United Nations’ guarantee. 5 James Hugh Keeley 1 This despatch was repeated to Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Ankara. 2 An enclosure to despatch 123, March 6, neither printed. The Aide-Mémoire quoted the extract from the Wireless Bulletin of February 27, p. 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , and stated that “Since the lifting of the United Nations embargo on the shipment of arms to Near Eastern states, the United States has indicated its willingness to consider the purchase of arms in the United States by those countries provided such purchases are limited to arms necessary for maintaining internal law and order by the governments concerned and for providing for reasonable requirements of self-defense.” It also asserted that there were no pending requests for the export of arms to Syria, inasmuch as the Syrian Legation at Washington had informed the State Department on January 18 that any applications for the export of arms before that date were not approved by the Syrian Government and no new applications had been filed since that date (784A.561/3–650). 3 Dated January 12, p. 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] . 4 See p. 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 667 ] . 5 Despatch 123 concluded with the following paragraph: “To grant arms to either the Israelis or Arabs before real peace is achieved between them can well jeopardize the slim hope of achieving it and may well lead to an armament race which can be expected to have only one result: a renewal of hostilities. It is evident that if Israel is accommodated, even to a limited extent, such action will serve only to stimulate the desire of the Arabs to increase their armaments.” (784A.561/3–650) Embassy Cairo, on March 1, reported the alarm of the Egyptian Foreign Minister over press reports of Israeli requests to purchase American arms and his expression of hope that the requests would not be granted (telegram 203, 784A.56/3–150). The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–650: Telegram [Document 387] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret niact Tel Aviv , March 6, 1950—3 p. m. 158. Morning March 6 Foreign Minister asked me his office and said substantially following: Crisis in Amman is “more than local test strength between King and Opposition; it is clash between negative and affirmative forces. Now Amman is crossroads Middle East. Decision there will affect whole course of history for next few years. Both sides have strong Jordan support and from outside. Example latter is presence Amman Iraq Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Jaber. Abdullah does not need pressure but needs moral encouragement in his present ordeal.” Foreign Minister stressed that Israel and King both favor accord though not yet agreed on exact provisions. Sharett earnestly pleaded that US encourage King by official but secret assurance of US moral and economic support and hopes for his success. Sharett added there is also practical problem. King’s willingness resume trade relations with Israel involves more than break with Arab boycott. It necessitates legislation to undo Jordan’s part in boycott. There is possibility Egypt and Iraq might cut off Jordan’s supplies as penalty. Abdullah would be reassured if US would suggest possibility American supplies of sugar and rice to replace those from Egypt, not as gifts but on commercial basis. Sharett “ventured suggest that if Department agreed it would be most helpful if President Truman gave King personal encouraging message”. In urging above Sharett was “acting solely on own initiative; King not involved”. Answering my question if he is making same appeal to UK Foreign Office, Sharett said: “I am considering it.” Comment: Sharett will probably appeal also to Britain. It is obvious that Israel attaches highest importance to success of King in present “tug of war”, because his success would “remove key log in whole jam which still prevents peace in Middle East”. This may be overly optimistic but surely King as first Arab ruler to show courage to face realities does deserve US encouragement in this crisis. End comment . 1 Sent niact Department 158; repeated Jerusalem 15; Department pass priority Amman 13, Cairo 46, priority Geneva for USPCC and USTC, London 37, Moscow 7, Paris 26, pouched other Arab capitals. McDonald 1 Embassy London advised, on March 8, of a discussion with Mr. Furlonge concerning the McDonald-Sharett conversation of March 6. Mr. Furlonge stated that Mr. Sharett’s suggestion was predicated on the assumption that the King had not met with a decisive reverse in his differences with the Cabinet. The Foreign Office’s information was that the King’s reverse was complete and that Tewfik Pasha’s condition for withdrawing his resignation was that he not be required to resume the Israeli negotiations before the April elections. In view of these circumstances, Mr. Furlonge concluded, the Foreign Office was unable to see how encouragement given to the King would improve the situation (telegram 1311, 684A.85/3–850). The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–650: Telegram [Document 388] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , March 6, 1950—6 p. m. 161. For personal attention of President and Secretary. Further re Embtel 158, March 6. For first time in many months I ask your personal consideration. If projected Israel-Jordan five-year nonaggression pact can be saved, US policy of peace and stability in ME will be immeasurably advanced. Abdullah sorely needs and fully deserves our moral and economic support as he struggles against intransigent forces which hope for Israel’s economic collapse demand indefinite continuance anti-Israel boycott. Personal message of sympathy and support from President to King might be decisive. Also friendly word of counsel in Cairo urging sympathetic understanding Abdullah’s stand would diminish greatly forces threatening King’s program conciliation. I think Dr. Bunche would agree that now is opportune moment save Arab extremists from themselves. McDonald The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–750: Telegram [Document 389] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , March 7, 1950—11 a. m. 164. Further re Embtel 158, March 6, Shiloah at his suggestion at residence night March 6, said “according to Reuter’s” Syrian Prime Minister Khaled Bey Azzam “has declared his government is considering closing Syrian frontiers with Jordan if five-year agreement Jordan-Israel becomes effective. Other Arab Governments already conferring what action to take.” Shiloah hoped US would: (1) regard such statements as blows to peace and stability in ME and as interference internal affairs Jordan-Israel, (2) urge neighboring Arab capitals permit Israel-Jordan settle own affairs. Re present authority Abdullah, Shiloah of opinion different from that expressed by the informant quoted in Amman Legtel 38, March 5. According Shiloah: (1) King has sent Israel message “Abdullah, son of Hussein, does not break his word.” (2) Samir did succeed in getting cooperation of more than “third rate politicians”. (3) Two members old cabinet asked to be included in Samir’s. (4) Tewfik “has promised King to work out solution with Israel”. (5) Another Israel-Jordan meeting tentatively fixed for night March 7 but this may be postponed. Related subject: UK Minister 1 with whom I consult regularly saw me March 6: In his “mature judgment maintenance of strong Israel at peace with Arab neighbors is essential to UK and US vital interests. Present Arab policy refusal to make peace with Israel is futile and dangerous to UK and US. If Arab diehards did succeed in destroying Israel, this would be disaster for UK and US in ME”. Helm has been urging this view on London. Comment: I think opinion of Helm who is able and objective with no Palestine background to confuse his judgment is sound. End comment . 2 Sent Department 164, repeated Damascus 10, Baghdad 10, Jidda 10, Beirut 10. Department pass Cairo 47, Geneva for PCC and TC 8, Amman 14, London 38, Paris 27, Moscow 8. McDonald 1 Sir Alexander Knox Helm. 2 On March 7 Ambassador McDonald sent telegram 165 to the Department of State for the personal attention of Charles S. Murphy, Administrative Assistant to President Truman. The message gave his opinion that the crisis in Jordan offered the President the “best opportunity to date to speed peace and stability in Middle East by giving Abdullah moral encouragement to hold firmly to his purpose to make five year non-aggression pact with Israel and thus break prolonged deadlock. The Ambassador suggested that Mr. Murphy ask the President to study his telegrams 158, 161, and 164. (684A.85/3–750) The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–750: Telegram [Document 390] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State confidential Amman , March 7, 1950—2 p. m. 40. At King’s request held hour’s conference with him morning March 5, at which he appeared completely unruffled by recent political storm and made only passing reference to it. He stated emphatically negotiations with Israel would be resumed without, however, suggesting date. He expressed sharp criticism unrealistic attitude other Arab Governments, particularly Egypt and Syria toward negotiations. To his query why we and British did not bring pressure presumably on Israel I replied that while we hopeful that mutually satisfactory agreement could be reached it must rest on firm foundation which would not be case if either party agreed under pressure. He emphasized vital necessity both Jordan and Israel for establishment normal trade relations. General opinion Government and diplomatic corps circles that Prime Minister acted impetuously in submitting resignation and King equally so in accepting it and that both parties “having let off steam”, long range effect should prove beneficial. All concur that Israel negotiations cannot in any case be resumed prior April election and that any agreement eventually reached with concurrence Parliament representing both sides Jordan [River] would have greater chance popular acceptance. Sent Department 40; Department pass London 19, Tel Aviv 18, Geneva 16, for USPCC and USTC 15, Cairo 6, Beirut 5, Jerusalem 17, Damascus 4, Baghdad 3, Jidda 3. Drew The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/3–750 [Document 391] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Geneva , March 7, 1950—10 p. m. 338. Palun 337. In dinner conversation with Barco last night Rafael again took occasion to request Commissioners’ utmost patience and restraint. Israel’s position with Jordan was confused and fluid and it would be most unfortunate if Commissioner took step which might cause Jordan’s ultimate withdrawal from negotiations on theory more could be hoped for from Commissioner. Rafael admitted it was possible no accord would be reached with Jordan and that Israel would certainly not enter into empty agreement. He believed two or three weeks might see decision taken one way or other. Meanwhile Egypt was watching progress of negotiations with Jordan closely and the outcome would be important factor in Egypt’s own decision whether or not to have talks with Israel. Egypt was of course at same time trying in every way to sabotage Israeli-Jordan talks. Rafael admitted success or failure Jordan talks might be equally effective in deciding Egypt to have negotiations with Israel. Asserting that “windfall” of most strictly confidential information had come to hand, Rafael claimed Egypt and Soviet Union had made deal in New York whereby Russia would support Egypt in UN in return for certain agreements. Israel now knew for certain Egypt was being called on to make good her commitments. Rafael was not in position to allude to this except in these general terms, but matter was intimately connected with Egypt’s present review of her policy with respect to international situation in general and Palestine in particular. Egypt was considering alternatives of agreement with Israel or resumption of war. In interest of stability of Middle East it was therefore essential that every assistance be given Israel in her attempt reach agreement with Jordan. PCC would not contribute to this effort by seeking piece-meal solutions such as PCC proposal for committee on Gaza. Egypt was not concerned over form which negotiations with Israel might take, but only with principal question of whether to have peace with Israel at all. Under these circumstances pressure on Egypt was needed, primarily from US and secondarily from PCC, by demanding that Egypt enter direct negotiations. Barco recalled to Rafael that PCC had in numerous conversations with Abdel Monem 1 pressed without success for Egypt’s agreement to direct talks and that he did not believe PCC could continue demand direct talks without offering some compromise proposal either as to procedure or substance. Barco said also that whereas US might not be willing exert pressure on Egypt on the sole question of direct negotiations, the American Government, in view of its policy of supporting UN activities and procedures, might see fit to indicate to both parties its support for a reasonable procedure if such were proposed by PCC. He therefore hoped Israel would regard any PCC suggestions for breaking impasse in this light. The pressure which Israel desired might best be furnished in this way. Rafael agreed reflect on this possibility. Our impression is however that Israel representatives here are dead set against any proposal by PCC which in any sense might improve Arab states negotiating position. Rafael and Eban regard Boisanger as “agitator” and quite pointedly indicate USDel, “in America’s own interest”, must counteract French impatience. Rafael asserted French Government views possibility Israel-Jordan accord with “panic”. It was principally for this reason that Eban was talking over week end with Parodi in Paris. His first purpose was attempt convince French there was no danger to their position in Middle East in agreement between Israel and Jordan. At same time Eban wished impress Parodi with necessity PCC’s forbearance. Having in mind all of foregoing and fact Arab delegates continue ask for PCC action in each and every conversation, I believe time has come for consideration of new approach. Labbane of Egyptian delegation declared on Friday if PCC remained inactive much longer, Arab delegates would not participate further. Fisher, PCC press officer JELM, reported in meeting with PCC today that Abdullah told him his present policy was “one of despair” which he was pursuing because PCC had “let him down”. Amman telegram 38, 5 March, 3 p. m. indicates probable postponement Israel-Jordan discussions until after Jordan elections. PCC will with difficulty remain inactive for this period of time. Heretofore USDel has been well aware of desirability avoiding any action by PCC which would lend credence to Israeli claim of interference in imminent agreement between Israel and Jordan. We must in our opinion still avoid giving cause for claim by Israel PCC has by its action stiffened Abdullah’s attitude, as long as there is still honest hope for agreement. Such assertions by Israel could be avoided if Jordan saw fit to request direct talks, coupled with request for mediation if necessary, under PCC auspices. PCC itself could not suggest this to Jordan without encountering Israel’s claim of interference. In view of deteriorating situation here and in Palestine, USDel suggests Department give serious consideration to suggesting at Amman that Jordan Government make such an official request to PCC. Abdullah will of course have to be convinced that PCC will in fact follow-up such request with results at least more favorable to him than present stalemate. In order convince Abdullah of this we must be prepared play more active role both within PCC and outside. A proposal by PCC, following request from Jordan, for direct negotiations under PCC coupled with PCC’s mediation might be difficult for Israel and Arab States refuse and could provide means breaking present impasse. This might be sufficient give impetus to direct negotiations without necessarily committing PCC to finding solution for every problem. Parties themselves might be relied on after initial break in logjam to keep ball rolling. Department consideration this suggestion and possible alternatives urgently requested. USDel feels present instructions have outlived their usefulness. [ Palmer ] 1 Head of the Egyptian Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. His name is also transliterated as “Muniem”. The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 684A.85/3–850: Circular telegram [Document 392] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1 restricted Washington , March 8, 1950—3 a. m. Emb Tel Aviv reports high Israeli official disturbed by recent Reuters report that Syrian PriMin has declared his Govt is considering closing Syrian frontiers with Jordan if 5-year agreement Jordan-Israel becomes effective, and that other Arab Govts now conferring on what action to take if this agreement reached. Comment. Acheson 1 Sent to Damascus; repeated to Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, and Jidda. Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–650 [Document 393] Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] March 8, 1950. Subject: Telegrams to Amman and Tel Aviv concerning Israel-Jordan negotiations. Discussion: After a conversation with the Israeli Foreign Minister in which the latter suggested that a personal message of encouragement from President Truman to King Abdullah of Jordan might be helpful in resolving the present stalemate in the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations (Tab A), 1 Ambassador McDonald in Tel Aviv has telegraphed the President and yourself urging that the President send such a message to the King, and also that the Department approach the Egyptian Government in an attempt to obtain a sympathetic understanding in Egypt of the desirability and necessity that Jordan reach an agreement with Israel (Tab B). 2 It is our belief that, motivated by his own personal interests, King Abdullah has gone as far as he could in attempting to reach an agreement with Israel. He had accepted the resignation of one Cabinet which refused to accede to his wishes to agree to the projected agreement with Israel, was unable to establish another Cabinet which would so agree, and has been forced to reinstate the first government. A message from the President to the King would in our opinion not help the King vis-à-vis his Government. Moreover, King Abdullah is already in receipt of a message of indirect encouragement from the President concerning negotiations with Israel, sent on December 30, 1949, in response to a telegram from the King (Tab C). 3 Under the circumstances we do not believe that another message from the President is desirable. However, a message authorizing, our Minister in Amman discreetly to encourage the King and the Jordan Government to continue the conversations with Israel might be helpful. A draft of such a message is attached for your consideration (Tab D). 4 With regard to Ambassador McDonald’s suggestion that the United States Government approach the Government of Egypt, we have received no information that Egypt is actively intervening concerning the Jordan-Israeli conversations beyond the usual radio and press criticism of Abdullah. However, we are asking our Embassy in Cairo and our missions in the other Arab capitals for comments on this point. A draft telegram to Tel Aviv concerning this suggestion is attached (Tab E). 5 Recommendations: That you approve the attached telegrams to Amman and Tel Aviv. Since the incoming telegram from Ambassador McDonald is addressed to the President as well as to yourself, it is suggested that if you approve the attached telegrams you may wish to convey to the President the sense of these messages at your meeting with him on Thursday morning, March 9. Concurrences: UNA concurs. 1 Telegram 158, March 6, from Tel Aviv, p. 781 [ Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] . 2 Telegram 161, March 6, from Tel Aviv, p. 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] . 3 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1564 . 4 See telegram 24, March 9, to Amman, p. 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] . 5 See telegram 115, March 9, to Tel Aviv, ibid [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–950 [Document 394] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] March 9, 1950. Subject: Telegrams from McDonald on Israeli-Jordan Negotiations I discussed this matter with the President along the lines indicated in the briefing book and recommended to him that he should not send a personal message to Abdullah because Abdullah’s primary difficulty was with his own Cabinet with which he had agreed not to press this matter further until after the April elections. It seemed to me that a message from the President, which had been suggested by the Israelis would be most certain to leak and he might find himself the principal issue in the Transjordan elections. The President said that this recommendation thoroughly accorded with his own strong feeling upon reading the telegrams. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 784.02/3–950 [Document 395] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] March 9, 1950. Subject: Israel–Jordan Negotiations, Status of Jerusalem, and General Palestine Problem. Participants: Ambassador Elath Mr. Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel NEA—Mr. Hare ANE—Mr. Rockwell Problem: The Israeli Government desired the United States Government to take certain action which it alleged would facilitate the reaching of an agreement between Israel and Jordan and a solution of the Jerusalem problem. Action Required: None Discussion: The following subjects were discussed during the conference with Messrs. Elath and Keren. 1. Message of Encouragement to King Abdullah . Ambassador Elath said that his Government very much hoped that the United States Government would find it possible to send to King Abdullah a message of moral encouragement in the King’s present difficult situation arising out of the trouble he was having in persuading his Government to reach an agreement with Israel. He thought the King would be grateful for some indication that the United States was fully behind him in his fight. Mr. Hare said that we had already heard of this desire on the part of the Israeli Government through messages from our Embassy in Tel Aviv, and that we had made certain recommendations to the Secretary. We did not know what decision the Secretary would take, but Mr. Hare doubted that it would be decided that the President should send a message to King Abdullah, 1 as we understood Mr. Sharett had suggested. The President had, in fact, sent the King a message last December indirectly encouraging direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan. At times, Mr. Hare continued, it was disadvantageous to press a thing too hard. We were fully in agreement with the necessity of Israel and Jordan reaching an accord and would continue to offer the King encouragement to this end, as Mr. Elath knew we had in the past. Our understanding was that the King was not particularly disturbed by the present situation. Mr. Hare thought, however, that it might be possible for us to send some kind of new message of general encouragement. Ambassador Elath volunteered the information that after the King had accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Tawfiq Pasha, and had requested Samir Pasha to form a new Government, Tawfiq Pasha learned that Samir was making good progress in establishing a new Government and thereupon offered to withdraw his resignation, agreeing at the same time to carry on the conversations with Israel. The King allegedly decided to give Tawfiq Pasha another chance, and reinstated him as Prime Minister. 2. United States Support of Jordan Guarantee Concerning Holy Places . Ambassador Elath said that his Government, after much difficulty, had managed to persuade King Abdullah to agree to offer to the international community a guarantee of protection and free access for the Holy Places. The positions of Jordan and Israel on this matter were thus now the same. The Israeli Government hoped that the United States Government would be able to indicate to Abdullah its approval of his position, thereby strengthening him in this attitude. Mr. Hare reiterated our position on the Jerusalem question, pointing out that the international community and particularly the Christian world was very much involved in the matter of Jerusalem, and that while an agreement between Jordan and Israel would be a good start, it would be incomplete unless this third party were also included. He recalled that we had felt that a plan along the lines of the PCC proposals represented a fair compromise between all the parties at interest, but that the United States had been defeated in the General Assembly and was now abiding by the Assembly’s decision and cooperating in the Trusteeship Council. We would thus not be in a position to take the move suggested by the Israeli Government, particularly since a régime for the Holy Places consisting solely of a guarantee by Jordan and Israel to the international community would not contain all of the elements we thought desirable in a Jerusalem solution, and since there was no indication of agreement by the majority of the international Christian community with the guarantee idea. Mr. Hare reminded Ambassador Elath and Mr. Keren that he had given them substantially the same response when, acting upon instructions, they had sought United States support for a discussion between the Trusteeship Council, Jordan and Israel in Geneva of a statute for Jerusalem limited to the Holy Places alone. Ambassador Elath then inquired whether this meant that the United States would not approve an agreement on Jerusalem reached by Jordan and Israel alone. Israel desired the participation of the Vatican, but would make no concession concerning the parts of New Jerusalem not containing Holy Places. The Vatican was intransigently insisting upon international control of the whole area. Mr. Hare did not comment directly on this question beyond reiterating that Jordan and Israel were not the only parties at interest and that the United States had to consider all the elements involved. 3. Jerusalem in the Trusteeship Council . Mr. Keren said that the Israeli Government thought that approval by the Trusteeship Council of a Jerusalem statute drawn up according to the December 9 General Assembly instructions would have a very bad effect upon the Jordan-Israeli discussions. His Government hoped that the United States would take the lead in working against the approval of such a statute by the Council. Mr. Hare replied that we were in a rather awkward position in the Council, since we had expressed our original disapproval of the resolution under which the Council is now working. However, we had our obligations as a member of the United Nations, and were fulfilling them by cooperating constructively in the Council. “We would, however, take the Israeli Government’s desire in this connection into consideration. 4. Syrian Threat to Close Jordan Frontier . Ambassador Elath said that his Government was very much disturbed by press accounts of a threat by the Syrian Government to close the frontier with Jordan if Jordan came to an agreement with Israel. This would be a blow to peace and stability in the Near East, he said, and his Government hoped that the United States would do what it could to prevent such a step. Mr. Hare said that we had heard this report and were asking our Missions in Damascus and the other Arab Capitals for comments. 5. Arms for Israel . Mr. Hare then referred to the Israeli requests for assistance in obtaining defensive military equipment in this country. He wished to assure his visitors that this matter had not been pigeon-holed, but to inform them that the whole procedure was very complicated, involving as it did a number of agencies outside the Department. We were actively working on the question but it would be a little while before we had any definite information. Ambassador Elath expressed gratification for this information and said that his Government was extremely impatient to receive a definite answer. 6. Sale of Arab Refugee Property in Israel . Mr. Hare then said that a story in the New York Times that morning stated that the Knesset had passed legislation enabling the Alien Property Custodian in Israel to sell abandoned Arab refugee property. We had not had official confirmation of this, but he wished to point out informally that steps such as this were just the kind that muddied, if not poisoned, the atmosphere. Mr. Hare thought it particularly unfortunate that such a move should have been taken at this time, if the newspaper report was true. He reminded Ambassador Elath that about a year ago we had cautioned Israel 2 concerning the harmful effects which the sale of Arab refugee property would have, insofar as the possibility of arriving at agreements between Israel and the Arab states was concerned. This was not an official representation on the matter, but merely an observation and a reminder. Ambassador Elath said that he had not received official confirmation of the press report but would convey Mr. Hare’s comments to Tel Aviv. 3 1 For the text of the message, dated December 30, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1564 . 2 See telegram 98, February 17, 1949, to Tel Aviv, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 754 . 3 The substance of the discussion recorded under item 6 was sent to Tel Aviv on March 10 in telegram 119, with the instruction to Ambassador McDonald to discuss the matter with Israeli officials (684.85/3–1050). The Embassy in Tel Aviv, on April 19, commented that “Whether or not Mr. Hare’s comments have deterred the Government of Israel in any degree from exercising the privilege granted by this legislation cannot be conjectured, but there has not as yet been an instance where the Custodian has disposed of real property by sale. In all probability, the necessity of reorganizing the Office of the Custodian and establishing the State Development Authority (the latter is the agency empowered under the Absentees’ Property Act to purchase real property from the Custodian) has been primarily responsible for the delay in making use of the new law. There are indications, however, that sales of absentee property will be limited, at least initially, to those made with one of the following ends in view: 1) the improvement of the public road system, 2) the construction of Government-sponsored housing projects, and 3) the restoration of abandoned orange groves.” (Despatch 243, 784A.00/4–1950) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Munitions Division (Elliott) 484A.118/3–950 [Document 396] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Munitions Division ( Elliott ) [ Washington ,] March 9, 1950. Participants: Col. Ben Arzi, Military Attaché, Major [ Lieutenant Colonel ] Avidor, Assistant Military Attaché, Embassy of Israel, Mr. Elliott (MD) and Mr. Hamilton (MD) State Col. Ben Arzi called today to inquire, prior to his return to Israel on March 13, concerning the status of applications pending in this division for the export of arms to Israel including those items listed in the Ambassador of Israel’s request by Note, dated February 13, 1950. 1 I told Col. Ben Arzi that the entire list of items submitted by the Ambassador was being given a most careful examination within this Government and that the first problem was the question of availability from U.S. stocks since most of the items on the Ambassador’s list were obviously not obtainable from commercial sources. I then told Col. Ben Arzi that if it should appear that any of the items were excess in Government stocks, considering the higher priority of MDA, the very complex question of whether the requested items could be considered as “legitimate security requirements” would have to be explored and a decision on the export made on that basis. I said that the major items of equipment to be obtained from commercial sources such as the jet aircraft and the Sherman tanks would also be subject to the latter consideration. Col. Ben Arzi repeated his offer to make available, informally, information concerning the strength of the Israel Military Establishment, particularly with respect to items on the list submitted by the Ambassador. He pointed out that even a very broad request for information on the armament situation in Israel might be given informally if the Department desired it. He said that the Israeli Government would not give such information formally since to do so would be sure to involve the Israeli legislature and raise a “red hot” political debate. I told Col. Ben Arzi that when we had proceeded somewhat further in our studies of the Israel requests we might come to him or his successor with a request for detailed information. Col. Ben Arzi said that he could assure me now that any information on the Israeli armament situation would be furnished to me upon request. I told Col. Ben Arzi that we would try to give him an indication in the near future of our action on the AT–6’s, the radar equipment and the Piper cubs for which applications are pending. Col. Ben Arzi raised the question of the recoilless rifles and I told him that these items, while being obtained from private manufacturers, were being treated in the same way as the items which are being requested from Government stocks inasmuch as the design drawings and specifications had to be released by the military services. Col. Ben Arzi asked that we take no action on the application of the Foreign Supply Company for the export of recoilless rifles until he had time to examine the commitments being made by the Israel Embassy for the purchase of this equipment elsewhere. 2 1 Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] . 2 On March 15, David A. Robertson, Politico-Military Adviser in NEA, and Messrs. Rockwell and Elliott exchanged views with representatives of the Munitions Board, the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, and of the Secretary of Defense to determine the availability of military equipment sought by Israel and the views of the Department of Defense regarding its export to Israel. Mr. Robertson “explained the political background of the Israeli requests and emphasized that failure of this Government to grant any of the requests of the Israelis for combat matériel could be interpreted as continuation of the embargo which the United Nations action of last August had terminated. Mr. Robertson said that the State Department must depend upon the military establishment to determine legitimate security requirements’ of the Middle Eastern states in connection with requests for arms of US origin.” The consensus of the meeting was that “(1) The inquiry conducted by Defense in January indicated that none of the items sought by the Israelis were available…; (2) Defense would advise the Department of State concerning the availability of all items sought as soon as its current study is completed; (3) Defense has not given its approval to the export of any of the items in question; (4) Defense states that it has not intended to place an embargo on shipments of military equipment to Israel despite its failure to approve any of the items in question and that it is being guided by the policy as laid down in NSC 47/2; and (5) Defense takes the position that it has insufficient information to approve the export to Israel of any of the items in question.” (Memorandum of conversation by Messrs. Elliott and Robertson, 484A.118/3–1550) For NSC 47/2, dated October 17, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1430 . The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/3–950: Telegram [Document 397] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , March 9, 1950—1 p. m. 344. Palun 338. PCC is considering first draft of notes prepared by Secretariat for possible submission to Arab and Israeli delegations, text of which follows: “1. During past weeks, members of Commission have had informal conversations with Arab delegations and delegation of Israel regarding best procedure to be followed for ensuring concrete and positive results from their joint efforts. Commission wishes to submit following observations and suggestions for consideration of interested delegations and their governments. 2. In New York, Commission was requested by Arab delegations to extend procedure of conciliation to that of mediation; practical implications of such measure would be that Commission instead of restricting itself to trying to conciliate points of view of each party, would present proposals to them designed to serve as basis for discussion and study with view to reaching agreement on various questions outstanding between them. On other hand, Commission notes that delegation of Israel, in its statement to Commission on 30 January, has again indicated that it considers opening of direct negotiations between Arab states and state of Israel as only way in which Commission can contribute to fulfillment of its task. 3. Commission does not consider as incompatible these two points of view regarding procedure which have thus been set forth by Arab states and Israel respectively. Commission believes that they should be regarded as complementary. It would, indeed, be difficult to visualize how Commission could undertake procedure of mediation, in course of which it would be expected to submit proposals to parties, without assurance that these proposals could be examined and discussed at meetings between representatives of Commission itself and of all parties having interest in subject under discussion. In opinion of Commission, request of Arab states that it embark upon procedure of mediation and request of state of Israel that direct negotiations be undertaken are thus bound up with one another. Commission is prepared to accept both these requests and hopes establish thereby basis of new method of operation. 4. In this connection, Commission would like to present to parties certain clarifications: 5. Commission must reserve right of determining which questions would form subject of its proposals. Commission alone is in position to judge as to advisability of submitting at any given moment proposals on certain point. This will not prevent parties from informing Commission of questions on which, in their opinion, Commission could usefully take initiative. On contrary, parties would thus make most positive contribution to proper functioning of new method of operation. Commission attaches so much importance to this that it urges parties to keep it informed of all questions which they consider should form the subject of proposals by Commission. It is obvious that Commission would be obliged to carry out request coming jointly from one or more Arab delegations and from delegation of Israel. 6. As regards actual procedure, Commission considers it preferable not to adopt rigid rules. For moment, it envisages formation of joint committees under chairmanship of representative of Commission and composed of representatives of countries concerned in particular subject under discussion. In particular cases, of course, this general formula could be modified by mutual agreement between parties and commission. In principle (and having in mind possible modifications mentioned above), each committee would have precise and concrete terms of reference, consisting either of discussion and study of questions which Commission, in agreement with parties, had submitted to it for preliminary examination, or of study and discussion of proposal drawn up by Commission on its own initiative or at request of one or more delegations. 7. Commission hopes this new method of operation will meet with agreement in principle of parties. It realizes that certain details of actual method of application, and, particularly, of organization, functioning and procedure of joint committees, will need to be discussed further and agreed upon with the parties. Commission hopes that spirit of collaboration shown up to now by delegations and governments which they represent will permit agreement on this subject to be reached without delay. 8. Commission earnestly requests delegations to transmit their replies as soon as possible.” Boisanger and Yalcin believe that above note represents only course open to PCC. I have indicated to them in preliminary discussions that some such approach is needed under present circumstances. I also made clear that it would be worthless without full support of three governments represented on PCC and that it would require careful study here and in our respective FonOffs. I believe that as first draft Secretariat note represents reasonable approach, which in fact emerges from my first statement as chairman to parties, the only alternative to which, I fear, would be complete stalemate as far as Commission is concerned. I hope Department will give it favorable consideration. [ Palmer ] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 684A.85/3–950: Telegram [Document 398] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1 secret Washington , March 9, 1950—3 p. m. 196. Dept reps in Israel and Switz have been given fol info by Israeli reps. 1. There is possibility Egypt and Iraq might cut off Jordan’s food supplies if Jordan shld reach projected 5-year nonaggression agreement with Israel. 2. Egypt and USSR have reached agreement in New York whereby USSR would support Egypt in UN in return for “certain agreements”. Egypt now being called upon to make good her commitments and matter intimately connected with Egypt’s present review of her policy with respect to internatl situation in gen and Palestine in particular. Egypt considering alternatives of agreement with Israel or resumption of war. This for your strictly confidential background info only. Pls comment. 2 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to New York for action. 2 In regard to paragraph numbered 2, Ambassador Caffery replied on March 10 that he was “sorry to see Israel put out inaccurate ‘information’ of this sort; it is very bad tactics.” The following day, he reported information from the Egyptian Foreign Office that if Jordan signed an agreement with Israel, Egypt would bring the matter to the attention of the next meeting of the Arab League. The Foreign Office was said to have no other plans at this juncture. Then on March 13, he advised of information from the Jordanian Minister that at no time had the Egyptian Government made threats regarding the Jordanian-Israeli negotiations. These observations by the Ambassador were made in telegrams 233, 238, and 243 from Cairo, 684A.85/3–1050, /3–1150, and /3–1350. New York advised, on March 14, of conversations with the Egyptian Delegation at the United Nations and concluded that “Considering vagueness of rumor and source we feel it probably should not be taken seriously.” (Telegram 246, 357.AC/3–1450) The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 784A.00/3–950: Telegram [Document 399] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret Tel Aviv , March 9, 1950—4 p. m. 170. Shiloah at his suggestion at residence March 9 reported substantially: Short Israel-Jordan meeting March 7 which agreed to “adjourn” but “not break off” negotiations. Present for Jordan, Mulki, the King, and Said el-Mufti; for Israel Shiloah and Dayan. Mulki read text “ note verbale ” which was copied textually by Israelis. This stated substantially: Jordan Government accepts King’s plan as basis for settlement. Owing to rumors and lies circulating in Jordan it is decided not to press negotiations but to ask for adjournment. Hope expressed that at earliest possible moment these will be resumed “animated by same spirit and objectives as in conferences to date.” End text. King explained that he preferred to go ahead but since his government accepted his plan he agreed delay. Shiloah attributes King’s willingness to delay to pressure from outside Jordan from Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and from internal intrigue. Shiloah “hopes resume conferences after April election.” Meanwhile, he hopes there will be American and British “more encouragement” for King’s position, “perhaps during Drew’s and Kirkbride’s planned holidays as King’s guests.” New subject: Answering my question suggested by General Riley’s conference at residence earlier March 9 “would Israel do better to concentrate on negotiations with Egypt?”, Shiloah replied: Israel recognizes that peace with Egypt “would end danger of second round” and that Egypt’s lead would be followed probably by negotiations with other Arab states. Difficulty is that Israel not in least convinced Egypt now ready for negotiations. On contrary, recent information suggests that King and Foreign Minister favor “second round” or at least preparations for it. Letter received from Eban re his recent talk with Muniem was “not encouraging.” Re Riley’s complaint that Israel misses opportunity conciliate Egypt by refusing withdraw from disputed Ras En Naq, Shiloah argued with such withdrawal would strengthen extremists in Egypt and “put back peace negotiations six months.” Comment: I have no judgment as between the opinions of Riley and Shiloah. I am certain only that each man is wholly convinced that his interpretation is correct. End comment. 1 Sent Department 170, repeated Beirut 11, Baghdad 11, Damascus 11, Jidda 11. Department pass Cairo 48, London 39, Paris 28, Moscow 9, Geneva 9. McDonald 1 Ambassador McDonald, on March 20, reported to the Department of State on his talk with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion the day before, in which the latter indicated his belief that King Farouk does not now desire peace, although he had the power to make peace, and that Israeli concessions in negotiations would only whet the King’s appetite and his desire for a second round (telegram 195 from Tel Aviv, 784A.00/3–2050), Embassy London advised, on March 9, of information from the Foreign Office that “reports from British Embassy Cairo [indicate] apparent unlikelihood present Egyptian Government agreeing negotiate with Israel.” (Telegram 1342, 674.84A/3–950) The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 684A.85/3–550: Telegram [Document 400] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan secret Washington , March 9, 1950—7 p. m. 24. Ur 38 Mar 5 and previous. Dept disappointed by recent developments culminating in setback for King in his efforts bring conversations with Israel to concrete conclusion. If you believe such action wld be helpful, you are authorized convey to King an expression of Dept’s appreciation for efforts he has so far made on behalf peace and stability in Palestine, and of Dept’s hope that King will continue seek agreement. You might refer to President’s msg of encouragement to King sent Deptel 216 Dec 30, 1949. 1 In your discretion you are also authorized discreetly to encourage members of Jordan Govt re desirability of continuing conversations with Israelis in effort arrive at satisfactory formula for agreement. Acheson 1 This message gave the text of President Truman’s message to King Abdullah; see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1564 . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 684A.85/3–650: Telegram [Document 401] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel secret Washington , March 9, 1950—7 p. m. 115. Fol tel sent Amman re ur 161 Mar 6: [Here follows instruction to code room to repeat telegram 24 to Amman, supra .] Fol is pertinent section President’s message to King mentioned in above tel. “It is my belief that the cause of peace in the Near East wld be greatly furthered if the states most directly concerned in the Palestine dispute shld find it possible to agree among themselves upon the basic elements for a just settlement.” Re approach to Cairo concerning Abdullah’s position, Dept appreciates your suggestion but has recd no info Egypt actively intervening re Jordan-Israeli conversations beyond usual radio and press criticism. Dept querying Cairo and other Arab capitals re this. Abdullah’s greatest difficulties appear arise from opposition his own Govt and from public opinion in Jordan and Arab Palestine. If Jordan-Israeli conversations resumed, opportunity will be offered to work out formula more susceptible being accepted by Jordanians. Reports from Amman reveal King determined continue talks and that he seems calm in present situation. Acheson Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 474.418/3–1050 [Document 402] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] March 10, 1950. Subject: Near Eastern Armaments Situation Participants: S—The Secretary Senator Herbert Lehman of New York Mr. Edelstine, Legislative Assistant to Senator Lehman ANE—Mr. Rockwell I received the Senator and Mr. Edelstine at the Senator’s request. We discussed the question of the British shipment of arms to the Arab states, and particularly to Egypt, for approximately one-half hour. The Senator opened the conversation by stating that Great Britain was now shipping heavy military equipment to Egypt and the other Arab states. He said that the military balance in the Near East had thereby been disturbed, and that Israel for its own security was now forced to spend precious dollars to acquire arms to defend itself. The Senator added that he was sincerely alarmed by the situation, not only because Israel was being forced to spend for military equipment money which could much better be used within Israel, but because the security of Israel was so seriously threatened. I said that this situation was a matter of deep and continuing concern to the Department, and that we were maintaining a very close watch on developments. It was essential, we thought, that peace and stability be established and maintained in the Near East. There were, of course, two elements involved in the situation. One was the relationship between Israel and the Arab states, and the other was the Soviet threat to the Near East and the oil fields there and the desirability that the states in the area be generally strengthened in order to be able to contribute as much as possible to the defense of the region. We felt that the overall situation could not be considered without giving full weight to both of these factors. With regard to the first factor, I said that we were encouraged by continuing developments to believe that the trend in the Near East was away from war toward peace. I mentioned the talks now going on between Israel and Jordan, and the Israeli-Egyptian agreement concerning the disposition of certain “no man’s land” areas near Gaza. If an Israeli-Jordan five-year nonaggression pact should be signed, as it was entirely possible that it might be, there would be no reason to believe that similar or related agreements might not be reached between Israel and the other Arab states. I said that we sincerely did not believe that Egypt was planning to attack Israel. If we received any signs that Egypt was making serious preparations to do so, we most certainly would get together with the British and take strong steps to prevent this. With regard to the second factor, I said that the Senator would appreciate that the Near East was an extremely vital strategic area from our point of view. The military situation of the Western powers vis-à-vis the Soviet Union made it desirable for us to rely as much as possible and wherever possible upon the military strength of friendly nations, such as this strength was. This did not mean that we thought that Egypt could stave off a Soviet attack. However, we did think that Egypt could be helpful in defending the Suez Canal and the Near Eastern oil fields. The Senator was of course aware of the strategic importance in the Near East in British military planning in the two past wars. We knew that the British had assigned the highest priority, militarily speaking, to this region. I had discussed this question often with Mr. Bevin, and had not failed to point out to him the danger of re-igniting the Palestine conflict. I would see Mr. Bevin again in a month or so and would discuss the matter with him anew. I did not wish to minimize the danger latent in the Near Eastern armaments situation. I wished to assure the Senator, however, that we did not believe that the present situation was leading to a renewal of the conflict between Israel and the Arab states. I then asked Mr. Rockwell if he had any additional comments to make. Mr. Rockwell emphasized the reports which we had been receiving and which led to the conclusion that the trend in the Near East was towards peace rather than towards war. He mentioned the capable body of United Nations military observers who, in fulfillment of their responsibilities to the Security Council, were on the spot in Palestine closely observing developments and travelling about between the various countries. They had reported the area to be relatively calm and in fact the chief observer, an able American Marine [Corps] general, was of the opinion that not only was neither side making serious preparations to renew the conflict, but neither side was actually in a position to do so. Mr. Rockwell also emphasized that the relations between the Arab states were governed by internationally-recognized armistice agreements in which the parties committed themselves not to resort to hostilities. Senator Lehman felt that the Arab states had proven themselves to be unreliable partners in past military adventures on the side of the Western powers. He felt that the Department was placing too much emphasis on Arab military potential, and was tending to overlook what he considered to be the real purpose for which the Arabs were acquiring the arms—to renew the attack on Israel. It was imperative that the defense needs of Israel therefore be met. The Senator then Inquired what I thought of his suggestion that the United States request a Security Council investigation of the Near Eastern armaments situation. I said frankly that I did not think that such action was merited by the facts or that it would be helpful. I foresaw that the Soviet Union would use this for its own purposes and that the water would become very muddy indeed. Mr. Rockwell then said that the Department recognized the necessity that the states in the Near East be able to provide for their own legitimate defense needs and that we had established this necessity as one of the basic principles underlying our Near Eastern arms export policy. As a matter of fact, within the framework of this policy we were even now considering an Israeli request for assistance in obtaining defensive military material in this country. Mr. Edelstine repeated that the Egyptians had proved themselves to be thoroughly unreliable during the last war. Accordingly, perhaps it would diminish the security of the Near East from the Western point of view if the British continued arming such undependable people. I said that I thought that the Egyptians were indeed not thoroughly reliable. It was essential, however, that the British stay in the Canal area as long as possible, and perhaps if the Egyptians felt that they had more military responsibility in a partnership with the British for the defense of the Canal, they could be counted upon to be more effective in the military sense. Mr. Rockwell commented that although certain Egyptians had not proven themselves to be very reliable during the last war, the fact was that it would have been very easy for the Egyptians to sabotage British communications and other war preparations involving Egypt, and that the British had had very little trouble in this regard. He thought that if the Egyptians had determined to be effectively disloyal, they could have done great damage to the British war effort in the Mediterranean area. Senator Lehman then said that the future of Israel would be dark indeed if Israel were forced to arm itself to the point where it was militarily equal to the strength of all its Arab neighbors. I said that I thought that if there was any danger at all, it would not come from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria or Jordan. Egypt was the center of any possible trouble. Mr. Rockwell stated that the Israeli Ambassador had that morning informed the Department that Israel realized that it could not arm itself to the point of being militarily equal to all its neighbors. The Israelis relied upon their superior technical ability and manpower, plus defensive arms which they hoped to obtain, to enable them to withstand an Arab attack. The Senator then said that he thought that public opinion would not stand for Great Britain’s furnishing to the Arab states arms given to England by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact. I assured the Senator that the British were not sending to the Arab states any arms which we were sending to England, or any arms for which we were furnishing England replacements. 2 The Senator added that none the less he thought there were a number of people in Congress who would oppose a Governmental program of sending arms to any nation which was arming the Arabs at the expense of Israel. I said that I had a feeling this might be so. Mr. Rockwell added that we thought that the strengthening of the Arab states should not be considered as being at the expense of Israel. The strengthening was being done for an entirely unrelated purpose, and the two elements should be kept separate. The Senator concluded the discussion by expressing the hope that the Department’s analysis of the situation was the correct one, and by requesting that we keep in constant touch with the British on this matter and influence them to stop sending heavy military equipment to the Arabs. Dean Acheson 1 Drafted by Mr. Rockwell. 2 At one point in a memorandum of March 8 to Secretary Acheson briefing him on his appointment with Senator Lehman, Mr. Hare stated: “You will recall that the National Military Establishment has, on an informal and top secret basis, informed us that it is fully advised of the amount of arms the British plan to ship to the Near East in connection with their plans for the mutual defense of the area, and that this amount is not excessive for the purpose envisaged. The NME has, accordingly, expressed the hope that the Department will interpose no objection to these shipments.” (474.418/3–850) The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva 357.AC/3–750: Telegram [Document 403] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva secret Washington , March 13, 1950—7 p. m. 329. Unpal 246. We assume Palun 338 supersedes suggestions 337 1 re Jordan initiative obtaining direct negots under PCC auspices. Re proposal outlined Palun 338, since Israeli Del rejected proposed PCC mediation, principal apprehension is that such rejection will be reiterated. In this case Arab element opposing settlement would have additional propaganda argument that Israel insists on settlement on own terms, with possible adverse effect Israeli-Jordanian negots. Israel no doubt aware of this and therefore might accept proposal with qualifications, especially prior agreement on subjects to be discussed. If proposal accepted PCC should exercise caution avoid such suggestions as might interfere these negots. Beginning might be made on subjects affecting Israel and Egypt, since Egyptians have already put forward specific proposals. You probably agree proposal involves calculated risk in view possible effect on Israeli-Jordanian negots and that proposal may lead PCC into another impasse. Dept prepared accept risk in light your estimate that PCC’s present position requires effort devise new procedural approach. Suggest you also consider as alternative that PCC attempt achieve same result without submitting a formal proposal which might incur danger rejection and of misuse by parties for propaganda purposes. PCC might informally consider with parties subjects that might usefully be discussed and, on basis these discussions, invite parties to discuss them either privately or with PCC assistance with or without PCC suggestions. Situations might then develop in which PCC could make informal suggestions. We realize difficulty getting Arabs to enter direct talks without some Israeli concession and this might depend upon nature of topics selected. While Israel objects to suggestions from PCC on substantive matters, this might be possible on purely informal basis as normal part of discussions. Object this proposal is to use methods as informal as possible to get parties together with appropriate PCC participation and to avoid such formal proposals as will require governmental consideration and decision. Selection subjects difficult, but Egyptian Gaza proposals offer starting point. With regard to support by three Govts members PCC, you of course aware parties cannot be forced accept suggestions and recall that previous efforts by Govts to persuade parties modify positions have not been successful. What are your comments on Eban’s view re French attitude toward role of PCC and possible Israeli-Jordanian agreement reported Palun 337? Acheson 1 These telegrams, identified also as Nos. 344 and 338 from Geneva and dated March 9 and 7, respectively, are printed on pp. 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 397 ] and 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] . The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–1450: Telegram [Document 404] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , March 14, 1950—4 p. m. 41. ReDeptel 24, March 9. Since arrival have exchanged courtesy visits with principal Cabinet members and subject Israel negotiations has in most cases come up during conversations. Have in every instance let it be known, that we hope for successful outcome while avoid statements which could be interpreted as exercise of pressure. Have also made similar statements to King (Legtel 40 March 7). I believe it would be serious error for me now to suggest to King or Cabinet members that negotiations should be resumed prior April 11 elections. I understand when Prime Minister withdrew his resignation and Cabinet agreed remain there was at least implicit understanding with HM that negotiations would not be resumed prior elections. I fear that if King in response to our suggestion or otherwise were now to endeavor resume talks another and perhaps much more serious Cabinet crisis might be provoked. Also believe King himself needs no urging and if he should find situation altered so as permit earlier renewal negotiations he would be first seize opportunity. In brief periods since my arrival I have been increasingly impressed by fact that King is far from being absolute monarch which he apparently is believed to be by responsible Israeli officials. I believe King despite his natural impulsiveness is astute enough politician realize strength of forces in Cabinet and public ranging from die-hard elements which oppose any settlement with Israel to more moderate groups with realistic approach eventual settlement on terms favorable to Jordan. To urge him now endeavor assert his will against these forces would be hazardous indeed. In addition to internal forces vociferous denunciation Jordan efforts, settle with Israel made by press and radio neighboring Arab states particularly Syria was powerful factor in situation. Renewal negotiations concurrently with Cairo AL meeting would surely invite renewed concerted attacks from other members which would only play into hands Jordan elements opposed to settlement. I am in close touch with Kirkbride and had previously discussed with him possibility of our concerted action at some stage proceedings when such course might prove fruitful. We agree that now is not the time but that our weight should be held reserve against possible crucial moment during negotiations when parallel démarche with King and possibly Cabinet might tip the scales. I nevertheless appreciate having Departments authorization encourage Jordan officials conclude settlement and shall not hesitate to do so if and when right time comes. Drew The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–1450: Telegram [Document 405] The Minister in Syria ( Keeley ) to the Secretary of State restricted Damascus , March 14, 1950—6 p. m. 116. Re Cirtel March 8, 3 a.m. Circumstances behind Reuters report as follows: According local editor Syrian Prime Minister in press conference March 6 voluntarily introduced subject of reported Jordan-Israel negotiations and expressed government’s deep concern this development. Stated conferring with other Arab Governments on matter. In emphasizing seriousness of démarche , Prime Minister pointed out that most effective Arab weapon against Israel was economic blockade which was currently undermining Israeli economy. He added Jordan-Israel agreement would constitute breach in blockade, permit flow of Israeli goods throughout Arab world and provide life blood for Israel. Prime Minister concluded that in the circumstances Syrian Government is seriously considering closing its frontiers with Jordan should such an agreement be implemented. Assume “Damascus for action” at end reftel 1 does not mean Department desires Legation to endeavor to dissuade Syria. To attempt to do so could have only adverse result as Syria unsympathetic to what it considers our greater concern for Israel’s economic plight than for threat to Syria’s sovereign existence inherent to Israel’s declared destiny. 2 Sent Department 116, repeated Baghdad 23, Beirut 11, Jerusalem 3, Jidda 16, Tel Aviv 9, Department pass Amman 9, Cairo 26, London 13, Paris 12, Ankara 5. Keeley 1 Note that the words “Damascus for action” do not appear on the Department of State copy of the circular telegram of March 8. 2 Legation Beirut, in response to the circular telegram of March 8, noted that “Unless adverse reaction is taken by Arab League believe there is at least possibility that Lebanon may start trade with Israel if Jordan agreement becomes effective. Among Christian statesmen here, there is desire to open Lebanese Israeli frontier if Syria continues maintain its restriction against goods from Lebanon, but I believe such action could not be taken now because of fear of Arab retaliation which is strong factor in all Lebanese policy.” (Telegram 106, 684A.85/3–2350) The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/3–1550: Telegram [Document 406] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , March 15, 1950—6 p. m. 373. Tcdel 128. 1. USDel has discussed question of provisional adoption Jerusalem statute, consultation by president with two parties and further consideration at TC June session (Tcdel 103 and Deltc 29) 1 with number of delegations which have expressed following views: [Here follow the views of the British, Belgian, Australian, and French Delegations.] From our discussions with other delegations we believe majority would be favorable to idea of submitting completed statute to Israel and Jordan end this session and resuming discussion in TC in June. 2. Basis above discussions USDel believes it would be difficult if not impossible to obtain general support for proposal of “provisional adoption”. We therefore believe wisest program would be to adopt formula for article 39 as suggested by Australia 2 (which we believe would receive majority support) and then upon conclusion third reading to “approve the statute” in accordance with terms GA resolution. Since under amended terms article 39 statute would not yet come into force it would seem that difference between “provisional adoption” and “approval” is only a matter of words but former would unnecessarily make us vulnerable to attack under wording of GA resolution. We should then expect Council as necessary next step before proceeding with question of implementation to instruct president to present statute thus approved to governments of Israel and Jordan for their comments. If this course adopted USDel could make statement prior to voting along lines suggested in Deltc 29. Do we correctly understand from this that our vote as thus explained should in third reading be affirmative on statute as whole? 3. We expect second reading to finish early next week after which there will probably be few days delay for Secretariat to prepare final text of statute. Unlikely therefore that third reading will commence before March 27. However if view possibility that question of adoption may be raised in consideration of Article 39 USDel would appreciate Department’s instructions soonest. 3 Sent Department, repeated London 97, Jerusalem unnumbered, Tel Aviv unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, USUN unnumbered. Department pass Tel Aviv, Amman, USUN. 1 Dated February 28 and March 3, respectively, pp. 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] and 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] . 2 Article 39 dealt with the question of entry into force of the Statute. The Australian view was that the “TC might adopt formula that Statute would come into force ‘date to be determined by TC’. This would avoid question of implementation, give opportunity for consultation with two parties and yet not be open to criticism as undermining GA resolution.” (Telegram 373) 3 The Department of State, in reply on March 20, approved the procedure suggested in paragraph 2. It also answered in the affirmative the question in the last sentence of that paragraph, stating that “We consider statement outlined Deltc 29 can be adopted situation then existing in light Art 39 as approved 2d reading.” (Telegram 361, identified also as Deltc 35, 350/3–1550) The President to the Secretary of State 357.AC/3–2450 [Document 407] The President to the Secretary of State Washington , March 16, 1950. My Dear Mr. Secretary : Under the provisions of the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1949 pertaining to a special contribution by the United States to the United Nations for the relief of Palestine refugees, I have today made the finding that other nations party to the agreement on United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees have met their obligations under said agreement to the extent that an additional contribution to the United Nations in the amount of $622,070 is justified. I have allocated the sum of $622,070 to the Department of State from funds appropriated under the head “Relief of Palestine Refugees” in the Second Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1949 (P. L. 119, approved June 23, 1949), which funds have been established under Appropriation Symbol No. 119/00043 with the Treasury of the United States. These funds are to be used by the Department of State for an additional special contribution to the United Nations for the purposes set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of November 19, 1948, providing for the relief of Palestine refugees. 1 Sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 1 The Department of State transmitted the substance of the President’s message to the United States Representative at the United Nations on March 24 and directed him to inform Secretary-General Lie that a check for $622,070 would be delivered shortly (instruction 83, 357.AC/3–2450). The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 684A.85/3–11450: Telegram [Document 408] The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 1 confidential Washington , March 17, 1950—7 p. m. 95. Dept deplores attitude revealed by PriMin in press conference described ur 116, Mar 14. Nonaggression agreement between Jordan and Israel and normalization relations between the two countries wld be important step toward re-estab NE stability, so badly needed by all states in area, particularly Syria. Dept’s interest in estab normal relations between Israel and Jordan, and between Israel and other Arab states, motivated by desire see present instability NE, with its resultant adverse effects upon strength and unity of area, disappear. Syrian notion that this attitude based on US concern over Israel’s econ situation of course utterly unfounded, and you shld make every effort disabuse Syrians of this idea. Dept disturbed by Syrian Govt’s interference in Jordan-Israeli conversations by such means as PriMin’s statement re closing Syrian frontier with Jordan if Jordan-Israel agreement reached. Dept realizes task most difficult and Leg’s position delicate, but desires Leg endeavor discreetly persuade Syrian Govt cease interference and take no retaliatory action if agreement actually reached. It is to Syria’s advantage not to hinder gradual progress being made toward conditions of peace and stability in NE. This tel being rptd Baghdad, Jidda and Cairo 2 with instrs that Embs take similar action vis-à-vis respective Govts shld latter show signs deciding intervene in Jordan-Israeli talks or take retaliatory action against Jordan. 3 Webb 1 This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv, London as No. 1221, Amman, and Jerusalem. 2 On March 17. 3 Embassy London, on March 23, reported information from the British Foreign Office that it would not instruct the British Minister at Damascus to approach the Syrian Government along the lines of telegram 1221 (telegram 1589, 684A.85/3–2350). Regarding telegram 1221, see footnote 1 above. The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/3–1750: Telegram [Document 409] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , March 17, 1950—7 p. m. 390. Palun 340. We have given thought to considerations raised by Department in Unpal 246 1 and remain of opinion present situation requires action by PCC along lines proposed Palun 338. 2 Alternative Department suggests in paragraph 5 Unpal 246 is almost exactly procedure Commission has followed during past months and in particular during discussions of PCC proposal for Gaza committee. Results have been entirely negative and we do not believe that following such procedure with respect to larger issues will be any more likely produce results. We therefore feel calculate risk to which Department refers should be taken. If proposal accepted we would of course take every precaution avoid prejudicing outcome any other talks with Jordan or others which Israel might be engaged in (paragraph 3 Unpal 246). We are aware also in speaking of full support three PCC governments that none of parties can be forced accept proposal (penultimate paragraph Unpal 246). Boisanger states French Foreign Office, in interest stability ME, will go as far as US in supporting [garble] PCC proposal. We feel it most important that Department indicate clearly its support for PCC proposal in Washington and in US missions Israel and Arab countries, as well as in Paris and Ankara, at same time proposal is submitted to parties here. Yalcin and Boisanger feel strongly that at time of submitting proposal PCC should make substance known to world through press release. They believe publicity for such reasonable PCC proposal, with emphasis on fact procedure is in response to repeated requests of parties, will strengthen position of those in each government who would favor acceptance. They anticipate favorable editorial comment on PCC suggestion in world press which will encourage reasonable elements in governments both sides. They are convinced that unless such a formal approach with accompanying press release is made, there is great danger of a hasty, ill-considered, unfavorable reply. USDel shares this view but will delay consideration of press release until Department’s opinion received. Boisanger has planned for some time make short trip ME to review situation with government leaders. He feels present is opportune time and that new procedure when proposed by PCC can profitably be discussed during visit. I had hoped make similar visit without, however, turning these trips into Commission tour. Discussion of this question in PCC leaves us with three alternatives: (1) PCC tour of capitals, (2) short trip by Boisanger as PCC chairman accompanied by principal secretary, (3) short trip by USRep as chairman accompanied by principal secretary. USDel believes after thorough consideration that PCC tour would accomplish no tangible results and might even delay consideration of proposed procedure. On other hand chairman may be able have useful discussions. His visit would establish precedent which succeeding chairmen could follow at later time if desirable. On balance we feel therefore it is preferable for either Boisanger or USRep to undertake short trip now as chairman and that it would be helpful if Department, in indicating US support for PCC proposals, could inform governments concerned that it is understood chairman will discuss procedure with them on Commission’s behalf. Boisanger feels that if he is to go as chairman French Foreign Office will be more receptive if Department indicated to Quai d’Orsay suggestion for such procedure originated with USDel. Boisanger willing to go but he and Yalcin favor passing chairmanship to USRep. With reference Department’s question (Unpal 246) re Eban’s view of French position, I have observed nothing either in Boisanger’s attitude or attitude Foreign Office officials in Paris to substantiate Eban’s or Rafael’s claim. Boisanger has stated he fully believes in desirability Israel-Jordan agreement. He is, of course, sceptical, as we are, of any substantial agreement between Jordan and Israel being accomplished in near future outside framework of larger peace offensive and sees danger in PCC remaining inactive while awaiting outcome. Department is best able judge however whether Eban’s comments are accurate reflection French-British competition ME. [ Palmer ] 1 Identified also as telegram 329, March 13, to Geneva, p. 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] . 2 Identified also as telegram 344, March 9, from Geneva, p. 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 397 ] . The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 774.56/3–1850: Telegram [Document 410] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State top secret Cairo , March 18, 1950—noon. 260. Reference to my air despatch 471, March 16, 1 I received yesterday a personal note from Minister Foreign Affairs, reading as follows: “I undertake to point out to you some reflections, dictated by our common concern for maintaining peace and for safeguarding the welfare of the ME. “It would perhaps be superfluous to draw your attention to the disquiet which reigns in Egypt as a result of the growth of the political and territorial ambitions of Israel, encouraged by the sympathies of some and the indulgences of others. In this connection, I regret that I am obliged to emphasize that the declarations of certain American personalities and the tendencies manifested many times within the American Congress itself are of such a nature as to intensify the feeling of Arab opinion. In fact, such declarations and tendencies run the risk of encouraging the Zionists to attempt to add a new round to the shocking series of blows and of violations of the rights of people which they have committed with impunity, in order to put before the world a fait accompli , the bitter memory of which is still fresh in Arab minds. A supply of arms, of whatever kind it may be, coming as support to the said declarations and tendencies, will not fail to reenforce the position of the Zionists, thus exposing peace in the ME to a danger which we all are interested in avoiding. “On the other hand, given that the American Government, while maintaining its policy in regard to the export of arms to the ME, is effectively coming to the aid of Israel by supplying it with quantities of non-offensive military equipment, would it not be just that the said government should benefit Egypt with this type of aid in order to permit it to exercise its legitimate right to take necessary measures to assure its own defence. In this regard, I believe that you will agree with me that it would only be just and natural that this aid should be offered, taking into account the size of Egyptian territory, the extent of its frontiers, and the importance of the population of Egypt. “In drawing the above to your attention, I should be very grateful to you if you would bring it to the attention of your government and would communicate to me its response, which I hope will be favorable. “Yours sincerely, M. Salaheddin.” 2 Caffery 1 Not printed; it transmitted a message from Prime Minister Nahas thanking the Ambassador for his “great assistance” regarding the release to Egyptian authorities of spare parts for Sherman tanks and requesting his good offices in securing the release of 160,000 rounds of 75 mm. ammunition (774.56/3–1650). 2 The “Summary of Daily Meeting with the Secretary” of March 21 states the following: “The Secretary referred to telegram No. 260 from Caffery which said the Egyptians were now accusing us of furnishing arms to the Israelis. The Secretary said this is the reverse of what we have been charged with in the past since the Israelis have been accusing us of allowing the Arabs to get arms. He wondered if we could not make some capital of this but did not receive a very enthusiastic response. Mr. Rusk said he was hesitant to fan glowing embers. The Secretary concluded by saying that at least NEA should get down in cold type who is getting what in the way of arms. Mr. Rusk said he would see that this was done.” (Secretary’s memoranda, Lot 53 D 444) The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/3–2250: Telegram [Document 411] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , March 22, 1950—8 p. m. 411. Tcdel 139. 1. This morning during discussion Article 39 Garreau put forward suggestion that statute should come into force on date to be determined subsequently by resolution of TC. Belgium formally proposed this which was supported by Australia, US, 1 France and Dominican Republic. Iraq, objecting, insisted that in order to comply with terms of GA Resolution December 9, statute should come into force immediately upon its adoption. As compromise, Philippine Delegation suggested date should be decided subsequently by TC but it should not be later than December 1, 1950. 2 UK, without taking position, pointed out that date on which statute should come into force and steps to be taken in connection with implementation statute were two different matters and should not be confused. New Zealand requested postponement of vote until next week to seek instructions in view of fact interpretation of UK, to which New Zealand and Australia agreed, was not generally accepted by Council. Dominican Republic believed that Article 39 should be moved to next to last article of statute and suggested further consideration of Article 39 should be postponed until third reading. 2. Following morning’s meeting, USDel feeling that TC failure to decide on Article 29 [ 39 ] during second reading would seriously complicate its vote in third reading, asked New Zealand Delegation whether it would be possible for it to obtain earlier instructions. New Zealand Delegation agreed request urgent instructions and it is hoped that if such instructions are received within next day or two, Article 39 can be discussed again and be dealt with prior to third reading and preferably this week. 3. USDel feels that position it should take with respect to article by article vote and vote on statute as whole should depend somewhat on outcome of vote on Article 39. If Article 39 is redrafted along lines Belgian proposal, USDel will proceed in accordance with Deltc 35, March 20. USDel is forwarding in separate telegram 3 for Department’s consideration draft of proposed statement to be made in this event. However, if Iraqi proposal adopted, Department may feel it desirable for USDel to vote against statute as whole. Please also instruct what course to follow if Philippine proposal is adopted. 4. USDel will communicate with Department as soon as further developments occur. At present impossible to predict Council’s action on Article 39. 4 Sent Department 411, repeated London 105, Jerusalem unnumbered, Tel Aviv unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, USUN unnumbered. Department pass Tel Aviv, Amman, USUN. 1 The views expressed by Ambassador Sayre are summarized in TC (VI), p. 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 234 ] . 2 The Iraqi proposal is printed in ibid.; [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 234 ] the Trusteeship Council released the texts of the Belgian and Philippine proposals in T/L.64 and T/L.65, respectively. 3 No. 413, identified also as Tcdel 140, March 22, not printed. 4 The U.S. Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, on March 22, stated that “After considerable discussion Trusteeship Council March 22 deferred until third reading of Jerusalem Statute the question of date on which Statute would come into force. Majority appeared to favor revision of Article 39 to effect that TC would determine date in a subsequent resolution.” (Telegram 412, identified also as Tcdel 138, from Geneva, 350/3–2250) For a summary of the Council’s discussion on the morning of March 22, see TC (IV, 6), pp. 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] ff. The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva 357.AC/3–2450: Telegram [Document 412] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, at Geneva secret Washington , March 24, 1950—6 p. m. 385. Unpal 247. In response Palun 338 and 340 1 and as supplement Unpal 246 2 Dept has further comments on proposals and tactics now under consideration by PCC. 1. We believe approach to Arabs and Israel of Secretariat draft (Palun 338) represents move which could possibly result in resumption of conciliation efforts by PCC. 2. As indicated Unpal 246, however, Dept has real question whether it is wise for PCC submit proposal to both sides in such form and in so formal a manner as require governmental response from all parties of acceptance or rejection. It wld seem from here that merit of proposal lies in its informality and in fact that it can be construed by both sides in way that each wld like construe it. That is to say, Arab states cld interpret new method as essentially meeting their request that PCC submit proposals to parties and Israel can construe it as meeting essentially its desire that direct negots be started. Thus, it is our view that Comms suggestion by its nature must not be too categorical and if to be acquiesced in by both sides must contain to some degree that which each side wants. If suggestion couched in such formal language or if presented parties in too formal a way requiring type of searching analysis necessary for formal acceptance or rejection, we believe merit of idea will be lost to large degree. Further, if proposal submitted formally and rejected PCC wld be in worse position than if this approach had not been tried. 3. Same reasoning applies to Boisanger and Yalcin idea that PCC’s proposal to be effective must be published in press. If published and analyzed in press, emphasis may be placed on that part of proposal which parties do not like and parties may ignore aspects of proposal which meet their desires. Dept questions whether public reaction to press account wld have effect of increasing chances of acceptance of PCC suggestion either by Arab states or by Israel. Further, in Dept’s view optimum role of PCC is that of available catalyst and good officer, remaining in unobtrusive background rather than in center of stage. 4. Dept also questions philosophy apparently underlying Boisanger and Yalcin approach that Secretariat paper represents only course open to PCC (Palun 338). Dept’s view of potential of PCC is that it shld continue seek different ways in which it can proceed and that certainly not at this stage is there only one last clear chance for PCC bring parties together. Dept has always recognized that it is unlikely that work of PCC will result in successful settlement this year. At same time we think it eminently worthwhile that PCC remain in being in area for purpose probing attitudes parties in consistent effort find some method which will make progress toward settlement. Thus, Dept hopes you can impress upon other members PCC its possibilities are by no means exhausted and will not be even though current proposal gets nowhere. There is always possibility activities UNPRA will be helpful in adjusting parties attitude to one of moderation and conciliation. Necessarily effects of UNPRA’s work will be felt only slowly and by degrees. 5. As far as proposed trip ME concerned review situation with govt leaders in Arab capitals and Israel, Dept believes this wld be useful idea. Conversations in capitals cld be used as opportunity further discussion proposal which we assume wld be given reps of parties in Geneva before departure on trip. Conversations likely be more fruitful if proposal is put forward as merely another suggestion find avenue for progress rather than as decisive or revolutionary step in Commission’s work. Indeed, in presenting proposal to reps in Geneva, Commission can make clear that discussion of it cld take place between PCC and govt leaders in capitals. This wld insure flexibility and emphasize that it was ambulatory instrument subject to modification to meet desires of parties rather than rigid document requiring yes or no answer. It cld be impressed upon them that all PCC is seeking is their acquiescence in method of procedure which in PCC’s view might provide an opportunity for progress. PCC is not seeking a commitment from them which cld in any way prejudice their substantive positions nor is it necessary for them give formal acceptance to proposed procedure. 6. Dept believes it wld be undesirable for US rep to make trip alone as Chairman PCC. Also, Dept does not think Boisanger alone wld be effective. Accordingly, best solution wld appear have PCC as such make trip rather than send single individual as its rep. If Yalcin does not wish go, Dept sees no objection to Boisanger and US rep making visits together. Dept wld hope however if PCC goes as such it wld make visits as informal as possible with minimum staff, etc. Acheson 1 Identified also as telegrams 344, March 9, and 390, March 17, from Geneva, pp. 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 397 ] and 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] . 2 Identified also as telegram 329, March 13, to Geneva, p. 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] . The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 350/3–2450: Telegram [Document 413] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva secret niact Washington , March 24, 1950—7 p. m. 386. Deltc 37. 1. Fol Dept comments on proposed statement by US Tcdel prior to vote on Jerusalem Statute (Tcdel 140 1 ): [Here follow Department of State changes in the wording of paragraphs 1 and 2 and its acceptance of paragraph 3.] Para 4–7—Delete and substitute as fol: “In voting upon statute as whole and upon separate Arts, my Del wld like make its position clear. Affirmative vote my Del on statute as a whole is on assumption that TC will have further opportunity consider attitudes of Israel and Jordan toward statute. It is our belief, therefore, that following statute’s approval, it shld be presented to Israel and Jordan and their cooperation requested under provisions of para II of GA Res of Dec 9. It is our earnest hope that this cooperation will be freely given. As regards affirmative vote my Del on those Articles which involve more complete internationalization than we believe desirable or practicable, this shld be considered as resulting solely from loyal participation my Del in technical task of TC in completing preparation of statute.” 2. Foregoing statement for use if Belg proposal Art 39 adopted (Tcdel 139 2 ). Del shld continue support Belg proposal. Dept notes this proposal supported by five states and hopes that explanations of Del to UK and NZ concerning difficulties which wld follow immed entry into force of statute will persuade them either support Belg proposal or abstain. In either event Belg proposal wld carry. 3. Re Phil proposal Art 39, Dept not clear whether Statute wld or wld not come into force on Dec 1, 1950 without further TC action. If former, Del should oppose and if proposal carried Del shld vote against Statute as a whole for reasons set forth in para 4. If Phil proposal merely means that TC shld decide before Dec 1, 1950 when to put Statute in force, Del should abstain on grounds inadvisable to take such decision at this stage in advance of parties reactions. In event such proposal carries, Del shld vote for Statute as instructed Deltc 29 3 and 35 4 and make statement set out in para one above. 4. If Iraq proposal Art 39 (statute to come into force immediately upon TC vote) is accepted, Del should vote against statute as a whole but affirmatively on Arts other than 39 as previously instructed. Del shld make statement indicating cooperation US in preparation statute pursuant to GA Res, but belief Del that essential obtain views Israel and Jordan on statute before TC decides put statute into force. 5. Del authorized as appropriate inform other Dels of intentions re voting on statute. Acheson 1 Not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] . The proposed statement was to be made by the U.S. Delegation at the beginning of the third reading of the draft statute for Jerusalem (350/3–2250). 2 Identified also as telegram 411, March 22, from Geneva, p. 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] . 3 Telegram 286, March 3, p. 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] . 4 Telegram 361, March 20, not printed. Editorial Note [Document 414] Editorial Note The Twelfth Ordinary Session of the Arab League Council opened on March 25 at Cairo. In his welcoming speech, Prime Minister Nahas, Chief of the Egyptian Delegation, suggested that the Council invite a Palestinian Arab observer, not as a representative of the “Gaza Government” but as a “representive of Palestine”. After the speech, Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, the guiding force of that “Government”, and Ahmad Milmi, its Chief, convinced the Egyptian Prime Minister that a representative of the “Palestine Arab Government” should be invited. Despite the opposition of Azzam Pasha and Salaheddin Bey, the Council extended invitations to Hilma Pasha and two other ministers in the “Gaza Government”. This decision was preceded by a protest by the Jordanian Minister in Egypt to the Egyptian Foreign Minister concerning the unfriendly attitude of the Egyptian press to Jordan, the proposed invitation to a Palestinian Arab to attend the League’s deliberations, and Egyptian opposition to Jordanian annexation of Arab Palestine. King Abdullah was said to have warned that he would not send a delegation to the League meeting until these attitudes changed (telegram 301, March 28, and despatch 662, April 5, from Cairo, 786.00/3–2850, /4–550). The King actually sent an instruction to his Minister to close the Jordanian Legation at Cairo; but after further reflection, the Jordanian Government issued a communiqué, which, it was hoped, would result in a backdown by the Arab League or force it to expel Jordan (telegram 59, March 29, from Amman, 786.00/3–2950). The communiqué, issued on March 28, stated in part: “To accept what has been prearranged in Cairo would lead to anxiety and turmoil and would cause indignation and fear among our brothers whose destiny is now linked with the destiny of this kingdom.… To engage in arguments about matters which have already been decided upon would be fruitless.… The Jordan Hashemite Government considers that it is sufficient to have the Jordan Minister to Cairo represent it at the Arab League Council meetings. This is on condition that he avoid those matters which this government cannot approve.” (Telegram 58, March 28, from Amman, 786.00/3–2850) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/3–2550: Telegram [Document 415] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State secret Dhahran , March 25, 1950—3 p. m. 54. From Childs. Shortly before receipt paraphrase Deptel 106, March 17 1 sent by Hill 2 in Jidda to me Riyadh while with McGhee, 3 McGhee had an extended talk on March 22 with Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister, in which Assistant Secretary touched upon Israeli relations Arab states. In course broad general review efforts which might be made to achieve peace and stability in ME, McGhee made plea for use moderating influences in Arab League to remove points of difference among Arab states and to assure cooperation states concerned, particularly Syria with which SA had close ties, with Clapp program. Passing from that thought McGhee emphasized policy USG was one of complete objectivity and impartiality as between Israel and Arab states. Yusuf said he warmly welcomed this. SA had never sought pro-Arab policy from USG, but all it asked was that USG should weigh the scales between Israel and Arabs in spirit of complete impartiality tempered by a sense of justice and right. McGhee said he wished to assure Shaikh Yusuf this was purpose of USG and that as evidence of USG’s complete impartiality it refrained from any form of pressure on Arab states for settlement Arab differences with Israel. There had been recent reports of use of such pressure on Jordan directed toward conclusion treaty arrangements between Jordan and Israel, but he could assure Yusuf there had been no such pressure. Yusuf said he was very happy to hear this. McGhee then said bearing in mind that his exploration of subject was not to be construed in any way as attempt influence SA, he wondered whether something could not be done by Arab states themselves to normalize their relations with Israel and achieve some kind of working relationship, pointing out that present Arab policies likely to produce aggressive Israeli reaction most feared by Arab states. Yusuf stated very politely, but emphatically, that this was not possible and said that Arab states would never agree to any working relations with Israel. He added that Arabs considered Israel a great menace without any limits to territorial ambitions. Arabs believed Israel had every intention of expanding beyond Israel to include Syria, Jordan, et cetera. Arabs had no aggressive designs against Israel, but intended to treat that state as if a wall surrounded it. If Israel wished to extend beyond that wall, it could put its people on vessels and send them overseas to London and Paris, but Arabs wished to have none of them. SA had no basis for trade with Israel and could easily isolate itself from Israel. McGhee pointed out that Jordan’s economy, unlike SA, was dependent on commercial exchanges with Palestine and Israel and asked what would happen if Jordan broke down wall. Yusuf’s answer was “We shall then include Jordan within the wall separating us from Israel”. In course of conversation Yusuf said, “We shall never admit a Jew in SA and we shall never admit any one traveling with an Israeli visa.” When concluding his observations, Yusuf said, “We believe greatest menace offered by Russia in Middle East is through state of Israel and I expect to recall these words to you one day.” Comment: It is believed Department will agree, in light of foregoing, no possible useful purpose would be served by taking action suggested Department’s reftel. To do so would only give mistaken impression such [garble] gained whenever we take up matter with SA [garble] advantage Israel that we are at all times ready to take cudgels up on behalf that state with Arab states with resultant continued exacerbation Saudi feelings and consequent giving impression extreme solicitude anything affecting Israeli relations with not always corresponding regard Arab interests. Sent Department 54; repeated Baghdad 5, Tel Aviv unnumbered, Damascus unnumbered; pouched Amman, Jidda. Department pass London 2, Cairo 4, Jerusalem unnumbered. [ Childs ] 1 Not printed; it repeated the text of telegram 95, March 17, to Damascus, p. 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] . 2 Heyward G. Hill, Counselor of Embassy in Saudi Arabia. 3 Assistant Secretary McGhee visited various African countries and Saudi Arabia in February and March 1950; see especially the editorial note, p. 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 784A.56/3–2750: Telegram [Document 416] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel top secret Washington , March 27, 1950—8 p. m. 147. Consideration Israeli requests military equipment US origin makes desirable obtaining more accurate info size and composition Israel military establishment. Discussion Israeli Emb Wash reveal Israeli Govt unwilling furnish specific info on official basis but will do so informal and personal level. Dept has requested Defense instruct US Service Attachés Tel Aviv submit estimates present Israeli strength. Israeli Emb Wash so informed and plans arrange Col. Efraim Ben-Arzi, until recently military attaché Wash., to consult on his own initiative Service Attachés Tel Aviv and furnish whatever info desired. Stress has been placed by Israeli Emb on need for informal and discreet transmittal such info by Israeli Govt sources. Pending Israeli export requests for arms from commercial sources include: 10 AT–6 aircraft, 15 Sherman tanks, 15 75mm. tank guns, 250 cal. .50 machine guns, 18 Jet fighter aircraft, 9 37mm. guns and quantity military radar equip. Israeli Emb on Feb 13 submitted formally list of military equip 1 “required by Israel for defensive purposes” which included most items listed above and in addition following items obviously obtainable only from US Govt stocks or procurement: 66 anti-aircraft guns, 68 anti-tank guns, 36 105mm. howitzers, 18 155mm. howitzers, 45 Sherman tanks with guns, 18 M24 tanks, 90 armored cars and 100 recoilless rifles as well as a number of less significant ground force items. Dept cannot foretell effect of info which may be furnished by Israelis on action on export requests and has so advised Israeli Emb. Defense has already given adverse recommendation on number these Items on basis info now available. If Col. Ben-Arzi approach materializes, Israelis may be assured info will be kept in strictest secrecy for US Govt only. Acheson 1 Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] . Editorial Note [Document 417] Editorial Note On March 28, the staff of the National Security Council prepared a report whose purpose it was “To define the policy the United States should follow with respect to shipment by the United Kingdom of arms to certain Near Eastern states within the framework of United Kingdom plans for joint defense of the Near East by the United Kingdom and the states concerned.” The report, identified as NSC 65, is printed on page 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 59 ] . For additional documentation on the armaments situation in the Near East, see pages 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State USUN Files 1 [Document 418] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 2 confidential [ Washington ,] March 28, 1950. Subject: Palestine Situation. Participants: The Secretary Dr. Nahum Goldmann, American Section, The Jewish Agency for Palestine ANE—Mr. Rockwell Discussion: I received Dr. Goldmann at his request. Dr. Goldmann began the conversation by saying that he thought the situation in the various American Jewish organizations was now well in hand. Dr. Silver 3 was out of the picture and likely to continue so. Dr. Goldmann thought he could, therefore, devote more time to relations between the American Jewish community and the State Department. He said that in the past he had been successful in stopping pressure on the Department by various Jewish organizations concerned over developments affecting the Palestine situation. He believed that he could be useful in conveying to the Department the feelings of the American Jewish community, and in transmitting to American Jews the thinking of Departmental officials. Dr. Goldmann said that he thought that it was a waste of time for delegations to call upon the Department, and that perhaps individuals could be much more useful. He inquired whether I thought it might be helpful if he were to keep in regular touch with the Department’s Near Eastern experts. I said that I knew Dr. Goldmann had always been discreet in the past and that I would be delighted to have him keep in touch with the Near Eastern Division. Dr. Goldmann then took up the question of the Near Eastern armaments situation. He said that he had had a long talk recently with British officials, particularly with Hector McNeil. 4 He understood the British treaty obligations to Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, and that also it was not entirely logical to insist that the US Government request the British Government to cease arms shipments to the Arabs. On the other hand, there was in both Israel and the Arab states a genuine fear of aggression. Dr. Goldmann did not think Egypt would attack Israel in the near future, but who knew what might happen later? The Israelis were naturally nervous and felt it their duty to rearm. The feeling of insecurity in Israel was now greater than it was six months ago. Under the circumstances, Dr. Goldmann wondered whether there was any way for the Great Powers to allay these fears by making some kind of a declaration concerning the territorial integrity of the Near Eastern states. He understood that the US could not guarantee frontiers, but perhaps there was some other approach which might be effective. I said that I was surprised to hear that the sense of insecurity was growing in Israel, and asked Mr. Rockwell if reports we had received gave the impression of impending trouble. Mr. Rockwell stated that, on the contrary, we thought that the trend was away from war toward peace. He mentioned the Israel-Jordan talks, and the Israeli-Egyptian agreement over the “no man’s land” areas near Gaza. 5 He emphasized the relatively little time which had passed since the end of the war, and said that a number of arrangements had been reached between the Arabs and Israelis which no one would have thought possible a year ago. Mr. Rockwell then mentioned the statement which the United States Government had already made to the effect that should it receive reliable information that any party to the Palestine dispute were preparing to renew hostilities, it would take appropriate action both within the United Nations and outside to attempt to prevent such an occurrence. He added that of course the UN was the logical guarantor of the territorial integrity of nations. Dr. Goldmann said that he had been thinking of what the United States Government had already said, and wondered whether it might not be possible for the Department to go a little further in secret conversations with representatives of the Arab states and Israel. Specifically, could the United States not say exactly what concrete steps it would take if any party resorted to aggression? I said that I would be happy to consider Dr. Goldmann’s suggestion. Dr. Goldmann then took up the question of the status of the Jerusalem question in the Trusteeship Council. He understood that the Council had adopted the Belgian suggestion that the Jerusalem statute was to come in force at a date to be determined by the Council. He mentioned that the British delegate had recently made an energetic declaration reiterating the UK belief that the statute was utterly unworkable. Dr. Goldmann thought that it would be very helpful if the US delegation would make a similar statement in order to avoid giving the impression that the US was determined to see the statute put into effect. I asked Mr. Rockwell what the situation concerning this was, and he replied that we had made no recent declaration of our position in the Trusteeship Council but that we planned to explain our vote when the statute came up for final approval. Dr. Goldmann was interested to learn this. Dean Acheson 1 Files of the United States Mission to the United Nations. 2 Drafted by Mr. Rockwell. 3 Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, prominent American Zionist leader. 4 British Minister of State. 5 This agreement was in the form of a modus vivendi to the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement and was signed at El-Auja on February 22, 1950, by Lt.-Col. Mahmoud Riad Mohamed and Lt.-Col. Kalman Keet on behalf of the Egyptian and Israeli Governments and by Georges Bossavy, Chairman of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Commission. The Security Council released the text of the agreement, including appropriate maps, as S/1471 on March 17. The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/3–2850: Telegram [Document 419] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret priority Geneva , March 28, 1950—noon. 436. Tcdel 148. For Hickerson 1 from Sayre. Last night I had private conversation with Bunche 2 on Jerusalem question. When I intimated to Bunche that USDel, with a carefully worded explanatory statement, expected to vote affirmatively on approval of statute as whole, Bunche expressed misgiving and strong regret. He felt that such affirmative vote, in spite of explanatory statement, would be widely misinterpreted throughout ME and elsewhere as US revising its position against complete internationalization. Regardless of statement which USDel might make, only fact of affirmative vote would be publicized. He felt this particularly true as against background of abstention by UK, Dominican Republic, probably New Zealand, and perhaps others. Bunche considers that the one constructive hope is that prior to June meeting of TC some agreement can be reached between Israel and Jordan which will protect Christian and international interests in Jerusalem. He said he was convinced from talks with Israeli representatives here that Israel is sincerely anxious to reach agreement and would make concessions but that the real hurdle lies in getting Abdullah to join in a satisfactory agreement. Abdullah’s agreement is of course vital since most of holy places are situated in old city. Bunche said that Jordanians are so ignorant of whole situation that he feared affirmative vote by US will cause Abdullah to understand US as switching its position and now being for unqualified internationalization. In his opinion, this will considerably increase the difficulty of getting Abdullah to reach agreement with Israel re holy places. 3 TC plans to begin third reading and voting Wednesday afternoon. [ Sayre ] 1 John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs. 2 Ralph J. Bunche, United Nations Acting Mediator in Palestine, 1948–49. 3 The Department of State replied on March 28, stating that “In view Tcdel 148 Dept believes you should abstain on statute as whole rather than vote affirmatively. You should make essentially same statement as for affirmative vote pointing out therein that you approve transmission of statute to parties for their consideration prior to further TC action.” (Telegram 399, identified also as Deltc 40, 350/3–2850) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 684A.85/3–2850: Telegram [Document 420] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1 secret niact Washington , March 28, 1950—6 p. m. 256. Dept disturbed by press reports Arab League planning expel Jordan and by Egypt-Saudi recommendation to this effect described Baghdad tel 208 Mar 28 2 rptd you as 38. Ref instrs contained Deptel 228 Mar 17 3 re Arab interference in Jordan-Israeli relationship, Dept desires Emb in its discretion urge Egyptian Govt adopt prudent and conciliatory approach to Jordan question in Arab League mtg. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to other Arab capitals. 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed; it transmitted to Cairo the text of telegram 95, March 17, to Damascus, with instruction to take the action outlined in the last paragraph of No. 95, if circumstances warranted (684A.85/3–1450). Ambassador Caffery, in reply on March 25, stated he had “lectured” the Egyptian Foreign Minister the previous day, “counseling moderation in general and in re Jordan in particular at the Arab League Council meetings which begin today. He said that my advice was sound and he would follow it.” (Telegram 286 from Cairo, 786.00/3–2550) The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Department of State 684A.85/3–2850 [Document 421] The Minister in Syria ( Keeley ) to the Department of State secret No. 171 Damascus , March 28, 1950. Subject: Syria’s Attitude Toward Jordan–Israel Peace Move Prime and Foreign Minister Khalid Bey al-Azm, who leaves early tomorrow morning as head of the Syrian Delegation to the Arab League meeting at Cairo, received me at nine o’clock this evening and for the better part of an hour explained, among other things, his attitude toward Jordan’s peace move with Israel in response to my expression of the Department’s concern in the sense of Deptel 95, March 17. I had previously asked to see him, but he had been too occupied with urgent matters to be disposed of before his departure for Cairo to see me earlier. My call, ostensibly to bid him Godspeed on his journey, offered an opportunity to bring up the subject of his alleged threat (Renter’s report Tel Aviv Embtel 164 March 7 to Department) to retaliate if Jordan signed a peace accord with Israel. Khalid Bey emphasized that his statement to which I referred had been conditional upon future circumstances that might make it necessary to take steps to protect Syria’s economy. He denied that to declare that Syria would have to consider the possibility of closing its frontier with Jordan if the latter signed an accord with Israel that would have the effect of flooding Syria with Israeli goods, or other competitive products, constituted intervention in Jordan’s or Israel’s affairs. It was merely a declaration of assurance to the Syrians that their economic interests would be protected no matter what Jordan and Israel might do. He pointed out that recently to protect Syria’s economy, the Syrian Government had closed its frontier with Lebanon, a sister state with which it is on cordial terms. Surely this could not be construed as interference in Lebanese affairs. Lebanon did not so consider it, for only today he had been to Beirut and had conferred and amicably agreed with the Lebanese Government on a common front in the forthcoming Arab League meeting. If Syria was free, as no one would seriously dispute, unilaterally to regulate its commerce with a friendly sister Arab state such as Lebanon, how much more so was it free to regulate its commerce with Jordan if the latter endangered Syrian economy by an agreement with Israel whose militant aggressive expansionism was well known. If that could be construed as intervention, how was my communication any less so? Was it permissible for a big state to tell a little state how it should protect its own interests but not within the little state’s right to decide for itself how its own interests could best be protected? I replied that one seemed to me to be in the nature of a threat against another state (Jordan) if it did what it evidently considered to be in its own interest, whereas my démarche was in the nature of friendly persuasion to endeavor to make him see how his statement, evidently designed for home consumption, had had a disquieting effect abroad which might tend to impede what seemed like a healthy trend toward the resumption of more normal relations in the area as a whole. He said that he did not question my own friendly motives, but the United States, while pretending to be a friend of the Arabs, seemed always to favor Israel. We had intervened, he said, to help Israel establish itself against the will of the indigenous population; we had intervened to prevent the Arabs from defending themselves against Zionist aggression; and now we were intervening to try to persuade those who are merely trying to protect their own interests that they should not do so. I replied that in our view it was in the interest of all states in the area to restore normal relations. He countered that that was for each state to decide for itself; if Syria should come to believe that its interests so dictated it would act accordingly. He was not convinced that a so-called peace agreement between Jordan and Israel would serve the cause of peace in the Near East. As he now saw it, the U.S. appeared not only content with Israel’s territorial conquests but wants as well to see Israel expand its economic position to encompass all the Arab lands. The agreement which we favor with Jordan was in that direction; instead of a “Greater Syria,” we would see a “Greater Israel.” I said “Why not a “Greater Jordan?” He shook his head and said: “Abdullah represents only himself, and they (the Israeli) are too much for Him!” With respect to our vaunted desire for peace, said Khalid Bey, one might ask why we do not make peace (end the cold war) with Soviet Russia, which like Israel says it seeks peace. As far as Syria is concerned the situation is similar with Israel; there is an armistice which Syria has no intention of violating; Syria will not attack Israel, but will defend itself if attacked. If Israel respects the Armistice, the existing “peace” will continue. I might assure my government, he said, that Syria will take unilaterally from time to time for the protection of its own economy such action as it considers necessary whether with respect to Israel, Jordan or any other state, just as it has done recently in its relations with its friendly neighbor Lebanon. As for political measures, they would be taken in consultation with other Arab states. In conclusion, Khalid Bey said sadly that he couldn’t understand why the United States persists in rebuffing and alienating Arab friendship and in burdening its back with Arab ill will by continuing to favor Israel against the Arabs. Other countries, he said, seemed to be able to be friends impartially with both the Arabs and the Israeli, but while we profess equality of friendship we prove by our action, such as my intervention, that we still play Israel’s game. Without admitting that in this instance our action was evidently inspired by Shiloah of the Israeli Foreign Office (Tel Aviv Embtel 164, March 7), I assured him that our policy is one of strict impartiality and that my Government’s démarche in this instance was in its considered opinion as much in Syria’s interests as in any other’s. He reiterated, and gave details to support, his previous statement that it would not serve Syria’s economy to permit trade to flow freely into Syria from Jordan in the circumstances envisaged, although he admitted that Syria might continue to admit such few products as now come from Jordan: some wheat and some sheep. He pointed out that Israeli goods are already prohibited entry into Syria and that his statement to which I had referred was intended only to reassure his compatriots that there would be no breach in the embargo which had been imposed solely for Syria’s own protection. I felt it unwise to labor the point, for, as he had himself pointed out, his original statement was conditioned on future developments that might or might not come to pass and which if they come to pass might have a different issue than that now envisaged. James Hugh Keeley The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/3–3050: Telegram [Document 422] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret niact Geneva , March 30, 1950—2 p. m. 455. Following receipt US views (Unpal 247, 24 March) Boisanger and Yalcin agreed to presentation memorandum embodying PCC proposal without release any information to press. Text as forwarded Department Palun 338 2 remains unchanged except for minor grammatical improvements. PCC also agreed that Boisanger and Principal Secretary should proceed to Jerusalem about April 5 to be available ME Governments for consultation. They will return before April 17 to attend meetings to be arranged with Kennedy Mission. In view Yalcin’s departure for Turkey 6 a. m. 30, PCC invited Arab and Israel Delegates to meetings afternoon of 29th. Upon receiving notice of scheduled meeting Rafael immediately called Barco to request private conversation before seeing Commission. In conversation morning of 29th Rafael showed marked spirit of cooperation. He wished to know purpose of afternoon’s meeting with Commission in order to coordinate efforts to greatest extent possible. Barco explained first purpose of meeting would be to inform all delegates of chairman’s prospective trip to Jerusalem and that no meetings of PCC with delegates would be scheduled during period 1 April to 17 April to enable delegates to make contact their governments if they desired. PCC would remain intact at Geneva for any meeting that might be necessary. Rafael expressed keen disappointment USDel would not be going to ME and surprised that French Foreign Office had agreed to trip by Boisanger alone. Barco explained that as things had developed alternative to trip by chairman was full Commission trip which could not be made as informal as we felt conditions required. He said that Palmer had great desire to visit countries concerned but especially wished to be able have frequent and informal contacts on both government and non-government level which would not be possible during Commission tour. We felt therefore Boisanger as chairman could elucidate Commission’s position and lay groundwork for later visit by Palmer. Rafael seemed satisfied with wisdom this decision. Barco then explained Commission would present memorandum to each delegate for transmittal to governments concerned outlining PCC’s views on how present deadlock can best be broken. He summarized contents of PCC proposal and explained procedure PCC would follow in effort maintain confidential nature of communication. Rafael took no exception to substance of proposals. He expressed no objection to idea of coupling appeal for direct over-all negotiations with mediation, asserting that Israel’s only fear of mediation was Arabs interpretation of mediation as in fact arbitration. Commission’s view of mediation role appeared acceptable to him. He was concerned, however, over PCC’s decision maintain its proposal as confidential, saying that time had come when soft approach should be abandoned since only decision to be made by Arabs was whether have peace or war. Issue had to be presented squarely by Commission and this required public announcement. Israel Government he said was on point of addressing note to PCC outlining its views on present stalemate which might constitute reply to PCC memorandum and which Israel would insist should be made public. Barco told Rafael PCC had decided on keeping memorandum confidential to give it best possible chance of acceptance and to avoid misinterpretation in press which might crystallize whatever opposition to it there might be. He told Rafael Commission was most anxious no government make hasty reply and pointed out that if statement by Israel Government at this time could be interpreted as negative response to Commission’s proposal this might well insure negative response from Arab Governments. He hoped therefore Israel would give most thoughtful consideration to this possibility before addressing any communication to PCC and that before any release were made to press it would be possible for Rafael and USDel to consider together how best this could be accomplished. Rafael agreed not to make any reply before giving USDel opportunity study text but urged Commission not close door on possible release to press of PCC memorandum and Israel communication. He recognized that release of Israel note alone might put PCC in awkward position. In view these developments USDel proposed and Boisanger and Yalcin agreed Commission should inform Arab and Israel Delegates that for time being PCC memorandum should be regarded as confidential and that before PCC made any release to press each government would be informed in order that any communication from them could be coordinated with PCC’s release. At meetings afternoon of 29th Israel and Arab Delegates received PCC announcements and memorandum without significant comment other than to extend cordial invitation to chairman to their countries and to agree to forward memorandum to their governments who would give it most careful consideration. USDel believes Israel may now be more disposed take reasonable attitude to PCC proposal. Rafael’s attitude, at least, so indicates, although his reaction may be personal. Arab countries may not be so well disposed in view of position they have taken re Jordan-Israel talks. We feel it is essential that Department indicate at earliest possible moment in Washington and ME capitals its support for PCC proposal and its concurrence in trip to ME by PCC chairman for consultation. [ Palmer ] 1 This telegram does not bear a Palun number. 2 Identified also as telegram 344, March 9, p. 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 397 ] . The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State 350/3–3050: Telegram [Document 423] The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , March 30, 1950—5 p. m. 458. Tcdel 155. 1. USDel discussed with Garreau this morning procedure to be followed subsequent to approval of Jerusalem statute which will probably be end of this week. 1 We expressed our belief it would be desirable for Council to adopt resolution requesting TC President to transmit statute to Israel and Jordan for their consideration and showed Garreau possible draft of such resolution as follows: “The TC, having approved the statute for Jerusalem at its—meeting on—1950, requests the President of the TC, “( a ) To transmit the text of the statute for Jerusalem to the governments of the two states at present occupying the area and city of Jerusalem, “( b ) To request from the two governments their cooperation in view of paragraph II of the GA resolution of December 9, 1949, “( c ) To ascertain from these two governments as fully as possible their views as to ways and means for putting the statute into practical effect, “( d ) To report on these matters to the TC during the course of its 7th regular session.” 2. We told Garreau that we had informally discussed this question with Bunche, who felt TC would be well advised proceed along such lines. Bunche indicated he would be willing, if invited, to assist President on such mission and if necessary to go to Jerusalem and respective capitals. 3. Garreau said he also discussed question with Bunche and he (Garreau) personally approved this procedure. However, he had later received instructions signed by Schuman, 2 which were substantially as follows: In view previous French position on Jerusalem, French delegation would vote in favor statute. In order avoid this matter remaining “dead letter”, French Government thought it would be advisable for TC to appoint person from “neutral” state to proceed to Jerusalem as TC representative not only to request parties to accept statute, but also urge them accept and to give them opportunity of suggesting changes which might make statute more acceptable to them. Such individual would report back to TC at its next session. In event Council could not decide on such appointment prior to termination present session, Council should request President and two other members to select and appoint individual to undertake above task. Council and its President should be guided in its choice of this individual by necessity for finding person who could convince both parties that unless they adopt more reasonable attitude on Jerusalem question, GA at next session might decide to take more drastic steps to bring about acquiescence of parties. Above procedure would obviate necessity for selecting a governor and, in any event, it would not be desirable for a governor to proceed to Jerusalem except for sole purpose of putting statute into effect. However, in event TC decides to appoint another committee to choose governor, its functions should be limited only to selecting number of candidates for consideration by TC at next session. 4. Garreau said these instructions were quite confusing as they were in contradiction to instructions which had been given to French delegation by Parodi 3 on Saturday. Parodi had been in favor of President transmitting statute to Israel and Jordan. Garreau indicated possibility that Schuman might have been influenced in this change of instruction by Vatican sources. Garreau gave impression that he would seek change in Schuman’s instructions. 5. USDel considers that resolution set forth in paragraph 1 above is proper way to proceed since we doubt if any person other than President TC could have sufficient authority and intimate knowledge of subject to present case properly and accordingly recommends that it be authorized to sponsor jointly resolution along these lines with such other delegations as may be willing. Department may also wish consider approaching French Government with view to obtaining their agreement to this procedure, particularly to Garreau’s role. 6. In event French Government unwilling for Garreau undertake task, USDel would appreciate Department’s views re appointment of neutral person. In this connection, name of Walter Stucki, Swiss Protestant, former Swiss Government official, Minister to France, and now adviser to Swiss Government, has been put forward and USDel understand Swiss President has indicated he would have no objection appointment Stucki. 7. As question of subsequent procedure will probably come up Monday, April 3, and in order permit time gain support for suggested resolution (if Department approves thereof), USDel would appreciate Department’s instructions by Saturday, April 1. Sent Department 458; repeated London 117, Jerusalem unnumbered, Paris 55; Department pass Tel Aviv unnumbered, Amman unnumbered, USUN unnumbered. 1 The third and last reading of the Jerusalem Statute began on March 29, when the Trusteeship Council formally adopted 21 articles. No negative votes were cast, but the United States abstained on Articles 4 (boundaries) and 21 (the legislative council). Before the vote on Article 1, Ambassador Sayre stated that the U.S. Delegation “had cooperated sincerely and wholeheartedly in Council’s task of drafting statute. He said he would vote in favor of such articles as US felt were properly and appropriately framed under GA resolution of December 9 and generally consistent with its terms. He added that such affirmative votes resulted from US desire to participate constructively in purely technical task of Council in completing preparation of statute.” (Telegram 454, identified also as Tcdel 154, from Geneva, 350/3–2950) The official record of discussions on March 29 is printed in TC (VI), pp. 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 277 ] ff. 2 Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 Alexandre Parodi, Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/3–3150: Telegram [Document 424] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret Tel Aviv , March 31, 1950—2 p. m. 228. March 31 Eytan in name Foreign Minister handed me without comment following note verbale requesting it be cabled: “The Government of Israel considers it its duty to draw attention to the grave consequences that might ensue from the adoption of the Jerusalem statute as drafted by the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. “The detachment of Jewish Jerusalem from Israel would inevitably disrupt the city’s institutional life. Instead of being governed by public bodies based upon the consent of the governed, Jerusalem would, under the proposed statute, be placed under an authoritarian régime, in defiance of the national allegiance and sentiment of its population. The Jews, who even before the present division of Jerusalem formed the majority of its inhabitants, would find themselves reduced to the position of a permanent minority in an unrepresentative and impotent legislative council. “As far as the economic life of Jerusalem is concerned, detachment of the city from Israel will sever the arteries sustaining its economy and prevent any effective recovery, the establishment of a régime of economic autonomy being ruled out by the realities of the situation. “Nor would the statute be conducive to the peace and security of the city. Indeed, by undermining the armistice agreements now in force, which for the past year have assured the security of life and property in both parts of Jerusalem, the proposed ‘internationalization’ would produce a renewed state of tension and unrest and expose the Jews of Jerusalem to the danger of encirclement and attack. “As for the juridicial aspect of the proposal, attention must be drawn to the fact that the statute would impose a régime of trusteeship without this being based on any measure of agreement such as prescribed by the Charter of the UN. It would also be repugnant to the spirit of the Charter which does not warrant the imposition of any trusteeship régime on a population fully capable of governing itself. “The proposed statute would not even contribute to the safety of the holy places. In engendering political conflict and turbulence and imposing upon Jerusalem a régime rejected by the bulk of its population, the statute could not but endanger also the security of the holy places, concern for which was the essential reason for the proposed ‘internationalization’. “Finally, the Government of Israel would point out that the adoption of this unrealistic scheme would obstruct the search for an agreed solution which would safeguard the religious interests of all faiths and communities a solution which the State of Israel is anxious to see achieved—for the reasons stated, the Government of Israel ventures to express the hope that your government will not grant its support to the draft statute which, as shown, is fraught with grave perils for the welfare of Jerusalem, the safety of the Holy Places and the security of Israel, and is strongly opposed by the two governments now controlling the area of Jerusalem.” 31 March 1950. Comment: Above is note referred to Geneva’s March 29, 448 to Department. End comment . 1 Sent Department 228; repeated Baghdad 14, Beirut 15, Damascus 15, Jidda 14, Jerusalem 20; Department pass Amman 20, Cairo 62, Paris 40, London 53, Moscow 13, Geneva 13. McDonald 1 No. 448 identified also as Tcdel 152, not printed; it advised that Mr. Eban, at Geneva, had informed the U.S. Delegation that the Israeli Government was approaching through diplomatic channels all governments represented on the Trusteeship Council regarding their votes on the Jerusalem Statute (350/3–2950). The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 350/3–3050: Telegram [Document 425] The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council, at Geneva 1 secret priority Washington , March 31, 1950—8 p. m. 417. Deltc 41. 1. Del authd sponsor with other Dels Res along lines Res quoted para 1, Tcdel 155 (Geneva’s 55 to Paris, Mar 30) designed secure views Israel and Jordan prior June Session TC. 2. Fr proposal neutral person visit Jerusalem present Statute does not seem desirable. Garreau, as TC Pres, obviously logical person obtain views Israel and Jordan. Since he wld clearly be acting in capacity Pres, no question “neutrality” involved. Del shld present this view Garreau and express earnest hope US he will be willing undertake responsibility as set out in proposed Res and his Govt will permit him, as TC Pres, to do so. 3. Dept had not anticipated TC Rep wld go Jerusalem for consultation with Govts. Proposed Res does not appear require this and we have in mind personal security as factor in this situation where concrete results are not likely be achieved. There is further question whether visit wld accomplish more than handing Statute Israeli and Jordanian Reps in Geneva with request their Govts views in due course. Latter procedure, carried out by TC Pres, appears preferable to sending “neutral person” to Jerusalem. However, Dept does not rule out personal consultations in Jerusalem if generally felt useful. 4. If TC decides consultations in Jerusalem by TC Rep necessary, Dept feels Res shld name person undertake such consultations and selection such person shld not be left in hands Comite TC. Dept suggests fol persons in order named: Garreau, Bunche, Ryckmans, and Stucki. Strong preference for Garreau as TC Pres. Dept wld wish consider other names that might be suggested. 5. Paris pls seek FonOff support Res quoted reftel, expressing hope Garreau, as TC Pres, will be able accept responsibilities indicated therein and giving position Dept set forth paras 1–3 above. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Paris, London, Tel Aviv, Amman, and USUN. The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Barco) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/3–3150: Telegram [Document 426] The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Barco ) to the Secretary of State secret niact Geneva , March 31, 1950—9 p. m. 468. Palun 342. Shortly before Palmer’s and my scheduled departure for Bern at 11 a. m. today to attend luncheon meeting with Egyptian Minister and member Egyptian royal family, Rafael telephoned to say Israel delegation would submit note to PCC today and issue four page summary as press release. He was sending USDel copy of note. It was decided therefore I should remain Geneva to receive note which arrived few minutes after departure Palmer’s train. Israel note is fourteen pages of severe attack on Arab attitude towards direct negotiations and rearming of Arab countries. I feel its importance warrants forwarding it as following telegram (Palun 343 1 ) for Department’s immediate consideration. Asserting that no negotiations for final settlement have been undertaken and “none are in prospect” Israeli delegation states “Arab states which launched savage war for destruction Israel now refuse negotiate with Israel for settlement problems created by their war.” Israeli note further states “refugee question only exists as result war launched by Arab states.” Asserting that Arab states “actually laid claim to entire territory Israel with exception small strip in coastal plain and Valley of Jezreal,” Israel note says “Arab refusal negotiate became more sinister than ever in light these avaricious demands.” Arab territorial proposals “frankly and wildly expansionist” and “Arab states explicitly covet greater part Israel.” Note states further that “these general considerations assume particular urgency in light current policies Arab governments; these policies consist of program of active rearmament—and campaign of inflammatory utterances whereby public opinion in Arab countries conditioned for renewal of war. Israel Government has authentic information to effect war of revenge against Israel is plan which exercises certain minds at very summit of political power in Arab world. Representatives of US and UK gave assurances Arab states would only receive such arms as essential for internal security and most essential defense. These assurances have been swept completely aside. Governments which have taken up arms against their neighbors and have created only threat to peace yet determined under Chapter VII of Charter are in no moral condition to affect air of injured grievance or dictate settlement to a state which successfully resisted their onslaughts Israel asks nothing of any of these states. But Israel owes them nothing and has done them no injury which merits the ‘compensation’ which they inexplicably demand.” Israel note ends with request to PCC “to convey to each Arab state its readiness to begin negotiations at once by any effective procedure which may be devised, with view to settlement all outstanding questions and attainment permanent peace.” General tenor of note is all-out attack on Arab position. At same time it can readily be inferred from note that Israelis not prepared make any concessions to Arab countries. In my opinion, if such statement is made public at this time it will create immediate reaction in Arab countries which will make almost certain a rejection by Arab states of PCC proposal contained in memorandum of March 29. I therefore telephoned Rafael immediately after reading Israel note and requested him and Eban to meet me in Azcarate’s office at close of morning’s session TC. I explained to them when we met that I believed publication of summary their note would be most detrimental to prospects of acceptance by Arab states of PCC proposal. While I did not deny that presentation Israel’s case was plausible and probably justifiable, I felt it would have exactly opposite effect to that which I believed Israel and the Commission wished. Coming at this time it would not give PCC proposal a fair chance nor did I feel that it was fair to Palmer and Boisanger for a statement to be made public which they had not had an opportunity to see. I therefore urged Eban to hold up release at least until Commission had met on Monday and had had opportunity to consult with him. Eban said Israel Government had been giving long consideration to its statement and could not forego an appeal to world opinion when forces leading to war were gaining ground. Rafael asserted I was assuming tremendous responsibility in asking Israel to remain inactive in face of growing threats to its security and that I was committing US Government to proving that their fears were wrong. I said I felt it was unfair to say that I was assuming responsibility or committing anyone but on contrary responsibility was entirely with them for taking a step which might well prevent the peace talks which they apparently desired. It seemed to me that the important question was whether peace talks could be achieved and if my judgment was correct release of their note would be against Israel’s interests. Eban then revealed in reply to my questioning that Israel delegation had received no instructions from Tel Aviv since transmitting PCC memorandum but that arrangements were already made for release their note simultaneously today in Geneva, Tel Aviv and New York which indicates plan for release was known to Rafael when he reiterated immediately after meeting March 29 his desire to coordinate with me any publicity by Israel delegation or PCC. Nor am I convinced that delivery of Israel note to USDel at 11:40 today was not timed to occur after our departure for Bern, since I had told Rafael on March 29 of our plans to leave at 11 a. m. 31st. After further discussion all of which was on friendliest basis Eban said that he could not take responsibility for advising Israel Government not to release note but would cancel press release and telephone New York and Tel Aviv to do likewise. He would at same time make known my views to government and be prepared to meet with Commission Monday morning. He and Rafael felt, however, that Israel could not hold up statement indefinitely and again said Commission should first release its memorandum of 29 March. I believe that Israel should be dissuaded from releasing statement, but if this is not possible, PCC memorandum should be released first to avoid some of damaging effect of Israel statement. Prior release of Israel note, which curiously enough is dated 29 March, date of PCC memorandum, might create impression that PCC action in submitting memorandum was solely at insistence of Israel, which would have damaging effect on PCC relations with Arabs. Meanwhile, Paris edition Herald Tribune March 30 carries story that PCC placed new secret proposals before Israel and Arab states involving direct contact in peace negotiations based on suggestions by PCC. Fisher reports from Jerusalem 30 March that similar stories front-paged all Israel and Arab press. Since PCC announced to Arab delegations situation might arise when release of PCC memorandum would be necessary and the PCC would in such case notify Arab Governments, I believe situation generally requires such action. 2 [ Barco ] 1 Identified also as telegram 469, March 31, not printed; it gave the text of the note to be submitted to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Its 36 numbered paragraphs dealt with “The Present Situation”, the history of efforts at conciliation, and the “Implications of the Arab attitude”. 2 The Department of State, in reply on April 1, gave its view that “decision rests with PCC and in view developments agrees action along lines last paragraph Palun 342 (telegram 419, identified also as Unpal 249, to Geneva, 357.AC/4–150). The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/4–250: Telegram [Document 427] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Geneva , April 2, 1950—6 p. m. 474. Palun 344. Following is paraphrase telegram from Fisher, Jerusalem to PCC 1 April: “Fisher visited King Abdullah 31 March at King’s request in order inform him of démarche recently undertaken by PCC. King Abdullah had not yet received text of PCC’s memo but after Fisher had explained procedure envisaged in proposal, King expressed his deep satisfaction adding that he would accept PCC’s proposal even if it were rejected by all other Arab states and even if Jordan were to be expelled from Arab League for doing so. King then stated he was looking forward to conversations with Boisanger and Azcarate as soon as possible. King Abdullah appeared extremely pessimistic in connection with proceedings of Arab League and informed Fisher he had instructed his Minister in Cairo, Toukan Bey to return immediately Amman and leave meetings Arab League unattended by any representative Jordan. In explanation this action King pointed out present Jordanian Government was about resign and it would not be correct for Jordan be represented by delegate who was not supported by stable government. In connection Arab League, he expressed hope his acceptance PCC’s proposal would have effect silencing baseless accusations of secret negotiations between Jordan and Israel. He further stated that from now on nobody would be in position accuse Jordan of negotiating secretly with Israel since Jordan would be acting in accordance open proposals submitted by UN to all parties. King Abdullah bringing interview to close reiterated his appreciation of PCC’s initiative and expressed hope that its prompt acceptance by Jordan would facilitate this country’s admission to UN. PCC is cautioned to interpret above only as expressing personal views King Abdullah. Reactions Jordanian Government have not yet been received.” [ Palmer ] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 357.AC/4–350: Circular telegram [Document 428] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1 secret Washington , April 3, 1950—1 a. m. In effort resolve present impasse re its work PCC has made formal proposal Arab and Israeli Delegations Geneva for new procedure consisting series Comites composed reps of parties combined with PCC reps with mediatory role and power make specific suggestions. Proposal combines Israeli desire for direct negots and Arab desire for mediation by PCC. Proposal does not go into details but Dept understands PCC wld like estab four bilateral Comites to consider broad range problems between Israel on one hand and respective Arab states on other. In addition one or more comites contemplated with Arab jointly represented on one hand, Israel on other, to consider certain specified subjs of common interest. Procedure wld be similar previous comites on blocked accounts and broken families. Proposal is effort by PCC break stalemate in negots. It will be held confidential for present in order avoid hasty reactions and undue influence resulting from propaganda efforts by elements opposed settlement. Boisanger, French Rep PCC, plans visit ME between Apr 5 and Apr 17 to contact Govts on behalf these proposals. USRep Palmer intends fol later for similar purpose. One of main objectives these visits will be urge parties avoid hasty conclusions and endeavor have proposals considered in spirit good will and cooperation. Missions Cairo, Tel Aviv and Amman, Beirut and Damascus requested inform Govts USG hopes PCC proposals will receive friendly and dispassionate consideration as representing sincere effort by PCC find means advancing towards settlement Palestine problem, emphasizing particularly proposals being held temporarily confidential in order they may receive full and fair consideration and to avoid hasty and ill-considered action. Also express hope Boisanger will be met with full spirit of cooperation. Since Palmer’s plans uncertain do not mention at this time. Acheson 1 At Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, and Beirut for action; and at London, Geneva, Jerusalem, Jidda, and Baghdad for information. The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 786.00/4–350: Telegram [Document 429] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority Amman , April 3, 1950—noon. 64. Interview April 2 King Abdullah gave me [in] strictest confidence his interpretation Jordan delegation’s action support Arab League resolution providing expulsion members state negotiating with Israel. Following April 11 elections His Majesty intends resume negotiations with Israel simultaneously informing League and calling on other states follow same course. If all oppose, he fully prepared face expulsion League for which he displays ill-concealed contempt. King reminded me he had never discussed real peace treaty Israel but that suspended talks envisaged only extension existing armistice agreement. While text Arab League resolution not available here, I infer King may have in mind legalistic out. King wants Jews to know his plans but I leave to Department nature of any instructions may wish give my colleague Tel Aviv. Obviously recurrence of past Israeli leaks could have most serious repercussions especially during current League session. Extreme caution indicated use this information, unless of course, King himself talks too much as has been known to do. His Majesty has preliminary but vague information re nature mediation proposals being brought Jerusalem by Boisanger. He understands they embrace whole horizon meeting both Israeli thesis favor direct negotiations and Arab objections individual states holding talks. He eagerly welcomes visit hoping one or more other Arab Governments may come in and that if not, use of UN machinery will strengthen his hand vis-à-vis League event he has to go it alone. King emphasized importance role of new Parliament due convene May 1 in Israeli negotiations hinting it would be brought into picture. Throughout conversation displayed serene optimism which should not, however, induce over-sanguine attitude our part as aside from menace sanctions by other Arab states I am increasingly impressed extent and intensity internal opposition any negotiations from Palestine element both in and out of government. Drew The United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council (Sayre) to the President 350/4–450 [Document 430] The United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council ( Sayre ) to the President 1 secret Geneva , April 4, 1950. My Dear Mr. President : Knowing your very personal interest in the situation in Palestine, and particularly in Jerusalem, may I report to you briefly on the developments which have taken place in the recently concluded meeting of the Trusteeship Council with respect to Jerusalem. You will recall that the General Assembly on December 9, 1949, adopted a resolution proposed by Australia calling for the complete internationalization of the Jerusalem area. Although the United States, the United Kingdom, and twelve other Delegations voted against this resolution, it was nevertheless adopted by a curious combination of the Soviet bloc, the Arab bloc, and the majority of Latin American Delegations, together with France, Belgium and Australia. Many of these were undoubtedly inspired by strong views held by the Vatican. You will remember also that both Israel and Jordan, although at present technically only in de facto occupation of Jerusalem, have strongly opposed any drastic plan of internationalization and that neither our Government nor the British Government has felt it possible, nor indeed wise, to implement such a drastic plan by force or by economic compulsion. During the past weeks the Trusteeship Council in Geneva has faced the exceedingly delicate and well-nigh impossible task of acting as an “executive organ” of the General Assembly, charged with the task of completing the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem for thoroughgoing internationalization, and of taking immediate steps to implement it, even though certain interested Governments might strongly oppose it. Although the United States voted against the General Assembly resolution on the ground of its impracticability, nevertheless, as a loyal member of the Trusteeship Council and in accordance with your instructions of December 20, 1949, 2 the United States Delegation has cooperated in the technical part of the task laid before the Council. To the completed draft Statute the United States made one notable contribution by proposing that the property rights of all churches, missions and other religious and charitable agencies in Jerusalem should be confirmed and respected, and that all such properties which have not already been returned should be returned to their original owners or to other churches, missions or charitable agencies representative of the same confession. To this proposal our Delegation won general acceptance. After a protracted debate on the texts of the various articles, the Statute as a whole was approved by the Trusteeship Council on April 4, 1950 by a vote of 9 to 0, with the United States and the United Kingdom abstaining. 3 Since complete internationalization as provided by the General Assembly resolution of December 9 is manifestly impracticable and realizing that the question of Jerusalem must therefore eventually be referred back to the General Assembly, the United States Delegation devoted its efforts to the support of a program calling for the transmittal of the completed Statute to the Governments of Israel and Jordan during the period between the winter and spring sessions of the Trusteeship Council. The objective of our Delegation was thus to give the two Governments the opportunity of expressing their views on the completed Statute and also, if possible, of reaching some common agreement of a nature to protect Christian and world interests in the Holy City. The Trusteeship Council agreed unanimously to this program. In spite of the obvious difficulties under which the Trusteeship Council has had to work, our labors have not been in vain. We have drawn up a constructive and excellent trusteeship agreement under which Italy has already undertaken to administer its former colony of Somaliland for a period of ten years prior to its independence. In addition, the Council has carried on its normal work of examining conditions in a number of Trust Territories. Altogether the Geneva session of the Council, which commenced on January 19 and ended on April 4, 1950, has been a constructive one. The absence of the Soviet Delegation, due to the Soviet boycott of the Council, has facilitated our work. May I, in closing, Mr. President, express the deep personal satisfaction of Mr. Gerig, the Deputy United States Representative, and myself, in having the opportunity under your guidance and inspiration of helping to build part of the necessary foundations for the lasting peace of the world. Respectfully yours, Francis B. Sayre 1 Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Sayre in his letter of April 4. 2 Copy not found in the files of the Department of State or in the papers of Ambassador Sayre in the Library of Congress. A White House copy is presumably in the Harry S. Truman Papers. 3 For the text of the Statute, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/1286), p. 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] . This publication will hereinafter be identified as “A/1286”. The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 784A.02/4–450: Telegram [Document 431] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Cairo , April 4, 1950—2 p. m. 332. Deptel 276, April 3. 1 Text of Arab League resolution re negotiations with Israel which was sent Department in substance in mytel 305, March 29 2 and in full in despatch 635, March 31 3 is as follows: “Seeing the vital importance of the Palestine question for all states of the Arab League, seeing that these states have dealt with this question in unison, seeing the common danger incurred by states of the League and by Palestine from the viewpoint of their common defense, the Council of the League unanimously decided the following: “(1) It is forbidden for an Arab state belonging to the League to negotiate or conclude a separate peace or a political, military, or economic accord with Israel. The state which contravenes this principle will be considered as excluded from the League ipso facto , in conformity with Article 18 of the Charter of the League. “(2) The Political Commission is charged with carrying out the necessary dispositions toward the state which renders itself guilty of such offense”. As indicated in mytels 322, April 2 4 and 327, April 3, 3 approval of resolution by all Arab states including Iraq and Jordan places League definitely on record against peace negotiations at a time when leaders of Arab states except Saudi Arabia (mytel 313, March 31) 5 admit privately that an arrangement must eventually be made with Israel. Resolution therefore represents setback to any immediate approach to Israel but need not completely bar eventual action. Future action by Abdullah can best be ascertained elsewhere, but it seems plausible Abdullah, notwithstanding his approval of resolution, will pause only to find opportune time to renew negotiations with Israel on whom it is possible he may raise his demands as compensation for his break with League. Abdullah may also be motivated by whether he wants to remain in League and his estimate of effectiveness of Arab economic boycott. In meantime as suggested in mytel 327, Arab leaders here are saying “where do we go from here”. Sent Department, Department pass Amman 22, Tel Aviv 49, pouched Arab capitals. Caffery 1 Not printed; it instructed Cairo to send to the Department the text of the Arab League resolution regarding Arab negotiations with Israel and the Embassy’s appraisal of the importance and effect of the resolution (784A.02/4–350). 2 Not printed; it advised that the prevailing attitude at the meeting of League toward Jordan had softened. The “Trend now away from expulsion and toward using Israel–Jordan negotiations to demonstrate official Arab opposition to relations with Israel by adoption formula that any Arab state concluding separate arrangements with Israel without League approval would be considered as being automatically out of League and subject to economic boycott by Arabs.” (786.00/3–2950) 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed; it reported that the Arab League Council on the evening of April 1 unanimously approved the resolution (786.00/4–250). 3 Not printed. 5 Not printed; it conveyed the views of Amir Faisal, Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that “stability would never come to the ME as long as Israel remained. Arabs had no intention of renewing war. They could not, in fact, but it would remain to his children and to their children to see that this menace was eliminated from the ME.” (786.00/3–3150) The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/4–450: Telegram [Document 432] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Geneva , April 4, 1950—3 p. m. 486. Palun 346. Eban informed Barco in private note April 2 he had succeeded in cancelling press releases New York and Geneva. In Tel Aviv statement had been issued to press with release hour at 5:30 p. m. and was withdrawn before that hour. There might be some unreliable correspondent, however, who would reveal contents, but he thought embargo would be generally respected. If leak occurred, we must not regard as breach good faith in undertaking Eban had given to hold up publication. At best there would be complete silence. At worst, result would be “minor pop” and not “major explosion” that would otherwise have ensued. At meeting April 3 PCC agreed advise Israel Delegation that release of Israel note at present time would in PCC opinion injure chances for success of PCC proposal. If Israel Delegation decided at later date release note, PCC hoped prior to taking action Israel Delegation would consult with Commission. PCC decided for present to withhold release memorandum of March 29. Afternoon of third, Eban and Rafael called on US Delegation at our request. They did not seem disturbed over withholding their note from press for time being, but emphasized that in absence indication PCC proposals possible success they believed Israel would be compelled call for support world opinion along lines note to PCC. Israel was hemmed in by hostile neighbors and had to look outside Middle East for help. They would therefore hold note in reserve for eventual use, but would not release without further talk with US Delegation. Referring to reports that Arab League had passed resolution for expulsion any member League making peace agreement with Israel, Eban said if this were true he could see little chance of Arabs accepting PCC proposal. He therefore thought that text Arab League resolution and attitude individual Arab States towards its implementation should be immediately ascertained. Eban gave US Delegation impression that Israel would be prepared accept PCC proposal if there were indications Arabs would do likewise. Israel might not, however, be willing go on record as accepting PCC proposal without first receiving clear indications of Arab acceptance to avoid creating impression Israel overly anxious from weakness. US Delegation would appreciate being kept informed of developments Arab countries re reported Arab League resolution and PCC proposal. [ Palmer ] Editorial Note [Document 433] Editorial Note The United States Delegation to the Trusteeship Council reported from Geneva on April 5 on the Council’s session of the previous day. Ambassador Sayre was said to have “recalled US had voted favorably on many articles but had certain reservations on number of others, some of which were of major importance. He would, therefore, abstain on final vote. TC should have further opportunity to consider Israeli and Jordanian attitudes toward statute, Sayre added, expressing hope cooperation of these states would be freely given in accordance with paragraph two of GA December 9 resolution.” (Telegram 490, identified also as Tcdel 161, 350/4–450) Following the Council’s adoption of the Statute, Ambassador Sayre introduced a joint draft resolution on behalf of the Delegations of the United States, Australia, Belgium and the Philippines, which read as follows: “ The Trusteeship Council , having approved the Statute for the City of Jerusalem at its eighty-first meeting of its sixth session on 4 April 1950, requests the President of the Trusteeship Council: “( a ) To transmit the text of the Statute for the City of Jerusalem to the Governments of the two States at present occupying the area and City of Jerusalem; “( b ) To request from the two Governments their full co-operation in view of paragraph II of the General Assembly resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949; “( c ) To report on these matters to the Trusteeship Council in the course of its seventh regular session.” (TC (VI), page 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 294 ] ) The joint draft resolution was approved by the Council by ten votes to none, with one abstention. A summary of the Council’s deliberations on April 4 is printed in ibid , pages 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 293 ] ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State USUN Files [Document 434] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 1 confidential [ Washington ,] April 5, 1950. Subject: Arab League Attitude toward Negotiations with Israel. Participants: S—The Secretary The Ambassador of Israel ANE—Mr. Rockwell I received Ambassador Elath at his request. He said that he had been instructed by his Government to take up with me on the most urgent basis the attitude recently displayed by the Arab League concerning negotiations by the Arab states with Israel. The Ambassador said that the Israeli Government was seriously disturbed by the resolution adopted by the Arab League providing that any Arab state which negotiated a peace with Israel without the consent of the League would be considered as automatically out of the League and would be subject to economic boycott by the other Arab states. The Israeli Government was particularly disappointed because of the harmful effect this resolution would have on the Israeli conversations with the Jordanians. The Israelis believed that chances for negotiating an Israeli-Arab peace with all the Arab states together were very poor, and that individual negotiations between Israel and the separate Arab states were likely to be much more productive. After the League resolution, the Israeli Government thought that it would be more difficult to come to peace terms with Abdullah. The Israeli Government also thought that the presence of the Mufti as a delegate in the League meeting had made an unfortunate impression in the Arab world. The Mufti was the personification of Arab violence, and his presence in the League meeting might strengthen the hands of those Arabs who desired the resumption of hostilities. The Israeli Government thought it particularly unfortunate that the Arab League had come out with nothing positive. The representatives had made no progress toward solving their own numerous internal economic and political problems, but had merely banded together to seek outlet from their own troubles by pointing to Israel as the cause of all their difficulties. The League resolution, when combined with the US–UK attitude in seeming approval of Arab rearmament, would have a psychological effect which the Israeli Government thought harmful. The Ambassador said that this rearmament itself might perhaps not be on a very great scale, but that the encouragement given by it to Arab revenge motives was considerable. The Arabs believed, said the Ambassador, that the US and UK were supporting them. Mr. Bevin’s recent “unfortunate” remarks in the House of Commons contributed to this impression. The Ambassador then declared that his Government knew that rearmament by Israel was not the solution. Israel did not wish to spend money on unproductive military material, but in the circumstances would like to acquire some additional arms so that the Arabs might realize that any venture on their part would be very costly for them. The Israeli Government still maintained that the UK should cease its shipments to the Arab states. The best way to peace, continued the Ambassador, lay in direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states one at a time. Dr. Bunche had been successful in using this method. Mr. Porter had not been successful with combined negotiations. King Abdullah should be further encouraged in his desire to reach a peace with Israel. There was one thing that was entirely certain, and that was that Israel had no intention whatsoever of attacking any of the Arab states. Under these circumstances, the Israeli Government hoped that the US would use its best influence to see that the recent resolution of the Arab League should not hinder the possibilities of peace in the Near East. Encouragement of King Abdullah was not enough. It had to be brought home to all the Arab states that nothing is to be gained by the continuation of their present hostile attitude. Ambassador Elath then said that Israel was encouraged by the Trusteeship Council’s decision to refer the revised Jerusalem statute to Jordan and Israel for their opinions. This course of action did not mean that Israel would cease its efforts to reach an agreement with the Christian world, and particularly with the Vatican. The Ambassador thought that the Vatican was very realistic and would abandon its present uncompromising attitude when it realized that the revised statute did not have much chance of being put into effect. I explained to the Ambassador the action which we had taken in the Arab capitals when we had first heard the rumors that the Arab League was planning to expel Jordan for its negotiations with Israel. Our representatives in the Arab countries had been instructed to urge moderation and prudence upon local Government officials. We thought that our action might have had something to do with the League’s decision to back away from the expulsion resolution. This did not mean we were pleased by the resolution as adopted, but at least it was not as bad as originally it seemed it might be. I added that we had the impression that in the recent League meeting the Arab leaders had adopted a purely public attitude, and that in private most of them felt that they would eventually have to reach peace arrangements with Israel. I said that we would continue our efforts to urge upon the Arab leaders a prudent and conciliatory attitude, but that, of course, the Arab states were sovereign nations and our influence was necessarily not unlimited. I stated that generally speaking, however, past history had shown that the Arab League has taken extreme positions which it has not carried out. I assured the Ambassador that our views as regards the necessity of peace and stability in the Near East were the same as his. We were encouraged to think that progress was being made toward peace, and we would continue our efforts to facilitate this progress. The Ambassador expressed his gratitude for the above information, which he said was the most encouraging he had heard for quite a while. He would immediately inform his Government, which he knew would be grateful for what the US had done. Dean Acheson 1 Drafted by Mr. Rockwell. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 784.00/4–650 [Document 435] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs secret [ Washington ,] April 6, 1950. Subject: Stability in the Palestine Area Participants: NEA—Mr. Hare Mr. Burrows, British Embassy Mr. Greenhill, British Embassy ANE—Mr. Rockwell Messrs. Burrows and Greenhill called under instructions to discuss the question of the stability of the Palestine area. Mr. Burrows said that the Foreign Office had decided that there was little hope of being able to establish at the present time a regional security system in the Near East. The present state of Arab-Israeli relations prevented any kind of cooperation between Israel and the Arab states. Mr. Hare commented that the Department had understood that the British Government hoped eventually to draw Israel in with the Arab states for a kind of partnership with the UK for the military defense of the Near East. Mr. Burrows said that this might be so but that he foresaw that any such complete arrangement would be a long way off. Mr. Burrows continued by stating that the Foreign Office would be prepared to make a declaration to the effect that the British Government would take strong steps in an attempt to prevent aggressive moves either by the Arabs or Israelis in the Near East. The Foreign Office was tentatively thinking that such a statement might be made on the occasion of the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, even if this takes place, as seems likely, before any Arab-Israeli agreement is reached. The Foreign Office was also thinking that at the same time proclamation might be made of the extension of the provisions of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty to Arab Palestine. The Foreign Office wondered whether the US Government would be willing to make the same sort of declaration at that time, a declaration which would welcome the incorporation of Arab Palestine in Jordan and support the UK statement against aggression in the Near East. Mr. Hare said that his first reaction was that the occasion of the union of Arab Palestine with Jordan would not be such a favorable time for the US and UK to make a declaration as the occasion of an agreement between Israel and one of the Arab states. With regard to a statement approving the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, Mr. Hare recalled that the Palestine Conciliation Commission, of which the US is a member, had only last December challenged the claim of Israel to sovereignty over all the territory now controlled by Israel. Mr. Rockwell said that the Department had recently been giving considerable thought to the question of the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan. He wished to mention the following factors for the consideration of Messrs. Burrows and Greenhill: a . The union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, with US and UK approval, would certainly shut the door on any possible territorial readjustment in Palestine, since the reaction of Israel would undoubtedly be to proclaim sovereignty over all territory under its control. b . There was the question of whether the extension of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty to Arab Palestine would inject a third party into the Jordan-Israeli armistice agreement, with adverse effects on the agreement. c . Since the question of Jerusalem was sub judice in the United Nations, it would be impossible for the US to approve the incorporation of Arab Jerusalem in Jordan. Mr. Rockwell said that in his personal opinion it would be much better to continue the present process of gradual extension of Jordan sovereignty to Arab Palestine rather than to make a sudden pronouncement of a constitutional union. Mr. Burrows replied that in the opinion of the British Government there were at present dangerous disintegrating tendencies in Arab Palestine and that the psychological stimulus of formal incorporation was necessary. It was particularly desirable to strengthen the Jordan Government against the activities of the Mufti and his followers. Mr. Burrows maintained that the influence of the British Government upon King Abdullah was not unlimited and that the King seemed definitely determined to go ahead with a formal proclamation of union as soon as the elections were over. Mr. Rockwell inquired what the reaction of the other Arab states would be to the incorporation of Arab Palestine and Jordan. Mr. Burrows said that the reaction would undoubtedly be hostile but that the British Government was prepared to disregard it. Mr. Hare said that one difficulty for the US was that we were members of the PCC, which had a mandate to promote negotiations between the parties to the Palestine dispute. A unilateral move by one of these parties would certainly make the Commission’s already difficult task all the more so. As the British Government knew, the US approved of the incorporation of Jordan in Arab Palestine and the extension of the terms of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty to the new territory, at an appropriate later date . 1 Mr. Burrows then inquired whether it would be better from the US point of view if the proclamation of union should take place after some sort of agreement had been reached between Jordan and Israel. Mr. Hare said that this would definitely be better. Mr. Burrows then asked whether if there were such an agreement between Jordan and Israel the US would be able to make some kind of reassuring declaration concerning stability in the Near East shortly thereafter. Mr. Hare replied that this was a question which was being actively considered in the Department at the present time but he was not prepared to indicate what the decision would be. Mr. Greenhill inquired whether it would be easier for the US if the Arab League should approve the incorporation of Arab Palestine. Mr. Hare said that this would help but that it would be still better if there were also a previous Israel-Jordan agreement. Mr. Rockwell then said that King Abdullah seemed to be most interested in the Palestine Conciliation Commission’s new proposal combining mediation and direct negotiations. The King appeared to think that this gave him an out in connection with the recent pronouncement of the Arab League against separate negotiations with Israel. Mr. Burrows and Mr. Greenhill had not heard of this interest on the part of King Abdullah. Mr. Hare stated that there were three imponderables in the situation. One was the result of the Jordan elections, the second was the action the Arab League might take before concluding its Cairo meeting, and the third was the reaction of the Arab states and Israel to the new PCC proposals. The Department would wish to consider all of these factors. Mr. Burrows then took up the question of arms for the Near East. The Foreign Office hoped to be able to supply arms to both the Arab states and Israel but the conditions for this did not yet obtain. Supplying arms to Israel would be very harmful to the UK’s relations with the Arab states. Therefore, no Israeli application for armaments would at present be entertained. When such applications were considered, the size and equipment of the Israeli armed forces would be an important factor in any decision. The UK would wish to be as well informed concerning the Israeli military establishment as it is concerning the Arab armies. Mr. Hare inquired whether the UK was obtaining guarantees from the Arab states that arms supplied to them by the UK would not be used against Israel. Mr. Burrows said that such guarantees were not being obtained for each shipment but that in the past over-all assurances had been obtained from all the Arab states. Mr. Burrows then remarked that the Foreign Office was worried that the present US–UK attitude toward arms for the Near East lead the US–UK into what both countries agreed was a most undesirable situation—that the UK would supply arms to the Arabs only and that the US would supply arms to the Israelis. Mr. Hare agreed that this was something which must be carefully avoided. 1 The latter portion of this sentence, italicized here by the editors, was ordered deleted by Mr. Rockwell in a revision of his memorandum of conversation, drafted by him on April 20. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 784A.5/5–3150: Telegram [Document 436] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt top secret Washington , April 6, 1950—2 p. m. 283. Re Embtels 297, Mar 27 and 312, Mar 31. 1 Art appearing Al Misri Mar 24 erroneous and distorted version info obtained Dept official Mar 21. Al Misri correspondent informed US NE arms policy based criteria preventing arms race area while recognizing desirability of countries concerned obtaining such arms as necessary for legitimate security requirements. Re points one and two Min’s ltr spokesman stressed equipment being exported Israel and Arab countries represents small arms and equipment for defense purposes rather than weapons of war and such shipments consistent US arms export policy. Re point three spokesman’s remarks limited Egypt and fact Egypt export license applications for mil equipment will be considered same basis other NE countries under US arms export policy. Point four Min’s ltr re Israel not discussed interview. Ltr MinFonAff re mil aid recd Dept Mar 20 (Embtel 260 Mar 18) and contents unknown spokesman at time interview. You may in ur discretion convey substance above MinFonAff. Israeli arms request Feb 13 being evaluated Natl Defense to determine consistency with US arms export policy (re embtel 299 Mar 28). 2 Acheson 1 Neither printed; the former transmitted the text of a further letter from the Egyptian Foreign Minister, which continued his earlier message (see telegram 260, March 18, from Cairo, p. 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] ). The letter cited the newspaper Al Misri as authority for the following points said to have been made by an official spokesman of the Department of State: “1. The American Government has delivered to the Ambassador of Israel permission to buy arms for the requirements of internal security within its country. “2. Without giving any details regarding these arms the spokesman has tried to explain that they are not of the category of heavy arms. “3. The Arab countries have not formulated demands with the objective of obtaining permission to buy arms. “4. Israel has not furnished to the Department of State the information which the latter had demanded regarding its armed forces, which information was the condition stipulated for supplying the arms in question.” (784.5/3–2750) 2 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 774.562/2–950: Airgram [Document 437] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1 confidential Washington , April 7, 1950. A–152. [Re] Embdes 220, February 9 2 the Department is presently studying the question of exports of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to the Near East, taking into account the existing size of the various military establishments as well as reported procurement efforts of these states. The Department is also discussing this question with Defense with the view to determining which proposed exports are or are not legitimate requirements for self-defense or for internal security. For your confidential information it may well be, however, that even prior to the achievement of State-Defense agreement as to permissible levels of armaments in the NE area, the Department may consider the approval in the near future of exports to the Near East of munitions items which can be considered to be “token” either as respects the type or the quantities of equipment involved. The AT–11’s for Egypt and Syria could possibly fall within this category. The Embassy should refrain, however, from expressing any definitive view with respect to the AT–11 question until further guidance is received from the Department. Furthermore, action is being withheld on the Egyptian request for 160,000 rounds 75 mm. ammunition for Sherman tanks as well as the matter of an export license for heavy military equipment which the Egyptian Government may purchase from Marmon-Harrington pending conclusion of above mentioned State-Defense agreement. The same situation applies to the February 13 Israeli application for arms. Acheson 1 This airgram was repeated to Damascus. 2 Not printed; it informed the Department of the interest of the Egyptian air force in purchasing 3 Beachcraft AT–11’s and of the Syrian air force in purchasing an unspecified number of these planes. The aircraft were to be used for bombing training and were to be equipped with appropriate armament and ammunition (774.562/2–950). The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/4–750: Telegram [Document 438] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , April 7, 1950—1 p. m. 255. Following conference at residence April 6 with Boisanger and Ascarate, I gave Eytan early April 7 (despite Passover holiday) substance Department’s instructions cirtel April 3 which not received until after Boisanger visit. Eytan stressed points made by Sharett to Boisanger, in substance that Israel willing accept any form PCC procedure but convinced no hope for progress until Arab states indicate at least tacitly willingness negotiate peace. In light Arab League actions Cairo Israel fearful PCC procedural suggestions will be futile. Eytan emphasized, however, possibility which Israel would welcome that Abdullah may find PCC committee idea a means of enabling Jordan resume negotiations with Israel while avoiding Arab League penalties. I called Eytan’s attention large publicity Palestine Post April 7 on Boisanger’s talk at Foreign Office despite his urgent request for secrecy. I expressed fear this publicity would jeopardize Boisanger’s chances to secure sympathetic hearing in Arab capitals. Comment: I believe Israel hopes PCC suggestion may result resumption Jordan negotiations. Hence unable understand today’s publicity unless it be one more unexplained Foreign Office leak. End comment . McDonald The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 784A.56/4–750: Telegram [Document 439] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel priority Washington , April 7, 1950—2 p. m. 167. Re AP report Apr 6 that US Govt has tentatively rejected request of Israeli Govt for US military equipment, Departmental spokesman making following statement today: “The report that the US Govt has tentatively rejected the request of the Israeli Govt for American military equipment is untrue. The Israeli Govt’s recent request for permission to purchase additional military equipment is under consideration by the responsible agencies of the Govt and no final decision has as yet been taken pending complete examination of the factors involved.” Acheson The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 684A.85/4–850: Telegram [Document 440] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 1 secret Washington , April 8, 1950—1 p. m. 45. Tel Aviv tel 23, Apr 7 rptd Dept as 251. 2 Dept did not transmit to Tel Aviv info re Abdullah intentions resume talks with Israel for fol reasons: 1) Dept considered Abdullah has adequate means contact with Israelis and that it therefore was unnecessary and undesirable for US assume role intermediary. Reftel indicates King has been able convey his intentions Tel Aviv; 2) Since Israelis were already aware Abdullah intended resume talks after Jordan elections, Dept believed it not urgent that reaffirmation this intention be conveyed Tel Aviv at time when Jordan under strong attack in Arab League mtg for negotiating with Israel. Moreover, any recurrence past Tel Aviv press leaks at that particular moment wld have been especially harmful to Jordan’s position vis-à-ivis other Arab States and might have had adverse effect on future Jordan-Israeli talks. Acheson 1 This telegram, presumably, was in response to telegram 64, April 3, p. 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] . It was repeated to Tel Aviv. 2 This message from Ambassador McDonald stated that “Shiloah told me April 5 King had sent informal message through Drew via American Embassy Tel Aviv Israel Government indicating Jordan intention resume negotiations. Since no such message was received from Amman, Drew please comment.” 684A.85/4–750) The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/4–1050: Telegram [Document 441] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Amman , April 10, 1950—7 p. m. 67. Boisanger and Azcarate arrived Amman from Jerusalem April 9 seeing Abdullah same day. He extended cordial welcome evincing enthusiasm PCC plan mediation under its auspices between Arab States and Israel. When I met with Boisanger and French Minister Du Marçay late same day former optimistic Jordan at least would utilize good offices PCC. April 10 Boisanger saw separately Prime Minister Tewfiq Pasha, Defense Minister Fawzi Pasha, Samir Pasha and Prime Minister. Apparently Said Pasha Mufti lunching later with King. All had made complete volte face from King’s position previous day insisting Jordan could only resume negotiations with Israel if Egypt took lead. Fawzi suggested possibility sending Jordan delegation Cairo effort prevail Egypt reverse current policy having in mind it was first Arab State undertake armistice negotiations but in same breath expressing complete lack hope progress that direction. King reflected same abrupt shift. Boisanger described all as “dégonflé”. 1 Boisanger thinks statements negotiations understood to have been made by Iraq, Syria and Lebanon (details not available here) in course last day or two responsible for reversal. He proceeding Damascus April 10 as planned but completely disillusioned prospect success at this time. Intends inform Israel authorities fully on return Tel Aviv advising them greater moderation in bargaining with Jordan offers only prospect saving situation. I fear visit of Boisanger while embers Arab League fire still glowing was most ill-timed. Shall seek and report clarification from government circles. Sent Department 67. Department pass London 27, Paris 7, Tel Aviv 27, Jerusalem 26, Baghdad 8, Beirut 11, Cairo 13, Damascus 10, Jidda 8, Geneva 23 for USPCC. Drew 1 Deflated. The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/4–1150: Telegram [Document 442] The Minister in Syria ( Keeley ) to the Secretary of State secret Damascus , April 11, 1950—7 p. m. 172. Depcirtel April 3; 1 a. m. Boisanger and party called on me today following unsatisfactory calls on Syrian officials. Latter were polite as usual but also as usual uninterested in discussion peace with Israel except in terms of as yet ignored UN resolutions, namely, return of Israel to partition boundaries and repatriation and compensation of refugees. As Boisanger’s itinerary would cause him to miss seeing Prime Minister Azm I urged him to alter it sufficiently to enable him to talk here with Khalyd Bey who is scheduled return Friday. I feel that of current Syrian leaders he offers best hope of breaking impasse. If agreement in principle could first be obtained on above basis he would I believe be willing, in agreement with other Arab States, to negotiate details which might provide for some territorial adjustments and some resettlement of refugees elsewhere than in Israel proper if adequately compensated. Without change in attitude on Israel’s part I see no possibility of progress toward so-called permanent accord. Boisanger gave me same report of Amman’s attitude as set forth so cogently by Drew (Amman Legtel 67, April 10 to Department) and said he felt that Jordan-Israel negotiations not likely even to be resumed unless Israel comes forth with some concessions. That holds for Syria as well except that concessions Syria will probably insist upon are those mentioned above, at least in principle. Since PCC proposal was an unpopular one as far as Syria is concerned I feel it was best that French member put it forward, but I also feel that visit to Near East by Palmer could have beneficial results. At least it might help him better to understand gravity of the problem and depth of Syrian feeling thereof. Sent Department 172, repeated Baghdad 31, Beirut 19, Jerusalem 8, Jidda 20, Tel Aviv 13. Department pass Amman 14, Cairo 38, London 22, Paris 20, Ankara 12, Geneva 4 for PCC. Keeley Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syriar–Iraq Affairs (Clark) 611.86/4–1250 [Document 443] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syriar–Iraq Affairs ( Clark ) confidential [ Washington ,] April 12, 1950. Subject: Necessity for Improving Arab-American Relations. Participants: Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State Dr. Stephen B. L. Penrose, Jr., President of the American University of Beirut Mr. Arthur Gardiner—NEA Mr. H.B. Clark—ANE Problem: Dr. Penrose believes that if steps are not taken to correct Arab misapprehensions concerning American policy in the Near East, there is a real danger that Communist influence will gain control there. Action Required: To re-study Dr. Penrose’s previous suggestions as to means for improving Arab-American relations. Action Assigned to: ANE Discussion: Mr. McGhee said that we would be very glad to have Dr. Penrose’s views concerning conditions in the Near East. Dr. Penrose replied that he regretted to say that distrust of American policy in the Near East had increased, if anything, within recent months. Regardless of what we may say to the contrary, Arab leaders and the Arab people are, to an increasing degree, convinced that every move we make in the area is for the benefit of Israel. At the same time, Communist propaganda activities have increased greatly both in volume and effectiveness. The Communists not only play upon traditional grievances of the under-privileged Arab people and encourage their dissatisfaction with their own governments: they also attribute all existing ills to Western policies, especially those of the United States. They say in effect, “You’ll never get justice out of the West. Abandon the United States and Britain and come along with us. We will fix everything up for you.” We were thus faced with more or less the same situation we had in China, where Government leaders and policies were discredited, but we also have the additional disadvantage of appearing in Arab eyes to be constantly supporting their worst enemy—an enemy whose avowed purpose was to gobble up their neighbors. Dr. Penrose expressed the opinion that the possibility of Russian penetration of the Near East is very real, and that in Syria especially the Communists might be able to take over during further periods of disorder. Mr. McGhee said that the charge that we were motivated solely by consideration for Israel was entirely untrue. We believed that the first essential for all the Arab countries was to stabilize the situation. It could not be shown that we had favored Israel to the disadvantage of the Arabs during the past year, for example. Dr. Penrose declared that the Arabs believed we had favored Israel on several occasions within the past year and once very recently. He had learned in Syria not long ago of an approach Minister Keeley had been instructed to make to Prime Minister Azm, urging Syria not to close its frontiers should Jordan contract a peace agreement with Israel. The Arabs felt that the only way they could prevent Israel from flooding their markets with Jewish goods and otherwise falling under Israeli domination was to maintain a rigid boycott of Israel. It was in self-defense that Syria had threatened to close its frontiers to Jordan should it sign a peace agreement with Israel, and yet the United States had in effect urged it not to exercise this right of self-defense against Israel. Mr. McGhee asked what Dr. Penrose thought we should have done in the circumstances. He replied that we could at least have kept quiet, as had the British. Mr. McGhee said that while we wished to convince the Arabs of the sincerity of our friendship, there were certain things we could not do. We could not, for example, agree to roll back the tide of events in Palestine. The Arabs refused to recognize that Israel exists, whereas the fact is Israel exists as a state and will continue to do so. The sooner the Arabs adjust themselves to that fact the better it will be for everyone concerned. Dr. Penrose said that most Arabs likewise agreed that Israel was here to stay. Mr. Clark said that in the past the Arabs had always been from two to ten years too late in taking advantage of favorable opportunities to achieve a reasonable settlement. The Arab Governments pleaded that they could not seize such opportunities because of public opinion, yet it was these very Governments who kept stirring up public opinion by taking more and more extreme stands. Dr. Penrose rejoined that the Israeli leaders were themselves by no means conciliatory and in fact appeared to do everything possible to enrage the Arabs. Why did they not show a conciliatory attitude? Mr. McGhee said that the Arabs not only criticized us unjustly of partiality for Israel but never gave us credit for many things we had done in the past for the benefit of the Arabs, sometimes in the face of Israeli protests arid notwithstanding the weight of opinion among American Jewry, which was solidly behind Israel. There was no escaping the fact that the Zionist movement did have the sympathy of an important section of the American electorate. He referred, for example, to the United Jewish Appeal paid advertisement, “America Speaks”, in the April 12 issue of the New York Times , which included statements from the Vice President of the United States and such leading figures as Republican Senator Taft and Franklin Roosevelt, Jr. We had not hesitated, however, to send some very stiff messages to the Israel Government at critical periods, which had had a moderating influence. We had likewise, for example, conducted our own investigation of charges of the Israel Government and of leading American Jewish organizations that the Iraqi Government was engaging in a campaign of persecution against its Jewish minority and had publicly stated our conclusion that these reports were without foundation. There were many other instances which could be cited showing the straightforward character of our policy. Dr. Penrose said that unfortunately none of the Arabs knew about these cases in which the United States could be shown in a friendly light. He wished that an effective informational campaign could be undertaken to acquaint the rank and file of the Arab people of American good will and especially of US readiness to stand first against Israel should it attempt to jump over the traces. He had always said that the United States should play a more active role in arranging a peace settlement between the Arabs and Israel and to reassure the Arabs that we would not stand idly by should Israel go over the borders which would be established. Mr. McGhee said that much thought had been given to the question of guarantees of frontiers or assurances short of guarantees. He was sure that Dr. Penrose realized that this Government was not in the same position as the United Kingdom, which had traditional strategic ties in the area and which was able to enter into treaties of alliance with the states in the area. However, we would continue to consider how we might appropriately contribute to area stability by some form of assurances concerning the frontiers which might be established between Israel and the Arab states. Mr. Clark observed that it was first necessary to establish the frontiers, and such frontiers could only be established through the conclusion of treaties of peace such as Jordan was endeavoring to conclude with Israel. We sincerely believed it was in the interest of Jordan and the other Arab states to facilitate peace settlements, and at least they should not do anything to deter them. That is why we expressed our strong disapproval of Syrian pressure upon King Abdullah in an endeavor to prevent conclusion of a peace agreement with Israel. In these circumstances we would do the same thing again tomorrow in the interest of achieving a peace settlement. Mr. McGhee said he would be glad to have any further suggestions Dr. Penrose might wish to make, and Dr. Penrose replied that he still stood by the suggestions he had made in his letter to Mr. McGhee last September (See letter dated September 9, 1949). 1 He especially thought it necessary for Israel to make some concessions to the Arabs, and perhaps the best thing we could do at this time would be for us to urge the Israeli Government to unfreeze the bank accounts of Palestinian Arabs who were now taking refuge in other Arab countries. This would go far toward appeasing the refugees and restoring confidence in the United States. Mr. McGhee said that we would be glad to go over the points raised in Dr. Penrose’s letter again and would like to have his further views upon his return to Washington next week. Dr. Penrose said that he might suggest that the United States assist him in setting up an Agricultural Department in the American University of Beirut, which was a project he considered one of the most worthwhile in the area. He would give the subject further thought and endeavor to come up with some specific suggestions upon his return. 1 Not printed. The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/4–1350: Telegram [Document 444] The Minister in Lebanon ( Pinkerton ) to the Secretary of State secret Beirut , April 13, 1950—1 p. m. 135. ReDepcirtel April 3, 1 a. m. Boisanger told me he had talked with President Khoury and with acting Foreign Minister re PCC proposals and is convinced Lebanon desires cooperate but can do nothing unless initiative is taken by some other Arab state preferably Egypt. His opinion agrees with mine after informal talk with acting Foreign Minister that all Arab states will act together on proposals re Israel particularly now following Arab League meeting. He stated that any pressure exerted should be directed toward Egypt which holds key to situation and that effort elsewhere would only result in irritation. Boisanger left for Jerusalem where he expects to see Ben-Gurion immediately upon arrival. Pinkerton Editorial Note [Document 445] Editorial Note The Twelfth Ordinary Session of the Arab League Council ended on April 13. Embassy Cairo, in despatch 969, May 2, transmitted the unofficial texts of decisions made and resolutions adopted at the Session, several of which dealt with the Palestine question. The first of these decisions, on April 1, concerned the question of Arab negotiations with Israel, the text of which is printed in telegram 332, April 4, from Cairo, page 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] . This text is presented in slightly different Wording in despatch 969. The decision of April 1 was amplified in a unanimous decision on April 13, as follows: “1. If an Arab League state learns of a violation of the Council’s decision of April 1, 1950, it shall report the matter immediately to the Secretariat General, which shall, in such an event and whenever it learns of such a violation, hasten to convoke the Political Committee to make a decision in the light of the information that it has received. “2. The Political Committee shall request the state alleged to have violated the above decision of the League Council to answer the allegations. If this state fails to present itself or to make a satisfactory reply within the time fixed, the Political Committee has the right to investigate the case and to issue an appropriate decision on the strength of the information received.” (Despatch 969, 786.00/5–250) The text of the decision of April 13 was transmitted originally in telegram 383, April 14, from Cairo, which stated that the approved resolution also included provisions to break diplomatic and consular relations with the offending state; to close common frontiers and end all financial, economic, and commercial relations; and to terminate all indirect financial and commercial relations with its citizens (786.00/4–1450). Telegram 383 also reported that the League Council on April 13, “Reaffirmed, with Jordan abstaining, the Political Commission’s resolution of April 12, 1948, to the effect that the entry of Arab Armies into Palestine was a temporary measure without the object of occupation or partition of Palestine and that territories occupied must be relinquished after liberation to the inhabitants for such rule as they desire.” Embassy Cairo had advised on April 13, that a strong tendency had developed at the League meeting “to recognize de facto administration but to refuse de jure annexation of Arab Palestine” (telegram 379, 786.00/4–1350). Adopted also on April 13 were a Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation among League members, the Military Annex to the Treaty, and the Protocol to the Treaty. The texts of the three measures were transmitted to the Department in Embassy Cairo’s despatches 761, April 14; 776, April 17; and 879, April 25, respectively; none is printed. Finally, on the same day, the League Council approved an amended decision of the Political Committee, as follows: “The Political Committee has examined the question of the attendance of its meetings by representatives of the All Palestine Government and has decided to invite the head of the Palestine Government, or whomsoever he may delegate, to attend these meetings whenever the Committee discusses questions of Palestine.” The remaining decisions on the Palestine question by the Arab League Council were made on April 8. A resolution was adopted continuing previous Arab practice of refusing to issue Arab visas to persons with passports bearing Israeli visas. A second resolution banned supplies to ships known to be carrying immigrants or contraband of war to Israel. Finally, the Council passed several resolutions dealing with the Arab interest in Jerusalem. The most significant of these, as transmitted in despatch 969, read as follows: “The demographic situation. The International Statute (for Jerusalem) should include a provision whereby the population of every zone shall remain as it was on November 29, 1947. Those (persons) who had Palestinian nationality on that date should be considered citizens of Jerusalem entitled to enjoy all the rights of nationals. Those not fulfilling this condition should be merely considered as residents. Those who resided in that zone after November 29, 1947, should be considered residents, in order that an equilibrium may be maintained between the two elements of the population, as on November 29, 1947. Another resolution stated that “In order to assure the prosperity of all the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the proportion of agricultural lands and real estate property possessed by the two elements of the population, should be the same as on November 29, 1947.” November 29, 1947 was the date the United Nations General Assembly voted to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish States and to internationalize the Jerusalem area. Unofficial texts of some of the resolutions were transmitted to the Department by Embassy Cairo in despatch 911, April 27 (786.00/4–2750). Concerning the visa and shipping resolutions adopted on April 8, Ambassador Caffery, on April 13, advised of information from Hakki Bey, Egyptian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that Egypt had been obliged to support these resolutions, which he agreed, reversed former Egyptian policy (telegram 376, from Cairo, 786.00/4–1350). Ambassador Caffery evaluated the Twelfth Session of the Arab League Council in his despatch 969, as follows: “it appears that little strength was added to the League structure by any of the decisions including that of the Collective Security Pact. On the contrary, it appears that [the] League attitude in regard to Jordan is likely to pave the way for further deterioration of relations between Jordan and the Arab League. It also further demonstrated that the League operates under Egyptian influence.” The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/4–1450: Telegram [Document 446] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential Cairo , April 14, 1950—4 p. m. 384. Azcarate, Secretary PCC, tells us that Foreign Ministry [ Minister ] Salaheddin Bey declined this morning on behalf of Arab States to participate in new committees as proposed by PCC until Israel accepted GA Resolution of December 11, 1948, on refugees. Salaheddin in prepared statement as approved by Arab League Council (mytel 383, April 14 1 ) reviewed attitude of Israel along lines reported mytel 377, April 13 2 and stated Arabs regarded as key question whether Israel would in fact accept principle of return of refugees as formulated in GA Resolution. In addition Arabs would also expect Israel to guarantee safety of returning refugees and to apply Charter of Human Eights to them. If Israel accepted these conditions Arabs would send delegation to meet Israeli delegation under PCC chairmanship. Arabs would join other committees on matters where Israel agreed in principle. Boisanger replied that he would report the Arab statement to his PCC colleagues. Azcarate said Boisanger was obviously disappointed and felt that Arab attitude together with the publications blast from Tel Aviv on Arabs made prospect of peace very difficult. Sent Department 384, pouched London, Tel Aviv, Arab capitals. Caffery 1 Not printed; but see editorial note, supra . 2 Not printed; it advised that Foreign Minister Salaheddin supported Arab League acceptance of the Palestine Conciliation Commission’s proposal for a series of committees but that the trend in the Political Committee of the League was opposed (357.AC/4–1350). The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 611.84/4–1750: Telegram [Document 447] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Amman , April 17, 1950—6 p. m. 72. During courtesy visit April 17 to new Prime Minister Said Pasha Mufti 1 he informed me that Parliament has been convened for April 24 instead May 1 and I understand from other sources reason advancing date is to expedite finalization Union Arab Palestine with Jordan. Prime Minister explained that King in his speech from throne would propose union. Parliamentary committee then drafts report on speech which submits to Parliament for debate approval by Parliament and promulgation of law by King would presumably constitute final action on union (LegDesp 57 April 14). 2 Prime Minister asked whether US intended recognize union. I answered view expression will of people both areas concerned April 11 elections I did not believe my government would express any opposition but I could not now state when or how our formal recognition of Union would be forthcoming. Kirkbride tells me that in exchange views on subject with Foreign Office question has been raised by London whether formal recognition union by US and UK at this time might not weaken Jordan’s position vis-à-vis Arab League and consequently in any eventual peace negotiations with Israel. Kirkbride has told London on contrary he feels our formal recognition union would strengthen Jordan’s position both respects. I agree with him. Prime Minister confirmed general opinion approximately 60 percent registered voters eastern Jordan and 65 percent in western participated April 11 elections. This widely and I believe accurately interpreted as constituting plebiscite union issue. Prime Minister expects union will receive near unanimous approval members Parliament. While situation re resumption negotiations with Israel continues stalemate (Legtel 67 April 10), I believe hesitancy our part extending de jure recognition union would serve no useful purpose and on contrary prompt recognition by US and UK would be calculated serve our basic interest in political stability this part world and could conceivably make it easier for Abdullah get Israeli negotiations off present dead center. I assume this action would be consistent with decision Istanbul Chiefs of Mission Conference. While others will have to evaluate nature and extent opposition to union which will be provoked neighboring countries I cannot conceive would be of such magnitude as to outweigh desirable consequences. I do not consider any argument union would conflict UN decisions to be realistic. I understand decree finalizing union will not freeze existing boundaries with Israel but will be drafted such way as to include any additional territory eventually transferred from or exchanged with Israel by peaceful means. While I have not raised issue with Prime Minister or Cabinet officials I assume decree of incorporation will not exclude Arab Jerusalem from its effects. Further assume we and British in any action taken will wish reserve our position re Jerusalem. I recommend that if decision on de jure recognition union is favorable it be extended promptly and wholeheartedly. Sent Department 72, Department pass London 31, Paris 9, Jerusalem 29, pouched Tel Aviv and Arab capitals. Drew 1 Tewfik Abdel Huda resigned as Prime Minister on April 12. Said el-Mufti became Prime Minister in the new Cabinet on April 13, with Mohained Shureiki as Foreign Minister. 2 Not printed. Editorial Note [Document 448] Editorial Note The question of British, French, and other contributions to the budget of the Palestine Refugee Agency (see telegrams 52, January 5, to London and 103, January 10, to Paris, pages 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] and 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] ) continued to present anxiety to the Department of State. Ambassador Blandford reported from Geneva on April 18 that the British had proposed a $7,000,000 contribution, of which $2,800,000 was to be earmarked as a loan to Jordan; and that the French were contemplating a total contribution of about $3,000,000, to be furnished in two installments. He stated that he had strongly emphasized to his British and French colleagues on the Advisory Commission that the original estimates, which amounted to $12,000,000 and $6,000,000 for British and French contributions; the problem of hearings on appropriations in the Congress; the weakness of the PRA negotiating position with Near Eastern countries; the danger and ultimate additional cost of delaying the works program; and other factors. (Telegram 537, identified also as Rapun 1, from Geneva, 357.AC/4–1850) Ambassador Blandford reported further on May 25 that the British contribution had been increased to $9,000,000 and that the French contribution would amount to 500,000,000 francs in June and another 500,000,000 at the end of the year “if PRA shows progress, has projects in Syria and Lebanon and improves percentage employment French nationals.” (Telegram 231, identified also as Rapun 12, from Beirut, 320.2AA/5–2550) The Embassy in Paris, on May 31, noted that this amount totalled approximately $2,800,000 and was “disappointing” compared with the State Department estimate of $6,000,000. (Telegram 2594, from Paris, 320.2AA/5–3150) The Department of State, in a telegram of May 31 to Paris, which was sent prior to the receipt of No. 2594, observed that the French contribution of 1,000,000,000 francs was only approximately one-third of the British contribution and that unless it were raised about one-half of the British figure, fulfillment of the PRA program was unlikely. The Department instructed the Embassy to approach the French Foreign Office with these considerations and point out that the French prerequisites in the face of an unsatisfactory contribution would hamper the freedom of action of the PRA and imply “spheres of influence” so repugnant to the Arabs. (Telegram 2490, to Paris, 320.2AA/5–2550) On June 2, the Department informed Ambassador Blandford that the British and American Embassies in Paris were making parallel approaches to the French Foreign Office, requesting that the French contribution be increased to at least one-half of the British contribution. (Telegram 246, identified also as Unrap 15, to Beirut 320.2AA/5–2550) The Department, on May 10, informed Ambassador Blandford that “To avoid dissipation US contribution on relief early months program, considered desirable stretch US funds over 18 months period. … This course will it is hoped expedite firm forward commitments other contributors.” (Telegram 201, identified also as Unrap 4, 320.2AA/5–1050) Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 357.AC/4–1950 [Document 449] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] April 19, 1950. Subject: Jerusalem Participants: Mr. Eliahu Elath, Ambassador of Israel Mr. Aubrey Eban, Permanent Israeli Representative in the United Nations NEA—Mr. McGhee UND—Mr. Gerig ANE—Mr. Rockwell Discussion: Messrs. Eban and Elath called at their request. They desired to discuss the question of Jerusalem. Mr. Eban briefly reviewed the recent deliberations in the Trusteeship Council, saying that Israel at first had hoped that the Council would abandon the 1947 [ 1948 ] Statute and consider alternative proposals, but that it soon became evident that the Council members believed they had no choice but to go ahead under the instructions of the General Assembly. The result was the approval by the Council of a “completely unrepresentative and unrealistic document” which did not in any way take into account the allegiance of the people of Jerusalem for Israel and Jordan respectively. Despite this fact, Israel still thought that there could be achieved the main objectives of the United Nations in Jerusalem. These were described by Mr. Eban as being the protection and control of the Holy Places and the maintenance of religious and spiritual rights. He mentioned the procedure suggested by Israel in the last General Assembly whereby there would be a contract between Israel and the United Nations providing for a UN representative to be accredited to the Israel Government who would have as his function the supervision of the protection of and free access to the Holy Places. Mr. Eban said that Israel was now prepared to make proposals which would go further than this, as follows: 1. The UN would establish a statute for Jerusalem which would spring from the authority of the United Nations itself and not be in the form of a contract between the UN and the occupying powers. 2. Instead of an accredited representative of the United Nations in Jerusalem, there would be a representation of the United Nations, established as a result of the right of the world community so to indicate its interest in the Holy City. This representation would be wholly separate from the occupying states and would be a sovereign authority of the United Nations. 3. The UN representation would have full control of the Holy Places, including protection, free access, repairs, etc. There might even be a certain degree of extraterritoriality as far as the Holy Places were concerned. The UN representation would have the sole power of decision in disputes between the different religious communities in Jerusalem. Mr. Eban emphasized that insofar as the Holy Places were concerned the authority of the occupying Governments would more or less be withdrawn. Mr. Eban added that Israel was willing to consider the extension of the authority of the UN representation to religious sites outside of Jerusalem and not included in the “status quo”. The exact terms of the Israeli proposal were not as yet set down on paper but Mr. Eban thought they would be in a week or so. Mr. Eban stated that of course the attitude of Jordan was very important, and that a reaction to the new Israeli proposal might be that Israel was being very generous with Holy Places located in Jordanian territory. So far Jordan had adopted an uncompromising attitude toward recognizing any authority of the UN in Jerusalem. Messrs. Eban and Elath thought that it was very important that if Israel made a counterproposal in the Trusteeship Council such as the one outlined above, Jordan not maintain its present negative attitude. They pointed out that the Israeli proposal alone would not solve the problem and that if Israel and Jordan could agree they might together approach representatives of the world religious community. Mr. Eban said that later on Israel would appreciate an expression of the views of the United States on its new proposal. Perhaps there would be an opportunity for the US to make helpful statements in the June session of the Trusteeship Council with a view that the Council in reporting to the fall meeting of the General Assembly, might make favorable reference to the Israeli proposal. It would also be helpful if the US could see its way clear to influencing Jordan to change its present negative attitude. Mr. McGhee said that the US had given a great deal of thought to the Jerusalem question. However, the US was only one of a number of Christian nations deeply interested in the matter. Therefore, we had felt that we could not take as much initiative concerning Jerusalem as we had, for example, in the refugee question. He added that it was quite apparent that the General Assembly last fall did not feel that Israel was willing to go far enough to meet the international point of view on Jerusalem, and said that the new Israeli proposal seemed to indicate progress in the right direction. However, the Vatican was every bit as important as Jordan. The Department would consider whether it could be helpful in this new approach but it was, of course, not possible to make any commitments at the present time. Mr. McGhee then suggested that Israel make renewed efforts to reach agreement with Jordan and the Vatican. Mr. Eban complained that the present Israeli contacts with Jordan were very poor and that the influence of some friendly nation would be very desirable. With regard to the Vatican the situation was very complex, but Catholic representatives with whom the Israelis had talked tended to continue to think in terms of a territorial international enclave. Israel was firmly opposed to this idea and so was Jordan. Therefore, agreement with the Vatican seemed far off. Mr. Rockwell inquired whether Israel would be willing to consider adding other points to its proposal, such as the demilitarization of Jerusalem. Mr. Eban said that this would have to be very carefully considered. He did not think that it was generally realized how much progress had been made toward the demilitarization of Jerusalem under the armistice agreements. In conclusion, Mr. Eban said that Mr. Garreau, the President of the Trusteeship Council, would receive the Israeli proposal in ten days or so. Action Required: To determine US attitude toward new proposal when received. Action Assigned to: ANE, UND Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 884.00/4–1950 [Document 450] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] April 19, 1950. Subject: General Palestine Situation Participants: Dr. Yusuf Haikal, Minister of Jordan NEA—Mr. McGhee ANE—Mr. Rockwell Problem: Dr. Haikal desired to discuss the general Palestine situation and the Jordanian economic position. Mr. McGhee received Dr. Haikal at the latter’s request. The Minister wished to have a general discussion with Mr. McGhee. In this discussion, Dr. Haikal made the following points: 1. The breakdown of the Israel–Jordan talks clearly indicated the necessity that Israel make some kind of real concessions to Jordan. If King Abdullah had been able to show any such concessions to his Government, there would not have been strong opposition to reaching agreement with Israel. 2. The Arab League would probably expel Jordan from the League if Jordan reached an agreement with Israel, but would not do so if Jordan annexed Arab Palestine. 3. The new Jordanian cabinet was very weak. The Palestinian members were of low caliber. Mr. McGhee asked Dr. Haikal what the present Jordanian attitude toward Jerusalem was. The Minister replied that Jordan would admit United Nations supervision only. Mr. McGhee suggested that it would be necessary for Jordan and Israel to make some concessions to the international community if the UN were going to reach an agreement on Jerusalem. Dr. Haikal then said that an economic crisis was rapidly approaching in Jordan. There was enough food in the country, but no employment and thus no money to buy the food. The Jordanian budget was inadequate in the circumstances and the presence of the Palestinian refugees was going to have disastrous effects in the near future. Mr. McGhee observed that the Palestine Refugee Agency was going to spend a great deal of money in Jordan. The cooperative attitude shown by Jordan was deeply appreciated, and it seemed likely that Jordan would receive more of the PRA funds than any other of the Arab states. The Minister thought that a combination of PRA and Point IV 1 might bring some much desired relief to the Jordanian economy. If the results of the PRA operations become obvious in Jordan, King Abdullah’s policy would be strengthened and his position greatly improved. The trouble was that everyone in Jordan had heard much concerning the PRA’s plans but had not seen much in the way of concrete action. The King’s position would be still further strengthened if the Israelis would make some concessions to Jordan. Action Required: None Action Assigned to: 1 For documentation on the Point IV Program in the Middle East, see pp. 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] ff. The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/4–1930: Telegram [Document 451] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Geneva , April 19, 1950—8 p. m. 548. Palun 348. Today and 17 April PCC had most cordial and satisfactory meetings with Director and Advisory Commission PRA who leave tomorrow for Beirut. Meetings consisted of exchange views on respective roles PCC and PRA, which revealed no misunderstandings or differences of opinion, and review by members of PCC of developments Middle East and progress PCC’s work. It was agreed effective liaison between two bodies should be maintained and that staff members PRA and PCC Jerusalem should be designated to receive and transmit information of interest both groups. As yet no reply has been received from Israel to PCC proposal. Sharett requested Boisanger forward information coming from Arab states to him through Kahany, local Israeli liaison officer with European headquarters UN. PCC has communicated to Kahany 1 substance Arab reply, given Boisanger Cairo 14 April, with request Israel reply be made in near future and that such reply be given PCC on merits PCC proposal and without undue concern over Arab reply to Boisanger. PCC is hampered in dealing with present critical stage by absence qualified representatives Israel and Arab states. Israeli officials have already made statements in press tantamount to negative reply to Arab answer. USDel is convinced that best move Israel can make, in own interests, is to accept promptly and without condition PCC proposal and send representatives here to work out details. PCC proposal is in fact affirmative response to Israel’s own demand for direct negotiations to settle all outstanding questions, and while it includes provision for PCC mediation, the latter proposal has been explained by us to apparent satisfaction Eban and Rafael. In absence an affirmative and unconditional reply from Israel there is little with which PCC can go to Arabs in effort obtain satisfaction amendment their position. Under the circumstances, USDel believes this viewpoint can be most effectively expressed to Israel by Department in Washington and AmEmb Tel Aviv. Eytan has stated to press recently that talks with PCC in Lausanne, New York and Geneva have got exactly nowhere. He should remember that at Israel’s request Geneva talks have left greatest possible freedom of action and initiative to Israel, which has got Israel exactly nowhere. It could well be impressed upon Israelis that more reliance on PCC assistance and less on their own methods might in end be more profitable. Unless Israelis ready make genuine and magnanimous effort through PCC, USDel sees little prospect peace negotiations with any Arab state in near future or any justification for continuation PCC’s efforts. Arabs have for first time agreed sit down with Israel provided principles UN resolution area agreed to. Unless Israel meets this challenge we doubt Arab states mood is such that any further concessions will be forthcoming from them. Israeli acceptance unconditionally of PCC proposal would in our opinion be effective acceptance Arab challenge which would provide opportunity work out terms of reference for overall conference which, when put into operation, would not, we are convinced, prejudice Israel’s interests. USDel recommends Department consider making known these views to Government Israel through Embassy Washington and AmEmb Tel Aviv. Boisanger and Eralp 2 concur in our view and of necessity such démarche . They intend recommend immediately similar action to their respective FonOff’s with whom Department may wish coordinate. [ Palmer ] 1 Menahem Kahany, member of the Israeli Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. 2 Orhan Eralp, Adviser to the Turkish Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission. The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/4–2250: Telegram [Document 452] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret niact Geneva , April 22, 1950—3 p. m. 559. Palun 349. Rafael called on USDel last night en route New York from Israel. He had stopped in Geneva at Sharett’s suggestion to talk with USDel concerning Israel’s reply to PCC proposal of March 29. Having received from PCC substance Arab answer to Boisanger in Cairo 14 April, Israel would have to take into account real purpose and intent Arab answer. Israel regarded Arab answer as completely “bogus” and designed to make it impossible for Israel to reply affirmatively. Israel had received from most reliable source including Jordan delegation to Arab League, account of Arab League Political Committee decision with respect PCC proposal. It had been clearly stated that Arab answers should be couched in terms to give appearance of cooperation with PCC while in fact “thwarting” PCC’s efforts bring about agreement. Israel was thus convinced Arab states were as far as ever from making decision in favor final peace. Jordan however still intended renew peace negotiations and Israel put its greatest reliance on this prospect. Rafael read from letter which he said came from Abdullah in which King outlined steps he intended take. These were: (1) to proclaim on April 25 annexation east Palestine. (2) Immediately thereafter Jordan would welcome return of Shiloah to renew talks. (3) Discussions should take place both in Palestine and Geneva. Neither Israelis nor Jordanians would take seriously Geneva discussion where PCC would be used simply as “cover” for real talks in Palestine. (4) At later stage if it seemed desirable agreement reached locally could be brought forward for final acceptance under auspices PCC. Rafael did not know what changes in previously initialed agreement King contemplated, if any. Israel had made clear to Jordan, however, that Israel would look favorably upon annexation eastern Palestine only within context of final peace settlement or nonaggression pact. In discussing further Israel’s reply to PCC proposal, Rafael agreed that an affirmative, unconditional reply by both Israel and Jordan might strengthen Jordan’s position vis-à-vis Arab League and pave way for Israeli-Jordan agreement. Israel’s present intention however was simply to reply to PCC by reaffirming desire for settlement of all outstanding differences and by “clarifying” Israel’s understanding of mediation. While Israel accepted USDel’s definition of mediation, Israel was not sure other Commission members had similar views and was quite sure Arab views on mediation were entirely different. At same time Israel’s attitude would be affected substantially by knowing whether or not PCC would take clear and unequivocal position on Arab reply and for this reason Israel wished to know USDel’s views before deciding finally on its answer. We told Rafael that in our opinion only way PCC could take the clear and unequivocal position Israel desired was to receive from Israel an affirmative, unconditional reply to PCC proposal. With such a reply, PCC would have strongest answer to Arab’s conditions. We feared moreover that should Israel undertake so-called clarification of mediation, this would start all over again the process of trying to reconcile unreconcilable views. If on other hand Israel accepted PCC formulation on mediation as contained in memorandum of 29 March, which did not differ from USDel views on mediation, whole theoretical question might be avoided in practice without prejudicial effect. In short PCC could be of greatest assistance under present circumstances if Israel’s answer was on merits of PCC proposal and without reference either to Arab reply or to what was behind Arab reply. Discussion of pros and cons this question lasted for hour and half, in very frank and friendly exchange of viewpoints and in “thinking out loud together”. Rafael said that he would make known our views to Israel Government. We had impression he was partially convinced at least of wisdom unconditional acceptance. He suggested possibility of Israel’s clarifying mediation question in press and public relations campaign which Israel was considering undertaking, without including question in reply to PCC. Such a campaign in itself might prove dangerous to healthy atmosphere, but for time being USDel feels it is most important concentrate on encouraging acceptance our proposal without conditions. Department assistance this respect (Palun 348 April 19) at this time will be most helpful. [ Palmer ] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 785.022/4–2450 [Document 453] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs secret [ Washington ,] April 24, 1950. Subject: Union of Arab Palestine and Jordan and Extension of Anglo-Jordan Treaty to New Territory. Participants: Mr. Burrows, British Embassy Mr. Greenhill, British Embassy NEA—Mr. Hare ANE—Mr. Rockwell Problem: The British Foreign Office planned to issue a declaration recognizing the union of Arab Palestine and Transjordan and stating the view that the Anglo-Jordan Treaty applied to the new territory. The Foreign Office hoped the US would be able to issue a declaration of approval of the Union. Action Required: To consider what action should be taken by the US on the occasion of the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, and the US reaction to the British démarche . Action Assigned to: ANE, NEA. Discussion: Mr. Burrows and Mr. Greenhill called under instructions to leave copies of two telegrams from the Foreign Office. The first telegram said that, on the assumption that the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan would shortly be proclaimed, it was the intention of the Foreign Office, soon after the proclamation, to announce recognition of the union and to state the view that the Anglo-Jordan Treaty applied to Arab Palestine. At the same time the Foreign Office would announce de jure recognition of Israel. Either at the same time or later, the Foreign Office intended to issue a further statement declaring UK opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any Near Eastern states, and the UK intention of using its influence to prevent any such development. The second telegram contained the text of the statement which the Foreign Office was considering issuing on the occasion of the proclamation of the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan. In addition to recognition of the union and the extension of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty, the statement declared that in view of the fact that the frontiers between Arab Palestine and Israel had not yet been defined, the UK regarded the territory of Jordan to which the Anglo-Jordan Treaty was applicable as being that bounded by the armistice lines, until such time as definite frontiers were established by final settlement. The statement also declared that the UK did not recognize Jordan sovereignty over Arab Jerusalem, but that, in view of the fact that Jordan exercised de facto authority in the Old City, the UK considered that the Anglo-Jordan Treaty applied to the Old City unless or until the United Nations should have established effective authority there. In conclusion, the statement said that the UK had no intention of establishing military bases in peacetime in Arab Palestine. Mr. Burrows said that the Foreign Office had given full consideration to the points made by Departmental representatives in the last meeting on this general subject but still hoped the US would be able to make a declaration approving the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan. The Foreign Office believed that such a declaration would be helpful in promoting the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. Mr. Hare inquired as to the timing of the proposed UK declaration. Mr. Burrows did not know exactly what the timing was, but thought the Foreign Office would wish to take action shortly after announcement of action by Jordan. Mr. Hare said that the Department had thought of discussing this subject further during the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. The Department’s policy was not fully developed but, frankly, the Department was still worried by the same points which had been taken up in the last meeting, such as Jerusalem and the position of the PCC. We had been thinking that the ideal situation would be for the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan to take place in the context of a final peace settlement, but we had an open mind as regards other occasions. Unilateral action was not the best method but, if that course were adopted, we had hoped that it would be possible for the union to take place quietly, as a sort of prolongation of a de facto situation. Mr. Hare added that we had also been considering the possibility of US–UK declarations concerning general security in the Near East and of possibly tying them in with the Near Eastern arms situation. We still did not feel that the Jordan union afforded an appropriate peg on which to hang such declarations. We were specifically thinking of the apprehensions of Israel and Egypt, with the idea of seeing if there wasn’t something general which could be applied to the situation. We were planning to put forward certain considerations in London during the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Mr. Hare then inquired of Mr. Burrows what the UK thought the reaction of Israel and the Arab states to the declaration would be. Mr. Burrows thought that Israel would protest unilateral action but would not feel too deeply about it. As regards the Arabs, they all would make vocal protests but none would take serious action except possibly Syria, which might close its frontier with Jordan. The UK was prepared to disregard all this. Mr. Hare asked what would be accomplished by a public announcement concerning something which could quietly be accomplished de facto . Mr. Burrows said that it was essential for the UK to let the Near Easterly states know exactly where it stood concerning Arab Palestine. 1 In response to a further question from Mr. Hare, Mr. Burrows said he did not believe that the extension of the Anglo-Jordan Treaty would add a new element to the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement. Mr. Burrows commented that he thought it was essential for the US and UK to make declarations on the union before the USSR had an opportunity to say something which might create a disturbing influence. Mr. Hare said frankly that the Department’s position was pretty much the same as it had been when this matter was last discussed. He saw no reason to change our basic attitude. Mr. Burrows then remarked that if the US was not able to go along with the UK on a declaration on the union, perhaps it could make a general statement about security in the Near East at the same time. Mr. Hare stated that, if the US was not able to go along with the UK on the union statement, the Department might suggest withholding the general statement until we could find a satisfactory common basis for this statement, possibly in connection with the armament situation. We had developed some ideas on this on the working level which were now awaiting top level clearance. If such clearance were obtained, we hoped to bring the matter up in London at the Foreign Ministers’ conference. Mr. Burrows inquired what the Department would say when the press asked for comments on the union. Mr. Hare replied that the Department might say that the union was a de facto situation which did not require formal recognition. As regards the Treaty, this was a matter for interpretation by the two parties. Mr. Burrows commented that, frankly, London would be “horrified” if the US were to indicate that it disapproved of the Jordan Parliament’s action in proclaiming a union. Mr. Hare said that this whole thing was a matter which would have to be very carefully thought out as far as the US position was concerned. The situation in the Near East was rather tense at the present time. Two of our Legations had been bombed, 2 presumably because of our efforts to accelerate peace between Jordan and Israel. A US declaration of approval of the Union of Arab Palestine and Jordan might be taken as another step in the same direction. It was necessary to let an explosive situation quiet down. The US and the UK were basically after the same thing in this matter, and it was purely a question of tactics. Mr. Hare reiterated that he saw no reason for the Department to change its position as regards a US declaration on the union question or the use of this occasion for a general security statement. 1 In a parallel discussion between Embassy officers and the British Foreign Office on April 24, the latter gave its views that the “time had come back Abdullah against Arab League” and that “extension [of] treaty to Israel border should be best assurance to Arabs against possibility Israeli expansion.” (Telegram 2236, April 25, from London, 784.02/4–2550) 2 The U.S. Legations at Damascus and Beirut were bombed during the evening of April 18. For documentation on the bombing of the Legation at Damascus, see pp. 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 665 ] ff. The Consul General at Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Department of State 784.02/4–2450 [Document 454] The Consul General at Jerusalem ( Gibson ) to the Department of State 1 No. 107 Jerusalem , April 24, 1950. Subject: Remarks Made by King Abdullah on April 19, 1950 Regarding the Future Status of Jerusalem The April 21, 1950 issue of the Arab Jerusalem paper, Falastin , carried the following statement reported to have been said by King Abdullah on April 19 regarding the future status of Arab-held Jerusalem: “Pointing across the window overlooking the mosque area H.M. said: this is El Aqsa mosque which God has blessed. The mosque is an Islamic legacy embodying the holiness and grandeur of Islam. Am I to surrender it, whilst it is a pledge binding my neck and a point I defended with the blood of my soldiers, to a foreign administration called internationalization? No—No—I shall not do so and if I did I should not be Abdullah ibn Hussein. Should I surrender it so that the remaining part of Palestine will be lost? No, emphatically, no. But why do certain Arab parties and presses ignore these facts or attempt Precognition by taking a negative course in this case.” For the Consul General: John B. Root 1 This despatch was repeated to Amman and Tel Aviv. The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684.85/4–2550: Telegram [Document 455] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State Amman , April 25, 1950. 82. Following is translation of statement received from Jordan Foreign Ministry which includes text of Parliament’s decision of April 24 on union eastern and western Jordan. Covering Foreign Office note states decision approved unanimously by members both houses and took effect from moment of signing by King at 5 p. m. Apr. 24. “After the National Parliament studied and debated in its meeting held on Monday April 24, the resolution of unity between the two banks of the Jordan, this resolution having been submitted by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, the National Parliament approved it and decided to submit it to His Majesty, the Hashemite Exalted King, in order to have the Royal approval and signature. This is the decision: “In confirmation of the confidence of the nation and in recognition of the good efforts for the realization of national aspirations exerted by His Majesty Abdullah Ben-el-Husein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, and in accordance with the right of self-determination, the existing situation of the two banks of the Jordan, the eastern and western, their national, physical, geographical unity and the necessities of their common interests, the Jordan Parliament, representing both banks, decides on this day, Monday, April the 24th, 1950, and declares the following: “1. Approval is granted to complete unity between the two banks of the Jordan, the eastern and western, and their amalgamation in one single state—the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, under the crown of His Hashemite Majesty, King Abdullah Ben-el-Husein, the Exalted. This will be upon the basis of Parliamentary Constitutional rule and complete equality in rights and duties of all the citizens. “2. Arab rights in Palestine shall be protected. Those rights shall be defended with all possible legal means and this unity shall in no way be connected with the final settlement of Palestine’s just cause within the limits of national hopes Arab cooperation and international justice. “3. This decision which has been taken by the two houses of the National Parliament, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, representing both banks of the Jordan shall be submitted to His Majesty, the Exalted King, and it shall be effective as soon as it is signed and approved by His Majesty. “4. Declaration and implementation of this decision by the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan shall follow as soon as the decision receives the Royal approval and signature. It shall then be announced to the sister Arab states and the friendly foreign states according to traditional diplomatic methods.” 1 Drew 1 The Legation in Amman forwarded to the Department on May 1 a translation with slightly different wording. (Despatch 69, 684.85/3–150) The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684.85/4–2650: Telegram [Document 456] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , April 26, 1950—1 p. m. 84. Tel Aviv’s 286, April 23. 1 At audience with King April 26 he described as optimistic and premature any suggestion negotiations with Israel would be resumed immediate future. He said first he must wait subsidence tempest in Arab teapot re Union east and west Jordan. Next he has in mind attitude Parliament re resumption negotiations. However, he was not pessimistic re Parliament pointing out that Palestine members in particular have stake in settlement because of property and other interests Israeli held territory. He even ventured it not impossible Parliament itself might take initiative pressing for settlement with Israel. Kirkbride informs me King has received message from Shiloah expressing hope talks will soon be resumed and that at meeting with Jordan officials Kirkbride could be present. He has wired Foreign Office for instructions re this rather remarkable proposal. Having in mind the many factors involved including reluctance Prime Minister resume negotiations; known opposition considerable number members Parliament; recent decision Arab League; and pending question recognition Act of Union of April 24, I should be surprised if negotiations were resumed in very near future. Shall endeavor keep informed of developments while avoiding any appearance of pressing for early resumption which I consider momentarily inopportune. Sent Department 84, Department pass London 33, Tel Aviv 29, Jerusalem 31, Cairo 16, Damascus 15, Jidda 10, Beirut 14, Baghdad 10. Drew 1 Not printed; it reported information from Mr. Shiloah that “we have word from Amman that Jordan-Israel contacts will be resumed week of 23rd.” (684.85/4–2350) Mr. Shiloah reaffirmed, on April 24, his expectation of seeing King Abdullah “this week”, although a specific date had not been fixed. He also indicated Israeli expectation that King would seek additional concessions as compensation for the threats by the Arab League (telegram 293, April 25, 684.85/4–2550). Tel Aviv reported on April 25 that today’s newspapers carried a statement by the spokesman of the Israeli Government to the effect that the annexation of Arab Palestine was a “unilateral act” and that the “status of Arab areas west of Jordan ‘remained open question as far as Israel concerned’. Spokesman continued Jordan’s move in no way bound Israel and he reiterated government’s ‘firm intention’ to abide by armistice agreement but added entailed final political settlement. He concluded to effect no final settlement would be possible without negotiation peace treaty between two countries.” (Telegram 298, 684A.85/4–2550) Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations (McDermott) of the Press and Radio News Conference of the Secretary of State on April 26, 1950 ON Files: Lot 60 D 641 1 [Document 457] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations ( McDermott ) of the Press and Radio News Conference of the Secretary of State on April 26, 1950 April 26, 1950 [Extract] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Annexation of Arab Palestine by Jordan Asked if he had any comment to make on the annexation of Arab Palestine by Jordan, the Secretary said that the elections, which were held on the 24th, were on the basis of the incorporation of Arab Palestine into the Hashemite Kingdom. He continued that those elections had taken place and that this action of the Parliament was to ratify that decision. Mr. Acheson remarked that our American attitude was that normally we had no objection whatever to the union of people who were mutually desirous of this new relationship. He continued that in this case it had a bearing on the efforts we had made through the United Nations to solve the Palestine matter. He said that we were studying it from that point of view, adding that he thought that was all he could say about it at the present time. (Following the press conference, the correspondents were informed that it was on April 11 when the Jordanian Parliamentary elections were held in which the voters from Arab Palestine participated. They were told that the date referred to by the Secretary, April 24th, was the date of the ratification by the Jordanian Parliament of the union rather than the date of the elections.) 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . M. J. McDermott 1 Lot 60 D 641 is a collection of memoranda of the Press Conferences of the Secretary of State (1935–1955), Department of State Radio (Wireless) Bulletins (1935–1946), News Digests (1945–1952), and other unclassified press materials for the years 1906–1954, as maintained by the Office of News, Bureau of Public Affairs. 2 The Department of State, on April 26, informed Amman that it did “not contemplate making further public statements” on the union of Jordan and Arab Palestine. It also instructed Minister Drew to send a note to the Jordanian Government stating that the United States Government had instructed him to acknowledge receipt of the decree on union (telegram 52, 684.85/4–2650). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) 785.022/4–2650 [Document 458] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) secret [ Washington ,] April 26, 1950. Subject: British Intention to Issue a Statement Following Announcement of the Union of Central Palestine with Jordan Participants: Mr. Burrows, British Embassy NEA: Mr. Hare Mr. Burrows called late yesterday afternoon to ask if we had anything which we could tell him further regarding our reaction to the message which he had delivered the day before regarding the British intention to issue a statement following announcement of the union of central Palestine with Jordan. I told Mr. Burrows that we had been giving the matter serious thought and that the result had been essentially along the line of what we had previously told him, i.e., that although we favored the inclusion of central Palestine in Jordan at the appropriate time, we felt that unilateral action to that effect by the Jordan Government was of such a character as to make it difficult for us to announce official and public approbation. I then told Mr. Burrows the suggested line which we had submitted to the Secretary for Use in reply to any questions which might be put to him by the press and said that we would probably limit our action to such an informal expression of opinion. Mr. Burrows inquired whether this meant that we also felt that that would not be an appropriate occasion to issue a declaration or statement regarding general security in the Near East. I replied that such was the case and reminded him that this was a matter which we had hoped to bring up for consideration with the British and possibly the French at the London Conference. I added that, whereas I had not been certain when I talked to him the night before that such a proposal would actually be made, I now had information confirming our intention to do so. I indicated that in the circumstances, it would be helpful if the British could see their way clear to deferring action on their general statement until we could discuss the matter in London. Mr. Burrows said that the message which he had received from London indicated that the statement on general security might in fact be timed either immediately following the union proclamation or at some later date and that it was consequently possible that the British Government might wish to defer its action in order to permit discussion with us. Mr. Burrows said he would get a telegram off on the subject to London. Immediately after this conversation, I told Mr. McGhee of my discussion with Mr. Burrows and he authorized me to tell Mr. Burrows that, in view of our intention of discussing this matter in London, the Department would strongly urge that the British Government refrain from issuing its general statement until we had had an opportunity for discussion. I telephoned Mr. Burrows to this effect and he said he would make this point clear in his telegram to London. Late this afternoon, Mr. Burrows telephoned me to say that the Embassy had received a reply to his telegram of the night before regarding a statement on the Near Eastern Security and that decision had been reached to postpone British action in this regard in order to afford an opportunity for discussion of the matter in London. 1 1 Embassy London, on April 28, commented that “when US suggestion defer statement re opposition to change by violence in area was explained to Prime Minister, latter agreed deletion this statement. Furlonge emphasized Foreign Office’s pleasure at Department’s suggestion and its readiness discuss it next week. He felt suggestion had further merit in that it would provide breathing spell for Foreign Office to observe reactions in Arab States to yesterday’s parliamentary statement. In this connection, Foreign Office understands political committee Arab League being hurriedly summoned to consider situation brought about by annexation. He thought it probable League would find some face-saving formula to accept annexation, perhaps laying stress on steps taken by Jordan to obtain concurrence inhabitants Arab Palestine.” (Telegram 2313, 784.02/4–2850) Embassy Cairo, on April 28, reported information from the British Ambassador that the Egyptian “Foreign Minister received news of British recognition ( de jure ) of Israel and of Jordan’s absorption of Arab Palestine with ‘regret’ and manifestations of resentment. Salaheddin Bey said Egypt would never recognize Israel nor would it recognize Abdullah’s annexation of Palestine.” (Telegram 427, 784A.02/4–2850) The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/4–2750: Telegram [Document 459] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , April 27, 1950—5 p. m. 309. Shiloah at annex to Prime Minister’s office told me April 27 following: Shiloah met Abdullah alone in Amman night 25th. King was “cheerful and optimistic. He convinced his people support peace with Israel” and his present “stronger government will cooperate”. King is not fearful of actions by individual Arab States or by Arab League. He “counts confidently upon his friends,” presumably including Israelis. No mention of UK or US. King agreed important proceed promptly with negotiations. He plans adjournment parliament next week and then with cabinet organize and brief peace delegate [ delegation? ]. By 10th May negotiations might begin and “should continue” until concluded. King affirmed “loyalty” earlier agreed statement of Jordan-Israel principles. Only sign Shiloah discern of King’s possible plan increase Jordan demands was compensation to Arab refugees whom King said “should remain” in enlarged Jordan. Shiloah now goes on fortnight vacation and returns to open negotiations. 1 Sent Department 309, repeated Jerusalem 29, Department pass Geneva 23, Moscow 20, Paris 50, London 68, Amman 30, Cairo 75. McDonald 1 Consulate General Jerusalem, on April 28, transmitted another account of the Abdullah-Shiloah conversation of April 25, based on information from General Riley. It covered much the same ground, stating additionally that the King “agrees with suggestion Israelis that when meetings resumed negotiators sit for two, three, or four days—continuously—to iron out all difficulties and to complete a paper. Abdullah suggested and Israelis concurred that negotiators sign paper at which time he will cover actions formally by taking up with PCC according to their new plan of procedure. Abdullah stated he would take all steps possible that an agreement is reached in the near future.” (Telegram 94, 684A.85/4–2850) The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State 784.00/4–2850: Telegram [Document 460] The Ambassador in Italy ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State secret Rome , April 28, 1950—8 p. m. 1736. Conveyed Department’s views Deptel 1491, April 27 1 to Garreau this morning. He is gratified know Department considers he has fulfilled his mandate TC resolution of April 4 simply by transmission substitute [ statute? ] to Jordan and Israeli Governments, with TCs request their cooperation. He is proceeding Paris Monday for short visit after which will continue on to NY. Garreau informed us he is in constant touch with Israeli representatives and considers that they making effort be cooperative. He is advised Israeli Government preparing its formal reply to TC and that it will be presented in NY near future, Informed reply will restate Israeli position internationalization Jerusalem as recommended TC resolution inapplicable in light existing circumstances and that therefore Israel cannot accept. However, willing cooperate formulation workable solution which will be acceptable all three directly concerned, i.e., Jews, Arabs and Christian interests. Garreau believes Israeli have not closed door to consideration any applicable and reasonable solution. Garreau tells us Jordan representative here embarrassed by his Government’s complete silence re TC communication. Garreau feels this lack minimum courtesy of even acknowledgment on part Jordan Government, in addition recent formal annexation Arab Palestine, including old city Jerusalem, indicates Arab intention refuse all cooperation resolution problem. Garreau has discussed Jerusalem problem at length with Tardini, acting Secretary of State Holy See, as well as with Pope personally. Found former adamant in insisting UN must find means implementing GA resolution; that Holy See has vital spiritual interest in problem and that GA resolution passed last session provided minimum safe-guard those interests. Garreau told Tardini he and all UN well aware importance spiritual interests, but that unfortunately job of implementation involved rather complex temporal interests as well. Garreau tells us he found Pope considerably more reasonable than Tardini and that Holy Father concluded audience by observing that he would be satisfied with “any reasonable solution”. Garreau himself still feels his own compromise formula best solution and that in end GA must come around to some such settlement. He added that in his opinion year lost by vain attempt carry out unworkable resolution has increased difficulties and that in view most recent developments ultimate solution will be much less satisfactory than one which might have been achieved year ago. We said would pass on to Department Garreau’s views. Sent Department 1736, repeated Paris 207, Tel Aviv 20. Department pass Amman 3, USUN 3. Dunn 1 Not printed; it instructed Embassy Rome to express to President Garreau the appreciation of the Department of State for the information in Rome’s telegram 1679 of April 26 and requested that he be informed that transmission of the Statute to Israeli and Jordanian representatives at Rome or elsewhere, with a request for cooperation of their Governments, was sufficient to meet the requirements of the Trusteeship Council resolution (784.00/4–2650). Telegram 1679 had advised of information from President Garreau of his failure to obtain a reply from King Abdullah concerning the Statute and of his opinion that no useful purpose would be served by his proceeding to Tel Aviv (784.00/4–2650). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 611.86/4–2650: Telegram [Document 461] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1 confidential Washington , May 2, 1950—3 p. m. 150. Dept approves your reply Shaikh Abdullah 2 re reported pressure on AL by Emb Cairo (Embtel 238, Apr 26 3 and Cairo tel Apr 28 sent Dept 425 4 ). It shld be noted that both Amir Faisel and Azzam Pasha have publicly disclaimed knowledge such incident. While many such charges cannot be dignified by public denial you shld take appropriate opportunity to stress informally that while US continues hope for stability and well being NE exercise of pressure is entirely contrary US policy and charges therefore unfounded. 5 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Cairo. 2 Abdullah Suleiman, Saudi Arabian Minister of Finance. 3 Not printed; it stated that Ambassador Childs had commented to Shaikh Abdullah that the United States was not accustomed to dictating to other governments, that he had seen most of the Department of State’s instructions regarding relations between the Arab States and Israel and that he had seen no such instruction. He also stated that as far as he knew the policy of strict impartiality as between the Arab States and Israel had been pursued (684A.86/4–2650). 4 Not printed; Ambassador Caffery advised that he had “consistently urged upon all responsible Egyptians to ‘go slowly’ in regard to Jordan. This Embassy has also made it clear to them, to all officials and visiting Arab leaders that the US hopes for prosperity, stability and security in ME; that peace between Israel and Arabs would contribute greatly to these objectives[;] and that in US view direct talk[s] between Israel and Arabs appear to be the most fruitful means of bringing about peace. ‘Pressure’ has not been exerted, nor has aid or other rewards from US been held out as inducement.” He also stated it was absurd to believe that an Embassy envoy had awakened Arab leaders at midnight to demand that Arabs make peace with Israel (611.86A/4–2850). 5 Ambassador Childs, on May 4, discussed the substance of telegram 150 with Amir Faisal who stated that “these unfortunate misrepresentations are due not to what happened in Cairo but to policy previously pursued by US in Palestine matters. Press and diplomats mistakenly and unfortunately drew inferences on basis actions US with respect to Palestine pursued previously.” (Telegram 259, May 4, from Jidda, 611.86/5–450) The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684.85/5–350: Telegram [Document 462] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , May 3, 1950—8 p. m. 90. Legtel 84, April 26. Learn from Kirkbride that King Abdullah’s meeting with Shiloah night 25 held without prior knowledge any member his government and only disclosed to Kirkbride several days later. King’s request British Minister informed PriMin Said Pasha Mufti of meeting. Response King’s query transmitted thru British Minister re PriMin’s attitude he stated all members cabinet oppose resumption negotiations this time. PriMin asked Kirkbride prevail on King not resume negotiations which British Minister obviously very reluctant to do, as he does not want be put in position assume blame for postponement. No doubt Kirkbride’s mind that PriMin and cabinet would resign if hand forced by King. PriMin intends raise matter cabinet meeting next day or two and if usual cabinet leaks occur news will reach public at once. According Kirkbride, PriMin thinks not over five or six members parliament would support peace negotiations this time. Recalled abortive negotiations of March failed primarily because of King’s impetuous demand speedy action. Commented King has himself in bad hole and is going to have difficulty extricating himself. Incidentally, Kirkbride remarked this was first time King has ever held out on him. His unusual reticence with Kirkbride and me probably inspired by desire keep meeting secret from his own government and realization he was acting hastily. Re Shiloah’s statement (Tel Aviv’s 309 to Department 1 ) King intended adjourn parliament this week, Kirkbride doubts this very much. Some talk government circles that following adoption proposed amendments constitution King may dissolve parliament and call new elections according practice some European countries, although nothing definite re this. When news recent resumption contacts with Shiloah becomes known it will probably be denied by Abdullah, following which course of events dependent on King’s completely unpredictable decision. I still consider as valid factors militating against early resumption negotiations mentioned mytel 84 A[pril] 26. Sent Department 90; Department pass London 35, Tel Aviv 31, Jerusalem 33, Cairo 20, Damascus 17, Jidda 12, Beirut 16, Baghdad 12. Drew 1 Dated April 27, p. 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 474.418/5–250: Telegram [Document 463] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1 secret Washington , May 4, 1950—1 p. m. 373. Dept has recd note from Israeli Emb dated May 2 2 reiterating request for permission to acquire arms in this country originally made in Emb’s note Feb 13 which is under consideration. New note sets forth info concerning arms allegedly acquired by Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon during period Jan 1–Mar 31, 1950 as further justification Israeli need for additional armaments. Note states 6 Vampire and between 20 and 25 Meteor jet planes delivered by UK to Egypt during above period. Additional 12 Vampires and 10 to 12 Meteors alleged ready for delivery. Note further states Egypt has recd 6 Fury fighter aircraft and up to 10 Halifax bombers. Fol additions described as having recently been made to Egyptian navy: 2 Frigates each carrying 4-inch guns; a number of high-speed motor torpedo boats. 20 Fiat planes originally sold by Italy to Egypt stated now to have been transferred from Egypt to Syria. Based on previous facts and analysis re developments in NE, Dept has reached conclusion trend in NE gradually away from war toward peace and no state making active preparation resume conflict. Dept has recd no info which wld indicate this position shld be changed but wld appreciate Emb’s comments on above info as well as on Egyptian mil position and intentions as of present date. Rpt reply to Emb London for Jessup. Similar tels being sent Damascus, Beirut, and Baghdad. 3 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to London for Mr. Jessup. 2 Note No. 4715/50 from the Israeli Ambassador, not printed (474.418/5–250). 3 All dated May 4, 1 p. m. No. 175 to Damascus cited the Israeli note of May 2 as stating that “Syria has signed contract for purchase in UK of 14 Meteor jet planes. Syria also allegedly receiving 20 Sherman tanks and more than 20 19-ton medium tanks from France under agreement signed originally by Zaim. 20 Fiat planes originally sold by Italy to Egypt allegedly now transferred by Egypt to Syria, and another 20 Fiats due to be delivered soon.” (474.418/5–250) No. 186 to Beirut cited the Israeli note as stating that “with support of UK Lebanese Govt has begun establish air force. Leb has bought 11 Fury fighter planes from UK and 6 Savoya bombers from Italy.” (783A.56/5–450) No. 165 to Baghdad cited the note of May 2 as stating that “Iraq has purchased 4 Fury fighter planes from UK and additional supply expected arrive soon. Iraq also stated recently to have obtained 24 tanks, including 4 Shermans, from US war surplus in Europe.” (785.56/5–450) A British Foreign Office spokesman, on May 2, denied Israeli allegations that the United Kingdom had sold aircraft to Syria and Lebanon and stated the Israeli figures on British sales of military equipment to Egypt, Jordan and Iraq were exaggerated or grossly exaggerated. A clipping containing these official views as printed in the Manchester Guardian was transmitted to the Department of State in London’s despatch 2226 of May 5 (484A.418/5–550). Embassy Baghdad, on May 7, reported information from its service attachés that reports of Iraqi purchases of 24 tanks were “completely false” (telegram 311, 785.56/5–750). Legations Beirut, on May 6, and Damascus the following day, broadly denied the Israeli allegations (telegrams 190, 783.56/5–650; and 255, 474.418/5–250, respectively). The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 784A.5/5–450: Telegram [Document 464] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tel Aviv , May 4, 1950—6 p. m. 330. Department inform Army, Navy, Air [Force]. At Foreign Office May 4, Sharett during one hour talk amplified six page aide mémoire justifying Israels formal arms request. [ Aide -] Mémoire being air mailed May 9. Salient points [ Aide -] Mémoire follow: After mentioning Israel had received “no direct reply” to its February 13 letter to USG re Arab rearmament and outlining “future arms deliveries Arab countries during first three months current year” [ Aide -] Mémoire continues “Israel appreciates statements made Secretary of State reiterating previous peace and stability Middle East remain aim US to this area. Israel not informed if US has in fact sought utilize its good offices especially with UP [ UK ] stop flow ‘second round’ war material Arab countries. Should be emphasized, however, UK treaty obligations Egypt and Jordan do not specify amount of arms and equipment to be supplied these states; that American acquiescence volume of arms deliveries now being made—acquiescence without protest—is certain increase unwillingness Arab Governments conclude peace agreements with Israel; that hope expressed Bunche statement for UN SC August 4 that shipment heavy arms ME should be limited reasonable security needs, has failed, that hope expressed to me by representative UK and accepted by Bunche and Senator Austin has been abandoned; that in sum Arab states have begun arms race which endangers security Israel and jeopardizes stability ME.” Document then refers Israel’s unanswered request in February 13 letter for assistance in purchase arms for “defensive purposes” and emphasizes that requests based on equipment requirements for approximately six brigades authorized by armistice agreements in contrast 24 brigades maintained Arab States and that Israel seeks arms “for her protection alone.” Sharett commented on political aspect “current ME arms race” substantially as follows: “surprised at US justification” of UK arms flow. Because Sharett considers Secretary Acheson “pillar of world peace” latter “must not be aware of tragic effects” UK arms policy. Moreover, UK refusal arms Israel on grounds “lack of peace” and grant of arms to Arab States without requiring peace pledge in effect encourages Arab intransigence. Sharett indicated “pained surprise” that US accepts UK “falacious arguments.” Sharett continued Israel disturbed current rumor London that UK does not favor Israel-Jordan separate peace. Recent private letter from Abdullah intended be shown Foreign Minister disclosed King as result UK recognition annexation is “excessively confident and is now preparing make new political and territorial demands on Israel.” At conclusion talk Sharett urged me stress Israel’s willingness disclose to US present arms Israel if US agreed either (1) determine amount and kinds arms needed Israel defense purposes and to supply difference existing stocks and those US decides required; or (2) make up armament deficiencies in defensive force strength as permitted Israel armistice agreements (these are same two Israel purposes as per Usaira Israel 0025 dated 13 April). 1 McDonald 1 Copy not found in Department of State files. Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in Egypt (Ireland) 674.84A/5–650 [Document 465] Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in Egypt ( Ireland ) 1 top secret [ Cairo , undated.] Col. Ismail Shirine, 2 brother-in-law of King Farouk and principal Egyptian officer on the Egyptian Armistice Commission, invited me to call on him at Princess Fawzia’s house yesterday afternoon in response to my remark, on the occasion of his return from Europe, that it had been a long time since we had seen each other and talked. Col. Shirine has the reputation of being on excellent personal terms with the King and enjoying his confidence. His marriage with the King’s favorite sister, H. I. H. Princess Fawzia was with the approval of the King. Col. Shirine was, during the premiership of Nokrashi Pasha, chief of the latter’s political cabinet. He also enjoys a general favorable reputation as a bright young man with a reputation for practical thinking. We were together three months in 1945 at San Francisco and we have been on friendly terms since that time. Several conversations with him at the General Assembly meetings in Paris in November, 1948, indicated that he was probably the most realistic of all the Egyptian delegation. I have found him frank almost to the point of indiscreetness, as well as genuinely interested in the future of this country on a realistic and practical basis. My part in the present conversation was to keep him talking. His English is perfect and he makes frequent use of American idioms. Col. Shirine opened the conversation by saying that he was “wild” with the way he found things concerning Israel had been handled by the present government during his two months trip to Europe. He had even considered resigning from the Armistice Commission. He feared that he had greatly offended Salaheddin Bey by his frank speech. He had agreed with Salaheddin Bey, however, that the public sentiment in Egypt was still anti-Israel and that any government in Egypt which proposed peace would be in a delicate position. He believed something positive could be done if it were carefully handled with regard to the psychology of the people. He further believed that an Egyptian-Israeli peace would be followed almost immediately or simultaneously by negotiation of peace with Israel by other Arab countries. Three courses, he said, were now open to Egypt: I. War. This, he reminded me, was manifestly impossible. Even if Egypt wished to renew hostilities it could not possibly do so for eight to ten years. Egypt had no equipment, no ammunition, and no transport. Every Military Attaché and observer in Egypt knew this. It was, in fact, apparent to everyone. Notwithstanding the Israeli declarations to the contrary, practically no arms promised under contract with the British had been delivered. Two or three planes had been delivered here and there but the bulk of the material had not been supplied. He was critical of Britain’s and America’s attitude on the subject of Egypt’s request for arms. He characterized the situation as one in which both countries passed the buck to each other, possibly under pressure from the Israelis. In any case, Egypt was getting nothing. He labelled the idea of an arms race in the Near East being initiated by Egypt or the Arab States as fantastic. Egypt and the Arab States would start from scratch while the Israelis could rely on their imports from Czechoslovakia and other points. Israel’s military potential, in fact, was already immeasurably greater than that of all the Arab States put together. An arms race was, therefore, impossible. It was thus a fact that Israel, notwithstanding its propaganda, was in no danger from an attack from Egypt or any of the Arab powers. Egypt, however, should have arms in the interest of the common defensive position. He said this lack of military power was a bitter pill to swallow but the Arab loss of the war in Palestine and the current lack of military potential, which could not be remedied for years to come, definitely limited Arab ability to negotiate with Israel. II. The second alternative was to continue the present situation. This was possible but he held it to be potentially dangerous and therefore unwise. ( a ) Israel during the first three weeks of the armistice had started nibbling away at Egyptian territory contrary to the terms of the armistice. It made advances here, and took a point there. This may have been a calculated campaign or it may have been due to natural enthusiasm of the army and its officers. But, in any case, the position had changed greatly to the disadvantage of Egypt in the area between Egypt and Israel and he was afraid it would continue and get worse. ( b ) Israel was engaging in a campaign of faits accomplis . The Arabs feared that this campaign would be continued, if not with the tacit consent of the Great Powers, at least without opposition by the Great Powers. The Arabs, moreover, could expect no help from the United Nations. The Israelis had disregarded instructions and declarations by the United Nations. General Riley himself was a fine man and, Shirine said, their personal relations were of the best. Riley, however, either acted on instructions from his superiors or from the knowledge that he, fundamentally, was powerless if he found for the Egyptians. He had always urged Egypt “for the sake of peace” to accept violations by the Israelis at the same time he indulged in ineffective remonstrances with Israel. Riley also took certain points of view because he was imbued with the desire to be a great “mediator”. The rest of the Military Commission, Frenchmen for the most part, Shirine described as time-servers, completely ineffectual, and perhaps even venal. ( c ) Gaza represented a certain amount of danger to Egypt. Egypt had withdrawn practically the whole of its troops but it was still in occupation. Should Israel occupy Gaza, it would set back the cause of eventual peace. There was a general feeling, moreover, that if the Israelis did move into Gaza, it would be done with tacit approval of Great Britain or the United States. In any case they do no more than look on ineffectively. ( d ) Sooner or later, he said, the Arabs expected there would be pressure from the United States and Great Britain, arising out of their impatience with the Arabs, stimulated by Israeli complaints that the Arabs were stubborn and uncooperative. ( e ) There might also be pressure from the United Nations through cutting off United Nations funds for refugees. III. There remained, he said, the establishment of peace. “Let’s not ‘kid’ ourselves”, he said. “Peace means recognition of Israel by Egypt and the other Arab countries. It means going back on our announced and sincerely meant principles but Egypt and the Near East must have peace.” In discussing the obstacles in the way of peace, he listed the following: (1) No basis for negotiations had ever been set up by the Israelis. One hears, he said, that Israel wants peace and that she is ready to negotiate. When one asks the Israelis, however, what they have to propose as a basis for negotiation they merely say, “Start negotiations with us and then you will see how benevolent we can be.” Egypt could not negotiate on this basis, he said. Once negotiations were started they had to go on to completion. They could not be broken off because the Great Powers would bring enormous pressure, once they are started, to carry through to an end. Moreover, if Egypt starts negotiations it will be the signal for all the other Arab states to negotiate and Egypt might be faced with the prospect of Lebanon, Jordan, and even Syria signing a peace with Israel, leaving Egypt high and dry as the only Arab state which has not signed peace with Israel. Therefore, the items of negotiation must be agreed upon prior to their initiation. He said, in this connection, that a principal objection by Egypt to separate negotiations by Jordan or any other Arab state was that if Israel once made concessions to Jordan and then afterwards were called upon to make concessions to Egypt, such immense political difficulties would be raised for the Israeli government that the chances of the essential concessions to Egypt would be diminished. It was, therefore, necessary to think in broad terms of peace for all. (2) No Egyptian Government or head of state can announce peace and recognition at the same time. This job has to be done in two stages: ( a ) Delimitation of frontiers with the announcement that Egypt had reached satisfactory arrangements with Israel, with specific achievements. Without such a declaration including the announcement of definite achievement, no Egyptian Government could even approach the second stage, that of recognition. In further discussion of what he held to be Egypt’s basic requirements he emphasized again that the first essential was delimitation of frontiers. This meant: 1. Restoration of the situation at Akaba as it was on the day the Israeli-Egyptian armistice was signed. He described in some detail the process by which he claimed that Israel had occupied the area in and around Akaba in direct violation of 1) cease-fire arrangements with Jordan, and 2) of the Armistice Agreement with Israel. In addition the area around the head of the Gulf of Akaba represents a defensive necessity for Egypt. Its possession by Israel meant that the whole coast of Sinai and of the Red Sea would require the establishment of defenses by Egypt. Egypt, therefore, was unable to accept the proposal of dividing the area as put forward by the French officer who was in charge of negotiating between Israel and Egypt on this matter. The settlement of this point in Egypt’s favor was essential. He said that Egypt had threatened to take the issue to the United Nations but it did not want to do so since the whole Israeli-Arab question would then be raised with public recriminations on both sides. 2. Rectification of frontiers, including the points occupied by Israel in violation of the Armistice Agreement. 3. Gaza. He said Egypt set no great store by Gaza but there was the question of the refugees. Egypt realized that any proposal that Israel would take over Gaza in exchange for assuming responsibility for the refugees was based on false premises. The refugees, either because of actual Israeli treatment or fear of such treatment, would leave the area. The desert southward would not support anyone. He, therefore, suggested that an outlet for the refugees now at Gaza should be made by allotting territory between the coast and the north of the desert, say toward Beersheba, where these refugees might earn a living, precarious as it might be. As for the refugee question in general, he criticized the Arab states for adopting an unrealistic attitude. Whether or not the refugees wished to go back or whether Israel itself would be willing to take them back or not made no real difference. The fact was that there was no room for the refugees to return to in Israel. The more quickly the Arab states recognized this point, he said, the quicker better relations would be established with Israel. ( b ) The second essential was restoration of confidence in Israel’s pledged word. He said he had talked at great length on this subject with Elias Sassoon, the Israeli negotiator at Rhodes, when the armistice was signed. He had implored Sassoon to see that (1) the armistice terms were kept, and that (2) the question of further talks leading toward peace should not be raised for at least six months. His first request was made on the basis that if the armistice terms were not kept by Israel no Arab could be convinced that a peace settlement would be observed by Israel. Sassoon had emphatically declared that the armistice would be kept. Nevertheless, in three weeks infringements had begun and they had continued. Now every time the question of peace with Israel came up responsible Egyptians shook their heads and referred to the failure of Israel to keep its word. On the matter of raising peace talks immediately after the armistice, Sassoon had also said that he was in agreement. Shirine pointed out that his request had been based on the necessity for Egyptians to get familiar with working relations with the Israelis on military points. It would then be possible to pass on to the political subjects. Not only had the Israelis demonstrated that no working relations could be established between themselves and the Egyptians but they had also raised too soon the question of peace negotiations. Shrine then reiterated that even if the delimitation of frontiers were established, some time would then have to elapse before commercial and diplomatic recognition of Israel. To think otherwise, as apparently did the Israelis, was to fail to understand the psychology of the Egyptians and Arabs. It simply could not be done. He went on to say, in connection with restoration of Arab confidence in the future, that if some guarantee could be given by the United States or by the United States and Britain along the lines of the guarantee such as Britain had extended to the territory absorbed by Jordan (which he approved as the only practical thing to do), he believed much good would be done. He then remarked that whatever genuine fear might exist in Israel concerning the Arabs, the fear of Israel by the Arabs was ten times greater. Col. Shirine gave the impression that he is tremendously interested in peace with Israel as a practical necessity and his analysis of the obstacles was directed toward the objective of revealing what he deems are Egypt’s basic views concerning peace and not merely toward laying the groundwork for the territorial aggrandizement of Egypt. Philip W. Ireland 1 Transmitted to the Department of State by Embassy Cairo in despatch 1017, May 6; pouched to London and Arab capitals. 2 Rendered also as Chirine. The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/5–1150: Telegram [Document 466] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret niact Geneva , May 11, 1950—10 p. m. 606. Palun 351. Following receipt of Israel delegation reply on 6 May to PCC memo of 29 March, PCC has been in almost continuous session considering best method of replying to Israel and Arab states. PCC considered that in view of Israel’s acceptance of PCC proposals and Arab states’ conditional acceptance of procedure, only course open to PCC was to reaffirm its belief that its proposals taken as a whole provided best means of bridging gap between parties and to invite governments to designate fully empowered representatives to enter into negotiations in accordance with procedure proposed in 29 March memo. PCC this morning adopted note to be delivered this afternoon to Geneva representatives for transmission their governments. Text of notes mutatis mutandis follows: “The Conciliation Commission for Palestine has the honor to acknowledge the reply of the Arab Governments to its memo of 29 March 1950. The Commission has also received the reply of the Government of Israel, under date of 6 May, accepting the proposals contained in its memo. The Commission finds in these replies a spirit of cooperation which it appreciates. “In making its proposals the Conciliation Commission was guided by the resolutions of the GA on Palestine. The Commission also took into consideration the position of the Arab Governments and the Government of Israel on the implementation of these resolutions, having in mind those principles of law, justice, and humanity referred to by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt in Cairo on 14 April 1950 when he delivered the reply of the Arab Government. The Commission believes that its proposals of 29 March represent the best method of reaching a settlement of the refugee problem as well as all other questions outstanding between the parties. “The Commission has not failed to note the various observations which have been formulated in response to its proposals. It considers that the problems thus raised could best be examined under the procedure proposed by the Commission in its memo of 29 March. “The Commission wishes to take this opportunity to reaffirm that its objective in suggesting the creation of mixed committees was the attainment of the final settlement called for by the GA’s resolution of 11 December 1948. The past experience of the Commission has proved that the questions involved in such a settlement are linked to each other. Certain of these questions might be of a particularly urgent character and might be studied before others by common agreement of the parties. “The Commission considers that the work of the mixed committees could not lead to favorable results unless the discussions take place in a completely frank manner and the parties have the opportunity of expressing their points of view with unrestricted freedom. It goes without saying that the principles laid down by the GA’s resolution of 11 December 1948 would have to be respected. “The Conciliation Commission hopes that the Arab Governments and the Government of Israel will be represented in negotiations under the procedure envisaged in the Commission’s proposals of 29 March by delegation fully empowered to act on their behalf. The Commission would appreciate notification of the names of the delegates so empowered. “The Conciliation Commission considers that negotiations under its auspices as proposed in its memorandum could begin in Geneva on 23 May 1950.” An unfavorable response by Arab Governments to above note does not necessarily preclude further useful work by PCC. USDel feels however that in that case it is unlikely Israel will continue participate in PCC work, and that it will be difficult and perhaps undesirable continue indefinitely in desultory fashion such refusal will make inevitable. We feel therefore crossroads have been reached and that anything which Department can do to encourage favorable Arab response will be more than justified. We are aware, in view manifestations in ME capitals of rising anti-American feeling, that on balance Department may not find it desirable exert equal persuasion in all capitals concerned. In view first favorable reaction King Abdullah to PCC proposals, Jordan Cabinet’s reluctance continue unilaterally direct negotiations with Israel, Jordan’s recently expressed enthusiasm for concentrating UN assistance under UNPRA in Jordan, and doubt surrounding Jordan’s endorsement of Arab reply delivered Cairo on “behalf Arab Governments”, latest PCC note should provide Jordan with excellent opportunity undertake negotiations with Israel under PCC auspices and lessen risk incurring opprobrium of Arab neighbors. It is also possible acceptance by Jordan, if discreetly indicated in advance to other states, would encourage acceptance by all. USDel strongly recommends Department consider making known these views to King and Jordan Cabinet, as well as British, as early as possible. 1 Success renewed negotiations under PCC proposals will depend also on quality of delegations sent to Geneva. Israel has indicated she will be ready send highest authorities, but will of course wait to see how Arabs will be represented. As for Israel, USDel and other members PCC feel it highly desirable Eban and Rafael, with whom we have been able work most successfully and who complement each other in their approach, return to Geneva. Boisanger intends take up in Paris this weekend question of Syria’s being represented by Atassi, Syrian Minister Paris. He has also sent telegram to Beirut suggesting Mikaoui’s replacement here by Fouad Ammoun, who in Lausanne had influential position among Arabs. It will in our opinion be difficult make any progress towards Israeli-Jordan agreement here unless Abdul Hadi is replaced by able Jordan representative with substantial authority. Abdul Hadi’s position borders on ridiculous with his complaints that he knows nothing of his government’s policy and his requests that PCC inquire as to whether or not he is expected by his government to remain Geneva. Department may wish consider these questions also with Jordan Government. [ Palmer ] 1 The Department, in a circular telegram of May 12, 7 a. m., informed U.S. missions at Arab capitals (except Amman) of the May 11 note of the Palestine Conciliation Commission and requested their views as to the course of action the United States should take. Similar messages were sent to London (telegram 2255) and to Amman (telegram 66) the same day making inquiry also concerning the views of the British Foreign Office and of the British Minister Kirkbride, respectively. These messages, as well as the replies from the various posts, are filed under 357.AC in the Department of State files. The Department concluded, on May 23, that “USG approach Arab Govts on behalf negots proposed by PCC appears inadvisable. Missions may in discretion offer informal encouragement.” (Circular telegram of 2 a. m., 357.AC/5–2350) Three days earlier, the Department had authorized Amman to “informally encourage acceptance PCC proposal, in response request ur views. Essential avoid impression new US approach or ‘pressure’ being exerted. “Dept understands UK FonOff favors joint US-UK approach. Dept desires you consult Kirkbride but favors above line in order avoid any impression UK-US pressure being applied.” (Telegram 67 to Amman, 357.AC/5–1750) Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Acting Secretary of State 784A.5/5–2550 [Document 467] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret [ Washington , undated.] Subject: Arms Exports to Israel and the Arab States. Discussion: The Department has under consideration a number of requests from the Israeli, Egyptian and Syrian Governments for the acquisition in the United States of arms, ammunition and implements of war. The Israelis have located some of these arms in the hands of commercial suppliers and have made formal application for export licenses for such items. Other items which were listed in a note from the Israeli Ambassador, dated February 13, 1950, 2 obviously can be supplied only from U.S. Government stocks. The Department has referred, upon receipt, each export application for combat items to the Department of Defense requesting that Department’s views as to whether the particular request comes within the limitations imposed by the President’s policy for limiting arms exports to the Near East to those deemed necessary for the maintenance of internal law and order and reasonable requirements of self-defense. Applications for non-combat material such as civil aircraft, coastal vessels and ammunition and half-tracks for civilian end-use have generally been approved without reference to the Department of Defense. The recommendations of the Department of Defense in all cases referred to it where the Israeli Government was the recipient have been for denial of the export applications. The reverse has been true for all recommendations concerning arms for the Arab states. The Department of Defense is of the opinion that the military position of Israel is so strong that additional arms for that state are not justified. Because of the position of the Department of Defense on the Israeli requests it has not been possible to approve any of the items which are listed in the enclosure to the attached letter to the Secretary of Defense. (Tab A) 3 The Department believes that this position should be reconsidered and that limited amounts of the arms requested should be permitted to go to the Arab states and Israel. Recommendations: It is recommended that you sign the attached letter (Tab A) to the Secretary of Defense. [Here follow the concurrence of the Munitions Division and the listing of the attachment.] 1 Drafted by Mr. Rockwell on May 16. 2 Not printed; see footnote 2, p. 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] . 3 The letter was actually sent on May 25, see p. 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] . The Legation in Lebanon to the Secretary of State 320.2AA/5–1650 [Document 468] The Legation in Lebanon to the Secretary of State 1 restricted No. 215 Beirut , May 16, 1950. Subject: Weekly Round-Up of UNRWA Activities No. 1 1. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency was formed in accordance with the General Assembly Resolution of December 8, 1949, and is composed of a Director, Mr. Howard Kennedy, his staff and an Advisory Commission with the following members: The Honorable John B. Blandford, Jr., USA (First Chairman) The Honorable Jacques Tarbe de Saint Hardouin, France General Refet Bele, Turkey Sir Henry Knight, UK The chairmanship of the Commission rotates and will be held by each member for a period of three months. 2. The Agency established its headquarters in the UNESCO Building in Beirut and held its first meeting on April 25, 1950. 2 On May 1 it formally assumed responsibility for the distribution of relief supplies from the various voluntary agencies formerly carrying on this function. 3. The Agency has been received by the Governments of Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Its schedule tentatively calls for a second visit of the Director and Commission to Amman, a trip to Saudi Arabia during the week of May 21, and for conversations with the Government of Iraq on or around May 29. The purpose of these visits is to establish contact with these Governments and to consult with them regarding the initiation of work projects which may be undertaken in the area. The Jordan Government has been most cooperative, and King Abdullah suggested that PRA concentrate its activities in Jordan. The combination of a large concentration of refugees in Jordan and Arab Palestine and a cooperative governmental atmosphere is tempting, and present thinking of the Agency is to regard Jordan as a beachhead in which it is most feasible to begin work projects. The limiting factors to the Agency’s work here will be the absorptive capacity and economic potential of the area. This requires further study. It is hoped that the PRA activity in Jordan will stimulate cooperation in the other Arab States. 4. A press conference was held by the Director and Chairman of the Commission on May 11. A brief outline of the objectives of the Agency was presented and questions of newsmen answered. Attached is a copy of the statement issued. 3 5. One of the first problems with which the Agency has had to cope is a strike of refugees in camps at Sidon and in the Damascus area. An undetermined number of refugees in these sectors are refusing food rations and medical treatment and have closed their schools. In general, the strike is alleged to be a protest against implementation of works projects which are regarded as a step away from repatriation. 4 There are also allegations of waste and inefficiency. We hope to reassure the refugees as to both their political fears and their complaints as to operations. 1 Drafted by Ambassador Blandford and Rodger P. Davies, Second Secretary of Legation in Syria. 2 The reference is to the first formal meeting at Beirut. A UNRWA press release of May 11, transmitted in despatch 215, stated that the Agency held its first formal meeting in Geneva from April 17–19, where it conferred with various specialized and voluntary agencies including the International Refugee Organization, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, and the International Red Cross Committee, and with the Palestine Conciliation Commission. 3 Not printed. 4 Legation Beirut reported, on May 24, that the strike had been called off by the refugee committees, that most refugees in Lebanon had complied, and that there were still some hold-outs in Syria (despatch 228, 320.2AA/5–2450). The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/5–1650: Telegram [Document 469] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Geneva , May 16, 1950—4 p. m. 619. Palun 353. Shiloah returning from vacation trip to London stopped last night in Geneva to call on USDel on instructions from Sharett to obtain clarification PCC letter of 11 May (Palun 351 1 ). Israeli Foreign Minister was anxious to know PCC’s exact intention in sending letter, with particular reference following points: (1) Did PCC expect reply from Israel prior to informing Israel of designation Arab delegates participating in new PCC procedure? (2) What was significance date of 23 May for convening conference? (3) What would be minimum PCC would accept as Arab reply? (4) If Arabs replied making conditions similar to those made by Egypt Foreign Minister in Cairo, would PCC expect Israel to send representatives Geneva? In explanation his questions, Shiloah pointed out to best their knowledge Israel believed Arabs did not intend engage in serious discussion for settlement outstanding issues whatever form their answer might take. Israel did not wish repeat experience of Lausanne 2 and saw no utility in going through motions of peace settlement. Their discussions with Abdullah were on point of recommending [ fruition? ] and they would require certain time to develop understanding with Jordan which could then be completed here under PCC auspices. Because of shortage qualified representatives, it would be difficult carry on necessary preliminary discussions with Jordan in Palestine simultaneously with meetings in Geneva with PCC. In reply Shiloah’s questions, USDel explained that PCC’s intention was to reiterate that its proposals of 29 March in their entirety represent finest method of procedure; in having Israel’s acceptance of procedure as proposed, PCC had in effect requested from Arab states similar acceptance without conditions. Because we believed no progress likely under other procedure, minimum which PCC could usefully accept from Arabs was in fact reply such as Israel had given PCC. We could not expect Israel to send representatives to Geneva for proceedings substantially different from those we had proposed and Israel had accepted, unless it appeared to them and to us at later date that such would serve useful purpose. Date of 23 May was indicated as possible time for reconvening, but not as fixed time. We did not actually expect all delegations to be represented at this early date, nor did we expect further reply from Israel until we could inform them of acceptance by some or all of Arab states. Beyond these explanations, with which Shiloah appeared satisfied, we did not indicate approval idea of postponement replies pending outcome negotiations in Palestine with Jordan. On contrary USDel continues feel, and so informed Shiloah, Jordan would be well-advised promptly accept PCC proposals. Actual date for commencement negotiations here could be adjusted to give time for any preliminary talks thought desirable. [ Palmer ] 1 Identified also as telegram 606, May 11, from Geneva, p. 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] . 2 The Palestine Conciliation Commission had used Lausanne as its headquarters in 1949 for its discussions with Arab and Israeli delegations; for relevant documentation, see Foreign Relations ,1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. Memorandum by the Department of State to the President 784.02/5–1150 [Document 470] Memorandum by the Department of State to the President 1 secret [ Washington , undated.] 2 Subject: Public Speeches and Statements by United States Officials Regarding the Palestine Situation. During recent weeks there have been a number of speeches, statements and endorsements by United States officials on behalf of drives conducted by private organizations for funds to promote the immigration of persons of Jewish faith into Israel. The remarks made on these occasions were words of high praise for the people and Government of Israel, their past accomplishments and future objectives, and were, of course, in themselves appropriate and in keeping with the friendship for and interest in this country in the State of Israel. During recent weeks, on the other hand, the United States has been the target of widespread adverse criticism in the Arab countries for alleged partiality towards Israel. Our legations in Beirut and Damascus have been bombed. A summary of Arab criticisms and reactions is enclosed as Tab A. American prestige in the Arab countries has been greatly lowered and this trend may, if continued, endanger the lives of American citizens in the Near East and cause further damage to American property in that area. The Arabs point as evidence of American partiality for Israel to the statements by United States officials on behalf of Israel and on behalf of aid to Jewish immigration into Israel as against the absence of any statements made by persons of similar prominence and authority on behalf of the Arab countries or of sympathy for the Arab refugees from Palestine. While holding no brief for these Arab attitudes, the Department of State, during the past two years, has as a means of restoring peace and stability in the Near East, been attempting to convince the Arab states and Israel that the United States desires the friendliest of relations with both and on a strictly impartial basis. I, therefore, respectfully suggest: ( a ) That, in order to redress the balance of public statements and to create a more favorable psychological atmosphere in the Arab countries, it would be helpful if you were able to reaffirm in a public statement our friendship for the Arab Governments and peoples, at the next suitable occasion. If you approve, I shall make further suggestions shortly as to the context and timing of such a statement. ( b ) That you request high officials in the Executive Branch of the Government to avoid making public statements which might appear to suggest partisanship by this Government in the controversial Palestine problem. [Annex] Summary of Current Arab Attitudes Toward the United States secret [ Washington , undated.] A. Syria The virtually unanimous attitude of all Syrians in and out of public life as well as of the Arabs throughout the Near East in general is summed up in the following statement made on November 23, 1949, by Nazim Qudsi, formerly a distinctly pro-American Syrian Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, now a prominent political leader in Syria: “Everything that the United States now does, no matter how it may be labelled with unselfishness and impartiality, is suspect as a camouflaged means of furthering Israel’s interests.” Anti-American sentiment has furthermore reached a crescendo in in the wake of a statement on April 9, 1950, made by the Syrian Minister of National Economy, Marouf al Dawalibi, as follows: “If the American Government continues its pressure on Arab states in an attempt to make the Arab people subserve the Zionist cause, I hope a plebiscite will be taken in Arab countries so that it may be known whether the Arabs prefer a thousandfold to become a Soviet republic rather than a prey to world Jewry.” Minister Dawalibi’s statement was made ex cathedra and normally could have been discounted as an emotional outburst or extremist view, were it not for the surprisingly enthusiastic reception accorded the statement by nearly all Syrian newspapers and the messages of congratulations to Minister Dawalibi which are reported to have poured in from all over Syria. Moreover, Prime Minister Khalid Azm, in discussing the statement with our Minister at Damascus, remarked that although the statement had been made without prior consultation with him, it expressed his own feelings. He said it indicated that the people of Syria have become disillusioned, to the point of desperation, with respect to the “continued support given Israel by the United States”. It did not mean, the Prime Minister said, that Syria was as willing to align itself on the side of Russia as on the side of the United States, or desired to do so; it was not a question of choosing between two friends, such as between France and the United States, for instance; it was a question of deciding between a friend who had let one down and the devil. The Prime Minister further remarked that if we could understand how repugnant Communism is to Syria, we might better understand the depth of Syrian disappointment over our “manifest partisanship” for Israel and our efforts to persuade Syria to submerge its interests to those of Israel. The Prime Minister said that he asked only that the United States be truly impartial. Nine days after Minister Dawalibi’s statement, the American Legations at Damascus and Beirut were bombed by unknown extremists. The American Legation at Damascus reports: “It is becoming increasingly apparent that the Dawalibi statement and subsequent developments are well planned campaign and perhaps part of a Soviet ‘black propaganda’ drive which has thus far been more successful than (even the) most pessimistic observers would have thought possible before it started.” B. Egypt Two brief reports from our Embassy in Cairo point up the situation in Egypt: 1) “Arabic press today including usually sober Al Ahram vigorously attacks US for official ‘bare-faced support of Israel’ alleging that Secretary Interior and Secretary Agriculture have participated campaign to raise Zionist funds. Al Ahram links such activities with alleged anti-Egyptian press campaign and inquires if US Government ‘has no control over press surely it has control over its own Ministers’.” 2) “What with Life article about the King, the ‘Arms for Israel’ business, and the alleged presence of the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior at a meeting to collect contributions for Israel, the press of the Arab countries in general and Egypt in particular have gone hysterical in last few days in regard to United States.” C. Iraq The following statement was made to the United Press by Iraqi Prime Minister Tawfiq Suweidi: “The present policy of the United States toward the Arabs is preventing cooperation to form a unified front against Communist danger.” In July, 1949 Suweidi said: “Jewish activity in America is great, not because of its strength, but because of American weakness and surrender to the Jews.” And again in July, 1949 Suweidi said: “I believe (Point IV plans) lack good faith, sincerity and earnestness. They may be meant more as propaganda … 3 than as concrete propositions.” D. Lebanon Prime Minister Riad Solh in Lebanon informed our Minister that the Dawalibi statements were receiving wide circulation in the Arab states and said he thought it would be helpful for the future if the United States Government issued a declaration of neutrality between the Arab states and Israel. A high official of the American University of Beirut (Lebanon) has informed the Department confidentially of his view that Communist activities have increased greatly both in volume and effectiveness. “The Communists not only play upon the traditional grievances of the under-privileged Arab people and encourage their dissatisfaction with their own governments; they also say in effect … ‘You’ll never get justice out of the West’. We are thus faced with more or less the same situation as we had in China …” E. Saudi Arabia While the attitude of the Saudi Arabian Government has continued friendly throughout the recent press campaign, the Saudi Finance Minister stated privately that the atmosphere between the Arab states and the United States Government had been greatly poisoned by the charges that had been made against the United States Government. In commenting on the above-mentioned suggestion of Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Solh, our Embassy at Jidda has expressed the view that a public statement of our impartiality as between Israel and the Arab states “would do much to clear the atmosphere which has been empoisoned recently by Dawalibi’s declaration, press reports in Cairo concerning alleged dictation by the United States Government to the Arab States, support given Zionist fund raising campaign by United States Cabinet officers … “Arabs are asking why, if we profess impartiality or even common humanitarian impulses, there are no voices raised in the United States of comparable rank to Cabinet Secretaries in behalf of thousands of Arab displaced persons.” These are but a few representative samples of impressions of the United States in the Near East, which make it abundantly clear that United States prestige has seriously declined in all the Arab countries. 1 On May 1, Mr. McGhee sent a memorandum to Secretary Acheson, to which was attached a suggested memorandum to the President dealing with public speeches and statements by United States officials regarding the Palestine situation (784A.00/5–150). The editors have been unable to find the draft, the first of three drafts, in the files of the Department of State. A revised memorandum to the President was prepared on May 4 (784A.00/6–1650), not printed. Secretary Acheson took this second draft to the White House on May 4 to discuss it with the President but “did not have time to refer to this item” (Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444. This file is described below.). The Department thereupon prepared, with minor changes, a third draft, herein printed, which Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb carried to the White House on May 18. Mr. Webb’s memorandum of conversation of that date recorded that “The President examined the memorandum with respect to statements by Government officials regarding Palestine and said he would like to keep it. When I expressed a reservation about this he said I need not worry, it would not cause any trouble, and that he would take care of the matter. He said also that at some proper time when this series in the Israeli fund-raising campaign was over, he would also make a statement reiterating friendship for the Arab states. We should prepare such a statement at the proper time and submit it” (784A.00/6–1650) Lot 53 D 444 is a comprehensive chronological collection of the Secretary of State’s memoranda and memoranda of conversation for the years 1947–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 Handwritten note on the source text: “Left with the President 5–18–50”. 3 All ellipses as in the source text. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Seventh Session of the Trusteeship Council IO Files: SD/T/157 1 [Document 471] Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Seventh Session of the Trusteeship Council confidential SD/T/157 [ Washington ,] May 19, 1950. Item 10: Question of an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and Protection of the Holy Places (General Assembly Resolution 303 (IV) of December 9, 1949) The Problem The problem is to determine the position of the United States Delegation to the Seventh Session of the Trusteeship Council on the implementation of the draft Statute for the Internationalization of Jerusalem. This Statute was revised by the Council at its Sixth Session and transmitted to Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan with a request for their cooperation. It is expected that these two countries will inform the Council that they cannot accept the draft Statute and will be unable to cooperate in its implementation. It is understood that Israel will submit an alternate plan for Jerusalem. Recommendations 1. The Delegation should oppose any proposals directed to the imposed implementation of the Statute against the wishes of the parties, on the ground that an imposed implementation would contribute neither to a viable solution of the problem nor to the peace and stability of the area. 2. The Delegation should support a proposal that the Trusteeship Council submit to the General Assembly a report which (1) would point out that the Council has fulfilled the Assembly’s instruction to complete and approve the Statute for the internationalization of Jerusalem, but has been unable to proceed with the implementation of the Statute in the light of the opposition of Israel and Jordan and (2) would include ( a ) the draft Statute as revised by the Council and transmitted to Israel and Jordan and ( b ) the replies of Israel and Jordan to the Council’s request for their cooperation, including any proposal made by them singly or jointly. Discussion At its Sixth Session the Trusteeship Council, pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 289 (IV) of 21 November 1949 2 revised the Statute which it had previously prepared for the internationalization of Jerusalem. The General Assembly Resolution had reaffirmed the principle of the 1947 resolution that Jerusalem should be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime administered by the United Nations and had directed the Council to complete, at its next meeting, the preparation of the draft Statute which the Council had drawn up in compliance with the 1947 resolution, to approve the Statute, and to proceed immediately with its implementation without permitting any actions taken by any government to divert it from this task. The United States, although it had opposed the General Assembly resolution, cooperated in the technical task of revising the Statute during the Council’s Sixth Session, and in the third reading of the Statute voted in favor of those articles which were in general consistent with the terms of the General Assembly resolution. In the vote giving final approval to the Statute as a whole, however, the United States abstained on the ground that this Government had reservations of a major importance regarding some of the articles contained in the Statute. Consideration had been given to the possibility of a vote in favor of the Statute with a statement that such a vote on the part of the United States indicated merely a technical fulfillment of the Assembly’s directions to complete the Statute. It was felt, however, that the explanation of the vote would be lost sight of and that the affirmative vote would, therefore, generally be interpreted as a change in the United States position on the fundamental issue of internationalization. The Statute was approved by the Council by a vote of 9–0–2 (UK, US) and a resolution adopted which requested the President of the Council to transmit the text to Jordan and Israel, to request their full cooperation in view of paragraph 2 of the General Assembly resolution, and to report on these matters to the Trusteeship Council at its seventh regular session. Representatives of the Israeli Government have indicated to the Department that they consider the Statute to be a “completely unrepresentative and unrealistic document” and have indicated that Israel will be unable to cooperate in the implementation of the Statute. These representatives state that Israel will make a proposal to the Trusteeship Council which would: (1) provide for a Statute for Jerusalem which would spring from the authority of the United Nations; (2) provide for UN representation which would be wholly separate from the occupying states and would be a sovereign authority of the United Nations; and (3) place full control of the Holy Places within Jerusalem, and possibly outside Jerusalem, in the UN representation. The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan has given no indication since receipt of the Statute of its intentions. On the basis of its past attitude, however, it is expected that the Jordan Government will not accept the Statute. The underlying objective of the United States in the Jerusalem problem is to achieve a solution which will meet with a considerable degree of concurrence by the world community and be acceptable to the two nations which are most directly involved. As previously pointed out, the United States opposed the General Assembly resolution. It did so on the ground that the resolution was unrealistic since it could not be implemented by the United Nations against the wishes of Israel and Jordan without the use of substantial force. Moreover, if it were possible to impose upon Israel and Jordan, who presently occupy Jerusalem, a solution which did not meet with their agreement, constant friction would result. This situation would detract from the viability of the solution and from the peace and stability of the area. Consequently, the Trusteeship Council would be unwise to disregard these factors and to attempt to proceed immediately as directed by the General Assembly with the implementation of the Statute “without permitting any actions taken by any government to divert it from this task”. The alternative would be for the Council to inform the Assembly of its actions as regards the completion of the Statute and of the replies received from Israel and Jordan. The present indications are that Israel and Jordan will not be able to reach any agreement between themselves on the Jerusalem question prior to the Trusteeship Council’s consideration of the problem during the first week of June. The Israeli Government, however, will include in its reply to the Trusteeship Council’s request for cooperation the proposal outlined above. The terms of reference for the Trusteeship Council as contained in the General Assembly resolution do not permit the Council to undertake detailed consideration of solutions other than that approved by the General Assembly. The Council should, however, transmit any such proposals to the General Assembly for its consideration. With a report from the Trusteeship Council containing the completed Statute, the replies of the parties concerned, and any proposals made by those parties, the General Assembly would be in full possession of the facts which would enable it to make a new appraisal of the situation and to inform the Trusteeship Council of any further steps which it should take. 1 The IO Files are the master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs of the Department of State, comprising the official UN documentation and classified Department of State records on United States policy in the UN Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Economic and Social Council, and various special and ad hoc committees for the period from 1946 to currency. 2 This Resolution dealt with the question of the former Italian colonies. Presumably Resolution 303 (IV) of December 9, 1949, was intended. The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/5–1950: Telegram [Document 472] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret Tel Aviv , May 19, 1950—6 p. m. 380. Shiloah with Kollek at residence May 19 told me message was received from Amman May 16 inquiring re Shiloah return. Latter expects date for meeting with King to be fixed within few days. Shiloah emphatic King must personally participate during early stages negotiations if these are to succeed; later they might be transferred to PCC offices Geneva. Sent Department 380, repeated Jerusalem 35, Department pass Amman 38, Moscow 28, Geneva 30, London 84. McDonald The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/5–1950: Telegram [Document 473] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , May 19, 1950—7 p. m. 2795. Embtel 2670, May 15. 1 Furlonge said today that he understood that Drew and Kirkbride had discussed in Amman possibility Jordan negotiating with Israel through PCC machinery. Kirkbride has reported that, in view Jordan Cabinet deadlock over question resumption direct negotiations with Israel, it might be good idea for US and UK to encourage Jordan to accept PCC offer. Kirkbride emphasized, however, that there should be no pressure on Jordan to accept and that Jordan should not be encouraged to consult with other Arab states on this question. Furlonge said now that AL political commission has adjourned, Foreign Office concurs Kirkbride’s line and is prepared join with US in giving appropriate encouragement to Jordan. From remarks which Furlonge dropped, we gather Foreign Office is not at all optimistic re possibility Jordan reaching settlement with Israel through PCC machinery. Foreign Office’s principal interest in proposal seems to lie in fact that its acceptance would result in reconciliation differences between Abdullah and his Cabinet. Sent Department 2795; repeated information Geneva 74. Douglas 1 Not printed: it provided some interim views of Mr. Furlonge on this question (357.AC/5–1550). The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 350/5–1950: Telegram [Document 474] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority New York , May 19, 1950—8:30 p. m. 443. For Rockwell, ANE. Eban and Rafael (Israel) called on Ross this afternoon at their request and left with him copies of draft of memorandum 1 to be presented by Israeli Government to Trusteeship Council on question of Jerusalem. They said they would present draft to Garreau, TC president, around May 26, and until then at least it is confidential. They have shown it to British, French and some other members TC. Eban requested Department’s reactions to it. Eban also left letter addressed to me, text of which follows: “I have the honour to enclose the draft of a memorandum which I shall submit to the President of the TC on behalf of the Government of Israel before the opening of the seventh session. This document comes as a reply to the resolution of the TC adopted on the 4th April, 1950, and to a subsequent letter from M. Garreau enclosing the text of a statute for Jerusalem. On April 19 I had the privilege of joining Ambassador Elath in Washington for a discussion of the Jerusalem question with Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee and his colleagues. 2 In the course of that conversation we indicated that the Government of Israel planned to offer proposals for a solution of the Jerusalem question in an effort to reconcile all the interests involved—especially the interests of the religious world and those of Israel and Jordan. The Assistant Secretary of State assured us that US aspired to a solution reconciling the legitimate interests of these three parties, and would look with sympathy on any constructive effort that might be taken towards that end. The idea of a UN statute for the Holy Places which I outlined orally on that occasion appeared to be regarded by the Assistant Secretary of State and his colleagues as a constructive effort in that sense, and my government has felt encouraged to take further steps in formulating its proposals. The enclosed document begins with a detailed argument explaining why the statute adopted by the TC in Geneva does not provide an effective solution of this problem. In its second part, however, it goes on to elaborate the principles which might underlie an equitable and practicable solution. This second part contains all the proposals which I outlined orally in the Department of State on April 19. On that occasion they had only tentative validity. With the presentation of this memorandum, however, they would become the formal policy of the Government of Israel. The effect of this proposal would be to establish a statutory system whereby all matters directly affecting the Holy Places in Jerusalem, and the unique religious life which revolves around the Holy Places, would come under the jurisdiction of the UN through a permanent organ to be established for that purpose. At the same time my government states (in paragraph 18) that if the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan were disposed to accept the establishment of a direct international regime over the limited area containing the main Holy Places, in the walled city and its immediate environs, the Government of Israel would cooperate in the establishment of such a regime. However, it is because we have no reason to believe that such a project is acceptable at this time to the Government of Jordan that we have devoted more specific and detailed attention to the proposal for a statute of the Holy Places to be adopted by the GA and implemented by a special organ of the UN. My government has deeply appreciated the friendly and cooperative discussions which its representatives have had on this question with US representatives during the fourth session of the GA, the sixth session of the TC, and, more recently, in Washington. The principles which we now suggest for a solution have been formulated in a conscious effort to take account of the views which US representatives have expressed to us. My government believes that it is urgent for this problem to be settled rapidly in an atmosphere of harmony and consent. A continued deadlock with the UN remaining committed to an unimplementable plan indignantly opposed by the populations concerned, could only prejudice the stability of the entire Middle East area; perpetuate an unfortunate state of inter-religious relations in the world; hinder the efforts of Israel and Jordan to normalize their relations; leave important universal interests in Jerusalem outside the scope of international attention, and undermine the influence of the UN which should be maintained as a potentially important factor in the stabilization of peace in the Middle East. The Government of Israel having taken the initiative towards breaking a serious international deadlock hopes that its proposals will secure the support of the Government of the US in the TC and the GA, and that the other parties in this question may thus be encouraged to explore this ground of compromise with us. In presenting this memorandum to the US in advance of its formal submission, I am instructed to say that my government would greatly welcome any intimation of US views or comments on it.” Two copies draft memorandum pouched tonight to Rockwell. Austin 1 This 16-page document, dated “May 1950” and entitled “Draft of Memorandum To Be Presented by the Government of Israel to the Seventh Session, United Nations Trusteeship Council on the Question of Jerusalem” is not printed. The introduction stated that the Israeli Government would offer full cooperation in a solution of the Jerusalem problem, whereby United Nations responsibility for the Holy Places would be reconciled with the freedom and independence of Jerusalem and its inhabitants. It denounced any implementation of the Statute as involving the United Nations in destroying free and democratic institutions in Jerusalem and imposing against the popular will an authoritarian regime from outside. The draft memorandum noted that of the 36 sites marked as Holy Places on a map prepared in 1949 by the United Nations, only two were located in Jewish Jerusalem. Any attempt to eliminate the elected institutions and the political rights of Jewish Jerusalem, therefore, could not be justified in terms of universal or religious characteristics affecting the New City. The population of the New City would oppose its separation from the State with which it identified all its activity and sentiment. Part II of the draft memorandum presented “An Alternative Proposal”, which expanded on the proposals set forth to Department of State officers on April 19. The memorandum was submitted to the Trusteeship Council by the Israeli Government on May 26 with a letter of the same date addressed by Mr. Eban to the President of the Council. The texts of both documents are printed in U.N. doc. A/1286, p. 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] . 2 See Mr. Rockwell’s memorandum of conversation of April 19, p. 864 [ Pg. 864 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] . The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 811.86/5–2050: Telegram [Document 475] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State confidential niact Jidda , May 20, 1950—3 p. m. 301. Shaikh Yusuf asked me meet him Foreign Office this a. m. upon his return from Riyadh to meet Syrian Prime Minister, and we had discussion lasting one hour and a half. YY 1 said Syrian Prime Minister had on his own request sought audience with HM to discuss general situation Middle East and what could be done to improve general feeling Middle East, Iraq, Syria toward US. Prime Minister said it was his desire do everything possible to remove factors which stood in way closest possible relations between Syria and US and between Arabs generally and US, and he had learned this also policy HM. There was widespread public feeling in Middle East against US because conviction US constantly weighting scales favor Israel against Arabs. US was withholding arms from Syria but granting them to Israel, and US was doing nothing to obtain compliance by Israel with UN resolutions while constantly exerting its influence with Arab states to make peace with Israel. Neither Syria nor any other Arab state had any aggressive intentions against any country in Middle East, and the Arab states would be glad to give positive assurances to this effect and urged that similar assurances be sought in Israel. Syria and Arab states generally were obsessed by fear Israeli aggression and, while they were eager and willing to give assurances against aggression, they were doubtful if Israel would give similar assurances, particularly as Israel had indicated it could adopt any policy it chose toward Arab states without any US interference while it could count on immediate US support re any Arab action vis-à-vis Israel. I stated I greatly welcomed this opportunity to have such frank, friendly discussion with Prime Minister, of whom I had heard many favorable things from our very able Minister in Damascus, Keeley. I stressed Keeley deserved fullest possible support Syrian Government and intimated he had had very rough treatment recently. I emphasized we would do well to turn our faces to present and future rather than past and that I thought objectives we sought, namely, peace and stability Middle East were shared by all concerned, although we might differ as to means of obtaining this objective. Syrian Prime Minister interrupted to remark he agreed except re Israel’s objectives. I recalled brilliant analysis by Minister Keeley at Istanbul Conference Arab public feeling and stated he had doubtless heard from Keeley that one of most important decisions reached at Istanbul was unanimous view Chiefs of Mission US Government should maintain impartial attitude as between Arabs and Israel. I did not believe we had deviated from this. Syrian Prime Minister had said we were pursuing different policy re arms. I said our policy was exactly the same toward Israel as toward all Arab states in the matter of arms. Syrian Prime Minister said Minister Keeley had recently asked him for list of arms possessed by Syrian Government before any consideration could be given to shipments. I said I did not think this unreasonable request and recalled UK had made similar condition recently to Israel, and I was not sure, but I believed we had informed Israel we would have to be better acquainted with their present position if we were to consider their request for arms. I said when in Yemen I had first heard from Yemeni friends re Dawalibi’s statements in Cairo, particularly that Arab League delegates had been aroused by US Embassy representative and pressure put upon them to come to terms with Israel. I recalled that HE had informed Keeley Dawalibi’s statements did not represent views Syrian Government, but it was unfortunate so many misstatements were made about American policy and so many false interpretations given currency about it. It was true number of US Congressmen had publicly opposed shipment of arms to Arab states, but this was not to be taken necessarily as representing US policy. Syrian Prime Minister recalled Keeley had aroused him after midnight to leave aide mémoire expressing views US Government re reported Syrian decision close frontiers against Jordan if peace made with Israel. 2 He cited this as unwarranted interference Syrian policy and as representative policy pursued by US Government against which so much resentment had been aroused in Arab world. Syrian Prime Minister emphasized neither Syria nor any other Arab state was seeking aid US Government in its behalf in order to change public feeling against US Government. What was most needed in that regard was that US Government pursue a policy of absolute impartiality to restore former confidence in it. Shaikh Yusuf said he would like sum up SA Government views re discussions: Question introducing peace and stability Middle East had been discussed by Syrian Prime Minister at length with King at Riyadh. This was subject deep concern all Arab states. Facts were US Government and UK had imposed Israel upon Middle East, and situation had been created which had been source great disturbance and unsettlement. No effort had been made by US Government to obtain compliance Israel with UN resolutions. Arab states had gained impression HM had great influence with US Government, but facts were HM’s representations re Israel had proved of no avail. It was important we all make strenuous efforts to bring about cessation present uncertainty and disturbed conditions Middle East. Arab states had no aggressive intentions and accepted fact of Israel but had greatest concern re Israel’s intention. HM had thought of asking me join them in Riyadh, but considered it best discussion take place Jidda, and after report this initial conversation had been made US Government, HM would discuss US Government’s observations. Syrian Prime Minister said he would like to add he and responsible officials in Arab states were strongly opposed to communism and wished to see Middle East source of strength to US rather than weakness. Unless we pursued policy designed attract Arab states to us rather than against us, aid we were giving Turkey would be nullified. I said I thought our very frank and cordial exchange views had been most fruitful as it was evident to me we were all earnestly seeking same objectives. I knew my Government would welcome and take particular note assurances Syrian Prime Minister Syria had no aggressive intentions against other states Middle East. I asked if he had made similar statement to Keeley. He replied he had not, but had said arms furnished Syria would be used only for defensive purposes. At my suggestion he agreed reiterate his assurances Keeley on his return Damascus, and he took initiative in stating he would urge giving similar assurances by Egypt and Lebanon. I said my government had been greatly impressed by assurances given 1947 by Crown Prince Saud on behalf HM to US Government in this regard 3 and that I felt certain US Government would consider assurances given by SA, Syria, and other Arab states represented as step forward toward goal we are seeking. Shaikh Yusuf nodded his head and seemed very pleased at reference made to SA Government. (Department will appreciate reason my making this reference.) At one moment in conversation, Prime Minister said, unless there was same willingness on part of Israel as there was on part of Arab states to reach a just and equitable settlement, any peace treaty reached would mean nothing. I said his statement closely conformed with Secretary Acheson’s words re peace treaty with Russia, to effect that treaties and agreements are only of use when they reflect existing situations of fact. I asked if Arab states had formulated any reply to recent PCC invitation Israel and Arab states send delegations Geneva. I remarked I understood Israel had agreed to send delegation without conditions. YY said decision had been taken at Arab League to send delegation only if Israel would agree to execute UN resolutions, and Arab states were adamant in this regard. YY concluded by saying HM always used utmost frankness with US Government in view their close friendly relations. We have stated the problem, and it is up to the US Government to take cognizance of this situation which we have analyzed frankly and sincerely in order to indicate means by which public opinion may be changed in favor US. Prime Minister proceeding Cairo for conversations Egyptian Government. Department pass priority Cairo 62, Amman 14, Geneva 2 (for PCC). Sent Department 301, niact London Tosec 68, repeated priority Damascus 34, repeated information Baghdad 27, Tel Aviv 9, Jerusalem 5, Beirut 16. Childs 1 Yusuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, sometimes Acting. 2 Legation Damascus advised, on May 23, that the Prime Minister’s statement that Minister Keeley had roused him after midnight was inaccurate. The Minister had requested an audience with the Prime Minister through customary Foreign Office channels the day before the Prime Minister’s departure for Cairo and the hour of reception (9 p. m.) had been fixed by the Prime Minister (684A.85/5–2350). 3 For documentation on the visit of Crown Prince Saud to the United States, see Foreign Relations ,1947, vol. v , pp. 738 – 741 , 1007 – 1008 , and 1329 – 1340 , passim . The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 611.86/5–2150: Telegram [Document 476] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Jidda , May 21, 1950—1 p. m. 302. ReEmbtel 301, May 20. Shaikh Yusuf said to me at Foreign Office today he wished to add under instructions HM certain information to that given me yesterday, but which he did not wish reveal in presence Syrian Prime Minister. YY said while in Cairo, he had informed Egyptian Foreign Minister King Ibn Saud’s displeasure with Dawalibi’s statement. Egyptian Foreign Minister had replied statement was reflection of wide-spread public feeling and committee Egyptian Parliament had adopted unanimously resolution in this sense. Azzam Pasha had informed Yusuf he fully subscribed to statement, although Yusuf had urged him not to state so publicly and Azzam had retracted statement, although in very equivocal manner. Egyptian Foreign Minister had told Yusuf Arab states disappointed King Ibn Saud had not been able exert greater influence with USG to obtain Arab rights. Both US and UK were making difficulties re arms shipments needed defense purposes, and were doing nothing to accede Egyptian Government’s desire evacuation British troops from Suez. Russia was buying Egyptian cotton and selling Egypt wheat and if US and UK cooperation unobtainable, Egypt would have no difficulty in obtaining arms from Russia or in concluding a nonaggression pact with Russia which would make presence British troops unnecessary. Egyptian Foreign Minister emphasized no responsible leader in Arab world wished Communism in their country but US and UK had cooperated recently during war for defeat Germany and Arab states might be forced make such diplomatic alliance if US and UK continued deaf to Arab pleas for justice and if US continued its all-out support Israel at expense Arab states. I remarked I had too great a respect for Shaikh Yusuf’s intelligence to be under necessity of pointing out to him fallacies in these arguments. Dawalibi had stated Arabs preferred Soviet to Zionist regime. Yusuf would agree by no stretch of imagination could any US policy be interpreted as directed toward Zionisation Arab world. One had only to look to Eastern Europe to see what would happen Arabs under Soviet regime. Yusuf said what Dawalibi said was not so important as causes behind it and fact it symbolized wide-spread resentment and bitterness on part both people and responsible leaders against manner in which Arab states had been treated. It was most important to endeavor to remove these causes, although he had no suggestions or proposals to offer but left this for us. He hoped we would treat information confidential as Egyptian Government might not welcome divulging to another government secret conversations between SAG and EG. I informed Yusuf my government would appreciate confidence reposed in it. Sent Department 302, repeated information London 69, Baghdad 28, Tel Aviv 10, Damascus 35, Jerusalem 6, Beirut 17, Cairo 63, Amman 15, Geneva 3 (for PCC), Moscow unnumbered. Childs The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 674.00/5–2350 [Document 477] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential No. 1185 Cairo , May 23, 1950. Subject: Foreign Minister’s Statement on Egypt’s Foreign Policy Foreign Minister Salaheddin Bey told the Senate last night that Egypt stands by the recent resolution of the Arab League Political Committee regarding Jordan, that Egypt continues to recognize the All-Palestine Government, that the troops stationed at Gaza serve a strictly defensive purpose, and that Egypt continues to believe in the utility of the Arab League. Although none of the Foreign Minister’s remarks in reply to an interpellation on these subjects indicated any change in Egyptian policy, his statement on the Arab League was noted with interest because of speculation here as to what attitude Egypt will adopt if the League Council, which convenes on June 12, refuses to expel Jordan. Salaheddin Bey’s statement threw little light on this contingency, however, beyond asserting that a regional bloc of the Arab states is clearly in their own interest. On the subject of Egyptian-Jordanian relations, the Foreign Minister stated merely that Egypt’s views have already been set forth in the official communiqués issued by the Secretariat of the Arab League on April 13, 1950 (Embtel 383, April 14 2 ) and at the end of the Political Committee meetings from May 11 to 15, 1950 (Despatch 1119 of May 17 3 ). With regard to Palestine, Salaheddin Bey observed that all the Arab states except Jordan had recognized the All-Palestine government headed by the great leader, Ahmed Hilmy Pasha. Even though present circumstances prevent that government from exercising authority in Palestine, the object of its recognition by Egypt and the Arab states is to place on record their insistence on the Arab character of Palestine until such time as a final Palestinian settlement is made on the basis of right and justice. With regard to the Egyptian troops at Gaza, the Foreign Minister said that this question is regulated by the Rhodes Armistice, which Egypt “rigorously respects”. He went on to say that “as for Egypt’s military preparation, it does not include any aggressive intentions and has no other goal than to safeguard Egypt’s internal security and to insure her defense in case an attack should be directed against her.” On the subject of the Arab League, Salaheddin Bey affirmed that there is no doubt that the League has political benefits for its members. At the present time there is a tendency all over the world to form regional blocs, he affirmed, and it is particularly in the interest of the Arab states to do so because their language, history, religion, customs, hopes, and fears have so much in common. “However”, he added, “this coalition can prove helpful only if its members work with a spirit of sincerity, fraternity, and unselfishness, in order to respect the desires of the Arab peoples and to safeguard their interests.” In describing the accomplishments of the Arab regional bloc, Salaheddin Bey made reference to the recently acquired independence of Syria and Lebanon and the Arab attitude on the questions of independence for Indonesia and Libya. He praised the manner in which the Arab states had rallied around Egypt when her case was submitted to the Security Council and asserted that the Arab peoples would never forget “the support which Egypt has always given at the United Nations to countries which had not obtained home rule.” The Foreign Minister also made reference to the government’s statement in the Speech from the Throne that Egypt would seek to establish the League on the basis of “sincere cordiality and complete sincerity”, and declared that the attitude which Egypt has adopted in the League sessions since that time proves that the government has fulfilled its engagements to Parliament. At the conclusion of the Foreign Minister’s remarks, Senator Al Sayid Ahmed Abaza (Liberal Constitutionalist), who had presented the interpellation, arose to say that he still wanted to know what Egypt had derived from the League. If matters continue to go on as at present, he asserted, Egypt should withdraw from the League. Jefferson Caffery 1 This despatch was repeated to London, Moscow, Arab capitals, and Tel Aviv. 2 Not printed; but see editorial note, p. 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] . 3 Not printed; it advised of the disappointment in Egyptian official circles and the pleasure the Iraqis and Jordanians at Yemen’s defection from the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian bloc in the latter’s attempt to expel Jordan from the Arab League for annexing eastern Palestine. The Yemeni Delegate had abstained from voting because of the absence of instructions from his Government (786.00/5–1750). The despatch also noted that “it was by unanimous vote, with Jordan abstaining, that Jordan was found guilty of violating the April 13th resolution. Iraq and Yemen differed, therefore, from the other members of the League only on the punishment to be handed out to Jordan.” The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/5–2350: Telegram [Document 478] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , May 23, 1950—6 p. m. 108. Re Deptel 67 May 20. 1 Minister Defense unable receive me discuss PCC proposal until morning May 23 when he informed me Cabinet, at meeting preceding day, had learned from FonMin Shuraiki Pasha of joint reply to latest PCC proposal despatched with Jordan concurrence from Cairo by AL Political Committee. Reply understood amounts reiteration AL communication of April 14 setting forth conditions under which Arab states would agree to renewed negotiations with Israel. Fawzi Pasha said that no decision would be taken by Cabinet until receipt further communication from PCC. I gained impression Fawzi Pasha, although more moderate in his approach to Israeli problem than some of his Cabinet colleagues, also seriously impressed by meeting he held recently on behalf government with representative group members of Parliament. He said they all supported strongly Arab League stand re conditions precedent to PCC negotiations. He also insisted that public opinion continues strongly opposed settlement dismissing recent Palestine pro-peace editorials as inspired by King. He claimed that public feels that British recognition unification and guarantee armistice lines had lessened urgency of making peace with Israel. He also stated that May 22 cabinet meeting disclosed solid support for AL conditions. On this point, I hazard guess that FonMin has returned from successful defence in Cairo of Jordan unification with enhanced prestige and influence in Cabinet and that having just subscribed to Political Committee’s reply to PCC he could hardly advocate any modification of that position at present time. Minister Defense promises keep me informed any possible developments. I am not satisfied he told me whole story and may have more later. 2 Department pass London Geneva, sent Department 108, repeated info London 40, Geneva USPCC 26. Drew 1 Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] . 2 The Legation in Amman reported, on May 25, that Foreign Minister Shuraiki had confirmed the general tenor of the statements made to Minister Drew by the Minister of Defense but had nothing to say concerning the substance of the PCC proposal. (Telegram 111, 357.AC/5–2550) The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the United Nations 350/5–1950: Telegram [Document 479] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the United Nations confidential Washington , May 24, 1950—7 p. m. 268. Ur 443 May 19. You are authorized inform Eban that Dept appreciates kindness of Israeli Del in making available draft memo 1 to be presented by Israeli Govt to TC on question of Jerusalem. You may add that in Dept’s opinion new Israeli proposal is forward step by Israel toward agreement between Jordan, Israel and Internatl Community on Jerusalem. For your info, Dept does not wish to become involved at this stage in substantive discussion with Israel Del on Israeli proposal. Dept wld also not wish to see impression created in UN that USG has given substantive approval to new Israeli proposal or is supporting Israeli initiative in circulating new proposal in UN. Week 1 See telegram 443, May 19, from New York, p. 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] . The Acting Secretary of Slate to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) 784A.5/5–2550 [Document 480] The Acting Secretary of Slate to the Secretary of Defense ( Johnson ) secret Washington , May 25, 1950. My Dear Mr. Secretary : In the light of your conversation with Secretary Acheson at the White House on April 14, 1 it is suggested that you may wish to undertake a review of the status of recommendations regarding arms exports to Israel and the Arab states. The Department of State believes that broad policy considerations suggest the desirability of a change in the existing trend. The President directed on September 1, 1949 that arms exports from this country to Israel and the Arab states should be limited to those deemed necessary for the maintenance of internal law and order and for the purpose of providing for reasonable requirements of self-defense. This was in accordance with the position this Government had taken in the United Nations Security Council on the occasion of the lifting of the United Nations ban on shipments of arms to the Near East. Since the ban was lifted, the Department has received a number of requests from Israel and the Arab states for the export of arms and other war material. It has been possible to approve some of these requests because they involved items of low military potential and were essentially for non-military end use. Requests for the export of equipment of high military potential, such as tanks, guns and jet fighter aircraft, have also been received. The majority of these latter requests have come from the Government of Israel, although some have been received from the Governments of Egypt and Syria. These requests have been referred by the Department of State to the Department of Defense through the established military channel of the Munitions Board for military advice as to whether the arms desired represented legitimate requirements within the meaning of the President’s policy referred to above. The recommendations of the Department of Defense on the Israeli cases have been of such a character that the results for the Israelis have been almost completely negative. The implications of adhering to this position on the Israeli requests are to continue to deny to Israel access to combat material from United States commercial sources, despite the action taken by the United Nations Security Council in lifting the restrictions on arms shipments to the Near East. With respect to the requests received from the Arab states for significant military items, the Department of Defense’s recommendations have been generally for approval of the export licenses. The Department of Defense in its comments on the Israeli requests has noted the inadequacy of information on the size and composition of the Israeli military establishment. The Department of the Air Force has expressed the opinion, however, that the Israeli air force is the most powerful in the Near East except that of Turkey. There is attached a list of the pending Israeli requests for arms from United States sources, including the proposed sources of material and such comments as have been received from the Department of Defense. There is also attached a list of pending requests from Egypt and Syria. 2 We are in agreement that it is in the strategic interests of the United States that the Near East be militarily strengthened for defense against communist aggression and that the countries concerned obtain their arms from friendly sources. In furtherance of this objective, the Department is of the opinion that it would be in the national interest to permit Israel, as well as the Arab states concerned, to acquire in this country limited quantities of arms to meet their legitimate requirements for maintaining internal law and order and for self-defense. The above leads us to the conclusion that further consideration of pending requests is warranted. The Department would favor the export to Israel and the Arab states of such items as AT–6 aircraft, machine guns and ammunition, radar equipment, half tracks and other material of a similar military potential. It is contemplated that approvals could be granted for moderate amounts of material at intervals over a period of time. Sincerely yours, James E. Webb 1 See footnote 6, p. 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] . 2 Lists not printed. The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/5–3050: Telegram [Document 481] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Geneva , May 30, 1950—4 p. m. 667. Palun 356. Following is text of note approved today by PCC and delivered by USDel personally in Bern to Lebanese Minister, and in Geneva to Jordan and Israeli representatives; by French member to Egyptian representative Geneva; and by Turk member to Syrian representative Geneva: “The Conciliation Commission for Palestine has examined the replies of the Arab Governments and the Government of Israel to the Commission’s note of 11 May and finds it desirable to clarify the proposals put forward in its memo of 29 March 1950. The General Assembly of the UN, in its resolution of 11 December 1948 which established the Conciliation Commission and constitutes its charter, requested the Commission ‘at the earliest possible date’. It also called upon the governments ‘to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them’. It was in response to this request and in accordance with the instructions given in paragraph 6 of that resolution that the Commission, in view of the fact the parties had failed to undertake direct negotiations, invited them to seek in mixed committee under the chairmanship of the Commission, the agreement aimed at by the Assembly. The Conciliation Commission believes that the parties will recognize the inappropriateness of laying down prerequisite conditions for the initiation of a procedure conforming to the Assembly’s resolution, especially where such conditions refer to principles laid down by that resolution. It should be emphasized that all these principles must be respected and that one of them cannot be singled out for special recognition without impairing the equilibrium of the resolution of 11 December 1948 as a whole. The Commission feels sure that these principles are recognized by the parties, and that they mean to respect them; but their implementation gives rise to complex problems. It is with these problems that negotiations in the Mixed Committees would deal. The Commission is convinced that each government will recognize the urgent need for the establishment of conditions of peace and stability in the Middle East and for bringing to an end the suffering of the refugees. The Conciliation Commission trusts that in the light of the foregoing considerations it will be possible to proceed with the establishment of the mixed committees without further delays”. Covering letter to Arab representatives reads “I have the honor to enclose a note which the Conciliation Commission is forwarding today to the representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Syria, for transmission to their respective Governments. I should be grateful if this note could be transmitted to your government as soon as possible”. Following is covering letter to Israeli representative, drafted to indicate that while identical notes addressed to Arab and Israeli Governments, notes are in fact for Arab action and Israeli information. “I have the honor to inform you that in view of the correspondence exchanged with the parties in connection with the proposals of 29 March 1950, the Conciliation Commission has considered it useful to address to them the enclosed note setting forth certain clarifications of its position with regard to these proposals. “This note was addressed today to the Government of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and the Commission would be grateful if its contents were brought to the attention of the Government of Israel”. [ Palmer ] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 780.56/5–2450: Telegram [Document 482] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 top secret Washington , May 31, 1950—6 p. m. 2620. Embtel 2911, May 24. 2 Arms request from Israel and several Arab states including lend-lease retransfer to Egypt are currently under consideration and Dept unable predict how soon decision will be reached. In any event Dept believes it would be unwise if immed fol declaration it became publicly known arms shipments were going forth to one side or other. Moreover numbered para 1 of declaration intended reaffirm previous arms policy and not enunciation new policy. Dept inclined believe that when decisions are reached re further arms shipments it wld be preferable to grant export licenses against current requests from Israel and Arab states simultaneously. Emb will, of course, be informed when decision made. Pls comment. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Cairo. 2 Not printed; it reported that a British Foreign Office spokesman had raised again the question of American permission for the United Kingdom to transfer weapons and ammunition of lend-lease origin to Egypt (780.56/5–2450). The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/6–250: Telegram [Document 483] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , June 2, 1950—8 p. m. 3043. a . Furlonge today gave us following information: 1. Re Arab League action on Jordan’s annexation of Arab Palestine, 2 new suggestions have been put forward which Furlonge thinks generally reflect desire find formula for getting both Arab League and Jordan off hook. First is suggestion by Tawfiq Suweidi to postpone Arab League meeting on question until October. Second is suggestion of Saleh Jabr and Biadh Solh 1 referred Amman’s 117 May 29. 2 2. Furlonge referred to report that Israel has offered make concessions to Jordan in Jenin triangle in return renunciation claims by Jordan to Negev. (Amman’s 116 to Department. 3 ) Furlonge says Foreign Office feels it necessary to be realistic about Negev, which Israelis going to retain in any event. Nevertheless, he thought Jordan should proceed carefully on question of settlement with Israel at this time, since this, on top of Jordan’s defiance of Arab League on question of Arab Palestine might have very serious repercussions, including likelihood of other Arab states imposing economic sanctions on Jordan. For this reason he felt Jordan should recognize potential seriousness of such situation and, if it decided resume negotiations, take measures to insure its economy would be protected by insisting on free zone at Haifa. b . In separate conversation with Sheringham we asked him what Foreign Office thought of numerous recent press reports re armistice violations on Jordan-Israeli borders. Sheringham said Foreign Office has had no direct reports from its missions re these incidents but that in view persistent press reports, Foreign Office took occasion a few days ago informally to express concern to Israeli chargé here. Sheringham added Foreign Office feels Israelis may deliberately be provoking these incidents to test efficacy of application Anglo-Jordan treaty to Arab Palestine, although British Minister Tel Aviv discounts this possibility. Sheringham also speculated that reported Israeli interference with Arab harvesters may be calculated endeavor to force Jordan to agree to peace settlement which would be guarantee against such interference. 4 Department pass Amman; sent Department 3043, repeated info Tel Aviv 41, Amman 17. Douglas 1 Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Lebanese Prime Minister, respectively. 2 Not printed; their suggestion was to “recognize unification of both banks until the liberation of all Palestine; in other words, until the disappearance of Israel” (786.00/5–2950). The message also indicated that “King Abdullah, while finding the formula silly, is prepared to accept it.” 3 Dated May 29, not printed; it reported that King Abdullah had informed Minister Kirkbride of a “message from Israel” to this effect (786.00/5–2950). 4 Embassy London advised, on June 6, that Mr. Furlonge took a less serious view of the reported Israeli-Jordanian armistice violations than did Mr. Sheringham. The Foreign Office official indicated that there had been suggestions that the incidents were part of a calculated campaign by Israel but there was no evidence to prove this point (telegram 3169, 684A.85/6–650). Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 784A.00/6–550 [Document 484] Memorandum of Conversations, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ], June 5, 1950. Subject: Status of Jerusalem Participants: Mr. Gabriel Rosaz, Attaché, French Embassy Abdel Monem Rifai, Counselor, Jordan Legation (separately) ANE, Mr. Rockwell Problem: To discuss with Messrs. Rosaz and Rifai the future status of Jerusalem. Action Required: To consider what US action, if any, is required in view of developments. Action Assigned to: ANE, UND, UNP. Mr. Rosaz called under instructions to say that the French Government was favorably impressed by the recent Israeli proposal to the Trusteeship Council on the future status of Jerusalem. The French Government thought, however, that the Israeli proposal did not go far enough and that it should be expanded to provide an international curatorship for religious sites in Palestine not included in the list of Holy Places. Mr. Rosaz said that the French Government wondered whether the US Government agreed that it would be useful to approach Israel at the present time to persuade it to enlarge its proposal in the above sense. The French Government thought, moreover, that it would be desirable to approach the British Government in an effort to persuade it to urge the Jordan Government to exhibit a more cooperative attitude toward the settlement of the Jerusalem problem. In fact the French Ambassador in London had been instructed to make a démarche to the British Foreign Office in this sense. Mr. Rosaz wondered whether the US Government would wish to do the same. Generally speaking, the French Government wanted to know what the attitude of the US Government concerning the Israeli proposal was. I told Mr. Rosaz that we had informally advised the Israelis that we considered their proposal a forward step in the direction of an agreed solution. I said that we did not, however, consider it desirable to enter at this time upon a substantive discussion of the proposal with the Israelis. I added that our preliminary point of view was that tactically speaking it would be more advantageous if amendments to the Israeli proposal could be made during the General Assembly session, rather than to have the proposal expanded to the limit to which the Israelis would agree before the Assembly met and then to have it presented to the Assembly as a final Israeli position. Our present thinking was that it might be possible for several interested delegations to get together in the Fifth General Assembly in an effort to get through a sensible resolution on Jerusalem. I said that my personal view was that such a resolution might take the Israeli proposal as a starting point. Generally speaking, we did not consider it wise to engage in consultations of this nature with the Israelis or with other delegations at this point, particularly in view of the fact that our belief is that the Trusteeship Council does not have authority to consider proposals alternate to the instructions given by the Fourth General Assembly. (I gathered that the French Government had in mind approaching the Israeli Government prior to the June 12 meeting of the Council.) Mr. Rosaz agreed that it would be much wiser to await the General Assembly before engaging in consultations with the Israeli Government. With regard to Jordan’s attitude, I explained that we had informally suggested to the Jordan Legation here that it would be helpful if the Jordan Government were to adopt a less intransigent attitude concerning Jerusalem, especially vis-à-vis the Trusteeship Council. We had also informally suggested the same thing to the British Embassy. I did not believe, therefore, that we would wish to make a formal approach in this sense to the British Government. Mr. Rosaz agreed that this would be unnecessary in view of the informal steps which the Department had already taken. Abdel Monem Rifai invited me to lunch today in order to discuss the status of Jerusalem. He reported that he had written to his brother, Samir Rifai Pasha, 1 and to the Jordanian Foreign Minister after our discussion several weeks ago in which I had suggested that it might be helpful if Jordan could adopt a less intransigent attitude vis-à-vis the Trusteeship Council concerning Jerusalem. I had mentioned that the President of the Council had not even received a reply to his letter to the Jordanian Government transmitting the statute drawn up by the Council. Mr. Rifai said that today he had received a letter from the Foreign Minister which made no reference to a more polite Jordanian attitude toward the Trusteeship Council. The letter, however, said that the Foreign Minister, Samir Rifai Pasha, and King Abdullah all felt that the idea of an international curatorship for the Holy Places, which Abdel Monem Rifai and I had informally discussed at the above meeting, was one which merited full consideration. The Jordan Government, however, could not make any commitments concerning such a scheme until it knew more about it. Mr. Rifai noted that since our discussion the Israelis had made a proposal along these lines. He said he would be interested to have a copy of this proposal, and I promised to send it to him. Mr. Rifai then asked what I thought Jordan should do in the forthcoming meeting of the Council. He emphasized that Jordan would not have ready any kind of counterproposal. I suggested that the Jordanian representative might reiterate his country’s opposition to the full internationalization of Jerusalem but leave the door open to a possible compromise by stating that the Jordan Government currently had under consideration a possible other course of action. What this other course of action might be would be a matter for decision by the Jordan Government, but I suggested that one line which Amman might consider might be to suggest that the international curatorship for the Holy Places be extended to include religious sites located in Israeli territory. This might have the benefit of removing the one-sided nature of the Israeli proposal and might indicate a Jordanian willingness to compromise, which would encourage the GA delegations interested in a moderate solution. There were doubtless other proposals which Jordan might wish to make. Generally speaking, I said that we thought it was essential to reach some agreed solution during the Fifth General Assembly and to get the Jerusalem question off the UN agenda. This could best be done, I thought, if the GA delegations saw the general lines of a solution which both the Jordanians and the Israelis would be prepared to accept, and yet which might go a long way to meet the views of the international community. I urged upon Mr. Rifai the necessity that his Government adopt a more constructive attitude in the Assembly-He agreed that this would be a good idea, particularly if the result was a solution which did not in any way imperil Jordanian sovereignty in the Old City. He promised that he would convey the sense of our conversation to his Government. In response to Mr. Rifai’s question as to when the US was going to recognize the union of Arab Palestine and Jordan, I explained the Department’s position, stating that it was not the custom of this country to issue formal statements of recognition every time a foreign country changed its territorial area. The union of Arab Palestine and Jordan had been brought about as a result of the will of the people and the US accepted the fact that Jordanian sovereignty had been extended to the new area. Mr. Rifai said he had not realized this and that he was very pleased to learn that the US did in fact recognize the union. 1 Jordanian Minister of Court. Editorial Note [Document 485] Editorial Note President Truman, on June 5, signed into law the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950. Title III of the Act authorized the appropriation of a sum not to exceed $27,450,000 for aid to Palestinian refugees. The White House, on June 5, released a statement by the President, which stated in pertinent part: “I am especially glad that the Congress has taken action with respect to the problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine. The program authorized in this bill carries out the recommendations of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Near East, headed by Mr. Gordon Clapp. This program has been drawn up in the light of the serious problems facing the Palestine refugees, and with the economic potential of the Near East in mind. Successful development in this area will make an obvious contribution to the maintenance of peace. To achieve this aim, we shall need the cooperation of other members of the United Nations, who have expressed their interest in the problems of the Arab world. We shall count also, on the continued work of private agencies. Government programs will supplement, but not replace, their work.” The United States Mission at the United Nations had released on June 1 a statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin after congressional action on the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950. The full texts of the statements by President Truman and Ambassador Austin are printed in the Department of State Bulletin , June 26, 1950, pages 1042 and 1043. For documentation on the activities of the Economic Survey Mission, see Foreign Relations , 1949, volume VI, pages 594 ff. The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State 674.84A/6–650 [Document 486] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Department of State 1 secret No. 1315 Cairo , June 6, 1950. Subject: Major General Riley’s Visit to Cairo Major General Riley, Chief United Nations Military Observer in Palestine, has informed us that his visit to Egypt had the following objectives: 1) To induce the Egyptians to forego demands for evacuation of Bir Qattar and Umm Reshresh by the Israelis as a prior condition before entering into political talks with the Israelis. He had seen Colonel Cherine, as the brother-in-law of the King and as the Egyptian military officer most intimately familiar with the Palestine situation. Colonel Cherine pointed out it was impossible for Egypt to give up on this point. (Despatch 1017, May 6.) 2 It would be impossible to sell the country the idea. If the Israelis would voluntarily withdraw, 70% of the obstacles towards peace talks with Israel would be removed. General Riley said that the Egyptians from a technical point of view were 100% right about Israeli seizure of Bir Qattar after the signature of the armistice. They had a poorer case on Umm Reshresh. His own view was to get this problem laid on the table at a general political discussion rather than make its settlement a prior solution for Israeli-Egyptian talks. 2) To convince the Arab League and Egypt, which he believed was the Arab League, to forego their insistence on the discussion of the refugee question on the basis of the 1948 United Nations resolution prior to peace talks with Israel. Col. Cherine had indicated that there was no prospect that the Egyptians would relinquish this demand. The General also said that he had just made a tour of the armistice frontiers and for the moment all was quiet. Any incidents which took place were incidents which would take place in peacetime over any frontier. They were largely concerned with shepherds trying to move their flocks across the frontier and raiding parties going across the frontier to steal and to rob. He also spoke of a project regarding Gaza which he had in mind. He was proposing to Israel that as a gesture towards the solution of the refugee problem they turn over about a ten kilometer strip along the eastern borderline of Gaza. This area contained several Jewish settlements but if the Israelis would relinquish it it would be possible to solve the refugee problem by moving 150,000 refugees into Jordan and settling the remainder in this ceded area. He was not optimistic that the Israeli government would listen to him but he intended to raise it and use the argument that without some concessions on the part of Israel the Arabs would have no basis on which to sell peace to their people. He had urged the Israelis again and again that they should give generous terms to the Jordanians in order to convince the Egyptians and the other Arab states that the Israelis were serious about making peace. He said that Jordan had dropped peace talks for the moment because of Arab League pressure. Nothing would be done until after June 12. After that date much would depend on whether the Arab League expelled Jordan or not. 3 Jefferson Caffery 1 This despatch was repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and Arab capitals. 2 Not printed; but see footnote 1 to the memorandum of conversation by Ireland, p. 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] . 3 The Egyptian Foreign Office handed an aide-mémoire of June 8 to General Riley presenting Egypt’s case on Bir Qattar and Umm Beshresh. The General believed that the Egyptian case had considerable validity and stated he would present it to the Israeli Government, pointing out that Israeli evacuation of these points would greatly enhance the possibility of opening political talks with Egypt. The General was said to have little confidence that he would persuade the Israelis to take such action. The aide-mémoire is attached to transmitting despatch 1351, June 9, neither printed (674.84A/6–950). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 684A.85/6–550: Telegram [Document 487] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 confidential Washington , June 6, 1950—7 p. m. 296. Dept June 6 took up informally with Israeli Emb reported incident subject Amman tel 121 June 5, 2 rptd you as 41. Dept emphasized report not verified but stated that if true undesirable consequences re Israel-Jordan relationship obvious. Israeli Emb said had not recd any info from Tel Aviv and promised teleg immed. Entirely agreed with Dept that incidents of this nature have very harmful effect upon possibilities further Israel-Jordan rapprochement . Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Amman, London, and Jerusalem. 2 Not printed; it gave a report from Jordanian sources that the Israelis had brutally expelled a group of Arabs from Wadi Araba into Jordan (684A.85/6–550). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 350/6–550: Telegram [Document 488] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom confidential priority Washington , June 6, 1950—7 p. m. 2729. Ur 3117 June 5. 1 Dept believes TC shld submit to GA a report which wld point out that TC has fulfilled GA instrs re completing and approving Jerusalem statute but has been unable proceed with implementation of statute view opposition Israel and Jordan. Report wld include statute as revised by TC, replies of Israel and Jordan to TC request for their cooperation, and any proposals made by Israel or Jordan. GA wld then be in possession of facts which wld enable it to make new appraisal of situation. Dept agrees TC shld not enter substantive discussion Israeli proposal. Dept has noted FonOff reference to “kind words” and wld be interested know what kind of statement FonOff has in mind. 2 Acheson 1 Not printed; it indicated that present thinking in the British Foreign Office was that the Trusteeship Council had no authority to discuss the substance of the Israeli proposals and that the Council should report its failure regarding the Statute to the General Assembly and transmit to it the Israeli plan. The telegram concluded that the Foreign Office was considering the desirability of saying “a few kind words” about the Israeli plan before the Trusteeship Council (350/6–550). 2 London advised, on June 8, that the British Representative to the Trusteeship Council was to be given discretion to say before the Council that the “Israeli proposal for Jerusalem seems to be constructive approach to problem, but that TC is not proper forum to consider it. Therefore proposal should be referred GA. These are ‘kind words’ referred Embtel 3117” (350/6–850). The United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council (Sayre) to the Secretary of State 350/6–850: Telegram [Document 489] The United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council ( Sayre ) to the Secretary of State secret priority New York , June 8, 1950—8:07 p. m. 490. From Sayre. Text of draft resolution set forth below prepared by USDel as indication of action which TC might take re Jerusalem and for purpose of clarifying delegation’s thinking this question. Draft resolution shown informally Fletcher-Cooke (UK) who made certain suggestions incorporated in following text. He indicated UK could readily support Jerusalem text along these lines: “ The Trusteeship Council , Having received the request of the General Assembly concerning an international regime for the City of Jerusalem contained in resolution 303 (IV) of December 9,1949; Having approved on April 4, 1950, a Statute for the City of Jerusalem (T–592) in accordance with that resolution; Having transmitted the text of the Statute to the Government of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with a request for their cooperation; Having received [from] the Governments of Israel and Jordan expressions of views which appear to render impossible the implementation of the Statute; Decides to transmit the attached report to the General Assembly for its consideration, together with copies of the Statute as approved by the Council, the reply of the Government of Israel dated May 26, 1950, which includes certain new proposals, and all other pertinent documents.” Report referred to last paragraph above draft resolution would be merely factual statement actions taken TC re Jerusalem during sixth and present sessions. Delegation has no present intention of introducing resolution on Jerusalem and will keep Department informed this matter. 1 [ Sayre ] 1 In preliminary soundings made by the U.S. Delegation general agreement with the position of the United States on the handling of the Jerusalem problem was expressed by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, and the Dominican Republic (telegrams 482, June 6, and 495, June 9, both from New York, 357.AC/6–650 and /6–950). The latter message also included for comment a draft statement to be made before the Trusteeship Council by Ambassador Sayre at an appropriate time. The Department of State, on June 12, approved the statement, with various changes in language (telegram 304 to New York, 357.AC/6–1250). The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/6–950: Telegram [Document 490] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , June 9, 1950—9 a. m. 425. Shiloah at residence hour and quarter June 8 said substantially following: Israel-Jordan relations more discouraging than if impasse had been reached on one or more specific issues. Present obstacle is “intangible atmosphere” which most difficult to combat. “Possible Israel did exaggerate King’s power” to press through to agreement with Israel. Abdullah “needs encouragement not pressure” from USG and UKG. “King requires only assurance he will be supported” if his settlement with Israel gets him into trouble with AL. “Peace and stability in NE would be advanced by US and UK concentration on peace between Jordan and Israel”. After success there, Israel-Egypt peace “would be easier”. Since US and UK policy is peace in NE encouragement of Abdullah could not justify charge they are injuring other Arab states. “Present UK and US comparative lukewarmness” toward Jordan-Israel peace is dangerous because: 1—continuance of uncertainty increases danger of friction on unsettled points Article 8 of armistice, 2—lack of NE peace “accentuates” internal disunity in “Syria, Iraq and even Egypt” and failing domestic reforms “opens doors to Communists”. Despite 3-power declaration, future of NE is perilous and requires more fundamental study and more consistent attitude by US and UK. New Subject: Re Amman Legtel 121 to Department June 5. 1 Shiloah promised investigation this weekend and prompt explanation. 2 Sent Department 425; repeated information Amman 41, Jerusalem 38, London 92, Geneva 33; Department pass Amman, London, Geneva; pouched Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Jidda, Paris, Moscow. McDonald 1 Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] . 2 Embassy Tel Aviv received a letter from Mr. Eytan on June 12 which confirmed Mr. Kollek’s statement and averred that the fact that whatever abuse did occur was a “serious source of concern and regret”. The letter stated that Mr. Eytan had been instructed to inform the Embassy that further energetic investigation was being carried out and that the guilty would be punished (telegram 442, 684A.85/6–1350). Embassy Tel Aviv, on June 11, reported information from Mr. Kollek that while it was “unfortunately true” that a group of Arab infiltrators had been expelled on May 31 and that while the facts of expulsion were “pretty horrible”, he did not believe that torture had been practiced by the Israeli Army. Mr. Kollek also stated that the responsible Army officer had been court-martialed and that a public statement would be issued on June 9. The statement “admitted increasing number border incidents in which ‘force had clearly to be used to round up and capture the infiltrators who were usually armed’. Denied torture and tended place full responsibility on Jordan Government which ‘in last few weeks seems to have lost control of its population in border areas.’” The statement gave no indication of action against any officials (telegram 427, 684A.85/6–1150). Embassy Tel Aviv received a letter from Mr. Eytan on June 12 which confirmed Mr. Kollek’s statement and averred that the fact that whatever abuse did occur was a “serious source of concern and regret”. The letter stated that Mr. Eytan had been instructed to inform the Embassy that further energetic investigation was being carried out and that the guilty would be punished (telegram 442, 684A.85/6–1350). The United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council (Sayre) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/6–1250: Telegram [Document 491] The United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council ( Sayre ) to the Secretary of State restricted New York , June 12, 1950—7:43 p. m. 502. From Sayre. Following is text draft resolution proposed by Garreau and Ryckmans after discussion TC today on Jerusalem question. “ The Trusteeship Council: “Having received the request of the General Assembly concerning an international regime for the city of Jerusalem contained in Resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949; “Having approved on 4 April 1950 a statute for the city of Jerusalem (T/592) in accordance with that resolution; “Having entrusted to its President the mission of transmitting to the Governments of Israel and Jordan the text of the statute and of requesting their full cooperation; “Having received no reply from the Government of Jordan and an expression of views from the Government of Israel as a result of which it appears that neither government is prepared to collaborate in the implementation of the statute as voted by the Trusteeship Council; “Decides to submit to the General Assembly the attached report together with copies of the statute as approved by the Council, the reports of President Garreau to the Council, the reply of the Government of Israel dated 26 May 1950, which includes certain new proposals, and all other pertinent documents.” Draft resolution believed in line with US position. TC will vote on resolution Wednesday together with report to GA. May be slight changes last paragraph but none of substance expected. [ Sayre ] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt, Adviser to the United States Mission at the United Nations USUN Files: Jerusalem, 1950–1958 [Document 492] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt, Adviser to the United States Mission at the United Nations confidential [ New York ,] June 13, 1950. Subject: Status of Jerusalem Participants: Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell—ANE Mr. Edward P. Maffitt—USUN I telephoned Stuart Rockwell this morning and inquired what the Department’s thinking is regarding the next steps to get the Jerusalem matter settled by the end of the next GA. I referred to the New York Times report of May 31 that the Vatican opposes Israel’s new proposal and I asked whether the Department plans to explore the possibilities stemming from the Israeli proposal and to do anything about the Vatican’s attitude, especially with the Latin American group. Rockwell replied that orders from the White House are that the United States, having got its knuckles rapped in the 4th GA, now take a back seat in this matter. “Let someone else take the lead”. He added that the Department, of course, has no objection to discussing the Jerusalem matter between now and the 5th GA, but will require that someone else bring the matter up. I caterwauled a little and asked if this means that we not endeavor to guide some thinking up here, particularly with respect to the Latin American Delegations. I said I thought we might do some good work if we knew what we could say and if what we could say was constructive. I foresaw an unholy mess in the Assembly if we reach it without having cleared some ground around a prepared position. Rockwell agreed but did not see what we could do about it just now. He said it was entirely possible that the 5th Assembly would be unable to reach a conclusion because of a too close balance in voting power between disagreeing groups. The White House orders are clear enough, but I wonder whether we might not have something we could put our hands on later in the summer. It is inconceivable to me that we should sit quietly and let this thing stew up into a witch’s brew in the Assembly. This is an issue Mr. Ross might talk about when he goes down to the Department some time. The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/6–1350: Telegram [Document 493] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Geneva , June 13, 1950—midnight. 730. Palun 361. Egyptian representative requested with PCC afternoon 12 June to deliver Egyptian reply to PCC note of 30 May and to make general statement on behalf government. Abdul Monem requested also that representatives of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan be invited to attend. In three-hour meeting Abdul Monem, noticeably tense, made lengthy statement, general tenor of which was disappointment of Egyptian Government at meager results of Commission’s year and half of existence, denunciation of Zionist and Israeli policy and tactics, sharp criticism of Western Powers, and throughout a distinct note of finis. At end of statement Abdul Monem announced replacement of Egyptian delegate by Egyptian Minister at Bern, Safwat Bey, to continue Egyptian representation during PCC meetings Geneva. In his statement Abdul Monem declared Egyptian delegate had been astonished at failure of PCC to reply to question of Arab States as to whether Israel had agreed to follow the GA recommendation for return of refugees to their homes. Commission in its 30 May note had merely made a statement to effect that right of refugees to return and payment of compensation to those not wishing to return was one of basic principles of GA resolution. Such statement indicated nothing justifying a change in attitude already taken by Egyptian Government to PCC proposal. If Israel accepted unconditionally and categorically return of refugees, Egypt would be willing take part in discussions in mixed committee on refugees. On other questions present procedures should be followed until agreement with Israel had been reached on principle and then, and only then, would Egyptian delegate participate in mixed committees on such other questions. Turning to a review of year and half of PCC’s existence and Palestine situation in general, Abdul Monem characterized PCC’s work as having achieved meager results of little value. Proposals put forward in PCC by Arab delegates had never been taken up as result of Israel refusal to consider them. Past experience forecast a pessimistic future for PCC, while reason for present distressing situation in Palestine, including discriminatory treatment and brutal persecution of Arabs living in Jewish-occupied territory, to be found in policy of Zionist and Jewish ideology, unfortunately supported by certain powers whose actions concerning everything except Palestine problem were based on democratic principles and peaceful intentions. Policy of Jewish immigration presented serious danger to Middle East security and something for powers supporting Zionists to think over carefully. Jewish immigration policy had two calculated results: to prevent return of refugees to their homes and to make expansion inevitable. Summing up, Abdul Monem stated that PCC had failed in its mandate as result of policy of fait accompli followed systematically and with impunity by the Jews and encouraged by certain of great powers. He had learned with great disappointment of joint French, UK and US declaration of 25 May, the first consequence of which was to help consolidate present state of affairs in Palestine and to support those following the policy of faits accomplis . It was high time for PCC, which had dealt too tenderly with Jewish susceptibilities, to make clear to world that reason for its failure was refusal of Israel to respect UN resolution. Shukairi, Syrian representative, supported wholeheartedly Egyptian statement, which offered point of view of entire Arab world. Syria’s position was exactly same as Egypt’s on PCC proposals. PCC’s clarifications brought to light no new factors. It was in fact redundant and superfluous for PCC to give analysis of its own terms of reference. Arab States had not asked for that, but for assurance by Israel of its intention abide by GA resolution. What Arab States had asked could not be regarded as condition to accepting PCC proposals, but as something already laid down by GA. Shukairi then took up various matters included in PCC’s progress reports (reunion of families, blocked accounts, et cetera) and inquired why PCC characterized any of these as progress. He next outlined the four stages of PCC’s failure. First was when great powers had advocated and supported admission of Israel to UN without making any effort to assure the success of PCC’s efforts. PCC was bound to fail under these circumstances. Second was lending of military, financial and political assistance to Israel by members of UN without requiring any assurances for the success of the PCC’s work. PCC was likewise bound to fail under such conditions. Third was de jure recognition by certain countries of Israel without requiring any assurance of cooperation with UN and with UN organ, PCC. Why would not PCC fail under these conditions? Last and most fatal blow to efforts of PCC was Three-Power declaration of 25 May. PCC could not be blamed for its failure. It had not been supported by the UN or governments of members of PCC itself. Perhaps actions taken in four stages he had outlined had been taken without consulting PCC. In any case such actions were opposite of support for PCC work. In conclusion Shukairi said that it was PCC’s duty to look at situation in this way: that continuation of present state of affairs would lead ultimately to a human catastrophe and upset peace of Middle East and it was PCC’s duty to so report to UN. In its report PCC could not complain of Arab attitude which was simply to ask for carrying out of UN resolution. Israelis, on other hand, demanded negotiations and peace treaty which meant simply opening of Arab markets, establishment of diplomatic relations, refugees out, and all territory retained. The philosophy of Israel was no concession, no retreat, continued consolidation and continued aggression. This was bound some day to ignite Middle East. Shukairi then stated that if PCC thought it possible to continue, he should like to be informed in order to advise his government, to whom he would report in next few days, since he would be leaving Geneva at end of week. Mikaoui, representative of Lebanon, in a comparatively brief statement declared that Israel had done nothing to facilitate PCC’s task, which had become so arduous as result their intransigence, and stated that Lebanon maintained common attitude adopted by all Arab countries at Arab League Political Committee meeting and communicated to PCC by Egyptian Foreign Minister 14 April. Abdul Hadi, Jordan delegate, remained silent until chairman raised question of press communiqué on Arab attitude to outline of which Egyptian, Syrian and Lebanese representatives had agreed. Abdul Hadi then stated that communiqué could not accurately reflect “Arab” attitude, since he had not spoken and could not speak for lack of instructions. Communiqué as issued today stated briefly that Egyptian, Syrian and Lebanese delegates had maintained their attitude and that Jordan representative being without instructions had reserved his right to reply to Commission’s note of 30 May at later date. American and French delegates with Principal Secretary (Eralp, Turkish adviser, being absent in Marseilles to meet Yalcin who returns tomorrow) met this morning to consider situation with which PCC is now confronted. It was generally agreed no immediate action should be taken pending possible reply from Jordan to 30 May note. Possibilities of a recess for delegates and PCC members to make contact their governments or removal of PCC to Jerusalem to make further efforts with governments concerned and prepare report to GA where considered. Consensus seemed to be PCC’s best course, if Jordan reply is negative, would be to remove to Middle East probably around July 15. US delegate believes PCC cannot by its action or reports minimize seriousness present impasse and that forthright action is required. Trip to Middle East seems to be first step to be taken this direction. 1 [ Palmer ] 1 The Department summarized this message, with a request for comments, in a circular telegram of June 16, 6 a. m. to Cairo, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, and Amman for action and to Jidda, Ankara, and Baghdad for information (357.AC/6–1650). The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 310.5/6–1450: Telegram [Document 494] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] 508. New York , June 14, 1950—9:59 p. m. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trusteeship Council . The Council June 14 adopted 10–0–1 (Philippines) its report to the GA on an international régime for Jerusalem, and then approved 9–1 (Iraq)–1 (Philippines) the Belgian-French resolution submitting to the GA the Statute as approved by the TC, the report of President Garreau to the TC, and Israel’s reply of May 26. 1 A mention of the fact that the Israeli reply “includes certain new proposals,” was deleted from the resolution on the initiative of Iraq. At the same time, reference to these new proposals was maintained in the final para of the report, with the statement that the TC had not discussed them. The Iraqi Delegate put forward this last modification, as a less desirable alternative to deletion of the reference to the new proposals from the report, and it was quickly agreed to by the Council. In a summarizing statement following the votes, the TC President expressed the view that it was now up to the GA to “pursue further” the work begun by the Council. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Austin 1 The texts of these documents are among those included in the “Special Report of the Trusteeship Council” to the General Assembly. The Special Report is undated and was released in 1950 by the Assembly as U.N. doc. A/1286. 2 The General Assembly did not give formal consideration to the Special Report until December 7, when the Ad Hoc Political Committee began deliberations on the Jerusalem question; see the editorial note, p. 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] . A summary of the Trusteeship Council’s deliberations on June 14 is printed in TC (VII), p. 71. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Barrow of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 396.1–LO/6–1750 [Document 495] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Barrow of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] June 17, 1950. Subject: Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. Participants: Dr. Chas. Malik—Minister of Lebanon Mr. Hare—NEA Mr. Rockwell—ANE Mr. Barrow—ANE Problem: Dr. Malik sought clarification of certain aspects of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. Action Required: None Discussion: Dr. Malik raised several questions about the May 25, 1950 Tripartite Declaration to which Mr. Hare responded. The points raised and the responses were as follows: (1) Dr. Malik referred to the French approach to Lebanon for assurances of non-aggressive intent and stated he hoped this did not mean recognition of a “sphere of influence”. Mr. Hare said it was explained in paragraph 2 of the declaration that assurances had been sought by those countries who had already provided significant quantities of arms. Contrary to the impression that may have been gained, France had not been authorized to seek assurances on behalf of the US and UK; the latter countries would themselves seek assurances from those countries to which significant quantities of arms are provided in the future. There was, of course, no intent to recognize spheres of influence. (2) Dr. Malik asked if the declaration was addressed to the question of prevention of aggression within the Near East or whether it also had reference to the larger question of aggression against Near Eastern countries by a non-Near Eastern power. Mr. Hare said the former interpretation was correct. Although paragraph 1 of the declaration recognized that the Arab States and Israel need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purpose of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole, the set of premises from which the declaration had been formulated were centered on the security problems within the Near East itself. The approach to the larger problem would obviously involve a different set of premises. (3) Dr. Malik asked several questions about paragraph 3 of the declaration, viz: ( a ) He was troubled by the fact that the declaration referred only to “preparation” to violate frontiers or armistice lines and not also to the “commission” of violations. If, as was conceivable, aggression occurred so suddenly that the “preparation” for it was not ascertainable, was it the intent of the declaration that the status quo ante be restored? Mr. Hare said it was the understanding and intent of the US, and he believed the understanding and intent of the UK and France as well, that if either preparation for or commission of aggression occurred, the three countries would take vigorous action to put matters right. It had not been believed necessary to refer to commission of aggressive acts since this seemed to follow naturally. ( b ) Dr. Malik was also disturbed about the placing of the clause “consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations” immediately after the verb “would”. He believed that with this clause so placed, it could be interpreted to mean that if the Security Council failed to take action there would be no obligation on the three powers to act. Mr. Hare replied that there had been no intent in drafting the declaration to set out a formula by which action would be undertaken, and the wording of the declaration should not be given a legalistic interpretation. The purpose of the declaration had been to set forth as simply and clearly as possible the intentions of the three powers with regard to the security problems of the Near East and should be taken at its face value in the spirit in which it was issued. ( c ) Dr. Malik asked if the erection of fortifications or the deployment of troops on maneuvers in frontier areas would come within the meaning of paragraph 3. Mr. Hare said that the question could not be answered hypothetically. It was, of course, entirely possible that the erection of fortifications or deployment of troops in a given area would be an entirely legitimate and peaceful maneuver and clearly not fall within the purview of paragraph 3. On the other hand, the erection of the same fortifications or deployment of the same number of troops in an atmosphere of hostility would present a different situation. Dr. Malik said he was entirely satisfied with Mr. Hare’s clarificacations and that they had confirmed his own understanding. He said he had no information as to the nature of the reply to the declaration being prepared by the Arab League Political Committee. Speaking personally he thought the declaration would, in the long run, be the most important contribution to peace in the Near East made by the three powers—provided it were implemented with honest and sustained impartiality. He wanted, in his personal capacity, to congratulate the United States on it. The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/6–1950: Telegram [Document 496] The Minister in Syria ( Keeley ) to the Secretary of State confidential Damascus , June 19, 1950—2 p. m. 347. ReDepcirtel June 16, 6 a.m. 1 Legation has repeatedly pointed out that more conciliatory attitude on part of Israel re UN resolutions on refugees and boundaries would seem prerequisite to any expectation of negotiations by Arab League States with Israel (Legdes 352 June 16, 314 June 5, 224 April 18, etc.). Legation believes that impasse can be bridged only if right at least to repatriation of Palestine Arabs and our compensation of those resettled elsewhere accepted in principle, by Israel. If Israel agrees in principle to negotiate on basis pertinent UN Resolutions, it should be possible to find a formula for final settlement based on realities situation through give and-take of actual negotiations. In comment on forthcoming tripartite statement, Legation suggested that endeavor to remove in text any possibility implication acceptance territorial statics quo should be made (Legtel 256 May 7). Separate French démarche requesting assurances from Syria and Lebanon prior to joint delivery of note, interpreted locally as sphere of influence deal, was unforeseen development. These two aspects statement were largely seized upon by unfriendly local press to discredit good faith of agreement as whole. Legation is still of opinion that tripartite statement was welcome in Syria by more responsible political (Legtel 299 May 28) and military (Legtel 315 June 2) circles notwithstanding press campaign to discredit it. Sent Department 347; repeated info unnumbered Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Ankara. Keeley 1 Not printed; but see footnote 1 to telegram 730 from Geneva, p. 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] . The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 784.02/6–1950: Telegram [Document 497] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Cairo , June 19, 1950—4 p. m. 664. Azzam Pasha states text of compromise formula re Jordan as given below is authentic. Whereas the Arab states have declared their adherence to the Arabism and independence of Palestine and to the integrity of its territories in realization its peoples legitimate wishes, and have rejected every solution based on its partition, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan therefore declares that the annexation of a part of Palestine only an expediency dictated by factual necessities, and that Jordan will preserve that part as a trust pending the final settlement of the Palestine problem when the other parts shall have been liberated and restored to their pre-aggression status, and that it will accept our unanimous decision made by the other member states of the League, thereby realizing the objectives aimed at by the Arab States in their previous resolutions tending to preserve the entity of Palestine. Department pass Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Amman, Jerusalem, Baghdad, sent Department 664, repeated info London 76, Tel Aviv 71, Damascus 47, Jidda 54, Amman 52, Jerusalem 23, Baghdad 68, Beirut 57. Caffery The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/6–2050: Telegram [Document 498] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , June 20, 1950—2 p. m. 465. Re Depcirtel June 16, 6 p. m. [ a. m .] 1 Embassy comments: I Arab charge PCC has “failed” is true because: a . it has not moderated demands of Arabs or Jews; b . has not made any progress towards negotiations; c . its organization and portion of its personnel (Boisanger and Azcarate) are self-defeating. II Arabs demands for “unconditional refugee return” prior to discussion of possible negotiations on other issues seem based on: a . complete ignorance of Israel policy and possibilities, or; b . vain hope Israel will collapse economically, or; c . disguised but firm determination to use delay to prepare for “second round”. III Arabs fail understand that world Jewry’s economic aid will continue and Israel’s own efforts will prevent collapse. IV Israel’s intransigence re refugee return or compensation is strengthened if Arab failure recognize refugee concessions as integral part of overall peace settlement. V Present position is worse than impasse because Israel-Arab relations are worsening as also are relations among Arabs themselves and towards US and UK. (This last shown by Egypt’s, Saudi Arabia’s and Iraq’s suspicious reactions to 3-power declaration.) VI NE peace and security demand radical new approach which should include: a . replacement of PCC by 1-man medium or not hampered by an advisory commission and particularly not by commission composed of national representatives responsible to their own governments; b . naming of strong personality, such as Riley, with conciliation powers comparable those of Bunche; c . utilization of strengthened existing MAC’s as negotiation bodies. VII If politically impracticable implement VI in near future, PCC should immediately: a . concentrate on only hopeful point, e.g., Israel-Jordan negotiations, and; b . under no circumstances attempt negotiations now re refugees Compensation because prior to tentative agreement on frontier talks of compensation are meaningless. Moreover, PCC’s futile discussion compensation now would confuse beginning of PRA’s work. VIII PCC is condemned by own record and irrespective of personalities or national or UN pride should be scrapped by next UNGA. To continue this body would discredit UN and states represented on PCC and block other means toward peace. Ethridge, Porter and now Palmer have struggled valiantly but vainly against inherent organizational defects and inertia and bureaucracy of their colleagues which have made PCC mockery in NE. 2 Sent Department 465, repeated info Jerusalem 45 for Riley, Department pass info Cairo 91, Geneva for Palmer 36, London 97, Moscow 31, pouched Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda. McDonald 1 Not printed; but see footnote 1 to telegram 730 from Geneva, p. 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] . 2 Consulate General Jerusalem, on June 22, expressed a “pessimistic outlook for successful outcome of mediation work and it is felt that CCP should return to Lake Success for preparation of its report rather than remain in Geneva or ME area. Continuance organization in ME may hinder other UN organizations work.” (Telegram 135, 357.AC/6–2250) The Department of State, on June 28, informed the U.S. Delegation to the Palestine Conciliation Commission that it concurred in the unanimous decision of the Commission to move to Jerusalem. It also noted that the advantages of the presence of the Commission in the Near East might well outweigh any disadvantages and suggested it was prepared to support new endeavors (telegram 778, identified also as Unpal 257, to Geneva, 357.AC/6–2850). The Palestine Conciliation Commission, on July 4, addressed a letter to the Egyptian, Israeli, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian Governments in which it announced suspension of its meetings at Geneva on July 15, because it had reached an impasse there, and their resumption at Jerusalem early in August, to have the opportunity for first-hand contact with these governments. The text of the letter was sent to the Department of State by Geneva in telegram 4, identified also as Palun 372, 357.AC/7–450. The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Barco) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/6–2150: Telegram [Document 499] The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Barco ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Geneva , June 21, 1950—1 p. m. 763. Palun 364. Jordan Representative, Abdul Hadi, telephoned this afternoon from Paris Jordan Government’s reply to PCC note 30 May, substance of which, from Arabic, follows (Abdul Hadi agreed forward confirming letter): First, Jordan Government notes failure Government Israel implement GA resolution December 1948. Second, Jordan Government stresses fact Israeli authorities continue drive numerous Arabs into Jordan territory in order facilitate settlement new Jewish immigrants arriving Israel. For these reasons, Jordan Government considers no useful purpose would be served in beginning negotiations with Israel as long as Israel has not fulfilled conditions required by Arab Governments. 1 Immediately after receipt of above, PCC informed by telegraph from Jerusalem that Quimper, PCC secretariat had talks with Jordan Foreign Minister afternoon 20th in which Foreign Minister stated negative reply had been sent to PCC 30 May note that morning. Quimper had interview with King also that morning in which King declared Jordan’s reply would be forthcoming and would be negative. Twenty-first Quimper received telephone call from Jordan Foreign Minister requesting Quimper revisit him in Amman on morning 22nd. [ Barco ] 1 This note, datelined Amman, June 20, was sent by Foreign Minister Shureiqi to the Jordanian Minister at Geneva. A supplemental note, dated the following day, elaborated on the earlier one, stating that Jordan would not initiate peace talks inasmuch as they would be contrary to the joint policy of its Arab sisters. It also repeated a denunciation of the expulsion of the tribal population. It concluded that when Israel exhibited goodwill, Jordan would be ready to understand its position, on the bases of preserving Arab rights and of respecting the wishes of the Arab states. The texts of the two Jordanian notes are given in telegram 779, identified also as Palun 369, June 24, from Geneva, 357. AC/6–2450. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/6–2150: Telegram [Document 500] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , June 21, 1950—4 p. m. 3494. Embassy officer discussed yesterday with Furlonge Depcirtel June 16, 6 a. m. 1 re Arab reply PCC. Furlonge, while noting unyielding attitude of Arab states on principle of repatriation, said Foreign Office has felt that what Arabs really want and expect is compensation for refugee property in Israel. Foreign Office is studying possibility suggesting to Department that US and UK (and possibly French) might approach Israelis with suggestion latter indicate publicly that in any negotiations with Arab states they would be willing discuss principle of compensation in amounts within limitations their resources. We noted foregoing based on assumption Arabs more interested in material aspect than in what they regard as matter of principle. Given unrealistic nature their public stand, we wondered whether this was really case. Furlonge replied that one Arab state (Jordan) had accepted idea of compensation in agreed statement of principles which Jordan and Israel had initialled in February. We noted Jordan (or King, at least) had always been more realistic re settlement with Israel than other Arab states which, because of their less exposed positions, seem more inclined stand on unrealistic matters principle. Comment: We suggest Department may wish give careful consideration possible efficacy approach to Israelis along foregoing lines as possible means contributing to break in present deadlock. Department pass Amman 25. Sent Department 3494; repeated information Ankara 19, Baghdad 40, Cairo 91, Jidda 38, Tel Aviv 49, Paris 1060, Beirut 12, Damascus 25, Jerusalem 11. Douglas 1 Not printed; but see footnote 1 to telegram 730 from Geneva, p. 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] . The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Barco) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/6–2250: Telegram [Document 501] The Acting United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Barco ) to the Secretary of State secret Geneva , June 22, 1950—5 p. m. 766. Palun 365. USDel cannot agree with reasoning contained paragraph one Tel Aviv’s 465, June 20 in support charge PCC has failed. Certainly a and b are not “reasons” for failure, while c , in light real reasons for PCC present failure, with which Department officers working with Palestine case are thoroughly acquainted, would, if true, be little more than contributory cause. USDel does not, moreover, believe c to be true as far as Boisanger and Azcarate are concerned. Peculiarities of Palestine question in recent months and close observation Azcarate’s work and his full understanding of American policy have convinced us Azcarate has been well suited for his position. Boisanger has cooperated fully with USDel at least as far back as drafting of PCC statute on Jerusalem, which was essentially American draft, even despite his honest preference for other courses. Main responsibility as far as PCC activities are concerned has always rested with USDel and ultimately, of course, with US Government, and this has been recognized throughout by Boisanger, Yalcin and Azcarate. However, in our opinion, while there is some substance to b and c of paragraph II, Tel Aviv’s 465, real reason behind Arab attitude is their conviction, which Israel has done little to counteract despite USDel’s frequent efforts to convince them of necessity, that negotiations with Israel would gain Arabs absolutely nothing. Much of PCC inactivity has been in deference to Israeli wish to pursue own course. When within last two weeks Israel had opportunity to make statement aimed at counteracting Arab feeling of futility, as suggested by USDel and Department (Palun 358, June 5 and Unpal 253, June 6), 1 Israel failed to do so, while official Israel utterances and actions have consistently confirmed Arabs in their belief Israel not prepared negotiate in true sense. USDel sincerely regrets Israel has not seen own best interests in different light, but it is this failure on their part that is primarily responsible for PCC failure. As for paragraph VI of Tel Aviv’s 465, USDel recognized merit such suggestion when first advocated by Eban and Rafael, but genuinely doubts one man conciliator can accomplish more than PCC without substantial change in attitude of one or both of parties. We doubt such change can be effected by conciliator alone or by commission, without renewed efforts US Government. USDel’s comment on paragraph VII ( a ) is that recent actions Israel (Palun 363, June 20 2 and Palun 364, June 21) make even Jordan–Israel negotiations extremely difficult. USDel and PCC as whole recognize that taking up compensation question (paragraph VII( b ) Tel Aviv’s 465) may not be fruitful. We have, however, been guided by Department policy this respect (Unpal 245, February 7). Moreover, PCC, having specific instructions from GA this question, cannot ignore it, while Clapp mission recommendations on compensation are likewise still on the record. Finally, USDel believes PCC position on the whole has been correct and appropriate in circumstances. We doubt if Israel itself can successfully contend otherwise, in view of its representations to US from time to time. Fact remains, however, that in absence negotiations Israel-Jordan, a change of direction has become necessary, either by persuading Israel accept something like Shukairi formula (Palun 362, June 20), new directives from GA to PCC, or entirely new instrument. Ultimate consideration in mind USDel is, of course, what is best from standpoint overall US policy. 3 [ Barco ] 1 Neither printed. 2 Not printed. 3 Mr. Palmer, on June 24, fully endorsed the views set forth by Mr. Barco in this message (telegram 780, identified also as Palun 368, from Geneva, 357.AC/6–2450). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 480.008/6–2350: Telegram [Document 502] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom secret niact Washington , June 24, 1950. 3095. Dept does not like suggested answer your 3595 Jun 23 1 for fol reasons: 1. It seems to imply that the three powers are able veto plans any one of three may have for NE arms exports, while in reality situation is that US–UK–Fr each estab own export policies which are limited only by necessity of being based on principles contained in tripartite declaration. 2. It implies existence of established machinery for prior US–UK–Fr consultation re NE arms exports, while such consultation is actually on post facto basis. 3. There wld certainly be very unfavorable reaction in US to info that US and UK were consulting with each other re arms shipments to Israel. FYI only Dept wld not like to see UK, when pressed re UK arms shipments to Israel, attempt place upon US some responsibility for decision on this difficult question. 4. Dept believes answer of this type wld certainly give rise to speculation and uncertainty in NE. This wld be particularly unfortunate after generally favorable Arab League commentary on tripartite declaration. Dept suggests ans along fol lines: “HMG have military situation in NE under constant review and are giving full consideration to the practical steps to be taken in light of para one of tripartite statement. I hope to make a further statement in due course”. Brit Emb here believes statement along above lines shld be acceptable to Foreign Office. In any event, Dept desires Emb make absolutely clear to Foreign Office that US does not desire answer to state, directly or by implication, that US–UK consultation is taking place re arms shipments to Israel. 2 Acheson 1 Not printed; it described a request from the British Foreign Office asking for Department of State approval of a proposed statement which it hoped to give in the House of Commons when the question of arms shipments to Israel arose. The proposed statement read as follows: “HMG are in consultation with US and French Governments regarding the practical steps to be taken in the light of paragraph 1 of the tripartite statement. I hope to make a further statement on the subject in due course.” (480.008/6–2350) 2 In reply, on June 26, Embassy London advised of Mr. Furlonge’s disappointment at reason 2 and gave his understanding that the Department of State welcomed British initiative in consulting with the United States regarding arms shipments to the Near East. The Embassy replied that “our interpretation Reason 2 was that Department wishes avoid giving mistaken public impression three power declaration established formal machinery for prior consultation; but that we felt sure this did not mean Department would not continue welcome informal and confidential consultation on this and other subjects of mutual interest within general framework US–UK cooperation in area.” (Telegram 3611, 480.008/6–2650) The Department, on June 28, confirmed the Embassy’s interpretation and requested it to assure Mr. Furlonge to that effect (telegram 3159 to London, 480.008/6–2650). The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 785.00/6–2750 [Document 503] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 109 Amman , June 27, 1950. Subject: Political Situation in Jordan I enclose a memorandum of an interview with King Abdullah on June 24. 1 Despite the fact that the King must be under a considerable strain caused by the fast of Ramadan, he did not display any signs of nervousness or fatigue. In fact, he was in good form, breathing a considerable amount of fire and brimstone in discussing Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which he described as “snakes and scorpions”. He devoted a considerable part of the interview to a rambling exposé of his views of geopolitics in this part of the world, all designed to bolster his well-known Greater Syria scheme. The King was feeling very smug about what he considered his “victory” over the Arab League. He did not seem to realize that his “victory” was in large measure made possible by the support received from Iraq and that withdrawal of such support at a future meeting of the League could result in Jordan’s expulsion. There is no question that he considers the unification of Palestine with Jordan as an irrevocable fact and he displayed no slightest disposition to compromise it. During the week ending June 24, His Majesty received a visit from a Mr. Quimper, understood to be a representative in Jerusalem of the PCC. It is reported that Mr. Quimper urged His Majesty to take advantage of the latest proposal of the PCC with regard to resumption of peace negotiations with Israel. Possibly prompted by this visit, His Majesty summoned his Cabinet and instructed it to get on with negotiations with Israel. According to reliable accounts, the Cabinet met and agreed unanimously that the time was not suitable for resumption of negotiations. The King is understood to have considered dismissing the Cabinet, but on reflection, to have renounced the idea, stating to the Prime Minister and other Cabinet members that the responsibility for the continuance of the present state of affairs must rest with them. King Abdullah undoubtedly realized that it would be next to impossible at this juncture to find any worthwhile politician willing or able to form a Cabinet committed to making peace with Israel. As the Department well knows, the recent series of border incidents, particularly that of Wadi Araba, in which Israel, at least in the opinion of Jordanians, has been the aggressor, has created a most unfavorable atmosphere for such talks. Furthermore, the very recent flurry in the Arab League over unification is another potent factor militating against any peace talks for the time being at least, if held by Jordan alone, and the Legation is not aware of any disposition on the part of any other Arab state to join with Jordan in such talks. I might add my own opinion that the Cabinet is absolutely right. I think it would be a serious mistake for the King to force the issue and undertake negotiations with Israel just now. This opinion is shared by my British and French colleagues. It would be an equally serious mistake for any of us to urge such talks on the King. I am reliably informed that when the King visited Jerusalem some two weeks ago, several contacts were made there with Shiloah and possibly other Israeli officials. His Majesty cannot resist the temptation to have contacts with Israeli officials and he delights in keeping them secret from his own people. When the King first saw Shiloah in Amman on April 25 (Legtel 84, April 26, 1:00 PM and Legtel 90, May 3, 8:00 PM), he for the first time held out on Sir Alec Kirkbride. When I happened to see His Majesty the morning after the meeting, he gave me no hint that it had taken place. We must regard this as a more or less normal state of affairs. I do not attribute any significance to the resumption of such talks and Israeli officials would be well advised to evaluate them in their true light. Before announcement of the visit of the Regent of Iraq, who arrived in Amman June 26, King Abdullah planned to spend the better part of this week in Jerusalem. He undoubtedly had in mind further meetings with Israeli officials. Presumably the visit to Jerusalem will take place after the departure of Abdul-Illah and presumably one or more meetings will be held in Jerusalem or elsewhere. To summarize, apart from the flurry of last week described above, the local political scene is in something of a dead center due largely to the fast of Ramadan and the recess of Parliament. It looks as though the Cabinet has the upper hand, at least with respect to negotiations with Israel, and no change in the Government is in prospect for the time being. Gerald A. Drew 1 Not printed. The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 486.118/6–2850 [Document 504] The Secretary of Defense ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State secret Washington , 28 June 1950. My Dear Mr. Secretary : As you suggested in your letter of 25 May 1950, I have reviewed the situation regarding arms exports to Israel and the Arab states. I am in agreement with you that broad policy considerations may warrant the approval of limited amounts of material to these states at intervals over a period of time. Accordingly, I will be glad to acquiesce in your approval of the export to Israel and the Arab states of such materials as AT–6 aircraft, machine guns and ammunition, radar equipment, half tracks and other material of a similar military potential where you determine that broad policy considerations override the strictly military views previously furnished you in regard to exports to these states. Sincerely yours, Louis Johnson The Consul General at Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/6–3050: Telegram [Document 505] The Consul General at Jerusalem ( Gibson ) to the Secretary of State confidential Jerusalem , June 30, 1950—11 a. m. 142. Deptel 90, June 27. 1 Israel–Jordan relations appear to have improved last week re border incidents. In Jordan–Israel MAC Jordan delegation has agreed to substantial reductions in number of Jordan complaints appearing on agenda referring many minor items to subcommittee or local commanders for solution. Frontier situation not endangering present status of truce although might offer casus belli . Principle evil [of] current border clashes is repressive effect on possibility peace negotiations. Recurring incidents anger populace both sides who in turn push respective governments to extremes. Present deterioration frontier relationship due in great part to desire of Arabs to harvest crops on Israel side of demarcation line. Similar situation existed during 1949 harvest season but Israel Government more lenient in allowing Arabs cross lines for this purpose. In refusing permission individual cases Israel delegation MAC stated willingness discuss over-all problem in connection Article 8. Most clashes between Bedouins and Kibbutz members in border regions and not between Arab League [ Legion ] and Israel Army who are not controlling populace. Bedouins are not yet used to frontiers which are not clearly defined. Many destitute Arabs are located close to border near former properties and frequently raid nearby Kibbutz for livestock, food and farm equipment. Kibbutzim and local Israel Army commanders inclined to hasty retaliation without orders. In order to ameliorate situation would suggest: (1) Closer cooperation between governments such as mixed patrols and substitution of police for army units; (2) Stronger control of populace near borders; (3) Possible frontier rectification in certain areas; (4) Greater discipline of Israeli commanders to enforce human treatment of infiltrees; (5) Cautioning of newspapers both sides to report objectively on matters pertaining to two governments (inflammatory newspaper reports are factors tending towards dividing two nations); (6) Pointing out to Jordan necessity of carrying out its armistice agreement with relation to Article 8 in renewing meetings of special committee at high level. General Riley will arrive in Washington on or about July 4 for 10-day period. Department may desire to discuss problem with him. 2 Sent Department 142; repeated info Tel Aviv 23, Amman 23, Department pass Amman. Gibson 1 Not printed; it stated that the Department was disturbed by the recent deterioration in the Israeli-Jordanian frontier relationship and instructed that an appraisal of the situation be telegraphed (684A.85/6–2750). 2 The Consulate General in Jerusalem, on June 30, reported information from General Riley that the Israeli representative on the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission promised an investigation into the alleged unauthorized transfer of Arabs from Majdal to the Gaza strip. The Egyptians had alleged that Israeli police had transported the Arabs to the demarcation line for voluntary transfer without prior notice to, or agreement with, the Egyptian authorities (telegram 144, 884A.181/6–3050). The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 884A.85/6–3050: Telegram [Document 506] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , June 30, 1950—1 p. m. 485. Re Deptel 346, June 28 [ 27 ]. 1 Shiloah at my request at residence (Kollek also present) hour June 29 explained deterioration as follows: 1. Neither side desire present tension. Only one basic cause is delaying task in starting Jordan-Israel peace negotiations which he attributed to failure United States Government and UK Government to give Abdullah assurances of assistance if Jordan’s negotiations brought Arab League threat of sanctions. Absence restraining influence of prospective peace negotiations Shiloah no longer able urge successfully continued Israel border “leniency;” hence, resulting stiffening of controls and “possible occasional violations of correct procedure.” 2. Incidental causes deterioration include: ( a ) MAC is not now effective because failure Jordan, despite King’s repeated promises, to replace Abdullah El Tel by comparable strong man on MAC; ( b ) Failure King keep promise to Shiloah to order Glubb name high officer to work with Dayan. At last meeting with Shiloah, June 12 (Embtel 456, June 16) King “apologized” for delay and again promised to order Glubb name officer meet Dayan and name strong man on MAC. Neither has been named. ( c ) Jordan’s “slackness” in patroling own borders. ( d ) Israel is “technically” responsible for failure implement plan set up joint border patrols because it demands prior release three recently captured Israel patrol guards. ( e ) Failure Jordan accept Riley’s suggestion that Glubb meet Yadin. 3. Example “some progress” is setting up June 30 of frontier markers agreed to June 15. 4. Shiloah sees “danger” in “UK Government policy favoring six months delay Jordan-Israel peace negotiations;” because “probability delay will worsen not improve” chances successful negotiations. Comment: I consider Shiloah’s analysis is honest and generally sound but possibility Israel is using stiffer policy as form of pressure on Jordan cannot be dismissed. Believe Israel genuinely anxious resume negotiations, because of urgent necessity win peace on at least one front. I recognize failure King’s policy negotiating without knowledge or support his government but I doubt wisdom reported UK policy six month’s delay and believe that affirmation by Israel of earlier willingness make “immediate compensation” for Arab urban property Jerusalem and agree Joint Claims Commission other property if coupled with UK Government and United States Government encouragement of Jordan to negotiate might break log jam. Shiloah says Israel “would cooperate”. Sent Department 485, repeated information Jerusalem 46, Department pass information Amman 47. McDonald 1 This was a repeat of telegram 90 to Jerusalem, not printed; but see footnote 1, supra . The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/6–3050: Telegram [Document 507] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State confidential Amman , June 30, 1950—2 p. m. 145. Deptel 95, June 27. 1 Legation shares Department’s concern over present deterioration Jordan Israeli frontier situation. Am informed by Glubb that most infiltrations of Arabs into Israeli territory involve crossings between Gaza and Hebron area during darkness. While infiltrees doubtless motivated on occasion by desire plunder or seek vengeance against Jews illegal border crossing may in large part be attributed to natural desire visit relatives, inspect property, reap crops, etc., and is likely to continue to some extent despite repressive measures taken by Israelis. It is view of Kirkbride and Glubb, which I share, that border incidents arising from infiltration should be handled by local police both sides rather than by military. Glubb states Jenin and Tulkarm area police control border situation and incidents rarely arise. Jordan authorities willing and desirous extend this system to south but Israelis reportedly refuse order exert diplomatic pressure for return certain Israelis held by Arab Legion. It is also Glubb’s feeling that border incidents have better chance being resolved if they do not reach MAC which he believes both sides use as platform for exaggerating grievances and injecting political factors into disputes. It is Legation’s opinion that situation could be greatly ameliorated by: (1) Agreement both sides employ police forces rather than irresponsible military to control boundary and minimize infiltration; (2) Understanding that institution police control system not to be conditioned on political factors and enforced or suspended as means exerting diplomatic pressure; and (3) Proper marking of boundary which Legation understands is now in progress on Jordan side. Despite King’s apparent indifference to boundary situation (Legdes 109, June 27) unless amelioration takes place public resentment against Israel will increase worsening present unfavorable atmosphere for renewal Jordan Israeli peace negotiations. Department pass London, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, sent Department 145, repeated info London 56, Jerusalem 45, Tel Aviv 43. Drew 1 This was a repeat of telegram 90 to Jerusalem, not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] . The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 785.11/7–150: Telegram [Document 508] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State confidential Amman , July 1, 1950—1 a. m. 1. King Abdullah left June 29 for several days visit Jerusalem where it is assumed he will secretly meet with Israeli officials. If they are sincerely interested facilitating settlement with Jordan they would be well advised try reach agreement with His Majesty, at least on border control measures which would tend to reduce current wave of incidents. See Legtel 145, June 30. They cannot be unaware that this is condition precedent to setting favorable scene for improvement relations between two countries. 1 Department pass London, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem. Sent Department 1, repeated info London 1, Tel Aviv 1, Jerusalem 1. Drew 1 Legation Amman, on July 5, reported that King Abdullah had informed British Minister Kirkbride that he had seen no Israeli officials during his recent visit to Jerusalem. However, the King had received a letter from Mr. Shiloah requesting an urgent audience, at which he would not be accompanied by an Israeli military representative. The King had agreed to see Mr. Shiloah at Amman at the end of the week (telegram 5, 785.11/7–550). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State Secretary’s Memoranda: Lot 53 D 444 [Document 509] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 6, 1950. Meeting With the President [Subject:] Item 4. Statements by Government Officials regarding Israel I discussed this matter with the President, pointing out that it was of course important that whatever statements or speeches were made by Government officials should not be couched in terms of criticism of the Arabs. I went over with the President the latest examples of this difficulty. 1 He will deal with this matter himself. L[ ucius ] D. B[ attle ] for D[ ean ] A[ cheson ] 1 The “latest examples of this difficulty” appeared in the New York Times of June 30 which gave an account of a group of messages sent by members of the Cabinet and a score of Senators to the Zionist Organization of America, said to describe Israel generally as a “democratic outpost in the Middle East.”; and in the New York Times account of July 4 of an address to the ZOA the day before by Vice President Barkley, which described Israel as “an oasis of liberty in the desert of despotism”. These examples were transmitted to Under Secretary Webb by Mr. Hare in memoranda of July 3 and July 5 (784A.00/7–350./7–550). The earlier memorandum stated that this type of statement (i.e., the statements by Cabinet members and Senators) “has, over a period of time, helped to create in the Arab states an atmosphere of extreme hostility to the United States. The damage which has resulted in our relations with the Arab states was vividly demonstrated during the past week when Egypt, a member of the Security Council of the United Nations, refused to support the UN action regarding Korea. Egyptian officials stated that the anti-US feeling in the Arab states was so strong that it would have been difficult for any Egyptian Government to give its support to a US-backed measure in the UN.” Ambassador Caffery was cited as authority for the statement that “the principal consideration motivating the Egyptian Government in taking this position was the desire to demonstrate in a dramatic way the hostility toward this country which exists in the Arab world as a result of the Palestine situation.” Ambassador John B. Blandford, Jr., to the Secretary of State 320.2AA/7–850: Telegram [Document 510] Ambassador John B. Blandford, Jr., to the Secretary of State restricted Beirut , July 8, 1950—noon. 15. Rapun 33. During meeting Damascus this week with Keen 1 on administrative matters, Syrian Prime Minister stated Syrian Government now ready cooperate PRA on public works projects provided did not involve refugee settlement. Agency [garble] Syrian Government on working level re projects on July 11. In later discussions Cairo Ali Bey Marei, Egyptian Government liaison officer to PRA told Keen: (1) Egyptian Government about to permit PRA undertake works projects Sinai area; (2) Government will shortly indicate agreement permitting up to 150,000 Gaza refugees leave area for other Arab states; (3) Government forming high level interdepartmental committee to study refugee question. PRA watching developments. 2 [ Blandford ] 1 James Keen, Deputy Director of UNRWA. 2 The Department, on July 11, expressed gratification at PRA progress in Syria and Egypt (telegram 20, identified also as Unrap 34, from Beirut, 320.2AA/7–1150). Legation Beirut advised, on June 21, that the Advisory Commission had authorized UNRWA’s planning committee to proceed with plans for two road projects in Arab Palestine and had requested the planning committee to meet with it within one week and present to the Commission an outline of a comprehensive program of public works for Jordan. The objective of the program was “to assist Jordan to carry the refugee burden when international assistance is no longer available.” (Despatch 268, 320.2AA/6–2150). Ambassador Blandford had further discussions with Syrian Prime Minister Azm on UNRWA and technical assistance on July 12 and 13. The Prime Minister was said to have shown his usual hostility to resettlement of refugees and peace with Israel but manifested a greater desire to cooperate in non-Palestinian connected economic fields than he had shown before. The Prime Minister pledged himself to immediate acceptance and implementation of UNRWA programs for roads, irrigation, and drainage projects (telegram 21, July 13, from Damascus, 320.2AA/7–1350). As summarized in Legation Beirut’s “Round-Up of UNRWA Activities No. 8”, the Prime Minister’s position was that “his Government was prepared to cooperate in works projects, so long as they did not involve external pressure on Syria for a political settlement with Israel.” (Despatch 20, July 19, 320.2AA/7–1950) The Department, in reply on July 18, noted that “If firm resettlement plans shld prove politically acceptable (referring Rapun 33) Dept wld be encouraged seek further funds for PRA which wld be justifiable as leading permanent solution segments of refugee problem. Present PRA budget was for interim works relief only and was not put forward as ultimate solution. Furthermore, such plans wld strengthen prospects of further action by GA in calling for additional funds for extended PRA program.” (Telegram 39, identified also as Unrap 37, to Beirut, 320.2AA/7–1850) Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John W. Halderman of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs 357.AC/7–1150 [Document 511] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John W. Halderman of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs secret [ Washington ,] July 11, 1950. Subject: Palestine Participants: General Riley Mr. Hare Mr. Berry Mr. Wilkins Mr. Rockwell Mr. Halderman, UNP General Riley came in on July 5, having just returned from Palestine. He opened the conversation expressing regret that the PCC has decided to go to Jerusalem. He expressed the view that the Commission is without standing and can perform no useful functions in the future. His principal reason for not wishing to have it go to Jerusalem seemed to be that this would delay preparations for the General Assembly. It came out rather obliquely that he advocates Assembly action to have the functions of the Commission transferred to the MAC’s. He expressed the view that the PCC has been in a dead end street in attempting to deal with the Arabs jointly, ever since it met with those governments in Beirut last year. Mr. Hare pointed out that the Commission had no choice in this matter since it was the decision of the Arabs themselves to act in concert. It was also noted that the PCC has endeavored to encourage direct negotiations between the parties and that its recent efforts to establish committees envisioned bilateral committees under Commission chairmanship. General Riley agreed with the general proposition that the Commission has been unable to make headway because the parties themselves were not yet ready to come to an agreement, even on a negotiating basis. As to the proposal to transfer the conciliation function to the MAC’s General Riley himself remarked at one point that this was basically no different from the Commission’s proposals to form joint committees of the parties of the dispute. This is because the MAC’s are formed by agreement of the parties themselves and any change in their terms of reference would have to be agreed to by them. Asked whether he had any indication that the Arabs would agree to this procedure, General Riley answered negatively. He seemed to think, however, that between now and the General Assembly, and during the Assembly, we might try to persuade the Arabs to do so. He said that Dr. Bunche was inclined to favor the transfer of function to the MAC’s simply on the theory that if one approach fails we should try another. 1 General Riley said that several Jewish representatives had talked to him about returning to Jordan one hundred thousand dunums of land in the Hebron area (about 40 square miles) provided that a certain number of refugees were settled in that area. General Riley informed us that Israel is demanding that the Victoria Augusta Hospital in the Mt. Scopus area be closed unless they are allowed to use the Hadassah Hospital in the same area. The PRA has opened Victoria Augusta and it now has about 300 patients. General Riley says that he might be compelled to comply with the Israeli demand since the use of Victoria Augusta is contrary to the terms of the truce agreement covering Mt. Scopus. 1 The Department, on June 29, informed USUN of its attitude toward the suggestion by Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Secretary to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to transfer the functions of the Palestine Conciliation Commission to the Mixed Armistice Commissions. The Department indicated it had two preliminary doubts: first, any expansion of the terms of reference of the MAC’s “wld require agreement parties to dispute on bilateral basis and wld involve same issues which prevented formation joint committees under PCC auspices.” Additionally, the suggestion raised a question concerning the desirability and practicality placing this additional function on MAC’s which were established for entirely different purpose, are fully occupied with these duties, and have personnel adapted for the purpose.” (Telegram 339 to New York, 357.AC/6–2950) The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/7–1150: Telegram [Document 512] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State secret Tel Aviv , July 11, 1950—3 p. m. 21. Shiloah with Kollek came to residence July 11 [and] reported following: Shiloah and Abdullah met alone night July 7 at Israel initiative. Shiloah told King meeting had been requested in order to clarify J–I relations. Israel anxious not embarrass King by attempts resume negotiations if he considers this undesirable. Israel willing wait three, six or nine months at King’s pleasure and would always be available if he gave word for resumption of negotiations. Shiloah then outlined to King situation in Arab countries contrasting Jordan’s stability with lack in other states. Shiloah expressed concern at prospective worsening Jordan’s economic situation if peace long postponed and reiterated Israel’s willingness make peace promptly and begin payment compensation Arab property Jerusalem. King in reply said he was not willing postpone negotiations for any fixed period not even for three months. He was hard at work using his own means which he would not explain to Shiloah. “I have not” King said “received as much encouragement from certain quarters as I might have.” He left impression that latterly there had been somewhat more encouragement. He had “not lost hope.” King then retired and Shiloah was joined by group of King’s intimates for “heavy meal with little salt” just before dawn which preceded day-long fasting period. Shiloah added that though he is not optimistic about early resumption negotiations with Jordan he “dreads return of PCC to Jerusalem” because if PCC intervenes “all hope of progress with Jordan will end.” Sent Department 21, repeated info Jerusalem 2, Department pass info Amman #1. McDonald Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner to Mr. James Terry Duce, Vice President of the Arabian-American Oil Company 786.00/7–1350 [Document 513] Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner 1 to Mr. James Terry Duce, Vice President of the Arabian-American Oil Company Washington , July 13, 1950. My Dear Mr. Duce : In accordance with our recent conversations, I am taking this opportunity to write you on the subject of the need as we see it in the Department for private assistance to provide relief for indigent Arabs who are not properly classifiable as refugees from their homes in Palestine. The calculations of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission, accepted by the General Assembly, indicate that a total of 652,000 are qualified for current assistance from the United Nations funds made available for relief and work relief. General Kennedy estimates that there are 150,000 to 200,000 indigents, now in receipt of United Nations assistance, who no longer can qualify for such assistance, as the reasons for their indigency do not arise from their refugee status. You will recall that General Kennedy mentioned that there were some 15,000 in the old City of Jerusalem, who formerly depended on the tourist trade for their livelihood, and who are now unemployed. Thousands of additional cases of indigency are to be found in the Gaza Strip and throughout Arab Palestine. If the United Nations program is to succeed, the Relief and Works Agency of the United Nations can no longer continue to provide food and clothing for people in this category and they must look to private sources of charity for their future support. The cost of the minimum food and clothing required is estimated to be of the order of $3,500,000 per annum, based on the experience of the United Nations relief program. Charitable agencies, and in particular, the Pontifical Mission, are making a very substantial contribution to relief in the area. It is our feeling that if the facts are fully known, and if an appropriate organization is established, a very substantial response to assist these people would be made by the American people. Steps are being taken to initiate action along these lines by various charitable organizations interested in the Near East, such as the Near East Foundation, the Near East College Association, H.E.L.P., the American Middle East Relief, and CARE. Church organizations are also being consulted. We hope that these efforts can be centralized and agree with you that appropriate publicity can do a great deal to make a fund raising program successful. General Kennedy has indicated to you his full willingness to cooperate with the resources at his disposal in the Near East, so that the United Nations and private programs will not overlap in their activities. We can do no more than lay these facts before you and trust that you will give them your sympathetic and thoughtful consideration. Sincerely yours, Arthur Z. Gardiner 1 Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/7–1550: Telegram [Document 514] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Geneva , July 15, 1950—2 p. m. 35. Palun 373. In reply PCC note re compensation (Palun 360, June 8) following letter dated 9 July received yesterday by PCC from Sharett, Israel Foreign Minister: “I have the honor to refer to your letter of 8 June, 1950, to which the Government of Israel has given it most careful consideration. “It is true that on a number of occasions, in meetings and conversations with members of the PCC, representatives of Israel have touched upon some of the principles which in their view should govern the payment of compensation for lands abandoned by former Arab residents of the present territory of Israel. They have also referred on those occasions to claims arising from losses suffered by the population of Israel as a result of Arab aggression and the war of defence into which Israel had been forced. “While certain lines of approach to the compensation problem were thus tentatively adumbrated, the Israel representatives have through their discussions with the Conciliation Commission consistently upheld the attitude that no useful purpose would be served by the subject of compensation, or, for that matter, any other single aspect of the problem before the Conciliation Commission, being torn out of the general context and treated in isolation from the rest. “The only context in which the Government of Israel would be in a position to determine with due definitiveness and precision the terms under which it would be prepared to envisage the solution of the compensation problem would be that of comprehensive peace negotiations, in which all aspects of the final settlement between Israel and her neighbors could be treated in their inter-relation as forming one coherent whole. Such a context would arise only if one or several Arab States declared themselves willing to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. In the absence of such readiness, all discussion would lack the basis of reality and therefore be futile. “The Government of Israel would recall that in its memorandum of March 29, 1950, the Conciliation Commission invited the governments concerned to negotiate, under certain procedures, for the settlement of all outstanding questions. In its reply of May 6, 1950, the Government of Israel signified its acceptance of the substance of the Commission’s proposal. A similar response on the part of the Arab Governments would open the way for such comprehensive negotiations aiming at a final and definitive settlement. In these negotiations the problem of Arab claims and Israel’s counterclaims for compensation could be accorded their due prominence.” PCC held last Geneva meeting today. Plans reconvene Jerusalem 5 August. [ Palmer ] Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: NSC 27 Series 1 [Document 515] Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Matthews ) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay ) top secret Washington , July 15, 1950. Subject; Second Progress Report on NSC 27/3, 2 “Provision of a Police Force for Jerusalem”. NSC 27/3 was approved as Governmental policy on November 24, 1948. It is requested that this Progress Report dated June 28, 1950, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information. The First Progress Report on NSC 27/3, dated February 28, 1950, 3 stated that the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem, of the type recommended by the General Assembly in its resolutions of November 29, 1947, and December 9, 1949, was unlikely in view of the strong opposition of the Governments of Israel and Jordan to such a regime. The First Progress Report further stated that because of this fact an international police force such as that described in NSC 27/3 would probably not be set up in Jerusalem. The possibility that a full international regime, and international police force, will be established in Jerusalem has decreased further since the submission of the First Progress Report. The United Nations Trusteeship Council decided on June 14, 1950, to refer the question of an international regime back to the General Assembly without attempting to implement the statute for such a regime which the Council had prepared in accordance with the instructions contained in the General Assembly’s resolution of December 9, 1949. The Council based its decision mainly on the fact that neither Israel nor the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, presently occupying Jerusalem, appeared ready to cooperate in the establishment of an international regime. Under the circumstances the Council was unable to proceed with the implementation of the statute. The General Assembly will give further consideration to this question at the Fifth Regular Session. In view of the failure of the Trusteeship Council to obtain the cooperation of the occupying powers, and of the fact that the Soviet Union has announced the withdrawal of its support for full internationalization, it is probable that the General Assembly will not again recommend the establishment of a regime such as that called for in 1947 and 1949. It is not likely, therefore, that an international police force such as that described in NSC 27/3 will be set up in Jerusalem. In the event that a force of this nature should be established, however, this Government should continue to be guided by the principles set forth in the conclusions of NSC 27/3. 4 H. Freeman Matthews 1 Lot 61 D 167 is a serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. 2 Of November 16, 1948; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , Part 2, p. 1591 . 3 Not printed; a copy is in S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167, NSC 27 Series. 4 On November 7, 1950. Under Secretary of State Webb submitted a “Third and Final Progress Report on NSC 27/3, ‘Provision of a Police Force for Jerusalem’” to Mr. Lay. Webb stressed the continued disinclination of the United Nations to “put into effect a regime for Jerusalem of the type which would require the establishment of an international police force as envisaged in NSC 27/3”, and therefore concluded that action contemplated by NSC 27/3 “will not be necessary in the circumstances. Progress reports are therefore being discontinued” (S/P–NSC Files, Lot 61 D 167, NSC 27 Series). At its 75th meeting on December 14, the National Security Council took note of the third and final progress report on NSC 27/3 without further action or discussion (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action). Lot 66 D 95 contains administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State for the years 1947–1963. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) 357.AC/7–2550 [Document 516] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs ( Rockwell ) 1 confidential [ Washington ,] July 25, 1950. Subject: Future Action of the Palestine Conciliation Committee Participants: Mr. Benard, French Embassy ANE—Mr. Rockwell Mr. Waldo Mr. Day UNP—Mr. Barco Problem: To receive views of French Government on future action of PCC. Action Required: To determine Department’s position on above. Action Assigned to: UN/P [ UNA/P? ] ANE Discussion: Mr. Benard called under instructions to inform the Department of the contents of a note from the Foreign Office conveying Mr. de Boisanger’s ideas as regards future action of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Mr. de Boisanger reviewed the present situation, pointing out the stalemate in which the Commission is at present because of the rigid positions taken by the two sides. He was of the opinion that the Commission could not very well continue in this unsatisfactory state of affairs, since there was nothing for it to do. Mr. de Boisanger suggested that the Commission should make a report to the 5th General Assembly, which would be in two parts. The first part would review the Commission’s activities for the past six months or so. In the second part the Commission would make to the Assembly some suggestions for a new course of action in an effort to bring about peace between the Arab states and Israel. Mr. de Boisanger did not explain exactly what the suggestions would be, but thought that they might involve the passage of a new resolution by the General Assembly to adjust the terms of reference of the PCC to the present situation in the Near East. Mr. de Boisanger felt that the Commission’s terms of reference as regards the refugee question were not applicable in the present circumstances, and that a new appeal should be made to the parties in a resolution calling upon the Arab states and Israel to negotiate “under UN auspices”. It was Mr. de Boisanger’s view that any suggestions made to the General Assembly by the PCC would first be agreed upon by the Governments of Turkey, France, the U.S. and the U.K., and supported by those nations in the General Assembly. I said that the Department was at the moment discussing the future of the PCC and that we were glad to have Mr. de Boisanger’s ideas to consider. I noted that Mr. de Boisanger had not said what specific suggestions he thought the PCC should make to the General Assembly. I added that the general Palestine question was not on the agenda of the General Assembly, and that we thought that it would be undesirable to place it there unless by so doing we would accomplish something which would facilitate a peace settlement in the Near East. Unless there were prior general acceptance by the parties of whatever new suggestions the PCC might make, I foresaw that the debate would degenerate into another of the all too familiar emotional Palestine conflicts in the General Assembly. In this connection, I thought that the PCC, while in the Near East, would have an opportunity for informal contacts with the parties which would give it an opportunity for appraisal of the possibilities for success of any new approach. The situation in this sense frankly did not seem encouraging to us at the present time, but we were always willing to consider any plan which seemed to have a reasonable chance of success. Accordingly, we looked forward with interest to the PCC’s evaluation of the possibilities of peace after its new Near Eastern trip. 2 Meanwhile, we would consider Mr. de Boisanger’s ideas here and would be interested to receive any specific suggestions the French Government might have for a new approach. 3 Mr. Benard said that he would convey the sense of the above to his Government, stressing the idea that the informal reaction of the Department was that it would not be desirable to place the general Palestine question on the agenda of the General Assembly unless something beneficial could thereby be accomplished. He would also report our interest in the PCC’s evaluation of peace possibilities. In response to a query from Mr. Benard, I said that I believed that the Department thought that the PCC should not be abolished but permitted to continue in order to be available should circumstances affecting the possibilities of peace talks change for the better. 1 Mr. Rockwell was appointed to this position on May 14, 1950. 2 The Department, on August 4, informed Ambassador Blandford that “While US does not at this time favor raising genl Palestine question in UNGA this fall, this will depend in final analysis on results PCC stay in NE and its final recommendations to GA.” (Telegram 88, identified also as Unrap 44, to Beirut, 320.2AA/8–450) 3 Mr. Benard, on August 2, called on Arthur R, Day of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs to present the further views of Mr. de Boisanger. These envisaged a new appeal by the General Assembly to the Arab States and Israel to negotiate under UN auspices. Previously, the Arabs had insisted on discussing a peace settlement with the PCC, rather than directly with the Israelis, a procedure made possible by the Commission’s terms of reference. Steps should be taken by the Assembly to make it clear that peace talks should be held directly between Arab and Israeli representatives, under the guidance of the PCC, and that they should begin at a set date (Mr. Day’s memorandum of conversation, 357.AC/8–250). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) 357.AC/7–2650 [Document 517] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs ( Rockwell ) confidential [ Washington ,] July 26, 1950. Subject: Action on Jerusalem in General Assembly Participants: G. N. Upton, 3rd Secretary Australian Embassy ANE—Mr. Rockwell Problem: To receive views of Australian Government on possible course of action on Jerusalem in General Assembly. Action Required: To consider above. Action Assigned to: ANE, UNP, UND Discussion: Mr. Upton called under instructions to acquaint the Department with the Australian Foreign Office’s preliminary thinking on the course of action which might be followed concerning Jerusalem in the General Assembly this year. [Here follow the views of the Australian Government that a corpus separatum should be maintained under full sovereignty of the United Nations, but that the international zone should be smaller than the original Jerusalem area and might include about half of the Old City and a corresponding portion of Jewish Jerusalem.] I said that the Department believed that any Jerusalem solution should be acceptable to Jordan and Israel and receive a reasonable degree of concurrence by the International Community. I recalled that the United States had taken an active role in the preparation of the PCC Statute for Jerusalem last year, and that this Statute had not even been considered by the General Assembly. In our eyes the PCC Statute, with suitable modifications, still seemed to be a good basis for a compromise between the positions of the various elements interested in the Jerusalem problem. I recalled that the Israeli Government had submitted a proposal involving international control of the Holy Places alone, while it was our understanding that the Vatican still strongly supported the full internationalization of the whole Jerusalem area. I added that in my opinion the passage of time had altered the situation in Palestine to such a degree that full internationalization of the entire Jerusalem area as envisaged in 1947 was no longer practicable. As a matter of fact, it seemed dubious that a two-thirds majority could be obtained this year for another resolution calling for full internationalization in view of the Soviet decision no longer to support this idea. It seemed to me that the idea of the territorial internationalization of a small area in Jerusalem would to a great deal depend for success upon the attitude of the parties. The trend of the present thinking of the Australian Government appeared to me to be leading toward a plan such as that proposed by Mr. Garreau, and I recalled that both Jordan and Israel had opposed this plan. There were also the costs of administration of an international territory to be considered. I said that the Department had not adopted a firm position on this question as yet, and had not received an indication of the views of other nations on the subject. For this reason the Department would shortly request its missions in the field to ask the Governments to which they were accredited for their views. I thought it important that the Jerusalem question be removed from the UN agenda this year, but at the present time frankly could not foresee what decision the General Assembly would reach. To put it plainly, I said that we believed that the nations which had taken the lead in bringing the General Assembly to such an impracticable solution last year might well be expected to take the initiative toward a more workable solution this time. However, until we saw signs pointing toward such a solution, and its acceptability to a majority of the international community and the two parties most concerned, our entirely tentative thinking was that the PCC Statute was as good a point as any to start from. Mr. Upton thanked me for these views and said he would communicate them to his Government. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to Dr. Francis Wilcox, Chief of Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 320.2AA/7–2650 [Document 518] The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to Dr. Francis Wilcox, Chief of Staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Washington , July 26, 1950. My Dear Dr. Wilcox : I should like to give you the following justification for restoration of the full amount of $27,450,000 authorized for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: A recommendation from the Appropriations Committee to cut the above amount by 10 percent 1 was not accompanied by any reasons for doing so. In the Palestine Refugee Program, the Department presents to the Congress a definite program, carefully designed and documented, to do a particular job in a sensitive area, for a sum of money that is moderate when weighed against anticipated accomplishment. The budget of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine, Refugees of $54,900,000 was based on studies made by technicians, under the guidance of Mr. Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East. This program received unanimous acceptance by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee reported unanimously when considering the authorizing legislation. Authorizing legislation provides that the United States contribute half of this sum, or $27,450,000. Added to the contributions of other nations, who have begun to make gratifying responses to this need, the Agency will use a major part of this budget to help the Arab refugees to help themselves by putting them to work on public projects which the Clapp Mission recommended as beneficial to the economy of the nations surrounding Palestine. These states are poor, among the poorest in the world. They are not able to care for the refugees themselves. And so the refugees have stayed, for more than two years now, in camps and caves, or under temporary shelter, recipients of a dole of food and clothing from international sources, in idleness. The problem is to bring direct relief to an end, and create opportunities for works projects that will help the economic development of countries bordering on Israel. If the works program does not succeed, the United Nations will be faced with a continuing problem of providing doles for relief to the refugee population, the principal casualties of the Israeli-Arab hostilities. If the full budget of the Agency is not met, it can safely be predicted that the cost of caring for this indigent refugee population will continue for a longer time than it otherwise would. The longer these unfortunate people remain in indigence, the more they are prey to every kind of political subversion. The Department has become increasingly concerned in recent months at growing evidence of the activity of communist agitators among these people. Refugees who have lost homes, land and work are an easy mark for the blandishments of communism. At least, they reason, things could not be worse than they are. What we wish to do is, in cooperation with local governments, give them at least the opportunity to earn their living once again, by their own effort. The Arab states where this effort is taking place lie in one of the most strategic areas of the world, as Admiral Sherman 2 has testified before your Committee. For a comparatively small sum, we can add to the stability of the area, contiguous to Greece, Turkey and Iran. All of our help to these latter countries could be wasted if their southern flank is weakened by dissension and subversion. Already the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is a bright spot on the Near Eastern scene. Local governments are cooperating with the Agency, after an initial period of distrust. Refugees are requesting work. The Agency is directing this willing pool of manpower into a constructive effort. Under these circumstances, a cut of 10 percent would have at least three unfortunate results. First, it will discourage other governments from contributing to the Agency; we have taken the leadership in encouraging such contributions. Second, the reduction of American and other contributions will fall entirely on the constructive phases of public works, many leading to settlement of refugees, the essence of the Clapp plan. Third, as there has already been delay in starting a works program, resulting in a heavier relief burden than originally contemplated, there is now more need than ever for the full amount of funds budgeted. It would indeed be unfortunate if a plan so well worked out were to suffer or fail for lack of a marginal difference of $2,750,000. 3 Sincerely yours, George C. McGhee 1 The Department on July 10, had notified Ambassador Blandford concerning this development, pointing out that similar or deeper cuts had been made in all other foreign aid appropriations (telegram 17, identified also as Unrap 33, to Beirut, 320.2AA/7–1050). 2 Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations. 3 The Department, on August 1, informed Ambassador Blandford of the Senate action the day before to restore the full authorized appropriation of $27,450,000 (telegram 76, identified also as Unrap 42, to Beirut 320.2AA/8–150). The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 784A.13/7–3150: Telegram [Document 519] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority Tel Aviv , July 31, 1950—11 a. m. 61. Importance of Prime Minister’s disclosure reported below will I hope excuse my accidental violation of Department’s standing instructions re my actions in Jerusalem to escape Tel Aviv heat and attend Bach concert, I was in Jerusalem July 28–30. Being informed Prime Minister was in Elath, Mrs. McDonald and I had tea his residence with Mrs. Ben-Gurion where to my complete surprise Prime Minister joined us. He talked to me privately an hour substantially as follows: Eban is returning Washington with instructions sound out desirability of visit of Prime Minister to US this fall to discuss “on highest level” possibility of USG sponsoring three years program to increase Israeli population through intensified refugee immigration to two millions and build with American arms effective Israeli army of 250,000 men “capable and anxious aid US and UK and Turkey to resist Russian aggression”. Prime Minister hopes he “can convince President Truman, Secretary Acheson and US military that America’s vital interest would be served by proposed strengthening of Israel as only country other than Turkey in eastern [ western ] Asia willing to fight Russian aggression to limit of strength”. Prime Minister feels American Jews would give or lend money required beyond USG possible loans only if USG first sponsors intensified Israel efforts speed up immigration. Prime Minister praised President Truman’s Korean decision as “bold and vital step to block Communist expansion and hence may prove turning point in history.” Russia, he added, is regime “based on fear, deceit, force and repression”. It “must be stopped if freedom is to live in world”. In answer my question re Israel left-wing labor, Prime Minister said confidently, “Israeli people would support crushing any form Communist collaboration in event world conflict. Only few Mapam could possibly cause embarrassment and this locally”. Re-equipped and enlarged Israeli army “would guarantee Israeli unity in support of West”. If Russia attacked Israel’s strategic air fields “Israel’s new army could and would hold until US and UK forces could arrive”. Comment: Conscious of large implications of effects Prime Minister’s proposal upon US overall ME policy, I gave no indication possible Washington response. Prime Minister could not have been more explicit in willingness commit Israel unreservedly to West. His statement is doubly significant because it follows and doubtless represents conference opinion Foreign Office and diplomats whose fortnight conference Tel Aviv and Jerusalem he attended. Although Israel’s attitude strengthened by increasing difficulties internal economy, I believe it basically represents culmination of realization by Israeli leaders that Israel can survive only in world freed from menace of Communist aggression. To defend itself Israel would fight against Russian invaders as desperately as against Arabs. End comment . McDonald The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 784A.00/8–150 [Document 520] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 61 tel Aviv , August 1, 1950. [Here follow four paragraphs dealing with the concern over the waning interest of Western Jews in the State of Israel, expressed by Israeli chiefs of diplomatic missions at their conference in Israel from July 17 to 23; and with the arrival in Israel on July 31 of six American Zionist leaders to discuss Israel’s difficult economic situation.] Comment: The decision of the Israel diplomats and the hurried visit of the American Zionist leaders bespeak larger issues than the mere failure of an appeal for funds. Both are further indications that the powers that be in Israel are seriously preoccupied with the momentous question of the future of the State. While it is too early to state with any degree of certainty, it is likely that the Korean crisis has acted as a catalytic agent, and that as a consequence the solution that is Israel is now in the process of being cleared of certain impurities. It is known that since the beginning of hostilities in Korea, many Israelis have come to the conclusion that should a world war result, Israel would be left to fend for herself. One general fact is undeniable: without the unwavering and increasing support of Western Jewry, the future of the state is in peril. Israel’s immediate economic future looks increasingly bleak. The waning interest in the State amongst Western Jewry spells disaster and has apparently brought home to the Government the dire necessity for a complete reexamination of its basic policies. It could be that Israel’s leaders have at last recognized the ultimate folly of pursuing policies (strict West-East neutrality, socialism which belabors free private enterprise, etc.) which run directly contrary to the personal interests of the very people from whom Israel is demanding greater and greater sacrifices. The Foreign Minister’s recent redefinition of Israel’s West-East neutrality policy, wherein he carefully pointed out that Israel’s policy would better be defined as one of “non-identification” than of neutrality in its strictest sense, and the even more startling hint of a basic change in policy outlined in one of the Embassy’s most recent Top Secret messages to the Department can only mean that Israel’s leaders have realized that certain existing: policies no longer serve the best interests of the State. Any reassessment of foreign and internal policy which might be taking place within the Israel Government has resulted not from a sudden ideological change of heart—it has always been generally recognized that the majority of Israel’s officials and civilians are essentially pro-Western in outlook and sympathy—but rather it has resulted from the ultimate realization that the hand that feeds will not submit indefinitely to being bitten. End comment . For the Ambassador: Richard Ford Counselor of Embassy The Secretary of State to Ambassador John B. Blandford, at Beirut 320.2AA/7–2850: Telegram [Document 521] The Secretary of State to Ambassador John B. Blandford, at Beirut confidential Washington , August 3, 1950—7 p. m. 85. Unrap 43. Re Rapun 43. 1 Present thinking on your numbered questions in reftel as fols: 1. Discussion with Arab Govt[s] on multilateral technical assistance shld at this time fol latest news from Lake Success. 2 Dept cannot now give you detailed info on bilateral Point IV programs, although hope shortly cable figures of tentative country dol allotments for planning purposes, as soon as appropriation firm. Discussions with govts on resettlement of refugees not desiring repatriation shld fol polit possibilities of the moment, bearing in mind explosive qualities of this subject. You shld be guided by corns on present thinking in Arab states. Perhaps more emphasis cld be given to works in Jordan which wld create absorptive capacity rather than roads in presently settled areas and afforestation projects which do not immed create such capacity. Good relations that PEA may be able to foster with Syrian Govt may enable PRA’s continuing studies of resettlement projects in Syria to bear fruit. 2. Dept sees no objection to your initiating gen discussions with Arab League reps and suggests you get in touch with Azzam Pasha through Emb Cairo. 3 These discussions wld necessarily be exploratory and you can judge best the desirability of continuing contact. Ur previous comment on encouraging AL officials to initiate statistical and regional econ studies seems to have considerable possibilities. Whether you have discussions alone or jointly with Director and Comm. colleagues is matter best left to your own judgment. 3. Dept now thinks your report might cover fol gen lines: 1. Appraisal of progress using Clapp report recommendations as criterion. 2. Recommendations on continuation of direct relief. True that Clapp left initiative to Arab states on this but it seems to Dept that report and subsequently the GA will have to face the issue. PEA alone can determine necessity. 3. Recommendations on future of PRA: a. Continuation b. If so, possible changes in terms of reference to broaden scope. c. Extension of foreign aid necessary with justification. d. Role that banks, govts, and non-governmental agencies might play in econ development of countries in the gen area of Palestine. FYI Dept expects that PRA will look to future re economic rehabilitation and development and recommend further steps to be taken, whether through PRA machinery or otherwise. You will recall that before Clapp went to NE the Dept was thinking, with executive approval, in terms of 3-year program involving US grant funds larger on annual basis than 1951 US appropriation PRA to match equally other sources of funds including loans. Dept would like your appraisal possibility re-initiation of this approach, not only in terms of refugees, but also of economic development NE which in turn cld be related to building strength and stability in the NE and determination and means to resist invasions USSR, and orientation toward US–UK. With this in mind you may wish to submit a separate report to US Govt on advisability continuation of PEA in contrast to bilateral action to be taken by US in furtherance of plans of economic development or both. Your views and those of corns on advantages and disadvantages of divorcing the refugee problem from economic development and points of view of local governments thereon will be studied here in the light of possibilities of obtaining further funds for fiscal year 1952. End FYI. [Here follows the remainder of the telegram dealing with the possible return of Ambassador Blandford to the United States and various technical questions.] Acheson 1 Identified also as telegram 62, July 28, from Beirut, not printed. 2 Meeting place of the Security Council. 3 The Department of State informed Embassy Brussels on August 2, that the Arab contribution to PRA would amount to $6,000,000 (airgram 39, 320.2AA/8–250). The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 684A.85/8–150: Telegram [Document 522] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 1 confidential Washington , August 3, 1950—8 p. m. 22. Urtel 28, Aug 1. Dept believes such proposals as Israel–Jordan high level military talks or inclusion political reps on MAC do not conflict with PCC efforts achieve overall settlement. On contrary Dept believes that they are complementary. Dept fears present border frictions may prejudice chances PCC success in bringing parties together and believes implementation these proposals will tend create atmosphere more conducive successful negotiations. Dept agrees, however, that appearance pressing proposals upon parties might have unfavorable results, and believes gradual development should be permitted. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals, London, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem (for Mr. Palmer). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 784.13/7–3150: Telegram [Document 523] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 top secret Washington , August 7, 1950—7 p. m. 52. Embtel 61, July 31. Dept has read with interest your acct PriMin’s views re Israel’s support for West, particularly his remarks concerning attitude Israeli people re Commie collaboration in event world conflict. Israeli official statements with respect UN action re Korea are gratifying example this attitude. Dept’s policy re NE is based on desire for stability and peace that area as whole. Our participation in and support of such activities as PRA and Point IV are intended help achieve this end. Such statements as tripartite declaration are indicative our endeavors restore confidence and foster security in area. These policies and activities have merit of helping NE states to help themselves and of assisting them more effectively to play their individual and regional roles in world affairs. Three-year immigration program providing for movement approx one million people and direct mil assist by USG for greatly augmented Israeli Army are concepts whose implementation wld be contrary to present programs and policies and wld thereby jeopardize current progress toward area stability and peace. Furthermore, US requirements in light of internatl situation and US commitments around the world, particularly in Europe and Far East, wld make such concepts as those of PriMin impossible to implement. Dept considers it advisable that prior to ur departure you seek opportunity to convey Dept’s views to PriMin along foregoing lines. 2 Webb 1 This telegram was drafted by Messrs. Wilkins and Day on August 4. Acting Secretary Webb took the message on August 7 to President Truman, who read it and “generally agreed that this was the right line to take.” (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Webb, Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444) Before being transmitted to Tel Aviv, the message was cleared by officers of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in the Office of the Secretary of State and of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, and by the Department of Defense. 2 Ambassador McDonald, on August 17, informally conveyed the substance of telegram 52 to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. The latter “was obviously disappointed but made no comment.” (Telegram 99, August 18, from Tel Aviv, 784A.13/8–1850) The same message advised the Department of State that a visit by the Prime Minister to the United States had not been decided on but that he would not make the visit unless the Department had no objection and that he would be able to see President Truman. Chargé Ford advised, on August 20, that “government leaders at last realize Ben-Gurion’s explanation of plan to Ambassador McDonald was premature and consider Ben-Gurion’s action as blunder”. He indicated also that Mr. Kollek’s hasty departure to the United States on August 19 was ‘indicative state nervous agitation government circles result final recognition Ben-Gurion’s blunder. Ultimate manifestation nervousness was when Ben-Gurion went so far as to tell Ambassador McDonald during their final conference August 17 he had no intention Ambassador’s reporting his plan Washington, that he was merely ‘talking personally’ to Ambassador.” (Telegram 101 from Tel Aviv, 884A.10/8–2050) The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 784A.11/8–850: Telegram [Document 524] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , August 8, 1950—1 p. m. 75. At invitation Sharett his residence Sunday August 6 during hour and quarter talk following were among subjects discussed: (1) re possible visit Prime Minister to States (Embtel 61, July 31), Sharett asked my opinion likelihood official invitation from Department. I explained difficulties and suggested that Eban could without embarrassment sound out Department. Sharett gave impression Ben Ourion would go even without official invitation provided Department and President indicated Prime Minister’s presence would be welcome. (2) Re Israel hope for large US financial aid in “three-year plan” (Embtel 61) Prime [ Foreign ] Minister at length explained his “personal conviction” that best method would be regional aid program for settlement Arab refugees “in Arab countries” and speeding up settlement “in gathered exiles in Israel.” I refrained from predicting Department’s reaction but indicated personal opinion that Arab states except possibly Jordan might interpret Foreign Minister’s plan as: ( a ) Israel refugee victory and ( b ) threat to Israel’s neighbors through rapid increase Jewish population. Sharett replied: “If this were Arab reaction, there could be no regional plan.” Foreign Minister then discussed as alternative possible US Marshall aid to Israel. He said that Israel because of public sensitiveness to infringements on independence could not accept such aid if it involved: (1) US representatives in UN SC or GA “whispering voting instructions” to Israel, or (2) presence in Israel of US representative commission with authority to try to influence Israel domestic, economic or financial policies. He added Israel would gladly accept conditions similar thereto of Exim Bank loan. Re assurance from Israel that in crisis it would be loyal to West, Sharett said mechanical guarantees are futile and urgent faith in Israel and knowledge that its self-interest is inescapably western. Comment: Sharett’s attitude towards possible US. financial aid was less cocky than his language quoted above re US representatives “whispered voting instructions” might indicate. His outline was probably Israel’s initial proposal and might later be broadened to include concessions to Arabs on refugees to make regional aid program worth serious consideration by Department. End comment . New subject : Re my retirement, Sharett said he hoped I would return from leave at least for short time. Foreign Minister expressed “personal hope” my successor would be man “without” previous experience in area and not Jewish. 1 McDonald 1 Embassy Tel Aviv, on August 11, reported a conversation the previous day with Mr. Kollek, who explained he was “slightly worried” about the talks of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister with the Ambassador, as set forth in telegrams 61 and 75. According to Mr. Kollek, the Prime Minister had not expected the Ambassador to call on him at Jerusalem and was “mentally as well as physically in bedroom slippers” at the time. He stated, moreover, that the proposals outlined by the two Israeli leaders would probably meet resistance in their own party and from some of the populace outside the left-wing groups. He also indicated that “unlimited immigration was most sacrosanct tenet of present government and since it is now realized policy can only be carried on with assistance Western Jewry, principally American Jewry, Prime Minister and those advisers consulted had decided upon necessity for radical change in basic policy. Kollek then explained that Prime Minister intended begin process of educating party and public to new policy at Mapai Party conference to be convened August 15.” (Telegram 86, 784A.11/8–1150) Mr. Shiloah, on August 11, also played down the conversations, stating that the Israeli leaders were doing “informal thinking out loud” to an old friend, rather than to the U.S. Ambassador (telegram 87, August 12, from Tel Aviv, 784A.11/8–1250). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines 784A.561/7–1750: Telegram [Document 525] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines secret priority Washington , August 8, 1950—2 p. m. 209. Embtel 133, July 17. 1 Dept fully considered aspects transfers M–4 tanks Israel. Regardless condition tanks Dept unwilling consent shipment out of Far Eastern area such material which undoubtedly has real war potential otherwise doubtful Israelis wld be interested. Dept’s info at present time does not indicate Israel is at disadvantage militarily with respect Egypt. Dept is permitting export from US quantities war material lesser mil potential to Israel and: Arab states. US policy re arms shipments to NE, as stated by US rep in UN Security Council at time UN lifted embargo on arms to NE, limits such shipments to arms necessary for internal security and self-defense. Declaration three foreign ministers made no change this policy. Dept, in fact, hopes Declaration, in stating three-power concern for NE security, will increase confidence NE states in future security, and hence lessen need for large amounts of armament in area. In gen Dept believes trend in NE is away from war toward peace. Acheson 1 Not printed; it reported that an Israeli representative had been negotiating vainly with the Philippine Government for the purchase of 122 Sherman M–4 tanks (784A.561/7–1750). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) 684A.85/8–1250 [Document 526] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs ( Stabler ) confidential [ Washington ,] August 12, 1950. Subject: Palestine and related problems Participants: Abdel Moneim Bey Rifai, Counselor of the Jordan Legation NEA—Mr. George C. McGhee NE—Mr. Wells Stabler Problem: To convey to Mr. Rifai certain views prior to his departure for Amman. Action Required: None Action Assigned to: — Discussion: Mr. Rifai called at his request to say goodbye prior to his departure on transfer to Amman August 20. He said how much he had appreciated the courtesies extended to him while in the United States and that during his year of service he had had a good opportunity of understanding the underlying philosophy of American policies throughout the world. He had come in to see Mr. McGhee to ascertain whether there was any message which he could convey to the King and the Jordan Government upon his return to Amman. Mr. McGhee outlined the position of the United States in the world today and pointed out that we were motivated only by our desire to assist in strengthening the free world. The US had no ulterior motives in its various programs and we had no desire to obtain territories or special political privileges. He cited as an example of our policies the position which we hold in Greece today. Our only interests had been to bolster Greece in its desire to remain a free nation. Just as soon as the threat to Greek independence has been removed we shall be only too happy to withdraw. However, it was necessary to bear in mind that because of the vast responsibilities which the U.S. has had thrust upon it, it was not possible for our policies to please everybody. We are aware of this fact and hope that others will also recognize what our basic motives are in dealing with world problems. Mr. Rifai expressed his appreciation for this frank expression of view and said that he had come to understand this during his tour in Washington. He then referred to the question of Palestine and said that, as we knew, the King wished to settle his problems with Israel as soon as possible. However, he was up against opposition both in his country and the other Arab States, and Mr. Rifai wondered whether there was anything we could tell him which he could use when he returned to Amman to support and encourage those who felt that peace with Israel was desirable. If it was possible to explain the need for peace in a rational way to public opinion in Jordan, it would undoubtedly make the King’s task easier. Mr. Rifai mentioned that the various incidents which have occurred recently between certain of the Arab States and Israel played into the hands of those who opposed peace. Mr. McGhee said that we had greatly appreciated the King’s attitude on this question but wanted to make it clear that we did not wish in any way to press him. We felt that it would be preferable for him and Israel to reach peace on a basis which was mutually satisfactory to them. While we were anxious that peace and stability return to the area, it must come through the conviction of the States concerned that peace was a necessity. With respect to these incidents Mr. McGhee pointed out that we favored a full and immediate investigation of the facts by the Mixed Armistice Commission. If these Commissions came up with a report on any given incident which made clear that one side or the other was at fault, we should support whatever action the UN might recommend. Mr. Rifai then referred to the question of Jerusalem and asked what would be done about this question during the General Assembly. Mr. McGhee and Mr. Stabler stated that the U.S. favored a solution to this problem which would be satisfactory to the two parties immediately concerned as well as to the world community which had a legitimate interest in Jerusalem. Israel had moved a long way from its original position and had presented a plan to the UN. We felt that Jordan should also move from its negative position and recognize that complete Jordan control of the area it presently holds in Jerusalem was not possible. The impression which had been created by Jordan during the Trusteeship Council meetings in Geneva was not favorable and we believed that if Jordan came to the General Assembly with a real desire to settle the Jerusalem question it could be settled once and for all. Mr. Rifai said he would bear these comments in mind. Mr. Rifai mentioned that the King and Jordan were solidly behind the West in its opposition to communism and that we could count on Jordan’s support. Mr. McGhee expressed his appreciation for these words and said that we had been very much encouraged by the immediate and strong stand which Jordan had taken with respect to the Korean situation. We felt certain that we could continue to count on Jordan. Mr. Rifai expressed his appreciation for having been received by Mr. McGhee and said that he would inform the King and the Jordan Government in detail of this discussion. The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 357.AC/8–1250: Circular telegram [Document 527] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1 secret Washington , August 14, 1950—1 a. m. View fact Qudsi 2 departing Damascus Aug 14 (Damascus Legtel 85, Aug 12 3 ) Caffery Alexandria shld reply to him along fol lines: US deeply appreciates motives which have prompted Syrian Govt consult with it re this matter and believes they reflect wise and statesmanlike leadership. However decision is one entirely for Syrian and other Arab Govts to make and we do not wish in any way influence or interfere with that decision. GA will be mtg at time of serious internatl developments and will be faced with many complex problems arising out of Korean situation. Attn will therefore be primarily focussed on that subj. However question of Jlem and PEA report are already on GA provisional agenda and we are certain they as well as any additional important points will receive fullest possible consideration. Urinfo Dept concurs with Leg Damascus and Palmer’s views (Amman 42 Aug 14 4 ) negative reply or any semblance pressure (Alexandria’s 19 Aug 13 4 ) wld have unfortunate repercussions. Other missions in Arab caps shld fol above line if similarly approached. Acheson 1 At Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Ankara, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. The circular telegram was sent niact to Alexandria and Damascus. 2 Nazim Qudsi, Syrian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. 3 Not printed; it relayed information from the Syrian Prime Minister that be was departing from Damascus on August 14 to attend the Arab League meeting on the 18th at Alexandria. Among the items to be discussed was whether the Palestine problem should be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly. The Prime Minister also indicated that his Government was seeking the views of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union on the question. The important consideration to the Syrian Government was said to be the views of the United States; those of the Soviet Union were being sought only for form’s sake (357.AC/8–1250). 4 Not printed. 4 Not printed. Memorandum by Mr. James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Director of That Office (Bancroft) 357.AC/8–1750 [Document 528] Memorandum by Mr. James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Director of That Office ( Bancroft ) secret [ Washington ,] August 17, 1950. Subject: Future Policy on Palestine 1. Present Situation The Palestine Conciliation Commission is now established in Jerusalem and is in the process of conferring at the various capitals in the area with the governments concerned. Following these conferences and an assessment of the possibilities of further effective negotiation in the area, the PCC will prepare its report for submission to the General Assembly. So far as I know, no specific date has been set for the preparation of such report but it will probably be done about the middle of September or shortly thereafter. Jim Barco is of the opinion that the PCC will return to Geneva for the purpose of writing the conclusions and recommendations to the report. By Palun 377 of August 14 1 and by our circular telegram to the area of August 11 2 it appears reasonably clear that the general subject of Palestine and the future of the PCC will come up in the General Assembly. In view of the fact that Korea and the subject of Aggression will be the most significant items for the General Assembly to consider, the timing of General Assembly considerations of the Palestine problem and the extent to which we are prepared to go in committing ourselves to any future action with regard to Palestine are important. 2. Possible Courses of Action While these courses of action obviously are not mutually exclusive they do indicate different directions which this Government’s policy on Palestine may take. a . As outlined in Jim Barco’s memorandum, 3 the PCC could initiate discussions immediately with the Arab nations and Israel with the idea of advancing a system of direct negotiations between the parties as envisaged, for example, by the Shukairy proposals. As you may recall they suggest that direct negotiations be conducted through the establishment of three committees under the general guidance of the PCC. One committee would consider refugee problems taking as the basis of its considerations the General Assembly’s December 11, 1948 resolution. The second committee would consider territorial adjustments using the partition plan map as the basis for negotiation. The third committee would consider any special problems which the parties themselves or the PCC might suggest as necessary to a general settlement. Should all states approached by the PCC indicate a general willingness to agree to some system of direct negotiation the PCC would report to the General Assembly that it had obtained or expected to obtain agreement from the parties to negotiate, thereby presumably obviating any lengthy discussion of the Palestine problem in the General Assembly. Should the PCC fail to get the acceptance of the Arab states and Israel to such a proposal it would so report to the General Assembly with the recommendation that the parties should be called upon to enter into direct negotiations. Presumably any General Assembly resolution would endorse the PCC recommendations thus adding weight to the requirement that the Arabs and the Israelis start direct negotiations. Coupled with the PCC efforts to start direct negotiations of the sort envisaged by the Shukairy proposal, this Government should reassess, if possible, its Palestine policy toward the end that we might bring pressure to bear upon the Israelis to the effect that it would be advantageous for them to agree to the suggested plan for direct negotiation. The advantages to be obtained by the Israelis for entering into negotiation along the line suggested would be: that since the plan was of Arab origin, presumably it would have to be endorsed by the Arabs; that it is of the utmost importance to Israel that it achieve peace treaties with the various Arab states, particularly in view of the unsettled world conditions which might prevent the United States and other powers from coming to the assistance of Israel if set upon by its Arab neighbors; and that, in order to assure a satisfactory compensation plan as part of the settlement of the refugee problem, the United States would undertake to make a very substantial loan available to the state of Israel in order that it might release some of its own funds for compensation settlement. A proposal of this scope of necessity would have to have the President’s approval, particularly since our bringing diplomatic pressure to bear upon Israel to accept such a plan of direct negotiation would quite possibly soon cause possible political repercussions in this country. b . If the PCC should determine that it had been unsuccessful in getting the Arabs and Israelis to agree to some form of direct negotiation this Government could take the position with the respective governments that it was in effect “washing its hands” of any further efforts to get the parties to arrange for a peaceful and permanent settlement. This Government would take the position that it would be willing to assist, individually or in concert with other nations, the parties at any such time as there was any satisfactory indication that they desired to arrange for a permanent and peaceful settlement of their problems. This position of the Government in the General Assembly could take the form of advocating the abolition of the PCC or “putting it up in mothballs” until such time as it might be of some positive use. Concurrent with such a move this Government would indicate that continued United States financial support of PRA might be stopped, in view of our heavy commitments elsewhere in the world and of the unlikelihood that its continued operation would effectively resolve the refugee problem. We would, of course, have to reiterate our intention to support the three power statement of May 25 as the most effective means of assuring our continued interest in the maintenance of peace in the area. c . If the PCC reports no agreement to direct negotiation this Government might take the position in the General Assembly that a fresh directive should be given to the PCC and the parties. This directive might take the form of a resolution calling upon the parties to enter into direct negotiations and stating that the first item for negotiation should be the assessment of claims and damages and the establishment of a system of compensation. The second order of business might be the settlement of frontiers. The PCC might be charged with making specific recommendations on both these matters in supervising the negotiations. d . Assuming that the PCC report stated that it had failed to achieve any degree of success in fulfilling its functions this Government might urge that the PCC continue in existence, consider any possible means of negotiation and attempt to bring the parties together at such time in the future as might be propitious. 1 Identified also as telegram 42 from Amman, not printed. 2 Not printed; it reported that the Syrian Foreign Office had approached the French Minister in Damascus regarding whether Syria should support a move to place the Palestine question on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The Department of State had asked the views of the PCC on the matter. (357.AC/8–1150) 3 Not further identified. The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/8–1750: Telegram [Document 529] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Jerusalem , August 17, 1950—2 p. m. 40. Palun 379. Jordan Prime Minister Said Pasha El Mufti entertained entire Commission at tea afternoon August 14. Foreign Minister Shuraiqi, Azmi Bey Nashashibi, and other officials also present. On conclusion social activities press officer Sabit Bey Khalidi read on behalf of Prime Minister an English translation of note setting forth views of Jordan Government re Palestine settlement. Prime Minister’s message began by stating PCC had heard personal views of King at audience that morning. Prime Minister now wished clarify views of government in light of guidance supplied by HM. Note discussed three aspects of Palestine situation: (1) refugees, (2) territorial adjustments and (3) final settlement. Re. refugees Prime Minister said technical studies indicated even after land reclaimed, water provided and necessary capital secured, would still possibly settle only 100,000 refugees in Jordan. 500,000 refugees would remain dependent on foreign aid scheduled cease by June 1951. These refugees would then face misery, disease, and would constitute fertile ground for spread of “destructive ideas” and thus become threat to security. Jordan therefore proposed following: 1. Former inhabitants Arab area demarcated in map attached to 12 May protocol should return their home soonest and prior expiration UN assistance program. 2. Jordan Ministry of Refugees would cooperate with PRA to ensure employment and food for refugees choosing remain in Jordan. 3. UN should warn Israel all immovable property of refugees from Palestine conflict should be preserved for original owners for retention or sale by them and exchange for full value. Re territorial adjustments, Jordan proposed in order attain stability and as way to peace, that special committee be reestablished under article 8 of armistice, but noted that it was vital for Jordan have indication Israel goodwill possibly by ( a ) surrender of Arab quarters Jerusalem, ( b ) return to Jordan of Arab lands and property in Tulkarm area. These questions however could be settled in committee. Prime Minister then complained about repeated Jewish violation armistice agreement and the alleged failure MAC to stop violations. He stated Jordan unaware whether weakness MAC toward Jews was leniency on part of individuals or in accord their instructions. Prime Minister expressed belief satisfactory territorial adjustments could be reached through special committee. Re final settlement, Prime Minister said Jordan’s attitude this question dependent on coordinated policy Arab states and Israel willingness honor Lausanne protocol as basis for territorial settlement, as well as Israel acceptance provisions UNGA resolution 11 December 1948 re refugees. Comment: It is possible this statement of Jordan Prime Minister’s may indicate that if Israel is prepared offer adequate basis for negotiation, Jordan Government willing reach territorial settlement through special committee which would not however alter final settlement. In this way Jordan could still maintain united front with Arab states with regard to a so-called final settlement. Jerusalem Post August 16 reports that NE Arab broadcasting station has announced that Jordan has named to special committee Hamed Bey Farhan, Director Department of Statistics, and Azmi Bey Nashashibi, chief of Jordan delegation to MAC. 1 [ Palmer ] 1 On the morning of August 14, King Abdullah granted an audience to the Palestine Conciliation Commission, in the presence of the Jordanian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The King emphasized he was talking for himself. He discussed the refugee and compensation problems. He then denounced Israeli arrogance and reluctance to meet the reasonable demands of Jordan, which he described as an outlet to the Mediterranean, the cession to Jordan of that part of the Negev east of a line drawn from Dhahiriya to Akaba, and the adjustment of the demarcation line in the triangle area (telegram 44, identified also as Palun 381, August 21, from Jerusalem, 357.AC/8–2150.) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 684A.85/8–1450: Telegram [Document 530] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 confidential Washington , August 18, 1950—7 p. m. 76. Embtels 929, Aug 14, and 969, Aug 16 from Lon, 2 rptd Tel Aviv as 7 and 8, Amman as 4 and 9. Dept understands Brit Govt instructing its reps Tel Aviv and Amman urge respective Govts agree high-level mil mtg. View continuing stalemate this matter, due unwillingness or inability parties arrange mtg, Dept agrees it may be necessary urge on both parties desirability such mtg. You shld therefore confer with Brit colleague and, if it appears such action wld be helpful, you are authorized support informally UK approaches. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Amman for action and to London for information. 2 Neither printed; the former reported the British Foreign Office’s concern over, the continued impasse regarding the proposed meeting of high ranking Jordanian and Israeli military officers to discuss the problems on their frontier. The Foreign Office was of the opinion that if the problems were not settled the relations between Jordan and Israel would be exacerbated, resulting in prejudice to any possibility of overall settlement between the two nations. It therefore recommended that the United States and the United Kingdom “should take fairly strong line in urging both sides to agree to meeting” (684A.85/8–150). The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/8–2150: Telegram [Document 531] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Jerusalem , August 21, 1950—4 p. m. 46. Palun 382. On August 17 PCC had meeting at Israeli FonOff Tel Aviv. I gave Israel FonMin résumé PCC position for peace negotiation between Arab states and Israel and stressed desirabilty favorable Israel attitude question of compensation. I also gave account of PCC activities Egypt and Jordan and read brief summary of views of Jordan PriMin (Palun 379 1 ) re negotiating peace settlement with Israel. FonMin replied by general restatement Israeli position and promised full written reply at later date. Both FonMin and Shiloah appeared very much interested in Jordan suggestion re the special committee, but both gave evidence of considerable scepticism as to actual intentions of Jordan Government this regard. PCC did not officially inform Israelis of suggested territorial concessions which Jordan had indicated would be necessary as indication of Israeli desire to work out territorial settlement, but both FonMin and Shiloah were clearly aware some specific proposal had been made. Evening of August 18, I accompanied Shiloah to his house at his request. Shiloah analyzed at great length what we thought were motives behind apparent Jordan willingness re-establish special committee. He was very sceptical that Jordan Government had any serious intent reach actual settlement by this means. Shiloah said he had two excellent reasons confirming his convictions: (1) King had not communicated with him as had always been case in past when Jordan actually meant business; (2) announcement on Arab radio of appointment of Hamad Bey Farhan and Azmi Bey Nashashibi is clear indication that Jordan Government did not expect to accomplish anything through special committee. Shiloah said that he was himself prepared to sit on special committee and would expect Jordan to appoint someone with equal authority. Shiloah agreed with US Del that it was possible that after committee had been set up dels of both sides could be strengthened or replaced by high level officers. He did not think that this was likely however. Shiloah gave very artful reconstruction of what he felt had been background of situation in Jordan leading up to Jordanian proposal for reconstitution of special committee. His account indicated that he had excellent knowledge of King and of political situation in Jordan. Shiloah then continued that he did not think US or UK were in any great hurry for final peace settlement. In his opinion both countries were of opinion that tripartite declaration and armistice agreements were adequate guarantees of stability in NE and it was therefore unnecessary to urge parties to reach final settlement. British after permitting Jordan to annex Arab Palestine had been unwilling to do anything further which might upset AL applecart, and neither US nor UK had any intention of urging Jordan to take any attitude which might put that country at odds with AL. Shiloah said that there were certain circles in both Arab states and UK who advocated policy of keeping AL in existence. In this connection, he referred to conversation he had had with Doctor Cleland 2 when latter visited Tel Aviv a few months ago. Shiloah felt that it was definitely in interests of US and UK to urge above all Jordan to reach settlement with Israel. With regard to agenda of special committee, Shiloah said he had no objection to Jordan’s adding any question concerning territorial matters which latter might wish to include, but Israel could make no prior concessions as peace offering or conciliatory gesture before sitting down to discuss these matters in committee, and while he ardently hoped that committee might be able to serve useful purpose, he doubted, in light of composition of Jordan Del, it would be possible for special committee to accomplish anything at all. 3 [Here follow remaining two paragraphs, dealing chiefly with various views of General Riley, particularly that if the Mount Scopus question were not resolved within the next few months, the Israelis might take military measures to occupy the area.] [ Palmer ] 1 Identified also as telegram 40, August 17, from Jerusalem, p. 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] . 2 William W. Cleland, Intelligence Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 3 In a conversation with Mr. Shiloah on August 22, Chargé Ford learned of the latter’s pessimism regarding the efficacy of high level meetings of military rep represensatives of Israel and Jordan. The Chargé also noted Mr. Shiloah’s “vehemence” in his refusal to accept preconditions to peace talks with any Arab state. The Chargé concluded that the attitude of Mr. Shiloah indicated a “continuing and possibly hardening intransigence Israeli attitude vis-à-vis her neighbors.” (Telegram 106, August 23, from Tel Aviv, 684A.85/8–2350) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 784A.00/8–1450: Telegram [Document 532] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 confidential Washington , August 22, 1950—7 p. m. 979. Embtel 928 Aug 14. 2 Dept on Aug 18 informed Brit Emb rep its present view re Jerusalem question along fol lines: (1) We consider proposals which call for internatl regime over whole Jerusalem area, with maximum local autonomy consistent therewith, generally embody just and workable principles. However, primary US concern is agreed solution among interested parties. US will therefore support another approach only if it appears have good chance acceptance by two states controlling Jerusalem and large proportion internatl community. (2) View (1) Dept unable join UK–Fr as sponsor suggested res, which widely departs from what Dept has consistently held as just and reasonable solution; Dept wld join as sponsor only if approach offered good basis agreement of interested parties. While possibly HJK and Israel might accept proposal, not evident internatl community wld feel plan satis. Dept furthermore feels advancement such res at this time undesirable, in absence indications gen support. Middle ground shld be sought on which all parties cld meet, with views other govts ascertained before specific approach is decided upon. (3) US and UK shld therefore continue consult while obtaining views other govts. Another approach such as suggested res might later be considered if there was indication support of considerable proportion internatl community. Meanwhile Dept believes it shld not commit itself to firm support any one plan. While above represents Dept’s general approach Jerusalem problem, final position this question still under consideration. 3 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to US UN, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Jerusalem. 2 Not printed; it reported a conversation with Geoffrey W. Furlonge, Head of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, in which the latter expressed disappointment at an indication from the British Embassy at Washington that the Department was disinclined to associate itself with the United Kingdom and France in taking the lead to find a solution to the Jerusalem problem at this session of the General Assembly. The British official was of the opinion that the three nations should take the lead to obviate the repetition of the unrealistic solution reached at the last session of the Assembly (320/8–1450) 3 Embassy London, on August 24, advised of Mr. Furlonge’s disappointment at the Department’s reaction. The Foreign Office spokesman also noted that the French reaction was much more favorable than the Department’s and that the Dutch had approached the United Kingdom with proposals which bore remarkable resemblance to those of the British. He expressed the hope that at least the United States would not oppose the British proposals should the British proceed with them (telegram 1168, 320/8–2450). The Department, on September 13, advised Embassy London that “Brit Emb Sep 13 informed Dept that FonOff, view lack of enthusiasm in US, France and other nations for original FonOff plan to push in GA a proposal for Jerusalem based on modification of Israeli proposal re City, had decided drop this idea and was now prepared to support res along lines of Swedish-Dutch proposal tabled in GA Dec 5, 1949.” (Telegram 1367, 684A.85/9–1350) Regarding the Swedish-Dutch proposal, see telegram 91, November 28, p. 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 597 ] , and the editorial note, p. 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] . The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/8–2450: Telegram [Document 533] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Jerusalem , August 24, 1950—11 a. m. 50. Palun 383. I had short talk with Kirkbride Amman morning August 21 informed him of PCC visit Tel Aviv and subsequent talk Shiloah (Palun 382 1 ) and requested his views re my discussing with Jordan Government pertinent matters relating special committee. Kirkbride gave interesting background recent developments leading to proposals Prime Minister’s note (Palun 379 2 ). He said King had for some time been pressing government to negotiate some type agreement with Israel and had told government that every time he talked with Palestine Arabs, latter seemed to favor peace negotiations with Israel. Government had replied its impression exactly opposite. Government agreed, however, to investigate and proceeded west Jordan for this purpose. Kirkbride said government’s arrival on scene in west Jordan rather awkward for him because he was himself in west Jordan attempting persuade Palestine Arabs of desirability of negotiating some sort of settlement with Israel. Investigating commission however, promptly set about proving government’s thesis concerning Palestinian opposition to peace. King was so angry at putup job on part of government that according Kirkbride he nearly had attack of apoplexy. Situation so bad Kirkbride finally had to mediate between government and King. Kirkbride informed King government was willing talk peace through PCC. King replied he washed his hands of whole situation, that it was up to government to see what it could do and that he would not even see PCC. Subsequently King agreed invite PCC for lunch but stressed he would not discuss politics. Situation of course was smoothed out by time PCC arrival. Kirkbride said Prime Minister’s suggestions were entirely work of government and looked at in that light he believed they represented substantial advance over previous attitude of government. Kirkbride said it was his belief that if Israel should show any indication of making substantial concessions to Jordan in special committee, Jordan Government would be willing seek final peaceful settlement with Israel through PCC in complete disregard attitude AL. I told Kirkbride of Shiloah’s scepticism re possibilities of progress in special committee and latter’s belief progress could only be facilitated by appointment of representatives of greater authority. Kirkbride said reason Shiloah had not heard from King was that His Majesty was not involved in present negotiations. Kirkbride said Israelis were under impression that King was autocrat. Since annexation of Arab Palestine, King had far less authority than before. His Majesty was now surrounded by Palestinian lawyers who were quick to note any attempt by His Majesty to exceed his prerogatives. In past Jordanians had maintained rather casual policy of allowing King to do as he pleased. Shiloah had been accustomed to dealing with King and Samir Rifai but Jordan Government does not have any one comparable to Shiloah. Kirkbride said reason why Israelis found it so pleasant to negotiate with King and Samir Pasha was because King did not really care on what terms peace was negotiated with Israel so long as settlement reached. After a settlement with Israel, King hoped proceed with his plans to establish Greater Syria and then achieve his life long ambition re taking [ retaking? ] Hejaz. Kirkbride said that these were pipe dreams of course, but explained King’s lack of concern with terms on which peace might be established with Israel. Jordan Government on other hand very much afraid of opinion AL and did not wish go ahead of other Arab states in negotiating with Israel. If Egypt should negotiate peace with Israel today, Jordan Government would be prepared sign tomorrow. Kirkbride thought would be useful for me to talk to Said Pasha but recommended against discussing Palestine situation with Samir unless King should request me to do so. Kirkbride said that Samir is King’s man and very unpopular with present government. Kirkbride believed that if progress were made in special committee, it might be possible to raise level of representatives and to expand agenda. In afternoon I had talk with Prime Minister and Sabit Bey Khalidi as interpreter. I told Prime Minister that Israel had expressed great interest in Jordan suggestion concerning special committee and had inquired of commission whether there were any conditions precedent to establishment of committee. Said Pasha told me that Jordan had no prior conditions to impose on Israelis before commencement of negotiations in committee. It was not true as Azmi Bey had previously informed Riley (Palun 382) that Jordan representatives would be expected to report to government commission of four. All dealings of Jordan representatives would be directly with Cabinet and any discussions which were held in committee would be reviewed by entire Cabinet. Said Pasha said Jordan Government would not prepare terms of reference until after Jordan delegates (Fawzi Mulki Pasha and Hamad Bey Farhan) return from AL meeting. If discussions should go well in special committee, Jordan Government could give consideration to increasing level its representation. Meanwhile Jordan Government awaited with interest appointment of two Israel representatives. In response my question, Said Pasha told me Jordan Government had already informed General Riley formally of its desire to commence discussions through Special Committee. (Riley received communication evening August 22.) Said Pasha said commission of lour had been originally established under Foreign Minister as liaison between Jordan Government and PCC as well as PRA. It was not clear from statements of Said Pasha whether committee of 16 Palestinians was to work with this commission in connection with eventual negotiations for final settlement through PCC or whether only concerned with activities special committee. 3 [Here follows final paragraph transmitting the views of an Israeli spokesman given to Ambassador Palmer.] [ Palmer ] 1 Identified also as telegram 46, August 21, from Jerusalem, p. 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] . 2 Identified also as telegram 40, August 17, from Jerusalem, p. 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] . 3 The Palestine Conciliation Commission met with the highest officials of Syria on August 24. The officials were said to be very friendly. Prime Minister Qudsi expressed the opinions that not many refugees would wish to return to Palestine and that those who did not wish to return should be resettled. He indicated that the Syrian Government would cooperate in a careful study of resettlement and that payment of compensation would facilitate resettlement. Territorial adjustments, he said, would also facilitate a solution of the refugee problem. The Commission met with the highest officials of Lebanon the next day. Foreign Minister Philip Tacla stated that his Government was agreeable to the resettlement of refugees who could not return to their homes. He reaffirmed, however, that no refugees could be resettled in Lebanon because the country was already overpopulated and resettlement there would upset the existing religious equilibrium. These accounts of the Commission’s meetings with Syrian and Lebanese officials were transmitted by Jerusalem in telegram 58, identified also as Palun 387, August 29, 357.AC/8–2950. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444 [Document 534] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State confidential [ Washington ,] August 28, 1950. Memorandum of Conversation With the President Item No. 4 Ambassador to Israel I explained to the President the reasons why we thought it would be most unwise to appoint General Riley as Ambassador to Israel. He said that I need not argue with him. He was totally convinced that we were right. General Riley’s present task was of the most vital importance and should not be prejudiced in any way. He would like to have us canvass the field, both inside and outside the Department and would like to appoint a very level-headed man. This person should not be a partisan. He should be concerned with the interests of the United States. While he should be sympathetic with the nation to which he was accredited, he should not cause antagonism to the Arabs. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Clark) 320/8–2850 [Document 535] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs ( Clark ) [Extract] confidential [ Washington ,] August 28, 1950. Subject: Exchange of views on UN Questions. Participants: [Mr. Faiz el-Khouri, the Syrian Minister] NEA—Mr. McGhee NEA—Dr. H. Howard UNP—Mr. D. Popper NE—Mr. H. B. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Jerusalem Mr. McGhee outlined our position on Jerusalem and remarked that Jordan had refused to cooperate in achieving a sound and workable internationalization of Jerusalem. Faiz Bey declared that in his personal opinion internationalization was wholly impracticable. Mr. McGhee said it would be helpful if the other Arab states could persuade Jordan to adopt a more cooperative attitude on this question. He said we continued to favor some form of internationalization which would be workable and find acceptance by Israel and Jordan as well as the world community. He mentioned the Israeli proposal for functional internationalization of the Holy Places as indicating the development of an attitude of compromise. Faiz Bey ridiculed this statement, saying that while he personally was against internationalization he regarded the Israeli attitude as hypocritical. He said Israel’s proposal to put the Holy Places under UN control was “like that of a thief who has robbed you of all your furniture and compromises by offering to give you back a chair.” Mr. McGhee said that Israel had come forward with a proposal and it would be helpful if Jordan could be persuaded to demonstrate a constructive attitude. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Presumably on August 30, Wells Stabler, the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, conversed on the Jerusalem question with Mohamed El Kouny and Abdel Shafi El Labbane, Counselor and First Secretary of the Egyptian Embassy, respectively, much along the lines of Mr. McGhee’s observations to Faiz Bey. At one point “Mr. El Kouny asked whether the US had given any thought to the possibility of postponing the Jerusalem case until: the 1951 session. Mr. Stabler said that as far as he knew no such possibility had been envisaged. We felt that it would be desirable to attempt to dispose of the Jerusalem question at this session as it has already come up twice before and it would be unfortunate to have it on the General Assembly for a fourth time. Mr. Labbane asked whether it was true that the Palestine Conciliation Commission might be requested to draw up another plan for Jerusalem. Mr. Stabler replied that he believed that the Palestine Conciliation Commission no longer had responsibility for Jerusalem under the 1948 Resolution. The problem was squarely in the hands of the General Assembly. Mr. Labbane asked whether the Department had received any indications [as] to the present attitude of the Catholic Church on the Jerusalem question. Mr. Stabler replied that we had received no recent information and we assumed that the Vatican’s position remains the same.” (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Stabler, August 29 and 30, 320/8–3050) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) 320/8–2950 [Document 536] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs ( Rockwell ) [Extract] confidential [ Washington ,] August 29, 1950. Subject: Preparation for General Assembly—Conversation with Israeli Ambassador Participants: Mr. Aubrey S. Eban, Ambassador-Designate of Israel 1 Mr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel NEA—Mr. McGhee NEA—Mr. Howard NE—Mr. Kopper NE—Mr. Rockwell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11. Jerusalem: Mr. Eban said that he thought the important thing concerning the GA discussion of Israel this year was the parliamentary situation. He foresaw a distinct possibility that no solution would be forthcoming from the GA. It would be an excellent thing if the Assembly could achieve a solution this session. Generally speaking, private and public opinion, Mr. Eban thought, favored the Israeli proposal. Several of the governments which opposed the 1949 GA Resolution thought the Israeli proposition looked good. However, the Latin-American governments frankly said that they would take no position without receiving the views of the Vatican. Israeli soundings showed that the Vatican was determined to maintain its support for full internationalization, even though realizing that this was impossible of fulfillment. Mr. Eban thought that the Vatican could command enough votes to frustrate any other plan in the GA. He believed that the UN must face the fact that with the passage of time the possibilities of UN representation and functions in Jerusalem were growing more remote. If delegations took upon themselves the responsibility of acting so that a deadlock was produced, they must also accept the responsibility of lessening chances of UN representation in Jerusalem. Mr. Eban said that the UK felt that the Israeli proposition went too far. The UK would include under UN supervision only those Holy Places not under the actual control of governments representing one of the major world faiths. Thus, under the UK scheme, Jewish Holy Places in Israeli-controlled territory and Moslem Holy Places in Jordan-controlled territory would not fall under UN supervision. According to Mr. Eban, Jordan had said that it would not object to periodic UN inspection of the Jordanian control of the Holy Places, but that the Israeli proposal for UN control of the Holy Places went too far. Mr. Eban added that Mr. Schumann had told the Israelis that the French Government thought that the Israeli proposal should be expanded to include the Holy Places in Nazareth. If the Israelis would agree to this, Mr. Schumann said that he would undertake to attempt to modify the Vatican’s position. The Israeli Government was prepared to make this concession, said Mr. Eban. Mr. Eban continued by saying that if anything like the Israeli plan was to get through the Assembly this fall, high-level sponsorship was necessary. If the US and the UK took a passive attitude there would be no solution this year. The US and the UK should introduce a resolution embodying the Israeli suggestion and press Jordan to accept this solution. Israel would welcome US suggestions for the improvement of the Israeli proposal. Mr. Eban then referred to the question of improving the water supply in Jerusalem. He wished to assure the Department that the Israeli Government had no intention of making any political hay out of an allocation of Ex-Im Bank funds for the improvement of the Jerusalem water supply, if approval of such an allocation could be obtained. Mr. McGhee pointed out that there were important political elements involved in this problem and that the Ex-Im Bank Was governed by very strict rules in allocating funds under international loans. 12. Palestine Refugees: With regard to this item, Mr. McGhee said that the US supported the basic principle that those refugees who wished to return should be allowed to do so and that those who did not should be resettled and compensated for their losses. Mr. Eban remarked that the UN had already done much in the line of resettlement, referring to the Clapp report 2 and the activities of PEA. He added that the 1948 resolution was unrealistic as regards refugees, and that a mass return was impossible. If the UN reaffirmed the refugee sections of the 1948 resolution, the Arab resistance to refugee resettlement would increase. Mr. Eban thought that the proper method to handle this problem was that it should be discussed by the Arab states and Israel within the context of a general peace settlement. 1 Abba Eban presented his credentials as Israeli Ambassador to President Truman on September 5; see Department of State Bulletin , September 18, 1950, p. 459. Note that Mr. Rockwell used Mr. Eban’s former given name in the list of participants in the conversation of August 29. 2 For documentation on the activities of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, whose Chairman was Gordon Clapp, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 594 ff. The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State 784A.00/8–2950: Telegram [Document 537] The Chargé in Israel ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , August 29, 1950—1 p. m. 114. ReEmbtel 113 August 28. Shiloah at my home evening August 28 discussed following: Special committee Article 8. He quoted from what described as “exceedingly friendly” secret personal letter just received from King Abdullah in which King, referring formation special committee under Article 8 TJ–Israel armistice agreement, (1) informed Shiloah that Jordanian Prime Minister had been instructed proceed with appointment representatives on special committee as well as fixing of date for meeting, (2) expressed belief this was “good opening which might lead eventual peace settlement between two countries,” (3) recommended that Israel send representatives of “sufficient status to assure constructive beginning of negotiations,” and (4) concluded substantially as follows “I hope that move of UN will give my government sufficient courage to face public opinion both in Jordan and elsewhere”. Shiloah’s comment on letter was that King “wanted to add his personal weight in reassuring Israel of authenticity of Jordan’s wish to get on with negotiations,” and he said Israel was replying in same friendly spirit “not by letter but by oral message” since previous experience has shown tendency written messages to King to fall in wrong hands to embarrassment of His Majesty. Shiloah said two Israel representatives special committee would be Abraham Biran Foreign Ministry representative Jerusalem, and Uriel Heyd, former counselor Israel Embassy Washington and more recently Istanbul. Shiloah said Israel representatives being kept on civilian rather than military level at General Riley’s suggestion. High level military meeting. Shiloah in reply my question confirmed this meeting was to be held “any day now” despite strong tendency in Israel military circles to call everything off following explosion of road mine night August 27 near Beit Jibrin killing four Israel NCOs and injuring four others including two officers. Shiloah said this “outrage was viewed with alarm” by his government but that Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had insisted that incident not be permitted interfere with projected meeting. 1 Comment: Shiloah wished to impress me with sincerity his government re overtures of Jordan although his own inherent skepticism which is still very evident made his efforts difficult. I feel he continues convinced that only crack down tactics by Britain and US on Arab leaders will produce any constructive results toward peace in foreseeable future. End comment . Shiloah who returned to Tel Aviv day earlier than planned leaving August 30 on month’s inspection trip Israel diplomatic missions Rome, Paris, London. Sent Department 114 repeated information London 10 Jerusalem 6 Department pass information Amman 9. Ford 1 Consulate General Jerusalem, on September 3, reported information that on “evening of September 1 Abdul Gany Khermy, understood to be Chef de Cabinet for King Abdullah, came from Beit Jala, crossed lines at Mandelbaum Gate, and proceeded King David Hotel visit Moshe Sassoon, son of Eliahu Sassoon, Israel Minister to Turkey. Visit arranged at request Sassoon who had ‘urgent top secret’ message impart Abdul Khermy. Source stated such visits had taken place fairly regularly in past.” Consul General Gibson commented that the visit may have been made in connection with the “oral message” to King Abdullah as set forth in telegram 114 (telegram 68, 784A.00/9–350). The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to Ambassador John B. Blandford, at Beirut 320.2AA/8–350: Telegram [Document 538] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to Ambassador John B. Blandford, at Beirut restricted Cairo , August 30, 1950—3 p. m. 22. For Blandford. Embassy today enquired Foreign Office re progress Egypt’s reply PRA proposals. Following information given: 1) Egypt favors cooperation “in principle”. 2) Egypt insists that nothing be done to prejudice right of refugees to return to homes. Therefore, will cooperate only in short term project. 3) Since matter is primarily a UN one, UN has no right to disown refugees after June, 1951. 4) In view of UN responsibility, Egypt feels that its contribution should only be in the same proportion as its UN contribution, that is, 79 percent (a percentage which it hopes to have reduced). 1 5) Hopes to forward communication to Kennedy along above lines in near future although final decision not yet taken. 2 Sent Beirut 22, repeated information Department 226, repeated Arab capitals unnumbered, Tel Aviv unnumbered, London unnumbered, Paris unnumbered, Asmara unnumbered. Caffery 1 The Department, in reply on September 6, stated that the Egyptian position as set forth in paragraph 4 was unreal in “view necessity place UN refugee finances on voluntary basis due lack interest in many UN members in subscribing quota for refugee aid. Egypt contributions have in past exceeded suggested .79% quota materially, taking concessions and services into account” (telegram 194 to Cairo, 320.2AA/8–3050). The Department, as early as August 18, had informed Ambassador Blandford that it was “disturbed small nr contributions PRA as contrasted UNRPR and effect this may have on GA consideration question continuation PRA.… Dept hopes PRA report to GA can show broader based fin support and suggests PRA endeavor obtain largest possible nr commitments to contribute before GA” (telegram 129, identified also as Unrap 46, to Beirut, 320.2AA/8–1850). The UNRPR had functioned in 1949. 2 Lebanese officials, on August 24, stressed to Major General Kennedy their country’s “inability accommodate refugees for settlement within country and suggested their transfer to other Arab states willing and able receive them for settlement pending political solution Palestine problem and refugee repatriation. Promised cooperate re works projects (two of which have already started) provided they temporary and not tend settle refugees in Lebanon” (telegram 135, identified also as Rapun 54, from Beirut, 320.2AA/8–2950). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) 784A.00/8–3150 [Document 539] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs ( Rockwell ) secret [ Washington ,] August 31, 1950. Subject: Israeli Situation Participants: Theodore Kollek, Chief, American Section, Israel Foreign Office NE—Mr. Rockwell Problem: Mr. Kollek came in for a general discussion of matters affecting Israel. Action Taken: Various aspects of the Israeli and Palestine situations were discussed with Mr. Kollek. Action Required: None Discussion: Mr. Kollek called at his request. During the general discussion of the Israeli and Palestine situations the following points emerged: [Here follow the views of Mr. Kollek on the volume of immigration into Israel and the methods of financing the immigration.] 2. Israeli-Arab Relations I asked Mr. Kollek what he thought was the motive of the Arabs in placing the refugee question on the agenda of the GA. He replied that he believed the purpose was to embarrass Israel and to attempt to force the members of the GA to reaffirm the sections of the 1948 Palestine Resolution concerning refugees. The Israeli Government had seen no signs that the Arabs were any more disposed to reach a modus vivendi with Israel. Mr. Kollek said that a peace treaty was not the important thing. What would be desirable would be the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states. This would be profitable to both sides. However, Israel was not desperate for peace and could well wait until the Arab attitude changed. There was no possibility that Israel would make extensive prior concessions in order to lure the Arabs into a settlement. If Israel should give this sign of weakness the Arabs would only raise their price and meanwhile Israel would have abandoned its position. 3. International Position of Israel We discussed Israel’s international position, with particular reference to the efforts of the free world to curb Soviet aggression. Mr. Kollek said that Israel’s position was very difficult. The vast majority of people in his country still ardently hoped to establish for Israel a position similar to that of Switzerland. They did not wish to see this possbility destroyed by alignment with any group of nations. Most Israelis were too preoccupied with internal and regional problems to think ahead into the future of the world outside. Mr. Kollek said that Israel had “not yet had its Korea”, while the United States had. I replied that we considered that Korea and its implications applied to every member of the free world, but Mr. Kollek stated that outside the Foreign Office in Israel this realization had not as yet come, principally because Korea was so far away. Prime Minister Ben Gurion was one of the very few people who were thinking ahead. His approach to Ambassador McDonald concerning possible future arrangements between Israel and the United States 1 was an indication of this. Mr. Kollek gave me to understand that the Prime Minister’s ideas were definitely not those of the Israeli Government and I inferred that he was of the belief that such a program would not be supported in Israel at the present time. There was, however, progress in his country toward realization that the only salvation lay with the Western democracies. But should there be a general war and should Western troops come to the Near East, there would be serious problems as far as Israel was concerned. Anti-British feelings were still too high and it was likely that there would even be incidents should American troops come to Israel. Mr. Kollek compared the present Israeli attitude toward foreign troops to that of the Irish as regards the possibility of the entry of British troops into Ireland during the last war. 4. Soviet Activities in Israel I asked Mr. Kollek if he felt that the Israel security forces were fully informed of the number of agents who might be coming in among immigrants from the Iron Curtain countries. He said that he believed Israeli intelligence discovered these people as soon as they made any moves in the intelligence line, but that he imagined the best agents were probably under instructions to do nothing for two or three years and to assimilate themselves completely in Israel. Israeli intelligence had received indications that the Czech Minister in Tel Aviv was a high ranking official of the Cominform. Mr. Kollek said that the local Russians were not particularly active in the intelligence field, as far as Israeli intelligence was aware. I remarked that it seemed difficult for the Israeli authorities to control the local Communists, referring particularly to the recent Communist destruction of the screens of motion picture theatres showing films concerning the UN effort in Korea. Mr. Kollek conceded that the problem of controlling such Communist outrages was very difficult. I asked whether the Government was making an effort to keep Communists and doubtful MAP AM members out of confidential official positions in the Government and the Army. He said that this was definitely the case and that there were no such persons in key posts in the Israeli Government. This he regarded as another indication of the slowly growing realization in Israel of the menace represented by the Communists. 1 See telegram 61, July 31, from Tel Aviv, p. 960 [ Pg. 960 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] . The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/8–3150: Telegram [Document 540] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Jerusalem , August 31, 1950—10 a. m. 62. Palun 389. I had short talk with Prime Minister Ben Gurion morning August 30. Biran, Jerusalem District Commissioner, and my adviser were also present. Ben Gurion asked me re prospects peace settlement. I replied did not appear likely at present but PCC encouraged by Arab attitude toward refugee problem and apparent willingness Arab Governments consider re-settlement Arab refugees. I said another encouraging sign was Arab Governments now thinking partly of compensation. Ben Gurion inquired whether any plan for re-settlement. I told him I did not think so. He said Israel would contribute to a plan of re-settlement when one had been formulated. He thought Iraq by far best area for such re-settlement. It was richest country in NE, had most available vacant land capable of development and was strategically in most exposed position. Settlement refugees there would benefit Iraq on all counts. Both Biran and Ben Gurion appeared underestimate number refugees in Arab countries. In response to my question as to amount of land required for re-settlement he said that if refugees were Israelis, he could settle millions in very small area. He said that he personally preferred desert area Negev to any rich farm land of Iraq. The desert offered Israel a challenge and Israel would make of it another California Imperial Valley. Beersheba was capital of area, had a rapidly growing frontier. Going up to map of Israel on wall, he pointed out that Beersheba was almost in geographical center of Israel, taking pains to point out northern Galilee and Elath as the two extremes. Ben Gurion said Arabs were under serious misapprehension if they thought Israel would pay compensation outside context general peace settlement. Arabs would gain nothing by postponing peace and even prospects of payment of compensation or other concession would diminish if present cold war between Israel and Arabs continued. He said Arabs thought their advantage postpone settlement but he was of view that Israel did not lose anything and could continue status quo for 8 years or as long as necessary. Present lack of peace had had an advantage in that Israel had been able build up economy increasingly independent of neighboring states. Nonetheless, Israel urgently desired peace settlement. Ben Gurion said that if he had choice of having without hostilities and fighting, Jewish state with boundaries recommended in GA resolution of November 29, 1947 and including large Arab minority and internationalized Jerusalem, or choice of present boundaries of Israel with small Arab minority but with hostilities and fighting, he would even today choose former. He said Arab Governments NE were weak, split by factionalism, and without popular support. He admitted, however, that growth of democracy in Jordan Governmment had made impossible for King negotiate peace with Israel. Ben Gurion said he was still very optimistic about eventuality of peace in NE, and was also certain that a durable and lasting peace would come to whole world if not in his lifetime, certainly in lifetime of his children. 1 [ Palmer ] 1 The Palestine Conciliation Commission had a two-hour meeting with Foreign Minister Sharett during the afternoon of August 30. The meeting dealt chiefly with the refugee question. Mr. Sharett stated that more than two years had elapsed since Israel had indicated its willingness to pay compensation to Arab refugees within the framework of a general peace settlement. He then requested the Commission to notify the Arab Governments that their refusal to negotiate peace with Israel might lead to withdrawal of the offer of compensation. Mr. de Boisanger made known the unofficial views of the Arab States that most refugees would choose resettlement with compensation rather than repatriation, based on free choice. In reply, Mr. Sharett “stressed there should be no question of asking refugees which they would prefer. Israel was interested in achieving real conditions of peace and stability in NE. Resettlement but not repatriation could make these conditions possible.’(Telegram 64, identified also as Palun 390, September 2, from Jerusalem, 357.AC/9–250) The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State 784A.02/8–3150: Telegram [Document 541] The Chargé in Israel ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , August 31, 1950—1 p. m. 123. Commissioner Education McGrath arrived Israel August 29 and was met by Embassy officer. McGrath informed Embassy that during his discussions with Department, including Israel desk officers, no mention was made of what should be his attitude toward paying official visit Israel Government in Jerusalem. In view of Embassy’s instruction from Department (Deptel 4, January 4, 1950), Embassy informed McGrath that in Embassy’s opinion he might consider visiting Jerusalem on informal basis only, and only after he had made formal call upon Israel Government here in Tel Aviv. When Embassy requested Foreign Office make appointment for Embassy to present McGrath to Ministry of Education in Tel Aviv not in Jerusalem, Foreign Office spokesman retorted McGrath guest Israel Government and did not understand why he could not pay official call Ministry of Education in Jerusalem. Embassy politely reminded Foreign Office that McGrath an official US Government and as such he preferred make official call on Israel Government in Tel Aviv, not Jerusalem. Foreign Office spokesman then argued that “even Ambassador Palmer was making official call on Sharett in Jerusalem August 30.” Today’s press confirms this. An appointment was made for McGrath pay formal call August 30 in Tel Aviv on Director General of Education Ministry who happened to be visiting Tel Aviv. Department can readily see that time has come for concise clarification of instructions to Embassy as to Jerusalem deportment of official Americans. Embassy has informed Department several times of increasing difficulty efficiently carrying out routine business with Israel Government agencies already moved to Jerusalem. Adding to this difficulty is fact that either different or incomplete instructions given US and UN officials such as McGrath and Palmer are making Embassy’s position of strict non-intercourse increasingly ludicrous in eyes of Israel Government. Furthermore, fact that certain American officials appear have permission treat Jerusalem as seat of Israel Government while State Department does not, lends additional credence to feeling in Israel that State Department as part US Government most unrealistic re facts of Jerusalem. Embassy respectfully requests Department to restate its instructions to Embassy as to pattern Department desires Embassy to follow with respect to Israel Government in Jerusalem. Ford The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 784A.02/8–3150: Telegram [Document 542] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel confidential Washington , September 1, 1950—6 p. m. 94. Ur 123 Aug 31. Dept regrets inadvertence not discussing question Jerusalem with McGrath and commends Emb for manner in which McGrath’s official visit handled with Israeli Govt. With regard Palmer’s visits in Jerusalem, point made by FonOff spokesman is not valid since Palmer member of UN Comm whose seat is Jerusalem by virtue GA Res establishing PCC. View difficulties being encountered by Emb Dept willing consider modification position but reluctant make any major changes prior consideration Jerusalem question by Fifth GA. What modification wld Emb recommend? What is current practice other missions Tel Aviv re dealings with Israeli Govt officials in Jerusalem? Acheson The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 320.2AA/9–650: Telegram [Document 543] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt confidential Washington , September 6, 1950—6 p. m. 191. According AP press reports Mustafa Nosrat Bey, Egypt Defense Min, said Sept 4 Israel Forces drove 2000 Arabs from Israel terr into Egypt terr and Egypt wld ask UN prevent such actions. Shld UN fail do so Defense Min quoted as saying Egypt wld consider itself free of Armistice obligations. In view previous statements by Egypt Govt that it regards Armistice Agreements as of indefinite duration Dept requests ur comment on above. 1 Acheson 1 The Embassy in Cairo, on September 12, reported information from Foreign Office sources that the remarks of the Defense Minister had been exaggerated in the press and that the Egyptian Government regarded the Armistice Agreements as of indefinite duration. (Telegram 272, 320.2AA/9–1250) The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission (Palmer) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/9–950: Telegram [Document 544] The United States Representative on the Palestine Conciliation Commission ( Palmer ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Geneva , September 9, 1950—noon. 228. Palun 394. Re Depcirtel August 31. 1 USDel PCC submits following comments: No Arab Government now appears ready envisage peace with Israel or likely commit itself at GA request to discuss directly with Israel question of resettlement of refugees. Even as between Jordan and Israel it cannot be expected that special committee talks on present specific agenda or additional agenda within framework of Rhodes Agreement will open way to direct overall discussions leading to full peace settlement as long as deterioration of refugee situation continues without prospect of some promising solution and as long as distrust of Abdullah on part of large number of refugees remains unchanged and attitude of Palestinians in Jordan Cabinet and Parliament is one of general insistence on territorial rectification, which Israel will not consider, and particular concern for their own individual property losses which Israel is not prepared to pay. Although all Arab governments continue to regard refugee questions as natural and effective basis for their condemnation of Israel they appear to be genuinely concerned over plight of refugees both in its humanitarian aspects and in its possible influence on local and international political developments and seem to realize hopelessness of insistence on repatriation and to recognize consequent urgent need for assurance of compensation and for support of resettlement. But they are ahead of present Arab public opinion and have no assurance of any acceptable alternative to repatriation. We believe Arab Governments in deciding to request that the question of Palestine refugees and payment of compensation due these and the implementation of GA resolution regarding this question be placed on GA agenda anticipate that its discussion will afford them opportunity to air fully Arab views and grievances re all aspects of Palestine question that are of immediate concern to Arab States, including territorial claims in their natural relationship to refugee problem, and to appeal to international community with initial insistence on right of refugees to return to their homes but with recognition of possible widespread refugee acceptance of compensation for property losses if assured in fair amount and with emphasis on need for urgent action to provide for refugees not repatriated nor sufficiently compensated the opportunities and the means for rehabilitation. Sincere settlement as an alternative to repatriation is regarded by Arabs as an easy way out for Israel and as unfair to refugees and since Arab States ready to accept refugees for resettlement have clearly indicated their determination to decide for themselves their capacity for any such resettlement and the conditions of acceptance with due regard for political and economic considerations, it is difficult to conceive of their agreeing to discuss this question with Israel. Nor does it seem likely that even in response to UN suggestions through GA they would be prepared to discuss with Israel question of repatriation or compensation without some prior encouragement as to attitude of Israel. [ Palmer ] 1 Sent to Arab capitals, Jerusalem (for the USPCC), and Tel Aviv, not printed; it requested an analysis of the motives behind the Arab decision to place an item on refugees on the agenda of the General Assembly. The message also suggested the possibility that protracted and heated discussion of the item might result in the Assembly calling on the Arabs and Israelis to discuss directly with each other questions of refugee repatriation, compensation, and resettlement, and possibly other aspects of the Palestine problem. (320/8–3150) The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/9–950: Telegram [Document 545] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Amman , September 9, 1950—1 p. m. 57. Was called FonOff morning September 9 where ForMin Shuraiqi Pasha handed me confidential urgent note invoking three power declaration May 25 against incursion Israeli forces into Jordan territory on east bank Jordan Eiver near confluence of Yarmouk River. (See Legtel 52, August 31, 11 a. m.) 1 ForMin stated Israeli forces which at one moment had been withdrawn following original incursion had returned and established military post within Jordan territory. He has verified this by personal visit area with other Cabinet ministers. He pointed out that land in question was not in any way involved armistice agreement and had always been included in area; of British mandate Transjordan. He attributed action to Israeli plan obtain possession old Ruetenburg hydroelectric concession. (It is recalled Israeli President during last winter’s talks endeavored bring; in discussion Ruetenburg concession 2 but Jordan representative refused consider matter on grounds Palestine and not Jordan territory was under discussion.) ForMin claims Jews have given-General Riley forged map area showing armistice line to east of Jordan River thus favoring their claim to occupy area in such manner as to deprive Jordan of control Yarmouk reservoir. However, map accompanying Rhodes armistice agreement (UN document S/1302/Rev 1 annex 1 map 1 part 1 3 ) shows armistice line passing to east of Jordan through center Yarmouk reservoir. Minister takes position border violation clearly within scope three power declaration and hinted Anglo Jordanian treaty would be invoked if necessary compel Israelis withdraw. Also stated that while his government looks to us to effect peaceful solution it is fully prepared use force if necessary and that garrison in area has been reinforced in anticipation that contingency. I requested and he has promised supply me with more specific details such as number Israeli forces involved, size of area occupied etc. I told ForMin that my government would deplore use force particularly at this critical juncture in world affairs and suggested possibility Israeli military might be acting as it has been known to do in, past without knowledge or approval of civilian element of governments I promised transmit his communication promptly Washington and let, him know nature reply as soon as possible, but advanced personal opinion that three power declaration did not contemplate minor border incidents such as present appeared to be but rather envisaged major belligerent violations in force. He was not impressed. I learn independently that Jordan Cabinet has adopted unanimous decision expel Jewish troops by force at once. While government known to be extremely agitated this action interpreted as political manoeuver for record knowing that British will prevent use Arab Legion for that purpose. Kirkbride has received official note invoking Anglo-Jordan treaty but as of moment writing only French Minister has received note similar one handed me. British Minister believes he has convinced government folly taking belligerent action especially while resorting diplomatic measures. I have told Kirkbride call on me at any time he feels my influence could be usefully exerted backstop him. Text Jordan note follows in Legtel 58, September 9, 2 p. m. 4 Sent Department for action 57, Department pass priority London 23, Paris 3, Tel Aviv 20, Jerusalem 25. Drew 1 Not printed; it cited unconfirmed rumors that 400 Israeli soldiers had crossed the Jordan River into Jordanian territory near the junction of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers into land that may have been owned by the Israeli-controlled Palestine Electric Corporation. (684A.85/8–3150) 2 Pinhas Rutenberg was the founder of the Palestine Electric Corporation,, which began operations in 1923. The company obtained the concession to develop the hydroelectric resources of Palestine. Its main plant was located at the juncture of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, below the Sea of Galilee. 3 For the text of this document giving the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan signed at Rhodes on April 3, 1949, and of the attached map entitled “Palestine [:] North Sheet”, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 1 . 4 Not printed; it concluded with the sincere wishes of the Jordanian Government that the United States, in the interests of peace and stability in the Middle East, use all means at its disposal to allay the increasing anxiety throughout the Arab and Moslem world caused by “militant Zionist expansionist ambitions.” (684A.85/9–950). Legation Amman transmitted the full text of the Jordanian note to the Department of State in despatch 60, September 11 (684A.85/9–1150). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 684A.85/9–1050: Telegram [Document 546] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 secret niact Washington , September 10, 1950—7 p. m. 106. Please bring substance of Amman tel 58 Sep 9 2 rptd you as 21, urgently to attention FonOff, and state USG wld appreciate receiving info from Israeli Govt on matter. Add that “USG, as friend both Israel find Jordan and deeply concerned over any reports of circumstances which might lead to outbreak of hostilities, disturbed by events described in Jordan FonMin’s note. State that US rep Amman being instructed urge Jordan Govt take no precipitate action, view desirability full examination and report on situation by UN reps in Palestine. 3 Say that USG, lacking detailed info on alleged incursion, unable reach final conclusion on rights and wrongs of matter pending receipt of report of UN reps. Add that, however, view apparent explosive nature of situation and urgent necessity prevent any outbreak of hostilities, particularly when Israeli-Jordan talks about to take place in Special Comite, it is opinion USG that, if Israeli forces have made move described in Jordan note, course of wisdom requires their withdrawal pending full examination of circumstances. 4 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to London, Amman, Jerusalem, and Paris. 2 Not printed; but see footnote 4, supra . 3 See telegram 42, infra . 4 Embassies London, on September 13, and Paris, on September 14, advised that the British and French Foreign Offices were taking parallel action. (Telegrams 1559 and 1360, respectively, 684A.85/9–1350, /9–1450) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Jordan 684A.85/9–950: Telegram [Document 547] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Jordan 1 secret niact Washington , September 10, 1950—7 p. m. 42. Immed fol tel 2 rpts instrs sent Emb Tel Aviv re ur 57 and 58 Sep 9. 3 Inform FonMin immed that USG, as friend both Jordan and Israel and deeply concerned over any reports of circumstances which might lead to outbreak of hostilities, is bringing subject Sep 9 note urgently to attention Israeli Govt and expressing concern over reported move Israeli forces. State USG also informing Israeli Govt it reserving its position on matter pending full examination of circumstances by UN reps in Palestine. Add that USG hopes Jordan Govt will not take precipitate action, view desirability report on situation by UN reps. Assure FonMin that USG shares concern of Jordan Govt and will fol situation very closely with view determining whether reported incident can best be resolved by UN machinery in Palestine or whether tripartite declaration may provide the formula. State that it obviously important full details be obtained quickly. Dept desires Gen Riley be informed of substance above and of tel to Emb Tel Aviv. Tell Riley Dept hopes receive benefit his views and recommendations re alleged incursion soonest, and also hopes he will be able arrange for immed on spot examination circumstances. If queried by respective FonOffs, Embs London and Paris authorized convey substance of action being taken by US reps Amman and Tel Aviv re reported incident. If possibility action under tripartite declaration raised by UK and Fr FonOffs, Embs shld stress that first step shld be obtain full report from UN reps Palestine. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Paris, and Jerusalem. 2 Telegram 43, September 10, not printed. 3 Latter not printed; but see footnote 4, p. 995 [ Pg. 995 includes portions of Doc. 545 and Doc. 546 ] . The Consul General at Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/9–1150: Telegram [Document 548] The Consul General at Jerusalem ( Gibson ) to the Secretary of State secret Jerusalem , September 11, 1950—6 p. m. 77. Reference Deptel 45 September 10. 1 General Riley informed me that on August 28, Colonel De Ridder, chairman of Jordan Israeli MAC was requested to proceed immediately Amman for conference with General Lash. 2 The Colonel made trip in airplane furnished by Jordan Government, but since General Lash was not available Major Hudson, General Lash’s intelligence officer, requested Colonel to accompany him to the Maharayim settlement, to investigate report that 300 to 400 Israel soldiers had invaded Jordan territory at mouth of Yarmuk river. Colonel De Ridder found that Maharayim settlement was occupied by AL soldiers, and the cadet commanding post pointed out on the ground where the supposed 300 to 400 soldiers were alleged to be digging in. This young officer had no idea where demarcation line was and after careful observation, Colonel De Ridder observed three military police sitting on a small mound at MR 2037–2271 located on Israeli side of demarcation line, according to Rhodes official map. Following conversation with cadet officer commanding post, it was determined that one or two truck loads of soldiers might have accompanied some settlement workers, who were transporting ploughs and other farm implements. Colonel De Ridder observed that there were new cultivations in the fields around mound. On Colonel’s return to Amman, same day, he informed Major Hudson that ground alleged to have been invaded by Israelis was, without doubt, inside Israel controlled territory as far as armistice demarcation line was concerned. Colonel De Ridder informed General Riley at noon today, September 11, that no increase of Israeli police had been reported to MAC over the number stationed on August 28. General Riley further stated that prior to signing of an armistice agreement, there was a small area just north of confluence of Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, inside Transjordan boundary that was no-man’s land. Israeli troops were to the west of Jordan, and Iraqi troops to the east of Yarmuk. Official map which is marked map No. 1, 3 and contained in the annexes to Israeli-Jordan general armistice agreement, volume 2, issued at Rhodes, shows demarcation line as following the Yarmuk, eliminated the no-man’s land in existence during truce. This map has signatures of Colonels A. Sudki [ Sidki ] El-Jundi and Moshe Dayan. Paragraph 1, of article 5 of Jordan-Israel general armistice agreement states: “Armistice demarcation lines for all sectors other than sector now held by Iraqi forces, shall be as delineated on maps in annex 1 to this agreement, and shall be defined as follows … 4 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 6 read as follows: “1. It is agreed that the forces of the HJK shall replace the forces of Iraq in the sector now held by the latter forces, the intention of the Government of Iraq in this regard having been communicated to the acting mediator in the message of 20 March from the FonMin of Iraq authorizing the delegation of the HJK to negotiate for the Iraqi forces and stating that those forces would be withdrawn. “2. The armistice demarcation line for the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on map 1 in annex 1 to this agreement and marked ( a ).” Therefore a small portion of Transjordan territory remained to west of armistice demarcation line as drawn. Whether or not Colonel Jundi was aware of this fact at time he signed the map was not known by the General. Statement that Israelis have produced a forged map is incorrect, inasmuch as official map, signed by both parties, has not been out of the possession of General Riley since he received it at Rhodes. There may be according to General Riley a legal question involved as to old Transjordan boundary separating Transjordan from Palestine, but there has been no violation by Israel of general armistice agreement that was signed at Rhodes. General stated that inasmuch as Colonel De Ridder has been informed unofficially that Jordan Government does not intend to submit a complaint on this matter to MAC, but that it was planned to submit case to International Court of Justice, under backing of Great Britain because Jordan Government maintains that sovereign territory has been invaded. To date chairman of MAC has not received an official complaint from Jordan Government, and until this is done general has no authority to send out another investigating team. 5 Sent Department 77 repeated information Amman 2 Tel Aviv 4 Department pass Amman. Gibson 1 This was a repeat of telegram 42 to Amman, supra . 2 Brigadier Lash, Commander of Arab Legion Forces in Palestine. 3 See footnote 3, p. 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 545 ] . 4 Ellipsis in the source text. 5 Because of the absence in Jerusalem of responsible Foreign Office officials, it was not until September 10 that Chargé Ford was able to learn the Israeli point of view that the “action of Israel in occupying territory in Yarmuk-Jordan Kiver confluence area was no contravention pertinent armistice agreement which ‘clearly showed Israel frontier line as making bulge this point’ to include area in question which was property Israel firm Palestine Electric Corporation.” (Telegram 145, September 11, from Tel Aviv, 784A.00/9–1150) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 674.84A/9–1150: Telegram [Document 549] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1 secret Washington , September 11, 1950—8 p. m. 210. It has been suggested to Dept that Korean situation has demonstrated to both Arabs and Israelis necessity for settlement of their differences and thus produced atmosphere conducive achievement some sort settlement or modus vivendi . While experience PCC in recent visit wld seem indicate to contrary Dept believes possibility shld be investigated. Confidential comment therefore requested on fol: 1. Is there greater chance general settlement or settlement most important issues between Arabs and Israelis as result Korean crisis? 2. If so, do you believe Egypt and Israel wld be willing reach limited settlement on basis some such quid pro quo as territorial and refugee compensation concessions by Israel in return reduction or elimination trade restrictions by Egypt? Rpt reply to Emb London for McGhee. 2 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv for action. 2 Ambassador Caffery replied on September 14, giving his opinion that the Korean crisis had not made the Egyptians any more amenable regarding Palestine. He added that recent Israeli actions expelling several thousand Arabs into the Gaza strip had created such ill feeling in Egypt that even a limited settlement was doubtful. (Telegram 283 from Cairo, 884A.411/9–1450) Chargé Ford replied the following day, expressing his beliefs that there was no chance of appreciable settlement of any Arab-Israeli issues as an immediate result of the Korean crisis and that Israel would favor talks with Egypt concerning a limited settlement. He noted also that the suggestion of territorial concessions by Israel to alleviate trade restrictions by Egypt was completely unreal in the light of the obduracy of the Israeli leaders; and that even the question of compensation was being played down, probably for tactical and bargaining reasons. (Telegram 151 from Tel Aviv, 674.84A/9–1550) The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/9–1250: Telegram [Document 550] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Amman , September 12, 1950—1 p. m. 59. Deptel 42, September 10.1 communicated substance second paragraph reference telegram Foreign Minister September 11. His only comment was that he expected that the USG as friend of his country would not only see that Jordan obtained justice but also received our active support. While Cabinet decision to expel Israeli forces from newly occupied territory has not been rescinded there now appears to be no likelihood that government will endeavor to resort to belligerent action. The notoriously inefficient Foreign Office is in state of genuine confusion re both the armistice line and the old international boundary in region in question and now appears to be somewhat less confident of strength of position. I have lent Foreign Minister UN map referred to in Legtel 57 of September 9 with which he did not appear to be familiar although I have declined to be drawn into discussion of authenticity of various maps which he has produced. Aside from question of legal rights of Israel in matter, there is no doubt that its action is regarded here as violation of spirit of Article II of Rhodes Agreement and as inconsistent with its desire to reach settlement with Jordan. I fear that it has seriously prejudiced any chance of making progress in that direction through the Special Committee and is considered as one more instance of Israeli military systematically undermining all efforts in the direction of peace and security. 1 Department pass addressees; sent priority Department 59, repeated info priority Jerusalem 27, London 25, Tel Aviv 22, Paris 5. Drew 1 The Jordanian Foreign Office sent to the U.S. Legation note No. 24/11/1/6218, dated September 21, which transmitted Arabic and English texts of a memorandum outlining the Jordanian position regarding the alleged Israeli aggression of August 28. The note requested that the memorandum be sent to the Department of State by the quickest possible means and expressed Jordanian hopes of mediation by the United States to eliminate the “aggression which is contrary to Jordan rights”. The legation in Amman, on September 26, transmitted an English translation of the note and a copy of the English version of the memorandum to the Department in despatch 74 (684A.85/9–2650). The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 320.2AA/9–1250: Telegram [Document 551] The Ambassador in Egypt ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State restricted Cairo , September 12, 1950—8 p. m. 270. Reference to Deptel 194 September 6, 1 I spoke to Acting Minister Foreign Affairs this morning about Egypt’s contribution for Arab refugees. He told me that the Government had authorized him to sign an agreement on the basis of the UN quota. I gave reasons for my opinion that this was not enough. He said he would take it up again with the Council of Ministers. I told him that in my opinion it is urgent for the Government to do something about settling some of the Gaza refugees in Sinai peninsula. He promised to look into that too. Sent Department 270, repeated unnumbered Arab capitals. Caffery 1 Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 684A.85/9–950: Telegram [Document 552] The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 1 secret priority Washington , September 12, 1950—8 p. m. 44. Jordan Min called Sep 12 under urgent instrs his Govt furnish Dept copy of tel from Jordan FonMin to Security Council notifying latter of “Jewish aggression” in Jordan terr in Rutenberg area and requesting urgent steps be taken instr Israel withdraw to “line in Pal terr originally occupied by their forces”. Tel states Jordan terr was not and cld not have been subj of discussion during Rhodes armistice talks, and claims armistice agreement based solely on positions occupied by forces of opposing parties in Pal terr. Dept gave Jordan Min substance Amman tels 57 and 58 Sep 9, Dept tels 106 to Tel Aviv and 42 to Amman Sep 10, and Jerusalem tel 77 Sep 11. Dept emphasized to Jordan Min its concern over matter and stated US wld keep close watch on situation. However, view fact that present trouble seemed to be traceable to Jordanian agreement during Rhodes discussions to armistice line which did not follow internatl frontier between Pal and Trans Jordan mandates and which in fact included small amt Trans Jordan terr in area under Israel control, Dept expressed opinion that best way to handle wld be for Jordan Govt to make use of provisions of Israel-Jordan armistice agreement applying to machinery for revision of armistice line, and to make immed request for such revision. Dept observed that Israel move seemed to be on very small scale and to be limited to police officials, not troops. Jordan Min said that Col. Jundi in signing armistice line map apparently had not realized that line had been “wrongly” delineated and did not follow internatl frontier between the two mandates; however, basic principle remained that armistice talk concerned positions of forces in Pal terr and there cld not have been, nor cld there now be, any question of Jordan agreeing to presence of Israel forces on terr which had always been part of orig Trans Jordan mandate. Min agreed that best means of procedure wld be for Jordan to request revision of armistice line and said he wld urge this course upon his Govt. However, it was obvious that Jordan Govt was very exercised over matter and in no mood to take conciliatory attitude. Min thought that in interests furthering peace in NE and particularly in interests improving relations between Jordan and Israel, with special ref to forthcoming talks in Special Comite, Israel shld withdraw such personnel as might be in disputed terr pending thorough exam of question. Dept agreed this wld be wise move. Dept stated info it had recd did not confirm Jordan charges of Israel forgery of Map showing demarcation line. Dept also urged Jordan Min that matter be handled in calmest atmosphere possible,, and preferably by formal or informal means in Pal. Jerusalem pls bring foregoing to attn Gen Riley. Webb 1 This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and Paris. Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: NSC 47 Series [Document 553] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay ) top secret Washington , September 13, 1950. Subject: Second Progress Report on NSC 47/2 1 —“United States Policy toward Israel and the Arab States”. NSC 47/2 was approved as Governmental policy on October 20, 1949. It is requested that this Progress Report, as of August 28, 1950, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information. There follows an account of important developments affecting the policy set forth in NSC 47/2. 1. An action which affects many aspects of American policy as set forth in NSC 47/2 was the issuance on May 25, 1950, by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France of a joint declaration concerning the security and armaments situation in the Near East. 2 In this declaration the three sponsoring Governments reaffirm their opposition to the development of an armaments race between the Arab states and Israel and to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments state also that, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, they will take immediate action to prevent any violation of frontiers or armistice lines should they find that any state in the area were preparing to take such action. The sponsoring Governments, moreover, state that they recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of internal security and legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. With reference to arms which any of the three Governments has permitted to be supplied to the Near East, the declaration says that assurances have been received from the recipient state, by the Governments permitting the export of the arms, that that state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances, it is declared, will be obtained from any other state in the area to which the sponsoring Governments permit arms to be supplied in the future. Official reaction to the declaration in Israel and the Arab states has been generally favorable, although the press of the Arab countries at first adopted a hostile attitude. It is believed that the declaration will help to give both the Arab states and Israel a sense of confidence in future security, and will thus hasten the progress being made toward peace in the Near East. It is evident that the declaration has already been effective in lessening tension in the area. In the United States, reception of the declaration in Congressional and press circles, and by groups interested in the Near East, has been very favorable. 2. An unfavorable development regarding the maintenance of the good will and Western orientation of the peoples of the Near East has been the recent intense anti-American campaign in certain of the Arab states. Since the Palestine hostilities, and the establishment of the State of Israel, sentiment in the Arab countries has been generally unfavorable to the United States, because of the alleged U.S. partiality for Israel. During the past few months Arab newspapers and leading politicians have expressed a greatly increased dislike of American policy and have gone so far as to threaten a reorientation of their countries towards the Soviet Union if the United States did not convince them of its friendship and impartiality. This attitude has been stimulated in part by recent speeches in favor of Israel made by high officials of the U.S. Government. The United States has taken a number of steps to convince the Arabs of U.S. friendship, and has others under consideration at the present time. Primarily, the action has taken two directions: to demonstrate that this Government is impartial as between Israel and the Arab states, and to convince the Arabs that the United States has a policy toward them which is distinct from and unrelated to the Palestine question. The friendship of all the peoples of this strategic part of the world is very important to the United States. 3. The close United States–United Kingdom collaboration recommended in NSC 47/2 has continued. Extensive conversations were held on Near Eastern problems during the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers at London in May 1950. 3 It was as a result of these conversations that the joint US–UK–French declaration concerning the Near East (described in paragraph 1 of this report) was issued. In the matter of arms shipments to the Near East, also, exchange of information has continued between the United Kingdom and the United States, and between France and the United States. 4. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees has made considerable progress, carrying forward the policy set forth in NSC 47/2. The Agency has organized its staff and has established its headquarters at Beirut, Lebanon. It has recently passed from the organizational stage into that of actual operation, and has begun detailed planning of two projects in Jordan. The reception of the Agency in the Near East has been generally favorable. Jordan, in particular, has shown a constructive attitude toward the refugee situation. It has expressed a willingness to cooperate in the work of the Agency, and has apparently accepted the principle recommended in NSC 47/2, that the large numbers of refugees who cannot be repatriated should be resettled in the other Arab states. The United States contribution of $27, 450,000 for the support of the Agency was authorized by Congress and signed by the President on June 3, 1950. It is expected, however, that the actual appropriation will be somewhat less, due to Congressional economy measures. An advance of $8,000,000 has been appropriated and has been used to sustain the Agency during its early months. 5. With regard to the achievement of a final settlement between Israel and the Arab states there have been a number of unfavorable developments: a . The Arab League Council, on April 1, 1950, adopted a resolution forbidding any member state to undertake separate peace negotiations with Israel. By a subsequent resolution of April 13, any member state found guilty of doing so would be expelled from the League and subjected to economic and diplomatic sanctions. b . The Jordan cabinet has so far been unwilling to support King Abdullah’s continuing efforts to negotiate a settlement with Israel, and such talks as have been held between the King and Israeli officials have been fruitless up to the present time. The King desires a peace, but believes he must obtain enough in the way of concessions from Israel to justify a settlement to the people of Jordan, who now oppose it, and to the other Arab states. c . Meanwhile, increasing numbers of incidents along the Jordan–Israel armistice line, caused for the most part by Israeli action against Arabs infiltrating across the lines, have brought about a deterioration in the relations between the two countries and have resulted in a virtual stalemate in the Jordan–Israel Military Armistice Commission. d . The Palestine Conciliation Commission, which has been endeavoring to bring representatives of Israel and the Arab states together with a view to reaching a final settlement of the Palestine dispute, has so far in its discussions with representatives of these states been unable to bring about such a settlement. It invited the parties to cooperate in mixed committees in which it would take the role of mediator, but the Arab Governments gave as a condition to their cooperation prior acceptance by Israel of the provisions regarding refugees of the General Assembly’s resolution of December 11, 1948. Israel, on the other hand, regards such questions as subjects for negotiation, and as a result the PCC has not been successful in initiating discussions between the parties. The Palestine Conciliation Commission has transferred its activities to Jerusalem, and believes that it may be able to secure the cooperation of the Arab Governments, at least of Jordan, if Israel will adopt a more conciliatory attitude toward the Arab position. Up to the present time, however, Israel has maintained its unwillingness to adopt such an attitude, and it appears doubtful that it will alter its position substantially in the near future. Despite these developments unfavorable to the establishment of formal peace in the Near East, the trend away from war continues, and there are no indications that either party is preparing to renew hostilities. 6. With regard to Jerusalem, the First Progress Report on NSC 47/2 4 stated that the United Nations Trusteeship Council was instructed by the General Assembly on December 9, 1949, to complete the statute for the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem which it had prepared in 1948. The Council, in accordance with this instruction, completed and approved the statute on April 4, 1950. However, since it was apparent that neither Israel nor the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, the two states now controlling Jerusalem, were willing to cooperate in establishing an international regime such as that provided for in the statute, the Council decided, on June 14, 1950, to refer the question of Jerusalem back to the General Assembly without attempting to implement the statute. The Assembly will consider the problem at its Fifth Regular Session. The direct talks which had been in progress between Israel and Jordan concerning Jerusalem have ceased, and it does not seem likely that bilateral agreement on the City will be reached prior to the General Assembly’s consideration of the matter. 7. A development which affects favorably the implementation of paragraph 19 of NSC 47/2, in which are recommended efforts to prevent discrimination against Jews in the Arab states, is the adoption by Iraq, in early March 1950, of a law permitting Iraqi Jews legally to emigrate. This law will remain in effect for one year. Prior to the promulgation of this law, Jews had been subject to some discrimination in Iraq but had been unable to emigrate legally. Of Iraq’s estimated 135,000 Jews, about 25,000 have announced a desire to leave for Israel and it is expected that many others will emigrate as well. To date, more than 5,000 have left Iraq for Israel. Also during the period covered by this report, the transport of more than 40,000 Jews from Yemen to Israel was completed. In Yemen, these Jews had been subject to discrimination and their emigration to Israel is a development which affects favorably the policy set forth in paragraph 19. 8. A step was taken in the direction of raising the economic opportunities of the peoples of the Near East area when, on June 15, 1950, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development extended a loan of $12,800,000 to Iraq for partial financing of a flood control system on the Tigris River. 5 James E. Webb 1 Of November 16, 1948; for text, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1430 . 2 For documentation on the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950 concerning arms shipments to the Arab States and Israel, see pp. 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] ff. 3 For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, at London, May 1950, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. 4 February 27, 1950, p. 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] . 5 This Progress Report was discussed by the National Security Council at its 69th meeting on October 12. It was then agreed that the next Report should cover the economic crisis in Israel, Israel’s increasing tendency toward alignment with the West, and the growing instability in the Arab States, particularly Syria. It was also agreed that the Department of State should be asked to give particular attention to development projects in the Arab States (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files, Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action). The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State 611.84A/9–1450 [Document 554] The Chargé in Israel ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 118 Tel Aviv , September 14, 1950. Subject: A Pattern for Behavior toward Israel The State of Israel, assisted materially in its creation both by the Government of the United States and the American people, has been in existence a little over two years. Throughout that period our official relations with the country have been maintained on a friendly mutually cooperative basis, while in the furtherance of that relationship the vast reservoir of sympathy and good-will in America for all Jewish people has been freely tapped as occasion has warranted. An informality not normally associated with the high-level political ties found between two sovereign states has characterized both the official and the public relations of the United States and Israel. Because of the disparity both in size and age between the two countries, a considerable measure of paternalistic tolerance has likewise entered into America’s attitude toward and treatment of Israel. Again, the nature of our diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv and the intimate, longstanding interest of American Jewry in the Zionist movement have tended to give us the position of a benign father confessor in the estimation not only of the Israelis themselves but of a great many people outside of Israel. Finally, an over-all emotionalism inevitable in the drama of a nation’s birth and particularly of the Jewish nation’s birth has tended to clog the channels of normal political intercourse and has at once made difficult a fair estimate of Israel by the world at large and hindered the Israelis in reaching an accurate appraisal of their own true value to the community of nations. In the belief that, however desirable and perhaps even necessary these pleasantly informal relations may have been during the formative stage of Israel, the time has now come for an objective review of the situation and for the adoption of a rather more impersonal approach in our top level official dealings with Israel, the Embassy presents for the Department’s consideration the following suggestions relative to our future relations not only with the Government and people of this country, but with regard to our handling of political problems and tensions which, while not an integral part of Israel, are nevertheless affected by the coming into existence of this new state. I. Relations Inside Israel First, it is believed that the United States Diplomatic Mission accredited to Israel and at present stationed in Tel Aviv is offered a unique opportunity during the pending change of Chiefs of Mission to inaugurate with a minimum of notoriety a completely non-partisan attitude in its daily dealings with officials of the Israel Government. It is not even remotely suggested that a get-tough policy be adopted either overnight or ever with Israel, but a relationship stripped of the casually dropped hints and even openly advanced offers of advice and suggestions which heretofore has all too often characterized our top level contacts with Israel officialdom is believed to be desirable, both in our own interests and for the good of Israel itself. Our over-all job is to serve our country by conveying an unbiased, strictly impartial picture of Israel and the Israelis to our Government, and to present a similar view to Israel of America’s sentiments, official and otherwise, toward the Israelis, and any departure from that impartiality tends to weaken not only our country’s purposefulness as a world leader but our own official standing in this community. Moreover, after the observations of two years the Embassy is convinced that the Israelis themselves would prefer, in the interests of consistent continuity and long-range planning, that American diplomatic representation be kept on a friendly but objective level. It is therefore the Embassy’s considered opinion that the time has come to name a Chief of Mission to Israel who embodies not only the qualities of effective leadership but who understands the importance to our interests in this entire area of not offering advice or suggestions to the Israel Government or its officials in the conduct of its affairs unless and until such advice or suggestions shall have been received in clearly worded instructions from the Department of State. Finally, to sketch in briefly this portion of the diagram, the new Chief of Mission to Israel should be supplied with a staff each American member of which shall have been assured in advance, and preferably in writing, that his or her tenure of duty in Israel will not exceed a maximum of 18 months. There is no need to spell out a situation with which the Department is fully aware. It is sufficient to note that, until over-crowded, underfed, pioneering, intensely exigent Israel shall have solved some of its pressing economic problems, American objectivity here will best be realized by specifying clearly each staff member’s period of assignment. II. Relations Outside Israel It is appreciated that the Department is in a far better position to draw a blueprint of official attitudes outside Israel than is this Embassy. However, it is believed well to point up in this discussion certain factors which inevitably come to our attention as the Department’s listening post in this country and which must necessarily form part of the pattern of our behavior toward Israel. Two years of hard knocks have solidly confirmed Israel in the fact of its existence, and all the dialectical efforts to dash away unpleasant dreams on the part of the Arab States will not change that fact. The new state is here to stay, and from all present appearances it will continue to remain very much a reality despite the enormous cost its maintenance is going to mean to the world generally and to American Jewry in particular. However, the heroics attending Israel’s birth have largely passed and there is now little occasion for wide-eyed wonder at this fulfillment of biblical prophecy. Israel is settling down to the prosaic tasks first and foremost of survival and thereafter of getting on with its social experiment in the highly volatile Middle East. This is not the place for a discussion of the political merits or demerits of Israel; it suffices to bear in mind the present fact of Israel’s existence and the future probability that this nation will become an increasingly important member of the Middle East community. Finally it is likewise well to remember that the Government of Israel as at present constituted and a sizeable majority of the people of this country are sincere in their friendship and preference for the United States and for the Western group generally. In the immediate neighborhood of Israel itself the current wave of anti-American feeling, indubitably caused to a large degree by the moral and material aid extended by the United States to the Jews during and following their fight for independence, must necessarily be taken into consideration in seeking to draw a diagram of our attitude toward Israel. The present poised moment in world affairs and particularly in the overwrought and overly-sensitive Middle East will permit of no abrupt change of approach either toward Arab sensibilities or toward Jewish touchiness. At the same time, the hard cold fact of Israel remains. It is inescapable, and a way must be found to convince the several Arab neighbors of Israel that their own present national interests and future welfare can best be served by reaching a modus vivendi with the unwelcome newcomer in their midst and to reach it in the shortest time possible. With the foregoing observations in mind, it is believed that the time has come to put into active practice the following rules with regard to our external relations with Israel and our treatment of both political and economic problems which may stem from or lead to this country: ( a ) The tendency of American officials and private citizens to speak and write about Israel as one of the wonders of the modem world will be discouraged wherever and whenever possible, whereas any mention made by anyone anywhere tending to merge Israel’s political apartness into the general background of the Middle East and to lump Israel in a regional rather than an isolated economy will be given the utmost encouragement, ( b ) American officials will hereafter refrain from sympathizing with Arab political leaders and other persons who would seek to turn back the clock, and continuing efforts will be made to bring home to these people the desirability of coordinating their efforts with those of the United Nations in reestablishing a peace in the Middle East based on the situation as it actually exists. This Embassy is the first to appreciate that the problem of Israel as it relates to the United States will never be susceptible of either an easy or a normal solution. No set of rules can hope to cope with the emotional unknowns inherent in the relations which will ever exist between Israel and the five million American Jews. Nevertheless, we are convinced that an opportunity presents itself now to gather together the known factors, including the existence of the new state, the determination of its leaders to survive, the demonstrated will of American Jewry to assure that survival, and the inevitability of Israel as an important influence in the political and economic future of the Middle East, and to fashion a pattern of behavior based on straightforward objectivity, friendly impartiality and normal common sense which will be more effective as a long-range instrument for peace and understanding in this region than the more informal, frequently paternalistic, and occasionally biased attitude which has heretofore prevailed. Richard Ford The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 684.86A/8–2950: Telegram [Document 555] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia secret Washington , September 15, 1950—5 a. m. 94. Re YY’s remarks reported in Embtel 112, Aug 29, Dept believes it wld be appropriate as occasion offers to restate UN principle as indicated in Depcirtel Jun 30 that issue of Korea is full use and support of UN functions by its Members in maintenance of peace and in opposition to aggression and is not question of special interest to any one country. It cld be added that all GA and SC resolutions are result of UN deliberation with respect to specific items on agenda and represent UN views re action required. UN resolutions re Palestine and Korea deal with different situations. Former do not provide for force; latter do. It is assumed all UN Members will assist in implementation. Meanwhile, particularly in a troubled world situation, it shld be obvious that any endeavor by individual Members to play one off against another wld undermine unity of freedom-loving Members and decrease effectiveness of UN. Webb The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/9–1550: Telegram [Document 556] The Chargé in Israel ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State secret Tel Aviv , September 15, 1950—1 p. m. 152. Embtel 149 September 14. 1 Press conference by Israel Chief Staff Yadin September 14 consisted largely saber rattling at Jordan specifically and Arab States generally. Israel’s occupation Jordan–Yarmuk River confluence again upheld with map citations, and while Yadin termed action “farming operation” rather than “land mine clearance” as used by Kollek, his conclusion with respect Israel’s justification largely same. Warning any country which hoped by threats or use of force to achieve changes in frontiers as delineated in armistice agreements that it was deceiving itself and its own people. Yadin told press Israeli Army was “prepared defend every millimetre” of its territory. British Chargé Chadwick, who discussed with Comay (UD desk office Israel Foreign Office) September 14 contents Jordan note to UN, saying specifically his Government hoped Israel would vacate disputed area until adequate UN investigation had been made, says he was informed this morning by Comay that “Israel Government did not see way clear discontinue its farming operation on Yarmuk River”. Reliable Foreign Office informant told Embassy today that Israel is today lodging complaint with MAC charging Jordan by its “threat of force” with breach Rhodes agreement. Comment: Israel double-talk, plus apparent deliberate inconsistency of explanations suggest both local military circles and Foreign Office officials feel completely sure their ground in Yarmuk incident. One suggested reason for action at this time is Israel effort find piece territory which later might be “given away” without causing too much public reaction. End comment . Department pass information Amman 12; sent Department 152, repeated information Jerusalem 9, London 14, Paris 8. Ford 1 Not printed; it advised of a conversation with Mr. Kollek on September 14, in which the latter indicated the chief activity of the small force in the disputed area was to clear mines planted there over two years ago (684A.85/9–1450). The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 320.2AA/9–1550: Telegram [Document 557] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) secret Washington , September 18, 1950—7 p. m. 289. Reurtels 540 of Sept 15 and 563 of Sept 16 1 Dept believes US position on Egypt and Israeli complaints shld be as follows: 1. In view of likely thorough airing Palestine problems during GA, we shld discourage possibility of two forums simultaneously considering problems if scheduling of items on GA and SC agenda wld bring this about; 2. Since Egypt allegations may not involve violation of armistice agreement SC shld request overall report from Gen Riley before considering allegations; 3. Re proposed Israel SC agenda item, Dept believes Israel Delegation shld be queried re their aim in submitting complaints and advised US is not convinced putting item before SC at this time will result in benefit to gen Palestine situation. If Israel item is placed on SC agenda and comes up for discussion, US shld state willingness to discuss allegations but it essential Gen Riley be called to participate in SC discussions. Efforts shld be made to avoid polemics by stressing desirability of clarifying facts behind all allegations. Dept will advise further on course to be followed shld full debate items eventuate. Webb 1 Neither printed; the former reported that Egypt had requested that an item concerning Israeli expulsion of thousands of Bedouins be placed on the agenda of the Security Council; the latter, that Israel had requested the similar placing of an item concerning violations of the armistice agreements with Israel by Egypt and Jordan and their nonobservance of procedures laid down by the armistice agreements. (320.2AA/9–1550, 330/9–1650) The Embassy in Cairo, on September 12, reported information from the Egyptian Foreign Office that the Israelis had expelled 2,000 refugees the previous day, making a total of 6,000 during the past few weeks. The Foreign Office emphasized how strongly it felt about the matter and insisted that the United Nations do something about it. (Telegram 271, 320.2AA/9–1250) The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 684A.85/9–1750: Telegram [Document 558] The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 1 confidential priority Washington , September 19, 1950—3 a. m. 112. Sense fol may be conveyed to FonOff in response approach subject ur 144 Sept 17. 2 US Govt Sept 9 received note from Jordan Govt alleging Israel penetration into terr vicinity confluence Jordan and Yarmuk rivers. Note said terr in question was part of original Trans Jordan mandate, and invoked Tripartite Declaration maintaining question of violation of frontiers involved. US Govt Sept 10 informed Jordan Govt that US, concerned over any reports of circumstances which might lead to outbreak of hostilities, was bringing subject of Jordanian note urgently to attention of Israel Govt expressing concern re reported Israeli move. US Govt assured Jordan Govt it shared latter’s concern over situation and would follow matter very closely, with view determining whether reported incident could best be resolved by UN machinery in Pal or whether Tripartite Declaration might provide the formula. US Govt also stressed necessity obtaining full details of incident and suggested desirability complete report on situation by UN Reps in Palestine area. Investigation by these UN officials has revealed that Israel-Jordan armistice line, as drawn up on Rhodes by Israel and Jordan Reps in presence Acting Mediator, placed present disputed area in terr under Israel control. View this circumstance and fact Jordan Govt position is that terr of original Trans Jordan Mandate was not and could not have been subject of discussion during Rhodes armistice talks, Dept suggested to Jordan Min Sept 12 that since present trouble seemed to be traceable to agreement during Rhodes discussions to armistice line which in disputed area did not follow international frontier between Palestine and Trans Jordan mandates, best way to handle would be for Jordan Govt to make use of provisions of Israel-Jordan armistice agreement applying to machinery for revision of armistice line. Under these provisions Israel and Jordan have agreed to several revisions of line since signature of agreement. Jordan Min said he wld convey this suggestion to his Govt. You should assure FonOff that US Govt in its constant concern for security and well-being of NE and as signatory Tripartite Declaration, will keep close watch on above situation. 3 Webb 1 This telegram was repeated to Tel Aviv, other Arab capitals, London, and Paris. 2 Not printed; it gave the text of an oral message from a Foreign Office spokesman inquiring concerning the attitude of the U.S. Government toward the “Zionist aggression on Jordanian territory”. (684A.85/9–1750) Legation Damascus, on September 19, reported a conversation with the Syrian Minister of Defense, who made the following points: The Syro-Israeli Armistice may be considered broken, because of armed aggression against an Arab State; the Arab League Security Pact provides for joint defense against aggression aimed at any signatory; the Syrian Army favors direct and immediate use of force if necessary rather than formal protests, “Since US apparently refrains from effective interference in Israeli faits accomplish”; and that the Syrian army has taken precautionary measures. (Telegram 147, 684A.85/9–1950) 3 Legation Damascus read telegram 112 to Prime Minister Qudsi on September 27. The Prime Minister expressed his disappointment with the U.S. message, stating that the Rutenberg incident followed the usual pattern of Israeli aggression and relegation of a fait accompli to a low-level mixed commission. At the same time, the Legation conveyed its impressions that the Prime Minister was on the defensive, realizing that Syria had acted precipitously, and that Syria and the other Arab States did not plan to use the incident in connection with the larger issue of alleged Israeli aggression and violation of armistice agreements. (Telegram 160, September 29, 684A.85/9–2950) The Jordanian Minister, on October 3, left with the Department of State a copy of an explanatory note on the Yarmuk incident sent by his Government to the President of the Security Council. The note dealt chiefly with the alleged map falsification and with the Jordanian position that the negotiations at Rhodes could not concern territory in the original Trans Jordan Mandate. The Department expressed to the Minister the viewpoints set forth in the penultimate paragraph of telegram 112 to Damascus. (Telegram 56, October 3, to Amman, 684A.85/10–350) The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 684A.85/9–1950: Telegram [Document 559] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 confidential Washington , September 19, 1950—6 p. m. 134. Foll for your guidance in conversations with Israeli officials: Dept in informal conversation Sept 18 reviewed Palestine situation with Israeli Counselor. Stating before progress cld be made toward normal relations in area new attitude seemed necessary, Dept expressed view Israel’s course of action in Yarmuk terr dispute with Jordan and in matter expelled Beduins hardened Arab attitude and delayed peace. While Israel might be legally right Yarmuk matter, she seemed have delivered blow to possibilities peace with Jordan by taking such an unconciliatory attitude on this very small amount terr which was part of original Trans-Jordan Mandate. With regard to Beduins, Dept maintained in long run it wld have profited Israel more to suffer depredations these people for a while than aggravate relations with Egypt by expulsion, action which also wld be likely discredit Israel in eyes of world. Dept view was Israel, familar with Arab sensitiveness on issues arising out of Palestine question, shld exercise greatest caution avoid incidents likely aggravate Arabs, and shld forego minor gains in interests larger issue relations with neighbors. Counselor stated Israel shared Dept’s concern over continued incidents but cld not agree Israel’s attitude was wrong. Maintained Arabs were “blowing up” relatively minor incidents occurring in day-to-day relations between states in area as part continuous propaganda move discredit Israel. Israel had no aggressive intentions against Arab States. In Yarmuk matter was only carrying out agricultural operations in area accorded Israel under armistice agreement. In matter Beduins was expelling people orginally from Sinai who had caused continued and grievous harm Israel. Israel desired peace with Arab States but cld not fail react when Arabs took steps which brought harm Israel. Dept appreciated there were two sides these questions but reiterated view that in long run Israel’s interests wld be best served by taking more conciliatory attitude in incidents of above nature. Webb 1 This telegram was repeated to New York for Action and to Cairo, Amman, and London for information. The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State 784A.02/9–2050: Telegram [Document 560] The Chargé in Israel ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , September 20, 1950. 160. Re last paragraph Department’s 94 September 1, Embassy has given careful consideration possibilities modifying existing Department instructions to Embassy regarding intercourse with Israel Government. On one hand has reached conclusion that present practice of no official contact Jerusalem and keeping personal visits of CM to barest minimum is still only practical policy, at least until UN shall have clarified internationalization issue. Embassy has consulted British, French, Belgian and Turkish missions Tel Aviv all of which presently follow same policy as Embassy despite fact that British have possible out in recent de facto recognition Israel occupation western Jerusalem. However, Embassy would request Department to make every possible effort to see that all US Government officials visiting Israel be instructed follow same rigid non-intercourse policy. Unless this is done, there is no way of avoiding inevitable embarrassment when Israelis point out to Embassy that other US officials are following policy apparently more liberal than that of Embassy. Kollek of Foreign Office volunteered to me September 19 that Ben Gurion would welcome visit in Jerusalem “to talk things over” but I regretted that until Prime Minister had occasion visit Tel Aviv or other rendezvous in Israel or until I was so ordered by my government I would have to forego this signal honor. Ford Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State 784A.00/9–2150 [Document 561] Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Berry ) to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] September 21, 1950. Subject: Important Aspects of the Palestine Situation. There is submitted hereunder a brief review of currently important aspects of the Palestine situation: 1. Jerusalem . The Trusteeship Council during the past year found itself unable to implement the General Assembly’s resolution of December 9, 1949, reaffirming the principle of the 1947 resolution that Jerusalem should be established as a corpus separatum under an international regime administered by the United Nations. The main reason for the Council’s failure was the strong opposition of Israel and Jordan, the nations occupying the city. The Council has accordingly referred the matter back to the General Assembly. The Israeli Government submitted to the Council a proposal which would limit international participation in Jerusalem to the supervision of the protection of the Holy Places, most of which are located in the Jordan half of the city. Jordan opposes this proposal, as does the Vatican, which still firmly supports full internationalization and which last year influenced the Catholic nations to vote for this kind of a regime in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union has announced that it no longer supports full internationalization, and it is unlikely that a majority could be obtained this year for another resolution for this kind of regime. It also seems, however, at the present time that there will not be a majority for any other proposal, since enough nations will probably be influenced by the Vatican not to support a plan for international supervision of the Holy Places alone. If no decision is reached this year, the present division and control of Jerusalem by Israel and Jordan will continue and be strengthened. Our position is that we seek a solution acceptable to Israel and Jordan and the greater part of the International Community. Last year we devoted much effort to drawing up the statute of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, which was not even considered by the Assembly. Our present intention is not to play an active role on this issue in the Assembly and, while freely discussing all proposals, not to support any one of them which does not give clear signs of obtaining acceptance by Israel, Jordan, and the greater part of the International Community. 2. The Palestine Conciliation Commission . The Palestine Conciliation Commission has spent a fruitless year attempting to promote agreement between Israel and the Arab States. The main reason for its failure is that the parties do not seem to desire peace ardently enough to make the concessions in their basic positions which might bring peace. The Arabs are not yet prepared to swallow the pill of signing peace with Israel; they are not willing to renounce one of the main provisions of the General Assembly of December 11, 1948—that the Palestine refugees have the right to return to their homes in Israel in occupied territory, and that those who elect not to return shall be compensated for their property. The Arabs are also unwilling to renounce the claims which they have made for territory allotted to the Palestine Arab State by the Partition Resolution of 1947, but which was occupied by Israel forces during the Palestine war. The Israelis are unwilling to permit the return of large numbers of Palestine Arab refugees; they are also unwilling to cede to the Arabs any sizable amount of territory. Under the circumstances the relations between the parties are being governed by the armistice agreements. There is to be considered the nature of the report which the Palestine Conciliation Commission will make to the General Assembly, and whether the PCC should recommend that the Assembly take some kind of action designed to bring about agreement between the parties. We have not taken a final position on these questions pending consultation with Ambassador Palmer, the U.S. member of the PCC, who is scheduled to arrive in the United States in October. 3. The Palestine Refugee Agency . The Palestine Refugee Agency is scheduled to report to the General Assembly on the results of its efforts during the past year toward relief, repatriation and resettlement of the Palestine refugees. It is expected that the Agency will confine itself to a review of its activities, and to outlining the necessity of further international contributions to enable it to carry on its work. Our final position on the nature of the PRA report is being reserved pending consultations with Ambassador Blandford, the U.S. member of the Agency, who is due to arrive in the United States in the near future. 4. Arab-Israeli Complaints Before the United Nations . Recently several of the continuing Arab-Israeli border incidents have been officially placed before the United Nations, as follows: ( a ) Jordanian Complaint . The Jordan Government has officially requested the Secretary General to cause the Israelis to withdraw from a small amount of territory which is part of the original Trans-Jordan Mandate and which has recently been occupied by Israel. This territory is located in the vicinity of the Rutenberg Hydro-Electric Works. Investigation has revealed that when the Israeli-Jordan armistice line was demarcated at Rhodes by Israeli and Jordanian representatives in the presence of Dr. Bunche, the Jordanian representatives unwittingly agreed to the line’s being drawn in such a way that the area in question fell in the territory under Israeli control. The Jordanians have now discovered this mistake, and maintain that the territory of the original Trans-Jordan Mandate could not have been under discussion at Rhodes. The Israelis refuse to evacuate the territory. The Jordanians have invoked the Tripartite Declaration, but the matter is clearly one for solution in the Israeli-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, and we have so advised the Jordan Government. Iraq has sent the Secretary General a communication supporting Jordan, and Syria has approached the United States to invoke the Tripartite Declaration on behalf of Jordan. ( b ) Egyptian Complaint . The Egyptian Government has placed upon the agenda of the Security Council the matter of the expulsion by Israel of a considerable number of nomad Arabs into Egyptian territory. The Egyptians claim that these people have always lived in Palestine. The Israelis claim that they are nomads from the Sinai desert who have infiltrated into Israeli territory and there committed all kinds of depredations. The chief U.N. observer in Palestine believes that the Egyptians have a good deal of right on their side, and that the Israelis should take back the nomads. ( c ) Israeli Complaints . Apparently to counter the above Arab moves, the Israelis have placed upon the Security Council agenda the following items: 1. Violation by Egypt of Israeli-Egyptian Armistice agreement through maintenance for 17 months of blockade practices against Israel. 2. Violation by Jordan of its armistice agreement with Israel through non-implementation of Article VIII (which provides machinery for the handling of such problems as Israeli access to the Hadassah Hospital and Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus). 3. Violation by Egypt and Jordan of their respective armistices with Israel by officially and publicly threatening aggressive action. 4. Non-observance by Egypt and Jordan of procedures in the armistice agreements with Israel stating that claims and complaints should be handled in the Mixed Armistice Commissions. We are following these complaints closely and are attempting to persuade the parties to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. 1 1 A marginal notation appears at the end of the memorandum, stating that “UNP agrees to general presentation of Subject. Reservation is made, however, to the categorical position in paragraph 3 under ‘Jerusalem.’ the feeling being that a majority proposal may be forthcoming with less emphasis on Internationalization and complex administration.” The Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador John B. Blandford, at Beirut 320.2AA/9–1550: Telegram [Document 562] The Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador John B. Blandford, at Beirut confidential Washington , September 21, 1950—6 p. m. 206. Unrap 59. Department in agreement (Rapun 63 1 ) PRA terminate its ration distribution in Israel soonest, with Israel accepting responsibility, and PRA shld consider cooperation with Israel in works projects build housing rather than make lump-sum contribution. It is believed, however, Israeli proposals for Arab housing shld be examined with care make certain housing will be for genuine Arab refugees from Palestine hostilities rather than for use in connection with forced movement of resident Arabs within Israel. PRA might obtain undertaking this effect from Israeli Govt. Webb 1 Identified also as telegram 171, September 15, from Beirut, not printed; it advised of the Israeli reply to an aide-mémoire from the PRA which requested the latter to terminate its ration distribution in Israel and to contribute $1.6 million, to which Israel would add at least three times that amount, for the final integration of 25,000 Arab refugees into the Israeli economy. (320.2AA/9–1550) The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 320.2AA/9–2250 [Document 563] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) No. 87 Washington , September 22, 1950. The Secretary of State requests the United States Representative to the United Nations to transmit the enclosed check in the amount of $6,200,000 to the Secretary General of the United Nations as a contribution by the United States to the United Nations for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. A receipt from the United Nations for the enclosed check should be transmitted to the Department of State by the United States Mission to the United Nations. It is also requested that the United States Mission to the United Nations acknowledge receipt of the enclosure. 1 1 The Department of State had informed Ambassador Blandford on September 13 that further sums would become available for Relief and Works Agency activities in late September, that it wished to prevent any feeling of letdown in PRA operations but that it was disappointed at the continued magnitude of relief costs. (Telegram 184, identified also as Unrap 55, to Beirut, 320.2AA/9–850) The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 684A.85/9–3050: Telegram [Document 564] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 confidential Washington , September 30, 1950—5 p. m. 149. Dept Sept 30 in frank, friendly and informal conversation with Shiloah made fol points: 1. Israel shld look to long-range relations with Arab states and in this interest shld forego seeking temporary advantages such as occupation Yarmuk territory. In interests of area peace and stability wld be desirable that this small disputed area be relinquished by Israel. Incident of Lebanese plane and recent expulsion of Bedouins other examples of action by Israel to gain temporary advantages which resulted in worsening chances of progress toward improvement in Israeli-Arab relations. 2. Final settlement in NE important to Israel in time of peace since only thru full intercourse with neighbors as well as with rest of world can Israel develop and maintain sound economy. Good relations with neighbors wld give Israel opportunity benefit itself and whole area by full use special Israeli scientific talents and knowledge. However, good relations with Arabs particularly important to Israel shld world war come. Israel may be militarily strong but experience has shown that in a world conflict a strong point must succumb if the hinterland is unfriendly. If world war shld come, many foreign sources of supply now open to Israel certainly wld be restricted. Therefore real effort to improve NE area relations is necessary. 3. There has long been sympathy in world and in US for Jews as oppressed people. Now that Jews have own state and in specific incidents seem to some people to have changed from oppressed to oppressors, there is danger this sympathy being diminished. 4. World community cannot be expected indefinitely continue pay for Palestine refugees. Primary responsibility for these people lies with Israel and Arab states. We have noted recent tendency by Arabs to consider resettlement. Israel shld encourage this by making official public undertaking at an appropriate time to compensate refugees for their property. Fol main points Shiloah’s reply: 1. Agreed Israel must make real effort reach agreement with Arabs. Such effort must be reciprocated by Arabs, who must not be allowed think time is on their side and that after extracting compensation from Israel for refugees they can refuse discuss other points. Israel fully recognized its obligation pay compensation. 2. Israel had not recd credit for forbearance it had already shown in face Jordanian refusal implement Art VIII and constant depredations Jordanian infiltrees. On number of occasions Arab states had violated Israel air space. Bedouins expelled into Egypt were infiltrees from Sinai. 3. As long as there was hope for agreement with Jordan Israel had not protested Jordan laxity in observing Armistice Agreement. When this hope faded Israel decided to “tighten up” and had occupied Yarmuk area to which it entitled. This had had beneficial result in that msg recently recd from Abdullah asking Israel send Rep to Amman. Perhaps talks wld start again. Dept gathered Israel might give up Yarmuk area if agreement reached with Jordan on other points. 4. Israel cld not agree to separation of refugee item from context general settlement. Was willing that refugees be first installment in “installment settlement” but must be clearly understood other installments to fol. 5. Friends of Israel and Arab states shld tell Arabs to face realities. Arabs wld not do so as long as it clear to them other nations expected Israel to make prior concessions. Arab hope that Israel on point of economic collapse unfounded. Dept understands Brit and Fr Reps Tel Aviv to be instructed point out to Israeli auths desirability relinquishing Yarmuk area in interests relations with Jordan, pending discussion question in MAC. After concerting with these colleagues you shld seek separate opportunity take this line in informal conversations with appropriate auths. (See first para this tel) Webb 1 This telegram was repeated to London, Amman, Jerusalem, and New York. The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/10–250: Telegram [Document 565] The Chargé in Israel ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , October 2, 1950—6 p. m. 191. Herlitz, Israel Foreign Office told me October 2 that Eytan conferred with King Abdullah Amman October 1 at King’s invitation on general question relations between Israel and Jordan. Eytan reported King professed still be very keen for peaceful understanding with Israel, but that his Cabinet, and especially Prime Minister and Foreign Minister who “sang Egypt’s tunes” made things difficult for him, that King said was going dismiss his present Cabinet and appoint new one within one or two weeks which would be more amenable King’s wishes, that this connection Samir Rifai being recalled from Lebanon, and that King all ready resume relations with Israel where they had been broken off some months ago and possibly conclude five year nonaggression pact or “something similar”. Eytan reportedly proposed this point that form negotiations heretofore followed between two countries be changed and that instead of hit-or-miss midnight meetings followed “large indigestible dinners” a more businesslike procedure be adopted with regular meetings attended by duly authorized representatives. King allegedly said this made sense and that he had hopes that with new cabinet some such regularity might be instituted. Eytan is reported have been impressed by King’s attitude, but feels that while King ready reach agreement with Israel he must first reach agreement within his own official family. He said that, for example, when he expressed pleasure over resumption Article 8 Special Committee meetings, King admitted nothing constructive could come these meetings under present Jordan Cabinet. King reportedly had never seen map showing Yarmuk River “concession” and was extremely shocked to see Jundi’s signature affixed thereto. King is said to have asked Eytan as personal favor to “return” occupied zone, and Eytan says he agreed some such step might be considered within framework general settlement. Comment: Next step possible negotiations between Jordan and Israel would appear to be determination and clarifications of person or persons in Jordan who have necessary power and discretion treat constructively with Israel representatives looking toward settlement. Eytan says his Government ready appoint representatives with full powers, but that he and other high officials Israel Government continue skeptical Jordan’s willingness and ability undertake serious discussions. End comment . Sent Department 191; repeated information Jerusalem 12. Department pass Amman 13, London 18, Paris 11. 1 Ford 1 A handwritten notation states the message was also sent to Cairo on October 12. The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 320.2AA/10–350: Telegram [Document 566] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) secret Washington , October 3, 1950—7 p. m. 361. Re Deptel 289, Sept 18. Fol views of Dept re Palestine for ur consideration: Dept now views submissions to SC of Egyptian complaint against Israel over expulsion Palestine Arabs, Israeli counter complaints against Egypt and HKJ on alleged armistice violations, and possible consideration by SC of Iraqi supported HKJ complaint against Israel’s occupying Jordan territory as possible occasion to let off steam by countries named before consideration of Palestine items in GA. All complaints while likely to engender acrimonious argument appear to be matters which can be settled by essentially dispassionate review of facts by SC, followed by possible SC res or res’s if necessary reaffirming faith of SC in MACs and any other means of direct discussion between Arabs and Israelis conducive to lasting peace in area. Dept believes since US has SC presidency this month, US should assume initiative in calling for consideration of complaints after careful consideration of time Palestine items likely to be considered in GA Ad Hoc Comite. Obviously desirable subject not be discussed simultaneously in SC and GA. This initiative plus expression earnest desire to have thorough and dispassionate discussion of complaints may strengthen US hand in GA debates. SC debates may also be used as occasion for US and other UN members to assess possibility of anything constructive being done in GA on Jerusalem and Palestine refugees. Accordingly Dept feels US position on items mentioned whether considered together or separately should be along following lines: 1. Allegations all appear to be ones involving matters of fact. Therefore SC should call upon all parties concerned and Gen Riley to state their views and present such evidence and documentation as they wish. 2. If evidence presented indicates MACs can handle complaints SC should move to have them do so. If SC feels complaints cannot be handled by MACs, SC should call upon parties concerned to designate Reps immediately to meet with Gen Riley in his capacity as Trace Supervisor to settle differences. 3. Unless evidence presented shows glaring incapacity of MACs to handle problems involved in complaints, which Dept believes unlikely, SC should reaffirm its faith in MACs and call upon parties a ) to abide by armistice agreements and procedures of negotiation contained therein and b ) to abide by decisions of MACs. 4. SC should remind parties of their obligations under armistice agreements to refrain from all actions likely to endanger peace and security of area and of fact that UN membership, and armistice agreements by implication, require understanding by all parties that they have obligations to work out lasting agreements resolving all their outstanding differences. 5. SC should request Gen Riley to report to SC at end of 3 months on status of problems unresolved before all MACs or to report to SC at any time prior to that set should he deem it advisable. In special case of Iraqi supported HKJ complaint SC would of course call upon HKJ to accept provisions Article 35, para 2, Charter, and could invoke provisions Article 32. Thinking behind Dept’s feeling Gen Riley should be present is he may be of great assistance in making SC deliberations as dispassionate as possible and since possible general effect of consideration of complaints is attack on overall effectiveness of MACs and enforcement of armistice agreements, Gen Riley should have opportunity to present views. Webb The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 700.00(S)/10–450: Circular telegram [Document 567] The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1 secret Washington , October 4, 1950—6 p. m. (Infotel). USUN reports that after expressing hope US wld support Arab position in SC on alleged Israeli aggression against Jordan, member Iraqi Del 2 stated wld be good if UN wld impose on Arabs and Israel solution of Pal problem. He added that Arabs wld not like it, but wld simply have to take it, and that, provided UN-imposed solution fair and equitable, he cld see no other way achieving real peace. Meanwhile, Bunche 3 told USGADel he thought Jordan made mistake in agreeing Yarmuk line. He doubted forgery involved and thought more likely Jordanians taken in by more skillful negotiators. Bunche felt, however, Jordan had good claim to terr in question on basis equity, since never been intended that armistice negots shld involve anything but Pal terr. He thought SC shld refer question back to MAC in first instance. 4 Webb 1 At Arab capitals and Tel Aviv. 2 Fadhil Jamali. 3 Ralph J. Bunche, former Acting United Nations Mediator in Palestine. 4 The information in this circular telegram is based on telegram 647, October 4, from New York (310.5/10–450). Editorial Note [Document 568] Editorial Note General Kennedy and each of the four members of the Advisory Commission signed at Paris on October 6 the Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. The report covered the period May 1 to September 15, 1950. Part II embodied their joint recommendations, which read in part as follows: “75. Since contributions received to date are below the amount recommended by the Economic Survey Mission and insufficient to cover the cost of urgent relief needs, the Agency is compelled to ask for additional funds for the current year. We strongly urge the governments of the world immediately to contribute an additional total of $5 million to assist in bridging the gap between the budget foreseen by the Economic Survey Mission and the promise received to date. Otherwise no improvement in the existing scale of rations or services can be provided for the coming winter without further depleting the comparatively small sum which remains available for work projects. Unless these contributions are received immediately, the Agency will be forced to request an advance from the United Nations Working Capital Fund. 1951–1952 76. For the year ahead generous assistance is requested from the international community to cover the costs of the proposed readjusted programme of UNRWAPRNE. The following estimates are submitted for the period July 1951 to 30 June 1952: US dollars Direct relief 20,000,000 Reintegration fund 30,000,000 Total 50,000,000 77. When viewed against the large number of needy refugees, the estimate of $20 million for direct relief is a minimum figure. It is based upon the belief that the numbers of refugees can be diminished by an effective programme of reintegration and in other ways. The establishment of the fund of $30 million constitutes a first step (without commitment as to the future) in a major undertaking to reintegrate the majority of over three quarters of a million refugees, which may ultimately entail the expenditure of several hundred million dollars over a period of years. It should, at the same time, be noted that all expenditure under this fund will hasten the day of refugee self-support, and bring nearer the day when international assistance can be withdrawn. 78. In presenting this financial estimate, the Agency wishes strongly to stress the necessity of firm financing. Ample funds must always be at hand on schedule, for the simple reason that vital supplies and services to needy refugees must be available on time. The Agency must feel assured of its resources for one entire fiscal year, at least, if relief is to be regularly provided and if reintegration projects are to be effectively undertaken.” The Department, on October 17, sent the substance of these recommendations to Cairo in telegram 342, which was repeated to other Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Paris, and London. The telegram concluded as follows: “Current temporary work program to be terminated this year but refugees to be employed on improvement temporary quarters financed by relief funds or on permanent projects financed by reintegration funds. “Because of econ significance relief and reintegration projects and inevitable relation with gen development projects PRA to be recognized as a p[oin]t of ref and consultation for multilateral programs technical assistance and gen econ development in NE.” (320.2AA/10–1750) The full text of General Kennedy’s Interim Report is printed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 19 (A/1451/Rev. 1). The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) 320/10–650: Telegram [Document 569] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) confidential Washington , October 6, 1950—7 p. m. Gadel 31. Re Wainhouse Taylor telecon Friday Oct 6 on possibility Arab item on refugees being pushed for prompt consideration in Ad Hoc Comite, Dept believes that while too obvious opposition to consideration this item now shld be avoided as it might exacerbate relations with Arab Dels, US should take firm position that in view fact PCC and PRA report conclusions and recommendations have not been transmitted to GA and since it may be anticipated that these reports will be most germane to consideration Arab refugee problem, consideration of Arab item now wld not be orderly Comite procedure and wld in effect involve consideration refugee problem twice by Ad Hoc Comite with less chance of worthwhile debate both times. Such unusual procedure for debating refugee problem wld be unnecessarily time consuming and hence in interest of orderly consideration of Comite’s agenda items shld be opposed. Webb Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler IO Files, Lot 71 D 440 1 [Document 570] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler 2 secret US/A/AC.38/96 [ New York ,] October 9, 1950. Subject: 1) Uniting for Peace 2) Jerusalem 3) Refugees and PCC 4) Timing of Palestine Question Participants: H. E. Abba Eban, Israeli Delegation Arthur Lourie, Israeli Delegation Gideon Rafael, Israeli Delegation John Ross, U.S. Delegation Wells Stabler, U.S. Delegation Mr. Rafael asked Mr. Ross and me to lunch today to discuss the following questions: [Here follow two numbered sections of discussion on the American draft resolution on “Uniting for Peace” and on Jerusalem.] 3. Refugees and PCC Mr. Eban spoke with some emphasis regarding the necessity for eliminating any reference in any refugee resolution passed this year to the right of refugees to return to their homes, which was contained in the 1948 resolution and reaffirmed in 1949. Israel felt that such reaffirmation would only give the Arabs further excuse to procrastinate. Israel considered that any Arab entering Israel was no longer being repatriated but he was being resettled in a foreign land. Those who went to one of the neighboring Arab countries were considered as having been repatriated. He doubted whether Israel could repatriate any substantial number of refugees. Mr. Rafael said that there were now 167,000 registered Arabs living in Israel, as well as 20,000 Bedouins. Mr. Ross and Mr. Stabler said they felt Israel would make a great mistake in opposing the reaffirmation of the 1948 principle on refugees. In practice, most people believed that resettlement was the only answer, but at the same time the principle enunciated in 1948 could not be abandoned. Moreover, its reiteration in 1950 could do no possible harm to the Israeli position. Mr. Ross then raised the question of whether Israel could not lift the compensation question out of the context of an overall settlement and express a willingness to examine that question immediately. It might be possible to establish a sub-committee to consider this question without relation to other outstanding problems. This question might conceivably be what was causing the log jam at the present time. It was pointed out that Israel would not be committed to anything immediately upon agreement to consider the compensation question in this manner, because it would take a long time for a Committee of Experts to study this highly complex problem. Mr. Eban said the Israeli government might be willing to consider the compensation question as the first item, but it was essential that this be a forerunner to more definitive negotiations. He stated that payment of compensation was something that ordinarily was done only between two governments that were at peace and that until such time as peace had been achieved, it was difficult for the Israeli government to pay compensation. He explained that a continued state of war between the Arab states and Israel cost Israel money and weakened her financial position. Consequently, they found it very difficult to agree to the payment of compensation unless they were assured that settlement of other outstanding questions would follow. He expressed the thought that the General Assembly might pass a resolution which might refer to the compensation question as being a matter for discussion outside of overall settlement and to the need for the two parties to get along with their negotiations for the settlement of outstanding issues, either directly or through the PCC. 4) Timing of Palestine Question Mr. Eban thought that the Palestine question, at least the Jerusalem part, might come up in the next ten days or so. He said his delegation would not object to this. With respect to refugees, it was of course necessary to wait until the reports of the PRA and PCC had been received. Wells Stabler 1 Lot 71 D 440 is a master file of classified records and correspondence of U.S. Delegations to sessions of the U.N. General Assembly for the years 1945–1965, maintained by the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 2 Detailed as Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly, which met at New York from September 19 to November 5. The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/10–950: Telegram [Document 571] The Chargé in Israel ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tel Aviv , October 9, 1950—5 p. m. 211. In course 80-minute informal general discussion Prime Minister his Tel Aviv home October 7 our treatment of directive contained Deptel 149, September 30 was briefly as follows: Yarmuk River: Stressing my government’s strong belief Israel should relinquish this recently occupied area at least until MAC had adjudicated issue and urging Prime Minister give matter his own personal attention rather than let it drift into sea of bureaucracy, I pointed out any legal justification Israel felt on its side was far outweighed by moral issues at stake, and that world would applaud Israeli gesture at this point in relinquishing this relatively unimportant acquisition in interest general peace and stability this area. Prime Minister replied in effect that Yarmuk issue had ceased to be of great concern to him and his government and that while Israel was acting fully within its rights in occupying area he was in fact ready make immediate settlement question with Jordan either by evacuating zone, declaring it kind of no-man’s land, or on basis any other formula which might be found mutually agreeable. He then referred Abdullah–Eytan talk of October 1 (Embtel 191, October 2) and expressed hope this might be beginning new and happier phase relations between two countries, and said one of first steps would be settlement Yarmuk and other border differences to satisfaction all concerned. Negev Bedouin expulsions: Pointing out to Prime Minister that while one of his earlier predecessors had successfully commanded sun to stand still there existed some doubt Israel’s ability so far to disrupt nature’s laws as to expect nomadic tribes abruptly to stop customs of centuries, I urged that military registration be extended to cover all nomads Negev area and other humane procedures adopted to accommodate Egyptian-Israel border regulations to periodic comings and goings tribal peoples living that general neighborhood. Prime Minister, profound student Old Testament miracles, seemed enjoy being bracketed with Joshua, and replied steps had already been taken and more would be taken immediately to relieve situation tribes accustomed seek greener pastures in Negev. He added grimly however that due and direct punishment would be meted out in instances where it was established that tribes were acting as cloak, whether innocently or otherwise, for Egyptian mine-layers or any other persons not prepared behave themselves and respect Israel law and order. Comment: My wife and I were Prime Minister and Mrs. Ben Gurion’s only guests and thus talk was both easy and uninterrupted. Ben Gurion was relaxed and friendly but his chief interest seemed centered on present fight on Israel black market which he is conducting personally. Thus it was difficult to tell whether my comments on Yarmuk registered deeply or not, although mention of Negev led inevitably his favorite theme that Egypt remains keystone in arch of Middle East peace. He reiterated hope that my government’s full attention would continue concentrated this direction (Embtel 194, October 4 1 ) and expressed his conviction that calibre our diplomatic representatives Cairo proved our awareness Egypt’s preeminent position in Middle East affairs. ( End comment ) British Minister Helm following long talk with Eytan October 8 informed me he was extremely hopeful Israel would get out Yarmuk area in immediate future. Comment: I likewise am hopeful this respect although still harboring conviction Israel will not completely or readily relinquish bargaining possibilities inherent this small but lush bit of land East of Jordan. ( End comment ) 2 Sent Department 211, repeated info Jerusalem 14, Department pass Cairo 16, Amman 15, London 21. Ford 1 Not printed; it reported the interview on October 1 of Senator Claude Pepper of Florida with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, at which Chargé Ford was present at the Senator’s request. The Prime Minister expressed his belief that a peaceful settlement with Egypt was the only possible solution to the Arab-Israeli problem and his hope that “all US efforts might be directed this end. ‘Make peace with Egypt and all others will follow as night does day.’” The Prime Minister was also said to have twitted the Chargé, “as usual”, because of his failure to call on the Prime Minister at Jerusalem and assured him that the “latchstring always out and no questions asked.” The Chargé indicated that he settled for a cup of tea at the Prime Minister’s Tel Aviv home the following Saturday (884A.00TA/10–450). Consulate General Jerusalem advised, on October 11, that the Israelis regarded Jerusalem as their capital city and that the Government, except for the Foreign Office and the Ministry of National Defense, functioned there (despatch 127, 784.00/10–1150). 2 The Department of State in reply on October 12 requested Embassy Tel Aviv to express to the Prime Minister the Department’s appreciation of his attitude concerning the Yarmuk area and the Bedouins and to “Reiterate belief that conciliatory gestures in matters of this nature should help prepare way for settlement not only with Jordan and Egypt but also with other Arab states.” (Telegram 171, 684A.85/10–1250) Chargé Ford advised, on October 17, that “on personal visit to disputed zone on October 14 I saw neither man or beast anywhere within area, only evidence any recent activity being small plowed tract of not more than five acres. Military Attaché also on visit inspection October 9 found similar state of abandon. Israelis have of course made no admission of withdrawal and are not likely to do so unless and until they feel some advantage may thereby be reaped.” (Telegram 220 from Tel Aviv, 684A.85/10–1750) Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly 320/10–1050 [Document 572] Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly 1 confidential [ Washington ,] October 10, 1950. SD/A/C.1/342/Rev 1 Question of Jerusalem the problem The problem is to determine the position which the Delegation should take on the question of Jerusalem. The Assembly will have before it a resolution and a report from the Trusteeship Council transmitting the text of the Statute approved by the Council pursuant to the resolution adopted by the Fourth Session of the Assembly. The Council’s resolution states that: “it appears that neither government [Israel or Jordan] 2 is prepared to collaborate in the implementation of the Statute as approved by the Trusteeship Council.” Accordingly, it is anticipated that a general discussion of the question of Jerusalem will again take place at the Assembly. recommendations 1. The basic position of the delegation should be to encourage such a solution of the Jerusalem question as will be acceptable to Israel and Jordan and meet with general concurrence by the world community. 2. Accordingly, the Delegation should oppose any plan which does not have the elements of acceptability indicated in Recommendation 1. The Delegation should oppose any proposal to implement the Statute drawn up pursuant to the resolution of the Fourth General Assembly, 3 since this plan is manifestly unacceptable to Israel and Jordan. Similarly, the Delegation should oppose any new schemes for internationalization of Jerusalem in a degree comparable to that involved in last year’s resolution on the grounds that such schemes are unrealistic and incapable of gaining the acceptance of Israel and Jordan. 3. The Delegation should maintain a flexible position on other types of proposals for Jerusalem which may be advanced by other delegations until such time as there appears to be a good opportunity of reaching agreement on a generally acceptable solution. Consequently, the Delegation should not take a leading position, and particularly should not sponsor any proposal which is not clearly likely to receive general acceptance. However, the United States should urge all parties to take a moderate approach and to endeavor to reconcile differences on the Jerusalem question. On this basis, the Delegation should freely participate in informal discussions of any reasonable plans which may be brought forward. These might include, for instance, such middle ground proposals as the Swedish-Netherlands plan and the Garreau plan, if any of them, or variations of them are brought forward for consideration. With regard to the suggestions put forward by the Government of Israel, in its memorandum to the Trusteeship Council dated May 26, 1950, 4 the Delegation should take the position that if Israel and Jordan should agree on this or any other plan, the other Members should give this important fact careful consideration with a view to seeing whether the proposal in question could be used as a basis for efforts toward a solution acceptable to a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly. 4. If the 1949 resolution on Jerusalem continues to be unacceptable to Israel and Jordan and if it appears impossible for the Assembly to reach agreement on any plan acceptable to Israel, Jordan, and the world community, the Delegation should consider whether broad agreement, including the concurrence of Israel and Jordan, could not be reached on a resolution reiterating the United Nations interest in the status of Jerusalem and calling upon the Secretary-General to send a UN representative to Jerusalem, with staff, to represent the United Nations interest in the City pending further decisions of the UN on the status of the City. We should take a strongly affirmative attitude that it is possible to reconcile differences and achieve a reasonable solution which will satisfy the main objectives of all parties in interest. However, we would be best advised not to come out at an early stage in support of any particular plan. Last year we helped prepare and supported the Palestine Conciliation Commission’s proposals, which we considered a reasonable basis for a solution. These proposals gained little support and we do not believe therefore that anything would be gained by continuing to support the proposals themselves this year, although use might be made of certain of the elements contained therein, other than those relating to the concept of a corpus separatum or which might tend to produce a complex administrative structure. In addition, we have little reason to believe that our strong support of any particular plan would greatly influence other delegations on a matter of such religious and emotional value. On the contrary, the result might be in the opposite direction. We can, however, constantly advocate that all reasonable plans be carefully examined by all parties concerned and that every effort should be made to get such agreed modifications as will permit a solution. We should participate in such discussions and should feel free to talk with the sponsors and other parties in interest on any number of alternative plans that might be brought forward. This procedure, carried on for the most part outside of meetings, might reveal a solution which could gain general acceptance. Undoubtedly, the best prospect of a solution would arise if Israel and Jordan should agree on a plan. If this occurred, it might be expected to be somewhat along the lines of the Israeli proposal. Certain countries would in these circumstances probably attempt to insist upon a greater degree of internationalization. The United States should in such case use its influence to further a solution which was acceptable to the parties and to the world community. If a solution appeared possible based on Israel–Jordan agreement on a proposal along the lines of the Israeli plan, we should be prepared to support the probable desires of some delegations to have the regime of the Holy Places extended beyond those places indicated in the Israeli plan and made to include other “religious buildings and sites in the area of Jerusalem and the routes giving immediate access to them,” as prescribed in previous proposals. We should also be prepared to support further reasonable measures looking toward a greater degree of internationalization, if we believe the parties will accept or acquiesce in them and if by the adoption of such measures the acceptance of a statute by a majority of the General Assembly can be assured. In view of the possible inability of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council to effect a resolution of the problem of some sort of international regime for Jerusalem and the Holy Places, the standing guidance to the Delegation would appear to be that approved by the President last year to the effect that if the General Assembly was unable to agree upon detailed and definite arrangements, the Delegation should support some other form of temporary arrangements for the Jerusalem area which, pending further consideration by the Assembly, would provide the necessary protection of and access to the Holy Places under UN supervision and which would offer further opportunity for an agreement which would be acceptable not only to Israel and Jordan but also to the other members of the United Nations (Gadel 110 November 21, 1949). 1 The authorship of this paper is not indicated. Its origins, however, may be traced back to the draft prepared by James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs on August 31. The draft was given control number SD/A/C.1/342 on September 11. The changes in the revision of October 10, through the first paragraph of recommendation numbered 4, are those of language. The original draft concluded with five numbered comments. The comments, as such, have been omitted from the revision but the sense of some of the comments has been incorporated into a greatly amplified recommendation 4. A carbon copy of the original draft is filed in IO Files, Lot 74 D 440, Committee 1 Originals. 2 Brackets appear in the source text. 3 The resolution of December 9, 1949. 4 See telegram 443, May 19, from New York and footnote 1 thereto, p. 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] . The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 320/10–1050: Telegram [Document 573] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) secret Washington , October 13, 1950—8 p. m. Gadel 43. Re Delgas 101 and 102, 1 Dept’s views on Swedish-Netherlands draft res re Jerusalem are as follows: 1. Pursuant to position contained SD/A/C.1/342/Rev, 2 USDel shld not express at this stage views pro or con overall draft. Del shld watch closely for any indication Res’s acquiring voting strength. 2. It wld appear appropriate make a few informal observations on draft Res, but such comments, if made, shld be presented as in interest of perfecting Res. Shld be made clear US not participating in drafting Res. Suggestions follow: Invitation to Govts and States of Holy Land to make pledge before UN and thereupon enumerating items to be pledged appears satisfactory; particularly shld be noted emphasis on reducing armed forces in Jerusalem area by progressive stages rather than former concept of complete demilitarization. This makes proposal more realistic and shld make it more acceptable Israel and Jordan. In para A ref to “States in the Holy Land” not clear. Shld this not be limited to Israel and Jordan by direct ref? Dept presumes ref to internatl regime in para B before Art I applies to Jerusalem area only. Suggest this be made clear. [Here follow comments and suggested changes in wording of the draft resolution by the Department of State and a request for comment.] Acheson 1 Both dated October 10; neither printed. The latter message transmitted the text of the draft resolution, said to have been prepared by the Netherlands and Swedish Delegates, with the collaboration of the British Delegate (320/10–1050). The draft resolution was subsequently introduced by the Swedish Delegate alone; for its nature, see the second paragraph of the editorial note on p. 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] . 2 Dated October 10, supra . Editorial Note [Document 574] Editorial Note Embassy Cairo, on October 18, advised that Colonel Ismail Chirine, brother-in-law of King Farouk and Director of the Egyptian Administration of Palestine, came to see Ambassador Caffery a few days before, together with Azzam Pasha. On the 17th, the Ambassador received an aide-mémoire , dated October 10, from the Foreign Office that dealt with Colonel Chirine’s remarks. The aide-mémoire denounced the “continual and illicit presence of Israeli forces” at Om Rashrash and Bir Kattar near the Gulf of Akaba as violations of the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement of 1949 (despatch 932). The Department replied on November 18 that “it would be inappropriate to comment on this matter since it clearly falls within jurisdiction of Mixed Armistice Commission and Special Committee established by Egypto-Israeli General Armistice of February 24, 1949. Should Colonel Chirine Bey raise matter with the Embassy again, it is suggested that you might wish to point out that, while we are not in a position to comment on these particular questions, the US Government is most anxious that letter and spirit of General Armistice Agreement be observed and believes machinery which has been established is entirely adequate to resolve any problems which may arise.” (Airgram 192) Despatch 932 and airgram 192 are both filed under 674.84A/10–1850. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 320.2AB/10–2050 [Document 575] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] October 20, 1950. Subject: Situation of Israel. Participants: S—The Secretary Mr. Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the US NE—Mr. Rockwell I received Messrs. Sharett and Eban at their request. 2 Mr. Sharett began the conversation by expressing Israel’s pleasure at having been elected to the Peace Observation Commission. He said that Israel was grateful for US support of its candidacy. Mr. Sharett then began a lengthy discussion of the Israeli immigration situation. He described the numbers of Jewish immigrants arriving daily in this country, and said that Israel considered it to be its destiny to accept all Jews who wished to come. For the next few years it was hoped to receive 200,000 Jews annually, but thereafter the flow would most certainly begin to diminish. Although the Government did not publicly say so, Mr. Sharett continued, it was making efforts to restrict the immigration according to the absorptive possibilities of the moment. Thus, a system of priorities had been set up. At present the highest priorities were accorded to Iraq and Rumania, while countries where the Jewish communities were not suffering undue hardships, such as Turkey, were accorded low priority. Mr. Sharett said that the all-out immigration policy of the Israeli Government should be of interest to the US Government because through it manpower was siphoned from the Soviet reservoir into the Western reservoir. There was another advantage in that the Israel immigration policy was eliminating potential trouble spots. The Jewish community in Yemen, for example, had been transported to Israel practically in its entirety. Mr. Sharett declared that the Israeli Government believed it was entitled to help in carrying out its destiny of receiving Jews from all over the world. Israel was prepared to face starvation and disaster in order to accomplish this end, but the Government naturally did not desire to do so if other means of accomplishing the purpose could be found. To date the American Jewish community had been unprecedentedly generous. Israel itself cheerfully was facing a harsh austerity regime, and in emptying the displaced persons camps in Germany had, Mr. Sharett felt, greatly assisted the US by lifting the burden of caring for the displaced persons. Mr. Sharret believed that the US should undertake a program of financial assistance to the Near East which would involve aiding Israel to absorb immigrants and aiding the Arab states to resettle the Palestine refugees. One of the most immediate needs which Israel was facing was that of an adequate food supply. Although he was not making a request at this time, Mr. Sharett wondered whether it would not be possible for the US to arrange for the shipment of food supplies to Israel, either on a grant basis or on very long-term credit arrangements. There were precedents for this in the recent cases of India and Yugoslavia. I said that frankly I did not consider India and Yugoslavia to be very good examples of precedents. There was real famine in these countries, and we had really had to torture procedures in order to help the Indians and the Yugoslavs. The conversation then turned to the world situation. Mr. Sharett believed that with the action in Korea and the passage by the General Assembly of the Uniting For Peace resolution the possibility of a third world war had greatly receded. The Russians had learned a lesson. I said that I agreed that the Russians had been taught something, but that I did not believe their purpose had in any way been altered. No one should be fooled by the appearance of Russian geniality at Lake Success. There was always the possibility of trouble in some other part of the world. I said that in this connection it seemed to us essential that the Near Eastern problem be solved as quickly as possible. The trouble was that when people in the Near East had the opportunity to do right things to help solve the problem, they seemed to do the wrong things. We were particularly concerned over the plight of the Arab refugees and believed that urgent steps should be taken to solve it. Messrs. Sharett and Eban then took their departure. Dean Acheson 1 Drafted by Mr. Rockwell. 2 In a memorandum of October 19, Mr. McGhee transmitted to Secretary Acheson a summary of points that Mr. Sharett might raise in their conversation the following day and recommendations as to the comments by the Secretary. Among the recommendations were: “We believe that a more conciliatory Israeli attitude toward the Arab States is necessary if progress is to be made toward a settlement. Israel should make a prior concession on one of the outstanding issues”; “The United States has consistently supported reasonable internationalization of the Jerusalem area. We do not wish to take the initiative at this time, but would support a solution providing for an international regime which was acceptable to Jordan, Israel and the international community”; “We are informed that the current Israeli request for a $35 million Ex-Im Bank loan for agricultural purposes is being studied by the Ex-Im Bank and the National Advisory Council, and that a decision should be reached in the near future … but some months ago [we] informed the Israeli representatives in Washington that there was no objection to the floating of an Israeli bond issue in the US”; “We recommend that you again inform the Foreign Minister of our position” with respect to military equipment for Israel, i.e., that “the US is unable to assist in the development of an Army. The shipment of heavy equipment is not possible because of prior commitments in other parts of the world. We have already approved export licenses totalling approximately $1,000,000 in light equipment for Israel”; and “Israel has a responsibility to assist in the solution of the refugee question through repatriation and compensation. We are encouraged by indications received through conversations with Israeli representatives in New York that Israel is prepared to consider making compensation outside the context of a general peace settlement. Such action might help persuade the Arabs to talk about other matters.” (611.84A/10–1950) In the summary of daily meeting with the Secretary on October 12, the question of the Export-Import Bank loan to Israel was discussed. Adrian S. Fisher, the Legal Adviser, indicated that the “Department preferred to let this one drag out until after the General Assembly but in view of White House interest it seemed difficult to do. After some discussion, it was decided that he should take the position at the Export-Import Bank meeting this morning that the Department would interpose no political objection but that we preferred to handle the loan in the normal course of events rather than rush it through.” (Secretary’s memoranda, Lot 53 D 444) The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 784.00/10–2450: Telegram [Document 576] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State confidential Amman , October 24, 1950—2 p. m. 82. As Department may have learned from UK at UN, British Minister here has obtained acceptance in principle subject to certain reservations of King and Council of Ministers of Sweden–Netherlands draft resolution on Jerusalem. Jordan observer Ahmad Tukan is fully authorized to accept it on behalf of his government. While he has been instructed to propose addition of provision regarding exchange of Jewish and Arab quarters in Jerusalem, it is not believed that Jordan will press this point as it was introduced by one Cabinet member at meeting where resolution was agreed to and was not urged by other members of government. Principal modifications to be proposed by Jordan are: [Here follow six principal modifications.] Kirkbride tells me that King Abdullah welcomed proposed draft enthusiastically and hopes that its adoption may effect final settlement of Jerusalem issue. I gathered that Cabinet also took constructive attitude. In event our delegation takes active role in Jerusalem issue, I am confident it will find Jordan observer Ahmad Tukan intelligent in approach and cooperative in attitude. 1 Department pass London, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, USUN. Sent Department 82, repeated info London 31, Tel Aviv 26, Jerusalem 32, USUN 3. Drew 1 Embassy Tel Aviv, on November 2, reported information from an official of the Israeli Foreign Office that the Israeli Government regarded the Netherlands Swedish plan for Jersusalem with general favor (telegram 264, 357.AC/11–250). Legation Amman informed the Department on November 19 that the Jordanian Cabinet had put aside the demand for the exchange of territory but had raised a new series of objections to the proposed resolution. It also advised that the “King believed genuinely desire solution along lines of proposed resolution but unwilling to override cabinet.” (Telegram 96, 784.00/11–1950) The same telegram advised that the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other Cabinet members had expressed to Minister Drew their “general lack of enthusiasm for any action on Jerusalem at this time.” The Minister, for his part, refrained from any expression of views “other than hope that solution satisfactory to all concerned would be reached this GA session.” Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler IO Files, Lot 71 D 440 [Document 577] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Wells Stabler secret [ New York ,] October 26, 1950. US/A/AC.38/167 Subject: Refugees Participants: H. E. Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Delegation Mr. Gideon Rafael, Israeli Delegation Mr. Arthur Lourie, Israeli Delegation Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Delegation Ambassador John B. Blandford, Jr., PRA Representative Mr. John C. Boss, United States Delegation Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner, United States Delegation Mr. Wells Stabler, United States Delegation At lunch yesterday Ambassador Blandford outlined to the Israeli Delegation the contents of the PRA report 1 and explained what PRA had in mind with respect to reintegration. Mr. Ross indicated that he felt Israeli opposition to reaffirmation of the resolution of December 11, 1948 was unrealistic and believed that more harm than good would be done by such opposition. He also suggested to the Israelis that, in view of their desire for peace, it was incumbent on them to remove the “key log” to break the log jam. In this connection he suggested that a more forthcoming attitude on the question of compensation might contribute to a solution and would certainly be in line with the PRA concept of a reintegration fund. Mr. Eban said that he realized that the December 11, 1948 resolution was still on the books, but felt that its reaffirmation could have no other effect than to retard what was believed to be growing realization on the part of the Arab states that resettlement was the only answer. The Israeli Government had been informed by the PCC that it had found amongst the Arabs a more realistic attitude on resettlement versus repatriation. With respect to compensation, the Israeli Delegation had always accepted the principle that the refugees should be compensated for their losses. However, they had no indication that the immediate payment of compensation would contribute towards a settlement between the Arabs and Israel. On the contrary, the Arabs are more than ever convinced that their economic blockade will eventually force Israel to its knees and there are signs that the Arabs are tightening the economic blockade. This blockade, Eban asserted, had done considerable damage to Israel, even though its extent might not be known to the Arab states. However, with regard to compensation, it might well be that the Arab states would feel that by extorting large sums of money from Israel they could further weaken Israel’s economic position. In other words, the compensation demands would, therefore, be satisfied. Mr. Ross and Ambassador Blandford argued that this was not realistic and that one had to look at this question from a humanitarian point of view. There were eight or nine hundred thousand refugees with no place to go and at the present time without hope. They were now entering their third winter and this impasse could no longer continue. Israel had a definite responsibility towards these refugees and must condition itself to make a substantial contribution to its solution. This solution would not only include compensation, but the repatriation of a number of refugees. Mr. Eban said that his delegation would report fully what had been said at the meeting and would propose to his Government the possibility of Israel paying a substantial sum for the purpose of the reintegration fund. This payment could be considered in the nature of compensation. Wells Stabler 1 See the editorial note, p. 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] . Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Battle) Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444 [Document 578] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State ( Battle ) confidential [ Washington ,] October 26, 1950. Item 6. Israeli Loan Application The Secretary told me after his appointment with the President today, that he had discussed the Israeli loan application with him, and that the President had indicated he would look into the matter and speak to the Secretary again. The Secretary said that meanwhile he would discuss this matter with Mr. Webb. L[ ucius ] D. B[ attle ] The Chargé in Syria (Jones) to the Secretary of State 357.AC/10–2650: Telegram [Document 579] The Chargé in Syria ( Jones ) to the Secretary of State restricted Damascus , October 26, 1950—noon. 200. Re Deptel 143, October 17. 1 Legation believes Prime Minister Qudsi’s understanding basis Syria coup [apparent omission] PRA is that projects not be directly identified with resettlement refugees until political settlement Palestine problem. While some Syrians may privately concede that resettlement is not only inevitable but even desirable and while UNRWA projects must eventually be identified with resettlement, it is doubtful if Syrians generally are psychologically prepared to now move along as fast as reference telegram contemplates. There may therefore be adverse reaction from government and press to blunt proposal that UN funds be available only for “projects initiated by NE governments which repatriate or reestablish refugees”. 2 Sent Department 200, repeated info unnumbered, Beirut from Damascus. Jones 1 This was a repeat of telegram 342 to Cairo, not printed; but see penultimate paragraph of the editorial note on p. 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] . 2 Taken from the sentence in telegram 141, which read as follows: “30 million as initial contribution to a reintegration fund to be available only for projects initiated by NE govts which repatriate or reestab refugees.” The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 357.AC/10–2650: Telegram [Document 580] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 1 restricted Washington , October 27, 1950—6 p. m. 153. Reurtel 200, Oct. 26. In discussions of PRA report with Syrian officials you shld emphasize that “reintegration” means either repatriation or resettlement according to free choice of refugees and govts themselves. The funds are to be available for this purpose and for relief alone. It is precisely to afford refugees a choice which they have previously not had that this concept has been estabd. Urinfo. In conversations this week with Arab Dels to UNGA this concept was explained to their satis by Blandford and USDel members. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to Cairo, Beirut, and USUN. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 320.2AA/11–150 [Document 581] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President confidential Washington , November 1, 1950. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees has submitted a report to the General Assembly recommending a program for the period July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1952. This Agency has been carrying out a relief and works program in the Near East along the lines recommended by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East, headed by Mr. Gordon Clapp, and approved by the General Assembly in December, 1949. The recommended program calls for the creation of a reintegration fund which can be used by the Agency for projects to reestablish refugees and remove them from the relief rolls. The amount requested for this fund for the fiscal year 1952 is $30,000,000. The report of the Agency makes the following statement regarding this fund: “The establishment of the fund of $30 million constitutes a first step (without commitment as to the future) in a major undertaking to reintegrate the majority of over three quarters of a million refugees, which may ultimately entail the expenditure of several hundred million dollars over a period of years.” The Agency also recommends that $20,000,000 be made available for the necessary continuation of direct relief, during fiscal 1952, for refugees who have not been reestablished. The Department must instruct the Delegation to the General Assembly on this matter which, unexpectedly, has just been scheduled for consideration November 1. The work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the Near East during the past five months has stimulated thinking among the Arab Governments on the possibilities of finding an economic solution to the refugee problem. It is hoped that this in turn may lead to a political solution. The reintegration fund would be available for refugee resettlement in Israel as well as in the Arab States. There is evidence that the fund could be used to advantage for this stated purpose. The Department considers that the proposed program is an important step toward settlement of differences outstanding between Israel and the Arab States, as it looks toward removal of the issue raised by the refugees. The program has in the past received strong support on humanitarian grounds, and the plight of the refugees, now entering their third winter, becomes more desperate than ever. We cannot overlook the threat to stability raised by this mass of homeless people, fertile ground for the spread of Communist dissidence in this sensitive and strategic area. When this program was considered in 1949 and 1950, it was strongly supported by the Department of Defense. We understand that the views of the Defense Department are unchanged and that Defense agrees that we should continue effective measures to prevent this body of refugees, numbering 800,000 people, from becoming a graver menace to the stability of the area. In the past the United States has agreed to contribute 50% of the estimated costs of the program. The Department expects to submit to you a firm recommendation regarding the United States contribution for the fiscal year 1952 at an early date. Proposals for grants in aid to Near Eastern States are currently under consideration within the Government. The Department considers that such a bilateral program of grant aid is necessary as a concurrent measure. Reestablishment of the refugees cannot be successfully achieved unless the economies of the Near East are expanding in such a way as to provide employment opportunities throughout the entire economy. Grant aid is estimated to require provision of $25,000,000 during fiscal 1952. In the execution of the two programs, administrative arrangements can provide for due coordination. Recommendation: That the Department be authorized to instruct the Delegation to support the recommendations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the General Assembly. 1 Dean Acheson 1 Marginal notation by President Truman: “Approved 11/1/50”. Editorial Note [Document 582] Editorial Note The Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly began its deliberations on the Palestine refugee question on November 1, centering its attention on Major General Kennedy’s report of October 6. Ambassador Austin, on November 1, advised the Department that “3 Arab speakers in morning confined themselves to preliminary remarks of approval, and since no speakers volunteered during afternoon session, Committee adjourned until 3 o’clock November 2. Seemed obvious that most delegations not prepared. However, since debate so far confined to report as economic and humanitarian subject, and since it seems unlikely there will be large scale opposition, Palestine Working Group believes it desirable that US table as soon as possible, preferably November 3, resolution along lines that contained position paper, (US/A/AC.38/191)” (telegram Delga 214 from New York, 320/11–150; US/A/AC.38/191, not printed). The summary of the deliberations on November 1 is printed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 30 September to 14 December 1950 (hereinafter cited as GA (V), Ad Hoc Political Committee ), pages 193 ff. The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 320/11–250: Telegram [Document 583] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority New York , November 2, 1950—2:55 p. m. Delga 216. Palestine Working Group met with representatives UKDel morning November 2 to discuss tactics on PRA item in Ad Hoc Committee. Following points covered: 1. Sponsorship of resolution . Group agreed it would be desirable for resolution in support PRA report be sponsored by UK, US, France, Turkey and Canada. 2. Method of financing . We explained our present preference for procedure involving reference resolution without financial clauses to Committee 5 for advice as to best means of financing program. UK representatives strongly defended voluntary contribution system. They stressed their belief that method of financing is political matter which should be decided in Ad Hoc Committee. They thought it quite possible that refugee program needs may exceed funds available, and objected to any procedure whereby nations would be expected to accept obligations they might not be able to honor. UK representatives also maintained that changing from voluntary to assessment system might throw open question of organization of agency and create possibility undesirable elements who might contribute under assessment system might also seek representation in agency. UK representatives believed present method, whereby agency in effect controlled by UK and US but other nations participated through voluntary contributions, eminently satisfactory. Since no agreement was reached on this point it was decided to consider it again at an early date. 1 3. Resolution . UK representatives expressed general agreement with resolution as contained in position paper. 2 They had several suggestions for strengthening resolution and it was decided to meet again evening November 2 to work out possible changes. Austin 1 The Department, on November 3, instructed the United States Mission at the United Nations that “If final attempt secure acceptance US financial proposals PRA by co-sponsors fails, Ross in conversation with co-sponsors and UK in particular shld attempt secure agreement to have PRA financing discussed Comite 5 only, and then only after decision on Korea financing, in recognition agreement on our part not to oppose a continuation voluntary financing PRA when taken up Comite 5.” (Telegram Gadel 91, 320/11–350) 2 US/A/AC.38/191, not printed. The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 320/11–350: Telegram [Document 584] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State secret New York , November 3, 1950—7:36 p. m. Delga 228. Following are Delga decisions November 3: Palestine Refugees. Ad Hoc Political Committee situation described and draft resolution (US/A/AC.38/191) 1 summarized. It was explained difficult decision would have to be taken on financing of program; it had been hoped at least tentative commitments from number other countries re their contributions could be obtained before action on program taken in committee and resolution adopted. Present negotiations disclosed impossibility obtaining such commitments, so that it now appeared necessary for committee to approve program without specific financial provisions. We would hope between now and time program sent to Congress for action information would become available re financial support forthcoming from other UN members. Delegation aware of problem which would arise in event US turned out to be sole or main contributor to UN program. Relationship between financing Palestine refugee program and Korean relief noted. It was stated it would also be desirable, insofar as possible, to integrate our unilateral economic program in NE with refugee program. Delegation accepted draft resolution as basis for further negotiations other delegations. 2 [Here follows final paragraph dealing with the “Cuban item on representation”.] Austin 1 Dated October 30, not printed. 2 Ambassador Austin, at 1:19 a. m. on November 3, informed the Department that “We are in urgent need of further instructions for conduct of Palestine refugee case in Ad Hoc Political Committee. Committee adjourned this afternoon [November 2] until Saturday morning [November 4]. Parliamentary situation such I consider essential we be prepared introduce and speak to resolution at Saturday’s meeting. Time fortunately [ unfortunately? ] available Friday less than minimum needed for perfection resolution with co-sponsors (UK, France, Turkey, Canada) and for discussions with Arab, Israeli and other delegations. We are meeting with British again this evening, with co-sponsors at 11 Friday morning, and will have other discussions Friday afternoon. Meanwhile, however, we do not have basis for carrying on this work in absence of decision on method of financing.” (Telegram Delga 222 from New York, 320/11–350) The summary of the Committee’s deliberations on November 2 is printed in GA (V), Ad Hoc Political Committee , pp. 199 ff. Actually it was as early as November 2 that the U.S. Delegation began discussions with several foreign delegations to secure agreement on a draft resolution for assistance to Palestine refugees. The Delegation reported these developments in various telegrams which are filed under 320 in Department of State records. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations 357.AC/11–1550 [Document 585] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Edward P. Maffitt, Adviser to the United States Delegation at the United Nations confidential [ New York ,] November 6, 1950. Subject: Palestine Participants: Dr. Ralph Bunche—Director, Division of Trusteeship, UN General William Riley—Chief of Staff, Palestine Truce Supervision Organization Ambassador Gross, 1 Mr. Ross, Mr. Ludlow, 2 Mr. Rockwell, Mr. Maffitt The above met in Dr. Bunche’s office late Saturday afternoon, the 4th, to discuss Palestine developments. Dr. Bunche reported that Dr. Farid Zeineddine (Syria) had approached him on October 27 indicating a conciliatory attitude toward the Palestine issue. He said he had come to the conclusion that the present would be a propitious time to wind up the Palestine question and he wondered whether Dr. Bunche would arrange for a talk to be held between the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ambassador Gross, Dr. Bunche and himself. Some skepticism regarding the depth of the Arabs’ conciliatory feeling was voiced, but it was felt that Zeineddine’s idea should be followed up. Ambassador Gross was disposed to attend the proposed meeting and Bunche said he would so inform Zeineddine. Although it was clear that the meeting proposed by Zeineddine had nothing to do with present Palestine matters before the Security Council, it was agreed that developments in the Council, such as the submission of a resolution, might complicate or obstruct the conversation suggested by Zeineddine. In that connection Gross reported that Tsiang (China) had told him that morning that he thought Fawzi (Egypt) had suggested he present a resolution calling on the Israelis to evacuate Bir Qattar and take back the expelled Bedouins. Tsiang was not very clear about just what Fawzi had suggested he do, because of Fawzi’s “Dance of the Seven Veils” technique, but gathered that the Egyptian wanted him to check around among the Members and ascertain their reaction to such a draft resolution. Ross said he thought the Israelis had authorization to depart somewhat from their rigid line. Bunche said that if the Arabs, or any of them, really wanted settlement, something might be done. Riley added that Fawzi had told him that if Bir Qattar and the Bedouin matter were cleared up satisfactorily to Egypt, he might be able to proceed toward a non-aggression pact with Israel in association with other Arab States. This would be more a psychological than a practical matter since the Armistice Agreements already contain adequate undertaking against aggression. It was felt among the group that an effort should be made to have the Security Council meeting scheduled for the following Monday put off, and Bunche and Riley undertook to talk to Shiloah (Israel) and try to persuade him to commit the Israelis to get out of Bir Qattar by Monday. If successful they would inform Gross who would call Tsiang and explore the possibility of the latter’s suggesting to Fawzi that the Egyptian seek postponement of the meeting. Clarifying the Yarmuk situation somewhat, Riley said that while technically, in accordance with the maps, Israel had a right to be in the enclave, equitably it did not since the land was undeniably Jordan territory. The Jordanian, el Jundi, who had signed the map had apparently been nodding. He did not think that Israel would leave the territory until the issue went through the Mixed Armistice Commission. Edward P. Maffitt 1 Ernest A. Gross, U.S. Deputy Representative at the United Nations. 2 James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs; at this time, on detail to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations. Revised Joint Draft Resolution Introduced on November 7, 1950 in the “Ad Hoc” Political Committee by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Document A/AC.38/L.28/Rev. 1) [Document 586] Revised Joint Draft Resolution Introduced on November 7, 1950 in the “Ad Hoc” Political Committee by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States ( Document A/AC.38/L.28/Rev. 1 ) 1 November 7, 1950 The General Assembly , Recalling its resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, Having examined the report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (A/1451); and the report of the Secretary-General concerning United Nations relief for Palestine refugees (A/1452), 1. Notes that contributions sufficient to carry out the programme authorized in paragraph 6 of resolution 302 (IV) have not been made, and urges Governments which have not yet done so to make every effort to make voluntary contributions in response to paragraph 13 of that resolution; 2. Recognizes that direct relief cannot be terminated as provided in paragraph 6 of resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949; 3. Authorizes the Agency to continue to furnish direct relief to refugees in need, and considers that for the period 1 July 1951, to 30 June 1952, the equivalent of approximately $20,000,000 will be required for direct relief to refugees who are not yet reintegrated into the economy of the Near East; 4. Considers that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, * the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement is essential in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available, and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area; 5. Instructs the Agency to establish a reintegration fund which shall be utilized for projects requested by any government in the Near East and approved by the Agency for the permanent re-establishment of refugees and their removal from relief; 6. Considers that for the period 1 July 1951, to 30 June 1952, not less than the equivalent of $30 million should be contributed to the Agency for the purposes set forth in paragraph 5 above; 7. Authorizes the Agency as circumstances permit, to transfer funds available for the current relief and works programmes, and for the relief programme provided in paragraph 3, to reintegration projects provided for in paragraph 5; 8. (Method of financing) 9. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding $5 million from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December 1951; 10. Calls upon the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to utilize to the fullest extent the Agency’s facilities as a point of reference and co-ordination for technical assistance programmes in the countries in which the Agency is operating; 11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the International Labour Organisation, and the Food and Agriculture Organization for the assistance which they have rendered and urges them to continue to furnish all possible assistance to the Agency; 12. Commends the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends Service Committee for their invaluable service and whole-hearted co-operation in the distribution of relief supplies until those functions were taken over by the Agency; 13. Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations, the programmes of which have brought much needed supplementary assistance to the Palestine refugees, and urges them to continue and expand, to the extent possible, the work which they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees; 14. Extends appreciation and thanks to the Director and staff of the Agency and the members of the Advisory Commission for their effective and devoted work. 2 1 Reprinted from United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Agenda Item 20, Annexes (hereinafter cited as GA (V), Agenda Item 20, Annexes ), p. 34. * The original draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.28) did not contain the words “without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948”. [Footnote in the source text. The insertion was submitted by the Pakistani Representative on November 7 as an amendment to the joint draft resolution and was accepted by its four sponsors (GA (V), Ad Hoc Political Committee , pp. 215 and 216).] 2 Mr. John C. Ross of the U.S. Delegation discussed the joint draft resolution in his statement to the Ad Hoc Political Committee on November 7. He noted that the response to the General Assembly’s appeal for voluntary contributions of $54,900,000 under resolution 320 (IV) had not been as generous as hoped. He indicated that paragraph 8 of the draft resolution dealing with the method of financing refugee assistance had been left open and suggested that the Ad Hoc Political Committee should seek the views of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly for its advice on this crucial question. Mohamed Fadhil al-Jamali, the Iraqi Representative, denounced the tendency to disregard the legitimate rights of the Arabs to return to their homes. The only permanent solution to the problem, in his view, was “to compel those who had despoiled the Arabs of their homes to comply with the decisions of the General Assembly and to restore to the Arabs the property which they had looted. The United Nations could not acquiesce in or remain indifferent to such a violation of property rights, or the usurpation of the rights of one group of human beings, by another.” He refused to accept the joint draft resolution because it completely ignored resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. Abba Eban indicated that his Delegation had been prepared to support the joint draft resolution but was now reserving its position because of the Pakistani amendment. He asserted that Israel “could not agree to give any special legal validity to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 as distinct from the entire resolution, which called upon the parties to negotiate a final settlement of all issues outstanding between them. It was legitimate to interpret the reiteration of the 1948 formula as an injunction to the effect that 800,000 or 900,000 Arab refugees could, if they chose, be resettled in Israel. That idea was neither feasible or practical.” The statements of Messrs. Ross, al-Jamali, and Eban are printed in GA (V), Ad Hoc Political Committee , pp. 207, 212, and 216, respectively. Various changes were made in the draft resolution of November 7, after consultation with Arab, Israeli, and other delegations. Telegrams documenting these changes are in the Department of State files under 320. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James M. Ludlow 357.AC/11–1550 [Document 587] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. James M. Ludlow secret [ New York ,] November 15, 1950. Participants: General Riley Mr. Ludlow Yesterday afternoon, General Riley informed me that he had had conversations with Salah-El-Din, Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Tarazi of the Syrian Delegation, concerning the suggestion which had been made by Zeineddine to Dr. Bunche about ten days ago that Arab representatives have a conference with Dr. Bunche and Ambassador Gross concerning possible political steps which might be taken during the General Assembly to ameliorate the overall Palestine situation. General Riley said that both Salah-El-Din and Tarazi seemed to be fully acquainted with Zeineddine’s proposal and felt that it would be desirable to arrange a date for the suggested conference. Salah-El-Din stated that he wished to consult with Fawzi Bey concerning Egyptian views and that he would advise Riley within a day or two on the possibility of a date for the get-together. Ambassador Gross has already conveyed to Zeineddine directly and through Dr. Bunche and General Riley his willingness to be available for any discussions which might take place and has requested me to keep in touch with General Riley and Dr. Bunche on any developments. Editorial Note [Document 588] Editorial Note The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of Committee 5 reported on November 16 concerning the method of financing the relief and reintegration program for Palestine refugees, as proposed in the revised joint draft resolution of November 7. The Advisory Committee concluded that “After a careful review of the circumstances, including many alternative methods of financing, the Advisory Committee, while proposing a voluntary basis for United Nations contributions, recommends the very early appointment of a negotiating committee composed of seven members for the purpose of negotiating as soon as possible, during the current session of the General Assembly, with Member and non-member States the amounts which Governments may be willing to contribute to: “( i ) The current programme for relief and works for the period ending 30 June 1951, bearing in mind the need for securing contributions from Member States which have not yet contributed; and “( ii ) The program of relief and reintegration projects envisaged in the draft resolution (A/AC.38/L.28/Rev. 1) for the year ending 30 June 1952.” The full text of the Advisory Committee’s report is printed as A/1516 in GA (V), Agenda Item 20, Annexes , page 37. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 786.00/11–2050 [Document 589] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] November 20, 1950. Subject: Your Appointment with Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League on Friday, November 24 at 12 Noon. Discussion: Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, is calling on you Friday, November 24 at 12 Noon. 1 He is visiting Washington at the Department’s suggestion and has been here since November 20. In view of the important position he holds in the Arab world, we believe it desirable to exchange views with him on a number of matters affecting US-Arab relations. Although Azzam Pasha strongly opposed the U.S. position during the Palestine affair, and still feels deeply on the subject, he has more recently shown a more friendly and moderate attitude towards the U.S. Ambassador Caffery has maintained close relations with Azzam Pasha and has found him helpful on a number of questions of importance to us. One recent example was the Arab League consideration in June 1950 of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950 on Security in the Near East when Azzam Pasha persuaded the League members to draft a moderate resolution on the question. The Department has for some time believed that the almost complete preoccupation of the Arab League with political matters has resulted in its being a disturbing influence in the Near East. If it were possible for the League to concentrate increasingly on social and economic problems common to the area as a whole, it might become a force for good rather than discord. It is suggested that you might wish to stress to Azzam Pasha the line which is suggested in the attached memorandum (Tab A). 2 Azzam Pasha may wish to bring up one or a number of subjects of interest to the Arab States and there is attached a memorandum on these topics (Tab B). There is also attached a short background sketch on the Arab League (Tab C) and biographic data on Azzam Pasha (Tab D). 3 Recommendations: (1) that you stress to Azzam Pasha our hope that the Arab League will increase its efforts in the social and economic fields along the line suggested in Tab A; (2) that you discuss such points as Azzam Pasha may raise along the lines suggested in Tab B. [Tab B] Subjects Which May Arise in Discussions With Azzam Pasha 1. Palestine and Arab-US Relations At the present time various aspects of the Palestine question are being considered in the General Assembly. The most important aspect, that of Arab refugees, is being discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly, where the Arabs are attempting to have the General Assembly recommend that Israel should repatriate the refugees. The Arab States believe that while this Government is anxious to force the Arabs into direct negotiations with Israel on matters stemming from the Palestine affair, we are unwilling to put pressure on Israel to repatriate the refugees. This approach would be consistent with the general Arab conviction that U.S. policy is pro-Israel and anti-Arab. Recommendation: With regard to repatriation, the U.S. supports the principle of repatriation or compensation and resettlement, as set forth in the UN resolutions. In the current General Assembly session we are hopeful that constructive steps will be taken by the UN toward bringing about a solution which will be in the best interests of the refugees and the states directly concerned. The U.S. is neither in a position nor is it willing to apply pressure to either party with respect to this question or the question of direct negotiations. We believe that the political settlement of this problem is the responsibility of Israel and the Arab States and that it can only be achieved through negotiations between the parties. With respect to the Arab States, it should be emphasized that we are impartial as between them and Israel. Since Israel exists as a state in the Near East we must include it in any of our plans for the area. [Here follows subject 2, dealing with Anglo-Egyptian relations.] 3. Arab Union Certain member states of the Arab League have been considerably concerned at various times regarding the schemes of Iraq and Jordan to achieve unification with Syria. Azzam has, in general, been opposed to those plans. Recommendation: The United States, in accordance with its traditional policy of support for self-determination, would favor any plan looking toward further Arab union, provided such a plan came about as the result of the clearly and freely-expressed will of the people concerned. The U.S. would strongly oppose any such plan achieved as the result of force. [Here follows subject 4, dealing with the former Italian colonies.] 5. Arms for the Arab States The Arab States, particularly Egypt, are anxious to acquire military equipment. The UK has been supplying Egypt with a considerable amount of such material, but has recently reduced its shipments. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, when in Washington a short time ago, stated publicly that Egypt should receive grant arms from the U.S. Recommendation: The U.S. has extensive domestic needs and urgent foreign commitments, both of which have severely reduced the amount of military equipment available for sale to other countries. We are, however, licensing the export of arms obtainable from commercial sources in accordance with the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. 6. Economic Assistance Azzam Pasha may raise the general question of economic assistance to the Arab States, possibly in connection with loans which have been granted to or are now being considered for Israel. Recommendation: It is suggested that emphasis be given to our interest in the economic development of the Near East. We are pleased that Egypt has accepted Point IV aid and has submitted a very worthwhile social welfare project as its first request for assistance. We hope that similar arrangements will be worked out with other Arab States. With regard to loans, they are available to all states which apply for them, and we would be very happy to receive and consider applications from the Arab States. [Here follows subject 7, dealing with French North Africa.] 1 Azzam Pasha had come to the United States on invitation from the General Assembly to attend its sessions as an observer (memorandum of November 14 by Mr. McGhee to the Secretary of State. (786.00/11–2050) 2 Drafted on November 20 by Mr. Stabler and entitled “Subjects to Be Discussed with Azzam Pasha”, not printed. The only subject mentioned is that of the Arab League, with the following recommendation: “The socio-economic problems in the Near East are fundamentally similar and in many of their aspects they can best be approached on a regional basis. Through the Arab League progressive programs can be sponsored with individual Governments which might find it difficult to sponsor unilaterally. River development, health and Point IV in general are examples of how the Arab League could play an active part in the social and economic improvement of the area. We believe the Arab League could make valuable progress in this field and hope that Azzam Pasha, through his great knowledge of the problems, will exert his influence to guide the League in this direction.” 3 Tabs C and D not printed. The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 320/11–2150: Telegram [Document 590] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) secret Washington , November 21, 1950—6 p. m. Gadel 129. [Here follow three paragraphs indicating chiefly that the United States Delegation at the United Nations was authorized to negotiate a contribution for Korean relief by the United States of 65% of the total requirements of $250,000,000; and that White House approval was being sought for a contribution of $25,000,000 to $30,000,000 for Palestine refugee assistance out of requirements of $50,000,000.] Fol are Dept’s views re negots Pal program. 1. For fiscal 1952, to meet $50,000,000 budget, in recognition local interests Arab States and Israel’s expressed willingness consider payments into fund against liability for compensation, A. Israel and Arab States involved—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt—shld be approached in first instance. Arab contribs in past in form services, waivers of duties, free oil, etc., shld furnish basis estimate future contribs. Contribs Arab States may make in terms land and other resources to reintegration program shld be noted for info GADel only as such resources required over and above $30,000,000 reintegration fund. Decision by Israel as to amount payment acct compensation awaited with interest. 1 B. After making deduction for Israel and Arab contribs, believe best preliminary procedure attempt spread balance of cost among UN members in proportion contribs to regular UN budget, omitting Russia and satellites except for formal approach as matter of record. Obviously many countries will not be able to contrib amt asked but Dept hopeful UK Commonwealth countries, France, Western European countries and possibly some Latin Amers will agree in first instance to pay in proportion regular UN scale. In practice this will mean, according rough calculations here which omit countries obviously hopeless as contributors, that percentages on first round will total only about 75%. Second round requires effort meet balance by surcharge of ⅓ among contributors, thus making US offer second round about 50%. C. To extent second round unsuccessful mtg balance, expect UK, US, Canada, possibly France meet balance in ratio their UN contribs. D. This procedure, which based on best available analysis comparative resources, shld result in keeping US contrib at lowest level consistent with success of program. 2. Basis approach to raise balance 1951 budget may also be found in foregoing percentages bearing in mind terms pending GA res UNRWA. In view resentment in last Cong at inference US had definitely committed itself to technical assistance conference prior to Cong authorization, any statement re our contribs for both programs shld very explicitly safeguard both legal and moral right of Cong to reject our recommendation and make clear GADel commitment extends only to amt for which Cong support will be sought. Suggest consult Congressional leaders present NY with respect final negotiating position both programs. Acheson 1 Arthur Z. Gardiner, Special Assistant to Mr. McGhee, telephoned Ambassador Eban to express the Department of State’s interest in the approximate sum that Israel intended to contribute to the reintegration fund. The Ambassador replied that he could not answer the question with precision pending consultation at New York with Foreign Minister Sharett but that his Government “had promised to pay a certain sum of money into the reintegration fund, and that this would be considered as payment on compensation.” Mr. Gardiner expressed the hope that the Israeli contribution would not be held up and that “Israel might consider any sum contributed at this time as an advance on the compensation which might eventually be paid for refugee property in Israel.” (Memorandum of conversation, November 9, by Mr. Waldo, 320.2AA/11–950) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 357.AC/11–2550 [Document 591] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 1 confidential [ Washington ,] November 22, 1950. Subject: Visit of Israel Ambassador Participants: H. E. Abba Eban, Israel Ambassador, Washington Moshe Keren, Counselor of the Embassy of Israel Mr. McGhee—NEA Mr. Waldo—NE Problem: To take action on certain points raised by Israel Ambassador. Action Required: See below. Action Assigned to: NE Ambassador Eban called on me this morning at 11 a. m., at his own request, to discuss a number of matters principally concerned with Palestine items on the UN agenda. 1. Israel Arms Plants: The Ambassador opened the discussion with an item which he said had nothing to do with the Palestine discussion at the UN. There are presently in Israel a number of small munitions plants which were set up hurriedly in 1948 to produce small arms and ammunition for use by Israel forces in their fight against the Arabs during the period of hostilities. He said the plants were still in operation but that there was now an adequate supply in Israel of the types of equipment manufactured by them. His Government wondered, therefore, whether the plants might not usefully manufacture equipment to assist in the rearmament of the Western World. The Ambassador said that Israel could easily sell the equipment on the open market but that his Government did not wish to act in any irresponsible fashion and would prefer to have the arms go where they would do the most good. Much of the equipment consisted of mortars and mortar ammunition of a standard US size. Colonel Herzog, Israel Military Attaché in Washington, had already discussed the matter informally with some of his friends in the Defense Department and they had said the matter should first be raised with the Department of State. The Ambassador said that none of the items manufactured in Israel were the type of equipment Israel was applying for in the US. I thanked Mr. Eban for this interesting offer, and instructed Mr. Waldo to take the matter up with the appropriate persons in the Defense Department and in the Department in order that a more thorough discussion of the matter might be undertaken by the Israelis with the Defense Department. 2. Security Council Action: Ambassador Eban indicated that he was not very happy over the form in which the Palestine resolution had been passed by the Security Council on November 17, 1950. He felt that the various delegations, including the US delegation, had slipped one over on him in this matter. Israel had agreed to evacuate Bir Qattar. The Ambassador admitted that this was the one point at which Israel might be considered at fault in connection with the overall armistice situation. The resolution as it had been originally drafted was satisfactory to Israel and referred in general terms to the complaints of the various parties. The section of the resolution which was concerned with the Egyptian complaint relating to the movement of Bedouins in the Negev was offensive to Israel in its present form. First, it referred to the fact that it was dealing with an Egyptian complaint, whereas none of the other complaints were specifically mentioned. Secondly, the resolution called upon both parties to give effect to any findings of the Mixed Armistice Commissions regarding the repatriation of any Arabs who in the Commission’s opinion are entitled to return. Ambassador Eban felt that this was in effect a prejudgment of the entire issue and a suggestion as to what type of finding should be reached by the Mixed Armistice Commissions. He said the additional article which called upon the governments concerned to take no action involving the transfer of persons across frontiers without prior consultation with the Mixed Armistice Commissions raised a very difficult problem. It would not be practicable for Israel to consult with the UNSC in every case where Arabs infiltrated into Israel across the lines. Such consultation would obviously result in an impossible situation in view of the great number of cases which would occur. The Ambassador continued that it seemed to him that the US delegation and other delegations made every attempt to conciliate Fawzi Bey and draft a resolution acceptable to him, but that in the end the Egyptians had not voted for the resolution. I said that I was not aware of the details of the discussions in the SC but that I was sure there was no intention on the part of the US delegation to slight the Israelis. We were anxious that the resolution should be acceptable to the Israelis, as well as to the Arabs. It did not seem to me, however, that the resolution in any way prejudged the situation in the Negev. 3. Arab Refugee Item and PCC Conclusions: Ambassador Eban then brought up the question of the draft resolution on the Arab refugee item and the conclusions of the PCC, which is presently under informal discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee. The Ambassador thought that when this resolution was first drafted in the Committee it was fairly good. The modifications which had just been made at the suggestion of the Arab states appeared to him seriously to jeopardize any effectiveness the resolution might have. Specifically, the Ambassador deplored the removal of any reference to giving priority to a discussion of the refugee question in calling upon governments and authorities concerned promptly to enter direct negotiations. The Ambassador said that it was obvious that in any discussions looking toward a final settlement, the refugee question would have to be given prior consideration. This modification was merely another attempt to appease the Arabs and in the end would not result in obtaining their support. By separating a discussion of the refugee question from all other outstanding matters, the way would be opened to the same type of stalemate which existed after the passage of the December 11 resolution. I said that it appeared to me that the resolution was a step forward in calling promptly for direct negotiations. In any such negotiations it would of course be impossible to side step the refugee question. If by the suggested modifications the acquiescence of the Arab states could be obtained, we would have achieved something that had never been achieved before. It would almost amount to an informal commitment by the Arabs to enter the direct negotiations for which Israel had been clamoring for so long. 4. Jerusalem: The Ambassador then briefly mentioned the Jerusalem question. He said that Israel intended to support the Swedish-Dutch draft resolution and he hoped that it would receive wide support among the other delegations. He said that Israel hoped it would be possible to refer the question to another committee which had a less crowded agenda. I told the Ambassador that the resolution looked reasonable to us, but, unfortunately, it did not appear to have the support of the Vatican and we had recently been informed by the Jordanians that they had certain objections to it. I reiterated our position on this question—that we could not actively advocate any plan which had not received the support of Jordan, Israel and a majority of the international community. In view of the Jordanian position on this matter I thought we might, however, discuss the question informally with them. 5. Suez Canal: The Ambassador complained that after a full discussion of the Egyptian item in the November 17 resolution, the SC had not seen fit to consider the Israel draft resolution concerning the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal. He said that a number of the other delegations had supported Israel in its position on this matter but that it had been decided not to take it up in the Council since the local remedies available in the Mixed Armistice Commission, i.e. the Special Committee, had not yet been exhausted. The Ambassador said he thought it was unfortunate the SC could not have considered the resolution since he was certain that, if a resolution along the lines of the Israel draft had been passed, the Egyptians would have removed their restriction against shipping through the Canal. He was not so optimistic that favorable action in the Special Committee would result in any change of the Egyptian position. If no solution to this matter was reached in the Special Committee, the Ambassador said Israel would raise the question again in the SC. He said that he hoped the Israel action at that time would receive the support of the other interested delegations. I said that we, of course, felt that the Egyptian blockade was unreasonable, although they might have some justification for such action under the Suez Canal Convention of 1888. However, we believed that the Mixed Armistice Commission could appropriately handle the matter at the present time. I pointed out that we, the British, and other maritime powers had, of course, been vitally interested in this question and had been actively working to reach a solution with the Egyptians for some time. 6. Arab League and Azzam Pasha: The Ambassador said that he was unhappy to see that Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, had been permitted, to attend the UN as observer and was being given red carpet treatment by all parties. He said that he had met Azzam Pasha in 1947 and found him completely rabid on the Palestine question. Azzam Pasha had said he would devote the rest of his life to the elimination of the Jews from Palestine. In addition, Mr. Eban said that the Arab League seemed to be a factor in preventing possible peace between the Arab states and Israel; that whenever an Arab state seemed prepared to discuss peace negotiations, the Arab League intervened to prevent that State from taking such action. He felt sure that by permitting Azzam Pasha to act as Arab League observer at the UN we had given the Arab League an exaggerated importance and one which would militate against the possibilities of peace in the Near East. I told the Ambassador that I did not agree with him at all. Although the Arab League did at times appear to interfere with negotiations between the Arab states and Israel, I pointed out it was the political committee of the Arab League made up of representatives of the Arab states which took such action, and not the Secretary General. I said I thought that having an observer from the Arab League in the UN would serve a very useful purpose and we were in favor of it. The Arab League had a useful function to perform in many aspects of life in the Arab states. With regard to peace negotiations, I said that Israel consistently maintained that the Arab states should make peace with Israel on Israel’s terms. To date Israel had offered no concessions to the Arab states in an effort to get them to make peace. In view of the Israel position it was not surprising that the Arabs took the position they had. If Israel showed a willingness to concede something, it was possible that the Arab states might adopt a more cooperative attitude. 1 Drafted by Mr. Waldo. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) 786.00/11–2250 [Document 592] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs ( Stabler ) secret [ Washington ,] November 22, 1950. Subject: Exchange of views with Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League Participants: Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League NEA—Mr. McGhee NE—Mr. Lewis Jones NE—Mr. Stabler Problem: To exchange views with Azzam Pasha on matters affecting US-Arab relations. Action Required: None Action Assigned to: — Discussion: After an exchange of amenities Mr. McGhee said that he was much interested by Azzam Pasha’s talk at Mr. Webb’s lunch the day before regarding Moslem theocracy and wanted to continue that discussion with him. However, today he wished to discuss practical matters of importance to the Arab States and the U.S. and he hoped that Azzam Pasha would be quite frank in discussing matters with us. He pointed to the easy relationship which existed between ourselves and the British and others, and hoped that the same easy relationship could also be achieved between the U.S. and the Arab States. 1. Palestine Azzam Pasha said that he was concerned by the way things were developing in the General Assembly on the resolution regarding Palestine which was sponsored by the U.S. and the UK. He felt that this resolution, in its present form, opened the door to further discussions regarding the right of the refugees to return to their homes. The Arab States considered that this right was inalienable and that there could be no further discussion or negotiation on this point. He said that no Arab statesman could return to his country if he agreed to any compromise on this question. He hoped the U.S. would take the lead in setting forth clearly in the resolution that the only point of negotiation with regard to refugees was the manner in which the refugees would be returned to their homes. Mr. McGhee said that the U.S. still supported the right of repatriation and recognized the difficulties confronting the Arab statesmen. However, the U.S. felt that the Arab States should move forward in reintegrating those refugees who did not wish to return home. He pointed to the impossibility of large numbers returning to Israel and felt that the refugees should be made aware of facts of life in this connection. Azzam Pasha said that the Arab League had decided to cooperate with the PRA and he believed that the Arab States would make continuing efforts to resettle the large numbers of refugees which would not return. He felt that on the whole the Arab States wanted to shelve the Palestine question and to resume the relationship with the U.S. which had been enjoyed prior to this problem. However, there had been a real disillusionment in the Arab States regarding the U.S. because they had always looked upon us as a fair and just nation which would follow a policy of morality and not expediency. The hurt which the Arabs had received had been very great and we could not expect it to be removed merely within a year or two. He hoped that Palestine would soon become a matter of history, but he indicated that the Arab States still expected the U.S. to make a positive contribution to the solution of the problem. Azzam Pasha said that the Arabs felt that the U.S. was unreasonably pressing them to negotiate directly with Israel. They felt that nothing could come of such direct negotiations and remarked that at the time the Egyptian representative talked privately this year with the Israeli representative in Switzerland, the Israeli representative had offered nothing to Egypt except its assistance in getting the British out of Egypt. Mr. McGhee said that we did not wish to press the Arabs in direct negotiations, although we believed that this was the only way in which they could settle their differences with Israel. By refusing to negotiate with Israel the Arab States left themselves open to strong criticism that they were opposing the restoration of peace. Mr. McGhee indicated that the U.S. wanted the Palestine question to be put aside so that our genuine desire to cooperate with the Arab States would not continually be frustrated. We were anxious to restore relations to a basis of mutual confidence and trust, and to work with the Arab States in many fields. Azzam Pasha said that that was what he too wished but hoped that the U.S. would follow a genuine policy of cooperation and not always slant things toward Israel. While he recognized that the State Department had always been friendly with the Arabs, this could not be said of other branches of this Government. He pointed to the large numbers of Jewish delegations which were received by the White House while Arabs were never received. He also referred to the large amounts of money collected in this country for Israel. Mr. McGhee pointed out that the President was glad to receive Arab leaders at any time and it was quite natural that he should receive Jewish delegations as he received any other delegation. With respect to the money it was privately collected and the U.S. Government had no control over this. 2. Economic Assistance Mr. McGhee said the U.S. was happy to consider economic assistance to the Arab States but that the Arab States never came forward with any definite ideas of what they wanted. Azzam Pasha said that it was his view that the Arab States did not need a Marshall Plan. There was plenty of money in the Arab States and the introduction of financial assistance would certainly lead to greater corruption and indolence. What the Arab States needed was economic guidance on how to develop what they had. As an example, he mentioned the possibility of increasing and streamlining the production and the marketing of Egyptian vegetables. He believed that if American experts could advise on some such plan and give the Egyptians the benefit of their know-how, markets could be found in Europe and even in the U.S. He proposed that a team of American technicians come out to the Near East, possibly at the invitation of the Arab League, to make a large scale survey of economic conditions in the Near East. This survey should not be made in a matter of weeks but should be carried on over a longish period of time in order that it could make a thorough examination of development projects. As a result of such a survey advice could be given on certain types of development projects which could be carried out with capital available in Arab countries as well as foreign capital. 3. Arab League Referring to the previous point Mr. McGhee said that in our view the Arab League could make many contributions to social, economic and cultural welfare of the area as a whole. For example, he wondered whether the Arab League could take part in the Point IV Program on a regional basis and take responsibility for certain projects which individual countries could not. Socio-economic problems were similar throughout the area and we felt that the Arab League could play a major role in the solution of these problems. Azzam Pasha reviewed at considerable length the various committees which are established by the League Charter and indicated that in his opinion the League was doing a considerable amount in these fields. He particularly pointed to the part that Egypt was playing in providing teachers for certain Arab countries and in establishing institutions of higher education in Cairo which were available to students from the entire Arab world. [Here follows discussion of Eritrea, Syria, and the Anglo-Egyptian question.] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler) 786.00/11–2450 [Document 593] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs ( Stabler ) secret [ Washington ,] November 24, 1950. Subject: Exchange of views with Abdul Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League Participants: Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League The Secretary NEA—Mr. McGhee NE—Mr. Stabler Problem: To exchange views with Azzam Pasha on matters affecting US-Arab relations. Action Required: To develop plans for an economic survey commission for the Arab States. Action Assigned to: NEA and TCD Discussion: Azzam Pasha expressed his pleasure at being received by the Secretary and by the friendly reception which he had been accorded during his visit to Washington. 1. United Nations Azzam then went on to say that he greatly regretted the manner in which the United Nations was developing. He had hoped that the UN would be able to consider questions purely on their merits and that it would act as a supreme judge. However, the UN was the scene of power politics and it had developed along amoral rather than moral lines. He found that the United States had not taken the lead, as he had hoped it would, in following a policy based on moral principles. Instead the U.S. was following a policy of compromise and expediency and this, in his opinion, was a disservice to the world. The Secretary said that he agreed with Azzam that the UN had not developed as many had hoped but that it was necessary to understand the basic cause. The USSR had brought into the UN an unrestrained cynicism with regard to world peace and while they maintained this attitude, it was impossible for the UN to progress towards the attainment of the high principles on which it had been originally founded. [Here follows discussion of “Anglo-Egyptian Question”.] 3. Palestine At this point Mr. McGhee said that he and Azzam Pasha had agreed that it was necessary for the U.S. and the Arabs to regain mutual confidence in each other. He had been glad to hear from Azzam Pasha that the Arabs believed that the Palestine problem should be “shelved” and that it should not be allowed to stand in the way of developing cooperation and mutual confidence. Azzam Pasha said that he did feel this way but that it must be realized that it would take some time for the 80,000,000 Arabs to share a similar view. This could not be accomplished over night and the U.S. would have to do something to help in resolving the Palestine question, particularly with respect to the refugees. He felt that there was much that the Arabs and the U.S. could do together and this brought him to the question of economic assistance. [Here follows discussion on section numbered 4 on economic cooperation, which followed along the lines of section numbered 2 in Mr. Stabler’s memorandum of conversation of November 22, supra . Azzam Pasha indicated that the Arab League would be glad to invite a survey group and would cooperate with it in every way. Secretary Acheson replied that “this idea appealed to him and added that the legislation on foreign technical assistance provided for this type of venture.”] Azzam Pasha again thanked the Secretary for receiving him and took his departure. 1 1 Mr. McGhee, on November 28 and December 13, held further conversations with Azzam Pasha on such matters as the Arab League, economic cooperation, the Anglo-Egyptian situation, the former Italian colonies, North Africa, and Syria. Mr. McGhee’s memoranda covering these talks are not printed; they are filed under 786.00/11–2850 and 611.86/12–1350. Azzam Pasha conferred also with Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall on November 22. The memorandum of conversation prepared by Captain G. Serpell Patrick of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs in the Department of Defense is filed under 786.00/11–2250. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 320.2AA/11–2450 [Document 594] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President secret Washington , November 24, 1950. Subject: Contribution to Palestine Refugee Program Pursuant to your approval of my memorandum of November 1, 1950, the United States Delegation to the General Assembly supported a program of relief and reintegration as recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees for fiscal 1952. As final action of the General Assembly is to be deferred pending negotiations on Governmental contributions, your approval as to the extent of the United States contribution to the work of the Agency for fiscal 1952 is now desired. Congress has appropriated $27,450,000, half of the estimated requirements, for the current program of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the period ending June 30, 1951. It does not now appear likely that contributions from other governments for this period will exceed $15 or $16 million. In view of the difficulties in securing widespread support from other countries, it may be necessary for the United States to contribute a larger proportionate share than in the past. The subject of the United States contribution has been reviewed by the Department with the National Advisory Council, which perceives no objection to a contribution as large as $35,000,000 from the United States to the total fund of $50,000,000. Its decision is attached (Tab A). 1 Negotiations at the General Assembly will necessarily be limited to commitments as to the amounts for which delegations will be pledged to seek legislative authority. It is now believed that distribution of the costs can be determined in such a manner that the United States contribution will be set at a figure between 50 percent and 60 percent of the $50,000,000 total, and that it is necessary to make such a tentative commitment to provide a basis for negotiation. This program has received preliminary review by the Bureau of the Budget. The Bureau agrees in principle with the proposal, but reserves opinion on the exact form of the legislation and the amount of the appropriation involved. I therefore recommend that you authorize the Department to engage in negotiations relating to the extent of our contribution to the program and the contributions of other governments and involving an undertaking by the Executive Branch to seek legislative authority for a contribution not in excess of $30,000,000. 2 Dean Acheson 1 Document 88 (Action 432) of November 2, not printed: it stated that the Council unanimously perceived “no objection to United States participation in the Palestine Refugee Program … on a grant basis estimated at $50 million … for the period July 1, 1951, to June 30, 1952.” It also had “no objection to a proposed United States commitment to the above program not in excess of $35 million.” The National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems was an interagency group comprising the Secretaries of the Treasury, State, and Commerce and the heads of the Federal Reserve System, the Export-Import Bank, and the Economic Cooperation Administration. 2 The Embassy in London, on November 22, informed the Department that the British Treasury had authorized a contribution of $9,000,000 in sterling to Palestine relief, provided that the United States contributed $27,500,000; and an additional $1,000,000 in sterling, provided that the United States increased the proportionate share of its contribution. The British authorization was based on the futher proviso that these actions would have a salutary effect on stimulating larger contributions by third countries. (Telegram 3020, 357.AC/11–2250) Editorial Note [Document 595] Editorial Note The Ad Hoc Political Committee, on November 27, considered the recommendations of the Fifth Committee as to the financing of Palestine refugee assistance (see the editorial note, page 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] ). The four sponsors of the draft resolution of November 7 accepted the recommendations. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Political Committee then called for a vote on the draft resolution, as completed by incorporating these recommendations. The Committee thereupon adopted the draft resolution by 43 votes to none, with six abstentions. For the Committee’s deliberations on November 27, see GA (V), Ad Hoc Political Committee , page 363. The Committee reported to the General Assembly on November 30. The text of its report is printed as A/1566 in GA (V), Agenda Item 20, Annexes , page 42. The Assembly, on December 2, adopted the draft resolution contained in the Committee’s report by 46 votes to none, with six abstentions; see GA (V), Plenary , page 529. The resolution is numbered 393 (V). The President of the General Assembly, on December 4, announced the appointment of the Negotiating Committee on Contributions to Programmes of Relief and Rehabilitation, consisting of Canada, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay (GA(V), Plenary , page 588). The Chairman of the Negotiating Committee reported in a statement on December 15 that the responses to requests for pledges on Palestine refugee assistance had been a “keen disappointment” and that it would “endeavour in the next few weeks to close the gap left by the failure of many Governments to meet their responsibilities.” (A/1744, IO files) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 320.2AA/11–2850: Telegram [Document 596] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel confidential Washington , November 28, 1950—7 p. m. 226. Discussions have been underway for some time with Israeli Del to GA on subj Israel contrib to funds required by UNRWA. This Agency is short by about $12 million of total required to meet $54,900,000 budget for period ending June 30, 1951 and requires $50,000,000 for fiscal 1952. Understand Blandford has advised you on gen nature present proposals. Israel has supported program in GA and has contrib $50,000 for current period as token. Dept considers it opportune time seek financial support from Israel in substantial terms. Dept thinking in terms millions. Eban’s acknowledgment in GA of Israel’s obligation to pay compensation to refugees may be helpful line of approach, as payments toward compensation claims in bloc cld be considered pro tanto discharge of Israel’s obligation, and refugees accepting offer of resettlement in Arab States wld necessarily waive claims for compensation up to value of property each recd in new holdings finished pursuant to reintegration plans. Info here is that Kaplan 1 has subj of contrib under study at present. Dept hopeful you can expedite favorable decision of Israeli Govt so that gap in current budget can be met and realistic basis estab for negots 1952 program with US UK and others. Acheson 1 Eliezer Kaplan, Israeli Minister of Finance. The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 320.2AA/11–2550: Telegram [Document 597] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Jordan 1 secret Washington , November 28, 1950—7 p. m. 91. Urtels 96 Nov 19 and 98 Nov 25. 2 Jordan Min Washington informed Dept Nov 21 that Jordan Govt not prepared support Dutch-Swedish res re Jerusalem. He stated Jordan cld adequately protect interests Holy Places Old City and claimed res as drafted wld permit Jews enter Old City at will. Dept pointed out draft res did not attempt settle present polit or mil problems Jerusalem. Implementation res, particularly re free access for Jews and Arabs and demilitarization, actually depended on final or interim settlement which was entirely outside scope this res. FYI Brit Emb rep called Dept Nov 24 to report fol which may already be known to you. Brit Min Amman has reported having seen letter from Haikal to Jordan Govt recommending strongly latter not support draft res which Haikal considered Western plot deprive Arabs of their rights. Emb rep believed Haikal’s position might have been motivated by what he considers humiliating treatment of him in SC discussions re Yarmuk–Jordan situation. Issa Bandak, Jordan UNDel, reportedly wrote Jordan Govt that if latter shld support res he wld resign and publicly attack Govt. To date Tuqan has made no report to Jordan Govt. Dept informed that Tuqan stated Nov 23 he had recd instrs not to accept Swedish-Dutch res. While Dept’s position remains same—we are not prepared support res which is not acceptable to Jordan, Israel and majority world community—Dept believes it wld be unfortunate from point of view NE stability and interests world community if no practicable res adopted this session. Present draft res appears reasonable and no other presently in sight. Suggest you concert with your Brit colleague and in your discretion express to Jordan Govt hope Jordan will adopt constructive attitude in UN re Jerusalem and will either indicate support of res or at least acquiesce therein. In our view res does not interfere with Jordan sovereignty in Old City. If Jordan has specific concrete objections to draft res, US certain Dutch and Swedes wld gladly consider amendments which wld make it more acceptable to Jordan. In this connection we do not believe matters such as transfer of Arab quarters southern Jerusalem are appropriate subjects for inclusion this type of res which not concerned with territorial or military situation in area. Since there is apparently confusion re instrs Jordan del UN shld fol at present, it is hoped new categoric instrs can be sent by Jordan Govt to its del re stand Jordan will take on question Jerusalem. FYI Dept believes it highly unlikely any practicable res can be passed this session if Jordan Govt not prepared accept or acquiesce in present draft res. Copy draft statute already forwarded to Leg. Meanwhile Brit Min may be willing permit you see his copy. 3 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to USUN and London. 2 Neither printed; regarding the former, see footnote 1, p. 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] . The latter noted that the situation remained confused, with apparent disagreement between the King and his Cabinet (320.2AA/11–2550). No. 98 also advised of information from the British Minister that the King had cabled instructions to the Jordanian Delegation to take no stand for or against the resolution. Minister Drew speculated that if the resolution were adopted, the Jordanian Government might accept it on a de facto basis. 3 In telegram Gadel 159, December 5, to Ambassador Austin, the Department reviewed the situation concerning Jerusalem broadly along the lines of telegram 91, November 28, to Amman and concluded that “Should the Swedish-Netherlands proposals appear certain of defeat, the course of action set forth in recommendation 4 of the position paper (SD/A/C.1/342 Rev [1]) should be pursued.” In a telegram of the same date, which seemed to cross Gadel 159, Ambassador Austin stated that “there seemed to be little prospect for adoption of either Swedish resolution or any other comprehensive, substantive proposal” (Delga 376). Gadel 159 and Delga 376 are both filed under 320/12–550. Editorial Note [Document 598] Editorial Note The Israeli Ambassador, on November 28, sent note No. EC/3/20/1 to the Secretary of State, which requested that authority be granted to make direct purchase of surplus materials from United States Army stores in Europe. The note indicated Israeli interest in such items as food, medical and signal equipment, tools and machinery, motor vehicles and spare parts, payment for which was to be made by letter of credit, cash on delivery, or any other method acceptable to the United States Government. The Secretary of State, in a note of January 15, 1951, informed the Israeli Ambassador that the matter had been referred to the appropriate authorities. The exchange of notes is filed under 784A.56/11–2850. The Consul General at Jerusalem (Gibson) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/11–3050: Telegram [Document 599] The Consul General at Jerusalem ( Gibson ) to the Secretary of State confidential niact Jerusalem , November 30, 1950—10 p. m. 120. AL placed roadblock on Beersheba–Elath Road November 29. Section road blocked is a by-pass and is undoubtedly in Jordan territory. On November 22, Jordan delegation had presented complaint to Israeli-Jordan MAC that Israelis had constructed and were using road in Jordan territory. Complaint has not been acted upon. Israeli Senior Delegate called Colonel De Ritter, Acting Chief of Staff, TSO, early morning November 30 demanding emergency meeting re incident. Delegate demanded that AL withdraw their troops from road and that Israelis be permitted to send their normal convoys over road. Acting Chief of Staff contacted Senior Delegate Jordan who stated he was under instructions his government not to discuss question. This was at 10 a. m., November 30. R. Shiloah, political adviser Israeli Government, informed Colonel De Ritter that Israeli Government would abide by any decision of MAC but that Israeli would not agree to stopping of convoys prior to decision of MAC since this section of road had been used for some 9 months without interference by Jordan authorities. Between 3 and 4 p. m. November 30, Lieutenant Colonel Ramatti, Senior Delegate 1 informed Colonel De Ritter that General Yadin, Israeli Chief of Staff, had stated that unless AL withdrew troops by 11 a. m. December 1, Israeli Government would resort to force to pass AL roadblocks. At 6:30 p. m. General Yadin sent word to Colonel De Ritter, through Lieutenant Colonel Ramatti, Senior Israeli Delegate, that “since Jordan refused to discuss matter, it gave question an ominous portent, and that the Israeli Government restated its 11 a. m. December 1 ultimatum”. UN observers stationed at Gaza, traveling from Gaza to Beersheba, reported morning November 30 that there were Israeli armored cars, artillery, and motorized units proceeding towards Beersheba southward, and that there was increased Israeli military activity in Beersheba. Department pass Tel Aviv, Amman; sent Department 120, repeated information Tel Aviv 9, Amman 7. Gibson 1 On the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 320.2AA/11–3050: Telegram [Document 600] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State secret Amman , November 30, 1950—midnight. 102. Re Deptel 91, November 28 repeated info USUN 535, London 2805. Present Cabinet which appears determined to block any solution of problem of Jerusalem and Holy Places is tottering on its last legs and any approach to it now in way of proposed resolution would not only be futile but might even be seized on by it as pretext which it is known to be seeking for early resignation. Members would like nothing better than chance to make triumphal exit from scene in role of patriotic defenders of homeland. In any case, Prime Minister is inaccessible on grounds alleged ill health and Foreign Minister leads bloc opposing new resolution unless exchange of quarters can be dragged in by the heels. King Abdullah doubtless wishes to dispose once and for all of Jerusalem issue on any basis not involving internationalization or derogation of Jordan sovereignty in Old City but it is doubted whether he will go along with proposed French amendment to preamble defining new resolution as interim solution pending implementation of full internationalization. By accepting this he would, in effect be bowing to inevitability of latter. Until his reaction to French amendment is known I prefer not to take up matter with him. He will probably learn of it in course next few days from British Minister. Even if King does accept it, relations between King and Cabinet have reached point where he can no longer bend it to his will. (Legtel 96, November 19) 1 Further complicating note in situation is telegram received by King from Ahmad Tukan stating that resolution has no chance of obtaining ⅔ majority in GA and that Israeli delegation now opposes it. Only hope that Jordan will accept resolution is if new Cabinet, composition of which still highly problematical, is amenable to wishes of King. I have been informally exchanging views and information on subject with British Minister Kirkbride and he agrees that present moment is not opportune for démarche to King or Cabinet. I shall continue to follow matter closely and if and when propitious situation develops shall use best efforts to support those of my British colleague. I trust Department on its part will continue to keep me informed of all pertinent developments at Lake Success. Department pass USUN, London. Sent Department 102, repeated info USUN 6, London 36. Drew 1 Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 684A.85/10–950: Telegram [Document 601] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 secret Washington , December 1, 1950—7 p. m. 235. Dept concerned over report contained Jeru Con-Tel 120 Nov 30 rptd you as 9 re Arab Legion road block Beersheba–Elath Road and hopes neither Israel nor Jordan will take precipitate action pending investigation and decision Jordan–Israel MAC. Dept believes matter shld be considered that body if separate Israel–Jordan talks do not bear fruit (Tel Aviv Embtel 305 Nov 30 2 ). Dept believes consideration incidents this type fully within competence MAC particularly in light of SC Res Nov 17, and urges Israel and Jordan refrain provocative and impetuous action such as ultimatum presented to Col. de Ritter by Lieut. Col. Ramatti re use of force in area and refusal Jordan rep consider matter in MAC. Emb Tel Aviv and Leg Amman shld discuss Dept’s views this matter with appropriate auths. Foregoing being discussed with Israel, Jordan and Brit Emb reps Washington. FYI Dept suspects Jordan action may stem from resentment Jisr Majami incident and considers voluntary Israel concession that area cld be important factor improvement Israel–Jordan relations (Dept tel 149 Sept 30 and Embtel 211 Oct 9). Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated for action to Amman and for information to Jerusalem, London, and New York. 2 Not printed; it reported that an Israeli convoy intending to test the roadblock was being withheld pending the outcome of special talks between Israel and Jordan now in progress in Jerusalem. (684A.85/11–3050) Embassy Tel Aviv, on December 1, retracted the statement that Israeli-Jordanian talks were being held. (Telegram 311, 684A.85/12–150) The Department, on August 4, reiterated to Tel Aviv its deep concern about the situation on the Beersheba-Elath road and instructed the Embassy to follow the matter closely with the Israeli Government. It informed also that the United States Delegation at the United Nations had discussed the matter with Ambassador Eban and Minister Haikal in New York. (Telegram 236, 684A.85/12–450) The Department also made representations to the Israeli Counselor on December 4. Mr. Waldo expressed to Moshe Keren its concern about the roadblock incident and expressed the “hope neither party would take impetuous or provocative steps. Israel appeared to have rushed matters a bit by delivering an ultimatum on December 1, only two days after Jordan established the road block. We felt that more time could have been allowed for the Mixed Armistice Commission to look into the matter. The Jordanian action did not warrant the threat of the use of force by Israel”. Mr. Keren advised that he would report these views to his Government but indicated that the incident was one of a long series of intentionally provocative actions by the Jordanian authorities. (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Waldo. 684A.85/12–450) The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 320/12–250: Telegram [Document 602] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State restricted New York , December 2, 1950—8:23 p. m. Delga 360. In accordance with suggestion chairman Ad Hoc Committee in formal working group met Flushing 1 December 2 attempt reach common position re four draft Palestine resolutions now tabled in Ad Hoc Committee. Present were representatives UK, US, France, Turkey, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Israel. Egyptian representative refused to attend. Basic differences in approach between Four Power and Israeli resolutions on one hand and Egyptian and Pakistani-Ethiopian on the other soon became apparent. Discussions were inconclusive and Eban (Israel) declared there was no point in continuing meeting unless Egyptian representative appeared. Meeting broke up without any agreement that another meeting would be held. After meeting Eban expressed view to us there no point in continuing this effort and that Committee should proceed to vote on four resolutions separately. Austin 1 An area in New York City where the United Nations met. The Minister in Jordan (Drew) to the Secretary of State 684A.85/12–550: Telegram [Document 603] The Minister in Jordan ( Drew ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Amman , December 5, 1950—5 p. m. 110. At audience with King Abdullah morning December 5 at Shuna 1 he substantially confirmed information given in Legtel 106, December 4, Noon. 2 Communication from Israeli authorities referred to therein as telephone call was actually however a letter from Shiloah received sometime December 2 requesting King to authorize use of Gharandal by-pass by Israeli convoys and stating that if permission not granted they would open roadblock by force. King replied with suggestion that Shiloah come to Shuna evening December 2 to discuss matter. This suggestion was not acted upon. 3 His Majesty for first time in nine months I have been in Jordan appeared to be at end of patience with Israelis and former basic goodwill no longer manifest. He reminded me that each time he has been close to a settlement, Israelis have spoiled everything by some act of aggression such as Wadi Aruba incident of last May or Jisr el Majami affair. He was very bitter about Israeli plane circling his Palace December 3 which he considered as personal insult. He indicated his awareness of interest of US and UK in peace between two countries and reiterated his devotion to that objective, but went so far as to threaten, if Israeli aggressions continue, to revert to tactics he learned during Arab revolt after World War I and organize sabotage and terrorism within Israel. While I do not take this seriously, it shows that at least for time being Israelis have lost their one sincere friend in whole Arab world. King informed me, which subsequently confirmed by Glubb Pasha, that Jordan MAC representative accepted UN orders to pull troops back from scene of hostilities and that this has been done, but that Israeli forces have not only declined to accept UN orders but are flagrantly patrolling by-pass with apparent object of provoking Legion forces to open fire. Also informed that Israeli aircraft have repeatedly overflown Jordan territory last few days. Though making due allowances for patriotic prejudice of sources available here, it does appear that by-pass is in Jordan territory and no indication that Jordan forces have been aggressors. While giving due weight to restraining influence of British Minister, Glubb and King, I fear that continued recalcitrant and provocative attitude on part of Israelis may have unfortunate consequences. Department requested to repeat all or appropriate parts of this telegram to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London and Arab capitals in its discretion. Drew 1 Alternate spelling of Shuneh. 2 Not printed; it reported that on December 3, the “King learned for first time by telephone call from Israeli authority of establishment of roadblock and hostilities then in progress. Apparently he had been kept in ignorance by Minister of Defense who ordered roadblock established and Kirkbride himself was not consulted by Glubb Pasha. King was deeply shocked with situation which was aggravated by Israeli air force plane circling over his palace in early afternoon. He returned Amman in towering rage, sent for Prime Minister and demanded his immediate resignation. He has vowed that Minister of Defense, Fawzi Pasha Mulki will never again hold cabinet position during his lifetime. King has ordered Glubb Pasha in future to report personally to him all plans for military movements affecting Israeli relations. “All concerned disposed consider incident as closed. Kirkbride expresses opinion it may have salutary effect in long run by showing Legion that Israeli threats are not necessarily bluffs and Israelis that Legion does not push around easily. “While Cabinet would have fallen in near future in any event, Gharandal incident hastened its fall.” (684A.85/12–450) 3 Embassy Tel Aviv reported, on December 11, that in a conversation the previous day, Mr. Shiloah denied that any Israeli plane had flown over Jordanian territory in recent weeks or that any Israeli plane had circled over the King’s palace on December 3. He also indicated he planned to visit the King at Shuna on December 12 or 13 at the King’s invitation. (Telegram 342, 684A.85/12–1250) The Embassy, on December 18 forwarded to the Department a translation of Mr. Shiloah’s letter of December 1 to the King. (Despatch 296, 684A.85/12–1850) Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State 320.2AA/12–650 [Document 604] Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State secret Washington , December 6, 1950. I have approved your memorandum of November 24, 1950, on the subject of United States’ contributions to the Palestine Refugee Program, with the proviso that the U.S. share of the total agreed program shall not exceed fifty percent. This is consistent with the recommendation of the National Advisory Council (Action No. 432). 1 Harry S. Truman 1 Dated November 2, not printed; but see footnote 1 to the memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, p. 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] . Editorial Note [Document 605] Editorial Note The Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly, on December 7, began consideration of the Special Report of the Trusteeship Council on the Jerusalem question (see footnote 1, page 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] ). Draft resolutions were submitted to the Committee by the Swedish and Belgian Representatives. The General Assembly released the texts of the drafts as A/AC.38/L.63 and A/AC.38/L.71, respectively. The Swedish proposal, dated December 5, called for the United Nations presence in Jerusalem to center on the protection of, and free access to, the Holy Places in the person of a United Nations Commissioner, Jurisdiction over Jerusalem was to be given to the States concerned, subject to the powers of the Commissioner in connection with the Holy Places. The Belgian proposal, submitted to the Committee on December 12, provided for the appointment of four persons by the Trusteeship Council to study, in consultation with the Governments exercising de facto control over the Holy Places and with other concerned groups, methods of ensuring effective protection of the Holy Places under United Nations auspices. The proposal also called on the States concerned to cooperate fully in giving effect to the resolution. The United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay, on December 13, submitted an amendment to the Swedish draft resolution which provided for a United Nations Representative to represent the interests of the United Nations in Jerusalem and to make recommendations regarding the Jerusalem question. Israel and Jordan were called upon to cooperate fully with the United Nations Representative. The amendment envisaged subsequent decisions by the United Nations regarding the interests of the international community in the Jerusalem area. The General Assembly released the text of the amendment as A/AC.38/L.73/Rev. 2. The texts of the Swedish draft resolution and of its amendment are also printed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 20 (hereinafter identified as GA (V), Annexes ( 20 )), pages 2–6. The Swedish draft resolution encountered great opposition at the meetings of the Ad Hoc Political Committee. The Brazilian spokesman, for instance, in his remarks before the Committee on December 12, stated that while decision of the General Assembly might be modified, he was of the opinion that the refusal of certain States to comply with those decisions should not force the Assembly to revise them. He deemed the Swedish proposal tantamount to a retreat from the principle of internationalization and constituted a series of concessions to the Israeli and Jordanian points of view (United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee (hereinafter identified as GA (V), Ad Hoc Political Committee ), Summary Records of Meetings, 30 September to 14 December 1950 , page 504. Later the same day, the spokesman of El Salvador stated that the United Nations could not allow the occupation of Jerusalem by two powers to be converted from a de facto to a de jure situation and that adoption of the Swedish proposal would be tantamount to rescinding previous General Assembly resolutions ( ibid. , page 506). As early as December 11, the Jordanian spokesman advised the Committee that he was unable to accept the Swedish draft resolution ( ibid. , page 486). The Israeli spokesman, on the other hand, supported the draft resolution and indicated that Israel would not oppose various amendments that might make the proposal acceptable to Jordan. He also denounced the Belgian draft resolution as merely a device to postpone decision ( ibid. , page 509). The Iraqi Representative denounced the joint amendment to the Swedish draft resolution as dangerous because it implied United Nations resignation to the idea that it had failed in its task and because it indicated that the United Nations would change its policy with changes in circumstances; and as unjust because it attempted to legalize the unjust situation in Jerusalem. He concluded that it would be better to abide by the principle of internationalization but to wait for the right moment to implement it (GA(V), Ad Hoc Political Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 30 September to 14 December 1950 , page 516). Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 357.AC/12–850 [Document 606] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President secret [ Washington ,] December 11, 1950. Subject: Contribution to the Palestine Refugee Program I request your reconsideration of your decision of December 6 dealing with the United States contribution to the Palestine Refugee Program, which contained a proviso that the United States share for the total agreed program should not exceed 50%. In view of the interest of the Bureau of the Budget in this matter, I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Lawton. The following are the grounds for recommending reconsideration: 1. The National Advisory Council, in its Action No. 432, perceived no objection to United States participation in this program involving contributions on a grant basis estimated at $50,000,000 from interested member countries for the fiscal year 1952. The Council further stated that it perceived no objection to a United States contribution to the above program not in excess of $35,000,000 and stressed that every effort should be made to obtain contributions from other member countries approximating 50% of the total. The Department, in asking for authority to negotiate only up to 60%, has limited its request to a minimum margin for purposes of negotiation, and it is hoped that a figure may be arranged under 60%. 2. The United Nations urged that negotiations be held at the United Nations in order to assure the success of the program and avoid the dangers of haphazard financial support available to the Agency. If these negotiations fail, it will impair a program important to our national security. While it has been our position that the United States contribution should be limited to 50% if possible, the program should not be permitted to fail for the sake of the marginal $5,000,000. 3. Specifically, developments in the negotiations now underway at Lake Success indicate that the United Kingdom may be willing to contribute as much as $10,000,000, though their willingness as expressed to the Department is limited by the stipulation that their contribution be in the ratio of 1–3 as compared to the United States contribution. There is an indication from Israel of a contribution of the equivalent of $1,500,000. The Delegation will make every effort to secure widespread support from others, and the Department has sent appeals through our missions to many countries. It is most unlikely, however, that other nations will contribute enough to meet 50% of the amount. It must be recognized that there are many countries who will not contribute at all, such as the Soviets and the satellites, and that other nations lack the interest or the resources, or both, to contribute in proportion to their contributions to the regular United Nations budget or to make any contribution. 4. Our own interests in this program, which involves our national security, have been sufficient to obtain Congressional support for appropriations requested by the Department with no cut whatsoever in such requests for fiscal 1950 and fiscal 1951. The current crisis accentuates our interest in the area. 5. The issue may turn on whether the program should be continued under the auspices of the United Nations or must be carried on as a combined program of the United States and the United Kingdom. In view of action already taken in the General Assembly, with United States support, calling for a United Nations program, the Department would prefer not to carry out the operations on a bilateral basis. It is desirable for the United States not to assume any direct responsibility for refugee relief and rehabilitation, taking into account the background of the conflict in Palestine. For these reasons, the Department requests authority, if the Delegation finds it impossible to obtain pledges for 50% of the amount required from other countries, to negotiate for a United States share not in excess of $30,000,000, or 60% of the $50,000,000 program. The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 320/12–1350: Telegram [Document 607] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) confidential Washington , December 14, 1950—7 p. m. Gadel 182. Re Jerusalem, re telecons Ross 1 to Kopper 2 and Bancroft Dec 13. 1. Dept believes USDel, in a consultation with co-sponsors res in Delga 432, 3 shld consider submitting res for vote in plenary session if Belgian res fails to gain necessary two-thirds vote. 2. Dept feels US position made amply clear during Ad Hoc Committee discussions. Therefore, you shld vote against Belgian proposal but no effort shld be made to persuade others to fol our course or to discourage possible shift in voting for Belgian res in plenary since Dept believes it might be desirable to have res re Jerusalem on books as basis for possible GA action next year. 3. If simple res introduced sending UN rep to Jerusalem you may vote for it at your discretion. Acheson 1 John C. Ross, Alternate United States Representative at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly. 2 Samuel K. C. Kopper, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. 3 Dated December 13, not printed; it gave the text of the joint amendment offered by the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay to the Swedish draft resolution (320/12–1350); see the fourth paragraph of the editorial note, p. 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] . The Ad Hoc Political Committee, on December 13, adopted a Chilean proposal that it vote first on the Belgian draft resolution, even though it had been submitted after the Swedish draft resolution. The Committee proceeded to adopt the Belgian proposal by thirty votes to eighteen, with eleven abstentions. The United States and the United Kingdom were recorded in opposition; the Soviet Union abstained. The Committee then adopted a Lebanese proposal whose effect was to make unnecessary a vote on the Swedish measure; see GA (V), Ad Hoc Political Committee , pp. 521–522. The official summaries of the meetings of the Ad Hoc Political Committee on the Jerusalem question, which were held from December 7 to 13, are printed in ibid. , pp. 469–522. The report of the Committee to the General Assembly, dated December 14, is found in GA (V), Annexes ( 20 ), pp. 7–8. The report contains the text of the resolution adopted by the Committee. The Secretary of State to the United States Represertative at the United Nations (Austin) 320.2AA/12–1350 [Document 608] The Secretary of State to the United States Represertative at the United Nations ( Austin ) No. 165 Washington , December 13, 1950. The Secretary of State requests the United States Representative to the United Nations to transmit the enclosed check in the amount of $5,000,000 to the Secretary General of the United Nations as a contribution by the United States to the United Nations for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 1 A receipt from the United Nations for the enclosed check should be transmitted to the Department of State by the United States Mission to the United Nations. It is also requested that the United States Mission to the United Nations acknowledge receipt of the enclosure. 1 The Department, in a telegram to Ambassador Blandford at Beirut on December 12, bad foreshadowed its $5,000,000 contribution. It also informed the Ambassador of its grave concern “at slowness with which some other countries are meeting their obligations. Poor payment record will seriously prejudice Cong reaction to US support for FY 1952 program. Assure every effort made to secure prompt collection”. (Telegram 403, identified also as Unrap 90, 320.2AA/12–1250) The Chargé in Israel (Ford) to the Secretary of State 784A.00/12–1350: Telegram [Document 609] The Chargé in Israel ( Ford ) to the Secretary of State secret Tel Aviv , December 13, 1950—6 p. m. 350. Shiloah told me December 13 he saw King Abdullah Shuni 1 Palace night December 12 King’s invitation. Said King accompanied only by his personal physician but that His Majesty assured Shiloah Samir Rifai fully aware meeting and could not attend only because detained in Parliament. Shiloah said King eminently cordial. Shiloah said he denied strongly reported Israel plane circling over King’s Palace and believed he had convinced King of story’s untruth. Shiloah said otherwise no specific problems dealt with but that he in something of professorial role outlined to King his recent travels to London, Lake Success, Washington et cetera, which enabled him to bring fresh news from outside world on which King possibly not fully advised and enunciated his belief to King that western powers not as much interested in an individual nation’s pronouncements of democracy as in the nation’s actions in supporting democracy and in preserving peace and stability. King’s reaction to these platitudes not indicated. Shiloah said His Majesty professed himself as being far more reassured re ME situation than 4 months ago and that presence of Samir Rifai as active participant in government rather than mere observer one of strongest elements his reassurance. Shiloah said no specific date set for next meeting but that King indicated he proposed consult advisers and would inform Shiloah of prospects for another meeting possibly within fortnight. Comment: impossible gauge actual significance this secret meeting from Shiloah’s guarded remarks. He obviously has soft spot in his heart for King Abdullah but whether this encounter like most of its predecessors was more of social call than meeting of minds remains to be seen. In any event it represents renewal of personal contact between two reasonably imaginative men and in delicate circumstances now prevailing warrants careful nurturing. End comment . Department pass Amman Jerusalem London Paris sent Department 350 repeated information Amman 37 Jerusalem 27 London 79 Paris 41. Ford 1 Alternate spelling of Shuneh. Editorial Note [Document 610] Editorial Note The President of the General Assembly put the draft resolution on Jerusalem contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee to a vote on December 15. There was no discussion of the measure. The result was thirty votes in favor, eighteen opposed, and nine abstentions. The United States and the United Kingdom were recorded in opposition; the Soviet Union abstained. Inasmuch as the measure failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority, the draft resolution failed of adoption (GA (V), Plenary , page 684). The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 320/12–1950: Telegram [Document 611] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) restricted Washington , December 19, 1950—7 p. m. Gadel 188. For Hall. 1 Re Delga 452, Dec 19, 2 agree that Lebanon’s contributions have been substantial. Leb must admit however that UN program will fail if Arab states, who have special regional interest, limit their future contributions to their percentages regular UN budget. It must be obvious that states with such special interests must continue to make up deficits that will arise from lack of support from Russia and satellites, China, and other countries who have shown no interest in program. US and UK will find it impossible to meet such deficit in its entirety. Must look to Lebanon and other Arab states to contribute thru UNRWA several times their regular annual UN budget assessments. Webb 1 William O. Hall, Director of the Office of International Administration and Conferences. 2 Not printed; it gave the text of a letter sent by the Lebanese Delegation to the Chairman of the Negotiating Committee, which stated that the Lebanese Government had financed without outside assistance the relief of Palestinian refugees from their arrival on April 27, 1948, until January 21, 1949, at a cost of $2,466,760. Since the latter date, when UN aid began, Lebanon had allocated $897,775, a sum equivalent to 40 times the Lebanese contribution to the UN budget. These figures did not include estimates for various services performed for the refugees. The letter concluded that Lebanese contributions were greatly in excess of the country’s means and requested that its future contributions should be fixed at the percentage of its contribution to the UN budget. (320/12–1950) Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State 320.2AA/12–2050 [Document 612] Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State secret Washington , December 20, 1950. I have your memorandum of December 11 relative to the rate of contribution by the United States to the United Nations Palestine Refugee Program. While it is my view that the objectives of the United Nations Program might be furthered if the rate of the United States contribution can be held to approximately 50 percent, authority is granted in accordance with your request to negotiate for a United States share not in excess of $30 million or 60 percent of the $50 million program. Harry S. Truman The Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sharett) to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) Department of Defense Files [Document 613] The Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Sharett ) to the Secretary of Defense ( Marshall ) 1 DEL/251/50 New York , 23 December, 1950. Dear Secretary Marshall : On the eve of my return to Israel, I write to express my deep appreciation of your courteous and sympathetic attention to the views and requests which I have put before you. Knowing the heavy and urgent responsibilities which you bear in such vital spheres I have especially valued these opportunities of being received by you. The matters which I have brought to your attention cover so wide and detailed a range, that I have thought it convenient to summarise them in the enclosed memorandum. 2 The first part deals with Israel’s supply position and the need for stockpiling in advance of a possible emergency. The second part relates to Israel’s immediate military needs which I have described to you during two of our conversations. I should be grateful if opportunity could be afforded for Ambassador Eban and Colonel Herzog to discuss these matters further in the United States Department of Defence. In this connection I cannot refrain from expressing one general reflection. The uncertainty affecting the question of the defence of our region weighs very heavily upon us and disturbs us deeply. In conclusion, may I send to you my most cordial greetings on the festive season and my best wishes for your continued health and for success in your labours on which so much depends for the peace and freedom of the world. Yours sincerely, M. Sharett [Enclosure] confidential Memorandum i The present world tension has caused the Government of Israel to examine its position in the event of any further aggravation which might affect the Near East. 2. Israel’s population is increasing at a rate unprecedented in the development of any country. The Jewish population of Palestine in 1948 was 650,000; Israel’s population today is over 1,300,000. Immigration is continuing at the rate of 200,000 a year; the possibility of war is an additional incentive for Jews to expedite their departure from certain countries of Europe and from the Arab world, while the opportunity still exists. Although Israel already has many notable achievements to its credit in the increase of its productivity, it is obvious that such increase cannot yet keep pace with this rapid expansion of population. Israel has plans whereby it hopes within three or four years to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency and a considerably higher degree of industrial production. When that stage is reached Israel will be less dependent on imports for the provision of its most essential supplies in food and other consumer goods. In the meantime that dependence is very marked indeed. Israel’s imports, paid for in foreign currency, total about $200,000,000 annually. 3. The high degree of Israel’s dependence upon its sources of supply abroad, especially in the United States, is further enhanced by the situation now prevailing in the Near East. Israel has no contacts of trade or communications with any of its immediate neighbours. Its single life-line for all essential supplies reaches out across the Mediterranean Sea towards the Western world. 4. Thus, even in the event of a temporary interruption of maritime communications in the East Mediterranean, Israel would be in danger of losing its current supplies of food and of raw materials. Its population would be threatened with famine and its industries with paralysis. Owing to its rapid increase of population, Israel is even now barely able to cope with its current needs and has obviously been in no position to build up reserves or stock-piles in any essential commodity. 5. It is therefore imperative for Israel, as a matter of elementary precaution, to take immediate steps to build up reserves of essential commodities, especially grain, preserved foods, oil seeds, feeding stuffs, petroleum products and basic raw materials for its industries. 6. While the existence of such stock-piles is a vital necessity for the State of Israel, it could also be an important asset for the United States in its capacity as a world power with an interest in the defence of the Near East. Any power with possible military commitments in this area would be gravely handicapped by the absence of supplies with the resultant necessity to build up reserves in conditions of actual emergency, perhaps even under fire. The prompt transportation of such reserves to Israel in advance of such an emergency would thus solve an important defence problem. It is realized that this problem may well exist in relation to other strategically situated areas; it certainly does not apply in the same degree to the Arab countries, none of which is experiencing a similar growth of population, and most of which have a surplus of food available for export and for the stock-piling of their own reserves. 7. Israel’s supply position is directly related to its defensive capacity. Israel has declared its determination to fight, if necessary, in the defence of its democracy. The importance of this pledge is reinforced by the fact that Israel has a manpower potential for combat duty in the neighborhood of 200,000, which figure is constantly growing as the population increases by immigration. Moreover, Israel’s factories, whether devoted at this time to the manufacture of war material or to the production of civilian consumer goods, could, as they stand, and even more so after suitable improvements or conversions, furnish important sources of supply such as food stuffs, clothing, equipment, etc. for any forces operating in this area. Even during World War II, despite adverse political circumstances and without the powers and potentialities of statehood, the Jews of Palestine made a disproportionately significant contribution towards the Allied war effort, including maintenance and replenishment of Allied supplies. Today that potentiality is greatly increased. Yet Israel’s ability to defend itself effectively and to render assistance to any larger effort of defence now depends on an effective interim solution of its own supply problem, pending the attainment of a stable balance of production and trade. If its supplies of food and raw materials are consolidated by the timely building up of reserves, Israel can be a unique and powerful asset to any cause which it helps to defend in the Near East. 8. For these reasons, the establishment of these stock-piles in advance of an emergency would both serve the interest of Israel’s security and powerfully increase the defensive resources of democracy in the Near East. This dual objective might well be attained by a project along the following lines: ( a ) The United States would establish in Israel territory stockpiles of essential materials, especially grain, preserved foods, oil seeds, petroleum and the basic raw materials for industry. These commodities would remain the possession of the United States Government and, if necessary, be kept under its direct supervision. ( b ) These stock-piles would be greater in quantity than Israel’s annual needs. Israel would withdraw from them according to its current requirements and the United States would replenish the stockpiles in order to maintain them at a fixed quantity. Israel would pay for the materials that it withdrew at any given time. ( c ) Arrangements for transportation, storage and payment would be made by agreement between the United States and Israel, after negotiation between Israel representatives and the appropriate departments of the United States Government. ii 9. In the military sphere, on the understanding that the Middle East is a vital area for the democracies to defend, Israel is anxious to be in a position to contribute as effectively as possible to the security of the region. The military achievement of the Jewish population of Palestine in World War II and the record of the Army of Israel in defending the newly born State against the combined Arab forces in 1948 are a good augury of the service Israel could render, if its military potential were developed and organised in good time. In that spirit it is respectfully requested that urgent consideration be granted to the following matters, all of which have been discussed in conversations between the United States Secretary of Defence and the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs. ( a ) Arms No official reply has yet been received to the request for most of the categories of armaments mentioned in the note of the Ambassador of Israel to the Secretary of State on 13 February, 1950. Nor has Israel’s deficiency in these armaments been made good from any other source in the meantime. ( b ) Standardisation of Equipment The Israel Government is anxious to bring the rifle strength of its army up to the mark. Moreover, it would like to replace all its rifles, which are of varying origin, by American rifles. This would involve the supply of 150,000 rifles and a corresponding proportion of machine guns to the Israel Army. The Israel Government would like to discuss possibilities of paying for these weapons and for the arms released under ( a ), above, through short-term credits (four or five years), if it is not found possible to provide them without payment as part of projects for the consolidation of the defence of democracy in the world. ( c ) Israel’s Arms Factories These, if fully utilised, are capable of producing more of certain types of medium and light weapons than is necessary for national purposes alone. It is suggested that the United States utilise this facility which is without any parallel in the Near East. Assistance by way of expert advice, provision of adequate raw materials, and the despatch of machine parts and tools could increase both the quantity and quality of Israel’s arms production. ( d ) Improvements in Israel’s Port Facilities (e.g. Haifa and Elath) Such improvements would enhance Israel’s value as an asset in the defence of the Near East against aggression. ( e ) Expert Survey A discreet expert survey, undertaken without undue delay under United States auspices, of Israel’s military and industrial potential as well as of its installations and communications, would be an invaluable and prudent prelude to any plan for the defence of the area. ( f ) Vacancies Allotted to Israel Students The recent limited increase of the vacancies allotted to Israel students at United States Military Schools is appreciated. It is hoped that favourable consideration will be given to applications submitted for entry to the State [ Staff ] 3 College at Fort Leavenworth, where it is understood, students from 22 countries outside the United States are receiving instruction. ( g ) Israel’s Security Grading It would similarly be appreciated if Israel’s security grading were adjusted so as to enable Israel attaches to receive “restricted” material which would be of great use for training purposes. ( h ) Defence Orders It is submitted that in considering the issuance of Defence Orders authorising the export from the United States of raw materials, essential supplies and capital goods consigned to Israel, the Department of Defence should fully bear in mind both Israel’s special problems and its potential value, as set forth in this memorandum. 10. It is hoped that an opportunity will be granted for the Ambassador and the Military, Naval and Air Attaché to discuss these proposals in detail with the competent officials of the United States Department of Defence. New York , December 23, 1950. 1 This letter was prepared on stationery of the Israeli Delegation to the United Nations. 2 Printed below. 3 Reference is to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones) 784A.00/12–2750 [Document 614] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs ( Jones ) secret [ Washington ,] December 27, 1950. Subject: Difficult Position of Israel. Participants: Dr. Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel Mr. George McGhee, NEA Mr. Lewis Jones, NE Discussion: At the conclusion of a briefing on Korea by Mr. Merchant of FE, Dr. Keren mentioned the great concern of Israel in the world situation since Israel is in a particularly vulnerable position with regards to food, oil, etc. Mr. McGhee said that the vulnerability of Israel is very much on our minds at this time and he thought that Israel should consider carefully what concessions it might make to the Arab States in order to have the Arab economic blockade lifted. The Arab states could, if they would, supply Israel with oil and much food. Dr. Keren said that Israel had recently offered some concessions with regard to the Arab refugees but that he was “not hopeful” with regard to a general settlement with the Arabs. Mr. McGhee said that the bare facts of the situation are that Israel has possession of the territory in dispute and that the Arabs have the refugees. Consequently, logic indicates that Israel will have to make the concessions. The US has always thought Israel has the capability of making concessions both with regard to the refugees and territory. The only concessions which the Arabs can make are to agree to a peace settlement and to lift the blockade. Dr. Keren expressed doubt that Israel could go further than it has already done with regard to the Arabs. Mr. McGhee replied that, if this were true, Israel would be well-advised to “weigh the consequences.” Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) 611.84A/12–2850 [Document 615] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs ( Rockwell ) secret [ Washington ,] December 28, 1950. Subject: Attitude of Israel toward the West. Participants: Mr. Rockwell, NE Mr. Theodore Kollek, Minister, Embassy of Israel During the course of a conversation last night, Mr. Kollek vouchsafed the following information as the result of questions I put to him. 1. He was certain that Israel would fight against the USSR should the latter make any effort to invade Israel territory. 2. Israel is firmly on the side of the West, and, foreseeing the difficulties which will arise in the case of a major conflict involving the Near East, desires to make as many advance preparations as possible to insure her own security. Israel wishes to be a partner of the West in the defense of the Near East, and to participate in Western planning for this defense. 3. The Israel proposal for the manufacture of small arms and small arms ammunition 1 for the benefit of the West was made in the above framework. The Israelis believe that Greece and Turkey, for example, might be supplied with such equipment from Israel, and that this would alleviate the US burden of furnishing armaments of this category to the two states mentioned. In order to bring the armaments plants in question to the proper degree of efficiency, one or two additional machines would be needed, as well as technical personnel from the US. It would, of course, also be necessary for the US to provide the raw material for the manufacture of the armaments. 4. In its desire for collaboration with the US for the defense of the Near East, Israel of course realizes that there is close collaboration between the US and the UK in this field. The possibility of Israel collaboration with the UK is hindered by a strong psychological barrier, but this barrier is disappearing gradually and can be overcome. 5. In its desire for unity in the Near East, Israel is prepared to make the type of concessions which might “save face” for the Arabs, but only as part of general negotiations, not as prior concessions. Mr. Kollek left the impression that these concessions would not be major ones. 1 See Mr. McGhee’s memorandum of conversation of November 22, p. 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs (Rockwell) 784A.5/12–2850 [Document 616] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine, Israel, and Jordan Affairs ( Rockwell ) secret [ Washington ,] December 28, 1950. Subject: Israel’s Participation in Defense of Near East. Participants: Mr. Kollek, Minister, Embassy of Israel Col. Herzog, Military Attaché, Embassy of Israel General Burns, Department of Defense 1 Mr. Rockwell, NE Messrs. Kollek and Herzog invited General Burns and myself to lunch today. During the course of the meal the two Israelis made the following points: 1. For a long time, the Government of Israel had suffered under the illusion that it could maintain a policy of “non-identification” with either the East or the West. The worsening international situation, and the attitude of the USSR, had revealed the fallaciousness of this position, and the Israel Government was now convinced that the only hope for its salvation lay with the West. It was accordingly prepared to offer the West full cooperation, in return for participation in one form or another in Western plans for the defense of the Near East, and for the benefit of Western aid in the event of a major conflict affecting the area. 2. The Israel fighting force was a good one. It consisted of a standing army of between thirty and forty thousand men, and of trained reserves numbering about two hundred thousand. In the event of a crisis this army would be prepared to fight for the defense of the Near East. Moreover, Israel was prepared, in the event of a crisis, to see Western forces use Israeli facilities, such as Haifa Harbor and Lydda Airport. 3. The Israelis realized, from their experience and participation in the last war in so far as it was fought in the Near East, that it is essential to make plans well in advance if a crisis is foreseen. Therefore, they urgently desired that their country at once begin to be taken into consideration in connection with Western defense plans for the area. They also desired to do what they could as soon as possible to assist in these defense plans. 4. In this connection, Mr. Kollek and Col. Herzog referred again to the proposed use of Israeli arms production facilities for the benefit of the West. Mr. Kollek, in response to a request I had made the day before, gave me a paper elaborating upon this proposal. The paper in question 2 is attached to this memorandum. Mr. Kollek maintained that the arms producing proposal was something which could be carried out fairly soon and which would not depend upon unity between Israel and the Arab states. US control of the raw materials to be used should assure anyone who might be uneasy lest Israel use the increased production for warfare against her neighbors. Mr. Kollek suggested that if anyone were skeptical about the efficiency and productive ability of Israel’s small arms manufacturing facilities, it would be easy to verify this by sending one or two experts quietly to Israel to look into the matter. He was of the opinion that ready use for the armaments produced could be found in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. 5. Col. Herzog said that the Israel Army wished to exchange its Czech weapons for weapons of US manufacture, in order that there should be greater standardization along US lines. He speculated that the present Czech weapons, which conform to those used by the German Army might be used by the US in equipping Western German divisions. Col. Herzog also desired that more training opportunities for Israeli officers be made available in this country. He expressed gratification for the increase offered to Israel this year over last year. 6. In conclusion, Mr. Kollek said that if the US should say to Israel that the UK had primary responsibility for the defense of the Near East and that the Israelis should therefore consult with the UK, this would be quite all right with the Israelis. At least they would know where they stood, and, although in dealing with the UK there was an important psychological barrier to overcome and the assistance of the US would certainly be needed, he believed that a satisfactory arrangement could be worked out. The important thing was that the time is short and that it was essential to make plans as soon as possible, preferably with the US but anyway with the US or the UK. General Burns asked a number of questions concerning the size of the Israeli army and the technical qualifications of Israeli arms-producing facilities. He expressed the opinion that Israel was definitely on the side of the West, and said that there was no doubt that the Israeli fighting forces would be a valuable one. The General added that he would see that action was expedited on a memorandum which the Israeli Embassy had sent to the NME outlining the means by which Israel Could be helpful to the West in the military sense. I expressed personal interest in the arms-producing proposal which Mr. Kollek had outlined. I added that it should be apparent to any student of the recent history of the Near East, and to any observer of military realities, that the UK had a primary role to play in the defense of the Near East, and that any plans which the US might have for this defense would certainly involve cooperation with the UK. 1 Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for foreign military affairs and military assistance. 2 Dated December 28, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 790.5/12–2950: Telegram [Document 617] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Israel 1 top secret Washington , December 29, 1950—4 p. m. 270. Sharett, Eban and Kollek have recently urged upon Dept and Defense proposal whereby Israel armaments plants wld produce arms for use of West, after having recd small amt of US assistance in form of technical advice and new machinery and upon receiving from West raw materials necessary for manufacture of equipment. (See memo conv McGhee–Eban Nov 22.) 2 Israelis have said they now convinced fallaciousness their policy “non-identification” and that they know only hope their salvation lies with West. They desire that Israel be taken soonest into consideration in Western plans for NE defense, and also that Israel begin at once to make contribution within framework these plans. Hence arms proposal, which Israelis believe wld facilitate supply of armaments of caliber involved to such nations as Greece, Turkey and Iran. Israelis are also pressing other proposals, such as food and fuel stockpiling in Israel, standardization of Israeli arms along US lines, and increased training facilities for Israeli mil officers in US. Israelis have given clear indication that in event crisis they might be prepared offer to West such Israeli facilities as Haifa harbor and Lydda airport, even if use by UK involved. Kollek states that if USSR attempts invade Israel latter will certainly fight. Dept and Defense now examining armaments proposal from point of view requirements our allies and friends, present Western production facilities, and Israeli technical capacities. Dept suggested to Kollek possibility that Emb’s service attachés might inspect arms plants. He replied that Herzog 3 had already cabled to Tel Aviv stating attachés shld be invited to do so. Dept hopes attaches will forward comprehensive report. Emb’s comments on above desired, with particular ref to armaments proposal. FYI, this procedure wld involve several complex problems, possibly including new legislative authority. Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated to London. 2 For text, see p. 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] . 3 Col. Chaim Herzog, Israeli Military, Naval, and Air Attaché in the United States. Agreements between the United States and Israel concerning a civil air transport agreement and an arrangement on copyrights; initiation of negotiations with Israel for a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation Agreements between the United States and Israel concerning a civil air transport agreement and an arrangement on copyrights; initiation of negotiations with Israel for a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation [618] The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State Tel Aviv, February 8, 1950. 611.84A94/2–850 [619] The Secretary of State to the President Washington, April 24, 1950. 611.84A95/4–2450 [620] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices Washington, June 9, 1950—2 a. m. 611.84A94/6–950: Circular telegram [621] Current Economic Developments [Washington,] December 18, 1950. [622] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices Washington, December 28, 1950—8:55 a. m. 611.84A4/12–2850: Circular airgram The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State 611.84A94/2–850 [Document 618] The Ambassador in Israel ( McDonald ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 78 Tel Aviv , February 8, 1950. Subject: Proposal to Negotiate Air Transport Agreement with the Israel Government. Sir : The Commercial Attaché, upon several occasions extending from August 1949 to date, has discussed informally the points of difference that may occur between the United States and Israel in negotiating a bilateral air agreement. The Department and the CAB is acquainted with the Embassy’s note to the Israel Government, No. 17, August 9, 1949, 1 for formalizing the presentation of a draft agreement. A tentative date was set for a formal discussion on the subject during November, 1949, but the Department found it expedient to recommend that the Embassy not press the negotiations with Israel while an air agreement was being negotiated with Iraq. 2 In the meantime and with reference to the Department’s telegram No. 42, January 27, 1950, 3 attorneys for the El Al Aviation Company have called on the Department and CAB to inquire regarding the status of an El Al application for a Foreign Air Carrier Permit. Officials of El Al have seen fit not to mention this application to the Embassy, and the Embassy, concurring with the Department, has not made any inquiry on the subject. As the Department points out in the above-mentioned telegram, the Israel Government has seen fit, driven by problems of currency stringency, to follow a definite restrictionist line—in this case appplied to transport by land, sea and air—and it is further reflected throughout its present politico-economic policies. Nevertheless it is becoming more evident that in matters aviation, the officials of El Al are evidencing a disposition to court and even favor American transportation (air and sea) over that of other nations. This occurs to the Embassy as a somewhat dangerous line for them to take and the Commercial Attaché has been quite reluctant to express in his informal contacts with the local officials either approval or disapproval. An example of special consideration is the recent authority given TWA to put a third weekly flight into this country while denying the same privilege to France, Italy and Holland (Embtel 81, February 6, 1950). 4 The Department has on several occasions suggested that a proposal be put to the competent Israeli authorities to set forth points in the draft agreement delivered to the Israel Government on August 9 by Note No. 17 upon which discussion may well develop in a formal negotiation. For some reasons best known to the Israeli authorities, this has only now been done and the Embassy attaches herewith an exact copy of an informal note 5 received today from Mr. L. A. Pincus, Legal Advisor and Managing Director, Ministry of Transport and Communications, who sets forth in paragraphs 1–5 certain principles of the Bermuda type agreement 6 on which he seeks advice. [Here follow the remaining three paragraphs of the despatch, chiefly in the nature of an analysis of the operations of El Al and of its management.] For the Ambassador: Malcolm P. Hooper A/Counselor and Commercial Attaché 1 Not printed; it formally submitted the U.S. draft civil air transport agreement for consideration by the Israeli Government. Embassy Tel Aviv transmitted a copy of the note to the Department of State in despatch 202, August 11 (711.67N27/8–1149). 2 These negotiations did not eventuate in a treaty with Iraq. 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed. 5 Dated February 5, not printed. 6 For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. i , pp. 1450 ff. The Secretary of State to the President 611.84A95/4–2450 [Document 619] The Secretary of State to the President Washington , April 24, 1950. My Dear Mr. President : I submit herewith a draft of a proposed proclamation 1 extending to Israeli authors and proprietors the benefits that may be accorded, on the basis of reciprocity, under the authority of the Act of Congress approved July 30, 1947, entitled “An act to codify and enact into positive law title 17 of the United States Code, entitled ‘Copyrights’” (61 Stat. 652). This act provides that the benefits therein may be extended to the works of a foreign author or proprietor when the foreign state or nation of which such author or proprietor is a citizen or subject grants, either by treaty, convention, agreement, or law, to citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright protection substantially equal to the protection secured to such foreign author or proprietor under the said act. It is further provided in this act that existence of such reciprocal conditions shall be determined by the President by proclamations made from time to time. The Department of State is of the view that the assurances given by the Government of Israel satisfy the reciprocal requirements of the Act of Congress of July 30, 1947. These assurances are to the effect that under the provisions of the Israeli Copyright Law all literary and artistic works published in the United States are accorded the same treatment as works published in Israel, including mechanical reproductions of musical compositions, and that citizens of the United States are entitled to obtain copyright for their works in Israel on substantially the same basis as citizens of Israel, including rights similar to those provided by Section 1 ( e ) of Title 17. The substance and wording of the proposed proclamation to be issued by you have been approved by the Copyright Office. The text of the proposed proclamation has been agreed to informally by officials of the Israeli Government. Your proclamation will form an integral part of an arrangement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Israel, consisting of (1) a note from the Israeli Ambassador in Washington to the Secretary of State in which he sets forth the aforementioned assurances; and (2) a reply note from the Secretary of State to the Israeli Ambassador to which there will be attached a copy of your proclamation. As has been customary with respect to the conclusion of such copyright arrangements, it is intended to have the above-described notes exchanged on the same date as the proposed proclamation is issued. 2 Faithfully yours, Dean Acheson 1 Not printed. 2 The texts of the notes exchanged on May 4 by the Secretary of State and the Israeli Ambassador are printed in Department of State Treaties and Other International Agreements (TIAS), vol. 1, 1950, p. 645 . The proclamation, issued on May 4 by President Truman, is printed in 64 Stat. (pt. 2) A402. The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 611.84A94/6–950: Circular telegram [Document 620] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1 confidential Washington , June 9, 1950—2 a. m. Air transport agreement with Israel scheduled for signature 1500 GMT June 13 Tel Aviv. 2 For ur background info if questioned, and guidance in event of adverse reaction Arab states, agreement is 43rd bilateral air transport agreement negotiated by US. US policy, and that of most countries whose airlines operate internationally, calls for negot intergovernmental arrangements with all countries on certificated routes of scheduled flag air carriers. In limited nr cases operations through foreign countries are conducted by US carriers under temporary or interim arrangements. However, this is exception to above policy. Thus in NE area US concluded air agreements with Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey 1946, with Syria 1947. 3 No special significance shld be attached to fact that US-Israeli agreement is first such formal arrangement concluded by Israel. In nr other cases, for example Burma, Egypt, US was first state with which agreement concluded. Acheson 1 At London, Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Paris, Athens, Rome, Tehran, and Ankara. 2 Negotiations on the proposed civil air transport agreement with Israel had been conducted at Tel Aviv, except for one session at Washington with Mr. Pincus. The details of the negotiations are documented in the files of the Department of State, chiefly under 611.84A94. The agreement was signed at Tel Aviv on June 13; for text, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Agreements (TIAS), 1952, vol. 3, pt. 4, p. 4582. The Department statement, printed in Department of State Bulletin , June 26, 1950, p. 1043, noted that the “text closely follows the United States standard form for such agreements. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States flag carrier TWA will conduct services to Lydda, and the Israeli flag carrier will be authorized to conduct services to New York City across the North Atlantic.” The Israeli Government’s press release of June 13 quoted Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok as stating, “It is the first agreement signed by Israel with any power. It is also the first agreement signed by us with the United States of America on any subject. It augurs well for the cementing of friendly ties between us and the United States as well as for the development of Israel’s air connections with the world.” Embassy Tel Aviv transmitted a copy of the press release in despatch 379, June 14 (611.84A94/6–1450). 3 See Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. vii , pp. 793 – 80 , and footnote 24, p. 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 471 ] , respectively; and ibid , 1947, vol. v , p. 1343 . Current Economic Developments Current Economic Developments , Lot 70 D 467 1 [Document 621] Current Economic Developments secret [ Washington ,] December 18, 1950. Negotiation of Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation With Israel 2 Formal negotiations for a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with Israel were opened with officers of the Israel Embassy late in November. The negotiations have proceeded rapidly and have already disclosed so broad an area of agreement that signature of the treaty by the end of January is becoming a distinct possibility. In large measure, the rapid progress to date appears attributable to the business-like attitude of the Israelis toward the negotiations, to the thorough advance study they gave to our negotiating proposals, and to the exploratory conversations which were held with representatives of the Israel Embassy last spring and which appear to have cleared up most of the questions and uncertainties the Israel Government may have had with respect to our draft. The principal difficulty which has developed during the formal negotiations involves Israeli requests for the right to accord preferences to those countries which in 1914 were included within Asiatic Turkey and Arabia, and for the elimination from the treaty of the customary reservation for possible future US policies in furtherance of the objectives of GATT and the ITO Charter. For the present, discussion of these points is being deferred until the Economic Counselor of the Israel Embassy, who is conducting the negotiations for his government receives clarification and amplification of his instructions respecting these matters. The current negotiations are the outgrowth of an informal approach by the Israel Embassy late in the summer of 1949. Last April the Embassy formally proposed that negotiations be undertaken, and a definitive draft shortly was given to it for consideration. During the course of the informal talks and later during the negotiations, the Israeli representatives have frequently alluded to the conviction of their government that private capital is essential to the economy of Israel and to its awareness that private capital, in order to be attracted to Israel, needs specific assurances of the kind embodied in the treaty under negotiation. They have told us, moreover, that in shaping its economic legislation Israel has sought an orientation compatible with the basic objectives of the treaty and that it had proposed the negotiation immediately upon enactment by the Parliament of certain legislation favorable to foreign capital (so-called investment law of March 29, 1950). 1 Lot 70 D 467 is a master set of the Department of State classified internal publication Current Economic Developments for the years 1945–1969, as maintained in the Bureau of Economic Affairs. 2 Information on this subject is found in the files of the Department of State under 611.84A4. The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 611.84A4/12–2850: Circular airgram [Document 622] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1 confidential Washington , December 28, 1950—8:55 a. m. The Department is in the final stages of negotiating a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with the Government of Israel and, unless unforeseen complications arise, it may be assumed that this treaty will be ready for signature by the two Governments by the end of January. It may be possible that announcement of the signature of such a treaty will have repercussions in the Arab states, particularly criticism that the signing of a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the United States and Israel is another manifestation of unduly close ties which allegedly exist between the two countries. In answering such allegations, if they arise, the Department suggests that it might be useful to point out that such a treaty is not intended and should not be regarded as a token of special political favor toward the country with which it is signed nor as evidence of political disfavor toward any country with which no such treaty has yet been concluded. The objective of these treaties is to define by common agreement and to establish the rules to govern basic economic relations between the United States and individual foreign countries. The United States holds such treaties to be conducive to investment, trade and advantageous economic intercourse generally and thus to the upbuilding and prosperity of foreign countries. It sees in such treaties an instrument for developing a sound world economy rather than for obtaining localized political advantages, and it stands ready at any time to enter into negotiations, on the basis of full sovereign equality, with any friendly, like-minded country. Furthermore, the United States has had underway for several years a program for negotiating such treaties with all countries prepared to do so. As a result of this program, treaties have been concluded with China, Italy, Uruguay and Ireland and negotiations are now in active stages of development with eight countries including four in the Eastern Mediterranean area, and draft negotiating proposals are being studied by a number of other governments. As the Missions are aware, the Department has often indicated its desire to negotiate modern treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation with the Arab states, and proposals to this effect were made to certain of these countries as long ago as 1945 and 1946. Negotiations have been held intermittently with several Arab states since that time but have not been successfully consummated in some instances for reasons which the Department considers to be largely beyond its control. Moreover, as the Missions are also aware, the possibility of treaties with other Moslem countries, to which drafts have not yet been presented, has been carefully explored. In effect, therefore, all of the Arab states have been given ample opportunity to enter into negotiations with the United States, and considerable effort has even been expended to adapt our standard negotiating proposals to their particular needs. In this respect the Department has formulated an abridged, simplified draft of the standard version of the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation for use in connection with the less-advanced countries of the Near East area. The possibility of negotiations was not taken up with the Government of Israel until well after approaches had been made to the principal Arab states, and less than a month of formal negotiation has made early signature of the treaty a distinct possibility. This rapid progress may be attributable in large part to the determined interest of Israel in encouraging investment and to its like mindedness with the United States as to the most effective means for attaining that end. Acheson 1 At Baghdad, Jidda, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus. Policy of the United States with respect to Jordan Policy of the United States with respect to Jordan [623] Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State Washington, April 17, 1950. 811.85/4–1750 Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State 811.85/4–1750 [Document 623] Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State 1 secret Washington , April 17, 1950. Jordan a. objectives The political and economic stability of Jordan, as well as that of the rest of the Near East, is of great importance to the security of the United States, and the economic opportunities of the people should be raised above the level at which social revolution is a recurring threat. It is in the national interest of the United States to have the respect and, so far as possible, the good will of all the peoples of the Near East, Jews and Arabs alike, and their orientation toward the west and away from the Soviet Union. We should seek to reconcile the differences between Israel on the one hand and Jordan and the other Arab states on the other and to promote economic arrangements such as the resumption of normal commercial intercourse within and through the area. We should provide advice and guidance in the solution of the economic, social and political problems of the country contingent upon its willingness to apply the maximum of self-help. There should be close United States–United Kingdom cooperation wherever possible to achieve these basic objectives. b. policies Political . The Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan was created by the United Kingdom out of the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The country continues to depend upon the United Kingdom for economic assistance and political support. The United States regards the continuance of the special relationship existing between the United Kingdom and Jordan to be in its own interests as well as those of the two countries concerned. The US at first withheld recognition of Jordan because we wished to be satisfied that the country was in fact sovereign and independent and fully able to discharge its international obligations. More recently recognition was delayed because of the political complications it would have injected into the Palestine question. On January 31, 1949, however, the United States extended de jure recognition simultaneously to the governments of Jordan and Israel. Legislations have been established in Amman and Washington, and Ministers Plenipotentiary have been exchanged. The fact that Jordan has the longest military frontier with Israel of any of the Arab states, that it possesses the only efficient and highly trained Arab military force, that it shares the occupation of Jerusalem with Israel, and that many of its economic development problems can only be solved on the basis of cooperation with Israel, makes Jordan a highly important factor in any solution of the Palestine problem which may be reached. The major problems which confront Jordan today and which are of primary concern to the United States are the establishment of peaceful and friendly relations between Israel and Jordan and the successful absorption into the polity and economy of Jordan of Arab Palestine, its inhabitants, and the bulk of the refugees now located there. Since the cessation of hostilities in Palestine, Jordan has consistently maintained a more favorable and realistic attitude than the other Arab states with regard to reaching an agreement with Israel and resolving the problem of the Palestine refugees. The United States has encouraged this attitude on the part of Jordan. Beginning in November 1949 and continuing into March of 1950, Jordan and Israel have held direct talks on territorial questions in general and on the Jerusalem question. Difficulties centered for the most part around the width of a corridor to the Mediterranean desired by Jordan. In Jerusalem they turned on access for the Israelis to Mt. Scopus and the Old City and the return of the Arab quarters to Jordan. Finally on February 24 a special agreement was initialled by the emissaries of King Abdullah and representatives of the Israeli government with a number of provisions including a five year nonaggression pact, the resumption of trade, continuation of the armistice lines, and a free zone at Haifa for Jordan. As the result of the failure of King Abdullah to consult his cabinet before initialing the agreement and the unwillingness of the Palestine Arabs in the Cabinet to approve, the Jordan government refused to ratify the terms of the agreement and a temporary cabinet crisis ensued. The government agreed, however, to continue the talks with Israel after the Jordanian elections on April 11. 2 Since February 1949 King Abdullah has taken successive steps to incorporate the area of Central Palestine into Jordan. Although he has not yet issued a formal decree of annexation, it is believed that this step will be taken in the near future. The United States with the United Kingdom has favored the annexation by Jordan of Arab Palestine. Although the UK would have preferred to permit King Abdullah to annex this territory at an earlier date, we opposed precipitate action on the ground that it would have been detrimental to the negotiations then in progress in the Palestine Conciliation Commission. 3 Since 1948 Jordan has been in occupation of the old city of Jerusalem. At an earlier period, King Abdullah indicated that he was willing to accept internationalization of the entire city and, failing that, would prefer Jordan annexation of the Arab section of the City. As time has passed, however, Jordan has become increasingly unwilling to permit internationalization and would prefer to reach agreement with Israel on partition of the city. To a certain extent Jordan recognizes the special status of the city since it has not requested exequaturs from our consular representatives in Jerusalem and permits them to travel freely in the Old City without visas. The United States has favored the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem to the degree necessary to achieve agreement among the main parties in interest, and has supported United Nations efforts to achieve this. Since the Jerusalem question is still sub judice in the United Nations, we do not recognize any claim to sovereignty on the part of Jordan or Israel in their respective zones of occupation in the Holy City. 4 Jordan is not yet a member of the United Nations. The United States continues to support its application. Economic . The economic situation with which Jordan is presently faced results primarily from two factors: first, the lack of productive resources, either agricultural or industrial, in Jordan itself and in Arab Palestine; second, the influx of refugees from western Palestine as a result of the Israel-Arab war. This increase in population-amounted to 280,000 or more than 50%, in Arab Palestine, and 70,000 or about 20%, in Jordan itself. Jordan, which controls and is in the process of annexing Arab Palestine, is financially incapable of caring for this refugee population and of promoting its absorption into the economy of the country. The United Nations Belief for Palestine Refugees organization has been supporting the refugees at a subsistence level but is not equipped to do any more than that. To fill the resulting need, the United Nations General Assembly, by its resolution of December 8, 1949, established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (PRA). The function of this Agency is two-fold, to provide relief and work for the refugees and to contribute to the economic development of the country, primarily through the use of the water resources of the Jordan and its tributaries for the irrigation of potentially arable land. The Agency plans to undertake a number of important development projects in Jordan which, it is hoped, will result in permanent settlement in the area of some of the refugees. The Jordan government has promised full cooperation. There will be opportunity under the Point IV program to further the economic development undertaken by PRA and to facilitate complementary progress in other fields. In both programs the emphasis should be on creating a situation in which Jordan will be able to proceed more or less independently with her development after the initial PRA effort is concluded. To this end, an attempt should be made to stress the training of Jordan students and technicians so that they will be able to carry on the work themselves once it has been begun. 5 There are, of course, urgent political reasons for assisting Jordan in her economic development so that the large refugee population may be absorbed. These homeless and jobless people constitute an unstable element in the Near East wherever they have gathered, and there is ample evidence that Communists have found fertile ground for their propaganda among them. 6 In order to eliminate this danger to the stability and to the western orientation of the area, the refugees must be settled and provided with means of livelihood. Aside from direct assistance through the programs outlined above, the United States should seek to promote the economic betterment of Jordan through the removal of trade barriers and the resumption of normal commercial relations between Jordan and all the neighboring states. To the extent that relatively high prices prevailing in Israel might, if trade is resumed with that country, initially drain off food products from the local Jordan market, the Jordan government should take steps to import other cheaper and perhaps equally acceptable food from surrounding countries to prevent food shortages and resultant hardships. Such a trade pattern between Israel and Jordan should be encouraged as of mutual benefit to both countries. The United States should encourage use of measures which will result in more productive employment of currently earned foreign exchange and also an increase in exchange earnings through production for export. 7 It should be emphasized that in our activity with regard to Jordan’s economic situation, as with her political affairs, we should cooperate closely with the British government, which is in special relationship with the country. c. relations with other states The relationships existing among the Arab states are fundamentally, the relationships among personalities and families. Antagonisms have developed on two general levels: the Hashemites versus anti-Hashemites; and King Abdullah of Jordan versus all other ruling groups. The Hashemites rule Iraq and Jordan, and they are opposed particularly by Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, with whom a traditional feud has existed since the early 1920’s, and by Egypt, who sees them as a potential threat to her position of leadership in the Arab world. Abdullah himself, because of his “Greater Syria” scheme, is feared even by Iraq. Iraq–Jordan antagonism has recently been augmented as a result of the agitation for Iraq-Syrian unity. Lebanese Christians fear a “Greater Syria” in which they would be subject to the domination of the Moslem majority. Syrian ruling families approve the scheme in principle but only if they can retain their power. These animosities have been heightened as a result of the recent Palestine hostilities. Jordan and the other Arab League states differ in this regard on three basic points: 1. The disposal of Arab Palestine, which Jordan desires to annex and which the other states wish to see remain a separate entity. 2. The Jerusalem question. The Arab League has supported the internationalization of that city, while Jordan is anxious to retain control of it. 3. Peace with Israel. The Arab League desires to maintain a common front against Israel and to continue the economic blockade of that state. The League itself has reportedly threatened Jordan with expulsion if it comes to a separate peace agreement. Syria and Egypt have threatened to cut off supplies to Jordan in retaliation for any breach of the economic boycott of Israel, and Syria has gone further in threatening to close its frontier with Jordan as a retaliatory move. Jordan has special treaty relations with Great Britain, under the terms of which Britain supports the Jordan Arab Legion. Although nominally independent, Jordan depends largely upon Great Britain for economic support. Jordan has no relations with the Soviet Union. Jordan is a member of the Universal Postal Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the World Health Organization, and it has applied for membership in the United Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. d. policy evaluation The policy which is being followed with regard to the Jordan–Israel negotiations involves a certain element of risk. It is possible, for example, that encouraging Jordan to make a separate peace with Israel may, if successful, result in open animosity between Jordan and the other Arab states which would have damaging effects upon the stability of the area. However, the chance of bringing to an end the uneasy situation which now exists appears to be well worth the risk, and our policy in this regard toward Jordan has been helpful in strengthening King Abdullah’s determination to reach a peace settlement. Another obstacle to a peace settlement, the intransigent attitude of Palestine Arabs, may become of greater importance following the election of representatives of Arab Palestine to the Jordan legislature. With regard to Jerusalem, neither Israel nor Jordan has given any indication that it will be willing to accept internationalization as demanded by the General Assembly resolutions. It is the US hope that these two states can come to an agreed solution which will be acceptable to the Christian world. This problem will undoubtedly continue to give difficulty, and the means to its resolution are not clear at this time. 1 Department of State Policy [Information] Statements were concise documents summarizing the current United States policy toward, the relations of principal powers with, and the issues and trends in a particular country or region. The statements were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad. They were generally prepared by ad hoc working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department of State and were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions abroad, under cover of formal instructions from the Secretary of State, for comment and criticism. The Policy Statements were periodically revised. 2 For documentation concerning the failure of the Jordan-Israeli negotiations and the ensuing Jordanian Cabinet crisis, see files 785 and 684.85. The Minister in Amman, Gerald A. Drew, doubted that negotiations would be resumed in the near future following the April crisis (Embtel 84, April 26, 684.85/4–2050). According to a despatch from Amman which reviewed the Departments Policy Statement, the Jordanian government did not agree to continue these negotiations after the elections of April 11 (despatch 163, January 9, 1951, 611.85/1–951). 3 On April 24 the Jordanian Parliament unanimously approved a resolution concerning the union of Central Palestine with Jordan. For documentation concerning this annexation, see files 784 and 684.85. The text of the resolution passed by Parliament is included in telegram 82 from Amman (April 25, 684.85/4–2550). The policy of the Department, as stated in a paper on this subject prepared for the Foreign Ministers meetings in London in May was in favor of the incorporation of Central Palestine into Jordan but desired that it be done gradually and not by sudden proclamation. Once the annexation took place, the Department approved of the action “in the sense that it represents a logical development of the situation which took place as a result of a free expression of the will of the people.… The United States continues to wish to avoid a public expression of approval of the union.” (FM D D–10/1, p. 2, CFM files, lot M 88, box 149, May FM Meeting, C & D series) For documentation concerning these Foreign Ministers meetings in London, see Foreign Relations , 1950, vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. Lot M 88 is a consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancillary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center. 4 For documentation concerning the internationalization of Jerusalem, see pp. 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] ff. 5 For documentation concerning technical assistance to Jordan, see file 885.00 TA. 6 The Legation in Amman, in their review of this Policy Statement, denied that the propagandistic efforts of the Communists among the refugees have found “fertile ground” (Despatch 163 of January 9, 1951, 611.85/1–951). 7 Although the United States initiated negotiations with Jordan concerning the possible signing of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation during the last several months of 1950, talks were not begun in earnest until January 1951. For documentation concerning these discussions, see file 611.854. Lebanon Lebanon Contents Interest of the United States in mitigating anti-western attitudes in Lebanon (Documents 624-626) Interest of the United States in mitigating anti-western attitudes in Lebanon Interest of the United States in mitigating anti-western attitudes in Lebanon [624] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Clark) [Washington,] August 1, 1950. [625] The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State Beirut, October 11, 1950. 611.83A/10–1150 [626] The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State Beirut, October 11, 1950. 611.83A/10–1150 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs (Clark) McGhee Files: Lot 53D468: Syria and Lebanon 1948 1 [Document 624] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs ( Clark ) secret [ Washington ,] August 1, 1950. Subject: Anti-Western Attitudes in the Arab World and Means of Combatting them. Participants: Dr. Charles Malik, Minister of Lebanon NEA—Mr. McGhee NE—Mr. Clark Discussion: Mr. McGhee said that we were very interested in Dr. Malik’s presentation on July 27 (See Memorandum of Conversation dated July 27 2 entitled “(1) Attack on Lebanese Plane by Israeli Fighter; (2) Lebanese Assistance in Korea; (3) General situation in the Near East”) and were very happy to have this opportunity to hear his further comments on the growth of anti-Western feeling in the Arab world. He added that Dr. Malik’s description of conditions favorable to Communist penetration of the Near East were more forceful than we had had from other sources. Dr. Malik said he felt there was no doubt whatever that the universal feeling in the Arab world is that when the worst comes to the worst in any conflict of Arab and Jewish interests, the US will inevitably side with the Jews. A corollary to this feeling is that “the US does not give a damn about the Arabs”. He said that he believed this feeling was shared in some measure even by King Ibn Saud himself and that all sections of the population both in and out of Government believed it to be true. He said he admitted the Arab Governments feel that they are supported by the US in a pro forma sort of way but that this was a type of hypocrisy indulged in by the US. This was the feeling which we had to disprove by our actions at once if the present trend were to be reversed or even stopped. It is based on the American position in the Palestine controversy and the record of American support for Israel against the Arabs in every crisis. Dr. Malik said that even he, whose sincerity of friendship for the West could not be disputed, still felt that in any crucial conflict it was a mathematical, foregone conclusion that this Government would be forced by American Zionist pressure to side with the Jews. Mr. McGhee said he understood how Dr. Malik’s experiences might have led him to that impression, but that he wished to assure him again that it was simply erroneous. Dr. Malik repeated that it was a thesis which we had to refute by our actions. Mr. McGhee said he did not see why the Arab-Israeli conflict should carry over to the struggle the free world was waging against world aggression. Dr. Malik replied that when bitten by the known one always prefers the unknown, and that the unknown usually has a halo. Mr. McGhee asked whether the Arabs had any information on conditions behind the Iron Curtain. Dr. Malik said the Arabs regarded Western versions of such conditions as mere propaganda. Dr. Malik said he felt there are seven basic questions on which our representatives in the US should be asked to ascertain Arab attitudes, as follows: 1. In the event of a war between the East and the West what would be the attitude of the Arab Governments? 2. In a similar emergency what would be the attitude of the Arab peoples? 3. What would be the possibility of anti-Western sabotage and fifth column activity? 4. In case of Communist invasion and expulsion of the West, how many people in the Arab world would “miss” the West? The answers to this question, he said, would be most illuminating. 5. In the event of Sovietization of the Arab world—again by no means impossible, what would be the possibility of an underground movement developing to resist the Russian occupation. 6. In case the West reconquers the area, how will the people receive it? 7. What then ought to be the shape of things to come? Mr. McGhee asked Dr. Malik for his own evaluation as to the answers to these questions. Dr. Malik said he could only talk specifically about his own country but he would comment in general about the attitudes on each of these questions in other Arab countries. As for Lebanon, Dr. Malik summarized the answers as follows: 1. The Lebanese Government in the event of an East-West conflict would be inclined toward the West, at least to the extent of benevolent neutrality. He added that the Lebanese open support for the West on the Korean question was the result of much pressure by such individuals as himself. In other words, the Lebanese Government was susceptible of being induced to cooperate with the West in the event of such a conflict. 2. The attitude of the Lebanese people in the event of such a conflict would generally be pro-Western. The Christian population would definitely be on the side of the West and the Moslems would not be on the side of Russia although they would be “open to suggestion” from the Arab hinterland. In other words, should the Arab hinterland go Communist, Lebanese Moslems would likewise tend to follow the lead of their Arab brethren in such countries as Iraq and Syria. Mr. McGhee inquired whether, in so far as pro-Soviet sentiment existed, such sentiment was motivated by expediency. Dr. Malik replied that the motivation was resentment against our Palestine policy although there was a long accumulation of resentment against the European colonial powers in the area. He emphasized that at the outset of such a Soviet occupation, even the Moslem population in Lebanon would not be pro-Russian. 3. Neither sabotage nor fifth column activity would be likely in Lebanon and in so far as any occurred it would be ineffective. Sabotage might be attempted by a few individuals or small groups including those infiltrating from other countries such as Palestine. Dr. Malik added that there is an underground Communist party in Lebanon. 4. Approximately 70% of the people would generally miss the West should it be ejected from Lebanon. This figure would include all the Westernized, commercial and landlord classes. The remaining 30% of the people would be apathetic:—never having seen anything better for thousands of years they would not miss what they never had. 5. It was very unlikely that any real anti-USSR movement would develop during Russian occupation. The Lebanese have never known the means to operate an underground against effective police methods and the people would simply “not have the guts” to undertake such activity. 6. If US reconquest of Lebanon should occur within a reasonable period of time, say within five or six years, the West would be genuinely welcomed on its return. However, if reconquest were delayed for one or two generations, national and pro-Western feeling would be completely suppressed, even in Lebanon. 7. Lebanon was thus a special case in the Arab world, distinct from the Arab hinterland. Dr. Malik summarized answers to his seven questions for the rest of the Arab world as a whole in the following manner: 1. If attacked, Governments would probably make token resistance but in the event of an East-West conflict not involving a Soviet attack on the Near East, the Governments would remain neutral with the possible exception of Iraq and Transjordan which are tied to the British by treaties of alliance. Mr. McGhee inquired as to the probable reaction on the part of King Ibn Saud and King Farouk. Dr. Malik said he doubted whether any positive action would be taken by these monarchs if they were not attacked in the first instance. 2. The attitude of the Arab hinterland people would be one of neutrality plus hatred of the West which can be played upon by the Soviets. 3. Sabotage against the West would be quite possible and might be quite serious. 4. If the Western powers were driven out of the Near East only a negligible portion would miss them, not more than 10%. 5. The possibility of an underground resistance movement developing against the Soviets would be absolutely nil. 6. If the West should endeavor to reconquer the Arab hinterland area the attitude of the peoples would be “distinctly antagonistic”. Mr. McGhee asked whether they would oppose our re-entry by force in such a hypothetical case. Dr. Malik said that the Arabs would be far more antagonistic to the West then than even the Soviets would have found them, or the imperialistic powers when they first came to the Near East, or the Iron Curtain countries of Eastern Europe when the Western powers return there. 7. The overall picture was thus one of distinct disadvantage to the West and, conversely, to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Mr. McGhee inquired whether Dr. Malik considered a firm stand by the US against aggression would make a difference. Dr. Malik replied that it would, particularly if we provided arms to the Arab states in order to build up their defenses. However, he described the situation in the Arab world as being similar to that in Southeast Asia today, particularly that in Indo-China and Malaya. Mr. McGhee said that the impression we had was that Siam was fully on the side of the West, that Malaya was in fact not a state and that in Indo-China there was a colonial question which did not exist in the Near East. Dr. Malik said that his impression was that Southeast Asia was nevertheless on the whole unfriendly to the West and would not oppose further Soviet advances. Mr. McGhee said it was common knowledge that people in the Iron Curtain countries hate the Russians. Why would the Arabs be any different? Dr. Malik repeated that mistrust of and resentment of the West over the Palestine controversy is extremely strong and deep-seated. Mr. McGhee asked whether the Arabs would endeavor to defend themselves against a Russian attack. Dr. Malik replied “only if they are properly armed and you befriend them. Not if you just show an interest in the Arabs when you are in trouble”. Mr. McGhee said, but what about their feelings of national pride? Would the Arab peoples defend their own countries’ independence? Dr. Malik replied that an increasing number of Arabs are saying that the present struggle is an East-West fight and that if the East comes into the Near East, it will be for the purpose of liberating the Arabs from the West. Mr. McGhee asked whether in the light of his estimate of the situation, Dr. Malik could say what he felt should be done to improve the situation. Dr. Malik said that the present American approach to solving our problems in the Near East seemed to be wholly an economic one. In his opinion economic help, while also essential, was not even a first step but instead merited only 4th or 5th place in our lines of action. The Palestine problem is the number one source of resentment against the West and it would continue to be probably for his lifetime. Two things ought to be done: the first was to disabuse the Arab mind by acts—not words—that the United States is not going to side with Israel at every critical juncture. He personally believed the Three-Power Declaration 3 was an excellent start but the Arab people distrust the United States very deeply. There should be a declaration by the President of the United States that it will not come to pass that in every election year the United States Government will yield to Zionist pressure. Mr. McGhee interrupted to say that this is an election year and we have not yielded to pressure of any sort. Dr. Malik replied that that was encouraging but the people wanted a firm declaration of American intent. All that they hear now is such statements as those made by the Vice President of the United States comparing the Arab states unfavorably with Israel. Mr. McGhee said that we had reason to hope that such statements would not again occur. Dr. Malik declared, “But it is out of your hands! I have heard similar things from all your distinguished predecessors in the last few years and yet Zionist pressure has always succeeded in swaying the US Government on vital issues.” He said what is needed is for this Government to issue a “Balfour Declaration in reverse” to the effect not that the Israelis will be thrown into the sea but that they will not be permitted to seize further Arab territory—that it would be inconceivable for this country to side with the Jews against the Arabs in any future conflict of interests. Such a declaration would show the Arab world that the US has the “moral guts” to stand up against pressure. The Three-Power Declaration is not enough to demonstrate this fact. A separate declaration by the United States on the highest possible level is required. The second necessity is for United States Government “again to take courage and with aggressive intent to help honor the three standing resolutions of the General Assembly on the refugees, frontiers and the status of Jerusalem.” 4 He referred to the “curve of deterioration” in the American position on Jerusalem, from the Jessup statement through Hershel Johnson’s watered-down statements, to the “weak statements of my good friend, Mr. Ross”. Perhaps the key to the question was the resolution on Jerusalem. If the US has 30,000,000 Catholics who are in favor of the internationalization of Jerusalem and still the US Government will not assist in implementing the Jerusalem resolution voted by 38 nations of the United Nations, how can the Arabs expect us to support implementation of the other resolutions? Mr. McGhee said that while it was true we had not voted for the Jerusalem resolution we had loyally cooperated in drafting the Jerusalem statute in the Trusteeship Council and our position was still known to be one of willingness to cooperate in working out a satisfactory implementation. This was true, notwithstanding the fact we honestly believe the PCC recommendations on Jerusalem were the most practicable and reasonable of any put forward. Moreover, both Israel and Jordan had rejected internationalization. Dr. Malik exclaimed “Jordan is the absolute stooge of you and the British! We Arabs have known all along that the intent of the West was not to partition Palestine but to establish a Jewish state. King Abdullah has cooperated fully in that aim.” Mr. McGhee pointed out that we had no influence over Jordan and said that we had a substantive middle-of-the-road position between the extremes of one side and the other. Dr. Malik retorted that the world community has spoken and its wishes should be carried out on the Jerusalem question. Mr. McGhee again reminded him that we had gone in good faith to Geneva and had participated fully in the work of the Trusteeship Council in its endeavors to implement the resolution. Dr. Malik declared that to him Jerusalem provided a crucial test and that he believed all Arabs would watch our further actions intently to see whether the US will yield to Zionist pressure. Mr. McGhee said that, in fairness, it must be admitted that we have not knuckled under on this question, that we have and will continue to participate in UN efforts to reach a solution of the problem. Dr. Malik said that if the US helps in achieving the internationalization of Jerusalem it will show the world that the US means what it says and not otherwise. Mr. McGhee said that the Trusteeship Council will report back to the General Assembly this fall and Dr. Malik expressed his personal fear that the US will “whittle it down” and that the Arab world will not fail to see us do so. Dr. Malik said he earnestly felt we should take a fresh look into the dangerously unstable situation in the Near East and adopt positive measures to deal with it. We must implement the resolutions of the General Assembly on Palestine even if we incur the enmity of Israel. Mr. McGhee said that we had openly declared our support for the resolutions on the refugees, for example, and that our endeavors to have the refugees return had failed. How would we force the refugees to go back? Dr. Malik said that Israel must show a willingness to abide at least by the spirit of the resolution and to make fair compensation for the property seized. He said that he readily perceives why the United States would be more interested in implementing the Security Council resolution on Korea than the General Assembly resolutions on Palestine but that our position in the whole Near East hangs in the balance. Dr. Malik said also that the situation in Syria was a festering sore and we should take immediate measures to stabilize it. Mr. McGhee observed that this was again a question involving the internal affairs of another country and we were therefore limited in what we could do. Dr. Malik said that we should nevertheless go to the Syrian Government with an offer of assistance in strengthening its military position and then provide money for development programs. This economic aid was, however, still 4th or 5th in priority. Without accomplishing the measures he had suggested in the political field, no amount of money we poured into the area would change the situation. Mr. McGhee thanked Dr. Malik for his remarks and said that we should like to have another opportunity to exchange views with him in the near future. 1 Lot 53D468 contains copies of memoranda and correspondence of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George C. McGhee for the years 1949–1951. 2 Not printed. 3 For documentation concerning the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, see pp. 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] ff. 4 For documentation concerning these resolutions, see pp. 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] ff. The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State 611.83A/10–1150 [Document 625] The Minister in Lebanon ( Pinkerton ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 141 Beirut , October 11, 1950. Ref: Memorandum of Conversation, August 1, 1950, Anti-Western Attitudes in the Arab World and Means of Combatting Them. 1 Subject: Comments on the reference Memorandum of Conversation. There is no doubt that there is deep-seated resentment in the Arab world, including Lebanon, against the United States for its policy toward Palestine and its support of the State of Israel. It is probable that this resentment is neither so acute nor so universal in Lebanon as it is in other Arab countries but it definitely exists and adversely influences relations with the United States. There is a fairly large section of the Lebanese population, particularly the Shiites in South Lebanon, which has shown its willingness to trade illicitly with the Israelis which may indicate that resentment of the establishment of Israel is only superficial with them but, on the other hand, they might be expected to trade with their worst enemy and this may have no significance in interpreting their feelings toward Israel. It is fairly reliably reported that the threat to join Israel has been used by some South Lebanon leaders as blackmail to obtain favors from the Lebanese Government, This section, however is the least developed economically, socially and culturally of all parts of Lebanon and the population has no sense of political responsibility but follows its feudal leaders blindly while the leaders themselves are not much better. A small section of the Christian population is secretly pleased at the establishment of Israel as an additional safeguard to the Christian community from the Moslems surrounding them. Although the above-mentioned minorities may serve to temper the resentment of Lebanon against the United States, they are not strong enough to turn the country away from the policies adopted by other Arab States. Their very existence makes Lebanon doubly cautious in seeming to take the lead against Arab policies, and the country has to be handled very carefully for that reason. The exertion of undue pressure upon the Government to be more reasonable toward the United States might well backfire. I agree with Dr. Malik that the Arabs, including Lebanon, are convinced that if the United States had to choose between Israel and the Arabs, it would choose Israel, regardless of the justice of the case. There is also a belief among the Lebanese, fairly widely spread, that the United States is more friendly to Lebanon than to the Moslem States because of its religion and quasi-western civilization. This belief can, I believe, be used in economic and cultural, but not political, approaches. Furthermore, I doubt very much whether anti-American propaganda used by the communists is a strong influence in Lebanon because the Lebanese know the United States too well to be taken in by it. I believe that communist strength in the country stems from economic causes which the Government either refuses to recognize or is unable to correct. Public resentment of U.S. policy in Palestine may make it difficult for the Government to appeal to us for economic assistance, but I do not believe the elimination of Palestine from the picture would eliminate the danger of communism unless there was an accompanying correction of the bad economic and political situation. In this respect I disagree with Dr. Malik as I believe the economic approach would most certainly be effective in combatting communism in Lebanon if we could be sure any assistance we gave would trickle down to the grass roots and not serve to make the rich richer. I believe one of the most potent factors in the growth of communism in Lebanon and perhaps throughout the Arab world is the envy of the poor for the rich which is increasing due to the display made by the rich. Previously the rich man rode a horse but the poor man had his donkey; the rich man had a large house but it was not much different in design from the small one of the poor; and there was frequent contact between the rich land owner or merchant and his employees. Now, the rich man has expensive automobiles and the poor man still has his donkey; the rich man lives in western style with much display of wealth and the poor man still lives in his small eastern-style house; and the rich man lives mostly in the cities with frequent trips abroad and the poor man rarely sees him and the contact is far from close. These and similar differences create envy and such envy creates a fertile field for communism, particularly when even minimum requirements for subsistence cannot be met. The urge for personal enrichment and, in some cases, political graft is so strong that unless at least part of the economic assistance goes to the rich it would be difficult to interest the country in such economic assistance. The correction of the fault is a long-term proposition and the situation as it exists must be accepted in extending aid. We have religion on our side and the Moslems and Uniate group may be expected to resist communism, but the Chargé d’Affaires of the Nonciature tells me even they have difficulty in impressing the local clergy with the dangers of communism. Most of the recruits locally come from the Greek and Armenian Orthodox sects and from a young group which refuses to take any religion seriously. My replies to Dr. Malik’s seven questions are: 1. The Lebanese Government has been pro-West in the past and as those in power can expect no consideration from the communists, I believe it would continue that policy in the event of an East-West conflict. It would, I believe, give open support to the West because the politicans know they would have to leave the country if the Russians entered. They are not, however, above using threats to turn to the East as blackmail to obtain advantages. 2. The sentiment of the Lebanese people would be generally pro-West, but their attitude would be governed by circumstances. If it was apparent that the country would be occupied by the Russians, I should expect the red flag to be raised on every flag-staff. This was confirmed to me by the Lebanese Chief of Staff who stated it as a fact and nothing to be regretted. Except for communist party members and fellow travelers who would act from principles, this attitude would be motivated entirely by self-interest. I doubt any change in our policy toward Palestine or any other question would have the least effect in that attitude. 3. As Dr. Malik well knows, there is a fairly well organized, but small communist party in Lebanon with much larger periphery groups, and they would certainly engage in anti-Western sabotage and fifth column activity in the event of the occupation of the country by the West. The mass of sympathizers is entirely without courage or stamina and, if the few leaders were identified and eliminated, this activity would become negligible. 4. I believe all except a few Lebanese would miss the West in the event of Soviet occupation. To the Lebanese, war has always been a means of personal enrichment and full advantage has been taken of opportunities to trade with occupying powers and to engage in lucrative contracts with foreign armies. There is a growing realization that the Soviet army would take what it wants and would leave no newly acquired fortunes behind it. They also know there would be a great shifting of wealth among the Lebanese and the present rich merchant would give place to his communist employee. They do not like the idea. 5. I agree that the development of any anti-Soviet movement is most unlikely during Russian occupation. 6. Reconquest of Lebanon by the West would be welcomed at any time. Political principles and sentiments of nationalism are flexible and not strong in the Lebanon, but the instinct for trade and profits is so deep-seated that it would require generations to eliminate it. The suppression of trade and nationalization of assets, which would come with Soviet occupation, would be most unwelcome and relief from them at any time would be sought. Lebanon has known many occupations and the inscriptions on the Dog River mark the passage of invading armies from the time of the Assyrians. None of them has been resisted by the local population and none of them has had much effect on the racial characteristics. The Soviet army might be different but I find little to indicate it. For this reason I believe the return of the West and of the status quo would be welcome at any time. 7. Lebanon is an uncertain quantity and cannot be relied upon to defend its own territory. It may be expected to endeavor to remain out of any conflict until the result is apparent and then join the winning side. In this respect it is not believed to be a special case in the Arab world. The above is critical of the Lebanese population, but it is based upon the history of the country and the racial and national characteristics of the people. I believe the United States, either through the United Nations or with the United Kingdom and France, should ( a ) endeavor to settle the Refugee problem, which is a source of social, economic and political uncertainty, ( b ) encourage the Arab States to adopt a constructive policy designed to serve their own interests rather than the negative one of hating Israel, ( c ) try to build up the economies of the Arab States so the standard of living of their populations will be raised, ( d ) encourage better governments with the gradual elimination of graft and nepotism, ( e ) show what would happen to the Arab States if the friendship of the West were removed, ( f ) encourage the establishment of a more responsible press, ( g ) convince the Arab States that Western friendship is as important to them as Arab friendship is to the West and that mutual friendship is advantageous and ( h ) acquire any desired benefits from the Arab States well in advance of the outbreak of any possible conflict. The Lebanese Government is democratic only in form. Actually it is oligarchic, corrupt and democratic processes exist only on paper. It has no sense of social responsibility and the interests of the population as a whole count for very little with the ruling clique. Unfortunately, there is no person or group of persons with the ability to govern who could be expected to be more honest than the present rulers. The problem is therefore to teach, guide and influence the present group and hope for a gradual improvement of the Government. Department please pouch to the Arab capitals copies of this despatch. Lowell C. Pinkerton 1 Supra . The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State 611.83A/10–1150 [Document 626] The Minister in Lebanon ( Pinkerton ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret No. 142 Beirut , October 11, 1950. Ref: DepCircGram September 27, 1950, 4:05 p m 2 Subject: Changed Attitude of Arabs and Israelis since Korean Crisis In so far as Lebanon is concerned, the following appears to be the reaction to the Korean crisis: 1. ( a ) The Lebanese attitude towards the United States has definitely improved since the favorable turn of events in Korea. Nothing succeeds like success in Lebanon. Although the Lebanese themselves do not admire force for its own sake as much as do certain other Arab States, nevertheless their stock in trade is picking winners and trading with them. Up until June 25th the Lebanese Government and traders had observed with alarm the constant weakening of the United States and the policy of retreat which was apparently being followed almost everywhere except in Europe and Greece, Turkey and Iran. They were surprised and pleased at our prompt reaction to the invasion of South Korea, but as friends of the United States they were unhappy over the long retreat which took place there. Now that we are winning so decisively, the Government, the press, and almost all the Lebanese appear definitely more cordial to the United States. ( b ) Because the United Nations’ success in Korea is essentially a success of the West, all the nations of the West have shared, although in a considerably lesser degree, in the improved Lebanese attitude which is most clearly evidenced towards America. 2. The Korean crisis has affected the thinking of the Lebanese towards Israel because of the United Nations’ part in the Korean war. The Lebanese had for the most part written off the United Nations as a debating society with certain social and cultural functions on the side. As a result of this summer’s developments in Korea, the Lebanese, to their surprise, find that the United Nations can be a strong and forceful instrument for preserving world order and settling international problems. The Lebanese, therefore, recalling the United Nations’ handling of the Palestine problem, are asking themselves, “can the recently found strength of the United Nations be applied to bring about a general or limited agreement on the Palestine problem which will be satisfactory to the Arabs?” Because it hopes that the United Nations can be pushed into taking a strong stand with the Jews, the Government and much of the press and public of Lebanon have now hardened their attitude on the question of a settlement with Israel, and will be disappointed if it turns out, as some of the extreme Arabs are saying, that “there is one United Nations’ law for Israel and another for the rest of the world”. 3. Since the United Nations’ success in Korea, the attitude of the Lebanese Government and people towards the USSR and Communists has hardened. A new campaign has been started to track down and arrest Party members, along with members of the P.P.S., which the Lebanese Government considers equally subversive; and a judge has been appointed to handle cases involving Communists, and Communist or fellow traveller groups are beginning to have more trouble with the police than has been the case for some time. Unfortunately, however, it is doubtful if even this new campaign against Communists in Lebanon will be very effective. Due to the age old conflict between Christians and Moslems in Lebanon, the Government has refused to put all of the power for this anti-Communist-anti-P.P.S. drive into either Christian or Moslem hands. As it now stands the Lebanese Surete, under the direction of Emir Farid Schehab, a Christian, makes the investigations and recommends arrests. The actual arrest, however, is made by the Moslem police. This has already resulted in several cases in which Moslems with Communist records who were recommended for arrest by the Surete have not been detained long by the police. Emir Schehab has indicated that he will try the system out for a month or so and if it does not work will seek a showdown looking toward a better arrangement. Lowell C. Pinkerton 1 Copies pouched to Tel Aviv, Damascus, Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Amman, London, and Moscow. 2 Not printed; it requested Embassies and Legations in the Near East to comment on the general effects of the Korean crisis on Arab and Israeli attitudes (611.84A/9–2750). Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Contents Interest of the United States in questions of economic and military assistance to Saudi Arabia; the question of the renewal of United States tenancy at Dhahran airfield (Documents 627-664) Interest of the United States in questions of economic and military assistance to Saudi Arabia; the question of the renewal of United States tenancy at Dhahran airfield Interest of the United States in questions of economic and military assistance to Saudi Arabia; the question of the renewal of United States tenancy at Dhahran airfield 1 1 For previous documentation on these subjects, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1573 ff. [627] Report of the Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia [Washington, undated.] 711.56386A/4–1850 [628] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, January 17, 1950—7 p. m. 611.86A/1–1750: Telegram [629] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, February 1, 1950—1 p. m. 611.86A/2–150: Telegram [630] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, February 9, 1950—4 p. m. 611.86A/2–150: Telegram [631] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, February 13, 1950—4 p. m. 886A.10/2–1350: Telegram [632] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, February 14, 1950—1 p. m. 786A.5/2–1450: Telegram [633] President Truman to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia [Washington, undated.] 786A.563/2–2150 [634] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, March 1, 1950—11 a. m. 7864.11/3–150: Telegram [635] The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) Washington, March 8, 1950. 711.56386A/2–1350 [636] Memorandum, of Conversation [Jidda,] March 19, 1950. 611.86A/3–1950 [637] Memorandum of Conversations, by the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) [Jidda,] March 23, 1950. 611.86A/3–2350 [638] The Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Collins) to the Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Haislip) Jidda, April 3, 1950—5 p. m. 786A.5MAP/4–350: Telegram [639] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 3, 1950. 886A.413/4–350 [640] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State Jidda, April 8, 1950—5 p. m. 786A.11/4–850: Telegram [641] Excerpt of Report by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Collins) to the Secretary of the Army (Gray) [Washington, April 1950.] 786A.5/4–1950 [642] Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. Samuel Gorlitz and Wilfred Koplowitz of the Investment and Economic Development Staff [Washington,] April 19, 1950. 886A.10/4–1950 [643] Memorandum by Mr. Frederick H. Await of the Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) [Riyadh ?,] April 30, 1950. 786A.11/4–3050 [644] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Consulate General at Dhahran Jidda, May 7, 1950—10 a. m. 886A.413/5–750: Telegram [645] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, May 10, 1950—5 p. m. 786A.5–MAP/5–1050: Telegram [646] The American Embassy to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office Jidda, May 22, 1950. 986A.524/5–2250 [647] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, May 25, 1950—11 a. m. 786.56/5–2550: Telegram [648] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State Jidda, June 26, 1950. 886A.10/6–2650: Despatch [649] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) Washington, June 30, 1950. 886A.10/6–3050 [650] Editorial Note [651] Editorial Note [652] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt) [Washington,] July 28, 1950. 886A.10/7–2850 [653] Editorial Note [654] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 3, 1950—4 p. m. 786A.00/9–350: Telegram [655] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, September 12, 1950—11 p. m. 786A.56/9–350: Telegram [656] Counselor of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State Jidda, September 19, 1950—8 p. m. 786A.00/9–1950: Telegram [657] Memorandum by Mr. Robert Thayer of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Ambassador-Designate to Saudi Arabia (Hare) [Washington,] September 19, 1950. 986A.524/9–1950 [658] President Truman to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia [Washington,] October 31, 1950. 711.56386A/10–3050 [659] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 4, 1950—3 p. m. 786A.5/11–450: Telegram [660] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, November 4, 1950—8 p. m. 886A.10/11–450: Telegram [661] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) Washington, November 17, 1950. 711.56386A/11–1750 [662] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, November 21, 1950—5 p. m. 786A.5–MAP/11–2150: Telegram [663] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia Washington, December 18, 1950—2 p. m. 886A.13/12–650: Telegram [664] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State Jidda, December 24, 1950—noon. 711.56386A/12–2450: Telegram Report of the Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia 711.56386A/4–1850 [Document 627] Report of the Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia 2 top secret [ Washington , undated.] JUSSGSA Field Report With Final Recommendations for the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force general 1. Introduction a . The Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia visited Riyadh for the purpose of discussing with His Majesty the mission of the survey group. It was decided that the first objective would be an on-the-site study of Saudi Arabian defense requirements, and would be conducted with Saudi Arabian Army members. American members of the survey group would also determine United States requirements at Dhahran for future consideration in connection with long-term agreement negotiations. b . To accomplish the mission of the survey group, a number of distinguished military experts representing the three Armed Forces of the United States were chosen by the Department of Defense. These military experts are currently occupying positions of great responsibility in their respective services in Washington. All of these officers achieved records of outstanding distinction in the past war. The United States Government was very careful to select qualified officers who had the theoretical knowledge of military affairs and also required these officers to have a background of extensive military experience under actual battle conditions. His Majesty assigned five Saudi Arabian Army Officers to the survey group to represent the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in accomplishing the assigned mission. c . His Majesty was informed that the group would establish headquarters at Dhahran Airfield and would cover the Arabian Peninsula by vehicle and aircraft to accomplish the on-the-site study of the Saudi Arabian Government’s internal security. Headquarters, United States Air Force, in Washington, directed that Dhahran Airfield would logistically support the survey group mission. Since the Arabian American Oil Company had extensive experience in Saudi Arabia, and facilities throughout the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula, the oil company was asked to assist the survey group in its mission. Mr. Floyd Ohliger, Mr. George Johnson, and Mr. Richard Kerr were the principal Aramco officials who contributed much of their time and effort to the successful completion of the survey group’s studies. Mr. Kerr acted as Liaison Officer between the survey group and Aramco, and accompanied the survey group on all of the ground vehicle survey trips in the capacity of Field Manager. It is pertinent to state at this time that the on-the-site study would have been impossible without the full cooperation of the Arabian American Oil Company. Both the Saudi Arabian Government and the United States should be grateful to Aramco for their unselfish efforts in accomplishing the survey group’s mission. 2. Travel a . The survey group made four separate vehicle trips. The routes covered were, generally, throughout the Hasa Province, the southern Nejd east of the Tuwaiq Mountains, the northern territories in the vicinity of the Tapline, and the central Nejd in the Hailburaida district. Total vehicle travel in the above areas was 3,825 statute miles. Survey groups objectives in vehicular travel were: (1) Terrain study. (2) Climate. (3) Local tribes. (4) Saudi Arabian Army garrisons and outposts. (5) Equipment, arms and training of Saudi Arabian troops. It was felt that more extensive vehicle travel in the Arabian Peninsula was desirable; however, in the interest of expediting the mission, vehicular travel was kept at a minimum. b . Vehicular observations were supplemented by air trips throughout the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea area, and the Gulf of Aden. The entire Arabian Peninsula was covered by air with the exception of the Trucial Oman, Muscat, Hadhramaut, and the extreme eastern Rub ’Al Khali. Aerial surveys were made by the survey group in thirteen separate air trips which traversed air routes of 10,988 statute miles. The aerial survey objectives were: (1) Road observations. (2) Topography. (3) Invasion routes. (4) Defensive areas. (5) Coastlines. (6) Large centers of population. (7) Large areas of cultivation. (8) Natural terrain barriers. (9) Airfields and airstrips. (10) Ports. The distances travelled, as enumerated above, included only route miles. In addition to the route miles traversed, the Air Rescue Service unit of Dhahran Airfield supported the survey group in the field by forty-eight support missions which traversed 27,310 statute miles. The Air Rescue Service unit also performed six photographic missions covering 6,315 statute miles. To summarize, the Joint United States Survey Group’s studies required a total of 44,613 statute miles of travel by vehicle and aircraft. 3. Economic a . The survey group followed the American concept of military requirements; namely, (1) simplicity, (2) economy, and (3) mobility, in recommendations for the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force. This concept resulted in the determination that all vehicles for the Armed Forces should be commercial vehicles suitable for the needs of Saudi Arabian defense and, at the same time, capable of use by the Saudi Arabian Government in support of normal government operations. The type of vehicles should be, in general, such, as those now being successfully used by the Arabian American Oil Company in Arabian desert operations. In addition, the Air Force Troop Carrier aircraft should be suitable not only as troop carrier aircraft, but also for commercial airline operation of the government-owned Saudi Arabian Airlines. Communications, airfields, maintenance shops, etc., should have the dual use of supporting the Arabian Government operations and being readily available if required for the defense of the Kingdom. b . The American members of the survey group have followed the instructions of His Majesty in making the on-the-site survey of Saudi Arabian defense needs by placing themselves in the position of the Saudis and assuming that it was their mission to defend Saudi Arabia from its enemies. In following these instructions, the survey group has arrived at conclusions which must be carefully analyzed by the Saudi Arabian Government with regard to the ability of the government and its financial structure to support the military organization recommended. c . National Defense budget data obtained from eighteen major and minor nations may be used by the Saudi Arabian Government in arriving at some conclusion as to its ability to support the recommended Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force. In terms of the national income, these eighteen nations obligated to the defense establishment, an average of 6 per cent of the total national income. Also these eighteen nations averaged, for defense needs, 19 per cent of the total government expenditures. During the survey group’s visit at Riyadh with His Majesty, Shaikh Yussef Yassin 3 and Bey Hamze 4 were asked to keep these figures in mind as a wise guide for the type of military equipment and the extent of the military establishment which would be desirable for Saudi Arabia. In view of the lack of official figures relative to the Saudi Arabian Government’s national income and budget for the coming year, with a five year forecast, the survey group roughly estimated that the total national revenue for 1949 would be approximately eighty-five to one hundred million dollars. d . The recommended defense organization for Saudi Arabia is considered by the survey group to be a desirable organization rather than an essential one. The organization can be reduced in strength and cost as determined by the Saudi Arabian Government, keeping in mind that the existing defense organization is in such condition that it requires complete reconstruction, reorganization, re-equipping and training; therefore, the initial cost of the recommended defense organization might appear to be beyond the ability of the Saudi Arabian Government to support it. e . The recommended defense organization is planned on a five-year program for reconstruction, re-equipping and training. This five-year program is based upon a smooth coordinated effort by both the Saudi Arabian Government and the United States Government. There will be unforeseen delays which might easily extend the recommended five-year program. It is suggested that the Saudi Arabian Government arrange for distribution of initial defense costs over a period of years which would be commensurate with its national income. It is not considered infeasible that the Saudi Arabian Government could budget twenty million dollars each year to its Department of Defense. f . In obligating Saudi Arabian defense funds to support the recommended defense organization, the Saudi Arabian Government should consider that these costs accomplish a great deal in addition to providing a strong defensive force. Implementation of the defense organization will not only provide a strong internal security for the Kingdom, but will contribute to the progress of the people and the government in improved communications, improved airfields, construction of many types of facilities such as roads, maintenance shops, etc., and above all else, will institute a technical and educational program which will be available to a large bulk of the Arabian population. g . The American training required for implementation of the recommended defense organization will be made extremely difficult by the scarcity and, in some cases, the total absence of an adequate elementary and scientific educational program for children and young men of the Kingdom. It is strongly recommended that the Saudi Arabian Government take the necessary steps to establish an adequate educational program with recognized standards which will prepare the youth of Saudi Arabia for future service in the defense organization. Basic knowledge acquired by youth during at least eight years of elementary school and possibly four years of high school are very necessary in preparing them to absorb the knowledge required of a modern soldier using modern weapons. h . If the recommended defense organization is to serve its purpose, it must have full support of its government, financial and otherwise. The defense organization and its General Staff must be organized in such a manner that it will only be under the authority of the Minister of Defense and not be subject to the will or the desires of local Amirs. To accomplish this, the defense organization must be entirely independent of local Amirs in garrisons, billeting, messing and all supporting facilities. In other words it must be an instrument of His Majesty and Minister of Defense and no one else. summary of requirements 4. Army a . The survey group recommends that the Saudi Arabian Army consist of approximately 2,700 officers and 39,700 enlisted men organized into: (1) A GHQ. (2) Reserves for GHQ. (3) Two infantry divisions. (4) Reserves for two divisions. (5) Parachute Infantry Combat Team. (6) TD Battalion. (7) Miscellaneous service support units such as medical, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, engineer, motor pools, and reserves. b . The recommended Saudi Arabian Army will be trained and advised by a United States Army cadre consisting of about 150 American Army Officers and 240 Enlisted Men. c . The armament would be modern and that which is normal in the American Army for the recommended units. Ammunition required for a five-year training period will also be necessary. d . The initial cost for equipping the Army and construction of the necessary facilities is calculated at approximately $80,000,000. This figure is broken down into $46,000,000 for combat units (including trucks, communications, uniforms, and individual equipment); $20,000,000 for service units; and $14,000,000 for construction of items such as barracks, training buildings, instructor (U.S.) quarters, signal repair shops and field hospitals. In addition, in order to provide for the initial Army training at Dhahran Airfield, it will be necessary that additional Army construction be provided at a cost of about $1,700,000. e . All costs are roughly estimated and are subject to major changes. It is contemplated that exact costs will be discussed in detail during final negotiations. Costs listed do not include Saudi Army pay, subsistence, billeting, nor maintenance cost of the Saudi Arabian Army during its training or active service periods. The costs enumerated above simply include the cost to Saudi Arabia of military equipment which must be provided by the United States to include some facilities necessary to the Saudi Arabian Army and the American Army training program. 5. Navy a . The survey group recommends that the Saudi Arabian Navy consist of approximately 50 Officers and 215 Enlisted Men organized into: (1) A Naval Headquarters. (2) Two Naval Bases. (3) Persian Gulf Fleet of: 2 PGM (Motor Gun Boats) 2 PT (Motor Torpedo Boats) 2 LCS (S) (Landing Craft Support Small) 3 ML (20 to 26 ft.) (Motor Launches) (4) Red Sea Fleet of: 2 PT 2LCS(S) 3 ML b . The recommended Saudi Arabian Navy will be trained and advised by a United States Navy cadre consisting of three American Naval Officers and eight Enlisted Men. c . The armament would be modern and that which is normal in the American Navy for the recommended units. A complete set of spare parts will be provided for all engines and for radio and ordnance equipment. Necessary training ammunition will also be necessary. d . The initial cost for equipping the Navy and construction of the necessary facilities is approximately $7,800,000. This figure is broken down into $6,500,000 for vessels; $1,200,000 for bases (construction of training buildings, storage, quarters, headquarters, kitchen, etc.); and $100,000 for a five-year ammunition training allowance. All costs, as in the case of the Army, are roughly estimated, subject to change, and do not include Saudi Navy pay, subsistence, or maintenance cost of the Saudi Arabian Navy during its training or active service periods. The costs enumerated above simply include the cost to Saudi Arabia of Naval equipment which must be provided by the U.S. and, in addition, the cost of Naval base facilities which must be constructed by the Saudi Arabian Government, to include training facilities. 6. Air Force a . The survey group recommends that the Saudi Arabian Air Force consist of approximately 107 Officers and 755 Airmen. b . The recommended Saudi Arabian Air Force will be trained and advised by a United States Air Force cadre consisting of 26 American Air Force Officers and 38 Airmen. c . The major items of equipment and facilities for the Saudi Arabian Air Force are: (1) 28 Super C–47 twin-engine Transports. (2) 5 C–54 four-engine Transports. (3) 2 Major Air Bases. (4) 2 Major Airfields. (5) 8 Minor Operational Airfields. (6) 12 Weather Stations (all airfields). (7) 4 Major Airways Communication Centers. Necessary training ammunition will be necessary. d . The initial cost for equipping the Air Force and construction of the necessary facilities is approximately $19,700,000. This figure is broken down into $10,300,000 for tactical and service units (including 33 transports); $3,500,000 for construction (housing, airfields, storage, runways, etc.); and $5,900,000 for spare parts, packing, shipping and maintenance. In addition, in order to provide for Air Force training at Dhahran Airfield, it will be necessary that additional Air Force construction be provided at a cost of about $26,200,000. e . All costs are very roughly estimated and are subject to major changes. It is contemplated that exact costs will be discussed in detail during final negotiations. All costs recommended do not include Saudi Arabian Air Force pay, subsistence, nor maintenance costs for the Saudi Arabian Air Force during its training or active service periods. The costs enumerated above simply include the cost to Saudi Arabia of military equipment which must be provided by the United States to include airfield facilities throughout the Kingdom very necessary to the Saudi Arabian Air Force. f . Attention is invited to construction required at Dhahran Airfield for Saudi Arabian Army and Air Force training. It will be noted that in the event the U.S. undertakes training for the Saudi Arabian defense organization, it will be necessary to expand the present facilities of Dhahran Airfield at a cost of about $27,900,000 (Army and Air Force combined). The expansion of Dhahran Airfield would then provide for housing and maintaining some 500 American military personnel, and, in addition, provide family quarters for an additional 53 American military families. The expanded facilities will also provide for 500 civilian personnel which would be necessary for the administration and maintenance of the expanded airfield. Additional housing, messing, and training facilities are provided in the program to process 70 Arabian Army and Air Force students undergoing training at Dhahran. The expanded airfield and its facilities would provide for an Army training program with an Arabian Army student body of 117 Officers and 117 Noncommissioned Officers at one time. The Air Force training program would provide for a Saudi Arabian student body of 100 Officers and 200 Airmen. Saudi Arabian Navy training will be conducted at one of the selected naval bases with a student body of 150 personnel and a 9 month course duration. Three such courses will be conducted consecutively by U.S. Navy instructors. 7. Training a . In addition to the Saudi Arabian Army, Navy and Air Force student training noted in paragraph 6 f above, it is contemplated that selected students would receive training at appropriate U.S. Service schools in the United States in accordance with the following table: Army: (1) During first three years: Two separate groups of 59 Officers and 58 Enlisted Men each. (2) During last two years: Two separate groups of 69 Officers and 58 Enlisted Men each. Navy: (1) During first two years: One group of 15 Officers and 52 Enlisted Men. Air Force: (1) During last four years: Four separate groups of 30 Officers and 50 Airmen each. 2 This report was better known as the O’Keefe Report. It was named after Brig. Gen. Richard J. O’Keefe, U.S.A.F., Commander of Dhahran Airfield, who was the chief of the survey group. The survey team had spent the period from September 1 to October 22, 1949, in Saudi Arabia studying that country’s security requirements and ways in which United States requirements at Dhahran Airfield could be correlated with Saudi Arabian military needs. The group’s mission was outlined by Ambassador J. Rives Childs to King Ibn Saud in an aide-mémoire of May 30, 1949, printed, along with other documents relating to the survey group, in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1573 ff. The group’s report was completed and submitted on January 3, 1950, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for review. He in turn submitted it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 19, 1950, for study as a matter of priority. The source text was enclosed in a letter from Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson to the Secretary of State on April 18, 1950; not printed. In his letter, the Secretary of Defense said the enclosure was a condensation of an abridged report. He recommended that the Department of State transmit a copy to King Ibn Saud together with a statement telling him that a great mass of detail had been omitted, but “the detailed report would be available for the detailed working out of arrangements between his Government and the United States Mission to Saudi Arabia.” He further requested the King be informed that: “No action has been taken on the report and no inference should be drawn that it has been approved by the United States Government, particularly as to the size and composition of forces recommended. However, the report is under study.” (711.56386A/4–1850) A memorandum dated June 26, attached to a file copy of the letter, stated that the Department of State had decided in April not to transmit a copy of the O’Keefe Report to the King. An undated memorandum, also attached, said: “The consensus is that this report be placed in our file and not be sent to Jidda. It would only give us headaches we need not have.” A complete copy of the O’Keefe Report is in the Department of Defense files. 3 Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia. 4 Fuad Bey Hamza, Adviser to the King. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 611.86A/1–1750: Telegram [Document 628] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1 confidential Washington , January 17, 1950—7 p. m. 17. Review your recent conversations with SAG indicates six important questions are of continuing interest: (1) possible mil moves against SA (Deptel 451 Dec 2 2 ); (2) possible mil moves by SA (Embtel 5 Jan 4 3 ); (3) mil assistance to SA; (4) DAB; 4 (5) FCN; (6) Civil Air Agreement (last four in Embtel 730 Dec 19 5 ). Dept realizes most these questions interrelated but believes all of them shld be handled and discussed separately with SAG in so far as possible. Method of handling will depend on developing circumstances. Some might be resolved through Emb; in other cases it may be necessary handle by providing you temporarily with expert assistants from US. SAG shld not, however, be permitted gain impression that USG is prepared in near future to undertake overall negots or series of talks at which all of reference questions will arise for discussion and immediate solution. Dept fears if SAG entertains hope of simultaneous solution of all important problems in near future subsequent delay or failure may prove disillusioning and thereby affect US–SAG relationships adversely. For further information on this topic, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 180 ff. For example, suggested threat of any NE mil move against SA may be removed by developments in other Arab States and in NE as whole but these may require months and possibly years. Under existing circumstances no possibility foreseen of US Govt independently going beyond position taken in Deptels 93 Mar 23 6 and 451 Dec 2. 7 Furthermore any advance in position wld probably be within framework of UN. It is important therefore you use every occasion reestablish prestige of UN in eyes SA officials. Other questions, such as mil assistance to SA, are dependent on consideration of O’Keefe report 8 by JCS and Congressional MAP action. Meanwhile reference is made to Deptel 407 Oct 15 9 which contains possible approach if SAG further presses question mil assistance. Still other questions, such as DAB and possibly Civil Aviation Agreement, will arise for earlier consideration. Meanwhile Dept is studying means for solving these questions. Consideration is also being given to FCN. With specific reference to possible mil moves by SA as reported in Embtel 5 Jan 4, you are authorized orally inform SAG that Dept recalls statement of Dec 5 (Deptel 451 Dec 2) and that it also recalls USG has long maintained policy of opposing any modification of frontiers or governmental structure of NE states through intervention or external force. USG has and will continue to make known these views to NE States as occasion warrants. It shld always be made clear to SAG, in event it indicates impatience or dissatisfaction with USG views, that USG desires continue closest relations of friendship with SAG and work with it in reaching satisfactory solution outstanding questions between us. At same time USG feels and believes SAG shld agree, fol serious reflection, that relations between USG and SAG are basically good. They therefore shld not be permitted to deteriorate by acquiescing in development of state of mind among SAG officials wherein USG is partly responsible for bad relations existing between SAG and some of its neighbors. It is suggested that many complaints currently addressed by SA officials to Emb shld be handled by turning back on the spot rather than by informing officials their views are being reported to Dept for study. Acheson 1 Repeated to Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, and London. 2 Not printed; but see editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1624 . 3 Not printed; the Ambassador reported a call at his residence by Yussef Yassin to inform him that any action of Jordanian or Iraqi forces toward Syria would precipitate retaliatory action by Saudi Arabian and Egyptian forces (786A.00/1–450). 4 Dhahran Airfield was built by U.S. armed forces in 1946 and was operated by the Air Transport Command in an agreement with the Government of Saudi Arabia. The current agreement was to last until June 1950. 5 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1628 . 6 Not printed, but see footnote 1, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1584 . 7 Not printed, but see editorial note, ibid. , p. 1624 . 8 See p. 1112 [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] . 9 Printed in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1615 . The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 611.86A/2–150: Telegram [Document 629] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret Jidda , February 1, 1950—1 p. m. 62. Deptel 17 January 17. 2 It would be most helpful if we could have as soon as possible information re (1) present status consideration O’Keefe report by JCS; (2) plans Department concerning MAP action; (3) results explorations mentioned paragraph 3 Deptel 407 October 15 last; 3 (4) present status availability to SAG informal guidance for Commercial procurement military equipment, or possibility certain supplies from army surplus. See Embtel 573 September 27. 4 It is as certain as anything can be SAG will expect US soon enter DAF negotiations with proposals MAP. Department will recall short term extension DAF agreement last June 5 for one year predicated on positive expectation USG would during ensuing 12 months examine means by which MAP might be devised to warrant long-term agreement and fulfill King’s wishes for internal security which he has been demanding with increasing forcefulness for more than 10 years. Time is rapidly approaching when I shall again be asked by King re status our plans to help him. In connection MAP assistance for SAG I am of course concerned by recent publicity Javits’ comments 6 which are certain eventually reach SAG if not already in their hands and which may serve stimulate apprehensions their part. As of course Department aware there is no more important problem in US relationships with SAG than this question military aid and DAF negotiations listed as points 3 and 4 Deptel 17 January 17. Time rapidly approaching when it must come to head OSR–DAF agreement expires in June. Department will no doubt realize my position here will be practically untenable unless I can furnish King with concrete evidence of what we intend to do to help him and time about past when promises re our future intentions will carry much weight with him. I realize delicate question on MAP to SAG in light Israel but I feel strongly we should approach question not from point view aid to an Arab country but aid for country which is helping us out and is extremely important to US strategically. Aid should be viewed not as aid to Arabs but as aid which seconds US interests. Childs 1 This telegram was repeated to Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, London, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Amman, and Dhahran. 2 Supra . 3 Printed in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1615 . 4 Not printed, but see footnote 1, ibid. , p. 1616 . 5 For information on the June agreement, see despatch 179, July 20, 1949, from Jidda, and enclosures thereto, ibid. , p. 1602 . 6 Jacob K. Javits, United States Representative from New York, criticized the reported export of British arms to the Arab states in two letters to Secretary of State Acheson, dated December 28, 1949, and January 26, 1950, not printed, which Javits also released to the press. For the Secretary’s answer to the first letter, dated January 12, 1950, see p. 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 611.86A/2–150: Telegram [Document 630] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia secret Washington , February 9, 1950—4 p. m. 49. Reply your nr points Embtel 62 Feb 1: 1 1) We anticipate O’Keefe report which JCS comite now studying will be taken up by JCS fol their return from Far East. 2 No indication when their consideration will be completed. 2) Dept reexamining question seeking legis auth for mil asst for countries (including SA) other than those covered by present mil asst legis. Further info fol. Congressional action of course cannot be foretold. 3) USG may only provide mil asst including sales of surplus to countries presently authd receive mil asst and to members with US collective defense and regional arrangements; consequently only alternative appears to be commercial purchase available items in open market. 4) Dept remains willing as stated Deptel 407 Oct 15 3 to offer SAG informal guidance in contacts for commercial procurement and generally favorable export license consideration. Initiative for commercial procurement rests with SAG. SAG might take prelim step authorizing reps or agents in US investigate open market for available items in mil and particularly in non-mil categories. Dept realizes extent to which King relates mil assistance to DAB but believes, as indicated Deptel 17 Jan 17, 4 we shld make strenuous effort handle and discuss separately if possible. Pending USG action under 1) and 2) Dept believes SAG action under 4) shld have effect partially allaying SAG apprehensions and providing evidence means by which US can assist at this stage. Reference recent publicity with respect Brit mil asst Arab states, ME file (item no. 7, Jan 16 5 ) containing text See’s reply Javits, indicates USG attitude and shld provide basis for positive response if SAG raises question. FYI only McGhee wrote Johnson Feb 6 6 re June 23 expiration DAB agreement and proposed negots for extension. In requesting asst of Defense in preparation for these negots, McGhee stated Dept was studying MAP for SA during fiscal 1951 and observed JCS findings on basis O’Keefe report wld undoubtedly have important bearing on reimbursable MAP for SA and extension DAB agreement. McGhee suggested it wld be helpful if JCS findings cld be expedited. Acheson 1 Supra . 2 The Joint Chiefs of Staff spent late January and early February 1950 in the Far East. 3 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1615 . 4 Ante , p. 1120 [ Pg. 1120 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] . 5 The editors are unable to identify this reference. 6 The letter to Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense, was written for the Secretary of State by George O. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; not printed (711.56386A/2–650). An answer from Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance, dated February 13, not printed, stated that the Department of State would be notified as soon as the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their recommendations on the O’Keefe Report. He further informed the Department that the Secretary of the Air Force was being asked to designate a representative for informal discussions on tentative arrangements for handling the proposed negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government. (711.56386A/2–1350) A letter from Burns to McGhee, dated May 9, not printed, informed him that Col. Howard Moore, United States Air Force, had been so designated (711.56386A/5–950). In a letter to McGhee on November 13, not printed, Burns reported that Col. Richard D. Wentworth had subsequently been designated the Air Force representative to work with the Department of State in handling the arrangements for negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government (786A.5/1–1350). The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 886A.10/2–1350: Telegram [Document 631] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret Jidda , February 13, 1950—4 p. m. 78. I discussed at great length, but in very general terms, with Crown Prince Saud on February 8 at Dhahran deplorable state administration finances by SAG. Upon conclusion my remarks Saud said: “I wish thank you from bottom my heart for friendliness which has inspired your comments. I wish you know I will always welcome expression any opinion from you which you may feel disposed express on any matter. “I am fully aware of situation you have mentioned which has been source of deep disturbance to me for some time past. Situation is one by no means confined to Ministry of Finance but extends to almost every administration of government. “You will appreciate that I am in very peculiar and delicate position. I recognize fully problem and fully share your own views and conclusions you have drawn regarding necessity of thoroughgoing reforms. I am deeply aware my responsibilities. However, my father is not equally as aware of this situation on account his age and the difficulty he has in adjusting himself to modern advances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “There is only one person in SA to whom I am unalterably attached and that is my father. I will do nothing to hurt him or prejudice his state of mind or his health. I shall act decisively when I have power and I shall spare no one in taking necessary measures I recognize to be necessary for well-being of my country whose interests I place above everything else in life except my religion.” Crown Prince informed me also that his father’s advisers, referring particularly to Finance Minister, 2 have his ear and confidence to such extent that anything he, Crown Prince, or his brothers might say in writing existent state of affairs might so severely react on him and his brothers as to prejudice their position. Saud confided to me he had spies throughout SAG administration who were reporting to him personally on everything happening. For some time past he has been studying constitutional and budgetary practices neighboring Arab states as well as Turkey and he directed his private secretary 3 show me draft decree he has prepared providing for new constitution setting up Cabinet, Legislature and Senate along Egyptian model. He was deeply appreciative my comments and requested me to repeat them to His Majesty without reference to fact I had made them previously to him or that this suggestion had come from him. This morning in Riyadh I had more than hour’s talk with King on same subject, with Fuad 4 as interpreter. In middle of my talk Fuad said in aside to me “I don’t know how to thank you for bringing this subject up. It proves you are real friend of SA. I have been working to this same end for twenty years without result. It is imperative that something be done.” As I anticipated it was extremely difficult to make King understand situation. First of all I feel he has failed considerably during recent months and Crown Prince is also concerned with this phase of situation. King stated several times that he had introduced security in SA as a result his liberality to tribes and he made reference to necessity expenditures by him outside SA to maintain Saudi influence. I emphasized my remarks were not directed at question of manner in which he disposed his revenues but at their proper conservation and their orderly expenditure. I also said I was not criticizing any individuals but I likened situation to that of once small store whose accounts might first have been kept in head of owner but which were now too complex for any one man. Toward end Fuad remarked in aside he thought it was difficult for King to grasp exactly what I was aiming at. I then said to His Majesty: “I have seen Russian Revolution. We have witnessed recently collapse of great regime in China. World is in state of great turbulence. Changes are inevitable. I cannot speak too seriously in expressing to Your Majesty my belief financial reforms are essential in SA. I have full faith in present stability regime but if situation allowed continue indefinitely it cannot but have seriously adverse effect. I have no axe to grind. I am speaking not as Ambassador but in capacity of Saudi as Your Majesty has so frequently described me. I would have been recreant to extraordinary confidence Your Majesty has shown me if I were not to make my apprehensions known to you. If you do not believe me then take counsel of your sons and of your advisors and if you find my words idle tell my government you have no trust in me.” King stopped Fuad short and said he would not permit him to express any such thought. He then said, visibly moved “I knew you were friend. But you have established it now beyond all question. I want you to feel free to express to me at all times any question which is on your mind with same frankness you have shown today.” I added that I had no suggestions offer His Majesty as that would be presumptuous but I hoped he would invite his counselors to look into question and propose remedies. When I left Fuad said he could not be more grateful. He added he feared nothing radical would come of talk but it could not possibly do any harm and it might well give push toward those reforms for which so many were crying in country. Childs 1 Repeated to London, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, and Amman. 2 Abdullah Sulaiman, Saudi Arabian Finance Minister. 3 Abdullah Effendi. 4 Fuad Hamza, Adviser to the King. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 786A.5/2–1450: Telegram [Document 632] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret Jidda , February 14, 1950—1 p. m. 83. ReDeptel 28 February 11. 2 In my opinion which is completely shared by General O’Keefe it will not be possible to keep separate questions of MAP and DAF. After full discussion we believe that in event delays action by JCS on JUSSGSA and consequent delay in obtaining required enabling legislation before 23 June 1950, the minimum necessary to maintain our position at Dhahran will be (1) concrete expression of intent regarding MAP to SAG by Department State and Defense; (2) offer as token demonstration intent to SAG of 20,000 M–1 rifles with 1,000 rounds ammunition per rifle to be delivered on loan (Deptel 201 May 27, 1949, 3 paragraph 3). If and when MAP program is authorized, above material would be considered part 38,000 rifles under recommended SA defense organization. We both hope, however, this palliative may not be considered necessary and that we may enter long-term negotiations prior to termination date with such MAP program as may have been approved by that time by State and Defense and for which enabling legislation will have been obtained. In absence such, short-term renewal Dhahran agreement may be possible on basis outlined but this is minimum which might probably placate SAG. Childs 1 A note in the margin indicated that a copy of this telegram was enclosed with a letter from Raymond A. Hare, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, to the Secretary of Defense, dated March 8, p. 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] . 2 The reference appears to be an error. The editors have been unable to identify this message. 3 Not printed, but see footnote 1, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1600 . President Truman to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia 786A.563/2–2150 [Document 633] President Truman to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia 1 top secret [ Washington , undated.] Your Majesty : I am sending you this letter by Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Near Eastern Affairs, who is making a visit to your country as a representative of this Government. You will recall that I wrote you on May 23, 1949 2 with regard to the negotiations which were then taking place with respect to the renewal of the Dhahran Air Base Agreement, and that shortly thereafter agreement was reached providing for renewal of the previous agreement for a period of one year. Subsequently, Brigadier General O’Keefe of the United States Air Force, at your invitation, visited your country for the purpose of studying the military requirements of Saudi Arabia. I understand that he has already discussed his recommendations with you. General O’Keefe’s report is being studied by competent agencies of the United States Government. It is expected that this study, which is an essential prerequisite to a decision as to future courses of action, will be completed shortly. I am sure you will understand the necessity for the most careful consideration by the United States Government of such an important matter. I have followed with great interest the remarkable development of Saudi Arabia under your enlightened leadership. Your country stands as a bulwark to peace in the Near Eastern world. It is gratifying that your leadership extends not only throughout Saudi Arabia, but also generally through the Near East. The United States has always attached the greatest importance to the strong ties of friendship and understanding which bind us with Saudi Arabia. I assure you it is our hope and belief that these ties will always continue. I avail myself of this opportunity to wish you much continued success and good health. Faithfully yours, [ Harry S. Truman ] 1 The source text was the draft of a letter, attached to a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, dated February 21, not printed. The Secretary recommended that the President sign the letter and have Assistant Secretary of State McGhee hand it to the King during his visit to Saudi Arabia. (786A.563/2–2150) McGhee was in Saudi Arabia from March 18 to March 25, and met with the King on March 22 and March 23. He delivered a letter from the President during his March 22 visit with the King, presumably this letter, but the editors have not found a copy signed by the President. For a record of McGhee’s visits with the King, see the memorandum of conversations, dated March 23, p. 1146 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 637 ] . 2 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1599 . The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 7864.11/3–150: Telegram [Document 634] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State secret Jidda , March 1, 1950—11 a. m. 112. Deptel 69 February 24. 1 In call 27th on Deputy Foreign Minister, Admiral Conolly 2 and I spoke of availability services Captain Hubbard 3 to proceed Riyadh make examination of King and survey needs drugs and equipment his subsequent treatment by US specialists. 4 Shaikh Yusuf expressed warm thanks and said he was confident His Majesty would be very grateful but he would confirm by telegram inquiry Riyadh. At dinner offered by Prince Mansour 5 in name of King to Admiral Conolly and his officers at Palace that night Yusuf stated telegram received expressing King’s warm appreciation and stating he would welcome visit Captain Hubbard who left for Riyadh early yesterday morning expecting return today. I have discussed situation with both Admiral Conolly and Brigadier General R. J. O’Keefe, CO Dhahran. They concur full with me in opinion it would be in national interest if Department Defense would undertake find most competent arthritis specialist available in any of service departments who would be sent Riyadh, accompanied by assistant, as response to original request King. I am the more persuaded to make this recommendation by extremely favorable impression made on King and Crown Prince as result similar mission Lt. Colonel Moffett, USAF. 6 O’Keefe suggests clinical assistant to arthritis specialist accompany him with necessary equipment in special mission aircraft in order obtain general health King regarding life expectancy. Childs 1 Not printed; it approved the suggestion made in telegram 106, February 23, from Jidda, that Captain Hubbard visit the King before the arrival of a specialist from the United States (786A.11/2–2350). 2 Adm. Richard L. Conolly, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Despatch 111, March 13, from Jidda, not printed, contained an account of the visit of the U.S.S. Roanoke and two escorting destroyers to Jidda from February 27 to March 2, a trip previously suggested by the Ambassador as an expression of friendship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. (711.5886A/3–1350) 3 Capt H. D. Hubbard, United States Navy, area medical officer on the staff of Admiral Conoly. 4 In telegram 105, February 22, from Jidda, Childs sent a request from King Ibn Saud for the help of the United States Government in obtaining the best American arthritis specialist to come to Riyadh to examine him. In addition, he wanted the doctor to bring an assistant who would be able to remain in Saudi Arabia after the specialist left. At two meetings in the Department of State, on February 23 and 24, Fraser Wilkins, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, and Frederick Awalt, Acting Officer in Charge, Arabian Peninsula Affairs, discussed the request with Shaikh Asad Al-Faqih, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, and an arthritis specialist from the Mayo Clinic. An account of the visit of the American medical team is in the memorandum of April 30, p. 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] . Further documentation on this subject is in Department of State file 786A.11 5 Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense. 6 In January 1950 a United States Air Force ear specialist, Lt. Col. Oscar P. Moffett, from Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, visited Saudi Arabia after a request from the King for an American doctor to diagnose Crown Prince Sand’s ear trouble. Colonel Moffett reported to Dhahran on January 14 and arrived in Riyadh on January 15. After examining the Crown Prince, Moffett made arrangements for him to enter the Dhahran Health Center, an Arab hospital. The Ambassador transmitted Moffett’s report of his treatment of Prince Saud and other members of the royal family to the Department of State with despatch 34, January 27, from Jidda, not printed, and enclosed a final report on Prince Sand’s medical treatment with despatch 94, March 10, from Jidda; not printed. In that despatch he said Colonel Moffett’s visit had made a deep impression on the royal family, and he asked the Department to convey the sincere appreciation of the Embassy to the Department of the Air Force. Hare enclosed a copy of despatch 94 with a letter to the Secretary of the Air Force, dated March 28; not printed. Further documentation is in Department of State file 786A.11. The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) 711.56386A/2–1350 [Document 635] The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) to the Secretary of Defense ( Johnson ) 1 top secret Washington , March 8, 1950. My Dear Mr. Secretary : I have received General Burns’ letter of February 13, 1950 2 with respect to the Dhahran Air Base Agreement which expires on June 23rd of this year. Your cooperation in requesting the Secretary of the Air Force to designate a representative for informal talks with the Department of State is appreciated. It is hoped these talks may commence in the near future. It is believed advisable in this connection to give particular consideration to the question of timing which has arisen. It is understood that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense with regard to Brigadier General O’Keefe’s report will be available during March. On the other hand, it is not expected that the Congress will complete its consideration of the question of military assistance for all countries including Saudi Arabia for the fiscal year 1951 before June. It therefore seems likely that, at the time negotiations commence between the United States and Saudi Arabia regarding the Dhahran Air Base, Congressional action will not be complete and only your recommendations regarding the O’Keefe report will be available. It is recalled that the Saudi Arabian Government including particularly King Ibn Saud has consistently informed us that although the United States was welcome to use the strategic facilities of Saudi Arabia, it was absolutely essential that military assistance be provided if we wished to enjoy such facilities on a long-range and comprehensive basis. It is even possible that King Ibn Saud might refuse to engage in conversations unless the United States was in a position to give him some indication of the extent to which we were able to provide Saudi Arabia with military assistance. There is no doubt that such information will be required by the representatives of the United States during negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government with respect to the extension of the Dhahran Air Base Agreement. It would, therefore, be appreciated if the Department of Defense would give consideration to the question of whether the United States Government would be able to provide Saudi Arabia with some form of military assistance on a token or temporary basis pending Congressional action on presently proposed military assistance legislation. 3 In considering the various forms of token or temporary assistance which might be provided it is suggested that reference might be made to the suggestions contained in telegram No. 83, of February 14, 1950 4 to the Department of State from the American Embassy at Jidda. A copy of this message is enclosed. Sincerely yours, Raymond A. Hare 1 A summary of this letter was transmitted in telegram 48, March 11, to the Legation in Ethiopia for McGhee. The telegram, not printed, also informed McGhee that the final Mutual Defense Assistance Program for 1950 and programs and budget estimates for 1951 were scheduled to be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget on April 1, and to Congress on April 20. (786A.5MAP/3–150) McGhee had gone to Africa for a United States diplomatic meeting at Lourenco Marques and then visited a number of African countries. For information on his African trip, see the editorial note, p. 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] . 2 Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] . 3 An answer to this letter from the Secretary of Defense, dated April 20, reported the Joint Chiefs of Staff had determined that 5,000 M–1 rifles and 5 million rounds of ammunition could be made available to Saudi Arabia without seriously affecting the mobilization capability of United States forces. The closing paragraph of the letter read: “I suggest, therefore, that if you should determine that as a last resort tangible evidence of US intent is required in connection with negotiations for the extension of the Dhahran Base Agreement, and if definite indication of favorable action is obtained from appropriate congressional leaders as to the proposed reimbursable aid program for Saudi Arabia, we collaborate in recommending that the President authorize the transfer.” (711.56386A/4–2050) The proposal to send such a shipment had previously been made by Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, during his visit to Saudi Arabia on an inspection trip to the Middle East. See his telegram of April 3, p. 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] . 4 Ante , p. 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] . Memorandum, of Conversation 611.86A/3–1950 [Document 636] Memorandum, of Conversation 1 secret [ Jidda ,] March 19, 1950. Subject: United States-Saudi Arabian Relations Participants: HRH, Prince Feisal, Viceroy of the Hejaz and Foreign Minister Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, Minister of Finance Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, Deputy Foreign Minister Najib Bey Salha, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance Ambassador J. Rives Childs The Honorable George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary for NEA Heyward G. Hill, Counsellor of Embassy, Jidda William D. Brewer, Third Secretary of Embassy, Jidda Mohammed Effendi Massoud, Embassy Arab Secretary The above group met in the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 19, 1950, to discuss current problems of interest to the two governments. After greetings and expressions of welcome were exchanged, His Royal Highness stated that this personal visit by Mr. McGhee would help greatly in developing understanding between the two countries. He stated that any visit by an American official always increased this understanding and expressed the wish that more Americans could visit Saudi Arabia. Mr. McGhee stated that he would like to summarize each important problem facing our two countries as it appears to us, and then ask His Royal Highness to comment as well as to raise any questions he might have, and discuss them fully. The relationship between the two countries, Mr. McGhee said, is unique among all our international relationships. There is no country in this section of the world in which we have this particular type of relationship. Although it is not possible to view relations between countries as between individuals, nevertheless our relationship is stronger than could be defined by formal contracts or treaties, since it arises from the genuine personal friendships between our respective peoples. Twice in modern history our country has come to the assistance of Europe despite the absence of a formal treaty, because of the ties between our people and the people of Europe. Our relations with Saudi Arabia are founded on strong human relationships, personal relationships between our leaders, as exemplified by the meeting of His Majesty and our late President, 2 together with frequent interchanges among our peoples. All of our businessmen and oil men and government officials find that they may easily conduct their business with Saudi Arabs on the basis of human understanding. This is the underlying force which joins our two countries together and transcends all treaty arrangements. In addition, as one analyzes it, the United States has an extremely strong interest in the American investment in petroleum in Saudi Arabia. 3 This is an interest which is vitally important to the security of the United States and to the world. American interests in oil in this part of the world, which is the greatest reservoir in the world, is largely confined to Saudi Arabia. American oil companies have a small interest in Iraq and Kuwait but the major interests that American companies have in the Middle East is in Saudi Arabia. This fact alone, if it were not for other factors, would give to our country a very great responsibility and interest in Saudi Arabia and its right to be a free and independent state. Mr. McGhee said that he felt that since this relationship exists it is the obligation of the United States to understand the problems of Saudi Arabia and, as a friend, to assist her within the limits of American capabilities in facing these problems. Cognizance must be taken of what Saudi Arabia considers her problems, and not only what the United States considers are Saudi Arabian problems, because Saudi Arabia knows better than the United States just what these are. It is hoped that Saudi Arabia will correspondingly judge the effectiveness of the assistance which the United States gives, taking into consideration the fact that the United States has very large world responsibilities. Only the United States, among the independent countries of the world, is in a position at the present time to take the lead in facing the grave dangers which exist in the world. This means, not only for the benefit of ourselves but for the benefit of all free nations in the world, it is necessary that the United States render assistance to nations who find themselves threatened by aggression or subversion from the north. The United States does not have unlimited resources of wealth with which to support these grave obligations. In fact, there is an internal deficit in the American budget which imposes considerable financial difficulties. While the United States is willing and anxious to do what is possible, it is hoped that His Royal Highness and Saudi Arabia will recognize that there are always limitations to what the United States can do. The most important thing to any nation is its security—the most important thing to the United States is its security. The United States feels that this must be uppermost in the minds of His Majesty and the people of Saudi Arabia. Security is something about which, Mr. McGhee said, he felt one must take a very broad view. One can view immediate security menaces or one can view long-range and possibly more dangerous security menaces. The United States feels that the only important long-range security menace that faces the world is the obviously aggressive designs of the USSR. The United States accepted this view very reluctantly, and it hopes that history will reveal that it made every effort in the post-war period to cooperate with Russia and establish friendly relationships with her. Rut the United States found it impossible and discovered that they must assume a defensive attitude with respect to Russia. That is why the United States, as a normally peaceful nation, which has never waged aggressive war or spent large sums on military armament, has had to devote such a large part of its budget to military purposes. Even though it is alien to American history and nature to provide arms to other nations, the United States has, in cases where it was felt necessary to preserve the independence of nations which were being threatened by Russian aggression given large scale military assistance. First to Greece, when the Greek Government asked the United States to protect them from guerrillas, the United States gave wholesale assistance. Also, in the case of Turkey, the United States gave military assistance. 4 Now the United States is prominent in the military assistance being given to the Western European countries, something provided for by the North Atlantic Treaty which was negotiated between the United States and the North Atlantic countries and which reflects the American conclusion that the security of the North Atlantic area is most vital from the standpoint both of the United States security and the security of the world. The security of this area is necessary in order to protect its great industrial potential for the nations of the world. This is not only important to Saudi Arabia and the United States, but to all free nations who desire protection from Russian aggression. The Department of State feels that in pursuing this program the United States is giving assistance to Saudi Arabia and each country in the world which wants to remain free and independent. Since the resources which the United States has for making commitments are limited, of necessity the United States has made commitments where it was thought the most urgent situation existed from the standpoint of world security. Now Saudi Arabia is not, fortunately, menaced by Russian aggression. Saudi Arabia has no common boundaries with Russia and fortunately has no internal Communist problem. The United States understands that Saudi Arabia would be a very valuable target in the event of a shooting war and in that event Saudi Arabia would face the problem of its own defense. The United States understands that Saudi Arabia cannot ignore her security problem from the standpoint of Russia itself. The United States also understands fully the apprehension of Saudi Arabia with respect to her neighbors, the Hashemite Kingdoms, 5 and irrespective of American conclusions as to whether or not Saudi Arabia is menaced by the Hashemites, the fact that Saudi Arabia considers herself menaced is taken into consideration. This is a question to which the Department of State has devoted much thought. It is troubling Saudi Arabia and should be analyzed by the United States to see if there is any real basis for apprehension on the part of Saudi Arabia. Mr. McGhee said that he, himself, had had special discussions with the British Foreign Office on this problem as well as with United States representatives from all over the Near Eastern countries at the Istanbul Conference. The representatives in the countries concerned do not feel that there are aggressive designs against Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi Arabia knows its neighbors much better than the United States does and the latter does not want to attempt to tell Saudi Arabia in an authoritative way what their ultimate designs may be. The situation was analyzed, however, in this way, a way which Mr. McGhee said he thought should be reassuring to the government of Saudi Arabia. In the first place, there appears to be little basis for a community of interest in action on the part of the Hashemite countries. In the case of both countries, they have special treaty arrangements with the United Kingdom. In each case the United Kingdom has certain specific rights with respect to their own internal forces and with respect to the base rights in their areas. In both cases the countries are dependent upon the United Kingdom for the supply of military equipment, personnel, and in many cases military leaders. In our judgment the British are fully capable of restraining any action of aggression on the part of either of the two countries. The British have assured us in a most sincere way that they have every desire to prevent such aggressive action and share the interest of the United States that Saudi Arabia be not menaced and be permitted to maintain its independence and integrity. If one considers the close relationship that exists between the British and the United States, Mr. McGhee said that he could assure His Royal Highness in a categorical way that it would not be possible in the light of these factors that these countries undertake any independent aggressive action against Saudi Arabia. Mr. McGhee said he fully understood that despite these questions Saudi Arabia is entitled to a security force. It is the conclusion of the United States that the only ultimate security any nation has is in its internal political and economic strength, and it is indeed fortunate, in a sense, that nations who are not in a position to bear a large portion of world responsibilities can devote a large portion of their energy toward internal economic development. His Royal Highness is fully aware of the succession of events which have led the United States to send a group headed by General O’Keefe to investigate the problems of Saudi Arabia. The United States is very pleased indeed, that Saudi Arabia requested such an investigation and very pleased also that it was possible to provide such a qualified group to study these security needs. The Department understands that their recommendations have been studied by Saudi Arabia and that Saudia Arabia is in agreement with the general conclusions and recommendations. As the President has written to His Majesty in a letter which Mr. McGhee said he would deliver to him in Riyadh, 6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is the highest military tribunal in the United States, is presently studying General O’Keefe’s report. A most careful and authoritative study is being given to this report to determine whether or not the recommendations are the best possible for Saudi Arabia in the light of her military situation and the equipment available. After the Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed their report it will be studied by the Department of State and what is finally agreed upon by the President will become the basis upon which the United States will assist Saudi Arabia. At the appropriate time the Executive of our Government will seek from the Congress what additional authority if any is needed in order to meet the requirements of the recommendations of the O’Keefe report. As His Royal Highness understands fully, the United States is a democracy and the Executive sometimes has difficulty in obtaining its requests from the Congress but the Executive will press this point with all possible vigor when the recommendations of the O’Keefe report have finally been agreed upon. When the United States has this authority, the Department of State looks forward to renewing discussions with the Saudi Arabian Government, looking toward negotiations for a long-range arrangement for the Dhahran Air Base which, as the Saudi Arabian Government knows, is the desire of the United States be concluded. The United States still attaches the greatest importance to the utilization of this air base both from the standpoint of United States and Saudi Arabian security interests and the security interests of all the free nations of the world. The United States also has every desire that Saudi Arabia feel that it has in the United States a strong and ready friend who will assist it in time of adversity, and that although the United States does not feel that Saudi Arabia is at present menaced, if at any time it is menaced by aggressive action or subversive activities from any neighboring power, the United States Government will take most definite action. Mr. McGhee then said that he thought it might be appropriate before he talked any further to inquire whether His Royal Highness had any comments to make with respect to the general question of security, although he recognized that no conclusions would be considered final before they met with His Majesty’s approval. His Royal Highness Prince Feisal then replied that he had no doubt that everyone who is sincere in his feelings toward Saudi Arabia has been well-pleased to see the friendship existing between the two countries so greatly strengthened. He said that he was, and remained, one of those who are so eager to see the strengthening of this friendship and he expressed the hope that, even though sometimes differences may exist in points of view, these differences will not have an adverse effect on the friendly relationships that exist between the two countries. As far as security and defense were concerned, you have been acquainted with the report which was submitted by General O’Keefe’s Survey Mission. 7 Saudi Arabia considers the contents of that report a bare minimum. In other words, His Royal Highness stated, “We need more but not less than that”. His Royal Highness went on to point out that security and defense can be divided into several stages, namely, internal stability, complete security from any aggression or menace from a neighboring country, and lastly, a menace which is menacing the whole world. Saudi Arabia must make preparations to face this aggression. The Saudi Arabian Government hopes that the United States will understand that the situation in Saudi Arabia differs from the situation in the United States or England or any other country in Europe. For this reason Saudi Arabia states that it must keep certain methods of preserving security which differ from other schemes used in the United States or Europe or in any foreign nation. If Saudi Arabia is going to form a force just to maintain internal stability, His Royal Highness asked Mr. McGhee if he had any idea of what that would involve. Looking at the recent past, the police force is not the prime safety factor for safety and peace in Saudi Arabia. The security and peace prevailing all over Saudi Arabia is not the result of its police force, but the result of the wise system of His Majesty in governing Saudi Arabia. Everyone is talking, building up a campaign against His Majesty, saying that he is an absolute monarch spending all his money for nothing, neglecting all important projects. His Royal Highness stated that he was sure that His Majesty has the final authority in issuing any instructions, but while it may be thought that His Majesty is spending money for his own personal luxurious life, or spending it to augment his own personal wealth, on the contrary, he is spending that money in gifts to those who, if they had no money to feed themselves, would be a threat to internal stability. If the history of this peninsula is reviewed, it will be found that most of the tribes did nothing to guard the security of this country. But since His Majesty has been in power it is apparent that he is spending that money in certain areas so that those places would keep quiet and not stir up the whole situation and menace the security of this whole country. It may be that certain of His Majesty’s employees may make mistakes, but human beings are prone to make mistakes. Nevertheless, the basic principle is there. If it is desired to consider the revenue of Saudi Arabia, which also the world has just made a big fuss about, in any other country it is not a great deal. The Saudi Arabian Government does not deny that it has certain income which would be sufficient to feed its people, but if it is desired to use this income to build a strong army and spend it on government projects, and not to make a luxurious life but merely to improve transportation and communications in Arabia along modern lines, Saudi Arabia’s funds would never be sufficient to cover all these projects. For, in spite of the fact that we do have some revenue, this alone is not sufficient for us at once to step forth and take our place among the fully developed nations of the world. His Royal Highness stated that he desired to give Mr. McGhee certain ideas on this point and that he would now return to the main topic. He said that if this question of the neighboring menace had been left to Saudi Arabia and its neighbors alone to settle without interference on the part of foreign powers, Saudi Arabia could have settled it very easily. Saudi Arabia’s neighbors are supported by a great foreign power and though that foreign power has no intention of threatening Saudi Arabia, yet the threat comes indirectly through their support of these neighbors. While these neighbors have been supported and have been given armaments, Saudi Arabia has been deprived of them. These neighbors have been offered a lot of arms and have been given support along lines of military education and training for their personnel while Saudi Arabia, who should it seek similar assistance, would have difficult obstacles put in its path. Despite the current high prices for arms, which Saudi Arabia cannot meet, Saudi Arabia would like to get as much in the way of military assistance as its neighbors are getting. In addition to that, these neighbors are manufacturing a campaign of propaganda against Saudi Arabia, not only in the adjacent countries, but abroad as well. For Saudi Arabian prestige, it would be better that this point not be considered by it. Saudi Arabia has no desire to grant any aid when people are desirous of maintaining the stability of their area, but Saudi Arabia hopes that its friends will try to stop or limit such propaganda which Saudi Arabia does not consider so much a real menace and threat as something to be disgusted about. Saudi Arabia would prefer that this area be left alone to itself, but this is impossible and the interference of foreign powers seems rather the type of action which serves to justify this whole situation. It is not sufficient to say that Saudi Arabia is not directly threatened by its neighbors at the moment, for nothing is far away. Though it is not immediately threatened, the United States is taking certain measures to insure its security against Russia. It should not be necessary for Saudi Arabia to have to wait until the bell of danger rings and then make its cries for help heard. Saudi Arabia considers that it has a right to ask help of its friends. When Saudi Arabia approaches the United States it is claiming the right of friendship. The United States has certain interests here, as Mr. McGhee says. Saudi Arabia cannot deny that the United States is a democracy with certain difficulties with Congress in the matter of obtaining appropriations, but if the President and the Government and the Department of State, who are well acquainted with the situation all over the world, felt there was a menace to the interests of the United States, American public opinion could be molded, if not for the sake of Ibn Saud, for the sake of the interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Childs knows, said His Royal Highness, that he is always frank and never restricts himself to the niceties of diplomatic protocol. As is known, Saudi Arabia has turned away from the United Kingdom and placed more of its interests in the hands of the United States Government. However, Saudi Arabia continues to maintain very friendly relationships with the British and will continue to maintain friendly relations with them. Formerly, the British treated Saudi Arabia very well, but recently they have, in view of certain interests, tried to maintain these interests which have become a menace to Saudi Arabia. In spite of this action on the part of the British, Saudi Arabia has continued to maintain friendly relations with them and it hopes that these friendly relationships will continue. However, to maintain friendly relations with the British does not prevent Saudi Arabia from looking out for its security and preparing its defenses. Saudi Arabia’s interests are more closely related to those of the United States now, and because of this sharing of interests Saudi Arabia feels that the United States Government should be more willing to help support Saudi Arabia. His Royal Highness said that Saudi Arabia had many problems, involving financial and economic questions, communications, public works, cultural development, and health. He said he was giving Mr. McGhee a complete picture of Saudi Arabia’s situation so that he would understand the situation well. What is left unclear may be completed and cleared up by Mr. Childs. Mr. McGhee then stated that he fully appreciated the factors which His Royal Highness had mentioned and that Saudi Arabia does have the need for security. He said that the United States has every desire to assist in meeting this need and particularly, out of this special friendship which His Royal Highness has been kind enough to refer to, the United States feels that it is incumbent upon it to assist Saudi Arabia in providing these forces, and that, of course, is why General O’Keefe made his survey and why we are giving such earnest consideration to his report. Concerning economic development, this is something in which the United States Government has taken increased interest in connection with the statements of our President in his inaugural address concerning Point Four. It is the desire of the United States Government to help Saudi Arabia in its development program which His Majesty has undertaken and is pursuing so vigorously. It is thought that the United States can assist Saudi Arabia in two ways. First, Mr. McGhee said that he was very pleased that Saudi Arabia has put forth a request for some money to assist in developing very specific projects. Although the request had been sent to the Department since he left Washington, he had seen a statement of it and the projects seemed to be sound. As His Royal Highness knows, the Export-Import Bank granted a loan at one time to Saudi Arabia. Mr. McGhee said that although final decision on the granting of the loan would be made by the Bank, he felt that the Bank would consider favorably these new requests and he stated that he would discuss this matter with the Bank when he returned to Washington. Saudi Arabia can be sure that from every political standpoint, it is the earnest desire of the United States that these projects be carried out. The other way in which the United States can be of assistance is through the President’s Point Four technical assistance program. In the requests that have been made to the Congress, there is a request for a considerable sum for technical assistance to Saudi Arabia. This sum is not large in comparison with the cost of the projects, but the amounts which can be spent on technical assistance are limited. It will make it possible, if Congress acts favorably on this request, for the United States to send to Saudi Arabia American technicians who can come and assist in solving the basic problems which Saudi Arabia must face before it can effect this development. These technicians will, of course, be provided on a grant basis. The types of technicians which are required depends upon the wishes of the Saudi Arabian Government, but, from Ambassador Childs’ discussion with this Government and United States discussions with Saudi Arabian officials, it would appear that among the most important problems that Saudi Arabia faces are the problems of ground water exploitation, the improvement of agricultural methods, improvement of transportation, and technical assistance in various fields such as finance and administration. As soon as authority is received from the Congress, the United States Government will enter into detailed discussions with the Saudi Arabian Government on their desires. The United States Government feels that technical assistance and the loans from the Export-Import Bank, augmented by private investment, will assist Saudi Arabia in its development. The United States on its side is gratified that American investors, both oilmen and others, have chosen to come here to work with the Saudi Arabian Government and that the Saudi Arabian Government has cooperated with them so well. One small but typical example is the recent negotiations for a cement plant in which the Export-Import Bank has assisted. Part of the Point Four Program is to provide legislation which will induce the participation of private investors through reducing some of the risk of foreign private investments. The United States Government hopes that in the future more American business men will come here, if the Saudi Arabian Government so desires. In this connection, it is the desire of the United States Government to negotiate with the Saudi Arabian Government a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation which will serve as a basis here on which business may be conducted. The treaty would, of course, correspond to the wishes of His Majesty. It need not be a complicated treaty. The United States Government feels that the negotiation of such a treaty would symbolize the close and friendly relations between the two countries. Prince Feisal then stated that he was pleased with such assurances that the United States will assist Saudi Arabia in the economic field in the ways Mr. McGhee had mentioned. Since His Majesty will ultimately determine the final points of such aid it was not his wish to go too deeply into discussion of the economic questions. Assurances from Mr. McGhee that the United States Government is ready to help Saudi Arabia with this is sufficient. Mr. McGhee replied that there were two special questions which he would also like to discuss. One was the question of the dispute over the eastern boundaries of Saudi Arabia. 8 The United States Government recognizes, of course, that this is Saudi Arabia’s problem and a problem of great concern to Saudi Arabia. Since, however, the dispute is largely with the British, and the British and Saudi Arabia are both good friends of the United States, the United States Government is reluctant to see them in a dispute. As a good friend to both, the United States Government will do all it can to assist in reaching a settlement, since it would help greatly from the standpoint of security and the development of the country for this question to be settled. Mr. McGhee said that he did not feel that it was appropriate for the United States to inject itself directly into the question, since it is a problem for the Saudi Arabian Government and the British. The two parties should be able to devise a method of working out the problem. The United States Government was pleased that the Saudi Arabian Government put forth the suggestion of creating a fact-finding commission, since we felt that this was a constructive step. If a fact-finding commission could be created by mutual agreement, the United States Government feels a most useful step would have been taken in narrowing the existing area of disagreement. Once this area of disagreement has been determined, the question can be narrowed even further by straight diplomatic negotiations. Any remaining problems can possibly then be dealt with by means of arbitration. Mr. McGhee said that he understood that this was the suggestion of the Saudi Arabian Government and that he would like to offer the good offices of the United States Government if this could assist in any way the reaching of an understanding with the British. Shaikh Yusuf Yassin then stated that most of the difficulties involve disputes over some islands in the Persian Gulf. The Saudi Arabian Government is perfectly sure that these islands are part of this country, and they belong to Saudi Arabia, and no neighboring country has any right whatsoever to take them. Saudi Arabia has given a concession to Aramco, which is represented by the American Government and the Saudi Arabian Government should have help from the American Government, which is Aramco’s government. More than that, as has been stated, Saudi Arabia has on several occasions had difficulties with its neighbors but has always managed to settle these without interference of a foreign power. Prince Feisal said that the Saudi Arabian Government had written to the British Government with reference to this, and the British had no proof to the claim. From the Saudi Arabian Government’s communications, Mr. McGhee could come to the conclusion that the British had no proof and no right to these islands. His Royal Highness said that he would like to invite Mr. McGhee’s attention to the fact that Saudi Arabia does not want to create any differences with the British or with neighboring countries. Saudi Arabia has been silent for many years and they have taken the initiative. Aramco told the Saudi Arabian Government that British agents had stopped them from continuing exploration work. It was requested that all parties be withdrawn pending the working out of a settlement. As an example of the validity of the British claims, His Royal Highness said he would mention that many years ago Britain requested through the Saudi Arabian Government that India be permitted to establish a lighthouse on one of the islands, and the British stated that that did not affect sovereignty over those islands, and now they present their claims. Mr. McGhee stated that he felt sure that Saudi Arabia had a basis for its claims. Although the United States does not feel that it can decide this for itself, it is sure that justice will be given to the claims of Saudi Arabia. The United States thinks that the Saudi Arabian Government has been very patient in this matter. If the United States can assist in any way in setting up procedures to evaluate these claims and arrange a settlement on a fair basis, it will be very glad to do so. Prince Feisal replied that the Saudi Arabian Government had suggested procedures but that the British have not as yet sent a reply. Regarding the other matter, Mr. McGhee said that he would like to discuss briefly the shortage of dollars, and its effect on the sale of Saudi Arabian oil on the world market. He said that, as His Royal Highness knew, there had been a tendency on the part of the British to purchase oil from sterling sources rather than from dollar sources and, while in some cases the decision has been based on purely legitimate necessity for conserving foreign exchange, the United States Government feels that the decision, in many cases, has been based on actual discrimination against Saudi Arabian oil. It is, of course, in the interest of both countries that the oil production of Saudi Arabia be maintained at its present high level. This is, of course, very important to the Saudi Arabian Government since oil royalties are its principle source of income. When the United States Government recently discussed the matter with the British, we protested to them in very strong terms the action they have taken. The question is currently under discussion with the British with the end in view of protecting Saudi Arabian sales in the world market. Various compromise proposals have been discussed, which involve receipt of sterling by the American companies for a part of the proceeds from the oil. Mr. McGhee said that he would like to reassure His Royal Highness that the United States Government has the interest of Saudi Arabia fully at heart in this question and will press the matter to the utmost. Mr. McGhee said that he had as his personal assistant in these negotiations Mr. Funkhouser, 9 formerly Petroleum Attaché in Cairo, who is known to the Saudi Arabian Government. Another question concerns the possible union of Iraq and Syria. 10 The position of the United States Government with respect to the proposed union is very clear. This position was stated to the countries concerned, to the British, and to all interested governments, namely, that although we would not oppose union which came about as a result of the freely expressed will of the people, that we would oppose any union which was the result of outside force or which was not freely accepted by the people. At the same time the United States expressed great concern over the actions or reported actions taking place, because the United States saw no evidence that the impetus toward union arose from a genuine desire on the part of the people concerned. The United States Government knows, of course, fully well the position of the Saudi Arabian Government in respect to this question, and it was largely influenced by the position the Saudi Arabian Government took. The United States Government is gratified that the Saudi Arabian Government has seen fit to extend aid to Syria, 11 and feels that this is a generous and constructive action which will help Syria through grave difficulties. It is the desire of the United States that Syria emerge as a strong independent democracy to take its place among the nations of the Near East and that it acquire some political and economic stability which it badly needs. The United States Government hopes that Saudi Arabia through its great influence on Syria will influence Syria toward this objective. The United States Government feels that Syria has a great opportunity in its participation in the program which has been recommended by Mr. Clapp, 12 and for which some $54,000,000 will be supplied by the United Nations, to be available for Syria (and for other countries immediately adjacent) not only to assist in actually feeding the refugees but also to be used in benefiting Syria. This assistance implies no political obligations on the part of Syria, but the United States Government feels it would be one of genuine benefit to Syria. Mr. McGhee said that he had presented to Congress the request for some $27,000,000 for this program, and it was his earnest desire that Syria should participate in this program. All these funds are for the benefit of the Arab states and for their economic development, as was clearly stated in the Clapp Report. Prince Feisal then commented that, concerning the question of Syria-Iraq union, as is known all Saudi Arabia’s activities are for the benefit of the independence of Syria. One may hear that something is desired by the people when in reality it is not. All nations are not like the United States in stating what they would like, with full freedom. For example, in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, it will be said following the elections that the officials have actually been elected while in reality they have not. Mr. McGhee replied that he fully concurred that there is no evidence at present which would lead one to believe that this is true of the nation of Syria. The United States Government does not have evidence that the people of the nations involved want union. Prince Feisal stated that this is really what is worrying Saudi Arabia, namely that there shall be no action which will be said to represent the desire of the nation but which may not be so. Saudi Arabia was always helpful to the Syrians when the previous President was in power. As regards Mr. Clapp’s report, there is one more point: when the Arab refugees take residence in the country where they are, there will not be anyone left to claim residence in the home country of Palestine. Mr. McGhee replied by pointing out that the Clapp Report does not prejudice a political settlement. The Report rightly addressed itself to two problems which must now be faced; namely, how the refugees will live and eat from day to day, and how those countries affected by hostilities can develop economically. His Royal Highness replied that Israel did not come into line in the case of the General Assembly resolution, but in the case of the earlier resolutions the Arab states were forced to come into line. Mr. McGhee stated that the United States had pressed Israel with every means available to make Israel come into line. Certain notes which the United States Government had sent to Israel have been made public and are probably known by the Saudi Arabian Government. He wished to assure His Royal Highness that it is a great source of regret to the United States that Israel has not carried out the resolution. Prince Feisal stated that Saudi Arabia would not like to see America either give Israel another loan or give financial assistance in any way. Saudi Arabia would appreciate any assistance which the United States could render to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations. 1 A notation on the last page of the source text read “Drafted at American Embassy, Jidda. Copied in NEA.” Although no drafter is indicated, it was possibly drafted by McGhee. Despatch 153, April 3, from Jidda, reported “An extended account of this conversation was made and taken back to the United States by Mr. McGhee.” The despatch was an account of McGhee’s March 18 to March 24 visit to Saudi Arabia. Enclosed with it were a translation of a Saudi Arabian newspaper account of McGhee’s arrival, and the memorandum of conversations of March 22–23, infra . (110.15MC/4–350) Despatch 50, April 10, from Dhahran, contains additional information on his trip. McGhee was in Dhahran from March 20 to March 22 and March 24 and 25. On March 25 he made a brief trip to some oil well sites and then, with Ambassador Childs and Consul General Parker T. Hart from Dhahran, flew to Kuwait. There they were received by Shaikh Abdullah As-Salim Al Subah in a formal visit at the palace. McGhee returned to the United States on a commercial flight from Basra, Iraq, on March 26. (786A.00/4–1050) A summary of the source text was prepared in the Department of State on April 7 and sent by McGhee to the Secretary of State on April 11 (Secretary’s memoranda, lot 53D444). Lot 53D444 is a comprehensive chronological collection of the Secretary of State’s memoranda and memoranda of conversation for the years 1947–1953, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 See documentation on the meeting between President Roosevelt, King Farouk of Egypt, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and King Saud, in Egypt, on February 13–14, 1945, in Foreign Relations , 1945, vol. viii , pp. 1 ff. 3 See documentation on the participation by the United States in the development of the petroleum resources of the Near East, pp. 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] ff. 4 See documentation on United States economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 1 ff. 5 Jordan and Iraq. 6 McGhee met with the King on March 22 and 23; see the memorandum of conversations, infra . 7 Ante , p. 1112 [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] . 8 For documentation on boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf in special treaty relations with the United Kingdom, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 91 ff. 9 Richard E. Funkhouser of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs. 10 For documentation on this topic, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 180 ff. 11 In telegram 63, February 2, from Jidda, not printed, the Ambassador reported the Deputy Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia informed him that the Saudi Arabian Government signed an agreement on January 31 to loan Syria $6 million, without interest. The loan was to be repaid in Syrian products over the 4-year period from 1955–1958. (883.10/2–250) 12 The first interim report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, whose chairman was Gordon R. Clapp, was signed on November 6, 1949; see editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1472 . Memorandum of Conversations, by the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) 611.86A/3–2350 [Document 637] Memorandum of Conversations, by the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) 1 secret [ Jidda ,] March 23, 1950. Subject: United States-Saudi Arabian Relations Participants: H. M. King Abdul Aziz ibn Abdurrahman al Faisal al Saud H. R. H. Amir Saud ibn Abdul Aziz ibn Abdurrahman al Saud, Viceroy of Nejd H. E. Shaikh Yusuf Yassin, Minister of State H. E. Fuad Hamza, Adviser to the King J. Rives Childs, American Ambassador George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary for NEA Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and I arrived shortly after 9:00 o’clock in Riyadh on March 22, 1950, and after being conducted to our rooms in the new palace, were received by His Majesty during which the usual courtesies were exchanged. His Majesty expressed his great pleasure at receiving Mr. McGhee and having the opportunity to exchange views with him during the course of his visit. We later saw Shaikh Yusuf Yassin at which time Mr. McGhee discussed the influence of SA in the Arab League in the matter of facilitating the introduction of stability in the M.E. (See Dhahran Telegram No. 53, dated March 25, 1950. 2 ) Shaikh Yusuf agreed that although SA was not as wealthy or powerful as other Arab states, nevertheless, in the Arab League meetings the representative of SA always spoke last. Of the two points raised Shaikh Yusuf appeared to indicate that he would use his influence in the Arab League to urge the states concerned to cooperate in the carrying out of the Clapp program and accepted the assurances that no political commitment was involved. His response, however, was entirely negative to any suggestion of encouraging or even permitting any country to make peace or establish any normal relations with Israel. In the afternoon Mr. McGhee and I were received again by the King at which time Mr. McGhee reviewed in summary manner the problem of meeting SA’s security requirements. The presentation was a summary of the verbal presentation made by Mr. McGhee in Jidda to Prince Faisal. Mr. McGhee in concluding said that if the independence or integrity of SA were threatened, the United States would take most immediate action. The King would understand, however, that in the light of the complexities of the situation which might exist at any future time, that it was not possible to state in precise terms what action might be taken. His Majesty referred at some length to his problem with the Hashemites with which he was obviously preoccupied. He said the two Hashemite rulers had been imposed on their respective countries and had never been accepted wholeheartedly by the people. Their military power was entirely derived from British support, without which they would represent no threat. SA on the other hand had no such outside support. His Majesty said that he had at one time offered the oil concession of SA to the British but they had refused it, although he himself was well aware, on the basis of information given him by the Turks before the first world war which they had obtained from the Germans, that SA was potentially one of the richest countries in the world so far as oil was concerned. Although the British had been given first refusal of the oil, they had always resented the fact that the concession had been given to America and his difficulties with the British had begun from that time. Accordingly, SA had every right to expect that we would approach its needs in security requirements with sympathy. The King referred to his boundary difficulties and described the British position as very unreasonable. The King said that the British were a people of “but”. They made statements and gave you assurances but always at the end “but”. His Majesty said that he would like for us to meet with Shaikh Yusuf Yassin and Fuad Bey Hamza at which time the discussions could be continued and amplified. In the evening there was a State banquet. Dinner was served in complete western style, except for the King himself—a very recent innovation at Riyadh. On request from Ambassador Childs His Majesty recounted the capture of Riyadh, which represented the first stage of the establishment of the King’s power in the Arabian peninsula. It is given here as being of historical interest. Mr. McGhee inquired of His Majesty if any Arab rulers had previously controlled the peninsula as His Majesty does now. His Majesty replied that a member of his family, coincidentally with the same name, had established such control over the Arabian peninsula some 250 years ago. This constituted the only previous union of SA. Subsequently, his family had ruled only over minor villages. He was assisted in his conquest of Riyadh by some 40 followers. They proceeded to the vicinity of Riyadh on camels from which they descended and walked some four hours to Riyadh arriving after dusk. The King knocked at the door of a house, which was at the edge of the village and which constituted a part of its outer fortifications, and was received by a woman who refused his admittance. He advised her, however, that he was a servant of the Amir and that if she did not admit him he would see that her husband would be killed by the Amir, whereupon she acceded. When he entered the house she immediately recognized him since he was apparently well known, but when his identity was known to the other members of her family they acclaimed him and agreed to support him. In order to prevent the woman from disclosing his presence he locked her in her room and he and his followers proceeded over rooftops to an adjoining house where he found a man sleeping in bed with his wife. He also locked them in a room so that they would not give an alarm. They then proceeded to the home of one of the Amir’s wives whom they found sleeping with her sister. She, when awakened, advised that the Amir was in his palace but warned him that he could not overcome the Amir, whereupon he locked them up. At this juncture it was still a long time before morning so he and his followers prepared coffee and slept until dawn. At dawn, as was his custom, the Amir emerged from the palace which was well defended, along with some seven of his guards. The gate to the palace was opened and they came into the open courtyard in front. Ibn Saud and his followers, who had been lying in wait, attacked them and the seven guards fled back into the palace with the Amir behind. Ibn Saud grabbed the Amir from behind and arrested his flight. The Amir in turn kicked Ibn Saud and pushed him down, whereupon Abdullah Saud bin Jelui hurled a spear at the Amir and killed him. The group then attacked the palace which was defended by some 200 soldiers and took it with the loss of only two killed and 14 wounded after inflicting the loss of 15 on the defenders. Within two days some 4,000 men had rallied to his support. Ibn Saud said that the Riyadh Conquest was a difficult one, especially since it was the first, but not the most difficult one. On two occasions all of his followers, aggregating some 800 or 900 people were killed, and he alone escaped to recruit more support. His Majesty said the best account of the Capture of Riyadh was that given in Rihani’s book. Mr. McGhee questioned His Majesty as to any conversation he might have had with the King of Afghanistan who had departed several days before, after visiting His Majesty, with respect to the dispute with Pakistan over the Northwest territory. 3 His Majesty said he had spoken with the King urging upon him that he make every effort to reach agreement with Pakistan over the issues between them involving the Pushtoon tribes of the Northwest territory. His Majesty added that he would make every effort to do so. Mr. McGhee stated to His Majesty that it was the frank view of our Government after a detailed investigation that the situation among the tribes did not appear to justify the strong position taken by the Afghanistan Government. In fact, it appeared that the Afghanistan Government itself was, to a considerable extent, responsible for the unrest among the tribes. The King indicated that this was his own conclusion in the matter and promised that he would renew his attempt to reconcile the difference. Mr. McGhee pointed out the difficulties of creation of an independent state of Pushtoonistan even if, as the Afghanis allege, this was the desire of the tribes. He particularly noted the fact that both the British and Pakistanis had found it necessary to subsidize the tribes and that they could not possibly develop trade to support themselves in an independent state. The King appeared to agree with this conclusion. In response to a passing remark from Mr. McGhee about the relations between SA and Ethiopia, the King said SA had friendly but never close relations with Ethiopia; did not, in fact, now have a representative in Ethiopia, although it did have one at one time. He had, he considered, close relations with Pakistan. His Majesty complained that European-style dinners were too long drawn out to suit him. After dinner Fuad Bey Hamza and Shaikh Yusuf Yassin came to our palace for a further discussion. In the course of an extended conversation, Fuad Bey, who acted as Arab spokesman, set forth at considerable length the desire of His Majesty for the closest possible treaty relations with the United States in the form preferably of an alliance which would assure SA of its security. SA needed to be assured that America had more than friendship for SA, that it had vital interests, since American support would flow from such interest. He questioned whether or not Americans have sufficient incentive to protect SA’s oil interests and those of American companies in SA; since there are adjoining countries such as Kuwait and Bahrein where American companies also have interests. He was assured that America did consider they had vital interest in SA both from the standpoint of its oil interests and from the standpoint of the importance of the stability and independence of SA from a strategic standpoint. He was assured that America would take all appropriate steps to protect legitimate SA interests independently of its own commercial interests outside of SA. It was explained that America had not traditionally entered into treaties of alliance such as those entered into by the British and others, but that it was believed that America’s record for assisting friendly states and those wherein it had vital interests was sufficiently clear to give assurances to the Saudi’s. Mr. McGhee said that despite the fact that we could not envisage the conclusion of an old-style treaty of alliance, he thought that there were several measures open to the United States which would not only give evidence of our great desire to assist SA but which might also serve in effect the practical purposes of a treaty of alliance. These measures he summarized as (1) conclusion of a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation 4 which might symbolize and serve as a notice to all concerned of the closeness of our relations; (2) the making available of such technicians as SA might desire under the 4-point program; (3) the making of loans such as the Eximbank loan now under discussion 5 and; (4) the conclusion of a long-term Dhahran Airfield Agreement which would include or follow (5) a program of military aid to carry out these recommendations if the O’Keefe report finally approved including the making of arms available on a cash reimbursable basis and the sending of an appropriate military mission to aid in the training of SA forces. Fuad Bey was disposed to question at first whether the granting of a loan might be claimed as a real service inasmuch as SA could obtain loans from others. Mr. McGhee pointed out that such loans were not easily obtained these days and it seemed doubtful if a loan such as SA desired might be available from ordinary banking sources. Mr. McGhee added that he did not know of any other government which was in a position to make a loan to SA. Fuad Bey asked whether SA might obtain today the arms it needed through commercial sources. Mr. McGhee stated that the arms available through commercial channels in the United States were rather limited, but he said other common use items, such as trucks and transport aircraft, which would be a part of SA defense requirements would be available. Most modern purely military and used items could be obtained only by purchase from the US armed forces which required Congressional authorization. When Fuad Bey suggested that Israel had been obtaining arms in the United States, it was pointed out that the arms which Israel had obtained were those limited quantities available through ordinary commercial channels and that it was open to SA equally to obtain these. It was added that Israel had obtained no authorization to purchase arms from the US Armed Forces. Fuad Bey stated SA by this time appreciated some of the difficulties in the way of the fulfillment of its complete desires. It could be most unfortunate if it were suddenly to be confronted with an adverse decision on the O’Keefe report and he hoped the SAG might be kept currently informed of the progress of the USG’s purposes with respect to SA to avoid the shock of some sudden unexpected reverse to the aim we were seeking of bringing about closer relations. Mr. McGhee reassured him on this. At the end Shaikh Yusuf raised the question why, if we professed such friendship for SA, we could not make available military aid on a grant basis such as we had made available to other countries, including, in particular, Greece and Turkey. Mr. McGhee replied that this was not a matter of friendship and pointed out that the resources of the United States were not unlimited; that we already were suffering from a budgetary deficit this year of approximately 5 billion dollars and that it was essential for us to confine our grants of military aid to those countries whose economy did not permit them to sustain the cost of such a burden. Our National Advisory Council who made policy in such matters, required countries who were in a position to pay, like SA, to obtain assistance on a reimbursable basis. Greece and Turkey were not able to repay. Shaikh Yusuf said in conclusion that there were two things which His Majesty really desired: (1) arms on a grant basis; and (2) conclusion of a military alliance. However, we had discussed with him the possible alternatives. He realized that SA desired more than we could fulfill, whereas the United States had offered less than SA desired. It was agreed that our purpose would be to reach a common ground between these two. In the morning of March 23 the word was sent to us that His Majesty was somewhat fatigued and would not be able to receive us as planned but that instead we would be received by Crown Prince Saud. The Crown Prince welcomed us very cordially and stated what a great satisfaction it was to have the visit of Mr. McGhee and the opportunity for such frank exchanges of views. He added that Fuad Bey Hamza had reported to him and to His Majesty at great length the conversation of the evening previous. The Crown Prince said while SA desired a treaty of alliance, it fully appreciated the difficulties which stood in the way of the conclusion of such an agreement, as had been explained by Mr. McGhee. Mr. McGhee remarked that it was very gratifying to know that our warm friend SA had understood our difficulties and that it was a mark of the closeness and friendliness of our relations if we endeavored to understand and appreciate the problems of the other in connection with our mutual interest. Our friendship was certain to be founded on a fundamentally strong and lasting type when we took the pains to understand one another’s point of view in solving our common problems. He added that he has already convinced his father of USG’s procedure and its circumstances which His Majesty now has absorbed and understands very well. The Crown Prince stated he very much hoped this would not be the last visit which Mr. McGhee paid to SA but only the first. On the afternoon of March 23, on our way to another audience with His Majesty, Fuad Bey Hamza met us and stated that after an explanation of the conversation of the previous evening to His Majesty and the Crown Prince, His Majesty had been persuaded to accept the bases as outlined by Mr. McGhee for our relations. Fuad Bey suggested that Mr. McGhee summarize the points briefly for His Majesty and to emphasize that SA would be kept advised before Congressional action was sought and the progress of the steps which were being taken in the United States toward the realization of a military program. When we were received by His Majesty, Mr. McGhee went over the points briefly and gave the suggested assurances to His Majesty. His Majesty stated that he welcomed these assurances and that he wished it to be understood that he considered the United States and SA as one state. He said that he hoped, when final plans for military aid had been worked out, someone might be sent to SA, such as Mr. McGhee to review them with His Majesty before final decision for their execution is reached. Later in the afternoon we were received by the Crown Prince at his summer palace and were offered tea; followed later by dinner. During the dinner the Crown Prince was asked what his views were concerning the development of Yemen. He stated he could best answer by recounting the conversation he had in Cairo a few days previous with the Yemen delegate to the Arab League who called on him. The Crown Prince said he had expressed the hope that Yemen would open itself to greater development and contact with the outside world. The Crown Prince pointed out that SA had welcomed an American oil company and had benefited greatly by this enterprise without any prejudice to its sovereignty and that the only way Yemen could raise the standard of living of its people was by welcoming outside assistance. The Crown Prince said the Yemen delegate expressed thorough agreement. The Crown Prince said that according to all the information of the SA Government, conditions in Yemen were anything but stable and he hoped that when Mr. Childs visited Yemen he would urge the same views on the Yemen Government. 6 Mr. McGhee remarked that private investment in fields where production could be undertaken in SA such as textiles, glass, cement, etc., was one of the means which might contribute greatly to the advancement of SA. The Crown Prince said SA would welcome this private investment, either directly or in partnership with SA capital. After dinner Mr. McGhee referred to the audience with His Majesty in the afternoon during which His Majesty had spoken of the alarming exodus of rivals from SA and the need for examining the situation and studying the possibility of introducing the Indian Rupee. The Crown Prince said he was in thorough disagreement with this and thought Mr. McGhee had been well advised to make the suggestion that the matter be studied by experts. It had been suggested and agreed upon that an effort would be made to obtain the services of Mr. Judd Polk from the Embassy in Cairo to come to Jidda to confer with the Finance Minister and give disinterested advice as to how the Government might best proceed in this matter. Mr. McGhee said that a stable currency in which the people had confidence was a fundamental pre-requisite to a stable economy. He added that when SA studied its needs under the President’s Fourth Point and so desired the United States would be glad to make every effort to find suitable financial technicians who might come to SA to give advice and assistance in these technical financial matters. In the final audience with His Majesty on the evening of March 23, appropriate remarks were exchanged with respect to the visit of Mr. McGhee and both His Majesty and Mr. McGhee expressed satisfaction with the conclusions reached in the conversations which had been held. His Majesty reiterated his strong opposition to Communism which was based on the fact that [it?] opposed religion which constituted the basic element in Arab life, and also because it was an aggressive force. He stated that the stability of the Arab world is an extremely important factor in safeguarding against the spread of Communism since any disaffection in the Arab world would spread elsewhere. He pointed out that Communism had made some gains in the Arab world, particularly in Iraq and Egypt, and urged the US to make efforts to assist in counteracting such movements. His Majesty gave China as an example as to what happens when such movements are unchecked. Mr. McGhee replied that the US sought, through assisting these countries in their economic development, to provide them with an incentive to continue to cooperate with the free world by demonstrating that such cooperation offered more than adherence to Communism. Mr. McGhee said that the friendship of the two countries involving the interchange of advice was one extending to the giving of advice by SA with respect to the Arab and Islamic world to the United States. His Majesty replied that one manner in which the United States could be very helpful was in supporting the Arab League and in urging and promoting unity among the Arab states. Mr. McGhee promised that he would convey to the President the generous remarks of His Majesty with respect to the United States and advise him of the satisfactory conclusions reached. 1 A summary of the source text was prepared in the Department of State on April 10, and Acting Secretary James Webb transmitted it to the President on May 9 (Secretary’s memoranda, lot 53D444). 2 Presumably this refers to telegram 54, March 25, from Dhahran. The telegram reported a conversation between McGhee and Yassin on March 22 on Arab-Israeli relations and is printed, p. 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] . 3 For documentation on this topic, see pp. 1446 [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 815 ] ff. 4 Information on the proposed negotiations for a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation is in Department of State file 611.86A4. 5 See the memorandum of conversation of April 19, p. 1166 [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] . 6 For documentation on this topic, see pp. 1355 [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 754 ] ff. The Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Collins) to the Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Haislip) 786A.5MAP/4–350: Telegram [Document 638] The Chief of Staff of the United States Army ( Collins ) to the Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army ( Haislip ) 1 secret priority Jidda , April 3, 1950—5 p. m. 194. Personal for Haislip from Collins. Reference WAR 81319, 31 March. 2 Provided it appears likely favorable action will be taken this session Congress to provide reimbursable aid for Saudi Arabia under FY 51 MDAP legislation and provided prior assurances such favorable action is obtained from appropriate Congressional leaders, recommend that JCS authorize token shipment 5,000 rifles with ammunition on loan basis to be chargeable later Saudi Arabia as part of aid program. Recommend furthermore token shipment be made in case it becomes evident to State Department that no satisfactory interim agreement can otherwise be reached for use Dhahran air base. Suggest that necessity of token shipment be left to discretion Ambassador Childs. In this connection Ambassador Childs and General O’Keefe inform me that possibility exists of reaching acceptable interim extension for period of 6 to 9 months without loan of equipment prior to Congressional action. If it appears MDAP bill permitting reimbursable aid to Saudi Arabia will not be acceptable to leaders of Congress, I consider it inadvisable for JCS to commit themselves to token shipment at this time. [ Collins ] 1 The source text was transmitted as telegram 194, April 3, from Jidda, and was relayed to the Department of the Army for Gen. Wade Haislip at 10:30 p. m. Saudi Arabia was one of the places visited by Collins during an inspection trip he made to the Middle East from March 20 to April 8. For more information, see excerpt of his report, p. 1158 [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] . 2 Not found in Department of State files. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 886A.413/4–350 [Document 639] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 155 Jidda , April 3, 1950. Subject: Christian religious services held on the Dhahran Air Base During a call at the Foreign Office on March 29, Khairradin Bey, 1 temporarily in charge, stated that His Majesty and the Minister of Defense had received a report that an American “Missionary”, Captain Sloan, 2 was holding public religious services on the Dhahran Air Base attended not only by officers and men of the USAF but also by people from Aramco. In a long discussion which followed Khairradin Bey emphasized that Saudi Arabia was unique among Arab and Moslem states in that it included the Moslem holy places and that not since the time of Mohammed had any Christian activities ever been permitted in the country. I informed Khairradin Bey that this was an extremely delicate question and that I hoped the Saudi Arabian Government would not bring it up in a way to make it difficult for us. I said very frankly that to press us unduly might have extremely unfortunate consequences. In my discussion I emphasized that we fully appreciated the delicacy of the question for the Saudi Arabian Government but we expected the Saudi Arabian Government to show as great an understanding of our difficulties as we were disposed to show of theirs. Both I and Aramco had been pressed for an active pursuit of the matter with the Saudi Arabian Government but we felt that the situation would work itself out if the matter were handled with appropriate delicacy and if neither side were precipitate. I assured Khairradin Bey that so far as I was aware there were no American Christian “Missionaries” in Saudi Arabia nor were there any regularly established churches and I could assure him further that there were no public Christian religious services being held so far as I knew. I requested him earnestly not to press me for any further assurances beyond these. I said that I could not believe His Majesty would object to the assembling privately of officers and men of our air base at Dhahran for the saying of their prayers. Khairradin said, after considerable argument, that the objections of the Saudi Arabian Government were not to what occurred in the privacy of the homes or quarters of the officers and men but to public atherings for the holding of public services in a fixed place and at fixed times. He said it had come to the Saudi Arabian Government’s attention that Captain Sloan was a religious leader who was conducting these services and he wondered if Captain Sloan could not be transferred. I replied that if the Saudi authorities could present me with facts establishing that Captain Sloan had conducted public services at which Moslems were present or could establish the fact that he had engaged in religious discussions with Moslems I would be glad to bring the facts to the attention of General O’Keefe with a recommendation for his transfer. I could not admit, however, a complaint against Captain Sloan for discussing religious matters with the officers and men of the USAF at Dhahran, as this was a purely internal administrative question which solely concerned General O’Keefe and the internal organization of the Air Base. Khairradin’s conversation was extremely conciliatory but at the same time he sought by every means to obtain more specific assurances from me that no regular services would be held in a specific place at regular times which were open to the public. I avoided giving any such assurances and made it plain to him as diplomatically as possible that I could not and would not interfere with the holding privately of devotional exercises at Dhahran for the American officers and men of the USAF, but I stated I would take steps to see that such gatherings were restricted exclusively to those officers and men, and that there were no public gatherings to which outsiders might have access. I did everything possible to impress on Khairradin Bey the necessity of letting sleeping dogs lie as quietly as possible. He said he realized that I had a very great appreciation of the Saudi Arabian Government’s position in this matter. I said that I did but that if we were to keep this question from arriving at a very dangerous impasse it would be well for the Saudi Arabian Government to show as much understanding and appreciation of our situation as we had been disposed until now to show of theirs. Later our very able Arab Secretary, Mohammed Effendi, said that when we were recently in Dhahran, Colonel Nagshabandi 3 had informed him that a party of Saudi officials had visited the Airport on Sunday, March 5th and that their attention had been attracted by the numerous cars and visitors outside the Character Guidance Center and that he had been obliged to disclose the nature of what was taking place in answer to their inquiries. Mohammed said he believed this was the occasion for the latest démarche on the part of the Foreign Office. J. Rives Childs 1 Acting Foreign Minister. 2 The editors have not been able to identify Captain Sloan further. 3 Lt. Col. Salim Nagshabandi, Saudi Arabian Army. The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State 786A.11/4–850: Telegram [Document 640] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia ( Hill ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Jidda , April 8, 1950—5 p. m. 203. On April 6 I informed Khairadeen Bey, Acting Foreign Minister, substance Deptel 124, April 5. 1 This afternoon he read me following telegram signed by King: “We welcome coming of special physician of President Truman to head defense medical team. Inform American Embassy and ask them transmit our thanks to President Truman for this gracious attention which we appreciate.” Shortly after my return to Embassy Khairadeen Bey phoned urgently to say that message had just arrived from Royal Cabinet stating they had telegraphed SA Ambassador Washington directing him ask Department and President Truman in a personal way not to permit any news either press or radio concerning medical team coming here until mission finished and team departed on return trip. He added that this was considered essential precaution to prevent any rumors arising that some very serious matter was reason for medical team coming here so urgently. Message added that SA Ambassador also being instructed transmit to President Truman the thanks of His Majesty for such kind attention. Re foregoing paragraph, Department will recall from previous reports this Embassy the extreme sensitiveness SAG to any possibility rumor concerning illness in royal family. Re last sentence Deptel 124, in belief Ambassador would prefer comment himself, I relayed telegram to him at Aden on April 6. Hill 1 Not printed; it informed the Embassy that the President would like to send his personal physician, Brig. Gen. Wallace H. Graham, as the head of a proposed Department of Defense medical team. It asked the Embassy to consult the Saudi Arabian Government to find out if that would be agreeable and ended by saying that the Embassy’s comment would be appreciated. (786A.11/4–550) A report on the visit of the medical mission is on p. 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] . Excerpt of Report by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army (Collins) to the Secretary of the Army (Gray) 786A.5/4–1950 [Document 641] Excerpt of Report by the Chief of Staff of the United States Army ( Collins ) to the Secretary of the Army ( Gray ) 1 top secret [ Washington , April 1950.] Saudi Arabia a . Unfortunately my visit to Dhahran was so short that it was not possible to make any detailed inspection of the Air Base which, of course, is under Air Force control. b . In my several conferences with Ibn Saud and his principal advisors, which are detailed in appendices hereto, I was impressed with the fact that at no time did any Arab raise the question of the extension of our base rights at Dhahran. I do not believe this was an oversight but rather, to me, indicated that at least a subconscious acceptance of the fact that American Base Rights at Dhahran would be continued. c . The thought uppermost in the minds of Ibn Saud and his advisor was the early implementation of the so-called O’Keefe report, however modified it might be. I believe that I convinced them that it would be far wiser to accept a more gradual and modest modernization of their Armed Forces than that envisaged in the O’Keefe report. (1) I am certain that the Arabian officials were shocked at the cost of the proposed O’Keefe program. They immediately proposed a monetary grant-in-aid to provide sufficient funds for military equipment. I believe Ambassador Childs and I convinced them that this would not be possible. (2) At the specific request of the King and his principal advisors and with the full assent of Ambassador Childs, I have made a record of our discussions with reference to the strength and organization of Arabian Forces. A copy of this discussion is attached hereto as Annex 6. I have agreed to furnish copies thereof to Ambassador Childs for transmittal to Ibn Saud. d . I am convinced that Ibn Saud is more concerned over possible warfare resulting from some subsequent expansion of Israel than he is over any threat from Russia. However, he and his advisors are fully cognizant of how serious such a threat would be, not only to Saudi Arabia but to the Moslem World. The Arabs would fight to the limit of their ability if threatened by Russia. e . With reference to a proposed token shipment of rifles to Saudi Arabia (see CM–IN 16971, 4 April 1950 2 ), I believe that if Congress approves a MDAP program for Saudi Arabia clearance should be obtained from appropriate Congressional leaders for a shipment of 5,000 rifles and an appropriate amount of ammunition. Decision as to offering such a token shipment should rest with Ambassador Childs, who assures me that he will use the authority only if he finds it necessary in order to obtain an extension of our base rights in Dhahran. 3 f . Action to be taken: (1) G–3 take appropriate steps to expedite action leading to the initiation of a modest MDAP program, on a reimbursable basis, for Saudi Arabia, including a token shipment of arms, if such is deemed advisable by Ambassador Childs. Annex 6 Saudi Arabia 1. Shortly after arriving at Riyadh on 2 April 1950, Ambassador Childs, General Collins, Colonels Johnson, Dodge and Howze called upon the King, Ibn Saud. The King greeted the party very graciously and extended a welcome to Saudi Arabia. The King’s good humor was indicated by the fact that he gave a detailed account of his capture of the Palace of Riyadh fifty years ago with a party of only 40 men. 2. At four o’clock in the afternoon, following customary procedure, the party paid its respects to the King. 3. Following this audience, the party then met with Crown Prince Saud; Prince Mansur, Minister of Defense; Fuad Bey Hamza, Minister of State and Counselor to the King. 4. At this conference General Collins outlined the current status of the O’Keefe report and stated that an abbreviated copy of this report had been forwarded by the JCS, without any final action on their part, to the U.S. Secretary of Defense for transmittal, through the Secretary of State, to Ibn Saud. 4 5. General Collins pointed out that the whole matter of military aid to Saudi Arabia was still under study and emphasized the fact that no final action would be taken until Congress authorized appropriations. He further pointed out that if the usual MDAP procedures were followed, it would be necessary to consummate a bi-lateral treaty between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. He made clear that this treaty would not be a military or political alliance but would simply stipulate the extent of the program and the method of financing it. The next step would be the completion of negotiations between representatives of the Arabian government and U.S. officials to determine the exact nature and extent of the program. 6. General Collins then asked if the Crown Prince would care to have General Collins’ personal observations as to the type and organization of forces which he would recommend for the Arabian Army. The Crown Prince and his associates immediately expressed a desire to obtain General Collins’ views. 7. General Collins then told the party that he had read the O’Keefe report. While it represented a very fine study, he was convinced that the forces proposed would be much too large and costly to be maintained by the Arabian Government. He stated that the U.S. Army staff had made an analysis of the costs involved in such a program and determined that the cost would amount to at least 107 million dollars. This cost would cover the provision of equipment, necessary ammunition, packing, crating and transportation charges and the establishment of necessary shelter for a U.S. military mission which would be needed to train the Arabian Army. Even if this cost were spread over a period of 5 years, the annual cost would be approximately 22 million dollars. Since it would not be possible to create and train newly equipped forces immediately, it would be necessary for Saudi Arabia to continue to maintain its present forces for some time. The 22 million dollars for the new forces would be over and above the annual cost of maintaining the residual current forces. 8. When asked what the current military budget was, Fuad Bey replied it was about 9 million dollars. However, he admitted that this did not represent the entire military budget. It was then pointed out that for at least the first 2 years the annual cost would total at least 31 million dollars since the bulk of the present forces would have to be maintained. This would be nearly four times the present military budget. General Collins stated that he doubted very much that the country could afford to spend that much money on its armed forces at this time. 9. Ambassador Childs pointed out that when the O’Keefe report was drafted the financial situation of the government was different from that now existing. In 1949 oil production was rising with consequent increase in oil royalties; the O’Keefe report was developed using a Saudi income approaching 100 million dollars annually. In the meanwhile there has been a falling off in the demand for oil and a cutback in oil production, with the result that in 1950 government revenues were likely to be substantially below those of the high-water mark of 1949. The Ambassador added that there was a serious question as to whether Saudi economy could support the very heavy military charge. 10. Fuad Bey said the government was well aware of this problem and that consideration was being given already to the means of increasing oil royalties. (This short paragraph should be omitted from the copy of the report forwarded to the Arabian Government.) 5 11. General Collins then suggested that rather than to embark on such an ambitious program, it would be far wiser to initiate a more feasible and modest one. He made the point that it was not simply a question of money but also the problem of the ability of the Arabians to absorb the new techniques and to establish and to train the essential non-commissioned officers and experts who would be required to handle this equipment. He pointed out that it would take some time to establish schools and to develop competent instructors in the Arabian forces. If this were not done, valuable equipment would stand idle and rapidly deteriorate. Should such equipment be seen by visiting Congressmen from America it would have a very bad effect. It might well result in the curtailment of the program. General Collins, therefore, suggested that it might be well to start with an Army force of three infantry regimental combat teams and a modified mechanized cavalry regiment. 12. General Collins outlined to the Arabians the American triangular system of organization under which each unit consists of three smaller homogeneous elements plus a fire support unit. This type of organization is designed primarily for an attack. For any attack there must be three elements; first, the force which finds the enemy and holds him in place. This is called the finding and fixing force. Next, there must be a maneuvering unit which is employed to outflank the enemy who has been fixed in position by the holding force. Third, it is necessary to have a reserve in order to carry home the attack and destroy the enemy. Each of these homogeneous units requires the movement of men and equipment over the ground. It is necessary for the commander to have a fourth element by which, without the movement of men or equipment, he can shift his supporting fires to assist any part of the attack. This fourth element is called the fire support unit. 13. All U.S. Army organizations are based on this theory of attack. For example, a platoon consists of three rifle squads and a fourth light machine gun squad, the latter being the fire support element. A company consists of three platoons and a light mortar and machine gun platoon. A battalion consists of three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company. A regiment has three battalions and a heavy mortar company and finally a division consists of three regiments and an artillery group. 14. There are two great advantages of this type of organization. First, young officers familiar with the method of handling a platoon have no new principle to learn when they become company commanders, a good company commander can readily handle a battalion, and so on throughout an officer’s career. The second great advantage and one which would have special application to Saudi Arabia, is that, if after the three regimental combat teams were well trained and equipped and the government should decide then that it could increase the size of its army, each of these regimental combat teams could be expanded to become a division. This could be done by adding men and material to each company so as to convert it into a battalion. Each battalion could be expanded into a regiment and then each regiment could then become a division. Thus, under the framework of the program suggested by General Collins, the Saudi Arabians might ultimately develop three infantry divisions and a light mechanized division, the latter being created from the original mechanized regiment. 15. Fuad Bey then interrupted to say that while this was very logical, the Arabs had felt that the forces recommended by the O’Keefe report represented the minimum forces with which Saudi Arabia could start. General Collins again pointed out the great costs involved and the lack of wisdom in embarking on such a large scale project until the proper groundwork had been laid by training the necessary specialists in schools. 16. Without divulging the contents of the O’Keefe report, General Collins pointed out that he could not agree with some of the units recommended in the report. 6 For example, the report provided for a parachute battalion or its equivalent. General Collins told of his experience with two airborne divisions in the Normandy campaign and pointed out how complicated and difficult were airborne operations. He stated that with the relative short distances in Saudi Arabia it would be better to employ perhaps a mechanized regiment to seize a given area and then to move troops by air transport or overland by trucks rather than to parachute them from the air. 17. In answer to a query, General Collins began to outline the method now used of transferring equipment under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP). However, it was necessary to adjourn the meeting in order that the Arabians might have time for their evening prayers. 18. Following dinner, given by the King, the conference was resumed. In addition to the Americans and Arabs present during the afternoon discussions the King’s brother Abdula, headed the Arabian group. 19. General Collins resumed his discussion of the pricing methods employed under MDAP. He made clear that considerable equipment being furnished countries of Western Europe, Greece, Turkey and Iran was generally surplus to the maximum needs of the US forces. This equipment was divided, for pricing purposes, into three categories as follows: a . The lowest category consists of such articles as older types of armored vehicles, small bazookas, and certain types of artillery of which the US Army has some surplus above its maximum needs. In the original program this equipment was priced at 10% of its original cost plus the cost of rehabilitation, handling, packing, crating and shipping. This system was changed so as to eliminate the 10% charge; however, the cost of rehabilitation and handling, packing, crating, and shipping has usually amounted to roughly 25% of the cost of new equipment. b . The second category of equipment contains items which the U.S. needs but are not required for the minimum supply levels felt necessary for the U.S. Army. Some examples of equipment in this category are: certain radios, small arms and ammunition, mortars, and 105 mm Howitzers. This equipment has been furnished at its original acquisition cost which is roughly the 1945 purchase price. These costs represent approximately one-half of the current 1950 new procurement costs for similar items. c . The last category of equipment contains those items which are needed to meet the minimum supply levels of the US Army. Examples of this category are: engineer equipment, artillery ammunition, almost all types of trucks, recoilless anti-tank weapons. Such items may be furnished at the current 1950 procurement cost if the item can be procured by the time the US Army needs it. 20. Abdula then remarked that the Arabian Army wished to have only new equipment as it had had some bad experience obtaining second hand equipment in the past. General Collins pointed out that the equipment that might be furnished them would be similar to that being used by the United States itself and being furnished to the Armies of France and Italy. He stated that it would be necessary to rehabilitate some of this equipment but that it would be all in excellent order. It would have a long life if properly maintained. 21. Abdula then raised the question as to whether Saudi Arabia could not be given this equipment as is being done for other countries. He stated that Saudi Arabia was of great strategic importance to the U.S. and that the oil from Saudi Arabia was essential to the U.S. Navy; therefore, the U.S. should be willing to furnish this equipment to Saudi Arabia by means of a grant-in-aid. Prince Abdula also pointed out that the O’Keefe report had been submitted some months ago and that before that there had been discussions by His Majesty Ibn Saud, concerning military aid for a period of 2 years and that nothing had come as yet from these discussions. The inference left was that we did not seem to be any nearer a meeting of minds than we had been before these long drawn out discussions. 22. Ambassador Childs stated that he would assume the responsibility for replying to certain of Prince Abdula’s remarks as he was intimately acquainted with the background of certain of the problems involved. The Ambassador stated that, as he had so frequently remarked to His Majesty, the United States Government was a very cumbersome machine. It was unlike the Government of Saudi Arabia where decisions could be implemented at the will of one man. Mr. Childs stated that in his opinion the O’Keefe report was receiving as prompt a consideration as was to be expected in light of the many authorities in Washington who had to pass judgment upon it and all the many other complicated problems with which the American Government is faced in all sections of the world. The O’Keefe report, after being studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which General Collins was a member, would be referred to the Department of Defense and, thereafter, to the State Department. When the decision had been reached between these authorities and the President’s approval had been obtained, it would still be necessary to seek Congressional authorization for the implementation of the report. 23. The Ambassador recalled Prince Abdula’s statement that the Saudi Arabian Government considered the O’Keefe report recommendations an absolute minimum. Prince Abdula had stated the government desired even more than the O’Keefe report had recommended. This attitude might be said to be characteristic of all governments today in the world. In the United States, as rich as it is, there is great controversy of the amount of the military budget. No one was ever satisfied regardless of what the military budget might be. The great problem today is to fit the military budget to the financial means available to the country. If an intolerable burden were placed on a country’s economy it might be a means of hastening the forces of disintegration and preparing the way for Communism, against which all are seeking to guard themselves. 24. Mr. Childs observed that when Mr. McGhee had visited Riyadh, the week previous, he had taken great care to explain that military grants-in-aid could only be made by the United States to those countries not financially able to bear the cost of such aid. Saudi Arabia was financially solvent and had no external debt. It would be impossible to justify to Congress, under these circumstances, any request that the United States should bear the burden of military aid to Saudi Arabia. The United States was already faced with a budgetary deficiency of 5 billion dollars and every American was groaning under the burden of income taxes which he was forced to pay, not only to support the American military budget but for military aid to those countries not in a position to pay for it. It would be out of the question to expect the American taxpayer to assume the burden of military aid for Saudi Arabia which was in a thoroughly solvent financial position. The Ambassador stated he would ask General Collins to undertake any additional replies to Prince Abdula’s remarks. 25. General Collins stated that he fully supported the position of the Ambassador. He pointed out that it would be necessary in the United States to reduce the military budget one billion dollars for the fiscal year 1951 under that which was appropriated for fiscal year 1950 and that armies everywhere had to reduce military expenditures in order to prevent economic collapse. 26. General Collins then quickly reviewed the world strategic position as might be estimated by the Soviets. He pointed out that in the event of another major world war, the Soviet major effort would most likely be launched against the countries of Western Europe and England and that a subsidiary attack would probably be made via Iran or Turkey to seize the Cairo–Suez area. This latter attack might well by-pass Saudi Arabia entirely; however, any attack on Cairo would have to proceed through the Moslem countries, and if successful, would be a blow to the Moslem world. 27. General Collins went on to say quite frankly that, in his judgment neither the United States, nor its Navy, would be dependent upon Arabian oil in the event of war. He pointed out that it was likely that neither Russia nor the Western Powers would be able to obtain oil in any quantity from the Middle East. Russia would not be able to do so because of the lack of transportation and both the Western Powers and Russia would probably take steps to deny Middle East oil to the other by destroying through bombardment all the great refineries of the Middle East. 28. General Collins went on to say that, although the United States did not regard Saudi Arabia as being in the “front line”, nevertheless, its independence was of great concern to the United States. The United States would, from a strategic point of view, have to deliver its major military aid under the MDAP programs to the Western Powers and to the countries in the Middle East which were in immediate contact with Russia. He stated that, in his judgment, based on experience with the appropriations committees of the Congress, it would not be possible to obtain a grant-in-aid to Saudi Arabia for military supplies but that if Congress would approve a program it would be on a reimbursable basis. 29. After some further discussion and at the request of the Crown Prince, General Collins agreed to furnish a transcript of the entire discussions, including an outline of his proposals for consideration for the officials of the Saudi Arabian Government. This transcript is intended to serve this purpose. 30. It is particularly interesting to note that not once in the discussions outlined above was the subject of the renewal of the lease to Dhahran Air Base raised by any Saudi Arabians. They gave the impression that they accepted as a foregone conclusion the extension of U.S. base rights at Dhahran. (This paragraph should be omitted from any copy of the report forwarded to the Saudi Arabian Government. 7 ) 1 The source text was enclosed in a memorandum of April 19, by Lt. Col. Stanley It. Larsen, Aide to General Collins, to Francis E. Meloy, Jr., of NEA/ANE; not printed. Larsen asked that the Department of State forward it to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, and a copy was sent to Jidda on May 18. (786A.5/4–1950) On his March 20–April 8 Middle Eastern inspection trip, Collins went to Italy, Trieste, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, and Tripoli, as well as Saudi Arabia. This report and the attached Annex 6 were a portion of his overall report on the Middle East. For a memorandum of Collins’ conversation with President Inonu, dated March 26, see p. 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] . Annex 5 is printed on p. 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] . A copy of Collins’ complete report, attached to a memorandum for McGhee, is in Department of State file 780.5/4–1750. 2 Not found in Department of State files. 3 Handwritten notes on the source text, “deleted from enclosure,” indicate that paragraphs e and f were deleted from the copy forwarded to Jidda. 4 Paragraphs 4, 10, and 30 were deleted from the copy of the source text that was sent to Ambassador Childs for transmittal to King Saud, and the following paragraphs were renumbered. 5 Paragraphs 4, 10, and 30 were deleted from the copy of the source text that was sent to Ambassador Childs for transmittal to King Saud, and the following paragraphs were renumbered. 6 In the copy sent to Saudi Arabia, the latter part of this sentence read: “General Collins pointed out that he could not agree with some of the units recommended in the O’Keefe report.” 7 Paragraphs 4, 10, and 30 were deleted from the copy of the source text that was sent to Ambassador Childs for transmittal to King Saud, and the following paragraphs were renumbered. Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. Samuel Gorlitz and Wilfred Koplowitz of the Investment and Economic Development Staff 886A.10/4–1950 [Document 642] Memorandum of Conversation, by Messrs. Samuel Gorlitz and Wilfred Koplowitz of the Investment and Economic Development Staff confidential [ Washington ,] April 19, 1950. Subject: Saudi Arabian Eximbank Application for $16.4 million loan. Participants: Mr. Snodgrass—International Bechtel, Inc. ANE/E—Mr. Burns ANE/E—Mr. Strong ED—Mr. Gorlitz ED—Mr. Koplowitz The Eximbank is now considering the application from Saudi Arabia for a loan of $16,456,000. The credit is intended to finance 11 projects of a public works nature. (See attached list.) The application was made through a letter from the Saudi Arabian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Ambassador in Jidda and was forwarded to the Bank by the Department on March 24, 1950. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the U.S. confirmed the request in a letter to Mr. Gaston, Chairman of the Bank. Mr. Snodgrass has just returned from Saudi Arabia. He is a vice-president of International Bechtel, Inc., the American engineering concern which has been working for Aramco and the Saudi Government. The project presentation was prepared by Bechtel. Several of the 11 projects have already been begun under previous Bechtel contracts. This meeting followed a luncheon at which Mr. McGhee, Mr. Stinebower, Mr. Wilkins, Mr. Burns and Mr. Snodgrass were present. Mr. Snodgrass traced the origins of the present loan application admitting the hastiness of preparation. This seemed to have been dictated by the development of a Saudi Arabian financial crisis and the resulting shortage of building materials needed to continue going and planned operations. In the event that external aid would not be rapidly forthcoming, he said, a serious reduction in the Bechtel labor force would become necessary. After a discussion of the projects, the Department officers mentioned various factors likely to be considered by the Eximbank. 1. Regarding the problem of repayment, it was suggested that the Bank might request the assignment of future oil royalties to loan service. Mr. Snodgrass felt that the Saudi Arabian Government and Aramco might be reluctant to agree to such a condition. 2. On the subject of costs, two points were made: a ) since the present figures were such tentative estimates additional breakdown and accuracy would probably be requested, and b ) local currency costs have not been separated out of the total estimated costs. Therefore, it seems that the Eximbank is being asked to finance both foreign exchange and riyal components. Mr. Snodgrass was told that it is customary for the borrowing country to meet local costs from its own funds, and to provide details as to how it intends to do so. 3. The self-liquidating character of the projects was questioned since even the revenue-producing projects will not, for the most part, earn dollars directly. 4. The integration of the projects into the general development picture and their relationship to each other was discussed. Mr. Snodgrass stated that present plans were to complete the projects in about two years. The suggestion was made that Mr. Snodgrass be prepared to answer Eximbank inquiries as to why completion of all projects in two years was intended instead of the more usual procedure for underdeveloped countries of proceeding with a smaller work force more slowly, using the skills and income gained from each completed project on the next. 5. Since there has already been a substantial investment in several of the projects the comparatively small additional investment will result in important returns to the country in a comparatively short time. This point might be stressed, but it also opens the question of why the Saudi Government ran out of funds for projects underway. The loan of the Saudis to Syria is a partial explanation. 1 6. The problems of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia was introduced in a question concerning the status of the English Electric Company contract for the electrification of Jidda. Mr. Snodgrass stated that as far as he knows the terms of the contract involved only the purchase of equipment and that Bechtel was free to undertake the electrification of Jidda under the proposed loan. He indicated that wherever appropriate companies other than his own would be included in the project work. Mr. Snodgrass asked if there was any possibility of immediate action by the Eximbank for about $2 million to allow the procurement of the backlog of materials needed to maintain current operations. The Department officers did not consider that such action by the Bank would be likely. Comment: It appeared to the Department officers present that Mr. Snodgrass had not anticipated the Eximbank’s specific, technical requirements which were pointed out to him. He communicated to Mr. Gorlitz upon leaving the building his and the Saudi Government’s understanding that this application was to have been dealt with and expedited on a political basis. Mr. Gorlitz received a telephone call from Mr. Snodgrass on April 20, concerning a meeting of that date between Mr. Gaston and the Saudi Ambassador. It seems that as a result of questions from Mr. Gaston relating to Eximbank normal requirements the Ambassador left the interview extremely discouraged. He indicated, however, that he would not report to his Government until further discussions had been held with the Department and the Bank. 2 [Attachment] Project Estimated cost Jeddah 1. Pier, causeway, and marginal wharf $845,000 2. Hospital 2,189,000 3. Sewage system 1,900,000 4. Quarantine stations 950,000 5. Airport facilities 958,000 6. Shop facilities 258,000 7. Power plant and line to Mecca 5,750,000 8. Jeddah–Mecca road 766,000 Riyadh 9. Power plant extension 540,000 10. Airport facilities 1,300,000 Dammam 11. Free port area and transit warehouse  1,000,000 Total $16,456,000 1 See footnote 11, p. 1144 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 636 ] . 2 The Export-Import Bank approved a credit of $15 million for the Saudi Arabian Government on July 20. Further information is in the editorial note, p. 1181 [ Pg. 1181 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] . Memorandum by Mr. Frederick H. Await of the Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) 786A.11/4–3050 [Document 643] Memorandum by Mr. Frederick H. Await of the Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) 1 secret [ Riyadh ?,] April 30, 1950. Subject: Special Medical Mission for King Ibn Saud. The special medical mission sent to treat King Ibn Saud arrived on schedule at Riyadh at noon, April 18. The party was headed by Brigadier General Wallace H. Graham, USAF, personal physician to the President, and included Capt. Frank P. Kreuz, USN, orthopedist, Dr. Gilbert H. Marquardt of Northwestern University, specialist in internal medicine, Dr. Darrell C. Crain, Jr., arthritis specialist in Washington, D.C., Edward E. Stults, pfc, USA, x-ray technician, James D. Brown, HM2, laboratory technician, Ralph D. Rich, HM1, USN, physio-therapist technician, and Fred H. Await of the Department of State. Mr. Hey ward Hill, Counselor of Embassy at Jidda had come to Riyadh the day before to greet the party and make the proper introductions at Court. He was accompanied by an Embassy interpreter, Bakur A. Khomais. The party was accommodated at the new guest palace recently completed for the King of Afghanistan. 2 It was comfortably furnished and complete and private bathroom facilities were provided. Every room was equipped with ceiling fans. The dining room was large and furnished in western style. All food came from the Crown Prince’s palace where a large stock of American canned goods are kept. Every effort was made to prepare the food to our liking. Our initial reception by the King was at 4:00 p. m. and His Majesty was very patently glad to see us. He said he was deeply touched by the President’s gesture in sending him his own physician. He welcomed the whole group warmly and said that he would be at the entire disposition of the doctors. The King seemed considerably aged and enfeebled since my last visit to Riyadh in 1946 and his voice was very low and his words mumbled. He made to [ no ] attempt to rise upon our arrival or departure. His Majesty uses a wheel chair constantly when moving about, but the treatment given by the doctors relieved him a great deal from the stiffness and pain in his knees and reduced the swelling in his legs to almost normal. Before our departure on May 1st, he was able to move about with considerable ease and with his knees fully straightened. He was delighted with the progress made in improving his condition. The King has become increasingly senile and on a few occasions was pettish and even angry with his servants in our presence. Two incidents involved his doctors who, the mission is convinced, have done very well by His Majesty and could have done better had the latter accepted their recommendations and treatment. The mission overlooked no opportunity to commend the Court physicians to the King. Although the King’s doctors, Madhat Sheikh al Ard and Adib Tebni, may well have viewed the mission’s arrival with some misgivings at first, General Graham and his team worked closely with them from the outset and won them over to complete friendship and cooperation. Dr. Said Abdul Rahim Dabbagh, a very capable bacteriologist brought to Riyadh from Jerusalem by Dr. Madhat, was very helpful to the mission, although His Majesty objected to his attendance upon him. Friendly relations were also established with several other doctors in Riyadh, including Dr. Adib Hashim from Mecca, Dr. Frederick Waltherscheid, a Nazi refugee from the British, and Dr. Hans Mueller, a Nazi refugee from the US occupied zone of Germany. Although ministering to the King was the principal purpose of the mission, and daily and sometimes twice daily treatments were given, the doctors were in heavy demand by other members of the Royal Family and by high officials of the Court. Among these were the Emir Saudi bin Jiluwi of al Hasa, Fuad Bey Hamsa, King’s Councillor, Rushdi Bey, Chamberlain, the King’s favorite sister, Nura, Rashid Ali al Kilani, the refugee from Iraq and the British, a former wife of the Crown Prince, his three daughters, several princes, and Abdul Rahman Tubeshi, King’s Councillor. The mission was given every facility possible for carrying on its work and it received lavish and most cordial hospitality from the King and several of the princes. No effort was spared to make our stay comfortable and we had complete freedom of movement in and out of the palace and through the city, including the colorful market of the old walled area. It was noted with considerable interest that many of the old restrictions on music, games, toys, and other forms of non-religious pastime have been lifted in Saudi Arabia. The Crown Prince has a soccer field laid out at one of his palaces and games are played on Friday afternoons. Many of the younger princes participate and on Friday, April 25, the American visitors and the Bechtel men were invited by the Crown Prince to play baseball at his Nasiriya Palace, followed by a challenge soccer match with the local Saudi team. The latter played in regulation shorts and skivvy shirts and performed very well indeed, beating the Americans 6–0. HRH the Crown Prince was an interested and even active spectator, along with a considerable entourage. On a brief visit to Jidda several football fields were seen and games there attract very sizable crowds. Some inter-city games are played. In addition to football, at least two of the Princes, Emir Saud and Emir Tallal, also have facilities for swimming, tennis, badminton, and other outdoor sports. It is recalled that some six years ago, several Arabs who were playing with a homemade rag ball in Jidda were imprisoned, and the Bechtel personnel in Riyadh report that up to a year ago police would smash any phonographs or toys they came upon. Sports and other forms of entertainment are, therefore, a recent innovation in Saudi Arabia, but the speed with which they have taken hold of popular interest is amazing. Most of the credit for this change in Saudi Arabian life is undoubtedly due directly to the Crown Prince. An old friend from Jidda, Izzedine Bey Shawa, and formerly of Palestine, was in attendance on His Majesty. When it was possible to have a word with him, he told me that he had returned to Saudi Arabia for an assignment in the Government service. I asked if he knew what it was to be, and he stated that he was to be the deputy administrator of a new political unit which would embrace the Tapline area in the northern part of al Hasa and al Nejd Provinces. He added that a Suadairi family leader would be the top authority. I asked when the new administration would go into effect and he replied that he hoped it would be in two or three weeks. Muzahim Bey Bajahji, former premier of Iraq, arrived in Riyadh on Saturday, April 22, and was lodged in the new guest palace with the medical mission. The purpose of his visit was not ascertained. It was noted, however, that Rashid Ali, the Iraqi rebel who threw in with the Nazis in an abortive putsch in Iraq during the war, abruptly ceased to put in any appearance. He had been coming to the guest palace for treatment of a heart condition, but he failed to keep appointments after Muzahim Bey arrived. He likewise ceased to attend Court or receptions given by various princes during the period of Muzahim Bey’s visit, although he had been regularly present at such functions previously. Muzahim Bey departed Wednesday, April 26 and Rashid Ali was observed to have resumed his Court appearances at a reception April 28 given by the Crown Prince. By way of conjecture, it is suggested that Muzahim Bey, having fallen from power in Iraq, may have endeavored to take a cue from Syria and come to Saudi Arabia to seek a loan with the promise of opposing any union of Iraq and Syria. An unusual entertainment was offered us by the Crown Prince on April 28. He invited us to his usual Friday evening reception and informed us that a special program by the young princes of the royal household would be offered. Shortly after our arrival at the palace a lavish high tea was served. Following that we were invited to attend a program out of doors which had obviously been prepared for the occasion of our visit. The program was very long and consisted primarily of short speeches of eulogy to King, Crown Prince, country, and the flag, but it was particularly notable for several skits and group singing of the national anthem (twice) and of a pledge to the flag. Many of the speeches delivered by the young princes were given in English, a remarkable accomplishment in view of the fact that they had been studying the language only four months. About forty princes participated, ranging in age from 4 to 15 years. The program was an impressive accomplishment in itself, but it was remarkable also for the fact that this was the first time, according to the Crown Prince, that plays of a nonreligious or comic character had ever been given in Saudi Arabia. One skit had obvious political implication of great current importance in Saudi Arabia, although it was superficially attributed to Yemen. The King of Yemen, an elderly and infirm old man, was carried in to his throne where he called all his sons about him. Each was asked to discuss an aspect of life that was important to him—love of country, obedience, respect for motherhood, food, etc. After hearing from each, he expressed his thanks to God for such fine sons, and then said he was an old man who had ruled his country 40 years and it was burdensome to him. He forthwith announced his abdication in favor of his eldest son. The implication was very clear and it was notable that the old king, supposedly of Yemen, did not wear the Imami headdress, but the red qutra and gold agal of Ibn Saud, who has ruled 50 years. The skit was suitably applauded by the audience which included over one hundred Arabs as well as ourselves and a few American employees of Bechtel Inc. The Emir Feisal had remained only for the opening part of the program, but his withdrawal was believed to have been prompted by the chill and damp of the evening. It was interesting to note that the Emir Saud did not recognize the Saudi national anthem when it was first played and Rashid Ali, sitting near him told him what it was. Neither he nor any of the audience stood during either rendition of the anthem. The omission, however, was not indicative of any disrespect, but was undoubtedly merely ignorance of its national significance. It was a creation of the US Marine Band for the occasion of the Crown Prince’s visit to the United States in 1947 and has since been officially adopted for international ceremonial purposes, but it has not yet become familiar in Saudi Arabia where music and musical instruments were until very recently considered offensive. There may have also been some significance in the repeated cheers by the young princes for the health and long life of the Crown Prince. Similar cheers were given for the Crown Prince and King, but on several occasions cheers were given only for the Prince. At the close of the program HRH made a point of requesting that the doctors not speak of the entertainment to the King when they were attending him. 1 Childs transmitted the memorandum to the Department as an (enclosure to despatch 232, April 30, from Jidda, not printed (786A.11/4–3050). 2 The King of Afghanistan had been in Saudi Arabia March 15–20. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Consulate General at Dhahran 886A.413/5–750: Telegram [Document 644] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Consulate General at Dhahran 1 confidential Jidda , May 7, 1950—10 a. m. 124. Re Embtel 266 May 6. 2 FonOff asked me meet Prince Feisal late yesterday for further exchange views re extremely delicate question religious services Dhahran. I had one and half hour talk with Feisal whose statements and conciliatory attitude impressed me greatly as indicating SAG as deeply desirous as we to find some satisfactory formula which would enable matter to be kept within bounds. Briefly Feisal stated: Saudi Arabia as Holy Land Islam made situation here different than other Arab countries and made it essential King have regard not only for extremely strong feeling existing interior re protection character this Holy Land but also possible criticism from abroad by other Arab or Moslem states. Prohibition existed against holding any public religious services by any other than four orthodox Sunni sects and this prohibition extended not only to Christian religion but even to Shia Moslem rites as well. King under very great pressure in this respect and Feisal did not believe we realized extent feeling in many parts kingdom. His Majesty was already proceeding much too far in his accommodation Americans. But for great personal prestige of His Majesty, Saudi Arabia would never have been able to go as far as it has in way innovation. I repeated many arguments I had already used. I stated FonOff had informed me that morning Christian religious leaders not permitted in Saudi Arabia. I knew for fact SAG had invited members Dutch Reformed Mission Bahrein to Saudi Arabia as doctors who had same holy character as Sloan and furthermore assignment chaplains at airbase no new development. I repeated neither I nor General O’Keefe nor USAF could accept deprivation by USAF personnel spiritual counsellors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I replied I regretted not having had any comment so far from General O’Keefe but I could state frankly I had recommended assemblies cease at Guidance Center and prayer services be transferred to more private premises. I could also state Sloan would be transferred but I emphasized this would not necessarily be tomorrow and SAG must give us time both to avoid any possibility appearance his transfer at instigation SAG and in order to effect his replacement. Feisal stated he could assure me SAG would raise no objections holding private services in private premises not as conspicuously identified as place of worship. Although I had stated Guidance Center not a church, Saudis did not know what a church was and accordingly had come to identify Guidance Center as a church. … In light of all facts it is very evident desire of SAG to find accommodation us which will not make difficult His Majesty’s position with religious leaders. It is my considered judgment foregoing represents most satisfactory solution this very difficult question which has troubled me more than any problem I have had in Saudi Arabia since Palestine partition. I wish emphasize Sloan’s transfer would not be made at suggestion SAG as Feisal assured me there was no suggestion whatsoever of his expulsion. It is my view his transfer would contribute much to relieve situation and it was on this account I proposed it although no immediate urgency. In face extremely explosive elements confronting King I believe SAG has displayed considerable good will and appreciation our own position in closing its eyes to question religious services Dhahran until we by our own imprudence and excessive zeal forced SAG raise issue. I strongly feel we should take measures now proposed which represent real concessions on part SAG even though some concessions on our part but which when balanced with need protecting King’s position, conform with our own interests. It was agreed interim reply would be made to King while awaiting comments from O’Keefe. 3 Childs 1 This telegram was repeated to the Department of State as 268, here used as the source text. 2 Not printed. Childs recommended transferring religious services from the Guidance Center to some other building on the Dhahran Airfield to which Saudi Arabians would not have access and replacing Sloan with an officer who would exercise as much discretion as the Catholic chaplain. (886A.413/5–650) 3 In telegram 82, May 9, from Dhahran to the Department of State, O’Keefe sent a message that he would convert the Guidance Center to a base library, hold worship services in the base theater, and request the transfer of Sloan (886A.413/5–950). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 786A.5–MAP/5–1050: Telegram [Document 645] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia top secret Washington , May 10, 1950—5 p. m. 164. Deptel 48 Mar 11 1 and Embtel 250 May 3. 2 1) FYI only State informed by Defense JCS consider, on basis continuing US interests in security of SA, negots to obtain extension DAB agreement and certain additional rights shld be pursued as matter of urgency. 2) JCS have further agreed in principle to provision of mil assistance to SA on reimbursable basis and are according priority to study of extent of proposed assistance. 3) Re assistance on token or temporary basis pending congressional action, JCS have determined 5,000 M–1 rifles and 5,000,000 rounds ammunition cld be made available to SA without seriously affecting mobilization capability US services. 3 4) Defense has made it clear, however, availability dependent on a ) determination that as last resort evidence of US interest is required in connection with negots for extension DAB agreement; b ) definite indication favorable action is obtained from congressional leaders as to proposed reimbursable aid program for SA. 5) Dept does not believe that determination under 4) a ) cld be justified since it now appears short-term extension may be obtained without token shipment. Re 4) b ), in advance presentation leg to Congress, Dept considers inadvisable to request commitment and in any event unlikely congressional leaders wld be willing give such assurance. 6) MDAP 1950–51 draft leg submitted to Budget May 1. Presidential submission leg to Congress sched May 24. 7) On basis recent developments in SA (McGhee and Collins conversations with SAG) and in US (question arms shipments to NE and fact Congress has not yet taken up MDAP leg) Dept considers it advisable to confine your approach to SAG to request for extension present DAB agreement for some period no later than Mar 1, 1951 by exchange of ltrs with intention on our part opening negots soonest when circumstances permit. 8) For purpose facilitating exchange you may if necessary indicate Dept wld be willing in so far as it can be to assist SAG in commercial procurement of such interim supplies as are available in open market. It shld be added however that except for urgent items SAG wld undoubtedly consider it desirable to await final Defense and JCS recommendations re O’Keefe report before initiating procurement program. 4 9) In view foregoing Dept does not believe State–Defense negotiating team will be necessary at time of exchange of ltrs but will be required at later stage when USG is in position to commence discussions re long-term agreement. 10) Dept wld, however, like ur views before making foregoing approach. Webb 1 Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] . 2 Not printed; it stated that if the Department of State preferred extension of the Dhahran Airbase Agreement to March 1 instead of January 1, it could probably be arranged (786A.5/5–350). 3 See footnote 3, p. 1130 [ Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 635 ] . 4 Department of State telegram 173, May 18, to Jidda, not printed, authorized Childs to use the information in paragraphs 7 and 8 when approaching the Saudi Arabian Government, and also to explain to them that the information in paragraph 6 was “required procedure in US for obtaining necessary legislative authority from Cong to provide USG procurement assistance on reimbursable basis.” (786A.5–MAP/5–1850) The American Embassy to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office 986A.524/5–2250 [Document 646] The American Embassy to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office 1 top secret Aide-Mémoire The American Ambassador stated he was authorized by his Government, in making a request for the temporary extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, to explain that despite every effort on the part of the United States Government to be prepared to discuss the Military Aid Program to Saudi Arabia coincident with the opening of new negotiations for a long-term Dhahran Airfield Agreement it had not been possible to arrive at that objective prior to the date of expiration of the existing airfield agreement. The Ambassador stated that a draft military aid program for 1950–51 had been submitted to the Bureau of the Budget on May 1 and that it was expected that the President would submit within the next few days such legislation to the Congress. This procedure is the required one in the United States for obtaining necessary legislative authority from the Congress to provide United States Government procurement assistance on a reimbursable basis. The Ambassador recalled that in the light of statements made on the occasion of the recent visits to Saudi Arabia of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and General J. Lawton Collins, regarding military aid, and in the light of the fact that the Congress has not yet had an opportunity to consider the new military aid program legislation, the Department of State is of the opinion that the best means of meeting these circumstances is by a request for a temporary extension of the present Dhahran Airfield Agreement by an exchange of letters 2 with the expression of an intention on the part of the United States Government to open negotiations for a more inclusive agreement as soon as circumstances may permit. The Ambassador stated that he had been authorized to indicate the Department of State would be willing insofar as it can to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the commercial procurement of such interim supplies as are available in the open market. He has been requested to point out however, that except for urgent items the Saudi Arabian Government would undoubtedly consider it desirable to await the final Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations regarding the O’Keefe Report before initiating a procurement program. In that connection the Ambassador said he had been authorized to inform the Saudi Arabian Government that consideration of the O’Keefe Report actively continues by the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, the Ambassador stated that his Government wished to assure the Saudi Arabian Government that when the necessary legislation has been enacted containing the necessary authorization to extend reimbursable aid and when the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff’s recommendations on the basis of the O’Keefe Report are known, His Majesty will be consulted in advance of the definitive formulation of plans in the above regard by the United States Government. Jidda , May 22, 1950. 1 Childs delivered the aide-mémoire , together with a note making a formal request for the extension of Dhahran Airfield Agreement to February 1, 1951, to Yassin at the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office. He transmitted the aide-mémoire and note to the Department in despatch 300, May 22, from Jidda. (986A.524/5–2250) 2 An answer from the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office, dated June 17, agreed to extend the Agreement until the following February. The original Saudi Arabian note, a translation, and an affidavit verifying the translation were transmitted to the Department of State as enclosures to despatch 368, June 21, from Jidda, none printed. (986A.524/6–2150) The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 786.56/5–2550: Telegram [Document 647] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State top secret Jidda , May 25, 1950—11 a. m. 321. Embtel 320, May 25. 1 HM requested I have another private audience with him in afternoon. Before audience I informed Shaikh Yusuf I did not intend to bring up DAB agreement unless Yusuf considered it advisable. He agreed we could settle question together after obtaining King’s authority do so. During audience however, I thought it advisable to give HM briefly status MAP program as set forth in Jidda in my conversations with Yusuf when justifying request for extension to February 1, 1951. At conclusion HM stated very warmly we might have extension and did not ask me any questions but appeared completely satisfied with explanation I had given. Later Yusuf said he would examine file and as soon as he had brought himself up to date he would take necessary action by way of formal acknowledgement my letter requesting extension. Repeated info Dhahran 145. Childs 1 Not printed; it reported a visit by Childs and the British Ambassador to Riyadh on May 24 to inform the King of a tripartite declaration by the United States, British, and French Governments concerning security in the Near East The two Ambassadors met separately with the King in the afternoon to present the declaration. He “appeared visibly pleased” and emphasized to Childs that “SA’s great interest was to combat Communism and to take measures with US to that end.” (786.56/5–2550) The Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East was issued after a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France in London in May 1950. For documentation on the meetings and the Declaration, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. A copy of the Declaration was published in the Department of State Bulletin , June 5, 1950, p. 886. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State 886A.10/6–2650: Despatch [Document 648] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Childs ) to the Secretary of State top secret No. 375 Jidda , June 26, 1950. Ref: Embassy’s telegram no. 378, June 26, 1950. 1 Subject: Conversation with Abdullah Effendi regarding financial and political situation. In the course of my very extended conversation with Abdullah Effendi, private secretary of Crown Prince Saud, he stated that the Crown Prince had asked him to inquire of me what I thought that the general financial situation, particularly in view of His Majesty’s refusal to approve the budget as submitted by Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, minister of Finance, and Najib Bey Salha, Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance. I told Abdullah Effendi he might tell His Royal Highness I was very deeply disturbed about the financial situation and that he might recall I had informed His Majesty when I discussed the subject with him that while the Saud dynasty was at the present time secure, the time might come when, if the present situation were allowed to continue, no one could prophesy what might happen. I added to Abdullah that I was even more concerned at the present time than I was when I had discussed the situation with the King. Abdullah stated he was also and that he had discussed the situation repeatedly with the Crown Prince. He had urged upon the Crown Prince his responsibility in the matter and the necessity for him to press the need of reforms to the King. The Crown Prince had stated he feared the anger and displeasure of His Majesty and that the King might even go so far as to pass him over in favor of one of his other sons. Abdullah had remarked that, knowing the King’s character, he would probably admire the Crown Prince’s action and take it as indicating that he was following in his father’s footsteps. Abdullah said that the truth was that the King did not in fact have too high an opinion of the Crown Prince and he did not enjoy the cooperation of his brothers. There was certainly a gathering discontent in the country. He thought that the Crown Prince should go to Prince Faisal and Prince Mansour and persuade them to accompany him to the King to press upon the King the need for thoroughgoing financial and other reforms. Even if the Crown Prince’s brothers refused to act he should take it upon himself to do so as it was definitely his responsibility. Abdullah asked what I thought. I said it was hardly appropriate for me as Ambassador to make any comment but personally and in view of the deep interest I had in Saudi Arabia and the Saud family I thought his advice could not have been sounder. History was full of examples of disaster attending those who let matters drift until the situation had become so aggravated that it was incapable of normal and orderly correction. If I were the Crown Prince I would not hesitate. I would first of all endeavor to enlist the cooperation of my brothers in proposing a voluntary cut in budgetary allocations. I would then go to the King and represent the need of drastic reforms and indicate the disinterestedness of those proposing them by the voluntary offer to accept a substantial reduction in present allocations from the budget. Abdullah said that he would inform the Crown Prince of his extremely interesting conversation with me and urged that I come to Taif and speak to the Crown Prince myself in the same sense. I said I was prepared to come to Taif but I thought it extremely unwise, for any rumors to be given currency that I was putting my head together too closely with Prince Saud. A diplomat was no diplomat who figured either prominently in the news or whose name was the subject of conversation. I thought my best contact with His Royal Highness was through Abdullah Effendi himself. I was not going on leave until July 21 and by that time His Royal Highness would be coming to Jidda on his return to Riyadh and I would be able to see him then much less conspicuously than if I went to Taif. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J. Rives Childs 1 Not printed; it reported a conversation between Childs and Abdullah about Saudi Arabian relations with the British (786.00/6–2650). Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp) 886A.10/6–3050 [Document 649] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Thorp ) confidential Washington , June 30, 1950. This Bureau was considerably disturbed by the failure of the Board of the Export-Import Bank to take action on the application of Saudi Arabia at the meeting held on June 29, 1950. This application has been pending since February 27, 1950; it has been thoroughly examined and discussed by the Staff and Board of the Bank; and the unequivocal support of the Department has been conveyed to the Bank by Assistant Secretary McGhee at the Board meeting held on April 26, 1950. The delay appears to be explained largely by the pressure of other business, but in view of the high priority assigned to the Saudi Arabian request by the Department, and in view of the favorable report on it submitted by the Bank’s Staff, doubts could be expressed as to whether this explanation meets the test of the Bank’s and the Department’s responsibility. The leisurely processing of the Saudi Arabian application is a source of increasing embarrassment to the Department. It is not necessary to recount to you the critical elements of the situation which are shaping up in Saudi Arabia, including the financial and budgetary crisis, the prospects of less favorable oil royalty arrangements, and reported unrest and anxiety within the Kingdom. These complications underline the urgency of prompt action on the pending application, since public knowledge of substantial U.S. support of Saudi Arabia through an Eximbank loan will tend to allay the fears of insecurity, which, if not checked, could lead to damaging instability in that country. If I am correctly informed, the only remaining significant obstacle to favorable action on the loan is the delay of the NAC Secretariat to acknowledge receipt of the Bank’s letter providing information on the application, since NAC review or formal consideration was not contemplated. NEA assumes that formal approval by NAC is not necessary since according to the proposed terms of the loan contract with Saudi Arabia the Bank’s security will be more than adequately covered by the earmarking of future oil royalties accruing to the Kingdom. In NEA’s view the above brief adds up to compelling evidence that the Department should intervene in such a manner as in your discretion would quickly remove the last obstacles which are blocking final approval of the Saudi Arabian request. Therefore, NEA respectfully requests that you, as the Alternate Member to the Secretary of State, both as respects the National Advisory Council and the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, take such steps which will be calculated to accomplish the objective described. 1 1 For information on final approval of the loan on July 20, see editorial note, infra . Editorial Note [Document 650] Editorial Note On July 26, 1950, the President signed Public Law 621, “An Act to Amend the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.” Congress had amended Section 408 ( e ) of the 1949 act to allow the President to transfer military equipment, materials, or services, at no cost to the United States, to other countries whose defense was important to the security of the United States. The section of the act relevant to Saudi Arabia’s request for military equipment authorized transfers to a country not eligible to join with the United States in a collective defense and regional arrangement, but whose ability to defend itself or to participate in the defense of the area of which it was a part was considered important to the security of the United States. Prior to receiving any equipment or services, the recipient country was required to sign a contract to assure the United States against any loss on the transfer. (64 Stat. 373) Representatives of the Department of State met with Defense Department officials on three different occasions (August 18, September 12, and September 18) to discuss provisions the Defense Department wanted included in a proposed long-term Dhahran Airbase agreement and ways to implement cash reimbursable assistance for Saudi Arabia. Memoranda of those conversations are in Department of State files 711.56386A/8–1850, 786A.5/9–1250, and 786A.5/9–1850, respectively. A declaration that Saudi Arabia was eligible under the amended Mutual Defense Assistance Act was necessary before it could obtain military aid from the United States on a reimbursable basis. On September 16, 1950, John O. Bell, the Acting Deputy Director for Mutual Defense Assistance, asked for the opinion of the Defense Department on Saudi Arabia’s eligibility for aid. In a memorandum, dated September 27, Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer replied that Saudi Arabia was eligible because it was clear that the ability of Saudi Arabia to defend itself was important to the security of the United States. Documentation is in Department of State file 786A.5. Editorial Note [Document 651] Editorial Note A memorandum from Wilfred Malenbaum, Investment and Economic Development Staff, to John E. O’Gara, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, dated April 25, not printed, reported the Export-Import Bank would review its policy on the extension of credits to Saudi Arabia on April 26. He recommended that the Department press the Bank to approve as many of the proposed projects as practicable, since it was the opinion of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs that disapproval of all or a large part of the Saudi Arabian application would have a deleterious effect on United States relations with Saudi Arabia. (103–XMB/4–2550) The Saudi Arabian application was considered by the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank on April 26, June 22, June 29, July 6, and July 13, but a decision was deferred, pending action by the National Advisory Council. A memorandum by Jerome J. Stenger, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Investment and Economic Development Staff, to Leroy Stinebower, dated July 18, not printed, reported that the National Advisory Council staff committee had approved Export-Import Bank consideration of the Saudi Arabian application. The National Advisory Council advised the Export-Import Bank on July 21 that, through a telephone poll completed that day, it unanimously approved consideration by the Bank of applications by Saudi Arabia for credits up to $15 million to finance specific projects which the Bank found economically sound. On July 20 the Export-Import Bank approved a credit of $15 million for the Saudi Arabian Government. Information on the loan is in Department of State files 103–XMB and NAC Files, Lot 60D137, a master file of the documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs (Awalt) 886A.10/7–2850 [Document 652] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs ( Awalt ) confidential [ Washington ,] July 28, 1950. Subject: Export-Import Bank Loan to Saudi Arabia. Problem: Although the Bank approved a loan of $15,000,000 for Saudi Arabia on July 20th, several details are still in a state of negotiation before it can be signed. Action Required: None. Summary: Mr. Snodgrass called this afternoon to brief me on the progress of the loan agreement. Mr. Snodgrass, in his conversations with the Bank and the Saudi Arabian Ambassador, 1 is acting in his official capacity as adviser to the Saudi Arabian Embassy for the purpose of obtaining the Export-Import Bank loan. He stated that there are now three points at issue. The first involves evasion of the term “interest” which is unacceptable owing to religious considerations. The expression “service charge” had been regarded as satisfactory, but the Ambassador expressed his preference yesterday for “handling commission”. He is rather insistent on that terminology, Mr. Snodgrass reported, while the Bank prefers to keep the expression “service charge”. It is a minor point and should present no real difficulty. The second point is the grace period before repayment of the loan is to begin. The Ambassador asked for five years, the Bank offered three. There is no period generally applied to loans, but each is decided on its merits. The Ambassador believes Saudi Arabia should have treatment equal to the best accorded any other State. The Bank has now offered four and a half years with repayment to be in twenty-two equal semiannual installments. It should be possible to resolve this difference without too much delay. The third issue is an important one. The basic form of the Export-Import Bank contract requires the contracting firm on a project to be jointly responsible with the borrowing Government for proper expenditure of the funds extended by the Bank. Mr. Snodgrass, in view of Bechtel’s poor experience with the Saudi Arabian Government on financial matters, has suggested the money be paid into a Bechtel account for the Saudi Arabian Government, in order to obviate dependence upon the Saudi Arabian Government for drawing on the funds. The Ambassador is adamant that the credits should be extended to the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Finance who will disburse them as needed. I told Mr. Snodgrass that I could appreciate the motives of both sides on this issue, but felt it would be impossible for the Saudi Arabian Government to give way. I asked if it would be possible to open a joint account requiring signatures from both parties for drawing on it. He agreed that that might be a workable compromise. Mr. Snodgrass also stated that Sheikh Asad did not want to be responsible for the proceeds of the loan in any way and was suggesting to his Government that a special officer from the Ministry of Finance should be attached to his Embassy to be signing officer for all expenditures under the loan. 1 Asad Al-Faqih, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States. Editorial Note [Document 653] Editorial Note On August 11, 1950, in a letter to the Secretary of State, not printed, the Secretary of Defense transmitted the proposed military assistance program of the Department of Defense for Saudi Arabia. He reported the Joint Chiefs of Staff had scaled down the program proposed in the O’Keefe Report because the high cost would be likely to have an adverse effect on the Saudi Arabian economy and because the time required to train Saudi Arabian personnel to handle the equipment might lead to deterioration of valuable equipment before it could be effectively utilized. He added, however, that “in view of the importance of securing long-term rights at Dhahran Air Base, it is believed that the program recommended herein should be modified upward if such action is essential to accomplish this.” The program recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for an expenditure of $75,765,648 by Saudi Arabia to equip a military force consisting of 18,085 officers and men in the army, 108 in the air force, and 265 in the navy. (786A.5/8–1150) Colonel R. D. Wentworth, U.S.A.F., Department of Defense liaison officer with the Department of State on the negotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, sent a summary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations to Ambassador-designate Hare in a memorandum, not printed, on September 28. (786A.5/9–2850) The Chargé in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State 786A.00/9–350: Telegram [Document 654] The Chargé in Saudi Arabia ( Hill ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Jidda , September 3, 1950—4 p. m. 127. Immediately preceding Embtel 126 1 is factual report Riyadh visit and was repeated Dhahran. Following observations made to Department only; I consider it most unfortunate that subject of military aid for SA was brought up at this time. This is practically the keystone our present relations with SA and is vitally connected future negotiations long term DAF agreement. This subject is top level importance and should if possible be handled only by chief of mission after carefully conceived plan of action. It is elementarily obvious that O’Keefe could not call on King and discuss subject described without immediately reopening delicate question of military aid and this is exactly what happened. I am surprised that matter of this importance and potential reactions was not fully discussed by USAF with Department and mutually cleared and Department’s instructions issued before we acted. 2 Furthermore I fail see what was the necessity our having audience with King. Fuel tank proposition was discussed in Riyadh by Ambassador Childs with YY 3 when he making good-bye visit and YY indicated there probably would be no difficulty and Ambassador so informed O’Keefe. The activities US soldiers is within terms DAF agreement article 16 and simple notification would have sufficed if even that was deemed necessary. Likewise bomb storage proposal is logical move these days and would have surprised no one. It could have been taken up casually by Foreign Office note and without fanfare. Although this subject started with Top Secret classification it is now known to usual Palace group including interpreters. Only encouraging feature during audience was that King maintained friendly attitude throughout never losing temper or speaking harshly. Even when making some of his strongest statements he looked at me and spoke smilingly as if seeking assurance his remarks being understood and not rousing fears. This created instinctive impression that despite his disappointment that USG has so far failed to meet his requests he realizes he has at present no better alternative than to go along with US. Neverthless I wish to assure Department that the much worn theme of the “O’Keefe report still being studied in Washington” is rapidly becoming unpleasant to Saudi ears and they beginning consider it as delaying tactics and double talk on our part. New subject: towards end of audience King said that Aramco also not cooperating with him completely and that he does not believe anything they say. He said even on purchases made for him they charge him “ten times as much as cost.” I replied that if His Majesty would permit me to say so in my opinion Aramco had pursued a very honorable and honest course with SA. Further details by despatch. Hill 1 Not printed; it reported a visit by Hill and O’Keefe to Riyadh on September 2, during which O’Keefe requested permission for the U.S. Air Force to store 5,000 tons of ordinary bombs at Dhahran Airfield, set up a rifle range and bring in more small arms, and construct an underground fuel tank. His request brought immediate complaints from the King and Yassin that the United States was only interested in protecting the Dhahran Airfield and Saudi Arabian oil wells. They then repeated their requests for American arms. (786A.00/9–350) 2 Telegram 76, August 29, from Washington, answering a query from Jidda, had informed the Embassy that O’Keefe’s request for an audience with the King was “presumably on subject creation bomb dump DAB.” (786A.56/8–2950) 3 Yusuf Yassin, Acting Foreign Minister. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 786A.56/9–350: Telegram [Document 655] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia top secret Washington , September 12, 1950—11 p. m. 90. Embtels 126 1 and 127, Sep 3. 2 Defense and Dept understood O’Keefe planned to raise single subject of creation bomb dump DAB (Deptel 76, Aug 29 3 ). In view Embdesp 29, Jul 20, 4 it was thought King might welcome measure. It might also be assumed training activities and fuel tank wld be similarly considered by SAG. Dept believes it might be useful 1) to recall Collins’ 5 and McGhee’s 6 conversations earlier this year, which were followed by temporary DAB extension to Feb 1, 1951, and 2) to emphasize that USG now has question cash reimbursable mil assist under serious consideration. 7 At same time, Dept appreciates depth of SAG feeling re this question but believes SAG may not fully realize numerous steps required within USG before it may be in position definitively to negotiate with SAG. In view remarks by King and Sheikh Yusuf reported Deptel [ Embtel ] 126, Sep 3, Dept considers you shld take early opportunity to hint to SAG that 1) since signature MDAP legislation by Pres Jul 26, real progress has been made by Defense and State on plan for reimbursable mil assist and 2) Amb Hare hopes following his arrival SA 8 to commence discussions on this subject as well as DAB. You shld not, however, commit USG or Amb Hare in any way. FYI, JCS recommendations have been reed. USAF now preparing draft DAB agreement. Dept now seeking designation SA as eligible under MDAP legislation (Public Law 621) for cash reimbursable mil assist. Webb 1 Not printed, but see footnote 1, supra . 2 Supra . 3 Not printed, but see footnote 2, supra . 4 Not printed; it reported a meeting in which the King asked if Dhahran Airfield had sufficient military equipment to defend itself (786A.5/7–2050). 5 For an account of Collins’ visit, see excerpt of his report, p. 1158 [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] . 6 For an account of McGhee’s visit, see p. 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] . 7 For information on cash reimbursable military assistance, see editorial note, p. 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] . 8 J. Rives Childs, United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Minister to Yemen since 1946, submitted his resignation from those posts on July 7, 1950. He left Jidda on July 21 for leave in Europe before returning to the United States, and Heyward G. Hill assumed charge of the Embassy until the arrival of the new Ambassador. President Truman approved Childs’ resignation on August 1. An announcement is in the Department of State Bulletin , September 25, 1950, p. 516. On August 28, 1950, the White House publicly announced the appointment of Raymond A. Hare as the new Ambassador. Hare arrived in Jidda on October 19 and presented his credentials at the court in Riyadh on October 24. Counselor of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia (Hill) to the Secretary of State 786A.00/9–1950: Telegram [Document 656] Counselor of the Embassy in Saudi Arabia ( Hill ) to the Secretary of State secret Jidda , September 19, 1950—8 p. m. 160. Prince Feisal came to Jidda this afternoon from Mecca and shortly afterwards Foreign Office called to say he wanted me come see him at 4:30. Meeting was at Foreign Office, with Prince Mansour and Tahir Bey in attendance. Feisal said that reason he sent for me was because after our conversations Riyadh September 2, 1 His Majesty had formulated his reply and not wishing to send it by telegram or to call me back to Riyadh to receive it, His Majesty had instructed him to communicate it to me personally, in view its confidential nature. Feisal explained he been unable come to Jidda sooner because of illness, and had arrived in Mecca from Haifa only last night. Said he came Jidda for this purpose and would return Mecca immediately after our talk and Prince Saud giving big reception there tonight for pilgrim leaders. He added that in order not to delay work at airfield he had already informed O’Keefe personally of the message. Prince Feisal then read message and handed me copy, translation of which follows: [Here follows the message, net printed, expressing the King’s desire to base his Government’s action regarding defense of the Dhahran Airfield on the overall defense needs of Saudi Arabia.] This seemed auspicious occasion to convey thoughts Deptel 90, September 12. 2 I stated Department had informed me that President Truman had signed MDAP legislation on July 26 and that defense progress had been made since then on plans for granting reimbursable military assistance to Saudi Arabia. Feisal interrupted to say that instead of “reimbursable military assistance to Saudi Arabia” we should say “military equipment sold to Saudi Arabia”. When he said this, Prince Mansour, who is usually immobile and expressionless, shrugged his shoulders and made a discouraged gesture. I continued by saying that Ambassdor Hare hopes shortly after his arrival to begin discussions on this subject and also on DAF. I made no commitments of any sort nor were any requested. In spite of fact that Ambassador Childs repeatedly made it clear to SAG that military aid would have to be reimbursable (Embdesp 197, June 14 3 ) it is obvious that this thought is extremely distasteful to them and that they personally feel they are entitled to some free military assistance in form of arms. It would appear likely that these sentiments may cause a major obstacle in negotiations long term DAF agreement as I believe their pride also deeply concerned here and perhaps more important to them than monetary considerations. No doubt Department already giving serious consideration all such factors in connection with plans for long term agreement. I did not inquire of Mansour anything about munitions factory development (Embtel 159, September 19 4 ) as he did not raise subject and because I was not in position offer any proposal in lieu thereof had he broached such inquiry in reply. Repeated info Dhahran 81. Hill 1 See telegram 127, September 3, p. 1185 [ Pg. 1185 includes portions of Doc. 653 and Doc. 654 ] . 2 Supra . 3 The reference appears to be an error. The message cited cannot be further identified. 4 Not printed. Hill reported that Najib Salha told him Prince Mansour was negotiating with two French officers about SAG plans to set up a munitions factory to produce both rifle cartridges and small shells. Najib said Mansour had decided the Saudi Arabian Government could wait no longer for military assistance from the United States. (7860A.00/9–1950). Memorandum by Mr. Robert Thayer of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Ambassador-Designate to Saudi Arabia (Hare) 986A.524/9–1950 [Document 657] Memorandum by Mr. Robert Thayer of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs to the Ambassador-Designate to Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) secret [ Washington ,] September 19, 1950. Dhahran Airbase is for the most part a civil airport. As you know, it is used extensively by civil aircraft in transit on routes between the Near East and South Asia. The field is located on the normal great circle route between points in the Near East such as Cairo and points in Pakistan and India. It has never been clear to me whether the desire of the USAF to retain control over the operation of the field is necessitated by the fact that the Saudis are technically and financially incapable of operating it themselves or whether USAF operational control is made necessary by virtue of the possibility of having to mount combat air operations from the base. If the latter, I would expect that in the event of an emergency, civil aircraft would be excluded from the field. If, on the other hand, inability of SAG to operate the base is the reason for USAF retention of control, it seems to me that we should approach the problem of a long term agreement on a somewhat different basis than has been the case in the past. In that event, I believe that we would wish to recognize the fact that 90% of the operations at Dhahran are civil operations, and that the problem before us can be stated as follows: “How should the U.S. assist the SAG to operate the civil airfield of Dhahran and how can we best retain the right to conduct necessary military air operations at the field?” The SAG holds title to Dhahran and it follows that the SAG is within its sovereign rights in retaining operational and administrative control over the entire base if it so chooses. The SAG appears unwilling to enter into a formal agreement which gives up this right even though they are prepared to relinquish it in fact through the device of a jointly appointed administrator in the person of General O’Keefe. The problem is not one of attempting to define the area of responsibility and authority of the SAG as against the USAF. The existing agreement attempts to do this although it is an accepted fact that an airport cannot be safely and efficiently administered and operated under dual authority. I suggest, therefore, that providing the Air Force concurs, we call a spade a spade and formally acknowledge the full sovereignty of the SAG over Dhahran with all that it implies. We should then insist, that in view of the inability of SAG to operate the field that the two governments enter into partnership by jointly appointing a mutually acceptable Administrator of the field. During the period of existing military requirements this individual would, of course, be the Commanding Officer at Dhahran. At some future date he might well be a civilian, perhaps a firm such as the private company which ran Kimpo Airfield in Korea under contract with the ECA and CAA, or an individual who might be employed by the SAG. I strongly recommend that we try to provide for the future through such an arrangement. It is always possible that at some future date Dhahran might not be of sufficint military importance as to justify the large expenditures from the military budget which are required to maintain and operate this essentially civilian airport. President Truman to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia 711.56386A/10–3050 [Document 658] President Truman to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia 1 secret [ Washington ,] October 31, 1950. Your Majesty : Upon sending to you my new Ambassador to reside near your Court, I wish to take occasion to renew to Your Majesty expressions of my sincere and lasting friendship toward yourself, the Royal Family and your people. Your steadfast loyalty and good will, alike in times of stress as in days of happiness and well-being, have ever been sources of pride and pleasure to me and to the American people. Our countries have been comrades in arms together and we have common cause in opposing the godless forces of Communism which are endeavoring to destroy freedom throughout the world. I count it a high tribute to the United States to have support of so illustrious a warrier as yourself in this struggle. The efforts you are making to develop your country and improve the standards of living for your people are admirable and praiseworthy. I am proud that American enterprise has been able to assist you in such worthy projects. I wish to renew to Your Majesty the assurances which have been made to you several times in the past, that the United States is interested in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. No threat to your Kingdom could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the United States. The health of Your Majesty is a subject of no less importance and I pray that you will be long preserved for the welfare of your country and the happiness of your people. 2 Faithfully yours, Harry S. Truman 1 A draft of the source text was attached to a memorandum from McGhee to the Secretary of State, dated October 24, not printed, with a recommendation that the Secretary send it to the White House for the President’s signature. The letter was prepared for Ambassador Hare to present to the King soon after he presented his credentials and before he began negotiations for a renewal of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. (711.56386A/10–2450) The Secretary transmitted the letter to the President with a memorandum, dated October 30, not printed, with a recommendation that the President sign it. The President signed the letter on October 31 and William J. Hopkins, Executive Clerk, sent it back to the Secretary attached to a memorandum, not printed, for Ambassador Hare. (711.56386A/10–3050) The Secretary transmitted the letter to Ambassador Hare in Jidda as an enclosure to Instruction 15, not printed. Hare was instructed to inform the King orally that he might make public use of the letter if he wished. (711.56386A/11–350) In telegram 400, December 24, from Jidda, p. 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] , he reported presenting the President’s letter to the King in December. 2 A translation of the King’s letter of reply to President Truman, dated Riyadh, January 14, 1951, together with the original in Arabic, was transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 250 from Jidda, February 1, 1951 (711.56386A/2–1551). The King’s reply was forwarded to the President on February 27 under cover of a memorandum by Acting Secretary Webb (711.56386A/2–1551). The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 786A.5/11–450: Telegram [Document 659] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority Jidda , November 4, 1950—3 p. m. 270. Deptel 149 October 31. 1 It is unanimous opinion here that anything which could be done to simplify requirements would be highly desirable for following reasons: 1. Despite our maintenance consistent position on cash reimbursable feature of aid Saudis feel they are entitled to grant aid ( a ) because they have clearly professed their desire to have us as their “next friend” and feel that such a policy entitles them to treatment comparable to that we have accorded other countries such as Iran in which we have a close interest (aside from practical aspects, there is also considerable degree amour propre in this contention), ( b ) because Saudis gave us DAB rights without demanding compensation and feel gesture of comparable liberality on our part would be in order, and ( c ) because they maintain inability to pay due to financial stringency. We of course have arguments prepared to rebut these assertions which we hope will be effective in bringing Saudis around to our point of view but debate promises to be spirited and insistence on acceptance our demands in a highly formalized and detailed agreement might be straw that would break the camel’s back. 2. Immediate consideration aside, aversion of Saudis in principle to detailed formal agreements is well known phenomenon as pending negotiations on TWA, civil air rights and FCN bear witness. Generally speaking Saudis take view that if intent is right details can be worked out satisfactorily but that without good will detailed undertakings on paper are unavailing. Foregoing picture would of course be changed entirely if we were able on our part to assume an obligation in the agreement which would satisfy Saudis desire for security assurances by US. I take it however that best we can hope to do along this line in existing circumstances is something in nature of proposed letter of President. In addition foregoing general comments we would specifically recommend that agreement should if possible take form of an exchange of notes covering basic requirements in simplest language. Our reading of MD 5/3 2 leads to conclusion that fundamentals are neither numerous nor complicated nor that they would be objectionable to SAG if properly presented. Re payment terms Embassy suggests most inadvisable to present on “cash on barrel head” basis. Fact is that our offer of military aid is intended inter alia to have political overtones designed to make Saudis more responsible DAB lease. Thus it is important that gesture should not appear niggardly. Section IV, B, 1, of MD–5/3 appears to afford considerable latitude in this regard and it is believed that financial position of SAG sufficiently sound to permit considerable degree of liberality in guarantee payment. Repeated information Dhahran 142 for General O’Keefe. Hare 1 Not printed; it informed the Embassy that Saudi Arabia had been officially designated eligible for cash reimbursable military assistance on October 26 and said that some modification of the requirements might be desirable “considering special nature SA case.” (786A.5–MAP/10–3150) 2 The editors have been unable to identify this reference. The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 886A.10/11–450: Telegram [Document 660] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State secret Jidda , November 4, 1950—8 p. m. 274. Following week-long meeting Riyadh of top Saudi officials including princes, FinMin and Najib Salha, latter returned Jidda Thursday and informs following decisions taken: 1. Introduce income tax SA along lines Treasury proposals of September. Decree this subject to be published tomorrow. 2. Establish “accounting department” Riyadh directly under King to prepare budget, oversee SAG finances. To assist here Salha wants two trained American accountants, to which King agreed in writing and for which Salha will apply under Point IV soonest. Embassy yet not perfectly clear as to scope proposed new office, but believes perhaps similar to Budget Bureau. In any event feel top priority should be assigned getting these experts to SA once formal request received. Prior efforts to line up personnel would be appreciated. Salha stated AUB graduates would be hired assist these Americans. 3. King also reportedly agreed to American experts for customs and for FinMin, and Salha informs he will request two US customs experts and one financial-monetary expert under Point IV in addition to those paragraph 2. Queried as to reason this sudden “coming of age” SAG, Salha stated King and princes impressed by what had been done so far (by him) to introduce order in SA finances and reduce waste, and felt now with income running high and expenses becoming increasingly manageable was time to introduce further steps required by more complicated financial problems created. Also said YY had faithfully reported King my observations on SA finances (Embtel 272, November 4 1 ), that leaky faucet figure of speech had caught King’s imagination and that timing just prior Salha’s arrival Riyadh had been fortunate coincidence. Salha added members royal family had indicated they now willing live within given budget. Also appears star free-spending Shaikh Abdullah perhaps descending for moment, while Salha appears to have returned with more duty than heretofore. FinMin has returned to his fishing camp 50 miles south Jidda, leaving Salha in complete charge here. If, as indicated by latter, FinMin’s role in coming Aramco talks is to be intermittent, while Prince Feisal heads delegation, further indication his eclipse will have been provided. While foregoing still partly in talking stage and we feel all talk SAG financial reforms should be viewed with caution, information furnished by Salha concerning King’s new willingness have budget, foreign experts and income tax indicates definite forward steps in Saudi governmental structure are planned. Salha says he told King if such measures taken and Americans secured, USG would be more sympathetic any subsequent requests based on financial troubles, but that we would do nothing as long as existing profligacy and mismanagement continued. Embassy feels every effort should be made by USG take advantage this new turn events to ultimate benefit ourselves as well as SAG. Further developments will be reported and formal SAG requests transmitted soon as received. Sent London pass Cairo 42 for Parker. Hare 1 Not printed; it discussed the Saudi Arabian financial situation as it related to demands being made on Aramco. Hare informed the Department he had “compared the situation to a leaking faucet on a water tank. It would be a poor way to correct the continual loss of water merely by pouring in more water and not fixing the wasteful leak.” (886A.2553/11–450) The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) 711.56386A/11–1750 [Document 661] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) secret No. 19 Washington , November 17, 1950. Sir : The Secretary of State transmits for your attention the approved draft of the proposed long term Dhahran Air Field Agreement 1 for negotiation with the Saudi Arabian Government. Although the proposed agreement is essentially for military purposes, the importance of the civilian aspects of the Dhahran Air Field are obvious, and it is accordingly suggested that you may wish to invite the Civilian Air Attaché resident at Cairo to assist you in these negotiations. Yon are hereby authorized to initiate negotiations at a time to be decided in agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government. An effort has been made to stress the idea of partnership and mutuality of interest in the utilization of the Dhahran Air Field and toward this end a preamble has been drafted to set the tone for the agreement generally. Every opportunity is made in subsequent articles to stress the joint aspect or to emphasize that derivation of our rights and privileges at the Air Field is by specific agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government. To the greatest extent possible the terms of the existing agreement have been preserved. Modifications have been made for the most part only in those instances where long term interests require changes. Every effort has been made throughout, however, to maintain brevity and clarity in keeping with the expressed wishes of the Saudi Arabian Government. [Here follows an explanation of the various articles of the draft and a comparison with the terms of the existing agreement.] For the Secretary of State: G. Lewis Jones Director Office of Near Eastern Affairs 1 Not printed (711.56386A/11–1750). Further details on the negotiations and terms of the treaty are scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 786A.5–MAP/11–2150: Telegram [Document 662] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia top secret Washington , November 21, 1950—5 p. m. 180. Emb will be advised date notification to Cong Comites of designation SA as eligible cash reimbursable mil assistance, re Deptel 171, Nov 15. 1 Emb shld simultaneously notify SAG. Emb also authorized as of that date institute negots extension this aid. 2 FYI fol is substance of note which shld be submitted SAG at appropriate time setting forth minimum requirements for extension assistance. “Re request of Govt SA for trans of certain items of mil supplies and equipment, there are certain assurances and understandings which US Govt is required obtain from ur Govt before completing any transaction under section 408( e ) of Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Public Law 329, 81st Congress) as amended by Public Law 621, 81st Congress. “I understand ur Govt is prepared to agree to use such items as may be provided to foster internatl peace and security within framework of Charter of UN”; and moreover, that the items to be provided by US Govt are required by SAG to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense or permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state. “I understand also that your Government will obtain the consent of the Govt of the US prior to the trans of title to or possession of any equipment, materials, info, or services furnished, and that ur Govt will take measures to protect the security of any article, service, or info furnished. “In order pay for mil assistance, SAG will open an irrevocable ltr of credit in favor of SecState in US bank for full cost including accessorial and administrative expenses incident thereto of each order equipment to be purchased when order made. Drafts on this ltr payable Treasurer of US will be drawn before equipment out of USG stock is transferred to SAG. Re equipment for which orders must be placed with manufacturers, contracts will be placed in behalf SAG by agency USG. Payment for such equipment must therefore be arranged in advance in same manner outlined above including such amounts as may be required to defray progress payments on contract and plus the estimated cost of damages resulting from possible cancellation of contract by the SAG. Increments necessary cover possible damages will be applied toward final payment under contract. Any remaining funds will be returned SAG. “The Govt of SA will also understand that the Govt of US necessarily retains the privilege of diverting items of equipment or of not completing services undertaken, if such action is dictated by considerations of national interest. “A reply by the Govt of SA to the effect that these understandings are correct will be considered as constituting an agreement between our two Govts.” Dept aware payment scheme undoubtedly unpalatable SAG, but law stringent re this point and above payment scheme least burdensome legally possible. Might be helpful cite recent example advance SAG payments to UK for arms. Acheson 1 Not printed; it informed the Embassy that the final instructions on military assistance were being prepared, and promised to consider the Embassy’s suggestion on lending equipment to Saudi Arabia (786A.5–MAP/11–1550). Further information on cash reimbursable military assistance is in the editorial note, p. 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] . 2 Telegram 188, November 29, from Washington, not printed, authorized the Ambassador to begin negotiations with the Saudi Arabian Government on cash reimbursable military assistance. Negotiations for military aid were to be carried on simultaneously with negotiations for the new Dhahran Airfield Agreement. (786A.5–MAP/11–2950) The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 886A.13/12–650: Telegram [Document 663] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia 1 confidential Washington , December 18, 1950—2 p. m. 215. Embtels 359 Dec 6, 2 352 Dec 4, 3 and previous tels same subj. Dept discussed subj reference tels with Treas and Bureau of Budget. SAG request five experts approved in principle and prelim efforts being made find personnel. To obtain final approval request and recruit personnel, further info needed re terms of reference for experts. Dept believes experts shld serve in advisory capacity and not assume responsibility execution or admin their recommendation. Discuss above with SAG and transmit its and your comments Dept. Difficulty anticipated obtaining experts due scarcity technically competent individuals plus doubts SAG will undertake reforms which by nature require self-discipline. Another serious determent is critical housing situation in SA. SAG will be expected provide suitable living qtrs, transportation and other facilities and necessary to obtain assurances they will do so. Dept wld also appreciate Emb’s views re feasibility of accountants and possibly their families living in Riyadh for extended period in view unfavorable living conditions there. Webb 1 Repeated to the Embassy in Cairo for Parker. 2 Not printed; Hare stressed the importance of the early selection of a qualified currency expert for Saudi Arabia (886A.13/12–650). 3 Not printed; it relayed a request from the Ministry of Finance for five American experts under Point Four—two experts for customs organization, two to organize accounting procedures at the Ministry of Finance, and one for currency and coinage questions (886A.00TA/12–450). The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State 711.56386A/12–2450: Telegram [Document 664] The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State secret niact Jidda , December 24, 1950—noon. 400. Arrived Riyadh December 14 1 with General O’Keefe. General Day 2 joined us December 17. Returned Jidda yesterday December 23 on understanding would return December 30 to continue drafting. First item on agenda was presentation of President’s letter 3 to King who greatly pleased and said appropriate reply would be prepared. Later advised him not intended publication now but would contemplate doing so at appropriate time later. The King did not undertake to discuss either military assistance or DAF other than remark that latter was subject upon which he wished agreement reached without delay. He then appointed Yusuf Yassin and Khalid Bey Gargani to negotiate behalf SAG. Next few days devoted to our presentation military assistance and DAF proposals and general discussion with Saudi representatives who indicated disposition reach agreement re both but emphasized immediate problem in both cases was how overcome King’s strong feelings that aid should have been on grant rather than cash basis, whereas, re DAF principle difficulty was King’s sensitiveness to both domestic and outside criticism for having acted to detriment Saudi sovereignty. Problem therefore was find counterbalancing factors and also present both matters in such way as to make appear that SA had made good bargain. Saudi negotiators repeatedly said in time war all SA would be at disposal US but in time peace political factors necessarily loomed large. I believe presentation basic problem by Saudis reasonably accurate but, of course, it gave them good cover for hard bargaining which they did not fail exploit. Should be noted here that chief Saudi spokesman was Yusuf Yassin who reputed for his exasperating negotiation tactics and in this case he turned in star performance. Against background of practically no knowledge of subject he attempted rewrite practically entire draft and out-Shy locked Shy lock in endeavor exact more than pound of flesh on each point. Further complication lay in fact that group of similarly uninformed members of King’s entourage, including Prince Abdullah, were constantly injecting themselves into matter behind scenes and that Fuad Hamza, only man with knowledge of subject, was absent from Riyadh. As consequence for first week can be said Saudi tactics were on horse-trading rather than negotiation level. Re military assistance discussion was relatively brief and devoted largely to trying to get greatest concessions on training; to get assurances of advantageous price; to seek some method for long-term credit, to obtain advance delivery of arms for storage pending purchase, and to obtain general assurance arms not specified in program would be available on request. After our initial presentation Saudi negotiators appeared convinced on cash-reimbursable character of aid but seemed find it difficult understand other aspects also had legal limitations. On DAF agreement pressure was much greater and Yusuf Yassin was at his petty-fogging worst. Following are some of points which he merged: 1. King’s sensitiveness re giving civil air jurisdiction of DAF to US military commander and also giving rights to US Government as such (see following telegram). 4 2. Attempt to transform any rights sought by us into mutual obligations in which we would be giving more than receiving. 4. [ sic ] Insistence that rights given to us would be fully exercised for full term of agreement. 5. Lack of appreciation our requirements and concentration on exactly maximum advantage for SAG. 6. Suspicion that agreement as drafted did not reveal our true intentions. 7. Desire restrict agreement to DAF within clearly defined limits of [garble] and to reserve off-field rights for separate handling. 8. Insistence on discussing details having no place in an over-all agreement. As result these tactics Yusuf Yassin (Khalid Bey seemed quite friendly and reasonable throughout) we found ourselves in position where at end eighth day we had only discussed five articles despite repeated insistence American group that we first review American draft and tentative Saudi draft so as to determine area of agreement and points on which discussion required. At this point Prince Mansour, Minister Defense, suddenly appeared on scene to head Saudi delegation with result that remaining twenty articles were reviewed in single day and opportunity afforded assess problem as whole (we were later told that this development occurred as result of reports reaching King regarding Yusuf Yassin’s tactics and our dissatisfaction therewith). As matter stands following [garble] of estimate situation re DAF agreement: 1. King wants agreement and his entourage are taking cue from him but nevertheless putting troublesome finger in pie. 2. Fact that agreement is for 25 years makes Saudis understandably cautious especially bearing in mind their own feeling of incompetence in matters this kind and example of unfortunate British experience in Egypt and Iraq. 3. So far tentative drafting only done on first five articles and if Saudis insist on discussion in such detail as heretofore work to be done will be exceedingly burdensome and time-consuming with result additional extension present agreement probably necessary. 4. Although list of problems long and items complex, chances for eventual agreement barring unforeseen developments are good. This estimate is based upon attitude of His Majesty, statement of Saudi representatives even in midst most difficult discussion and statement made to me by Prince Mansour while we were returning by plane together from Riyadh yesterday. 5. The one immediate hurdle which has to be surmounted is action by Department and Defense on suggestion regarding use of training mission (see Embtel 401 December 24) 5 as means playing down for public relations reasons military character of DAF agreement. Prompt action on this point is essential, since without it we are unable to continue constructive discussions with SAG negotiators. Prospects are also favorable on military assistance proposal. One of first things which Prince Mansour did on assuming charge of negotiations was specifically to say SAG approved JCS recommendations in principle but also on assumption that further requests would be cooperatively entertained, especially as regards (1) combat planes situation, (2) basic workshops and training therefor; and (3) increased supplies of ammunition and spare parts. He also expressed hope that first group of military experts would be able help in drawing up military budget. Present situation is that draft note including obligations of SAG as specified in Deptel 180, November 21 6 and also some friendly phrases designed appeal SAG susceptibilities under discussion with Yusuf Yassin who characteristically has put forward not only unacceptable but practically unintelligible revision our draft but believes this situation can be met with mixture of firmness and patience. We left Riyadh yesterday on understanding that we would return by December 30 to endeavor complete drafting on both DAF and military assistance agreement following reference of “mission concept” to Department for expression views (see Embtel 401, December 24). Chronological account discussions to date together with pertinent drafts being forwarded by pouch. I have suggested that if possible Major Napper return Washington immediately in order give first-hand account of problem as revealed during first phase negotiations. In so doing I desire express great appreciation for most helpful services he rendered in Riyadh. Hare 1 Telegram 391, December 13, from Jidda, not printed, informed the Department of State that the Ambassador would proceed to Riyadh on December 14 to begin negotiations on the Dhahran Airfield Agreement and military assistance (711.56386A/12–1350). Despatch 202, December 23, from Jidda, not printed, contained a complete account of the negotiations. Enclosed with the despatch were a chronology of the meetings at Riyadh from December 14–23, an undated copy of a Saudi Arabian counterdraft of the Agreement, and a tentatively agreed draft of the first few articles of the Agreement. (786A.5/12–2350) 2 Brig. Gen. Edwin M. Day, USAF, who was to assume command of Dhahran Airfield in February 1951. 3 Dated October 31, p. 1190 [ Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] . 4 Telegram 401, December 24, from Jidda, not printed, reported that the King was sensitive to the reflection on his sovereignty implied in giving rights to a United States military unit “as had been previously done by specifically delegating SAG civil air jurisdiction to ‘commander Dhahran airfield.’” (711.56386A/12–2450) 5 It informed the Department of State the Saudi Arabians found the title “commander, DAF” objectionable, and the Ambassador wanted permission to substitute the title “chief, training mission” wherever reference was made to the base commander. Since the established Saudi Arabian training mission at Dhahran was a subordinate unit, he saw no reason why the title change could not be made, especially since “outcome present negotiations hinges on this issue.” 6 Ante , p. 1194 [ Pg. 1194 includes portions of Doc. 661 and Doc. 662 ] . Syria Syria Contents Policy of the United States with respect to Syria and the possibility of a Syrian-Iraqi union; development of a program of technical and military assistance to Syria (Documents 665-680) Policy of the United States with respect to Syria and the possibility of a Syrian-Iraqi union; development of a program of technical and military assistance to Syria Policy of the United States with respect to Syria and the possibility of a Syrian-Iraqi union; development of a program of technical and military assistance to Syria 1 1 For previous documentation on United States policy toward Syria and the proposed Syrian-Iraqi union, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1630 ff. and pp. 180 ff. [665] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria Washington, January 7, 1950—5 p. m. 783.00/1–750: Telegram [666] The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State Damascus, January 9, 1950—1 p. m. 783.00/1–950: Telegram [667] The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State Damascus, January 10, 1950—6 p. m. 783.56/1–1050: Telegram [668] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria Washington, January 27, 1950—7 p. m. 783.56/1–1050: Telegram [669] The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State Damascus, February 24, 1950—5 p. m. 883.10/2–2450: Telegram [670] Paper Prepared in the Department of State [Washington,] April 25, 1950. [671] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria Washington, April 28, 1950—1 p. m. 124.835/4–2250: Telegram [672] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria Washington, July 14, 1950—7 p. m. 783.00/7–1450: Telegram [673] The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State Damascus, July 19, 1950—5 p. m. 611.83/7–1950: Telegram [674] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria Washington, October 25, 1950—7 p. m. 783.00/10–1850: Telegram [675] The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Secretary of State Damascus, November 1, 1950—4 p. m. 783.00/11–150: Telegram [676] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria Washington, November 9, 1950—8 p. m. 783.00/11–150: Telegram [677] The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Secretary of State Damascus, November 16, 1950—5 p. m. 783.00/11–1650: Telegram [678] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, November 22, 1950—7 p. m. 783.00/11–1750: Telegram [679] Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Minister in Syria (Gannon) Washington, November 14, 1950. 783.00/11–150 [680] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices Washington, December 6, 1950—7 p. m. 783.00/12–650: Circular telegram The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 783.00/1–750: Telegram [Document 665] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 2 confidential Washington , January 7, 1950—5 p. m. 8. Brit Emb Wash states FonOff has instructed UK Min 3 Damascus express to Syrian PriMin 4 Brit concern over recent army coup and apprehension lest instability and army interference in civilian govt may continue. 5 He is to assure Syrian Govt UK policy is one of complete nonintervention and to state UK asking other govts in area fol similar policy in belief Syria must be left alone work out own salvation and restore internal stability. Dept understands Brit Min has taken exception certain aspects his instrs but will probably make approach along these or similar lines. Dept likewise concerned over Syrian instability and army interference especially since three successful military coups within nine months have established dangerous precedent which may tempt irresponsible elements in other Near Eastern countries plot violent overthrow ruling govts. Dept wld appreciate ur comments as to whether US expression concern to Syrian Govt over instability in Syria as reflected in three successive military coups wld serve useful purpose of strengthening position civilian authorities. Pls also state whether in ur judgment such a US approach might lend itself to misinterpretation by special groups as indicating unwarranted US interference in Syrian internal affairs and possibly as reflecting US disapproval anti-union orientation recent coup leaders. Acheson 2 Repeated to London, Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Beirut, and Amman. 3 P. M. Broadmead. 4 Khaled Azm. 5 Syria experienced three coups d’ etat in 1949, the last of which occurred on December 19, 1949. The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State 783.00/1–950: Telegram [Document 666] The Minister in Syria ( Keeley ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret Damascus , January 9, 1950—1 p. m. 16. Deptel 8, January 7. Consensus Legation officers is that having ref rained from any expression of concern over previous military coups US would be ill advised to take initiative in doing so at this juncture. British are in somewhat different position as they are suspect and failure to speak out might be taken as confirmation British intrigue in favor Syrian-Iraqi Union. See, in this connection, Legtel 13, January 9 2 re exchange of views with British Minister and my reply (Legtel 14, January 9 3 ) to Fr Minister’s suggestion that we go even further than Britain has gone. Legation feels however that should Prime and Foreign Minister actually broach subject, or suitable occasion otherwise arise, it should informally (conversation confirmed by aide-mémoire ) express US concern in sense of Deptel 8 which might serve to strengthen position of civil authorities. To help counteract possible misinterpretation we should mention démarche in Depcirtel December 22, 7 p. m. 4 and recall bur position (Depcirtel October 18, 5 a. m. 5 ) on [apparent garble]. Suitable occasion may arise momentarily as Prime Minister has asked me to see him January 10 at noon. 6 Keeley 1 Repeated to Baghdad, Jidda, London, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Ankara. 2 Not printed; it described a conversation with the British Minister in Syria, P. M. Broadmead, during which he informed Keeley that the British Government was announcing to “certain other governments” in the Near East that it opposed any interference in Syrian affairs (783.00/1–950). 3 Not printed; it explained Keeley’s refusal to agree to a French proposal whereby the United States and France would inform Syria that they opposed the idea of a Syrian-Iraqi union (783.00/1–950). 4 Not printed; it instructed diplomatic officers to advise the government to Which they were accredited to “refrain from any precipitous action and fol policy complete nonintervention” (890D.00/12–2249). 5 Not printed; it stated “US continues disfavor any use of force or intervention change status NE countries but shld not oppose union of peoples responsive to their freely expressed will” (790D.90G/10–1849). 6 On January 11 the Department sent a telegram to Damascus approving these suggestions (telegram 11, 783.00/1–950). The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State 783.56/1–1050: Telegram [Document 667] The Minister in Syria ( Keeley ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential Damascus , January 10, 1950—6 p. m. 20. Legtel 16, January 9. Suitable opportunity did not arise during talk with Prime Minister today to give full expression to concern expressed in Deptel 8, January 7, but when Khaled Azm inquired if US was now prepared to sell Syria arms (apropos item on military aid re confidential conclusions Istanbul conference 2 for guidance chiefs mission in oral presentation to governments which I took occasion our talk to convey and at his request to explain) I replied that whole embargo had been lifted. I did not for following reasons feel moment propitious to put forward such request: ( a ) continuance Palestine conflict and furore Israel likely to raise over potential threat to its security, ( b ) possible feeling that Syria should improve its economic before its military position, and ( c ) evidence better discipline rather than intensify power of army after three military coups in ten months. To latter he smilingly inquired if I thought more arms could make army more troublesome in that respect than it already is. Prime Minister went on to say Syria needs fighter aircraft. To my query “what for” he replied “to protect Damascus which is only 60 kilometers from Israeli frontier”. He then asked about possibility military mission. I replied that purchase of arms including aircraft and provision military mission were, I felt, both possibilities that had better wait some evidence progress in three directions I had indicated. He did not pursue subject. At time Legation reply to Deptel 522, December 13 3 drafted MA suggested that our refusal provide military equipment might not deter Syria which might obtain its needs elsewhere to our loss in trade prestige and influence. Arms purchased by Zaim 4 from France now arriving and French Minister has repeatedly indicated in conversation (Legation A–113, April 18 3 ) that France is natural source arms supply for Syrian army which being originally French equipped “will naturally turn to French for replacements”. Both French and British have received Syrian officers for training (Legation A–77, March 16 3 ) and are doubtless willing furnish military missions (British military adviser to Syrian army who recently died has not yet been replaced). Instruction for future guidance would be appreciated, particularly if Department wishes Legation to follow different line than I took with Prime Minister (Tel Aviv Embtel 16, January 9 5 to Department received since mytel). Keeley 1 Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Ankara, and Arab capitals. 2 For documentation concerning the Istanbul Conference of American Chiefs of Mission held on November 26–29, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 165 ff. 3 Not printed. 4 Col. Husni Zaim, former President of Syria who was overthrown by a coup d’état on August 14, 1949, and subsequently executed. 3 Not Printed. 3 Not Printed. 5 Not printed; it described, in part, Israeli criticism of British arms shipments to various Arab states and United States acquiescence with this policy. The Embassy in Tel Aviv asked the Department for a clearer statement on United States policy towards these arms shipments. (780.5/1–950) The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 783.56/1–1050: Telegram [Document 668] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria confidential Washington , January 27, 1950—7 p. m. 40. Legtel 20, Jan 10. Dept approves ur comments to PriMin. No legal auth now exists provide mil mission or grant or sell Syria arms from USG procurement. However Dept contemplates no change vis-à-vis Syria its export licensing pol Arab States and Israel defined Depcirtel Sep 7, 1949. 1 FYI: Although policy above wld permit Syrians purchase arms US commercial sources not likely quantities available commercial dealers cld materially affect Syrian econ or mil position. Moreover all applications export licenses carefully screened in terms limitations set forth refcirtel. FYI: Conversations with Brit progressing on exchange info arms shipments NE states. Talks not yet initiated with ER this subj pending estab working agreement with UK. Meanwhile Dept wld welcome ur further comments and summary available info Fr arms shipments Syria to date and projected. FYI: Syrian Leg notified Dept Jan 18 that any arms export application made prior that date does not carry approval Syrian Govt. Accordingly, application export Dec 2 to Syria Minister of Natl. Defense spare parts for AT–6 value $248,000.00 and application pending since Aug 1949 for export 10,000 steel helmets being cancelled by Dept. Acheson 1 Not printed; it stated that the United States would export arms to a country if it were determined that the equipment was necessary for “( a ) maintaining internal law and order by Govt in reasonable and legitimate exercise of constituted authority; ( b ) reasonable requirement of self defense.” (711.00111 Armament Control/9–749). The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State 883.10/2–2450: Telegram [Document 669] The Minister in Syria ( Keeley ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential Damascus , February 24, 1950—5 p. m. 94. Jidda Embtel 54, January 30 to Department, 2 King Ibn Sand’s wise council seems to be bearing fruit. Minister of National Economy, Maarhf Al-Dawalibi, called upon me yesterday and spent more than two hours reviewing Syrian-US relations, as briefly summarized below, preliminary to asking my assistance in opening way for Syrian-US cooperation in economic sphere. Referring to his recent trade talks with Ibn Saud and Egypt, Dawalibi said he believed it advisable to seek agreements on basis common interests wherever found exist. It is only part wisdom, however, to recognize obstacles. As between Syria and US there is thorny Palestine problem. He recognized that in supporting Zionists in Palestine, US has been moved by idealism and universal sympathy for suffering Jewish DP’s. He could understand our idealism in this respect for the Arabs themselves were not lacking in similar idealism. Long before emergence of political Zionism and its militant application against Arabs in Palestine, Arabs moved by humanitarianism to give asylum to the Jews of the Spanish inquisition. Unfortunately, succoring few hundred-thousand displaced Jews by their resettlement in Palestine had served displace and create equally or greater distress for million Arabs who had not only been denied right self-determination of their own homeland but had been dispossessed of their property by conqueror in violation international law. Syrian public opinion holds US partly responsible for plight refugees and believes that if true to its oft-expressed ideals, US should take lead in enforcing UN decisions, particularly, as Arab states were stopped by US–UN action in defending inalienable rights of Palestine Arabs. As long as Arab refugees are denied these rights and continue suffer tragic consequences of Israeli conquest of their homeland and Israeli ambitions remain uncurbed, Minister said Syrian opinion will remain exacerbated and any Syrian statesman who seeks cooperation with US in political or economic sphere will be plagued by criticism and opposition because of US connection with Palestine tragedy. Contending that in light foregoing Syrian Government would find it difficult cooperate with US, especially in realizing any projects envisaging refugee resettlement instead of repatriation, lie hopes be able work with US in economic sphere. He feels that if both countries understand difficulties each faces in present circumstances prejudicial influence of Palestine situation might be minimized sufficiently permit economic collaboration. I welcomed his approach which I noted was in marked contrast to indifference and even hostility that Syria had heretofore shown toward our disposition to be helpful (Legtel 85, February 22 and 92, February 24 3 ). Commending as statesmanlike his decision henceforth to judge American economic aid possibilities on their merits, I assured him Legation would be glad extend him all available information and appropriate assistance. We, thereupon, briefly discussed possibilities of stimulating trade, and procedure in applying Point Four and seeking Export-Import Bank and IBRD loans. In parting Minister said that economic approach between countries having basis of common interest offers more hope of agreement than of approach made in political sphere where one immediately runs into thorns. If Syria and US could fruitfully cooperate in economic domain, solution of their political problems might be facilitated. I agreed. Keeley 1 Repeated to Jidda, Ankara, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Arab capitals. 2 Not printed; it described how Ibn Saud told al-Dawalibi that Syria should follow a new policy in its relations with the United States. “He has advised Syrian Minister that Syria should take every step secretly without any announcement and that it should send, after mutual agreement with USG, Syrian representatives to US to come to an understanding on their common policy. Intention of His Majesty is that if an agreement can be reached it may be announced but if not no one will know about failure.” (883.10/1–3050) 3 Neither printed. Paper Prepared in the Department of State CFM Files: Lot M88: May FM Meeting, C & D Series 1 [Document 670] Paper Prepared in the Department of State 2 top secret FMD–D–12 [ Washington ,] April 25, 1950. The Political Union of Syria and Iraq problem There is evidence of sympathy among some elements of the Syrian and Iraqi peoples for a political union between the two countries. Since the fall of 1949 the union question has been a major political issue in the Near East, and wide divergencies of opinion have arisen among Near Eastern Governments and peoples over ( a ) the desirability of a union between Syria and Iraq; ( b ) the form of the union; ( c ) the measures to be taken to implement the proposed union; and ( d ) the relationship of such a union to other states. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France are interested in this question chiefly as it relates to ( a ) the peace and stability of the Near East as a whole; ( b ) the desires and well being of the Syrian and Iraqi peoples; ( c ) the interests of the Western countries in the Near East, with particular reference to the United Kingdom’s special treaty position in Iraq, France’s continued interest in Syria and Lebanon, and the close relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia; and ( d ) the implications of Syro-Iraqi union as regards the Palestine problem. background The modern concept of the political unity of the Arab peoples stems from an intellectual and political movement taking root covertly under the moribund Ottoman Turkish Empire at the turn of the century and is a natural component of the modern Arab cultural renaissance which has been under way since then. Nearly all Arabs today support the idea of the essential “unity” of the Arabic-speaking peoples. The Arab reverses in the Palestine hostilities and fears of Arab countries for their continued security against the Soviet menace from the East, and against what they consider to be the “Zionist menace” in their midst, has strengthened the desire for closer political relations, military coordination and economic cooperation among the Arab states. Beyond the common denominator of favoring an imperfectly conceived and defined “unity”, however, there is no general agreement either among the Arab governments or among the Arab peoples as to what form unity should take or how it should be accomplished. The Iraqi Government and some of the Iraqi people seem to favor a union or federation with Syria under the sovereignty of King Faisal II, of Iraq, as a first step toward achieving a larger unity; some groups in Syria appear to favor this idea, partly because they believe the union would end the instability in Syria manifested by three military coups within nine months, but other groups and the present Syrian Government are opposed. Some Syrians and Iraqis would favor Syro-Iraqi union if the unified government were a republic rather than a monarchy. Others will accept union only if the British treaty with Iraq and British influence in the latter country is terminated, and nearly all appear to oppose extension of the treaty or British influence to Syria. Egypt, which desires to retain its leadership of the Arab world, opposes Syro-Iraqi union and sponsors instead a proposal for collective security among all Arab states and the strengthening of the Arab League. This view is supported by the King of Saudi Arabia, implacable rival of the Hashemite ruling houses of Jordan and Iraq, and the Government of Lebanon and its supporters who fear Lebanon’s independence as a Christian haven will be extinguished by eventual absorption into the predominantly Moslem union. Important opposition groups in Lebanon, however, are somewhat favorable to the union of Syria and Iraq because of their fear of the consequences of continued instability and control by military cliques in Syria. King Abdullah, of Jordan, is believed still to covet Syria for incorporation into his Kingdom, and for that reason opposes Syria being incorporated under another crown, despite Abdullah’s family ties with the King of Iraq. Israel apparently opposes any sort of unification of Arab states at this time in the belief that such movements are directed against Israel and that the implementation of the union would retard a Palestine settlement. This is disputed by some proponents of union on the grounds that the main obstacle to settlement is Arab fears of Israel which the union might serve to allay. The Syro-Iraqi union question was officially raised with the United States Government by the United Kingdom on September 29, 1949, which confided to us on a Top Secret basis an approach it had received from the Government of Iraq and the Provisional Government of Syria presenting a plan for federation of the two countries under the Hashemite King of Iraq. The project envisaged at that time is believed to be, for the time being, a dead-letter, because the orientation of the Syrian Government in favor of union was sharply reversed as a result of a military coup-which occurred on December 19, 1949. The Department’s Aide-Mémoire in response to the United Kingdom’s request for our views at that time, however, sets forth the policy of this Government which has remained unchanged to the present. The principal points made in the Aide-Mémoire are as follows: 1. “The United States Government … would look with disfavor upon any modification of the status of the present sovereign entities of the Near East accomplished by force or external intervention. However, … this Government would not oppose unions of peoples brought about by the freely expressed wish of the peoples concerned.” 2. “…the United States Government should not at this time adopt an attitude either favoring, acquiescing in or disapproving … (proposals for union) because: ( a ) There is insufficient evidence on which to base an opinion as to the degree of popular support such a union would find in both countries and the overall effects of the proposed action on the peace and stability of the area. Such information as is available, however, gives this Government certain ground for concern. ( b ) The United States Government considers that it should not in any event, express an opinion in advance of consideration of the proposed move in an open and constitutional way within the two countries, which might in itself influence such consideration, and before the Governments of Syria and Iraq have consulted with other countries which may feel themselves affected. ( c ) In view of this Government’s concern, the United States would, furthermore, before expressing any judgment on the proposals, expect assurances by Syria and Iraq that the proposed union would safeguard legitimate interests of the United States; that it would carry out existing international obligations of the two states; and that it would undertake to respect the independence and territorial integrity of neighboring states.” discussion Both the British and French Governments have declared positions similar to that stated by the United States Government in paragraph 1 above. However, the tenor of British approaches in the past suggests the Government of the United Kingdom is inclined to be sympathetic to a union which would permit the Hashemite family of Iraq, traditional friends of the British, to predominate in a unified government or federation. Mr. Bevin, in somewhat casual and oblique fashion, orally indicated last fall that he was personally inclined in favor of the proposals then being advanced by Syria and Iraq. The Government of France, on the other hand, has informally expressed itself as believing the status quo in the Near East represents the best possible political arrangement in the Near East under present conditions. In the French attitude there is undoubtedly a modicum of distrust of British intentions and apprehension lest the United Kingdom extend its influence to Syria, a country where France, prior to 1945, enjoyed predominant influence. The attitude of the Department on this question lies on neutral ground between British enthusiasm and French opposition to the union movement. Although it might be difficult to mollify Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan if a union took place, there would be no justification for this Government to oppose the spontaneous emergence of a union between Syria and Iraq, achieved without force or external intervention, provided it were clear that the unified state had no aggressive intentions toward other states. On the other hand, there is little evidence to suggest that peace, stability, or capacity to resist Soviet penetration would be advanced by union of Syria and Iraq so long as deep cleavages as to the desirability, form, means of implementation, and relationship to other states of the union persist among the governments and peoples of the Near East. There would thus be no contribution to United States interests in giving encouragement to the movement and any suggestion of intervention by this Government in favor of union would undoubtedly incur deep resentment among peoples of the Near East, particularly in Saudi Arabia where US strategic interests are of vital importance. One further aspect of the problem which the UK, especially, must thoroughly consider is whether the effect of the union would be to strengthen, leave unchanged, or attenuate the British strategic position in the Near East (which the United States Government supports). There are some proponents of union, particularly among nationalists in Iraq, who see in the union movement the possibility of consolidating anti-British elements in Syria and Iraq in a concerted drive to eliminate the special facilities enjoyed by the UK under the present Anglo-Iraqi treaty. Although there are scattered and inconclusive reports of intrigue in Syria to unseat the present highly unstable Syrian government and to promote union, which, if successful in attaining its objective, could change the picture suddenly, there seems to be little prospect of formation of Syro-Iraqi union at this time because of the present Syrian Government’s negative attitude and the sharp adverse reactions the movement would engender elsewhere in the Near East. It is believed the British Government realizes the practical obstacles presently standing in the way of the union movement, and, as mentioned above, the French Government is content with the status quo . There thus seems to be no substantial reason for the question to be given an important place at the meeting. recommendations If either the British or French governments should for some reason wish to raise the question in the discussions, it is believed the United States Government should recommend that the Western countries allow events to take their course and limit their activity to expressing, when and where appropriate, their opposition to any attempt by force, external intervention, or intrigue, to prevent the government and peoples of Syria and Iraq from making their own decision. 1 The CFM files are a consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancillary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center. 2 This paper was prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs and cleared with the Office of Western European Affairs and the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs. It was written as background material for the Secretary of State in anticipation of the May Foreign Ministers Meeting in London. The subject of the proposed Syrian-Iraqi union was discussed in the preparatory meeting of May 1 but was not discussed in later meetings by the Foreign Ministers. For a description of the May 1 conference, see Secto 75 from London, May 2, in vol. iii , p. 975 . The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 124.835/4–2250: Telegram [Document 671] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 1 secret Washington , April 28, 1950—1 p. m. 159. In view recent bombing outrage, Dawalibi statement and apparent misunderstanding US policy re Palestine situation generally and towards Syria and the Arab states specifically, 2 fol summary and clarification US policy is for ur background info as basis for oral remarks in any gen discussions you may have on these subjects (Deptel 148 Apr 25 3 ): Begin Summary . 1. US cherishes traditional friendship with Syria, and agrees with PriMin this friendship rests on firm basis which cannot be prejudiced by isolated incidents. Policy friendship toward Syria manifested positively in US support 1942–1946 for aspirations Syrian people become independent. US-sponsored SC Res of 1946, which led to withdrawal all fon troops from Syrian soil, was inspired by no concealed motives, but solely by good will toward Syrian people and belief they were ready for full independence. Moreover, USG wld react with vigor to any attempt by force, intrigue, or by any external intervention whatever, compromise or undermine Syria’s independence and territorial integrity. 2. In recognition fact Syria’s independence must be accompanied by econ and social advancement, USG has always stood ready give sympathetic consideration to Syrian requests for assistance in carrying out econ development programs. Legis has been introduced US Congress seeking appropriations funds contribute to UN technical assistance program and also provide US technical assistance to certain countries on bilateral basis under Point IV program. USG is also contributing to UNRWA, which contemplates assistance NE countries in econ and social clevel programs, with special reference providing work relief for Arab refugees. US attaches no polit conditions whatever to any of these programs nor do charges US harboring concealed polit or econ motives in these programs have any basis in fact. 3. USG has recently granted training facilities in US service schools for five Syrian Air Force students and prepared continue this type activity. Re purchase arms and mil materiel, Syrian Govt is free to obtain arms and matériel from US commercial sources and USG will consider applications for export of arms to Syria within limitations Syria’s requirements for internal security and self-defense. List mil equip for which Syria desires export license recently received is being studied. 4 4. USG believes peace, stability and security of all states of the NE wld be advanced if Arab States and Israel wld reach equitable agreement to settle differences. USG supports PCC and any of the parties concerned in Pal controversy looking toward such agreement or agreements. In presenting this view, US categorically rejects charges it harbors desire undermine Arab economies out of special consideration for improving econ position Israel. From foregoing review it is evident possibilities for fruitful coop between US and Syria far outweigh differences in viewpoint on Pal question. It is also clear US is motivated entirely by spirit of positive friendship toward Syria and by desire Syria be politically, economically and socially strong in a peaceful and stable NE. USG believes genuineness and impartiality its policy speaks for itself. It wld, therefore, be most unfortunate if Syrian Govt and its peoples shld be misled by false rumors and speculative interpretations of US policy which have gained currency among some elements of NE. End Summary . Acheson 1 Drafted by Harlan B. Clark, Officer in Charge of Lebanon–Syria–Iraq Affairs, and cleared with ANE and NEA. Repeated to London, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Paris, and Moscow. 2 On April 18, a bomb exploded in the garden of the American Legation in Damascus. This act of violence was further aggravated by a public statement made by Syria’s Minister of National Economy, Ma’ruf al-Dawalibi, in which he suggested that Syria should make a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union if the United States continued to follow its pro-Israeli policy (telegram 204 from Damascus, April 21, 124.835/4–2150, and telegram 223 from Damascus, April 27, 124.835/4–2750). 3 Not printed. 4 The Syrian request for arms export licenses was received by the Department on April 18 (despatch 222 from Damascus, 783.56/4–1850). On June 21 the Department informed the Legation in Damascus that according to its preliminary estimate of the availability of arms requested by Syria, “only small percentage equip listed … is presently available from commercial sources.” (Airgram A–83, June 21, 783.56/4–1850) The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 783.00/7–1450: Telegram [Document 672] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria confidential Washington , July 14, 1950—7 p. m. 13. Syrian Min Khouri called at his request on Asst Secy McGhee July 12 asking advice as to course of action his govt shld follow in present unstable situation it faces. He declared most Syrians still feel insecure and fearful of attack by Israel. McGhee said Tripartite Declaration 1 was designed remove any remaining fears of aggressive action in NE, and Syrian Govt shld place full confidence in it. He said Syria shld have faith in friendship of western powers and embark on truly progressive program for developing its fine econ potentialities and raising standard of living. US and internatl community stand ready assist thru many channels open to Syria such as IBRD, Eximbank and PRA. PRA offers great benefits for Syria without strings attached. Govt shld attract to itself courageous leaders who will adopt and carry thru positive programs. Khouri stated Syrian army controls govt and McGhee replied that mil often steps in to fill a vacuum where civ population is apathetic, and the converse is true where courageous civ leadership exists. Khouri said he had once before nearly persuaded Qudsi 2 to follow positive policy of cooperating with US and western powers and then govt fell. He wld write again in same vein now but had no confidence present govt wld last or that instability wld not continue. Acheson 1 For documentation concerning the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, see pp. 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] ff. 2 Nazim Qudsi, deputy leader of the Peoples’ Party, became Prime Minister of Syria on June 4, 1950. The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State 611.83/7–1950: Telegram [Document 673] The Minister in Syria ( Keeley ) to the Secretary of State confidential Damascus , July 19, 1950—5 p. m. 34. Deptel 13, July 14. Legation has taken advantage every appropriate occasion to offer similar sound advice to Syrians (both in official and non-official circles) see this connection Legdes 24 of July 19 1 reporting press versions of my conversations with newsmen. While some usually find basic agreement re desirability Syria’s economic development and American aid therein, deep-seated chagrin over our past support of establishment of Israel in Palestine to Arab disadvantage and fear of further Israeli aggression makes almost everyone suspicious of our professed good intentions and current impartiality. Syrian Minister Khouri’s pessimism in present circumstances is quite understandable and shows commendable insight for one so far from scene. While we should all continue work to allay suspicion and to encourage confidence so necessary to restoration of greater measure stability in Syria, as well as cooperation with US, past experience has demonstrated that it would be unfortunate self-deception to expect too much of the future without remedying the errors of the past that brought about present situation (reLegdes 352 of June 16 and my letter of June 23, to Berry 2 ). US initiative in and support of UN Security Council’s prompt action against aggression in Korea, being in such marked contrast to US and UN apathy toward Israeli disregard of UN resolutions re Palestine, has given new hope to Syrians that in light Korean precedent, Israeli will henceforth encounter stiffer attitude in US and UN both regarding so far ignored UN resolution regarding Palestine and any possible future Israeli aggression versus Arabs. Prime Minister Qudsi, who is destined to play continuing important role in Syrian scene, whether in power or in opposition, states he is now willing to try cooperation with US on ad hoc basis of demonstrated impartiality. Unstable state Syrian politics and uncertainty future is burden of proof of ability of US and Syria to cooperate fruitfully despite suspicions aroused by our past Palestine associations must largely rest with US. We are suspect and will so remain until over period of time we prove by our acts, not by declared friendliness and largess alone, that we are in fact being impartial. Any pro-Israeli manifestation such as recent plugs for Israel by prominent US officials will most certainly be construed against us. Keeley 1 Not printed. 2 Neither printed. The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 783.00/10–1850: Telegram [Document 674] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 1 secret Washington , October 25, 1950—7 p. m. 151. Leg’s interesting teleg 190 Oct 18 2 indicates continued unsettling subversive polit activity in Syria by internal and possibly by external elements. It appears such activity has arisen in the past or may in future stem from any one or a combination of several sources, such as: adherents of ex-Pres Quwatly; Govts of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, SA; and the AHC. 3 These subversive activities in Syria, if continued, may not only invite counter polit activity by army factions, thereby making the task of achieving polit stability in Syria difficult, but might ultimately prejudice peace in NE. Dept is concerned these developments and believes US shld not lose any suitable opportunity to promote Syrian stability. Leg’s comments requested as to which, if any, of fol steps might serve useful purpose: (1) Emb Cairo discreetly to approach Quwatly and counsel him instruct his adherents refrain from any activities designed overthrow present constitution or return him to office in Syria by extra-constitutional means. 4 (2) Approach Govts of SA, Egypt, Iraq and Jordan with renewed counsel maintain strict policy non-interference in internal affairs of Syria. (3) Suggest to these govts and possibly other govts in the area that they shld avail themselves of any favorable opportunity to encourage Syrian civ govt and to express disapproval of any further extra-constitutional polit activity in Syria. (4) To make discreet approach Sec Gen of Arab League along lines paras 2 and 3. (5) Inform Syrian Govt of any action taken under paras 1 to 4 and state our earnest hope for further strengthening of Syrian stability. (6) Suggest UK and France make similar approaches designed eliminate subversive activity and promote Syrian stability. Acheson 1 Repeated for action to Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Amman, and Beirut; repeated for information to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. 2 Not printed; it described the wave of arrests that followed an attempted assassination of Lt. Col. Adib Shishakli, Deputy Army Chief of Staff, on October 12 (783.00/10–1850). 3 Interference in Syrian affairs by other neighboring Arab countries was a major concern of the Department. Reports from all the Near Eastern posts kept the Department informed of activities in this regards, and, in particular, on the subject of Syrian-Iraqi union. Egypt openly expressed opposition to the idea of a union between Syria and Iraq (Embtel 76 from Cairo, January 24, 683.87/1–2450); Saudi Arabia also opposed this union and, by offering the Syrian Government a loan in June, hoped to promote Syria’s internal stability and minimize unionist desires (airgram A–56 to Jidda, June 27, 883.10/6–2750). While the population of Iraq maintained an interest in union with Syria, this interest remained dormant and the government formed by Prime Minister Tawfiq Suweidi did little to revive it (telegram 173, from Baghdad, September 16, 683.87/9–1650). 4 The former President of Syria, Shukri Quwatly, who was forced out of power by a coup d’état on March 30, 1949, resided in Cairo and occasionally received visits from Syrian politicians who hoped to get him back in power in Damascus (despatch 189 from Cairo, February 7, 783.00/2–750). The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Secretary of State 783.00/11–150: Telegram [Document 675] The Minister in Syria ( Cannon ) 1 to the Secretary of State 2 secret priority Damascus , November 1, 1950—4 p. m. 207. Legation believes that positive support and encouragement Syrian Government by steps indicated Deptel 151, October 25 would enhance its stability, strengthen US position in Syria, and promote US policy objectives in the NE. Following considerations bear on this belief: (1) Unlike some other Arab states, Syria is viable with only limited outside aid. This economic potential which present government seems genuinely disposed to develop, together with efforts to raise general level of living, make Syria almost unique among Arab states in prospects for evolution as a modern state. If Syria succeeds in achieving stability through efforts present government, example to other Arab states would be of first importance. Not least important effect would be fundamental strengthening of progressive non-Communist forces in area. (2) Prime Minister Qudsi’s Government is on solid constitutional grounds and is backed by largest and most progressive political grouping in Syria. (3) Domestic opposition to Qudsi Government comes primarily from essentially reactionary and unrealistic groups such as Nationalist Front (Legation despatch 141, September 11) 3 whose domestic political programs are questionable and whose policies in past, when they have held power, have been contrary to principles of US policy in area and have not served to promote sound economic development. They were largely responsible for unstable situation which led to coup d’état of Husni Al-Zaim, they lack large body popular support and are incapable of rising above short-sighted partisan viewpoint. (4) Syrian Army is major imponderable in present situation. Factions unfriendly to present Government doubtless still exist, but fact remains that present Army strong man Shishikli who has remained in power for ten months, and his civilian comrade former Minister Defense Akram Hawrani, have support of large body of junior officers. Moreover, though impatient concerning what he considers unnecessary slowness in carrying out reforms, the Radical Hawrani seems to have decided to go along with general lines of Qudsi’s socio-economic policies. While Syro-Iraqi Union question could divide this partnership from Qudsi and the Populists, latter seem to have profited by previous lessons enough to agree to soft-pedal this issue. Working with Army will continue to require high degree of statesmanship, but Qudsi’s success since June 4 suggests obstacles not insurmountable. Firm action by US may tend discourage factionalism in Army caused by subversive elements. As part of program proposed in Deptel 151, US may wish to consider strengthening Qudsi’s position with Army through offers of military advice or perhaps limited military aid in working out military problems. (5) Recent organized attempts to subvert present Syrian Government, such as Ajlani–Kallas greater Syrian conspiracy (Legtel 169, October 4 4 ) and attempted assassination Lieutenant Colonel Shishikli (Legtel 182, October 12 5 ) were apparently not inspired or supported by sizeable body of opinion in Syria. Supporters former President Quwwatli seem to have been involved in an attempt on Shishikli and money and some members of gang have been traced to other Arab states (Legtel 203, October 27 5 ). We suggest that prior to action along lines Deptel 151 proposals be authorized approach Prime Minister Qudsi informally to discover which of suggested steps in his opinion best calculated promote Syrian stability. Such approach would serve also to elicit evidence subversive activity for possible citation in discussions with other Arab Governments and would be helpful in determining which lines of action most suitable in eventual approaches to other Arab states. Regarding step (1) of Deptel 151 we agree with Embassy Cairo (Embtel 423, to Department 6 ) that direct approach to Quwwatli by Embassy might be misinterpreted however discreetly made. Perhaps Azzam Pasha could ask Quwwatli and Mardam Bey in interests of Arab League, to request their supporters to refrain from further attempts at subversion in Syria. Embassy Cairo’s comment on this invited. Regarding Points (2) and (3) Legation concurs with Embassy Cairo that suggestions of Point (3) might lead to charge US interfering in Arab affairs, but we think renewed counsel of non-interference, contemplated in Point (2) could profitably be made, particularly if talk with Qudsi elicits specific evidence of interference of nationals of other Arab states in Syrian affairs. Regarding step (6) we greatly doubt if useful purpose would be served by bringing in the French. French Legation here does not share US–UK point of view toward present Syrian Government because of belief that Qudsi and Populists may attempt bring about Syro-Iraqi Union. French also appear to be worried lest Qudsi Government will loosen French economic foothold in Syria. Present level of French political prestige here and in other Arab countries makes approach by them of dubious value and until we can bring about improvement in rapport between French Legation and US and UK Legations, sharing highly classified plans of action, with French would be difficult and questionable. As for requesting British make similar approach, [French] would certainly view with alarm our making British privy to our action without bringing them in also. Moreover, SAG, Egyptians and Turks are extremely suspicious of British in Syria and might well misinterpret British action. On other hand, special position British in Iraq and Jordan would give immense value their making representations those governments along lines indicated Deptel 151. British Legation certainly shares this Legation’s attitude toward present government Syria and it also desirous promoting its stability. Wonder if best course would not be to inform British and French substance action taken by US and suggest that they take similar action under terms tripartite declaration. Cannon 1 Cavendish W. Cannon succeeded James Hugh Keeley as Minister in Syria; he was assigned to Damascus as of September 20. 2 Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed; it described the arrest of Parliament Deputy Munir Ajlani and Lt. Col. Bahij Kallas, Military Attaché-designate to Washington, on the charge of conspiracy to initiate a pro-Greater Syria coup, a conspiracy allegedly financed by King Abdullah of Jordan (783.00/10–550). 5 Not printed. 5 Not printed. 6 Not printed; it included the comments of the Ambassador in Egypt, Jefferson Caffery, who claimed that it was very difficult to approach Quwatly without publicity which might serve to defeat the main purpose of the approach and give the impression that Quwatly had the support of the United States (783.00/10–2850). The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 783.00/11–150: Telegram [Document 676] The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria 1 secret Washington , November 9, 1950—8 p. m. 172. Reurtel 207 Nov 1. You are authorized approach PriMin Qudsi informally to discuss in gen terms what USG might appropriately do help promote Syrian stability. You may in ur discretion guide discussion along lines numbered points (2), (4) and (6) Deptel 151 Oct 25 seeking Qudsi’s views as to whether any of these steps wld be helpful. Re NE Missions’ comments point (1) Deptel 151 Dept concurs preferable suggest Azzam Pasha 2 he may wish counsel Quwatly and Mardam 3 along lines Deptel 151. In ur discussion with Qudsi you shld be careful refrain from committing USG to any of foregoing or other lines of action. If necessary it shld also be made clear that USG sole concern is stability of Syria and not desire support one polit group against another nor to take position on any polit plan, e.g., union with Jordan or Iraq, nor in any way interfere with orderly polit activity under constitutional procedures. Urinfo only. Dept appreciates merits ur arguments re strengthening Qudsi position with army through offers mil advice or mil aid, but latter question can be considered only in context security NE as a whole which involves many complex problems under continuing study. Consequently, you shld endeavor avoid discussion this question. US is now in a position, however, to help strengthen Syrian Govt through provision technical assistance (re Depcirtel Sept 12, 1950 4 ) and it is at all times prepared give sympathetic consideration to supporting Syrian requests UN and specialized agencies for assistance in sound econ and social development projects. Possibility IBRD loan to Syria shld be clarified after current visit IBRD mission. 5 Eximbank also prepared consider loans for projects of econ and social merit. Re London’s 2414 Oct 27. 6 Although Dept has orally informed rep Brit Emb Washington it is considering possibility some action promote Syrian stability, Dept believes any formal consultation with Brit or Fr shld be postponed pending outcome of Leg’s discussions with Qudsi and further clarification as to what, if any, action is feasible or desirable. However, Dept has no objection Emb London continue informal exchange of views with FonOff on question Syrian stability. Dept wld appreciate Leg’s estimate as to whether and to what extent recent arrests and convictions 21 persons motivated by desire Shishakli eliminate polit enemies. Acheson 1 Repeated to London, Paris, Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, Amman, and Beirut. 2 Secretary-General of the Arab League. 3 Jamil Mardam, former Prime Minister of Syria. 4 Not printed; it instructed diplomatic officers to inform the governments to which they were accredited that Point IV funds would be available during fiscal year 1951 and told them to assist these governments in preparing their requests for technical assistance (880.00 TA/9–1250). 5 On July 31 the Syrian Government applied for a loan of $100 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Chargé in Damascus, Owen T. Jones, stated that Nazim Qudsi’s Populist Government wanted this loan in order to demonstrate to the Syrian people some concrete progress in the economic development of the country. Because Jones believed that Qudsi and his party offered the greatest promise for political stability and economic and social progress in Syria, he stated that “it is the opinion of this Legation that the United States should avail itself of every opportunity to help Dr. Qudsi and the Populist Party to consolidate their position. To that end, it is recommended that the Department use its good offices to obtain speedy action by the IBRD on the Syrian application.” (Despatch 188 from Damascus, October 9, 883.10/10–950) 6 Not printed. The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Secretary of State 783.00/11–1650: Telegram [Document 677] The Minister in Syria ( Cannon ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret Damascus , November 16, 1950—5 p. m. 243. Deptel 172, November 9. In long and friendly conversation with PriMin Qudsi this morning he agreed that proposed US approaches to other Arab capitals and through Azzam Pasha to Arab League would be helpful. He is confident of US goodwill and did not offer suggestions on methods to be used. As regards point 2 Deptel 151, October 25, I now think that we can steer clear of charges of interference in Arab affairs by shifting emphasis to exposition of US approval of constructive statesmanship as illustrated by Syria’s earnest effort to remove misunderstandings through Qudsi’s personal visits to Arab capitals (see below). Such a statement along lines of last paragraph Jidda’s 291 to Department, November 10, 2 could be made with minimum of direct advice. In light sensitiveness created by last Sunday’s incident (Legtel 237, November 15 [ 13 ] 3 ) I question wisdom of presenting “evidence” in talks at other capitals at this time. On point 4 reftel, Qudsi said he was aware of Caffery’s strong and beneficent influence on Azzam Pasha. He could not judge intimacy our contacts with Azzam NY, but believed effort either there or at Cairo would be helpful. On point 6 (parallel action by UK and French) I touched only lightly. To my surprise Qudsi reacted sharply as regards French. He said with special reference to Legation here they are still colonizers and were not pursuing enlightened policy. He wondered even if Quai d’Orsay was fully aware of line taken by local Legation. ( Comment: I suggest this be handled with extreme caution since on better acquaintance I hope to work with French Minister on this.) In regards British, he had been assured by British Minister of close cooperation with UK and wryly added was aware of British influence at Baghdad and Amman. I chose as background for talk his review of his visit to Ibn Saud. He told me he said to Ibn Saud that there was no real obstacle to friendliest relations between Syria and Saudi; that only “quarrel of three Kings” was bedeviling relations; that this had produced a band of professional agitators working for their personal profit; that he, Qudsi, felt sure these machinations were not supported by peoples in other countries concerned; and that Syria would not be led into this intrigue because, far from participating, Syria was a victim. Ibn Saud was taken aback, he thought, but did not demur, and asked if Qudsi would say the same to the Hashemites. Qudsi assured him he would go to Baghdad expressly to do so. He told me that he also expects to visit Cairo and is now planning these visits for next week. After reference to unpleasant incident of Sunday (see following telegram 4 ) which he admitted was setback, though temporary so he hoped, to his efforts toward Arab solidarity, Qudsi assured me Ibn Saud should have no misgivings on question of any Syrian interest in union, whether with Iraq or Jordan. This country is proud of its independent policy and alert to any scheme which would retard its further development. See parallel passage in Jidda’s 291. We note that approach at Beirut apparently was not contemplated at time Department’s 151, October 25 was despatched. Though Syria’s troubles with Lebanon have different character and Qudsi is not contemplating visit to Beirut, recent events such as Solh’s trip to Cairo, suggest that Lebanese aspect might be reviewed. We fully recognize force of Cairo’s and Jidda’s argument against invoking tripartite declaration. Cannon 1 Repeated to Cairo, London, Jidda, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Ankara and Paris. 2 Not printed; it described a conversation between the Prime Minister of Syria, Nazim Qudsi, and the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, Raymond A. Hare. When Qudsi stressed the necessity for progress in economic and social fields as contrasted with “old time politics,” Hare applauded him for his “constructive statesmanship which Near East so badly needs.…” (611.83/11–1050) 3 Not printed; it described the announcement by a military judge who, after an investigation of the attempted assassination of Adib Shishakli, charged that Saudi Arabia had supplied money to the 23 terrorists indicted in the case. (783.00/11–1350) 4 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 783.00/11–1750: Telegram [Document 678] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret Washington , November 22, 1950—7 p. m. 2709. 1. View its gen’l interest promoting area stability re Damascus tels 249 Nov 17 2 and 243 Nov 16 Dept favorably considering informal approach to all Arab Govts (including Lebanon but excluding Yemen). Dept reps wld be authorized state belief Qudsi’s efforts other NE capitals remove sources unrest in Syria have merit and shld commend themselves to Arab Govts. Approach wld be kept within context Syrian question only and discussion wld therefore be avoided Qudsi’s proposals paras 2 and 3 Baghdad [ Damascus ] tel 250 Nov 18. 3 2. Although Dept has given consideration joint US–UK–Fr approach it believes Qudsi’s suspicious attitude toward Fr and possible recurrence “spheres of influence” theme such as encountered tripartite approach at present. 3. Dept wld keep UK informed and wld welcome informal support when suitable occasions arise. UK cld be particularly helpful in Iraq and Jordan. 4. Dept wld inform Fr immed prior approach Arab Govts saying Dept confident Fr will approve objectives US effort and believes they may wish lend informal support shld suitable occasions arise. It wld be emphasized to Fr however that USG acting unilaterally and not proposing tripartite action. 5. Dept does not believe desirable refer tripartite declaration since inter alia this might arouse unwarranted fears of imminent threats to Syria, but Dept wld, if asked, reaffirm support of declaration. 6. You may also inform UK that McGhee discussed Syrian situation with Azzam Nov 22 along gen lines indicated Deptel 2153 Oct 25 4 and 2436 Nov 9 5 taking into consideration views Emb Cairo’s 504 Nov 20. 6 Summary of conversation will be forwarded by separate tele. 7. FonOff reaction desired soonest re foregoing. Acheson 1 Repeated to Baghdad, Jidda, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Paris, Amman, Beirut, and Damascus. 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed; it contained an outline of the three main themes which Prime Minister Qudsi hoped to discuss with officials in Baghdad, the last two themes of which dealt with Iraqi-Saudi Arabian friction and Egyptian-British conflict (783.00/11–1850). 4 Repeated to Damascus as telegram 151, October 25, p. 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] . 5 Repeated to Damascus as telegram 172, November 9, p. 1217 [ Pg. 1217 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] . 6 Not printed; it included a recommendation from the Ambassador in Egypt, Jefferson Caffery, that if a Department representative initiated a conversation with Azzam Pasha, the theme of the conversation should center around the point that if Egypt and Saudi Arabia expect Iraq and Jordan to desist from their involvement in Syrian internal affairs, they must desist themselves. The Department should solicit from Azzam Pasha what role he is willing to play in this situation. (783.00/11–2050) No summary of this McGhee–Azzam conversation could be found in Department of State files. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Minister in Syria (Gannon) 783.00/11–150 [Document 679] Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Minister in Syria ( Gannon ) secret official informal Washington , November 14, 1950. Dear Cavendish : We were most interested in your first political telegram (No. 207 of November 1) and those following it. We are gratified with your forthright approach to the problems confronting you in Syria. We knew you would take the turbulent situation in your stride, but had not anticipated that it would become so complicated so soon! Needless to say, we are following with keen interest your conversations with Prime Minister Qudsi. The close succession of events in connection with the alleged Kallas–Ajlani conspiracy, the attempt on Col. Shishakli’s life, and the arrest of nearly two dozen persons including foreigners allegedly in the pay of other Arab governments, represent many cross-currents of influence both within and without Syria. We hope that these hazards can be safely weathered by the fledgling Second Syrian Republic under the surprisingly sound and effective leadership of Nazim al-Qudsi. Naturally, we are most anxious for the orderly development of Syrian political and economic stability, and heartily approve your efforts to this end. Syria has gone through a year and a half of instability. It is remarkable, however, that there have been no widespread disorders and that on the contrary there has been a relative degree of progress along a number of lines. There is, it seems, a hope that Syria may be moving ahead towards greater strength and a more truly democratic regime. In these circumstances we look forward to working out with you the steps we can take to give Syria that encouragement, help and freedom from outside interference which will foster its orderly development. So far as area stability is concerned, we find that one of the most encouraging aspects of Qudsi’s attitude is that he seems ready to remove the Palestine question as an issue in Syrian politics and to let the Arab League handle it. From our contacts with Azzam Pasha and with members of the Arab UN delegations, we are hopeful that some of the other leaders of the Arab League states will be less vociferous than in the past in their opposition to any settlement which can be worked out on such issues as the refugees. However, we shall not make the mistake of being overly-optimistic about this possibility. We would like to encourage Qudsi’s belief, as indicated to Ray Hare in Jidda, that Syria should devote itself to economic development and other matters more important to its national development than raking over the coals of the Palestine conflagration. We wish you success in encouraging Qudsi and other Syrian leaders in this line of thinking. We are confident that you and your staff will constantly endeavor to persuade the Syrians with whom you come in contact that the US Government has a policy of positive friendship for Syria as well as for all other states in the area. We realize your task is not a light one, especially since the extension of American help is so dependent upon Syrian initiative. We hope that Syria will not be less active or thorough in presenting its case for technical assistance or Eximbank and IBRD loans than its neighbors. This will demand positive and early action by Syrian officials. With best wishes, Sincerely yours, George C. McGhee The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 783.00/12–650: Circular telegram [Document 680] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1 secret Washington , December 6, 1950—7 p. m. 286. Although appreciative UK views expressed London tels 3065 Nov 25 2 and 3081 Nov 27 3 Dept believes possible advantages US approaches re Syria outweigh risks that Qudsi will be branded tool of west and purpose approaches thereby defeated. Controlling factor shld be Chief of Mission’s estimate of local reaction to approaches each NE country. US missions thus authorized in their discretion informally approach Arab Govts along lines para 1 Deptel to London 2709 Nov 22 bearing in mind also para 5 re tripartite declaration. Missions may time and tailor approach in manner most likely be effective in country to which accredited but shld stress USG’s strong view that Syrian Republic shld have fair chance set house in order and decide own destiny unhindered by neighbors. Every effort shld be made avoid impression Qudsi visits in any way inspired by US or other western countries and Missions shld make clear that approach not related Anglo-Egyptian question, Collective Security Pact or Qudsi’s proposals re Iraq-Saudi rapprochement , but solely addressed to question intervention by other Arab States in Syrian affairs. Emb Paris shld inform Fr re these approaches stating USG confident Fr will approve Dept’s objective of helping Syrian Govt eliminate intrigue against Syria. Dept not proposing tripartite action but welcomes informal Brit and Fr support shld suitable occasions arise. If Fr, because of suspicion Qudsi or Populist Party favor Syro-Iraqi Union, shld express fear USG action might pave way for extension Hashemite hegemony to Syria, Emb shld emphasize approach being authorized Iraq and Jordan as well as other Arab countries and may state that based on present info USG considers such a development unlikely. Emb London shld also inform UK of foregoing stating USG hopes UK, despite doubts held re advisability of approach, will nevertheless lend support where appropriate, especially in Iraq and Jordan. When action taken inform Brit and Fr colleagues and tel Dept rpting msgs other NE missions London and Paris. Amman being sent special additional instrs by separate tel. Acheson 1 Sent for action to London, Paris, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Beirut, and Amman; sent for information to Damascus and Tel Aviv. 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed; it noted that the British Foreign Office strongly doubted the advisability of approaching the Arab governments about Syrian internal stability (783.00/11–2750). Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Turkey Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Turkey 1 1 For previous documentation on relations with Turkey, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1638 ff. [681] Editorial Note [682] Memorandum of Conversation, Presumably by the Acting Army Attaché at Large [Paris, February 1, 1950.] [683] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs (Moore) [Washington,] February 14, 1950. 882.00R/2–1450 [684] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) [Washington,] February 15, 1950. 641.82/2–1550 [685] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. David H. Henry of the Office of Eastern European Affairs [Washington,] February 23, 1950. 782.022/2–2350 [686] Memorandum by the Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State (Bruce), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) [Washington,] February 28, 1950. 711.56382/2–2850 [687] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, March 1, 1950—7 p. m. 782.5 MAP/2–350: Telegram [688] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) Washington, March 6, 1950. [689] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) Washington, March 20, 1950. 782.5/3–2050 [690] Editorial Note [691] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) [Ankara,] March 26, 1950. 780.5/4–1750 [692] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, March 31, 1950—5 p. m. 882.53/1–2050: Telegram [693] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Robertson) [Washington,] April 10, 1950. 033.1100/4–1050 [694] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance? Department of State (Ohly), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) [Washington,] April 26, 1950. 782.5 MAP/4–2650 [695] The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Consul General at Istanbul (Baldwin) Washington, April 26, 1950. 882.413/4–2650 [696] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) [Washington,] April 27, 1950. 782.5/4–2750 [697] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, April 29, 1950—3 p. m. 782.022/4–2950: Telegram [698] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (Conolly), at London Ankara, 3 May 1950. Ankara Embassy Files, Lot 58F33, 400 Naval Visits [699] The Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ankara, May 4, 1950. Ankara Post Files: Lot 57F72: 400 Defense-Turkey-Airfields 1950 [700] The Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ankara, May 4, 1950. 782.563/5–850 [701] Memorandum by the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Counselor of Embassy ( Perkins ) Ankara, May 5, 1950. 782.563/5–850 [702] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, May 9, 1950—6 p. m. 882.58/4–2450: Telegram [703] Memorandum by the Legal Adviser in the Department of State (Fisher) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and, Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) [Washington,] May 15, 1950. 782.022/5–350 [704] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President [Washington,] May 22, 1950. 782.00/5–2250 [705] President Truman to the President of the Turkish Republic (Bayar) Washington, May 24, 1950—3 p. m. 782.11/5–2450: Telegram [706] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) [Washington,] June 2, 1950. 782.00/6–250 [707] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary-General, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Akdur) Ankara, June 5, 1950. Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 57F72: Box 2: 322.2 Straits 1950–52 [708] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Chargé of Turkish Affairs (Moore) [Washington,] June 7, 1950. 882.00R/6–750 [709] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance, Department of State (Ohly), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) [Washington,] June 14, 1950. 782.5 MAP/6–1450 [710] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) Washington, June 14, 1950. 611.82/6–1450 [711] The Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (Hoffman), to the Turkish Ambassador in the United States (Erkin) [Washington,] June 15, 1950. Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 58F33: Box 3299: 500 ECA [712] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (McBride) Ankara, 28 June 1950—3 p. m. Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 58F33: 400 MDAP: January–June 1950 [713] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] July 21, 1950. 840.00(R)/7–2150 [714] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 22, 1950—noon. 782.5/7–2250: Telegram [715] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, July 24, 1950—11 a. m. 123 Wadsworth, George: Telegram [716] The Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ankara, July 24, 1950. 262A.0041/7–2850 [717] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, July 26, 1950—8 p. m. 782.5/7–2250: Telegram [718] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Istanbul, July 31, 1950—midnight. 782.5/7–3150: Telegram [719] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) [Washington,] August 14, 1950. 782.5/8–1450 [720] The Consul General at Istanbul (Lewis) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) Istanbul, August 16, 1950. 123 Lewis, Charles W., Jr. [721] Memorandum of Conversation, by Major General William H. Arnold [Ankara,] 19 August 1950. Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 58F33: 400 MDAP July–December 1950 [722] The Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador (Erkin) Washington, August 19, 1950. 795B.5/8–1950 [723] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, August 22, 1950—11 a. m. 782.022/8–2250: Telegram [724] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, August 22, 1950—noon. 782.022/8–2250: Telegram [725] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] August 25, 1950. 740.5/8–2550 [726] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, August 25, 1950—8 p. m. 982.542/8–2550: Telegram [727] Editorial Note [728] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, August 31, 1950—3 p. m. 782.022/8–3150: Telegram [729] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, September 1, 1950—6 p. m. 782.022/8–3150: Telegram [730] Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) Washington, 9 September 1950. 740.5/9–1150 [731] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) [Washington,] September 11, 1950. 740.5/9–1150 [732] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Istanbul, September 12, 1950—11 a. m. 740.5/9–1250: Telegram [733] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, September 13, 1950—11 p. m. 782.5/9–1350: Telegram [734] Editorial Note [735] Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom London, September 19, 1950 780.00/9–1850 [736] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) [Washington,] September 19, 1950. S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 42 [737] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State New York, September 19, 1950—6:15 p. m. 740.5/9–1950: Telegram [738] Memorandum by the Officer in Chargé of Turkish Affairs (Moore) [Washington,] September 25, 1950. 782.00/9–2550 [739] Editorial Note [740] The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Turkish Ambassador’ in, the United States (Erkin) Washington, October 13, 1950. 882.10/9–1150 [741] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, November 4, 1950—7 p. m. 782.5 MAP/11–450: Telegram [742] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, November 15, 1950—7 p. m. 611.82/11–1550: Telegram [743] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, November 18, 1950—2 p. m. 782.022/11–1850: Telegram [744] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, November 30, 1950—8 p. m. 282.1869/11–1450: Telegram [745] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, December 1, 1950—noon. 770A.5/12–250: Telegram [746] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, December 11, 1950. 740.5/2–1150 [747] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, December 14, 1950—1 p. m. 795.00/12–1450: Telegram [748] Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs (Tingling) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) [Washington,] December 14, 1950. 782.022/5–350 [749] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, December 18, 1950—5 p. m. 782.5/12–1850 [750] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mrs. Lucille Snyder of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs [Washington,] December 18, 1950. 782.5/12–1850 [751] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey Washington, December 19, 1950—7 p. m. 882.25/12–1950: Telegram [752] Memorandum by the Special Assistant, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (Oden) Ankara, 28 December 1950. Ankara Embassy Piles: Lot 57F72: Turkish Airfields 1950 [753] The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State Ankara, January 12, 1951—4 p. m. 882.25/1–1251: Telegram Editorial Note [Document 681] Editorial Note Turkey and the United States agreed on January 31, 1950, to the establishment of a Turkish Government special account in the Turkish Central Bank for the deposit of Turkish liras in an amount commensurate with the cost of United States grant economic assistance to Turkey, from which funds would be released for expenditure in Turkey. For the text of this agreement which entered into force upon signature, see the Protocol signed at Ankara on January 31, amending the Economic Cooperation Agreement of July 4, 1948, between the United States and Turkey; Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2037, printed in United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), Volume I, page 188; also, United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), Volume LXXVI, page 258. Memorandum of Conversation, Presumably by the Acting Army Attaché at Large Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 58F33: 500 ECA Counterpart Funds 1 [Document 682] Memorandum of Conversation, Presumably by the Acting Army Attaché at Large 2 secret [ Paris , February 1, 1950.] At a meeting at the Turkish Embassy in Paris on 1 February, the following opinions were expressed by Turkish Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak and Turkish Ambassador to France, Numan Menemencioğlu. The Acting Army Attaché at Large was present and acted as interpreter for ECA Administrator Paul Hoffman and Ambassador Averell Harriman. 3 Mr. Sadak said lie was happy to have the opportunity to meet with Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Harriman in Paris. Their presence here had indeed been influential in his decision to come to Paris. Inasmuch as Turkey now has a Ministry for Marshall Plan affairs, he is no longer the competent minister to discuss the merely technical aspects of the European Recovery Program; nevertheless, inasmuch as the matter had political implications, he was delighted with the opportunity to speak to Mr. Hoffman, not only in his capacity as ECA Administrator, but also as a prominent American with considerable influence with President Truman, Secretary Acheson and other influential personalities in the American Government. He began by stating that Turkey because of her proximity to the Soviet danger had to bear an extremely heavy burden of military expenditures. Belgium, for instance, was spending 8% of her budget on national defense. France in the forthcoming year would spend between 18 and 20%. In the case of Turkey, this expenditure amounted to over half of the national budget. Because this situation had been going on for eleven years, Turkey had been unable to finance investment projects. He said that this situation was difficult for the Turks when they looked at Western Europe and saw that the countries thereof had already passed their prewar production indices and were continuing their economic development. Turkey had not yet been able to really start her economic development and during the past year when he had been in the United States, he had discussed Turkey’s problems with the State Department and asked two questions in the course of his conversations there. First, he realized that because of U.S. legislation and necessity for obtaining Congressional approval, it was not possible for the U.S. to help Turkey directly with her military budget outside of the military assistance being rendered under the existing military aid programs, but he wondered whether it would not be possible for the U.S. to furnish Turkey with some consumer goods of military use (concurrently with the Military Aid Program) which might help Turkey’s needs in this field and lighten the burden of the defense budget or, if this were not possible, if the U.S. could furnish Turkey with a certain quantity of consumer goods which the Turkish Government might sell in Turkey and with the result thereof proceed with their investment program and with the financing of projects to be developed with Marshall Plan credits. He also asked that the State Department support him in his efforts to secure a loan from private banking circles in the U.S. In reply to his first question he was told that it would not be possible for the U.S. to supply these consumer goods as requested but it was suggested that in the Turkish presentation of her program to the OEEC she might request that the counterpart in Turkish pounds for a wheat grant of $20 million and drawing rights might be used for the purposes Mr. Sadak had in mind. He was told the U.S. would view this initiative sympathetically and support it. With regard to the second question, he said the State Department had arranged for appointments with American bankers for him and also given him an official of the State Department to accompany him on his visits to these bankers. He had a number of interviews and the general tenor of the replies which he received was to the effect that while great friendship and interest was felt in Turkey, Turkey was nevertheless too close to the Soviet Union for loans to be granted unless guaranteed by the Turkish gold reserves. This, Mr. Sadak stated, his government was not able to see its way to do. The Turkish government had gone ahead and included in its programs this request for the use of the counterpart funds of the wheat grant and the drawing rights and this had been agreed to by the OEEC. He realized that the Marshall Plan credits would decrease from year to year but asked Mr. Hoffman for his assistance in obtaining for Turkey the same facilities in the forthcoming year and in pointing out the special case constituted by Turkey because of the immense burden of her defense budget. Mr. Sadak then stated that Turkey would not say to her American friends that unless she were helped she would be unable to bear the burden of this large military establishment. With help or without help, she would continue to maintain her army strong as long as the Russian danger was at her border. How this would be done without help he did not know but it would be done. Mr. Hoffman then thanked Mr. Sadak for what he had said and said that he hoped they would not exaggerate the extent of his influence. He said that in the matters relating to OEEC he would prefer to let Mr. Harriman speak because he was more familiar with the operation of OEEC. Insofar as he was concerned, he would do everything he could to promote a greater understanding of Turkey and to develop friendship for Turkey in the U.S. This would not be difficult as there had been a great change in American opinion in the last ten years. At that time the attitude toward Turkey, if not unfriendly, had been at least one of lack of interest. Today quite the opposite was the case. He would also give his support to any technical studies that might be of use to Turkey. He cited the recent Iraq study which had resulted in great interest in American investment circles. Ambassador Harriman then stated that he fully understood Turkey’s problems and that his advice was that Turkey include in her program for OEEC a request for the consumer goods that were necessary to finance her investment program and development program under the European Recovery Program. While he was aware of the defense considerations involved he thought that if the Turkish presentation established the relationship between the need of financing the investment program and the import of the consumer goods required to implement this that it would be more susceptible of favorable consideration by OEEC. Ambassador Harriman added that even if Mr. Hoffman were able to obtain for Turkey all that she wishes, which, he felt sure, would not be possible, there would be no permanence in this as a solution. He felt that Turkey should attempt to attract American capital in the form of private investment by creating a climate which would tend to cause American capital to flow toward Turkey. This would be a permanent development and was far less redoubtable now than it had been in the past when foreign capital had in some cases sought to exploit the countries in which it was invested. Today a new spirit was abroad in American business and there was a realization that foreign capital could not profitably be invested against the will of the country in which it operated and unless it contributed something to the life of the country in which it was invested. It was difficult to define what constituted a favorable climate but Mr. Harriman expressed his willingness together with Mr. Dorr 4 to advise the Turks how best this could be achieved in general terms. At this point Mr. Sadak broke in to state that the Turkish Government had introduced a bill to the Grand National Assembly guaranteeing foreign investments, guaranteeing their right to transfer reasonable profits out of the country and offering other additional guarantees. This bill might even have been passed and promulgated at the present time but he stated that despite the Turkish Government’s efforts to create a favorable climate, American capital was moving slowly toward Turkey. As far as oil was concerned, the Turks had received several vague and hazy proposals but nothing serious and straightforward. Mr. Harriman repeated that creating a favorable climate was difficult but that he and Mr. Dorr and Mr. Hoffman would do what they could to help the Turkish Government along these lines. Mr. Menemencioğlu then said that inasmuch as American banking circles had told Mr. Sadak that Turkey was too close to the Soviet Union for loans without guarantees in gold, might not the same reply be made by American investors? To this Mr. Hoffman replied that on his return to the U.S. he would bear in mind what Mr. Sadak had told him. Mr. Sadak expressed his thanks and the conversation concluded. Comment: Turks were apparently attempting to obtain exception to general rule of Marshall Plan funds for each country diminishing each year by pointing out unusually heavy financial burden Turkey must bear because of necessity for maintenance of a strong army. Outstanding flat declaration of Sadak’s was statement that with or without help Turkey would maintain strong armed forces. 1 Record Group No. 84, Federal Records Center (Suitland, Md.) Accession No. 59 A 543–part–10, Box 3299. 2 The author of this memorandum of conversation is not identified in the source text. The document was distributed by its originator, the European Command, U.S. Army, to the Army Attaché, Paris, and the Army Attaché, Ankara; it was seen by principal officers of the Embassy in Turkey. 3 Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration, and W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, attended the meetings of the Consultative Group of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), Paris, January 26–27, and of the Council of the OEEC, Paris, January 31–February 1. For documentation on OEEC participation in economic planning in Europe, see vol. iii , pp. 611 ff. 4 Russell H. Dorr, Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Turkey. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs (Moore) 882.00R/2–1450 [Document 683] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs ( Moore ) confidential [ Washington ,] February 14, 1950. Subject: Turkey’s Development Program in Relation to its Fiscal Policy Participants: Mr. McGhee, Assistant Secretary, NEA Ambassador Wadsworth 1 Mr. Russell Dorr, ECA Mission Chief in Turkey Mr. E. T. Dickinson, Jr., Director of Program Coordination, ECA Mr. William M. Blaisdell, EGA 2 Mr. Carter DePaul, ECA 3 Mr. William M. Rountree, Deputy Director, GTI Mr. George Woodbridge, GTI 4 Mr. Saul R. Srole, MN 5 Mr. Mortimer Goldstein, MN Mr. C. R. Moore, GTI Problem: In view of the threat to Turkey’s internal financial stability resulting from its ambitious economic development program, ECA seeks the support of the Department in its efforts to induce the Turkish Government to undertake a development program within its financial capabilities. Action Taken: General agreement reached on the necessity of obtaining from the Turkish Government a detailed statement of its program with the object of determining with it the relative priority of the component parts and agreeing on those which should be deferred. Mr. Dorr expressed grave concern over evidences that the Turkish Government is not making a serious effort to carry out its commitment under the ECA Bilateral Agreement 6 that it use its best endeavors to balance its budget and to create internal financial stability. He had been particularly aware of this recently when the Minister of Finance 7 informed him that he anticipated that the budgetary deficit for fiscal year beginning March 1, 1951 (FY 1951) might be in the neighborhood of TL 250,000,000 as contrasted with the then contemplated budgetary deficit for the fiscal year beginning March 1, 1950 (FY 1950) of TL 155,000,000. 8 The Turkish Government is counting on the release of counterpart funds to finance this latter deficit and even though such funds may not reach this figure, the deficit to be met from other sources may not exceed TL 50,000,000 which it is expected can be financed without serious inflationary effect. However, for FY 1951, releases of counterpart funds to finance the considerably larger deficit anticipated cannot be counted on to the same extent, as ECA aid, direct and indirect, will be on a declining scale with the further likelihood that imports of consumable goods financed by ECA grant funds and drawing rights will be substantially reduced. As there is little expectation that the market for government bonds, now extremely limited, will develop, the larger part of the deficit would probably have to be met by inflationary borrowing, which would tend to have the effect of undermining the objectives of the ECA program in Turkey. The Turkish budget is characterized by two large categories of expenditures—those for national defense and those for economic development. It was generally agreed that no reductions in the defense budget could be expected during the next few years and that; the economic development budget was the most susceptible of curtailment. Mr. Dorr expressed the view that the budget for FY 195Q as now drawn up contains a number of development projects which might be desirable if the Turks could afford them but which are not essential under present conditions. While this budget has not yet been approved by the National Assembly, it has progressed too far along in the parliamentary process to make it politically feasible for the Turkish Government to eliminate these projects prior to final Assembly action on the budget. He will continue his efforts to persuade it not to proceed with them even after they are authorized although he is not too hopeful of success as budgetary authorizations are generally viewed as commands. In order to avoid the recurrence of the same situation next year, he felt that no time should be lost in impressing on the Government the necessity of limiting the investment program for FY 1951 to those projects which are considered to be the most essential in relation to available financing. One of the most effective means of inducing the Turks to think in these realistic terms lies in our counterpart policy. Agreement by this Government to the release of counterpart funds should be based not only on the justification submitted for a specific project, but also on the broader aspect of the measures being taken to attain internal financial stability. Upon his return to Turkey Mr. Dorr wants to get this point of view over to the Turks and, if necessary, to use the release of counterpart funds for this purpose. Before so doing, however, he wants to be assured that ECA Washington and the Department of State will support him. Ambassador Wadsworth stressed the efforts that he and Mr. Dorr have made to get from the Turks an adequate statement of their entire development program, which would detail anticipated expenditures by year and by project. It was agreed that efforts to obtain such a statement from the Turks should continue to be exerted. With a statement of this kind, it would be possible to determine with them the relative priority of the component parts and to arrive at agreement on the projects which, in view of financial limitations, should be deferred. Our willingness to release counterpart funds might depend on the willingness of the Turks to reach such an agreement. Ambassador Wadsworth further advanced the suggestion that were we to inform the Turks that future ECA aid would be on a grant basis, we would give them added incentive to go along with our suggestions. In view of the uncertainty as to Congressional action on the ECA appropriations for the next two years, it was recognized that we cannot now give assurances to the Turks of grant aid. Mr. McGhee pointed out that it was not uncommon for countries undertaking a substantial program of economic development to resort to deficit financing but that the inflationary effects had to be carefully gauged. He felt that in any event, the rate of planned development was an arbitrary one and that it could be stepped up or slowed down as circumstances dictated. He assured Mr. Dorr of the Department’s support in his effort to induce the Turks to adopt a more realistic development program and to defer those projects which are unessential in relation to their present capacity to finance them. 1 Ambassador Wadsworth was in Washington for duty with the Selection Board of the Foreign Service from early January 1950. 2 Fiscal and Trade Policy Division, Office of the Assistant Administrator for Program, ECA. 3 Office of the Special Representative in Europe for the ECA. 4 Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, GTI. 5 Acting Chief of Monetary Stabilization Branch, MN. 6 For the text of the Economic Cooperation Agreement signed at Ankara by representatives of the United States and Turkey, July 4, 1948, see TIAS No. 1794, or 62 Stat, (pt.2) 2566. 7 Ismail R. Aksal. 8 Regarding the Turkish fiscal year 1950 budgetary deficit, the Embassy in Turkey recommended to the Department of State that the Turkish Government, which was required by law to present the FY 1950 budget to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA) by February 15, show TL 155 million counterpart funds on the receipt side of the budget with the explanation that the detailed allocation of this money to investment projects remained to be worked out (telegram 58, February 9, from Ankara, 882.10/2–950, not printed). The Turkish FY 1950 budget adopted by the Grand National Assembly on February 27 showed a deficit of TL 173,939,000, of which TL 154,949,000 was slated to be met out of counterpart funds generated by direct ECA aid and OEEC drawing rights. (Despatch 197, March 13, from Ankara, 882.10/3–1350, not printed) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) 641.82/2–1550 [Document 684] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) secret [ Washington ,] February 15, 1950. Subject: Remarks of Turkish Ambassador Participants: Feridun C. Erkin, Ambassador of the Turkish Republic Mr. R. A. Hare—NEA In the course of a luncheon at the Turkish Embassy in honor of Russell H. Dorr, Chief, ECA Mission to Turkey, the Turkish Ambassador took occasion to refer to a conversation which he had with Mr. Rusk on December 5, 1 in which Mr. Rusk had raised the question of Turkey’s attitude in the event of an attack on Great Britain, in view of the reservation in the Turko-British Treaty 2 specifying that Turkey would not be obligated to take action which would involve her in a war with the Soviet Union. The Ambassador said that he had observed that at the time of the drafting of the treaty with Great Britain, the focus of attention had been on Italy and Germany but that the situation had, of course, changed and with it the attitude of Turkey regarding any reservation in respect of the Soviet Union. He said that he had reported this conversation to his Government and had received a reply endorsing his observations. He asked that note be taken of this in connection with his previous conversation with Mr. Rusk. The Ambassador also referred to his repeated approaches to the Department regarding the desirability of concluding a regional Near Eastern pact of which Turkey would be a member and which would be supported by the United States. He said he wished to make it clear that what he basically had in mind was the desirability of some form of appropriate assurance to Turkey itself; that was essential. Taking into consideration the American constitutional procedure and recent policy developments, it had seemed that the best way in which such a relationship between Turkey and the United States could be achieved was by the regional pact method. But, if some alternative form of unilateral assurance could be given, it would meet Turkish desires. For instance, such assurance might even be given in the form of a declaration by the President which would specifically place Turkey in the same category as members of the North Atlantic Pact. He then observed that it was not only important that such an assurance should be given Turkey but that it should be timed before the coming Turkish elections in order that it might strengthen the position of the present Peoples’ Party Government. The Ambassador said that he was certain that there was no question but that relations between the United States and Turkey could best be maintained by the present Government headed by President Inönü remaining in power. The Ambassador also referred in terms of apparent serious concern to what he felt to be an over-emphasis by the United States Government on developments in the Far East. He said it seemed clear to him that Russia’s real objective was Europe and that the Russians were merely playing a clever game of distracting our attention to the Far East while preparing for a kill in Europe. On the other hand, with respect to one European country, Yugoslavia, the Ambassador was critical of the support we were giving that country. He seemed to feel that some form of support was perhaps desirable but that it would be a great mistake to become so deeply involved that disengagement would become difficult or impossible in time of crisis. 1 For text of the memorandum of conversation, December 5, 1949, by Deputy Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. iv , p. 359 . 2 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc , p. 167; also British Cmd. 6165, Treaty Series No. 4 (1940): Treaty of Mutual Assistance between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom, the President of the French Republic and the President of the Turkish Republic ( With Special Agreement and Subsidiary Agreements ), Angora, October 19, 1939 . Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. David H. Henry of the Office of Eastern European Affairs 782.022/2–2350 [Document 685] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. David H. Henry of the Office of Eastern European Affairs top secret [ Washington ,] February 23, 1950. Subject: Photographic Mapping of Turkey Participants: John D. Jernegan—GTI, Chairman Ambassador Wadsworth Colonel G. G. Northrup 1 Colonel H. Milwit 1 Captain T. T. Tucker 1 Mr. H. L. Coggin 2 Mr. C. Robert Moore—GTI Mr. David Henry—EE The meeting was largely devoted to a review of past developments on this subject and to an attempt to determine exactly how matters stand at present. It appears that the British have gotten nowhere with their plans for mapping in Turkey and also that there have been no developments in this project of a mapping survey through ECA-commercial channels. As to future course of action, it was decided that the Defense Establishment would take the initiative in trying to obtain ECA agreement to undertake a photo mapping survey of at least those parts of Turkey where maps are necessary for economic reasons. Mr. Jernegan said that the Department would support this proposal, mentioning that EUR had already given its approval for a commercial approach. It was further suggested that, if the above project went through, other, purely strategic areas of Turkey might be mapped at the same time through a separate and secret contract between the Defense Establishment and the American private corporation which would undertake the mapping. Both Mr. Jernegan and I pointed out that EUR had not agreed to such an additional contract in which Defense would participate directly. Mr. Jernegan said that from what he knew of Mr. Thompson’s position on this subject, he believed that Mr. Thompson would have no objection. I promised to inquire into this phase of the matter and to inform Mr. Jernegan. 3 1 Col. George C. Northrup, USAF: Col. Herbert Milwit, USA: and Capt. Thayer T. Tucker, USN, were members of the Photographic and Survey Section, Joint Staff, JCS. 1 Col. George C. Northrup, USAF: Col. Herbert Milwit, USA: and Capt. Thayer T. Tucker, USN, were members of the Photographic and Survey Section, Joint Staff, JCS. 1 Col. George C. Northrup, USAF: Col. Herbert Milwit, USA: and Capt. Thayer T. Tucker, USN, were members of the Photographic and Survey Section, Joint Staff, JCS. 2 Harry L. Coggin, Cartographer with the Joint Staff, JCS. 3 Mr. Henry informed Mr. Jernegan on February 23 that Llewellyn E. Thompson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, had given his approval for the proposal for mapping strategic areas of Turkey (notations by Messrs. Thompson and Henry on the source text). No documentation was found in Department of State files indicating that photographic mapping of Turkey was carried out in 1950. Memorandum by the Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State (Bruce), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) 711.56382/2–2850 [Document 686] Memorandum by the Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State ( Bruce ), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense ( Lemnitzer ) top secret [ Washington ,] February 28, 1950. Subject: Reconstruction of Military Airfields in Turkey with FY 1950 MDAP Funds. I refer to FACC D–19/2, November 15, 1949, 1 above subject, and to the approval informally given thereto at the FMACC meeting February 23, 1950. 2 As you are aware, the proposal set forth therein raised some very grave doubts on the part of the Department of State as to the wisdom of proceeding with the proposal concerned. These doubts were based upon considerations connected with the effect of the proposed action upon our foreign relations vis-à-vis certain other countries. The possibilities of accomplishing the rehabilitation of the subject airfields without direct and open operational control of the project by the United States Government has been thoroughly explored in conjunction with the Department of Defense. It appeared that the need for these airfields, the need for adequate fiscal and engineering controls, and the disadvantages connected with other proposals considered compel the conclusion that it is impossible to accomplish the desired objective in any way other than as originally suggested. The Department of State, therefore, is prepared to accept the proposal submitted in FACC D–19/2. However, it is imperative that, to the extent possible, it should appear that the work is being done for Turkey, compatible with the needs of the Turkish airforce, and not for the United States of America in view of the needs of our armed forces. It is therefore requested that this factual position be clearly and publicly taken by all connected with this project. Of course, undue emphasis on the negative aspect of this doctrine is undesirable from the point of view of the U.S.S.R. reaction thereto; but appropriate emphasis on the Turkish need for this project should be accomplished. For James Bruce: John H. Ohly 1 Not printed; this document transmitted to appropriate officers a memorandum of November 3, 1949, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for consideration at a future meeting of the interdepartmental Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee (FACC). The memorandum proposed reprogramming the fiscal year 1950 budget for assistance to the Turkish Air Force to provide for construction of Turkish airfields. Ambassador Wadsworth and Turkish Minister of National Defense Hüsnü Çakir had agreed in principle on the Turkish and American contributions for reconstruction of the required facilities on October 21, 1949, subject to the approval of United States authorities. (Interdepartmental Committee Files: Lot 54D5: FACC D–19/2. Lot 54D5 consists Of documentation of Department of State and interdepartmental committees dealing with military assistance programs, inter alia , for the years 1942–1953.) 2 The minutes of the interdepartmental Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC) meeting of February 23, 1950, do not refer to any approval informally given to the proposal for reconstruction of Turkish airfields or to any discussion of this proposal (FMACC M–4, February 23, 1950; Interdepartmental Committee Files: Lot 54D5: FMACC Minutes). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 782.5 MAP/2–350: Telegram [Document 687] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey top secret Washington , March 1, 1950—7 p. m. 90. Tomap. Re Embtel 43 Feb 3. 1 Desire clarify policy re appropriately pressuring Turk Govt take adequate steps place MDAP equipment to effective use. Imperative every appropriate action be taken insure US grant aid is effectively assimilated and used by recipient countries. Burden this program on US Treasury and mil aspect of its justification, which in case of Turk is very strong, require continued alert pursuit this policy. Dept has every confidence that CHAMAT 2 and Chief JAMMAT have in past fully recognized importance thereof and is confident they will continue implement same. Need for clarification believed exist view ref in Tap 8037, 18 Jan 3 to “disciplinary action”. Whether or not appropriate pressure be so termed, it is desired Turk officials fully appreciate US policy this respect, and that, if need be, supply action be appropriately restrained to indicate controlling importance US attaches this aspect. Dept relies on experience and discretion CHAMAT and group chiefs in pursuing this policy. Cleared Def. Acheson 1 Not printed; it stated that Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride, Chief of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT), had reported that the “Only known means to prod Turks into action [for effective use of Military Defense Assistance Program equipment] is to withhold shipment of FY 1950 material until positive corrective measures have been taken” (782.5 MAP/2–350). 2 Chief of the American Mission for Aid to Turkey and Ambassador in Turkey, George Wadsworth. 3 Not found in Department of State files. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 42 1 [Document 688] Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Webb ) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay ) [Extract] 2 top secret Washington , March 6, 1950. Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 42/1, 3 “United States Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to United States Security”, approved as Governmental Policy on March 23, 1949. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B. Turkey i. policy implementation Pursuant to the conclusions set forth in NSC Document 42/1, United States military aid to Turkey has been continued during fiscal 1950 under statutes appropriating $265 million for Greece and Turkey. Final determination of the portion of this amount that will be allocated to the Turkish program awaits agreement on justifications between the State and Defense Departments, but it is anticipated that it will be approximately $81 million. Total funds appropriated and allocated for military assistance to Turkey under the Aid Program will thus be brought to $236 million. It is tentatively contemplated that the Turkish requirement for fiscal 1951 will be in the order of $45 million. United States military aid in the form of matériel and training is playing a primary and effective role in the program to modernize the Turkish Armed Forces with the result that a greater combat effectiveness is being achieved with less expenditure of men. This has made possible a reduction in the size of the Turkish Armed Forces from an estimated 500,000 men at the time the Aid Program was initiated to somewhat less than 300,000 men at present, an important factor from the viewpoint of the civilian economy. The maintenance of the Turkish defense establishment, however, continues to impose a very heavy burden on the Turkish economy, necessitating the expenditure of 35 to 40% of the country’s budgetary revenues. The Turks have periodically urged that they be included either in the Atlantic Pact or some similar regional arrangement. This Government has taken the position that it cannot consider such an extension of its contractual security arrangements at this time. The Turks have also suggested that, while awaiting a decision on a political commitment by the United States, the General Staffs of the two countries undertake discussions of a common plan of defense and assistance. Views of the Secretary of Defense are being sought, but it is anticipated that the suggestion will be rejected on the grounds that such planning could only be undertaken if there were a prior political agreement. An increase in the very low standard of living in Turkey is one of the necessary elements in strengthening Turkish efforts to oppose Communist pressure. ECA assistance has enabled Turkey to undertake a program of economic development which, because of the national defense burden, would not have otherwise been possible. Direct ECA assistance in fiscal 1950 will total $59 million, in addition to which Turkey is expected to receive $55 million in drawing rights on other ERP countries. It is anticipated that in fiscal 1951, Turkey will receive $46 million in direct ECA aid and $30 million in drawing rights. These funds are being utilized to purchase modern agricultural equipment which will make possible an increase in Turkey’s agricultural production, to modernize and enlarge the coal mines, to develop the very inadequate internal transportation system, to develop power resources—all important elements in the country’s basic economy. While these projects are designed to contribute to European recovery, they will likewise serve to increase the national income of Turkey with resultant improvement in the standard of living and in its ability to support its defense burden. ii. policy evaluation There have been no developments which would appear to warrant a change in United States objectives with respect to Turkey as set forth in NSC Document 42/1. The determination of Turkey to resist Soviet pressure remains unshaken and its confidence in its ability to do so has been greatly fortified by the military aid extended by the United States, as well as by periodic public reiteration of the interest of the United States in its security and integrity. United States aid has contributed to strengthening the political stability of the country with the result that continued progress is being made in the program of democratization. These factors undoubtedly account in part for the absence of overt or violent Soviet pressure on Turkey during the past year, although Soviet radio and press propaganda, acting to undermine the Turkish Government, as well as Turkish-American relations has continued. The economic burden on Turkey of carrying out the necessary modernization of its military forces is still greater than that country can bear without direct United States military aid in addition to the economic aid extended through ECA. In view, therefore, of the long range interest of this country in Turkey, United States aid to that country must be continued. James E. Webb 1 Lot 63D351 is a serial master file of the National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State. 2 For the omitted portion of this report, see p. 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 135 ] . 3 For the text of NSC 42/1, of March 22, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 269 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) 782.5/3–2050 [Document 689] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) top secret No. 19 Washington , March 20, 1950. Sir : The Department has studied with considerable interest the memorandum given to you by Mr. Sadak, the Turkish Foreign Minister, on the occasion of your last conversation with him in December 1949 1 prior to your departure for this country. Particular attention has been given to the proposal contained in Mr. Sadak’s memorandum that a common plan of defense and assistance be drawn up between the General Staffs of the two countries while awaiting a Department of State decision on a political commitment to Turkey. You will recall that during your stay in Washington a reply was prepared in the Department for you to make to Mr. Sadak upon your return to Turkey (Enclosure 1). 2 It was subsequently submitted to the Department of Defense where it was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of State has now been informed by the Department of Defense that it perceives no objection to this reply from a military point of view and you are, therefore, requested to convey it to the Foreign Minister in such form as you deem appropriate. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: Dean Rusk [Enclosure 1] 3 Reply To Be Made by Ambassador Wadsworth to Mr. Sadak During my recent visit to Washington, I took occasion in my meetings with leading officials in the Department of State and the Department of Defense to discuss in full detail the conversation I had with Your Excellency on December ——, 4 1949, just before my departure from Turkey. I can assure you that as a result of these conversations, I have come away from Washington deeply impressed with the realization and appreciation of these officials of the particularly valuable contribution which Turkey is making in the joint endeavors of the freedom-loving countries of the world to prevent Russian aggression. In the view of the President and of the Secretary of State, the importance to the United States of the independence and integrity of Turkey, enunciated so clearly by the President in his speech of March 1947 requesting Congressional action on the Greek-Turkish Aid Program legislation 5 and reiterated on a number of subsequent occasions, has in no way been diminished by the developments that have taken place since that time. As Mr. McGhee explained to you last December, 6 my Government does not feel able to enter into any new contractual security arrangements at the present time. Secretary Acheson informed me that in his desire to speak very frankly with you during your meeting last April, 7 he had indicated that there was little likelihood of bringing Turkey into such an arrangement in such a relatively short period of time as one year. While considerable progress has been made since then in establishing the organizational framework envisaged under the Atlantic Pact, there remains the more important problem of implementing the Pact by concrete steps designed to strengthen the collective defensive capacity of the treaty nations. Under present circumstances, we still do not feel able to consider an extension of our formal security arrangements. I can assure you, however, that the desire of the Turkish Government to be included in the Atlantic Pact or a similar regional pact is being constantly borne in mind by the officials concerned with the problems of international collective security. I should like to comment very briefly on the third point mentioned in your memorandum of our last conversation concerning your suggestion that the General Staffs of our two countries begin the preparation of a common plan of defense and assistance while awaiting a political undertaking by my Government. I know the importance which your President attaches to this problem. My discussions at Washington, discussions held at a very high level, all led to the conclusion that joint war planning could only be undertaken if there were a prior political agreement. Joint planning without such an agreement would imply a commitment which the executive branch of my Government could not properly give. It is nevertheless considered understandable that as a result of the changed military capacities of the Turkish Armed Forces reflecting the aid received under the American Military Aid Program, as well as of the changes in strategic concepts which have been evolving since the conclusion of World War II, the Turkish General Staff would wish to revise Turkey’s strategic war plans. I have been particularly pleased to learn that, during my absence, discussions have been begun between your General Staff and General McBride relative to revising or improving such plans and that General McBride has indicated his willingness to be of assistance, within the limits of his authority, in giving military advice of a strategic nature. 8 It is, of course, understood that such advice as he may be able to give will not directly or indirectly commit the United States to any future course of action. This, the revision of Turkish strategic war plans, appears to me and to the officials whom I have consulted to be the most practical step that can be taken at the present time, a step which will unquestionably be of great value should circumstances make possible at a later date the joint planning you have proposed. 1 Not printed. 2 Ambassador Wadsworth was scheduled to call on the Secretary of State in Washington, March 20, to discuss the reply to Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak (Enclosure 1 below), a copy of which was transmitted to the Secretary of State by a memorandum of March 16 from John D. Jernegan, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (782.5 MAP/3–1650, not printed). No record of the scheduled conversation between Ambassador Wadsworth and the Secretary of State on March 20 has been found in Department of State files. Ambassador Wadsworth returned to Ankara on March 23. 3 President Ismet Inönü of Turkey read this memorandum on March 26 before his conversation with Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, at Ankara on the same day. 4 The date December 19 is inserted in handwriting on the French translation of this memorandum (RG 84, FRC Accession No. 68 A 5159, Ankara Embassy Files, Lot 57F72, Box 1, 030 Visits, 1950–1952). 5 Reference is to the address of President Harry S. Truman before Congress on March 12, 1947. (Department of State Bulletin Supplement , May 4, 1947, p. 829, or Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 176). 6 See the editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1685 . 7 See the memorandum of conversation, April 12, 1949, at Washington, by Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, ibid. , p. 1647 . 8 The Joint Advisory and Planning Staff (JAPS) of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) was established on January 15, 1950, to carry on discussions of Turkish war and mobilization plans with the Turkish General Staff Plans Group (Briefing for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, undated: Ankara Embassy Files, Lot 57F72, Box 1, 030 Visits, 1950–1952). Editorial Note [Document 690] Editorial Note Turkey and the United States signed at Ankara on December 27, 1949, an agreement (despatch 14, January 5, 1950, from Ankara, 511.823/1–550; TIAS No. 2111, printed in 1 UST 603; also, 98 UNTS 141) which, following its entry into force on March 21, 1950, provided for the establishment of a United States Educational Commission in Turkey to help administer an educational exchange program authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Congress, the Fulbright Act, approved August 1, 1946 (60 Stat. (pt. 11) 754). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Collins) 780.5/4–1750 [Document 691] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of Staff, United States Army ( Collins ) 1 top secret [ Ankara ,] March 26, 1950. Subject: Turkish War Planning Present: Turks Americans President Ismet Inönü General J. Lawton Collins Minister of National Defense Shukru 2 Ambassador Wadsworth Chief of Staff, General Gurman 3 Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride Deputy Chief of Staff, General Axelun 4 Colonel Douglas V. Johnson 2 Interpreters The President and General Collins exchanged greetings. General Collins said he had been Deputy Chief of Staff when he had been here last 5 but now that he was Chief of Staff he was even more interested than before in seeing what the American Aid Mission had accomplished. The President replied that he had no doubt the General would be satisfied and asked where he had been in Western Europe, especially had he been to France. General Collins said that he had been in Rome, Trieste and Athens. 6 The President asked if they were working hard in Western Union–harder than in Turkey. General Collins replied that he did not know—probably not! The President asked how the problem of defense of Western Europe would be worked out. General Collins replied that it was being most carefully studied under the Atlantic Pact. The President said that he was hoping for the best in the future but that he had not yet had the assurance that there was determination in Western Europe to establish a front. General Collins stated that he felt confident the North Atlantic Pact Organization would be able to organize and establish a front in Western Europe. The President asked how long it would take. General Collins said it would be three to four years before the western powers would be sufficiently strong. The President asked why it should be so long since those were rich countries and the United States was doing its best to help. If they decided seriously today, it would not take long. General Collins replied they could raise the men but they could not create the equipment overnight. The President said the front could be established with insufficient equipment and deficiencies eliminated in time. General Collins said Yes, but at least two or three years would be required in Western European countries, including Italy. The President said first of all they must make up their minds. General Collins said we thought they had made up their minds but that the equipment of modern armies cannot be constructed in a year or so. The President said that he was glad that the General was optimistic about the completion of the organization in the West but that he was afraid that the progress was sluggish—if the slow progress continued the task would not be finished in time. Turkey is impatient because it is under the guns. General Collins said that we were doing our best to help Turkey prepare its Army, Navy and Air Force for war. The President said he was grateful for that and asked the Ambassador what good news he brought from the United States. The Ambassador outlined the memorandum which he had brought from Mr. Acheson to the Turkish Foreign Minister, 4 stressing that it had received careful consideration and approval at highest level; the territorial integrity and the national defense of Turkey was continuously in our minds; it was part of our overall thinking but not confined to thinking alone; that was what General Collins meant when he said we are “doing our best to help”. He could, too, add an important point made in Washington in support of General Collins’ argument that it must take a relatively long time to get Western Europe working together; the foreign ministers take little time to agree on policies, the ministers of national defense agree easily on desired contributions to the common defense, and the Chiefs of Staff are anxious to make it work; but current difficulty comes when the finance ministers oppose measures which will affect their countries internal economies. Mr. Acheson had told him he felt confident that substantial progress on this score would be achieved at the Atlantic Treaty foreign ministers’ meeting next month. 5 The President observed that General Collins was very calm. He asked, “How long before the next war”. General Collins replied that we do not think war is imminent. The President asked, “Why not?” General Collins replied that we think Russia has no stockpile of atomic bombs; that she has no navy and only now has begun the creation of a long range air force, and that since Russia is gaining a large number of her objectives without fighting, there is no reason for her to go to war now. The President said that he had heard rumors that the Russians would take over Berlin in the near future. General Collins said he believed the Russians would cause disturbances in late May, using boys organizations but he did not think they would seek to occupy Berlin. The President said that occupation of Berlin would mean a collision. General Collins replied, “We will remain in Berlin”. The President said you have United States forces in Berlin. If the Russians want to occupy Berlin by force a collision will result. General Collins said that we expected that German civilians would be used to cause the disturbances but that we did not believe that Russian troops would seek to enter the Western Sectors. The President asked if we were going to raise an army of Germans. General Collins replied, “There is no plan now to do so”. The President asked if defense was possible without them. General Collins replied in the affirmative. The President asked if the Ambassador too would comment on this point. The Ambassador said he had heard nothing to the contrary in Washington; specifically he had heard of no plans to arm or otherwise use Western Germany within the framework of the North Atlantic mutual defense program unless it be in the moral field. The President told General Collins that he would find Turkey as strong as it had been on his (General Collins) last visit. Valuable economic and military aid, including the work of General McBride’s group, had been received from the United States and had been utilized to the maximum. The President of the United States had said that aid for Turkey would continue. 6 That statement gave Turkey a pleasing and reassuring feeling. Turkey was working very hard to overcome its difficulties. The United States and Turkey are at the world’s geographic extremes, but their cooperation had been necessary and been carried out in a fine way; that working together should be established as our national policies. He asked if General Collins had any questions. General Collins stated that he was happy to learn that General McBride’s group had been working with the Turkish General Staff on the Turkish War Plans and that he felt it very important that they continue to do so. We wished to continue to furnish military aid and equipment but it was necessary, in order to get Congress to appropriate the money, that Congress be assured of sound plans and that the equipment provided would be used in the implementation of such plans. He cited as an example the questions which he had been asked last week, when he and General Bradley 7 appeared before a Committee of our Senate, by very influential senators of the opposition as to whether the plans for Western Europe were being soundly developed. He pointed out that he must answer similar questions when he appeared before the committee asking new appropriations for aid to Greece, Turkey and Iran. He stated that one of his reasons for visiting those countries was to assure the Committees of Congress that sound plans were being developed and that the costly equipment was being well used. He stated that the members of the JCS must know how much money to allot to the Turkish Army, Navy and Air Force respectively and that it was, therefore, necessary to know something of the Turkish plans. The President asked if the Americans were not informed of the Turkish plans and stated that the Turks had been very open with the Americans. General Collins said that we had no complaints but that until recently General McBride dealt in training matters rather than the matters concerning the location in which the forces would be employed. He pointed out that we were concerned that they had proper plans, not only for the stationing of their forces, but to provide for the complicated logistical requirements which must be thought out ahead of time. General Collins explained by an example which pointed out the vulnerable position of a large part of the petroleum storage in Turkey. Although he realized this storage was a commercial project which could not be removed to a safer place, he felt that an analysis should be made of the situation in order that any new military storage should be placed in some position, such as the vicinity of Iskenderun, where it would be relatively safe and could be re-supplied by sea. The President stated that he saw no reason why the American and Turkish officers should not deal with such matters. General McBride had probably already told General Collins that he, The President, was very sensitive on the subject of storage for oil reserves which he felt would be a strategic problem of the utmost importance. He supposed that General McBride would give some advice on the subject in the near future. General Collins stated that if the President wished we would be happy to reinforce our group that is working on the Turkish war plans. The President said that he would be very grateful, and the Turkish Chief of Staff agreed. General Collins said that he was aware that the Turks did not wish their war plans disclosed to anyone who did not have to have the information. He reassured the President that Turkish war plans would not be discussed with the American Congress but would be handled as they are in our own service, that is, they would be known only by people who needed to know them. The Congress needed only to be assured that good plans do exist. The President said, “We are working with America and have nothing to conceal from you”. He said that the Turkish planning was progressing slowly but that it was being done with care and attention to detail. He said that discussion of military problems did not mean necessarily that agreements would be reached technically. Discussions would help both and as the work progressed the persons responsible for the defense of Turkey would make decisions in the light of the broad strategic concept adopted. Officers of both nations would explain their ideas and reach agreement. He had no doubt that General Collins would find proper plans would be established so that America could give more aid. He recognized that the current discussions were one-sided; full cooperation would come when both sides could discuss their plans. General Collins stated that military men in the US could not discuss military plans without prior political agreements, but he could tell the President that if war started there would be a tremendous strategic air offensive launched against Russia which would be of immense help to Turkey as well as the countries of Western Europe. The President said that was a very important point and he requested more detail, particularly as to whether the United States would bombard Russia if Russia attacked Turkey. General Collins answered that, if Congress declared war, we would. The question of declaring war was one for Congress to decide but that it was his personal opinion, as an individual, that if Russia attacked Turkey, such an attack would be part of a world war in which Russia would attack on several fronts. He reminded the President that the President of the United States had said that the security of Turkey was vital to the security of the United States. 8 The President asked if General Collins had said that if Russia attacked anywhere it would initiate a third world war and asked if General Collins was sure. General Collins replied that it was the case, in his personal opinion—again stressing that this was his personal opinion. The President stated that he accepted it as a personal opinion—that it was very important to him to hear General Collins, as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, give his views and that it was very refreshing to hear those views. He stated that when Turkey is engaged in war it will have to face attacks from land, sea and air—that if Russia would be subjected to long range bombardment the weight against the Turkish Armed Forces would be lessened. General Collins assured the President that would be true if it came to a third world war. The President commented that it was painful to think an attack on Turkey would start a third world war. General Collins stated that, as an individual, he believed Russia would first attack to the West. The President then recapitulated by saying: “Without any political commitment or agreement our two countries are working very closely together; Turkey has the very valuable statement of the President of the United States; and the personal opinions of American military and political leaders are that Turkey will not be left alone.” He asked if this was the case. General Collins replied in the affirmative. The President then stated that Turkey would await the future calmly and confidently. General Collins stated that that was good but that General McBride told him there was much yet to be done in developing sound Turkish war plans. The Minister of Defense and the Turkish Chief of Staff must understand that, if they wished it, he, General Collins, would, be happy to discuss the matter in more detail. The President replied that was very good—that the more advice General Collins gave the better he would be pleased. General Collins commented that he wanted his point clearly understood. He, General Collins, was not suggesting this, and any further discussion he might have with the Turkish General Staff would have to be on their initiative and not on his. The President stated that in his view there was no reason why such discussions should not be held; the Turks would be only too pleased! to know on which points they were deficient. The Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army expressed his pleasure. General Collins said to the Turkish Chief of Staff, “We will be happy to do this together”. 9 The President closed this audience by saying, with obvious sincerity, “General, our discussion has been most useful”. 1 This memorandum was Appendix 1 to Annex 4 of a memorandum of April 10, not printed, by General Collins to the Secretary of the Army on the subject “Inspection by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, of the Middle East Covering the Period 20 March to 8 April 1950,” a copy of which was transmitted to Mr. McGhee on April 17. The present memorandum of March 26 was prepared by the General’s aide, Col. Douglas V. Johnson, in consultation with Ambassador Wadsworth, and was approved by General Collins. 2 Hüsnü Çakir. 3 Gen. Abdurrahman N. Gürman. 4 Gen. Izzet Aksalur. 5 See the editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1638 . 6 See the memorandum of conversation, April 10, by David A. Robertson, Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, p. 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] . 4 Enclosure 1 to Instruction No. 19, March 20, to Ambassador Wadsworth, p. 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] . 5 For documentation on the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at London, May 15–18, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 6 Possibly a reference to the President’s budget message to the Congress, January 9 ( Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 44 ). 7 Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 8 Possibly a reference to President Truman’s address of March 12, 1947, before Congress, cited in footnote 5, p. 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] . 9 General Collins and heads of the American military mission in Turkey met in Ankara on March 27 with Minister of Defense Çakir, with General Gürman, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and with other Turkish officials; General Collins also met privately with Minister Çakir at the latter’s request. “Full details of these conferences were furnished to Ambassador Wadsworth who thoroughly approved the major points listed by General McBride and General Collins. Ambassador Wadsworth said that he would follow up with Minister Çakir on the problems involved in possible mining of the Straits.” (Record of conference, Appendix 2 to Annex 4 of the source text, 780.5/4–1750, not printed.) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 882.53/1–2050: Telegram [Document 692] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey restricted Washington , March 31, 1950—5 p. m. 140. Treas Dept reports disturbing increase heroin addiction US cities. Istanbul’s desp 38, Jan 20, 1 appears confirm Treas opinion major part this heroin originates Istanbul. Emb requested inform appropriate Turk auths US Govt concerned notwithstanding excellent work Istanbul police and suggest desirability continued close cooperation Istanbul police and US Bureau Narcotics. Latter ready send competent agent visit Istanbul collaborate police in order furnish names and addresses suspected traffickers and for other activities. Inquire discreetly whether Turk Govt wld be disposed extend invitation this purpose. Acheson 1 Not printed. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Robertson) 033.1100/4–1050 [Document 693] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Robertson ) [Extracts] top secret [ Washington ,] April 10, 1950. Subject: General Collins’ Visit to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Participants: General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary for NEA Mr. David A. Robertson, NEA Discussion: Mr. McGhee called on General Collins at the Pentagon on Monday, April 10, 1950 at 3 p. m. to discuss the General’s recent trip to Greece, 1 Turkey, 2 Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Mr. McGhee opened the discussion by observing that the reports we had received on General Collins’ visit to the various capitals indicated the warmth with which General Collins had been greeted and the fine impression he had made on foreign government officials he had seen. General Collins stated that he was delighted to find, wherever he went, the friendliness and warmth with which Americans were greeted, diplomats, military men and private individuals alike. He then proceeded to review the highlights of his visits, country by country. Turkey: General Collins stated that in visiting the Signal Corps school in Turkey he was happy to observe that almost all of the instructors were Turks. Mr. McGhee agreed that we should train the Turks to take over the instruction of their own people as rapidly as possible. General Collins stated that, in answer to questions put to him by officials in Turkey and Iran as to what support they might receive from the U.S. in the event of hostilities, it was the U.S. plan to give the enemy a very heavy pounding by strategic bombing at an early stage in hostilities which should be of considerable aid to these countries. When fears were expressed that the enemy would move in at an early stage by use of paratroops, he pointed out that this sort of fear had been expressed to him in many countries which he had visited and it was just not possible for the enemy to organize and commit paratroops except on a limited scale. He outlined the complications and difficulties that he had experienced in connection with a small parachute combat force under his command during the last war. General Collins said that while he had been very much impressed with the integrity of the President of Turkey, 3 he felt that the Defense Minister and the Chief of the Joint Staff and his Deputy were not too strong. In going over the Turkish war plans he observed to them that they had not provided sufficient depth for the armies for carrying on guerrilla warfare after the first blow had been struck; that supply, ordnance and other depots should be moved back from the front lines so that all would not be lost at an early stage; that it would be unfortunate to commit a large force in defense of that part of Turkey lying in Europe and that too many of the naval facilities were located on the east bank of the Bosphorus where they were exposed to destruction by gun fire from the other side. He felt that it might be necessary to find a stronger man to head up the U.S. Naval Mission in Turkey. As regards the Turkish army deployed in the east he has been informed that there was no coordination of plans with the Iranian forces adjacent to that sector and such discussions would, in his opinion, be desirable. Mr. McGhee observed that the Iranians had approached the Turks on several occasions requesting joint discussions but the Turks had not as yet consented. General Collins further observed that he found little or no coordination among the Turkish armed forces. The Secretary of Defense appeared to have been poorly informed as regards Turkish war plans and little or no time had been spent by Turkish military leaders in the Defense Ministry and Joint Staff observing conditions in the field. He made appropriate observations, particularly as regards the desirability of field visits, pointing out that he had come the long distance to Turkey for the purpose of making such observations. The Defense Minister assured him measures would be taken to correct these conditions. General Collins stated that General McBride would return to the U.S. in August and be replaced by General Arnold 4 who was also a very able officer. He stated that he had agreed with Ambassador Wadsworth concerning the desirability of sending out a separate general officer to head the Army Mission. This would tend to remove any resentment of the other missions and would permit General McBride to spend more time on advising the Turks regarding their war plans. 1 For the portion of this memorandum on General Collins’ trip to Greece, see p. 362 [ Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] . 2 March 26–28. 3 See the memorandum of conversation with Turkish President Ismet Inönü, at Ankara, March 26, by General Collins, p. 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] . 4 Maj. Gen. William H. Arnold, then Chief, Budget Division, U.S. Army Comptroller’s Office. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance? Department of State (Ohly), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) 782.5 MAP/4–2650 [Document 694] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance? Department of State ( Ohly ), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense ( Lemnitzer ) top secret [ Washington ,] April 26, 1950. Subject: Projects for Rehabilitation of Turkish Airfields; FY 1951 Presentation. In light of NSC 36/1, 1 and the concern of the Department expressed in my memorandum to you of February 28, 1950, subject, Reconstruction of Military Airfields in Turkey with FY 1950 MDAP Funds, I should like to draw your attention to the item in the proposed FY 1951 Air Force Budget for the Turkish MDAP for further Turkish airfield construction projects. The Department recommends that to the greatest degree possible the testimony before the Budget Bureau and Congress be limited to the general statement that these funds are for the rehabilitation of certain Turkish airfields now deteriorated from their World War II condition, in order to permit the fullest efficient use by the Turkish Air Force of the equipment which we have given them. It is recommended that details of size, strength, and location of airfields not be testified to if such is possible, and if such be not possible, that such testimony be given only in executive session. It is informally understood that these funds would be applied to re-surface the runways at three bases in western Turkey now already operational, and to develop two further bases at Adana and Antalya. It is informally understood that the proposal for the base at Adana, which is justified as a year-round training base, is generally being discussed in terms of roughly 100,000 lbs. gross load weight and over 10,000 ft. of runway. Before such a plan would be finally implemented, the Department will want to consider it further en its merits, but, subject to such further review, the Department believes that these items should be included in the FY 1951 budget request. John H. Ohly 1 A report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on Construction of Airfields and Stockpiling of Aviation Gasoline in Turkey, April 15, 1949, printed in Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1654 . The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Consul General at Istanbul (Baldwin) 882.413/4–2650 [Document 695] The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Consul General at Istanbul ( Baldwin ) secret official informal Washington , April 26, 1950. Dear Vern : Your letter of February 16 1 and your despatch No. 76 of February 18 2 have been brought to my attention by Mr. Gustin since my return to Washington last week. I am inclined to regard criticism of the alleged unorthodox behavior of Athenagoras 3 as largely a reflection of Phanar politics 4 and in any case as a problem which is likely to work itself out without any interference on our part. I also believe that the Greek Government is competent to make a decision with regard to Patriarch Christopher of Alexandria without our advice and that we should, in general, avoid involvement in the matter of Orthodox appointments and personalities except where it may be necessary to combat direct, obvious and serious Soviet efforts at penetration of the Church. On the other hand, I do consider that we should, if at all possible, extend some limited financial help to the Church where it is genuinely needed and likely to be effective, both with a view to counteracting the spread of Soviet influence through the Church in Greece and the Near East and to keeping open an important avenue for our own penetration of the communist but still basically Orthodox countries of eastern Europe. I am therefore inquiring whether an agency of this Government might be in a position to meet the Archbishop’s specific requests for the linotypes and financial help for other Patriarchates. I have given Bill Lewis 5 a brief letter of introduction to Athenagoras (copy attached) 6 in which I merely mention the latter’s conversations with Vice Consul Gustin and say that I am making inquiries as to the possibility of helping him in the matters in which he is interested. It would seem inadvisable to go any farther than this in talking with Athenagoras at the present time, but it may be helpful for you to have the above reactions in mind in your final conversations with him. [Here follow personal remarks.] Sincerely yours, George C. McGhee 1 Letter from LaVerne Baldwin, not printed (882.413/2–1850). 2 From Istanbul, not printed; enclosure 3 thereto was a memorandum on a conversation, February 7, by James R. Gustin, Vice Consul at Istanbul, with Athenagoras I, Archbishop of Constantinople and Ecumenical Patriarch, who outlined certain points to be conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State McGhee. Among these were a request for two linotypes for publication by the Patriarchate of a newspaper and magazines in Greek and English; an assertion by Patriarch Athenagoras of his willingness to remove Patriarch Christopher of Alexandria, who was “openly in favor of Russian Communism, … provided the Greek Government desires to eliminate him” ; and a request for financial aid for the Patriarchate of Antioch and the Archbishop of Finland. (882.413/2–1850) 3 Reference presumably is to some opposition faced by Patriarch Athenagoras from certain members of the Holy Synod at the Phanar (the site of the Patriarchate in Istanbul). 4 This question was raised by Grand Logothete Ghiokas of the Greek Patriarchate church in a conversation with Vice Consul Gustin at Istanbul on February 3 (memorandum of conversation, February 4, by Vice Consul Gustin; enclosure 1 to despatch 76, February 18, from Istanbul, 882.413/2–1850, not printed). 5 Charles W. Lewis, Jr., newly assigned Consul General at Istanbul. 6 Not printed; copy, April 11, 1950 (date of drafting of letter), in Ankara Embassy Files, Lot 58F33, Box 3301, 570.3 Religion 1950. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) 782.5/4–2750 [Document 696] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Webb ) secret [ Washington ,] April 27, 1950. Subject: Continuing Desire of Turkey to be Included in a Formal Security Arrangement Participants: H. E. Feridun C. Erkin—Ambassador of Turkey Mr. Webb—Undersecretary Mr. David Popper—UNP Mr. C. Robert Moore—GTI The Turkish Ambassador referred to his meeting with me on September 30, 1949 1 in which he had discussed the desire of Turkey to be included in a regional defense arrangement associated with the United States. He indicated he was aware at the time that the problem was one which required study and that we would not be able to give him an early decision. The recent series of Soviet actions and statements was a new development, however, which compelled him again to bring this matter to our attention with the request that we give it urgent consideration. The Ambassador mentioned that fourteen or fifteen months ago when the question of Turkey’s inclusion in a regional pact first came up he expressed the view that Turkish exclusion might well lead to an isolation complex on the part of the Turkish people and the feeling by the Russians that this country was indifferent or had a lack of interest in the survival of Turkey as a free nation. He considers that more recent developments have borne out his earlier fears and that the Soviet Union is now attempting to create an atmosphere of increasing turmoil and crisis leading up to a revision of the Montreux Convention 2 in 1951, the earliest date on which revision is possible. The Ambassador believes that this move should be countered now by a Mediterranean security pact, which would include Turkey. Such a pact would increase the confidence of the Turks in their own security and serve as a warning to the Russians. In addition, a pact of this kind would provide for the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, a very essential counterpart to the defense of the Western Mediterranean, an area which is covered by the North Atlantic Pact. The Ambassador stressed the importance of timing in creating the proposed regional pact in order to gain the maximum psychological benefit therefrom and urgently requested that his present conversation, together with papers relating to his earlier approaches to the Department, be brought to the attention of the Secretary with the view of placing the problem on the agenda of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London. 3 I informed the Ambassador that I did not feel that I was in a position to give him an answer to his request at this time as I wanted to discuss the matter with the Secretary, but that he could be sure that his views would receive serious consideration. Note: (NEA has submitted a position paper 4 on this subject for use if the general question of new security arrangements in the Mediterranean and Middle East is discussed during the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in London.) The Ambassador then reverted to the subject of what he termed a “neutrality complex” in Western Europe and asked how I felt about it. I indicated that my personal reaction was that while three months ago there might have been some tendency in some of the European countries towards a position of neutrality it seemed to me that they had since become increasingly aware of the long-term problem presented by the Russian threat and that they were now much more concerned about how best to tackle the problem. I mentioned, for example, that the French press, which three months ago was publishing articles in the “neutrality” vein, seems to have changed its tone. James E. Webb 1 Memorandum of conversation, September 30, 1949, not printed. 2 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii , p. 213; also British Cmd. 5551, Treaty Series No. 30 (1937): Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits [ With Protocol ,] Montreux, July 20, 1936. 3 For documentation on the question of a Mediterranean regional defense arrangement, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. and 828 ff. 4 Position paper FM D D–1 a , April 18, 1950, “Regional Security Arrangements in the Mediterranean and Near Eastern Areas,” quoted in part in the memorandum to Under Secretary Webb, May 1, by Assistant Secretary McGhee, printed ibid. , p. 79 . The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 782.022/4–2950: Telegram [Document 697] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret Ankara , April 29, 1950—3 p. m. 213. Foreign Office Secretary General Akdur 2 has asked me to inquire whether, in Department’s opinion, controlled mining of Straits would constitute an infringement of “complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits” which Turkey is required to accord by Article 2 of Montreux Convention. Turkish general staff desires to lay a shore-controlled mine field, and while there is no question as to Turkey’s right in principle to defend Straits—for instance, to fortify the land approaches—Turkish Government wishes before proceeding with mine-laying to assure itself that this particular measure defense would be compatible with letter and spirit of convention. (2) Admiral Ginder 3 and Naval aide-mémoire, 4 with whom Turks have discussed plan, inform me it is proposed to lay three lines of moored and ground mines at depth of 20–30 fathoms near Black Sea entrance to Straits. Mines would be controlled from harbor entrance post planned as part of harbor entrance defense system. When not energized mines would constitute no menace to navigation and field could be crossed at any point, so that no pilotage would be required. Moored mines that broke loose would be sterile and consequently would not endanger passing vessels. (3) Information in foregoing paragraph is, however, largely beside point stressed by Akdur who concluded: “Question is strictly a juridical one, technical and political factors not presently entering our consideration thereof. It is on juridical aspect of problem that I should much appreciate an expression of your Department’s opinion.” Wadsworth 1 This paper bears the notation: “C. R[obert] M[oore]: As a preliminary step, I suggest you consult Harry [N.] Howard, [United Nations Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs] then L [Office of the Legal Adviser] J[ohn] D. J[ernegan].” 2 Faik Zihni Akdur, Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, raised the question set forth in this telegram in a discussion with Ambassador George Wadsworth at Ankara on April 20, 1950 (memorandum, April 20, by Ambassador Wadsworth to Warwick Perkins, Counselor of Embassy in Turkey; Ankara Embassy files, lot 57F72, box 2, 322.2 Straits, 1950–52, not printed). 3 Rear Adm. Samuel P. Ginder, Chief of the United States Navy Group, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey. 4 Capt. William L. Kabler. The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (Conolly), at London Ankara Embassy Files, Lot 58F33, 400 Naval Visits [Document 698] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean ( Conolly ), at London confidential Ankara , 3 May 1950. Dear Admiral Conolly : Your request 1 concerning the frequency of visits of U.S. Naval units to Turkish ports arrived shortly after a similar question was posed by the Department of State. 2 I concur that it would be desirable for each of your Sixth Fleet groups to be given the opportunity to visit Turkish ports. From my point of view such direct contact, as these visits afford, furthers the cordial relations now existing between Turkey and the United States. Accordingly, an informal agreement 3 has been reached with the Turkish Government to permit a maximum of three major fleet visits per year to the Turkish ports of either Istanbul or Izmir. This does not modify the present agreement concerning the frequency of informal visits of destroyer and auxiliary types. I would appreciate it if you would arrange such coordination, as may be necessary, with the British Mediterranean Fleet as to insure no conflict between one of your major visits and visits of their units. The facilities of Turkish ports are limited and the overlap of major visits would seriously tax those facilities. Again, this request does not pertain to any possible overlap of visits of small units. I too was sorry not to have seen you on my return trip to Turkey. With kindest regards to Mrs. Conolly, Sincerely, G. Wadsworth 1 Admiral Conolly’s letter of April 25, 1950 to Ambassador George Wadsworth (Ankara Embassy files, lot 58F33, box 3298, 400 naval visits, not printed). 2 Department’s telegram 171, April 18, to Ankara, not printed (711.5882/4–1050). 3 Agreement was reached by telephone calls between Warwick Perkins, Counselor of Embassy in Turkey, and A. Bülent Uşakligil, Director General, First Department, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On April 27 and 28 (notations by Warwick Perkins on Ankara Embassy file copy of Department’s telegram 171, April 18, to Ankara; Ankara Embassy files, lot 58F33, box 3298, 400 naval visits). Telegram 208, April 28, from Ankara, not printed, informed the Department of this agreement (711.5882/4–2850). The Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ankara Post Files: Lot 57F72: 400 Defense-Turkey-Airfields 1950 [Document 699] The Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1 top secret No. 2449 Ankara , May 4, 1950. The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the Ministry’s note of April 18, 1950 2 and to previous correspondence 3 with reference to the request of the Turkish Government that the United States extend financial and technical assistance in connection with certain projects of the Turkish Government at certain Turkish airfields. The Embassy is authorized to advise that, in accordance with and subject to the agreement between the United States of America and Turkey, signed at Ankara July 12, 1947, 4 and subject to the pertinent United States legislation controlling aid to Turkey, the Government of the United States of America will be able to assist the Government of Turkey in these matters as set forth herein. It is understood that the airstrips at Diyarbekir, Kayseri, and Eskisehir have deteriorated to the point where the safety of aircraft operation is imperiled, and necessary training operations cannot be conducted. It is understood that it is the view of the Turkish Government that the Turkish plans for the defense of Turkey require that these airstrips be operational. It is further understood that there is a lack of housing and utilities at the airfields at Bandirma, Erzincan, Afyon, and Balikesir, so that complements of the Turkish Air Force required to be stationed at these airfields in accordance with the defense plans of Turkey cannot in fact be stationed there. It is understood that the Turkish Government, although it strongly desires to accomplish the rehabilitation of the airstrips and the construction of the housing and utilities mentioned, cannot, by reason of budgetary and fiscal limitations, assume all of the expenses involved in these projects. However, it is understood that the Government of Turkey will assume the cost of and attend to the acquisition of the land necessary for these projects, the cost of transporting within Turkey any and all matériel necessary for these projects, the furnishing of the services of Turkish aviation engineer units to the extent required by these projects and the employment on these projects of some, or, if necessary, of all equipment received by Turkey through American aid. It is further understood that any matériel imported into Turkey in pursuit of these projects shall enter without being subject to any tax or duty whatsoever. On the foregoing understandings, the Government of the United States of America will provide, within the funds available to it for such purposes, the remaining costs of these projects, the necessary construction materials, and the necessary supervisory, technical, and construction personnel services. 1 Department of State telegram 190, April 25, to Ankara, not printed, transmitted the text of this note to the Embassy in Turkey for delivery to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (782.5 MAP/4–2550). 2 The Turkish note of April 18, not printed, the substance of which was suggested by the Embassy in Turkey on instructions from the Department (not printed), inquired whether the United States military aid program could provide for the expenditures which the Turkish Government could not assume for reconstruction and improvement of certain Turkish military airfields (enclosure 2 to despatch 320, April 20, from Ankara, 782.563/4–2050). 3 Not printed. Department’s telegram 98, Tomap, March 6, not printed, read in part as follows: “State and Defense now prepared to proceed overtly with airfield rehabilitation project on basis outlined CHAMAT Oct 21, 1949 Aide-Mémoire to Defense Min. Suggest McBride inform Min accordingly and ask him to address ltr to CHAMAT, omitting specific reference to Aide-Mémoire (or to his oral acceptance thereof) as it refers to ‘proposed Turkish-American plan’, but incorporating reference to previous exploratory conversations held at Turks instance and requesting Amer assistance on this Turk Air Force requirement incl use of Aid funds and Amer contractor(s).… Ltr shld list airdromes involved and Turk contribution as outlined Aide-Mémoire. ” (782.5 MAP/3–650) 4 For text, see TIAS No. 1629, or 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2953. The Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 782.563/5–850 [Document 700] The Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1 confidential , Aide-Mémoire When presenting his note No. 2449 of May 4, 1950, the American Ambassador observed to His Excellency, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the project could now be considered as agreed upon in all essential respects and that implementation thereof would begin almost at once, notably by: ( a ) the despatch of the necessary American personnel, and ( b ) the setting up of a liaison office in the Ministry of National Defense. With respect to (( a ), it is expected that some 70 Defense Department personnel (four or five Army Engineers and the balance civilian employees) and some 150 contractor personnel (all United States citizens under contract with the Engineer group) will proceed to Turkey. This personnel will be under General McBride’s general administrative control and, as such, will be accorded the same treatment and privileges as those now enjoyed by other members of the military and civilian personnel of the Mission. With respect to ( b ), the Turkish Liaison Office will arrange for necessary land purchases, transportation movements and costs, quarry rights and related matters, and will constitute the principal clearing house for the Chief of the Engineer group. Ankara , May 4, 1950. 1 Enclosure 1 to despatch 354, May 8, from Ankara. Ambassador Wadsworth left this aide-mémoire with the Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Faik Zihni Akdur, at the same time that he presented the Embassy’s note no. 2449 of May 4 ( supra ), with regard to the Turkish military airfields project. Memorandum by the Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Counselor of Embassy ( Perkins ) 782.563/5–850 [Document 701] Memorandum by the Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Counselor of Embassy ( Perkins ) 1 confidential Ankara , May 5, 1950. Subject: Turkish Military Airfields Project; Reaction of Secretary General Akdur to our Note No. 2449 of May 4, 1950 2 and supplementary Aide-Mémoire 3 When presenting the note and aide-mémoire , I explained: 1) That the note, which had been sent me textually by the Department of State, would assure him that my Government was in full accord with his Government on the bases for undertaking the Turkish military airfields projects; and 2) That the aide-mémoire would inform him of the first steps which, as the result of preliminary conversations had at the Ministry of National Defense, would be taken to proceed to the implementation of the project. I would, I added, wish to ask, after he had read the two papers, his views as to the desirability of giving any publicity to the fact that the project was to be undertaken, if only by way of anticipatory rebuttal of possible adverse Soviet propaganda. After reading the two papers, Mr. Akdur commented: 1) That he was happy to receive the note which, with me, he considered as laying a mutually satisfactory basis for undertaking the project; 2) That, with respect to the aide-mémoire , although he had not as yet received any information from the Ministry of National Defense, a ) He could appreciate the desirability of setting up the projected liaison office, b ) He could well understand that the American Engineering Group would operate, in fact, as a part of AMAT under General McBride’s administrative control and, consequently enjoy the same treatment and privileges as the other military and (civilian members of the Mission, c ) But he questioned the desirability of enumerating the four listed elements of such treatment and privileges. There could, he added, be no doubt that, as a matter of practice, no objection to the enjoyment of such treatment and privileges by any members of the Mission or of this newly-associated group would be raised; but to so enumerate them in a formal communication would seem to raise the question as to whether the Ministry could properly recognize the existence of a formal legal basis therefor. Consequently, it would seem better to omit such enumeration. I replied that I could understand his hesitancy and that, on other grounds too, I had tended to question the desirability of enumerating only four of the many privileges and facilities accorded members of our Military Mission as a matter of courtesy and practice. To do so might even suggest a restriction in the case of this new group. I would, therefore, be glad, on the basis of his informal comment, to delete the four enumerated points and to send him the aide-mémoire in such revised form. 4 Mr. Akdur agreed. Finally, on the subject of the desirability of giving any publicity to the fact that the project is to be undertaken, Mr. Akdur was quite definite in expressing the view that the least publicity given to any matter of this kind the better. We agreed that no local publicity would be given thereto unless circumstances should arise warranting reconsideration. 1 Enclosure 2 to despatch 354, May 8, from Ankara. 2 Ante , p. 1256 [ Pg. 1256 is part of Doc. 699 ] . 3 Supra. 4 The revised form of the aide-mémoire of May 4 by the Embassy in Turkey ( supra ) apparently was drafted on May 5 but backdated to May 4 (copy in Ankara Embassy files, lot 57F72, 400 Defense-Turkey-Airfields 1950). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 882.58/4–2450: Telegram [Document 702] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey restricted Washington , May 9, 1950—6 p. m. 212. US Rep UN Comm Narcotics 1 feels he will be obliged inform Comm. Aug session recent spread heroin addiction US among young people largely result clandestine manufacture heroin Istanbul. In order strengthen Turk position before Comm vigorous action necessary to destroy illicit factories. Both this Dept and Treas believe better results this end cld be achieved by full cooperation and exchange info on spot between US narcotic agent and Istanbul police than by transmittal info to Turk auths through Ankara Emb as suggested urtel 159, Apr 11. 2 In endeavor obtain reconsideration Turk decision request above info be conveyed FonOff not as threat but as indication US view of seriousness of problem and desire cooperate with Turks on problem of mutual concern. (See Istanbul’s Desp. 226, Apr. 24.) 3 Also inform FonOff US narcotic agent wld be instructed present full info to Turk auths, take no action independent Istanbul police and make no statement to press. 4 Emb also requested ask Turk auths if seizures reported Embs despatches 292, Nov 30, 38 Jan 20 and 168 Mar 31 5 have been reported to UN for discussion fifth session Comm Narcotics. Webb 1 Harry J. Anslinger. 2 Not printed; it reported the Turkish Government’s response to the earlier U.S. proposal (Department’s telegram 140, March 31, to Ankara; p. 1247 [ Pg. 1247 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] ) that an American narcotics agent he stationed in Istanbul (882.53/4–1150). 3 Not printed. 4 Telegram 336, June 27, from Ankara, not printed, read in part as follows: “In reply to Embassy’s note based on Deptel 212, May 9 Foreign Office has orally informed Embassy of Turkish-US agreement that US narcotic agent may come to Istanbul to cooperate with Turkish police on following conditions: (1) Agent’s, arrival and departure will be kept completely secret, (2) Agent will take no action without consultation with appropriate Turkish authority, (3) Agent will make no statement to Turkish or foreign press” (882.53/6–2750). The Secretary of State’s instruction no. 5, July 17, to Ankara, not printed, identified Mr. Charles, Siragusa as the U.S. narcotics agent being sent to Turkey under the agreement set forth in the Embassy’s telegram under reference (882.53/6–2750). 5 None printed. Memorandum by the Legal Adviser in the Department of State (Fisher) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and, Iranian Affairs (Jernegan) 782.022/5–350 [Document 703] Memorandum by the Legal Adviser in the Department of State ( Fisher ) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and, Iranian Affairs ( Jernegan ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] May 15, 1950. Your memorandum of May 3, 1950 2 calls attention to Ankara’s; No. 213 of April 29 stating that the Foreign Office has requested the Department’s opinion whether from a legal standpoint there is any objection to the laying of certain moored and ground mines near the Black Sea entrance to the Straits. It is indicated that the mines would be controlled from a harbor entrance post planned as a part of a harbor defense system, that when not energized the mines would constitute no menace to navigation and that the mine field could be crossed at any point so that no pilotage would be required. It is added that moored mines which broke loose would be sterile and consequently would not endanger passing vessels. Article 2 of the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936 concerning the Regime of the Straits provides in part as follows: “In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, except as provided in article 3 below. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “Pilotage and towage remain optional.” Article 3 contains certain provisions relating to sanitary control which are not pertinent here. Since merchant vessels are clearly entitled under the provisions referred to to complete freedom of passage in the Straits by day or night in time of peace, it is evident that any militarization of the Straits which would interfere with such freedom of passage is prohibited. Whether the contemplated placing of mine fields in the Black Sea entrance to the Straits would interfere with such passage is a question of fact and the assurances in the Foreign Office inquiry indicate that it would not. The assurance that no pilotage would be required is also in accord with the Convention. In the absence of agreement to the contrary the right of Turkey to mine the Straits flows from sovereignty. While the Lausanne Convention of 1923 4 relating to the regime of the Straits required the demilitarization of specified zones and islands in the area, and contained prohibitions against the use of “submarine engines of war” all such provisions were omitted from the Montreux Convention. It was the intention of the parties to the later Convention, indicated in the preamble, “to replace by the present Convention the Convention signed at Lausanne on the 24th, July, 1923” and any doubt that such was the legal effect would seem to be completely resolved by the fact that all of the parties to the Lausanne Convention are also parties to the Montreux Convention. In any event, the right of Turkey to again militarize the Straits is clear from the protocol of signature of the Montreux Convention in which the respective governments accept the following provisions: “1. Turkey may immediately remilitarize the zone of the Straits as defined in the preamble to the said Convention.” 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . For the reasons indicated, it is the view of this office that if the placing of the proposed mines at the Black Sea entrance to the Straits does not as a matter of fact interfere with the complete freedom of passage of the Straits and navigation therein, without pilotagei, there is no objection thereto from a legal standpoint by reason of the provisions of Article 2 of the Montreux Convention. It might be added that although the Soviet Government in 1946 proposed to the Turkish Government “a new regime” for the Straits providing in part for a joint Turko-Soviet system for defense of the Straits, 5 this proposal for joint defense has been strenuously combated by the Turkish Government as incompatible with its sovereignty and security and this position appears to have been supported, at least in part, by the United States in a note to the Soviet Government on August 19, 1946 6 which expressed the view that the establishment of a regime for the Straits was not the exclusive concern of the Black Sea powers and declared that Turkey should remain primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. 1 Copy transmitted with Secretary of State’s instruction 39, June 1, to Ankara, not printed (782.022/6–150). 2 Not printed. 3 The following omission indicated in the source text. 4 Signed July 24, 1923; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii , p. 115; also British Cmd. 1929, Treaty Series No. 16 (1923): Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits , p. 109. 3 The following omission indicated in the source text. 5 Reference is to the Soviet note of August 7, 1946 to the Turkish Government, also transmitted to the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States; text in Foreign Relations , 1945, vol. vii , p. 827 . 6 Ibid , p. 847 . Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President 782.00/5–2250 [Document 704] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President confidential [ Washington ,] May 22, 1950. Subject: The Turkish Elections In free and orderly elections held in Turkey on May 14, 1950, 1 the Democrat Party, the leading opposition party, scored a sweeping and generally unexpected victory over the Republican Peoples’ Party, the party of Atatürk 2 and Inönü, 3 which has been in power since the Republic was founded in 1923. These elections represent the culmination of democratic development in Turkey, a country which in a remarkably short period of time, has evolved from absolute monarchy to the multi-party system, under the guidance of a benevolent dictatorship. Great credit is due President Inönü who has fostered this development even though it has meant the defeat of his party. The Democrat Party victory is believed to reflect countrywide dissatisfaction with, economic conditions, and reaction against the single party mentality characterizing many of the leaders of the People’s Party. That it does not reflect a desire for radical changes in policy is borne out by the very poor showing of the Nation’s Party, an opposition party appealing to extremist elements, which has won only one seat in the Assembly. The new National Assembly will convene on May 22 to elect the President of the Republic. 4 He, in turn, will appoint a prime minister who will form a new government. 5 This government, it is expected, will cooperate with the United States and the other western democracies as fully as its predecessor as the two parties are united on foreign policy. There are no fundamental differences in the tenets of the two parties with respect to domestic policies. The Democrat Party, however, while admitting the necessity for state enterprise in Turkey, appears to attach more importance to the role of private enterprise and foreign capital in the development of the country than the Peoples’ Party and also advocates the right of labor to strike which is now forbidden. The new government is expected to carry out its policies with moderation and caution. James E. Webb 1 The Turkish Ninth Grand National Assembly (GNA), which was elected on May 14, 1950, consisted of 395 members of the Democrat Party, 69 members of the Republican People’s Party, 1 member of the Nation’s Party, 9 Independents, and 13 vacancies (despatch 6, July 5, from Ankara, 782.00/7–550, not printed). 2 Kemal Atatürk, President of the Turkish Republic, 1923–1938. 3 Ismet Inönü, outgoing President of the Turkish Republic, was elected on May 14 Delegate for Malatya to the Ninth GNA in which, as President General of the Republican People’s Party, he led the opposition. 4 Celai Bayar, leader of the Democrat Party, was elected President of the Turkish Republic by a vote of 387 (for Bayar) to 64 (for Inönü) and 1 for Halil Özyöruk by the Ninth GNA on May 22. 5 Government formed on May 22 with Adnan Menderes as Prime Minister, Fuat Köprülü as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Refik Sevket Ince as Minister of National Defense. President Truman to the President of the Turkish Republic (Bayar) 782.11/5–2450: Telegram [Document 705] President Truman to the President of the Turkish Republic ( Bayar ) 1 Washington , May 24, 1950—3 p. m. I wish to express to Your Excellency my sincere congratulations on the occasion of your election as President of the Turkish Republic. 2 That the Turkish people, through their newly elected representatives in the National Assembly, have bestowed upon you this highest of honors is indeed recognition of the significant role that you have long played in furthering the cause of democratic development in your country. Turkey has shown the world yet another evidence not only of its attachment to this cause, but of its inner strength and fundamental stability which has won it such a respected place within the family of democratic nations. I am looking forward with confidence to the continuance of the very friendly and close relations which now exist between the peoples and governments of our two countries. 3 Harry S. Truman 1 This telegram was drafted by C. Robert Moore, Officer in Charge of Turkish Affairs, Department of State, on May 22, approved by the President, and returned to the Department on May 24 for appropriate transmittal. The text was sent by Department’s telegram 239, May 24, to Ankara, 782.11/5–2450, not printed, and it was released by the Anatolian news agency for publication by Ankara morning newspapers on May 27 (telegram 273, May 27, from Ankara, 782.11/5–2750, not printed). 2 See footnote 4, supra. 3 In reply to a letter of July 20 from President Bayar announcing his election, a letter of December 4 from President Truman read in part as follows: “I cordially reciprocate the sentiments you express for the continuance of the friendly relations existing between the United States and Turkey, and I assure Your Excellency of my best wishes for your personal welfare and for the prosperity of the Republic over which you have been called to preside. Your Good Friend, Harry S. Truman.” (Enclosure to instruction 36, December 12, to Ankara, 711.11–TR/10–1650, not printed; transmitted by the Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 4, 1951.) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) 782.00/6–250 [Document 706] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) secret [ Washington ,] June 2, 1950. Subject: Meeting with Turkish Ambassador Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin, Ambassador of Turkey Mr. R. A. Hare—NEA I lunched with the Turkish Ambassador on Friday, June 2, and in the course of the conversation the Ambassador particularly mentioned the matter of a pact including Turkey. The Ambassador recalled that he had urged the Secretary to include this as an item on the agenda of the London meetings 1 and that, at the Ambassador’s further suggestion, the Turkish Government had also approached the French and British Governments on this subject. He had noted that information emanating from London only included the statements of the Secretary and Mr. Bevin confirming previous policy with respect to Greece, Turkey and Iran, 2 and he inquired whether this indicated that the question of a pact had not been included in the London conversations. I told the Ambassador that the London meetings had been called in order to discuss certain specific points on an agreed agenda, the principal item on which was to make the NATO a more practical working organization. The matters included on this agenda had been of such a nature that the representatives of the various governments had had to work day and night in order to cover them, with the result that it had not been possible to take advantage of the meetings to enlarge the area of discussion. As a consequence, occasion had not been afforded to discuss the matter of a pact including Turkey on a substantive basis, but, realizing the desirability of avoiding the creation of any impression that emphasis on NAT in these particular meetings constituted any diminution of interest in Greece, Turkey and Iran, specific statements regarding those countries had been made immediately following the conference by the Secretary and Mr. Bevin, and the Secretary had again referred to this matter in his address before the informal joint session of Congress on Wednesday, May 31. 3 The Ambassador then asked if he could inquire who had raised this question in London. I replied that I did not feel that it would be proper for me to comment on this point. I said I wished again to emphasize, however, that significance should not be attached to the fact that it was not possible to take up this question at this particular time. To do so would create an impression which was totally unjustified by the facts. The Ambassador then made a rather self-revealing observation to the effect that the idea of a pact including Turkey and the Western Powers had in fact been initially advocated by him personally while he was still in Ankara, and that he had been given a free hand to do what he could on the matter when he had been appointed Ambassador to Washington. Initially, he said, his Government had not been overly interested in the idea, but as time had gone on they had developed a very strong interest in it, and he had been under constant pressure to produce results. This had even reached the point where he had found himself in the position of explaining the American point-of-view in the face of a disposition on the part of his superiors to interpret the failure of the American Government to act as an unwillingness to give Turkey the support required. Now, said the Ambassador, he had been called home to report and was leaving on June 16. What could he say to his Government? He hoped that there might be something new and constructive which he could take back, and if so he would greatly appreciate having an interview with the Secretary before he left. However, if the situation remained the same, there would be no necessity for his importuning the Secretary. I told the Ambassador that as far as I know there was no change in the facts governing our policy in this regard, but that I would get in touch with him in the event there were any further developments of which he should be apprised. 1 For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, London, May 11–13, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. For documentation on the session of the North Atlantic Council, London, May 15–18, see ibid. , pp. 1 ff. 2 A statement by Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson issued on May 19 on his departure from London following the Foreign Ministers meetings read in part as follows: “I wish to reaffirm the deep interest of the United States Government in the security of Greece, Turkey, and Iran and our determination to continue our policy of supporting these and other countries which are striving through military and economic efforts to safeguard their independence and territorial integrity” (Department of State Bulletin , June 5, 1950, p. 883). Foreign Secretary Bevin on May 19 issued a similar statement on behalf of the British Government. 3 Department of State Bulletin , June 12, 1950, p. 931. The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary-General, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Akdur) Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 57F72: Box 2: 322.2 Straits 1950–52 [Document 707] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary-General, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ( Akdur ) 1 Ankara , June 5, 1950. My Dear Mr. Ambassador : In compliance with your request, I am giving you herewith the substance of the telegram 2 from the United States Department of State which I read to you during our conversation on May 31: 3 “The Montreux Convention, which replaced the Lausanne Convention of 1923 and to which all the signatories of the Lausanne Convention adhered, places no limitations on the right of Turkey to militarize the Straits, such as the stipulation of the Lausanne Convention regarding the demilitarization of certain specified zones and islands in the area of the Straits or its prohibition against the use of ‘submarine engines of war’. Moreover, Turkey’s right to remilitarize the Straits appears to be clearly established by the protocol of signature of the Montreux Convention, in which the signatory Governments accepted a provision that ‘Turkey may immediately remilitarize the zone of the Straits as defined in the preamble of the said Convention’. “However, Article 2 of the Montreux Convention would clearly prohibit any militarization which would interfere with the complete freedom of passage through the Straits in time of peace. If, therefore, the proposed placing of mines described in your telegram 4 would not in fact interfere with the complete freedom of passage of the Straits and navigation therein without pilotage, the Department considers that the provisions of Article 2 would constitute no obstacle thereto from a legal standpoint.” You will recall that I emphasized to you the fact that this interpretation of a treaty to which the United States is not a party is an entirely informal one. The paragraph in my telegram 5 to the Department of State which I read to you was substantially as follows: “I am informed by Admiral Ginder and by the Embassy’s Naval Attaché with whom the Turkish authorities have discussed the plan, that it is proposed to lay three lines of moored and ground mines near the Black Sea entrance to the Straits, at a depth of twenty to thirty fathoms. The mines would be controlled from a post ashore which is planned as a part of the defense system for the harbor entrance. When they are not energized, the mines would constitute no menace to navigation; the field could be crossed at any point and pilotage would consequently not be necessary. Any mines which might break loose would be sterile and would therefore not endanger passing vessels.” Faithfully yours, George Wadsworth 1 This paper bears the notation: “Copy to Admiral Ginder 7/12/50.” 2 Reference is to Department’s telegram 244, May 27, to Ankara, 782.022/5–2750, not printed. 3 No memorandum of the conversation of May 31 between Ambassador Wadsworth and Secretary-General Akdur has been found in Department of State files. 4 Reference is to telegram 213, April 29, from Ankara, p. 1254 [ Pg. 1254 is part of Doc. 697 ] . 5 Reference is to ibid. [ Pg. 1254 is part of Doc. 697 ] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Chargé of Turkish Affairs (Moore) 882.00R/6–750 [Document 708] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Chargé of Turkish Affairs ( Moore ) confidential [ Washington ,] June 7, 1950. Subject: Difficulties Arising Between the Turkish Government and ECA Regarding the Release of ECA Counterpart Funds. Participants: Feridun Erkin, Ambassador of Turkey Raymond A. Hare, Acting Assistant Secretary, NEA George Woodbridge, Officer-in-Charge, Economic Affairs, GTI Francis F. Lincoln, Economic Affairs, GTI C. Robert Moore, Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs Problem: Ambassador Erkin requests the Department’s assistance in clearing up a difficulty between the Turkish Government and ECA arising over statements allegedly made to him by an ECA official and subsequently repudiated by ECA regarding the release of counterpart funds to Turkey. 1 Action Required: To express to ECA the Department’s interest in an early settlement of this difficulty. Action Assigned: Mr. Hare and GTI. Discussion: Ambassador Erkin called at his request to ask the Department’s assistance in bringing about settlement of the difficulties which had arisen between the Turkish Government and ECA with respect to the release of counterpart funds. More specifically the problem has arisen as a result of statements allegedly made in late April 1950 by Mr. McDaniel, 2 then Assistant to Mr. Foster 3 of ECA, to the Ambassador as well as to Messrs. Alpar 4 and Zorlu 5 to the effect that ECA had changed its viewpoint with respect to the release of counterpart funds and no longer would insist on the usual procedures being followed, and that Mr. Dorr, ECA Mission Chief of Ankara, was being informed accordingly. The Ambassador had further understood from Mr. McDaniel that it would be agreeable for the Turkish Government to submit all of the investment projects provided for in this year’s budget to Mr. Dorr, who would select projects totaling TL 155 million for ECA counterpart financing, which projects would then be forwarded to OSR, Paris and to the ECA Administrator for final approval. The Ambassador asserted that Mr. McDaniel’s assurances were such that he had no reason to doubt that ECA had decided upon a more flexible policy on counterpart releases for Turkey. The Ambassador then referred to his meeting on May 22 with Messrs. Hoffman and Foster. He was obviously very disturbed that these gentlemen, with whom he had maintained very friendly relations, had been under the impression that he had misinformed his Government in saying that an agreement had been reached. The Ambassador emphasized that if a mistake had been made it was a mistake that had been made by ECA, and that he felt ECA’s approach to him should have been in that vein, with the request to him to help straighten out the matter with the Turkish Government and to work out together the solution of the counterpart problem. Since a responsible ECA official who was presumably speaking for Mr. Foster had told him of the “new” ECA position and he had so informed his Government, he felt obliged to hold to that position and had so written to Mr. Foster following the meeting of May 22. The Ambassador stated that the matter had now become more serious as the new Prime Minister in presenting to the National Assembly the program of the new Government 6 criticized the previous Government for claiming that it had reached an agreement with the American authorities on the release of counterpart funds to cover the Turkish budget deficit, whereas in fact no such agreement had been reached. The Ambassador indicated that the previous Government had based its claim on his own report, 7 following the McDaniel conversations, and that he was the one who was being made to shoulder the blame. It was very clear that he wanted the Department to take up the matter with ECA and to induce it to accept a solution proposed earlier by the Ambassador viz: the Turkish Government to present its investment projects to Dorr, who would select for counterpart financing projects totaling TL 155,000,000, these to be forwarded to OSR and ECA/W for final approval. I pointed out that I was, of course, in no position to speak for ECA and did not know how they were going to reply to his letter. I did know, however, that certain procedures and criteria for the release of counterpart funds had been established by law and experience and were applicable to all ERP countries, not just Turkey. Consequently, ECA while wanting to redress any wrongs that may have been committed may well not be in a position to meet the Turkish Government’s wishes with respect to counterpart releases. I pointed out that I was sure ECA regretted that this difficulty had arisen and would want to straighten it out in the most satisfactory manner, compatible with its own limitations. I told the Ambassador that we would inform ECA of his visit and urge that an early reply to his letter of May 24 8 to Mr. Foster be given him, particularly as he is anxious to know where the matter stands before he sails for Turkey on June 16. The Ambassador stated that if a satisfactory reply was not received very shortly he would ask for an appointment with Secretary Acheson, an approach which I sought to discourage. 1 A memorandum of May 26 by Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee to Under Secretary of State James E. Webb on the question of release of counterpart funds to Turkey recommended that “No action by the Department appears required as the problem is one which ECA and the Turkish Ambassador should be able to work out” (882.00R/5–2650, not printed). Russell H. Dorr, Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission to Turkey, called on Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes at Ankara on June 7 to present the ECA position on use of counterpart funds in Turkey. On the following day Mr. Dorr sent Prime Minister Menderes an aide-mémoire setting forth the history of inconclusive negotiations between ECA and the Turkish Government regarding the status of counterpart funds (enclosure to despatch 439, June 17, from Ankara, 882.00R/6–1750, not printed). 2 Joseph M. McDaniel, Jr., former Assistant to the Deputy Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration. 3 William C. Foster, Deputy Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration. 4 Nahit Alpar, Financial Counselor, Turkish Embassy in the United States. 5 Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Secretary-General, Turkish Ministry of State, left Washington about May 11, after inconclusive Turkish loan negotiations with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Department’s telegram 221, May 15, to Ankara, 882.10/5–1550, not printed). 6 Program presented by Prime Minister Menderes to the Turkish Ninth Grand National Assembly on May 29 (enclosure 1 to despatch 415, June 7, from Ankara, 782.2/6–750, not printed). 7 Ambassador Erkin’s report, date not available, is quoted in part in telegram Toeca 419, May 18, from ECA Mission in Ankara to ECA Administrator (attachment to memorandum, June 13, by Mr. Hare to Under Secretary Webb, 782.5/6–1350, not printed). 8 Not printed. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance, Department of State (Ohly), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) 782.5 MAP/6–1450 [Document 709] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance, Department of State ( Ohly ), to the Director of the Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense ( Lemnitzer ) top secret [ Washington ,] June 14, 1950. Subject: Fiscal Year 1950 Air Force MDA Matériel Program, Title II. I refer to your memorandum, above subject, dated May 16, 1950, 1 concerning the Air Force Program for Turkey. The Department appreciates the arguments set forth in paragraph 2 thereof in support of supplying Turkey with jet aircraft, and will give fullest consideration thereto. It is also appreciated that early disclosure of the proposal to give jet aircraft to Turkey would facilitate the handling of the airfield rehabilitation project for FY 1950 and would permit of early training in flying and maintenance techniques. However, there are certain political considerations which make it necessary that the proposal to give jet aircraft to Turkey not be disclosed at this time even to the Turkish Government. The exact temper of the new Turkish Government and of its new Chief of Staff 2 remains to be established. Premature announcement of our intention to send jets to Turkey would indicate a confidence in the new Government not yet proven. A few months should provide indications of the extent to which cooperation can be expected from them, and of the strength they might be expected to exhibit should Russian pressure develop as the result of providing jet planes. It would also appear that the new Government may renew pressure for United States participation in a regional pact, and, should our reply be negative, simultaneous announcement of our intention to provide jet planes would appear desirable. Finally, it appears that the announcement to the Turkish Government should come as soon as possible in relation to the start of training in jet aircraft, to minimize the delay inherent in training and procurement procedures in the Turkish mind. It is therefore recommended that, in so far as the rehabilitation of the airfields is concerned, the position be adopted with the Turkish Government that it would be wasteful to invest funds to rehabilitate these fields only so as to permit the accommodation of conventional aircraft; and that sound business judgment indicates that, in view of the possibility that Turkey may herself wish to acquire more modern aircraft, the rehabilitation project should be pursued on a basis which will not call for doing the job over again in the next year or two, should Turkey obtain jet aircraft in one way or another. It is believed that this argument has some merit in and of itself in view of the technological strides being made in the field of aviation, and in view of the understanding of the Department based on informal statements of representatives of the Department of Defense, that constructing these fields for jet aircraft will not result in any substantial increase in length of runway or in the gross weight which the airstrip will be able to accommodate. “No specific publicity should be given to the fact that these fields will be designed for jet aircraft use. Conversely, no extreme secrecy should be given to this fact which would in turn unduly emphasize this aspect of the project and give it an unduly sinister cast. It is understood that the question of training becomes of immediate importance with respect to Turkish students who will be coming to the United States for flight training for jet aircraft. It is informally understood that it is possible to postpone this flight training for jet aircraft so that all of the Turkish students would commence this training in January 1951. Even if this were done, it is understood that sufficient advance notice to the Turkish Government is necessary in order to let it select those students. The Department of State therefore recommends that training spaces for such students be reserved in classes to commence not before January 1951, and that the Turkish Government should not be informed at this time that those spaces are reserved for jet flying training. The Department of State further recommends that in the fall, several weeks before the Turkish Government should be requested to select students for jet flying training in order that such students could be available for the January 1951 classes, the two Departments review the situation regarding the furnishing of jet aircraft to Turkey. You may be assured that the most sympathetic reception to the concept of giving jet aircraft to Turkey will be afforded, subject to developments in the political arena in the ensuing months. However, it is believed that the delay which this process will afford will permit the resolution of certain political aspects of the situation in Turkey and will permit us to gauge better the Russian reaction to the airfields rehabilitation projects. With respect to paragraph 4 of your memorandum, the Department is willing to accept the amendment proposed. Should the foregoing appear to you to call for still further consideration, the Department of State is agreeable to your suggestion of discussing this matter in the FMACC. John H. Ohly 1 Not found in Department of State files. 2 Gen. Nuri Yamut. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) 611.82/6–1450 [Document 710] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Webb ) secret Washington , June 14, 1950. Subject: Courtesy Call of Ambassador Erkin. Participants: Feridun Erkin, Ambassador of Turkey James E. Webb, Under Secretary C. Robert Moore, Officer-in-Charge, Turkish Affairs Ambassador Erkin stated that he was leaving for Turkey very shortly and had wanted to call on me before his departure. 1 While he had no particular problems to take up with me, he inquired whether there were any views the Secretary or I might wish him, upon his arrival in Turkey, to convey to the new Government, particularly with respect to the recent London meetings. 2 I referred to his call on me of April 27, 3 and stated that, as I believed he knew, it had not been found possible to place on the agenda of the London meetings the question of including Turkey in a regional pact, but that the Ambassador’s request had been taken up with the Secretary. 4 By way of observation on the London meetings I mentioned to the Ambassador that I felt these meetings had revealed that: (1) the peoples of Europe recognize more acutely than they did a year ago the implications of being a satellite nation and realize that there is no middle road for them; (2) the free peoples of Europe have a greater feeling of confidence as a result of the cooperation thus far achieved that war can be prevented, and they recognize that this is possible only through their cooperative efforts; (3) many of the measures of cooperation now being undertaken as a result of the Russian threat would, in any event, have been essential in order to meet major economic and other problems facing the world after World War II. The Ambassador inquired if he might inform his Government that the inclusion of Turkey in a security arrangement with the United States was only a question of time. I replied that I did not feel that I was in a position to make such a statement, but that he could be sure that we would be constantly working with Turkey to arrive at measures which we could both agree were the most suitable in the light of existing conditions. The Ambassador then asked if we were not concerned over the possibility that countries which were not covered by security arrangements with the United States might become discouraged. I pointed out again that there was abundant evidence of our interest in Turkey’s security; that Turkey was not only receiving direct aid from the United States, but was benefiting indirectly from the United States contribution to security measures in other areas. The Ambassador did not pursue the matter further, and the meeting came to a close. James E. Webb 1 Ambassador Erkin was away from Washington, June 16–August 15; Melih Esenbel, First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy, served as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim. 2 For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, London May 11–13, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. For documentation on the session of the North Atlantic Council, London, May 15–18, see ibid. , pp. 1 ff. 3 See the memorandum of conversation, April 27, by Mr. Webb, p. 1252 [ Pg. 1252 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] . 4 With reference to Ambassador Erkin’s request of April 27 that the question of including Turkey in a regional security pact be placed on the agenda of the May meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London, Mr. McGhee suggested in a memorandum of May 1 to Mr. Webb that a reply “be deferred until after the meetings of the Foreign Ministers as there is always a possibility that the question may come up during the meetings. Should Ambassador Erkin raise the question in the meantime, he could be informed that the Secretary was fully briefed on the matter before his departure but that it is doubtful that there can be any change at this time in this Government’s position as expressed to him previously.” For text of Mr. McGhee’s memorandum, see vol. iii , p. 79 . The Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (Hoffman), to the Turkish Ambassador in the United States (Erkin) Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 58F33: Box 3299: 500 ECA [Document 711] The Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration ( Hoffman ), to the Turkish Ambassador in the United States ( Erkin ) 1 [ Washington ,] June 15, 1950. Dear Mr. Ambassador : Mr. Foster and I have given thoughtful consideration to your letter of May 24, 2 and generally to the present status of the Turkish counterpart fund release matter. We regret exceedingly the apparent misunderstanding which has beclouded our mutual understanding of the principles and procedures which govern this situation. I hope in this letter to provide a further clarification of ECA policy and requirements which have a bearing upon the releases of counterpart funds. In this connection, may I call to your attention the recent meeting which took place in Paris between the Turkish Foreign Minister, 3 accompanied by Messrs. Zorlu and Tiney, and Ambassadors Harriman and Katz. 4 There was also an earlier meeting on May 16 between Messrs. Zorlu and Tiney and Ambassador Katz. At these meetings 5 the Turkish counterpart question was discussed at some length. I am sure that these meetings were most constructive forward steps in our mutual understanding of the terms of reference under which this problem must be solved. I fear, however, that I cannot agree with your feelings, as expressed in your letter, that our act in suggesting the earlier meeting can be interpreted only as an indication of a significant change in ECA policy. I believe that in all discussions which have taken place on this subject between officials of the Turkish Government and officials of ECA, a consistent position has been maintained on our part. I am informed that subsequent to April 20, there occurred various meetings between Mr. McDaniel and members of the Turkish Government, including yourself and Messrs. Zorlu and Alpar, and Mr. Foster has recently discussed these conversations with Mr. McDaniel. I fear that Mr. McDaniel’s sympathetic understanding of the Turkish problem may have given you the erroneous impression that a significant change in ECA policy was contemplated. This is not, and cannot, be the case. Therefore, I am sure you will agree that further discussion as to the possible interpretation that might be placed on these conversations would serve no useful purpose. May I therefore request that you accept our sincere regrets for any misunderstandings which have arisen out of past conversations on this matter. On the more constructive side, may I suggest that a continuation of the discussions currently being held in Ankara between Mr. Dorr and the officials of the present Turkish Government who are assuming responsibility for the coordination of the Turkish economic development program, will be the most rewarding means of pursuing this matter further. May I reiterate, as Mr. Foster has already stated on numerous occasions, that neither our responsibility to the Congress of the United States, nor our general policy in such matters, as it has been applied in similar situations in other participating countries, permits our consenting to the automatic or quasi-automatic use of counterpart funds to meet governmental budget deficits. What ECA requires, and must continue to require, is the submission of an overall counterpart expenditure program which is developed within the context of a total investment program and which takes into full consideration the objective of maintaining financial stability. Such a submission is required by ECA not only as a matter of policy, but also as part of our presentation to the U.S. National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, in support of our recommendations for the release of counterpart funds. As you know, counterpart funds can be released by the Administrator only after consultation with the National Advisory Council. I should like to emphasize that in considering a counterpart release program in any participating country, we invariably rely heavily upon the recommendations of the ECA Mission Chief in that country. Both ECA/Washington and the Office of the Special Representative in Europe will do everything in their power to assist Mr. Dorr in arriving at an appropriate judgment in this matter. No action can be taken either in Washington or in Paris, however, until after we have received recommendations from the ECA Mission to Turkey. It is for this reason that I strongly recommend that discussions in Ankara be continued until any points of difference are resolved. I cannot believe that any of the points at issue are of such a nature as to preclude a complete and mutually satisfactory agreement in the near future. I am confident that Mr. Dorr recognizes the limitations to investment programming imposed on the Turkish Government by reason of less highly developed statistical data and sources. I understand that you are about to leave on a trip to your homeland. May I extend every good wish for a most pleasant voyage and an enjoyable vacation. If you should desire, Mr. Foster and I should be very happy to see you before you depart. Sincerely yours, Paul G. Hoffman 1 The copy printed here was enclosed with a letter of June 22, not printed, from Mr. Moore to Ambassador Wadsworth. 2 Also enclosed ibid. ; not printed. 3 Fuat Köprülü. 4 Milton Katz, Deputy Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration. 5 No record of these meetings has been found in Department of State files. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (McBride) Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 58F33: 400 MDAP: January–June 1950 [Document 712] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey ( McBride ) 1 restricted Ankara , 28 June 1950—3 p. m. Present: Fuad Köprülü, Minister of Foreign Affairs H. L. McBride, Major General, Chief/JAMMAT Secretary to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter 1. Purpose. The Minister of Foreign Affairs requested General H. L. McBride to visit him and discuss the situation in the Turkish Military Forces. 2. Korean Situation. 2 The Minister of Foreign Affairs was asked what his reactions were to the present situation in Korea. He explained he considered it a political move on the part of the Soviets and that in view of the positive action taken by the United States, the Soviets would not directly participate in any military action. He stated he did not consider this a Soviet opening of a worldwide military action; that should the Soviets decide to begin a world conflict, they would not initiate action in a remote and unimportant area such as Korea. He stated that now, the Soviets had lost all element of surprise and the U.S. was alerted to the possible danger of attack. The Minister was asked what action had been taken by the Turkish Government in view of this situation. He stated that upon receiving news of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, he had informed his Government. Also, the General Staff had been notified and directed to take all necessary measures. He indicated that no conferences had been held either by the Council of Ministries or with the General Staff to review the situation and to determine what steps could be taken by the military authorities. The impression left was that the Turkish authorities considered this more or less a local affair and that it would not spread beyond the Korean area. The Minister also stated that he was very pleased by the positive action taken by the American Government. 3 3. Changes in Command. The Minister inquired whether or not cooperation between the American Mission and the General Staff had improved since the recent changes in high command. He was informed that due to the shifting of personnel and the fact that numerous replacements had been named for those who had been relieved from duty resulted in a slackening of the work between the American Mission and the General Staff. General McBride stated that he was very much pleased with the appointment of General Yamut as Chief of Staff and was confident that there would be much better cooperation than formerly. However, it would take some time for the officers in the new position to become acquainted with their responsibilities and the organization and operation of their departments. 4. General Military Conditions. The Minister asked for General McBride’s impressions as to general conditions in the military service as well as for corrections for any known deficiencies. a . General McBride stated that in his opinion, conditions in the Turkish Forces could be considered alarming as there were no units in the Turkish Military forces that were capable of taking the field and making a creditable performance in combat. b . It was pointed out that the problem in the Turkish Military Forces in time of peace is to effectively utilize the personnel available. The major difficulty is that the available personnel is not adequate to support all the units plus those presently existing in the Military Establishment. The first step necessary to correct this condition is to deactivate many existing units which could contribute little to the defense of Turkey in the event of war, reassigning the personnel to the more important major units, and give them sufficient personnel to effectively maintain and train with the modern equipment supplied by the Aid Program. It was pointed out that this could be done immediately and that little or no expense would be involved. It was further pointed out that these non-effective combat units require funds and maintenance facilities which are needed to support the major combat units in the Army. c . Another vital deficiency in the Military Establishment is the lack of sufficient permanent non-commissioned officers. It was stated that the number of non-commissioned officers in the Turkish Defense Forces should be increased approximately sixfold. It was observed that by reducing the number of gendarmes, there is the possibility of a great saving in manpower. This would result either in a saving to the budget, or, by assigning the surplus gendarmes to the military forces, it would increase the number of military personnel available. d . The lack of command inspections by senior commanders and staff officers, and the inclination of subordinates to give a favorable picture in their reports, led to a false impression of the conditions in the military units. It was stressed that it is important that the officers of the higher headquarters make more inspections and visits to the field units, personally, to see the conditions in the units. e . General McBride mentioned the need for full support of the School Training Program in order to provide trained personnel to maintain and operate the new equipment. 5. The Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his concurrence in these observations and stated that action had already been initiated on some of them; that he would discuss them with the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff, and direct that action be taken without further delay to correct the deficiencies mentioned. 6. Budget. The Minister stated that action already had been started to decrease the expenditures for the Military Forces. General McBride commented that he did not believe it was feasible to reduce the size of the military budget but action should be taken to eliminate the wasteful use of money and apply the available moneys to the most important projects. 7. Conclusion. The Minister stated that the present Government was determined that the work between the Americans and the Turkish authorities would be improved, that deficiencies pointed out would be corrected, and that we could expect immediate action to improve the general situation in the Military Establishment. H. L. McBride Major General, USA 1 This paper bears notations which indicate that Ambassador Wadsworth circulated this copy of the memorandum of conversation to William O. Baxter and Bertel E. Kuniholm, First Secretaries of the Embassy in Turkey and that the portion of the text beginning with the second paragraph was sent to the Department by despatch (not found in Department of State files). 2 For documentation relating to Korea, see volume vii . 3 Regarding the Korean crisis, Mr. Köprülü told Ambassador Wadsworth on June 28 the following: “We concur in what your government has done. That which was done at UN was the only proper thing to do. We will support it in any way we can.” (Telegram 343, June 29, from Ankara, 795.00/6–2950, not printed) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 840.00(R)/7–2150 [Document 713] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 1 restricted [ Washington ,] July 21, 1950. Subject: Turkish Government Request for Increased ECA Assistance for FY 1951. Participants: Mr. Melih Esenbel, Turkish Chargé d’Affaires Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary Mr. Gerald Keith, Counselor of Embassy, Ankara Mr. Francis F. Lincoln, GTI Mr. C. Robert Moore, GTI Problem: Turkish Government requests the Department’s support in obtaining an increase in ECA aid in FY 1951. Action Required: To determine if there is a legitimate basis for urging ECA to consider additional aid for Turkey. Action Assigned to: GTI. Mr. Esenbel called to express the serious concern of the Turkish Government over the probability of a very drastic reduction in ECA aid to Turkey for FY 1951 and to ask if the Department, in view of the very special factors involved, would take up with ECA the question of more favorable treatment for Turkey. Mr. Esenbel referred specifically to the establishment of an EPU initial position for Turkey of $25 million on a loan basis as against the amount requested by Turkey—$65.7 million on a grant basis—and to the anticipated direct ECA dollar aid of around $35 million, “more than $100 million less than the original Turkish request”. Mr. Esenbel then proceeded to develop the theme that ECA aid to Turkey from the very beginning had been on a different basis than ECA aid to other countries. Turkey had already attained its 1938 level of production, and its main problem was to develop its economy. As the other countries have spent a large portion of ECA funds on consumables and have been able to increase their production, their requirements are not as acute as in 1947. In the case of Turkey, however, ECA aid is being utilized on long range development projects, which would be seriously affected if the volume of aid should be reduced. Mr. Esenbel complained about the Snoy-Marjolin formula 2 for the allocation of direct aid and expressed the view that, since a special exception was being made for Greece, it should likewise be possible to make a special exception for Turkey. He commented that obviously conditions in various ECA countries, differed, so that it was not logical that the reduction in ECA aid to be received by all countries in FY 1951 should be uniform. He also mentioned that the ECA trade liberalization program would not benefit Turkey as much as many of the other ECA countries. Tobacco, one of Turkey’s principal export items, is a state monoply in most of the other ECA countries so that their imports will probably remain more or less fixed. I pointed out that we do not like to intervene in decisions that have been made by ECA and OEEC, and that as a general policy, it is difficult for us to suggest a greater amount of aid for one country, Turkey for example, which would result in reduced aid to other countries. To be able to do so would in effect impose on us the requirement of reviewing all of the available data on the needs of such other countries to satisfy ourselves that Turkey’s need was more essential. I also mentioned that in the case of a country’s investment program such a program can be carried out at a slower or faster rate depending, among other things, on the availability of funds to finance it. In the case of Turkey the budgetary factor is an important one, in view of the lira requirements that the investment projects generate. I also pointed out that it is generally recognized that Greece’s need for ECA assistance differs very much from that of Turkey in that this assistance is necessary to enable Greece to survive, which is not the case with Turkey. In reply to my question, Mr. Esenbel stated that the Turkish request was also being taken up directly with ECA. I suggested that this was the best way of handling it, but I indicated, however, that we would be glad to study his memorandum to determine if there was any action we could appropriately take. George C. McGhee 1 Attachments (not printed): memorandum, July 21, “Turkish Marshall Aid Program for 1950–51 and memorandum, undated, “Turkish Balance of Payments Deficit for 1950–1951” (source, presumably the Turkish Embassy, not indicated). 2 A formula for allocating economic aid through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Baron Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers was formerly Chairman of the Council and Robert E. Marjolin was Secretary-General of the Organization. For documentation on the OEEC, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. iv , pp. 367 ff., and vol. iii , pp. 611 ff. The Turkish share under the Snoy-Marjolin formula was 1.507 percent of direct country economic aid for Europe for fiscal year 1951. The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 782.5/7–2250: Telegram [Document 714] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State top secret Ankara , July 22, 1950—noon. 51. Foreign Minister pointedly took me aside after dinner July 20 for quiet half hour talk. He wished particularly “orient me re major matters discussed at Yalova conference” called by President July 18 “to survey national defense position in light of critical world situation”. Principal conferees were Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Chief of General Staff, and Commanders Navy 1 and Air Force. 2 On conclusion conference Prime Minister issued short communiqué reading: “We examined new measures for reorganization of armed forces. Government attaches great importance to question. It will be readily understood that in prevailing world conditions questions of national defense must be placed on highest plane”. Highlights of Foreign Minister’s comment to me follows: 1. Major subject discussed and decided was pressing need immediately to strengthen existing forces. Basis of discussion was General McBride’s letter of June 30 to Chief General Staff. 3 ( Note: This letter supplied check list of problems prompt solution of which were deemed necessary to ultimate success of aid program and to development of full combat potential defense forces, notably inactivation of certain units to permit reinforcement of others, immediate implementation recommendations for current doubling number NCO’s, general speed-up of training program, extensive command inspections and concentrated effort on war and mobilization plans.) 2. Conference decided immediate action would be taken in cooperation with aid mission to implement these recommendations. In light world situation it concurred in General McBride’s view that present state armed forces is “alarming” and that they must be brought immediately to maximum effective potential within practical possibilities and general budget limitations. ( Note: General McBride and I believe much currently needed improvements can be made within framework this formula.) 3. Conference then decided Prime Minister should invite Foreign Minister and US Ambassador to confer next week to review entire field US-Turkish cooperation from economic as well as military aspects. It took position that in event third world war defense through neutrality would be illusory for any nation and for Turkey unthinkable. “We shall”, Foreign Minister said, “continue our orientation to Western democracies. Our interests lie with yours”. I shall, of course, report further developments and meanwhile would appreciate any general guidance Department may consider desirable. Wadsworth 1 Rear Adm. Sadik Altincan. 2 Lt. Gen. Muzaffer Göksenin. 3 Letter to Gen. Nuri Yamut, not printed (Ankara Embassy files, lot 58F33, box 3299, 400 MDAP January-June 1950). The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 123 Wadsworth, George: Telegram [Document 715] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Ankara , July 24, 1950—11 a. m. 55. (1) On July 22, Turkish Foreign Office requested I call this morning on Secretary General Akdur. Same evening Foreign Minister told me subject would be Turkish reply to SYG Lie’s circular 1 to 50 UN member nations urging that they consider offering effective assistance (including ground forces) to resist North Korean aggression. (2) Foreign Minister explained Turkish Government wished its reply “bear witness to its sincere desire manifest by practical action its loyalty to UN and to Turk-US collaboration”. He added, “We wish particularly that our reply conform with US policy and public opinion”. (3) My immediate reaction was that I should urge prompt despatch ground forces; but I refrained from so replying except in general appreciative terms pending consultation with General McBride. (4) Yesterday after consultation with McBride and Senator Cain 2 (who arrived from Athens) I decided to reply that in my personal view Turkish Government could best manifest its support of UN policies by prompt dispatch of fully equipped regimental combat team. (5) General McBride described latter as consisting of infantry regiment, artillery battalion and appropriate headquarters, anti-tank, anti-aircraft, engineer, motor transport, signal, ordnance and medical units and “normal loads” of ammunition, spare parts, mines, wire, et cetera; i.e., a fully self-contained combat unit of between 4,000 and 4,500 officers and men approximately 10 percent above war strength. (6) General McBride believes such a unit could be assembled for embarkation at a Turkish port within one month. If sent, it would after arrival have to be maintained by UN Commander. Its artillery, trucks and general services equipment would conform to US standards. Small arms, however, none of which have been given under our military aid program, would presumably have to be supplied from US stocks in Far East. Ocean transport could presumably be supplied from shipping placed at UN disposal by other member nations. (7) McBride recommends also that, if such a unit be sent, it be accompanied, or joined in Korea, by 2 or more US military (officer liaison) personnel who have served in Turkey with TUSAG. (8) This morning I presented this “strictly personal suggestion” to Secretary General. He welcomed it warmly as such. We were in agreement that by such action Turkey could best show, in Foreign Minister’s words, its loyalty to UN and Turk-US collaboration and at same time best serve its own interests. There was no doubt in my mind that he sensed his country on verge its most important post-war decision or that he was wholly sincere in adding “I trust this decision will be taken promptly by Cabinet and will render even more effective our collaboration in political as well as military fields”. (9) This afternoon Senator Cain, General McBride and I had prearranged conference with Defense Minister, Chief of Staff and Commanding General Turkish ground forces. Foreign Minister joined us. Discussion naturally turned to foregoing subject. Foreign Minister said, “Personally I am wholeheartedly in favor sending ground forces promptly and will present your suggestion to Cabinet at earliest opportunity, if possible tomorrow”. Defense Minister said, “I share my colleague’s view”. Chief of Staff was clearly wholly favorably disposed. G–3 general staff wrote him informal memorandum, 3 “It will be greatest crime in Turkish history if we fail take advantage this, opportunity”. (10) This evening at dinner in honor Senator Cain, Foreign Minister told me he had telephoned President Bayar, Prime Minister and 3 other Ministers due return Ankara tomorrow from Bairam holidays to arrange Cabinet meeting that afternoon. He said he hoped sincerely and believed favorable decision could then be taken. If so, he would at once telegraph SYG Lie and instruct Turkish Embassy Washington to inform Department. (11) Tomorrow I am accompanying Senator Cain to Istanbul whence he will fly Frankfort. He has been most helpful in expounding American sentiment and policy as given him by General Bradley before leaving Washington fortnight ago. I should much appreciate receiving Department’s early comment. Wadsworth 1 Cablegram of July 14 from U.N. Secretary-General Trygve H. Lie (U.N. doc. S/1619). 2 Senator Harry P. Cain, of Washington, visited Turkey from July 23 to 26, to observe the military aid program. He called on the Ministers of National Defense and Foreign Affairs, as well as officers connected with the aid program. (Despatch 50, July 27, from Ankara, not printed; 782.00/7–2750) 3 Memorandum, date unavailable, by Maj. Gen. Yusuf A. Egeli to Gen. Nuri Yamut, not found in Department of State files. The Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 262A.0041/7–2850 [Document 716] The Embassy in Turkey to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1 No. 2795 Ankara , July 24, 1950. The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the former’s Note No. 2131 of January 10, 1948 and to its Note Verbale of October 10, 1948, both concerning the liquidation of German assets in Turkey and the restitution of looted property, including gold. 2 Reference is also made to subsequent conversations had with officials of the Ministry in regard to these problems. The Embassy is now under instructions to bring again to the attention of the Turkish Government the fact that the question of the liquidation of enemy assets in Turkey and the restoration of looted property, including gold, has not been disposed of. The principles, both international and moral, which govern this question, have been fully set out in the Embassy’s earlier communications. It is understood that draft legislation has been prepared which, on enactment, would give the Turkish Executive powers to negotiate on this question, but that it is unlikely that this measure will be considered by the Turkish Grand National Assembly for several months to come. The Embassy would appreciate it if the Ministry would confirm whether the information is correct. For reasons which the Ministry will readily understand, it is desirable that negotiations for the settlement of these two outstanding matters should be conducted at the earliest opportunity. The United States Government, therefore, in agreement with the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, 3 proposes that the two aspects of the subject, namely, the restitution of looted property and the liquidation of enemy assets be considered separately. While the three Governments are fully cognizant of the necessity for enabling legislation which would authorize negotiation on the question of enemy assets in Turkey, they fail to understand the apparent necessity for legislation to permit the Turkish Government to return the looted property to the rightful owners. The Embassy, therefore, in association with the Embassies of the United Kingdom and France, is instructed to propose that negotiations for the settlement of the question of restitution of the looted property, including gold, should not await the enactment of the legislative measures described above but should be conducted as soon as possible. The United States Government hopes that this proposal will be favorably considered by the Turkish Government and that an early reply may be expected. 4 1 Enclosure 1 to despatch 53, July 28, from Ankara (262A.0041/7–2850). 2 Neither printed. For documentation on the question of the disposition of German external assets, see Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. ii , pp. 853 ff. 3 The British and French Embassies in Turkey presented similar notes to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 25. 4 No reply of the Turkish Government to the present note has been found in Department of State files for 1950. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 782.5/7–2250: Telegram [Document 717] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey top secret Washington , July 26, 1950—8 p. m. 41. Embtel 51, July 22. Dept shares Turk view that questions of national defense must be placed on highest plane and that reorganization Turk armed forces of great importance. Urges no opportunity be lost to assure active support highest Turk officials to necessity earliest implementation McBride recommendations. Dept primary concern is that Turks take all necessary measures to bring armed forces to “maximum effective potential within practical possibilities and general budget limitations”. Possible consequences—not only on Turks but on other free nations facing common Soviet threat—of their failure to do so are such that Dept feels confident Turks will not delay effecting needed reorganization. While development of adequate corps of non-commissioned officers and technicians is only one of problems cited by Gen McBride, Dept wishes inform you it recently received letter from Sec Defense 1 referring to discussions held with Turks by Gen Collins during his recent visit re necessity this action, and recommending that Dept instruct you to use your influence to bring about such changes as may make this possible. In your discretion you may reiterate to appropriate Turk officials importance US Govt attaches this problem, avoiding of course implication that other problems cited by Gen McBride are of lesser concern. Dept assumes increased mil expenditures resulting from implementation of the McBride recommendations will be largely internal expenditures, at least in early stages, and Turks will undoubtedly raise problem of financing them. All countries threatened by Soviet aggression face similar problem. Dept naturally keenly interested in details of measures Turks prepared to take which you and McBride consider necessary, their cost, your appraisal of Turks ability to meet such costs and Turk proposals for meeting them, but not now in position comment on possibility additional US mil or econ aid. FYI Turk Chargé on July 21 2 requested Dept support in obtaining for Turk investment program larger allocation ECA direct aid for FY 1951 and larger EPU initial position. Did not relate request possibility increased mil expenditures. In view various factors, such as limited ECA funds available, previous general agreement to their distribution and fact that contemplated ECA assistance to Turkey in FY 1951 will provide for exchange requirements for a fairly substantial investment program, Dept has not felt justified in requesting that question of Turkey’s allocation be reopened by ECA. While entirely appreciative of Turkey’s need for economic development and of the financing problem which has long existed because of defense burden, Dept believes Turks will undoubtedly recognize that larger defense expenditures may be inevitable in light of recent events, with possibility that investment expenditures may have to be curtailed. Dept appreciates efforts you and Gen McBride are making to assist Turks in strengthening their armed forces and in utilizing US mil aid in most effective manner. Pls forward copy McBride letter June 30 to Chief General Staff. 3 Acheson 1 Reference is to a letter of July 12 from Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson to the Secretary of State, not printed, regarding a deficiency in the permanent noncommissioned officer corps of both the Italian and Turkish Armies. A letter of August 8, from Under Secretary of State James E. Webb to Secretary of Defense Johnson, not printed, stated that he had instructed the Ambassadors in Rome and Ankara to discuss this matter with the appropriate officials. (765.551/7–1250) 2 See memorandum of conversation, July 21, by Mr. McGhee, p. 1278 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] . 3 Letter to Gen. Nuri Yamut, not printed (Ankara Embassy files, lot 58F33, box 3299, 400 MDAP January-June 1950). The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 782.5/7–3150: Telegram [Document 718] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority Istanbul , July 31, 1950—midnight. 44. 1. At their requests I called on Foreign Minister July 29 and on Prime Minister July 30. Both conversations surveyed major objectives Turk-US collaboration in military, economic and political fields. On both occasions I was guided by and stressed position given me in Department’s most helpful telegram 41, July 26. On latter occasion I was able emphasize to Prime Minister supplementary instruction given me in Deptel 47, July 28 1 received morning July 30. 2. In re subject latter instruction (i.e. Department’s concern lest Senator Cain’s statements lead Turkish Government believe its offer assist in Korea might result in Turkey’s inclusion Atlantic Pact and increased economic aid), I can assure Department these statements played no part in formulation Turkish policy which had already before his arrival been well thought out by Foreign Minister in consultation with President and Prime Minister. Cain press conference, held at request official Turkish press bureau just prior to his leaving Ankara, 2 was unfortunate in that it suggested such conclusions to certain editors. In all prior conversations with Turkish officials Cain had been discreet, emphasizing that while he could report major reactions American public he spoke as an individual, as a Senator who represented minority view even in his own party and in no wise as spokesman official US Government policy. 3. Foreign Minister, after repeating earlier assurances government’s intention implement McBride recommendations for immediate strengthening Turkish defense forces, informed me he proposed stress again in conversation with Schuman 3 in Paris and with Bevin 4 at Strasburg Turkish view that critical world situation impelled reconsideration Turkey’s place in over-all western mutual defense. Basic foreign and security policy considerations, he said, had long pointed to desirability Turkey joining Atlantic Pact, “a view shared alike by former and present Turkish governments.” He hoped this “vital matter” could be considered by American, British and French Foreign Ministers at their September meeting. 5 He himself hoped to head Turk delegation to GAUNT and at time convenient to Mr. Acheson be afforded opportunity elaborate Turkish government views. 6 He said he would leave Ankara that evening, would make similar communication to British and French Ambassadors in Istanbul and fly Paris next day. Prime Minister would give me aide-mémoire confirming that position he had outlined was official position Turkish Government. 4. Foreign Minister then said fuller Turk-US collaboration in military and economic fields might in present emergency situation require additional US aid to attain objectives to be mutually determined. Generals McBride and Yamut would make recommendations re military. On economic side he handed me aide-mémoire 7 and asked that I study it carefully with Dorr and inform Prime Minister our views. Dorr and I believe position presented in this aide-mémoire is substantially same as that given Department by Turkish Chargé July 21. 8 We will comment further after my visit Ankara August 3 with Admiral Ballentine. 9 5. Prime Minister began by referring to Yalova conference (see Embtel 51, July 22). His communiqué had stated that “new measures for re-organization of armed forces had been examined.” Now, he could tell me, orders to implement them immediately had been issued and provision made for closest working relationship between Generals McBride and Yamut. He referred in detail and without notes to McBride’s June 30 recommendations; 10 then stressed urgency completion military airfields project. They, he said “constitute basic link for close collaboration with American forces.” 6. Prime Minister continued, “I have given particular instructions that defense planning by our staff and your officers be given top priority; but planning does not depend on one party alone. We naturally want to know what you are planning and are prepared to do in, and for joint defense of, Turkey in event of war.” In reply I reiterated Department’s answer to Turkish request for joint staff talks as given Turkish Government in writing on my return from Washington last March. 11 Its essence was that such talks could not precede political commitment. He promised read answer and memo of ensuing conversation between President Inonu and General Collins; 12 then said, “this brings us naturally to need for coordination our political views and first and foremost to Turkey’s vital interest in joining Atlantic Pact. Our collaboration should be as close in political as in military and economic fields.” 7. Prime Minister then handed me aide-mémoire 13 promised by Foreign Minister. It recapitulates major points outlined above; urges that military and economic aid “respond to exigencies of the present hour”; and stresses common interest in “moral reinforcement” of Turkish public opinion as defense against “harmful propaganda” by “bringing to contractual stage” present close, friendly collaboration and “thereby adding a link to the system for the safeguarding of general peace and security.” It concludes with urgent plea that “moment is propitious for admission of Turkey as member of system of defense and security instituted by the Atlantic Pact” and requests that “US Government kindly see to it that the necessary measures be taken to the end, that this question be examined and resolved with the shortest possible delay.” 8. In reply, after carefully laying before Prime Minister all major points made in Deptel 41, July 26, I promised wire Department detailed report my conversations with him and Foreign Minister. 9. Our conversation then turned to military and economic aid programs. Turkey would not, he said, reduce its defense budget but he could not see how it could be increased. In particular, if some 20 million Turkish liras were to be needed to augment NCO and technician corps, where could he find them; he would cut economic investment program wherever possible and would not undertake new projects (e.g. Sariyir hydroelectric dam project) 14 unless contributing immediately to over-all defense. Could I see, he asked, possibility that US Government might help if supplied with careful analysis of needs? Generals McBride and Yamut were to prepare such an analysis on military side; he was himself giving close study to economic. 10. In reply I made following suggestion: In same way that our two generals were elaborating military recommendations for submission to us at end first week in August, so it would seem highly desirable that Dorr and new Turkish Minister of State submit to us at same time economic recommendations including major elements ECA and Turkish Government investment programs for current FY. He concurred and set August 8 as date with me, two generals, Dorr and Minister of State. 15 11. Before ending conversation Prime Minister referred to official reports made him by Provincial Governors that Turkish decision to send troops to Korea had met with wide enthusiastic support, and he belittled any lasting effect of Opposition Party’s criticism “because it was so patently prompted by considerations of domestic policies”. He concluded: “Korean war has opened new era, one in which we must strive harder and work faster towards common objectives. We will not be Utopians but apply ourselves to practical realities.” Wadsworth 1 Not printed; it suggested that Ambassador George Wadsworth caution Turkish officials against drawing the conclusion that the Turkish offer to assist in Korea might result in Turkey’s inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and have a bearing on the extent of U.S. economic aid to Turkey (795.00/7–2550). 2 In reply to a question asked at a news conference in Ankara on July 25, Senator Cain said “I can say we are going to be much more sympathetic in helping those who helped most in Korea, we want all of our friends tied together as free nations militarily, economically and politically” (telegram 57, July 25, from Ankara, 795.00/7–2550). 3 Robert Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs; see telegram 124, August 22, from Ankara, p. 1296 [ Pg. 1296 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] . 4 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, met with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Köprülü at the offices of the British Delegation to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on August 5 (the London Times , August 7). 5 For documentation on the Tripartite Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and the United States, New York, September 1950, see vol. iii , pp. 1108 ff. 6 Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Köprülü did not serve as Chairman of the Delegation of Turkey to the Fifth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly. No record of a conversation between him and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson has been found in Department of State files for 1950. 7 Aide-memoire , July 29, from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (enclosure 1 to despatch 62, August 5, from Ankara, 882.10/8–550, not printed). 8 See memorandum of conversation, July 21, by Mr. McGhee, p. 1278 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] . 9 Vice Adm. John J. Ballentine, Commander, Sixth Task Fleet, visited Ankara, August 3–4. 10 Recommendations in a letter, June 30, from Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride, Chief of the Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, to Gen. Nuri Yamut, Chief of Staff, Turkish General Staff (Ankara Embassy files, lot 58F33, box 3299, 400 MDAP January-June 1950, not printed). 11 See Enclosure 1 to Instruction No. 19, March 20, p. 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] . 12 See memorandum of conversation, March 26, p. 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] . 13 Aide-memoire , July 30, from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (enclosure 2 to despatch 62, August 5, from Ankara, 882.10/8–550, not printed). 14 The Chief of the ECA Mission to Turkey, Russell H. Dorr, and the Turkish Minister of State, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoglue, signed the Sariyar hydroelectric power agreement on September 22, 1950 (despatch 307, December 5, from Ankara, 882.2614/12–550, not printed). 15 The meeting set for August 8 was held on August 19. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) 782.5/8–1450 [Document 719] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 1 to the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Matthews ) top secret [ Washington ,] August 14, 1950. Subject: The capability of Turkey to deal effectively with an attack by Bulgaria in which the Soviets do not overtly participate. Discussion: 1. An attack on Turkey by Bulgaria, with or without overt Soviet participation, would be launched through Thrace—an area of some 9,000 square miles which constitutes Turkey-in-Europe. Historically, Turkey has shown its vulnerability in this area and on several occasions, such as in 1877 and 1912, the fall of Istanbul, which lies at the extreme eastern tip of Thrace, has been averted only through the political intervention of various of the Great Powers. 2. The vulnerability of Thrace is even greater now than in the pre-World War I era as there are very few obstacles to cross-country movement in dry weather and advance could be rapid with motorized equipment. There are believed to be no major permanent fortifications in the area of the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier, the only permanent installations of defense in European Turkey being the Catalca defense lines (less than 30 miles west of Istanbul) which protect Istanbul and the Bosphorus from land attack from the west, and the fortifications in the Gallipoli peninsula which commands the western entrance to the Straits. 3. Turkey at present has three Armies, made up of an estimated 16 infantry divisions, 3 cavalry divisions and 6 armored brigades, with a total strength in the neighborhood of 235,000 men. The Turkish First Army, with headquarters in Istanbul, has primary responsibility for the defense of Thrace and the Istanbul area. It is believed to have stationed in Thrace 4 infantry divisions, including 2 in the Gallipoli area, and 1 armored brigade. In addition, there are a number of supporting units—field artillery, tank destroyers and antiaircraft units—attached to the Army and Corps headquarters, although no accurate assessment of their effectiveness can be given. Two infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and 1 armored brigade of the First Army are believed to be stationed in the area between Izmit and Istanbul in Asiatic Turkey. The Second Army, with units stationed in the western half of Asiatic Turkey, is generally considered as a reserve pool and could probably provide reserve units for the First Army. It is unlikely, however, that units of the Third Army, stationed in eastern Turkey, would be withdrawn from that area to assist in the defense of western Turkey. 4. Bulgarian forces are estimated to be the best trained and best equipped among the Soviet satellite forces. Reports indicate that Bulgaria has completed plans for mobilization in the event of an emergency, and it is estimated to have more than 600,000 men who have received “complete” military training. Estimates of the current strength of the Bulgarian Army have varied between 85,000 and 150,000, including 1 tank division and 2 independent tank brigades which are believed to have available 350 Soviet T–34 tanks and 50 obsolescent German mark IV’s. These forces are generally distributed throughout the country, but are in a position to be moved rapidly into any of the border areas. The troops near the Turkish border are in the normal summer maneuver area, and according to available reports, have not been alarmingly augmented, although there has been a strengthening of the border guard in this area. The Soviets have for some months been stockpiling war materials in the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria, in excess of the normal needs of the indigenous forces. 5. The Turks would be faced with the likelihood of the loss of all of Thrace in the event of a major Bulgarian attack with overt Soviet participation and would probably use their defenses in Thrace primarily for delaying tactics in an endeavor to withdraw their main forces to the Asiatic side of the Straits. However, in the event of a purely Bulgarian attack, the Turks might be successful in holding part of Thrace, at least at the Çatalca Lines and at the Gallipoli peninsula: a ) The Turks would undoubtedly mount a determined defense at the Çatalca Lines unless the Bulgarian advance were so rapid and powerful that the Çatalca Lines were breached before additional Turkish forces and equipment could be moved into the area and unless the Turks were deterred by fear of attack on other parts of the country or the fear of imminent overt participation by the Soviets in the Bulgarian offensive. b ) A Bulgarian attack, without overt Soviet participation, would probably have limited air cover, and little Turkish air support would probably be given Turkish ground forces in Thrace. However, some air support might be supplied by the British who with the French would be expected to come to Turkey’s assistance by virtue of their 1939 Alliance with the Turks, 2 which was reaffirmed in 1949. 3 6. In the event that the Bulgarians should succeed in occupying all of Thrace, with the exception of the Gallipoli peninsula, any further advance—into Asiatic Turkey—would be unlikely. In that area comprising 287,000 square miles of Turkey’s total land area of 596,000 square miles, Turkish forces should be able to cope with any purely Bulgarian attack. The Turks have stationed there an estimated 12 infantry divisions, of which at least 5 have been supplied with and are being trained in the use of modern equipment, and 5 armored brigades which are being modernized and reequipped under the United States Military Aid Program. The terrain would be more defensible and the mobilization of reserves, in this area where most of the reserves are located, would substantially increase the size of the defending forces. The important ports of Izmir, Mersin and Iskenderun could undoubtedly be kept open to receive supplies and equipment. 7. A Bulgarian attack on Turkey, without overt Soviet participation either through direct support or through a simultaneous attack on Turkey in the east or elsewhere, is not considered likely unless it is one phase of an over-all Soviet plan of conquest which the Soviets recognize will start a world conflict: a ) In view of present relations between Bulgaria and its neighbors, Yugoslavia and Greece, Bulgaria would undoubtedly have to devote some of its forces to protect these flanks, thereby limiting the size of the forces and the amount of equipment it could throw against Turkey, which in turn would have direct bearing on its ability to overrun Thrace. b ) A Bulgarian attack on Turkey could be expected to bring Great Britain and France into the conflict as allies of Turkey, with the possibility that the United States would likewise become involved. Allied assistance would lessen the probabilities of the success of such an attack. Even if not furnished in time to prevent the Bulgarians from overrunning Thrace, it would make their hold on the area much more tenuous and their prospects for further advances on Turkish territory even more limited. c ) Control of Thrace and the capture of Istanbul would not in themselves appear to offer conspicuous advantages to Bulgaria or the USSR outweighing the risks of inviting a major war. Bulgaria would not control the Straits if, as expected, the Turks could hold the Gallipoli peninsula, nor would they accomplish the destruction of the Turkish Army or the occupation of Asiatic Turkey. Conclusions: 1. A Bulgarian attack on Turkey, without overt Soviet participation, might accomplish the occupation of Thrace, with the exception of the Gallipoli peninsula, but a further advance into Asiatic Turkey would be unlikely. 2. The occupation of Thrace would not appear to bring advantages to the Bulgarians or Soviets that would compensate for the risk of inviting a major war. Hence, a Bulgarian attack on Turkey, without overt Soviet participation, does not appear likely unless it is undertaken as one phase of a Soviet plan of conquest which the Soviets recognize will probably start a world conflict. 1 Burton Y. Berry, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, initialed this paper for Mr. McGhee. C. Robert Moore, Officer in Chargé, Turkish Affairs, drafted it. 2 Signed at Ankara, October 19, 1939; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc , p. 167; also Britisli Cmd. 6165, Treaty Series No. 4 (1940). 3 See footnote 1, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. iv , p. 1682 . The Consul General at Istanbul (Lewis) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 123 Lewis, Charles W., Jr. [Document 720] The Consul General at Istanbul ( Lewis ) 1 to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) secret official informal Istanbul , August 16, 1950. Dear Mr. McGhee : Your and the Secretary’s letters 2 to the Patriarch Athenagoras were received and delivered by me a few days ago. They came at a very opportune time. I had just received a communication of considerable import from Kermit Roosevelt 3 and was thus enabled to present your letters by way of prelude to the introduction of the other subject. The Patriarch expressed his warm appreciation of the letters. He was also gratified to hear that as a result of your visit 4 and your interest in his problems it had been possible to raise some assistance for him in the United States. 5 I see the Patriarch from time to time and will continue to endeavor to maintain close and effective ties with him. If as a result of these contacts anything of particular interest develops, I will of course report it to the Department. Very sincerely yours, Charles W. Lewis, Jr. 1 Charles W. Lewis, Jr., assumed charge of the Consulate General at Istanbul on May 19 from La Verne Baldwin. 2 Reference is to the letter of August 3 (not printed) from Assistant Secretary McGhee to Patriarch Athenagoras which acknowledged receipt of a message of May 26 (not printed) from the Patriarch land expressed appreciation for the Patriarch’s “generous sentiments regarding this country’s endeavors to preserve peace and its substantial assistance to Turkey” (123 Baldwin, La Verne); and to the letter of August 3 (not printed), from Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson to Patriarch Athenagoras which acknowledged receipt of a message of May 26 (not printed) from the Patriarch and stated “It was heartening to receive reassurances of Your Holiness’ sincere endorsement of this Government’s efforts to establish peace and to preserve the dignity and rights of the individual” (123 Baldwin, La Verne). 3 The communication received by Consul General Lewis from Kermit Roosevelt, Consultant on Middle Eastern and Communist Affairs to the Secretary of State, was not found in Department of State files. 4 Assistant Secretary McGhee exchanged visits with Patriarch Athenagoras at Istanbul; see editorial note, Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1685 . 5 Reference is to assistance raised in response to the Patriarch’s request mentioned in footnote 2, p. 1251 [ Pg. 1251 is part of Doc. 695 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by Major General William H. Arnold Ankara Embassy Files: Lot 58F33: 400 MDAP July–December 1950 [Document 721] Memorandum of Conversation, by Major General William H. Arnold 1 [ Ankara ,] 19 August 1950. Subject: Notes Concerning Conference on Saturday, 19 August 1950, in Office of Prime Minister Present: Prime Minister Adnan Menderes Minister of Natl Defense Samet Ağoğlu 2 Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Köprülü Chief of Staff, TGS General Nuri Yamut Deputy C/S, TGS Lt. Gen. Zekai Okan Two Interpreters The Ambassador Hon. Geo. Wadsworth Major Gen. H. L. McBride Major Gen. W. H. Arnold 1. The Turks stated that it was absolutely impossible to accept 250,000 Bulgar Turks within 90 days. 3 They asked if we considered that there was any military significance to this demand made by the Bulgarians. No definitive answer was given. 2. Discussion concerning General McBride’s memorandum 4 to General Yamut concerning deficiencies in the Turkish Military Establishment and General Yamut’s reply 5 thereto. a . Deactivation of extra units. General Yamut stated that orders have already been issued for some deactivations. I requested that copies of orders be sent to Chief, JAMMAT. b . Discussion re lack of Chief of Ordnance. This discussion consumed considerable time but the Turks remained firm in their stand that a new man could not be in place prior to 31 August. General McBride was of the opinion, which was supported by The Ambassador, that there was only one qualified individual (Gen Aknoz) 6 in the Turkish Army for this position. General Yamut stated that this individual could not be assigned as Chief of Ordnance because of the provision in the Turkish Law which requires troop duty at stated intervals in an officer’s service. 3. The Ambassador brought out the necessity of assuring the U.S. that effective use is being made of MDAP funds and at the same time reinforced General McBride’s comments on the necessity of a proper Chief of Ordnance. The Ambassador stated that in the normal course of events the Aid Program would have been ended in two to three years but that now a new factor—the world situation—demands forces in being to be put into the best possible shape in the shortest possible time. This conversation tied in with the question of the Chief of Ordnance. The Turks asked what had recently occurred that makes General McBride so adamant. General McBride stated that we are unable to get anything from the present Chief of Ordnance because he will not assume responsibility. General McBride stated that the law must be changed concerning the detail of general officers to troop duty if the Turks are to ever have qualified technical chiefs. General McBride repeatedly stressed the need for continuity. This phase of the conversation was ended by a summation by The Ambassador which seemed to get the meeting back on an amicable basis. 4. General McBride stated that the bridging situation in Turkey is critical. A letter is required from the Turkish Government in order to secure bridges from Italy and now they are frozen. He stated that it would be possible to secure these bridges from Italy through ECA provided the necessary communication was received from the Turkish authorities. General Yamut stated that the letter 7 to ECA was dispatched last Tuesday, 15 August. This conversation lasted for some length and consisted of the statement that the Turks, through dilatory tactics, had perhaps missed the chance of securing the necessary bridging. 5. The Ambassador made an additional request: that of extending roads of prime military importance by the expenditure of 1,500,000 T.L., and 200,000 T.L. on bridging. The road in question, the Iskenderun-Erzurum Road, could be put into shape in 1950 instead of 1951 as will be the case now. If the Prime Minister will permit 2,000,000 T.L. to be diverted to road construction from counter-part funds, work can be commenced immediately. This was agreed to by the Prime Minister. 6. The Ambassador stated that General McBride had given examples of things that should be done. He mentioned the remark of the Foreign Minister in the press 8 that Turkey requires more and accelerated aid from the U.S. The Ambassador stated that he was confident that the U.S. would appropriate more money but it was not helpful to public relations to state the need of more aid unless there already exists an agreed-upon program. He spoke of the Military Airfields Program, and stated that Turkey was to be furnished a squadron of jet fighters in 1951; 9 that the pilots and specialists would go to the U.S. for advanced training. He made the request that this be kept confidential until the pilots leave for the U.S. He further discussed the transfer of all pilot training to Adana where they would be able to carry out all-year-round training. 6. [ sic ] The Ambassador stated that the U.S. would welcome assurance that the Turks will increase their budget for defense from 458,000,000 T.L. to 500,000,000 T.L. The Turks stated that they are now in a position to inform the U.S. of the projects they desire. 7. The Ambassador discussed the defense of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. He stated that the U.S. Government had replied 10 to the Turks’ enquiry as to whether electrical mining of the Bosphorus would be in violation of the Montreux Convention. The United States’ reply was to the effect that it did not consider this to be a violation. The Turks stated, then, that the British had replied to a similar request by stating that such mining would be in violation of the Montreux Convention. The Ambassador is communicating this to Washington. 8. Discussion then centered around turning over defense of the Bosphorus and the Straits to the Navy. This discussion was of some length but I understood General Yamut to state that the Turkish Navy would have the responsibility, including the manning of the guns now in the hands of the Army. I stated that JAMMAT would immediately proceed to examine the defenses of the Dardanelles and would commence discussions with the Turkish General Staff as soon as possible. 9. The Prime Minister stated that this conference had brought out several worthwhile points and that he desired to have additional conferences in the future. The items to be discussed at the next meeting are: a . Measures which should be taken in case of an emergency. b . Measures to be taken to enlarge, expedite and complete present program. 1 This paper, presumably a draft by Maj. Gen. W. H. Arnold, included several handwritten changes and additions, which are incorporated in the text as printed here. General Arnold arrived at Ankara on August 13; he became Chief, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, upon the departure of Maj. Gen. Horace L. McBride on August 21 for Beirut and the United States. 2 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State Ağoğlu served as Acting Minister of National Defense during the absence of Minister of National Defense Refik 3 A note verbale of August 10 by the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Turkish Legation in Sofia called for the admission to Turkey within 90 days of approximately 250,000 Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin who had expressed a desire to migrate from Bulgaria to Turkey (enclosure 1 to despatch 133, September 7, from Ankara, 882.1869/9–750, not printed; text as broadcast by Sofia radio on August 10—enclosure to despatch 113, August 15, from Istanbul, 882.1869/8–1550, not printed). 4 Reference is to the letter of June 30 from Major General McBride to General Yamut (Ankara Embassy Files, Lot 58F33, Box 3299, 400 MDAP January-June 1950, not printed). 5 Reference is to the letter of July 28 (not printed) from General Yamut to Major General McBride, a copy of which was transmitted by Major General McBride to Ambassador Wadsworth on August 10 at the Ambassador’s request (Ankara Embassy Files, Lot 58F33, Box 3299, 400 MDAP, July-December 1950). 6 Maj. Gen. Nurettin Aknoz, Commander, Turkish Fourth Division. 7 The Turkish letter of August 15 to the ECA was not found in Department of State files. 8 Reference is to a statement made by Foreign Minister Köprülü in an interview at Strasbourg (despatch 69, August 10, from Ankara, 782.00/8–1050, not printed). 9 The fiscal year 1950 Military Defense Materiel Program for Turkey included 25 F–84E jet aircraft with delivery scheduled to begin November 15, 1951, but partly dependent on readiness of suitable airdromes, completion of training of pilots and mechanics, and organizational readiness to receive the aircraft (Department’s telegram 71, August 9, to Ankara, 782.5 MAP/8–950, not printed). 10 See the letter of June 5 from Ambassador Wadsworth to Faik Zihni Akdur, Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 706 and Doc. 707 ] . The Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador (Erkin) 795B.5/8–1950 [Document 722] The Secretary of State to the Turkish Ambassador ( Erkin ) The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Turkish Republic and, in confirmation of a conversation on August 11, 1950, between the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires ad interim 1 and an officer of the Department, informs him that the Government of the United States, acting in its capacity as the Unified Command, has accepted the Turkish Government’s offer to the United Nations of a combat force to serve in Korea. 2 It is understood that, as agreed by the Turkish Government, 3 discussions regarding implementation of the offer will take place in Ankara between officials of the Turkish Government, the American Embassy, and the American Mission for Aid to Turkey. Washington , August 19, 1950. 1 Melih Esenbel. 2 Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuat Köprülü offered “to place at the disposal of the United Nations a Turkish combat force of 4,500 men to serve in Korea” (cablegram, July 26, to U.N. Secretary-General Trygve H. Lie, U.N. doc. S/1630). For documentation on Korea, see volume vii . 3 The Turkish Embassy in Washington informed the Department of this agreement (Department’s telegram 91, August 16, to Ankara, 795B.5/8–1150, not printed). The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 782.022/8–2250: Telegram [Document 723] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State top secret niact Ankara , August 22, 1950—11 a. m. 124. 1. Turkish PriMin and FonMin returned Ankara evening August 18. Earlier same day when presenting Counselor Keith, I had informed SecGen Akdur of receipt message from Department that Turkish request adhere NAT was under consideration (Deptel 92 August 17). 1 Akdur was “frankly disappointed message not more encouraging.” He argued vital importance to Turkish morale to morale and stability Near East, to security Mediterranean and Europe itself, and to world peace “now under critical Soviet threat.” I felt it politic to reply that in my opinion Department’s message, in view its very brevity, should be considered only as acknowledgement of receipt and assurance that Turkish application was receiving prompt serious study. 2. Following day August 19 Turkish PriMin and I reviewed at his request major problems US military aid program in four-hour conference with Generals McBride and Arnold and Turkish FonMin and Chief-of-Staff (remytel 44 July 31 from Istanbul). General Arnold will submit report. 2 I wish emphasize here realistic attitude Turks in recognizing deficiencies and seeking solutions through short-term program designed put existing armed forces in best possible condition preparedness to meet emergency. At conclusion this meeting FonMin asked me call August 21 to discuss Turkish request adhere NAT in light his conversations at Strasbourg and my conversation with Akdur. 3. Meeting was held as scheduled; to point its importance PriMin joined us. FonMin first told me of his meeting with Schuman and Bevin separately on August 5; Schuman promised wholehearted support, Bevin was noncommittal. Latter conversation was pursued “in more encouraging atmosphere” August 7 by Dalton 3 who, while in no wise committing British Government, gave assurance Washington was being consulted. Hence, FonMin said, my message of hardly more than simple acknowledgment almost a fortnight later gave him some concern; matter was of such prime importance he and PriMin wished recapitulate Turkish position. Following five paragraphs give highlights their exposition. ( a ) Turkey, a natural partner and militarily strong element in overall European defense, had long felt it should be formally included in and permitted contribute to such defense. Until recent intensification world crisis, precipitated by Korean developments, Turkey had accepted US view that, pending completion organizational stage NAT, moment for positive action was not propitious. Now there was pressing new urgency. ( b ) Turkish approach was essentially realistic; it recognized much still remained to be done to integrate European defense; it appreciated present limitations on possible European aid were Turkey to be attacked by Russia. Turkey realized too that it would be assuming new obligations and that it would bring to the common pool more and more readily readiable military strength than it could expect to draw there-from, but this it wished earnestly to do in the vital immediate common interest. ( c ) Towards protection that interest Turkey wished and felt it could materially contribute in morale-political fields as well. Would not Europe itself feel strengthened? In Near East effect would buttress wavering morale; Turkish Government had already expressed desire play positive role in Arab countries; if admitted to pact it could more effectively support Allied position in Libya, facilitate Anglo-Egyptian settlement, pursue private staff talks with Iran as well as Greece. ( d ) In Turkey, itself, moral effect of admission would be spur to greater preparedness effort; whereas effect on public morale of further deferment would be “not only painful but at best, a moral deception.” ( e ) Turkish policy today (PriMin emphasized) is “clear, unequivocal, honest and realistic”; it does not ask admission so it may relax its vigilance, but rather to end it may contribute more effectively to international peace. It relies first on its own armed forces and wishes strengthen them through more effective cooperation with JAMMAT. If attacked, it will resist with or without Western assistance; but Turkish Government and people believe such assistance will be forthcoming. Consequently, Turkish admission to pact, with its prescribed mechanism for positive common action, seems eminently logical to all Turks. 4. In light foregoing exposition, which I believe effectively portrays basic Turkish position, I do not find first question asked in Deptel 92 August 17 “perplexing.” 4 The sound realism of that position, recognizing as it does present inability NAT powers commit substantial forces in event Soviet aggression against Turkey, would seem clearly indicate beneficial rather than harmful net effect Turkish inclusion. 5. If, on other hand, Turkish request be rejected, harm would surely be done to presently high Turkish morale and to élan of present Turkish-US cooperative relations, if only because, as stated to me by FonMin, Turkish Government is persuaded other signatories NAT would welcome Turkish participation unless opposed by US. Canada, Italy and Norway, he said, as well as France, have indicated their support in principle. 6. Only suggestion I can offer to counter resulting disappointment (disillusionment is not too strong a word in light Turkish conviction inevitability eventual showdown with Russia) is to increase military aid (e.g. by bearing cost NCO program and other new projects mutually deemed practicable and essential to emergency preparedness) and at same time to assure Turks that our negative answer is in no sense definitive rejection but rather deferment dictated by vital present but not fundamental policy considerations (e.g. essential desirability of perfecting logistics of Western Mediterranean defense before inviting Turks participate in planning overall Mediterranean and European mutual defense). 7. In re second question put in reference Deptel, 5 I believe we may accept as sincere above Turkish comment that if Turkey adheres NAT it will be in better position undertake staff talks with Iran. PriMin added: previous Turkish Governments were hesitant on this point, whereas we seek assure ourselves position which will open way to effective positive action; Iran is not part of Europe, whereas Turkey is; consequently Iran should feel strengthened rather than abandoned as result Turkish adherence to NAT. Wadsworth 1 Not printed. 2 Presumably a report, not found in Department of State files, based on the; draft memorandum of August 19 by Maj. Gen. W. H. Arnold, p. 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] . 3 Hugh Dalton, U.K. Delegate to the Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, Strasbourg. 4 Department’s telegram 92, August 17, to Ankara, not printed, read in part as follows: “Two of several perplexing problems re admission GT are: 1. If, as members NAT, GT realize fact NAT powers, with present capabilities, cannot commit substantial forces to GT in event aggression, wld net effect incl GT be more harmful than not?” (782.5/7–3150). 5 Department’s telegram 92, August 17, to Ankara, not printed, read in part as follows: “Assuming GT included NAT, what measures can be taken indicate effectively to Iran and USSR continuing US interest in independence and integrity Iran?” (782.5/7–3150) The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 782.022/8–2250: Telegram [Document 724] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State top secret niact Ankara , August 22, 1950—noon. 125. I was taken aback to learn in conference mentioned paragraph two mytel 124 August 22 that, in answer to same enquiry unto Department in Embtel 213 April 29 on Bosphorus sea defense, British Foreign Office replied a month or more ago by long memorandum 1 citing views its legal experts to effect that laying of mines in question would constitute violation of Montreux Convention. Turkish Prime Minister commented to me that importance of problem is obvious; its early solution is to our mutual interest; in my view it would seem appropriate US and British Governments get together to find common ground; Britain is our ally and a signatory of the convention; you are not a signatory but our closest collaborator in field of mutual defense; we are ready to lay those mine fields. Unless Department perceives objection I propose call on British Ambassador in Istanbul this weekend, tell him our position and ask if I may read Foreign Office memorandum. It would be helpful if I could say (and also tell Turkish Foreign Minister) that Department is taking up question with Foreign Office. 2 Wadsworth 1 Reference is to a British aide-mémoire of June 19 to the Turkish Government (enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed). 2 Department’s telegram 101, August 24, to Ankara, read as follows: “No objection ur proposals outline Dept’s position re mining Straits with Brit Amb also tell Turk FonMin Dept has instructed London Emb take matter up with FonOff” (782.022/8–2450). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 740.5/8–2550 [Document 725] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] August 25, 1950. Subject: Turkey’s Desire to Adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty; Inadequacy of ECA Fund Allocations to Turkey Participants: The Secretary The Turkish Ambassador Assistant Secretary McGhee Mr. Rountree, GTI The Turkish Ambassador called upon me at his request at 11:45 a. m., August 25. This was his first appointment with Departmental officials following his recent return from Ankara. 1 The Ambassador said that he wished to discuss two matters which were of urgent concern to the Turkish Government. The first related to Turkey’s desire to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty; the second to Turkey’s requirement for more economic aid than it is now scheduled to receive. Ambassador Erkin reviewed in some detail his previous approaches to Departmental officials concerning the question of Turkish adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. These discussions began before the Treaty itself was concluded, when the Government of Turkey had urged that the proposed membership be extended to that country. The contention that this would not be inconsistent with the anticipated geographical arrangement was based upon the fact that Italy and North African territories of European powers were to be included. Notwithstanding the Turkish appeal, the pact excluded the eastern Mediterranean countries, and Turkey’s subsequent requests were rejected on the basis that the United States wished, before extending its commitments, to await completion of the organizational stages of the arrangement as constituted. The Ambassador said that notwithstanding his persistence in representing the Turkish Government’s point of view, he had appreciated the position of the United States and in his reports to Ankara had emphasized that position to the extent that the Foreign Minister under the previous government had recommended that he be recalled; During his recent stay in his country, the Ambassador said, he had observed a growing feeling among Turkish leaders and the people that Turkey should be included in the European collective security arrangement. The Korean development, which occurred during this period, intensified this feeling to the extent that the question is now a major issue in Turkey. The Turks feel that they could contribute materially to the collective strength of Western Europe and, on the other hand, believe that Turkey’s inclusion would enhance its own security. The Ambassador said that in Europe today there are three important organizations: the OEEC, the Council of Europe, and the North Atlantic Treaty. Turkey is included in the first two, and her exclusion from the latter on a geographical basis would, in his opinion, be inconsistent. The Ambassador said that his government had informally explored this question with a number of the treaty countries, and that Italy, France, and Canada had indicated that they would support Turkey’s admission if the United States agreed. He understood that the question would be discussed between the United States, British and French representatives in the New York meetings in September, 2 and urged that the United States take a favorable position which would result in Turkey’s inclusion. I thanked Ambassador Erkin for reviewing the past history of the matter and outlining the views of the Turkish Government. I assured him that the Turkish request was receiving serious consideration by the United States Government and that we intended to discuss it with the British and French in September. I said that there are, of course, important military considerations involved in our decision, and these are being reviewed currently in collaboration with our military authorities. I could not, therefore, indicate at this time what our position will be, but that he could be assured that we recognize the importance which the Turkish Government attached to the decision. The Ambassador said that while he would not go into details at this time, he wished to mention that the fact that Turkey’s requirements for economic aid are considerably greater than has been provided for in the proposed allocations of ECA assistance. He said that with the funds scheduled for Turkey the country cannot carry out its minimum essential development program and at the same time maintain an adequate level of security forces. While this matter is being pursued with ECA, he hoped that the State Department would lend its support to the efforts of the Turkish Government to obtain more favorable consideration. Mr. McGhee pointed out that the ECA appropriation for this year had been very substantially reduced by the Congress, and that reduction will be reflected throughout all participating countries. He said that we wished to adhere to the fullest possible extent to the recommendations of OEEC, 3 upon which Turkey is represented, in allocating the funds available. It was pointed out that Turkey, a country unravished by war and thus unlike other European countries, had been receiving very substantial sums under the European Recovery Program. During the first year of the program’s operation, he recalled, it was difficult to justify even a token allocation of funds to Turkey, and these annual allocations had grown to the point where Turkey has been receiving very substantial benefits. Both Mr. McGhee and I assured the Ambassador, however, that the Department would study the subject carefully and render to the Turkish Government whatever assistance it properly can in dealing with the Economic Cooperation Administration, which of course has primary responsibility in the matter. The Ambassador thanked me for permitting him to discuss these matters, which are of great importance to his Government, and departed. 1 Ambassador Feridun O. Erkin was away from Washington during the period June 16 to August 15 for a vacation and consultations in Turkey. 2 For documentation on the Tripartite Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and United States, New York, September 1950, see vol. iii , pp. 1108 ff. 3 For documentation on OEEC participation in economic planning in Europe, see vol. iii , pp. 611 ff. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 982.542/8–2550: Telegram [Document 726] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret London , August 25, 1950—8 p. m. 1218. Substance of Deptel 1013 2 discussed with Foreign Office today which showed us text reply 3 British Embassy Ankara instructed in June to make to similar question posed by Turks. British, reply expressed opinion that controlled minefield falls into same category of weapon as coastal battery and if laid in Straits “would not constitute infraction of Montreux Convention nor … of right of innocent passage through territorial waters”. This conclusion described as only valid if absolutely no risk of accidental detonation; however, “it should be possible entirely to obviate the risk”. Opinion also noted “Public opinion is notoriously sensitive to dangers to shipping, whether actual or potential and particularly where shipping lanes and straits are concerned. In spite of characteristics of a controlled minefield, freedom of passage might be restricted by the knowledge of existence and Turks might find selves involved in all kinds of political and legal controversy”. However, British reply to Turks cited “good practical reasons” why Turks “should refrain from laying a controlled minefield in the Straits unless and until they think there is an imminent danger of war”. Reasons advanced were ( a ) heavy wear and tear on underwater portions minefield which Admiralty believes in Straits would very soon be destroyed by current; (( b ) no point in laying sooner than necessary as this can be done very quickly if leads to water’s edge laid in advance. Rumbold, 4 head of Southern Department considers that Foreign Office legal opinion does not differ from Department’s opinion 5 except for “nuance and refinement” quoted in last two sentences paragraph 2 above. Rumbold suggests Department and Foreign Office instruct their respective Ambassadors Ankara to blend and reconcile any apparent divergence in the two legal opinions and explain to Turkish Government US and UK views as to legality are identical. 6 Embassy understands that competent US naval experts do not consider British “good practical reasons” as valid. Re paragraph 2 Deptel, 7 CINCNELM informs us that Turkish General Staff does not propose to lay any type other than ground mines while convention is in force. Douglas 1 At the request of the Department of State, this telegram was repeated to Ankara. 2 Dated August 24, not printed; it requested the Embassy in the United Kingdom to discuss with the British Foreign Office the divergent views of the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the legality under the Montreux Convention of the Turkish proposal for a controlled minefield at the Black Sea entrance to the Bosporus in order to learn the basis of the British position and exchange views on how a common position might be reached (982.542/8–2450). 3 Reference is to the British aide-mémoire of June 19 (enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed). 4 Sir Horace Anthony C. Rumbold. 5 Presumably a reference to the position stated in Mr. Fisher’s memorandum, May 15, to Mr. Jernegan, p. 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 702 and Doc. 703 ] . 6 Department’s telegram 114, August 30, to Ankara, not printed, authorized the Embassy in Turkey to follow the above-mentioned suggestion of Mr. Rumbold (782.022/8–3050). The Ankara Embassy file copy of telegram 114 bears the notation: “Done. W[adsworth]” (Ankara Embassy files, lot 57F72, box 2, 322.2 Straits 1950–52). 7 Paragraph 2 of the Department’s telegram 1013, August 24, to London, not printed, read in part as follows: “Turk Gen Staff proposes lay moored and ground mines at depth of 20–30 fathoms near Black Sea entrance to Straits. Mines wld be controlled from harbor entrance post constituting part of harbor entrance defense system. When not energized mines wld constitute no menace to navigation and field cld be crossed at any point without requiring pilotage. Moored mines that broke loose wld be sterile and wld not endanger passing vessels.” (982.542/8–2450) Editorial Note [Document 727] Editorial Note NSC document 73/4, “The Position and Action of the United States With Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation,” August 25, 1950, printed in volume I, page 375 , recommended that, in the event of an overt attack by organized Soviet military forces against Greece or Turkey, the United States should provide accelerated military assistance to either country and deploy such United States forces to their support as could be made available without jeopardizing United States national security. In the case of Turkey, the United States should urge the United Kingdom and France to give full support under the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara oh October 19, 1939, and should make every effort to obtain the support of Turkey by the Moslem world including Pakistan. The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 782.022/8–3150: Telegram [Document 728] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State top secret Ankara , August 31, 1950—3 p. m. 149. ReEmbtel 125 August 22 and Deptel 101 August 25. 1 British Ambassador 2 has given me copy his aide-mémoire dated June 19. 3 In our view it should not be read by Turks as expressing view that laying of controlled mine field would be incompatible with principle of liberty of passage in peace time or otherwise violation of Montreux Convention. Opening paragraph expresses opinion that, as legally such a field (if laid with absolutely no risk of accidental detonation) falls in same category of weapon as coastal batteries, it would not constitute infraction of the convention or of general principle of right of innocent passage through territorial waters. 2. Confusion in Turkish interpretation may have arisen from ensuing comment that, in view sensitiveness public opinion to actual or potential shipping dangers, freedom of passage “might be” restricted by simple knowledge of field’s existence and consequently that Turks might find themselves in violent political and legal controversy. 3. Then commenting on technical aspects of project aide-mémoire suggests as practical reason for deferring action unless and until war be thought imminent, that under water installation would soon be destroyed by currents. It adds that actual laying of mines could be quickly accomplished if proper shore preparations (e.g. laying of leads) be made. 4. Admiral Ginder comments that British reply was written before Korean war. He recommends urging Turks proceed with project since delivery time of materials plus time for completion of installation would probably require 6 to 8 months. He considers two months required for actual laying of mines. He realizes that continued maintenance of underwater installation is required. General Arnold concurs. We would appreciate Department’s early instructions. Wadsworth 1 Ante , p. 1299 [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , and footnote 2 thereto. 2 Sir Noel H. H. Charles. 3 Enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 782.022/8–3150: Telegram [Document 729] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey top secret Washington , September 1, 1950—6 p. m. 122. Urtel 149. 1 Dept considers Turks must make own decision on minefield. While Dept was willing furnish legal opinion this question on purely informal basis US cannot take responsibility of urging Turks to lay minefield. Such urging might be construed by Turks as indication US alarm Soviet intentions. Furthermore if accident to shipping inadvertently resulted US by advising original laying of mines might be considered to share responsibility. Dept suggests you advise Ad Ginder, 2 in his capacity as technical adviser, point out to Turks delays involved in establishment of minefield. Suggest you avoid, however, giving impression US directly interested in influencing Turkish decision. Acheson 1 August 31, supra. 2 The Ankara Embassy file copy of this paper bears the notation: “I have shown this message to both Adm. Ginder and Gen. Arnold; they will act accordingly, w[adsworth]. Sept. 19.” (Ankara Embassy files, lot 57F72, box 2, 322.2 Straits 1950–52) Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) 740.5/9–1150 [Document 730] Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense ( Johnson ) 1 secret Washington , 9 September 1950. Subfect: Admission of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty. 1. This memorandum is in response to the request contained in your memorandum dated 5 September 1950 2 in which the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested on an attached letter from the Secretary of State to you, dated 31 August 1950, 3 outlining the pertinent political considerations involved in the admission of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This memorandum also replies to your memorandum on the same subject dated 1 September 1950. 2 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the subject letter contains an excellent analysis of the specific problem of the admission of Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They feel, however, that full membership of Turkey and Greece in that organization is but one facet of the larger problem as to whether the North Atlantic Treaty should be revised in order to enlarge the region from the North Atlantic area to the entire anti-Kremlin peripheral area of Eurasia or possibly to a union of all peoples who are willing and able to contribute military resources to the defeat of communist aggression. In theory this union should be achieved in the United Nations, to which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now subordinate. Such a union in that body is impossible, however, while the USSR and its satellites continue as members. Thus, if the nations of the free world are to combine their resources effectively against the USSR, they must accomplish this outside of the United Nations through the media of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or by some other appropriate means. 3. If the United States should decide to press for an enlargement of the region now covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, a considerable revision of that Treaty would be necessary. Such a revision, however, might involve fewer difficulties than the establishment of an entirely new organization, particularly if United States preparations were made well in advance and the revision were undertaken at a propitious time. 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are strongly of the opinion that support of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area is a primary military commitment of the United States. The defense of Western Europe is of the greatest importance to the defense of the Treaty area in general and to each signator in particular. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now plan to augment materially, at the earliest practicable date, United States armed forces in being in Europe. They also plan to reinforce rapidly and substantially those forces at the outbreak of hostilities. This should indicate the intentions and capabilities of the United States with regard to the defense of Western Europe. A successful defense of Western Europe will call for increased effort on the part of all nations signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the inclusion of Turkey and Greece as full members in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might adversely affect the progress which is now evident in North Atlantic Treaty arrangements. On the other hand, the admission of Turkey and Greece now would enable the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to concert military planning and actions in the Mediterranean and the Near and Middle East with those already in progress in Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that it might be possible to obtain the benefits of Turk and Greek participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and at the same time minimize the disadvantages thereof by according to these two nations an associate status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Such a status would permit their representatives to participate in coordinated planning against Soviet aggression. 6. The following three paragraphs deal, respectively, with the other alternatives proposed in the letter by the Secretary of State, namely: a . The granting to Greece and Turkey of a consultative status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; b . The establishment of a regional pact in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area; and c . A unilateral, non-reciprocal declaration by the United States, or possibly a multilateral declaration with the United Kingdom and France, to make it clear that armed aggression against Greece, Turkey, or Iran will not be tolerated. 7. The granting of a consultative status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to Turkey and Greece would only be a temporary expedient, the effectiveness of which would depend largely upon the extent and nature of the consultations which would be held. The nature and extent of these consultations could be definitely fixed by according Turkey and Greece continuous limited participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization through their admission as associate members therein. The terms of such membership should provide for their collaboration in the military bodies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization so that a coordinated defense of Western Europe, the Mediterranean, and, at least to some extent, the Middle East may be effected. This collaboration should also extend to concerting military plans. 8. A new pact, generally along the lines of the Atlantic Treaty, with Greece and Turkey as members and with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France guaranteeing the integrity of these two nations on a reciprocal or on a non-reciprocal basis would in fact provide an arrangement by which the military plans of the new area and of the North Atlantic Treaty area might be coordinated. A superior authority for the concert of the plans of the two regions, however, would be lacking. Since the nations of the Near and Middle East, with the possible exception of Turkey, are too weak militarily to defend their own lands, and since even by common defense they could not alone insure the integrity of their region, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the formation of a Near and Middle East regional arrangement to be militarily unsound. 9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not favor a formal unilateral nonreciprocal declaration by the United States or a multilateral declaration of this nature to include the United Kingdom and France for the purpose of making it clear to the USSR that armed aggression against Greece, Turkey, or Iran will not be tolerated and with assurances to these three nations that United States aid in the maximum amount possible, consistent with other United States commitments, will be provided. In view of prior United States military commitments elsewhere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff doubt that this nation could, at any time in the near future, provide substantially more military aid to these three nations than is now already planned. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no objection, from the military point of view, to the United States joining with the United Kingdom and France in informally assuring Turkey that a Soviet attack against it would probably mean the beginning of global war and that the United States, United Kingdom, and France would act accordingly. Such assurances might do much to dispel the Turkish feeling of insecurity and to compensate now for the possible disappointment in Turkey’s failing to achieve full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 10. It is recognized that the status of Turkey, particularly, should be clarified. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Turkey be informed that the development of the necessary defensive strength in the North Atlantic Treaty area has not progressed sufficiently to permit full North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership of Turkey at this time; that as soon as the defense of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is reasonably assured, the matter of the inclusion of Turkey will be reconsidered; and that, meanwhile, the United States will suport the granting to Turkey of an associate status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in order that its representatives may participate without delay in coordinated planning. 11. It would appear that no particular organizational and administrative difficulties would be involved in this associative arrangement. Probably the most important problem in connection with planning would be that of security. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that adequate safeguards can be established. 12. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: 4 a . The United States now support the granting of associate status to Turkey and Greece in order that their representatives may participate without delay in coordinating planning; b . As soon as the defense of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is reasonably assured, the United States consider raising the question of full membership for Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and c . Serious consideration not be given at this time to granting Iran either consultative or associate member status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, would interpose no objection to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France joining to give informal assurances to Turkey that a Soviet attack against it would probably mean the beginning of global war and that the United States, the United Kingdom, and France would act accordingly. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A. C. Davis Rear Admiral, USN Director, The Joint Staff 1 Copy transmitted to the Department of State by Secretary of Defense Louis September 11, prepared in the Department of State, on the security of Greece and Turkey (text ibid. , p. 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] ), which was cleared in the Department of Defense for use in the Tripartite Meeting, Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and United States at New York, September 1950. For documentation on the discussion of the subject at this meeting, see ibid. [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 656 ] , pp. 1188 ff. 2 Not printed. 3 vol. iii , p. 257 . 2 Not printed. 4 In his letter of September 11 to the Secretary of State, cited in footnote 1 above, Secretary of Defense Johnson made the three recommendations stated here. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) 740.5/9–1150 [Document 731] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Berry ) secret [ Washington ,] September 11, 1950. Subject: Importance to Turkey of Admission to NATO. Participants: Mr. Feridun C. Erkin, Turkish Ambassador Mr. Burton Y. Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Problem: Importance to Turkey of Admission to NATO. Action Required: To take in consideration in formulating American position. Action Assigned to: GTI. Mr. Feridun C. Erkin, the Turkish Ambassador, at his own request, called this morning at 9:25. He said that he wished to continue a conversation that he had started with Mr. McGhee on September 8. 1 On that occasion he had discussed the importance to Turkey of being included in the North Atlantic Treaty. He said that he was considerably disappointed when he was told by Mr. McGhee that he should not be “too optimistic”. He had reported this conversation to his Foreign Office, but prior to the receipt of his telegram, a telegram had been dispatched to Paris and repeated to Washington which he wished to read to me in translation. Before reading, however, he wished to furnish me with this background: Mr. Schuman had informed the Turkish Foreign Minister at Strasbourg that France would support the inclusion of Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty. The same information was repeated to the Turkish Foreign Office by the French Ambassador in Ankara. 2 Recently, however, Mr. Schuman told the Turkish Ambassador in Paris that some of the smaller nations members of the North Atlantic Treaty had indicated opposition to extending the treaty to Turkey. Mr. Schuman, therefore, suggested that Turkey might think about forming a regional pact which, beside herself, would include France, England and the United States. With this background, the Ambassador read his translation of the telegram received. It stated that the Turkish Government does not agree at all with the suggestion of Mr. Schuman that a regional pact be created as a substitute for membership in the Atlantic Treaty group. On the contrary, the Turkish government insists strongly and emphatically upon their need for membership, NATO. Whether this need will be met will not depend upon the small nations but, upon the attitude of the great powers, namely, France, England and the United States and, most of all, upon the United States. It is therefore the duty of the Ambassador in France to inform Mr. Schuman of this fact and of the Ambassador in Washington to inform the United States Government. The Ambassador then went over the well-known ground of why Turkey should be included in the Treaty. He added that the matter was more urgent than last year when he had urged the inclusion of Turkey. In the interval the Turkish people had begun to feel very dissatisfied for being treated as second-rate members of European society. In spite of the Truman Doctrine 3 and all that America has done in Turkey, today they are beginning to feel abandoned when they see the center of American interest shifting to Western Europe. A wave of bitterness is growing. The Government has tried to correct the situation by asking for inclusion in the Treaty. This is publicly known. If it is refused, the feeling in Turkey of abandonment will be confirmed. Bitterness and disillusionment will grow. The Ambassador commented that we could count upon Russia to exploit fully this situation. However, we need never face such development if the, security problem of Turkey is raised to the same level as that of the Atlantic Pact nations. The Ambassador told me that he was doubly embarrassed by the situation; first, because his government felt that the inclusion of Turkey depended upon the attitude of the United States and the stand that the United States took would be an indication of the effectiveness of his diplomacy. Secondly, when the matter of the inclusion, of Turkey was discussed a year ago, 4 the first information received by the Turkish Foreign Office of the U.S. stand was received by the Turkish Ambassador in London from the British Foreign Office. Mr. Erkin asked, therefore, that when the American position as regards. Turkey’s request is determined, he be informed so that he may be the first to inform his government. 1 Memorandum of conversation, September 8, between Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George C. McGhee and Ambassador Erkin, not found in Department of State files. 2 Jean Lescuyer. 3 Reference is to the address of President Harry S. Truman before Congress on March 12, 1947 (Department of State Bulletin Supplement , May 4, 1947, p. 829, or Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947 , p. 176. For documentation on the origin of U.S. military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 (Truman Doctrine), see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , pp. 1 ff. 4 For documentation on the question raised in 1949 of including Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see ibid. , 1949, vol. iv , pp. 1 ff. The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 740.5/9–1250: Telegram [Document 732] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State confidential niact Istanbul , September 12, 1950—11 a. m. 91. 1. Since telegraphing Department some three weeks ago summarizing argument Turk Prime Minister and Foreign Minister for Turk admission Atlantic Pact, 1 I have been increasingly impressed by its sincerity and wide public support; and I have shared growing conviction my staff and friendly colleagues that domestic position present, sincerely cooperative government will be seriously weakened if its request not be granted. 2. Last evening at dinner I had striking confirmation this view. For two days as only foreign civilian guest I had followed closely in the field annual Turk army maneuvers. They were first to include joint operations with navy and air force including effective modern joint operations and communications center. During the day President Bayar joined us and presided at dinner. Flanking him at table were Minister National Defense, myself, Chief of Staff and Minister Communication, 2 a former general staff colonel. As Chief AMAT I raised several AMAT problems which President discussed freely. 3. He then said, in close substance: We are eminently satisfied with our cooperation with your country in this military field and, although we feel your Government has overly weighted, relatively speaking, its economic aid to such countries as Greece and Italy, we are sincerely grateful for the very considerable contribution to our national strength you have made in the economic field as well. But there is a third and today even more important field, the political-strategic field, in which we sense a hesitancy on your part. We do not understand it. I speak not only as President but more particularly as a Turk. We wish to join the Atlantic Pact and bring our full cooperation to mutual defense of the western democratic world of which we truly feel ourselves a part. 4. President hesitated a moment and continued: Does your Government not realize that we Turks will consider further deferment of favorable action on our request by the Atlantic Pact powers as a refusal and as unwillingness to accept us as equal partners in meeting jointly any threat of aggression? We have shown our good faith by forthright action towards meeting the Korean crisis. I fear frankly that, if Atlantic Pact Council of Foreign Ministers turns down our request, our morale will be seriously affected. We are not a people readily influenced by propaganda. In this matter, however, there is widespread concern and uncertainty. We feel our very future is at stake. 5. I believe I made as effective answer as was possible within framework Department’s general and specific guidance. President was appreciative but obviously not reassured; he had heard for instance that Foreign Ministers’ answer might suggest that Turkey endeavor organize with Greece and other countries some sort of eastern Mediterranean pact which might later be brought into relationship with Atlantic Pact. I commented that I had heard nothing whatsoever to bear out such reports; and I gave him in confidence information re our support Turkey’s SC candidature sent me in Department intel September 8. 3 6. Latter aided me in emphasizing our bona fides but again was not wholly convincing as to Department’s understanding his present problem. He asked I telegraph you fully. I assured him I would return Istanbul this morning, wire you and rejoin him at maneuvers. 7. After dinner former Admiral Uzdes, close presidential adviser and influential member parliamentary National Defense Commission [ Committee ] put their concern as follows: How can you expect Turk people not to be affected by constant Soviet propaganda, abetted even if unintentionally by bitter domestic political opposition, if you turn down our request. For already they assert that you Americans are only using us as pawns and that we should not send our youth to die for you in Korea. He had, he said, just returned from fortnight’s provincial speaking tour designed to counter just this sort of propaganda; he was worried and not optimistic of success if Turk request be refused or put off for reasons Turks could not understand. Wadsworth 1 Reference is to telegram 124, August 22, from Ankara, p. 1296 [ Pg. 1296 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] . 2 Seyfi Kurtbek. 3 Not printed. For documentation on the question of election of Turkey to a 2–year term in the U.N. Security Council, see vol. ii , pp. 87 ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 782.5/9–1350: Telegram [Document 733] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 1 top secret Washington , September 13, 1950—11 p. m. 135. Secy now discussing with Western FonMins 2 question security arrangements Greece and Turkey on basis fol US position formulated after consultation with Defense. 1) Any decision Turk participation shld include Greece. 2) While extension membership to Greece and Turkey presently unwise recommend offering opportunity assoc in work mil planning bodies under Defense Comite. 3) Entire NAT Council 3 shld adopt unanimous stand re proposal emerging from Tripartite talks to insure uniform position vis-à-vis Grk and Turk Govts. 4) All NAT members consulted by Turks and Grks shld take position development org NAT and defensive strength present members not yet advanced sufficiently permit extension to new members but Turk and Grk applications will receive continuing study. Meanwhile special arrangements accorded wld permit Turks and Grks participate in appropriate mil planning. 5) Council communiqué shld make public statement on special arrangements extended Greece and Turkey. 6) US, UK, France shld issue prompt statement similar that issued after May Council mtg 4 confirming their interest security of region specifically including Iran. Re further steps concerning gen security Greece, Turkey, Iran. a ) US continuing study mil requirements Greece, Turkey, Iran in light changed internatl situation. Studies in progress re additional mil equipment which cld and shld be supplied in event attack by satellite forces against Greece or Turkey or Soviet inspired revolution in Iran. b ) US favors continuation UNSCOB in present form as contribution Grk security. Background. Defense indicates inclusion Greece and Turkey NAT wld have adverse effect progress NAT org except in realm coordinated mil planning. Defense also opposed creation Eastern Mediterranean pact on ground coordination two pacts difficult in absence superior auth and that except Turkey individual countries in area militarily too weak to benefit from joint defense. Defense also against definite commitment mil assistance Greece, Turkey, Iran beyond those already made in view of prior obligations elsewhere. Precedent for arrangements permitting assoc Greece Turkey on mil planning drawn from Par II, 1 North Atlantic Council directive to Ocean Shipping Planning Board providing for representatives of nontreaty member countries to participate in work of Board “where appropriate”. ITS position that adverse effect denial NAT membership to Greece Turkey might be mitigated by offer of assoc appropriate planning accompanied by assurance that door not closed re NAT membership later. Dept particularly concerned re Iran reaction and believes best line for Iran wld be that comparable arrangements precluded on geographic grounds. Info this tel strictly FYI. You will be kept advised. 5 Comments Emb Tehran urgently requested. Webb 1 The same telegram was sent to Athens (798) and Tehran (467). 2 For documentation on the Tripartite Meeting, Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and United States, New York, September 1950, see vol. iii , pp. 1108 ff. 3 For documentation on the Fifth Session of the North Atlantic Council, New York, September 15–17 and 26, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 4 For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom, and United States, London, May 11–13, see ibid. , pp. 828 ff. Regarding the statement of May 19 by British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin and the statement of May 20 by Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, see footnote 2, p. 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] . 5 Department’s telegram 136, September 13, to Ankara, not printed, informed Ambassador Wadsworth that “ForMins have substantially agreed program outlined Deptel 135” (782.5/9–1350). Editorial Note [Document 734] Editorial Note The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States at their meeting in New York on September 13 accepted a draft directive to the Defense Committee of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) proposed by Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson. This directive (Int. Doc. 31) stated that it was not feasible at that time to accept the Turkish request for accession to the North Atlantic Treaty but that it was desirable for both Greece and Turkey to associate themselves with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) planning on the defense of the Mediterranean area. This proposal with minor changes was approved at New York by the NAC deputies on September 14 and by the NAC itself on September 16. The Council commissioned Secretary of State Acheson to inform Turkey of its decision and, provided Turkey decided to associate itself with NATO Mediterranean defense planning, to invite Greece to participate in that planning as well. For detailed documentation on these discussions, see volume III, pages 1 ff. and 1108 ff. Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom 780.00/9–1850 [Document 735] Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 London, September 19, 1950 [Extract] 2 secret Memorandum of Informal US–UK Discussion in Connection With the Visit to London of the Honorable George C. McGhee Tuesday Afternoon, September 19, 1950 Topic for Discussion: GTI—Items 1 (except Iran) 2 and 3 Question of Security for Greece and Turkey (GTI—Item 1) Sir Anthony 3 raised the question of the Foreign Ministers’ refusal of the Turkish application for full membership within the Atlantic Pact. He questioned Turkish reaction to the offer to participate in the Mediterranean phases of military planning of the NATO which would consist largely of establishment of contact between the military leaders of the Atlantic Pact and the Turkish General Staff. Mr. McGhee said it had been left to the Secretary to pass this decision to the Turkish Government and that Mr. Acheson planned to explain that the Organization is not yet sufficiently enough advanced nor full enough in substance to expand its membership. Sir Anthony noted that Turkey has unwisely placed internal stress on being admitted as a full member and that the right to participate in military planning would probably not be deemed sufficient to counter any disappointment felt by the Turks. Mr. McGhee said that the US Government would like to see the Turks a member of the Atlantic Pact, but until we have assessed the magnitude of the existing situation and until the military strength has expanded sufficiently so that we can actually provide a force to assist the Turks, we are not ready to admits them to full membership. Sir Anthony noted that his Government had originally feared that if the Turks were admitted as full members, they would see how bare the cupboard actually is. However, if they are concerned only with planning in the Mediterranean, then our lack of strength will not have to be revealed in its entirety. Mr. Wright 4 noted that the British Government has existing treaty commitments with Turkey and that if an emergency should arise, his Government would surely intervene. Mr. McGhee agreed that if Turkey were to fall, then the whole of the Middle East would crumble; but he reiterated that at present we cannot commit ourselves further. He also noted that what we do for the Turks must also be done for the Greeks. Mr. McGhee pointed out that military equipment is already being sent to Turkey in as vast quantities as the Turks are able to absorb; in addition, the situation in Korea has made us change our sights with respect to equipment for Turkey, Greece, and Iran, and the budget has been raised by an additional $193,000,000 for arms assistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The authorship and date of preparation of this memorandum are not indicated on the source text. It is one of a set of memoranda covering the various agenda items discussed by Mr. McGhee during his visit to London, September 16–23; regarding that visit, see the editorial note, p. 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] . Copies of this paper were sent to the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, as well as to the Embassies in Greece and Turkey. 2 For the remainder of this memorandum, items 2 and 3 and discussion of Iran, with a list of participants, see p. 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] . 3 Sir Anthony Rumbold, Head, Southern Department, British Foreign Office. 4 M. R. Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office. Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 42 [Document 736] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay ) [Extracts] 1 top secret [ Washington ,] September 19, 1950. Subject: Second Progress Report on NSC 42/1, “United States Objectives with Respect to Greece and Turkey to Counter Soviet Threats to United States Security.” 2 NSC 42/1 was approved as governmental policy on March 23, 1949, on the basis of the considerations set forth in NSC 5/4 of June 3, 1948. It is requested that this report, as of August 25, 1950, be circulated to members of the Council for their information. II. Policy Implementation—Turkey Military Aid United States military aid to Turkey was continued during fiscal 1950 under Public Law 329 3 authorizing $211 million for Greece and Turkey, with the Turkish program receiving approximately $91.8 million. With the end of fiscal 1950, total funds committed for military assistance to Turkey under the aid program had thus been brought to about $252.9 million. It is contemplated that the allocation for fiscal 1951 under Title II of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1950 will be $67.4 million, subject to substantial increase if supplementary foreign military aid funds are authorized and appropriated. This United States military aid is playing an effective role in modernizing the Turkish forces, augmenting their combat effectiveness, and reducing expenditure of manpower. However, notwithstanding a decrease in the Turkish forces from about 500,000 in 1947 to around 300,000 at present, maintenance of the Turkish defense establishment continues to absorb some 35 to 40 percent of the country’s budgetary revenues. Relations between the United States and Turkish military establishments were brought appreciably closer by the visit to Turkey in March 1950 of the Army Chief of Staff, 4 who undertook to review in general terms common defense interests of the two countries with the highest Turkish authorities. As a consequence of this visit, the Chief of the Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) is now advising and assisting the Turkish General Staff in connection with its strategic planning. Urgent steps are also being taken, in the light of the Korean situation, to remedy certain outstanding organizational weaknesses in the Turkish military establishment, Notably the need for regrouping of certain units, for doubling the number of non-commissioned officers, and for additional emphasis on training, command inspections, and war and mobilization planning. The principal threat to Turkey lies in the possibility of direct aggression by the USSR, perhaps supplemented by Bulgarian attack. 5 While there is no concrete evidence that such aggression is imminent, it remains a Soviet capability and reports that early and large scale air-sea-land maneuvers in the Black Sea are planned by the USSR merit close watching. Economic Aid An increase in the standard of living in Turkey is a means of strengthening Turkish efforts to oppose communist pressure. ECA assistance has enabled Turkey to undertake a program of economic development which, because of the National defense burden, would not otherwise have been possible. In fiscal 1950 Turkey received $59 million of direct ECA aid, of which $35 million was in the form of loans, plus a net figure of $46 million of indirect aid in the form of drawing rights. In fiscal 1951 direct aid is likely to be between $30 million and $35 million, and Turkey has an initial position in the European Payments Union of $25 million in the form of a loan. The Turkish Government is currently pressing for more favorable ECA treatment, but the United States has not been able to extend any encouragement in this respect. 6 Economic aid to Turkey is being utilized to purchase modern agricultural equipment which will make possible an increase in Turkey’s agricultural production, to modernize and enlarge the coal mines, to develop the very inadequate internal transportation system, and to develop power resources—all important elements in the country’s basic economy. While these projects are designed primarily to contribute to European recovery, they will likewise serve to increase the national income of Turkey with resultant improvement in the standard of living and in Turkey’s ability to carry its defense burden. Turkish Foreign Relations Apart from the usual Soviet propaganda against Turkey, there have been no special instances of Soviet pressure against Turkey during the period under review. A possible minor exception was an article in the official organ of the Soviet Navy Ministry, Red Fleet , on April 19, proposing revision of the 1936 Montreux Convention on the Straits on the grounds that its provisions “have ceased to accord with the interests of the Black Sea powers.” In accordance with United States policy of extending diplomatic support to Turkey, the Secretary of State, at a press conference on April 21, 7 made a statement deprecating this semi-official revival of an unacceptable Soviet proposal. The Turkish Government, like that of Greece, has urged periodically that Turkey be included in the North Atlantic Pact or in some other regional security arrangement guaranteeing United States’, and possibly other Allied, military support in the event of aggression. Although the United States has on various occasions publicly expressed its vital interest in the security of Turkey, as well as that of Greece and Iran, it has maintained that it could not yet extend its formal security commitments. Recent international developments have, however, intensified Turkey’s desire to be included in the Pact, resulting in renewed pleas to the United States, the British and the French for support on this issue. Urgent consideration is, therefore, being given to the position which this Government should now take on this question. The Turkish offer of 4, 500 ground troops for service in Korea is a welcome demonstration of Turkish solidarity with the United States in support of United Nations principles. Turkish Internal Situation United States aid and influence have contributed to the strengthening of political stability in Turkey with the result that continued progress has been made toward democratic development, as evidenced by the free and orderly elections of May 14. In these elections the Democrat Party, formerly the leading opposition party, scored a sweeping victory over the Republican Peoples’ Party, which had been in power since the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923. The new Government, headed by President Celâl Bayar, is cooperating as closely with American authorities as did its predecessor and has given rise to no significant problems. James E. Webb 1 For the remainder of this memorandum, with annotation pertinent as well to the present extracts, see p. 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 181 ] . 2 Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 269 . 3 Approved October 6, 1949; 63 Stat. (pt. 1) 714. 4 Gen. J. Lawton Collins; see memoranda of March 26 and April 10, pp. 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] and 1248. 5 See NSC 73/4, “The Position and Action of the United States With Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation”, August 25, 1950, vol. i , p. 375 . 6 Turkey tried to get its EPU initial position of $25 million for fiscal year 1951 increased to $65.7 million (memorandum of conversation, July 14, by C. Robert Moore, Officer in Chargé, Turkish Affairs, 882.10/7–1450, not printed) apparently without success ( Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1950–1952 , vol. viii , p. 11181A). For documentation on the European Payments Union, see vol. iii , pp. 611 ff. 7 Department of State Bulletin , May 1, 1950, p. 687. The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 740.5/9–1950: Telegram [Document 737] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State top secret New York , September 19, 1950—6:15 p. m. Secto 33. Secretary received Turkish Ambassador this morning 1 communicate decision NAT Council re Turkish request membership. Secretary made following points: 1. Request seriously considered by Council. 2. Council recognized importance Turkey’s role in free world and vital Near East area. 3. Council unanimously concluded vitally important develop strength within framework present organization and, therefore, impossible make additional commitments or extend treaty arrangements this time. 4. Council noted Turkey enjoyed substantial international support by virtue French and UK treaties, public statements of US interest in Turkish independence, and considerable military assistance which Turkey continues receive from US. 5. Council believed, however, Turkey deserves some measure reassurance and therefore directed Secretary invite Turkey, if Turkish Government so desired, associate itself with appropriate phases military planning work NATO concerned with defense Mediterranean urea. Secretary provided Turkish Ambassador with note verb ale 2 briefly setting forth-Council’s proposal. He added, in capacity Secretary State, he hoped Turkish Government would accept. Ambassador said he did not understand how Turkey could participate in defense Mediterranean area without some prior political commitment. Secretary noted Council proposed Turkey should participate in “planning” and said he did not consider this a weakness. It is difficult, almost impossible, conceive of Soviet attack on Turkey under conditions which would not bring on general war. In Secretary’s opinion USSR would not mount major attack without also attacking US. USSR would not make mistake providing US time to prepare. Attack, if it comes, will probably be against US, western Europe, and Turkey simultaneously. All will be in together. Turkish Ambassador pointed out community free nations desperately seeking develop military and moral strength. Turkey has moral strength and, as result US assistance, military strength which Turkey eager place disposal free nations, but which they reject. In his opinion Council’s reply would be unsatisfactory to Turkish Government. Secretary said he realized that, in fact, anything short full membership in pact would be unsatisfactory to Turkish Government. Proposal is, however, move in right direction. Ambassador said he was greatly disturbed at probable reaction Turkish people. USSR and everyone else knows US has made no commitment to Turkey. When it is known NAT Council has denied Turkish request, public reaction will be very bad. He feared very much USSR might be encouraged believe NAT powers have no fundamental interest in Turkey and that USSR might, therefore, make strong bid for Turkish friendship. Secretary pointed out US had not made public Turkish request for NAT membership and that international commitments could not be made on basis newspaper articles. Secretary, however, disagreed with Turkish Ambassador’s analysis and said, on contrary, he thought Council’s proposal would make USSR sit up and take notice. He conceded, however, it is impossible accurately forecast Soviet reaction. 3 Ambassador inquired whether anything more could be done in this matter. Secretary replied if Ambassador meant whether Council would reconsider at this time, answer was “no”. Ambassador then inquired whether it would be possible for US make unilateral commitment. Secretary replied it would not be possible make US commitment at this time. US already has too many commitments. However, US aided Turkey when no one else did and has been providing assistance now for more than three years. He suggested Turks not get nervous like French and talk about commitments. What is desired of Turks is remain strong and preserve their independence as they have done for centuries. Secretary added we must endeavor establish an integrated command and an integrated force in western Europe within next twelve to eighteen months and develop adequate strength within framework present arrangements before we can think in terms of additional commitments. At this moment strength upon which base new commitments is just not available. In closing Secretary reiterated Council proposal was good one and he hoped Turkish Government would accept. Department pass Ankara, London, Moscow, Athens; sent Ankara unnumbered; repeated Department Secto 33, London unnumbered, Moscow unnumbered, Athens unnumbered. Acheson 1 See memorandum of conversation, September 19, by Secretary of State Acheson, vol. iii , p. 333 . 2 Department of State Bulletin , October 16, 1950, p. 632. A note verbale of October 2, transmitted by Turkish Ambassador Erkin to the Council through Secretary of State Acheson, stated that the Government of Turkey had decided to associate itself with the above-indicated military planning work ( ibid. , p. 633). 3 For an analysis of possible Soviet reaction to Turkey’s admission to NATO, see telegram 574, August 31, from Moscow, scheduled for publication in volume iv . Memorandum by the Officer in Chargé of Turkish Affairs (Moore) 782.00/9–2550 [Document 738] Memorandum by the Officer in Chargé of Turkish Affairs ( Moore ) 1 top secret [ Washington ,] September 25, 1950. Subject: General McBride’s Comments on Turkey of September 25. In the FMACC meeting today, 2 Major General H. L. McBride, [former] Chief of JAMMAT, discussed the operations of the Aid Program in Turkey and answered a number of questions relating thereto and to other problems concerning Turkey. The following were some of the more important points brought up. 1. General McBride emphasized very strongly that, if it is the policy of the United States to make the Turkish Army effective in case of war, three things must be done: a ) More Americans must be assigned to TUSAG in order to help the Turkish field units make effective use of the equipment being supplied under the Aid Program and maintain it properly. To date training has been concentrated at centers of instruction, and it was not until this summer that the Mission appreciated how badly the field units needed help. General McBride estimated that an additional 350 Americans were required for TUSAG and stated that the Turks would welcome such an increase in the Mission’s training staff. He felt that TUSAFG and TUSNG were adequately staffed. b ) A war reserve supply program should be undertaken. At the present time, given existing stocks, the Turkish Army has the capability of fighting for only three weeks. General McBride urged that a war reserve be built-up to enable the Army to fight for at least six months. The war reserve would be concerned only with supplies for Army forces in being and not for forces that might be mobilized in case of war. He did not know what such a program would cost, but estimated that it would be not less than $100 million. c ) The number of NCO’s must be increased. At the present time the number of NCO’s is about 20% of requirements and an additional 30,000 are needed. Some formula must be found for helping the Turks meet the cost of this program which in the first year will amount to about $5 million, increasing to $30 million in the third year, at which point it will level off. General McBride suggested that the Aid Program supply the POL requirements of the Turkish ground forces for which approximately TL 15 million is now being provided in the budget of the Ministry of National Defense, thus enabling the Ministry to apply the funds to the NCO program. Another item normally covered in the MND budget, which might be financed by the Aid Program to provide such funds, is clothing for the forces. It is somewhat difficult to find direct military items in the budget which might appropriately be supplied under the Aid Program as the Turks are purchasing virtually no military equipment abroad and only small amounts locally, the production of the Turkish military factories. General McBride indicated that it did not matter to him what items we chose to finance so long as funds would be released thereby in the MND budget for the NCO program. In reply to questioning he admitted that the Turks might be able to finance the first year’s program of $5 million, but felt that the military budget already constituted a very heavy burden on the Turkish economy and that it would be most difficult for the Turks to meet the cost of the program, particularly after the first year. He mentioned that the Prime Minister had told him that, should the present international tension continue, he hoped to request TL 500 million for the Ministry of National Defense in FY 1951 as contrasted to TL 458 million in FY 1950. This would be an increase of only $15 million, out of which many other requirements of the Ministry, in addition to the NCO program, would have to be met. (Colonel Enemark 3 told me this morning that there was a fourth point which was implied in General McBride’s discussion, but which the General felt he may not have emphasized adequately in his efforts to get across the first three points, that is, the necessity of completing the modernization of the Turkish armed forces. He added that Defense was working on proposals covering the above points which would be presented to the FMACC in due course.) 2. General McBride seemed to find himself in dilemma with respect to Air Force requirements. We are rapidly approaching the time when the military planes which we purchased out of surplus and other stocks at only a fraction of their original cost will have to be replaced and at a very substantial cost. The General was disturbed at the portion of military aid which would have to go to the Turkish Air Foreign relation to the contribution which it could be expected to make in the event of a war. However, he seemed to feel that there was no alternative but to continue helping the Turks make their Air Force more effective. 3. General McBride felt very encouraged over the effects of the change in Government, resulting from the elections of May 14, 1950. He has a high regard for the new Chief of Staff and considered that a very good job had been done in replacing the “Balkan war mentality” generals with more progressive ones. In his opinion both the Government and the military leaders are seriously trying to assure the most effective use of American aid, and he was optimistic over the results that could be obtained if we are in a position to carry out the proposals made in paragraph one above. 4. When questioned about the likelihood of staff talks between. Turks, Iranians and Greeks, General McBride stated that, as a result; of the new personnel changes in the Government and the Genera! Staff, he was more optimistic that the Turks would be willing to enter into staff talks. They do not have much confidence in the Iranians as individuals or as soldiers but have a far greater respect for the Greeks. He stated that he had repeatedly tried to impress on them the desirability of such talks and felt that they were beginning to recognize that some good might come out of them. He mentioned several problems that could be profitably taken up, such as whether Turkish, forces would be permitted to enter Iran in the event of an attack on Iran and the status of Iranian troops in the event that they should be driven back into Turkey by an invading force. 5. General McBride pointed out that Turkey’s real desire to be included in the NAT was based on its desire to obtain a formal security commitment from the United States, which it felt could be obtained only in this way. This issue had become a very important one from the point of view of local party politics. He felt that the Turks would be keenly disappointed at not being included in the Pact. He did not consider, however, but that this would adversely affect their desire to cooperate with the Mission. 1 Addressed to Burton Y. Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; William M. Rountree, Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs; and John B. Howard, Regional Planning Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 2 For the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee minutes, September 25, see FMACC doc. M–34, October 9, in Interdepartmental Committee files, lot 54D5, FMACC minutes. 3 Lt. Col. William A. Enemark, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Operations, General Staff, U.S. Army. Editorial Note [Document 739] Editorial Note At its 294th plenary meeting on October 7, 1950, the United Nations-General Assembly by a majority vote elected Turkey a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council for a 2–year term beginning January 1, 1951. The United States actively supported Turkey’s candidacy. For documentation regarding this election, see volume II, pages 87 ff. The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Turkish Ambassador’ in, the United States (Erkin) 882.10/9–1150 [Document 740] The Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Berry ) to the Turkish Ambassador’ in, the United States ( Erkin ) Washington , October 13, 1950. My Dear Mr. Ambassador : Prior to his departure for Europe and Africa, Mr. McGhee referred to me for reply your letter of September 11, 1 regarding United States economic assistance to Turkey. I had hoped to be able to inform you of some concrete developments with respect to the problems you mentioned, but as I am not able to do so at this time, I can only comment generally on them. While they are the primary responsibility of the ECA, I need not tell you that they are problems in which the Department of State has the greatest interest. This Government, as it has demonstrated in many ways, recognizes the tremendous burden which the maintenance of a strong national defense establishment has imposed and is continuing to impose on the Turkish economy. It likewise recognizes Turkey’s need for external economic assistance to carry out a sound economic development program. The funds available for foreign economic assistance are limited, however, and in determining their distribution, there are many important factors, not always directly comparable, which have to be taken into consideration. While allocations of ECA aid to Turkey have been less than Turkey may consider it requires, Turkey has, I believe, received very favorable and fair treatment and has been able to derive more permanent benefit from the aid that has been extended to it than many other countries. I refer more specifically to the fact that aid funds in Turkey have been largely devoted to the economic development of the country, rather than to its rehabilitation as has been the case with most of the other ECA countries. Turkey’s productive capacity is being considerably increased as the aid consists almost entirely of capital goods, in contrast to the very large proportion of food stuffs and consumable goods that have been required by many of the other ECA countries. I note the comment in your letter that the average citizen in Turkey seldom sees any concrete evidence of ECA aid, and, in one sense, I think that this is a tribute to the ECA program in Turkey. It is a real indication that the United States, by assisting Turkey to finance vitally important long terms projects—such as the development of the Zonguldak Coal Basin, the lignite mines, and power facilities—which are less visible to the public than, let us say, consumer goods, but which will ultimately make a greater contribution to the welfare of the Turkish people, has a sincere and continuing interest in helping your country build up a sound and expanding economy. It is inevitable that ECA aid to be allocated to Turkey in the present fiscal year will be less than in the previous year, as a result of the very substantial reduction in ECA appropriations, even though Turkey, in common with other ECA countries, might well be able to absorb considerable additional aid. In view of rapidly moving international developments, however, I feel it would be unrealistic for me to say that the amount of ECA aid which a country might expect to receive as of today will, under any and all circumstances, remain unchanged throughout the entire fiscal year. I do not mean to imply that I foresee the likelihood of increased ECA aid to Turkey in the near future, but I can assure you that Turkey’s needs are being and will be given every consideration by ECA in the light of its policies. I am very pleased to learn that an ECA investment team recently visited Turkey and had profitable discussions with officials of your Government with respect to Turkey’s investment program. As I know you have long appreciated, the lack of a comprehensive investment program has considerably handicapped our authorities in their study of Turkey’s requirements. With this deficiency soon to be corrected, I am sure that any further decisions that may have to be reached with respect to direct and indirect ECA aid will be facilitated. I am also pleased to learn that it is expected that the decision on the release of counterpart funds will be reached in the very near future. 2 With respect to Point IV assistance, the Department is cognizant of the very effective collaboration between the Turkish Government and the ECA with respect to the active technical assistance program which is now in progress in Turkey, a program initiated considerably before other United States machinery existed to take care of this type of aid on any important scale in the non-ECA countries. I am sure you will agree that Turkey, which is one of the principal recipients of such assistance, is receiving very sympathetic consideration from the ECA on the many technical assistance projects which it is proposing. In addition to welcoming the benefits derived by Turkey from such projects, the Department welcomes the experience being gained in carrying out this program in your country, which it is confident will be of real value to our authorities who are now dealing with the program in the non-ECA countries. The Department, mindful of the serious problems which confront the Turkish Government in its efforts to combat tuberculosis, can well appreciate the serious consideration which the latter has given to the Swedish hospital project. It understands, however, that the ECA Mission in Ankara, which has given the matter careful study, questions the advisability of the specific project, although in no way minimizing the importance of the tuberculosis problem to Turkey. Consequently, I can only suggest that officials of your Government concerned with this problem discuss it further with the ECA Mission in Ankara to determine to what extent and in what way ECA might be able to be of assistance. I might further add, however, that a proposal to transfer the ECA obligation of one country to another participating country (in this case from Sweden to Turkey), would give rise to many difficulties and would have to be considered not only on the merits of the specific project but in the light of over-all policies. The importance which your Government attaches to its economic development program is well appreciated by the various Departments of this Government concerned with foreign economic assistance, and I can assure you that the needs of your country, as well as the specific problems mentioned in your letter, are and will continue to receive our sympathetic consideration. Sincerely yours, B[ urton ] Y. B[ erry ] 1 Not printed. 2 On October 31, 1950, the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems advised the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration that the Council had no objection to use of 125.2 million Turkish lire from the local currency counterpart fund account for the period ending December 31, 1950, with the understanding that 82.7 million Turkish lire of the total amount would be used to repay advances made by the Turkish Central Bank to the Turkish Government for investment purposes (NAC Files: Lot 60 D 137: NAC Minutes. Lot 60 D 137 is a master file of documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems for the years 1945–1958). Turkey withdrew the equivalent of $32.2 million in Turkish lire from the local currency counterpart fund account as of March 31, 1951 (H. Doc. 239, 82d Cong., September 18, 1951, p. 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] ). (One Turkish lira equaled $0,357.) The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 782.5 MAP/11–450: Telegram [Document 741] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret Ankara , November 4, 1950—7 p. m. 273. To enable me effectively answer Deptel 221, October 27, 2 I had conversation November 1 with Minister National Defense during which for first time he was able give me any real indication regarding prospects Turkish military budget fiscal year 1951 beginning March 1. He said that to increase Turkish armed forces (now only fifty percent war-footing strength) from present 260,000 to 300,000 men, enlist desired additional NCO’s and implement minimum other urgent recommendations of Turkish general staff would require total National Defense budget of TL 580 million as against TL 458 million appropriated for current year. He continued in substance: Our new government has pledged its best effort to balance over-all state expenditures and income. Consequently, although recognizing fully and giving maximum possible budgetary consideration to implications of critical international situation, it finds quite impossible budgeting for more than a very small increase, say to 475 million, for national defense. In reply my further questions Minister said he could not cite, for they had not yet been determined by the government, either estimated total receipts or total expenditures for next year’s state budget; but ( a ) it was hoped that on revenue side ordinary receipts could be made substantially to total current year collections and ( b ) no expenditure side military non-defense expenditures would be cut at least 7 percent from present level. ( Note: ECA comments that Ministry State apparently accepts idea that 7 percent cut is merely first step to projected other non-defense budget reductions. If these be made in amounts sufficient to reduce total expenditures to this year’s estimated total revenue of roughly 1,300 million, I calculate that the proposed national defense budget of 475 million would be 36.5 percent as against this year’s 30.8 percent of total state budget appropriations.) 2. ECA Mission states it has been pressing Turks since early September for total estimate revenues, defense expenditures, refugee expenditures, normal government running expenses, and investment expenditures for 1951. It has recently received government estimate total investment expenditures but is still awaiting data on extent to which these will be provided out of state budget. Pending receipt such data and determination Turkish policy regarding use of pension funds, ECA feels it impossible comment fully on economic impact proposed level defense expenditure. Supplementing this ECA statement, I venture following comment: Current state budget as voted shows debit of TL 174 million; and only possible important new source of revenue known to us here is pension funds. Under new 1950 pension law some 100 million TL are estimated as available in 1951 for investment in Turkish Government bonds. However, part of this total has already been earmarked for financing Sariyar Dam and other projects and there is good reason believe Turkish Government wishes retain availability of balance pending solution Bulgarian-Turkish refugee problem. We have reported Foreign Ministry’s estimate that minimum of TL 120 million would be required to settle in Turkey the 250,000 refugees whose expulsion is threatened. 3 3. Subsequently, however, one views over-all fiscal picture, the horizon is dark. Every government agency asks and could advantageously spend more money: For national defense, for investment development and for ordinary administrative running expenses; and there seems no way to obtain it from local sources. It would seem to follow that, if US wishes expanded and/or accelerated action to increase military potential of Turkey under MDAP, we must find a way with Turkish Government, directly or indirectly to defray cost thereof. Ministry National Defense has authorized chief Turkish General Staff give General Arnold next Tuesday detailed comparative breakdown of national defense budgets for 1950 and 1951. I will telegraph any new information thus obtained which may supplement foregoing presentation, e.g., whether adequate allocation is made for expenses of Turkish brigade in Korea. 4. Deptel under reference stresses that requested “interim report” is “essential for consideration MDAP fiscal year 1951”. We believe reference is primarily to fiscal year 1951 supplemental appropriation, because our regular program for equipment and training has already been approved: For Army $36.6 million, Navy 9.8 million, Air Force 22.1 million; total of 68.5 million which is well within $75 million figure which we have been led to believe will be allocated on basis careful justifications already submitted. If Department has any special questions on this score, we believe they can be answered promptly by telegraph. JAMMAT’s “interim report” 4 has been drafted and will be completed and airmailed following General Arnold’s Tuesday meeting with chief Turkish General staff. Remaining issue of importance today is then, as we see it in JAMMAT, how best to expend such allocation as is granted us under current $194 million GTI supplemental appropriation. We have recently heard informally that $87 million will be allocated Turkish program and are reprogramming recommendations for expenditure this amount for Army, Navy, Air Force. Double that amount could be advantageously programmed for emergency defense this bastion against westward Russian thrust. Our current recommendations if implemented would make possible a certain expansion and acceleration of our regular long-term program with a view primarily to assisting present Turkish forces to attain maximum state of readiness in shortest possible time. They would not defray, except in part, the costs of several projects believed essential to this end and/or of special interest to the US. The eight most important and pressing of such special projects are: NCO program, latest available details and estimated costs of which were submitted in JAMMAT telegram Tap 8278, October 20. 5 Training teams, accepted by Turkish Government November 1 as reported in JAMMAT telegram Tap 8295 November 2. 5 Implementation would double present JAMMAT military personnel. Bosporus Sea Defense, favorable decision on which was also taken by Turkish Government on November 1. Subsidiary naval base at Iskenderun, for which we understand $4 million has been tentatively earmarked. Desirable related port development would considerably increase cost. Acceleration of military airfields reconstruction programs including possible rehabilitation Iskenderun airfield. Joint military communications center to serve Turkish forces and tie in with our own existing world network. Unutilized $500,000 allotment in fiscal year 1950 program for portable station would meet only fraction cost this project. Prime movers for non-American artillery. Recent initial survey this problem has established pressing need; detailed study now being made. Stockpiling. Current war reserves of certain types ammunition, POL and other strategic materials, winter clothing and shoes are distressingly meager. 5. Military elements of desired “final report” 6 should be available for analysis and presentation by JAMMAT this month, but ECA states and I fully concur that to make adequate reply to all questions raised in Depinst April 25 7 requires information not now available to us or even known to Turkish authorities themselves. Such information is basic. Department will recall that it was not possible for me to submit last year’s report until November 17 (Embdesp 389, November 17, 1949). 8 It contains considerable information which is still of basic interest to our present presentation. 6. By way of tentative comment, ECA does not feel present 260,000 armed forces is (or that 300,000 would impose) serious burden on agricultural or industrial production. Since Turkey has little war production potential, ECA does not believe prospects of diversions of resources to this field are substantial. It believes principal impact increased defense expenditures would fall on either investment program or alternatively on general standard of living through inflation or increased tax burdens. Pending receipt estimates total resources versus total obligations, ECA provisionally tends feel substantial cuts in investment program would be necessary if budget is to be balanced and taxes not increased. Pending receipt data requested, it is unable estimate whether such cuts would occasion serious harm. Personally, I feel that this ECA comment, although accurate and pertinent so far as it goes, should not substantially influence Department’s decisions. There is so very little fat in Turkish economy that it seems unrealistic to suppose any situation short of imminent war would lead Turkish Government materially to increase national defense expenditures at serious expense other necessary government services. And to increase taxes materially at this time could, in my personal view, but harm that economy and weaken domestic position of new government which, earnestly oriented to MDAP principles, is seriously endeavoring within its possibilities and limited experience to keep its national economy and state finances on even keel. If, however, after fiscal position thus sketched has been crystalized by budget submission to GNA, we could, I believe, induce Turkish Government to increase national defense expenditure in any section we feel should be strengthened, were we to offer additional grant ECA or MAP aid. It is with this consideration also in mind that I again urge careful study in Washington of all special projects listed herein. Wadsworth 1 Several garbled passages have been corrected after comparison with copy in Ankara Embassy file 58F33. 2 To the military assistance program mission at Ankara, not printed; it requested an interim report on the military aid program for Turkey, containing all information available for use in consideration of the military defense assistance program for fiscal year 1951 (782.5–MAP/10–2750). 3 See footnote 3, p. 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] . 4 Enclosure to despatch 269, November 14, from Ankara, 782.5–MAP/11–1450, not printed. 5 Not found in Department of State files. 5 Not found in Department of State files. 6 Enclosure to despatch 454, February 16, from Ankara, 782.5 MAP/2–1651. 7 Instruction 28 to Ambassador Wadsworth, signed for the Secretary of State by John H. Ohly, Deputy Director, Mutual Defense Assistance, Department of State, requested a study of the military aid program for Turkey, 782.5 MAP/4–2550, not printed. 8 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 611.82/11–1550: Telegram [Document 742] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey confidential Washington , November 15, 1950—7 p. m. 252. Deptel 247, Nov. 10. 1 FYI Gen Bradley 2 in mtg with Gen Egeli 3 Nov 14 clarified Reader’s Digest art. Pointed out (1) by local war he meant war started by somebody other than Russia; (2) although naming Turkey and Asiatic countries as areas of potential local wars he cld have continued around periphery. He was trying to bring out US shld not get itself scattered in wars in which Russia not involved; (3) if Turkey attacked by Bulgaria without Russian participation Turks can handle; (4) US Govt has announced that Turk security of vital interest to US and this policy remains unchanged. This illustrated by fact US continuing aid Turkey. Dept understands Egeli pleased with Bradley explanations and will report them upon return Turkey. For security reasons Turks not cabling details their mtg with Bradley or with SG on Nov 13. Dept understands Egeli departing US well satisfied with results visit. Acheson 1 To Ankara, not printed; it referred to a conversation on November 10, between Melih Esenbel, Counselor of the Turkish Embassy; Burton Y. Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; and C. Robert Moore, Officer in Charge, Turkish Affairs, regarding an article entitled “U.S. Military Policy: 1950” by General Bradley in the Reader’s Digest , October 1950, p. 143 (611.82/11–1050). In the article, General Bradley mentioned Turkey as an area of potential local war and stated that those countries willing to resist Communist aggression should be aided. He emphasized, however, that local wars should not divert the United States from the central task of ensuring victory in the event of a world war. 2 General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also served as Chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and as U.S. Member of the Standing Group (SG) of the Military Committee of the NAC. 3 Lt. Gen. Yusuf A. Egeli, Chief of Operations (G–3), Turkish General Staff. The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 782.022/11–1850: Telegram [Document 743] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State top secret Ankara , November 18, 1950—2 p. m. 307. Deptel 229, November 1. 1 1. As reported mytel 273, November 4 2 Turkish Government is disposed to implement rounded project for Bosporus sea defense. This disposition must, however, be measured by usual practice in such matters; that is ( a ) agreement in principle, ( b ) careful elaboration of project on technical military level, and ( c ) definitive agreement in light of such elaborations. Consequently, we read Turkish disposition to proceed as being expressed “in principle”. Meanwhile Turkish General Staff and JAMMAT are working out details of project. Their study 3 should be completed within a fortnight. 2. British Embassy tells us no new instructions have been received from London. We believe Turks will not take final definitive decision before British Ambassador conveys British Government concurrence that controlled mines actually be laid; not simply that, juridically, Turkey is free to lay them. Consequently, we suggest that new démarche be made by Washington to London. Wadsworth 1 Not printed; it inquired whether the Turks had given any indication of their plans regarding controlled mining of the Straits in view of British and U.S. agreement as to the Turks’ legal right to do so under the Montreux Convention (770A.5/11–150). 2 Ante, p. 1328 [ Pg. 1328 is part of Doc. 741 ] . 3 Not found in Department of State files. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 282.1869/11–1450: Telegram [Document 744] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey confidential Washington , November 30, 1950—8 p. m. 282. Embtel 294 Nov 14. 1 US Govt well appreciates problems involved in influx Turk emigrants from Bulgaria. Hopeful Turk Govt can work out satisfactory agreement with Bulgars re emigrant flow so that resettlement can be effected with minimum dislocations. 2 Apparent, however, that Turks may be faced with continuing resettlement problem for some years to come. Dept believes that primary responsibility in solving refugee problem rests with Turks and that Turks should be given no encouragement re possibility US financial assistance to meet this specific problem. It recognizes however that care and resettlement refugees will undoubtedly impose burdens on Turkish economy which may therefore be factor in determination amounts and nature of economic assistance US Govt or its agencies should extend Turkey in future periods within framework US policies and objectives. Dept finds it difficult to give further guidance re Emb reply to Turks in absence current info re nature of discussions apparently carried on between ECA Mission and Turks as indicated in Toeca 758 Sep 21 and ECA Sep Progress Report as well as reported ECA Mission cable of Nov 27 to USRep IRO Geneva. 3 Therefore believe any comments you may make to Turks re US assistance should be closely coordinated with ECA Mission. Dept notes IRO favorably disposed provide technical assistance requested by Turk Govt (Geneva tel to Dept 481 Nov 28 quoting tel to AmEmbassy and ECA Ankara). 4 Without knowing further re ECA Mission views Dept and ECA/W had thought it quite possible that Turks could formulate TA project which would meet ECA criteria but presume IRO assistance will meet Turks TA needs, at least re reception care maintenance refugees pending resettlement. Acheson 1 Not printed. 2 The Turkish Government closed its border to immigrants from Bulgaria on October 6 and reopened it on December 2; see file 882.181. 3 The ECA documents under reference were not found in Department of State files. 4 Not printed. The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 770A.5/12–250: Telegram [Document 745] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State 1 top secret Ankara , December 1, 1950—noon. 2 326. Following is reply to four numbered paragraphs Deptel 266, November 22. 3 General Arnold concurs. 1. Since receipt Deptel 122, September 1, suggesting we “avoid giving impression US directly interested in influencing Turk decision”, our discussions and joint studies with Turks on question of laying controlled mines has been kept oh strictly military level within framework of larger project entitled “Bosporous Sea defense”. We have, however, gathered clear impression (confirmed in comment made to me and Admirals Ginder and Rees 4 by President Bayar last month) that considerations put forward in last three sentences of paragraph 2 of British aide-mémoire 5 have led Turks to feel they would not be on wholly sound ground were they to lay mines. Consequently we believe British concurrence in principle would dispel Turk apprehension on this score. 2. We believe it would be helpful were British so to indicate, but we have not gathered from high ranking Turk officers that they “want” British to do so. Rather do they suggest that they cannot, as they would wish, proceed with project before receiving green light from Turk Foreign Office. 3. Foregoing comments incorporate best answer we can make to your question re Turk thinking. We suggest Department may wish modify above quoted passage its telegram 122, September 1 in light paragraph 5– f JCS paper 2009/7 October 19 6 which states that denial of Soviet exit from Black Sea through the Straits is one of objectives to be sought in associating Turkey in defense planning for Mediterranean area prior to any outbreak of hostilities. 4. We gather that Turks are not approaching British; and I confirmed in conversation yesterday with British Ambassador that they have not done so since initial Foreign Office démarche last April. Turks feel, we believe, that as matter has been under discussion between Washington and London next move should come from our side. Wadsworth 1 This paper bears the following notations: “Taken up with Navy. Moored ground—not cable. Adm Conolly—took up with Brit Adm. Have money in aid program for mines.” 2 The source text is the corrected copy sent December 2, 7:48 a. m. 3 Not printed. 4 Rear Adm. William L. Rees arrived in Turkey on November 2 and assumed command as Chief of the United States Navy Group, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey on November 9, replacing Rear Adm. Samuel P. Ginder who left Ankara, November 12, en route to the United States. 5 Of June 19, not printed; the three sentences under reference dealt with possible controversy arising from the proposed controlled mining of the Straits (enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed). 6 Not found in Department of State files. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 740.5/2–1150 [Document 746] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey secret No. 35 Washington , December 11, 1950. The Secretary of State refers below to various statements which indicate that simultaneous with the negotiation of the Turkish-British-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance which was signed on October 19, 1939, 1 a secret military convention may have been negotiated between those three countries. During discussions at the French Foreign Office late in August 1950 with regard to the Turkish request for membership in the NATO, a French Foreign Office official stated, in effect, to an officer of the American Embassy at Paris, that Turkey had a political and a military treaty with Great Britain but only a political treaty with France, the “military clause” of the Franco-Turkish treaty having become inoperative upon the withdrawal of French troops from Syria and Lebanon. In this connection reference is made to Paris’ telegrams Nos. 1524 and 2217 of April 13, 1949, and May 31, 1949, 2 respectively (repeated to Ankara as Nos. 5 and 7), referring to the question of French confirmation of the validity of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance. The first of these references stated that although French legal experts regarded that Treaty as being still in effect, there was some question about military assistance since the original commitment was entered into by France on the basis of the presence of French troops in Syria and Lebanon. The second telegram under reference stated that, although a suitable opportunity might be found to confirm the validity of the 1939 Treaty, it would be made quite clear that the military convention “annexed” to the Treaty would be declared null and void since the situation under which it was negotiated no longer obtained. In addition, reference is made to the following excerpt from despatch No. 1238 of October 24, 1939, from the American Embassy at Ankara, 3 entitled “Conclusion of Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Alliance and Soviet-Turkish Negotiations”: “The Embassy has furthermore learned that a military convention was also signed on October 19, presumably with the participation of General Wavell, Commander of the British Forces in the Near East, and General Weygand, Commander of the French Army of the Levant, who both arrived in Ankara on October 18 and carried on discussions with the Turkish General Staff from October 19 to the 21st. The military convention is not to be published, and the interested Governments have manifested an earnest although patently over-optimistic desire to keep secret even the fact that such an agreement was signed.” The following questions have been raised by the above references: 1) Was a military convention, in addition to the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed by Great Britain, France and Turkey on October 19, 1939? 2) If so, ( a ) What were its general provisions, and ( b ) What is its present status? In connection with 2( b ) above, it is noted from the Embassy’s despatch No. 209 of July 2, 1949, 3 (copies to London and Paris) that, although the Turkish Foreign Office made available to the Embassy a copy of its acknowledgement of a note from the British Embassy of May 23, 1949, reaffirming the validity of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the texts of the British note and of a similar note from the French Embassy were apparently not made available. Since the fact that both Great Britain and France had reaffirmed the validity of the Treaty was given wide publicity in Turkey, the withholding of the texts of the British and French notes on the question would appear to support the view that they may have also made reference to a military convention. The Department would appreciate receiving any clarification of the points raised above which the Officer in Charge may be in a position to obtain. 4 1 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc , p. 167 also British Cmd. 6165, Treaty Series No. 4 (1940). 2 Neither printed. 3 Not printed. 3 Not printed. 4 Ambassador George Wadsworth raised the subject of the military convention during a call on Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Köprülü on January 27, 1951. “Mr. Köprülü replied that, at the time of the reaffirmation of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the question of the military agreement was not raised. He stated that he had been considering raising the question with Sir Brian Robertson when he visits Turkey in the near future. The Foreign Minister observed, also, that the military accord had now outlived its period of usefulness, and would need revision.” (Despatch 425, February 2, 1951, from Ankara, 740.5/2–251) The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 795.00/12–1450: Telegram [Document 747] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Ankara , December 14, 1950—1 p. m. 367. 1. In call on ForMin Köprülü yesterday I reviewed carefully subject matter Depcirtel 256, December 9. 1 He was keenly interested. Turkey too he said, believes that appeasement would be fatal to cause world peace and that aggression must be resisted; it is proud of contribution its brigade has made towards such resistance in Korea. 2. He expressed highest satisfaction that US and UK have close identity major objectives and warned against “Asiatic bargaining at which Russians are past masters”. He sees calculated Soviet policy of détente in west (e.g. Persia, Finland and Turkey) with view to all out effort achieve domination Far East. He cited, as examples this policy in Turkey, Bulgarian acceptance Turkish conditions for admission Bulgar-Turk refugees and fact that ten days ago Soviet Ambassador had called on him (purportedly to present new military attaché) for first time since he had taken office last spring. 3. He then urged earliest possible implementation NATO invitation to associate Turkey and Greece in Mediterranean defense planning. Recent Greek-Turk staff talks, he said, had been cordial and productive. Staffs would henceforth exchange military intelligence re situation in Bulgaria and other SE Europe satellites. They agreed however that Greece could not be successfully defended against full scale Bulgarian aggression with covert Soviet backing unless Yugoslavs were brought in and would attack from flank. ( Note: Turk Chief General Staff has promised General Arnold, only recently returned from consultation with Admiral Carney 2 in London, full information these talks.) 4. Köprülü continued substantially as follows: he wished say this connection that Turk Government and people view mutual planning with NATO for Mediterranean defense as essential intermediate step towards eventual juridical association with NATO itself, perhaps through subsidiary Mediterranean pact between UK, US, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey and with which, because of strategic importance Suez Canal area and increasingly strained British-Egypt relations, it would be well endeavor associate with Egypt. He believed that if such pact be proposed, Turkish influence in Cairo could be materially useful. 5. In re “action in UN” envisaged in reftel, he said he personally shared our views and would present them to PriMin. If however, Cabinet decision were deemed necessary he would appreciate brief aide-mémoire stating them succinctly, i.e., first, support of six-power resolution unless cease-fire be arranged, in which latter event resolution would not be pressed and, second, support of stronger resolution naming Communist China as aggressor if cease-fire not arranged and Communist advance continue south of 38th Parallel. ( Note: If this not be oversimplification Department’s thinking I should welcome early authorization send him personal note in that sense.) 3 Department in its discretion pass to Athens, Belgrade and Moscow. Wadsworth 1 Vol. vii , p. 1486 . This telegram presented the Department of State’s thinking on the Korean situation in the light of the communiqué issued on December 8 following the meetings in Washington of President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee of the United Kingdom (Department of State Bulletin , December 18, 1950, p. 959; also Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 , p. 738). For documentation on the December meetings between President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, see vol. iii , pp. 1698 ff. 2 Adm. Robert B. Carney, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. 3 Department’s telegram 320, December 19, to Ankara, not printed, read in part as follows: “Dept suggests you might postpone personal note setting forth US position future UN action on Korea until Dept’s views more firm, and time for proposed action is near” (795.00/12–1450). Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs (Tingling) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) 782.022/5–350 [Document 748] Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Legal Adviser for European Affairs ( Tingling ) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs ( Rountree ) top secret [ Washington ,] December 14, 1950. Your memorandum of December 8, 1950 1 refers further to the Turkish plan for the laying of certain moored mines near the Black Sea entrance to the Straits. This office’s memorandum of May 15, 1950 2 advised you that such a project was consistent with the provisions of the Montreux Convention of 1936 provided the mines did not interfere with complete freedom of passage of the Straits and navigation therein by merchant vessels. You ask for further consideration of the question in the light of statements in the British aide-mémoire of June 19, 1950 3 to the effect that the laying of such mines might involve the Turkish Government in legal controversy because mere knowledge of the existence of the mines might be considered a restriction on the complete freedom of transit guaranteed by the Convention in view of the sensitivity of public opinion to shipping dangers. It seems apparent that for some reason other than those disclosed in the aide-mémoire the British Government does not desire the mining of the Straits at this time. The suggestion that the Turkish Government might become involved in legal controversy is undoubtedly influenced by that fact, particularly since the British Government agrees with the Department’s position that the laying of such mine fields would not constitute an infraction of the Montreux Convention nor general principles of international law concerning the right of innocent passage through territorial waters, and in view of its admission that it is technically possible entirely to obviate the risk of accidental discharge of the mines. Your memorandum states that informal conversations with Navy Department officials indicate that they regard the mining of the Straits as extremely desirable. It is the view of this office that there is no substantial legal reason why such a project should not be carried out. In view of the specifically agreed right of Turkey to re-militarize the Straits so long as freedom of transit and navigation for merchant vessels is not interfered with and the admitted practicability of laying mines without, in fact, interfering with such transit and navigation, the suggestion of the British that the mere knowledge of the existence of such mines interferes with freedom of transit and navigation borders on the fanciful and is inconsistent with the right to remilitarize. Carried to its logical conclusions such a view could result in the entire nullification of the right to re-militarize. While no assurance against the possibility of legal controversies can, of course, be given since anyone is free to start a controversy of any kind, legal or otherwise, this office is of the view that there are no substantial legal considerations which would warrant this Government in discouraging the Turkish Government from going ahead with the project of controlled mining of the Straits. 1 Not printed. 2 Ante , p. 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 702 and Doc. 703 ] . 3 Reference is to a British aide-mémoire to the Turkish Government (enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed.). The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 782.5/12–1850 [Document 749] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State top secret Ankara , December 18, 1950—5 p. m. 381. Re paragraph 3, Embtel 367, December 14. 1 Following résumé Greek-Turkish staff talks communicated to General Arnold by General Yamut, General Egeli and Admiral Ulusan 2 : 1. Purpose talks to discuss possibility establishing mutual military assistance pact, including assistance against attack Communist guerrillas. 2. “Probable enemy” defined as anyone attacking from Bulgaria. 3. Greeks would endeavor assist if Turkey attacked from east, but such help recognized as difficult to apply. Bulgarian attack not expected for 3 or 4 months. Felt that Russians must and eventually will try to reach Mediterranean. Greeks reluctant concentrate forces around Salonika for fear attack guerrillas in other parts Greece. 4. Mutual assistance pact believed by Greeks to be deterrent to aggression. Turks point out that no assistance can be rendered without consulting UN. Turkish general staff prepared continue talks later, but believe discussion should be moved to higher levels. 3 5. General Yamut informed Greeks that if Bulgaria attacks Greece, Turks will mobilize at once. 6. Turks asked Greeks how they expected assist Turkey by attacking Bulgaria when Greeks unable control their own internal situation. 7. Conclusions reached: ( a ) Any aggression directed against eastern Mediterranean from north and northeast will be fought on territories of both countries (conclusion reached jointly). ( b ) Bulgarian attack must be part of greater attack, and sooner or later Russia will be party. ( c ) Theatre of operations of both countries, cannot, as consequence, be of local importance. All countries concerned with defense eastern Mediterranean must consider this area of utmost importance, and must regard attack against Greece or Turkey as attack against themselves. 8. Summary Turkish position: Military pact as proposed in discussion not practicable, unless pact becomes part broader treaty embracing all countries concerned defense eastern Mediterranean. 9. Summary Greek position: Military pact between Greece and Turkey would provide military advantages but would be more important politically. Existence of pact would be deterrent to Bulgaria, and if it did not prevent attack would necessitate deployment lesser force against Greece. Wadsworth 1 Ante , p. 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] . 2 Adm. Aziz Ulusan, Turkish Chief of Intelligence. 3 Maj. Gen. William H. Arnold, Chief, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, “inferred from Gen Yamut that so far as the Staffs were concerned, the conversations were finished” (despatch 331, December 18, from Ankara, 681.821/12–1850, not printed). Memorandum of Conversation, by Mrs. Lucille Snyder of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs 782.5/12–1850 [Document 750] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mrs. Lucille Snyder of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs top secret [ Washington ,] December 18, 1950. Subject: Proposed Project to Mine Turkish Straits. Participants: Admiral Ginder, 1 formerly head of Naval Group of JAMMAT Commander Davis, International Affairs Branch, Navy Department Mr. Raymund Yingling—L Mr. Richard Davis—EE Mr. John Howard—NEA Mr. William Rountree—GTI Mr. C. Robert Moore, GTI Mrs. Lucille Snyder, GTI Admiral Ginder outlined the proposed Turkish plan for controlled mining of the Straits, as part of an over-all project for defense of the Bosporus, and stressed the importance attached to it by JAMMAT, both as a Turkish peace-time defensive measure and as an aid to the Allies. He stated that the proposed minefield project is strongly supported by the Turkish military. However, the Turkish Foreign Office has not authorized implementation of the plan, presumably because the British, although admitting the legal right of the Turks under the Montreux Convention to lay the mines, had, in their aide-mémoire of June 19, 1950, 2 expressed reservations as to the advisability of proceeding with the project at that time. He thought the British may have viewed the plan as one involving moored mines suspended from cables, rather than moored mines on the bottom of the Bosporus which could be discharged only by shore control mechanism. Both Mr. Yingling and Mr. Davis expressed the view that British reservations with respect to implementation of the project were doubtless based on something more fundamental than the reasons given to the Turks. Mr. Yingling added that the British, bearing in mind their military alliance with Turkey, were probably fearful of Soviet reaction in the event that the Turks proceed to lay the minefield. It was Admiral Ginder’s view that knowledge of the mining project, which could not be kept secret after installation got under way, would deter the Soviets from any attempts to send submerged submarines through the Straits surreptitiously. He stated that the Turks are now installing a system in that waterway to detect submerged subs and that mines would serve as an aid in such detection. Any information gained thereby would, of course, be of great value to Allied intelligence. The Admiral added that the cables for the mines could be run in during the installation of the detection system, which will probably be completed next spring, and that it would subsequently take from six to eight weeks for the actual laying of the mines. He said that the mining project would be financed by MDAP funds and that $400,000 had been set aside for the purpose. The mines under consideration would not, he pointed out, be expected to replace other types in the event of hostilities. They are intended primarily for submerged submarines and would be placed so deep that they would have little, if any, effect on surface vessels, if discharged. Mr. Rountree pointed out that although it was the Department’s view from a legal standpoint that the mining project would not constitute a violation of the Montreux Convention, the Department had not yet formulated its position on whether it should urge the Turks to proceed with the laying of the mines. There were various factors to be considered, such as Soviet reaction to the project and the likelihood that the Turks might seize upon the issue to renew their request for a US security commitment. He expressed the view that the Department should, therefore, before deciding whether to request the British to reconsider the views expressed in their aide-mémoire and/or to urge the Turks to proceed with installation of the minefield, endeavor to obtain Embassy Ankara’s opinion of the Turkish Foreign Office estimate of probable Soviet reaction if the project is implemented as well as the views of the Embassy at Moscow with respect to possible Soviet reaction thereto. It was agreed that queries along the above lines should be sent to Ankara and Moscow. Upon the receipt of replies the Department will consider (1) whether to instruct the Embassy at London, in collaboration with Admiral Carney (CINCNELM), 3 to discuss the question with the British Foreign Office and the British Admiralty with a view to obtaining British agreement to a modification of the reservations set forth in their June 19th aide-mémoire to the Turks, or (2) whether the question of US support of the mining project would, in view of political and military considerations, have to be referred for decision to the NSC. It was the consensus that every endeavor should be made to settle the issue at a lower level. 1 Rear Adm. Samuel P. Ginder, Senior Member, Board of Decorations and Medals, Navy Department. 2 Enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed. 3 Adm. Robert B. Carney had succeeded Adm. Richard L. Conolly as Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, on November 1. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey 882.25/12–1950: Telegram [Document 751] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey top secret Washington , December 19, 1950—7 p. m. 318. Ur 326 Dec 2[ 1 ]. 1 Dept surmises Turks, particularly Turk FonOff, concerned with implications of carrying out mining project and have seized upon implied reservations Brit Aide-Mémoire 2 to defer implementation. Dept wld welcome Emb opinion as to prob Turk estimate Sov reaction if project implemented and whether likelihood Turks wld, particularly if project pushed by US, seek US security commitment as prerequisite. Dept now reviewing its position on project. Has requested Emb Moscow views re prob Sov reaction 3 and has had helpful discussion with Adm Ginder. Webb 1 Ante , p. 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] . 2 Dated June 19; enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed. 3 Department’s telegram 427, December 20, to Moscow, requested the views of the Embassy in the Soviet Union on the probable Soviet reaction to the contemplated placement by Turkey of controlled mines moored on the bottom of the Bosporus. The Embassy replied that it believed that the Soviet Government “would at least react loudly” to this prospect, and that it “would be capitalized on to intensify current war of nerves against Turkey.” In these circumstances the Embassy opposed the proposal for mining the Bosporus unless it could be shown to be “vital for defense” and that there was “no feasible alternative such as stockpiling the mines in a position to be laid expeditiously in the event of hostilities” (telegram 1227, December 22, from Moscow, repeated to Ankara by the Department as information telegram of December 26, 1 a. m.). Both telegrams are scheduled for publication in volume iv . Memorandum by the Special Assistant, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (Oden) Ankara Embassy Piles: Lot 57F72: Turkish Airfields 1950 [Document 752] Memorandum by the Special Assistant, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey ( Oden ) top secret Ankara , 28 December 1950. Subject: World Situation 1. A conference was held in General Yamut’s conference room at 1015 hours, 23 December 1950. Present were: Minister of National Defense, Mr. Refik Sebket Ince U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Wadsworth General Yamut Major General Arnold Lt Gen Egeli Lt Colonel Oden Admiral Uluson Lt Col Hayri Saner 2. The conference opened with General Egeli summarizing his visit to Washington. While there, he met General Bradley, Air Marshal Tedder 1 and General Eli. 2 At his first talk with General Bradley, he was informed that the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean had not been discussed by the Standing Group, but that it would be discussed shortly and that they would inform him on the 3rd of November as to the outcome of their conference. Due to other urgent meetings of the Standing Group, however, he had no opportunity to see General Bradley again until the 13th of November. At a conference with the French General Eli, General Egeli was briefed on the organization of the North Atlantic Pact. He was told that the Eastern Mediterranean problem could not be discussed until the Turkish security system had been investigated and found secure. General Eli said that the Russians are buying the same coding equipment from Sweden that the Turks buy, that a new ciphering machine was being made in the United States and that perhaps the Turks could be furnished some of these machines. In any event, before the Turks are brought into any discussions of a military nature their entire security system must be investigated by a small party of investigators who in turn should be invited by the Turkish Government to come to Turkey to conduct this investigation. This investigating team should be invited through diplomatic channels. The Minister of National Defense has written the Minister of Foreign Affairs requesting him to invite such an investigation team to Turkey. The Foreign Minister will extend this invitation through the Turkish Ambassador in Washington. 3. The day after General Egeli had talked with General Eli, General Bradley and Air Marshal Tedder both desired to see him. During discussions with these officers, they implied that General Eli had no business discussing the Eastern Mediterranean with General Egeli, that it was not a problem for the Standing Group as such. Of the NATO countries only Great Britain and the United States have an interest in the Eastern Mediterranean. General Egeli was then informed that the defense of this area must first be discussed by Generals Arnold, Tate, 3 Evans 4 and Admiral Carney. Following the exchange of views by those officers, they will in turn discuss the problem with the British Commander in the Middle East to prepare the way for a full discussion with Turkish authorities. General Bradley told General Egeli that Italy is the bordering state of NATO and that the area east thereof must be considered separately. He said that defense of this area must be discussed by the U.S., Great Britain and Turkish authorities and should be separate from NATO. At that time, General Bradley had issued no instructions to representatives in the interested countries but promised to do so shortly. 4. General Arnold informed the conferees that except for brief discussions with Admiral Carney, conferences indicated necessary by General Bradley had not been held. Even in the discussions with Admiral Carney, only concrete facts pertaining to Turkey proper were mentioned. Mr. Wadsworth said that no overall discussions of the Eastern Mediterranean as such have been held by Admiral Carney, that he is calling in the key people separately, such as General Arnold, General Evans, General Jenkins 5 and Admiral Ballentine 6 prior to touring the area in person. The Ambassador stated that he assumed that the Turkish conferences knew that Admiral Carney would be in Turkey from the 10th to the 14th of January. General Arnold said that while in London he gave Admiral Carney his estimate of Turkish capabilities and informed him of their needs. He also told the Admiral that the Turks are striving for maximum readiness by 1 May 1951, that present disposition of Turkish Armed Forces are generally as we feel they should be disposed. Admiral Carney told him that he would hold a conference with General Arnold, General Evans, General Tate and the British Commander in the Middle East, probably around February; exactly where and when was not indicated. General Arnold also told Admiral Carney that General Yamut had informed him that it was absolutely essential that the Abadahn-Suez areas and Cyprus be secured; that that security should not wait but should be accomplished before these areas are taken. General Arnold also informed Admiral Carney that the plans of the Turkish Armed Forces, insofar as known to him, are in conformance with the JCS desires for this area. They will fight a delaying action in Thrace as long, as possible without getting too many forces committed in Europe. “When they have to withdraw to the Asiatic side they will defend to the best of their ability in the mountains of Northwest Turkey, fighting successive delaying actions and inflicting maximum casualties back to the Iskenderun area. Likewise, they pose a threat to the flank of any enemy moving south through Iran. If the Russians attack from the East, the Turks will withdraw and delay back to the Iskenderun area. As a consequence, General Arnold stressed the absolute necessity of building the Iskenderun area as a port. He was asked his opinion of Iran, but informed Admiral Carney that he had little knowledge of that country and thought it best that General Evans brief him thereon. He also told Admiral Carney that as of now our capabilities are not as great as they will be 1 May. Every additional month we are in a better position to meet the enemy. If all goes well by Spring, Russia will have to use sizable forces to effect a quick victory in Turkey, and Turkish dispositions on the Eastern Front will force Russia to deploy much greater forces than she would have to normally prior to moving south toward the oil fields. Admiral Carney was also informed of our anxiety regarding the Bosporus and of our efforts to strengthen it. The Admiral was pleased with that information and indicated that he has a very high regard for the Turk Armed Forces and the Turkish people. 5. In General Egeli’s conference with Air Marshal Tedder, the Marshal informed him that the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean had not been discussed by the Standing Group, that that area is a British and US concern, and for that reason the US and Britain will take up the problem outside of the Standing Group. He said that the Turkish authorities will be approached on this problem by the US and Great Britain and that the problem must be taken up as soon as possible following the conference of the American and British officers as indicated by General Bradley. Marshal Tedder told him the reason for British and US officers meeting together prior to discussion with the Turks is because most of them are new to their areas. Marshal Tedder was anxious about the situation in Egypt. He expressed the importance of the Suez Canal in supplying the Middle East area and asked what Turkey could do to appease Egypt. General Egeli promised to convey his message to the diplomatic authorities in Turkey. 6. General Yamut then discussed Mediterranean Geopolitics from the military point of view. He indicated that if he were incorrect in his views, he desired the U.S. Ambassador and the Minister of National Defense to correct him. General Yamut said that every country that borders the Eastern Mediterranean has its own ideas of the defense of that part of the Sea which is contiguous to it. This area, however, must have an integrated defense plan, but such has not been discussed as yet. Starting with the World situation, General Yamut said that there are two blocs today, the Democratic and the Communistic. The leaders of the Democratic bloc are the US, Great Britain and France. The bloc leaders must trust each other and have mutual plans which enable the remaining countries in the Democratic bloc to rely on them. The Communistic bloc, of course, is controlled by one command. Actually, there is no Korean question and no Chinese question. There is only one problem to be considered and that is world communism. Some countries in the world that need material and moral help, consider themselves helpless and in a vacuum. In needy and backward countries, communist agents are unnecessary. The neediness creates the turmoil desired by the communists. The Mediterranean is a sea that enables countries to receive aid. Countries bordering that sea are bound together and are an ethnic bloc. The passages through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles are one entrance to the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal considered together with Aden is another passage, and the third passage is Gibraltar, with Spain and Africa as the hinterlands thereof. If the passages cannot be defended together with their adjacent areas, the defenses are weak. It is necessary for Great Britain to consider the hinterlands in that area in the defense of Gibraltar. Reported Spanish claims to Gibraltar cause General Yamut anxiety. France has a coast along the Mediterranean, is not only a member of NATO but considers herself the key to NATO. As such, her main interest must center there. Italy is a purely Mediterranean country due to geography. The military strength of Italy and her role in future defense problems is the concern of NATO. Yugoslavia and Albania must be considered together. From the Democratic bloc viewpoint, the security of these two countries is important and the Democratic bloc must control them. Like Italy, Greece is a complete Mediterranean country. Scarcity of natural resources and materials, however, make Greece of no value in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean without outside aid; this despite the Greeks’ goodwill. General Yamut said we all know the Turkish situation. The Arab countries must be considered in regard to both the Mediterranean problem as well as the defense of Turkey. These countries form the hinterland for the easternmost coasts of the Mediterranean, but they change color with events. The security of Turkey and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean demands serious consideration of this area as far east as half-way into Iran. If the security of these countries is not guaranteed, they form a vacuum in defense plans. We must establish security in this area now. We can expect movement of communist forces at any time, south into India through Nepal. The Baku area in Russia supplies fuel for the motorized units of the Russian Army, and as a consequence, is vital to Russia. Loss of this area would paralyze Russia. Consequently, the Kurds, under communist direction, may assist in seizure of Azerbaijan area to provide Russia a buffer state south of this vital area. Also, Iraqian and Syrian Kurds may seize the area in the vicinity of the Mosul oil fields. Mr. Wadsworth inquired if General Yamut thought that the Turkish Kurds would participate in such seizure. General Yamut informed him that a small number near the border areas may participate, but for the most part those who did would be relatives of the Syrian and Iraqian Kurds, but even if they did, the number participating would be of no significance and are a Turkish problem. Egypt causes General Yamut anxiety as it does Marshal Tedder. Egypt must be considered in the Eastern Mediterranean defense problem. Left to itself, Egypt would see turmoil and uprisings. Bengazi and Tripolitania are stable countries whose people are reliable as fighters. When these two countries were part of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks considered the recruits from there separately from those of Egypt and treated them entirely differently. The people of Bengazi and Tripolitania have strong character and have always been friendly to Turkey. Their troops are most effective and their officers are excellent. Tunis, Algiers and Sfax, under control of the French, are unreliable. When the Greek Chief of Staff was here, General Yamut told him that Turkey and Greece should be considered as a whole from geographical and historical points of view. Due to the fact that the two countries are separated by the Aegean Sea, they can help each other at this time only by praying. Neither Greece nor Turkey can stop a concerted attack from Bulgaria on Grecian Thrace. Main Turkish, forces must be concentrated on the Anatolian side of the Straits. Neither can Greece maintain its forces in Grecian Thrace. General Yamut again talked to the Greek Chief of Staff before he left and told him that Turkey and Greece must be considered as one country as their destinies are bound together. Both Turkey and Greece are strong fortresses. Together they will make one very strong fortress. They must, however, complete arming and establish strong communications across the Aegean between the two countries. The fortress will be provided by Greece and Turkey, but the equipment, arms and required communications must be furnished by their strong allies. As strong as this mutual fortress will be, there is a weak wall on the Bulgarian frontier. A strong aggressive force, in one step, can reach Salonika. Furthermore, unless Yugoslavia is secured by the Democratic bloc, her frontiers with Greece must be considered weak. If Yugoslavia is secured, then Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey form the strongest defense force in the Eastern Mediterranean. The armies of these three countries have been tested often in the past. Against such a bloc, a Bulgarian or a Bulgarian-Roumanian attack will be of no significance. Security of Yugoslavia’s borders permits us to ignore Albania. Cyprus and Crete are included in the fortress. From naval and air force supply points of view, Crete and Cyprus are the most secure bases in the area. If Yugoslavia is secured, the three countries can produce a force of 50 to 60 divisions, more than all the NATO countries can produce at the moment. If the German Army can be utilized, the Democratic front will extend north from Yugoslavia’s eastern border to the Baltic. In that case, a balance of power between the Democratic and Communist blocs can be established in Europe. General Yamut said he knew the Germans well and has worked closely with them in the past. Seventy million Germans, armed or not armed, will eventually need room for expansion. If this population is confined, it will cause another explosion. If the Germans study the lessons of the past, they will try to expand to the East, not to the West. If armed now, the Germans will be of great use. 7. General Yamut said that the principal requirements for Turkey are being, and have been for some time, discussed by General Arnold and himself. Major requirements of the Turkish Army are for animals and tractors to move artillery, ammunition for arms of Turkish origin, assistance in manufacturing this type of ammunition or the need for replacement of those weapons. General Arnold told General Yamut then that we are requesting 3,000 light machine guns from the US and some equipment for the manufacture of .30 caliber ammunition. The light machine guns are being procured in the 1951 Program. Standardization of small arms was discussed, General Yamut feels that small arms should be standardized prior to manufacturing .30 caliber ammunition, while General Arnold explained phasing in the manufacture of .30 caliber ammunition while standardizing small arms over a period of time. With the information that 3,000 light machine guns had been requested, General Yamut stated that delivery of such would solve one-third of the problem of standardizing small arms. General Yamut said that he would like to discuss the small arms situation with General Arnold at some future time. 8. General Arnold told General Yamut that the ECA agricultural experts are conducting talks with the Minister of Agriculture in an attempt to persuade him to change the breeding plan from race horses to draft horses. Some of the major items included in the ‘52 Program were discussed and General Arnold said that we are attempting to repair the Skoda tractors which are in Turkey to place them in operation. A technical expert to survey military factories, with a view toward improving manufacturing methods, is due here now. We have been told that the Turkish Minister of State will release 7 million Turkish Lira in counterpart funds to the military factories for labor and materials. Mr. Wadsworth explained ECA assistance to the military factories and stated that the factories are ready to make things for the military as soon as the military tells them what they desire. General Arnold then informed General Yamut that ECA would soon provide an expert to assist in textile manufacturing. Mr. Wadsworth stated that General Arnold was making considerable progress in solving problems pertaining to animals, tractors and armaments. He desired that the Minister of National Defense know this and requested him to give thought to other improvements in which we can assist in future. 9. General Yamut then desired to talk about the Turkish Air Force. He said that they now have 281 light-bombers and fighters; some are British and some American; but duration of flight is rather short. Some of these aircraft are to be used in close support provided there is air superiority. In 1952 they are to receive 25 Jets. Gradually, by 1955, Jets are supposed to replace the present planes. If the Turks were provided with 300 Jets today, they would not have personnel trained to man them, and they also need longer fields for Jets which can be provided by the end of 1955. General Yamut then said if allies came today with Jets, airdromes are not available from which to operate. Consequently, we should expedite improvement of fields, not for Turkish planes but for the planes of Turkey’s allies. General Arnold stated that he believes some fields will be completed shortly as soon as current work now in progress is completed. General Yamut said that the Engineers have agreed to expedite completion of fields at Balikesir, Eskisehir and Diyarbakir. General Arnold said that Colonel Frye 7 has just returned from Washington where he had been in an attempt to expedite construction. General Yamut stated that he wished to express his great gratitude to the US experts, and to the Ambassador, who were trying so sincerely to help them in supplying and improving the Turkish Armed Forces. He stated, furthermore, that the Minister of National Defense joined him in this expression of gratitude and that his statements were made in the atmosphere of a family circle. The Minister of National Defense stated that the conference had investigated possibilities of increasing the effectiveness of the Turkish Armed Forces and mutual defenses. He thanked Mr. Wadsworth and General Arnold for providing them with that opportunity. Mr. Wadsworth expressed his appreciation for the conference, stating that it will be extremely helpful to him in his talks with Admiral Carney when the latter arrives. 10. The Ambassador said that he had talked with the Ministers of State and Foreign Affairs the evening previously in regard to the present budget studies. These studies have been conducted jointly by those Ministries and ECA. It appears to him that it is the first time that the Turkish authorities and ECA agree as to what the facts are. Mr. Wadsworth then made the point that if we know the facts, and those facts indicate that the Turks will have a minimum gap of 250 million Turkish Lira between expenditures and resources, then we have guidance which will assist in doing something about it. We have long needed the information concerning the 250 million lira gap; 80 million Turkish Lira is for the Ministry of National Defense and 40 to 60 million for Bulgarian refugees. He then explained how, with this information, we include in our programs items with a view toward liberating funds in the Turkish Budget for other purposes. He requested the Turks to expedite the list of items which we have requested and which must be imported and bought with foreign exchange. The Minister of National Defense said that we agree in principle and that he spoke to the Minister of State on the telephone just prior to coming to the conference, and the undersecretaries of the two Ministries would meet that afternoon to reach an understanding. 11. Mr. Wadsworth then stated that he had also discussed with the Foreign Minister the evening previously, replacements for the Turkish Brigade in Korea. He had heard from General Arnold that the Turkish military is quite willing and desirous of sending replacements, and that we have received a radio from General MacArthur 8 saying that he is most anxious to fill the ranks of all his units. To that end, a transport will be made available when the Turkish Government decides to send replacements, and that he had asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs if the government had taken, or is considering taking, action on the matter. The Foreign Minister had informed Mr. Wadsworth that the question had not yet been submitted to the government. Mr. Wadsworth gathered that the Foreign Minister felt that replacements for Korea was a problem that should first be discussed within the Party before taking it up with the Government, which in turn would decide whether or not it desirable to take the question to parliament. He was left with the impression that no decision will be taken in this matter for some time. He impressed upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, the urgency of the situation and requested that it receive serious consideration as early as possible. He told the Minister that he had no instructions from the US Government, but that he did know that the military people considered the matter urgent. He then requested the Minister of National Defense to press for an early decision. 12. Mr. Wadsworth referred to the recent conference 9 held on the Bosporous defenses and to the information obtained from General Arnold to the effect that General Yamut is submitting the problem of installation of a controlled mine field in the Bosporous to the Turkish Government. Mr. Wadsworth said he remembered his first conference with the present Minister of National Defense, the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister, at which the latter said, “We will lay those mines as soon as we get a proposal from the military”. The military has now submitted the proposal. He desired a decision on this matter, or at least a definite indication of the official government thought, by the 8th of January 1951 to assist him in his talks with Admiral Carney. 13. The Minister of National Defense said that the replacements to Korea is a political problem now. The Prime Minister has informed him that there is no doubt that the Turks will keep their promise and send replacements, but that he felt the Turkish people must first realize that the US appreciates the Turkish sacrifices and that the Americans are making similar sacrifices. Mr. Wadsworth informed the Minister of National Defense that he had never seen such unanimity of high praise as that of the Americans for the Turkish Brigade in Korea. American casualties in the Korean war, he pointed out, have been proportionately higher than those of the Turks. The Minister of National Defense said that in addition to material help, Turkey must have greater and closer cooperation with the United States before they can act. Mr. Wadsworth then reviewed the steps which must be taken by the Turks before they could be included for consideration in the overall Atlantic defense. He stated that the reason that he was trying to give an answer then was because he had heard that argument before. He said that there are no two countries in the world today in greater harmony in their thinking and implementation of defense matters than America and Turkey. The Minister of National Defense said that these relations would be valuable in the future. Mr. Wadsworth agreed but reminded the Minister of National Defense that in the matter of replacements for the Brigade in Korea, it will take 25 days for a transport to reach here, following a decision by the Turkish Government to send replacements. As soldiers, Turkey has gained great support in the United States and as soldiers we want this prestige to continue. The Minister of National Defense said that he would convey the urgency of his American friends regarding the sending of replacements for troops in Korea to his government. He would also take up with the government the problem of the controlled mine field. The decision of his government regarding the laying of a controlled mine field will be conveyed to General Arnold through General Yamut. At 1407 the conference adjourned. Delk M. Oden Lt. Colonel, USA 1 Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Lord Tedder, British Member on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council. 2 Gen. Paul H. R. Ely, French Member on the Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Council. 3 Brig. Gen. Robert F. Tate, Chief of the U.S. Air Force Group, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey. 4 Maj. Gen. Vernon Evans, Chief of the U.S. Military Mission With the Iranian Army. 5 Maj. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Aid Group to Greece. 6 Vice Adm. John J. Ballentine, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet. 7 Lt. Col. Arthur H. Frye, Jr., Chief of the United States Engineer Group, Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey. 8 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. 9 The conference under reference was held on December 14; see paragraph 2 of telegram 422, January 12, 1951, from Ankara, infra . The Ambassador in Turkey (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State 882.25/1–1251: Telegram [Document 753] The Ambassador in Turkey ( Wadsworth ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority Ankara , January 12, 1951—4 p. m. 422. 1. By way of comment on first paragraph Deptel 318 December 19 General Arnold and I have never believed Turks were dragging their feet but rather, as reported in last sentence Embtel 326, December 1, felt that move should come from our side. 2. On December 14 Turkish and US military experts had full discussion Bosporus defense problems. On subordinate question of controlled mines US experts calculated 18 months for completion project. Turk Chief of Staff undertook solicit government approval for laying minefield leaving 200 yard gap for ship channel. 3. On December 23 I asked Minister National Defense let me have at least indication Turkish Government thinking on subject before arrival Admiral Carney January 10. 4. On January 10, when calling with Admiral Minister informed me question had two aspects: Military and politcal. On military side there was full agreement on desirability lay mines. For exposition political considerations he asked me call on Foreign Minister. 5. On January 11 I called on Foreign Minister who said governments primary political interest in matter was that such action as it might take be irrefutably correct and consistent with its obligations under Montreux Convention. British aide-mémoire 1 he said was definitely, perhaps intentionally equivocal; and Great Britain was signatory of that convention. He felt this aspect should be forth-rightly cleared up by British; but, in view my inquiry of Minister National Defense and favorable recommendation general staff, he would submit matter to next cabinet meeting. 6. I then asked Foreign Minister his view re probable Soviet reaction if project implemented (second paragraph Deptel 318 December 19). He replied that Moscow might be expected charge violation Montreux Convention with view to reopening question its revision. That was, he concluded, strong reason “for being sure we are clearly in the right”. Embassy believes, if project pushed by US, that Turkish Government might well exploit any resulting Soviet hostility to urge need for US security commitment (re Deptel 339, January 8). 2 Further comment by despatch. 3 Dept pass Moscow its discretion. Wadsworth 1 Dated June 19; enclosure to despatch 113, August 29, from Ankara, 681.8229/8–2950, not printed. 2 Not printed. 3 Despatch 385, January 17, 1951, from Ankara reported that Faik Zihni Akdur, Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “has advised Foreign Minister Köprülü to ‘go slow’ on the project for mining the Straits. … Further … he has advised his Government to prepare the necessary groundwork and installations, to train the personnel required, and to stock mines in Turkey for eventual use. He believes that mines should not be laid before ‘zero hour’, and that, when the decision to lay the mines is taken, no announcement should be made. … he feels that the Russians are now more nervous than many people realize, and might easily go off half-cocked if faced with a confused pattern of tensions which they have not expected nor prepared for. For the moment, until the Far Eastern crisis has evolved into something more predictable, we would be well advised, he thinks, to refrain from any action which might produce a potentially discordant note.” (681.8229/1–1751) Agreement between the United States and Turkey Agreement between the United States and Turkey [For text of Protocol signed at Ankara January 31, 1950, entered into force on that date, see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), volume 1, page 188.] Relations of the United States with Yemen Relations of the United States with Yemen [754] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Frederick H. Awalt of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] December 22, 1949. 786H.02/1–1450 [755] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President Washington, January 12, 1950. 786H.02/1–1450 [756] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia and Minister to Yemen (Childs) Washington, February 11, 1950—2 p. m. 786H.02/2–1150: Telegram [757] Editorial Note Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Frederick H. Awalt of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 786H.02/1–1450 [Document 754] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Frederick H. Awalt of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs restricted [ Washington ,] December 22, 1949. Subject: 1. U.S. Recognition of Yemen 2. Yemeni Claim to Shabwa Participants: Qadi Mohamed ibn Abdullah al-Amri, Yemeni Minister of State, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Yemeni Delegation to UN Abdullah A. al-Erian, interpreter (an Egyptian student) R. A. Hare, NEA 1 H. B. Clark—ANE 2 F. H. Await—ANE Problem: 1. Endeavor to overcome the impasse reached in April 1948 when we failed to receive assurances which we had requested that the Yemeni Government would observe its international obligations. 2. Attitude to be taken toward Yemeni observations on the dispute with the British over territory in the Shabwa area. Action Required: 1. Draft message to Yemen extending recognition. 2. Definition of attitude toward Yemeni claims. Action Assigned to: ANE Summary: Qadi Mohamed al-Amri called on Mr. Hare today at 2:30 by appointment made at Yemeni request Tuesday, December 20. After exchanging generalities regarding UN, Qadi Mohamed expressed his gratitude for the hospitality rendered him and his delegation in New York which he considered a mark of the cordiality of spirit existing between the United States and Yemen. He added that Yemen longed to strengthen the relations between our two countries. Mr. Hare reciprocated these sentiments and asked if there was any new development in this connection. Qadi Mohamed stated that Yemen respected the attitude of the United States on recognition, but it considered the United States a sympathetic nation from whom more cooperation could be expected than from others. It was therefore difficult in the Yemeni view to rationalize the fact that we attached conditions to our recognition, as no other state had made that a requirement in recognizing the Government of Imam Ahmed. Mr. Clark observed that it was customary for us to do so and that it had happened twice in respect to Syria within the year. Qadi Mohamed pointed out that in Syria new governments had come into power, while in Yemen Imam Ahmed’s Government was a continuation of his father’s and was subject to the same internal and external obligations as that of Imam Yahya. Mr. Hare inquired why, if the Government of the Yemen did in fact recognize its international obligations, it should be hesitant so to state. Qadi Mohamed explained that it was largely a matter of pride and personal feelings of the Imam, but he reiterated that his Government did in fact recognize its international obligations and that he wished so to state. Mr. Hare then asked if Qadi Mohamed was speaking in a personal capacity or on behalf of his Government. Qadi Mohamed replied that he was speaking officially and under Government authorization. Mr. Hare emphasized the importance of the statement made and said he wished to make its official character clear beyond any doubt in order that it might not be challenged in the future. Specifically, he stated that it would be the intention of the Department to make reference to this statement of Qadi Mohamed in such message of recognition as might be sent to the Government of Yemen, and also to make it a matter of official record in the Department. Qadi Mohamed re-emphasized his authority to make the statement and said he would confirm to his Government that he had made it as directed. ( Note: In anticipation that the Yemeni representative might intend to give oral assurances of his Government’s recognition of its international obligations, prior advice had been secured from L regarding the acceptability of an oral statement. It was the opinion of L that a clear oral statement did in fact constitute adequate assurance.) In discussing the best means of completing recognition, Qadi Mohamed hoped that we would send telegraphic advice to his Government, to be followed later by a document presented by an official visitor. He expressed his gratitude for our friendly attitude and explained his country’s previous reluctance to give assurances as oriental skepticism of wordly affairs with which it had had too brief an association. On our part, Mr. Hare expressed our satisfaction and assured Qadi Mohamed that recognition has never been a question of substance, but was a problem of procedure only. A second subject was broached by Qadi Mohamed embracing the Wendell Phillips 3 expedition into the Shabwa area. He said that his Government had recently declared an open-door policy to oil company exploration in Yemen, preferably by American oil companies. He added that there was likewise no objection to scientific expeditions. In either case, however, he said Yemen should be consulted and its permission obtained. Shabwa and adjoining areas, he stated, are in dispute with the British and the issue has not been settled. 4 Yemen wants an amicable settlement, but the British authorities have undertaken unilateral and unfriendly action by having bombed an objective there. Such actions, he observed, are obstacles to the friendship Yemen desired to maintain with the British and Yemen may be forced to submit the case to the Security Council if a peaceful settlement cannot be made. Mr. Hare said that we appreciated his views, that we were sorry to hear of differences separating two friends, and that we hoped the U.K. and Yemen could settle their difficulties as friends without recourse elsewhere. 1 Raymond Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. On August 28, 1950, the White House announced the appointment of Hare as the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Minister to Yemen. 2 Harlan B. Clark, Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria-Iraq Affairs. 3 Wendell Phillips was an American archeologist who was planning to pass through the Shabwa area with an expedition and had received permission from the British authorities in Aden to do so. He had not contacted Yemen for permission. A memorandum from Await to Hare, dated December 20, 1949, not printed, reported a note had been drafted, but not yet cleared, to be delivered orally by the United States Delegate to the United Nations to the Yemeni; Delegation to the United Nations in New York, advising that Phillips had been informed of the views of the Government of Yemen. (McGhee files, lot 53D468) Lot 53D468 contains copies of memoranda and correspondence of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs George C. McGhee for the years 1949–1951. 4 Representatives of Yemen and the United Kingdom met in London between August and October 1950, and set up a fact-finding ‘commission to look into the boundary dispute over Shabwa, a part of the Eastern Aden Protectorate claimed by both countries. (Policy statement on Yemen dated February 8, 1951, 611.86H/2–851. This policy statement will be included in the documentation on Yemen scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations .) Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 786H.02/1–1450 [Document 755] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 1 confidential Washington , January 12, 1950. Subject: Recognition of Imam Ahmed of Yemen The United States recognized the Kingdom of Yemen on March 4, 1946 2 and concluded an Agreement of Commerce and Friendship with that country on May 4 3 of the same year. You will recall your talk with Prince Abdullah, the fifth son of the late Imam Yahya, on July 16, 1947, 4 when he visited this country. The late Imam Yahya, who had ruled Yemen since 1904, was assassinated on February 17, 1948. 5 After a short period of civil war his oldest son, Prince Ahmed, who had been designated as Crown Prince by the Imam, was elected as his successor. On April 21, 1948 6 you addressed a message to Imam Ahmed offering United States recognition upon receiving his assurances that his Government would respect the international obligations assumed by his father, Imam Yahya, including the United States-Yemeni Agreement of Commerce and Friendship. Imam Ahmed failed to reply. He felt such assurances unnecessary because he considered his succession to all Yemen’s obligations was automatic when he ascended the throne. Our recognition has, therefore, been delayed. On December 22 the Yemeni Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief Delegate to the United Nations, Qadi Mohamed Ibn Abdullah al-Amri, called at the Department of State and gave the necessary assurances orally and officially on behalf of his Government. 7 There is now no obstacle to United States recognition of Yemen. Accordingly, if you perceive no objection, I propose to send Imam Ahmed the attached message. [Enclosure] Proposed Message To Be Delivered to the Imam Ahmed of Yemen by the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Minister to Yemen ( Childs ) 8 I wish to express the satisfaction of the United States Government for the oral assurances regarding Yemen’s observance of its international obligations extended on the authority of the Government of Imam Ahmed of Yemen and expressed by His Excellency Qadi Mohamed Ibn Abdulla al-Amri to the Department of State on December 22. I am accordingly authorized by President Truman to advise His Majesty that United States recognition of the Government of Yemen is now accomplished. This occasion affords great satisfaction to the United States Government as a step promoting friendship and increasingly close relations between Yemen and the United States. 1 A handwritten note on the memorandum read: “Approved 1/14/50 Harry Truman.” 2 Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. vii , p. 924 . 3 For the text of the treaty, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1535; United Nations Treaty Series, vol. iv , p. 165; or 60 Stat. 1782. 4 Documentation on Prince Abdullah’s visit is in Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v , p. 1344 . 5 A memorandum of conversation by Richard Sanger, Assistant Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, dated May 10, 1949, not printed, contains a report of the assassination of the Imam Yahya, and the civil war following it (McGhee files, lot 53D468). 6 An unnumbered telegram, April 17, 1948, from Washington, not printed, instructed the Legation in Jidda to transmit a message from President Truman to Imam Ahmed of Yemen. The message read, in part, “I would be grateful for assurances that Yemen will carry out international obligations assumed by your father including the US-Yemeni Agreement of Commerce and Friendship signed at Sana on May 4, 1946. On receipt of such assurances the recognition of Your Majesty, which I so earnestly desire, will have been accomplished.” (786H.02/1–1450) 7 Memorandum of conversation, supra . 8 Telegram 21, January 19, to Jidda, not printed, instructed the Embassy to transmit the message to the Foreign Minister of Yemen (786H.02/1–1950). Telegram 14, February 8, from Aden, not printed, reported a first-person note from J. Rives Childs had been delivered on February 7 to the representative of Yemen in Aden, since the Foreign Minister was absent from Yemen at the time (786H.02/2–850). A copy of telegram 21 was then enclosed in a letter from Burton Y. Berry, Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, to Al-Amri on February 9 (786H.02/2–950). The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia and Minister to Yemen (Childs) 786H.02/2–1150: Telegram [Document 756] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia and Minister to Yemen ( Childs ) 1 confidential Washington , February 11, 1950—2 p. m. 53. Deptel 21 Jan 19. 2 In view recent recognition Yemen Govt Dept desires early estab friendly relations with Imam Ahmed and Yemeni Govt officials. US officials last visited Yemen 1947. Additional visit desirable soonest. Dept suggests you plan visit before commencing anticipated discussions with SAG re DAB 3 beginning in Apr. McGhee agreeable to extend his stay in your area 4 for purpose accompanying you to Yemen, if you consider desirable and if visit wld not require too much time. Dept understands Fr, Ital and Dutch Mins plan visit Yemen 1950 (A–499 Dec 27 5 ). Brit recently informed Dept strong effort wld shortly be made improve Brit relations with Yemen, probably including appt of Trott as Min with residence at Jidda and visit to Yemen this year. Dept considers ur appt as Min Yemen still in effect 6 and new credence ltrs unnecessary. However, Dept wld comply if Imam requested but hopes his response ur note seeking entry and audience will not raise question. Dept suggests appropriate officers from Emb Jidda and Con Aden shld also accompany you for purpose attaining objectives Commercial Consular Mission as stated Deptel 194 May 23. 5 Pls comment. 7 Acheson 1 Repeated to Aden. 2 Not printed, but see footnote 8, supra . 3 For documentation on the discussions concerning Dhahran Airbase, see pp. 1112 [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] ff. 4 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, George McGhee, was in Saudi Arabia from March 16 to March 24, following a tour of African countries. Information on his visit to Saudi Arabia is on pp. 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] ff. Regarding his African trip, see the editorial note, p. 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] . There is no evidence that he visited Yemen on his trip. 5 Not printed. 6 Childs presented his letters of credence as first U.S. Minister to Yemen on September 30, 1946; see note 14 to telegram 69, September 17, 1946, from Jidda, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. vii , p. 926 . 5 Not printed. 7 In telegram 219, April 18, from Jidda, not printed, Childs reported on a visit he made to Yemen, April 8–16. He told the Imam and other officials that the U.S. Government would welcome the establishment of some form of diplomatic representation in Washington by the Government of Yemen. (786H.02/4–1850) Editorial Note [Document 757] Editorial Note On April 15 Yemen officially requested a loan from the Export-Import Bank to finance construction of a port at Hodeida and a road from Hodeida to the capital at San’a. The Chairman of the Board of the Bank informed officers of the Department of State that the Bank was reluctant to make a loan to Yemen because of a requirement that loans had to be closely related to the ability to repay in dollars. Telegram 148, October 31, from Washington to Jidda, informed the Embassy that the Export-Import Bank was not prepared to consider an application from the Kingdom of Yemen at that time because of a lack of technical and economic surveys of the characteristics of the economy of Yemen, and studies of the repayment prospects of the loan. (886H.10/10–3150) Information on this topic is in Department of State files 103–XMB, 886H.10, and 886H.2612. On June 11 the Foreign Minister of Yemen wrote to Childs to request aid for Yemen under the Point IV Program. He listed technical assistance in agriculture and health as two important fields in which the country needed help. A reply from the Embassy, dated July 31, explained that Congress had approved the Point IV Program but had not yet voted funds for it. Copies of the two notes were transmitted to the Department of State as enclosures to despatch 3, Yemen series, August 2, from Jidda. (886H.00–TA/8–250) In despatch 10, Yemen series, October 14, from Jidda, Charge Hill enclosed a copy of the Embassy’s note of September 28 to the Foreign Minister of Yemen. He informed Abdullah that the President had signed the appropriation bill for the Point IV Technical Assistance Program for the fiscal year 1951 and explained the procedure for Yemen to use in requesting aid. (886H.00–TA/10–1450) The Point IV allocation for Yemen for fiscal year 1951 was $50,000, but the amount could not be allocated until an agreement between the two countries was signed. The Department of State sent a draft of a Point IV Agreement between the United States and Yemen for use by the Officer in Charge in negotiating an agreement with the Government of Yemen, to the Embassy at Jidda, attached to instruction number 18, dated November 2. The original draft was then revised during discussions from December 4 to December 7 between members; of the Yemeni Delegation to the United Nations and officers of the Department of State in Washington and sent to the American Consulate in Aden in an unnumbered instruction dated December 26. Despatch 108, February 10, 1951, from Aden, contains an account of a visit to Yemen from December 11, 1950, to January 9, 1951, by L. Pittman Springs, American Consul in Aden, to initiate negotiations on a technical cooperation agreement. (886H.00–TA/2–1051) The negotiations were not concluded at that time, and further details will appear in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations . Information on this topic is in Department of State files 786H.00, 886H.00, and 886H.00–TA and the McGhee files, lot 53D468. South Asia South Asia Contents Efforts to resolve the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (Documents 758-814) Interest of the United States in preserving peaceful relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding jurisdiction over the North-West Frontier Province and the Tribal Areas (Documents 815-823) Interest of the United States in resolving the dispute between Afghanistan and Iran over distribution of the waters of the Helmand River (Documents 824-824) Relations of the United States with India (Documents 825-835) Agreements between the United States and India Policy of the United States with respect to Nepal (Documents 836-836) Policy of the United States with respect to Pakistan (Documents 837-839) Agreements between the United States and Pakistan Efforts to resolve the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir Efforts to resolve the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir 1 1 For previous documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1686 ff. [758] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, January 5, 1950—5:30 p. m. 357.AB/1–550: Telegram [759] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 6, 1950. 690D.91/1–650 [760] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 6, 1950—6 p. m. 690D.91/1–650: Telegram [761] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) [Washington,] January 13, 1950—10 a. m. 357.AB/1–1350: Telegram [762] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, January 13, 1950—2:13 p. m. 857.AB/1–1350: Telegram [763] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, January 16, 1950—1:18 p. m. 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [764] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, January 16, 1950—2 p. m. 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [765] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, January 16, 1950—6:33 p. m. 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [766] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, January 17, 1950—3 p. m. 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [767] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, January 25, 1950—3 p. m. 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [768] The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State New York, January 27, 1950—7:17 p. m. 357.AB/1–2750: Telegram [769] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) and the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] February 6, 1950. 357.AB/2–650 [770] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, February 11, 1950—4 p. m. 357.AB/2–1150: Telegram [771] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India Washington, February 11, 1950—4 p. m. 357.AB/2–1150: Telegram [772] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, February 13, 1950—5 p. m. 357.AB/2–1350: Telegram [773] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, February 18, 1950—3 p. m. 357.AB/2–1850: Telegram [774] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, February 20, 1950—5 p. m. 357.AB/2–1850: Telegram [775] The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State New York, February 23, 1950—7:10 p. m. 357.AB/2–2350: Telegram [776] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, February 24, 1950—4 p. m. 690D.91/2–2450: Telegram [777] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil) [Washington,] March 6, 1950. 357.AB/3–650 [778] The Chargé in Pakistan (Wolf) to the Secretary of State Karachi, March 23, 1950—3 p. m. 690D.91/3–2350: Telegram [779] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, March 24, 1950—7 p. m. 690D.91/3–2450: Telegram [780] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State Karachi, March 24, 1950—10 p. m. 690D.91/3–2450: Telegram [781] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, March 25, 1950—noon. 690D.91/3–2550: Telegram [782] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State Karachi, March 25, 1950—2 p. m. 690D.91/3–2550: Telegram [783] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, March 27, 1950—2 p. m. 690D.91/3–2750: Telegram [784] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, March 27, 1950—4 p. m. 690D.91/3–2750: Telegram [785] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, March 27, 1950—7 p. m. 690D.91/3–2750: Telegram [786] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, March 28, 1950—4 p. m. 791.00/3–2850: Telegram [787] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) New Delhi, March 28, 1950—6 p. m. 690D.91/3–2850: Telegram [788] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] March 28, 1950. 357.AB/3–2850 [789] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India Washington, March 31, 1950—7 p. m. 690D.91/3–3150: Telegram [790] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, April 8, 1950—7 p. m. 690D.91/4–850: Telegram [791] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India Washington, April 18, 1950—5 p. m. 690D.91/4–1850: Telegram [792] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, May 5, 1950—7 p. m. 690D.91/5–550: Telegram [793] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India Washington, May 9, 1950—7 p. m. 690D.91/5–550: Telegram [794] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State Washington, June 2, 1950—9 a. m. 357.AB/6–250: Telegram [795] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] June 15, 1950. 690D.91/6–1550 [796] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State Karachi, July 25, 1950—11 p. m. 690D.91/7–2550: Telegram [797] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, July 29, 1950—10 a. m. 357.AB/7–2950: Telegram [798] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State Karachi, August 4, 1950—7 p. m. 690D.91/8–450: Telegram [799] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, August 11, 1950—9 a. m. 357.AB/8–1150: Telegram [800] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State Karachi, August 13, 1950—7 p. m. 690D.91/8–1350: Telegram [801] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Embassy in India Karachi, August 15, 1950—3 p. m. 690D.91/8–1550: Telegram [802] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State Karachi, August 21, 1950—7 p. m. 690D.91/8–2150: Telegram [803] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, August 24, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AB/8–2450: Telegram [804] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, August 25, 1950—3 p. m. 690D.91/8–2550: Telegram [805] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, August 28, 1950—3 p. m. 690D.91/8–2850: Telegram [806] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State Karachi, August 30, 1950—3 p. m. 357.AB/8–3050: Telegram [807] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, September 22, 1950—8 p. m. 357.AB/9–2250: Telegram [808] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) [Washington,] September 25, 1950. 357.AB/9–2550 [809] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, September 29, 1950—noon. 690D.91/9–2950: Telegram [810] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] November 17, 1950. 357.AB/11–1750 [811] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs [Washington,] November 17, 1950. 357.AB/11–1750 [812] Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs [Washington,] December 15, 1950. 357.AB/12–1550 [813] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, December 20, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AB/12–2050: Telegram [814] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, December 27, 1950—2 p. m. 357AB/12–2250: Telegram The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/1–550: Telegram [Document 758] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State secret priority New York , January 5, 1950—5:30 p. m. 7. USUN considers it might be desirable and helpful to give our present estimate situation of Kashmir case. Up to expiration McNaughton 2 presidency SC our policy has been to support McNaughton’s efforts reach basis for agreed solution. 3 In our discussions with GOI and GOP representatives we have insistently urged that no door be closed until solution reached and that both parties continue seek McNaughton’s assistance. Our rationale of importance latter point is two-fold: (1) no preferable alternative to McNaughton’s continued efforts is in sight, and (2) repudiation by either party of McNaughton would signify disastrous breakdown of genuine efforts of parties to reach solution. Difficulty present situation however is based upon doubts as to McNaughton’s availability for future assistance. Such doubts flow from at least three sources, (1) expiration of McNaughton’s presidency and necessity for affirmative SC action to revive and define his mandate, (2) McNaughton’s personal feeling that he should not waste his ripe maturity in useless efforts and therefore would insist upon some token of both parties’ willingness to “be reasonable” and (3) attitude of GOI toward principle upon which McNaughton proposals 4 were based, this last point being closely related to McNaughton’s personal feelings. Two principal tactical alternatives seem now to present themselves (1) discussion of Kashmir case in SC, (2) suspension discussions SC in favor of Commonwealth discussions at Colombo. 5 Attitude of British and Canadians toward foregoing alternatives follows. British Foreign Office appears to favor first alternative ostensibly on basis that GOI might be impressed by SC forensics. Other possible Foreign Office reason, not expressed, is desire to keep Colombo Commonwealth conference sweet by avoiding necessity of having Kashmir dispute discussed on Colombo agenda. Canadian delegation here without McNaughton feels SC discussion of case might better be postponed until after Colombo conference on theory that intervention of Commonwealth members at Colombo might make helpful contribution to SC efforts towards solution which would be continued after conference. Furthermore, Canadians here at loss to see how chasm between two parties’ positions can be bridged here without important modification of stand by one or both. USUN view is that second alternative is preferable. Our view based on two primary considerations: (1) SC discussions would involve public position-taking by parties which would pour their divergent views in concrete; (2) Colombo offers opportunity for Commonwealth “family” discussion at which leading Commonwealth figures will be present, particularly Pearson. 6 At this stage, in view of doubts concerning McNaughton’s status (see above) and for other reasons as well, Pearson’s active intervention with Nehru 7 in Colombo seems to us highly desirable. In fact, from worm’s-eye view of mission, continuation of Canadian efforts starting with Pearson in Colombo seems now best hope of peaceful solution of dispute. This of course means resumption by McNaughton of mediation efforts upon return to New York, subject to coordinating orders from Pearson, and continuation for the present of our attitude of impartiality. If we are correct, Kashmir case for the moment has moved from mission level to government level. We are not informed concerning Pearson’s intention and Canadian delegation here advises he has “no fixed plans” in this connection. We recommend that Department consider advisability ascertaining without delay Pearson’s plans in this regard and urging him to get in and consult with parties at Colombo. It also seems clear to us that US Government must decide in light of broadest political considerations if and when it would desire SC tighten vise on India. We feel that this would not be advisable at least before Colombo effort made. Thereafter SC position would be assessed in light of Colombo development. Austin 2 Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton of Canada, President of the United Nations Security Council during the month of December 1949. 3 Much of the documentation on the Kashmir dispute is printed in the official records of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. A general survey of Security Council action on Kashmir in 1950 is printed in the United Nations, Year Book of the United Nations, 1950 , pp. 304–313 ff. Documentation including reports of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan and the U.N. Representative for India and Pakistan, the Security Council Resolution of March 14, 1950, and a summary of the mediation efforts of the President of the Security Council, is printed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 2 ( A/1361 ), Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly ( Covering the Period From 16 July 1949 to 15 July 1950 ), hereafter cited as GA (V), Suppl. No. 2 . The Security Council report for the subsequent period, July 16, 1950, to July 15, 1951, is printed in the Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 2 ( A/1873 ), hereafter cited as GA (VI), Suppl. No. 2 . The verbatim minutes of Security Council meetings involving the Kashmir dispute in December 1949 and in 1950 are printed in United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, Nos. 53, 54 and Fifth Year, Nos. 5–13 . See also United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1948, 1949, and 1950. 4 For draft text of the proposal presented by McNaughton to the Indian and Pakistani Delegations at the United Nations December 22, 1949, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. vi , p. 1764 . A copy of the proposal was distributed to members of the Security Council as a conference room paper and was not published as a Council document. 5 Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers at Colombo, Ceylon, January 9–14, 1950. 6 Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. 7 Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 690D.91/1–650 [Document 759] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State confidential [ Washington ,] January 6, 1950. Subject: The Kashmir Controversy Participants: The Secretary Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan Minister of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Mr. Mohammed Ali, Secretary General, Government of Pakistan Mr. T. Eliot Weil, SOA Sir Zafrullah, accompanied by Mr. Mohammed Ali, called on me at 2:30 p. m. Sir Zafrullah said the Kashmir question had again become “stuck” at the UN; 1 that General McNaughton had made an effort to settle the matter, and that while Pakistan had in effect accepted his proposals, the Indians had offered amendments which were to all intents and purposes a rejection of these proposals. Sir Zafrullah said he questioned whether General McNaughton would be willing to continue efforts at mediation unless the new Security Council gave him a specific directive. Sir Zafrullah said he had come, “almost desperately”, to seek advice and guidance. He said the people of Pakistan were becoming increasingly impatient over failure to settle the Kashmir controversy and he did not know how much longer they would control this impatience. I asked Sir Zafrullah for his views as to how a solution might be found. Sir Zafrullah replied that the framework already existed; that the resolutions of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, 2 had been accepted by both Governments, and that it was now merely a question of implementing these; but that the Indian Government was unwilling to accept conditions which would allow the Plebiscite Administrator 3 to take over. He said continued delay in settling the controversy was in some ways embarrassing to both countries, but that on the whole it was probably advantageous to India. He said it would be impossible to reach an equitable settlement merely by giving in to Indian demands, and that a solution should be sought within the framework of the UN proposals. I indicated to Sir Zafrullah that it was our hope that the negotiations would continue under General McNaughton and said it occurred to me that General McNaughton might either endeavor to effect a settlement of all outstanding issues or devise machinery for bringing about agreement. I also suggested that if General McNaughton failed in a new effort, he might make a full report to the Security Council in which he would point out areas of agreement and obstacles raised by one party or the other. Sir Zafrullah agreed that either of these two methods would be worth trying and said he felt that it was particularly important that in case of failure of the negotiations General McNaughton report details to the Security Council. Sir Zafrullah said he felt the prospect of such publicity might induce more nearly reasonable attitudes than attempts at mediation which were not reported to the Security Council. I remarked it was my understanding that the thorniest problem was the question of demilitarization. Mr. Mohammed Ali and Sir Zafrullah both agreed. Sir Zafrullah pointed out that the Indians had not only maneuvered in such a way as to prevent withdrawal of their troops from Kashmir, but had also demanded that their troops be stationed in the northern areas. I told Sir Zafrullah I felt we should consider the possibility of instructing our UN Delegation to request the Security Council to authorize General McNaughton to continue talks in New York and instructed Mr. Weil to follow up this matter in order that something might be worked out before the Council meets on January 10. As Sir Zafrullah and Mohammed Ali were about to leave, I remarked that the Kashmir case was indeed puzzling and that our Government fully appreciated its serious implications. I told Sir Zafrullah it was most helpful to have his views. 1 Zafrulla Khan had been leading the Pakistan Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly in recent months. 2 For texts of these resolutions and related documentation, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for November 1948 , pp. 32–49, 94–107, and 129–138; Fourth Year, Supplement for January 1949 , pp. 23–26; and Fourth Year, Special Supplement No . 7. For related documentation, see Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , Part 1, pp. 265 ff. and ibid. , 1949, vol. vi , pp. 1686 ff. 3 Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, U.S.N. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 690D.91/1–650: Telegram [Document 760] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret Washington , January 6, 1950—6 p. m. 59. Pls have FonOff deliver the fol personal message from the Secretary to Mr. Bevin: 2 “I have been gravely troubled by Patel’s 3 statement of Jan 4 that the relations between India and Pak have become so strained that they are capable of provoking war. Coming as they do in the midst of an economic war between the two Dominions and the lack of progress in current efforts to reach a solution in the Kashmir dispute, Patel’s words may have a prophetic ring. As you know, General McNaughton has been doing his best by direct talks in New York to bring the parties together on a preliminary agreement which will lay the basis for a final solution in Kashmir. Despite his earnest efforts, he has not so far been able to make much headway although Pak has proved more cooperative than India, and it looks now as though some additional impetus is necessary to remove the obstacles to the successful continuation of the mediatory efforts. It is unthinkable that these two members of the Commonwealth shld reach a stalemate in negotiations when both parties have agreed on the ultimate objective that the fate of Kashmir shall depend upon the freely expressed will of the people. I would strongly urge therefore that you take the opportunity provided by the Colombo Conference 4 to have a thorough discussion of the problem with both sides and use your influence to bring the Indians to a full realization of the necessity of continuing negotiations on a real give and take basis until a satisfactory solution is reached. I am seeing Mrs. Pandit and Bajpai 5 on Monday and shall emphasize this point to them. Because of Mr. Pearson’s prior efforts in this direction and General McNaughton’s able contribution I am sending a similar message to Mr. Pearson.” 6 Acheson 1 This telegram was repeated as 5 to USUN, 3 to Ottawa, 12 to New Delhi, 9 to Karachi, 8 to Colombo, 48 to Paris, and 12 to Moscow. 2 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 3 Speech by the Indian Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, before an estimated 30,000 persons in Bombay. 4 Secretary of State Acheson apparently received Austin’s telegram 7 of January 5 and the UNA draft of this message to Bevin too late to introduce the USUN thoughts regarding Colombo into his conversation with Zafrulla Khan and Mohammed Ali. 5 Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Indian Ambassador in the United States; Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General, Indian Ministry of External Affairs. 6 This message was forwarded to Bevin at Colombo, Ceylon, by the British Foreign Office on January 7. The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 357.AB/1–1350: Telegram [Document 761] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) 1 secret urgent priority [ Washington ,] January 13, 1950—10 a. m. 9. For Austin. I saw Ind Amb and Bajpai Jan 9. Bajpai reiterated Ind view that Ind and Pak positions on Azad forces and northern areas irreconcilable and that McNaughton can do nothing further. He said that case shld be returned SC which shld hear both parties and decide next step. He thinks this shld be appointment mediator or mediators to go to subcontinent with broad terms reference solve whole problem. Terms reference shld be broad enough include Ind idea of partition with plebiscite in Vale which Bajpai again developed but said this new approach cld not be adopted quickly as public opinion subcontinent not prepared. He apparently envisages protracted period mediation which wld lead eventually to partition proposal. I said we wld give consideration his views. Pls ask Bajpai call on you soonest and convey my views as fols: 1. After careful consideration I have concluded serious deterioration Indo-Pakistan relations requires earlier visible progress toward Kashmir settlement than he envisages. Most reassuring move for people of subcontinent and for world opinion wld be agreement on program for demilitarization Kashmir. SC appointment mediator without concomitant agreement demilitarization wld contribute little or nothing to removing fears or lessening tension. 2. I consider it essential that discussions with McNaughton be continued in NY until agreement reached. In my opinion proposals which McNaughton has put forward afford realistic approach to problem at this stage and practicable bases for further negot. According info available here, Ind reply these proposals contains nothing new and moves away from rather than toward settlement. From motives friendship and good will I urge reconsideration by GOI. 3. If McNaughton efforts fail owing Ind rejection, will be third consecutive time Ind has refused accept findings impartial UN agent. Pak however accepted UNCIP arbitration recommendation and we understand has accepted proposals McNaughton has put forward. In these circumstances if Ind shld terminate McNaughton’s efforts, we wld support in the SC his present proposals or such further proposals as he might put forward as a consequence of subsequent discussions with the parties and wld in light his recommendations support SC action necessary to overcome present deadlock. FYI and for discussion McNaughton ur discretion, I see no reason why McNaughton cannot continue explore combination partition and plebiscite possibilities with parties. Altho US does not propose such a course we wld of course have no objection if agreed to by both parties. McNaughton is extending general good offices and is at liberty pursue any approach which appears to him offer hope of compromise and settlement. Acheson 1 Repeated to New Delhi 34, Karachi 22, Colombo 21, and London 151. The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 857.AB/1–1350: Telegram [Document 762] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State secret priority New York , January 13, 1950—2:13 p. m. 30. At 12:30 p. m. today Ambassador Gross 1 and I called upon Madame Pandit and Sir Girja Bajpai to deliver the message from the Secretary, contained in Deptel 9, January 13. I said that I was glad of the opportunity to see Madame Pandit on the eve of her departure for India (she leaves at 3:00 p. m., this afternoon, January 13). I said that I had received instructions from the Department about an hour before to convey to Sir Girja the views of the Secretary of State on the Kashmir matter. I said that I thought that the clearest manner of conveying the Secretary’s views would be to read from a telegram in which those views had been transmitted. I said that I was not delivering a note or any other document, but that I merely wished to convey the views of the Secretary. However, I explained that I had thought it might be useful, to avoid any misunderstanding, if I were to leave Sir Girja the notes of my conversation in typewritten form. I then read with deliberation paragraphs numbered 1, 2, and 3 of Deptel 9. While I was reading the message, Sir Girja followed along by reading the typewritten copy, and Madame Pandit listened very intently. While I was reading the message, Ambassador Gross watched the expressions of Madame Pandit and Sir Girja. They were both visibily affected, and twice during the reading exchanged glances. As soon as I completed reading, Sir Girja stood up without comment and without giving Madame Pandit an opportunity to say anything. As Ambassador Gross and I were putting on our coats, Sir Girja said that he assumed that the reference in the message to our intention to support SC action was not intended as a threat. I replied that I was certain no threat was intended and that I hoped I had not read it in such a way as to make it sound like a threat. I added that it was simply a statement of fact. On the way out, Ambassador Gross mentioned to Sir Girja that the first sentence of paragraph 1 obviously referred to discussion between Sir Girja and the Secretary. Sir Girja said he undertood this. There was no further discussion of the message or the Kashmir matter. Department please repeat to New Delhi as Usun 1, Karachi as Usun 1, Colombo as Usun 1, London as Usun 4. Austin 1 Ernest A. Gross, Deputy U.S. Representative at the United Nations. The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [Document 763] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State secret priority New York , January 16, 1950—1:18 p. m. 37. In absence Ambassador Austin, Sir Girja Bajpai called upon Ambassador Gross at 9:30 a. m., January 16 re Kashmir case. Bajpai handed Gross message from Prime Minister of India, dated 14, January 1950. Text follows: “Your telegram dated 13th January: “1. I have read with considerable surprise the message from the Secretary of State of the US which has been conveyed to you through Mr. Ambassador Austin. This message is not only unfriendly in tone and substance but appears to us to be seeking to bring pressure on our government under threat of consequences. It will be appreciated that the government of India cannot accept this form of intervention nor do they think that it can lead to any beneficial results. The USA Government are apparently proceeding on some assumptions which are not based on facts. The Government of India, in their extreme desire to find a settlement, have repeatedly shown their earnestness by agreeing to many proposals which normally they would not have agreed to. Instead of appreciating this reasonableness under repeated and grave provocation, the present approach seems to be a further attempt to put us in the wrong. It appears to be totally forgotten that we are not the aggressors, but that we are the victims of aggression. This will not only fail to solve this problem, but will lead to further deterioration of Indo-Pakistan relations and to eventual prolongation of the conflict in Kashmir. I cannot help pointing out that present and similar proposals show disregard of the security and safety of the homes and persons of the people of Kashmir who have suffered so much already at the hands of invaders. The Government of India would be false to their trust and to both moral and legal obligations resting on a civilized government if they were to leave these people exposed to a repetition of the violence and danger from which (these people) were rescued. “2. The Government of India have declared that they wish to rule out war as an instrument of settlement of any dispute with Pakistan, and they made a formal offer in these terms to the Pakistan Government. They are always prepared for detailed negotiations or to accept mediation, but they cannot submit to such mediation being on the basis of a determination beforehand of vital issues. “3. In view of all the circumstances, the Government of India do not consider that further negotiations at Lake Success at this stage are likely to lead to any fruitful result. “4. I would like to add that it is a matter of great personal regret to me that Mr. Secretary Acheson should have sent us a message of this kind.” After reading note, Gross said he was certain Secretary would wish him to say emphatically and at once that Secretary’s message was not Intended to be “unfriendly.” On the contrary, said Gross, US Government throughout course of Kashmir dispute, as sincere friend of both parties, has been motivated solely by hope of a prompt and just solution of a dispute, continuance of which threatens to do irreparable harm to two countries whose friendship we prize. We had hoped parties would reach agreement by their own efforts or with the friendly advice and assistance of members of the Commonwealth family. Far from seeking course of unilateral intervention, Gross pointed out, our course has been and remains to do our duty as loyal members of the SC. For this reason, we have steadfastly sought to support Gen. McNaughton’s efforts to guide the parties to a settlement. In his message the Secretary had again stressed the importance we attached to this orderly process. Gross reminded Bajpai that GOI had not suggested a more practical or desirable alternative method of procedure. In this connection, Gross referred to paragraph 3 of Prime Minister’s message, and said that statement that GOI did not consider that further negotiations at Lake Success at this stage would be fruitful appeared to be a flat rejection on the part of GOI of any further efforts on part of Gen. McNaughton. Gross asked if this interpretation were correct. Bajpai replied he had not received any explanatory comments from his government, but that his reading of this paragraph led him to the same conclusion. Gross said that this was indeed disappointing to US Government, which had understood from earlier discussions with both parties that they both desired McNaughton to continue to lend his assistance. Bajpai repeated that he could not read the paragraph in any way other than as indicating GOI’s unwillingness to continue discussions at Lake Success. Gross asked whether Bajpai had any personal or official suggestion concerning next move. After some thought, Bajpai said he could only speak personally and did not wish to be misunderstood. He said that B. N. Rau was the Indian representative to UN and had complete confidence of GOI. However, Bajpai continued, he perceived advantages in US Government’s taking up matter in New Delhi through our ambassador, who would be able to speak personally with Prime Minister. Bajpai said that he had assumed that the message from the Secretary, which had been delivered by Austin on January 13 to Bajpai, had been handed him as chief of the FO of his government. He said that he had thought it would be desirable to have the Indian Ambassador present at the interview on January 13 because she was about to leave for India. He said that he, of course, kept Rau closely informed, but had not considered it necessary to bring him along for the purpose of delivering the Prime Minister’s note. Gross said US Mission would, of course, report at once to Department, and Department would decide how it wished to proceed from this point forward. Nevertheless, Gross added, that since SC was seized of Kashmir case, it might prove necessary to proceed in the Council at an early date. Therefore, it was not a question of transferring locus of discussion from Lake Success to New Delhi. Gross said it was still our hope that discussion between the parties with the friendly help of McNaughton would obviate the necessity for statements and counter-statements in the SC which would be of satisfaction only to members of the Council, who felt their own interests were served by trouble. Referring again to paragraph No. 3 in the Prime Minister’s message, Gross said he was struck by the word “negotiations.” Inasmuch as the SC obviously is bound to proceed until a solution of the case has been reached, it appeared from this paragraph that GOI preferred some course other than negotiations. Gross said he also felt sure the Secretary would be anxious to learn of any SC procedures GOI might deem preferable to negotiations between the parties. Gross repeated in this connection that US Government’s support McNaughton’s efforts had been based upon our feeling that the process of negotiation between disputants was the best road to lasting solution. Bajpai said he was returning to India in a day or two and did not expect to return. He said he had been here for a month, but now saw no useful purpose in remaining. When Gross expressed regret that we would be deprived of his company, he said that Eau would handle the matter in the SC and, of course, had his instructions. As he left, Bajpai said he would send a message to his Prime Minister as soon as he returned to his hotel: He said he would report that he had delivered the message and that he had been assured by Gross that the Secretary’s message had not been intended to be unfriendly or threatening, that the US was not attempting unilateral intervention, but was acting as a loyal member of the SC, motivated by friendly desire to see a just solution. Bajpai said he would report to the Prime Minister that Gross had asked concerning the interpretation of paragraph 3, and Bajpai had agreed with Gross’ interpretation that this constituted notice by GOI that it did not desire Gen. McNaughton to continue and that Gross expressed great disappointment. Finally, Bajpai said he would report that in response to request by Gross for Bajpai suggestion for future steps Bajpai had expressed personal view of desirability next US GOI discussion take place New Delhi. 1 Views and recommendations of USUN will follow. Austin 1 Answering telegram 22 to USUN, New York, not printed, stated that the Department was in complete accord with the position taken by Gross in this conversation by Bajpai (357.AB/1–1650). The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [Document 764] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret New Delhi , January 16, 1950—2 p. m. 68. Deeply appreciative information contained Deptel 38 January 13. 1 We desire do all possible here promote end Kashmir deadlock. Undoubtedly during next ten days number Indian officials will discuss matter with us. If, during talks with responsible leaders such as Nehru, Patel or Bajpai, we say US understands GOI position but “understanding” not necessarily entails agreement, we shall undoubtedly be questioned as to points of disagreement. More specific information from Department this respect would be helpful. For instance: (1) Does Department disagree India’s contention Pakistan committed aggressive act in entering Kashmir? (2) Does Department disagree that Pakistan should not be permitted to profit from its forceful entry into Kashmir by remaining in control various regions during plebiscite? (3) Does Department take view that Pakistan control these regions would not be advantageous to Pakistan during plebiscite? (4) Does Department disagree with GOI’s informal position that various regions Jammu-Kashmir so different that over-all plebiscite, particularly so long as any areas occupied by Pakistan, not best method finding solution or that in any event all of Jammu-Kashmir should not go to either party? (5) Does Department continue support idea over-all plebiscite with Pakistan in control of certain regions, on substantive or procedural grounds? That is, because it convinced fairest way decide future Jammu-Kashmir is over-all plebiscite even though during period certain areas under Pakistan control, or because it believes it would be too difficult at this stage to shift over to solution partial partition plus plebiscite for valley. If reason is procedural, does Department consider procedural considerations more important in present situation than those relating to fate peoples concerned? I am asking this further information, not with intention of arguing for GOI position, but in order make sure in our talks here we accurately reflect views of Department. If we are to do anything effective here, it seems to me we should get away from generalities and from what Nehru calls “pious declarations” of interest in settlement of problem and get down to frank expressions of our views. I still feel that it would be inadvisable for me to take initiative in endeavoring to persuade GOI change its position. Nevertheless, I would like to be able, not only to defend our position if and when subject is broached to me, but to assume offensive in pointing out where India’s position in our opinion, is wrong. Following Nehru’s return Patel no longer in effect acting Prime Minister. It would therefore be resented by Nehru if I should approach Patel now on matters of foreign relations. I may have opportunity, however, during casual talk to continue our conversation of January 11. 2 I do not believe that arguments for change of GOI position based on necessity for “realistic approach” would be helpful in Delhi since GOI spokesmen on various occasions have already intimated that pleas for “realism” indicate a desire avoid approach to problem on basis merit or principles involved. GOI certain take view that if trend in NY has been away from settlement, this trend not due to GOI change, but because McNaughton’s proposals were more favorable towards Pakistan than several sets proposals already rejected by GOI. Therefore, Pakistan acceptance and GOI rejection should not be surprising. For instance, McNaughton’s proposals for first time, as pointed out by Nehru, attempted balance Kashmir state forces and militia against Azad forces and went further than UNCIP in placing India and Pakistan on equal footing in Kashmir. Sent Department 68, pouched Karachi, Department pass London, USUN New York. Henderson 1 Telegram 38 to New Delhi, not printed, referred to the subject matter of Acheson’s conversation with Bajpai on January 9 and left to Henderson the initiative in approaching Nehru or other GOI officials regarding the U.S. position on Kashmir as set forth in Deptel 9 to New York, 34 to New Delhi (p. 1367 [ Pg. 1367 is part of Doc. 761 ] ) (357.AB/1–1250). 2 Henderson reported on this conversation in his telegram 52, January 12, not printed (357.AB/1–1250). The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [Document 765] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State secret New York , January 16, 1950—6:33 p. m. 40. Reftel No. 37, January 16. Further reference Kashmir case, my view is that no change in method of negotiation seems intended by Prime Minister’s message. GOI has always demanded more than it expected to get. The device of misconstruing our position has been frequent. I believe door is not closed by Prime Minister’s message more than it has been before. Suggest we not be drawn into position of a party. Believe transfer to New Delhi of negotiations would tend to neutralize influence SC in the case. Suggest carry on according to Secretary’s message January 13 so far as possible. Gross had long discussion with McNaughton and Cadogan 1 this afternoon. They agree we should continue efforts to keep McNaughton in picture. They agree to procedure set forth below tentatively suggested by Gross. Unless Department considers another course more suitable and advises us accordingly prior to SC meeting January 17, we propose to take following action at meeting: At opening of meeting when agenda is proposed for adoption, US representative will make brief statement referring to interim report by McNaughton made at SC meeting December 29, 2 and pointing out that no further developments had been reported to SC since that time. US representative will urge that Kashmir be added to agenda for next meeting with thought that McNaughton will file further report to SC, stating what, if any, developments had taken place since December 29 meeting. We would recommend SC meeting Thursday or Friday for purpose McNaughton’s submitting factual report his efforts, his proposals, and replies of parties. Following McNaughton report, US representative or some other representative would suggest that discussion of item be adjourned in order to permit parties time to prepare statements, and members SC to consider facts reported by McNaughton. Austin 1 Rt. Hon. Sir Alexander G. M. Cadogan, U.K. Permanent Representative on the United Nations Security Council. 2 For text, see United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year, No. 54 , pp. 4–8. The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [Document 766] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) secret priority Washington , January 17, 1950—3 p. m. 18. Reurtel 40, Dept agrees US Rep shld make brief statement in SC this pm along lines suggested and propose Kashmir item be placed on agenda for factual report by McNaughton at early mtg. Such action will be clear indication to GOI that US is prepared proceed along lines Secy’s message to Bajpai Jan 13, notwithstanding Nehru’s reply. However, Dept believes you shld propose that mtg to hear McNaughton be held next week, perhaps Jan 25, rather than Thurs or Fri this week. This longer interval offers fol advantages: (1) gives time for Nehru to cool off fol his initial reaction Secy’s message; (2) offers better possibility attaining agreed objective keeping McNaughton in picture and door open for any further consultations or developments if, as you suggest, Nehru’s message does not intend change in method of negot; and (3) gives Pearson opportunity carry on discussions in Delhi and Karachi (reftel 28 Jan 12 from Colombo 1 ) Dept has in mind when McNaughton presents factual report next week, Council cld hear parties if they desire to speak. Then if, as expected, stalemate still exists, Council cld ask McNaughton in view his background and experience to present at latter mtg his recommendations for Council action. This wld give us approximately two weeks from now to work out a recommended course of action which we wld strongly support in Council. Acheson 1 Not found in Department of State files. The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 357.AB/1–1650: Telegram [Document 767] The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) secret priority Washington , January 25, 1950—3 p. m. 38. While Dept sees no reason further delay SC meeting on Kashmir case, if McNaughton unwilling present rpt before Feb 1, Dept meeting be arranged for that date or soon thereafter. In further development of suggestions contained Deptel 18, Jan 17 and Gross-Zafrullah conversation Jan 21, 1 Dept inclined believe fol wld be best procedure for next SC meeting: (1) factual rpt by McNaughton, (2) statement by parties, (3) statements by Council members supporting McNaughton’s approach and approving the genl principles underlying his proposals, (4) resolution by Council requesting that McNaughton continue to consult with parties, that he consult with members of Council and that in light these consultations he submit to SC in say, one or two weeks, suggestions for Council action. In our present view such a broadened and more flexible mandate to McNaughton wld be preferable to resolution limited to directing him to continue his mediatory efforts and calling on parties to work with him. While affording sufficient opportunity for GOI assume more cooperative attitude in event it disposed to do so following SC debate, suggested mandate wld serve notice at same time that mediatory efforts outside Council will not be continued indefinitely and some SC action is imminent. Furthermore, such mandate wld provide useful procedure for placing before SC a recommended course of action which US cld strongly support. Dept not inclined favor this stage Council resolution formally approving principles McNaughton proposals as suggested by Paks. Such action, as distinguished from expressions views individual members, wld make even more unlikely any possibility reaching agreement with parties during interim through modifications McNaughton’s proposals. Unless you disagree, pls explore above approach with UK and CanaDels. Acheson 1 Memorandum of conversation not found in Department of State files. The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/1–2750: Telegram [Document 768] The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations ( Gross ) to the Secretary of State secret priority New York , January 27, 1950—7:17 p. m. 88. Gross and Ross 1 met with McNaughton and Cadogan this afternoon for further discussion of Kashmir case. McNaughton, quoting from telegrams he had received from Ottawa, indicated that Pearson would not be in favor of McNaughton continuing his efforts unless three conditions always laid down by Canadians are met. Pearson hopes that proposal for McNaughton to continue would not be put forward in any other circumstances. Pearson shares general view India not willing to agree continuance McNaughton’s efforts and Pearson feels very remote promise useful solution in present situation would result from such continuance. According to Pearson’s reports through Canadian High Commissioner New Delhi 2 all his interviews both Karachi and New Delhi reveal tragic nature present situation. Pearson found at New Delhi, contrary impression Noel-Baker, 3 Patel was more extreme than Nehru. Other ministers had very negative view. Bajpai reflected no further hope UN contribution in present situation and talked about mediation on fresh basis to bring parties together. Fresh basis would be three-man group, each of parties designating one and these two selecting third. Bajpai reflected view over-all plebiscite no solution. Pearson convinced if someone else does not propose procedure along Bajpai line India will itself. Chipman was informing Henderson fully. Gross emphasized immediate question was to determine what we do in next few days. Suggested possibility McNaughton continuing in his personal capacity. McNaughton said firmly, and it was generally agreed, his instructions preclude this possibility. Gross also suggested possibility McNaughton telescoping procedure by adding to his factual report analysis of issues and suggestions for further SC procedure, but later withdrew this suggestion. McNaughton wondered whether best course would not be to have SC instruct new president to continue where McNaughton left off. Neither we nor British thought much of this idea. Gross emphasized that position our secretary had taken in message to Bajpai was not reconcilable with new developments. Pearson quite unwittingly, and with best intentions had put Acheson in anomalous position from which we felt obligation to extricate him. This seems to require discussion Cabinet level between Acheson and Pearson who was due home in Ottawa February 8. Gross added he did not see how it was possible for us to make any statement in SC until we all knew precisely where we are going. It was agreed that best course in all circumstances would be to proceed with SC meeting Thursday, February 2, as contemplated, to hear factual report by McNaughton. We would then contemplate McNaughton’s report would be followed by statements by parties and by members of Council, but that meetings after Thursday would be spelled out to provide opportunity for meeting Secretary and Pearson. McNaughton seemed depressed, but in mood to carry out orders loyally. He commented, for example, that Pearson’s report “sweeps everything that has been done out of the road.” USUN’s comments to follow Monday. Gross 1 John C. Ross, Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N. Security Council. 2 Warwick F. Chipman, Canadian High Commissioner to India. 3 The Rt. Hon. Philip J. Noel-Baker, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, had been conversing in recent days with government officials in Karachi and New Delhi. His visit roughly coincided in time with that of Lester Pearson. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) and the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/2–650 [Document 769] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) and the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs ( Hickerson ) to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] February 6, 1950. Subject: Kashmir Dispute Discussion: The origin of the dispute, together with a brief account of the case in the UN and an analysis of the major issues and the position of the parties is contained in Annex A. Annex B consists of a legal analysis of the conflicting claims concerning the contested accession of Kashmir to India. 1 India’s position is based on the claim that a lawful and effective accession took place. Conclusions: 1. Importance of settlement: Early settlement of the Kashmir problem is essential to the maintenance of peace and security in South Asia, the one area of relative stability in Asia today. Lacking some immediate progress, the present Pakistan Government might well collapse and the present uneasy truce break down, leading to open hostilities between the Indian and Pakistan armies and the outbreak of communal strife throughout the subcontinent. 2. Principal difficulty: Although both India and Pakistan have proved difficult and recalcitrant and both are far from blameless in the matter, it is the intransigent attitude of India which has been primarily responsible during the past year for holding up progress toward demilitarization of Kashmir and final settlement within the framework of UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan) resolutions. Some recent indications of India’s attitude are: ( a ) the various steps taken by India to complete the incorporation of Kashmir into India; ( b ) India’s responses to the UNCIP truce terms in which it departed from the previously agreed basis for the truce; ( c ) India’s rejection of the proposal for arbitration; ( d ) India’s rejection of McNaughton’s proposals. 3. Legal aspects of Kashmir’s contested accession to India: India has always insisted that the Maharajah’s execution of an Instrument of Accession to India in October, 1947 2 was a valid and binding act which determined the legal status of Kashmir. On the basis of this contention, it has asserted that Pakistan was an aggressor and has from time to time sought to persuade the Security Council to make a finding of aggression against Pakistan. In the opinion of the Office of the Legal Adviser, execution of an Instrument of Accession by the Maharajah in October, 1947, could not finally accomplish the accession of Kashmir to either Dominion, in view of the circumstances prevailing at that time; the question of the future of Kashmir remained to be settled in some orderly fashion under relatively stable conditions; this question is an important element in the dispute; and, in proceedings before the Security Council, neither party is entitled to assert that rights were finally determined by the Maharajah’s execution of an instrument of Accession. [See Annex B. 3 ] It is the view of the United Kingdom Attorney General and Foreign Office legal advisers that the Maharajah’s execution of the Instrument of Accession to India was inconsistent with Kashmir’s obligations to Pakistan, and for that reason perhaps invalid. Since the agreed and fair solution is to restore peaceful conditions so that the question of Kashmir’s future may be decided by the freely expressed will of the people, efforts to deal with the Kashmir question on the basis of legal considerations alone—or to assess original responsibilities for the difficulties that have arisen in Kashmir—would not be fruitful. India’s insistence on its legal position renders difficult the attainment of the solution referred to above. For this reason, and because as a matter of law India is not entitled to assert that rights in Kashmir were finally determined by the Instrument of Accession executed in October, 1947, the Security Council should not permit this question to divert it from its basic task of bringing about a political solution of the Kashmir problem. 4. Analysis of specific points at issue: ( a ) Demilitarization in general: A large scale demilitarization of the state is essential as a prelude to the conduct of a plebiscite, (whether over-all or partial), to insure against an outbreak of hostilities and to promote a peaceful atmosphere conducive to the reestablishment of more normal conditions of life for the people of Kashmir, pending final settlement. Agreement on demilitarization has been impeded in part by the artificial division of the problem in the UNCIP Resolutions into a “truce” and “plebiscite” period. Agreement should now be pursued through a unified plan for the synchronized withdrawal of regular Indian and Pakistan troops now in Kashmir and the reduction or disbandment of the local forces—the pro-Pakistan Azad troops and the pro-Indian State troops. ( b ) Withdrawal of regular Indian and Pakistan forces: From the point of view of the maintenance of law and order or of threats of external aggression there is no need for the military forces of either country to be within the state. Reduced Azad and State troops, aided in their respective areas by local police forces, would be adequate. However, the factors of geography would permit the Pakistan troops to re-enter the state very easily where as (except for the southwest section) Indian forces must either be flown in or cross a formidable mountain pass. It would therefore be reasonable that all Pakistan and Indian troops be withdrawn except a small defensive Indian force garrisoned in the Valley. Pakistan has in effect agreed to this: India has rejected this. ( c ) Azad and State forces: India’s position that the Azad forces must be completely disbanded coincident with the initial withdrawal of its own regular troops contravenes the Commission’s Resolution of 13 August 1948 which was accepted by both parties. India, however, is justified in its demand that the Azad forces be substantially reduced before any plebiscite is held, a contention accepted by Pakistan if similar reductions are made in the State forces. India’s position that the State forces should not be reduced is unreasonable, although they should probably not be completely disbanded. ( d ) Garrison of northern area: There is no reasonable ground for granting India’s request to garrison the northern area. It is not necessary from the point of view of external security or protection of trade routes; it is not necessary to maintain local law and order. The populace, entirely Moslem, is pro-Pakistan and in the view of United Nations military observers who have visited the area, the entry of Indian troops would be forcibly resisted by the inhabitants. 5. Overall Plebiscite The theory underlying the original SC action and the Commission’s efforts has been that the fate of Kashmir should be decided by an overall plebiscite. This was originally agreed to by both India and Pakistan. Pakistan continues to insist on this as the only acceptable method of solution. However, it now has become clear that the Indian concept of a plebiscite is that of a referendum with a minimum of international participation, to confirm or reject the accession already made. The GOI now appears determined, despite its previous commitments, to avoid an overall plebiscite in Kashmir. This appears to be based on ( a ) the conviction that it would lose the whole state should the issue be decided by a majority vote of the whole population, and ( b ) fear that appeals to communalism during the plebiscite period would rekindle religious strife throughout the subcontinent. India may thus be expected to reject any proposal, however reasonable, predicated on an overall plebiscite. Rather, it may be expected to seek a settlement through partition, or partition with a plebiscite limited to the Vale of Kashmir. 6. Partition There is no feasible way of partitioning the Vale, which is the heart of the State. The remaining areas could, however, be divided—a southern sector to India, western and northern areas to Pakistan and the eastern area either to India or to follow the disposition of the Vale. Any such scheme, however, should be accompanied by a completely impartial plebiscite in the Vale. This would require its complete neutralization, perhaps with international administration, and to this end it would be equally necessary to obtain the demilitarization of the surrounding Pakistan-held areas. The Vale is now heavily garrisoned by Indian troops backed by the local State forces and the administration is in the hands of the pro-Indian faction headed by Sheikh Abdullah. 4 The following two major difficulties would impede efforts to press for solution along the above lines: (1) it is contrary to the concept of the plebiscite as agreed to by both parties in UNCIP resolutions and it might be difficult for the Pakistan Government to accept it and remain in office; (2) furthermore, neither India nor Sheikh Abdullah would be willing at this time to accept the degree of neutralization which Pakistan would insist on and which would be necessary to insure a free and fair plebiscite in the Vale. 7. Independence for Kashmir Neither India nor Pakistan has supported the independence of Kashmir as a possible solution. Recently, however, it has been advocated by the Yugoslav SC representative in informal conversations at Lake Success. It should be resisted because an independent Kashmir ( a ) would not be economically viable; ( b ) would quite possibly be taken over by the Communists; and ( c ) might otherwise weaken the security of the subcontinent. 8. Immediate objective The immediate objective should, therefore, be to achieve progress toward the demilitarization of Kashmir and agreement upon the method to determine its final disposition, by bringing about some modification of India’s position through a combination of: ( a ) continued pressure by the UK and other Commonwealth nations who have a special responsibility to resolve this essentially intra-Commonwealth problem; ( b ) the operation of general public opinion and the views of other SC members, brought to bear through early SC debate; ( c ) friendly, but firm and frank, statements of US views on appropriate occasions; ( d ) some concession to Indian aversion to an over-all plebiscite; and ( e ) a clear and reasonable program of action for the SC. [Here follows a listing of substantive and procedural recommendations for subsequent United States action on Kashmir. The recommendations were discussed and approved by Acheson in a meeting on February 9 (memorandum of conversation not printed), and the resulting policy decisions are summarized in telegram 664 to London, infra .] G[ eorge ] C. McG[ hee ] J[ ohn ] D. H[ ickerson ] 1 Annex A and Annex B not printed. 2 For documentation on this matter, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. iii , pp. 179 ff. 3 Brackets in the source text. 4 Mohammad Abdullah, Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 357.AB/2–1150: Telegram [Document 770] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret Washington , February 11, 1950—4 p. m. 664. Following summarizes US position re Kashmir problem as approved by Secy: 1. US objective is peaceful settlement on terms acceptable both countries. Both parties have consistently held that final settlement must be in accord will of people. Both have agreed under aegis UNCIP to cease fire and demilitarization as conditions precedent to pleb. 2. Early demilitarization of state, including large scale disbanding and disarming local forces is of primary importance and US will press strongly for this. US considers McNaughton’s proposals fair, reasonable, well designed accomplish this end. 3. US will maintain principle that final disposition of state shld be determined in accordance will people. Although parties now stand committed overall pleb as means ascertain will, US is prepared support at appropriate time any practicable alternative acceptable to both and consistent with above principle. 4. Specifically, depending on development attitude parties, US is prepared encourage agreement on partition plus pleb in Vale with following essential prerequisites: ( a ) Indian agreement to demilitarization along lines McNaughton’s proposals; ( b ) Agreement that Vale will be neutralized militarily and administratively; ( c ) Agreement that terms settlement safeguard flow of Kashmir rivers to Pak (Chenab, principal problem anticipated); ( d ) Agreement on some method resolve disputes re pleb arrangements. 5. Debate on legality accession or blame for origin is irrelevant to common purpose of peaceful solution. In US view Maharajah’s act did not definitively settle rights of parties and offers India no basis for superior moral position. US will make this view known in SC, only if necessary. 6. Accordingly, US favors SC res containing substantially following: ( a ) Call on parties to make immediate arrangements for, and carry out within specified time, demilitarization along lines of McNaughton’s proposals or any other basis if mutually agreed upon; ( b ) Call on parties to agree on method to determine people’s will in order carry out underlying principles SC and UNCIP resolutions. This part res shld be worded so as not preclude partition plus pleb but doubtful whether express reference shld be made this course. ( c ) Appointment of UN rep to assist in above tasks. Norman Robertson of Canada, 2 Adm Nimitz or Ralph Bunche 3 wld be acceptable as UN rep. Possibility envisaged that tasks under ( a ) and ( b ) might be performed by two different reps. 7. US continues believe UK shld bear major responsibility for promoting settlement and accordingly will urge UK to assume leading role in consultations with SC members in New York to work out solution along above lines to be submitted jointly by as many members SC as possible. Your info fuller text conclusions and recommendations as approved by Secy being dispatched. London to discuss with Brit. Acheson 1 Repeated to New Delhi 138, Karachi 90, USUN 66. 2 Norman A. Robertson, former High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom; Clerk of Privy Council and Secretary to Cabinet. 3 Ralph J. Bunche, former Acting Mediator in Palestine 1948–1949. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 357.AB/2–1150: Telegram [Document 771] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 1 secret Washington , February 11, 1950—4 p. m. 139. US position in current phase Kashmir case summarized in Deptel 138, Feb 11, 2 arrived at after complete reexamination of dispute from inception. [Here follows a summary of the information supplied in the eight numbered paragraphs of Conclusions in the memorandum of February 6, page 1378 [ Pg. 1378 includes portions of Doc. 768 and Doc. 769 ] .] Foregoing answers questions posed Embtel 68, Jan 16. Additional comments re numbered questions follow: 1. Dept remains convinced that UN or US assessment relative blame in dispute wld not contribute settlement. 2 and 3. These questions do not seem to take sufficiently into account fact, admitted by India, that peoples of area under Pakistan and Azad control are already and probably irrevocably oriented to Pakistan. 4 and 5. Dept not wedded to overall plebiscite. It has been and is prepared support any settlement acceptable to both India and Pakistan, including partition with plebiscite in Vale. It is not prepared to advance this proposal itself at this time. Moreover, Dept foresees almost as many difficulties in this course as in overall plebiscite unless India drops rigid insistence on its “rights” and agrees to establishment conditions in Vale which wld permit impartial plebiscite. Dept gratified ur helpful exchange views with Nehru reported Embtel 186, Feb 9. 3 Desires you continue utilize every available opportunity impress on Nehru and other GOI officials that US not attempting exhort or bring pressure. Our analysis Kashmir problem leads us to honest differences of opinion with India. We feel that in discussing problem with GOI officials we must be frank in making our views known. 4 As regards numerous indications GOI has received that prolongation India Pakistan disputes is damaging to India, this is inherent in situation and expression such views requires no inspiration by State Dept or other US official sources. In fact many non-official groups and individuals in this country take much more serious view as regards imminent possibility India Pakistan war than does State Dept. Acheson 1 Repeated to London 665, Karachi 91, USUN 67. 2 Printed as telegram 664 to London, supra . 3 Not printed. 4 Telegram 143 to New Delhi, February 13, not printed, informed the Embassy that it should not infer from this sentence that it should apprise the GOI and GOP of the U.S. position taken in Department telegrams 138 and 139 (357.AB/2–1350). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 357.AB/2–1350: Telegram [Document 772] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret Washington , February 13, 1950—5 p. m. 672. Pls deliver fol msg to Bevin from Secy: “As you know SC consideration of the Kashmir case has now reached a stage in which Council members will have to take affirmative action. We visualize the development through consultations among Council members in the next week of mutually acceptable principles which wld thereafter provide a basis for a resolution to be submitted jointly by as many members as practicable, including, of course the U.K. and the U.S. I had hoped that in view of Gen. McNaughton’s close connection with the case he might be persuaded to serve as a focal point for these consultations and as a channel for transmitting the resulting conclusions as recommendations for Council action. However, I now understand that the Canadian Govt is reluctant to have him accept this responsibility. In this situation it seems to me that for various reasons the U.K. as the senior member of the Commonwealth is in the best position to take the necessary leadership in the consultations in New York to work out a practical program of action for the Council. We will, of course, continue to work closely with your delegation and cooperate fully in developing a joint plan. I sincerely hope that Sir Alexander Cadogan will be in a position to take the initiative in carrying forward these consultations.” Acheson 1 Repeated to New Delhi 140, Karachi 94, USUN 69. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/2–1850: Telegram [Document 773] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State secret priority London , February 18, 1950—3 p. m. 960. Deptel 672, Feb 13. I have today received following letter dated Feb 17 from Bevin replying to Secretary’s message on Kashmir: “I have given thought to Mr. Acheson’s message which you were good enough to send to me in your letter of February 14, and shall be grateful if you will transmit the following reply to him: “Many thanks for the message which Mr. Holmes has passed to me. I am anxious not to lose any opportunity of making progress on Kashmir. The immediate essentials are support for demilitarization and the appointment of a United Nations representative to go out to the sub-continent, and I understand from His Majesty’s Embassy in Washington that the State Dept agrees with this analysis. I hope, therefore, that the Security Council will work towards a resolution on the lines of General McNaughton’s proposals, and embodying his paragraphs 1 and 6. The former sets out the general principles on which a settlement should be reached and has not been objected to by either party. Paragraph 6 defines the terms of reference of the United Nations representative in a way which I hope both parties can be persuaded to accept. “But I do not think that we would be wise to refer to, or in any way hint at the possibility of solution by a partition at this stage. Both parties are committed to a plebiscite, and though it may be very difficult to arrange it I do not think that the time has yet come to consider an alternative method. “I have accordingly instructed Sir A. Cadogan to proceed on the above basis, and if the views I have outlined above have your support I am happy to accept your suggestion that he should—in concert with your delegate—take the lead both in canvassing like-minded delegations and in open discussions. “I still hope very much that, if a Security Council representative is to go to Kashmir in pursuance of whatever resolution the Council may eventually adopt, the task will be entrusted to Admiral Nimitz, and that you and he will support efforts to that end. To my mind there can be no better qualified person for this difficult and responsible mission. “If at a later stage intervention by other Commonwealth countries seems likely to help, I am sure that this and other Commonwealth Governments will be ready to consider the matter carefully and sympathetically; but my present view is that firm action by the United Nations is more likely to be effective.” Re antepenultimate paragraph Bevin’s reply, we today asked Garner, Assistant Under Secretary CFO, for clarification phrase in “concert with your delegate,” pointing out this seems imply joint action where as Secretary’s message suggested UK alone assume such leadership. Garner stated intention of phrase is that Cadogan should take lead after consultation with US representative, but that UK hopes for strong support from US during consultation and open discussions. Sent Dept 960; repeated Karachi 17, New Delhi 17, pouched Moscow, Paris. Department please pass USUN New York as London’s 10. Holmes The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 357.AB/2–1850: Telegram [Document 774] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret priority Washington , February 20, 1950—5 p. m. 783. In light Bevin’s msg Embtel 960 Feb 18, Dept considers that differences US and UK positions Embtels 888 and 925 2 more apparent than real. We are in agreement there shld be no reference partition with plebiscite in SC discussion or res although we consider inclusion in res of wording along lines McNaughton para 6 makes it possible for UN Rep move this direction if circumstances warrant. We also agree emphasis shld be on existing agreement between parties and implementation thereof. There may remain some differences as to emphasis to be placed on plebiscite and letter of McNaughton proposals but difference is matter of tactics and UK and US Dels NY wld seem in best position determine tactical approach at this stage. Re last para Embtel 960 Dept does not consider phrase “in concert with ur delegate” inconsistent with Depts desire that UK delegate take initiative in NY consultations. Re Bevin’s comments re Nimitz we agree later highly qualified candidate for position UN Rep. However, we wish give full consideration other possible candidates such as Bunche before reaching firm position. Acheson 1 Repeated to New Delhi 164, Karachi 111, USUN 79. 2 Neither printed. The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/2–2350: Telegram [Document 775] The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations ( Gross ) to the Secretary of State secret priority New York , February 23, 1950—7:10 p. m. 181. Kashmir resolution follows in final form agreed to by cosponsors this afternoon. UK, Norway and Cuba have given final approval. We withheld final approval pending Department’s approval which is requested urgently. Ecuador might also become co-sponsor and there is outside possibility that Yugoslavia might also desire to do so. 1 It was agreed that confidential copies would be circulated to other members of SC and to parties Friday morning. Resolution will be tabled early in the meeting Friday and introduced during the course of the afternoon. It was the feeling of the other co-sponsors, led by Cadogan and Chauvel, 2 that there were serious risks involved in giving copies to parties several days before introduction. Possibilities of lobbying, of India persuading Yugoslavia or other SC member to introduce counter-resolution, and possibility that India in particular might advise us in advance of her flat rejection of resolution were given as reasons for avoiding such a course of action. We acquiesced in this attitude. “ Having received and noted the reports of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, established by the resolutions of January 20 and April 21, 1948, 3 Having also received and noted the report of General A. G. L. McNaughton on the outcome of his discussions with the representatives of India and Pakistan which were initiated in pursuance of the decision taken by the SC on December 17, 1949, 4 Commending the Governments of India and Pakistan for their statesmanlike action in reaching the agreements embodied in the UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949, for a cease-fire, for the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and for the determination of its final disposition in accordance with the will of the people through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, and commending the parties in particular for their action in partially implementing these resolutions by (1) The cessation of hostilities effected January 1, 1949 (2) The establishment of a cease-fire line on July 27, 1949, and (3) The agreement that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be plebiscite administrator, Considering that the resolution of the outstanding difficulties should be based upon the substantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles already reached, and that steps should be taken forthwith for the demilitarization of the state and for the expeditious determination of its future in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants, The Security Council , 1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make immediate arrangements, without prejudice to their rights or claims and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution of a programme of demilitarization on the basis of the principles in Paragraph 2 of General A. G. L. McNaughton’s proposal or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed. 2. Decides to appoint a UN representative for the following purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions in such place or places as he may deem appropriate. ( a ) To assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of demilitarization referred to above and to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarization. ( b ) To place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to place before those governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which has arisen between the two governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir; ( c ) To exercise all of the powers and responsibilities devolving upon the UNCIP by reason of existing resolutions of the SC and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the resolutions of the UNCIP of August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949; ( d ) To arrange at the appropriate stage of demilitarization for the assumption by the plebiscite administrator of the functions assigned to the latter under agreements made between the parties. ( e ) To report to the SC as he may consider necessary submitting his conclusions and any recommendations which he may desire to make. 3. Requests the two governments to take all necessary precautions to ensure that their agreements regarding the cease-fire shall continue to be faithfully observed, and calls upon them to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. 4. Extends its best thanks to the members of the Commission for India and Pakistan and to General A. G. L. McNaughton for their arduous and fruitful labours. 5. Agrees that the Commission for India and Pakistan shall be terminated, and decides that this shall take place one month after both parties have informed the UN representative of their acceptance of the transfer to him of the powers and responsibilities of the UN Commission referred to in Paragraph 2( c ) above.” It was agreed that the naming of the UN representative would be left until later, at which time he could be named either in a final paragraph added to this resolution or in a separate resolution. Gross 1 Ecuador and Yugoslavia did not join the list of cosponsors. The United States, together with the United Kingdom, Norway, and Cuba, tabled the draft resolution (Security Council Document S/1461) in the 467th meeting of the Security Council on February 24. See United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Fifth Year, No. 9 . 2 Jean Michel Henri Chauvel, French Permanent Representative to the United Nations. 3 Security Council Documents S/654 and S/726, printed in United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Third Year: Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1948 . 4 The Councils action of December 17 led to McNaughton’s efforts at conciliation. See United Nations, Security Council Official Records, Fourth Year ( 457th Meeting: 17 December 1949 ), No. 58 . The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/2–2450: Telegram [Document 776] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret New Delhi , February 24, 1950—4 p. m. 244. 1. According GOI leaders, India-Pakistan problem arising from recent developments Bengal beginning completely overshadow Kashmir dispute and to present most grave threat peace South Asia since partition. 2. Bajpai asked me see him on February 21 in order to discuss matter. Nehru and Patel both devoted considerable time to it during conversations with Jessup. 1 They and other responsible Indian officials and leaders have expressed to us deepest anxiety lest these developments create such violent reactions throughout India that Communism again will assume violent forms and will take initiative away from government. 3. Situation as outlined by Nehru and Bajpai briefly is that: a . During last two months rumors have been circulating that “atrocities” are again being perpetrated in East Bengal on minorities. As result police control and hysterical condition Hindu refugees entering West Bengal, facts have been difficult ascertain. Nevertheless clear between 600 and 1,000 Hindus have been killed in Dacca area alone, thousands have been injured, and much property destroyed. Although GOI has discouraged immigration and has turned back many thousands pressure increasing and if bars were let down there might be general exodus substantial proportion East Bengals 12,000,000 Hindus. b . Situation West Bengal under control for moment but every immigrant who arrives from West Bengal becomes an agitator for retaliatory action and feelings are running so high that there is always danger of an explosion. Nevertheless small number Moslems have been killed in West Bengal during various “incidents” and considerable Moslem property destroyed. c . In order restore measure confidence on both sides Nehru suggested on February 17 to Liaquat Ali Khan 2 that two missions each composed of a minister from West Bengal and minister from East Bengal be appointed and one commission travel through East Bengal and the other through West Bengal ostensibly for examining situation but really for showing desire both governments for maintenance order. Nehru followed this suggestion on February 20 with another that Liaquat Khan and he together tour both provinces. d . Liaquat turned down both proposals but suggested that each government announce its opposition to further immigration. This suggestion rejected by Nehru on ground that if followed tension would be increased rather than decreased in West Bengal because of anger at hopelessness of situation Hindus in East Bengal. e . GOI seeking earnestly for other ways reducing tension. f . Indian deputy high commissioner at Dacca in report dated 18th of which Bajpai sent me copy concluded “minority community feel convinced it will be impossible for them to stay in this province after what has happened which is the culmination of the slow process of squeezing out going on for some months past to which I had drawn the attention of the ministry in my annual report dated January 31, 1950.” 4. During past week press reports, sometimes of an unrestrained character and undoubtedly based in certain instances on facts difficult to verify, have drawn public attention increasingly to Bengal problem. Yesterday Nehru read prepared statement to Parliament (Embtel 242, February 24) 3 in which he evinced great anxiety and declared this issue now had priority over Kashmir. 5. Some observers here, notably British, tend question spontaneity and authentic quality present crisis and point out Nehru’s statement was timed just before resumption SC debate Kashmir. They advance as possibility, hypothesis that fearing unfavorable situation in SC GOI is using this issue seize initiative and place GOP on defensive. As further factor UK Commissioner 4 stresses Nehru under severe pressure from back benches and other critics and needs take strong line against Pakistan to retain control and prevent defections of extremist Hindu supporters to Hindu Mahasabha. UK HICOM to Pakistan 5 now Delhi has just visited Dacca, claims situation now quiet there, and raises question as to whether or not GOI is manufacturing case for ulterior purposes. In general British are tending minimize seriousness of situation. UK HICOM to India states in confidence that at recent meeting Council of Defense Nehru became so excited he ordered commanders-in-chief (two of whom are British) to prepare for action in East Bengal. The British commanders however persuaded him that such action premature and might accelerate situation. 5 [ 6 ]. Our feeling is that until up-to-minute and reliable facts as to East Bengal situation are available we should not question genuineness of concern expressed to Jessup and myself by so many top leaders or minimize potential gravity of situation. Situation as represented to these leaders probably in exaggerated form and may well have been played up unduly in press but fact remains situation is dangerous if for no other reason than that people here are so excited. Sent Department 244; repeated Karachi 25, pouched Dacca, Calcutta. Henderson 1 Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup was on a 14-nation fact-finding tour of the Far East. He was in India February 17–19 and 21–26 and in Pakistan February 27–March 2 and March 5–9. For additional information on this tour, see his oral report to the Secretary of State and other officials of the Department, April 3, vol. vi , p. 68 . 2 Prime Minister of Pakistan. 3 Not printed. 4 U.K. High Commissioner to India, Sir Archibald Nye. 5 Sir Laurence B. Grafftey-Smith. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Weil) 357.AB/3–650 [Document 777] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Office of South Asian Affairs ( Weil ) secret [ Washington ,] March 6, 1950. Subject: Kashmir Dispute: SC Resolution Participants: Mr. M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan NEA—Mr. Hare 1 SOA—Mr. Mathews 2 Mr. Weil Problem: The Kashmir dispute. Action Required: To continue efforts, through the UN and through direct contacts with Pakistani and Indian representatives, to resolve the Kashmir controversy. Action Assigned to: SOA Mr. Ispahani called, at his request, at 12 noon. He opened his substantive remarks by citing a Persian proverb, the gist of which was that a person who has been bitten by a cobra is afraid of the sight of a rope. He said he was afraid that the current delay in discussion by the SC of the new resolution on Kashmir might represent an effort by India to gain time in the way it had done in February 1948. At that time, he said, Gopalaswami Ayyangar 3 had requested two weeks for consultation, during which time the Indian Government had “turned on pressure” which had “changed the whole situation” in favor of the Indian case. Mr. Ispahani said he was very apprehensive lest Rau’s request for six or seven days delay constituted an effort on the part of the GOI to repeat its tactics of February 1948. The Ambassador said India had extracted concession after concession until there was now “no more give” in Pakistan’s “bag”. He said he did not blame India for adopting its attitude because it had gained thereby and would continue to gain until the great powers and the SC said: “This is the limit”. He said his Government had asked him to reiterate this point as strongly as possible. Mr. Ispahani remarked that the UNCIP had referred the case to the SC because of its inability to carry out provisions relating to demilitarization of the Northern areas. He observed that General McNaughton in sub-paragraph A of paragraph 2 had made specific mention of forces to be withdrawn, and under sub-paragraph B of paragraph 2 had made specific provision for dealing with the Northern areas. He went on to say that the draft resolution called on the two Governments to handle demilitarization on the basis of paragraph 2 of the McNaughton proposals and left the implementation to be worked out later. The Ambassador said the Pakistan delegation had endorsed paragraph 2 as a whole; that sub-paragraphs A and B of paragraph 2 were essentially a part of the principles of the paragraph; and that in the opinion of the GOP the clear intent of the SC resolution was to carry out this part of the McNaughton proposals. He went on to say that in its talks with the US delegation the Pakistan delegation had gained the impression that the US wished to leave the question of implementation in a vague form. He said that if this were the case the SC resolution would merely replace the UNCIP with a mediator and a resolution of this type would be “worse than useless”. Mr. Ispahani said he had been instructed to say his Government could not acept a resolution of this sort, which would merely intensify and prolong the deadlock. He said his Government felt the SC should make clear to the two parties the exact meaning of the resolution. The Ambassador said his Government was ready and willing to accept the SC resolution but the paragraph of the McNaughton proposals referred to in the resolution “must stand as a whole or fall”. Mr. Hare told Mr. Ispahani he need have no fear regarding the Department’s desire to give every consideration to these points. Mr. Mathews observed that the Department had foreseen there would be some delay in the submission of the resolution to the SC regardless of the Indians’ intentions because the Indian delegation had to obtain instructions from the Indian Foreign Minister at Delhi whereas the Foreign Minister of Pakistan was in New York. Mr. Hare remarked that the Department could not act as a spokesman for the SC. Mr. Ispahani said that nevertheless Mr. Hare knew that the US stand went a long way in influencing the SC. Mr. Hare said that obviously the Department wanted things made as clear as possible to other members of the Council. Mr. Mathews, referring to the SC meeting to be held the following day, said the schedule was such that we would see where we stood after the parties had made their comments. 4 Mr. Hare said he wanted to assure Mr. Ispahani that the Department took his remarks seriously and would give them full consideration. [Here follows a reiteration by the Ambassador of his views on paragraph 2 of the McNaughton proposal and a brief exchange of closing remarks with Hare.] T. E. Weil 1 Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 2 Elbert G. Mathews, Director, Office of South Asian Affairs. 3 N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Indian Minister of Railways and Transport, 1948–1952. 4 The draft resolution was further discussed in the 469th meeting of the Security Council on March 8, on which occasion statements were made by Zafrulla Khan and the Indian Representative, Sir Benegal N. Rau. In the 470th meeting on March 14, Zafrulla Khan and Rau submitted their governments’ acceptance of the draft resolution subject to their own clarifying statements, and the resolution was then adopted by a Council vote of eight in favor and two abstentions. The verbatim minutes of the two meetings are in the Security Council Official Records, Fifth Year, Nos. 11 and 12 . The Chargé in Pakistan (Wolf) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/3–2350: Telegram [Document 778] The Chargé in Pakistan ( Wolf ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Karachi , March 23, 1950—3 p. m. 209. Foreign Secretary has requested me transmit immediately following from GOP: “GOP regret have to inform Government US of following troop movements which have recently taken place in India towards frontier west Pakistan. Forward movement is continuing: 1. Move of one infantry division to area Hissar Rajastan. 2. Move of one armored brigade to area Ferozepore-Nabha. 3. Move of one armored division to area Meerut. 4. Formation of a corps headquarters at Ambala as operational headquarters. 5. Fourth Indian division and Pepsu division which are already in East Punjab have come under Ambala command. 6. Heavy concentration warlike stores and supplies in forward areas like Ferozepore Jullundur and Ludhiana. Appreciation of Pakistan HICOM is that these concentrations are more offensive than defensive view of their locations specially that of the dumps of ammunition et cetera. GOP are anxious avoid any action which may aggravate situation but Government US will appreciate that GOP cannot but take necessary defensive measures. Pakistan stands for peace and has absolutely no aggressive designs on India. Pakistan also believes that on continuance of peace between India and Pakistan depends world peace. In order therefore maintain peace not only between India Pakistan but also world peace, GOP earnestly hope Government US would exert their influence with GOI and do their best persuade them move back their forward formations.” Embassy advised similar communications have been sent UK, Canada, Australia through HICOM. 1 Absence from Karachi Ambassador Warren and ARMAT have discussed this only with Canadian HICOM who called this morning to ask if I had other confirmation or further information. He stated action taken by GOP without prior consultation any Commonwealth HICOM and he had no idea what reply his government would make. 2 Sent Department 209, repeated New Delhi 32 for Ambassador Warren. 3 Wolf 1 On March 23, after receipt of a copy of the Pakistan message, U.K. High Commissioner Nye telegraphed London stating he had already discussed the matter with Bajpai and felt that nothing more should be done until he learned what Nehru’s reaction might be (690D.91/3–2450). The Canadian and Australian High Commissioners to India also recommended that their governments delay formal action with India (690D.91/3–2450). 2 Henderson, speaking for both Warren and himself, stated in his telegram 390 of March 24, not printed, that they felt it would be preferable before taking action with India, or replying to Pakistan, for Warren to talk with Liaquat Ali Khan on his return to Karachi that evening to learn if the Prime Minister had taken up the matter directly with Nehru (690D.91/3–2450). 3 Avra M. Warren, U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan, was on diplomatic business in New Delhi after a brief tour of East and West Bengal with some of his own and Henderson’s military and political advisers (690D.91/3–2450). The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/3–2450: Telegram [Document 779] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State confidential niact New Delhi , March 24, 1950—7 p. m. 401. Reference Embtels 396 and 397 March 24. [Here follows Henderson’s summary of his conversation with Sir Archibald Nye, United Kingdom High Commissioner to India, on the afternoon of March 24.] 6. I then called on Bajpai to discuss matters re China. At conclusion our talk I said I had just had visit from Ambassador Warren who had obtained some interesting impressions while in East Pakistan. One of his impressions was that many Hindus were leaving East Pakistan because they were being advised by relatives in West Pakistan that war was likely and that they should get out before it started. I added that Warren also had told me in confidence that there was much talk in Pakistan regarding Indian troop movements near Punjab frontier and that many Pakistanis seemed to feel that concentration Indian forces in that vicinity might compel them for reasons national security shift some of their forces. 7. Bajpai said he was glad I had mentioned this matter. He then described in detail conversations of last two days which he had with Nye. His description same as that Nye. He said that following first conversation he had immediately gone to Prime Minister and that he had based his second conversation on statements made by Prime Minister to him. Prime Minister had emphasized that he was opposed to making war on Pakistan but that he or no other [ neither he nor any other ] Indian leader could prevent Indian military forces from moving into East Bengal in case killings on large scale of Hindus should be resumed. He showed me in confidence secret memo distributed by Nehru to his Cabinet today emphasizing how stupid it would be for India to become involved in war with Pakistan over East Bengal and emphasizing that if India took initiative in such a war it would have whole world against it. Prime Minister nevertheless insisted that troop movement should be completed regardless of protest from any foreign sources whatsoever. He went on to say that if Pakistan on its part desired to shift its forces in order to meet any situation created by increased Indian military strength in East Punjab, India would have no complaint. 8. I said that it was depressing to hear India considered danger of war with Pakistan sufficiently great to warrant strengthening its military force near Pakistan borders. I was afraid that when it became general knowledge that this was being done the war hysteria would grow and that migration of minorities would increase rather than diminish. It seemed to me it would be difficult to convince Pakistanis India did not have aggressive intentions. 9. Bajpai said that there would be no objection his part if Ambassador Warren in talks with GOP leader would privately explain what he understood from reliable sources was reasons these troop movements. If Warren should have such conversations he should not, however, state that this information had been given by representative GOI to American Embassy. I intimated it might be more effective for GOI frankly to explain what it was doing and why to Pakistan. He made no reply. Sent Department 401, repeated Karachi 37. Henderson The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/3–2450: Telegram [Document 780] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Secretary of State top secret Karachi , March 24, 1950—10 p. m. 213. The Prime Minister when I called on him this evening at my request following my arrival from Delhi said that Karachi’s 209, March 23 had been sent prior to his arrival yesterday afternoon in a non-stop flight from Dacca but with his consent. When I asked him what consideration motivated this approach rather than a direct negotiation with Nehru with whom he maintains contact, he said he had experienced two instances of a run-around from Nehru during the Kashmir fighting and that he was not prepared to run the risk at this time of a third experience when the situation is so serious. Accordingly, he approved the approach that has been made and hopes the US will exercise its good offices with GOI to remove the menace of war either independently or in connection with Commonwealth countries who have been addressed. He said he is withholding action in his capacity as Defense Minister on the development defensive military posture until he has a reaction from the powers addressed but that he feels time is running out fast on account of the inflamed situation in West Bengal aggravated by the daily publication of Hindu refugee photos. When I asked him if we could rely on him not to publish his protest and exploit the situation in the event we brought the substance of his telegram to attention GOI, he said categorically we can depend on him to play ball. Based on my estimate of him and the urgency of the situation I, therefore, recommend Henderson bring the substance of Karachi’s telegram to the attention either of Bajpai or Nehru depending on Henderson’s judgment with request for their comment. This recommendation is based on reports from Henderson and military advisers that the tactical dispositions are established with the exception that the Karachi telegram did not spell out that ammunition and supplies have been stockpiled for a six weeks’ lightning campaign prior to the arrival of the monsoon in June. Sent Department 213, repeated New Delhi 33 eyes only Henderson. Warren The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/3–2550: Telegram [Document 781] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret niact New Delhi , March 25, 1950—noon. 407. Karachi telegram to Department 213, March 24. I find some difficulty in recommending action to be taken re Pakistan request for approach to GOI on troop movements. In my opinion it would be mistake for us to make formal representations. On other hand, there are disadvantages adopting entirely negative attitude to Pakistan request. It is likely UK and perhaps other members Commonwealth may make approaches of some kind. I do not believe we should associate ourselves with anyone in approaching GOI. My present thinking somewhat as follows, if approved by Department and if no other developments cause change in my ideas: I address letter to Bajpai enclosing copy of Pakistan note to US. In letter I say my government has expressed to me deep concern at situation which seems to be developing—a situation in which Pakistan and India might find themselves making moves and countermoves of military forces in manner which might indicate that each considers there is possibility of war with other. My government’s concern rises partly from fact that so frequently in past war psychology and even wars have developed as result series of military movements which began primarily for defensive purposes. My government has left it to my discretion whether or not I should bring Pakistan’s note to attention GOI and I have decided that it might be useful for GOI to understand manner in which Pakistan is viewing these troop movements. Since you were good enough during our talk on March 23 to explain in considerable detail the reasons and background for this reallocation of forces, there is no reason for me to ask you for comments. Nevertheless, if you care to make any further comments I shall be glad to pass them on to my government. If I write letter this kind Bajpai I could if agreeable to Department inform Karachi reaction and Warren could confidentially tell Liaquat. I do not think it would be advisable particularly at this stage for US take responsibility informing Pakistan either formally or informally that GOI feels invasion East Bengal is inevitable, in case large-scale killing again breaks out in East Bengal. 1 Sent Department 407, repeated Karachi 39. Henderson 1 Telegram 278 to New Delhi of March 25, not printed, concurred in these recommendations and instructed Henderson to handle the matter at his discretion and send to Warren the GOI reaction for him to inform Liaquat Ali Khan confidentially as he felt advisable (690D.91/3–2550). The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/3–2550: Telegram [Document 782] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Secretary of State top secret niact Karachi , March 25, 1950—2 p. m. 216. ReEmbtel 213, March 24. Prime Minister told me last night he had not seen UK-HICOM since he returned Karachi the night before. If UK approves Nye’s recommendation and instructs UK HICOM Pakistan inform Prime Minister immediately, this may delay GOP’s plan to reinforce East Pakistan by despatch two destroyers two supply ships now held Karachi on four hours sailing notice (reference Weeka 12, March 24) 1 and flight 8 Pakistan Furies direct East Pakistan without obtaining GOI permission fly over their territory. I do not know today status Pakistan armored brigade Rawalpindi, but hope to have report on its position soon. If GOP carries out any of these alleged defensive measures, I consider it inevitable news will leak and may serve to reinforce GOI’s arguments defending organization mobile forces Ambala. Certainly arrival of air and surface forces East Pakistan will support Hindu war fears there. Liaquat gave me positive impression last night he places greatest hope in alleviation of situation by expression US to GOI of its concern in maintaining peace this area. While I believe it is helpful if Nye makes first approach to GOI (Re Delhi’s 402, March 24 to Department), 2 I feel both GOI and GOP should receive from US an informal but strong statement of our concern that steps may be taken to ease popular panic, especially of Hindus in East Pakistan and to reduce war fever in West Bengal. I recommend, therefore, that Henderson and I be instructed to make informal statements along these lines, he either to Nehru or Bajpai, and I to Liaquat. Sent Department 216, repeated New Delhi 34. Warren 1 Not printed. 2 Not printed. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/3–2750: Telegram [Document 783] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority New Delhi , March 27, 1950—2 p. m. 417. Am delaying until March 28 giving letter Bajpai since UK High Commissioner plans on that date make formal representations Nehru and prefers, I understand, to talk with Nehru before I talk with Bajpai. Since this is more Commonwealth than US problem, I do not wish do anything which in his opinion might reduce effect his representations. I believe UK High Commissioner is not particularly happy our decision to take action. Although we may be rebuffed, nevertheless I still do not see how we can remain entirely deaf to Pakistan’s request. Full text my proposed letter to Bajpai follows: “My government is in receipt from GOP of urgent communication, copy of which is attached hereto, describing certain troop movements alleged to be taking place in India, stating Pakistan stands for peace and has no aggressive designs on India and expressing hope that US Government endeavor to persuade GOI to move back to its forward formations. My government has indicated to me its deep concern at situation which seems to be developing—situation in which Pakistan and India might find themselves making moves and counter-moves of military forces in manner which might indicate each considers there is possibility of war with other. My government’s concern arises partly from fact so frequently in past war psychology and even wars have developed as result of series of military movements which began primarily for defensive purposes. My government nevertheless has felt some hesitation in bringing to attention of GOI fact that Pakistan has addressed to it note on this subject since it realizes recent movement of troops in India is merely single development in whole series of events arising from present strained relations between India and Pakistan and it does not desire to make any move which might be misinterpreted as interference or which might exacerbate already extremely delicate situation. It has therefore left it to my discretion whether or not Pakistan note should be brought to attention of GOI. After giving matter careful thought, I have decided it might be useful for GOI to understand manner in which Pakistan is viewing these recent troop movements and I am therefore taking responsibility of writing this letter to you. Since you were good enough during our talk on March 24 to explain in considerable detail reasons and background for present reallocation of Indian forces, there is no reason for me to ask for comments. Nevertheless if you care to make any further comments, I should be glad to pass them on to my government.” Sent Department 417, repeated Karachi 40. Henderson The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/3–2750: Telegram [Document 784] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret New Delhi , March 27, 1950—4 p. m. 418. I have just received from Bajpai top secret letter enclosing paraphrase of telegram which Nehru has sent Liaquat Ali Khan on Bengal problem. Date of Nehru’s telegram is not given. Bajpai’s letter indicates text also sent Mrs. Pandit. For time being at least, it seems to me important knowledge of this message be restricted to immediately interested American officials only. Text is as follows: “In your telegram of fourteenth March, you said that you would write to me on your return to Karachi from East Bengal. I have not heard from you so far. “I need not tell you of the urgency of the East Bengal problem. You have been there and must now have a personal appreciation of the gravity of the situation. Refugees from there continue to pour in; during the last three days, the number has averaged 15,000 daily. Nearly half million have come over since the recent troubles started and there are no signs of the flood stopping. That is evidence of the persistence of a sense of insecurity among non-Muslims there. Apart from the misery that refugees suffer from this uprooting from their ancestral homes and all that that involves, the economic burden and the psychological strain upon our people, both Hindu and Muslim, have become intolerable. “A flow of Muslim refugees in the opposite direction, though smaller in volume, is also in progress. That must create a similar economic and psychological problem for you. “This process cannot go on without disastrous consequence to both our countries and we have to make an all-out effort to solve it. “I think that quickest and most effective way to attempt a solution is for us to meet. Correspondence is a poor substitute for personal discussions; the urgency and gravity of the task will not brook the unavoidable delays that correspondence involves. I would therefore urge you to come to Delhi at the earliest possible convenient date. So far as we are concerned, we are prepared to meet you here, and any colleagues that you may wish to bring, on any date and to put aside every other engagement. As I pointed out in my telegram dated sixteenth March, the stage for mere declaration on the lines that we have been discussing is past. Practically everything that was to be included in that statement has already been said by both of us publicly. It is imperative that we go to the very root of the problem and devise solutions which will put an end to the present situation that threatens catastrophe.” Sent Department 418, repeated Karachi 41. Henderson The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 690D.91/3–2750: Telegram [Document 785] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 top secret priority Washington , March 27, 1950—7 p. m. 222. For Warren. New Delhi’s 41 Mar 27 to Karachi. 2 Believe Nehru’s letter to Liaquat points way to next step. Suggest you reaffirm to Liaquat our great concern in informal conversation and urge immediate personal meeting with Nehru indicating we consider this such prime importance that nothing shld interfere. If Liaquat’s reluctance to go to Delhi real stumbling block, you might suggest neutral point such as Colombo. Since Henderson has indicated knowledge Nehru letter shld be restricted American officials only appears impossible for you to use this info unless you have already been informed by GOP. If you judge opportune might also suggest as gesture good intentions GOP shld hold fast on all redeployment armed forces during active consideration joint meeting. Acheson 1 Repeated to New Delhi 285 for Henderson. 2 Printed as telegram 418 to Washington, supra . The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 791.00/3–2850: Telegram [Document 786] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret niact New Delhi , March 28, 1950—4 p. m. 419. 1. I delivered Bajpai 12:30 p. m. today letter 1 enclosing copy Pakistan note to US re reallocation troops north India. He accepted letter good grace and said he appreciated our straight forwardness in matter. He had already explained background and reasons for movements and had nothing really to add. Movements had been practically completed and it was impossible undo measures which had already been taken in interests long term defense. GOI had no intention whatsoever using these troops except for defense purposes. 2. Bajpai said Nye UK High Commissioner had discussed with Nehru this morning what seemed to have been similar message from Pakistan to UK. Canadian High Commissioner had asked on behalf Pearson questions yesterday afternoon re movement these troops. He assumed Canada had received similar message from Pakistan. Australian High Commissioner had asked see Nehru this afternoon he assumed on similar errand. Furthermore, Nehru had received yesterday from Liaquat Ali Khan letter dated March 28 part of which Bajpai read aloud to me. In this letter Liaquat indicated his concern at finding on his return Karachi from east Bengal that these Indian troop movements had taken place and indicated movements this kind when known to public would undoubtedly increase resentment and strain. Letter further emphasized importance personal conversations and invited Nehru come Karachi soon as possible. 3. Bajpai then read portion Nehru’s reply sent yesterday to Liaquat in which Nehru referred to his communication to Liaquat inviting Liaquat visit Delhi which appeared to have crossed Liaquat’s letter to Nehru. Nehru then agreed on urgency of two getting together but stressed it was important that he have with him during conversations members his cabinet who for reasons of health could not travel to Karachi and again suggested Liaquat come Delhi. 4. I told Bajpai it would be unfortunate if meeting this kind which might result in quieting fears on both sides should be delayed because of disagreement re venue. Bajpai replied Nehru had told him this morning that he was personally prepared meet Liaquat any place since he did not wish petty detail such as place of meeting to postpone talks, but Nehru had pointed out it was absolutely necessary for sake of cabinet unity that Patel be at his side and Patel’s health would not permit travel Karachi. Bajpai added for my personal and confidential information that there had been terrific strain in cabinet during last week of such serious character that Nehru had felt constrained to tell President 2 that if cabinet prevented him from pursuing his policies he would have to resign. Nehru therefore felt Patel who was leader opposition should share responsibility of agreements reached with Liaquat. Bajpai hoped there was some way convince Liaquat Nehru’s desire for talks take place in Delhi was not based on cheap considerations prestige. 5. I asked Bajpai if he would object to me passing along to Ambassador Warren for his use in conversations he may have with Liaquat some of background responsible for Nehru’s insistence on Delhi. 6. Bajpai said it might be helpful if Warren could tell Liaquat he had heard from me that my information was that Nehru considered conference with Liaquat urgent, that he felt it necessary in view political situation India that Patel also be present, that Patel could not travel Karachi because of health and that therefore Nehru sincerely hoped Liaquat would understand real reasons for latter’s desire conference be held in Delhi. I told Bajpai I would pass this information to Warren for such discreet use as he could make of it. 7. I have reason believe Nehru is sincere in reason for not traveling Karachi. I had heard previously from reliable source of grave cabinet crisis which took place last week in which Nehru found himself almost alone in face hostile cabinet led by Patel. This will be subject of another telegram. It would be extremely helpful if Liaquat could find it possible in view gravity situation come Delhi. 8. Reverting to troop reallocation, Bajpai said it was Nehru’s belief this matter could be one of subjects for talks between two Prime Ministers when they met. [Here follows discussion of the recent murder in West Bengal of a prominent British businessman and an unprovoked mob attack there on two American fliers.] 11. Bajpai said he would bring my letter immediately to Nehru’s attention. Sent Department 419, repeated Karachi niact 42. Henderson 1 Henderson delivered a slightly altered draft of the letter suggested in his telegram 417, p. 1399 [ Pg. 1399 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] . Omitted from the first paragraph was the phrase “stands for peace and.” In the last paragraph, Henderson omitted the first word, “Since,” and the phrase “there is no reason for me to ask for comments.” (690D.91/3–3050) 2 Rajendra Prasad, President of India. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) 690D.91/3–2850: Telegram [Document 787] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) top secret niact New Delhi , March 28, 1950—6 p. m. 43. 1. We have received information this afternoon that Liaquat has announced his intention come Delhi for conversations. We consider this most hopeful development of recent days and believe his decision will much improve atmosphere negotiations so far as GOI is concerned. (Embtel 419, to Department, repeated Karachi 42, March 28.) 2. If you have not already talked with Liaquat, suggest in discussing Pakistan’s note to US that you inform him I have informally advised GOI contents his message and have indicated concern our government lest series of movements and counter-movements of troops might increase strain on relations between two countries. You may add that my approach received in friendly manner and I obtained impression GOI anxious that relations improve rather than deteriorate and looking forward to coming conversations in hope that they will serve to clarify atmosphere, alleviate tension and lay basis for future cooperation. 3. Important there should be no leak re our action this respect. Sent Karachi 43, repeated Department 420. Henderson Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 357.AB/3–2850 [Document 788] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State confidential [ Washington ,] March 28, 1950. Subject: United Nations Representative for Kashmir Dispute Participants: The Secretary Sir Oliver Shewell Franks, British Ambassador NEA: Mr. Mathews Sir Oliver opened the conversation by stating that he believed that London, which had previously regarded the Indo-Pakistan situation as troublesome and difficult, had now come to the conclusion that it was extremely serious and that war might overtake India and Pakistan with disastrous results for the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, both politically and economically. It was against this background, he believed, that his Government had instructed him to present to me its view that a panel of names should be submitted to India and Pakistan from which they could indicate their preferences for the position of United Nations Representative for the Kashmir dispute. London hoped that in addition to the name of Ralph Bunche, which they proposed, the name of one other outstanding American, such as General Marshall, 1 could be included. I commented that I was somewhat amused at the suggestion that someone like General Marshall be named as we had only one General Marshall and I was sure the President would not agree to his being proposed for the Kashmir position. I went on to say that we would find it very difficult to arouse the interest of any outstanding American in this position in view of the great difficulty which Admiral Nimitz had experienced. Mr. Mathews remarked that if a list were to be presented to the parties Admiral Nimitz’s name would certainly have to be included even though some other prominent American could be induced to lend his name. I told Sir Oliver that it was our view that since we understood that Norman Robertson of Canada and Owen Dixon 2 of Australia were available for the position of UN representative, the co-sponsors of the recent Security Council resolution should choose between these two candidates and inform the Indians and Pakistanis of their choice and of their intention to submit his name to the Security Council. I had the highest regard for both Robertson and Dixon but my personal view was that Robertson might be the better qualified for this particular task. As regards the submission of a list to the parties, it seemed to me that this would occasion further delay and might result in the gradual elimination of the whole list by objections to each name by one or the other parties. Sir Oliver said that he would report my views to London. 3 1 General of the Army George C. Marshall, former U.S. Secretary of State. 2 Sir Owen Dixon, former Justice of the High Court of Australia; Minister in the United States 1942–1944. 3 The cosponsors of the Security Council resolution agreed on April 4 to the selection of Dixon. It was decided that the decision would be communicated immediately to India and Pakistan by the SC President and that a meeting on the matter would be held if possible on April 12 (357.AB/4–450). On that date, the Security Council held its 471st meeting and approved the appointment of Dixon as United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan by a vote of nine in favor and two abstentions. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 690D.91/3–3150: Telegram [Document 789] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 1 secret priority niact Washington , March 31, 1950—7 p. m. 311. For Henderson and Warren. If you consider it wld be helpful and if you can both arrange before Delhi mtg convey orally substance fol msg from me to Nehru and Liaquat: “President and I had been fol developments in subcontinent with increasing dismay until we recd word that two PMs had agreed to meet in New Delhi. This act of high statesmanship on both sides has greatly encouraged us. I wish to express the President’s and my own heartfelt hopes for a successful mtg which will relieve the existing tension between India and Pakistan and mark the beginning of a new trend toward improved Indo-Pak relations.” Important that msg be delivered both PMs 2 and that there be no publicity. Acheson 1 Repeated to Karachi 231. 2 The message was conveyed orally to Liaquat Ali Khan by Warren on April 1 and was delivered to Bajpai in Henderson’s absence by the Counselor of Embassy on April 2 for Bajpai’s promised immediate transmittal to Nehru. Details of delivery of the message and brief replies from Liaquat and Nehru are in telegram 258 from Karachi of April 1 and telegram 452 from New Delhi of April 3, neither printed. (690D.91/4–150 and 4–350) The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/4–850: Telegram [Document 790] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret niact New Delhi , April 8, 1950—7 p. m. 486. 1. I have just returned from conversation with Bajpai who appeared exhausted and quite ill. (Embtel 484, repeated Karachi 48 of April 8.) 1 He said last few days represented great strain in his life. It seemed almost a miracle agreement has been reached and he gave much credit to Nehru for courage and perseverence pointing out that Nehru’s greatest difficulties were not in working out agreement with Liaquat but in maintaining unity in his own Cabinet. He maintained that although there were at times divergencies on various points between Nehru and Patel, Patel on whole loyally supported Nehru during various crises. Without Patel’s support result would have been negative. 2. Bajpai permitted me read text of agreement. It is lengthy and contains: detailed provisions covering treatment to be accorded to migrating refugees and to refugees returning to their homes, it calls for compensation for property losses for minorities from or in East Bengal, West Bengal, Tripura and Assam; it provides for the setting up of committees of inquiry and of minority commissions in these provinces, for suppression of news and propaganda of a nature calculated to arouse communal hatred or hostility between Pakistan and India, for appointment of a minister from each of central governments to handle minority problems, etc. Since under its terms agreement will be presented publicly to Parliaments both countries on April 10, I shall not endeavor describe it now in detail. Full text will be available early next week. My general impression of agreement however was that so far as provinces covered were concerned it was document which with reasonable amount of goodwill and with loyal implementation could be basis for gradual elimination of minority problems. 3. Bajpai said his deepest concern now was ability leaders GOI to prevent sabotage these arrangements by Hindu fanatics, extremists, and political opportunists. There can be no doubt that many Indians who desired war with Pakistan would be disappointed at success of conversations. On other hand he was convinced result of conversations would improve atmosphere both in India and Pakistan and would strengthen hands of those who really desire friendly cooperation. 4. Bajpai made additional comments and observations which may be of interest: ( a ) At Mohammed Ali’s suggestions, conversations have been taking place re trade relations and basis has been laid for formal conference on subject during latter part this month. ( b ) Mohammed Ali suggested that it would be helpful if Pakistan and India could come understanding re Kashmir before arrival mediator. Bajpai agreed and outlined various methods for settlement of dispute including his own favorite method which he described to Ali as “Lippmann’s 2 suggestions” i.e. partition plus plebiscite in Vale of Kashmir. Ali said Pakistan was so deeply committed to “over-all plebiscite” he did not see how any other method could be approved at this time. Bajpai replied that perhaps it would be preferable not attempt do too much during this first conference—perhaps mediator would be helpful in solution this particular problem. 5. In reply to my inquiry Bajpai said at opening conversations Liaquat had referred to Indian troop concentrations Ambala. Nehru emphasized shifting of troops was not planned by aggressive intentions and suggested discussion this problem be postponed until after agreement had been made re minorities. Today just before his departure Liaquat again raised this question. Nehru told him impossible make any changes in troop disposition just now but he was confident that if agreement resulted in improved atmosphere and in curtailment of migration of minorities he would be in position later to take measures which should relieve Pakistan anxieties in this respect. Nehru did indicate however that it might be possible to suspend further movements necessary to complete planned composition of mobile corps at Ambala. I told Bajpai I had asked this question because of my government’s deep interest in this matter. Unless Pakistan’s suspicions aroused by these movements could be removed much benefit derived from minorities agreement might be offset. 6. Bajpai said that Liaquat invited Nehru pay return visit Karachi discuss other outstanding problems before his departure US and Nehru tentatively agreed. Visit will probably be about April 27. 7. In conclusion Bajpai said that in his opinion greatest single advantage derived from conversation was that Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan had become acquainted and each had learned to have respect for and trust in other. 8. I told Bajpai my government had been awaiting with anxiety outcome of conference since it realized importance of success to stability and even peace of South Asia. I knew I was speaking on behalf my government when I asked him to convey to Prime Minister hearty congratulations. We understood perhaps better than Prime Minister realized strain under which he had been working and admired courage and restraint with which he had succeeded in face of such tremendous obstacles. It seemed that Liaquat had also shown outstanding statesmanship and all hopes must now be placed on ability two governments implement agreement and prepare way for elimination other differences. Bajpai promised convey this message to Nehru. Sent Department 486, repeated Karachi 50. Henderson 1 Telegram 484 from New Delhi, April 8, not printed, contained information concerning the current talks between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan in New Delhi (690D.91/4–850). 2 Walter Lippman, American editor and author, special news correspondent for the New York Herald-Tribune and other newspapers. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 690D.91/4–1850: Telegram [Document 791] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 1 secret Washington , April 18, 1950—5 p. m. 374. For Henderson and Warren. Convey fol msg Nehru and Liaquat earliest opportunity: “President and I wish thank you for your kind response my msg sent you on eve commencement mtgs New Delhi. We are highly gratified by results your efforts and believe they will have most beneficial effect not only as regards minorities problem but also by creating new atmosphere favorable to increased efforts reach agreement on other issues which block closer relations with your neighbor. President sends heartiest congratulations in which I join him.” Msg may be delivered orally or in writing ur discretion. Important as in case previous msg (Deptel 311 Mar 31) there be no publicity. 2 Acheson 1 Repeated to Karachi 278. 2 In telegram 562 from New Delhi, April 23, not printed, Henderson reported that this message was received on April 20 and sent to Nehru through Bajpai on that date. The Prime Minister, in his answer of April 22, transmitted in telegram 562, thanked President Truman and Acheson for their message of congratulations, expressed determination to make the minorities agreement a success, and looked forward to a resolution of the other problems in a continuing spirit of friendship and understanding. (690D.91/4–2350) Ambassador Warren, in his telegram 379 of April 27, not printed, conveyed Liaquat Ali Khan’s thanks for the message in telegram 374 and his assurance that it would continue to be his constant endeavor to reach agreement with India on all issues (790D.00/4–2750). The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/5–550: Telegram [Document 792] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority New Delhi , May 5, 1950—7 p. m. 629. V. P. Menon, Secretary of States Ministry, sent for Parsons 1 this afternoon and gave him following message which he said Patel would have given directly to me had it been practicable. Menon asked Patel’s name and his not be used in connection and discussion this matter. Message was as follows: GOI was loyally trying to implement truce represented by Nehru–Liaquat agreement April 8, but there was feeling of nervousness in view past experience with Indo-Pakistan agreements. This feeling heightened by presence Liaquat in Washington 2 and fact that he had at once made speech which to Indians seemed in bad taste. Moreover, he had already asked US for two things, economic aid and modern arms. No one could object to his asking for economic aid, but Indians could only ask themselves against whom does he wish to arm. If he were to receive promise of arms at this moment, it would undermine pact of April 8 and destroy its prospects of success. In outlining foregoing, Menon said that when India had moved its troops to East Punjab, Pakistan had thought India was about to fight and as result Liaquat came to Delhi and negotiated. He seemed to imply that in coming to terms in Delhi, Liaquat had gained time which he was now using to try and obtain modern weapons wherewith to balance India’s superior strength. Parsons told Menon that US Government fully appreciated delicacy of situation and that he absolutely confident that no action would even be considered which might appear as intervention in favor of one side or other or which might seem to upset balance. He said success of pact was of immense moment to entire world including US as well as to two countries most intimately concerned and that no one was more anxious than US for it to succeed. Menon expressed appreciation of this. Parsons then said we had been much embarrassed by recent Sulzberger story 3 to New York Times from Karachi stating Ambassador Warren, worried by trend Indo-Pakistan relations, had come Delhi with result I intervened to bring about Nehru–Liaquat meeting. He said he had been very grateful that Government and press here had apparently realized this story pure fabrication and had played it down. Menon said he remembered this well as both Patel and Nehru had seen and commented on story, but had realized US Government or its officials would not have inspired it. I believe Patel’s indirect approach (which presumably made through Menon because subject was outside his field and in that of Nehru as Minister External Affairs) is evidence of anxiety here over Liaquat’s visit and indication that restoration of mutual confidence of Indian and Pakistan leaders in each other has not yet progressed very far. It seems to me most important that anything which may be said to Liaquat publicly or even privately should be studied with as much care from standpoint of Indian reaction as of that of Pakistan. Menon is, I fear, correct in his estimate of affect [ effect ] on pact of any indication of a promise of US arms to Pakistan. I hope Department will find it possible to keep GOI as fully informed as possible of US talks with Liaquat. Parsons understands it our policy not to give any substantial military equipment either to Pakistan or India so long as outstandings dispute exists, but quite correctly in my opinion did not so state, since it would have been inappropriate make unilateral statement this effect in these circumstances. It might be helpful if I could be authorized tell Menon informally that I understood from general information received my Government that Liaquat not thus far taking advantage his visit US to press US to support Pakistan in connection any of its differences with GOI in case, of course, such statement is true. I would like to add that I was sure Liaquat was not expecting arms from US under present conditions. Henderson 1 James G. Parsons, First Secretary and Consul at New Delhi and in Nepal. 2 See footnote 4, p. 1498 [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 837 ] . 3 C. L. Sulzberger, chief foreign correspondent, the New York Times . The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 690D.91/5–550: Telegram [Document 793] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India top secret Washington , May 9, 1950—7 p. m. 460. Urtel 629 May 5. Dept suggests fol be conveyed informally to Menon in ur discretion: 1. Since it is our understanding both Govts doing best to carry out minorities agreement, we find it difficult understand why Liaquat’s visit to US shld heighten nervousness in Delhi, particularly as GOI knows trip is state visit identical with Nehru’s and planned many months ago. 2. While we not in position discuss with GOI substance of Liaquat’s statements we do not find it surprising that Liaquat has mentioned interest in obtaining mil equipment. It will be recalled that when Nehru was here GOI officials took up with US officials question of obtaining ammunition; Indian mil mission endeavored obtain mil equipment last year and Ind Emb is continuing efforts. 3. There has been no change in situation affecting procurement of arms in US by GOP or GOI since last year. Although U.S. cannot commit itself in advance to any specific transaction, in gen there is no objection in principle to purchases from commercial sources. There are still serious obstacles to procurement aid in obtaining items from Govt stocks. ( End remarks to Menon .) FYI Dept finds implications third para urtel exceedingly disturbing. This tends substantiate Dept’s fears GOI making mil pressure an instrument of policy in Nehru-Liaquat talks instead of believing Liaquat genuinely anxious for peace regardless of Indian troop movements. Dept concurs Parson’s remarks fourth para. Re sixth para Dept is carefully considering possible effect on GOI of anything we say to Liaquat just as GOP was kept in mind during our conversations when Nehru was in US. Dept does not however consider it any more appropriate to keep GOI currently informed of talks with Liaquat than it wld have been to inform GOP of talks with Nehru, which as you know was not done. Re last para, Liaquat is quite naturally endeavoring present GOP views in same way Nehru presented GOI views when he was here and has expressed interest in obtaining mil equipment. Dept does not recall any complaints from GOP during Nehru visit. However, in addition to approaches to you, Ind Emb official here has already made informal representations to Dept re certain remarks made by Begum Liaquat and PM. Webb The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/6–250: Telegram [Document 794] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret Washington , June 2, 1950—9 a. m. 781. During talk with Bajpai on June 1 re Kashmir situation he told me following: (1) Dixon had had several conversations with Nehru and himself re Kashmir which were for most part confined to matters procedure. (2) Dixon has taken position which GOI considers valid that on basis his terms reference he should at once endeavor to ascertain whether arrangements can be made with full cooperation India and Pakistan for plebiscite. Therefore, his first specific task should be endeavor obtain agreement re demilitarization. (3) Dixon believes it would be mistake for him to talk to each Prime Minister separately re matter demilitarization. His plan is to persuade them talk to each other in his presence on subject. If they fail find basis for agreement he might then offer suggestions. In case he fails bring about agreement re demilitarization he will decide at that time what next step should be. There will probably be no substantive conversations re demilitarization until after Nehru’s return India latter part June or early July. (4) Dixon asked Bajpai if it might not be helpful in meantime for latter talk over matter demilitarization with Zafrullah. Bajpai replied that in his opinion such conversation might merely serve make each side more firmly wedded to its present position. He certainly would have no authority to alter India’s viewpoint and he believed that it was unlikely that Zafrullah would be willing to recede from Pakistan’s position. (5) I believe that Dixon has made excellent impression thus far. He is feeling his way carefully and is wise in not attempting push forward too rapidly. (6) During short conversation which I had with him at dinner with Australian High Commissioner several days ago he told me he felt very much isolated in his work. He had thus far not been given any advisers other than Colban. 1 It had been suggested to him informally by both British and American Governments that it would be preferable for him to hold himself rather aloof from their respective representatives in Delhi. Although he felt very much in need of advice, particularly re background, he assumed that he would be compelled work singlehandedly. I told him that all of us were anxious for success of his mission and that it was probably felt in Washington and London that his mission would be more likely to be successful if GOI would be convinced such decisions as he might reach were based on his own conclusions uninfluenced by representatives any great powers. Department pass London. Sent Department 781; repeated info Karachi 66, London unnumbered. Henderson 1 Erik A. Colban, Norwegian diplomat, former Personal Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 690D.91/6–1550 [Document 795] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] June 15, 1950. Subject: Government of India Request for Official United States Statement Clarifying its Policy with regard to Shipment of Arms to India and Pakistan Participants: Her Excellency, Madame Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Ambassador of India The Honorable, Dean Acheson—Secretary of State Mr. T. N. Kaul—First Secretary, Embassy of India Mr. Joseph S. Sparks—SOA Madame Pandit apologized for requesting an appointment so soon after my return to Washington but explained that she was forced to do so by the deep concern of her Government over statements which had been made by the Pakistan Prime Minister. She said that following the agreement between the Indian and Pakistan Prime Ministers of April 8, 1950 it had been understood by the Government of India that Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan would refrain during his trip to the United States from making statements of a disturbing nature. He had, however, made such statements and their effect was to establish a barrier to the carrying out of the agreement. Madame Pandit said that her brother, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Ministers had tried very hard to make the Indo-Pakistan agreement workable but that their task had been made almost impossible by Liaquat Ali Khan’s speeches. Maintaining that unimportant statements would have been overlooked by her Government, Madame Pandit said that it was impossible to overlook Liaquat Ali Khan’s allegations that India had defaulted in its obligations to deliver Pakistan’s equitable share of military equipment following partition. She charged that Liaquat’s allegations had been linked by him with an appeal to the United States for arms and that the Pakistan Prime Minister had further blamed the high per cent of Pakistan’s budget devoted to military expenditures on India’s failure to deliver Pakistan’s rightful share of military equipment. In order to explain the actual situation in regard to military stores in the subcontinent, Madame Pandit related India’s interpretation of their history. She said that at the time of partition all military supplies in the subcontinent were owned by the United Kingdom. It was agreed that India should reimburse the United Kingdom for these supplies and that Pakistan in turn should reimburse India for the share of supplies which it received. The Ambassador said that India had paid the United Kingdom and that 14.6 crores of rupees (approximately 43.8 million dollars prior to devaluation of the rupee) were owed to India by Pakistan. She alleged that Pakistan had accepted this obligation originally, had re-accepted it at a later date and then in the last analysis had refused to pay. According to the Ambassador, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had referred to 160,000 tons of supplies. She said that he had not, however, referred to the 50 to 60,000 tons of supplies which Pakistan, under the agreement, was supposed to ship to India. Madame Pandit said that India had shipped all of the important items in the list and sixty per cent of the unimportant items to Pakistan, whereas Pakistan had shipped only ten per cent of the supplies to India which it owed. Although India did not customarily refer to these supplies in terms of tons, the partition had been carried out in such a way that each military unit transferred to Pakistan from India had carried its own equipment with it and it was estimated by India that 75 to 80,000 tons of supplies were actually shipped from India to Pakistan. The Ambassador stated that she particularly regretted the timing of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s charges in that the Indo-Pakistan agreement of April 8 had been working on a mutually satisfactory basis and the Indian Cabinet had hoped that within a matter of weeks it might be possible to tackle other matters between the two countries. As a result of Liaquat Ali Khan’s speeches, however, she alleged that the position has again become tense between India and Pakistan and any attempts to resolve differences amicably have been made extremely difficult. In this connection the Ambassador referred to Sir Owen Dixon’s conversations with Prime Minister Nehru and Sir Girja Bajpai. She said that she had just been informed that a meeting was to be arranged between the Indian and Pakistan Prime Ministers when they had each returned to the subcontinent and she felt that such a meeting would not be productive in the present atmosphere. One of the unfortunate aspects of the situation according to Madame Pandit was the fact that the position of the United States has not been clear. She said that there is a widespread belief in India that the United States, by its passive attitude, has indicated acceptance and support of the Pakistanis’ claims and that a public statement from me on this subject would be helpful. It was her contention that the state of public opinion in India against the United States is one of the important barriers to an improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. I told Madame Pandit that I had personally missed hearing the Pakistan Prime Minister’s addresses in that I had been out of the country at the time. I understood, however, that Ambassador Henderson had discussed this matter in detail with Sir Girja Bajpai and had explained to him that the United States has not in any way interfered or taken a part in the question of the division of military supplies between India and Pakistan. I was certain that we had not in any way been influenced by the statement of the Pakistan Prime Minister on this problem. I took occasion to explain to Madame Pandit that in point of fact much greater amounts of arms have gone from the United States to India than to Pakistan. Mentioning our legal difficulties in being of assistance I told the Ambassador that we are currently seeking authority from Congress of a nature which we have not previously had. I explained, however, that Congress had not acted upon the pending legislation and that it was not possible to know, in view of the substantial opposition against it, whether or not it would be passed. In the meanwhile both India and Pakistan have made purchases exclusively on the commercial market and I pointed out again that India has done so much more successfully than Pakistan. I asked Madame Pandit how we could make this situation public, as she had suggested, without magnifying it. Madame Pandit said that the Indian public believes that the Pakistan Prime Minister came to the United States with the definite mission of obtaining American military assistance and that he had succeeded. I promised the Ambassador that we would give the matter careful thought and see if it was possible for us to say something publicly which would be helpful. Madame Pandit referred to articles which had appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post to the effect that Liaquat Ali Khan had talked to me about arms and that I had referred him favorably to Secretary Johnson. 1 She said that these articles were particularly played up in the Indian press. Mr. Kaul said that another article stated that Pakistan was going to enter MAP. The Ambassador remarked that she had been asked what India’s position would be if Pakistan were to receive aid from the United States and that she had replied that India’s foreign policy is not dependent upon the decisions made by the United States as to which countries it will extend aid. I said that I did not understand the source of articles of the nature described by the Ambassador and assured her once again that we would study the problem carefully and see if it were possible for me or someone else in the Government to make some sort of an official statement. 1 Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense. The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/7–2550: Telegram [Document 796] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Secretary of State secret Karachi , July 25, 1950—11 p. m. 91. Liaquat on his return from Delhi today told me results of his 16 hours conferences with Nehru and Dixon. 1 Dixon proposed that immediate consideration be given to implementation of the SC resolution that had resulted in his appointment and suggested specifically: (1) that Azad Kashmir forces be disbanded and the northern area be placed under jurisdiction of UN officers who would be appointed district magistrates to maintain order and prepare that part of area for the plebiscite; (2) that Abdullah’s militia be disbanded in the vale; (3) that Nehru’s army be withdrawn from Kashmir and Jammu down to an agreed figure necessary for internal policing; (4) that UN officers be appointed district magistrates in part of Kashmir and Jammu now held by Nehru’s army to keep order and prepare the people for the plebiscite. Nehru rejected these proposals categorically and said that the size of his armed forces to be retained in Kashmir would be determined by recommendation of his military staff. His staff have recommended that no diminution of forces can be accepted because of necessity of holding Kashmir against a surprise attack by Pakistan army. Liaquat said that from this point on the conversations were taken up largely by arguments between Dixon and Nehru. Dixon could not support Nehru’s fear of attack from Pakistan and held the point of view that unless Nehru were to modify his attitude substantially it would not be possible to hold a fair plebiscite under the guns of Indian army. The Prime Minister added that from time to time in conversations Nehru asked why it was that the SC had moved so quickly against North Koreans and yet had done nothing when his forces were attacked in Kashmir by Pakistan. Liaquat reminded him that at time of partition the proportionate size of Indian and Pakistan armed forces was 2 to 1. Now it is nearer 4 to 1. In response to Nehru’s inquiry why Pakistan was continuing to arm itself, Liaquat asked him why he was continuing to expand his regular and militia troops and offered if Nehru would meet him to reduce Pakistan strength to relative size at time the 2 states came into being. The press note given out last night at Delhi was drafted by Dixon. It was agreed that Dixon would remain in Delhi and discuss with Nehru after meeting of the GOI Cabinet tomorrow any other proposals that Dixon might support as being fair and reasonable and which he might bring to Karachi at end of week to present to Liaquat. Liaquat then told me he is keeping an open mind for any suggestions Dixon may present, but he asked Dixon not to press India’s minimum position unless he felt it was a fair proposal. Several times during conversations Nehru talked of war between the 2 countries and this seemed to be upsetting to Dixon. Liaquat feels that if Nehru believed he could launch a war without too much cost that he might try it without taking into consideration the probability of millions of Hindu and Muslim civilians murdering one another. Liaquat’s feeling is that nothing may be done until he hears further from Dixon. If Nehru should not recede from his present attitude then Liaquat feels that US and UK must give serious thought to a situation that could easily deteriorate and which from the point of view of Pakistan’s desire to give early and positive help in Korea 2 would present a grave risk to their local security should try [ any? ] substantial force be despatched abroad. He said Nehru came to see him early this a. m. before he took the plane at Delhi to ask if his government had taken a decision about sending armed forces to Korea whereupon Liaquat replied in negative. Then Nehru said he would keep Liaquat informed should GOI decide to give military support in Korea. Liaquat did not commit himself, for, as he put it Nehru had given him no indication of his projected correspondence with Stalin on Korean problem. Sent Department 91, repeated info Delhi 8, London 3. Warren 1 The talks in New Delhi began on July 20 and adjourned July 24 with the next meeting scheduled to be held in Karachi at an unspecified date. 2 Documentation on Korea is printed in volume vii . The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/7–2950: Telegram [Document 797] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret New Delhi , July 29, 1950—10 a. m. 232. 1. I learned yesterday through high and reliable Indian governmental sources following: a . During recent conversation between Liaquat and Nehru with Dixon participating, Dixon did his best to find formula for demilitarization looking forward to general Kashmir plebiscite. b . Liaquat displayed willingness make generous concessions in matter demilitarization provided his concessions would assure general plebiscite. Nehru was unyielding, laying down conditions which Liaquat obviously could not accept. c . During last of series of conversation after it had become clear that it was impossible find formula which would assure general plebiscite, Dixon advanced for consideration idea of partial partition plus plebiscite in Vale; that is, roughly each country to retain what it now controls of Kashmir subject to certain possible minor frontier adjustments with exception plebiscite would be held in Vale of Kashmir. d . Liaquat violently opposed such suggestion and Nehru felt compelled at this stage to act as though he was not enamoured with it. 2. My informant who had been sent to me by one of most powerful political figures in India added that: a . Indian Cabinet was extremely anxious for settlement of Kashmir in near future on basis which will leave as little bitterness as possible. b . It was absolutely out of question, however, for India to permit Jammu with its heavy Hindu population and its geographical position to go to Pakistan. c . Cabinet believed only solution was that of partition-plebiscite as advanced by Dixon and believed that if Pakistan accepts this solution, GOI should be extremely liberal in making concessions re demilitarization and UN control in Vale during course plebiscite even though it was confident that plebiscite under such conditions would yield Vale to Pakistan. In other words, Cabinet prepared now abandon idea of Vale going to India provided Jammu and Ladakh would be retained and decision re Vale would be based on plebiscite. d . Nehru although somewhat reluctant was willing go along with Cabinet in this regard but believed that he must continue treat Dixon’s suggestion with reserve in order that Liaquat would not gain impression that adoption this suggestion would represent great concession on part of Pakistan to India. e . Sheikh Abdullah and his associates were likely to protest loudly in case India and Pakistan should agree to partition with plebiscite for Vale. They might even attempt to resort to force with Communist support. They might cause some difficulties for UN civilian and military officials supervising plebiscite but these difficulties were not likely to become so grave as to prevent plebiscite from being held. 3. Source expressed hope of several prominent Indian leaders that anything US could discreetly do to condition Pakistan for accepting partition-plebiscite solution would be in interest of stability south Asia. 4. I gained impression that Nehru would like, if given opportunity, to endeavor obtain concessions from Pakistan in other spheres in return for agreeing to solution of Kashmir which would probably result in Yale going to Pakistan. Sent Department 232, Karachi 14 eyes only for Warren. Henderson The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/8–450: Telegram [Document 798] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Secretary of State top secret Karachi , August 4, 1950—7 p. m. 123. Eyes only Secretary. Sir Owen Dixon, in a long conversation with me this p. m., said Nehru in his eager and voluble opposition to the various conditions Dixon proposed for an overall Kashmir plebiscite made himself vulnerable time and again to Liaquat, but Liaquat appeared so inept at negotiation that he failed to take advantage of any of the opportunities presented. Dixon was unimpressed by both Prime Ministers as negotiators, and concluded when the conversations fell through that it would not be possible to obtain agreement on the mechanics of a free plebiscite. In their last meeting at Delhi, Dixon asked Nehru in Liaquat’s presence if there were any objections to him, Dixon, talking with other members of the Indian Government, specifically Rajagopalachari. 1 He said Nehru obviously disliked the suggestion but in the circumstances had to agree to it. Thereupon Dixon explored with Rajagopalachari the possibilities of a partition and partial plebiscite, and his conclusion at the end of the conversation was that he was dealing with an intelligent but disingenuous personality who would probably get him nowhere. Whereupon he suggested to Rajagopalachari that he would like to talk with Patel with the intimation that Nehru should be informed. In his conversations with Patel he found a more constructive and independent attitude which he hopes reflects not only the possibility of support of partition in the Indian cabinet, but may also show some desire on the part of the Congress Party to put an end to the expensive Kashmir adventure. I gathered that both of these last conversations reflected the thinking in Delhi’s top secret 232 of July 29. Since Dixon’s arrival at Karachi he has talked not only with Liaquat but with Zafrullah and Mohammed Ali and expects later this p. m. to talk with Gurmani, 2 who has been summoned by air from Rawalpindi for conference. He said that Zafrullah apparently hopes that Dixon will conclude it inadvisable to attempt further conference between the two governments because of the impasse on conditions for obtaining an overall plebiscite and will return to Lake Success and in his report given there will condemn Nehru for obstructing the negotiations. Should this action be taken, Zafrullah would be provided with the material for a denunciation of the GOI’s attitude before the SC, at time when he believes the US, the UK, and other powers might support a vote so adverse to India that Nehru would abandon his present position. Dixon feels that Zafrullah has communicated this thinking to Liaquat and this a. m. in a three hour conversation with Mohammed Ali taxed him for a confirmation or denial of this impression. Mohammed Ali said that Liaquat’s thinking is independent of Zafrullah’s but Dixon wondered in his own mind this p. m. if Mohammed Ali was adequately informed. Dixon’s own thinking is that Zafrullah, and to the extent that Liaquat subscribes to Zafrullah’s thinking, must be given to understand the utter improbability of success in their contemplated approach to the SC because in the first place Dixon cannot present a report that would promote further complications and difficulties in the Kashmir issue by censuring Nehru and, in the second place, members of the SC would be most unlikely to castigate Nehru in view of the current relationship between GOI and the USSR in SC debates. Dixon would welcome any help he might get either from the US or UK in putting the Pakistan Prime Minister and Foreign Minister back on the track in their thinking and expectations. Meanwhile, in his conversations with the Prime Minister and Mohammed Ali, he has sounded out the possibility of partition in Jammu plus a partial plebiscite in the Vale. I gathered he had presented to them the suggestions in Delhi’s top secret 232, July 29, which I inferred came from Patel. He said the Pakistani are suspicious of good faith in any suggestions proposed in behalf of India although it is obvious to Dixon that the Pakistani too are desperately anxious to arrive at a solution in Kashmir. He feels that if there could be some positive offer of record [ accord? ] from India he would have a basis for allaying the Pakistani’s suspicions. In the event that this could be brought about he would then suggest a further meeting of the two governments not limited to the Prime Ministers but, in the case of India, to include Bajpai, Patel and Rajagopalachari, and in the case of Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammed, 3 Zafrallah and Gurmani. Ghulam Mohammed this past week has been confined to a nursing home in London but is expected to arrive Karachi within the next few days. In a conversation Dixon had with him at the end of June before the Prime Minister’s return from the US, Ghulam said that he was certainly in favor of bringing the Kashmir issue to an end by working out the best possible compromise on partition. His presence at a meeting between the two governments would therefore be most helpful. I have not seen the Prime Minister since Dixon returned on Wednesday, and do not expect to see Zafrullah until Tuesday when I am lunching with him. Sent Department 123, repeated info Delhi 10 eyes only Henderson. Warren 1 H. E. Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, Indian Minister without Portfolio, July–December 1950; former Governor General of India. 2 Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Pakistani Minister for Kashmir Affairs, 1949–1951. 3 Pakistani Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/8–1150: Telegram [Document 799] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret priority New Delhi , August 11, 1950—9 a. m. 342. 1. Dixon told me following yesterday re Kashmir situation: ( a ) Although Nehru’s suggestions made during Dixon’s previous visit to New Delhi re conditions for partition plus plebiscite were by no means satisfactory, Dixon believed from conversations with various high Indian officials that they might well be altered during discussions to such extent as to afford fair basis for settlement. He therefore decided try persuade Liaquat enter into discussions with Nehru of solution this character. ( b ) Nehru had refused allow Dixon make offer to Liaquat on his behalf. He had however, agreed that Dixon could outline to Liaquat what Nehru had said. ( c ) Liaquat and his associates flatly refused attend conference for purpose discussing partition plus plebiscite. Such conference they insisted would be failure because they were sure from past experience GOI’s price would continue rise as discussion progressed. GOP would then face criticism of public for having without benefit to Pakistan abandoned Pak’s present advantageous position of insisting on general plebiscite. Liaquat and his advisors insisted India would not agree to fair conditions of plebiscite in Vale and that if it should unexpectedly agree it would not keep its word. They claimed India had thus far not lived up to any of its agreements with Pakistan. ( d ) Dixon told Pakistan officials that so far as he could see only hope for settlement was one of partition plus plebiscite and that if they refuse consider this kind settlement they would probably be abandoning any chances which they might have of obtaining Vale. Liaquat’s answer was that Pakistan would never give up Vale even if it had to wait many years in order obtain it. ( e ) Just before departure Dixon told Liaquat it seemed his efforts had failed and asked if latter had any suggestions. Liaquat suggested partition without plebiscite with Vale going to Pakistan. Dixon replied this solution out of question and asked if Liaquat would be willing consider detailed plan for partition plus plebiscite. Since Liaquat did not give categorically negative reply Dixon thought there might still be slender hope. ( f ) Upon his return Delhi, Dixon talked with Nehru and Bajpai. He told them of Liaquat’s attitude and proposed that he invite Liaquat and Nehru to conference and at this conference propose plan of his own to both for partition plus plebiscite. Either side could be free flatly to reject plan or to use it for basis tentative discussion. If Dixon should make suggestion neither side would be committed in any way merely by hearing it. Dixon told Nehru he would, of course, inform Liaquat privately when inviting him to conference that he might suggest plan of his own involving partition plus plebiscite. Liaquat in accepting invitation, however, would merely be going to conference and would have no official knowledge of what Dixon might suggest. ( g ) Nehru was not enthusiastic. He was afraid such conference would break down and if it did it might be more difficult for agreement to be reached later. He wondered if it might not be better for Dixon to return Lake Success and make report which would not make it appear that solution was entirely hopeless. When Dixon pointed out that failure his mission might render even more difficult any solution in future Kashmir problem, Nehru promised discuss matter with Cabinet and give answer to Dixon last night. If answer of Cabinet should offer hope of conference Dixon planned depart this morning for Karachi in order propose conference Liaquat. If answer was entirely negative Dixon would probably leave here Saturday or Sunday, stop for short time in Karachi, and return US empty-handed. 2. I did not see Dixon after he had received answer last evening from Nehru. We have been informed, however, by acting High Commissioner Australia Nehru has agreed attend and Dixon left early this morning for Karachi. Sent Department 342; priority Karachi 16. Henderson The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/8–1350: Telegram [Document 800] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Secretary of State top secret Karachi , August 13, 1950—7 p. m. 151. Dixon who is meeting Liaquat today in what may be a conclusive conversation asked Oldham to tell me this morning that the Dixon–Liaquat meeting yesterday was inconclusive. Liaquat agreed to discuss with his cabinet the proposal that Dixon submit separately to GOI and Pakistan a detailed proposal on Kashmir for comment, but said at the conversation’s end that he must insist on reserving his stand for overall plebiscite. He rejected a meeting with Nehru to consider Dixon’s proposals before Dixon had separate comments as a possible basis of negotiation. In today’s meeting Liaquat is to give his answer. Should it be negative Dixon will leave immediately for London and New York. If affirmative, then Liaquat will agree to a telegram Dixon proposes sending Nehru saying he is staying in Karachi for about ten days to formulate a detailed plan for Kashmir to be submitted separately for comment by the two Prime Ministers and then he will call a conference if there is a basis for agreement. Meanwhile the positions taken by Nehru and Liaquat are not compromised. Department pass London. Sent Department 151, repeated information New Delhi 13, London 8. Warren The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Embassy in India 690D.91/8–1550: Telegram [Document 801] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Embassy in India top secret Karachi , August 15, 1950—3 p. m. 14. Eyes only Henderson. Dixon in conversations last night and this morning told me he has obtained Pakistan acceptance his proposal to receive and consider an alternative solution of Kashmir problem by means of partition and partial plebiscite subject to reservation that Nehru must commit himself to accept the plan for implementation of partial plebiscite before negotiations may be resumed at Karachi. The Pakistanis are suspicious that Nehru may take decisions without fully informing Patel, Rajagopalachari and possibly other members of his cabinet of the proposed conditions and asked Dixon to go to Delhi today. Dixon however feels that negotiations have reached such a stage they should all be a matter of record and has drafted with Pakistan approval, specifically approval of Liaquat, Zafrullah, Gurmani and Mohammed Ali, a telegram to Nehru which will be despatched in course of the day. He permitted me to read draft message and suggested that I acquaint you with a paraphrase of its essential points should there come to your attention a distorted interpretation. (1) He informs Nehru that Pakistanis stand firm on position for impartial overall plebiscite in accordance with the three pertinent UN resolutions. Liaquat was unwilling in conversations of last week to receive or consider any alternative proposal. (2) In further conversations between Liaquat, Zafrullah and Mohammed Ali that took place Sunday and yesterday, Dixon assured the PM of his understanding of Pakistan’s position and said he was certain that UN officials would not hold he abandons his position should he receive and consider an alternative proposal. Unless all possible solutions are explored Dixon feels that he has not completed his function and that if either government refuses to go along they will be “lacking a fulfillment of duty resting on both countries to give willing consideration to any plan that might settle the problem.” (3) Based on these assurances of Dixon’s, Pakistan is now willing to attend a conference on the basis that “limited plebiscite will not be insuperable objection.” Pakistan fears that proposed conference may break down due to India’s inability to accept Dixon’s conditions for a limited plebiscite. Dixon does not share these fears on account of the impression he had in Delhi that any plebiscite must insure free expression of the will of the people uninfluenced by presence of troops or threat of reprisals. Dixon believes also GOI recognizes that operation of a limited plebiscite will not present obstacles identical to holding of an overall plebiscite. It would be unfortunate if Nehru were to attend a conference only to find he could not subscribe to the proposed conditions of a limited plebiscite. (4) ( a )Dixon therefore informs Nehru in advance that he proposes to set up a UN administrative body in the plebiscite area until after the poll is completed; ( b ) the chairman will be the plebiscite administrator or his representative; ( c ) other administrative officials will be UN personnel selected from experienced men who will function to carry on administrative and not initiate new policies; ( d ) the administrative power will be able to exclude from the area troops of every description; ( e ) if troops are necessary they will be so determined by the administrative power and the parties must provide them on request; ( f ) the administrative power will insure equality to both sides to secure the right to lay their views before the people and in other respects. (5) If Nehru feels inclusion in plan for these provisions to secure freedom and fairness for plebiscite after considering it “as a whole” make it impossible to accept it, Dixon requests that he be informed at Karachi. (6) Otherwise Dixon will proceed to draft his detailed proposal in the next four days and call a meeting at Karachi. Sent Delhi 14 eyes only Henderson, repeated information Department 156. Eyes only Secretary. Warren The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/8–2150: Telegram [Document 802] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Secretary of State top secret Karachi , August 21, 1950—7 p. m. 182. Eyes only Secretary. Sir Owen Dixon returned from Delhi this morning and invited me to see him. He flies to London day after tomorrow for a stay of ten days and is then going on to Washington and hopes to see you, Mathews, Hickerson and Gross about 6th September. He expects to be at Lake Success about September 10. General Hodges who has been ill for several days with some of the prevailing Karachi diseases hopes to leave Wednesday even for US and will remain in NY until Dixon arrives there. Dixon said he went to Delhi following the receipt of a telegram from Nehru last Thursday in reply to his of two days earlier: see my 156, August 15. He had me read Nehru’s message which stated in the first paragraph Dixon’s plan for partition and partial plebiscite was entirely novel. In the second paragraph he admitted partition and partial plebiscite as an alternative to overall plebiscite had been discussed by him and Dixon at the time of the conference with Liaquat but added he had understood it was a speculative idea and he had not taken it as a basis for further thinking. In three succeeding paragraphs he rejected the conditions for Dixon’s proposed partial plebiscite on the grounds that acceptance by India would mean acquiescence in Pakistan aggression and India in no case could accept Pakistan propaganda prior to voting, that India could not accept a “new government” as a substitute for “the lawful government now established in Kashmir” and lastly that only assurance of a free plebiscite could be obtained by continuance of the present government supported by necessary Indian troops to insure order. He then concluded by apologizing for the length of the telegram and suggested that if Dixon found it convenient to come to Delhi he would be glad to explain at length his reasons for rejection of Dixon’s plan. When Dixon arrived in Delhi Bajpai came to see him apparently on a fishing expedition to determine if Dixon would modify his plebiiscite conditions. He started out by telling Dixon he had not drafted Nehru’s telegram and was not prepared to discuss Nehru’s “novel amnesia”. When Dixon said he would not deviate one inch from his proposals, Bajpai then remarked he must report to Nehru. The interview with Nehru, which apparently was planned for Bajpai’s presence because three places for tea were laid, was confined to Nehru and Dixon. The time was taken up largely by a long dissertation by Nehru that conditions suitable for a plebiscite through the eyes of Australian democracy were entirely unsuitable in Kashmir because of the special conditions there obtaining. Dixon felt that the interview was entirely inconclusive and formed the impression that Nehru had taken Dixon’s telegram on partial plebiscite to a sub-committee of the Cabinet and had indicated it was a novel suggestion which if accepted would abandon Sheik Abdullah and his government and received a mandate to draft a reply of rejection. From his conversation with Bajpai Dixon inferred that the FonMin had made a draft which was torn up by Nehru who thereupon drafted a telegram himself, as received by Dixon, without further consultation with his Cabinet. Dixon has not yet seen Liaquat with whom he has an appointment this afternoon. Nehru, when Dixon left, inquired what kind of press statement he would issue when leaving the subcontinent. Dixon said he planned to issue identical statements simultaneously from Delhi and Karachi when he leaves Wednesday morning; that he does not intend to criticize governments but he does intend to set forth clearly the history of his activities and spell out his efforts to reach an agreement. His understanding of Nehru’s feelings at the time he left was that he is somewhat baffled and bewildered and wonders how severely Dixon may criticize him in his report to the UN. Dixon feels that his mission has accomplished something to the extent of bringing to the attention of the two governments conditions that may have to be met should the Kashmir question be brought to plebiscite, and that the partial reaction of some Cabinet members both in India and Pakistan, is to work out a partition that would not require the holding of a plebiscite. Dixon feels that this attitude is so strong among three leading members of the India Cabinet that if the Pakistanis were to attempt a solution at a lower political level there might be a friendly approach to Patel for an arrangement that would give Pakistan the Vale provided Sheik Abdullah could be looked after. He hopes that the Pakistanis will not attempt to exploit his press statement prior to the publication of his report by the UN. With reference to war talk voiced by Nehru this week and previously by Liaquat, Dixon said General Hodges is of the opinion that neither country can undertake a military foray unless they have an assured oil supply. Should war talk develop in political or press circles, Dixon feels an intimation from the UK and/or the US that oil would not be available would be an effective deterrent. Warren The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 357.AB/8–2450: Telegram [Document 803] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 confidential Washington , August 24, 1950—7 p. m. 1025. Brit Emb informed Dept Dixon intends submit factual report SC possibly without recommendations and does not intend remain Lake Success Kashmir hearing. We believe SC action will be guided by Dixon report and attach importance to his making recommendations as well as reporting to SC. Absence Dixon during at least initial stages Kashmir hearings wld handicap efforts SC. Suggest Emb approach CRO and express hope UK will prevail upon Dixon embody recommendations in his report and report in person SC. Acheson 1 Repeated to Canberra as 38, Karachi as 116, New Delhi as 295, and USUN as 182. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/8–2550: Telegram [Document 804] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret New Delhi , August 25, 1950—3 p. m. 476. 1. In view supersensitiveness displayed by Nehru at US “pressure” on India re Kashmir I have carefully refrained of late from mentioning subject to MEA. During my talk with Bajpai Secretary-General MEA on August 24 I noted he was leading discussion in direction Kashmir but I still refrained from mentioning subject. As I was leaving he asked if I had any idea when SC might again take up Kashmir question or what it might do in that regard. I replied in negative still displaying lack of interest. Bajpai then remarked that it was unfortunate Dixon’s mission had been unsuccessful. 2. I said I also was disappointed and my disappointment was sharpened by feeling he had misled my government with regard attitude GOI on Kashmir. In response to Bajpai’s questioning I said it had been my impression GOI really desired solution of partition-plus-plebiscite and that if it could have most of Jammu and Ladakh it would be willing agree to conditions for plebiscite in Vale which would be so generous that no one could later reasonably charge that plebiscite had been unfair. 3. Bajpai insisted my impression had been correct. He said that had been GOI position and still was its position. GOI did not believe, however, it would be necessary replace present Government Kashmir with UN administration in order have fair plebiscite. GOI would be displaying lack of confidence in present Government Kashmir if it should agree to suspension functioning that government during plebiscite period. Public reaction in India would be so sharp that no government which had agreed to such arrangement could survive. This had been opinion not only of Nehru but also of other members of Foreign Committee of Cabinet—Patel, Rajagopalachari and Ayyangar. Dixon, however, had offered no alternative. He had taken position there could be no fair plebiscite under Abdullah regime. It was on this issue and nothing else discussions had broken down. GOI was still willing discuss direct with GOP or under auspices SC solution involving partition with plebiscite in Vale under conditions which reasonable observers UN must consider fair. 4. I told Bajpai I still was not optimistic. He said that one constructive result of Dixon’s visit had been that solution of partition-plusplebiscite had finally been placed on table for discussion. Henderson The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/8–2850: Telegram [Document 805] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret New Delhi , August 28, 1950—3 p. m. 491. Point one. We are venturing set forth below in response Deptel 292, August 23 1 certain comments and suggestions re possible solution Kashmir problem in light of results Dixon’s mission. In so doing we realize it is difficult for us while in Delhi retain completely balanced view. For purposes convenience our comments and suggestions are divided into two categories, ( a ) substantive and ( b ) procedural. Point two, substantive—In our opinion partition plus plebiscite in Vale is best solution so far advanced. This solution would mean that India and Pakistan with certain adjustments should retain areas which they already hold with exception that future Kashmir Valley should be determined by plebiscite conducted by representatives UN. By term “best solution” we mean solution which would leave behind least amount bitterness and would result in least number of minority groups being brought under government distasteful to them. We also believe such solution would afford less practical difficulties than attempt to hold plebiscite for whole country. Although in general it is preferable to leave in hands plebiscite administrator all details connected with holding plebiscite, deep suspicion of both India and Pakistan of each other and lack of trust particularly on part of India in judgment administrator would render it, we believe, extremely difficult for either to agree to plebiscite, even in Vale, unless certain formulas were worked out in advance and incorporated in instructions to administrator. Undoubtedly much thought has already been given to this matter. Nevertheless we are listing several types of formulas which, if adopted in advance, might lessen suspicion and distrust at least of India: ( a ) Formula excluding from Vale so far as possible during period of plebiscite propagandists and propaganda from either India or Pakistan. ( b ) Formula admitting into Vale all refugees and other natives, to extent their identity can be determined, who had left during, say last five years and permitting person who had settled in Valley during, say last five years, to remain there but not to participate in plebiscite. ( c ) Formula insuring that all propaganda to be circulated by spoken or written word during plebiscite so far as possible be approved by administrator. Although he should allow each side to stress advantages of adherence to country supported by it, he would not permit any one during period of plebiscite to engage in propaganda or other activities calculated to stimulate hatred against country or against any religious, national, racial or economic group in Kashmir or in India or Pakistan. ( d ) Formula to effect present government Kashmir could remain in office during period plebiscite so long as in opinion administrator it was loyally cooperating in facilitating fair plebiscite. Administrator would have authority, however, to appoint UN officials to arrange for and conduct plebiscite. He would also be empowered to appoint observers to local military units and to civilian institutions, including juridical and police, in order to make sure there was no direct or indirect intimidation of population. Kashmir Government would be required accept administrator’s recommendation for removal any of its officials who in opinion administrator were not loyally cooperating in order bring about fair plebiscite and to revoke any administrative or judicial order which in opinion administrator was likely interfere with fairness of plebiscite. Such Indian military establishment as might remain in Kashmir would also be required to remove or replace any of its personnel who in opinion administrator were not giving proper cooperation. Administrator should also be provided with sufficient UN civilian and military personnel to replace local personnel in case in his opinion such replacements would be advisable. Point three, procedural—In view of growing resentment in India which has been quietly stimulated by Nehru himself at allegedly pro-Pakistan attitude of US re Kashmir, it would be desirable in our opinion for US in future to expect that UK and other members of Commonwealth rather than US take lead in working out solution Kashmir problem. It will be noted that although Dixon’s final suggestions were not agreeable to Nehru no insinuations have appeared thus far in press against Australia. If Dixon had been US citizen, there would have certainly been press campaign charging US with great power politics. Nehru still is hoping that his Commonwealth associations will ultimately be of value in carrying out certain of his foreign policies and is therefore much more solicitous of feelings members Commonwealth than those of US. There is no doubt that Nehru and his immediate circle are at present unhappy that American is to be plebiscite administrator. If plebiscite is decided upon they will not, in our opinion, give American citizen degree of confidence and support which they would give to citizen of Commonwealth. If therefore Dixon’s report could give opportunity for Nimitz graciously to resign and to give place to Canadian or Australian we believe it would be to US advantage and also facilitate solution Kashmir problem. It will not be easy to obtain agreement of both India and Pakistan to solution along lines suggested herein or to any other solution. It seems to us that Dixon is in best position to place solution this kind on table. He could do so either by incorporating plan in his original report to SC or by merely touching upon it in that report and then at request SC submitting subsequent report outlining plan in detail. Australian acting high commissioner tells us Dixon expected at time his departure from Delhi to talk with both British and American officials before preparing his report in order that his report might be of maximum value. In any event, Dixon’s views as to best solution of problem should be made available to SC. After recent statements made by Nehru it would be useless to propose plan completely abolishing Abdullah government during plebiscite. Nevertheless, Dixon might be able work out plan which while leaving facade Abdullah government intact, would render it powerless to prevent fair plebiscite. Point four—If Dixon unwilling incorporate in his report suggestions for solution Kashmir problem, we should, it seems to us, place burden on UK for decision re next move. Next move might perhaps be appeal India and Pakistan in light Dixon’s conversations to carry on direct negotiations in presence SYG or his representatives and to report progress conference to SC within, say, two months. Sent Department 491; repeated info Karachi unnumbered. Henderson 1 Telegram 292, repeated as 114 to Karachi and 179 to USUN, not printed, requested the views of Henderson and Warren on possible solutions of the Kashmir issue in light of Dixon’s experiences, including their preferences on future approaches (357.AB/8–2350). The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/8–3050: Telegram [Document 806] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Karachi , August 30, 1950—3 p. m. 217. Having been on tour in the Punjab for four days sampling public opinion, I did not see the Department’s 114, August 23, 1 until my return to Karachi evening 28th. I have subsequently seen a copy of Delhi’s 491 August 28 and yesterday evening I had a conversation regarding Kashmir, arranged at my request, with Zafrullah. To my question as to what he thought the next step should be, what he thought could now be done, Zafrullah replied there was no question in his mind or in the collective mind of his government that the next step would have to be taken in the SC with the active backing of the US, because both Pakistan and India realize that the American attitude will determine whether any settlement is possible at this juncture. Once the two parties had been brought together by the mediator, their differences exposed, it will then be necessary examine those differences and to draw up and require both parties to accept a program of action whereby the wishes of the population of Jammu and Kashmir will be freely determined, and to make it clear that failure of such acceptance by either party will invite the censure and discipline of the UK In adverting to conversations that he and I had had separately with Dixon about the possibility of direct negotiations on the working, political level between India and Pakistan, Zafrullah said it was by calculation that the Pakistan High Commissioner at Delhi was a weak person; otherwise he would not have been acceptable to India. He had therefore discounted to Dixon the practicability of exploring a solution in Cabinet circles in India based on the assumption that Nehru had doublecrossed his Cabinet in his arbitrary rejection of Dixon’s last proposal. Zafrullah feels that if an intelligence report he received on Sunday, that Patel had been charged with the Kashmir problem, is correct, it may be anticipated that incidents will be provoked which will eliminate Abdullah’s Government, and that the same procedure will be followed in the area that was adopted so successfully by Patel in his handling of Hyderab State. 2 Therefore the Pakistanis, who apparently do not expect Dixon to include recommendations in his report but to confine himself to factual presentation of the course of his negotiations, will seize upon Nehru’s rejection of the terms proposed for an overall plebiscite as well as his summary rejection of the proposed terms for a partial plebiscite in the Vale after an agreed-upon partition of Jammu and Ladakh, and will press in the SC for a decision that would require both India and Pakistan to review their attitudes as presented to Dixon and to accept and implement his subsequent recommendations. On the reasonable assumption that Zafrullah knows what he is doing in ruling out practicability of working-level negotiations in Delhi, I feel that the procedure he suggests represents the best available course of action, even though it carries the possibility of prolonged debate in the SC and would enable India to use its council membership to further delay effective progress toward the holding of a plebiscite. Zafrullah in discussing Kashmir possibilities with acting UK High Commissioner on Monday, said he anticipated no hasty action and believed six months period might be necessary to work out an acceptance by India of Dixon’s plebiscite, whole or partial, proposals. In my opinion any great delay in reaching a solution will be dangerous, firstly because the tribesmen are already holding meetings to demand action and may soon decide to take action themselves, and secondly because the probability that the Chinese Communists may soon control Tibet 3 and reach the borders of Ladakh greatly increases the risk of Communist infiltration into Kashmir. With Delhi’s belief that a partial partition plus plebiscite in the Vale is now the best solution, I am in full agreement, as well as with its suggestions re pre-plebiscite propaganda and return of refugees. I must say, however, that I see no possibility that Pakistan would accept any procedure that would leave Indian forces in the Vale, or leave to Abdullah’s stooge government the slightest possibility of bringing pressure on the local population either before or during the balloting. Since Delhi feels “It would be useless to propose a plan completely abolishing the Abdullah government during the plebiscite”, it will be imperative to convince Pakistan that whatever facade of his government remains is in fact powerless to influence the outcome of the voting. Sent Department 217; repeated info New Delhi 22. Warren 1 See footnote 1, supra . 2 For documentation on the dispute between India and Pakistan over Hyderabad in 1948, see Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , Part 1, pp. 265 ff. 3 For documentation on Tibet, see vol. vi , pp. 256 ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 357.AB/9–2250: Telegram [Document 807] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan secret Washington , September 22, 1950—8 p. m. 161. Fol is text ltr from Pres Truman dated Sep 19 which you shld deliver to PriMin GOP. Shld PriMin be unavailable msg shld be delivered FonOff. 1 Begin Verbatim Text . My dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am delighted that you have responded to my suggestion made upon your departure from Wash that you write to me, 2 and welcome this further evidence of the friendship established between us as a result of ur visit to the US. I have given my most earnest and sympathetic consideration to ur ltr and have discussed it with the SecState. Its contents clearly portray the efforts of the Govt of Pak to arrive at a solution of the Kashmir problem. I can appreciate ur grave concern and the concern of the people of Pak over the long delays in the settlement of this issue. The Govt of the US is keenly aware of the seriousness of the Kashmir dispute, and it consequently was a source of deep disappointment to me to learn of the breakdown of the negots undertaken by Sir Owen Dixon. We had hoped that progress cld be made in removing this major block to cooperation and understanding between the peoples of Pak and India. We are awaiting Sir Owen’s report, which will receive most careful consideration. We shall continue to use our best efforts in the UN SC to assist the Govt of Pak and the Govt of India to reach a fair solution of the Kashmir problem. I am confident that you will, in the coming consideration of this issue by the SC, continue to give the same splendid cooperation you rendered to Sir Owen Dixon. Mrs. Truman joins me in expressing to you and to Begum Liaquat Ali our sincere wishes for ur continued good health and success and for the welfare of the people of Pak. Very sincerely yours, (signed) Harry S. Truman End Verbatim Text. Webb 1 In the absence of the Prime Minister, delivered to the Secretary of External Affairs, Mohammed Ikramullah, on September 25. 2 A letter from the Prime Minister was addressed to President Truman on August 28 and transmitted by Ambassador Ispahani in a letter dated August 30, neither printed (357.AB/9–1550). A similar message was addressed to Attlee. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) 357.AB/9–2550 [Document 808] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs ( Hickerson ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] September 25, 1950. Subject: Kashmir Dispute: Meeting with Sir Owen Dixon Participants: Sir Owen Dixon, UN Representative for Kashmir Mr. John D. Hickerson, UNA 1. I had dinner with Sir Owen on Monday evening, September 18, at which time we discussed various aspects of his recent mission. Sir Owen, in addition to describing his efforts in some detail, as now set forth in his report to the Security Council, 2 reiterated his general conclusions on future action by the Council. These conclusions are: ( a ) No major changes in the Kashmir situation will occur in the next 6 months, even if nothing is done by the parties or by the Security Council to attempt to reach a solution of the issue; ( b ) The parties, themselves, must solve the political and territorial problems; ( c ) The Security Council should concentrate on reducing the armed forces in the area. Sir Owen referred again to the advisability of a Pakistan declaration that they would not commit aggression against India, and the use of such declaration by the Security Council as the basis for a resolution addressed to solving the Kashmir Dispute and placing the burden for such solution on India and Pakistan. 2. Dixon made two additional points, not hitherto expressed: ( a ) He believed that the Vale of Kashmir should go to Pakistan; ( b ) He remarked that it is so exceedingly difficult to secure Indian agreement to a fair plebiscite in the Vale, the principal bone of contention between the parties, that a possible solution might be to prevail on the Government of Pakistan to give the Vale to India in return for Indian concessions favorable to Pakistan. He suggested that these concessions should involve the principal remaining issues between the two countries, such as the Canal Waters Dispute, jute and cotton problems, and even the exchange-rate argument. 3. I referred to the suggestion made by Prime Minister Liaquat of Pakistan to Ambassador Warren that the Security Council appoint an arbitrator, with a prior commitment from both parties to accept the arbitrator’s decision. Sir Owen thought this an excellent move, and suggested that it was an opportunity for a tactical gambit by Pakistan, by which the Pakistanis would make a proposal offering to accept arbitration and suggest using three arbitrators, one appointed by Pakistan, one by India, and the third by the two arbitrators thus chosen by the parties. I remarked that it might be better to have only one arbitrator, appointed by the Security Council, since past experience in the Kashmir Dispute demonstrated the advisability of concentrating conciliary or mediatory powers in one person, and I assumed that this would be true of arbitral powers as well. On reflection, Sir Owen agreed that this seemed preferable. 1 This memorandum, prepared by Howard Meyers of the Office of the United Nations Political and Security Affairs, included the following notation: “This memorandum has not been read by Mr. Hickerson, but is based on his description of this meeting to the writer of this memorandum.” 2 Report transmitted by Dixon to the President of the Security Council in a letter dated September 15, 1950. The report, Security Council Document S/1791, S/1791/Add. 1, is printed in Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, Supplement for September–December 1950 . The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 690D.91/9–2950: Telegram [Document 809] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret New Delhi , September 29, 1950—noon. 799. 1. While in Kashmir I had two secret discussions with Sheikh Abdullah, Prime Minister, at his request during course of which he discussed with apparent frankness some of his problems and views re future of Kashmir. 2. He denied with considerable emphasis stories to effect he was pro-Communist, pro-Soviet, anti-West, or anti-US. He admitted there were two Communists in his Cabinet. He said during elections which have just been held they had both been defeated and he had been compelled to arrange other constituencies for them. He could not afford to have split with Communists and fellow-travelers at present juncture since they would turn on National Confederation in same way that Chinese Communists turned against Kuomintang. He had to get along with them as best he could so long as future Kashmir was undetermined. He was also compelled to take certain measures such as breaking up of large estates without compensations to landowners, nationalization of certain enterprises, etc. in order that National Confederation rather than Communists should get credit with people therefor. So long as there was possibility that there would be at some time popular vote as to future Kashmir, National Confederation must do as much for peasants and workers as Communists could reasonably promise to do. He was not unaware of dangers of communism but he was convinced his present course was best method meeting this danger. 3. Communists and fellow-travelers were carrying on extremely active campaign against US both within and outside National Confederation Party and were unceasingly endeavoring undermine himself, Bakshi, Deputy Prime Minister, and other non-Communists by intimating they were pro-Western and pro-US. Failure to deny it was [ while? ] negotiating with Pakistan for bases in Kashmir was being exploited by Communists as evidence truth their charges in this respect and was putting friends US on defensive. He personally had no hope for economic future of Kashmir regardless whether it went to India or Pakistan, or became independent unless it would have friendly interest and economic cooperation of US. 4. In discussing future Kashmir, Abdullah was vigorous in restating that in his opinion it should be independent; that overwhelming majority population desired this independence; and that he had reason believe that some Azad Kashmir leaders desired independence and would be willing cooperate with leaders National Confederation if there was reasonable chance such cooperation would result in independence. Kashmir people could not understand why UN consistently ignored independence as one of possible solutions for Kashmir. It had held special Assembly to deal with independence for Palestine which was smaller in area and population and less economically viable than Kashmir. Kashmir people had language and cultural background their own. Their Hindus by custom and tradition widely differed from Hindus India, and outlook and background their Moslems also quite different from Moslems Pakistan. Fact was that population Kashmir homogeneous in spite of presence of Hindu minority. 5. When I asked Abdullah if he thought Kashmir could remain stable independent country without friendly support India and Pakistan he replied negative. In his opinion independent Kashmir could exist only in case it had friendship both of India and Pakistan; in case both these countries had friendly relations with each other; and in case US through UN or direct would enable it, by investments or other economic assistance, to develop its magnificent resources. Adherence Kashmir to India would not lead in foreseeable future to improving miserable economic lot of population. There were so many areas of India in urgent need of economic development he was convinced Kashmir would get relatively little attention. Nevertheless, it would be preferable for Kashmir to go to India than to Pakistan. It would be disastrous for Kashmiris to be brought under control of government with medieval Koranic outlook. 6. Abdullah insisted that partition plus plebiscite formula Dixon would be impractical. No method for partition could be devised which would not sever close blood, cultural and economic ties and which would not result in misery economically and otherwise and lasting bitterness. He promised supply me with map supporting his statement, but floods prevented his seeing me again. 7. Military observers and other foreigners in Kashmir with whom I talked seemed almost unanimous in their belief that if Vale should be given opportunity to vote freely it would prefer Pakistan to India. Most of them were also of opinion that population in general would prefer independence to any other solution. Sent Department 799; repeated info Karachi unnumbered. Henderson Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 357.AB/11–1750 [Document 810] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] November 17, 1950. Subject: Kashmir Problem; Afghan-Pakistan Dispute; Nepal; Tibet; Korea. Participants: Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan The Secretary Mr. M. A. H. Ispahani, Ambassador of Pakistan Mr. Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan NEA–George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary SOA—T.Eliot Weil Sir Zafrulla called at his request at 2:30 p. m. and remained for 90 minutes. Kashmir Sir Zafrulla opened the conversation by remarking that the last time we had talked the appointment of Sir Owen Dixon as UN representative in the Kashmir case was under consideration. He said Sir Owen’s personal qualities had proved to be all that I had predicted, but that despite Sir Owen’s efforts the Kashmir case was again before the Security Council. Sir Zafrulla said he hoped we would back all efforts to reach a just settlement. He said the SC appeared reluctant to proceed; that Pakistan had refrained from pushing the case; that there must be something concrete to go before the SC.; and that aside from USSR and Yugoslavia, members of the SC were waiting for a move from the US and the UK. Sir Zafrulla said an unfortunate development had been publication of the Reuters summary of the Dixon report in a form so garbled that undue emphasis was laid on Sir Owen’s observations that the incursion of tribesmen into Kashmir had been contrary to international law, or “aggression.” Sir Zafrulla said India was unwilling to agree to demilitarization of Kashmir and that so far as partition-plus-plebiscite in the Vale was concerned, Pakistan was reluctant to agree to such a procedure. Sir Zafrulla said he had learned that the UN Commission had at one time considered putting into its resolution, a provision that the Plebiscite Administrator would have broad powers if a plebiscite proved impracticable, Pakistan had pointed out to Sir Owen that a plebiscite had not proved impracticable but had been prevented by the unwillingness of India to agree to this procedure. Sir Zafrulla went on to say that Sir Owen had said to him: “You know my views on a free and impartial plebiscite and I will insist on their being observed in a partial plebiscite.” Sir Zafrulla said he told Sir Owen that if he was anxious to have a conference on the subject of a partial plebiscite and if he thought anything would come of it he would not object to Sir Owen’s approaching Nehru. Sir Owen sent the telegram to Delhi and the answer was “No.” The situation in Pakistan, said Sir Zafrulla, was tense. People in the tribal areas were anxious to see the Kashmir problem solved, and the only thing to fall back on was the resolutions. Referring to Mr. McGhee’s remark of the previous day that the resolutions had been merely paper agreements which had not been carried out, Sir Zafrulla said any agreement had to be a paper agreement to begin with, and in a broad sense the two resolutions did provide a basis for further action. He pointed out that both India and Pakistan had agreed to the terms of these resolutions. He said it was not Pakistan’s views which had blocked settlement. He said he believed the SC should appoint a representative to examine the facts in the light of the two resolutions; the representative should report his findings to the SC; and the SC should call upon the parties to carry out such recommendations as were accepted by the SC. Sir Zafrulla said the difficulty was that India insisted on conditions for a plebiscite which would give the vote to India. Sir Zafrulla said Sir Owen had realized that the Kashmiri were a timid people and pointed out that unless Indian troops were withdrawn and a UN administrator placed in charge of the area, a free and impartial plebiscite would not be possible. Sir Zafrulla then said he had come to me for advice and guidance. I remarked that I thought I needed advice and guidance. I said we had been very discouraged over India’s attitude and had been trying through our Ambassador to make India see what should be done—with what success I did not know. I told Sir Zafrulla I gathered he had in mind a sort of master in chancery to investigate and to present specific proposals to the SC. The question would then arise as to what step to take if India disagreed with the recommendations of the SC. I said that nevertheless I could see great force in Sir Zafrulla’s suggestion, and I asked Mr. McGhee what he thought. Mr. McGhee said he thought. Sir Zafrulla’s proposal sounded logical. I remarked that logic was an outstanding characteristic of Sir Zafrulla. Mr. McGhee observed that the basic question was whether the proposal would be productive. He said past efforts had failed because of the Indian attitude and that a new move could lead to an impasse between India and the SC which of course would not help. In this connection, Mr. McGhee remarked that the Kashmir case was not parallel to the Korean case. I said I gathered that Sir Zafrulla regarded the proposed procedure as a moving toward a goal and as putting pressure on India. Sir Zafrulla agreed. Mr. McGhee asked Sir Zafrulla whether he really thought the proposal would work. Sir Zafrulla asked Mr. McGhee what he expected to happen if India were not informed of what it was expected to do. He said it was a case of reminding India of what it had agreed to and that India would interpret the agreements as it pleased until the SC called on it to implement the agreements. He said the SC could place the case clearly before the world. Mr. McGhee asked whether the Pakistan proposal really amounted to arbitration. Sir Zafrulla said it was really the same process but he had avoided use of the expression because the Indians had been opposed to arbitration. Mr. McGhee agreed there was probably no alternative. He said that in his talk with Sir Zafrulla the day before 1 it had been agreed that the obstacle to Sir Owen’s efforts at settlement was India’s objections to a plebiscite in the Vale. Sir Zafrulla Remarked that when Sir Owen proposed to the Pakistanis that they agree to consider partition-plus-plebiscite with no Indian troops in the Vale and a UN administrator, he was certain that Nehru would consider such a plan but he subsequently found this was not satisfactory to Nehru. Mr. McGhee suggested that further details of such a plan might have been explored. Sir Zafrulla said India would simply have procrastinated. Mr. Mohammed Ali pointed out that there was “no half-way house” between an arrangement providing a UN administrator and the present arrangements in the Vale. He said Nehru had flatly declared he would not agree to Sheikh Abdulla’s stepping down. Sir Zafrulla said another point to consider was that in any case Pakistan would start under a handicap because of the number of Muslims who would be excluded from voting for accession to Pakistan. Mr. McGhee suggested it was too narrow a view to think that Sir Owen’s plan was the only course to follow. He said we wanted to focus our attention on India’s position. Mohammed Ali said Sir Owen’s plan—removal of Indian troops from the Vale and appointment of a UN administrator—was the absolute minimum which Pakistan would accept; that anything short of this would make a fair plebiscite impossible. I remarked: “I think Sir Zafrulla has something.” Mr. McGhee assured Sir Zafrulla that our efforts were impartial. Sir Zafrulla said the Indian attitude must be assessed. He pointed out that in February 1950 the Indians took the measure of the SC and that their attitude toward the McNaughton proposals had probably been no stiffer than it had toward details which had been discussed since then. He said that if a new approach meant whittling down Pakistan’s position, Pakistan could not accept it. He said he was not sure that Pakistan had not already risked too much. He said it had not been a question of whether the quantity X could be achieved by continuing negotiations but rather a case of agreeing to X minus Y or X minus Z each time negotiations were renewed. Mr. McGhee said we had no particular line which we were pushing. Sir Zafrulla said “then what shall I say in the SC?” Mr. McGhee said: “We are not prepared to take the lead.” Sir Zafrulla said, however, that three efforts had been made. Mr. McGhee said we had no complaints against Pakistan’s efforts. Sir Zafrulla said he had told Ambassador Austin that he had never tried to buttonhole him, but he had recently asked Ambassador Austin to tell him where he had been wrong and Ambassador Austin had said there was nothing he could think of. I asked Sir Zafrulla whether Sir Owen would be a good master in chancery. Sir Zafrulla said he did not believe Sir Owen would accept the appointment. I said he had better go to work on the problem and that this might at least lead to some interpretations. Mr. McGhee remarked that there might be a chance of getting the Indians to adopt the Pakistan proposal as their own. Sir Zafrulla said it needn’t be regarded as a Pakistan proposal. [Here follows discussion of the Afghan-Pakistan dispute (pages 1446 [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 815 ] ff.) and discussion of developments in Nepal, Tibet, and Korea.] D[ ean ] A[ cheson ] 1 The memorandum of conversation dated November 16, covering a meeting of that date between Zafrulla Khan, Ispahani, Mohammed Ali, Mohamad Ayub of the Pakistani Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, McGhee, and Weil, not printed, is in Department of State file 357.AB/11–1650. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs 357.AB/11–1750 [Document 811] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs secret [ Washington ,] November 17, 1950. Subject: Kashmir Dispute: UK–US Discussions on Future Action Participants: Mr. Robert Fowler, CRO, UK Delegation to the UN Mr. Michael Walker, First Secretary, British Embassy Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, Director, SOA Mr. William L. S. Williams, SOA Mr. Edward Maffitt, USUN Mr. Howard Meyers, UNP 1. On 17 November, Messrs. Fowler and Walker came to the Department to discuss possible courses of action open to the UK and US in the Kashmir Question, since matters appeared at a standstill. [Here follows a lengthy account of alternative actions that is largely repetitious in background information.] Out of these discussions the following plan was evolved and tentatively agreed upon: a . The UK should make an informal approach to the Indians, preferably to Bajpai who had recently indicated his great interest in the matter, and ask the Indians if they were prepared to present their proposals for acceptable modifications of the conditions previously suggested by Sir Owen Dixon for a plebiscite in the Vale of Kashmir. The UK should let the GOI know that, if such proposals were not forthcoming, the UK would support Security Council action confirming the parties commitments to a state-wide plebiscite, and determining what remained to implement this overall plebiscite. If the Indians presented reasonable proposals, informal negotiations could be entered into with the Pakistanis. b . If the Indians would not present their ideas of reasonable modification, or if the proposals presented were so unreasonable as to indicate clearly no Indian desire for negotiations toward partition and a plebiscite in the Yale, then a meeting of the Security Council would be called requiring an explanation from the Abdullah Government regarding the 27 October resolution of the Kashmir National Conference. 1 As a result of this meeting, a resolution would be presented referring to the Kashmir National Conference action and insisting that the Security Council be reassured that nothing which is being done in Kashmir will prejudice settlement of the problem in accordance with past SC resolutions and the prior agreement of the parties. Norway will be asked to sponsor this resolution. c . Either as part of the resolution referred to above, or as separate therefrom, a resolution will be presented by which the Council will appoint a judicial figure (preferably Justice Bagge of Sweden) to examine the existing commitments of the parties under the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, to determine wherein they have been implemented, and to report what remains to be implemented. Norway, again, will be asked to sponsor this resolution. d . Following the report of Justice Bagge and the parties comments thereon, another SC resolution will be introduced: (1) calling on the parties: ( a ) to carry out their part of the commitments which remain to be implemented; ( b ) to consult together to work out their difficulties in carrying out these commitments; ( c ) in view of the attitudes of the parties expressed in previous meetings as well as the UNCIP and Dixon reports, to consult together and examine alternative solutions to the dispute; (2) Appointing a representative or representatives of the Security Council to aid the parties in these consultations. 6. Mr. Fowler had only one reservation to this plan worked out above, believing that London might object to the language, in the proposed Security Council resolution which would require the parties to examine alternative solutions to the dispute [ d , (1) ( c )]. 2 He suggested that it might be better to refer only to working out ways of implementing the agreed solution rather than coming out so bluntly for an examination of alternatives. Mr. Meyers pointed out that the Council, in its 14 March 1950 resolution and the explanation made subsequently by Sir Terence Shone 3 of the UK, had clearly brought out the possibility of the parties working for alternative solutions on the Kashmir dispute. Mr. Fowler agreed that we could always go ahead with the preliminary approach before we have agreement on this particular point, and will telegraph London regarding these proposals. H. Meyers 1 Resolution to the effect that elections would be held for the formation of a constituent assembly in the part of Kashmir under India’s control, to confirm the state’s political relationship with India. 2 Brackets in the source text. 3 Deputy UK. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Alternate U.K. Representative on the Security Council. Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs 357.AB/12–1550 [Document 812] Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Prepared in the Office of South Asian Affairs 1 confidential [ Washington ,] December 15, 1950. Kashmir problem Pending Security Council Action on Kashmir. discussion The members of the Security Council are so engaged in the Korean issue that it appears untimely for the Security Council to take up Kashmir in December. India favors delay in the Security Council and has given its approval to a move by Sheikh Abdullah to set up electoral rolls for a Kashmir Constituent Assembly. Such a body would most likely provide by unilateral action the semblance of popular support for the entire State’s accession to India. On December 14 the Pakistan Foreign Minister (Sir Zafrulla) addressed a letter (Tab A) 2 to the President of the Security Council formally protesting this Indian-supported action and stating it was a violation of the January 5, 1949 Security Council Resolution agreed to by both parties. The United States, while recognizing the Korean issue as a justifiable cause for delay, appreciates Pakistan’s great concern and is desirous of obtaining action in the Security Council at the earliest opportunity, consistent with developments with respect to Korea. The UK and US Delegations have drafted a resolution (Tab B) 3 which (1) deals with the Sheikh Abdullah’s move and, (2) proposes that the Security Council appoint a prominent jurist to interpret earlier Security Council resolutions, determine wherein the countries have failed in implementing them, and recommend what remains for each country to do. London does not favor inclusion of both items in a single resolution and has proposed that they be treated separately, agreeing to co-sponsor the latter proposal, but refusing to co-sponsor the former as it implies criticism of the Indian action. Likewise, the UK opposes hearings until late January or early February, after the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London. recommendations 1. Should Mr. Bevin raise the Kashmir issue 4 it is recommended that you state the Department believes a single resolution is preferable because: ( a ) A single resolution would be somewhat less objectionable to the Government of India because the implied condemnation aspect of the clauses regarding the Kashmir National Conference activity would be combined with specific recommendations for advancing the settlement of the Kashmir issue. ( b ) A separate resolution covering only the Kashmir National Conference which the UK did not sponsor, and which the US consequently would not sponsor, would have the effect of undermining the resolution and of further encouraging the Government of India to move ahead with plans for a Constituent Assembly and the absorption of the State. 2. You also might wish to say that further delay on the part of the Security Council beyond the present timetable suggested by the UK of late January or early February would be a matter of considerable concern to us. 1 Prepared by T. W. Simons and F. D. Collins. 2 Not printed. The letter, referring to the Kashmir National Conference resolution of October 27, was printed as Security Council Document S/1942. It was tabled and discussed in the 532d meeting of the Security Council on February 21, 1951; see Security Council Official Records, Sixth Year, 532d Meeting . 3 Not printed. The work on this resolution was not carried through to completion. 4 Reference here is to Bevin’s scheduled participation in the December Foreign Ministers gathering in Brussels for a North Atlantic Treaty meeting. Documentation on the NATO meeting is printed in volume iii . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 357.AB/12–2050: Telegram [Document 813] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority London , December 20, 1950—6 p. m. 3558. In absence Scott and Murray 1 (who are on leave), we saw Lloyd and Olver 2 today on Department’s 3110, December 19. 3 In response, Lloyd informed us present UK intention is to send telegrams to Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers informing them of UK willingness for whole range Indian-Pakistani problems, including Kashmir, to be explored behind scenes during Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference in January within context Communist threat to Asia and with UK in informal mediatory role. Message would make clear UK would not consider such efforts as substitute for SC action but as part of whole effort resolve differences. Final decision on messages will be taken tomorrow in meeting Attlee, Bevin and Gordon-Walker. 4 Lloyd said latest messages from Karachi indicated GOP now quite anxious have Kashmir problem aired at Commonwealth conference. Lloyd and Olver believed, and they were confident Ministers would concur, that any action by SC would be interpreted by Nehru as attempt put pressure on him and could only be prejudicial to talks on Indian-Pakistani matters at time Commonwealth meetings. They were sure UK could not sponsor any such proposals as suggested by Department and said that if they were taken up by SO, UK would undoubtedly feel it necessary take most neutral position possible towards them. In view UK’s probable decision tackle Kashmir during Prime Ministers’ meeting in serious effort now foreshadowed in message to two Prime Ministers, they wondered if Department would still consider action suggested reftel necessary or desirable. They did not think it would be desirable hold up UK’s messages to Liaquat and Nehru and did not think such action material to Department’s proposal since in any event UK had already made up its mind to try to have India and Pakistan discuss differences during Commonwealth meeting. Lloyd thought that with Attlee, Bevin and Gordon-Walker working on two Prime Ministers there was more than 50–50 chance that Indian-Pakistani atmosphere could be improved. We promised relay foregoing information to Department at once and again emphasized, as we had at beginning conversation, that reason why Department thought early SC action necessary was fear that unrest over Kashmir and Pakistan was reaching critical stage, Lloyd and Olver made quite clear that FonOff and CRO did not attribute same degree of seriousness to agitation in Pakistan. They said that FonOff naturally quite concerned about Liaquat’s attitude in matter, but did not consider that public unrest in Pakistan was in any sense at point of crisis. They discounted tale [ talk ] of Jehad, saying such talk endemic in Pakistan and while perhaps more serious in tone at moment than hitherto, they wondered whether GOP leaders might not be stimulating agitation to gain better bargaining position in negotiations. As evidence Pakistan prepared wait until after Prime Ministers’ meeting for further SC action, they cited Mohammed Ali’s statement to the press on arrival in Karachi that SC would not take up Kashmir problem again until after Commonwealth meeting. In short, ( a ) UK seems clearly have no fear that seriousness of situation in Pakistan has reached point where action in SC of even limited nature Department proposes is necessary; and ( b ) it would consider that this or any other action by SC now would only be harmful, and perhaps seriously so, to efforts now proposed here during Prime Ministers’ meeting. Would appreciate Department’s early reaction to foregoing. 5 Sent Department 3558; repeated information Karachi 34, New Delhi 89; Department pass USUN 55. Holmes 1 Robert H. Scott and James D. Murray, Superintending Under Secretary and Head, respectively, of the Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office. 2 John O. Lloyd, Assistant, Southeast Asia Department, and Stephen J. L. Olver. Officer for India, Pakistan, French and Portuguese India, and Ceylon, Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office. 3 Telegram 3110 to London, not printed, referred to Pakistan’s dissatisfaction with the Security Council’s, failure to solve the Kashmir problem (790C.00/12–1850). 4 Patrick C. Gordon-Walker, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. 5 Telegram 986 from New York, December 21, not printed, stated that in view of the British inability, as reported in telegram 3558, to associate itself at this time with any Security Council action deprecating the Kashmir national conference resolution, USUN felt the choice of whether there should be a Security Council meeting on Kashmir before mid-January should be left strictly up to the British (357.AB/12–2150). Telegram 3140 to London, December 22, not printed, said that the Department agreed with the UK position expressed in telegram 3558 and was hopeful that every effort would be made at the Commonwealth Conference to make progress on the Kashmir problem (357.AB/12–2050). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 357AB/12–2250: Telegram [Document 814] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 confidential Washington , December 27, 1950—2 p. m. 3168. Brit Emb informed Dept Dec 26 favorable Cabinet decision to approach GOI–GOP for informal talks Kashmir, other Indo-Pak differences during London PriMin mtg. UK HICOMMs have recd instrs approach respective govts. We will treat utmost confidence this subj (urtel 3573, Dec 22). 2 We have noted (urtel 3558, Dec 20) UK appraisal of situation in Pak to effect such is “not in any sense at point of crisis”. Although we sincerely hope this is the case, our own analysis of situation is not reassuring. We believe there are unmistakable signs growing unrest and mounting pressures against Liaquat Govt and that opposition groups are using effectively Kashmir issue to weaken Govt. We believe view tense world situation grave responsibility and challenge falls on Indo-Pak leaders to settle their outstanding differences and hope Commonwealth mtg with UK in mediatory role will provide means by which progress on Kashmir and other Indo-Pak issues may be achieved. Acheson 1 Repeated to Karachi 349, New Delhi 983, USUN 611. 2 Telegram 3573 from London, not printed, requested that the U.K. proposal for discussing the Kashmir issue at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in January be treated in utmost confidence (357.AB/12–2250). Interest of the United States in preserving peaceful relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding jurisdiction over the North-West Frontier Province and the Tribal Areas Interest of the United States in preserving peaceful relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan regarding jurisdiction over the North-West Frontier Province and the Tribal Areas 1 1 For occasional reference to this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , Part 1, pp. 265 ff. The principal documentation of the Department of State on this subject for the years 1947–1949 is in files 745.90H, 745F.90H, and 745F.90H15. [815] The Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] January 24, 1950. 689.90D/1–2450: Telegram [816] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan Washington, February 8, 1950—12 noon. 689.90D/2–850: Telegram [817] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan Washington, April 7, 1950—7 p. m. 689.90D/4–750: Telegram [818] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, April 19, 1950—7 p. m. 689.90D/4–1950: Telegram [819] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan Washington, April 29, 1950—3 p. m. 689.90D/4–2950: Telegram [820] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, May 1, 1950—10 a. m. 689.90D3/5–510: Telegram [821] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan Washington, November 2, 1950—5 p. m. 689.90D/11–250: Telegram [822] The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State Kabul, November 13, 1950—6 p. m. 689.90D/11–1350: Telegram [823] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan Washington, November 28, 1950—7 p. m. 689.90D/11–2450: Telegram The Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (Mathews) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 689.90D/1–2450: Telegram [Document 815] The Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs ( Mathews ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 2 secret [ Washington ,] January 24, 1950. Subject: Afghan-Pakistan Dispute over Tribal Areas: Suggested Remarks to be Made at Informal Meeting with the Afghan Ambassador. Problem: To take steps to check current deterioration in Afghan-Pakistan relations and to develop means of solving basic differences between the two countries. Discussion: The Afghan-Pakistan dispute over the status of the tribal areas has in recent weeks assumed dangerous proportions. It is my belief that the GOP, in spite of the Afghans’ provocative press and radio campaign, has shown considerable restraint in its attitude toward the dispute. However, following the announcement in Kabul of the establishment of an “independent Pushtoon State”, the GOP has announced it is contemplating stationing regular troops in the tribal areas, and using scout units to watch the Afghan border. Our Embassy in Karachi believes the Pakistan Government’s purpose may be twofold—to assure the tribesmen of protection in the event of an Afghan attack, arid to warn the Afghans that it will not tolerate interference in its tribal areas. The explosive nature of the situation is emphasized by the fact that the tribesmen east of the Durand Line are reported to be increasingly impatient over the failure of the UN to settle the Kashmir Dispute. Should substantial numbers of tribesmen decide to invade Kashmir again, the GOP might conceivably use regular troops in the tribal areas to prevent such a movement, but such action would be so unpopular in Pakistan that it seems unlikely that the Government would make any effort to keep the tribes out of Kashmir. Plans to move regular troops into the tribal areas are therefore probably, as stated by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 3 a direct result of Afghan agitation for “independence” for the Pathans. If troops are actually moved into garrisons in the tribal areas, the Afghans will probably point to this as proof that the tribes are restless and unhappy in their relations with Pakistan. We have no evidence, however, that any such feeling exists. On the contrary it is our understanding that most, if not all, of the tribes east of the Durand Line have signed agreements with the GOP similar to those concluded with the British prior to the partition of India. Embassy, Kabul reported January 19 that no gasoline had been imported from Pakistan since January 1. While Pakistan authorities state the embargo is the result of the Afghans’ failure to comply with certain safety measures governing operation of their tank trucks, it may be assumed that this action is another means of telling the Afghans the Pakistan Government is getting tired of Afghan efforts to interfere in the affairs of the Pakistan tribal areas. If the Afghans persist in their anti-Pakistan propaganda and activity, it is only logical to assume that the Pakistan authorities will eventually take steps to block Afghanistan’s transit trade. This would not only cripple MKA operations in Afghanistan, but would probably cause the Afghans, in martyr-like fashion, to turn to the Russians for economic and military assistance. In view of the fact that Abdul Majid Khan 4 has on two recent occasions made rather extreme statements to the Ambassador in Kabul, 5 and the fact that Prince Naim 6 in his talk with you on January 6 7 reiterated at length the current Afghan line, it should be made clear to the Afghan Government that we still find it difficult to understand the logic of their approach, and believe that the persistence in their present attitude may have dangerous consequences. The Afghans who are calling the tune in the propaganda campaign against Pakistan appear to have reached such a high emotional pitch that it is doubtful whether any proposal involving bilateral negotiations will succeed. The Afghan Government has already turned down an offer by the Pakistan Government to discuss the controversy. Placing the case before the UN would give the USSR an opportunity to interfere openly, and would probably only lead to further mutual vituperation. Mediation by other Muslim states might offer a means of initiating discussions, but it is a question whether these countries would have enough prestige to put their decisions into effect. The International Court of Justice might hear the case, but it is doubtful whether the Afghans could present really effective legal arguments, and if they lost, they would be more bitter than ever. At the moment I believe the most we can do is to continue our efforts to appeal to reason—despite the fact that the Afghan attitude appears highly unreasonable. Through the Export-Import loan 8 we have shown our confidence in Afghanistan’s ability to help itself. We are now in a position to tell our Afghan friends that we are puzzled by their suggestion that they may “turn to Russia” at a time when we are giving them material assistance. I believe we should make it clear that we are displeased by their efforts to gain our support in their campaign against Pakistan through threats to place themselves under Soviet auspices. It is difficult to believe that there are not some Afghans in responsible positions who recognize the folly of the anti-Pakistan drive. It is conceivable that if we take a firm line, such Afghans may be encouraged to urge restraint on their hot-headed countrymen. [Here follows a detailed presentation of 10 points that Mathews suggested McGhee cover with Prince Naim in the near future.] 2 Memorandum prepared by Thomas E. Weil, Assistant Chief of the Office of; South Asian Affairs. 3 Liaquat Ali Khan. 4 Afghanistan Minister of National Economy. 5 U.S. Ambassador Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. 6 Mohammad Naim, Afghan Ambassador in the United States. 7 Memorandum of this informal conversation not printed. 8 Recent loan to Afghanistan of $21 million. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 689.90D/2–850: Telegram [Document 816] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 1 secret Washington , February 8, 1950—12 noon. 32. Fol Asst Secy McGhee’s suggestion at conclusion conversation with Naim Jan 6, Naim accompanied by Ludin 2 called at Dept Feb 1 to continue discussion Afghan-Pak tribal areas dispute. Assuring Naim he was speaking in wholly friendly manner McGhee told Naim despite careful evaluation reports from Afghan and Pak Dept still unable fully understand justification for Afghan agitation against Pak and Dept unable confirm charges of unjust imprisonment tribesmen, and eviction tribesmen from lands nor had Dept been able obtain clear evidence genuine desire among tribesmen for greater independence than now enjoyed. McGhee said Dept further unable believe tribes independence “life and death matter” for Afghans; minority elements existed in many countries but it did not necessarily fol they were in position enjoy complete independence, and if tribes were given independence there was no indication Afghan or any other country wld provide assist their state wld need. McGhee said Afghans through propaganda seemed to stimulate very conditions they deplored and much of their propaganda seemed provocative. On other hand GOP appeared to have shown marked moderation and had not until recently taken steps clearly intended as retaliation. McGhee expressed surprise high Afghan official in Kabul had intimated to our Amb unless US gave Afghan more assist Afghans might turn to USSR. McGhee said he cld not believe statement was made seriously and since it was not US pol to “buy” any country’s friendship US cld not respond to such argument. He said Export-Import loan was evidence of US confidence in Afghan intentions. Referring to informal suggestion made in Kabul US mediate dispute McGhee said Dept appreciated thought but felt until it understood Afghan objectives more clearly it cld not find rational “basis for mediation. He said Dept still believed dispute was one which might be settled by responsible leaders two Gvts concerned. Ludin reiterated charges GOP had arrested thousands of innocent Congress members and evicted tribesmen from lands, and argued timber, minerals, water power and natural skills of tribesmen wld make independent state economically viable. He said Afghans owed great debt to tribesmen, who had kept Brit from extending domination beyond Khyber and amts Afghans now paying tribesmen were only small part of what Afghan owed them. Naim expressed concern over press reports by Amer correspondent in Kabul intimating Afghan turning to USSR. Ludin said emphatically Afghans self-interest lay in coop with West. When McGhee asked Ludin and Naim whether they seriously believed Afghan menaced by Pak, Ludin ansd in affirmative. Memo conversation 3 being pouched. Naim has requested another appt with McGhee. In absence Ali Mohd 4 Emb requested convey gist McGhee’s remarks to ranking FonOff official and in its discretion to other officials who may be capable of understanding significance, such as Abdul Majid. 5 While Dept realizes its views may have little effect in highly-charged Kabul atmosphere it hopes frank statement it is not impressed by extreme attitude toward Pak may possibly encourage such Afghan officials as may favor a more moderate and rational approach to problem. Acheson 1 Repeated to Karachi 76, London 582. 2 Mohammad Kabir Ludin Khan, former Afghan Minister of Public Works. 3 Memorandum of conversation between Naim, Ludin Khan, McGhee, and Mathews, prepared by Weil on February 1, not printed (689.90D/2–150). 4 Afghan Foreign Minister. 5 Abdul Majid Khan, Afghan Minister of National Economy. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 689.90D/4–750: Telegram [Document 817] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 1 secret priority Washington , April 7, 1950—7 p. m. 85. 1. Dept believes Afghan-Pak dispute at point where some concrete steps other than unilateral representations shld be taken with view effecting settlement or at least reducing tension. FYI Dept continues question wisdom taking case to SC or GA; however this is question which Dept believes shld be decided by parties themselves and in accordance US policy we wld not wish to take position urging them against it. The UN might however be used in other ways in helping solve problem which if used wld have probable effect of eliminating pressure to bring matter before SC. 2. Use of UN offers several possibilities: A. Dept cld endeavor utilize broad pol powers given SYG in Charter and ask SYG if he thinks can be of aid in situation and wld be willing offer services to parties. SYG can act in various ways ease or help solve problem. (1) He cld discuss situation with Afghan and Pak UN Reps to clarify issues and ascertain more concretely actual position both Govts. Action impartial world pol figure like SYG bringing parties together for discussion at UN might ease situation. (2) If parties so desire, SYG cld dispatch Rep to field to ascertain facts re “Free Pushtoonistan” and ancillary issues vexing both govts (inflammatory propaganda, incitement, transit trade problems etc.) and report finding to SYG. This might have salutary effect on rising tensions. Dept believes most immed inflammable matters are ancillary issues which susceptible easing under pressure discussion or observation by impartial third party of SYG’s stature. (3) SYG might suggest a method or procedure for parties to continue their efforts to reach settlement by direct negotiation or otherwise, in accordance with their obligations under UN Charter to seek a solution by peaceful means of own choice, and to refrain from actions likely to further aggravate situation. (4) SYG cld be available, if parties desire, to provide his services or suggest others as conciliator, arbitrator, or in any other role involving peaceful means agreed upon by parties. B. Another possibility offered by UN is use of inquiry and conciliation procedure authorized by UNGA in Res 268(III), Apr 28, 1949. Conciliation panel has been established and 17 states, including US, have nominated members of panel. Also possible that SYG wld recommend its use. 3. Among foregoing Dept is of opinion use of Fact-Finding (2A (2)), or UN inquiry and conciliation procedure (2 B) probably represent most workable approach, though other procedures not ruled out. Dept wld hope that exercise SYG’s discretionary authority as outlined wld be effective within limits fact-finding and conciliation. Dept believes emphasis shld be on conciliation rather than arbitration because latter may unduly imply substance in Afghan claim. 4. Dept assumes if Afg Govt’s expressed interest in some sort of third-party intervention is genuine one or more of these suggestions wld be welcomed. Dept likewise believes that short of accepting arbitrator GOP shld be willing to cooperate. 5. Dept wld appreciate Emb’s views foregoing soonest. 2 Meanwhile, believes desirable Embs Kabul and Karachi using their discretion as to manner of approach sound out respective Govts informally re above possibilities. Acheson 1 Repeated to Karachi 257, New Delhi 341, London 1582, Moscow 298, and USUN 155. 2 In reply, Ambassador Avra M. Warren in his telegram 292 from Karachi of April 10, not printed, reported that Liaquat Ali Khan told him there were no differences between Pakistan and Afghanistan that could not be settled directly between them and that any referral to a third party of Afghan’s espousal of the Pushtunistan concept would cloak a fiction with some garb of reality (689.90D/4–1050). Dreyfus, in his telegram 99 from Kabul of April 11, not printed, said the Embassy felt there would be unusual difficulties for a fact-finder such as described in 2 A(2), said it regarded arbitration to be the least desirable method of settlement, and concurred in the belief that UNGA resolution 268 held out the greatest hope of success (689.90D/4–1150). Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas in his telegram 2193 of April 21 from London, not printed, reported that the U.N. Political Department of the British Foreign Office questioned the authority of the U.N. Secretary-General to exercise the powers suggested in telegram 85 and in any case believed that if he exercised such powers he would set a dangerous precedent (689.90D/4–2150). The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 689.90D/4–1950: Telegram [Document 818] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , April 19, 1950—7 p. m. 2129. As Department may by now have learned, Foreign Office has sent instructions to missions in Washington, Paris, Rome, Cairo, Ankara, Jidda, Amman, Baghdad and Tehran (capitals of governments which have diplomatic representatives in Kabul) to inquire of respective governments whether they would be prepared emphasize individually to Afghan Government their grave concern over deterioration of Afghan-Pakistan relations as result of border dispute and urge Afghans try reach peaceful understanding with Pakistan on issues in conflict. According to Scott and Fry, 1 who discussed this matter with Embassy officer yesterday, Foreign Office does not intend that there should be a joint approach (which might backfire), but thinks a “series of more or less serious warnings” might have desired effect in bringing Afghans to adopt more temperate and conciliatory stand. In representing its own concern to Afghans, UK would probably point out its view that Durand Line is international frontier, that Pakistan has succeeded to responsibility of British Government in area, that tribes have already expressed desire remain within Pakistan and that Pakistan has indicated its willingness discuss with Afghanistan economic issues and any other problems of common concern which do not affect its internal administration (i.e., Pakistan’s side of Durand Line). In view different lines of attack on problem which Department and UK appear be undertaking independently, Embassy took occasion to mention to UK officials on strictly confidential basis possibilities Department was now considering for action by UN SYG under broad powers available him or by using inquiry and conciliation procedure of GA (Deptel 85 to Kabul, April 7). Foreign Office officials found these possibilities interesting and worthy of exploration but said that in considering whole problem they had been inclined feel that if time does come for using facilities of UN, International Court was organization to which border dispute, which is at heart of trouble, would have be referred. It was justifiable issue facts of which are available and which was simply and solely matter for legal determination. They emphasized their concern that airing dispute in UN might lend substance to Afghan claims, might result in decision which Afghans would refuse accept and might give opportunity for Soviets, interfere. Embassy pointed out that Department too questions wisdom taking case to SC or GA and had in mind using UN procedure, which would avoid reference of problem to these bodies but which in Department’s view might go long way in easing tensions and leading way to some understanding. Sent Department 2129, repeated Kabul 3, Karachi 38, New Delhi 31; pouched Paris, Moscow. Douglas 1 Robert H. Scott, Head of the Southeast Asia Department of the British Foreign Office, and Leslie A. C. Fry, member of the ILK. High Commission at New Delhi, presumably on temporary duty in London. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 689.90D/4–2950: Telegram [Document 819] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 1 secret Washington , April 29, 1950—3 p. m. 105. London’s 3 to Kabul Apr 19. 2 Re multilateral approach to AfGovt proposed by UK Dept informed Brit Emb Apr 26 of its willingness instruct Emb Kabul approach AfGovt along lines proposed by UK with certain exceptions. Dept stated wld ask Emb Kabul to: a ) inform AfGovt that USGovt is concerned over provocative, and dangerous anti-Pak agitiation; b ) warn AfGovt that continuance, agitation may react against Afghan; c ) state it is our understanding Pak willing discuss with Afghan questions of common interest, such as coop in maintaining peace on Frontier and econ and cultural matters, and that we urge Afghan take fullest advantage Pak willingness enter bilateral discussions. (FYI Dept believes Emb Kabul can avoid appearance of too close collaboration with UK by re fact that US has made similar representations in past and wishes reiterate these views.) Dept informed Brit Emb it believed UK in better position than US to stress view that Durand Line is internatl Frontier, and that Afghan shld accept Pak as successor to rights of UK and former GOI. Dept also indicated it believes wld be most helpful if GOI support Brit proposal, and that UK in best position seek GOI support. Dept believes there is some risk in action contemplated by Brit as this approach cld annoy Afghan and possibly retard settlement. On other hand in Dept’s opinion and judging from tel from Brit Emb Kabul relayed Br it Emb Wash Apr 28, there appears to be softening Afghan attitude, and Brit proposal, if carried out, cld prove helpful to any moderates in AfGovt who might be urging settlement. Since it wld be desirable for you to make representations to AfGovt before Liaquat Ali Khan arrives US Dept hopes you can see FonMin not later than May 3. FonOff London had no objections ur making approach prior BritEmb Kabul, but you shld consult BritEmb in order avoid making calls too close together. While Dept does not desire you attempt hide fact Brit have approached us, you shld stress in talk with FonMin fact that our current approach is continuation of representations we have made in past, and in line with views we have held consistently since June 1947. Dept aware current multilateral approach may not produce rapprochement . Nevertheless you are requested not for time being initiate further action on Deptel 85 Apr 7 re possible UN procedures. 3 Acheson 1 Repeated to Karachi as 311, New Delhi as 430, London as 1985, Moscow as 363. 2 Printed as telegram 2129, supra . 3 In telegram 122 from Kabul, May 2, not printed, Dreyfus said he would present the Department’s views as instructed in telegram 105, though he believed such action would appear to the Afghans as U.S.–U.K. collaboration and result in lowering U.S. prestige and pushing Afghanistan into submitting the case to the UNGA or SC, which the Department was hoping to avoid (689.90D/5–250). On May 3, Dreyfus reported in telegram 124, not printed, that when he communicated the three points of telegram 105 to the Foreign Minister, Ali Moh’d, on May 2, the latter insisted that discussion of Pushtoonistan must be a part of any Afghan-Pakistan meeting (689.90D/5–350). The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 689.90D3/5–510: Telegram [Document 820] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret New Delhi , May 1, 1950—10 a. m. 605. If and when we approach Afghanistan in endeavor to persuade it to cease stirring up anti-Pakistan feelings among Pathans I venture suggest it might be preferable for us not to state categorically that we consider area between Durand line and NWFP integral part of Pakistan. From strictly legal point view India may be correct in its position as again explained to me by Bajpai (Embtel 604, May 1 1 ) and we might be embarrassed if we should pass judgment on this point and should find ourselves overruled later by International Court of Justice. Sent Department 605, repeated Kabul 10, pouched Karachi, Department pass London. Henderson 1 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 689.90D/11–250: Telegram [Document 821] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan 1 confidential Washington , November 2, 1950—5 p. m. 117. Embs Kabul and Karachi shld on Nov 6 approach Afghan and Pak FonOffs along fol lines. US Govt concerned at continued unsatisfactory state Afghan Pak relations. Existing tension between neighbors with mutual interests impedes essential economic and social progress and creates situation favorable Soviet intrigues and subversion. US Govt has consistently taken position Afghan Pak differences can and shld be settled by direct negot two govts. This still US view. In order facilitate direct negot, US Govt making informal proposal. If both govts consider proposal has merit, US Govt willing assist as informal “go-between” in arranging Afghan Pak agreement to terms proposal. US proposal which may be left with Afghan and Pak FonOffs as memo fol: “The Govts of Afghan and Pak wld agree: 1. To cease attacks upon the other by officials or through official channels and to use their best efforts to prevent such attacks in the press or from other nonofficial sources. 2. To use their influence to prevent incidents among the tribes which were likely to affect good relations between the two govts. The two govts wld further agree that if, despite their efforts, incidents did occur, they would consult together through diplomatic channels and avoid public pronouncements with respect to such incidents. 3. To exchange Ambs within two months. 4. To designate reps to meet within three months for informal, exploratory discussions of their differences without a previously agreed agenda or stated preconditions. The two govts wld further agree that there shld be no publicity concerning these discussions without prior agreement between them.” FYI care shld be taken avoid giving impression US desires or wld act as mediator. Our role to be limited to bringing parties together. If third party to discussions proves essential, we wld endeavor persuade parties agree upon small neutral state or outstanding individual. Latter cld be US citizen, although we prefer not. FYI we have not asked UK or other govts participate our approach. Brit will support if queried by parties. Indians being asked do same. Emb Delhi shld on Nov 6 inform MEA orally of US approach and request GOI support if parties seek GOI views. Hardly likely that Pak wld but Afghans might. Acheson 1 Repeated to Karachi 228, New Delhi 656, London 2285, and Moscow 294. The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Dreyfus) to the Secretary of State 689.90D/11–1350: Telegram [Document 822] The Ambassador in Afghanistan ( Dreyfus ) to the Secretary of State confidential Kabul , November 13, 1950—6 p. m. 167. Embtel 159, November 6. 1 Foreign Minister summoned me today and after reiterating appreciation our kind offer informed me: 1. Our proposals considered by Cabinet and found acceptable as they conform with fundamental Afghan Government policy of maintaining peace and they contribute to desirable solution Pushtoonistan question. 2. He desired make following two suggestions: ( a ) Point IV, although agreeable eliminate publication progress of discussions, Afghan Government considers preliminary statement re negotiations would be necessary. He favors if agreeable to Department and GOP that he make public announcement negotiations have begun through friendly channels and urge there be no propaganda, that calm approach should prevail and public avoid jumping at conclusions. He alleges sudden silence would create impression in Afghanistan that Afghan Government had abandoned its Pushtoonistan policy and acceded to Pakistan viewpoint thereby selling Afghan Government policy supporters “down the river”. Amongst supporters he mentioned the young element and others (presumably tribal elements) who are keenly following Pushtoonistan issue. ( b ) Text of Point 2 be broadened by dropping from first sentence words “among the tribes” thereby covering fact tribes sometimes influenced from outside and not only from within. He alleged present language would not have covered Chaman incident. 2 If four points with suggested alterations agreeable to Department and GOP, Foreign Minister envisions prompt appointment Ambassadors and that either Pakistan should send representatives to Kabul for informal talks with him or Prime Minister of Afghan representative would proceed Karachi for informal talks there. Embassy comments: 1. Foreign Minister noticeably cordial giving impression he and Cabinet sincerely desired open negotiations and that this had always been Afghanistan Government desire. 2. Not clear whether real intent in suggesting broadening Point 2 extends beyond incidents of Chaman character. 3. If Foreign Minister alteration Point 4 accepted Embassy considers advisable obtain mutual agreement exact wording preliminary announcements by both governments. Sent Department 167, repeated info Karachi 13, Delhi unnumbered. Dreyfus 1 In telegram 159, not printed, Dreyfus reported that on November 6 when he delivered the proposals of telegram 117 to the Foreign Minister, the latter expressed the informal and unofficial opinion that there would be no undue difficulty with points 1, 3, and 4, but that point 2 would raise practical difficulties (689.90D/11–650). 2 One of a series of minor incidents on the Afghan-Pakistan border, this one occurring on June 17 and reported, like the others, in correspondence from Kabul and Karachi in Department of State file 689.90D. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 689.90D/11–2450: Telegram [Document 823] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan 1 secret Washington , November 28, 1950—7 p. m. 280. Zafrullah and Mohd Ali 2 called on McGhee Nov 16. They thought Dept’s approach of Nov 6 re Afghan-Pak differences wld lead only “to interminable discussions with no chance of solving basic problem” of Durand Line, which Afghans have constantly insisted on discussing. They feared if Pak accepts Dept’s proposal Afghans will interpret this as recession from earlier Pak stand re internatl boundary and that no other problems (propaganda, tribal welfare, trade, etc.) cld be solved. McGhee pointed out many other problems might be settled by negots even though no agreement reached immed concerning Durand Line; US did not intend make Pak recede from its earlier position; and he was still confident talks between Paks and Afghans cld settle most, if not all, their differences. In talk with Secy and McGhee Nov 17 Zafrullah and Mohd Ali maintained same position and pressed for clear US statement, similar to Brit, that US wld support Durand Line as valid. McGhee emphasized we did not believe it timely for us to make any such statement at present. Mohd Ali asked whether US wld make its attitude clear to Afghans in case talks broke down on this boundary issue and Secy stated that, in such event, we wld consider possibility of making our position clear to Afghans. Fol this conversation, Pak Amb requested firm commitment, before GOP able decide what action to take on Dept’s approach; that US wld clearly support validity of Durand Line. 3 Afghan Chargé informed Nov 20 4 that Pak reaction to Nov 6 approach not yet recd and that Fon Min suggestions (Kabul’s 167 Nov 17 5 ) appeared generally acceptable to Dept. McGhee informed Ispahani Nov 27 6 that (1) if US to maintain its impartiality it cannot give commitments to either Afghans or Paks re talks proposed between them; (2) US position re boundary is implicit in prompt recognition accorded GOP in 1947, and in attitude which US has adopted toward Pushtoonistan question since its inception; and (3) if proposed talks shld break down over Durand Line issue we wld then give consideration to making US position re boundary explicit to Afghans. Dept agrees ur view Murray’s suggestion (Embtel 450 Nov 24). 7 In ur discretion, you may discuss three points in foregoing para with Pak FonOff, pointing out that shld be no doubt concerning US position re validity Durand Line but that to undertake at this time commitment to make such position explicit wld be inappropriate and wld tend prejudice outcome of talks which Dept obviously expects will lead to gen improvement Pak-Afghan relations even if Durand Line question remains outstanding. Acheson 1 Repeated to Kabul 136, London 2804, Moscow, New Delhi, and USUN. 2 Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan, Pakistani Foreign Minister, and Mohammed Ali, Secretary-General, Government of Pakistan. 3 The memoranda recording these conversations of November 16 and 17, not printed, the first prepared on November 16 by T. W. Simons of the Office of South Asian Affairs and the second prepared on November 17 for the Secretary’s signature by T. E. Weil, Assistant Chief of that Office, are in Department of State files 357.AB/11–1650 and 11–1750. 4 Memorandum of conversation between Mathews and Abdul Hamid Aziz, prepared on November 20 by R. S. Leach of the Office of South Asian Affairs, not printed (689.90D/11–2050). 5 Not found in Department of State files. 6 The memorandum of conversation covering this talk with the Pakistani Ambassador, dated November 27 and not printed, is in Department of State file 611.90D/11–2750. 7 The suggestion referred to here was offered to the U.S. Embassy at London on November 20 by James D. Murray, head of the Southeast Asia Department of the British Foreign Office. The suggestion, reported in telegram 2969 from London on November 21, not printed, was to explain to the Pakistanis in Washington ( a ) that the U.S. view on the Durand Line was not of great consequence because the United States was not proposing to act as mediator in the Afghan-Pakistan talks and ( b ) that the United States could not at this time give any assurance to Pakistan on support of the Durand Line without endangering chances of successful negotiation should Afghanistan learn of it. Murray also suggested that the Department of State assure the Pakistanis that in the proposed negotiations with Afghanistan, the United States would not urge Pakistan to give up any of its territory. (689.90D/11–2150) Warren’s view concerning Murray’s suggestion, as expressed in telegram 450 from Karachi, not printed, was that the suggestion had best not be followed because Pakistan should know already from the way the proposal was originally presented on November 6 that the United States did not expect to act as mediator and because any U.S. assurance that the United States would not urge Pakistan to give up territory would imply the possibility that the United States might later assume the powers of a mediator (689.90D/11–2450). Interest of the United States in resolving the dispute between Afghanistan and Iran over distribution of the waters of the Helmand River Interest of the United States in resolving the dispute between Afghanistan and Iran over distribution of the waters of the Helmand River 1 1 For a previous statement on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1948, vol. v , Part 1, p. 486 . [824] Editorial Note Editorial Note [Document 824] Editorial Note Negotiations between Afghanistan and Iran concerning the distribution of the waters of the Helmand River (known in Iran as the Hirmand) had been underway since late 1947, when the Department of State tendered its informal good offices and the use of Washington as a neutral ground for informal discussions of the problem. Conversations were soon begun in Washington between representatives of the Afghan and Iranian Governments, and in February 1948 the Department of State suggested that a three-man neutral technical commission be selected by the two Governments to study the problem and recommend a basis for settlement. The Department subsequently suggested that a United States water technician be loaned to serve as Engineer-Factfinder in Iran and Afghanistan and to prepare technical data for use by the proposed commission. This proposal was accepted by the two Governments, and Mr. Malcolm H. Jones was appointed to this post in January 1950. In March 1950 both Governments agreed upon the selection of three neutral water experts: Messrs. Francisco J. Dominquez, Robert L. Lowry, and Christopher E. Webb; and on September 7, the representatives of the Afghan and Iranian Governments agreed in Washington on the terms of reference for the Helmand River Delta Commission. It was to be a factfinding body which would not recommend an apportionment of water but rather would provide technical data for use by the two Governments in the negotiation and settlement of the problem. Data on the following subjects were to be collected and studied: the stream flow of the Helmand River at or below Band-i-Kamal Khan, including annual and long-range cycles of drought, normal flow, and flood; the past and present uses of the waters of the Helmand in the Delta area (e.g., Iranian Seistan and Afghan Chakhansur), including a study of the land under cultivation there; the existing works in the Delta area for control or diversion of the waters of the river; and plans for new installations and methods which might enable a more scientific use of available water. Previous reports and documents pertaining to the apportionment of the waters of the Helmand were to be reviewed. The Commission members convened in Washington on October 6, 1950, and departed immediately for Afghanistan and Iran. They spent 3 weeks in each country collecting data, consulting with the Heads of Government and their officials, and discussing local irrigation troubles with farmers on both sides of the border in the Delta area. On February 28, 1951, the Helmand River Delta Commission presented its report to the Governments of Afghanistan and Iran. The report included a statement of the Commissioners’ view that the engineering data they had presented provided a basis for settlement of the problem by the two Governments. Principal documentation on U.S. interest in resolving the Helmand River dispute in 1950 and 1951 will be found in Department of State decimal file 889.2614–Helmand; in two files retired by the Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA): Lots 57D401 and 57D421; and in a file retired by the Office of the Country Director for Iran (NEA/IRN), Lot 75D353. Relations of the United States with India Relations of the United States with India [825] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, April 12, 1950—3 p. m. 611.91/4–1250: Telegram [826] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India Washington, April 21, 1950—5 p. m. 611.91/4–1250: Telegram [827] Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 3, 1950. 791.00/7–350 [828] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India Washington, August 15, 1950—7 p. m. 611.90/8–1550: Telegram [829] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, August 23, 1950—5 p. m. 611.90/8–2350: Telegram [830] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, November 3, 1950—9 p. m. 611.91/11–350: Telegram [831] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, November 3, 1950—10 p. m. 611.00/11–350: Telegram [832] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, November 10, 1950—11 a. m. 791.00/11–1050: Telegram [833] Department of State Policy Statement [Washington,] December 1, 1950. 611.91/12–150 [834] The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, December 15, 1950—1 a. m. 791.00/12–1550: Telegram [835] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India Washington, December 30, 1950—3 p. m. 611.91/12–3050: Telegram The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 611.91/4–1250: Telegram [Document 825] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret New Delhi , April 12, 1950—3 p. m. 504. (1) My speech of March 27 1 served to bring more into open feelings of unfriendliness towards US which according to our understanding have been steadily strengthening in India during last eight months. Although cutting criticism and type of jeers to which Indians, particularly those with thin veneer of British culture, are addicted are not pleasant, it is probably preferable that they frankly and publicly give vent to their pent-up resentment rather than remain silent while seething inwardly. (2) Criticism expressed in press or orally has been aimed at those weaknesses or faults, fancied or real, of US Government or people upon which Indians when irritated with US are accustomed to dwell, including our treatment of American negroes, our tendency to support colonialism and to strive for continued world supremacy of white peoples, our economic imperialism, superficiality of our culture, our lack of emotional balance as evidenced by our present hysteria in combatting Communism and our cynical use of “witch-hunting method” in promoting domestic political ends, our practice of giving economic and other assistance to foreign peoples only when we believe such assistance will aid in our struggle against Communism, our assumption of superiority merely because we have higher standards of living, our hyprocrisy, etc. (3) We are convinced that increase of dislike for, or resentment toward, US is primarily due to growing belief of Indians that: ( a ) we have not given and do not intend give India any substantial economic assistance during this trying period in its history, while giving billions to various countries in Europe and Asia. Failure of GOI to obtain wheat from US last year either as gift or at bargain prices has in general been accepted by Indians as conclusive evidence that US Government and people are not really interested in welfare of Indian people and that US has no intention of rendering India any important aid in foreseeable future in latter’s battle to maintain or raise standards of living or in carrying out urgently needed programs economic development. Indians are inclined regard Point Four aid as grandiose empty gesture made for double purpose of convincing undeveloped peoples US interest in them and of gaining extensive influence over such peoples at relatively little cost. ( b ) US favors Pakistan in Kashmir dispute, 2 is using its influence behind scenes to help Pakistan obtain Kashmir, and is even endeavoring exert economic pressure on India to follow course of action which would give Kashmir to Pakistan. Indians in ever larger numbers are becoming convinced that US preference for Pakistan is based on US belief that friendship of Pakistan is more valuable to US than that of India. ( c ) US engrossed in world-wide struggle for maintenance of system of free enterprise is using its economic power through various channels in attempts to force India to abandon national economic planning which GOI supported by majority Indian nationalists considers essential for economic development of country in view of India’s shortage in material and financial resources, of technical and administrative personnel in Government apparatus, and of public-spirited and able financiers, industrialists, and merchants in business circles. (4) Explanations of reasons for failure US to give India substantial economic aid, of US position re Kashmir, of US attitude re private versus state enterprise make little impression since most Indians take attitude “action speaks louder than words.” They state or insinuate that no explanations, regardless their smoothness, can erase facts as they see them that US has been and is slighting India in distributing aid among foreign peoples; that US has found it convenient ignore moral factors in Kashmir dispute and sometimes openly, sometimes furtively, support Pakistan’s position; and that US has been bringing pressure on India through various ways to abandon state planning and control and to lay itself wide open to penetration by American investors interested primarily in quick and large profits. (5) Indian public in general has been so deeply disappointed at failure expected American economic assistance to appear and at failure US to appreciate what it regards as high moral position India re Kashmir that much of resentment against US must be regarded as of spontaneous character. Nevertheless hostility towards US has been fanned by quiet undercover campaign encouraged by group politicians and sycophants around Prime Minister, 3 and systematic open attacks on US made by Socialists who regard US as leading exponent of capitalism, and by Communists who see US as main obstacle to complete Communist victory in Asia. (6) In presenting foregoing analysis of how India views US at present time, I realize that Department may be somewhat shocked to learn depth of resentment towards America and width of gap that divides our respective points of view. We have not however arrived at present stage of our relations overnight. Undoubtedly Department has been concerned by accumulating evidences of this trend in our reports over past few months, as well as in its talks with Indian visitors to US. I do not wish discount factors which could slow up, reverse present trend, such as persistent dissatisfaction of members of Cabinet and many other leaders with Nehru’s basic foreign policies and their conviction India must cease to alienate those who could be of greatest help to her and must adopt instead a more cooperative attitude in dealing with Western democracies (Embtels 321, 384 and 424 March 11, 21 and 29). 4 This struggle between Nehru and his opponents will probably continue. It is an unfortunate fact that some of Nehru’s most telling arguments are based on three fundamental causes of Indian dissatisfaction with US as set forth above in paragraph (3). So long as this internal struggle persists, those around Nehru will not hesitate to exploit such anti-American feelings as they can generate. Moreover, even Nehru’s opponents are not deeply interested in more friendly relations because of any partiality for US; fundamentally their position is that more cooperative attitude on part India toward US is practical way for India to obtain grants and other material assistance which are now going to others. So long as India continues to measure our friendliness by what we do for her, rather than by what we say, it will continue to be difficult to advance our basic objectives with respect to India, namely, to develop India’s pro-Western orientation and promote her stability. Moreover it would be mistake to dismiss rising tide of Indian unfriendliness as temporary phenomenon. This tide is likely to rise higher as Indian economic and political difficulties increase. Even if world events later should check flow and cause recession the after-effects will probably be felt for years to come. (7) In spite of foregoing there are islands of sincere friendliness to US to be found in all strata Indian society. This friendliness finds expression in various newspapers and in oral statements and gracious gestures by Indians whom Americans meet officially or socially. Even some of our most severe critics appear sincerely to regret present trend. Henderson 1 Speech before the Indian Council of World Affairs at New Delhi, released to the press on the same date. For excerpts, see Department of State Bulletin , April 10, 1950, pp. 562–567. 2 For documentation, see pp. 1362 [ Pg. 1362 is part of Doc. 758 ] ff. 3 Jawaharlal Nehru. 4 None printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 611.91/4–1250: Telegram [Document 826] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India secret Washington , April 21, 1950—5 p. m. 389. 1. Dept finds ur recent analysis state Ind opinion re US very useful (urtel 504 Apr 12). 2. Dept of opinion friendly relations and close US-Ind coop matters of mutual concern must be founded on something more enduring than million tons wheat, dollar loans or gifts. We believe surest way winning Ind confidence and friendship in long run is by rptd demonstration to Ind people and Govt by conduct our relations with other nations of world and with them that our objectives are disinterested constructive as we are confident Inds wld wish their own be regarded. Present Ind attitudes subj these beliefs to serious doubt but Dept not yet prepared accept relatively minor material contributions as basis on which build sound superstructure understanding and friendship. 3. Contents ur conversations with Bajpai (urtel 506 Apr 12) 1 emphasize impediment to better US-Ind understanding of mental compartmentalism which seems characterize Ind officialdom as well as articulate Inds generally. Thus, on one hand, Ind criticizes US for failure provide what Ind regards as legitimate share US fon aid. On other hand, they seem ignore public and private statements by responsible Inds to effect that: (1) Ind does not need assistance; or (2) that US aid is instrument of “dollar imperialism.” This compartmentalism complicated by refusal ack Ind domestic troubles, internatl disputes and irresolute econ policies are strong deterrents to public or private US investment. Despite this fact, Dept has supported IBBD loan applications which have been only concrete Ind requests for asst. 4. Inds have apparently never accepted fact US econ aid to fon countries, Such as Marshall Plan, was linked directly to US and Ind vital interest that countries to which aid given shld hasten postwar reconstruction and econ recovery. For example, Marshall aid to UK obviously benefits Ind. US is willing help and can help when conditions are right for help to be effective. As Secy said at Press Club address Jan 12 2 “Amer assistance can be effective when it is the missing component in situation which might otherwise not be solved. The US cannot furnish all these components to solve question. It cannot furnish determination, it cannot furnish the will and it cannot furnish the loyalty of the people to its govt. But if the will and if the determination exist and if the people are behind their govt then and not always then is there a very good chance.” 5. Inds frequently insist any fon aid recd shld be, as they put it, “without any strings attached.” Limitations were placed on uses to which Marshall aid cld be put. In our view, it is unreasonable for Inds or any peoples expect highly-taxed Amer people, from whose pockets comes every dol of Amer aid to fon countries, to give these dols freely without some safeguards they will serve achieve purposes for which intended. 6. Re belief US has food to spare for econ warfare but none for alleviation human suffering, US has recd rptd assurances from Ind qtrs that Ind has food problem under control and has noted rptd announcements it intends stop food imports after 1951. Independent reports of impending famine in South Ind and reduction acreage devoted food cultivation favor jute and cotton have been recd from our own sources and Dept of course realizes Ind does have difficult food problem. It has never been approached by GOI for assistance solution food problem on basis alleviation human suffering in Ind. Even single indirect approach for million tons wheat was on basis econ adjustment not suffering. 7. As you have explained Inds, US did not end wheat discussions, which, it shld be noted by Ind critics, never went beyond mere exploratory stage. US officials gave Amb Deshmukh 3 benefit of all info bearing on possible acquisition by Ind of one million tons US wheat. After this info given Amb Deshmukh on frankest basis, it was suggested he proceed as he thought best make formal request or otherwise. Subsequently, by an informal ltr from Ind Emb, discussions were terminated. Neither a firm nor a formal request was made by Ind for wheat. USG may be pardoned if it is puzzled learn it is criticized for Inds failure obtain wheat when no firm or formal request for it was ever made. FYI Dept preparing separately info on food surpluses requested urtel 528, Apr 15. 4 8. Re Kashmir, you are of course aware, and Dept had thought GOI was also, that GOP accuses US of favoring Ind. Fact both parties accuse US favoring other suggests sincerity US objectivity and inevitably causes Dept consider such accusations as possible tactic designed influence US to cease fol a strictly impartial line. 9. It is difficult for Dept reconcile Ind belief that “actions speak louder than words” with Ind opinion US exerting econ pressure order force Ind drop socialist programs and adopt system of private enterprise. Presumably, Ind critics do not think their country alone has been singled out for this treatment but rather believe this is a gen aim US econ fon policy in all countries. If this is true, how then do Inds explain vast quantities of aid which have been given countries govts of which encourage socialistic enterprises and have been vigorously pursuing a policy of nationalization of industry? 10. Dept agrees present Ind opinion re US has not developed overnight. On contrary, it believes attitudes you have described have been latent and submerged for a nr of years and are now being given special expression because of press of Ind econ problems and polit dissatisfaction. Despite discouraging state of Ind attitude toward US, it is believed we must continue on present course. As stated above, we doubt Ind friendship and confidence can be won by Amer gifts alone. As in past, so in future, econ assistance to Ind and other countries can only be forthcoming when there is coincident Ind receptivity and our own ability, and constructive purpose to be served. 11. In ur discretion and to such extent you consider helpful in present difficult position, you are authd use foregoing comments in confidential conversations with Bajpai and other Ind officials as representing comments ur govt in response pts previous discussions which you submitted its consideration. Acheson 1 Discussion with Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, regarding the growing resentment in India against the United States. Telegram 506 from New Delhi not printed. (611.91/4–1250) 2 Remarks entitled “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” made before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.; printed in Department of State Bulletin , January 23, 1950, pp. 111–118. 3 Sir Chintaman D. Deshmukh, Financial Representative of the Government of India in Europe and the United States, 1949–1950; Indian Minister of Finance, 1950. 4 Not printed. Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) to the Secretary of State 791.00/7–350 [Document 827] Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] July 3, 1950. Subject: Interpretation of Prime Minister Nehru’s Southeast Asian Tour, and Shifts in Indian Foreign Policy Prime Minister Nehru toured Southeast Asia from June 2 to June 26. A symbol of Asian anti-colonialism and always sensitive to the mood of his audiences, the theme of his speeches was a strong attack against Communism instead of against the continued existence of European colonialism in Asia which it might so well have been. The tone of his speeches was set by an address delivered in India just prior to his departure in which he asserted that the Communist Party in India is purely terroristic. He affirmed his Government’s intention not to tolerate its activities, and warned that India would not permit interference from China or elsewhere. In Indonesia 1 he said that the world had changed and that the “new imperialism” was a greater danger than the relics of colonialism. He talked of the ideological dangers lurking in Southeast Asia and decried the extremist movements which have undermined the solidarity of the Asian nationalist movements. He told his listeners to bolster their freedom lest outside influences “come to sweep it away like a broom.” He bluntly told the Indonesians that they must forget their old animosities, live peacefully, quit depending on outmoded slogans, get to work and avoid Communism. He referred to the confident relations between the Indians and the British and bespoke East-West cooperation. The Prime Minister talked to his audiences in Southeast Asia as few foreigners would have dared. In Rangoon his remarks were strongly anti-communistic; advocating peaceful progressive socialism, he warned the Burmese of the danger of forcing socialism on the people. 2 Nehru’s statements are to be interpreted as an extension into the international field of his domestic campaign against Communist tactics. If Communism does not change its tactics in South and Southeast Asia he may continue to take the offensive against it, not only in India but elsewhere. In speaking so frankly Nehru served our interests admirably. Following Nehru’s visit to Indonesia our representatives were informed that Indonesia had no intention of recognizing Viet Minh or of convoking an Asian conference on Indochina. During Nehru’s absence from New Delhi, his principal adviser on foreign affairs, Sir Girja Bajpai, told Ambassador Henderson that he was preparing a memorandum to the Prime Minister, the burden of which would be that India should adopt a more “positive” foreign policy. Nehru’s Southeast Asian performance may well have been the first manifestation of this more positive foreign policy. In this context, the second manifestation was undoubtedly India’s acceptance of the Security Council’s Resolution of June 27 on Korea, 3 even though it was accompanied by an explanation that it did not involve a modification of India’s foreign policy of friendship with all countries. Significantly the statement did not reiterate India’s neutrality in the cold war. It is important to remember the frequently received advice from top Indian officials not to worry about public statements but to judge only on actions. If the maximum advantage of India’s trend in policy is to be realized it is imperative that it receive no public acknowledgment and that emphasis be placed exclusively on India’s “splendid cooperation” with the United Nations. 1 For documentation on U.S. policy with respect to Indonesia, see vol. vi , pp. 964 ff. 2 For documentation on U.S. policy with respect to Burma, see ibid. , pp. 229 ff. 3 For text, see vol. vii , p. 211 . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 611.90/8–1550: Telegram [Document 828] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 1 top secret Washington , August 15, 1950—7 p. m. 247. Skeptical response of much articulate Asian opinion to UN action re Korea 2 is seriously disturbing and foreshadows possibility little Asian support shld further Commie aggression require deeper US involvement in such trouble spots as Indochina and Formosa. It is apparent that important segments Asian peoples are not yet convinced of our devotion to peace, lack of imperialist ambition and interest in Asian freedom and progress. Asian govts share these doubts and for this and other reasons are reluctant to take clear stand against danger of Soviet imperialism even though govts seem increasingly aware of threat to them and their countries. We may be able remove some doubts of Asian govts by closer consultation with them on Asian problems and by encouraging them assume greater responsibility for solution those problems. To this end Dept is considering approach to Nehru and Liaquat, 3 and possibly leaders of other free Asian countries at a later date, along fol lines: 1. US Govt wld like establish in Asia pattern of consultation on Asian and other world problems comparable to that now obtaining in Eur wherein US and Eur govts, particularly UK and Fr, maintain constant close liaison for frank exchange views on actual and impending situations both within and without UN. 2. We wld regard and wld wish Asian govts regard such consultation as two-way street with info re, and suggestions for solutions of, problems flowing in both directions in atmosphere mutual understanding and confidence. As regards situations in Asia, we recognize Asian govts have special interest and knowledge. We assume Asian govts on their part recognize that many Asian situations vitally affect US. 3. US approach to Asia is disinterested in sense we have no desire for territory, special privilege, or any form direct or indirect control. We do desire that Asian peoples have opportunity work out own institutions and destiny in accord with their deep-seated nationalist aspirations and that relations between Asia and rest of world, necessarily close in this day of global interdependence, be based on free consent, not force or duress. Asian development along these lines is, in our view, gravely threatened by clear intent of USSR to establish new world empire by aggression. We are deeply concerned lest some Asian countries find themselves unable withstand this threat. 4. We wish explore with key free Asian govts their appraisal Asian situations and ways and means strengthening Asia against Sov imperialism and increasing Asian participation in solution world problems in Asia and elsewhere. Foregoing approach is conceived as first step in phased plan of action. Later steps might include dispatch high level rep from Wash to visit free Asian govts to obtain comparative view their reactions this approach and prospects their cooperation. Existing ECA Asian aid programs and possible program for South Asia now under study in Wash are related to plan of action, but are not conceived, or wld they be presented, as reward for acceding to US or Western policies. Programs wld be directed toward assisting free Asian countries better their econ condition and increase their ability resist Sov imperialism. This tel FYI and shld not be discussed with govt to which accredited or foreign dipl colleagues. Ur comments on proposed approach to Asian leaders and ur suggestions re further steps urgently desired. Acheson 1 Repeated to Karachi as telegram 95. 2 For documentation on U.S. relations with Korea, see volume vii . 3 Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 611.90/8–2350: Telegram [Document 829] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority New Delhi , August 23, 1950—5 p. m. 452. 1. We have considerable doubt that presentation to GOI of proposals outlined Deptel 247, August 15 for setting up machinery of systematic consultation or dispatch of high US Government representative to Delhi for exploratory talks would serve any constructive purpose until atmosphere here has become more sympathetic to and trustful of US. 2. In our opinion most effective measure for improving atmosphere would be expression readiness our part extend India substantial economic aid along lines touched on in recent exchanges telegrams between Department and Embassy (Deptel 65, July 14 and Embtel 187, July 24 1 ). Unless we indicate our willingness materially assist in Indian economic development or unless international Communism should engage in fresh adventures which would frighten Indian leaders into abandoning their present foreign policy of so-called “non-alignment” we believe it would be difficult bring about close cooperation between US and India in international affairs. 3. Even though such proposals as we might make for setting up machinery for consultation should be presented in most delicate manner there is possibility that Indian leaders, instead of regarding them as flattering demonstration our realization of India’s growing international importance, might consider them as move to lure India into our camp and thus bring end to its policy of non-alignment. Recent strong reaffirmations of GOI policy of non-alignment and announcements of attitudes on certain Asian problems which are clearly at variance with ours, strengthen our doubts that setting up of systematic consultative machinery would serve to bring it under present conditions appreciably nearer our way of thinking. In fact operation such machinery may result in accentuation of differences between us. GOI might well utilize this machinery to insist on our abandonment of policies which we cannot in our national interest afford to give up. It might for instance endeavor introduce into discussions whenever opportunity offers question admission Peiping into UN and might refuse as it does now recognize danger further international Communist aggression in Asia or elsewhere and object to our policies based on that danger. Differences between foreign policy objectives of India and those of US are much sharper than differences between those of US and those of France and UK. 4. Regardless decision Department as to advisability endeavoring set up machinery for systematic consultation we believe we should try to consult more intimately with GOI in future than we have in past re our foreign policies and contemplated actions in foreign field and to encourage GOI to consult more frankly with US. In our opinion we might achieve more through informal voluntary consultations than through consultations held in pursuance of agreement between us. Closer informal, spontaneous consultations could be in form of exchanges of views between Secretary of State and Nehru and discussions through diplomatic channels and between our respective representations in UN. We could also instruct our diplomatic representatives in various world capitals to keep in closer touch than in past with their Indian colleagues. 5. In prevailing atmosphere GOI and Indian public would be likely regard visit high level representative from Washington as empty gesture unless that representative was empowered enter into concrete talks for extension substantial economic aid to India. At this juncture mere expressions of interest in and sympathy for India accompanied by references to Point Four as concrete form of expression thereof are likely irritate rather than inspire friendliness. Sent Department 452, repeated information Karachi unnumbered. Henderson 1 Neither printed. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 611.91/11–350: Telegram [Document 830] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority New Delhi , November 3, 1950—9 p. m. 1075. Embtel 1067, November 3. 1 1. During my conversations of November 2 with Nehru he made several references to India’s policy of “non-alignment”. He seemed to be under impression that US was anxious for India to change this policy. I told him I wished to make clear to him what attitude of US Government was in this regard. 2. I said US had no intention or desire to try to bring about change in what it understands to be India’s basic foreign policy. This policy, as we understood it, was that India would not align itself with either of what it termed “power blocs”, but would follow policy of deciding each international problem on its merits. Fact was US was not asking any power to “align” itself with it in any bloc. US did not consider that it belonged to bloc, unless cooperation among powers to discourage aggression might be considered as operations of bloc. US was, however, not dissatisfied with policy of India of deciding each question on its merits. It was convinced that basic international objectives of India and US were similar if not identical and that therefore differences which might develop between them in making of international decisions would be primarily of methods, tactics, or timing rather than of substantive nature. The US was concerned, however, at habit of Indian press and sometimes of Indian leaders of attributing to US unworthy motives when divergencies in foreign policy developed. We really were trying to understand factors and emotions which prompted India and other Asian peoples to react to world events and trends somewhat differently from ourselves. We were also endeavoring not to be unfair in criticism of their motives. It seemed reasonable to us to expect similar attitude on part of India and other free Asian countries. We thought India could follow an independent policy without questioning our motives whenever we had differences. 3. Nehru expressed surprise at my remarks. He said that at Lake Success and elsewhere it seemed to him US was continually trying to persuade GOI to follow in its wake. Many statements issued by US officials would indicate that US was anxious to have countries including India go along with it, particularly in connection with matters relating to collective security. I replied we had come to conclusion that aggression was at present chief threat to world peace and that best way to prevent aggression was for potential aggressors to realize that aggression on their part would be met by solid and determined collective opposition to it on part all free countries. It was natural therefore for us to wish that India on every appropriate occasion should indicate its determination to oppose aggression. We were of opinion that GOI could register such determination without abandoning its policy of “non-alignment”. 4. Nehru said that he was deeply interested in what I said. It would be helpful if on appropriate occasion US Government could authoritatively issue announcement to effect it was not expecting any powers align themselves with any bloc. I told him that I thought that in general most countries of free world knew what our ideas in this respect were. Nevertheless if he thought it would be helpful suitable occasion might be found to issue some kind of statement clarifying our position. Henderson 1 Telegram 1067, not printed, described the general tenor of the 3-hour evening conversation and identified the range of subjects covered (611.91/11–350). The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 611.00/11–350: Telegram [Document 831] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority New Delhi , November 3, 1950—10 p. m. 1078. Embtel 1067, November 3. 1 1. During my conversation with Nehru November 2 he referred to “anti-Communist hysteria, war psychology, and fear complex in US.” He said that it seemed to him that it would serve world peace better if US officials and press would stop talking about threat of Communist aggression and about necessity of military preparation to meet that threat. Such talk tended to excite other parts of world and to render it more difficult for restoration of international peaceful atmosphere. 2. I told him I would like briefly to describe situation in US as I understood it. Our analysis of world situation and experience of recent years in dealing with international Communism caused us to believe that international Communism planned expansion by force of arms or by threat of force of arms; that it would be prevented from engaging in aggression only if it was given to understand that aggression on its part would meet with such sharp armed opposition that it would be part of wisdom to restrain its expansionist ambitions. US was democratic country and American people were by character peaceful. They had no quarrel with, or dislike of, other peoples. Most of them wanted to live and work without bothering about international problems. They did not wish to pay taxes to support armament of US and other countries or to contribute either young men to military forces which might be sent to any part of world to fight aggression. They were at present paying such taxes and contributing their youths merely because they now understood dangers to world and to them of international Communist expansionism. Unless such dangers were kept before them they would be likely to relax, lose interest, and refuse longer to bear main burden of curbing aggression. It would be shortsighted therefore for American leaders or press to give US people sense of false security to such extent that they would not be willing longer to carry terrific burden under which they were struggling. I said I would also like to emphasize that US Government was not opposing Communism as such in various parts of the world. It was unmasking and exposing aggressive characteristics of international Communism. It also believed that not only American people but world at large should be awake to fact that Communists look for leadership to Moscow no matter how peaceful they might declare their intentions to be, must actually be engaged in endeavoring to create economic deterioration and public disorder in non-Communist countries, to soften up areas where early armed aggression was planned, and to prevent various non-Communist areas from joining in collective opposition to Communist aggression elsewhere. I added that if more of free world could be awakened to dangers of international Communist aggression by collective measures whenever and wherever it manifested itself US could afford perhaps to relax somewhat and to be relieved of its present tensions. 3. Nehru said he appreciated force my remarks. Nevertheless he wondered if US public would not in time become tired of strain under which it was laboring and whether its fatigue might not result either in its launching into preventive war or refusing further to bear present burden regardless of effects on world at large. I said that of course such danger existed. US leaders had extremely delicate task. Certain demagogues took advantage situation to endeavor create hysteria. Activities of these demagogues appeared to excite more interest abroad than restrained intelligent work carried on by responsible American leaders. Result was misunderstanding of what was going on in US. 4. I added that mere elimination of fear either in US or elsewhere of international Communist aggression was not likely to assure international security. Absence of fear of peoples close to Iron Curtain would not save them so long as at any moment curtain might roll up far enough to permit eruption of tanks and planes and of armed men who would not desist merely because their victims were not afraid. I said that we believed that only active preparation and collective opposition to aggression could save these people and forestall world war. 5. Nehru said that Gandhi 2 had taught Indians that individual passive resistance could defeat mighty British Empire. I replied that I had considerable doubt that these tactics would have been successful against foe so ruthless as international Communism was willing to be. If Gandhi had been opposed to international Communism he probably would not have lived long enough to issue his call of passive resistance and his disciples would undoubtedly have been liquidated in short order. Nehru agreed that coping with international Communists was not quite same task as that of opposing British imperialism. Henderson 1 Not printed. 2 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Indian nationalist leader; assassinated in 1948. The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 791.00/11–1050: Telegram [Document 832] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority New Delhi , November 10, 1950—11 a. m. 1161. 1. We have reliable and even authoritative information to effect that events in Tibet and unrest in Nepal 1 have resulted in increasing dissatisfaction in top Indian government and party circles with India’s present foreign policy. Even those members of Cabinet who [are] Nehru adherents appear to be convinced that time has come for India to recognize that international communism is country’s chief danger and to make corresponding shifts in policy. Patel 2 has been stating privately that within next few days he will insist in Cabinet meeting that India not only change policy in direction of closer cooperation with western powers, particularly US, but that it make announcement to that effect. Another Cabinet Minister who is in Nehru’s camp said privately two days ago that Nehru is now only member of Cabinet who insists that there is still hope friendship between Communist China and India and that GOI should make no move which may endanger development that friendship. Patel’s speech reported in this morning’s press (Embtel 1160, November 10) 3 condemning Communist China for attack on Tibet is believed opening gun in this internal struggle. Patel is reliably reported to have said in private conversation with one of his most trusted lieutenants that he would be willing to defer to Nehru in matters of foreign policy so long as India’s security was not at stake; “he was convinced now however that continuation of Nehru’s policy would endanger security of India and he could no longer remain passive. He felt so strongly in the matter that he would prefer to resign from Cabinet and to break openly with Nehru rather than to allow matters to drift. 2. One unfortunate feature of situation is that Patel and others advocating change in India’s policies are arguing that India must strengthen its military establishment if it is effectively to face its Communist neighbor, and that it cannot properly strengthen its military establishment without aid from West, particularly US; that it cannot expect aid from US unless it makes it clear before whole world that it stands with West against aggressiveness of international Communism. In this connection please see page 7 [ Pg. 7 is part of Doc. 2 ] enclosure Embdesp 200 July 26 4 in which outline Patel statement to me re need for US military equipment. It might be embarrassing if change of GOI policy would be based on expectation of receiving substantial military equipment from US in view of our own shortages in this respect. 3. So far as I know, no one this mission has been recently approached even informally by emissaries of those Indian leaders desiring change in foreign policy. Nevertheless whenever occasion arises we have been endeavoring to make it clear that demands on US for military equipment are so much in excess of our ability to supply such equipment that regardless of what India’s foreign policy might be it should not expect any substantial quantities of arms from US in near future. 5. 5 We have also from time to time indicated that we have no desire to press India to “align itself” with US or to join any “bloc;” we would however like for India to cooperate with US fully in strengthening existing systems of collective security, for it to join wholeheartedly with other free nations in opposing aggression, and for it to make decisions on international questions on their merits rather than on desire to “keep from taking sides.” 6. We are inclined to believe that in spite of declared determination of Patel and others to make foreign policy disagreements major issues, Nehru and Patel will be able to work out some kind of formula which will enable India gradually to shift in direction towards West without too much publicity being given to this change. Nehru is said to be showing somewhat more friendliness to US than heretofore and he appears to be steadily losing enthusiasm for Communist China. Henderson 1 For documentation regarding U.S. relations with Tibet and Nepal, see vol. vi , pp. 256 ff., and pp. 1484 ff. herein, respectively. 2 Vallabhbhai Patel, Indian Deputy Prime Minister. 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed. 5 There is no paragraph numbered 4. Department of State Policy Statement 611.91/12–150 [Document 833] Department of State Policy Statement [Extracts] secret [ Washington ,] December 1, 1950. India a. objectives We desire in India the continuance in power of the present noncommunist government and would like it to pursue, with wide popular support, a policy of friendship and cooperation with the United States. We should like India voluntarily to associate itself with the United States and like-minded countries in opposing communism. In the Indian domestic sphere our fundamental objectives are political stability and economic progress, the latter based on increased food production and expanded industrial capacity which would contribute to a rise in the standard of living and improve India’s ability to defend itself against attack. We desire also access to the resources and markets of India and the development of an attitude which would lead the Government of India to cooperate in denying resources to the Soviet Union and its satellites which are of importance to the development of Soviet war potential. Our relations should be such that India would be amenable to voluntarily allowing us the use of its facilities if necessary in the event of war. b. policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The most serious politico-economic problem which should command the attention of the US is the deepening need for strengthening India’s economy. The likelihood of the continuation in power of the present government, which is more favorably disposed toward the US than any probable successor, is directly related to the progress which that government can make in ameliorating domestic, economic and social conditions. To date, the Government of India has made little progress, and as time passes its problems promise to become more formidable. Since the end of World War II, India has had a large deficit in its transactions with both the dollar and sterling areas, due in part to extraordinary imports of food. The Government of India has controlled these deficits by restrictive import regulations (which were primarily responsible for small dollar and sterling surpluses in the year ending in June 1950 although the usual deficits have reappeared), by drawing on the dollar pool of the sterling bloc and on the International Monetary Fund, and by postponing needed development projects. In recent years the only source of certain essential Indian imports (especially some types of capital goods) has been the US, although recovery in Europe and Japan has somewhat improved this situation. It will continue to be our policy to make needed goods as freely available to India as is possible within the limits of the tightening supply situation and overall foreign requirements which must be met to achieve US foreign policy objectives. India’s dollar shortage remains an obstacle to the procurement of these items and limits its ability to proceed with developmental projects. India’s domestic politico-economic policies also impede progress in the development of the Indian economy. It is our belief that unduly restrictive governmental controls, tax and fiscal policies which inhibit domestic investment, heavy nonproductive military expenditures, and the failure to carry out needed agrarian and labor reforms stand in the way of efforts of the Government of India to revive and expand industry and agriculture. Our views in this regard have been brought to the attention of the Government of India, and the US should continue to make our views known tactfully at opportune occasions. It is apparent that India must depend upon outside sources of capital for rapid progress in its plans to increase agricultural and industrial output. Indian domestic policies, intra-regional tensions, the threat of war, and the fear of nationalization inhibit the investment of Indian capital, and these factors together with fear of the inability to remit profits, and the existence of more attractive investment opportunities in the US and elsewhere, limit to a marked degree contributions to the economic development of India by US private investment. Moreover, there is a need for certain basic improvements in India’s economy of a nature which do not lend themselves to financing by private capital. Accordingly we have supported serious consideration by the International Bank of Indian requests for credits based on well-conceived projects designed to reduce India’s reliance on foreign sources for the balance of its food requirements, to increase exports of important raw materials now being stockpiled in the US, and to repair India’s rail communications. It is recognized, however, that India’s ability to service international loans is limited. It is our policy to help India obtain technical assistance from abroad in the fields of agriculture, public health, education, labor, power development, and transportation. We are supporting United Nations technical aid programs for India. Under our own Point IV program, India will receive the largest portion of funds which have been allocated to the South Asian area. We assist India in obtaining the services of qualified experts from private organizations, and also make public officials available to the central and state governments of India under the provisions of the Smith–Mundt Act, a practice which will be continued under the Point IV Program. With China under Communist domination, Soviet power now encroaches along the perimeter of the Indian sub-continent. India has become the pivotal state in non-Communist Asia by virtue of its relative power, stability and influence. Yet grinding poverty, starvation, and sickness are the seeds of social and political unrest. As has been stated, it is likely that the present Government of India will lose power unless it can present the Indian people with definite progress in improving their social and economic conditions, and it is likely that a successor government would be less favorably disposed toward the United States than the present one. India, like other underdeveloped countries, lacks a capital surplus large enough to undertake all the large-scale developmental projects which seem to be necessary. There exists now a combination of factors and considerations which indicate the need for the adoption by the US of a program of financial and economic aid to India for the carrying out of projects which have both popular appeal and promise of showing early and positive results in terms of increased food production and a perceptible improvement in economic conditions. Such a program would supply the “missing component” to a set of circumstances which would permit progress in economic and social development; the other components would have to be supplied by India. One of them would be self-help on a scale hitherto unknown in India involving, among other steps, the modification of laws which inhibit economic activity and the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and enthusiasm. Action by the Government of India to settle disagreements with Pakistan, especially those relating to trade and finance, and positive accomplishment in this regard, would allow India to reap the greatest possible benefits from a program of this kind. The approval of P.L. 621 (amendment to Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949) on July 26, 1950 makes it possible to implement our policy of assisting India to maintain its ability to defend itself against aggression. We intend to give India reimbursable aid (by procurement assistance, technical advice, or by sales from US military stocks) within the framework of established higher priority and supply limitations. We also intend to assist India by approving licenses for commercial orders and by concurring in retransfers to them on the part of present holders of Lend-Lease stocks. We should make certain that such aid can be justified in terms of India’s internal security, its defense needs, the desirability of its participation in any possible regional defense plans, and its possible international commitments in defense matters (such as might arise through its association with UN” action). Bilateral treaty relations with India are based for the most part on international agreements concluded before India’s independence, being either US-UK treaties which applied to India or agreements concluded directly with India which remained in force under the terms of India’s independence arrangements. It is desirable that new treaties and agreements be negotiated to replace outmoded US-UK agreements and to fill gaps in our treaty structure. Still to be negotiated are a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, a Consular convention, and a double Taxation Treaty. Unresolved differences stand in the way of the conclusion of a commercial treaty. The Government of India wishes to “screen” all foreign investment, passing on each specific case to decide whether it would be consistent with Indian policy regarding the economic development of the country and the best use to which, in the Indian view, the natural resources of the country should be put. In order to conclude a FCN treaty with India it will be necessary for the US to make certain departures from the standard draft of the treaty. The Government of India has also indicated a certain reluctance to grant national treatment to American firms which are permitted to enter India, but in return for our agreeing to a provision regarding screening, it is contemplated that the Government of India will be required to agree to give national treatment to American firms. Our commercial policy is to encourage India’s full participation in the program for the expansion of world trade and employment of which the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization are the main features. India is officially committed to a multilateral trade policy, although we recognize that so long as India suffers from a critical shortage of hard currencies, it must retain restrictive trade and financial policies such as are permitted by GATT and the ITO Charter. Such restrictions adversely affect US exports of semiand nonessential items. Although India applies taxes and controls to many exports, it appears that the effect of these in limiting Indian exports to the United States is not serious, as compared with other factors such as transportation, and shortages of jute goods resulting from the trade war with Pakistan. India produces many materials which are of strategic value to the United States and whose uninterrupted flow to this country is of considerable importance. The continuing supply of Indian manganese is of essential importance to the maintenance of a high level of steel production in the United States. It should be our constant policy to encourage the maintenance and increase of the present rate of shipment. Burlap, mica, kyanite, corundum, beryl, and monazite are also of considerable importance. The opportunity which these materials present to diversify the basis of the Indian economy and their importance as dollar earners should be stressed. The Indian Government and Indian producers should be encouraged to maintain their dealings in these materials on a sound businesslike basis which would encourage the continued growth of this mutually advantageous trade. The Government of India is intent upon developing its own merchant marine in order to compete in the international cargo carrying field and to reduce its dependence upon foreign shipping and a drain on its hard currency. We should be alert to measures by the Government of India which are discriminatory to US vessels or are otherwise inconsistent with the treatment accorded by the United States to foreign shipping. The strategic location of India and its great importance in South and Southeast Asia requires the maintenance of United States air services to India. We should endeavor to prevent the further development of an Indian air transport policy which might reduce the capacity to carry fifth-freedom traffic. It should also be our policy to assist India in the development and maintenance of adequate air navigation and communications facilities as well as a good domestic air service. c. relations with other countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Government of India has refused to extend recognition to either Bao Dai or Ho Chi Minh, 1 and has stated its intention to postpone action in this regard until it is more certain which of the opposing sides has the support of the majority of the people of Indochina. Critical of what it regards as the half-hearted measures which the French have taken to turn over power, India is by no means persuaded that Ho is a greater danger to Indochina than the French, and is, therefore, critical also of the United States for the aid which it is giving Indochina. Divergencies between United States and Indian views toward China and Indochina are serious foreign policy conflicts blocking closer understanding with India. The Government of India is currently endeavoring to bring about, through negotiation with the French and Portuguese governments, the integration with India of the remaining foreign enclaves in India. It is our policy to avoid any involvement in this question. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Bao Dai, Chief of State of Viet-Nam, and Ho Chi Minh, President of the “Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.” The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 791.00/12–1550: Telegram [Document 834] The Ambassador in India ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret priority New Delhi , December 15, 1950—1 a. m. 1492. Rumors of Patel’s death began circulating in Delhi this morning three or four hours before announcement was issued. In spite of ill health his death has come as great shock and there is much speculation as to how it will affect future of internal and foreign policies. Some of Patel’s adherents are dejected and feel that without steadying influence his powerful personality India will follow erratic unpredictable course at least until figures not yet in sight appear on scene to restore balance. Other adherents expressed hope that his death will sober Nehru and that latter all conscious of his increased responsibilities, will act in much more restrained manner than hitherto. It is too early for Embassy make any predictions. There will undoubtedly be number changes in government, party, labor union and other circles as leaders who owed their importance to Patel’s support will be gradually replaced. Whether Patel’s disappearance will result in split of party is not certain but danger of such split exists since some of Patel’s adherents who are in working committee may decide to adopt strong attitude and endeavor make use of their present majority instead of quietly handing over power to Nehru minority. Henderson The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 611.91/12–3050: Telegram [Document 835] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India secret Washington , December 30, 1950—3 p. m. 1003. In hour’s talk with Sec Dec 29 IndAmb 1 said she going London solely to discuss Indo-US relations; that Bajpai had written her saying PM and late Deputy PM never really doubted ability US and India get along but “little things” occurred to cause public misunderstanding and PM anxious know how US and India can come closer together in view “threat which faces us”. Said she wld appreciate something to take back. Sec said differences must not be magnified but seemed likely Commie Chi wld try drive UN forces from Korea and extend aggression IC and other areas; sensitiveness US public wld be heightened and it is important US and India avoid saying things about each other. Both shld watch main threat—USSR, and India shld bear in mind effect of its policies on a country which has participated in UN action idealistically and having been humiliated is not in very judicious state of mind. Re two million tons food grains, Sec said Dept very sympathetic, and working on technical aspect, ascertaining availabilities. Said he believed dollar debt wld merely embitter relations and Cong action wld be necessary. Amb agreed with Sec undesirability taking request to Cong without reasonable assurance passage. Ind Amb expressed gratitude for interest; said grain shipts wld stabilize market, create favorable psychological effect; Patel’s death had encouraged govts enemies. US had difficulty interpreting India but it was difficult convince Indians US not trying buy India. Ind Amb asked what wld be result failure UN cease-fire efforts. Sec said if ChiCommies launched mass attack in Korea calm discussions impossible and UN wld expire if it ignored such aggression. On other hand if present mil positions stabilized talks might still be possible. Ind Amb said Chi Commies not likely abandon efforts have greater say in Asian matters. Sec said he saw no evidence other Asian countries wld take hostile attitude toward Chi Commies if they did not use force. Returning to grain request Sec said clear talks with MCs wld be necessary and GOI cld help considerably in answering MCs questions. Settlement Indo-Pak disputes such as Kashmir, canal waters wld strengthen subcontinents ability resist aggression and wld favorably impress MCs who wld also wish know whether India appreciated depth of danger in present crisis. Ind Amb said great efforts had been made resolve Indo-Pak differences and they wld have to reach understanding. India probably as great an enemy of Communism as US but if it wished retain any influence in Asia it cld not afford—short of still more critical sit—come out openly against USSR; no one need fear India’s not being staunch ally. Sec said he was sure difficulties wld be overcome. [Here follows the remainder of the telegram, presenting the substance of a conversation later in the day between McGhee and Mrs. Pandit which covered considerations of possible regional defense arrangements which might be discussed at the London Commonwealth meeting in January and the source of arms supply to India in case of military crisis in Asia.] Acheson 1 For documentation on U.S. relations with Tibet, see vol. vi , pp. 256 ff. Agreements between the United States and India Agreements between the United States and India [For text of Agreement and explanatory memorandum signed at New Delhi February 2, 1950, entered into force on that date, see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), volume 1, page 383.] AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA CONCERNING TECHNICAL COOPERATION [For text of Agreement signed at New Delhi December 28, 1950, entered into force on that date, see 2 UST (1) 425.] Policy of the United States with respect to Nepal Policy of the United States with respect to Nepal [836] Department of State Policy Statement [Washington,] August 28, 1950. 611.90C/8–2850 Department of State Policy Statement 611.90C/8–2850 [Document 836] Department of State Policy Statement secret [ Washington ,] August 28, 1950. Nepal a. objectives Our fundamental objectives with respect to Nepal are the maintenance in power of a non-Communist government, the continued orientation of such a government toward the western democracies as opposed to Soviet Russia and its satellites and the increasing participation of Nepal in world affairs. We desire the development of Nepal’s economy and political institutions along democratic lines. b. policies The United States Government extended recognition to the Government of Nepal in 1947, and an Agreement of Commerce and Friendship was signed at Kathmandu on April 25, 1947. The first Nepalese and American ministers presented their credentials in Washington and Kathmandu respectively in 1948. Nepal is dependent upon outside assistance for defense against aggression and for the acceleration of its economic development. We wish to be helpful to the Nepalese Government and people in their problem of adjusting their politically and economically backward country to twentieth century conditions while preserving internal order and territorial integrity. The Government of Nepal, one of the most autocractic in the world, contradicts in almost all respects our own traditional concepts of personal freedoms and representative government. It is not our purpose to support the Government of Nepal per se, but rather, by increasing contacts and demonstrations of friendship and fair dealing, to develop a firm basis for Nepalese reliance on the western democracies. While the Nepalese Government’s repressive policy effectively inhibits overt communist activity, it also stifles legitimate political movements, forces those who oppose the present regime underground, and encourages opposition elements of whatever political persuasion to collaborate with each other in their adversity. We believe that a gradual democratization of its governmental institutions would, in the long run, contribute to the internal stability of Nepal. We favor any steps which the Nepalese Government might take to give the people a more significant role in the conduct of their affairs. At the same time we recognize that too rapid progress in this regard would provide conditions suitable for seditious activities by those who do not have Nepal’s welfare at heart, would most probably result in internal chaos, and might jeopardize the independence of the country. Hence, it is our policy, as occasion permits and while assuring that the Nepalese Government remains alert to all forms of communist activity, discreetly and informally to encourage the Nepalese Government to make genuine concessions to increasing demands by Nepalese for popular government by giving effect to the 1948 Constitution, which has been promulgated but not put into effect, and by similarly progressive measures. The US seeks to encourage Nepal to abandon its policy of isolation and to support Nepal in its ventures into international affairs. We supported Nepal’s application for membership in the United Nations, an application which, like those of many other nations, was rejected by a Soviet veto. Nepal’s wish to become a member of the United Nations has become part of the general problem of the admission of new members. The United States will continue to work for Nepal’s admission along with that of other countries which we feel should be admitted but which have been opposed by the USSR. Pending the development of a formula by which Nepal may gain admission, we should promote Nepalese understanding of the motives on which our international acts are based. If Nepal becomes a member of the United Nations we would hope that the conduct of our relations has been such that we would find it adopting positions similar to our own in international problems. In the meantime, Nepal is gaining experience in international organizations; its application for associate membership in the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, supported by the United States, was successful, and Nepal has been represented at the recent meetings of the ECAFE. Since the inauguration of diplomatic relations with Nepal, official contacts with the Nepalese Government have been intermittent. The extent and tempo of US-Nepalese political and economic relations have not, of themselves, justified the establishment of permanent legations in the respective capitals. Increased Russian and Chinese Communist interest in the Himalayan periphery of Nepal, and events in Tibet and Sinkiang Province 1 and their impact on Nepal itself may well dictate the establishment of a post. A permanent post at Nepal’s capital would also provide a channel of information regarding Tibet. Consistent with our policy of promoting the opening of Nepal to western influences, the United States supports through diplomatic channels the applications of Americans to enter Nepal. While the Nepalese Government is becoming progressively more liberal as regards the travel of foreigners in the country, we should continue to urge it to grant Americans greater freedom to enter and travel throughout Nepal. Nepal is the home of the world-famous fighting castes, the Gurkhas. By international agreement the Nepalese Government continues to export as mercenary troops its fighting men who now serve in the Indian army and in the British imperial forces. We should endeavor to assure that the military manpower of Nepal remains available to us or our allies. The present Government of Nepal displays genuine interest in the improvement of economic conditions and the progressive industrialization of the country. It is planning a series of five-year programs to improve Nepal’s agricultural and industrial production, but is severely handicapped by the lack of technically qualified personnel in all fields. Plans to build a large dam on the Kosi River and an electrical power plant to serve western Nepal and parts of adjoining Bihar in India are under consideration jointly by the governments of Nepal and India. Our policy is to aid Nepal in so far as possible in its plans for agricultural and industrial development. It is our belief that an important first step in the fulfilment of Nepal’s plans is a thorough survey of the industrial and agricultural potentialities of the country. To this end we have prompted the Nepalese to negotiate with American organizations which could conduct a comprehensive economic survey of Nepal, but Nepal’s inability to muster exchange sufficient to cover the dollar costs of such a project has so far forced postponement of the scheme. We continue to emphasize the importance of Nepal’s obtaining reliable information about its own resources, since such data as exist are fragmentary and wholly insufficient to arouse the interest of potential investors. Preliminary studies in connection with the Point Four Program have earmarked funds to supply the services of experts for general assistance to the Nepalese Government in reclamation, hydroelectric power, and flood control, and to conduct a geologic survey of the country. Despite the fact that Point Four funds allocated to the area are much smaller than previously anticipated, it is desirable that the planned geologic survey be made. Should minerals of high importance be found, we would wish to obtain these minerals, observe the efforts of others to obtain them, and, if possible, deny them to unfriendly powers. Lacking sufficient foreign exchange to finance large scale developmental programs, it is incumbent upon Nepal to take fullest advantage of opportunities for self-help. Also, for technical assistance and foreign investment it must rely heavily on India, a country which unfortunately also lacks dollars, indigenous investment capital, and technicians sufficient for its own requirements. The prospects, therefore, of substantial progress in the foreseeable future are remote. It is unlikely that US assistance to Nepal will be very great in the future. We should, therefore, not create any illusions as to the amount of aid, financial or otherwise, which we can furnish Nepal. At the same time we should exhibit a continued readiness to discuss frankly and informally such problems as the Nepalese wish to raise. It would be a distinct service to Nepal and would accord with our objectives if we could assist the Nepalese in developing a reliable source of dollar exchange. While our efforts have so far not been productive, we should continue to explore means whereby we may help Nepal in this regard. c. relations with other countries Nepal’s most active foreign relations are those with India, the United Kingdom, and Tibet. Although Nepal has exchanged diplomatic missions with the Netherlands and France, relations with these countries are not significant. India and the United Kingdom are the only countries maintaining permanent missions at Kathmandu. Upon their withdrawal from India, the British yielded to India their preeminent position in the foreign relations of Nepal. Geographic propinquity, and cultural, religious and economic ties between India and Nepal lead naturally to a predominant Indian position. The Government of India desires the democratization of Nepal’s government to forestall a revolution which might inflame the entire area should the ruling family refuse to yield to the pressure for reforms. India pursues its objective primarily by permitting, and even encouraging, agitation within India by Nepalese political movements which are banned in Nepal. It is doubtful that Nepalese-Indian relations can be wholeheartedly friendly and cooperative so long as the governmental policies and arrangements in Nepal are unchanged. It would not accord with our traditional interest in the development of representative governments and would probably be resented if we were to press the Indians to withold support of these political movements. However, since there is evidence that they are being infiltrated by communists, it would not be amiss discreetly and informally to mention to friendly Indian officials our concern at their frankly communist complexion. India’s support of Nepal’s application for membership in the United Nations can be regarded as an earnest of its intention to respect Nepalese independence. Aware that approaching communism in neighboring areas of Central Asia may be a threat to India, Prime Minister Nehru has publicly announced that an attack on Nepal would be regarded as an attack on India. Nepal’s economic dependence on India is a cause of continuing Nepalese dissatisfaction, and although some concessions were granted the Nepalese in a recently signed commercial treaty, the agreement in effect solidified India’s control of Nepal’s trade by continuing the arrangement whereby Nepal must apply to the Reserve Bank of India for its foreign exchange requirements. The United Kingdom has occupied a special position in Nepal since the conquest of India. Although forces of the East India Company defeated Nepalese armies, the British gave Nepal special treatment partly because of the action of the ruler of Nepal in coming to the aid of the British during the Indian Mutiny in 1857. The British respected Nepal’s autonomy and by treaty in 1923 recognized its independence. Diplomatic representatives have been accredited to Kathmandu since that time. Alleging that they believe the United States is more objective and disinterested than Britain, officials of the Nepalese Government turn to the US for advice on occasion in preference to the British. We have consistently complied with these requests for assistance and advice, but at the same time we have not wished to undermine the British position. Long experience in Nepal and long acquaintance with Nepalese officials qualify British officials to offer friendly guidance, and we favor the continuation of close and friendly relations between Nepal and the United Kingdom. Tibet has cultural and religious ties with Nepal which overshadow the unpleasant recollection of Nepal’s two invasions of Tibet. As a consequence of the second invasion in 1854, Tibet pays Nepal an annual tribute of Rs. 10,000, and a Resident Agent of the Government of Nepal resides in Lhasa. In theory a commercial agent rather than a political officer, it is assumed that he reports to his government periodically regarding the political situation in Tibet. Today a certain amount of trade flows between the two countries. Nepal has never had diplomatic relations with Russia. The Soviet veto of Nepal’s application for membership in the United Nations caused genuine disappointment among Nepal’s leaders and served to confirm their natural antipathy for Russian domestic and foreign policies. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the Government of Nepal as presently constituted will wish to enter into relations with the USSR for some time to come. The Government is firmly opposed to communism, and it is believed that communism has made little headway in Nepal itself. It is, however, impossible to gauge the extent of covert subversive activities within the country. There is good evidence that there is considerable communist activity among Nepalese émigrés in India, and it is quite possible that Nepalese political organizations infiltrated by communists, and operating in India could constitute a serious threat to Nepal’s stability. Present plans of these communist-influenced movements are to infiltrate Nepal itself with trained agitators and workers to provoke revolt against the present government. d. policy evaluation Little progress has been made with respect to our desire to see the development of Nepal’s economy and political institutions along democratic lines. Increased attention should be given to action in implementation of our policies regarding economic assistance. It is believed that little political influence may be brought to bear upon the Nepalese Government until such time as a permanent mission is established in Kathmandu. It is believed that only by constant contact with the Government of Nepal can we hope to realize more fully the aims which we have set as regards Nepal. International developments having a direct impact on Nepal might compel closer relations with Nepal and broaden their scope. Under present conditions, however, the conduct of our relations with Nepal cannot be expected to produce immediately tangible results. 1 For documentation on U.S. relations with Tibet, see vol. vi , pp. 256 ff. Policy of the United States with respect to Pakistan Policy of the United States with respect to Pakistan [837] Department of State Policy Statement [Washington,] April 3, 1950. 611.90D/4–350 [838] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Department of State Karachi, May 17, 1950. 790D.00/5–1750 [839] The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State Karachi, August 18, 1950—2 p. m. 790.00/8–1850: Telegram Department of State Policy Statement 611.90D/4–350 [Document 837] Department of State Policy Statement secret [ Washington ,] April 3, 1950. Pakistan a. objectives Our principal objective in our relations with Pakistan is the orientation of its government and people toward the US and other western democracies and away from the USSR. We desire its further development as a politically and economically healthy state adhering to democratic principles. In the international sphere, we seek to encourage peaceful, cooperative relations between Pakistan and its neighbors, and the informed and voluntary association of the Government of Pakistan with our international objectives. b. policy issues Although Pakistan, as a British Dominion, is politically independent, it remains dependent upon outside assistance for defense and for economic development required to provide a basis for stable popular government and democratic institutions. US policy, therefore, is to assist Pakistan, within the limits of our capabilities, to obtain its requirements from the US, or other western democratic countries, and the Commonwealth. We encourage the GOP to maintain close contacts with friendly western democracies, and to try to understand our reasons for giving priority to the needs of the western European countries. We stress our conviction that the recovery of these countries from World War II will ultimately make the most effective contribution to Pakistan’s security and economic progress. The USIE program in Pakistan is designed to explain our position to the people of Pakistan, and to develop a western-oriented public opinion which will foster the state’s stability and growth along democratic lines. In the matter of security we recognize that, although Pakistan has inherited primary responsibility for the defense of the Northwest Frontier, the security of this frontier and of the whole Indian sub-continent against any major aggressor would require joint action by Pakistan, India and Afghanistan. We accordingly endeavor to promote solidarity among Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, and to use, as far as practicable, any plan for US assistance to Pakistan as an instrument to effect cooperation among these countries. Political Issues . Pakistan has demonstrated a high degree of internal stability and vitality. The great initial problems of organizing the administrative branches of government, and of providing for the resettlement of several million refugees, have largely been met. The sudden death in 1948 of the Pakistan leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, tended to unify the country, rather than to disrupt it as might have been expected. Separatism, which was evident in East Bengal in 1948, has temporarily subsided. The Pakistani Army has been brought to a high standard of training and morale, although it still lacks adequate matériel support. If disruptive forces remain in check, therefore, Pakistan will emerge after India, as the strongest power between Turkey and Japan on the periphery of Asia. There is no unified political opposition to the present Muslim League leadership in Pakistan, although opposition forces exist in the West Punjab and East Bengal. It is too early to assess the future strength of this opposition. It is evident, however, that if the government should suffer a diplomatic defeat entailing the loss of Kashmir or the tribal territory on the Afghan border, 1 or if its various schemes for social and economic advancement should not materialize, the present leadership would be seriously challenged. The Government of Pakistan has, during the past two years, made repeated requests to the US for military assistance, including the supply on a reimbursable basis of spare parts for equipment of US origin now possessed by the Pakistani Army, and for procurement assistance for certain new items. In making these requests Pakistan authorities have informally but repeatedly declared their desire to associate themselves closely with the US in long-range defense planning. These approaches were highlighted in June and July 1949 by the visit of a top-level military mission to the US. Because of legal, supply, and priority difficulties, none of the more significant requests has yet been complied with, although US policy recognizes the advantage of providing limited military aid to Pakistan. If some military aid is not forthcoming from us, it is clear that the Government of Pakistan must request this aid from other sources. During the past year it has turned to Czechoslovakia for Some items. We recognize that the final political orientation of Pakistani leaders will be influenced by the responses they receive to these requests. We may desire the use of bases and other facilities in Pakistan in the event of war. Our response to Pakistan’s requests for military aid should increase its willingness to make bases available to us. Treaty relations between the US and Pakistan continue to be based upon US-UK and US-India treaties and agreements which are applicable to Pakistan in accordance with the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order, 1947. Such agreements as have been concluded directly between the US and Pakistan have been merely exchanges of notes confirming the application to Pakistan of certain existing agreements. Negotiation of new treaties and agreements should therefore be undertaken, not only to replace US-UK and US-India treaties and agreements which are no longer entirely appropriate in view of Pakistan’s statehood, but also to fill the gaps in our treaty relations. Drafts of a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, a Consular Convention, an Educational Exchange (Fulbright) Agreement, and a Military Air Agreement have already been submitted to the Pakistan Government, and a draft Agreement for the Exchange of Official Publications has recently been transmitted to our Embassy at Karachi. The pace of negotiations will probably be slowed by Pakistan’s lack of trained negotiators. Our policy is to employ all appropriate methods of persuasion to encourage the early conclusion at feast of those treaties and agreements already under discussion. In labor matters we shall continue our present program to strengthen the ties between non-Communist labor organizations in Pakistan and in the US and other western democracies. Public opinion in Pakistan, which was at the outset largely favorable to the US has become much more critical. Factors adversely affecting Pakistanis’ attitudes toward the US include our stand on Palestine, our invitation to Indian Prime Minister Nehru to visit the US before we had invited the Pakistan Prime Minister, our support of India’s candidacy for the Security Council in 1949, and uncertainty regarding our intentions in the Kashmir case. It is becoming increasingly necessary, therefore, to remind the Pakistanis that we are neither pro-Indian, pro-Israel nor anti-Muslim. Economic Issues . The primarily agricultural economy of Pakistan was relatively stable until September 1949, when India (its most important customer and supplier) devalued its rupee from $0.30 to $0.21 while the Pakistan rupee was held constant, thus causing price differentials amounting to as much as 44 per cent. The resulting political tensions and control measures have brought trade between the two countries practically to a standstill. Accordingly, the deficit trend in Pakistan’s balance of payments which began in mid-1948 is likely to increase appreciably and, as Pakistan has already used all its convertible and non-convertible sterling balance releases for the year ending June 30, 1950, it will experience difficulty in continuing imports for the development of its economy. Our policy is to aid Pakistan to improve its economic position so that it may eventually be able to minimize its reliance on restrictive import regulations and on drawings from the central reserves of the sterling area. We have supported Pakistan’s applications for membership in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank, which it is expected to join this year. We hope that the Fund will be able to determine a par value for the Pakistan rupee which will have the support of both Pakistan and India and enable normal trade relations to be resumed between the two countries. Such relations should allow Pakistan to dispose easily of its jute, cotton, and wheat. As a potentially efficient agricultural producer and exporter, Pakistan might play a key role in our economic policy for south and east Asia, provided continued differences with India do not disrupt the Pakistan economy. In accordance with our present policy for economic development in Southeast Asia, we should encourage Pakistan to increase food production, both to enable its potential customers (including India and Japan) to minimize their present dependence on dollar sources of food imports and to enable Pakistan to expand its purchases of consumer and capital goods. We also recognize the desirability of achieving greater diversity in Pakistan’s economy through gradual industrial development. We believe this process can be speeded if Pakistan undertakes essential measures of self-help, including stimulation of private investment (both domestic and foreign), adoption of practical tax and fiscal policies, establishment of an active agency for geologic surveys, and some measure of reform in those agricultural institutions disadvantageous to the peasantry. The reduction of military expenditures would also be very helpful, although we realize that this may not be possible until an understanding is reached with India on political issues. We should assist Pakistan to obtain technical assistance under the Point IV Program, through the UN and through US official and private agencies. The various aspects of this program will be discussed with the Government of Pakistan before any specific implementation is undertaken. The fields in which Point IV assistance is most needed are agriculture, geological surveys, transportation, light industries, public health and administration. When possible, such aid should be coordinated with any capital investments made available by US or international agencies. We regard the investment of private capital as the logically primary source of foreign assistance for the Pakistan economy. We are trying to persuade Pakistan to establish opportunities for US private investors on a mutually satisfactory legal basis. To the extent that private capital is not available for the financing of certain basic developments in Pakistan, we will support serious consideration by both the International Bank (after Pakistan has joined) and the Export-Import Bank of loans for specific projects designed to increase food output, to develop economically sound industries, and to improve transport and communications facilities. Inland transport and better port facilities in Pakistan are of particular importance, as the rehabilitation and development of adequate transport systems in and between each of the two widely separated parts of the country is essential to economic and political stability. Our commercial policy is to encourage Pakistan’s full participation in the program for expansion of world trade, as expressed in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the ITO Charter. The Government of Pakistan is committed to a multilateral trade policy by its participation in the negotiation of both of these instruments and by its provisional acceptance of the GATT in 1948. We believe that Pakistan will join the ITO, although it may not do so until after the US and the UK have joined. Should Indo-Pakistan trade differences be brought before the Contracting Parties to the GATT, we will endeavor to seek a solution to these differences through means acceptable to both parties. The bilateral trade conferences, and agreements recently concluded by Pakistan with several Arab states, the USSR and certain satellite countries are not expected to have any appreciable effect on Pakistan’s trade policy. As Pakistan had a dollar deficit of some $50 million during the first nine months of 1949, it has found it necessary to maintain certain restrictive trade and financial policies; however, these do not appear to be inconsistent with the GATT and the ITO Charter. Pakistan’s rationing of dollars, designed to conserve them for goods not available from soft currency sources, appears to be directed toward insuring that these funds may be applied so far as possible in constructive enterprises and long-term projects that will strengthen the country’s basic economy. There is so far no evidence that import controls will be utilized for the purpose of protecting marginal or new industries not suited to Pakistan. We favor reduction in export taxes, as this would enable Pakistan to increase both hard and soft currency earnings. We should encourage the Govenment of Pakistan to assume a full share of responsibility for international economic cooperation. It has shown its willingness to do so by participating regularly in various economic conferences, by formal participation in the GATT, and by association with ECAFE. At our suggestion Pakistan signed the protocol stipulating that most-favored-nation treatment will be extended to Occupied Germany and we have been assured that similar treatment, under certain conditions, will be given to Occupied Japan. A draft treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation was presented to the Government of Pakistan in February 1948 and has been discussed informally with Pakistan officials, who are now considering it. We should like negotiations to be started soon, both to provide a mutually satisfactory basis for private US investments and to protect US commercial and shipping interests from possible discrimination. It should be borne in mind that Pakistan’s continuing relation with the Commonwealth implies a continuation of Empire preference. The strategic importance of Pakistan requires the maintenance of US air services to that country, but at a minimum cost in US Government support. We should endeavor to prevent further development of a Pakistan air transport policy which might seriously reduce fifth freedom traffic and which would involve predetermined capacity allocations. We should also assist Pakistan to maintain adequate air, navigation and communications facilities, together with a sound domestic air transport system, by means of technical assistance through US official agencies, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and flag carriers themselves. c. relations with other states Pakistan’s foreign policy and its relations with the US are affected by its close connections with the Commonwealth, its proximity to India and Afghanistan, and its desire to strengthen relations with Muslim states to the west. The question of its future relationship to the Commonwealth has become an issue in Pakistan. The government’s policy of continuing the present arrangement has met with opposition from nationalist, religious and leftist groups since the Prime Ministers Conference in London in 1949. Nationalist elements in the country believe that Pakistan has been relegated to a position secondary to that of India in British considerations. They resent the retention of India in the Commonwealth under a special formula which does not apply to them, and they believe that Britain has favored India on various questions since partition. Certain Muslim factions are opposed to the western orientation of Pakistan and, therefore, have added their voice in opposition to the Commonwealth relationship, and to British and other western influences in Pakistan. Because of the heavy commitments of the US in other parts of the world, and because we believe that Pakistan is more likely to remain closely associated with us and the other western democracies if it remains a member of the Commonwealth, we want Pakistan–UK ties to remain close and friendly, and we therefore avoid any actions which might weaken these. The British Government is probably not fully aware of our attitude toward UK–Pakistan relations, and comprehensive high-level discussions should be held with the UK to clarify the extent to which our respective policies toward Pakistan and South Asia afford a basis for cooperative effort in the area. Despite its recognition of the strategic and economic advantages of cooperation with India, Pakistan’s relations with India have become dangerously strained, and probably will remain so until the dispute over Kashmir is settled. Both Pakistan and India have agreed to abide by the result of a plebiscite conducted under UN supervision. The government and people of Pakistan believe that India is seeking an advantage by attempting to delay or avoid a plebiscite, India’s inflexibility, which has seriously impeded UN efforts toward a settlement, has increased the deep distrust of India which prevails in Pakistan, and has led to criticism of the US and the UK for not forcing an implementation of the UN resolutions which India and Pakistan have accepted. This issue, more than any other, is responsible for Pakistan’s desire for greater military security; its outcome will strongly influence Pakistan’s estimate of US and UK friendship. Our policy is to remain impartial in all Pakistan-India disputes, and to emphasize to both countries our conviction that they must work together if the problems of the subcontinent are to be solved. With regard to the Kashmir dispute, we shall continue to lose no opportunity to impress upon both Governments the importance of an early and peaceful solution of this problem. In the economic sphere, we recognize the need for increased production to maintain living standards in both countries and to supply US import requirements. We will in general avoid assisting any project undertaken by either Pakistan or India to develop within their respective territories productive facilities for commodities or manufactures procurable more economically from the other country. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan are still marred by differences over the political status of the Northwest Frontier tribal territory lying east of the Durand Line. Since March 1949 the Afghan Government has vigorously persisted in its demands for recognition of some form of independence for the tribes in this territory. The Government of Pakistan contends there is no basis for Afghan interference in that area. The strategic importance of the Pakistan-Afghan frontier, the lack of an integrated defense of the Indian subcontinent since the British withdrawal, and the need for Afghan and tribal cooperation in providing for the security of this region emphasize the need for an entente among Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. US policy, therefore, is to encourage Pakistan and Afghanistan to settle their border dispute as a preliminary step in an attempt to reach a broader understanding. The agreement for establishing diplomatic relations between Pakistan and the USSR, which was reached in April 1948, is now being carried out. Pakistan has sent an Ambassador to Moscow, and the Soviet Ambassador to Karachi has been named. Meanwhile, Moscow and its satellite countries have been active in promoting trade with Pakistan. Trade arrangements have been made with Poland and Czechoslovakia; a trade mission from the USSR spent several weeks in Karachi in 1949; and it has been reported that the USSR will open an office for a trade agent at Dacca. In June 1949 the Prime Minister of Pakistan accepted an invitation to visit Moscow. Although this received wide popular approval in Pakistan, the visit did not materialize and it appears now to be indefinitely postponed. In view of India’s conviction of its manifest destiny as the natural leader of the area, and of Pakistan’s deep distrust of India, Pakistan has endeavored to assume leadership of the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Such a development could lead to two opposing blocs, one dominated by Pakistan and the other by India. Except for the current strengthening of friendly relations with Iran, Pakistan so far has been unable to arouse much enthusiasm among the other countries of the area. Admitted to the UN in September 1947, Pakistan has taken a leading role in the bloc of Muslim states. It has assumed a strong initiative on such matters as Palestine and the disposition of the former Italian colonies. It has served on the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans since that organ was established, and it is now additionally a member both of the Council set up to aid and advise the United Nations Commissioner in Libya and of the Commission of Inquiry for Eritrea. For a country of Pakistan’s political importance and economic affluence this represents a broad range of active participation in the work of United Nations field commissions and furnishes ample evidence of Pakistan’s genuine interest in the United Nations. d. policy evaluation Our policies during the past eighteen months have been only moderately successful in achieving our objectives. The government and people of Pakistan are extremely sensitive to any aspect of US–India relations which they think indicates favoritism toward India or relegation of Pakistan to a position subordinate to that of India. Our policy of strict neutrality between Pakistan and India in the Kashmir dispute, which led to our refusal during 1948 and the early part of 1949 to supply arms to either country, caused much bitterness in Pakistan because it was not considered neutral. Since India retained most of the military stores of the old British Indian army, including most of those which by agreement were to have been delivered to Pakistan, and since India has some capacity for producing arms while Pakistan is totally dependent on outside supplies, the Pakistanis contend that our policy actually favored India, and do not believe it served as a deterrent to the use of force in the Kashmir dispute. While we recognize the desirability of giving Pakistan limited military assistance, we have not yet done so, and it now appears doubtful that under existing legislation we will be able to release any significant amount of military supplies to Pakistan from government stocks. We will, however, give sympathetic consideration to applications by Pakistan for licenses to export supplies procured from commercial sources. The announcement of the President’s invitation to Prime Minister Nehru 2 to visit the US, and our failure at the time to respond more enthusiastically to suggestions by Pakistani officials that a similar invitation to the Pakistan Prime Minister 3 would be welcomed, probably contributed to the belief in Pakistan that our policy is pro-Indian. This undoubtedly had some bearing on Liaquat Ali Khan’s acceptance of Moscow’s invitation. The President’s subsequent invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan, following our warm reception of the Pakistan Secretary of Foreign Affairs during June 1949; the Secretary of Defense and the Pakistan Military Mission during June and July; the Minister of Finance in September; and the Secretary General and the Foreign Minister in January 1950 may have helped restore confidence in official circles in Pakistan. 4 Among the people, however, it is doubtful that the US is as popular as it was in 1948. With regard to Pakistan’s endeavor to assume leadership of a Middle East Muslim bloc, it may in time become desirable critically to review our concept that Pakistan’s destiny is or should be bound with India. There is increasing evidence that Pakistan is a viable state and that it can continue to develop independently if not interfered with. There is reason to question whether solidarity with India will ever be achieved, although Pakistan may be forced to cooperate in some degree with India on economic matters. It is probable, also, that Pakistan and India would collaborate in the defense of the subcontinent if faced with a Soviet attack, but these would be expedients. The schism which led to the break-up of the old India was very deep, and this was further deepened by the slaughter of 1947–48, and by India’s arbitrary actions in Junagadh and Hyderabad. Therefore the development of a Pakistan-India entente cordiale appears remote. Moreover, the vigor and methods which have characterized India’s execution of its policy of consolidating the princely states, and its inflexible attitude with regard to Kashmir, may indicate national traits which in time, if not controlled, could make India Japan’s successor in Asiatic imperialism. In such a circumstance a strong Muslim bloc under the leadership of Pakistan, and friendly to the US, might afford a desirable balance of power in South Asia. On the other hand our interests should be better served by cooperation than by rivalry between India and Pakistan as long as Soviet expansionism threatens South Asia. In the economic sphere, it would be appropriate to place greater emphasis on our objectives including full use of the Point IV program and the IBRD. Since Pakistan’s economic development will require imports of capital, we should encourage the Government of Pakistan to give increased attention to facilitating the flow of both private and government investments into that country. 1 For documentation on U.S. relations with Tibet, see vol. vi , pp. 256 . 2 Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India. 3 Liaquat Ali Khan. 4 In December 1949, Prime Minister Ali Khan and Begum Ali Khan accepted a personal invitation from President Truman to visit the United States in May. President Truman’s words of welcome when he met them at Washington National Airport on May 3 are printed in the Department of State Bulletin , May 15, 1950, p. 755. Before leaving Washington for a tour of major cities of the United States and Canada, the Prime Minister on May 4 stated in addresses before the United States Congress and the National Press Club that Pakistan needed arms and technical assistance. The Indian reaction to his speeches is referred to in documentation of May 5, May 9, and June 15, pp. 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] and 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] . For information on the January visit to Washington of Secretary-General Mohammed Ali and Foreign Minister Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, see the memorandum of their conversation with Acheson on January 6, p. 1364 [ Pg. 1364 includes portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] . The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Department of State 790D.00/5–1750 [Document 838] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Department of State secret No. 525 Karachi , May 17, 1950. Ref: Department’s Instruction No. 43, May 3, 1950. 1 Subject: Policy Statements—Pakistan As requested in the referenced instruction I have reviewed the excellent policy statement on Pakistan and forward herewith the following comments: ( a ) The statement that “Pakistan has demonstrated a high degree of internal stability and vitality “must be accepted with certain reservations. In view of the short period of time, the demonstration has indeed been remarkable, but the fact remains that there is still considerable power in the Provincial Governments, and the Central Government is not yet firmly established. ( b ) With respect to Point IV, all the evidence to date indicates Pakistan’s desire to receive technical aid and assistance through the United Nations and not directly from the United States. ( c ) Although the statement that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation is now being considered by Pakistan is correct, it should be pointed out that the treaty is not yet under negotiation, nor have exploratory conversations at a technical level yet been authorized. ( d ) A policy of encouraging Pakistan to increase production may be sound only if appropriate consideration is given to the problem of distribution. Pakistan has learned during the past six months what it is to have large exportable surpluses which can only be disposed of at prices which reflect an overvalued medium of exchange—the inelastic demand theory has not worked out very well in practice. ( e ) That “the reduction of military expenditures would be helpful in economic development” is undoubtedly correct, but such an understatement suggests a lack of awareness of the true situation regarding Pakistan’s burden of debt caused by continuing deficits of relatively large proportions. Pakistan, although less than three years old, now has an internal debt of 1300 millions of rupees and will soon have a foreign debt of 3,000 millions of rupees. The ability to finance additional debt with the present system of taxation is doubtful. ( f ) Our policy of favoring a reduction in export taxes is sound, provided we suggest an alternative means of raising revenues. Eight now the Central Government receives approximately forty percent of current revenues from customs, a large part of which is derived from export tariffs on jute and cotton. ( g ) While there is a welcome realism in the statement that “Pakistan is a viable state which could continue to develop independently if not interfered with”, the need for avoiding a conflict in policy is thereby emphasized. For example, the statement is made: “We will in general avoid assisting any project undertaken by either Pakistan or India to develop within their respective territories productive facilities for commodities or manufactures procurable more economically from the other country.” But Pakistan is determined to use its raw jute and cotton and manufacture textiles now made in the mills of Calcutta and Bombay. If the “development of a Pakistan-India entente cordiale appears remote”, how is the United States to help Pakistan in its industrial development without considering Pakistan’s basic raw materials? Avra M. Warren 1 Not printed. The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Secretary of State 790.00/8–1850: Telegram [Document 839] The Ambassador in Pakistan ( Warren ) to the Secretary of State top secret Karachi , August 18, 1950—2 p. m. 173. First basic premise Deptel 95, August 15 1 is that doubts of Asian Governments of fundamental US foreign policy objectives contribute to their reluctance to take clear stand against danger of Soviet imperialism. This generalization is not applicable to GOP whose willingness to lend military support to UN in Korea is blocked by Kashmir negotiations which have had unfortunate byproduct of strengthening innate Pakistan suspicion of Indian motives. Assuming, however, that premise is otherwise applicable in free Asia, Department’s second premise is that some of those doubts of Asian governments may be removed by closer consultation of non-Asian problems and encouragement to assume greater responsibility therefor. Embassy is not satisfied that free Asian countries, most of whom currently engrossed in vitally pressing domestic problems, can be induced to seriously consult or to assume responsibility for non-Asian problems to such extent as to reorient them in foreseeable future to an appreciation our basic objectives and motives. Such a program is both sound and desirable in terms of the long run but we question seriously whether, given accelerated Commie expansion, pursuance of our immediate objectives should rely on that essentially educational approach to combat an urgent problem. On the other hand should the US approach Nehru and Liaquat and other free Asian leaders on basis establishing consultative machinery predominantly for important Asian problems, Embassy has two observations. (1) US Government must realize that in pursuance such program it stands to become more intimately associated than ever before with most controversial individual country issues (for example colonialism in Indochina). This association may not only unnecessarily spotlight differences in viewpoint between US and Asian countries which will be food for Commies, but it also has potential of introducing stresses and strains in our relations with interested European powers, i.e., UK, France and Netherlands. In this connection Department has not indicated in its telegram under reference what will be the status of the aforementioned powers in the concept of consultative machinery. The Embassy presumes that if such advances were made to Asian leaders by US they would be done so with knowledge and agreement in principle of interested European governments. (2) In Embassy opinion Baguio conference revealed that time is not yet for meaningful Pan Asiatic consideration of either Asian or non-Asian problems by Asian countries, with exception inoffensive (to west or east) economic and commercial development projects. However this exception in itself is sufficiently important for US to develop a consultative program through existing channels of Point Four, ECA and so forth. In reality a program of the kind envisaged by telegram under reference would automatically begin and normally center around Indian sub-continent. Unfortunate fact is, however, that Pakistan and India are certainly not now disposed to enter into a consultative pattern on Asian or non-Asian problems so long as they are unable to solve their own problems. Putting first things first Embassy firmly believes that US should concentrate its immediate energies and attention and full weight prestige to disposition Kashmir issue whose protracted deadlock would form substantial block to US aims in South Asia as a whole. It is significant as Department pointed out in telegram under reference that the several Asian governments seem increasingly aware of threat to them and their countries individually but not collectively. This is certainly true of Pakistan and is due partly to self explanatory activities of local Commies as well as USSR government and in part to combined effect western countries propaganda efforts. This increasing awareness is a phenomenon which we should exploit to the fullest. Commies will do their part in our behalf if we follow up with intelligently integrated and expanded USIS activities. In final analysis US Government’s problem in South Asia is a selling job and for reasons indicated in paragraphs above the relentless publicizing of our side of story and exposure of Soviet imperialism seems to be major and most effective implement at our immediate disposal. Warren 1 Printed as telegram 247 to New Delhi, p. 1468 [ Pg. 1468 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] . Agreements between the United States and Pakistan Agreements between the United States and Pakistan [For text of Agreement signed at Karachi September 23, 1950, entered into force on that date, and explanatory memorandum of implementation, see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), volume 1, page 630.] AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN CONCERNING MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE [For text of Agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington November 29 and December 15, 1950, entered into force December 15, 1950, see 1 UST 884.] Africa Africa Contents General policies of the United States with respect to Africa (Documents 840-863) The United States participation in discussions on disposition of the former Italian colonies in Africa (Documents 864-864) Libya (Documents 865-885) Eritrea (Documents 886-909) Italian Somaliland (Documents 910-910) Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Ethiopia (Documents 911-919) Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Liberia (Documents 920-943) Agreement between the United States and Liberia Policies of the United States toward the French Protectorate in Morocco (Documents 944-955) Interest of the United States in the evolution of Tunisia toward self-government (Documents 956-970) Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with the Union of South Africa (Documents 971-988) Multilateral Relations: Multilateral Relations: Contents Libya (Documents 865-885) Eritrea (Documents 886-909) Italian Somaliland (Documents 910-910) General policies of the United States with respect to Africa General policies of the United States with respect to Africa [840] Report Prepared in the Department of State [Washington, undated.] 120.4353C/2–650 [841] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State and to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) [Washington,] February 17, 1950. 611.70/2–1750 [842] Editorial Note [843] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred E. Wellons of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 6, 1950. 357.AM/4–650 [844] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State and to the Under Secretary of State (Webb) [Washington,] April 12, 1950. 120.4353C/4–1250 [845] Policy Paper Prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [Washington, April 18, 1950.] [846] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) [Washington,] April 20, 1950. 396.1 LO/4–2050 [847] Editorial Note [848] Editorial Note [849] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, May 19, 1950—8 p. m. 110.15 MC/5–1950: Telegram [850] The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State Paris, June 7, 1950—6 p. m. 110.15 MC/6–750: Telegram [851] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, June 27, 1950—11 a. m. 740.022/6–2150: Telegram [852] Editorial Note [853] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Bourgerie) [Washington,] July 13, 1950. 770.00/7–1850 [854] Editorial Note [855] Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom [London, September 19, 1950.] 780.00/9–1950 [856] Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom [London,] September 20, 1950. 780.00/9–1850 [857] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) and the Second Secretary of the Embassy in France (Lloyd) [Paris,] September 25, 1950. 851T.00–TA/9–2550 [858] Summary of Remarks by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to a Bureau, of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Staff Meeting, October 24, 1950 [Washington, October 25, 1950.] 120.4371/11–150 [859] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] November 6, 1950. 120.4371/11–650 [860] The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State Pretoria, November 22, 1950. 399.50 JO/11–2250 [861] The Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) to the American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General in Tangier (Plitt) Washington, December 19, 1950. 120.4371/12–1950 [862] The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State Pretoria, December 22, 1950. 399.50 JO/12–2250 [863] Policy Statement Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs [Washington,] December 29, 1950. 780.00/10–1750 Report Prepared in the Department of State 120.4353C/2–650 [Document 840] Report Prepared in the Department of State 1 restricted [ Washington , undated.] Political and Economic Problems of Africa Prior to convening the diplomatic and consular conference on Africa, to begin February 27 at Lourenco-Marques under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary McGhee, the Department called into consultation a panel of American experts on African affairs, to undertake an exchange of views on the items of the conference agenda. The panel included prominent experts in the academic field; representatives of commercial, philanthropic, and religious interests in Africa; and experts on UN affairs. 2 Although the panel discussion was primarily focussed upon the area of Africa south of the Sahara, during the course of the discussions the major political and economic problems of the entire continent were taken into consideration. Policy Considerations and Policy Problems —Department officials, characterizing the forthcoming conference as an opportunity to lay the foundations for a restatement of American policy towards Africa, emphasized that for the first time we have available the tools with which to work towards implementation of our objectives, in the form of ECA funds which can be expended as a part of the overseas territories program of the ERP, and funds which may be forthcoming under the Point Four program. 3 Our representatives referred to the dual approach which the nature of the African problem imposes upon us, because of our desire to utilize our assistance to further the aspirations of the African peoples towards economic betterment and development, and our desire to assist in the development of mutually profitable economic relationships between the European countries and the African colonies. It was further pointed out that implementation of our African policy not only involves our relations with the metropolitan powers, but also our participation in the UN, where we occupy a middle position between the metropolitan powers and the non-colonial powers which are pressing for early self-government for the colonial peoples. On the one hand, our traditional policy towards dependent peoples impels us to see that their economic, political, and social welfare is taken into account and that they move in the directions outlined in the UN charter. On the the other hand, we have an important interest in seeing that developments in the area take place in an orderly and stable manner because of our deep interest in the metropolitan powers and their interests in Africa. Moreover, because of the extensive development schemes which the metropolitan powers are themselves undertaking or planning for Africa, it will be one of our major tasks to determine how these various programs can be effectively coordinated, in view of the diverse channels through which assistance reaches Africa, and the diverse lines of authority affecting Africa. Economic Plans and Problems —Our representatives observed that the formulation of the Point Four principles, which places emphasis on the problems of the under-developed areas themselves, and the developing problem of balancing Europe’s dollar account, which tends to stress the contribution which the dependencies can make to European recovery, stimulated formulation of ECA’s overseas development program. With the regular funds available through ECA to assist the African dependencies, the special overseas development fund established in the spring of 1949, the Point Four program, and the large-scale development programs contemplated by the metropolitan powers, the opportunity exists to assist both in making Europe self-supporting and in the economic development of Africa for the benefit of its own peoples. It is presently estimated that during the four-year period of the Marshall plan, the increase in exports of dollar earning and dollar-saving commodities from the European dependencies as a whole will be approximately $700,000,000, of which more than $400,000,000 will come from Africa. Our representatives stressed the necessity of developing new relationships between the European and the African, since most of the assistance programs contemplated require a degree of cooperation which cannot exist in an atmosphere of suspicion. They also called attention to the administrative difficulties confronting colonialism in the twentieth century, referring to the inadequacies in numbers and in technical skills among the colonial administrators and the need to develop skills among the Africans if governments are to deal competently with the many problems which arise in a developing society. They referred also to the deficiencies of the metropolitan powers in developing their planning on a continental or inter-regional basis with respect to Africa. The basic economic facts of Africa, particularly the low level of production and consumption, together with the low but rising level of trade, were given special attention. In the latter connection it was pointed out that, since Africa exports to the ECA countries in Europe half as much as the US, a relatively small increase in African production would be of great significance towards improving the dollar deficit position of the Western European countries. However, the increase in exports, which has taken place in certain products such as strategic materials, has been accompanied by a shift in Africa from a cereal exporting basis to a cereal-importing basis in recent years. Political Problems Presented by Consultants —It was pointed out by the non-governmental experts that Africa is a relatively malleable area, more susceptible at present and for some time to come to outside determinism than any other large area of the world. Accordingly, it is the last large region in which outsiders can continue for a time to do very much as they please, because of the limited economic and political powers of the African peoples, their lack of cohesion and solidarity on a continental scale, and their helplessness except through the medium of world public opinion. This situation imposes upon the Western nations a special burden of self-discipline, voluntary high order planning, and wise action. The US is in a position of great influence to determine the actions of the Western nations with regard to Africa, because Africa contains no resident powers possessing sufficient strength and historical and ideological acceptability to gain pan-African predominance; because we are effectively allied with all of the governing powers except Spain, which are in a high degree dependent upon us; because many Africans look upon American institutions, influence, and support as desirable; and because of their recognition of our sympathy towards and contribution to the rapid indigenous development of all peoples. Accordingly, of all the nations having access to Africa, the US is in the best position to influence for good the entire continent, and the required development of Africa can only be achieved in desirable depth and speed with broad American cooperation. In the light of our lack of knowledge of Africa, therefore, a greatly strengthened governmental and private effort is required, both to inform America about Africa, and to work out with colonial and other powers and with the African peoples a progressive program to assist the latter towards self-development, self-government, and participation in world affairs. It was further emphasized that we must proceed cautiously and in an orderly manner in our activities in Africa, seeking to differentiate between Communist infiltration and the justifiable political ambitions of the native population; seeking to dispel the suspicion that we may be planning to establish spheres of influence or new monopolies; and seeking to resolve the conflict between our desire to foster self-determination and self-government and that of maintaining our close relations with the nations which have joined us in the Western European defense arrangements. Factors Affecting Formulation of US Policy —Analyzing the general problems of Africa with specific reference to economic assistance, the non-governmental consultants proceeded on the basic assumption that the ECA and Point Four programs should be closely related to basic US policy with regard to Africa and the colonies. It was stated that formulation of US policy must take into consideration a number of factors, such as our important strategic and economic interests in Africa; our relations with the colonial powers and the non-European independent states of Africa; the traditional sympathy of the government and peoples of the US with the aspirations of colonial peoples, and the need to preserve the reservoir of good will which we have built up with the African peoples. Another important factor is that of the cold war and the propaganda which is a central instrument therein. In this connection Soviet propaganda, which concentrates considerable attention on imperialism and colonialism, has been provided by the colonial powers with powerful arguments particularly because of the extreme positions which these powers adopted in Committee Four of the last General Assembly. Another major factor is the struggle going on within the UN in interpreting the principles and objectives of Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the UN charter, which refer to non-self-governing peoples, international interest therein, and the international trusteeship system. This is a struggle of interpretation, in which the colonial powders adhere strongly to the line of strict construction of Chapter XI to the end of minimizing any international concern for or intervention in colonial affairs. A further factor is that of the developing nationalist movements and aspirations in the African territories, particularly in North and West Africa, which is capable only of being retarded but not checked. Although the African peoples are lacking in resources and skills, the leaders of such movements are in no sense deterred by these deficiencies. This factor raises the question of standards to be applied to peoples to determine whether they may be ready to stand on their own feet economically and politically, and the observation was made that some of the peoples of Africa are perhaps as advanced as certain UN member states. This situation represents a dilemma for the UN, which as an international organization must put the brakes on nationalism while at the same time it has taken action towards the creation of new states. Finally, we must take account of the trend of world opinion towards anti-colonialism, which is not confined to those states which have just graduated from colonial status but, as the proceedings of the last GA show, applies to the Latin American states and others. Recommendations of the Consultants —Against this background, it was recommended by the non-governmental experts that there be a reformulation at the highest levels of US policy in Africa and of the colonial question generally. It would be most useful to have a clear definition of US policy in this regard, since the positions which we took in the Fourth Committee were to some extent tactical rather than policy positions, from which it is difficult to extract a definition of US policy. Second, any US economic aid should be carefully formulated within the framework of US political policy towards Africa and colonies in general. Third, on a long-term basis any such US aid should place less emphasis upon European recovery than upon the development of the African territories for themselves and for the good of the peoples therein. Fourth, US policy should be based upon abroad understanding with our Western allies who are colonial powers, and, to this end, consultations should be undertaken at a high level, in an attempt to obtain maximum agreement on the broad aims of colonial policy and on a reasonable acceleration of the economic and political development of the African peoples. This is regarded as essential to any effective program of economic or technical assistance, since such aid is unlikely to be acceptable to the colonial powers if the US is in serious disagreement with those powers regarding the broad bases of policy or if our representatives in the UN oppose the positions taken by the colonial powers with regard to broad political interests and objectives. Moreover, the US aid program should be geared as closely as possible to the program which will develop in the UN, in the interests of the US and of the African peoples. In addition, a bold new approach with regard to technical assistance should be coupled with at least a “moderate boldness” in affirming our political policy on the broad question of colonialism. Finally, it is axiomatic that, from the long-range viewpoint, any sound policy with regard to Africa should find its main reliance on the interests and well-being of the African peoples. The observation was made that there are three ways in which American ideals can be made clear to the peoples of the world and to the metropolitan powers, first, to define those ideals precisely and openly; second, to show preference to those governments which display a willingness to give consideration to those ideas; and, third, to give special consideration and priority to Liberia, because it presents our sole opportunity to strengthen a nation on the African continent which is built on the American pattern, to serve as a demonstration of the success of a “planted ideal” and of the capability of the African to govern himself. Economic Problems Raised by the Consultants —Africa was characterized by the non-governmental experts as the most impoverished of the continents, because of its unfavorable combination of unproductive soil and adverse climate. Accordingly, most of tropical Africa, and some non-tropical areas, have had great difficulty in developing agriculture, and have rapidly passed from the stage of marginal productivity to the stage of deterioration, soil erosion, and the destruction of the surface both on the slopes and on the lowlands. It was further pointed out that, despite the potential unproductivity of the continent, there is no evidence that the metropolitan powers have been discouraged by these considerations to the extent of withdrawing and, in fact, they are centering more interest upon Africa than before. It was suggested that agriculture is the foundation of society from the physical and material standpoints, and that any effectively organized economy consists of a pyramid in which agriculture forms the base. However, the economy which Europeans have instituted in Africa has inverted this structure, with the pyramid resting on the minerals and particularly upon the exportable minerals. It was also pointed out that, as a poor continent, Africa has historically suffered both from underinvestment, in a general sense, and over-investment with respect to certain phases of production, notably strategic materials. Moreover, as a result of Western investment and the application of Western concepts of technical development, a serious labor shortage and a tremendous dislocation of labor forces has occurred, producing both overconcentration of population in certain areas and the reduction in those conditions which make for human welfare. It was urged that we recognize that a society must be equipped with a measure of certain skills among the indigenous population to warrant independence under modern conditions, and that therefore it will be necessary to cooperate with the metropolitan powers rather than to put our weight behind the independence movements until the societies have become richer in skills. The consultants emphasized the attitude of suspicion with which the African peoples regard the entire ECA concept and operation, both because of its short-term nature and because of fear that we propose to establish monopolies or spheres of influence. They warned against the dangers of rapid development which would lead to rapid deterioration, and urged that attention be given to a really effective organization even though it would take longer to develop. Special attention was given to the question of improvement of domestic surf ace and air transportation within the colonial subdivisions and areas in Africa, as a means of enabling the indigenous population to improve its living standards, its health and social standards, and to facilitate the development of grazing and agricultural operations in the inland areas. 1 This report of a meeting held at the Department of State on February 6 was presumably prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. The text was subsequently included in its entirety in the Report on East–West African Regional Conference of U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Officers at Lourengo Marques, February 27–March 2 (regarding the Conference and the Report, see Assistant Secretary of State McGhee’s memorandum of April 12, p. 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] ). A close paraphrase of the report printed here was also included in the February 22, 1950, issue of Current Foreign Relations , the classified, weekly review of major foreign policy events and issues prepared in the Department of State and circulated within the Department and to posts abroad. For a summary evaluation of the meeting of February 6, see the memorandum of February 17 from Mr. McGhee to the Secretary of State, p. 1509 [ Pg. 1509 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] . 2 The 11 nongovernmental panelists participating in the February 6 meetingwere as follows: Dr. Emory Ross, Executive Secretary of the African Committee of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America; James A. Farrell, Jr., President and Director of the Farrell (Shipping) Lines, Inc.; Dr. Robert G. Woolbert, Director of the Social Science Foundation. University of Denver; Dr. Derwent Whittlesey, Professor of Geography at Harvard University; Dr. Cornelius W. de Kiewiet, Acting President of Cornell University; Dr. Mark H. Watkins, Professor of Anthropology at Howard University; Dr. Ralph Bunche, Director of the Department of Trusteeship of the United Nations; Dr. Channing Tobias, Director of the Board of Trustees of the Phelps-Stokes-Foundation; Dr. John Morrison, Professor of Geography at the University of Maryland; Juan T. Trippe, President of Pan American Airways; Ogden White of the Filatures Tissages Africains. The following oflicers of the Department of State took part in the meetings: Assistant Secretary of State McGhee; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Raymond A. Hare; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs Durward V. Sandifer; Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs Burton Y. Berry; Director of the Office of Public Affairs Francis H. Russell; G. Hayden Raynor, United Nations Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Arthur Z. Gardiner, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary of State McGhee; Norman Burns, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (ANE).; Samuel K. C. Kopper, Officer in Charge of Northern African Affairs (ANE); Leo G. Cyr, Officer in Charge of Southern African Affairs (ANE). Representatives of the Economic Cooperation Administration and the Department of Commerce were also present. 3 In the fourth point of his Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949, and in a subsequent message to Congress on June 24, 1949, President Truman called for a broad new program to provide technical assistance to underdeveloped countries. For documentation on the establishment of the machinery for the Point Four Program in 1950, see vol. i . pp. 846 ff. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State and to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) 611.70/2–1750 [Document 841] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State and to the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Rusk ) 1 [ Washington ,] February 17, 1950. There is submitted for your information a summary report of an informal panel discussion on African affairs held in the Department on February 6, over which I presided. 2 I. Purpose and Scope of Discussion; Participation The purpose of the discussion was to have an exchange of views on certain items on the agenda of the forthcoming Lourenco Marques Consular Conference (with special emphasis on ECA and Point IV technical assistance to Africa), and to provide the basis for a better understanding of present and possible future United States policies and objectives in Africa. Twelve specialists on Africa chosen from industry, commerce, educational institutions and foundations, missionary boards, and the United Nations attended the two three-hour sessions. (See Appendix A for list of participants. 3 ) II. U.S. Objectives in Africa It was generally agreed that the real basic objective of our policy in Africa is to accelerate its development. This should be accomplished by the cooperation of the European colonial countries, the Africans themselves and the United States. With ECA and proposed Point IV, the United States is for the first time in a strong position to carry out its role in this objective. It was urged that there was a definite need for an affirmation or a re-affirmation at the Very highest level regarding United States policy not only on Africa, but on colonial policy everywhere if our aims and objectives were to be understood instead of being deliberately misrepresented throughout the world. It was suggested that if the bold new program for technical assistance proposed under Point IV were to be coupled with a bold re-affirmation of our policy on colonialism, it would do much to strengthen our position in the UN generally. Such a definition would be a much more powerful weapon in our cold war with Russia than any tactical or ad hoc approach. III. Implementation of U.S. Policies in the Economic Assistance Field Economic aid should be administered within the general framework of economic and political policy. While Point IV should be administered primarily for the African people themselves, we should work for a maximum possible understanding with our Western allies, Britain, France and Belgium. Serious consideration should be given to the holding of a conference at the highest level to reach agreement on the broad aims of colonial policy. We should work towards a reasonable acceleration of the political and economic development of of the African peoples. Additionally it was suggested that any United States program for technical assistance should be coordinated with any UN plans. The Point IV program would need to be closely coordinated with that of ECA in the planning stage—to avoid duplication. In the actual administration they should be kept separate lest Point IV be characterized as just another plan for manacling the African peoples with the chains of Western imperialism. In this connection emphasis should be placed on the fact that ECA technical assistance is to assist the peoples of Africa as well as the metropolitan powers. IV. Attraction of Private Investment In order to attract private American capital and technical assistance to Africa it was emphasized that the improvement and extension of internal transportation systems (highways, railroads, waterways and airways); plans for conservation of water and possible hydroelectric schemes; and plans for hotels and rest houses should be given high priority in development schemes. It was felt that: (1) European technicians appear to be more willing to live under very primitive conditions than Americans; (2) Africans can be trained in industrial and mechanical techniques; (3) with careful planning no major dislocation of the local labor force need occur; (4) given time and patience that an efficient and profitable business can be established in central Africa. V. Recruitment of Personnel; Establishment of an Institute on African Affairs In discussing the problems of recruiting American technical personnel for work in Africa under ECA and Point IV programs, it was proposed that experience gained with the Institute of Latin American Affairs might be utilized in establishing an African Institute within the Department of State to serve as a device for carrying on service projects. The fact that the Latin American countries are sovereign states, whereas African countries are mostly dependencies, might indeed cause the metropoles to be suspicious of the purposes of such an Institute, but it was felt that such suspicions could be allayed by proper clearance with the metropoles prior to the setting up of such an Institute. It was further suggested that while such a mechanism might easily serve as a catalyst to arouse interest in African affairs, on a long-term basis a private Institute of African Studies was undoubtedly needed. The long-term interest in such a project and plans previously proposed by the Board of African Studies were discussed and questions of location, finances, necessary personnel, etc. were raised. It was generally felt that none of these difficulties were insurmountable and that further investigation should be made of the possibilities. VI. Further Settlement Possibilities of Europeans in Africa The question of transplanting large numbers of displaced Europeans to Africa to assist in the technical and economic development was discussed but two objections were raised: (1) that general public opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, Africa is basically a poor continent and cannot support a large European population in addition to its native population and (2) that any intrusive group—be it European or Asiatic—means exploitation as has been shown in the cases of the Union of South Africa and British East Africa. 4 1 The source text was initialled by Under Secretary of State James E. Webb (apparently for the Secretary of State) and by Dean Rusk. Copies of this memorandum were also sent to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp, and Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff. 2 Regarding the meeting under reference here, see the Report Prepared in the Department of State, p. 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] . 3 The Appendix is not printed; the participants listed therein are named in footnote 2, p. 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] . The Appendix listed 11, not 12, nongovernmental participants on the panel. 4 In response to a Department of State expression of interest in British views on the question of Italian settlement in Africa, telegram 269, January 18, from London, not printed, reported that the British Foreign Office was well aware of the problem of surplus Italian population and was constantly exploring means of helping in the matter. Means of assistance were limited, however, by local conditions such as West African objections to white settlement. The Foreign Office felt that on the whole there was not much possibility of a substantial increase in the number of European settlers in British Africa under current conditions. (840.00R/1–1850) Editorial Note [Document 842] Editorial Note Assistant Secretary of State McGhee journeyed to Africa in February to serve as chairman of the West and East African Regional Conference of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers, held at Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, February 27–March 2. For a summary of the conclusions and recommendations reached at the Conference, see Assistant Secretary McGhee’s memorandum of April 12, page 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] . On his way to the Lourenço Marques Conference, Assistant Secretary McGhee visited Liberia, February 21–25. Following the conclusion of the Conference, McGhee and a small party of advisers visited the Union of South Africa, March 4–9; Elizabethville, Belgian Congo, March 10; Salisbury, Rhodesia, March 11; Nairobi, Kenya, March 12; Ethiopia, March 14–16; and Saudi Arabia, March 16–24, before returning to the United States. Regarding McGhee’s visit to Liberia, see the memorandum prepared by the Department of State, page 1715 [ Pg. 1715 is part of Doc. 926 ] . For memoranda of McGhee’s conversations with South African Prime Minister Malan on March 6, and with South African External Affairs Secretary Forsyth on March 7, see pages 1815 [ Pg. 1815 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] and 1818 [ Pg. 1818 is part of Doc. 974 ] . Regarding McGhee’s meeting with Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I on March 15, see the Department of State aide-mémoire of April 13, page 1696 [ Pg. 1696 includes portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] . McGhee’s meetings with Prince Feisal on March 19 and with King Ibn Saud and other Saudi Arabian dignitaries on March 22 and 23 are the subject of memoranda of conversation on pages 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] and 1146 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 637 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred E. Wellons of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 357.AM/4–650 [Document 843] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred E. Wellons of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] April 6, 1950. Subject: Italian views on Italian Emigration to Africa and Italo-Ethiopian Relations Participants: Mr. Alberto Tarchiani, the Italian Ambassador Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper, ANE Mr. A. E. Wellons, ANE The Italian Ambassador at his request called on Mr. McGhee this afternoon to pay his respects and to discuss certain aspects of Mr. McGhee’s recent trip to Africa. 1 He also raised the question of what action could be taken with respect to the resumption of consultations between Ethiopian and Italian representatives, particularly on the subject of Eritrea. The Ambassador asked if Mr. McGhee had had an opportunity to consider the possibilities of increased white settlement in Africa during his recent trip. Mr. McGhee said this had been considered very thoroughly at the Consular Conference held in Lourenco Marques, Mozambique, 2 and the consensus was that relatively few areas in Africa were suitable for large-scale white settlement. The only areas open now are Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa with perhaps some possibilities in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. The other parts of Africa simply do not have the resources or the climate to support Europeans adequately. The Ambassador thought it might be possible under the Point Four program to assist white settlement in Africa, but Mr. McGhee said the officers at the conference were quite pessimistic about much being accomplished. He added that in large parts of Africa the problem is to find and develop adequate resources for the Africans and that Point Four assistance in those areas would be directed to the benefit of the inhabitants. Mr. McGhee also pointed out that the Point Four program could not be expected to solve the basic political problems with which those African territories are confronted. The Ambassador said that in regard to emigration to the Portuguese colonies the Italian Government would again approach the Portuguese Government in Lisbon on the matter. Mr. McGhee said that would be the best approach to the problem, and that in each case it would seem wise for the Italian Government to take it up directly with the metropolitan countries concerned. [Here follows the remainder of this memorandum of conversation dealing with the discussion of Italo-Ethiopian relations and the question of the future of Eritrea. For documentation on the attitude of the United States regarding the disposition of the former Italian colonies, see pages 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] ff.] 1 Regarding Assistant Secretary of State McGhee’s trip to Africa in February and March, see the editorial note, supra . 2 Regarding the conference under reference here, see the memorandum of April 12 by McGhee, infra . Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State and to the Under Secretary of State (Webb) 120.4353C/4–1250 [Document 844] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State and to the Under Secretary of State ( Webb ) secret [ Washington ,] April 12, 1950. Subject: Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations Reached at Lourenco Marques Conference. 1 The West and East African Regional Conference recently held in Lourenco Marques, Mozambique, under my direction as Chairman, was attended by officials of our missions in Ethiopia and Liberia and by our consular officers from the Gold Coast, Nigeria, Angola, the Belgian Congo, Mozambique, Tanganyika, Kenya, Madagascar and South Africa (to provide coverage of the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, South West Africa, and the High Commission Territories 2 ). The meeting concerned itself with problems confronting the United States in its political, economic, cultural and consular relations with the countries in Africa coming within the scope of the conference area; and also developed a preliminary statement regarding our attitudes, objectives and policy towards Africa. Prior to the conference, position papers were prepared in the Department on the principal items appearing on the agenda of the meeting and were circulated to posts well in advance of the meeting. 3 These served as a basis for discussions at the conference and resulted in the following conclusions and recommendations: Political 1. Cooperation Between Governments in Africa . It was generally agreed that formal cooperation among the powers having interests in West, Central and East Africa has been limited almost entirely to the technical field, except for economic cooperation on an ad hoc basis now taking place under the stimulus of ECA. The conference discussed the feasibility of greater cooperation in the political field among the powers having interests in this area, but concluded that establishment of closer political cooperation could only take place on an effective basis on the initiative of the governing powers and that it would be unwise and ineffective for the United States to inject itself into this situation. On the other hand it was generally agreed that we were in a position to suggest closer cooperation in the economic field particularly in anticipation of the expiration of the ECA program. The conference recommended that: ( a ) the appropriate agencies of the United States Government, under the direction of the Department of State, investigate the need for more formal cooperation in the economic field among powers having interests in West, Central and East Africa, particularly in anticipation of the expiration of the ECA program; and that they suggest any organization or means which might be needed to effectuate such cooperation and which the United States might properly support; and ( b ) the agencies of the United States Government administering the Point Pour program make every effort to bolster and support the permanent international commission which a Paris conference (January 14, 1950) of British, Belgian, French, Portuguese and South African representatives recommended be established for the purpose of coordinating the technical and scientific undertakings of their governments in African territories. 4 This support could take the form of providing the commission with Point Four technicians and by using its good offices, wherever and to the extent practicable, in Point Four business with the above-mentioned governments. 2. Regional and Interterritorial Cooperation in Africa . The conference noted that regional cooperation in Africa is largely limited to interterritorial arrangements among British African territories of West, Central and East Africa. To date no regional body has been formed having international membership which would be charged with responsibility for considering problems on a regional basis, but this is primarily explained by basic differences in interest, policy and orientation. After a careful review and appraisal of all factors involved in the consideration of this problem the conference concluded that: ( a ) a realistic appraisal of the needs and possibilities for regional technical cooperation in African areas be made, perhaps under the aegis of the new commission for technical and scientific cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara; ( b ) while support should be given to schemes for technical cooperation on a regional or interterritorial basis, the social and political implication of such schemes should be carefully considered; ( c ) while the United States is not in a position to formulate a policy on movements for closer political association among the territories of British West, Central and East Africa, the implication of such movements for social and political stability in these regions should be studied; and ( d ) the impact of the interterritorial scheme in British East Africa on Tanganyika’s status as a trust territory should be subject to periodic review. 3. Communist Influences in the Conference Area . In the opinion of the conferees organized Communism has made little headway in the conference area, with the possible exceptions of Madagascar and French West Africa, and even in these territories it was not a major problem as yet. It was generally agreed, however, that conditions do exist in some dependencies which are conducive to making the area a fertile field for Communism. In some territories there is a growing spirit of nationalism on the part of the natives, which should not, however, be confused with Communism. A possible danger exists that the unsympathetic and unprogressive attitude of some officials, coupled with the lack of understanding on the part of many Europeans towards Africans (and Indians in British East Africa), and parallel efforts to maintain white supremacy to the detriment of these peoples, will play into the hands of Communist agitators. It was recognized that a negative approach to the problem of Communist penetration should not be overemphasized; rather positive programs such as Point Four, ECA, and Educational Exchange, accompanied by intelligently prepared USIS material on objectives of these programs would be effective counter weapons. The conference recommended that action be taken along the following lines: ( a ) efforts to counter Communism assume positive character such as is found in Point Four, ECA, Educational Exchange and USIS; ( b ) every effort be made to distribute as widely as possible all appropriate and available material setting out the lasting benefits of the concept of the dignity and worth of the individual and pointing out that Communism is at complete variance with such a concept; ( c ) Consulates in the conference area receive the same documentation regarding political, economic and strategic aims and advancement of Soviet Communism as are sent to Missions; ( d ) that the keen interest of the Departments of State and Defense and CIA in Washington on Communist activities be borne in mind and that officers in the area be alert to report on genuine Communist activity, clearly distinguishing it, however, from activity with other motivations; and ( e ) that our officers seek cooperation from government authorities to prevent persons with Communist convictions from securing visas to the United States. 4. United Nations Activities Affecting Africa . General dissatisfaction was expressed at the conference with the decision to return Italian Somaliland to Italy under the trusteeship system and to provide for independence at the end of ten years. It did not appear that the African point of view had been given full consideration in these decisions. Doubts were expressed that Somaliland would be able to stand on its own feet at the end of ten years and fears were voiced that if Somaliland became independent and the experiment failed the movement towards self-government in other parts of Africa might be set back many years. The Department’s representative from UNA 5 explained to the conference the reasons which led to the decision to hand Somaliland back to Italy as a ten year trusteeship and pointed out that there was no other alternative at the time. Several officers pointed out that there was growing dissatisfaction on the part of colonial officials with the operations of the Trusteeship Council and concern over the demands made by UN Visiting Missions to Trust Territories. 6 In concluding its discussion on this subject the conference recommended that: ( a ) the appropriate organs of the United Nations should continue to be used by the Department, to the extent practicable, as a primary means of carrying out its traditional policy of supporting the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the peoples of Africa towards ultimate self-government when they are ready for it; ( b ) the views of the British, French and Belgians, as responsible administering powers, should be given careful consideration by the Department in determining the position of the United States in United Nations voting on proposals affecting the interests of these three powers in Africa; and ( c ) the extension of the activities of the United Nations specialized agencies in Africa should be supported by the Department whenever appropriate. 5. Local Attitudes Toward U.S. Foreign Policy . Country by country discussions revealed that American foreign policies are generally well regarded in Africa, but variations in knowledge of and interest in specific policies vary widely from country to country. A few generalizations may, however, be made. The U.S. anti-Communist crusade and its concomitants, the Atlantic Pact and the Military Assistance Program, are regarded by officials and Europeans in dependent areas in much the same light as in their respective metropolitan countries in Europe, i.e., with favor. Fear of Communism and of Soviet penetration is so strong in the area among the ruling group that there is little doubt of the area’s basic sympathy for this aspect of U.S. policy. As for Marshall Plan aid it was indicated that there is considerable interest in U.S. aid among officials and businessmen in places where actual deliveries of aid have occurred—an interest which also extends to neighboring countries as yet unaided. There is some misunderstanding as to the nature and scope of the Point Four program. Some suspicion of both programs is evident in some territories of Africa, it being feared that these programs may be entering wedges for American economic domination, but this feeling usually tends to give way to approval when the programs are adequately explained. Almost no current interest in U.S. Palestine policy was noted. The only aspect of our policy in the United Nations in which African territories are markedly interested is in the field of the trusteeship areas and of reports on non-self-governing territories. Among the colonial officials and European residents there is resentment of what is regarded as a United States tendency to give too much aid and comfort to native nationalists. It was emphasized that one factor which must be borne constantly in mind is that the mass of indigenous people in Africa South of the Sahara know little about our foreign policies and probably care less. While concluding that the reactions of a large part of Africa to American foreign policies are determined primarily by the attitudes of European metropolitan powers, the conference nevertheless recommended that U.S. foreign policies be depicted in Africa in terms of African interests, African limitations, and the capacities of African channels of mass communication. Policy presentations keyed to European interests and levels of sophistication have only a limited appeal in Africa. Similarly, the conference believed it unnecessary in Africa to belabor the whole range of our foreign policies and recommended that “full treatment” be given only to policies which are of direct interest to Africa and which need African support in order to be effective. 6. Possibilities of European Settlement in Africa . Discussion of this problem revealed that prospects for increased European settlement in the African regions falling within the conference area, which are considered habitable for Europeans, appear to be sharply limited by such barriers as poor soil, inadequate water resources, insects, pests and disease, the land supply available to European enterprise, limited availability of markets for agricultural products, inadequate transportation facilities, the high cost of European settlement, limited opportunities for urban and industrial employment, and the inability of Europeans to compete with the natives due to the necessity imposed on the white man to maintain a relatively high standard of living. It was recognized that there are also serious social, political and policy considerations which militate against extensive European settlement in all conference territories. The conference, therefore recommended that a careful scrutiny of the potentialities for European settlement in the territories in the area be made before a policy in support of European settlement is advanced, and before any pressures by our Government, acting in support of governments interested in settling surplus populations in the territories under consideration, is exerted on the governments of these territories. In the meantime, it must be assumed that political factors are an overriding consideration demanding immediate action and that these favor the above-mentioned recommendation. U.S.I.S. U.S. Information and Educational Exchange as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy . Officers attending the conference stressed the need for preparing and presenting informational materials in terms which the African peoples can understand. This necessity for greater adaptation of U.S.I.E. materials to local cultures was underscored by the observation that Africa’s illiterate and semiliterate peoples would be more receptive to a U.S.I.E. program that stressed America’s homelier virtues and simpler ways of doing things, in preference to a display of financial power and technical might that only tends to confuse, dismay, and sometimes antagonize the people of Africa. It was also observed that the techniques of “selling the American way of life” must include actual assistance through the medium of public health, education, agriculture and other fields in which the need among the Africans is almost universally acute. In pursuing the work of the U.S.I.S. in Africa the conference recommended that: ( a ) the media divisions acquire and prepare a larger portion of materials better adapted to local comprehension and experience and needs; ( b ) more attention be given to the exchange of leaders and specialists in the fields of public health; education; agriculture, etc.; ( c ) in each country U.S.I.S. should work with elements of stability in a process of orderly and peaceful change; and ( d ) U.S.I.S. should recognize local cultural values and seek through an affirmative approach to emphasize our friendship, understanding and cooperation with the people of Africa. Economic 1. The Point Four Program in Africa . One of the significant points made at the conference was that governments of colonial areas do not realize, in many cases, the purpose or the scope of the Point Four Program. The need for more active educational work pointing up the program and its adaptation to Africa was stressed. Other points made in this discussion included the need for backstopping Point Four programs in the field on a regional basis and for coordinating with UN and ECA efforts at that level; the need for unified direction to assure that the total local program will be well integrated, without attempting to interfere with technical guidance; and that emphasis be placed on programs which will be of direct benefit to the native peoples rather than on programs which are only indirectly beneficial. It was generally recognized that even though the technical assistance program may be successfully carried out in colonial areas the flow of private American capital into such areas will probably be limited by political and economic considerations so long as present conditions exist. With respect to the Point Four program the conference recommended that: ( a ) paramount consideration should be given to the needs of the peoples of Africa in the negotiation and execution of technical assistance and investment programs and that the allocation of funds reflect this principle; ( b ) care should be taken to overcome any doubts or suspicion by recipient governments regarding U.S. intentions and programs with political implications should be avoided; ( c ) where the programs are extensive in scope and involve technicians from more than one agency, it should be the general policy to place a qualified director in charge of the field administration and program coordination leaving technical guidance to the substantive agencies in Washington; ( d ) consideration should be given to providing funds to supplement local governments’ resources for construction of facilities for such activities as education and health, where these are inadequate; ( e ) consideration be given to establishing an Institute of African Technical Cooperation in Washington for the purpose of coordinating and integrating U.S. technical assistance, educational and cultural activities in Africa (It was proposed that the substantive agencies of the U.S. Government should be members of the Institute and that the Institute would coordinate its activities with those of the UN and ECA.); and ( f ) coordination of ECA and Point Four activities vis-à-vis the European countries be done by the O.T.C. in Paris. 2. E.C.A. Programs in Africa . The ECA representative at the conference 7 reviewed the major aspects of ECA’s past and contemplated programs of assistance to the territories of Africa to which ECA agreements extend. He pointed out that a special ECA reserve fund of $20 million had been tentatively earmarked during the current fiscal year for aid to economic development projects in all dependent overseas territories of ERP countries (chiefly Africa). It was emphasized, however, that ECA aid to colonial areas in Africa, originating in requests from the metropolitan governments, is necessarily marginal in character and is designed to facilitate and accelerate key economic developments within the framework of extensive development plans. Criteria governing the selection of such projects for assistance were briefly summarized at the conference. The terms of a working agreement between the State Department and ECA respecting relations between ECA and Point Four programs were also reviewed. The conference noted with approval the steps already taken to ensure full informational exchange and collaboration between ECA and the State Department personnel in the field as well as in Washington, and agreed that such cooperation should be continued and extended. Recommendations made by the conference with respect to ECA were that: ( a ) ECA personnel who visit any dependent area be instructed to see that U.S. Foreign Service establishments are notified in advance of their coming and that such representatives be instructed to work in close harmony and consultation with the consular officers in each area; ( b ) that ECA personnel will in turn receive full assistance and cooperation from the Consulates concerned; ( c ) that the Public Relations officers of the Consulates assist in improving public understanding of the ECA program in their area by disseminating local information with respect to ECA aid programs and policies within their respective area; ( d ) that in view of the generally recognized shortage of technical personnel in certain fields that consideration be given, in appropriate instances, to recruiting competent specialists in European and other areas as well; and ( e ) presently available facilities for informing potential private investors regarding opportunities for investment, under equitable terms, in the dependent areas of Africa be augmented. 3. Import Trade Opportunities . The conference noted that Africa has a present and a potential production of raw, semi-finished and finished products which are important to the domestic economy of the United States. It was recognized, however, that an increase of exports to the United States is dependent upon a better understanding on the part of local producers and government officials as to U.S. requirements and upon economic incentives which the governments may offer to induce exporters to seek our market as an outlet for their product. Officers attending the conference felt that they would be better equipped to assist in increasing imports into the U.S. if the Department of Commerce would provide them with current information on commodities having U.S. import possibilities. Our officers, on the other hand, stated that they would undertake to encourage exports from their areas to the U.S. by supplying information to appropriate persons regarding our market demands. 4. U.S. Commercial and Economic Rights in the Conventional Congo Basin and Trust Territories . Discussion of this topic indicated that in the Belgian Congo, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique there have been no significant violations of our right of equal economic treatment, but in some territories, notably British East Africa, and to some extent Northern Rhodesia, there has been a tendency to seize upon the shortage of dollar exchange as providing an opportunity for favoring the economic interests of the United Kingdom and to discriminate against United States trade with these territories. The apparent tendency, in certain British territories in Africa, to consider the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye 8 as being outmoded resulting in some disregard of our right of equal economic treatment was also pointed out by officers resident in these territories. The Consul General at Leopoldville 9 reported that the Belgians do not desire any revision of the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye at this time. It was the general consensus that it would not be desirable to open, at this time, the question of the revision of this treaty. The conference recommended that ( a ) each officer in the area be alert for violations of our right of equal economic treatment under treaties in force; ( b ) that if local efforts to remove or minimize such violations are not successful then a careful and complete record of all such cases be forwarded to the Department for consideration; and ( c ) a careful study be made of those violations which have already been reported to the Department with a view to bringing pressure to bear on the governments concerned to rectify the position and to make known to them our insistence of our treaty rights, in so far as such action would not be inconsistent with existing commitments with the governments concerned. A committee, serving under my chairmanship, and composed of Ambassadors Merrell and Dudley and Mr. Bourgerie drafted a preliminary statement of United States attitudes, objectives and policies towards Africa. It is intended that this statement will serve as the basis for further discussions in the Department the purpose of which will be the formulation of a more definite policy towards West, Central and East Africa. At such time as this statement is in more definite form it will be sent to your office. 10 A detailed report on the proceedings of the Lourenco Marques conference is being prepared for circulation to offices in the field and to interested officials in Washington. 11 1 The West and East African Regional Conference of U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Officers, held at Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, February 27–March 2, was one of the regular regional conferences held by the U.S. Foreign Service in various parts of the world. The conclusions and recommendations constituting the main body of this memorandum are identical with the conclusions and recommendations set forth in the 122-page official record of the conference, not printed (120.4353C/3–250). Details of the physical arrangements, security, and local press coverage of the conference were reported upon in the 19-page despatch 985, May 4, from Cairo, not printed (120.4353C/5–450). Forty-two officials from various missions in Southern and Central Africa, from the Department of State, from the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, and from the Economic Cooperation Administration participated in the conference. Department of State officials included Assistant Secretary of State McGhee (as Chairman), Director-General of the Foreign Service Richard P. Butriek, Deputy Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs Elmer H. Bourgerie, Leo G. Cyr, Officer in Charge of Southern African Affairs, and the Acting Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs D. Vernon McKay. Ambassador to Ethiopia George R. Merrell and Ambassador to Liberia Edward R. Dudley attended the conference. For the statement issued to the press by the Department of State on February 27 announcing the convening of the conference and the list of participants, see Department of State Bulletin , March 13, 1950, p. 420. For the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State McGhee to the press in Lourengo Marques on March 2 on the conclusion and results of the conference (issued to the press in Washington on March 4), see ibid. , pp. 420–421. For a photograph of conference participants together with a brief sketch of social aspects of the conference, see The American Foreign Service Journal , May 1950, p. 24. 2 The reference here is to the Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. 3 Documentation on the preparations for the Lourenço Marques Conference is included in block 120.43530 of the Central Files of the Department of State. 4 In accordance with an agreement reached in September 1949 among the governments of Belgium, France, Portugal, the Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and the United Kingdom, representatives from those six governments met in Paris, January 11–13, 1950, to establish the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (C.C.T.A.). A report on the founding of the Commission and copies of documents issued by the Commission were transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 765, February 15, 1950, from London, not printed. 5 Donald V. McKay, Acting Director of the Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (UNA). 6 For documentation on matters arising under Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations (Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories), see vol. ii , pp. 434 ff. 7 Harry Price, Chief of the Dependent Areas Branch, Economic Cooperation Administration. 8 The reference here is to the convention on trade and commerce in Africa, signed at St. Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. vii , p. 27. 9 William H. Beach. 10 The draft preliminary statement on Africa referred to here has not been found in the files of the Department of State, but see the paper prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, FM D D–4, April 18, infra . 11 Regarding the detailed report under reference here, see footnote 1, p. 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] . Policy Paper Prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs CFM Files: Lot M–88: FMD Papers 1 [Document 845] Policy Paper Prepared by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 2 secret FM D D–4 [ Washington , April 18, 1950.] Future of Africa i. problem To define the basic policy objectives and interests of the United States towards Africa, with particular relation to those areas which are non-self-governing, and to determine in what respects it would be desirable to achieve agreement with the United Kingdom and/or France, and/or the NAT countries on these objectives, taking due account of their respective policies toward the area. ii. background Africa has been assuming increasing importance in world affairs since the end of World War II. It is believed that this importance will continue to increase. The factors which have contributed to this trend are: A. The strategic value of Africa clearly demonstrated during the war, particularly in the northern part, is increasing. 3 B. Africa is a source of many raw materials which are of strategic importance to the United States and to Western Europe. The resources of Africa would assume even greater importance should other sources become unavailable. The economic potentialities of Africa are also of sufficient importance to warrant the attention of a number of nations. C. Africa contains virtually the last frontier areas in the world. Western European nations administering areas in that Continent (the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain and recently Italy) have high hopes of strengthening their positions in these areas in order to strengthen their overall economic and strategic positions in the world. D. While Communism has made very little headway in most of Africa, European nations and the United States have become alert to the danger of militant Communism penetrating the area, The USSR has sought within the United Nations and outside to play the role of the champion of the colonial peoples of the world. E. While the greater portion of the areas of Africa have as yet no firm nationalist aspirations, there are certain areas such as French North Africa and British West Africa where the spirit of nationalism is increasing. The USSR has sought to gain the sympathy of nationalist elements. As yet the efforts of the USSR in this field have met with little success. F. In the United Nations the problems of a great part of the African Continent have been receiving increasingly more attention, particularly in the Trusteeship Council, the Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73 e of the UN Charter and Fourth Committee (trusteeship) of the UN General Assembly. The European Nations administering areas in Africa are extremely sensitive to anything which might in their opinion tend to lessen their influence or weaken their positions in Africa. The United Kingdom, France and Belgium have recently displayed varying degrees of increasing resentment over the part played by the United Nations with respect to non-self-governing and trust territories. In addition, they have not been entirely happy about the role of the United States. There have been numerous signs recently that some French Government officials and responsible opinion are not only apprehensive but also suspicious of United States intentions with regard to French North Africa and French West Africa. While these suspicions on the part of the European powers are unfounded, they nevertheless continue to exist. The differing views of the United States and the colonial powers on the colonial question have become a source of irritation between ourselves and the Western European nations which should be removed in so far as is possible. Africa is today the largest remaining backward area in the world. The manner in which the continent is developed over the next fifty years will determine in a large measure whether the peoples of Africa will be friendly to Western European and American objectives or whether Africa will become the site of increasing differences between the native populations and the West. It is in the interest of the United States from the broad point of view of our overall world policy that (1) we have as much understanding and cooperation with Western European Nations on the future of Africa as is possible; and (2) the political, economic and social evolution of Africa proceed in such a way that the peoples of Africa will be favorably disposed towards the United States and other Western Nations. iii. discussion A. Attitudes, interests and policy of the United States with regard to Africa . The American people interested in the future of Africa have certain basic attitudes which influence United States policy: 1. A humanitarian interest in assisting under-privileged peoples. 2. Faith in the concept that the dependent peoples of the world can be assisted in progress towards ultimate self-government or independence through 4 the practical application of technology and American ideals of democracy. 3. Belief that Africa has considerable undeveloped resources and will be important in the future in any world struggle. 4. Interest on the part of religious and philanthropic groups in assisting African peoples. 5. Interest on the part of commercial enterprises. 6. Sympathy of the American Negroes for the aspirations of the African peoples, particularly those living in the area south of the Sahara. It is in the interest of the United States to achieve the following objectives in Africa: 1. Political and economic stability sufficient to resist domination by unfriendly movements or powers through subversion or aggression. 2. Advancement of the social, political, economic and educational condition of the African, peoples 5 and of harmonious relations between them and the other peoples with whom they are associated. 3. Development of political relations between the colonial peoples and the metropolitan countries which would in the long run strengthen both. 4. Creation and preservation of an attitude of friendship and respect for the United States on the part of the African peoples. 5. Advancement of United States strategic interests in access to raw materials, air and sea bases, air routes, communications points, etc. 6. Advancement of direct United States trade, investment, and transportation interests. 7. Increased total African production and trade and participation in world trade. 8. Development of conditions which will lead to a conviction on the part of the African peoples that their individual and national aspirations can best be achieved through continued association with the UN, and the free nations of the world, both during their period of colonial or trust status and when they become self-governing or independent. 9. Development of assurance on the part of colonial peoples in other areas of the world and those only recently emerged from colonial status of the sincerity of our support for the realization of their aspirations for eventual self-government or independence. We have sought to follow a policy with respect to the dependent areas of Africa based on three fundamental precepts: 1. We look with favor upon the progressive development of dependent peoples toward the goal of self-government, and the development of those dependent territories, where conditions are suitable, toward independence. 2. We desire to assist and encourage the Nations of Western Europe with interests in Africa to regain their strength. 3. We do not wish to see militant Communism gain any control whatsoever in the area. The United States has recently demonstrated interest in the development of Africa through aid under the ECA program and through programs under Point Four when the latter becomes law. In general, we believe that our economic goals in Africa should be achieved through coordination and cooperation with the colonial powers. We do not desire to initiate programs in those areas which might cause friction among the United States, metropolitan powers and the colonial peoples. With respect to French North Africa we consider this area of great 6 strategic importance. It has been our policy to encourage the French Government on all appropriate occasions to put forward a program of political, economic and social reform which would assure the gradual evolution of dependent territories in that area toward selfgovernment and to secure the agreement of the native leaders thereto. We believe the strength of France depends in no small measure on peaceful integration into the French Union of this important area. This should be accomplished, however, on a voluntary basis and the continued relationship should also be voluntary. Consequently French reforms should be such as to instill confidence in responsible native leaders. On the whole we do not believe that the French have accomplished much along these lines during the past four years although there are recent indications that they may take some progressive steps in Tunisia soon. However, we do not wish to bring pressure to bear on France by giving aid and comfort to the natives directly, although we do maintain open and above-board contacts with the native leaders and consider their good-will and friendship important. Our primary objective in French West and Equatorial Africa is to keep those territories under friendly and effective administration. To this end we recognize the legitimacy and desirability of French political control. We approve the liberal measures of the Constitution of 1946 and favor the orderly development of democracy in both territories within the structure of the French Union. We are willing to cooperate with French efforts to combat Communism when the French want our help and when it is consistent with our overall policy. Under the same conditions, we will extend economic assistance to the territories, both to enhance their strategic value and to strengthen the French economy and the economy of the territories themselves. With respect to areas in Africa under British and Belgian control, we have been generally sympathetic toward the efforts of these Governments to develop these areas. We have not taken any action of a positive character vis-à-vis the United Kingdom or Belgium on these matters other than through ECA. Within the United Nations, pursuance by the United States of its objectives on colonial questions has generally placed the United States in the moderate position between the more conservative colonial powers on the one hand and non-administering members on the other. On occasion, as required, United States Delegations have lined up clearly with either the administering or non-administering group and have incurred criticism at times by spokesmen of both groups. B. Attitudes, interests and policies of France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium in Africa . 1. France . Under the Constitution of 1946, the French Republic unilaterally established the French Union. This Union is designed to include the dependent territories. Algeria is an overseas department of the French Republic, while French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar are overseas territories. The position of Tunisia and Morocco, as protectorates in the French Union, is still unsettled. Togoland and the Cameroons (trust territories) are, according to French interpretation, associated territories. African representatives from overseas areas sit in the various legislative bodies in Paris, a practice which has caused some criticism in the UN, but which has also received favorable comment. In North Africa the chief political problem confronting France has been the aspirations of the Arab nationalists. The nationalists have not been unified, nor have they been strong although there have been very recent signs that their strength may be slowly increasing in Tunisia. Nevertheless, neither the Sultan of Morocco nor the Bey of Tunis have assented to the inclusion of Morocco and Tunisia into the French Union. French governmental authorities in general believe that the process of developing progressive political institutions must be slow. Comparatively little has been done to meet the demands of the nationalists. This is due in part to the fact that rightist and centrist groups within France have generally supported imperial domination of this area as well as all areas under French control, while the leftists in France have supported the chief aims of the nationalists short of independence. France considers North Africa as a vital link in her economy and security. Communism in North Africa is not nearly so strong as in France. The major objective of French policy in French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa is to integrate the area politically with metropolitan France. To this end the Constitution of 1946, which established the French Union, gave the natives French citizenship. It also accorded the franchise to a limited number of natives. The majority of the natives are too backward to make effective use of these privileges at present, but the door is open to future representative government within the French Union. A second French objective is to develop French West and Equatorial Africa into important supports for the French economy. Further objectives are to combat the spread of Communism and to prepare the military defenses of both territories, and the government of French West Africa, to become a haven for the Paris Government in the event that France is conquered by an aggressor. The French Government, however, is somewhat embarrassed by the presence in the African territories of a small number of French Communists who are attempting to sow discord among the natives. 2. The United Kingdom . British colonial policy in Africa as presently defined has four major objectives: (1) political freedom and self-government for the colonial peoples within the framework of the Commonwealth of Nations, advanced as rapidly as circumstances existing in given areas permit, and speeded up through programs of education and economic improvement; (2) the reinforcement of native institutions which are not incompatible with native welfare and progress; (3) the promotion of the social welfare of the colonial peoples through programs for the improvement of health, the development of educational institutions, including techniques of mass education, and the encouragement of higher standards of living; and (4) the economic rehabilitation and development of the colonial territories. These objectives are being sought through their method of indirect rule which favors the development of traditional institutions but causes some criticism among the younger educated Africans. 3. Belgium . Belgian policy in the Belgian Congo appears to be aimed at raising the economic and social standards of the natives with no emphasis being placed on political independence. While it is believed that the ultimate goal of Belgium in the Congo is that of a high degree of self-government, such a status is not expressly stated in official pronouncements. It is probably implied in the emphasis which is placed on the economic and educational development of natives to which there is no stated limit. Belgians evidently consider that political autonomy is a natural evolution to be reached when a dependent people becomes economically and intellectually capable of governing itself. In 1949, the Belgians inaugurated a Ten-Year Plan for the economic and social development of the Belgian Congo. The Plan is directed to a balanced development of the country. C. Economic Development in Africa . The importance of the economic development of Africa has been clearly recognized by the European nations administering areas in that continent. These nations hope that there can be an increase of production of certain foods and minerals in Africa. At the same time they hope that markets in Africa for European goods can be increased. The United States has recognized the desirability of stimulating the development of the African territories. There has been a tendency to place the emphasis on Europe’s need for Africa rather than on the mutual need of Africa and Europe for each other. It is now our view that the mutuality of this need should be emphasized. American interest in the development of Africa has recently been manifested in two principal ways: (1) through ECA assistance and (2) through plans under Point Four. The overseas territories of the Marshall Plan countries lie principally in Africa. They cover an area of some 7,700,000 square miles with a total population of almost 130,000,000. ECA’s economic objective in aiding these territories is to enlarge reciprocal contributions which can be made by them to European and overall economic recovery and development; to ensure that positive and tangible benefits will accrue from such aid to the inhabitants of these territories, and to strengthen the economic well-being of the United States through increased imports of essential raw materials and a broader market for its exports. To a large extent, ECA assistance will be in the nature of support to key development projects within the scope of plans which have already been made by the metropolitan countries and the territories. These overall plans contemplate an investment of several billion dollars in all currencies over the next ten years. ECA’s assistance thus is and will be marginal, with the major financial responsibility resting upon the four European governments concerned—Belgium, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom—and upon the territories themselves. ECA assistance for these territories consists principally of supplying dollars to finance purchases of equipment which must be obtained from the United States, to render technical assistance and to develop strategic materials available for the United States stockpile. United States equipment is needed for such purposes as improving or constructing roads, railroads, canals and harbors, for developing mines and for hydro-electric power. Technical assistance ranges from surveys of means by which Africa’s unusual resources can be developed, to study and advise on matters dealing with tropical diseases or training of technical personnel. Strategic materials projects include those dealing with development and transportation of cobalt, lead, zinc, copper, graphite, columbite, tentalite, corundum, mica, industrial diamonds, bauxite, manganese, tin and platinum. The assistance is financial from the following categories of ECA funds: The Special Reserve Fund for Overseas Territories, Technical Assistance Funds, Strategic Materials Funds and Allocated Program Funds. Preliminary indications show the possibility of the African participating territories increasing their dollar earnings, or saving dollars to the extent of several hundred million dollars in the year 1952/53 as compared with their record prior to ERP. Nearly two-thirds of this increase could be accomplished by greater production of material such as sisal, copper, vegetable oils, cinchona bark and derivatives, ivory, and tin. In the case of France there is a clear possibility of their African territories becoming by this date important net contributors of foreign exchange to the French Union. The correlation of the ECA program for Africa and the Point Four Program for underdeveloped areas has been carefully worked out with the Department of State and a mutally satisfactory agreement reached which is designed to eliminate any duplication of effort. While that part of the ECA program devoted to economic development projects in Africa is already under way, the Point Four Program has not as yet passed the planning stage. At present there still appears a lack of complete understanding as to our true intentions on the purpose and scope of the Point Four Program in Africa. So far as the United Kingdom, France and Belgium are concerned^ development plans in Africa involving technical assistance have already been instituted. Their reaction to United States Point Four plans has thus far been reserved and cautious. With respect to Point Four Program, we believe that ( a ) paramount consideration should be given to the needs of the peoples of Africa in negotiation and execution of technical assistance and investment programs and that the allocation of funds reflect this principle, ( b ) care should be taken to overcome any doubts or suspicion by recipient governments regarding United States intentions and programs with political implications should be avoided, and ( c ) there should be careful coordination of all plans for technical assistance. The official position of the United Kingdom with respect to African development is that all such development should be primarily for the benefit of the colonial peoples. The British recognize, in addition, the great importance of the African colonies in reestablishing the United Kingdom’s balance of payments. Investment in the colonies has been of major concern to home government. Almost all of the new economic development schemes in British territories are financed by United Kingdom arid local government funds. Ten-year plans have been formulated for each of the African colonies under the British Colonial Development and Welfare Program. British taxpayers are contributing £120,000,000 over a ten-year period ending on March 31, 1956, most of which is to be spent on the development of British Africa. Money from this fund is to be supplemented by loans raised by the colonial governments and by local revenues. In May 1949, ten-year plans from 21 colonial governments had been approved. France and Belgium have also launched colonial development programs. In 1946 France set up a Fonds d’investissement pour le developpement economique et social [ des territoires d’outremer ] 7 (FIDES) which combines contributions from both metropolitan and colonial governments. Estimates for expenditures in France Overseas from this and other funds for the year 1948–49 totaled 37 billion francs including 12 billion francs private investment. Big development schemes are actively under way in the French Cameroons and other African territories. The Belgian ten-year plan includes projects for the development of highways, port facilities, warehouses, forestry, agriculture, geology, cartography, medicine, education, public buildings, telecommunication and virtually every other phase of colonial life. Total outlay of public funds spread over a period of ten years is expected to approximate five hundred million dollars. Transportation and electrification are the two fields that have received the greatest attention, and evidently will require the largest outlays. There is no provision in the plan for any invasion of the industrial or commercial fields that have characteristically been conducted in the past on a private enterprise basis. However, the Plan anticipates a concurrent investment of another five hundred million dollars in the various fields of private investment. The Plan also includes various projects in the fields of native housing, hygiene, and industrial training, all designed to improve the living conditions of the native peoples. A further step forward, both in colonial development and in international cooperation in Africa, is the joint undertaking of the British, French, and Belgian governments to coordinate important aspects of their colonial planning. Since the end of World War II, close contacts have been established between London, Paris, and Brussels. In Africa successful conferences on veterinary problems, public health, and communications were held at Dakar and Accra in 1946 and 1947. These conferences were a prelude to important talks between the British, French, and Belgian Governments in Paris on May 20–23, 1947 at which an agreement was reached to hold eight technical conferences in Africa between 1947 and 1950 on agriculture, health, and problems of rinderpest, trypanosomiasis and the tsetse fly. These conferences are being attended by representatives of other governments, and by Africans as well as Europeans. The Soil Conservation Conference at Goma in the Belgian Congo in November 1948 is a good example of this constructive effort. Fifty-four Belgian delegates and 47 delegates from British, French, and Belgian territories in Africa, the Union of South Africa, and the Food and Agriculture Organization drew up resolutions calling for (1) a bureau in Paris to disseminate information on soil conservation in all African territories, (2) the coordination of technical information on East, Central and Southern Africa, and (3) the study and classification of African soil and establishment of pedological service with headquarters at Yangambi in the Congo. Representatives of the governments of Britain and France met in Paris in January 1950 and agreed to recommend to their governments the establishment of the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara. This Commission would serve the purpose of a clearing house for the exchange of information and plans on technical assistance in Africa south of the Sahara. Portugal, Belgium and the Union of South Africa would also be on this Commission. D. Possibilities of European Settlement in Africa . The question of possibility of European settlement in Africa has been repeatedly raised during the past several years. Italy, in particular, has expressed a keen interest in the question. The recent American Consular Conference held in Lourenco Marques 8 considered whether Africa south of the Sahara might provide homes within the more or less immediate future for surplus populations, including refugees, of European countries in areas considered suitable for European settlement. The conference reached the following conclusions: (1) The prospects for increased European settlement in these regions appear to be sharply limited because of the following considerations: ( a ) The highland areas presumably suitable and available for European settlement, while covering about 175,000 square miles or more, are with certain exceptions, relatively poor in resources. ( b ) The possibilities for European agricultural settlement in the areas considered habitable for Europeans are restricted by such barriers as inadequate water resources, insects, pests and disease; the land supply available to European enterprise; the limited availability of markets and the entirely inadequate transportation facilities; the large acreage required per unit of European enterprises; the high cost of European agricultural settlement; and the inability generally of individuals and governments to provide the capital and subsidies essential for the maintenance of a European agricultural population in these areas at the standard of living expected by Europeans. ( c ) The outlook for a permanent European urban and industrial population in most of the territories is uncertain. Even though significant expansion occurs in mining, commerce, and industry the chances for the establishment of a large European working class are limited in most of these areas. ( d ) The growth of a permanent European population in these areas is further inhibited by inability among Europeans to compete with the natives and by the necessity imposed on the white man to maintain a relatively high standard of living. (2) It was recognized that there are, in terms of physical and economic aspects, possibilities for European settlement in certain selected areas (e.g., Southern Rhodesia and Angola) on the basis of present inadequate information. However, in these cases such prospects depend on development programs which may not be implemented for some time to come. (3) It was recognized, moreover, that there are serious social, political and policy considerations which militate against extensive European settlement in all the Conference territories. In light of the foregoing, we believe that careful scrutiny of the potentialities for European settlement in the African territories south of the Sahara should be made before the United States Government supports a policy of European settlement. iv. recommendations During your conversations with the French and British Foreign Ministers regarding our policy and objectives towards Africa, with particular relation to those areas not as yet independent, it is recommended that you adopt the following line of action: A. Tripartite conversations with the British and French: (1) We believe that it is in our common interest that there be achieved in Africa political, economic and social stability sufficient to resist domination by unfriendly movements or powers through aggression or subversion. In this connection, we believe consideration should be given to conditions conducive to long-range, as well as short-range stability. We desire the alignment with the democratic world of dependent peoples and those which are looking forward to the achievement of ultimate self-government or independence. (2) We are interested in the advancement of the social, political, economic, and educational condition of the African people and of harmonious relations between them and the peoples and governments with whom they are associated. (3) We desire to see the development of increased economic and, where necessary, strategic advantages to France and the United Kingdom through their colonial and trust territories. We must insist, however, that equal economic treatment be accorded to American capital and to American nationals who engage in trade in these areas. We favor the progressive development of all dependent peoples towards the goal of self-government and the development of those dependent territories, where conditions are suitable towards independence. In this connection, we are sympathetic towards the efforts of France and the United Kingdom in the steps they have been and are taking to advance the dependent peoples in their areas towards ultimate self-government. We hope that these efforts will continue unabated. We favor the strengthening of relationships between the Metropolitan powers and the colonial territories so long as the peoples within the territories desire such development. (4) We will endeavor to promote understanding on the part of non-colonial powers of United States objectives and policies in the colonial field in Africa, as well as an understanding of the problems, responsibilities and achievements of France and the United Kingdom. (5) We believe that increased total African production: and trade and participation in world trade will be beneficial not only to the Western European nations and the United States but also to the African peoples. In so far as possible, we are prepared to assist the United Kingdom and France in their efforts towards this goal. (6) On its part, the United States wishes at the same time to develop its direct trade, investment and transportation interests wherever and whenever possible and practicable. We desire to have access to raw materials, air and sea bases, air routes, and communications points, and to be guaranteed the right of equal economic treatment in the colonial territories of Africa. (7) The United States also desires to have an attitude of friendship towards it on the part of the African peoples. (8) With regard to possibilities of European immigration into African areas, we believe that this should be given very careful study, having regard to the serious political, economic, and racial issues involved. (9) With regard to the role of the United Nations as it affects dependent areas in Africa, we have been giving careful study to the whole colonial question in the United Nations for the past several months. It has been tentatively agreed that the role of the UN in relation to dependent areas will be the subject of bilateral conversations between ourselves, the British, the French, and the Belgians in the early future. In the meantime, however, we might assure these three governments that we will continue to give careful consideration to their views in determining the position the United States Will take in voting in the United Nations on problems affecting their interests in Africa. (The Department’s views and conclusions with respect to discussion of the overall colonial question are the subject of a separate Position and Background paper. 9 ) (10) We wish to have the fullest possible mutual understanding and cooperation between the United States and France and the United Kingdom on colonial policy and, in so far as is possible, an understanding by them of basic United States objectives towards Africa. We wish to assure France and the United Kingdom that whatever may be our interests with regard to Africa, it is our desire that they be coordinated with France and the United Kingdom. B. Conversations with the French In addition to the points set forth in the preceding section, it is recommended that the following additional points be made to the French Government: (1) The United States wishes the French Government and French officials in overseas areas to understand and be assured of the fact that the United States has no intention of pursuing a policy designed to weaken the relationships between France and the overseas areas. On the contrary, we wish to see these bonds strengthened. Our economic assistance, the activities of the USIE and other aspects of our policy with regard to French territories in Africa are not in any way designed to undermine French influence. (2) With regard to French North Africa, our views remain substantially the same as they have been during the past three years. We believe that Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are of great importance to the strategic position of the Western European Nations and the United States. We desire to see the maintenance of peaceful and stable conditions in that area. At the same time we wish to have the friendship of the peoples in that area without adversely affecting their feelings toward France. (3) We believe that the political stability of this area can best be assured by the development of some plan guaranteeing evolution towards self-government which concurrently safeguards the economic development of the area and the legitimate French interests by its voluntary and peaceful integration into the French Union. (We are aware, of course, that Algeria has been incorporated into metropolitan France.) We are in accord with the belief of the French that the resurgence of her strength depends in no small measure on the peaceful integration into the French Union of this important area. We believe that events are moving rapidly and that it is essential for the French and the natives to achieve a sound friendly relationship. (4) We suggest again that the French Government give serious consideration to approaching leading nationalist elements in Tunisia and Morocco with constructive, concrete and long-range plans which will guarantee gradual but sure evolution towards something comparable to dominion status for these countries within the framework of the French Union. We believe that it would be most useful for the French to establish a time table for any such plans. (5) We should make clear to the French Government that we understand that the other areas in Africa under French administration have very different features when compared with the colonial areas of the Far East or other underdeveloped areas of the world. We appreciate the fact that the peoples in so-called “Black Africa” are not as far advanced. We understand that they have not yet achieved a full knowledge and understanding of modern political, economic and social institutions; but we believe that there must be an orderly, guided development of these peoples towards political maturity which only time and patience can provide. C. Conversations with the British There are no points not already covered in Section IV A above which the Department thinks it necessary to take up with the United Kingdom Government at this time. D. Conversations with other NAT Countries 10 (1) Should the question of Africa come up during conversations with the Belgians it is recommended that we follow the general line set forth in IV A above. There are no additional points. (2) It is possible that the Italian Foreign Minister may bring up the question of furthering Italian immigration into Africa. If this eventuality should occur, it is recommended that you inform him that the United States is not able to take a position in support of European immigration to Africa at this time. We believe the problem requires careful study and scrutiny. It would seem that the best course for the Italian Government to pursue would be to work out directly arrangements with European nations administering areas in Africa. (3) It is not believed that Portugal has any desire to speak about the subject of Africa at this time. 1 Lot M–88 is a consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancilliary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center. 2 This paper was circulated in the Department of State as document FM D D–4, April 20. It was concurred in by the Bureau of European Affairs, the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, as well as by the Economic Cooperation Administration. It was one of a series of policy and background papers prepared for the U.S. Delegation to the meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in London, May 11–13, and the preliminary tripartite meetings of experts that preceded the ministerial talks. Regarding the May meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the use made therein of the paper printed here, see the editorial note, p. 1541 [ Pg. 1541 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] . Telegram Tosec 144, May 9, to London, for Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hare at the meetings of the Tripartite Foreign Ministers indicated changes to be made in document FM D D–4 to take into account suggestions made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (396.L0/5–950). Those changes are described in footnotes 3, 4, 5, and 6, below. 3 According to telegram Tosec 144 (see footnote 2, above), this sentence was to be changed to read as follows: “The strategic value of Africa, particularly the northern part, has been clearly demonstrated.” 4 According to telegram Tosec 144 (see footnote 2, above), the word “through” was to be replaced by the phrase “by setting an example of”. 5 According to telegram Tosec 144 (see footnote 2, above), the phrase “at a rate commensurate with their capacity” was to be inserted after the phrase “African peoples” in Section A. 6 According to telegram Tosec 144 (see footnote 2, above), the word “great” was to be changed to “considerable”. 7 Brackets in the source text. 8 Regarding the Lourenço Marques Conference, February 27–March 2, see the memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State McGhee to the Secretary of State, April 12, p. 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] . 9 The reference here is presumably to document FM DF–3, April 27, not printed. This paper, entitled “Colonial Question”, was another of the many policy and background papers prepared in the Department of State for the meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in London in May. The paper recommended that no conclusions be reached on the general colonial question at the Foreign Ministers’ meetings in view of plans to hold bilateral discussions on the question before the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in the autumn of 1950 (CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 149). Regarding the disposition of the question at the meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the Washington conversations on colonial questions in the summer of 1950, see the editorial note, p. 1541 [ Pg. 1541 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] . 10 The Fourth Session of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council was held in London, May 15–18, immediately following the meetings of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers. The subject of Africa appears not to have been discussed at the Council session. For papers and reports on the session, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare) 396.1 LO/4–2050 [Document 846] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( Hare ) confidential [ Washington ,] April 20, 1950. Subject: French Plans for the Discussions on Africa at the Foreign Ministers Meeting. 1 Participants: Mr. Gabriel Van Laethem, Second Secretary, French Embassy Mr. E. A. Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA Mr. E. H. Bourgerie, Deputy Director, ANE Mr. S. K. C. Kopper, Officer in Charge, Northern Africa Affairs A. Problem: French Plans for the Discussions on Africa at the Foreign Ministers Meeting. B. Action Required: None. Mr. Van Laethem called on me at his own request at noon today to make known to the Department informally and unofficially what the French Foreign Office had in mind to take up at the May Foreign Ministers meeting on the subject of Africa. Van Laethem commenced by saying that the French Embassy here had received a personal letter from M. Monod, Head of the African Department of the Foreign Office, which described the informal thinking of the French officials dealing with this question. Van Laethem referred to a recent conversation covering this subject between M. Monod, La Tour du Pin, and Mr. Utter in Paris. 2 Van Laethem spoke from M. Monod’s letter which contained the following points: Further political deterioration in Africa should be avoided. The Communists have attempted to penetrate in Africa, so far, without success. However, the Western European powers in Africa should coordinate their plans to prevent any Communist entry. The French believe that large scale economic and social development in Africa should be instituted “right now”. In Africa there is more time to plan on a priority basis. Van Laethem continued by saying that the French Foreign Office believed a combined effort on the part of the European Nations with interests in Africa was necessary to start economic cooperation. There should be a combined pool to develop the resources of Africa. In this connection the United States, which has manifested an interest through the announcement of its technical assistance program, might be of assistance. French officials do not expect that it will be possible to start profitable enterprises in Africa immediately. It would be necessary to put a large amount of money in enterprises which are nonprofitable, i.e., such as railroads, harbors, transportation facilities, in order to give Africa an economic structure to develop. Africa must have such a structure before private investment could be expected to participate in any large scale. He reiterated that for the time being many of these development projects could not be expected to be profitable. Van Laethem then voiced his personal opinion based in what he had understood from other communications and discussions that the French believe that Point Four has definite limitations and would not be sufficient in itself to develop French, Belgian and United Kingdom territories in Africa. The main element it is lacking is capital. Thus the main effort should be to get a great amount of capital. Point Four would not cover this. He said that private capital would probably not want to come when there was no prospect of profitable return. He said the French officials wished to take up in London the necessity for the European nations to coordinate their efforts in the development of Africa. Eventually America might join in this combined effort. I thanked Van Laethem very much for letting us have this information and said that it would be extremely useful to us. Raymond A. Hare 1 Regarding the meetings in May in London of the U.S., British, and French Foreign Ministers, see the editorial note, p. 1541 [ Pg. 1541 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] . 2 The conversation under reference here, involving Guy Monod, Head of the African Division of the Office of African-Levant Affairs of the French Foreign Ministry, Geoffroy de La Tour du Pin Verclause, Head of the Suboffice for Protectorates of the Office of African-Levant Affairs of the French Foreign Ministry, and John E. Utter, Second Secretary in the Embassy in France, was apparently reported upon in telegram 1911, April 25, from Paris, not printed. Monod and La Tour du Pin emphasized that the social and economic development of African territories under European tutelage ought to precede the political liberation of peoples. Too rapid emancipation without proper means of livelihood would create misery and invite Communism. The French officials had in mind a giant economic and social program for Africa, established by the European powers but largely financed by the United States (870.00/4–2550). Van Laethem called at the Department of State on May 1 and May 2 to discuss further the question of the future of Africa. During those interviews, Samuel Kopper outlined American attitude and interest in the future of Africa as set forth in document FM D D–4, April 18, p. 1524 [ Pg. 1524 is part of Doc. 845 ] (Memorandum of two conversations by Kopper, May 1 and 2: 770.00/5–250). Editorial Note [Document 847] Editorial Note In late April and early May 1950, United States, British, and French representatives met in London for a series of preliminary meetings in preparation for scheduled meetings in London of the American, British, and French Foreign Ministers. At a meeting of American and French representatives on April 29 (reported upon in telegram Secto 53, April 29, from London, volume III, page 896 ), Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Embassy in France and a principal officer in the United States Delegation to the preliminary talks, reaffirmed United States interest in the harmonious economic, social, and political development in the North African area under French aegis. Bohlen stated that the United States did not seek special privileges or the substitution of United States for French position and influence in the area. The French representative reviewed the situation in French North Africa and warned against ill-considered statements and the mistaken impression that France was backsliding in the area. At a meeting between United States and French representatives on colonial problems on May 3 (reported upon in Secto 118, May 3, from London, volume III, page 948 ), the United States representative, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hare, reiterated the United States appreciation of the great responsibilities of the colonial powers in Africa and the United States desire to see the strengthening of friendly relations between France and the United States in overseas areas. Hare emphasized that United States activities would not be directed toward undermining France’s overseas position. Hare then summarized the recommendations set forth in Section IV of the policy paper of April 18 (FM D D–4), page 1524 [ Pg. 1524 is part of Doc. 845 ] . French representatives at the meeting emphasized the duality of the African problem for France. With regard to North Africa the French pointed out that Algeria, already a part of metropolitan France, required careful handling in view of important French interests and the French population there; that Tunisia was becoming ripe for a greater degree of self-government; and that Morocco was not yet ready to accept political responsibility. With respect to black Africa, the French emphasized that economic and social development had to precede political development, and that difficulties were being encountered with certain nationalist leaders who did not understand the real meaning of independence. The French would welcome United States financial assistance in emergent zonal economic development plans. United States and British representatives discussed colonial questions and Africa at a meeting on May 4 (reported upon in Secto 128, May 4, from London, volume III, page 950 ). Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hare once again summarized the recommendations on Africa set forth in Section IV of the policy paper of April 18 (FM D D–4). The British representatives expressed gratification and complete agreement on every point. Beginning on May 4, United States, British, and French representatives convened as Subcommittee D to consider the colonial question and Africa. The report of this Subcommittee to the United States, British, and French Foreign Ministers was set forth in document MIN/TRI/P/21, May 9 (for text, see volume III, page 1093 ). The representatives agreed that their three countries were basically in agreement as to the broad lines to be followed in the political development of the peoples of Africa and to the achievement of improved economic and social conditions. They recognized the importance of developing the existing cooperation among France, the United Kingdom, and the other African powers, and of establishing close cooperation between these countries and the United States. It was recommended that the questions and policies regarding Africa should be considered in detail at a later date. The more detailed views on Africa of the United States, British, and French representatives were set forth in three separate annexes to MIN/TRI/P/21 (for texts, see volume III, pages 1095 ff.). The views of the United States representative followed closely the recommendations set forth in Section IV of the policy paper of April 18 (FM D D–4). Secretary of State Acheson, British Foreign Secretary Bevin, and French Foreign Minister Schuman and their advisers held a series of meetings on world problems at London, May 11–13. At their fifth formal tripartite session on May 13 (reported upon in telegram Secto 246, May 13, from London, volume III, page 1052 ), the Foreign Ministers approved document MIN/TRI/P/21. Editorial Note [Document 848] Editorial Note In an address made before the Foreign Policy Association at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on May 8 Assistant Secretary of State McGhee outlined United States interests and policies in Africa. He pointed out that communism had made no significant inroad into Africa, but that advantage had to be taken of the absence of pressure to further the development within Africa of healthy political, economic, and social institutions. Assistant Secretary McGhee observed that current and future American policy toward Africa, although characterized by a significant absence of an informed public opinion, was based upon certain positive basic attitudes on the part of the American people: the general humanitarian interest of the American people in assisting underprivileged peoples everywhere, a great faith in the application of technology as a means of achieving basic progress, and a general background of sympathy toward aspirations for self-government and independence. He conceded that United States policy toward Africa was affected in an important way by the attitude of European powers toward the United States, which was at the same time friendly, critical, and suspicious, and he drew attention to fears of European powers of an apparent American tendency to give indiscriminate and uncritical support to movements toward self-government or independence without adequate consideration of the experience and resources of the peoples concerned. Assistant Secretary McGhee outlined the objectives of United States policy toward Africa generally as follows: (1) the progressive development of the dependent peoples of Africa toward the goal of self-government or, where conditions were suitable, toward independence; (2) the development of mutually advantageous economic relations between the European powers and the peoples of Africa, in the interests of contributing to the restoration of a sound European economy and in the interests of furthering the aspirations of the African peoples; (3) the preservation of United States rights of equal economic treatment in the territories of Africa and United States participation, both commercial and financial, in the development of Africa; (4) the establishment of an environment in which the African peoples would feel that their aspirations could best be served by continued association and cooperation with the “nations of the free world” and in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Assistant Secretary McGhee pointed out that United States objectives in Africa could be promoted through the Economic Cooperation Administration, through the American information and educational exchange program, and through the proposed Point IV Program for technical assistance. The text of Assistant Secretary’s McGhee’s address, made public as Press Release No. 469, was transmitted to 24 missions and consulates in Africa under cover of a circular instruction of May 18. A slightly revised text was subsequently published as an article by Assistant Secretary McGhee entitled “United States Interests in Africa”, appearing in the Department of State Bulletin , June 19, 1950, pages 999–1003. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 110.15 MC/5–1950: Telegram [Document 849] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France confidential Washington , May 19, 1950—8 p. m. 2305. Christian Science Monitor , May 16, contains Volney Hurd 1 article reporting Letourneau criticism McGhee’s Oklahoma City speech May 8 re US interests in Africa. 2 Far from reiterating “a current Amer fashion for independence for everyone everywhere”, speech was designed clarify US position by circumscribing this popular concept of our approach to Africa with limitations which we recognize as necessary. Thus self-govt and independence are not advocated indiscriminately but under proper conditions and timing. Moreover, far from presaging “US bid to move into Fr area” of Africa, speech emphasizes US (1) not in a position exercise direct responsibility in Africa; (2) desires cooperate with administering powers wherever possible; (3) does not desire to extend its world responsibilities; (4) recognizes value long African experience of Metropolitan powers and our lack of it; (5) recognizes difficulty of task and need for long-term planning; and (6) disclaims any desire displace colonial powers. Inur discretion discuss with appropriate Fr auths and advise whether Fr Govt’s reaction is same as Letourneau’s. 3 Air mailing exact text speech. Webb 1 Volney D. Hurd, chief of the Paris News Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor . 2 Regarding Assistant Secretary of State McGhee’s speech of May 8 under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 1540 [ Pg. 1540 includes portions of Doc. 846 and Doc. 847 ] . The circumstances of French Minister for Overseas France Jean Lefourneau’s comments thereon are described in telegram 2730, June 7, from Paris, infra . 3 Assistant Secretary of State McGhee took up the Letourneau “criticism” with French Ambassador Henri Bonnet during a call by the latter at the Department of State on a separate matter on May 25. McGhee explained that he had endeavored to be very moderate in his May 8 speech on Africa, and he hoped that Minister Letourneau had not misinterpreted the speech (memorandum of conversation by Jerome It. Lavallee of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, May 25: 745K.00/5–2550). The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 110.15 MC/6–750: Telegram [Document 850] The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State confidential Paris , June 7, 1950—6 p. m. 2730. Deptel 2305, May 19. 1 We have discussed with Foreign Office Letourneau’s remarks on McGhee’s Oklahoma City speech May 8. Monod stated that Letourneau, during press conference May 13 at end of meeting of French Colonial High Commissioners had been queried about McGhee’s speech, and that his comments had been based on fragmentary excerpts appearing in Paris press, which had highlighted American support of independence for colonial peoples. Without full knowledge of US policy as carefully defined in McGhee’s speech and uninformed on discussions being carried on in Foreign Ministers conference in London, Letourneau’s statements according to Monod, were ill-founded and calculated to appeal to parliamentary and public opinion. Monod again reiterated pleasure at basic understanding between us on general objectives in Africa as evidenced in Foreign Ministers conference, London, and remarked that there seemed to be only difference of emphasis on approach to problem. US put more stress on urgency political development dependent areas, whereas French placed economic and social progress well in forefront, and as prerequisite to self-government. Monod asked for 50 copies McGhee speech which he wishes circulate throughout French Overseas Ministry and French Missions in colonies, for he considers this clear declaration US policy would go long way to disabuse false notions of American intentions inculcated in minds some French colonial officers. We are delivering translation of full text and Monod has promised that it will be brought to attention Letourneau as well as other interested officers. Bruce 1 Supra . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 740.022/6–2150: Telegram [Document 851] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1 secret priority Washington , June 27, 1950—11 a. m. 3020. Dept believes Monod has misapprehension re scope proposed bilateral colonial discussions (ReEmbtel 3015 June 19). 2 Jul talks in our view intended carry out para 2 page 1 of MIN/TRI/P/21. Included beginning proposed agenda were two genl subjects but purpose was under those discuss general colonial problems as background to consideration specific UN problems and Dept wishes confine forthcoming talks to UN problems as envisaged when we first raised this with Fr beginning of 1950, in discussions between two dels in NY at last Assembly and during London mtgs. This approach outlined in some detail to Benard, first secy Fr Emb by Hare June 19. Benard was further advised Dept not prepared at this time to comment on matters other than UN listed annex 1 MIN/TRI/P/21 since position on proposals other than UN matters not yet formulated. During conversation Benard was advised that McGhee and possibly other members staff NEA wld be prepared stop off Paris either on way to or returning from Tangier Consular Conf scheduled first week Oct 3 for informal discussion Af problems with Fr shld they desire such a mtg. Presumably Benard has communicated this info his govt. This does not preclude in forthcoming talks some discussion of Af as it may bear on UN questions and shld Fr desire present in further detail info re proposals advanced at London or any new ideas re colonial problems such views may be presented at July mtg or in separate talks with Dept officials. It shld be made clear to Fr, however, that Dept will not be prepared at July mtg to comment on Fr views set forth annex 1 MIN/TRI/P/21 or on other substantive aspects of Af affairs, except UN matters, for reason lack of preparation mentioned above. 4 For your info it appears to Dept that Fr are primarily interested in securing some commitment from US for financial aid in implementing long-range econ development plan for Af and Dept not prepared at this time discuss or make any commitments along this line. Dept hopes, however, that Fr will send someone from Paris to participate forthcoming talks. Explain this in detail to Fr so they will not have misconception re forthcoming talks and attempt secure Fr concurrence urgently to date July and their final preference as to place between NY and Wash. Acheson 1 Repeated to London as 3126. 2 The telegram under reference here, not printed, reported that Guy Monod, Head of the African Division of the French Foreign Ministry, had asked the Embassy whether the Department of State was prepared to give its reaction to the French statement of policy on Africa set forth in Annex 1 to document MIN/TRI/P/21, May 9, approved at the meetings of American, British, and French Foreign Ministers in London, May 11–13. The French Foreign Ministry was prepared to send its African experts to the United States for proposed conversations on colonial problems in the United Nations only if substantive African problems were to be discussed. The telegram further observed that the French Foreign Ministry was obviously still smarting under what the French considered cavalier American treatment of the African item on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers meetings in London (740.022/6–2150). Regarding the meetings of the Foreign Ministers in London in May and document MIN/TRI/P/21, see the editorial note, p. 1541 [ Pg. 1541 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] . Regarding the U.S.-British, U.S.-French, and U.S.-Belgian talks in Washington in July on colonial problems in the United Nations, see the editorial note, infra . 3 Regarding the North African Regional Conference of U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Officers held at Tangier, October 2–9, see the memorandum of November 6 from Assistant Secretary of State McGhee to the Secretary of State, p 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] . 4 In response to a British suggestion in late May that the proposed U.S.-British talks on colonial problems be extended to include a wide-ranging discussion of Africa, the Embassy in London was instructed (telegram 2631, June 1, to London) to inform the Foreign Office that the Department of State was prepared to have discussions on Africa later in London at some mutually convenient time (740.022/5–3150). Telegram 8, July 3, to Brussels, not printed, instructed that the Belgian Foreign Ministry be informed that the Department was not currently prepared to discuss substantive aspects of African affairs but was willing to have separate talks on Africa with Belgian officials at some mutually convenient time and place (350/6–3050). Editorial Note [Document 852] Editorial Note Representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom held six meetings in Washington, July 5 through July 7, on a wide range of colonial and dependent area subjects, particularly with reference to the handling of such subjects in the United Nations Organization. The United States group at these meetings was headed by Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs John D. Hickerson and the United Kingdom group was headed by British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks. United States representatives held similar discussions with a French group headed by Ambassador Henri Bonnet, July 11–13 and with a Belgian group headed by Ambassador Baron Silvercruys. For documentation on the origin of these meetings and the positions taken there by the United States, see volume II, pages 434 ff. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Bourgerie) 770.00/7–1850 [Document 853] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Bourgerie ) secret [ Washington ,] July 13, 1950. Subject: African Problems. Participants: Governor-General Laurentie, Member of French Delegation on Trusteehip Council, United Nations. Mr. Guy Monod, French Foreign Office. Mr. Gabriel van Laethem, Second Secretary, French Embassy. Mr. George C. McGhee—NEA Mr. E. H. Bourgerie—ANE Mr. Jerome R. Lavallee—ANE Messrs. Laurentie and Monod, representatives of the French Government, who had been attending the talks on colonial problems in the United Nations in the Department, 1 called on Mr. McGhee in order to have an informal talk with the Assistant Secretary before leaving Washington. In answer to an inquiry from Mr. McGhee, Mr. Bourgerie stated that the talks on colonial problems in the UN, which had been held between the French representatives and Department officials, had been most helpful. Governor-General Laurentie said that he was very pleased with the results of the talks and that he felt that a much wider area of agreement now existed between the United States and France on these UN problems, and that he was of the opinion that the talks would lead to closer cooperation in this field between the two governments. Mr. McGhee said that he hoped that the two governments would continue to collaborate with each other on such matters and that they would discuss from time to time specific problems of this nature which were of interest to both governments. Mr. McGhee asked Mr. Laurentie about conditions in French “Black” Africa. Mr. Laurentie replied that he believed that the political reforms which had been brought about in 1945 and 1946 in French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa and the Trust Territories of the Cameroons and Togoland had struck a good balance between the wishes of the native populations and the necessities of Government. He stated that outside of the Ewe problem in Togoland, the political conditions in these areas were good, and that he was of the opinion that real progress was being made in the political and economic development of these areas. Turning to North Africa, Mr. McGhee inquired of Mr. Laurentie whether he believed that the conditions in that area were worse this year than they were last year. Mr. Laurentie stated that he was not an expert on North African questions, and that he did not know if that was true. He stated, however, that unfortunately many Nationalist groups in North Africa have the impression that they have the full support of the United States, and that many of these groups are only interested in obtaining independence without due regard to the rights of the French or other minorities, or without due regard to political or economic factors which come into play. Mr. McGhee stated that that was indeed a false impression for it was the policy of the United States Government to help maintain a strong France. He stated that the United States wished to work closely with France in order to maintain peace and security in her colonies and in order to assist the French in an orderly development of these colonies. Mr. McGhee said that we wished to help France, as much as possible, and whenever any problems arose we would like to talk them over with the French officials as friend to friend. In this connection, Mr. McGhee said that in the event of war, North Africa would again play a vital role, and that it was in our interests as well as in the interests of the French to maintain stable conditions in North Africa. We were, therefore, very much interested in any constructive steps which the French Government could take in certain of their territories which would result in keeping Nationalist pressures from building up to dangerous proportions. Mr. McGhee emphasized that it would be harmful to the interests of both countries if repressive rather than forward-looking measures were adopted in North Africa. He emphasized that the United States had no desire to break up the French Empire and that any thoughts we might have on North African political problems should be accepted by the French Government in the friendly spirit in which they were put forward. He added that the United States, looking at the North African picture as more of a disinterested observer, felt that it would be in the best interests of France if more attention was given to the granting of certain political reforms which would meet some of the grievances of the Nationalists in North Africa. Mr. McGhee then raised the Moroccan trade problem with Mr. Monod and he expressed the hope that the French authorities in Morocco could be persuaded to take a more moderate position with respect to the application of import and exchange controls which affect American businessmen operating in Morocco. Mr. McGhee told Mr. Monod that Mr. Rodes had been very active in Congress and has succeeded in persuading one of the Senate committees to add to the ECA Appropriation Bill a very strong amendment which would require the withholding of ECA counterpart funds from any country which violates any of its treaty obligations with the United States. The Assistant Secretary pointed out to Mr. Monod that this latest amendment to the ECA Appropriation Bill was much stronger than the Connally Amendment and that if the ECA had to enforce this amendment it might have a very serious effect on the ECA program in France. Mr. McGhee said that he realized that Mr. Monod is not responsible for North African affairs, but that he hoped that on his return to Paris he would discuss this matter with officials in the Foreign Office who were responsible for this area and make known to them the seriousness with which we view this problem. He added that he hoped that the authorities in Morocco would take a more liberal point of view in the enforcement of the December 31, 1949 Agreement to the end that some of the problems rising from that agreement could be settled satisfactorily. Mr. Monod said that for our part we must also consider that the French had certain Parliamentary problems in so far as their own businessmen were concerned and that this created certain complications which the French Government had to take into account. 2 Mr. Monod then asked Mr. McGhee whether he was planning to stop off in Paris in September on his way to the Tangier Consular Conference. Mr. McGhee said that he was hoping that it would be possible to arrange his schedule in such a way that he would be able to visit Paris for informal discussions with French officials on substantive matters relating to Africa. Mr. Monod said that he was very pleased to hear that Mr. McGhee planned to visit Paris in September and he expressed the opinion that informal talks with the various French officials in Paris would indeed prove most helpful in reaching a meeting of minds on various problems relating to Africa and in strengthening relations between the two countries. Mr. Monod said that the French had given a great deal of thought and consideration to economic development in Africa and that his Government had prepared a brochure giving details of their economic development plans for that area. He handed Mr. McGhee and Mr. Bourgerie copies of this document and expressed the hope that they would have an opportunity to study it prior to their visit to Paris in September. 1 Regarding the talks under reference here, see the editorial note, supra . 2 For more comprehensive documentation on aspects of the Moroccan trade problem taken up in this paragraph, see pp. 1737 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] ff. Editorial Note [Document 854] Editorial Note Prior to and in connection with his attendance at the North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, Morocco, October 2–7, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs McGhee and a small party of advisers visited London (September 16–23), Paris (September 23–26), Tunis (September 27), Tripoli (September 28), Casablanca (September 29), and Rabat (September 30). While in London, Assistant Secretary McGhee and his party held discussions with British Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Commonwealth Relations Office officials (September 18–23) on a lengthy, previously agreed upon agenda of topics covering South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The agenda items for Africa included current problems in Eritrea and Libya, Communist activity in Africa, the principles: governing the investment of American capital in African colonies, alleged trade discrimination against the United States in African colonies based on balance of payments difficulties, a review of British colonial policies in Africa, and proposed procedures for initiating Point Four programs in Africa. Records of Assistant Secretary McGhee’s discussions with British officials on principal African topics are printed in the immediately following pages. Regarding his meetings with British officials on Greece, Turkey, and Iran, see pages 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , and 1316 [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 735 ] . A comprehensive collection of records of the American-British discussions in London, September 18–23, is included in file 780.00/9–1850. Correspondence on the preparations for those discussions is included in file 120.4371. Assistant Secretary McGhee arranged to confer in Paris on September 25 and 26 with French Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Overseas Territories officials on a variety of Near Eastern questions and on the following African topics: Communist activities in Africa, French colonial policies in Africa, proposals for the opening of new American Foreign Service posts in West Africa, current problems in Libya, proposed procedures for initiating Point Four programs in Africa, and the problem of Moroccan trade controls. Complete records of the American-French meetings in Paris have not been found, but for the general review of problems in French Africa below the Sahara, see the memorandum of conversation by Bourgerie and Lloyd, September 25, page 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] . Correspondence on the preparations for the American-French discussions is included in file 120.4371. For records of the visit of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee’s party to Tunis on September 27 and his audience with the Sultan of Morocco in Rabat on September 30, see pages 1786 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] and 1747 [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] . A memorandum of McGhee’s conversation with the Mufti of Tripolitania, Sheikh Mohammed Abul As’ Ad Al Alam in Tripoli on September 28 is included in file 611.73/9–2850. Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom 780.00/9–1950 [Document 855] Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret [ London , September 19, 1950.] Subject: Communism in Africa Participants: 2 Mr. Michael Wright, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Africa Mr. Roger Allen, Head of African Department Mr. John Cotton, African Department Mr. E. H. Peck, Information and Research Department Mr. Walsh-Atkins, CRO 3 Mr. Marnham, Colonial Office 4 Mr. George McGhee, Asst. Secretary of State Mr. E. H. Bourgerie, Director, Office of African Affairs 5 Mr. Samuel Kopper, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs 6 Mr. Joseph Palmer, Embassy 7 Mr. John Root, Embassy 8 Miss M. J. Tibbetts, Embassy Mr. Allen opened the meeting by asking for State Department comments and queries on the Foreign Office paper on Communism in Africa. 9 Mr. McGhee said the State Department information was in general, in accord with the conclusions of the Foreign Office paper. It had been agreed at Lourenco Marques 10 that Communism as such was not an acute problem in Africa mainly because of the primitive condition of the people and also possibly because to date the Russians have not given the area a high priority. It was recognized that in Africa there were lots of trouble spots because of the generally low standard of living, but it was also recognized that nationalist movements and local discontents were not in most cases Communist inspired. In a sense the lack of Communism in Africa was surprising. It was the US opinion that the French territories were the most susceptible and that there was also a certain danger in African students who went elsewhere for their education. Mr. Bourgerie then asked for the latest Foreign Office opinions about the possibilities of Communism in Libya. Mr. Allen said that the Foreign Office was not aware of much Communist activity in Libya although it was difficult to say what might happen. If the transition to independence did not go smoothly, Communist activities might increase. Tripolitania was the only likely field and there was a certain amount of communism among the Italians in Tripolitania. The situation did not seem to be grave, and Communist activity was more the activity of individuals than an organized indigenous movement. It was mentioned that in the French territories the Labor movement might be the center of Communist activities but it was not the Foreign Office view that to date the Labor movement in Africa was a serious source of Communist strength. Mr. Bourgerie and Mr. Kopper referred to the visit of a group from North Africa to Moscow. The British had not heard of this visit but agreed that there were many possibilities of contact through the Russian Consul General in Algeria who might be able to arrange for visits of this nature. To date the British authorities have no real evidence that the Indians in East Africa have contacts with the Communists in India. Mr. Walsh Atkins said that there was no evidence that the Union of South Africa was a center for Communist activities in the continent. There was evidence that some Communist propaganda from the Union was being disseminated fairly far north and the constant traffic of migrant labor to and from the Union was a dangerous potential. As yet, however, the Union does not seem to be an active danger spot and the South African authorities were very much alive to the need of constant surveillance and care. On the question of students Mr. Walsh Atkins said that the South African Government had considerable misgivings about these students as potential Communist agitators and may impose a more restrictive policy. Already the South African Government has begun to withhold travel facilities from African students who wish to go to India. Mr. Marnham said that with respect to West African students it had been found advisable in West Africa to endorse their passports only for the UK thus preventing the students from travelling about the continent. This procedure was less satisfactory in respect to the stowaways who could get their passports in the UK and were thus able to travel about. There were potential dangers in the situation of the students in the UK and the Communists did seek them out. It was the belief of the Colonial Office that a rapid development of educational facilities in the Colonies themselves would make it possible for the students to secure their education in their home areas although there would always be a certain number of students, preferably post-graduates, who would go outside to study. Nor would it be desirable to choke off completely the flow of students to and from the UK. There was no evidence that students who had been to the US were particularly affected by Communist influences. Mr. McGhee stated that in the information program the US aim had been to give the local peoples information of substantive value and the British said that also had been their idea. The field was practically unlimited in size and there was an enormous amount which could be done by such means as mobile units and the saucepan radio sets. It was agreed that established procedure in the exchange of information on Communism between the US officials and Colonial Office officials in the field appeared to be working satisfactorily. Mr. Marnham was to arrange for Mr. Bourgerie to speak with the Colonial Office information specialists to discuss in more detail the sort of information program which might be of value in the areas under discussion. Both the US and the UK were considering the advisability of opening Consulates at Brazzaville and Abidjan because it is felt that there is need for more information from and cooperation with the French. It was agreed that cooperation on all aspects of this problem will be continued. 1 The authorship of this memorandum is not indicated on the source text, but it probably was prepared by Margaret Joy Tibbetts, Attaché in the Embassy in the United Kingdom and an expert in African affairs. The source text is one of a set of memoranda covering the various agenda items discussed by Assistant Secretary of State McGhee during his visit to London, September 16–23; regarding that visit, see the editorial note, supra . File 350 Africa of the London Embassy Files for 1950 includes a copy of the memorandum printed here together with a British record and a joint U.S.-British record of the meeting. 2 Wright, Allen, Cotton, and Peck were all officers of the British Foreign Office. 3 L. B. Walsh Atkins, Assistant Secretary of State, British Commonwealth Relations Office. 4 J. E. Marnham, Assistant Secretary of State, British Colonial Office. 5 Bourgerie became Director of the newly created Office of African Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on August 10. 6 Kopper was named Deputy Director of the newly created Office of Near Eastern Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on September 14. 7 Joseph Palmer 2d, First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom. 8 John F. Root, Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom. 9 A copy of the 18-page document under reference, entitled “A Survey of Communism in Africa”, dated June 29 and prepared by the Research Department of the British Foreign Office, was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch No. 1199, September 13, neither printed (770.001/9–1350). Another copy of the document, presumably delivered by the British Embassy in Washington to the Department of State, is included in file 770.00/8–250. 10 Regarding the West and East African Regional Conference of American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, held at Lourenço Marques, February 27–March 2, see the memorandum of April 12 from Assistant Secretary of State McGhee to the Secretary of State, p. 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] ; Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom 780.00/9–1850 [Document 856] Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret [ London ,] September 20, 1950. [Subject: Economic Questions Concerning Africa] Participants: Sir Hilton Poynton, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office Sir Gerard Clauson, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office Mr. Andrew Cohen, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office Mr. W. A. Mathieson, Economic Relations Department, Colonial Office Mr. A. Emanuel, Economic General Department, Colonial Office Mr. Marshall, Foreign Office Mr. Kelvin Stark, Exchange Control Board Mr. Leyden, East African Department, Colonial Office Mr. Bourne, West African Department, Colonial Office Mr. George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA Mr. Charles Baldwin, Embassy 2 Mr. Elmer Bourgerie, Office of African Affairs Mr. Ben Moore, Embassy 3 Miss Margaret Joy Tibbetts, Embassy Mr. McGhee and Mr. Bourgerie began by summarizing the views of investment groups in the United States on the requirements desired by United States investors. Although there is not to date any considerable amount of US investment in Africa, US investors are interested in the area and American investments there may be larger in the future. The four main points of interest to US investors are (1) general most-favored-nation treatment, (2) assurances, as much as possible, against expropriation, (3) repatriation of earnings and capital, and (4) equal treatment for American capital with respect to entry into and similar treatment within the colony. All these points are subject to the over-all balance of payments position. The British (Poynton and Emanual) outlined the British views as follows. Their general attitude in the broadest sense is that American capital investment is welcomed. The main qualification is the balance of payments situation and if a worth while economic benefit will result dollar expenditure is not automatically ruled out. It is the British view that the problem of finding out in which fiields there is scope for investment is one for the investors who should go to see for themselves. With reference to specific points. On Point 1 (mfn treatment) there is no formal discrimination against the US investor. On Point 2 (Expropriation) it is difficult to forecast the terms which any colonial or ex-colonial government might offer in the event of nationalization. To judge from British experience and traditions, there has never been expropriation without compensation but it is impossible to say that there would or could be any standard practice or guarantees. The British believe that traditional practices form a good basis for judgment. Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Bourgerie then raised the question of a standard clause on this subject to be inserted in a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce or [ and ] Navigation. Although the United States recognized the impossibility of an iron-clad guarantee, it was the US belief that the inclusion of this provision in a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation would facilitate investment and reassure American investors. The Colonial Office apparently were not aware of the fact that such a Treaty between the US and the UK was tentatively being considered but expressed the view that it would appear possible from their standpoint to include such a clause in the Treaty. Presumably this Treaty would be subject to the usual provisos concerning colonial accession but they thought it likely that the Colonial Governments would, if so advised by the British, accede to the treaties. Although they could not anticipate what the Colonial Governments might do on gaining full self-government, Mr. Cohen believed that they would realize the advantages to themselves of retaining such a treaty since they would need investment from outside. On the question of repatriation of capital Mr. Kelvin Stark summarized the present provisions of the Exchange Control Board on this matter, i.e. that for investments made after January 1, 1950 the full amount of the initial investment can be expatriated together with dividends etc. but an amount in excess of the initial capital investment can not be repatriated. With reference to the screening of capital investments, the British said that investments were, of course, screened both on the balance of payments criterion and the suitability of the investment for the individual colony’s overall economic plan. There was a certain amount of industrial licensing in order to afford protection to newly established industries but this was not appiled on a discriminatory basis against Americans. In some instances local participation in the enterprise was sought as a quid pro quo for concessions but here too there was no discrimination on a national basis. The immediate and important type of screening of capital investment was exchange control. Mr. McGhee pointed out that it was the US view that the territorial governments might do more to detail and publicize the opportunities available for investment and the British said that some governments were trying to do more along these lines. An Economic Survey of the Colonies is contemplated within the next year which would include a good part of this information. The British expressed a desire to be informed of any particular cases of discrimination which might come to the attention of the US officials. On the question of Trade Discriminations Mr. Bourgerie said that here too it appeared to be not so much a question of the regulations as the manner in which these regulations were interpreted by local officials. The State Department was under considerable pressure from both Congress and American business on this matter and it was the American belief that US trade should receive at least as favorable treatment as the trade of any other nation, including the metropolitan country, subject to the balance of payments position. The US had Treaty Rights in the area, based among others on the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, the Trusteeship Agreement and GATT. Although the balance of payments difficulties were fully and sympathetically recognized by the US there had been no surrender of our basic rights and there was no disposition to let these rights be nibbled away through administrative practice. After drawing the attention of the British to the so-called Connally and Hickenlooper Amendments to the ERP Appropriations Act, 4 Mr. Bourgerie said that it was the American impression that in East Africa and the Rhodesias discrimination had at times been carried beyond the need to conserve dollar exchange. The US had received complaints to this effect although he would not delay the meeting by presenting details of such complaints at this time. The British replied that they were in basic agreement with the US position that there should be no discrimination and expressed a keen desire to be informed of specific cases. They admitted that on occasion local officials would conceivably administer the regulations in what might appear to be a discriminatory manner although often on examination there was a reason for such action. In any case, they urged the State Department to bring these cases to their attention in order that, if the local officials should be in error, the situation could be corrected. Mr. Bourgerie stated that it would be of assistance to US exporters to have some indication of the dollar allocations to the various areas. The British hastily replied that there were no set allocations: rather, each government is given a ceiling of dollars based strictly on estimates of essentiality. These ceilings were maxima which could not be exceeded, not, in any sense, targets. The local governments were obliged to cut down on dollar expenditures as much as possible. Mr. Bourgerie pointed out that an improvement in the dollar reserves of the UK would undoubtedly make it increasingly difficult to explain discrimination on the basis of the balance of payments position. The Colonial Office stated that if, as a result of a rise in the dollar reserves of the sterling area, there should be an easing of the position vis-á-vis American imports, the Colonial Office would make a vigorous effort to see that the Colonies got their share of any general let-up. They again assured the Americans that they were anxious to diminish restrictions progressively and asked to be informed of specific cases of seeming discrimination. Mr. McGhee then briefly summarized the proposed procedures for utilizing the sums available under Point IV. It was the American belief that through trainees, demonstration type equipment, teachers for extension work etc. much valuable work could be done. The Colonial Office agreed and Sir Gerard Clauson said that the possibility had been discussed of asking for Pt IV assistance to pay the expenses of African students already in the United States. Although these students were not in every case committed to a specific project, they were a hand-picked group whose expenses were paid by the British Government in the expectation that they would return to the Colonies and work in such fields as medicine etc. Although recognizing that the amounts involved were not large, the Colonial Office indicated interest and stated that it should be possible to take advantage of the program. Mr. Mathieson expressed the hope that the “fair share” of expenses for an American expert which are to be paid by the local government would not include such generous emoluments for travel, housing etc. as to impose a strain on the local budget or on the relations of the American expert with his British colleagues. Mr. Mathieson also expressed some doubts as to the necessity or advisability for each Pt IV request to be routed through OSR in Paris. Mr. McGhee stated that OTC clearance would be necessary only for those projects which might need coordinating with the work of other governments participating in the area and that there was no intention of making OSR clearance a regular part of the channel. Mr. Bourgerie then expressed the view that it was better to overprogram and then to assign priorities than to attempt to match projects exactly with funds now tentatively allotted for British Africa. It was agreed that the Colonial Office would keep in touch with the Embassy on this question. 1 The authorship of this memorandum is not indicated on the source text, but it probably was prepared by Margaret Joy Tibbetts, Attaché in the Embassy in the United Kingdom and an expert in African affairs. The source text is one of a set of memoranda covering the various agenda items discussed by Assistant Secretary of State McGhee during his visit to London, September 19–23; regarding that visit, see the editorial note, p. 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] . At another meeting on September 20, Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, Mr. Bourgerie, and Miss Tibbetts received an informal review of British colonial policies in Africa, particularly the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and the Rhodesias, from Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Cohen of the British Colonial Office. The four-page memorandum of that meeting is included in the materials cited above. 2 Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom. 3 First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom. 4 The amendments under reference provided that no funds would be made available to any nation, if in the opinion of the President a dependent area of that nation failed to comply with a treaty to which the United States and the dependent area were parties. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) and the Second Secretary of the Embassy in France (Lloyd) 851T.00–TA/9–2550 [Document 857] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs ( Bourgerie ) and the Second Secretary of the Embassy in France ( Lloyd ) 1 confidential [ Paris ,] September 25, 1950. Subject: General Review of Problems in French Africa below the Sahara Participants: French: M. de la Tournelle, Director General of Political Affairs, Foreign Office M. Binoche, Director, Afrique-Levant, Foreign Office M. Monod, Chief, African Section, Foreign Office M. Francfort, Assistant Chief, African Section, Foreign Office M. Charpentier, Director General in charge of Economic and Financial Affairs, Foreign Office M. Wormser, Economic Affairs, Foreign Office M. Clermont-Tonnere, Ministry of Finance M. Delteil, Deputy Director of Political Affairs, Ministry of Overseas France M. Torre, Deputy Director of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Overseas France M. Vorss [ Vaurs? ], Economic Affairs, Foreign Office American: Mr. McGhee, Department of State Mr. Bourgerie, Department of State Mr. Utter, Embassy, Paris 2 Mr. Lloyd, Embassy, Paris Mr. Gordon, ECA, Paris 3 The conversation reported below took place at the Foreign Office on the afternoon of September 25, 1950. M. de la Tournelle opened the discussion by welcoming Mr. McGhee to the Foreign Office. He then reviewed the points to be taken up, and mentioned that fact that at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference earlier this year the French had proposed a plan dealing with the development of Africa, 4 which, he believed, had been well received. Mr. McGhee replied by thanking M. de la Tournelle for his welcome and stated that he and his associates came not in a critical mood, but as friends seeking a better understanding of French problems in Africa, and animated by a desire to assist in solving these problems. The interest of the United States was motivated by two considerations: (1) our obvious strategic interest in the African continent and (2) our desire to see the French overseas territories, by their economic development, assist in the strengthening of metropolitan France. Mr. McGhee said that he believed that the Foreign Ministers’ meeting and other conversations had gone a long way toward dispelling suspicions which may have existed regarding the critical attitude of the non-colonial powers toward those having African possessions. He added that the great strides which France had made in the development of its overseas territories were fully appreciated. There were, nonetheless, continued Mr. McGhee, a few questions which he would like to ask. The first of these questions concerned Communism in Africa. Mr. McGhee said that he realized that this was not yet a major problem, since Africa is now one of the most stable areas of the world. He felt however that it was a potential menace in certain strategic areas of Africa, which led him to inquire what plans the French had for countering this threat. In reply, M. Francfort made the following statement regarding Communist activities in Black Africa: The basis for a Communist movement in French West Africa is fundamentally weak, since the section of the population on which Communism usually relies most heavily for its recruits, i.e., the industrial proletariat of large cities, is of little importance in Africa. The peasantry, on the other hand, does not offer a fertile field for Communist propaganda, since it is still in a more or less primitive state and, of course, very backward from the political point of view. The Communists have, therefore, sought an outlet through nationalistic groups, a manoeuvre which they have used with success in other parts of the world. Especially since 1947, the Communists have attempted to capture the RDA (Rassemblement Democratique Africain) by their usual methods of infiltration. The RDA, on the other hand, has found it advantageous to associate itself with the Communist Party, since its representatives in the National Assembly (11 members) constitute too small a group to exercise much influence when acting independently. There are, nevertheless, Socialist members of the RDA who can be counted on to support the Government. The serious incidents in the Ivory Coast last year served to open the eyes of some of the less fanatical elements of the RDA, who are now seeking to escape from Communist domination. As a result, certain of the more virulent Communists have been eliminated from positions of influence within the RDA. There are thus signs of a healthy housecleaning in the ranks of this party, but so far only a beginning has been made in this direction. This recent evolution of the RDA and the signs that it may well proceed to clean its own house of Communist influence has made the question of exerting pressure on the RDA an extremely delicate one. Such pressure from the government might serve only to crystalize anti-French feeling, interrupt the progress now being made and thus play into the hands of the Communists. The central government has, therefore, considered it preferable to leave to the governors of the various African territories the task of persuading RDA members to adopt a broader attitude toward French aims in Africa. With respect to Communist influence in the labor movement, it may be said that although no labor union in Black Africa is at present entirely dominated by the Communist Party, a great many of the union leaders are Communists. The situation is therefore potentially dangerous and should be closely watched. The two most important personalities in Black Africa known to be closely associated with international Communism are d’Arboussier and Dialou, both RDA leaders. The former, the son of an ex-French governor and a native woman, has made frequent trips to Moscow and is most active in the “Peace Partisans” movement (Stockholm Appeal), 5 a movement which has not, however, made much headway in Africa. Dialou is active in the international Communist labor movement and is a vice president of the WFTU. All programs of agitation by the Communist party have been conducted in the name of Nationalist aspirations. Thus, while all Nationalists are not Communists, they can frequently be led to act along the same lines as Communists. This is the most disturbing facet of the situation. The Nationalists are now convinced that the only answer to their aspirations is complete independence. It does not seem, however, that this would be an acceptable solution since (1) the trend internationally is now in the opposite direction, i.e., association on a regional or world-wide scale, and (2) the dependent areas, if given complete independence, would be inclined to adopt an attitude of neutrality in the present ideological conflict and thus open the way for the same type of blackmail in Africa as is now being practiced in the Far East. M. de la Tournelle, in turn, summed up the situation in the following manner: 1. The Communist movement in Black Africa has only recently assumed any importance and is closely tied in with Nationalism. 2. The African adherents to the Communist philosophy, like those of the Soviet Union, repudiate any form of international cooperation. 3. International Communism probably considers the African continent as its second objective, after Asia. The center for its African campaign seems to be located in Ethiopia. 4. The most effective way to counter Communist tactics in French Africa is to persuade the native groups ( a ) that their aspirations for self-government be realized within the framework of the French Union, and ( b ) that their best interests, materially and otherwise, lie in close cooperation with France. Mr. McGhee asked whether the Communists were making a special effort to operate through the labor unions. M. Francfort replied by saying that although Communist action in the labor unions was limited in scope at the present time, the administration fully realized the potential danger of such action and was keeping a close watch on the situation. Mr. McGhee referred to Mr. de la Tournelle’s statement that the headquarters of Communist activity in Africa was believed to be located in Ethiopia and stated that information available to the Department of State regarding the size and activities of the Soviet Mission in Ethiopia indicated that an exaggerated idea may have been built up regarding the importance of Addis Ababa as the center of Communist propaganda in Africa. He then asked whether the French considered the Ethiopian center more important than the RDA as a means of furthering Communist aims in Africa. M. Francfort replied that the activities were on different planes: the Communists sought to work through the influence which could be exercised by outstanding personalities in the case of the RDA, whereas the Ethiopian center handled the details and the day-to-day business of the program. The two types of activities were designed to complement each other and thus any statement of relative importance would be difficult to formulate. Mr. McGhee asked what was the attitude of the French Government regarding the RDA. Mr. Francfort replied that the RDA is a legally constituted, political party represented in the National Assembly. The tactics of the Government were, therefore, to attempt to win over, individually, the more influential members of the RDA rather than to attack the party itself. Whenever illegal action occurs, as was the case in the Ivory Coast incidents, the Government will act with promptitude and vigor. In the meantime, the Government will do everything possible to throttle Communism in the overseas territories by acting through local administrations. The French Government, however, does not contemplate taking measures which would be in violation of French law or France’s international undertakings. Mr. McGhee asked whether the Communists were concentrating their efforts in any particular areas. Mr. Delteil said that there were no indications of special concentration except that afforded by the Ivory Coast incidents. He added that the Communists suffered a serious set-back in this their one attempt at direct action. Mr. McGhee inquired whether the Communists were organized well enough to carry out extensive sabotage of the war effort in the event of hostilities, and if they were making any definite plans along these lines. He referred, in particular, to reports that the Communists Were planning, in the event of an armed conflict, to instigate an uprising along the 14th parallel. M. de la Tournelle said that he did not think the Communists had worked out any definite program of sabotage and that their major effort seems rather to be concentrated on undermining French influence in Africa. M. Francfort said that the French were aware of rumors that the Communists were planning disturbances along the 14th parallel and that they probably have attempted something in this direction. He felt, however, that any such attempt was doomed to failure, since the inhabitants of the region concerned are for the most part fanatical Moslems and as such are likely to resist Communist ideas. On the other hand, the Communists might be instrumental in inciting a holy war in this area and this is believed to constitute the only real danger. Mr. McGhee asked if the French cooperated closely with the British, and with Liberia, in the surveillance and control of Communist activities in Africa. M. Francfort replied that the cooperation with the British was very close in this respect. As for Liberia, M. Francfort mentioned the matter of arms smuggling into Guinea and the Ivory Coast via Liberia, which, he said, was causing the French some concern. Mr. Bourgerie stated that the Department of State had investigated this matter and had discovered that only small caliber firearms and ammunition of a hunting type were involved thus far but that the Embassy at Monrovia had been instructed to keep a close watch over the situation. Mr. McGhee brought up the question of African students in France and asked whether the Communists were very active in seeking to influence these students and whether the French Government encouraged African students to come to France. Mr. Francfort said that while he could cite no particular cases of Communist work among the African students, such work was certainly going on. The French Government, he continued, encouraged African students to come to France, as a means of acquainting them with French life. There are some 3,000 African students in France at the present time. Naturally there was some danger that these students would come under the influence of French Communists, but the Government felt that the advantages in bringing them to France far outweighed this disadvantage. Experience has shown, in fact, that relatively few go over to the Communists and that the majority, many of whom return to occupy important administrative posts in the overseas territories, support the Government. Mr. McGhee asked whether the Africans could be brought to realize that Communism would impose a far worse form of imperialism than that now existing. M. Francfort did not believe an effort in this direction would prove fruitful, and pointed out that the African native is far too backward politically to grasp a concept which a great many Europeans find it difficult to understand. McGhee asked if there were any anti-Communist political organizations. M. Francfort replied that there were other political parties, but added that what was important in the situation was not the existence of anti-Communist parties, but the presence in the overseas territories of a French administration determined to suppress any overt action by the Communists, and prepared for any eventuality in this respect. The greatest bulwark against Communism in these territories is the French Administration. When the French feel that they have the comprehension of other powers in their task, they will be willing to act with even more confidence and vigor. Mr. McGhee asked whether, in view of the importance of the RDA, it was not necessary for any West African with political ambitions to join that party in order to get ahead. M. Francfort answered that the RDA is the most important political outlet for the Nationalist movement in all of West Africa but that there are other local political parties representing separate territories. There is for instance the Progressive Party ( Parti Progressiste ) in the Cote d’Ivoire, home of the RDA. Personal and sectional rivalries must also be taken into account. Mr. McGhee asked whether an effort was being made to offer a means of expression to non-Communist Nationalists. Mr. Francfort replied affirmatively and said that the Government was attempting to persuade the bona-fide Nationalists that the answer to their aspirations could be found within the framework of the French Union. This is of course a long-term matter and the principal difficulty is that of convincing the Nationalists of the necessity for a gradual evolution toward greater self-government. M. Binoche added that in this respect France was confronted with a dilemma: the Government was eager to see the native populations advance as rapidly as possible toward self-government and would like to accelerate this evolution. On the other hand, the Government feels that the premature relaxation of certain controls would play directly into the hands of the Communists. This situation makes it difficult to persuade the peoples of Africa and other nations as well that France is actually moving in the right direction. Mr. Monod introduced the subject of social developments in the French territories of Black Africa. He stated that reports on this matter had been submitted to the UN, but that there was one aspect of this question which he desired to stress, namely, the work of the Commission de Cooperation Technique en Afrique (CCTA). 6 M. Monod reviewed the development of this organization from its beginnings in 1945, outlined its organizational structure, and gave a resumé of its work by listing the various conferences held, which included those on veterinary medicine, tse-tse fly control, medicine, education, nutrition, commerce, transportation, and soil erosion. M. Monod stressed the fact that the CCTA was not intended to compete with the specialized agencies of the UN such as the FAO, but rather to cooperate with these agencies in the fullest possible measure. Mr. McGhee asked whether the natives were informed of what was being done by the CCTA. Mr. Monod replied that they were and that the delegations sent to meetings of the Commission and of the local working organizations always include African members. Mr. Bourgerie said that we were following the activities of such organizations with interest and would welcome the opportunity to participate, as observers, in some of the meetings of the CCTA. Mr. McGhee asked whether the CCTA worked in close cooperation with the OEEC. Mr. Monod replied that such cooperation was planned for the future but that the CCTA was still too young an organization for much development to have taken place along this line. Mr. McGhee said he understood that the ECA has had more funds for the assistance of such programs than have been utilized, since the demand was not so much for dollar exchange as for local currencies. He then asked Mr. Monod whether he thought the demands for ECA funds would be greater in the future. Mr. Monod replied that since the work under the CCTA program consisted largely of studies in the social field, large sums of money were not required. The important question was not one of funds but rather of methods and organization. Mr. Bourgerie asked whether the CCTA had definite programs for each territory. Mr. Monod replied that programs for each territory existed but that these programs had been drawn up by the specialized technical bureaus rather than by the Commission whose purpose was one of coordinating effort. Mr. McGhee asked if there was a parallel program in the economic field. Mr. Vorss replied that there was and that the economic program had been developed and was being carried out with three general principles in mind: (1) to raise the standard of living of the natives, (2) to increase the economic potential of the French Union, and (3) to increase the military potential of the French Union as a member of the Atlantic Pact. Mr. Vorss suggested that, in view of the complicated nature of the question, the discussions be carried on in accordance with the following outline: 1. Public investment policies, under the Four and Ten-year plans 2. Private investments ( a ) French; ( b ) Foreign and notably American 3. The strategic material program under ECA as a practical example of what can be accomplished by cooperative effort between France and the United States. Mr. Torre gave an account of the French program of public investment which is summarized as follows: The idea of extensive development of the overseas territories is not a new one and did not start with the 10-year plan of 1946. There was, for example, the loan of 1931, whose proceeds went mainly into railway and port development, although agricultural programs in Africa and Indo-China were also undertaken. This work continued up until the war. At the end of the war, the situation of the overseas territories was found to be very difficult because of the deterioration of material and equipment during the war years. The situation with respect to transportation was particularly grave. The central Government therefore, decided to work out an overall, coordinated plan for the re-equipment and development of the overseas territories. The result was the Ten Year Plan (Plan d’Equipment), set forth in the law of April 30, 1946. Two unexpected difficulties, however, prevented the Government from carding out the Plan as originally conceived: (1) the production objectives had been set immediately after the war when there were scarcities of almost all colonial products. Economists were convinced that these scarcities would continue over a long period and production goals under the Plan were set accordingly. It soon became apparent, however, that the scarcities would not last and that, in consequence, the marketing possibilities were not as great as had been expected. This was particularly true in fats and oils where the saturation point was quickly reached; (2) the disagreeable discovery was soon made that public works in Africa would actually cost far more than had been estimated when the Plan was drawn up. Thus, important modifications had to be made in the Plan with respect to production goals and credit ceilings. It was for this reason that the Plan was never published in full. Beginning in 1947, it was decided to go ahead with a series of limited 4-year plans drawn from the “legal” Plan. The amount to be spent on these plans is estimated at 200 billion francs. Fifty-five percent of this amount is to be supplied by metropolitan France, the remainder by the overseas territories. It is planned to devote 104 billion francs from this total to public investment, 44 billion to production and 40 billion to the social program. Investments by private capital will probably amount to an additional 20 to 25 billion francs. Progress is being made under the plan in the following fields: 1. Scientific Research , which is being carried out entirely at the expense of the central Government. 2. Basic Utilities . No new railroads have been constructed, but the existing ones have been re-equipped. The principal ports have been improved and re-equipped. Most important, a vast road program is now being carried out using modern machinery and methods. 3. Social Program . Education is being stressed with emphasis on technical instruction in order to create a supply of locally-trained skilled workers. 4. Production . The Government is attempting to promote production in every way but at the same time to leave complete liberty of action to private enterprise in this field. Several public work programs aimed at promoting increased production, such as the Niger dam, have been carried through to completion. A mining bureau has been set up not only to engage in prospection of minerals but, in association, with private enterprise, to exploit mineral deposits as well. As a result of the disruption of the money market immediately after the war, and the consequent inability of some companies to obtain private financing, the Government, to encourage industrial development, had joined with a number of private concerns to form “mixed enterprises” financed by both private and public capital. Examples of such mixed companies in West Africa are a textile concern and an edible-oil company. Mr. Torre concluded his exposition by saying that ECA aid had been of enormous assistance in carrying out the Plan, since counterpart funds applied in metropolitan France had enabled the Government to allocate more of its general funds to African development than would have otherwise been possible. The amount of direct ECA aid to Black Africa was estimated to be in the neighborhood of 17 billion francs. In connection with the last point, Mr. Vorss pointed out that the question of finances in general was much more important than that of dollar exchange, insofar as the Plan was concerned, and said that the French would like to raise the question of the utilization of ECA unallocated funds for purchases outside of the United States. Mr. McGhee asked whether the standard of living of the natives had been raised as a result of the operation of the Plan. Mr. Torre replied that it was still too early to make a positive statement on this matter. Mr. Vorss introduced the subject of American investments in French overseas territories by saying that there seemed to be considerable misunderstanding on both sides, for while there was a widespread conviction in the United States that enormous difficulties were placed in the way of such investment, French public opinion had become somewhat apprehensive over an imaginary “invasion” of French territories by American capital. Mr. Clermont-Tonnerre then gave the following resumé of the situation with respect to foreign investment in the territories under consideration: 1. The French Government, in principle, authorizes and guarantees the transfer abroad of the profits of foreign investments, and since September 1949 has permitted the repatriation of the total amount of the investment at any time. 2. In some rare instances, the French have refused to permit the transfer of profits of foreign investments but only in the cases where enterprises of doubtful economic value to the territories concerned were making enormous profits with a very small initial investment. 3. In spite of these favorable conditions, relatively little American capital has been invested in French overseas territories. The reasons behind this situation are probably the following: ( a ) the more liberal laws are of a recent date and are not widely known; ( b ) the territories themselves are not well known, have not been thoroughly prospected and hence present a large element of risk for potential investors, and ( c ) the American capitalist, unlike his European counterpart, has possibilities for superior investments in his own country which would entail less risk than investments in French overseas territories. Mr. Bourgerie asked whether foreign capital could enter French overseas territories on the same basis as French capital. Mr. Clermont-Tonnerre replied that this was so in all fields except mining enterprises, in the case of which the law required that the majority of the stock be held by French nationals. Mr. Bourgerie then brought up the question of the American petroleum companies with storage facilities at Conakry and Douala and pointed out that the French were insisting that these facilities, as well, have majority French control. Mr. Torre stated that this was a special case. The market possibilities of the territories in question were so limited that the construction of additional petroleum storage facilities would not make economic sense. The result was thus a de facto monopoly controlled by foreign companies. Mr. Bourgerie replied that incidents of this sort, nonetheless, were not conducive to encouraging American investments in French West Africa. Mr. McGhee suggested that the question of the American petroleum companies operations in French West Africa be discussed by the Embassy and the Foreign Office at a later date. He added that he hoped all the present difficulties would be settled and that more American capital would find its way into French overseas territories. Mr. Bourgerie, in turn, called attention to the success and mutually beneficial results of American investments in Liberia and the Union of South Africa. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. McGhee expressed his appreciation for the full and frank discussion, and stated that he was impressed by the effort which the French Were making in their overseas territories. 1 The meeting recorded here was one of several held between Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and his party and French officials in Paris, September 25 and 26. Regarding these meetings, see the editorial note, p. 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] . The memorandum printed here was apparently drafted by Second Secretary Lloyd on September 25 in Paris and was completed and probably amended by Director Bourgerie in Washington on October 23. 2 John E. Utter, Second Secretary of the Embassy in France. 3 Lincoln Gordon, Director of Program Division, Office of the U.S. Special Representative in Europe under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948. 4 Regarding the meetings of the U.S., British, and French Foreign Ministers in London, May 11–13, and the preliminary tripartite meetings thereto in late April and early May, see the editorial note, p. 1541 [ Pg. 1541 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] . 5 Documentation on the so-called Stockholm Peace Appeal of May 1950 is scheduled for publication in volume iv . 6 Regarding the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara, see footnote 4, p. 1516 [ Pg. 1516 is part of Doc. 844 ] . Summary of Remarks by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to a Bureau, of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Staff Meeting, October 24, 1950 120.4371/11–150 [Document 858] Summary of Remarks by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to a Bureau, of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Staff Meeting, October 24, 1950 1 confidential [ Washington , October 25, 1950.] Summary by Mr. McGhee of Conclusions of Tangier Conference and Recent Visits to Paris and London 2 Mr. McGhee referred briefly to his talks with British officials in London, remarking that our cooperation with the UK in the Near East has always been good, and that we are now looking to the extension of such cooperation to Africa and South Asia. The talks, which covered a broad range of problems, went into considerable detail on the coordination of US–UK policies. Our main differences with the British rose in respect to Iran, in connection with the problems of sterling convertibility and ratification of the AIOC agreement. 3 Mr. McGhee discussed with the Foreign Office political policies with respect to South Asia, and discussed with the Commonwealth Relations Office the Commonwealth aid program and means by which our aid might fit in with the Commonwealth effort. The latter, which we consider a realistic program, provides an impetus for planning and a basis for coordination which has not hitherto existed in the South Asia area. The talks in Paris were less satisfactory, since the French gave the impression of being on the defensive throughout the talks. Discussions concerning Moroccan trade controls were unsatisfactory. Moreover, the French showed considerable lack of frankness in discussing North African problems, and indications of the possibility of any French liberality with respect to their North African territories were wholly unconvincing. Although we attempted to allay French fears concerning our intentions in North Africa, there appeared to be no meeting of minds whatsoever during these discussions. 4 The Tangier Conference, which extended over a period of six days, was attended by 60 representatives including Ambassador Lewis Clark, a representative of the Embassy at Cairo, and officials from ECA, the National Military Establishment, and the Departments of Agriculture, Labor and Commerce. Admiral Conolly, Commander-in-Chief of US Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, attended the meetings for one day. This was of considerable value to us since the security aspects of North Africa, as our most important interest therein, loomed large in the conference discussions. North Africa, that is, the area north of the Sahara, is of considerable strategic importance since it commands the southern approaches to Europe and the western approaches to the Near East. Its population of 60 million represents only about 3 percent of the world’s population. The conference concluded that nationalism is an important factor in North Africa but one which has been exploited by the Arab League and by intellectual opportunists. Despite these factors, it constitutes the real force of the future in this area. The conference considered North African problems against the background of military considerations, since it is probable that the area would play the same role in any future war as it played in the last war. Accordingly, special attention was given to local attitudes, which vary considerably depending upon the people concerned and the area in which they are located. The relatively few educated North Africans are nationalists. However, it is a moot question as to whether their aspirations are for the population at large or for reasons of personal opportunism. In this sense the area generally follows the pattern of other emergent areas. All these nationalist elements are strongly anti-French, and since our policies are frequently similar to those of the French because of our coinciding interests, they frequently oppose our policies as well. The French colon in North Africa represents a strongly conservative element, who lives an uneasy existence because of his position of dominance over the resentful Arab population. He rules by repression and is accorded full support by the French Government. The colon is, in fact, more conservative than the metropolitan government, since there is in the former case no socialist pressure to temper his attitude. The French ruling class on the whole approves of our policies, such as ECA, NAT, and MDAP, which have the effect of strengthening; the position of metropolitan France. The local Arab elements are accordingly resentful of these policies because they play into French hands and strengthen French control of the area. The conference observed no interest in the Palestine question. However, there was some interest in the Italian colonies. Our stand on the latter question has accorded us some measure of good will, and a large reservoir of good will towards the US exists as a result of the last war. However, this good will is receding since we have not helped the nationalists to achieve their aspirations. The conference considered the attitudes of the French and Spanish towards their territories. Both powers know that they have a “good property” and they are determined to hold on to it for the benefit of the metropole and for the sake of prestige considerations. Both powers will make no concessions in these territories unless forced to do so. The Tunisia reform program was forced upon the French by the situation in nearby Libya and by the strength of nationalist unity in Tunisia itself, although it is still uncertain whether the program will actually be carried out. The Spanish have virtually the same attitude towards their North African territories, although they are pursuing a course of friendship with the Arabs at present, largely in order to obtain the support of the Arab states in the UN. French and Spanish Morocco are governed by military men with a military mentality. General Juin 5 has stated that the Tunisian reforms are meaningless, and he considers his sole function in Morocco is to impose a military regime in that area. In the light of the present world situation, we are not constrained to upset the equilibrium which the French maintain. North Africa enjoys stability, even though such stability is obtained largely through repression. The strength of communism is negligible. We must have and we do have stability in this area against the possibility of military operations. If the Arab nationalist leaders were to attain power, it would inevitably create a situation of instability in this area which might last for years or decades, since there is little evidence that the nationalist leaders are less selfish than the French. Therefore, we cannot project any great advantage to the people of this area in the event that the Arab nationalists were to obtain power. Accordingly, we cannot adopt an independent policy with respect to North Africa, nor intervene between the French and the Arab peoples. While nationalist pressures might be relieved by granting some greater measure of self-government to the area, the situation in Indochina does not provide a hopeful precedent in this regard. This is no guarantee that the situation in North Africa would not get out of hand if increased self-government were given the Arabs. The present critical period is no time in which to experiment in this regard, or to press the French, because France is too important to us to risk the loss of their solidarity through irresponsible actions by the US with respect to North Africa, although we can and should urge the French to give ground where they can. The French should continue their reforms in Tunisia. If the French are sincere and the program is successful, such an approach could be used in time as an example for Morocco. Evolution in North Africa must start with economic, social and educational reforms, as a precedent to political reforms. To these ends, we can play a role through our Point IV and ECA leverage. We face many difficulties in North Africa, primarily because of the attitudes of the Arab League and the UN. We cannot continue to support the French openly if they do not show sincerity in respect to reform. We are not at all convinced, moreover, that the French will show greater wisdom in the future, particularly with respect to eventual assimilation of French North Africa into the French Union, and it is always possible that the situation in North Africa may blow up in time. It is our hope that it will not do so during this critical period in world affairs. The conference agreed that the UN could play a role in North Africa through technical assistance and stimulating economic development. Although communism presents no menace at the present time, communist elements are well organized for sabotage and similar activities in the event of war, and the population is susceptible to communism. This situation must be kept in mind, particularly with respect to the use of North Africa in the event of war. The communists have not deluded the nationalists, who in general oppose them. However, French repression does tend to push the nationalists toward the communists, and there is always a possibility that they might attempt to use the communists for their own purposes. The communist organization in North Africa derives its strength chiefly from European elements, mainly French, who have entrenched themselves in the area. The Italian colonies question was discussed by the conference, which recommended that we resist any French effort to set aside the UN Libyan resolution, and that we press with renewed vigor for a federation solution of the Eritrean problem. Our technical assistance program should be dedicated to aiding the population, but it is unlikely that the French will permit it to function in this fashion. The ECA program is for the benefit of France and, accordingly, is resented by the population. Although it is difficult to isolate ECA funds for the dependencies from the metropolitan programs, it would appear that ECA funds in the dependencies are administered as loans to the dependencies by the metropolitan governments ECA is looking into the possibility of achieving more direct benefits for the people themselves, perhaps by planning ECA programs on a project basis. The conference concluded that private investment opportunities for American interests were small. It also concluded that there was little opportunity for inter-area trading with North Africa. Discrimination against American trade and investment is common throughout the area. The French refused to make any concessions to American resortissants in Morocco, and stated that they intended to take the controversy to the International Court of Justice. If, as is expected, the matter does go to the ICJ, it is possible that some of our present capitulatory rights will be lost. In this area the USIE is handicapped because it is unable to go directly to the people. Accordingly its first priority target is French officials and citizens in the area; second, the nationalist elements; and third, the masses of the population. It was recognized that Libya must be propped up with military and economic support if it is to become a viable state. Most of our technical assistance funds for this area will be diverted to Libya, since it lacks the benefits of an ECA program. In conclusion, French North Africa and North Africa as a whole are anachronisms in the present period of history, since they are among the last areas in which imperialism of the old school is practiced, as a prestige instrument and for economic reasons. This factor dominates great power relations with respect to this area. There is little hope that the metropolitan powers in this area will voluntarily undertake reforms for the population at large. While the foregoing represents a pessimistic picture, there is one favorable factor, that of US strategic interests, since we are in position to utilize this area in time of war. 1 This summary was prepared by Mrs. Mary E. Hope of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. A brief memorandum attached to the source text indicates that NEA did not regard this “unpolished draft” as finished minutes and did not want it too widely circulated. 2 For the formal summary report on the Northern African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, October 2–7, see Assistant Secretary McGhee’s memorandum of November 6 to the Secretary of State, p. 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] . Regarding McGhee’s visits to London and Paris in September, see the editorial note, p. 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] . 3 For documentation on the U.S. attitude toward the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company agreement under reference here, see pp. 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] ff. 4 For additional documentation on U.S. policy with regard to French North Africa, see pp. 1737 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] ff. 5 Marshal of the Army Alphonse Juin, French Resident General in Morocco. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 120.4371/11–650 [Document 859] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] November 6, 1950. Subject: Summary of the Tangier Conference. The Northern African Diplomatic and Consular Conference which was held in Tangier, Morocco, October 2–7, 1950, under my direction, was attended by officials of our missions in Tangier, Paris, and Cairo, and by our consular officers from Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Eritrea, and French West Africa, as well as by representatives of ECA, the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Labor and Agriculture. The meeting concerned itself with problems confronting the United States in its political, economic, military, cultural, labor, and consular relations with the countries in Northern Africa coming within the scope of the Conference area. On October 5 we were honored by a visit from Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Commander in Chief of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. 2 The principal observations of the conferees are summarised below 3 : Political 1. Local Attitudes toward the United States and its Foreign Policy . There continues to be a reservoir of goodwill and respect toward the United States throughout Northern Africa among all elements of the population, Arab and French. There is disagreement, however, with specific points of U.S. policy, which naturally varies among the different elements of the population. There is impatience among the Arabs with our apparent reluctance to give concrete recognition to Nationalist aspirations, and our apparent willingness to side with France in order to buy temporary security against the Russian menace. Our prestige is probably higher in Libya than in any other part of the area, because of U.S. support of Libyan independence. There is uniform opposition to Soviet expansionism throughout the area, and an admiration for the vigor with which we have countered this threat in Korea and elsewhere. While the Arab Nationalist leaders have occasionally flirted with the Communists, they have done so not because of admiration for Communist tenets or as a reflection of ultimate solidarity with the Communists, but opportunistically to achieve their own aspirations. The French see in our encouragement of Libyan independence a vital threat to their hold on Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. North African Nationalists, on the other hand, view our Libyan stand as one of our few real contributions since the war to Arab aspirations in that area. Our Eritrean policy does not conjure up much interest pro or con in the rest of the Northern Africa area. The Atlantic Pact, ECA and MAP are welcomed by the French colonials and officials. The Arab Nationalists, however, regard the ECA programs as a means of strengthening the French position in North Africa. Little is known about the Pact and MAP in the remainder of the area. Articulate opinion in the area generally supports the UN’s collective security concepts, but there is a sharp divergence of opinion on the UN’s attitude toward dependent territories. The French are extremely sensitive to demands in the UN for further advances in dependent areas and to criticisms of their administration of dependent areas. They would resist any effort to have any aspect of the North African situation discussed in the UN. Arab Nationalist leaders on the other hand look to the UN as their hope for bringing their aspirations to world attention. 2. Appraisal of the Political Situation in French and Spanish North Africa . There has been little change in the attitude of the French and Spanish authorities in Morocco since 1946. They both tend to look upon these territories as properties from which they intend to take full advantage. The two Zones are rigidly ruled by military regimes. Similarly, the French Government has not altered appreciably its policy with respect to Algeria. The Spanish are not willing to relinquish their claim to an area larger than the one they now control in Morocco, and consider Tangier to be legitimately Spanish. Largely because of Spanish objections, it appears unlikely that a definitive regime can be established in Tangier for some time to come. Arab Nationalists could not at present threaten French control of North Africa by force, but agitation may develop unless steps are taken in all three areas under French administration to satisfy to a greater degree the Nationalist aspirations. To date, however, the French have shown little willingness to put into effect any reforms unless forced to do so. French Governing authorities are concerned over possible Arab League action with regard to North Africa. The situation in Tunisia differs from Morocco and Algeria because France seems to have a more flexible attitude toward native aspirations, and the Tunisian Nationalists seem more willing to compromise. There is hope for substantial improvement in the Tunisian political situation, but implementation of the present reform program must proceed apace if continued Nationalist cooperation is to be expected. At present the main obstacle to the Tunisian reform program is the opposition of the French Colons. Our middle-of-the-road policy between the French and Arab populations in Morocco and Algeria has endeared us to neither. U.S. intentions are suspect, partly because of public statements by U.S. officials regarding the advancement of dependent peoples. Our North Africa policy must take into account our interest in the progressive development of dependent peoples as well as our interest in maintaining France as a strong nation. However, it would be difficult for us to undertake to exercise a restraining influence on the North African Arabs and the Arab League unless France shows good faith in carrying out reform programs. Nationalism in Morocco and Algeria is considered by the French a greater danger than Communism. While Nationalists apparently avoid open collaboration with the Communists, continuation of repressive policies might drive them into the arms of the Communists. We have derived little benefit from our policy of non-recognition of the Spanish Zone of Morocco. The Conference made the following recommendations: (1) It is essential that stability be maintained in North Africa. Therefore, we should continue to support and strengthen France while endeavoring to persuade France to initiate and implement political reform programs. (2) We should avoid encouraging Nationalist demands for immediate independence. We should directly reassure France that we have no desire to see her weakened; that we recognize her predominant interest in North Africa; and that we look to French maintenance of political stability. (3) We should also endeavor to persuade France to realize that Nationalist forces at work in the world today make it essential that the political evolution of the North African people be progressively forward. (4) If it should appear that the French are not carrying out the Tunisian reform program in good faith, we should forcefully present to them our belief that this will have serious consequences. (5) We should endeavor to convince France that it should not continue to abet the lowering of U.S. prestige in North Africa. (6) We should determine what policy the U.S. should follow if the North African problem is raised in the UN. (7) We should endeavor to persuade the Franco regime to introduce more reforms in the Spanish Zone of Morocco. (8) We should reconsider our policy of non-recognition of the Spanish Zone. (9) Consideration should be given to amending the present Tangier regime by unanimous action of the Committee of Control. (10) The Departments of State and Defense should consider what position the U.S. should take on the question of defense of the International Zone of Tangier. 3. The Former Italian Colonies . Regarding Libya the Conference recommended that: (1) We should seek definite clarification of UK policy towards Libya as a whole. (2) We should encourage the U.K. and France to coordinate their activities more closely in bringing about an independent Libya. (3) We should bring our influence to bear in the fulfillment of the UN resolution on Libya. (4) We should consult with the U.K. and others to determine how financial assistance should be furnished to Libya. (5) We should support Italy’s desire to reestablish economic and commercial relations with Libya, but oppose any attempts to restore Italian political domination. (6) We should canvass possibilities of using ECA counterpart funds in Libya, and should urge the Point IV Administrator to view with leniency any requests in respect of Libya, reducing to the minimum the demand for local funds. Regarding Eritrea, we should press for a solution during the present General Assembly, and should press Italy to accept a compromise federation formula which would be acceptable to Ethiopia. Regarding Somaliland, we should associate ourselves with all UN efforts to ensure that the unsettled Ethiopian-Somaliland border does not become a cause of hostilities. 4 4. Communist Aims and Activities . The native populations in all of the Northern African areas are susceptible in varying degrees to Communism. Europeans have been largely responsible for introducing Communism in French North Africa, and are the active leaders in the movement there. Although by no means widespread Communism is fairly well entrenched in North Africa, active in French West Africa, but not as yet in the former Italian Colonies. The greatest immediate threats to security in these areas, more particularly in French North Africa, lie in the covert and overt powers of Communist elements now active there. While Communists are not openly aggressive in North and West Africa, probably because there is no advantage to be derived in light of inability to seize power, indications are that they are, nevertheless, actively organizing for the future, and would attempt to take advantage of any crisis to embarrass the French and their allies. Islam is not by any means an insurmountable barrier to Communism. The Conference recommended that where necessary local authorities should be urged to take more positive measures to counteract Communism; and more information on Communist activities in these areas should be obtained. 5. United Nations Activities Affecting North Africa . The Conference concluded that: (1) the many activities of the UN had already demonstrated the importance of its role in Northern Africa; (2) UN specialized agencies should extend their services to the area; (3) should the French North Africa question be raised in the UN, it would be difficult for us to oppose its consideration; (4) UN decisions providing for Libyan independence on January 1, 1952 and Somaliland in ten years were considered premature. The Conference recommended that: (1) we should continue to emphasize U.N. activities in North Africa in USIE programs; (2) we should consider increasing efforts inside and outside the UN to assist Libya economically; (3) we should renew our efforts to warn France of the difficulties which would arise if the North African question were placed before the UN. Economic 1. Point IV . The Point IV program may have long-run significance in French dependencies in Africa, but its immediate impact will probably be slight because of the small amount allocated to this huge area ($100,000); because of French suspicion toward the aims of the program and the substantial ECA aid now being received. On the other hand, Point IV will no doubt have immediate significance in Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia. It was recommended that: (1) in North Africa priority be given to US and UN technical assistance programs in Libya; (2) we should avoid the appearance of thrusting Point IV on any country, and particularly upon French Africa where considerable suspicion of the program exists; (3) in French territories the U.S. should follow a selective policy of approving projects which would be of primary benefit to the indigenous inhabitants of the area; (4) priority should be given to Point IV assistance to American schools in the area since they are the most effective and least costly way of reaching local people; and (5) high priority should be given to public health, aid for agricultural experimental farms, for the development of extension agricultural education and for the sending of native trainees to the United States. 2. E.C.A . ECA aid has made an important contribution to the economic progress of French North Africa during the past two years. Economic development programs for the area financed partly by ECA appear to have been well designed and administered. While ECA aid has been welcomed by the French and has aided in the economic recovery of North Africa, Nationalist leaders have resented it and claim that such aid has been carefully channeled by the Metropole to French interests and in the name of France rather than from the United States; that the indigenous inhabitants have received little direct benefit; and that such aid, made in the form of interest bearing loans from France to North Africa rather than grants, has been used as a means of further consolidating the French position in the area. The Conference recommended that: (1) ECA aid to the French areas in Africa be continued as presently authorized with increasing emphasis upon specific projects of basic economic or strategic importance rather than the financing of general import requirements from dollar areas; (2) more intensive efforts be made through USIE and other available channels to widen local understanding among both Arabs and Europeans of the purposes and benefits of ECA assistance; (3) subject to general policy considerations, ECA explore with France the possibility of ( a ) clearly identifying the component of counterpart funds in public investment in French Africa, and ( b ) having counterpart advances made to territorial governments on a grant basis. 3. Private Investments in North Africa . The great need for capital for the economic development of North Africa was recognized, but the consensus of opinion was that it was unlikely that any significant amounts of US private investment would be attracted to the area until more basic economic development had taken place in the fields of transportation, communications, agriculture and electric power. In French North and West Africa other factors, such as the generally unfavorable attitude of France toward foreign investments, existing patterns of trade in those territories and monopolistic and other artificial arrangements which restrict the field within which US investors may operate also hamper investment opportunities for private US investors. In Libya, Eritrea and in Tangier, there are, at the present time, fewer restrictions on US investment capital but there are by the same token fewer investment opportunities. 4. Trade Discrimination in North Africa Against US Exports . Rigorous controls against US trade exist in Northern Africa, and the import and exchange controls in these dependent territories appear to be more rigorously applied against US trade than in the Metropole. The improvement in the reserve positions of France and the UK might warrant a review of US acquiescence in the discriminatory controls of North African and other dependent areas. The Conference recommended that the Department and ECA examine, as conditions permit, the possibilities of progressive relaxation of import and exchange controls in the countries in the Conference areas; and also consider whether it would be desirable to urge France and the UK to refrain from the more rigid application of import and exchange control systems in their dependencies and protectorates than in the metropolitan area. U.S.I.E . Considerable time was devoted at the Conference to reviewing and analyzing the effectiveness of our present U.S.I.E. program in the area; and in studying ways and means by which the program could be improved and expanded in order that U.S.I.E. could more effectively promote US foreign policy objectives in North Africa. An appraisal of U.S.I.E. programs in the area indicated that V.O.A. and local radio programs were particularly effective; news and press programs are receiving fairly good distribution; educational and exchange programs are, with the exception of Libya, hampered by the lack of cooperation from administering authorities, economic restrictions and low educational levels; libraries are expanding and are widely used; and motion picture programs, while somewhat limited at present, are expected to be expanded. The Conference was of the opinion that U.S.I.E. activities in the area should be concentrated on the following target groups listed in the order of their importance: (1) local government officials; (2) political, Nationalist and labor leaders; (3) students, technicians, teachers and other professionals; (4) the literate portion of the general-public; and (5) the semi-literate and illiterate masses. Specific recommendations were made by the Conference on the policy to be followed by U.S.I.E. in North Africa, and on media to be used in effectively presenting the US point of view. Details of these recommendations are included in the Conference Report. Four sessions of four hours each were also devoted to a discussion of: (1) additional economic problems (other than those mentioned); (2) labor problems in North Africa; (3) administration; and (4) consular activities. As in the case of other items on the Conference agenda, definite conclusions and recommendations were reached for inclusion in the detailed report of the Conference which will soon be available for distribution. 1 This memorandum was drafted by Director of the Office of African Affairs Bourgerie and Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Kopper. The source text is initialled by Secretary of State Acheson. 2 The Northern African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, October 2–7, was one of 12 U.S. regional diplomatic and consular conferences held throughout the world during 1950. The West and East African Regional Conference had been held earlier at Lourenço Marques, February 27–March 2; see Assistant Secretary of State McGhee’s memorandum to the Secretary of State, April 12, p. 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] . Sixty officials attended the Tangier Conference. The names of the 26-member delegation of officials from Washington were included in a statement issued to the press by the Department of State on September 6 announcing the convening of the Conference (Department of State Bulletin , September 25, 1950, pp. 515–516). For an authoritative article describing the procedures involved in convening the 12 regional diplomatic and consular conferences of 1950 and including a photograph of the participants in the Tangier Conference, see The American Foreign Service Journal , January 1951, pp. 13–15. The 105-page formal report on the Tangier Conference, not printed, is included in file 120.270/10–750. For an additional account of the proceedings and results of the Tangier Conference, see also the Summary of Remarks by Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, October 25, p. 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] . 3 The summary that follows here is identical with pages 1 through 8 of the formal report on the Tangier Conference identified in footnote 2 above. 4 For additional documentation on the position of the United States regarding the disposition of the former Italian colonies in Africa, see pp. 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] ff. The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State 399.50 JO/11–2250 [Document 860] The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa ( Erhardt ) to the Secretary of State 1 unclassified No. 271 Pretoria , November 22, 1950. Subject: Report of United States Delegation of Observers to Central and Southern Africa Transport Conference, Johannesburg, Union of South Africa, October 25–November 16, 1950 Introduction A Central and Southern Africa Transport Conference was held at Johannesburg, Union of South Africa, October 25–November 16, 1950, and was attended by Government representatives of the four metropolitan powers with overseas territories in Africa south of the Sahara—Belgium, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom; the Union of South Africa and South West Africa; Administrations of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, East Africa High Commission (Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya), Belgian Congo, Mozambique; United Kingdom High Commission for the Protectorates of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland; and Madagascar. The United States and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were represented by observers. The Conference: 1. Failed to agree on the establishment of a permanent transport organization. However, the Conference, in referring this matter back to the Governments for further consideration, did forward a draft constitution, as well as designate February 28, 1951 as the final date for reaching agreement in principle on the establishment of a permanent organization. Should the Governments so agree, the Conference recommended that a further Conference be held on June 1, 1951 to complete and sign the draft constitution. 2. Adopted a highway numbering system and a highway classification system with maximum permissible load and traffic limits. 3. Adopted African standard railway gauge (42 inches) and made important recommendations on railway equipment, service, and interchange of equipment. 4. Examined in detail all present proposals for railway and port development in Africa north of the Union and south of the Sahara, but avoided decisions on conflicting proposals, and failed to make judgments on economic needs. 5. Endorsed international through-rates and recommended principles for establishing rates, but failed to examine existing tariffs and existing rate agreements. At the final Plenary Session on the night of November 16, the Conference adopted a statement by the Secretary-General as a public summary of the work performed. (See Document P/5, attached as Annex A 2 ). Background and Agenda The Conference was held at the invitation of the Government of the Union of South Africa, pursuant to a decision made at a Conference on Central African Transportation which had been convened at Lisbon in May, 1949 upon the initiative of the Government of Portugal. The Agenda for the Johannesburg meeting was fixed at the Lisbon session. Further preliminary discussion of the problems under consideration occurred at a Special Meeting on Transport Problems in Africa South of the Sahara, convened by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation at Paris in February, 1950. At both these preliminary meetings the United States was represented by observers. The Agenda of the Johannesburg Conference was printed in the Department of State Bulletin of July 4, 1949. In general, the objective of the Conference was to consider the sound and coordinated improvement and expansion of transport facilities as a basic factor in the general economic development of the vast and promising region south of the Sahara. To achieve this objective the Conference was to consider the establishment of a permanent inter-territorial organization. United States Delegation The United States Delegation of Observers was composed of the following persons: The Honorable John G. Erhardt, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Union of South Africa, Pretoria. Henry H. Kelly, Chief, Inland Transport Policy Staff, Department of State, Washington, D.C. Allan Hugh Smith, Director, Overseas Territories Division, OSR–ECA, Paris. George Clemens, Alternate Representative for ECA, Paris. Frank H. Whitehouse, Assistant Chief, Economics Division, Munition Board, Dept. of Defense, Washington, D.C. John A. Birch, Commercial Attaché to the Embassy of the United States of America, Pretoria. Miss Virginia M. Robinson, Attaché (Geographic) to the Embassy of the United States of America, Pretoria. Stephen J. Shuttack, (Secretary) Administrative Officer, American Consulate General, Johannesburg. The United States representatives took part in the deliberations of all of the eight Committees of the Conference except two (the Steering Committee, composed of the heads of the various participating Delegations, and the Final Act Drafting Committee). They based their work in the Committees upon detailed instructions which had been prepared at Washington during the months preceding the Conference, by the Department of State in consultation with the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense and other governmental agencies. [Here follow five pages in the source text headed “Organization of the Conference” and “Work of the Committees”. The full text of those sections together with some of the material already printed here were included in the version of the Report of the United States Delegation printed in the Department of State Bulletin , January 15, 1951, pages 110–112. The remainder of the despatch not printed here, comprising approximately three pages in the source text, was a comparison of Conference decisions with the instructions to the United States Delegation. Also omitted here are the eight annexes reporting in greater detail on the work of the various Conference committees.] Action Requested 1. Distribution of this report and its enclosures to all interested Government agencies, including The Office of the Special Representative, Paris, and to U.S. Diplomatic and ECA Missions in the countries and territories concerned with the Conference. 2. Publication of appropriate sections of this report in the Department of State Bulletin . John G. Erhardt 1 This despatch was prepared by Henry H. Kelly, Allan H. Smith, and John A. Birch (identified in the document printed here). 2 Not printed. The Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) to the American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General in Tangier (Plitt) 120.4371/12–1950 [Document 861] The Director of the Office of African Affairs ( Bourgerie ) to the American Diplomatic Agent and Consul General in Tangier ( Plitt ) confidential Washington , December 19, 1950. Dear Ed : We have been giving further thought to the recommendation contained in Section A(1) ( b ) of the Tangier Conference Report which stated that at the appropriate time we consider approaching the Spanish Government with an offer to recognize the Spanish Zone of Morocco de facto , but that we maintain our capitulatory and other existing treaty rights. 1 The Embassy at Madrid has informally asked the Department if we wish them to take any action on this matter. However, we have suggested that the Embassy take no action until we have given this matter further consideration. Since recognition of the Spanish Zone will immediately raise questions concerning United States treaty rights there, we are now inclined to think that we should defer approaching the Spanish Government on this matter until such time as our present dispute with the French over our treaty rights in Morocco has been settled by the International Court of Justice. Once our treaty position in Morocco has been defined by the Court, we would be in a better position to formulate the position which we should take on this point vis-à-vis the Spanish Protectorate. Spain would, undoubtedly, be unwilling to recognize our rights while they are in the process of definition by the Court. Further, in light of the repercussions resulting from the Sultan’s trip to Paris, 2 and the apparent upsurge in nationalist sentiment in Morocco, it would not appear to be opportune at this time to take any action which might further alienate Nationalist feeling toward the United States. Finally, because of the limited number of Americans in Spanish Morocco and the fact that there is but little commercial activity there now on the part of Americans, it would not appear to be urgent that we act on this matter at this time. In the event that our strategic interests in the area increase markedly, which does not now appear to be likely, we would, of course, have to reconsider our position. I know that you have some very specific views on this problem. I would, therefore, appreciate having your comments on the subject in the light of developments which have taken place since the Tangier Conference. Sincerely yours, E. H. Bourgerie 1 The formal report on the Northern African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, Morocco, October 2–7, is not printed, but for a summary report, see Assistant Secretary of State McGhee’s memorandum of November 6, to the Secretary of State, p. 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] . 2 The Sultan of Morocco, Sidi Mohammed ben-Youssef, paid an official visit to France in October and November 1950 (see despatch 1244, November 17, p. 1762 [ Pg. 1762 includes portions of Doc. 951 and Doc. 952 ] ). There were extensive negotiations during the visit regarding possible administrative reforms in Morocco, but no agreement was reached. The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State 399.50 JO/12–2250 [Document 862] The Ambassador in the Union of South Africa ( Erhardt ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 375 Pretoria , December 22, 1950. Subject: Central and Southern African Transport Conference Johannesburg, October 25–November 16, 1950 1 While the Conference reached agreement on certain technical matters, it failed in its main purpose which was to recommend the establishment of a permanent transport organization. This failure was due to the last minute refusal of the Portuguese Delegation to accept the establishment of such a permanent body, although they had earlier in the Conference, while disapproving of the idea, given no indication that they would take an adamant contrary stand. It is reliably reported that the Portuguese position was taken on the instructions of President Salazar and that the possibility of reversing its stand is remote. Traditional Portuguese preference for bilateral rather than multilateral agreements in international affairs and lack of technically qualified personnel except on the highest level are understood to have been prime factors in the Portuguese decision. The Belgians, seeing that the Portuguese were firm in their position, also supported this view. The French had no strong views on whether to support or reject a permanent organization, although the French Ambassador, who was head of his delegation, told me that they had some misgivings about the desirability of a permanent body as a conference was being held in the French Cameroons at the same time on transport matters and he thought that the Johannesburg Conference might come up with some recommendations which would overlap the decisions to be taken at the Cameroon Conference. When it was clear that the Portuguese would not support the permanent organization, the French did likewise. Accordingly, it is clear the Belgians and French will not exert themselves to influence the Portuguese to change their minds. The French Ambassador informed me orally recently that in his report to the Quai D’Orsay he had said that unless the Americans intervened strongly at Lisbon in a permanent organization the prospects were dim for Portuguese approval. An incident which might also have influenced the Portuguese in their stand was the information given them by Mr. Curtin, an ECA representative from Washington who was then passing through Johannesburg, to the effect that ECA would not finance the Pafuri route which the Portuguese ardently desired. Mr. Curtin took the position that Portuguese economy was sufficiently sound to enable them to finance the road without outside assistance. Mention must also be made of the early suspicion with which the other delegates viewed the delegation of United States observers. This is believed to have been due to two principal factors. The first was the fact that the United States had taken a leading part in the preliminary special meeting on transport problems in Africa South of the Sahara which was convened at Paris by the OEEC in February and March 1950. In the words of Mr. W. Marshall Clark, Secretary-General of the Johannesburg Conference, an ECA representative “lectured us as if we were in a classroom”. There was thus the fear that the United States would attempt to take a similar position at the Johannesburg meeting. The second factor was the assignment to the United States observers’ group, less than a week before the Conference opened, of a representative of the United States Department of Defense. The Department of External Affairs of the Union of South Africa immediately raised the question as to whether there was a concealed motive in this assignment, particularly in view of the agreement at the preceding Lisbon and Paris conferences that strategic or military matters would not be discussed in any way during the Johannesburg Conference. We gave assurances to the Department of External Affairs that there were no military implications in the presence of the Department of Defense observer. The subject was none the less brought before the Steering Committee (composed of the heads of the delegations) of the Conference and influenced the decision of that Committee to permit the American observers to speak in any meeting only with the specific approval of the Chairman. While this decision was not to our liking we decided, after discussions among ourselves and with other delegations, to accept the rule and do our best to carry out the Department’s instructions. As it turned out the situation was much easier than the first day had indicated. Members of the United States group attended the committee sessions freely and some of them spoke with every evidence of appreciation from the other delegates. Thus by the end of the Conference the position of the U.S. Delegation, somewhat ambiguous at the outset, was well and favorably established. If an agreement can be reached on a permanent organization by February 28, 1951, for which we are not too optimistic, the Conference may be considered to have been worth while. If no permanent organization is formed, the Conference may be considered to have failed to achieve its primary purpose. None the less the Conference did afford an opportunity for representatives of the area concerned to meet personally and have a full and frank discussion of many of their mutual problems. For detailed information concerning certain phases of the work of the several committees there is enclosed a memorandum 2 prepared by Mr. H. H. Kelly assisted by Mr. A. H. Smith of ECA/OSR and Mr. J. A. Birch of this Embassy. John G. Erhardt 1 For Ambassador Erhardt’s report on the conference under reference, see despatch 271, November 22, from Pretoria, p. 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] . 2 Not printed. Policy Statement Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 780.00/10–1750 [Document 863] Policy Statement Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs 1 secret [ Washington ,] December 29, 1950. Regional Policy Statement on Africa South of the Sahara 1. estimate of the situation General A. Today “Black” Africa is oriented toward the non-Communist world. Communism has made no real progress in the area, but continuation of this state of affairs cannot be taken for granted. French West Africa is the weakest spot. Conditions exist throughout “Black” Africa which would play into the hands of Communist agitators. The low standards of living of the natives, the attitude of white supremacy struck by some colonial officials and white settlers, and the disintegration of tribal authority are examples of these vulnerable areas. Nationalist Government policies have created serious tensions between natives, Asiatics, and whites in the Union of South Africa. These tensions could lead to passive resistance, violence or Communism and spread to other parts of the African continent. B. The rise of nationalism, particularly in British West Africa, has made collaboration between metropolitan governments and their African colonies more difficult by undermining the confidence of the former in the security of their position. The metropolitan powers are making efforts to cope with this desire for autonomy. The United Kingdom is committed to a colonial policy designed to grant eventual self-government to its colonies, preferably within the British Commonwealth. France follows a policy of assimilation as Frenchmen and strives for development within the French Union. Belgium proceeds systematically with measures which eventually will raise the native standard of living to a level which in turn will generate a desire for successful self-government. Portugal maintains strict control from Lisbon over Mozambique and Angola, and apparently entertains no thought of anything but colonial status for these territories in the foreseeable future. Spain’s colonies south of the Sahara are unimportant and this fact is reflected in a laissez-faire policy which concerns itself little with native welfare. C. The Colonial powers are sensitive to any interest which the United States shows in their African territories. This sensitiveness stems from pronouncements made by American officials, especially, in recent times, and by our representatives in the United Nations, to the effect that we support the goal of self-determination and self-rule of all people. The metropolitan powers need reassurances from the United States that we are not purposefully working to bring about a premature according of political independence to the peoples of Africa. The position taken by the United States in recent UN debates on their African trusteeships has exacerbated the feelings of the colonial powers to the extent that this has become a source of irritation in their relations with us. D. “Black” Africa is an important source of raw materials, particularly in time of war or even now when other sources in the Far East are diminishing. Manganese, cobalt, columbite, industrial diamonds, chrome ore, uranium, rubber, palm oil, asbestos, graphite, vanadium, mica, copper, tin, and many other materials of considerable importance to the United States are produced there. E. For the masses in “Black” Africa agriculture consists of a low type of subsistence farming which precludes a decent standard of living and ruins the land. Improved methods are needed on this lowest level to increase production per man and to conserve the soil. The native needs more technical assistance from governmental and private sources before his standard of living can be improved through money crops. Notwithstanding the plight of the native, African farm products, such as sisal, wool, coffee, cocoa, palm oil and palm kernels, already play an important part in our everyday life. Those products are important not only to the United States, but also to the economy of Western Europe. F. In many parts of the area inadequate transportation facilities and lack of skilled labor are factors which retard economic development. G. American and other foreign capital is also required to develop Africa. While the climate for the investment of American capital is favorable in some areas there are other parts of Africa where investors find barriers raised, such as (1) rigid exchange controls which preclude repatriation of dividends or of the original investment; (2) suspicion of American motives; and (3) the feeling that American businessmen seek to supplant European business interests. A shortage of risk capital in the United States has also been a contributing factor in hampering further investment in Africa. At present total U.S. investments in Africa South of the Sahara are estimated to be at least $250,000,000, most of which is invested in South Africa and Liberia. H. As has already been indicated, “Black” Africa is important for the supply of strategic materials that may have to be obtained there in the event of war or where other sources of supply are denied to us. These strategic materials must not only be made available to the United States but must be denied the enemy. Thus the strategic value of Africa is increasing. In the event of war, an air route across Central Africa to the Middle and Far East would become very important as an alternate for the North African route. In addition our Navy would no doubt require bases and/or ship repair and supply facilities at such ports as Dakar, Monrovia, Freetown, Cape Town, Durban and Kilindini, most of which were of considerable strategic importance during the last war. I. The gradual weakening of the economic ties of the European powers with their Far Eastern possessions and the need for rehabilitating their domestic economy has led these nations to look to the development of Africa as a means of strengthening their over-all economic and strategic position in the world. The United States supports this objective through ECA assistance and Point Four aid. However, in seeking to attain this objective there is a growing tendency for some European colonial powers to endeavor to monopolize colonial trade to the detriment of U.S. commercial interests. U.S. Attitudes Affecting Implementation of Our Objectives The American people interested in the future of Africa South of the Sahara have certain basic attitudes which influence United States policy: (1) A realization of the contributions made by the administering powers in the development of Africa. (2) A humanitarian interest on the part of religious and philanthropic groups in assisting in the religious and social advancement of the African people. (3) Faith in the concept that the dependent peoples of the world can be assisted in progress towards ultimate self-government or independence by setting an example of the practical application of technology and American ideals of democracy. (4) Belief that Africa has considerable resources, both existing and potential, which will be important to us in any future world conflict. (5) A realization of the strategic importance of Africa in any future war, and consequently of the necessity for maintaining the friendship of the government and the peoples of Africa. (6) Interest on the part of U.S. commercial enterprises in assisting in the development of Africa and in maintaining an “open door” for American trade and investment in the area. (7) Sympathy on the part of the American Negroes for the aspirations of the native peoples of Africa. (8) A strong desire to assume as few additional world responsibilities as possible. 2. area objectives in terms of american interests It is in the national interest of the United States to achieve the following objectives in Africa: (1) Social, political, and economic advancement of the people of Africa as rapidly as practicable to convince them that their individual and national aspirations can best be achieved through continued association with the free nations of the world. (2) Political and economic stability sufficient to resist domination by unfriendly movements or powers through subversion or aggression. (3) Development of mutual understanding and cooperation by the United States and the colonial powers on questions relating to colonial policy. (4) Maintenance of our strategic interests, including access to strategic raw materials. (5) Advancement of U.S. business interests, including the securing of nondiscriminatory treatment for U.S. nationals. 3. u.s. policies In the light of the foregoing objectives, U.S. policy towards Africa South of the Sahara should be: (1) To cooperate with the responsible governments in the political, economic and social advancement of the people of Africa at the maximum practicable rate. (2) To encourage, within the political context existing at the time, maximum tolerance and respect for the human rights and dignity of the African and Asiatic peoples in areas of white domination, and of white people in areas of black domination to the end that a harmonious pattern of coexistence between the races can be developed. (3) To promote understanding on the part of the non-colonial powers of U.S. objectives and policies in the colonial fields in Africa, as well as an understanding of the problems, responsibilities, and achievements of the colonial powers in Africa. (4) To take all possible steps, in cooperation with the governing powers, to prevent militant Communism from gaining ascendance or control in any part of Africa. (5) To lend our support, whenever appropriate, to the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies in Africa. (6) To maintain and seek adherence to our rights under the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye and the Trusteeship Agreements. (7) To seek the removal of import, exchange, and other controls not specifically approved by the United States, which act in restraint of normal trade; and to secure nondiscriminatory treatment for U.S. business interests in Africa. 4. general lines of action A. Political (1) The conversations held in Washington in July 1950 with representatives of the United Kingdom, France and Belgium demonstrated the benefits to be derived from an informal exchange of views on dependent area problems at the working level. The American Embassies at London, Paris and Brussels should indicate to the respective Governments that we regard favorably the calling of similar informal meetings in the future whenever there is a need to discuss dependent area problems of common interest. (2) Procedures should be established with the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium for consultation between the delegations of the respective Governments before each session of the Trusteeship Council, the Special Committee, and the General Assembly. (3) Informal efforts should be made to induce the anti-colonial powers outside the Soviet bloc to adopt a more temperate attitude in discussing dependent area problems, since continued misinformed criticism endangers the orderly development of these dependent areas. (4) As conditions warrant discussions should be held with the appropriate colonial authorities to ensure that security measures in the dependent area are adequate to prevent interruptions in the procurement by the United States and its allies of supplies of strategic materials in time of war or other emergency. The Consulates in these areas should be instructed to follow closely the situation and to keep the Department promptly and fully informed of conditions which may directly or indirectly affect the production and shipment of strategic materials from the dependent areas. (5) Make clear to officials of the Metropolitan Governments that as a corollary to our efforts in strengthening the countries of Western Europe we wish to cooperate with them in the orderly and progressive development of their African dependent territories and in maintaining the present political stability in those areas. Consular officers stationed in the dependent areas should also be instructed to take similar action with respect to the local colonial officials. (6) Make every effort to dispel whatever suspicion the Metropolitan Governments might have that our actions are designed to bring about indiscriminate self-government in the African dependent areas. (7) Encourage the Metropolitan Governments to collaborate with each other in solving problems of mutual concern in Africa. (8) Continue to encourage and support the administering authorities in their efforts to curb Communist and subversive activities. (9) Endeavor to bring about in the Department and other agencies of the Government a greater realization of the strategic and economic importance of the dependent areas of Africa to the United States. B. Economic (1) Instruct our offices in the area to be on the alert for violations of our treaty rights (St. Germain-en-Laye and the Trusteeship Agreements) and to make every effort locally to remove or minimize such violations. Unsuccessful efforts should be fully reported to the Department with a view to determining whether representations should be made to the appropriate Metropolitan Government. (2) Continue to seek the removal or liberalization of such policies and practices of the colonial governments which discriminate against American trade and investment, and to make representations in instances where they tend to seriously hamper our trade and investment in the African dependent areas. (3) Inform the appropriate authorities in both the Metropolitan countries and in the D.O.T.’s that restrictive economic and financial policies may give rise to unfavorable public reaction in the U.S., and that a more liberal policy would seem advisable if U.S. financial aid is to be continued. (4) A realistic appraisal should be made by the Department of Commerce of the possibilities for and obstacles to American investment in the dependent African territories. (5) Urge the colonial powers to liberalize their investment and exchange control policies in the African territories with a view to encouraging the flow of American investment capital to these areas to aid in their development. (6) The Department of Commerce should continue its efforts to expand the U.S. market for commodities in which the African dependent areas are actual or potential producers. (7) Continue to take all necessary steps, with the assistance ECA, to assure the continuance of the flow of strategic materials from the dependent areas to the U.S. (8) Cooperate with the ECA, within the limits of the Point IV–ECA Joint Agreement of September 20, 1950 2 concerning bilateral technical assistance during fiscal 1951, in developing technical assistance programs for the dependent areas so as to avoid overlapping or duplication of effort, and so as to coordinate such programs with the development plans of the areas in order that they may contribute to the attainment of the broad economic and social objectives of the Metropolitan Governments. (9) To do everything possible to insure the cordial reception of Point IV assistance in Africa South of the Sahara. (10) The Department should explore the possibility of having private American philanthrophic institutions (e.g., the Rockefeller, Carnegie and Ford Foundations) assume responsibility for supplying technical assistance to supplement U.S. Government development projects in Africa under the Point IV and ECA programs. C. Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) Intensify our overt intelligence activity in Africa South of the Sahara. (3) Consider assigning research attachés to certain of the African dependent territories to conduct special studies on nationalistic and other political movements, the role and importance of non-African minority groups, and on labor unions. (4) DRN should be requested to undertake a study of the character and effectiveness of colonial policies in Africa. D. Military None E. Informational and Cultural (1) Our information program should endeavor to reach the following groups (listed according to priority): a . The local administering authorities. b . The educated African elite. c . The illiterate and semi-literate Africans. (2) Endeavor to create in the minds of the officials and literate Africans a better understanding of American culture, techniques, viewpoints and policies. We should also provide both the administrative officials and the Africans with access to informational, educational, and technological facilities which can assist in the task of developing African countries. (3) Explain more fully our policies with regard to ECA and Point IV as they affect the development of dependent areas, as well as the relations of United States technical assistance to UN programs and objectives in non-self-governing areas. (4) Allay any suspicions the local authorities may have concerning the informational programs and convince them that our concern for the orderly social, political and economic progress of the peoples of Africa is consistent with our desire for the increased strength and stability of the metropolitan governments, and that any United States Government information program will be carried out only with the prior consultation of the responsible authorities. (5) Expose, wherever possible, the methods, practices and deceptive propaganda of Communism and describe both clearly and simply the truth about the Soviet-dominated areas of the world, and convince non-Communist fence-sitting elements that they should belong to and actively participate in the true democratic world community. (6) Correct misconceptions and misrepresentations regarding the United States, planted by Communists in their cold war of vilification of the United States and its so-called “imperialistic motives” regarding Africa. (7) Work in close cooperation with the local information services. We must, however, maintain our identity and freedom of action. (8) Explain the nature of United States economic and strategic interests, activities and policies in Africa and indicate ways and means by which these activities can operate to the mutual advantage of the United States, the various Metropolitan Governments, and the people of these African areas. (9) Whenever possible we should develop an educational and informational exchange program with Africa—by arranging for visits to the United States of officials, educators, businessmen, and technicians and by assisting American educators, technicians and specialists to go to Africa. (10) The information program should continue to utilize all the usual informational and cultural media, such as radio, press features, books, magazines, exchange of students and leaders, films and filmstrips, the emphasis varying in each area depending on the political climate. In general, however, films and radio are the best suited for reaching the mass of illiterate Africans while published material is most successful in influencing the two primary groups. (11) An effort should be made to institute an exchange of students program in the French, Belgian and Portuguese areas and to expand this program in British areas. F. Administrative (1) A more careful selection of consular officers to serve in Africa should be exercised than in the past. (2) Whenever possible a Principal Officer assigned to one of the dependent areas should spend a short period of time at the capital of the Metropolitan country, before proceeding to his post, to enable him to become acquainted with officials in the Colonial Office and with officers in our Embassy who are working on colonial problems. (3) A Principal Officer assigned to the French and Belgian areas should have a fluent knowledge of French. (4) Whenever practicable, a junior officer, after having served a tour of duty in a dependent area, should be assigned to the American Embassy located in the capital of the Metropolitan Government administering that dependent area. In similar manner, a junior officer having served in the Embassy at the capital of the Metropolitan Government should be assigned to a consular establishment in one of the dependent areas of that country. (5) Officers stationed in dependent areas in Africa should be encouraged to travel as much as possible within the territory under their jurisdiction. (6) Consular staffs in the dependent areas in Africa should be augmented in order to meet the increasing demands for information on political, economic and social developments by the Department and other Government agencies and by the US representatives in UN bodies considering problems relating to the dependent areas. 5. country lines of action—liberia 3 A. Political (1) Continue to render advice to the Liberian Government, upon request and voluntarily when deemed necessary, to assist it in building a sound democratic government. (2) Continue to offer guidance to the Liberian Government in its political relations with other states. In this connection, we should continue to make known to other powers, when necessary, our intention to intercede in Liberia’s behalf to protect her independence. (3) Endeavor to bring about in the Department and other agencies of the Government a greater realization of Liberia’s political, economic and strategic importance to the United States. B. Economic (1) Continue to offer our help to further Liberia’s economic development in a balanced and orderly manner. (2) Continue to work for the expansion of the activities of our Economic Mission in order that it can achieve the maximum results in the development of Liberia’s natural resources. (3) While we favor increased private investment and commercial activity in Liberia by Americans, we should strongly impress upon those connected with new ventures the desirability of concentrating on a relatively small number of projects which directly relate to the economic development of Liberia, and are within their capacity to finance and to carry forward to a successful conclusion. (4) Assist the Liberian Government, in whatever way possible, to build and maintain a sound fiscal structure. The assignment of American financial experts to counsel the Liberians from time to time should be regularly pursued. The training of Liberian fiscal officials in our financial institutions, such as the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve System, should also be encouraged. (5) Further the development of an effective national health service in Liberia by expanding our Public Health Mission to Liberia, a by making greater efforts to bring Liberian students to the United States for technical training in the field of Public Health. (6) Assist the Liberian Government in its efforts to improve the present poor state of education throughout Liberia. Increased numbers of American teachers at all levels of instruction should, if possible, be made available to Liberia. (7) Encourage and assist where possible additional numbers of Liberian students to come to the United States for training. (8) Emphasize to private American business operating in Liberia the importance of providing larger and better educational facilities for the children of their employees. Strong emphasis should be placed on the need for vocational schools at the sites of industrial operations. C. Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D. Military (1) Assist the Liberian Government in its efforts to correct the shocking condition of its present military force. Our interests in Roberts Field, the newly-constructed Monrovia Port, [and] Liberia’s raw rubber and high-grade iron ore are ample justifications for assisting Liberia to build an efficient military force for internal security. (2) In addition to providing Liberia with a small military training mission we should endeavor to secure for Liberia small quantities of military equipment on a grant basis; continue to maintain Roberts Field, presently financed by the Department of the Air Force; prevent any type of activity or construction within the Port of Monrovia which would hinder in any way the use of the Port for Naval purposes; and continue to work with Pan American Airways and the Department of the Air Force to reconstruct (macadamize) the road connecting Roberts Field with the Port of Monrovia. E. Informational and Cultural (1) Explain fully and clearly to the Liberians the nature of American cultural activities, and devise ways and means by which these activities can operate within the framework of Liberia’s independence to the mutual advantage of the Liberians and us. (2) Encourage and assist American private interests engaged in educational and scientific activities in coordinating and strengthening their programs for development of progressive leadership in Liberia. (3) Assist the Liberian Government in the screening and selection of Liberians for study and training in the United States. (4) Render assistance in selecting responsible and competent American professional personnel for general educational work in Liberia. (5) Investigate the feasibility of establishing a comparatively strong radio station in Monrovia, for the purpose of expanding our broadcasting activities in West, Central and East Africa. F. Administrative (1) Continue the new policy of making our staff in Monrovia truly representative of the American people, i.e., both Colored and White personnel. 5. country lines of action—british west, central and east africa A. Political B. Economic (1) Urge Southern Rhodesia to consider the early construction of a railroad to Lourenco Marques, thus providing an alternate route to the sea for the shipment of strategic minerals from Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia. C. Intelligence D. Military (1) In consultation with the Department of Defense give consideration to the assignment of a Military Liaison Officer for Intelligence to Accra, Gold Coast. E. Informational and Cultural F. Administrative (1) Consideration should be given to the assignment of more officers of the Negro race to Consulates in British West Africa in an effort to offset the widespread and growing African criticism of racial practices in the United States and to encourage greater confidence among Africans to discuss matters freely with our Consular officers. (2) NEA should reconsider its decision regarding the raising of the status of the Consulate at Accra to that of Consulate General. (3) A separate USIE office should be established at Salisbury to provide for more intensive USIE coverage of British Central Africa which is presently covered from Nairobi. 5. country lines of action—french west and equatorial africa A. Political B. Economic C. Intelligence D. Military (1) Continue our efforts to obtain the concurrence of the French authorities to the establishment of an Army liaison office at Dakar. E. Informational and Cultural F. Administrative (1) A consular establishment should be opened at Abidjan, Ivory Coast. (2) A Consulate General should be opened at Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa. 5. country lines of action—angola and mozambiq A. Political (1) Urge the Portuguese, whenever the opportunity arises, to adopt more progressive policies for the political, economic and social advancement of the native inhabitants. B. Economic (1) Assist in any way possible in the development of the harbor at Lobito, Angola and with the improvement of the railroad running from Lobito to the Katanga area of the Belgian Congo, thus providing for an alternative outlet for the strategically important minerals of the Congo and Northern Rhodesia. (2) Continue to stress to the Portuguese the advantages which would accrue to Portugal through an acceleration in the economic development of these colonies. C. Intelligence D. Military E. Informational and Cultural F. Administrative (1) A USIE clerk should be assigned to Luanda as soon as possible. 5. country lines of action—belgian congo and ruanda urundi A. Political (1) Urge the Belgians, whenever the opportunity arises, to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the native inhabitants with a view to advancing them along the road to self-government. B. Economic C. Intelligence D. Military E. Informational and Cultural F. Administrative (1) A Public Affairs Officer should be assigned to Leopoldville as soon as possible, to service the Congo, French Equatorial Africa and Angola. 1 Work began in April in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on the preparation of the following five regional policy statements: (1) Black Africa, (2) North Africa, (3) Israel and the Arab States, (4) Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and (5) India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Afghanistan. In the course of NEA Bureau meetings in April and May, a standardized outline for the five regional policy statements was agreed upon. At the recommendation of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee it was also agreed that the policy statements cover a 5-year period, that the drafting be done by desk officers with appropriate consultation with other appropriate Department officers, and that basic responsibility for the papers rest with office directors. An NEA Bureau paper of November reviewed the form and purposes of the regional policy statements. This November paper noted that the statements were drawn up with a 5-year period or program in mind and that they were designed primarily for the use of the Bureau and therefore embraced a minimum of explanatory detail and background data. The November paper also observed that the regional policy statements were not intended to make policy or to contravene normal clearance procedures but only to record already formulated policy in a comprehensive way. General planning for the policy statements envisaged periodic revision of the statements—as often as two or three months. (Binder entitled “NEA Regional Policy Statements 1950–1951”) The source text is the only version of this regional policy statement found in the files of the Department of State. There is evidence in these files that the first draft version of this statement was circulated in the NEA Bureau in October. Texts of other policy statements in this series are printed elsewhere in this volume. 2 For documentation on this agreement, see vol. i , pp. 846 ff. 3 For additional documentation on principal policies and problems in relations with Liberia, see pp. 1706 [ Pg. 1706 is part of Doc. 920 ] ff. The United States participation in discussions on disposition of the former Italian colonies in Africa The United States participation in discussions on disposition of the former Italian colonies in Africa 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. iv , pp. 526 – 613 . [864] Editorial Note Contents Editorial Note [Document 864] Editorial Note In early January 1950 Adrian Pelt, the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, established his headquarters in Tripoli. His task was to cooperate with the administering powers in Libya, the United Kingdom, and France, to initiate steps for the transfer of power to a duly constituted Libyan Government and to promote the attainment of Libyan independence no later than January 1, 1952. Mr. Pelt was assisted in these tasks by the 10-member United Nations Advisory Council for Libya, of which the United States was a member. On January 20, 1950, Lewis Clark, a Foreign Service Officer of the Class of Career Minister, was designated United States Representative on the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya. On January 19, 1950, the United Nations Trusteeship Council began sessions in New York, where one of its tasks was to consider a draft trusteeship agreement for Italian Somaliland to be negotiated with Italy by a subcommittee of the Trusteeship Council. The United States was a member of that subcommittee. The five-member United Nations Commission of Inquiry in Eritrea, of which the United States was not a member, met at Lake Success in early January to begin its work. A summary of the work of the United Nations during 1950 with respect to the former Italian colonies in Africa is in United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1950 (Department of State publication 4178, 1951), pages 83 ff. For a detailed account of the work of the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya and of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, see Adrian Pelt, Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970). Libya Libya [865] The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Secretary of State Tripoli, February 6, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AG/2–650: Telegram [866] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, February 9, 1950—6 p. m. 773.02/2–950: Telegram [867] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy Washington, February 11, 1950—2 p. m. 357.AG/2–1150: Telegram [868] The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State Rome, February 15, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AG/2–1550: Telegram [869] The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State Paris, February 20, 1950—noon. 357.AG/2–2050: Telegram [870] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State London, February 24, 1950—5 p. m. 773.00/2–2450: Telegram [871] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, March 16, 1950—7 p. m. 773.00/3–350: Telegram [872] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Principal Secretary to the United Nations Commissioner in Libya (Power) Benghazi, 26 March, 1950. 773.02/4–550 [873] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, April 6, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AG/4–650: Telegram [874] The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State Rome, April 15, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AG/4–1550: Telegram [875] The Secretary of State to the Consulate in Tripoli Washington, May 5, 1950—6 p. m. 357.AG/5–350: Telegram [876] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate in Tripoli Washington, May 9, 1950—6 p. m. 711.56373/5–950: Telegram [877] The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Acting Secretary of State Tripoli, May 19, 1950—7 p. m. 711.56373/5–1950: Telegram [878] The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Tripoli Washington, June 23, 1950—5 p. m. 357.AG/6–2350: Telegram [879] Editorial Note [880] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) [Washington,] September 28, 1950. 773.00/9–2850 [881] Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions in Connection With the Visit to London of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, September 19, 1950 [London, September 19, 1950?] 780.00/9–1850 [882] Editorial Note [883] The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Secretary of State Tripoli, November 1, 1950—3 p. m. 357.AG/11–150: Telegram [884] The First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Palmer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) London, November 15, 1950. 711.56373/11–1550 [885] The Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) to the First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Palmer) Washington, December 11, 1950. 711.56373/11–1550 The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Secretary of State 357.AG/2–650: Telegram [Document 865] The Consul General at Tripoli ( Lynch ) to the Secretary of State secret Tripoli , February 6, 1950—6 p. m. 24. Pelt has given me his impressions received on Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. He seems to have reached two conclusions: (1) federal union of three territories only realistic eventual solution of Libyan problem, and (2) date of January 1, 1952 utterly unrealistic for real independence. In spite of these (as I look at it) advances in thinking, Pelt’s approach to method which should be adopted by UK and France to implement UN resolution remains unchanged and, in fact, if anything more determined than before. He believes (as indicated my 10 January 20 1 ) that governments of UK and France should make no further moves toward local autonomy until people of Libya have discovered for themselves that unitary state quite impracticable. He considers that best approach to problem is creation of preparatory committee composed of representatives three territories to discuss how Libyan national assembly or constituent assembly should be assembled. This group, he feels, may come to realization of impracticability of so-called unitary state and decide that federal union with certain autonomy reserved to each of the three components only answer. I fear that such a group would arrive at no constructive conclusions and would not advance the situation in any way. I now think it would probably be better for people of Libya if UK and France could go ahead with putting into effect existing plans and I do not believe such action would necessarily prejudice eventual unity. I understand also that administrators here and in Cyrenaica and in Fezzan are prepared to carry through instructions along these lines unless instructed to contrary by FonOff and Quai d’Orsay. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, and I have received the impression from talking to Blackley 2 and Chambard, French ConGen, that British and French will defer proposed moves at least until Pelt visits London and Paris. In this connection Pelt yesterday presented note verbale to French FonOff through Chambard 3 protesting against French plan to appoint a Fezzanese “Chef du Territoire du Fezzan” and a council of sub-Fezzanese advisors with executive powers as contrary to letter and spirit of paragraph 10 of UN resolution. He recommends creation for time being of a Fezzanese consultative body which will have only advisory duties, the French Governor retaining all executive powers. There is obviously a basic disagreement between Pelt and British and French Governments as to methods to be used in implementing independence Libya. Pelt’s complete conviction of strength of his position from UN point of view is becoming increasingly evident. It seems to me that Deputy [ Department? ] must decide now which way to use our influence. If the Department believes that proposed British and French moves toward autonomy in three territories would bring on an open debate in GA of such a heated and acrimonious nature (a debate which would not help Libya and would certainly make task of administering territories much more difficult) as to be disadvantageous to our strategic position this area, I respectfully suggest advisability of attempting persuade British and French to delay drastic moves for six months in hope that Pelt’s plan works or that, in any event, moves could then be made without being in direct opposition to Pelt and thus to UN. Repeat London and Paris. Lynch 1 Not printed; in it Lynch reported the substance of his first conversation with Pelt in which the United Nations Commissioner indicated that he felt the British plans to establish an autonomous Tripoli at that time were a mistake. (773.02/1–2050) 2 Mr. T. R. Blackley, British Chief Administrator in Tripolitania. 3 Copies of the note verbale , presented to Chambard on February 4, and of a similar note verbale , presented to Blackley on January 27, were transmitted as enclosures to despatch 15 from Tripoli, February 16, not printed (357.AG/2–1650). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 773.02/2–950: Telegram [Document 866] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret us urgent Washington , February 9, 1950—6 p. m. 615. For London. 1. After giving consideration Pelt’s reactions Brit and Fr plans for Libya (Tripoli’s 24 Feb 6, 21 Feb 3, 17 Jan 26, 10 Jan 20 2 ), Dept officers on Feb 7 discussed matter informally with Tebbit Brit Emb who agreed transmit our views London. 3 Fol is summary conversation. 2. Dept somewhat concerned over gap between Pelt and Brit and Fr re plans for Libya. While we in no way wished give impression we were telling Brit and Fr how to run their show, thought they might be interested know how situation looked to us. View eventual day accounting to GA, it was in common interest more harmonious approach be made reconciling difference opinion between views FonOffs and those Pelt. 3. While Pelt’s reactions may well have stemmed in part from his initial surprise at advanced stage Fr and Brit plans developed without consultation with him, speed with which Brit and Fr wished implement plans no doubt made him feel being presented with fait accompli . Thus while we have every hope Pelt will finally come around accepting substantially Fr and Brit plans (on assumption, of course, they are and will continue to be within framework UNGA res), delay in implementing those plans wld give opportunity for Brit and Fr Fon Offs discuss plans with Pelt and perhaps reconcile divergencies before they hardened into intransigeance. Pelt will soon be in Paris (Feb 18–19) and London (19–24) and short delay wld not make any material difference implementation plans. It was hoped delay wld give Pelt opportunity associate himself more gracefully with and thereby give approval to Brit and Fr plans. Delay wld also permit local polit situation Tripolitania become clearer. We believe last pronouncement Cyrenaican Congress strengthens Brit plans and Tripolitanian support wld strengthen still further. 4. (Dept informed Feb 8 by Brit Emb that Bashir Saadawi 4 is in gen agreement Brit plans. Wishes they cld be speeded up although he recognizes there is difficulty in that plans will be characterized by opposition as Brit dictate.) 5. Dept had never lost sight common US–UK interests in area and these interests foremost in our thinking. Thus when Pelt returns US, Dept wld stress to him ( a ) US did not regard proposed Brit measures prejudicial goal of unity which we had always conceived as form of federation; ( b ) we considered Brit plans desirable first steps in mtg objectives UN res; ( c ) long delay in implementing Brit plans wld merely give Arabs opportunity temporize at expense positive program, and ( d ) that “the unity of Libya” implied federation to us, not a unitary form govt. For Paris. 6. On Feb 8 Dept officer spoke with Benard of Fr Emb 5 along lines of paras (2) and (3) who said he wld inform his govt. He was not informed on lines para (5) because Dept only has Fr plans for Fezzan as outlined briefly in Depts 237 to Rome of Jan 23 6 and has no further info on polit developments Fezzan. 7. Urtel 640 Feb 8 7 just recd. Difficult for us react affirmatively at this time to Fr desire for our support of Fr position Fezzan without clearer understanding Fr intentions and plans re carrying out UNGA res and Pelt’s views thereon. As you know Fr reticence to disclose views on this area has past several years been source difficulty. Fr abstention in UNGA and attitude of fon affairs comite of Natl Assembly (reurtel 5162 Dec 8 and 5241 Dec 14 8 ) make it extremely difficult for US to commit itself at this time. Any light which you can throw on this subj through further informal talks with Couve and La Tour du Pin 9 wld be most useful to Dept in determining its position. 8. Power USUN who will be principal Secy to Pelt effective Feb 13 suggests Utter 10 might call on Pelt while latter is in Paris to give Dept’s latest thinking paras 2–5, not paras 6, 7. Pelt will be at Hotel La Perouse. Dept concurs this suggestion. Acheson 1 Repeated to Paris, Rome, Cairo, and Tripoli. 2 Telegrams 21 and 17 are not printed; regarding telegram 10, see footnote 1, supra . 3 A record of this conversation is in file 773.02/2–750. 4 Tripolitanian political leader. 5 Jean Benard, First Secretary of the French Embassy. 6 Not printed; the plan called for the establishment of a chief of state in the Fezzan, a council of six, and a consultative assembly similar to the one in Algeria (773.02/1–2350). 7 Not printed; it reported that the French planned to make every effort to persuade Pelt to accept their plans for the Fezzan. (357.AG/2–850) 8 Neither printed. 9 Maurice Couve de Murville, Director General for Political Affairs, and Geoffrey La Tour du Pin Verclause, Office of African and Levant Affairs, French Foreign Office. 10 John E. Utter, Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy in Paris. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy 357.AG/2–1150: Telegram [Document 867] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy 1 secret Washington , February 11, 1950—2 p. m. 510. Requested Emb find suitable occasion contact Pelt UN Comm Libya while in Rome Feb 12–15, address Hotel Excelsior, and verbally inform him in confidence our thinking along following lines. “In order assist Comm reconcile his differences opinion on interpretation UNGA Res with Brit and Fr Fon Offs US has suggested to both govts that they consider a delay in implementation plans until he has opportunity discuss matter with them. US has every hope that such delay, if forthcoming will afford opportunity for Comm and admins authorities draw closer in their interpretation Res. Pronouncement Cyrenaican Congress and statement of Bashir Bey Sadawi (since Pelt’s departure Tripoli) that he is in general agreement Brit plans Tripolitania and wishes they could be speeded up, we believe, adds weight to Brit approach. If Comm puts himself into open opposition to partial transfer of powers to autonomous govts before issue of unity is settled, he might be subject to criticism from both local inhabitants and admins authorities on grounds unduly delaying formation governmental institutions required by para 10( b ) Res. “Res as to degree responsibility local admins and responsibility Comm not clear and provides grounds for differences of interpretation. As we view legislative history res, establishment autonomous institutions self-govt in three territories need not be prejudicial unity Libya nor contrary spirit para 10 Res. Unity to us, in terms understanding of members who developed Res in sub-cmttee, means a single state of Libya. Form of govt, whether unitary, federal, or confederal, is to be left to the peoples of Libya. From our knowledge of exigencies local situation, federation appears to be form unity which responds faithfully to purposes of Res. If this is so, powers which presently reside in local admins may be progressively transferred to native authorities in three territories inasmuch as all powers need not devolve upon one central govt. If unity in a form acceptable to local inhabitants is to be achieved, we can understand that the admins authorities feel it necessary take early preparatory steps giving inhabitants respective areas progressively greater governmental authority prior calling Natl Assembly. Such steps might provide for corps of constructive leadership on quasi-governmental plane as distinct from present political orientation around leading personalities and thereby facilitate subsequent work Comm. “This matter has been discussed with Brit, and on basis our common interests in area, which we indicated to Pelt on his informal trip to Wash, we have agreed to speak to him on his return to US on following line (here see para 5 of Deptel 615 London rptd Rome).” Emphasize Pelt that above views being offered purely in desire to be helpful to Comm in reaching harmonious adjustment his own views with those admins authorities. Also inform Pelt that US is contacting countries on Advisory Council and seeking their agreement to have permanent seat Geneva and that we are requesting Council convene Tripoli by March 21 if possible. Power agreed with us that early meeting Council desirable and that it would be appropriate US start action get permanent seat Geneva. In this respect you may inform him of details Deptel 504 to Rome. 2 Acheson 1 Repeated to Paris, London, Cairo, Geneva, and Tripoli. 2 Not printed; in it the Department of State informed Embassy Rome that the implementation of the Libyan resolution seemed to be moving less rapidly than desirable, and that the permanent headquarters of the Advisory Council should not be located in Libya. (357.AG/2–1050) The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State 357.AG/2–1550: Telegram [Document 868] The Ambassador in Italy ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State secret Rome , February 15, 1950—7 p. m. 627. Pursuant Deptel 510 February 11. 1. Officer Embassy met privately with Pelt last night and conveyed Department’s views and discussed at length general problem implementation UNGA resolution Libya. Pelt greatly appreciative Department’s intervention UK and French governments obtain postponement implementation their plans respective territories. Pelt feels strongly administration powers should not take any irrevocable action affecting or prejudicing rights inhabitants arrive at own decision on form future Libyan unity. While he is in agreement in general first phase British plan he feels Advisory Council and UN, in addition to local inhabitants; would most likely resent unilateral policy decision and action by administration authorities prior even to constitution of council. Commissioner in complete agreement Department’s position re federation as only practicable form future united Libyan state. However, he is convinced sentiment increasing all parts Libya in favor real unity and that people and leaders do not understand or appreciate political concept federation as being compatible with their ideas of unity. Pelt’s thought is that should administrating powers take unilateral action designed to, or even only incidentally promoting, local autonomy, or dis-unity, Libyans would greatly resent such action and we would find that nationalist sentiment favoring unitary form state would be increased and our desired goal of federation or confederation would be seriously set back. Pelt feels that if Libyans allowed full opportunity consult amongst selves and endeavor without outside pressure to work out unitary state, they will quickly find that their own regional differences preclude such form and can be reconciled only under federation. Embassy officer found Pelt entirely sympathetic to our basic objective of seeing established a workable form of government which would contribute to rather than jeopardize future peace and security area. However, he fears that inclination UK and French to take precipitous unilateral action may in end endanger achievement goal desired by all. In this respect he grateful our objective intervention and anxious work closely with us. [Here follows a discussion of the permanent seat of the Advisory Council and the projected activities of Egyptian and Pakistani representatives.] Repeated Paris 44 London 84 Cairo 1 pouched Tripoli. Dunn The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 357.AG/2–2050: Telegram [Document 869] The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , February 20, 1950—noon. 786. Pelt had several conversations with officials FonOff (Couve, Margerie 1 , Tour du Pin and Balay 2 ) on February 16, 17 and 18. He informed us that while the French appeared to be conciliatory and wished to accommodate their views as far as possible to his, they were in effect non-committal. Pelt sensed that underlying French position was determination to acquire for Ahmed Bey in Fezzan same status as Emir in Cyrenaica. When Pelt proposed formation administrative council with Ahmed Bey as head and other members assuming specific responsibilities without actually carrying titles of Ministers, he states that Margerie expressed belief that there appeared to be little difference of opinion. However, when Pelt asked that French give him written statement of their position, he was told that FonOff could not prepare and clear such paper on ministerial level in so short a time but that he would receive document in New York or possibly during his stay next week in London. The upshot of the talks here was that Massigli 3 has been instructed to continue discussions with Pelt in London. Pelt is of opinion that Massigli will be empowered to make concessions no more nor less than those made by British, and that his talks in London will assume a tricornered aspect. On morning February 18 Pelt had three-quarter hour talk with Minister Interior Queuille, and told us before leaving that he had received a bombshell. During conversation Minister who has final responsibility administration of Fezzan through Algerian Governor General remarked that recent election of Ahmed Bey by Fezzanese tribes was a virtual declaration of independence. Pelt stated that he immediately challenged this statement, and was convinced that Queuille was digging political trenches in expectation of onslaught by critics in National Assembly. Pelt said that one of minister’s assistants had reassured him aside, and later Tour du Pin categorically affirmed that Queuille was giving his own personal opinion which was not that of the French Government. Pelt told us that he had tried to have audience with Bidault but latter had already left for speaking engagement at St. Etienne. Briefly, Pelt left Paris without reaching any firm conclusions with French, but with assurances that Massigli would finish negotiations commenced in Paris, probably with the aid of text furnished by FonOff, and with liberty to make concessions consistent with those made by British. We hope have FonOff version discussions shortly. 4 Repeated London 251, Rome 57; Department pass Tripoli 12. Bruce 1 Roland Jacquin de Margerie, head of African and Levant Affairs, French Foreign Office. 2 Georges Balay, French Representative on the Advisory Council. 3 Rene Massigli, French Ambassador to the United Kingdom. 4 On February 23 Bruce reported that Tour du Pin had confirmed Pelt’s account of his conversations with the French. Telegram 869, from Paris, not printed (357.AG/2–2350). The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State 773.00/2–2450: Telegram [Document 870] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes ) to the Secretary of State secret London , February 24, 1950—5 p. m. 1061. 1. Pelt, who concluded London conversations yesterday and sails on Queen Mary today, informed us last evening talks with UK Foreign Office had been very satisfactory and that agreement had been reached on practically all important issues. Basis of understanding is that nothing British do by way setting up local government in territories prior convocation National Assembly will impinge on competence that body decide future form Libyan state. Pelt described problem as, on one hand, need for educating Libyans for self-rule, and, on other, importance of avoiding rigid situation affecting question of Libyan union. He appears fully satisfied that his own and UK points of view on this score have been reconciled. 2. Talks here with French Ambassador, however, were inconclusive because Quai d’Orsay has still not furnished promised statement of position on Fezzan. Pelt has received assurances of French desire cooperate in carrying out UN Resolution and has now been told French statement will be sent to Chauvel 1 in New York for talks there. Pelt says he appreciates importance of Fezzan as political issue in France and therefore difficulties faced by French Cabinet on subject. He feels confident of good-will of Quai d’Orsay, says he is glad for understanding with British not only for its own sake but for effect it likely to have on French. He gave Massigli yesterday afternoon gist of his agreement with Britain. 3. Conversation with Strang and other UK Foreign Office officials described as “informal talks”, since on British side are subject to ministerial consideration, while Pelt will want refer agreement to his advisory council. Within this framework, Pelt is now reassured that British program will be consistent with UN Resolution. Timetable for three phases British plans in Tripoli is such, Pelt informed, that third phase is not scheduled for quite some time and will allow ample opportunity for Preparatory Committee and National Assembly meet to debate future of Libya in accordance with UN Resolution. Furthermore, in implementation of first and second phases, Tripoli will be given no power or competence prejudicing formation of Libyan state. 4. On Cyrenaica, Pelt said he had wanted clarify British intentions in connection with transfer of powers to Emir and his own confusion over MacNeil’s 2 use of term “sovereignty” in General Assembly when discussing proposed transfer. Foreign Office officials have assured Pelt that this was slip of tongue and that there is no question of pretending pass on to Emir any sovereign powers in Cyrenaica (which Pelt points out British do not possess). Formula agreed on by Pelt and Foreign Office is that transfer of powers in Cyrenaica must be consistent with UN Resolution. 5. Foreign Office has also told Pelt it is prepared use terms “administrative council” to describe body envisaged under first phase UK program in Tripoli. This body, in Pelt’s words will “advise on matters of administrative nature affecting Tripoli.” Excluded from competence of council will be such questions as use of troops, matters of defense and anything which might prejudice future form of Libyan state. There was also agreement that council should have Libyan majority and that it should have one Italian member. 6. Point of difference still exists over chairmanship of council. Pelt’s feeling, in light of Dutch practice elsewhere (e.g. Surinam and Curacao), is that British administrator should not be chairman of council or member and that there should be Libyan chairman. Foreign Office intention is that British administrator should be chairman of council. Compromise agreed on is that Foreign Office will seek advice on this point from Blackley, who will consult local people for their views. 7. On second and third phases, Pelt described results of talks with Foreign Office as compromise on his part over former in return for assurances on latter. Assembly envisaged by UK in second phase will be termed “administrative chamber” and will be law making body for Tripoli. Pelt himself says that this will provide Libyans very useful education, especially since body will consider matters of considerable importance, such as budget. Pelt’s fears re effect on future of Libya alleviated in that such matters as defense, religious administration, and anything properly pertaining to Libyan National Assembly will be reserved subjects not falling within competence of Chamber. Pelt is satisfied with checks on authority of Chamber remaining in British hands. He advanced point mentioned by Clutton 3 earlier in week (Embtel 1025, February 22 4 ) that either legislative body or electoral rolls will provide means of designation Tripoli representatives to Preparatory Committee. 8. As for third phase providing further extension powers to local organs of government, any question of conflict with Pelt’s plans in convening Preparatory Committee and National Assembly avoided simply by British assurance to Pelt that UK has no intention effecting this phase for perhaps another year or more or, in other words, before there has been chance for Preparatory Committee and National Assembly to meet and decide future form of Libya. Pelt concern over earlier British talk of drawing up constitution for Tripoli is also relieved by assurance that this idea will not be pursued in any way to detriment of future Libya. There is further understanding that UK Government will for present make no announcement of third phase of program. 9. According Pelt, Foreign Office officials agreed with his idea that Preparatory Committee for discussing National Assembly should be composed of equal number of delegates from each of three territories so that thorny question of proportional representation could be avoided right from start. They also accepted his views that function this committee should be two-fold: (1) to agree on underlying issues affecting future form of Libyan state; (2) to determine methods and means for selection of representatives to National Assembly. 5 Repeated Paris 305, Rome 91, pouched Moscow; Department pass Tripoli unnumbered. Holmes 1 Jean Chauvel, French permanent representative at the United Nations Security Council. 2 Hector MacNeil, British Minister of State. 3 George L. Clutton, Head of the African Department, British Foreign Office. 4 Not printed; it transmitted an interim report on the talks between Pelt and the Foreign Office (357.AG/2–2250). 5 In telegram 1072, sent 6 p. m., February 24, Holmes reported that Clutton had confirmed this report on the talks with Pelt, stating that “by clearing up misunderstanding about proposed UK measures and yielding to Pelt on terminology and other minor points, Foreign Office succeeded in reaching practically complete agreement with UN commissioner (in Clutton’s words, without really budging an inch).” (773.00/2–2450) The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 773.00/3–350: Telegram [Document 871] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret niact Washington , March 16, 1950—7 p. m. 1197. I. In discussions with Dept and USUN officers during last week Pelt has expressed satisfaction with his negots with Brit and in particular with understanding with FonOff on next steps to be taken in constitutional development program. Emb will have noted that UK has now evidently informed Pelt of points raised urtel 1234 2 (Re USUN 247 March 14 rptd London USUN 9 3 ). As additional background info Brit Emb here informed Dept yesterday that FonOff instructed De Candole 4 March 10 to begin negots with Emir without delay to reach agreement referred to urtel 1234. II. Re timing plans for Cyrenaica—Dept concurs with Wright that there is no need proceed with such haste as apparently desired by Emir and that it is preferable for action to be taken after Pelt calls on FonOff and has returned to terr. III. Dept sees no objection to steps leading to Cyrenaican independence as outlined first para urtel 1234. Since treaty negots (step a .) apparently started we wld appreciate receiving info as to when step ( b ) re agreeing to draft treaty and Emir’s request for recognition independence by HMG likely occur. Our view, as Wright knows, is that in taking such an important step both HMG and Emir shld emphasize that this step is being taken as means of implementing GA res. We are confident this will be done and note in this regard that according to reftel Wright plans to inform Pelt that recognition of Cyrenaican independence will be subject to Emir’s acceptance HMG obligation under GA res to take measures insuring that Cyrenaica form part of United Libya by Jan 1, 1952. Brit Emb here has informed us that both HMG statement and agreement will state that recognition is granted pending the constitution of the State of Libya in accordance with the recommendation of UN. We have also noted that treaty wld include provisions for its continuation after formation of Libyan State if people of Libya so desired and we consider such provisions wld help to persuade Pelt to agree to proposed steps re Cyrenaica. IV. Re Pelt apprehensions about use of words “independence” or “autonomy” (re USUN 247 Rptd London USUN 9), Dept appreciates difficulty finding any synonymous words which wld have same meaning but not give rise to complications which Pelt apparently fears. We have informed Power that we consider it exceedingly difficult to find other suitable expressions. Accordingly, if UK and Cyrenaica feel it impossible to go through with plans without use of word “independence” we wld go along with concept of “independence” or “autonomy”. V. Re question recognition. We do not feel it necessary to take definite stand on this matter at this juncture but will keep under consideration as situation develops. VI. Dept is also in process of drafting suitable statement to be issued when plans re Cyrenaica take effect. We believe you shld point out quite frankly to Wright however that when taking these steps we believe that both UK and we shld bear in mind effect on Fezzan. VII. We were also pleased to note that HMG wld be prepared consider the possibility of extending defense commitment to cover Tripolitania. It is our impression that Pelt now understands strategic importance Libya to UK–US. This plus obvious fact that independent Libyan state wld have to make some such arrangements for its defense might help persuade Pelt of advisability of Brit proceeding with their plans for Cyrenaica. Webb 1 Repeated to Tripoli, New York, Paris, Rome, Cairo, and Karachi. 2 Not printed; it reported that on March 2 Holmes had talked with Assistant Under Secretary of State Michael Wright who showed him in confidence a proposal by the Emir of Cyrenaica involving ( a ) the immediate inception of treaty negotiations, ( b ) recognition of complete independence when the treaty was agreed in draft, and ( c ) announcement of the treaty and annulment of the territorial power proclamation (773.00/3–350). 3 Not printed; it reported that Pelt had been informed of the Emir’s proposal for a treaty (320/3–1450). 4 British representative in Cyrenaica. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Principal Secretary to the United Nations Commissioner in Libya (Power) 773.02/4–550 [Document 872] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Principal Secretary to the United Nations Commissioner in Libya ( Power ) 1 confidential personal Benghazi , 26 March, 1950. Memorandum of Conversation With the Emir of Cyrenaica at Benghazi, Libya, March 20 th , 1950 Participants: His Highness the Emir of Cyrenaica Mr. Pelt, United Nations Commissioner in Libya Mr. Power, Principal Secretary Mr. Mahmoud, Political Advisor Subject: Discussion of Libyan problems including views of governments members of Advisory Council; establishment of Preparatory Committee for National Assembly; proposed declaration of Cyrenaican independence Mr. Pelt called on His Highness at his palace at Lete by appointment for a conversation which lasted two and one-half hours. Mr. Pelt indicated at the outset that he would like to give His. Highness a report on his trip to the capitals of members of his Advisory Council since he had last been in Benghazi and also would like to be informed regarding the Cyrenaican nominee for a post on his Advisory Council. The Emir indicated that he would be pleased to hear an account of Mr. Pelt’s trip. Mr. Pelt’s Visit to European Capitals Mr. Pelt said that in Cairo he had been assured by Foreign Minister Mohamed Saleh El Dine Bey that the Egyptian Government would fully cooperate in the implementation of the Assembly resolution on Libya. The Egyptian Government was opposed to the formation of separate governments in Libya. It had been stated that the Egyptian Government had no designs on Libya and that there were no outstanding questions or differences between the Egyptian and Libyan peoples. Mr. Pelt had been assured of the Egyptian desire fully to support him in carrying out his tasks as Commissioner in Libya. In Rome, Mr. Pelt said, he had a long conversation with Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, as well as with Mr. Zoppi, Secretary-General of the Foreign Office. He had received a pledge that Italy had no colonial ambitions and had abandoned all thought of returning to its former African territories. He had been assured that it was the official policy of the Italian Government that its nationals resident in Libya should become Libyan citizens. However, Mr. Pelt had been waited upon by a number of delegations of former Italian colonists in Libya who indicated their strong desire to return to that territory. Mr. Pelt commented that a considerable number of such persons had no realization of the changed situation in Libya. He had told them that there was no possibility of their returning to Cyrenaica and advised them to abandon any such hope. The Emir intervened at this point to confirm that it was the policy of his Government that no Italians should return to Cyrenaica. He thanked Mr. Pelt for having expressed these views which were unanimously held by the Cyrenaican people. It was, he said, inconceivable that any Italians should be allowed to return to Libya. He commented that the Cyrenaican hatred of the Italians sprang from their policy of taking their lands, particularly from 1936. Mr. Pelt said he fully recognized and sympathized with the Cyrenaican views on this question. However, he was reporting this matter to the Emir to point out that outside the Italian Government, there still existed among some groups the same colonial mentality and ambitions for a North African empire. This was not shared by the Italian Government. In Paris, Mr. Pelt reported, he had found some differences of opinion between himself and the French Government which had proposed a scheme for a transfer of broad powers of administration to a Fezzanese Government. However, Mr. Pelt had maintained strongly that those proposals would transfer too much political power, with the result that the unity of Libya would be jeopardized. He was glad to be able to inform the Emir that, following his representations, the French Government had altered its plans substantially so that the functions of the newly-chosen Chief of Territory, Bey Ahmed Seif Al Nasr, and his advisers, would be limited to gradually learning the administrative problems and techniques which would be needed in the Fezzan as part of a future united Libya. Mr. Pelt also reported that he had found differences between himself and the Government of the United Kingdom over the latter’s proposal to substantially increase the amount of self-government in their Libyan territories. Mr. Pelt had urged that the emphasis in the British plans should be on increasing Libyan participation in administration rather than on the transfer of political authority and powers. Mr. Pelt recapitulated the British proposal for Tripolitania under which an executive council would have been endowed with wide powers of self-government. The Emir intervened to observe that Tripolitania was now at the same stage at which Cyrenaica had been two years before when they had requested and received a substantial increase in self-government. Tripolitanian Administrative Council At this point the conversation turned to the establishment of the Administrative Council in Tripolitania, which the British were proposing to set up, modified along the lines suggested by Mr. Pelt, so that his functions would be confined to administrative matters. Mr. Pelt said that Beshir Saadawi felt very strongly that a Libyan should serve as Chairman of this Council and he also strongly opposed Italian representation on it. Mr. Pelt informed the Emir that while he sympathized with Beshir’s views on the Libyan Chairmanship of the Council, he believed that it would be most unwise to insist on excluding an Italian representative in view of the fact that the Council would be dealing with local matters in which the substantial Italian minority obviously had a clear interest. He observed that he was very certain that there would be criticism in the General Assembly if an Administrative Council were established in Tripolitania without Italian representation in view of the great importance attached to the principle that there should be no taxation without representation. Accordingly, he had advised Beshir Saadawi that his wisest tactics would be to offer to make a trade with the British authorities by which he would secure their agreement to a Libyan Chairman in return for accepting an Italian member on the Council. As part of this formula, the British members of the Council would not be entitled to a vote. He had informed Beshir Saadawi that it would be difficult to persuade the British to accept such a compromise, but he thought that if he pressed hard, he could probably succeed. Preparatory Committee for the Libyan National Assembly Mr. Pelt said he wanted to secure the Emir’s advice on a suggestion for a Preparatory Committee for the Libyan National Assembly. He had made this suggestion to the French and British governments and to Beshir Saadawi, who had authorized Mr. Pelt to inform the Emir that he approved. The Preparatory Committee might consist of an equal number of representatives from each of the three territories. The Committee should not include any foreigners, but consist entirely of Libyans since it would be dealing with Libyan problems. Mr. Pelt suggested that the Committee members might be selected through a process of indirect election in each of the territories. For example, in Tripolitania, the five members might be elected by the Administrative Chamber which it was expected would be elected in late June. In The Fezzan, the five members might be chosen by the same council of notables which had selected Seif Al Nasr as Chief of the territory and had later chosen the Fezzanese representative on the Commissioner’s Advisory Council. Mr. Pelt would suggest that it would be possible to have the five Cyrenaican members chosen by the Cyrenaican Assembly which, he understood, would be elected late this Spring. The Emir inquired whether Mr. Pelt envisaged that the members of the Preparatory Committee would be chosen from among the members of the Cyrenaican Assembly, or outside of that body. Mr. Pelt said that he thought they could be chosen from either and that this was a matter to be decided by the Cyrenaicans themselves. The Emir commented that there would be an election in Cyrenaica in late April or early May. Mr. Pelt said that he hoped the Preparatory Committee would begin its work in July. The Emir said that he saw no objection to the Preparatory Committee and that it seemed to him to be the shortest way to reach the desired goal of establishing a Libyan state. Therefore, he approved Mr. Pelt’s suggestion. Mr. Pelt’s Visit to Washington Returning to an account of his recent trip, Mr. Pelt said that after his return to Lake Success, he had also visited Washington, where he had been assured by the Department of State that they fully supported the resolution of the General Assembly and would support him in his efforts to implement it. He reported that he had discussed with the State Department the possibility of aid to Libya under the Point Four Program, a matter which he had also discussed with the FAO and at United Nations Headquarters in relation to the Technical Assistance Program. He said that he was most hopeful that technical aid and assistance would be furnished to Libya by the United States as well as by the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. The Emir intervened to express his sincere thanks to Mr. Pelt for raising this question since Libya was in great need of technical assistance. He was most appreciative that the United States looked with favour upon the Libyan needs. Mr. Pelt informed the Emir that just before his departure from Lake Success he had received a memorandum from the British Delegation stating that in response to a request from the Emir, His Majesty’s Government proposed to recognize the independence of Cyrenaica and to negotiate an agreement to that end and regarding future British relations with Cyrenaica. Mr. Pelt said that he had expressed his concern to the Foreign Office in London that such action would violate the provisions and intentions of the Assembly’s resolution. However, he was not certain just what was meant by this note and he had to say frankly that he had received no satisfaction on this point during his talk in London. He had informed the Foreign Office that it seemed to him that they were trying to put a square peg into a round hole. It appeared to him that to establish Cyrenaica as an independent state would endanger the establishment of an independent, united Libya; Consequently, there would certainly be severe criticism of the United Kingdom expressed in the General Assembly, and this criticism might go so far as to lead to a re-opening of the whole question of Libya. This might raise the possibility of a revival of an agreement along the lines of the Bevin–Sforza agreement which would give the Italians a predominant place in Tripolitania. The Emir appeared quite disturbed at this suggestion. 2 Mr. Pelt explained that certain members of the Assembly might very well feel that since a declaration of independence and agreement by Cyrenaica made implementation of the resolution impossible, a solution should be worked out which would give the Italians a privileged position in Tripolitania to balance the special British position in Cyrenaica and the probably comparable position which the French would establish in the Fezzan. He particularly referred to the Latin-American and the Arab states as likely to demand a re-opening of the whole question in the General Assembly. Mr. Pelt pointed out that such an action by Cyrenaica also raised the possibility that the Assembly, concluding that the United Kingdom and Cyrenaica had prevented the implementation of the Assembly resolution, would decide that no United Nations technical assistance funds could be made available to Cyrenaica. Mr. Pelt pointed out that the resolution provided that Libya should become a Member of the United Nations. It was quite clear that the intention was that one Libyan State should be admitted to the United Nations and that the Assembly had not intended that one part of the territory should become independent in advance of the other parts. In sum, Mr. Pelt believed that the contemplated action by Cyrenaica might jeopardize Cyrenaica’s international position. Mr. Pelt would advise the Emir and the British Government that they should wait at least until the Preparatory Committee had decided the form of the future Libyan State. He did not think that earlier action was in the self-interest of the United Kingdom or Cyrenaica. He reiterated that there was the danger that the French would take parallel action in The Fezzan and that as a result, there would then be a move to establish an independent Tripolitania or to give the Italians a predominant position there. The Emir, in reply, said that he wished to rid himself of the reserved powers which were still in the hands of the British Administration even after the declaration of Cyrenaican independence on 1 June 1949. He said that any agreement would provide that it would terminate by 31 December 1951. Mr. Pelt pointed out that if and when a Constitution for Libya was put into effect, the reserved powers would end automatically. He believed that while there had been no objection raised to the advanced state of Cyrenaican self-government when the Assembly approved the Libyan resolution, the members of the Assembly would not consider that they had therefore agreed to an extension of such self-government. He felt certain that the Assembly would feel that the resolution was inconsistent with the extension of powers of government to Cyrenaica which had been previously contemplated. In fact, the passage of the resolution created a new situation to which an adjustment had to be made. Mr. Pelt urged that by pushing for a lifting of the reserved powers, the Emir would run a greater danger than if he bided his time for approximately six months to a year, at which time, through the orderly process of drafting a Libyan Constitution and moving towards independence, the reserved powers would automatically come to an end. The Emir commented that Mr. Pelt’s suggestion meant that Cyrenaica would have to be burdened with the reserved powers for another six months or a year. Mr. Pelt agreed that this was a trying situation, but he thought it was necessary to choose between greater and lesser evils. He thought the lesser evil was to continue the reserved powers for a little while, until the form of the Libyan State was decided upon, rather than to run the risk of compromising the whole situation. He said that he feared for the future of Libya if the contemplated action were taken. He emphasized that he himself wanted Libya to achieve independence at the earliest possible date. He feared that a re-opening of the question, which would probably result from such action in respect to Cyrenaican independence, would jeopardize the attainment of Libyan independence. The Emir stated that at the time the British Government had proposed to him the establishment of a Council to increase the amount of self-government under the direction of the Cyrenaicans, he had replied that he was not satisfied with such a plan, but wanted to bring an end to the reserved powers. He stated that there was a draft agreement which was being discussed with the British Government and he requested Mr. Pelt to ask the United Kingdom for a copy of that agreement in order that he could see whether or not it were harmful and prejudicial to the Assembly resolution. Mr. Pelt inquired whether the agreement had already been signed. The Emir replied that it had not been signed, but was simply a draft which was under study. Mr. Pelt said that he would like to suggest to the Emir that he not sign such an agreement because he was certain it would be embarrassing for the United Kingdom, for the future Libyan State, and for Cyrenaica. The Emir commented that it was not an easy matter to sign a treaty. Such a step required serious study and the taking of much advice. He believed that the provisions of the draft treaty did not conflict with the provisions of the United Nations resolution since it stated that all action was taken without prejudice to the terms of the resolution and the agreement would be valid only until 31 December 1951. He said that if Mr. Pelt would read the treaty and find that it was not in conflict with the United Nations resolution, the Emir would be most happy because he would like to be rid of the reserved powers before 1951. He thought that it was too long to wait until that time, if nothing in the treaty conflicted with the United Nations resolution. He reiterated that the primary condition of the treaty was that it would not do harm to the United Nations resolution. Mr. Pelt observed that he did not believe that it would be sufficient to have a clause in such a treaty stating that it did not prejudice the Assembly resolution. It was more than a matter of interpretation, for the world would consider that a treaty providing for Cyrenaican independence went beyond the letter and spirit of the resolution. He hoped that the Emir would not sign the treaty until he had received Mr. Pelt’s advice which he would be able to render next month. The Emir said that he would ask Mr. Pelt to study the treaty to see if anything conflicted with the resolution and to advise the British authorities and himself on this point and to make suggestions concerning it. Mr. Pelt said that he would be very glad to make such a study and to advise bath the British and the Emir. He said that he would go to London to discuss this matter on 30 and 31 March and hoped to have an opportunity to study the treaty before that date. 1 The memorandum was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 52, from Tripoli, April 5, not printed (773.02/4–550). 2 In telegram 80, from Tripoli, March 29, not printed, Lynch commented on this paragraph of the memorandum, stating that he considered it unfortunate for Pelt to resurrect the Bevin–Sforza plan which the British had repeatedly declared “dead and buried”. He had told Pelt this on March 28 and the United Nations Commissioner seemed to realize the implications of this part of the conversation. (357.AG/3–2950) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 357.AG/4–650: Telegram [Document 873] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret priority Washington , April 6, 1950—6 p. m. 1554. Question proposed strategic agreements between US, UK, Fr and Libya raised Lidel 6 2 (rptd London 121 from Geneva) as outlined by Pelt para 3 urtel 1774 3 and para 6 H urtel 1783 4 shld be discussed with Fon Office. US desires make its arrangements for use strategic facilities directly with Libyan Govt, or perhaps with Brit if their defense agreement shld include Tripolitania. Pelt’s conception that US, UK and Fr defense arrangements wld form integral part Libyan constitutional arrangements which Natl Assembly wld draw up is in our view dangerous idea which we strongly hope FonOff will eliminate from any formal understanding with Pelt agreed to by UK. Dept has studied with interest various compromise formulae suggested by both FonOff and Pelt re Brit plans for Cyrenaica (urtel 1783) and which will be discussed by them in London Apr 7. Except for pt mentioned above para re strategic arrangements, US does not want express opinion on details any formula so far proposed. We hope, however, that Pelt will find it possible come some working agreement with FonOff at this time. Our only comment is that it probably premature to try agree now on nature final doc which wld emerge from deliberations Libyan Natl Assembly and negots with three powers as contemplated para 6 H urtel 1783 Apr 1 and we are particularly dubious about trying negot single treaty between Libyan state and US, UK and Fr. We agree with Pelt, however, that GA wld have no legal basis under GA res to discuss defense arrangements and consider this question shld be avoided altogether. Acheson 1 Repeated to Geneva, Paris, Rome, Cairo, and Tripoli. 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed; it reported that Pelt felt U.S., British, and French defense arrangements should form an integral part of the Libyan constitutional arrangements which the National Assembly would draw up (773.00/3–3150). 4 Not printed; it reported Pelt’s proposal for a constitutional arrangement embracing the following: recognition of Libyan independence, transfer of powers to the new Libyan state, settlement of defense arrangements, settlement of the Italian problem, and the assumption by Libya of international obligations. All these points would be embodied in a single instrument in the form of a treaty between Libya and the United States, United Kingdom, and France. (773.00/4–150) The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State 357.AG/4–1550: Telegram [Document 874] The Ambassador in Italy ( Dunn ) to the Secretary of State secret Rome , April 15, 1950—6 p. m. 1556. Lidel 16. [From Clark.] Ambassador Dunn took me 1 call on Sforza 2 and on Count Zoppi, Secretary General Foreign Office. As indicating appreciation and importance Italians attach my visit Borne was fact that initiative interview Sforza came from Foreign Office and fact of interview was immediately given press. Summing up in nutshell Italian position re Libya, Sforza said UK and Italians must learn to cooperate. He had stressed this to Bevin, 3 he said, who had agreed but had bemoaned fact that while he and Sforza looked forward, their respective functionaries insisted on looking backward. Sforza felt if all could look toward future, trying forget past, there might be hope in Libya. The Italians are there, he said, and must be allowed to stay and play their role in community or there will be disintegration authority and chaos providing fertile soil Soviet activity. Italy had lost her North African colonies, he said, and had no intention endeavor regain them. Italy hopes, however, to establish mutually profitable trade former colonies. Giving real evidence suspicion UK reluctant decrease its influence Libya but basing his reasoning on rather untenable ground, Sforza said he felt UK Government gave undue weight to opinions UK officials Libya who, accustomed austerity at home, were luxuriating in well-staffed, well-lardered palaces in Libya which they were reluctant to leave. Sforza obviously sought convince us Italians sole desire, at moment at least, is to trade with Libya and provide for existence and gradual normal increase in influence of Italian colony there. There was obvious, however, his fear that bureaucratic UK officialdom would prevent the cooperation between UK and Italy essential to that end. Zoppi, whom we saw later, covered much same ground but added that Balay, French representative Libya Council, expressed to him on recent visit Borne, French perturbation that we were proceeding too rapidly in Libya with effects on French North Africa which might prove disastrous. Repeated London 223, Paris 180, pouched Cairo, Karachi. [Clark.] Dunn 1 Ambassador Lewis Clark. 2 Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister. 3 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Consulate in Tripoli 357.AG/5–350: Telegram [Document 875] The Secretary of State to the Consulate in Tripoli 1 confidential Washington , May 5, 1950—6 p. m. 55. Delli 14. Evidence exists there appears to be misunderstanding and misinterpretation current US policy re Libya. Recent rather widespread and at times erroneous reports about UK plans re future Libya and speculations on US position have undoubtedly contributed this trend. It also appears Arab League and Egyptian polit pressure (urtel Lidel 25 and Tripoli’s tel 108) 2 being applied to influence certain members UN Council for Libya and some local polit leaders in such manner that if this continues US might find itself frequently in minority voting against what may be made appear as desires Libyan peoples. US has two main objectives in Libya: (1) In assoc with UK, to obtain right continue use US and UK mil facilities that area, and (2) to assist implementation Nov ’49 UNGA res which looks forward estab independent and sovereign Libya by Jan 1, 1952. In achieving these objectives US desires have so far as possible friendship, understanding and respect peoples inhabiting Libya, of Arab states interested in Libyan problem, and of other members UN. We do not wish have our true intentions, motivations or policy subj of suspicion. We recognize during next year and a half there will be many forms pressure in support various programs for estab of an independent Libya. We are willing consider all suggestions and proposals within framework GA res and our policy set forth above. Dept accordingly believes advisable you state US views constitutional development program Libya earliest suitable opportunity in Council mtg. Purpose explaining US position wld be dispel any suspicions Libyans, Arab states and others, assist Brit and Pelt in their plans and get work of Council going on moderate basis within its terms ref. Before making US policy statement in Council you shld discuss statement with Brit and Pelt and also, at your discretion, inform other members Council. Statement shld be along fol lines: 1. US Del in last session GA strongly supported res re Libya. That res is basis on which US intends proceed and US is confident it is basis on which all other parties concerned with estab independent Libyan state by Jan 1, 1952 desire proceed. Objectives stated in res and powers UN Commissioner and Council for Libya set forth in res are of great importance and shld be clearly understood so res can be properly implemented. 2. Major objective GA res is clearly that Libya shld be constituted an independent and sovereign State by Jan 1, 1952. It is equally clear GA had no intention specifying form govt to be estab in Libya and specifically left that very important matter to be determined by representatives of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan mtg and consulting together in a Natl Assembly. It is not for this Council or UN Commissioner, nor for administering powers, to determine form govt but for representatives of three terrs comprising Libya to work out. Of course, people in Libya shld be assisted in this task by administering powers and UN Commissioner. Task of Council is that of aiding and advising UN Commissioner in this regard. 3. Very important task of preparing country for independence, under para 10 of res, is given specifically to admin powers who are to do certain things set forth in that para in coop with UN Commissioner. Thus sub paras A and B of para 10 outline measures to be taken during interim period preceding independence Libya. On these matters Council can quite properly give advice to Commissioner but US believes fundamental responsibility rests with Commissioner. Commissioner in turn cannot act alone or directly since para 10 prescribes that admin Powers in coop with Commissioner are to take these steps. 4. Since question of establishing suitable program for constitutional development Libya raised (presumably by Pelt by time this statement is made) US views on this matter are as follows: a . Step shld be taken immed by admin Powers to estab maximum possible local governmental institutions managed by inhabitants in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. This is essential basis on which to build govt for Libya as whole. In case of Libya such local govts appear necessary in order to have democratic selection of representatives three terr who will serve in Preparatory Comite and, eventually, in Natl Assembly. Therefore US believes admin Powers shld continue process of setting up such local governmental institutions as rapidly as possible. This means elections shld be held without delay so preparatory comite can be formed to consider form of Libyan govt to be estab. b . Without wishing prejudge matter which shld be decided by people of Libya, US of opinion, after considerable study, that federal form of govt wld be best suited Libya. Due to rather formidable desert barriers separating Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, different mode of life and stage of development in each area, and traditional preference people in many areas for strong local govt it appears a federal structure wld be most reasonable and efficient form of govt for future Libyan state. We believe federal form govt will provide maximum local autonomy for three areas on one hand and on other, will permit effective central govt for those matters of national concern. Acheson 1 Repeated to London, Paris, Rome, Cairo, and Karachi. 2 Neither printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate in Tripoli 711.56373/5–950: Telegram [Document 876] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate in Tripoli top secret Washington , May 9, 1950—6 p. m. 57. Question of US retaining right to use Wheelus Field and related mil facilities after Libya becomes independent may be discussed by US–UK FonMins during current mtgs London. 1 Summary of position paper for Secy on this subj prepared in light comments by Joint Chiefs Staff fols: “The Brit Embassy informed Dept Apr 19 that Mr. Bevin is considering whether to discuss with Mr. Acheson question possible payment by US Govt to future state of Libya in respect facilities in Tripolitania used by US mil forces. This question of financial assistance for Libya was discussed informally with officers in Office of Secy of Defense and Air Force concerned with problem. The policy agreed to by Secy of State and Secy of Defense with regard to countries in NAT area is that US base rights in those countries shld not be negotiated on a quid pro quo basis in return for econ assistance from the US. Since US mutual defense treaty with Libya is unlikely situation is different from that in NAT area, but it wld probably be advisable to attempt to follow similar procedure in any negots this govt might have with Libyan Govt in regard to Wheelus Air Base and related facilities in Tripolitania. “If Mr. Bevin raises this question, it is recommended that we: “1. Agree with him on the desirability of the future Libyan state receiving some financial assistance to assist in its estab and functioning. “2. Express view that US and UK will undoubtedly be asked by Libyan Govt to provide financial assistance in return for use of mil facilities needed for our strategic requirements in eastern Medit. “3. Assure him that US officials wld be glad to discuss with Brit officials how such financial assistance might be provided for Libya. “4. Point out that US Govt does not desire to link US base rights in Libya directly with financial aid to Libya and therefore it wld not offer initially to negotiate for base rights with future state of Libya on a quid pro quo basis in return for US econ assistance. Therefore, US officials in talks with Brit officials, and eventually in any negots with Libyan Govt will make a distinction between arrangements for mil facilities and the supplying of financial assistance to Libya. However, every possible means shld be taken to obtain essential base rights as soon as possible and definitely prior to 1 January 1952.” Chief reasons for stand taken by Defense Dept and JCS as reflected in above are that: a ) Providing financial assistance directly for use Wheelus Field (such as paying exorbitant rent) wld set dangerous precedent which might affect US base rights in many other parts of world; and b ) US may want to retain use of such bases over much longer period than we might grant econ assistance to country where it is located (they cite as example US bomber bases in England which we will presumably want to use on long-term basis whereas ECA aid to UK will cease in 1952). Therefore US will have to try to maintain distinction between obtaining base rights in Libya and providing assistance to that country although there is full agreement in US Govt depts concerned that some form of econ assistance in fairly substantial amounts will probably have to be made available to Libya, particularly in next few years. You and Clark shld bear this in mind in discussing matter discreetly with Pelt since, if Dept understands his thinking correctly, he is willing go along with US and UK in obtaining strategic rights in Libya only in return for financial assistance on strict quid pro quo basis. You shld try to disabuse him of this idea, or at least to modify it. At same time you shld reassure him that US Govt fully recognizes need of Libya for financial aid and will do what it can to help provide some assistance. For purposes proposed discussions with UK and US Govt planning, Dept requests summary report on current economic situation and prospects for Libya, especially Tripolitania, with estimate amount assistance US might reasonably be expected to supply. Webb 1 For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom, May 11–13, at London, including materials on Libya, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Acting Secretary of State 711.56373/5–1950: Telegram [Document 877] The Consul General at Tripoli ( Lynch ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 top secret Tripoli , May 19, 1950—7 p. m. 127. In conformity with suggestion contained in Department’s top secret 57, May 9, I discussed matter of base rights during generalized conversation with Pelt yesterday. As result this conversation, think it possible there is misunderstanding of Pelt’s position in Department and possibly on part Mr. Bevin (Depcirtel May 16, 2 p. m. 2 ). I asked Pelt outline his general ideas as to how base rights might best be obtained. He suggested that upon establishment provisional government Libya, which he hoped to see set up by first month 1951, governments US–UK–France open separate negotiations with such provisional government for three draft treaties which would come into effect upon date of absolute independence. I then told Pelt that I believed there should be no connection between any economic aid or technical assistance US might extend to independent Libya and money we might be expected pay for base rights. Pelt replied that he heartily agreed with these views and stated categorically that he had never believed that payment for base rights should in any way be confused with general economic assistance to a new country. Pelt advanced view, however, that there should be some control over way money for base rights was spent. He felt that each of three proposed treaties should contain common or, at least, similar clause specifying that money for base rights should be used for education, public health, agriculture, et cetera, and that a neutral (UN) adviser be appointed who, while not exercising direct control, would, nevertheless, influence the Libyan Government to see that it was spent in proper manner. Pelt said that if this were done, it would assist him immeasurably when he had to defend the situation when challenged by Soviet or satellite delegates in GA. I said I had some doubts about this proposal, but that it was obviously worthy of serious study. Pelt emphasized strongly throughout conversation that any money aid for base rights should go to central Libyan Government and not to administration of any one of three territories. I hope I am correct in assuming that telegram under reference does not intend to convey that American policy vis-à-vis base rights in Tripolitania is to obtain them without financial remuneration on the basis of the long term benefits they will bring to territory. I am in complete accord with principle of keeping question of right to use Wheelus Field and other facilities, which must necessarily accompany it, entirely apart from general economic, technical or financial aid to the country. To link those problems together would, I fear, lay us open to perpetual blackmail on part any new state, which may evolve, and introduce source of constant friction, particularly on occasions when circumstances forced fluctuations in our direct financial aid. Nevertheless, it has always been my understanding that US Government was prepared to pay annual sum for base rights. I believe that this would be most satisfactory method of getting what we want. In conversations with ranking Air Force and MATS officers, including General Spry and Colonel Easley, commanding officer Wheelus Field, as well as with Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, I have received impression that they concur. This proposed payment is not to be confused with rent now paid by British administration for land they have requisitioned from individual landowners and for which we reimburse British. It would, in my opinion, be desirable for new independent government of Libya to acquire the necessary land, and itself recompense landowners, thus eliminating that particular aspect of problem. I trust payment of annual sum as recommended in an amount to be determined would not be considered in any way to “set dangerous precedent which might affect US base rights in many other parts of the world.” 3 Department pass London 32. Lynch 1 Secretary Acheson was still in London attending the fourth session of the NATO Council; for documentation on this session, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 2 Not printed; it reported, inter alia , that the British had already assured Pelt of their intention to make a financial contribution to Libya, since Pelt intended to make his cooperation in obtaining strategic facilities contingent on economic aid (700.00(S)/5–1650). 3 In telegram 131, from Tripoli, May 22, not printed, Clark reported that Pelt had told him much the same thing that he had told Lynch regarding Wheelus Field. Clark also indicated that he had discussed Wheelus Field with various Tripolitanian leaders who expressed not only a willingness but also the hope that the United States would retain the field. (357.AG/5–2250) In a subsequent conversation with the Emir on June 12, Clark mentioned the U.S. desire to remain at Wheelus Field. The Emir replied “without qualification” that he would “support and approve” any agreement negotiated with a provisional Libyan Government and approved by an independent Libyan Government which allowed the United States to remain at the field. Telegram 142, from Tripoli, June 12, not printed (357.AG/6–1250). The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Tripoli 357.AG/6–2350: Telegram [Document 878] The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Tripoli secret Washington , June 23, 1950—5 p. m. 71. Delli 20. I. ( a ) While situation in UN Council Libya with respect activities Pak and Egypt Reps regrettable and difficult for you, 1 Dept considers that if it is possible to obtain fair measure of agreement on methods for development of constitutional program at this stage, considerable progress will have been made. Since a major US objective in Libya is to retain use Wheelus Field after Libya becomes independent, our concern re methods used in implementation UNGA res to select members Prep Comite is that we not alienate feelings any important polit grouping Tripolitania or other areas so that we may have good relations with Arab leaders who are likely form new govt. If leaders Congress Party have succeeded, with Pak and Egypt assistance, in getting adopted procedure whereby their reps will be reps Tripolitania on Prep Comite without using elective machinery, Dept sees no great cause for alarm. Total lack experience in elective processes plus traditional politicking and jockeying which Arabs as well as others indulge in does not make result surprising. Important thing in our opinion is getting procedure established which is agreed to by Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. ( b ) From point of view Tripolitanians, Pak res on composition Prep Comite, which was adopted by UN Council, cld be regarded as rather large concession. This res provides for seven reps from Tripolitania, which has two-thirds population Libya, and allows Cyrenaica and Fezzan together to have fourteen reps, who so far as Tripolitanians are concerned may be expected adopt positions favorable to UK, France and Emir. If gen agreement can be reached to constitution Prep Comite, Dept feels this shld be expedited as rapidly as possible. ( c ) Agreement reached by Pak, Egypt, and Ital members Council with Beshir Saadawi to allow one Ital rep on Prep Comite may, therefore, be encouraging development. Dept agrees with Pelt’s view reported Lidel 49 2 that inclusion one Ital on Comite of 21 wld not prejudice future Libyan state. Depending on result Pelt’s and Jerbi’s 3 trip Benghazi (Lidel 51) 2 you cld, in your discretion, suggest to Brit that they point out to Emir that presence one Ital on Prep Comite cld do no harm since 14 members that Comite will be sympathetic to Emir’s point of view. Our reason for suggesting this step is that if Emir remains adamant in his opposition to any Ital participation, agreement reached among Tripolitanians may break down and entire program constitutional development be jeopardized. Therefore, we feel every effort shld be made to get Prep Comite started immed. II. ( a ) Re attitude and activity of Egypt and Pak delegates, Dept sympathetic to difficult situation with which you must deal when confronted with certain of their actions. However, we have realized since Advisory Council was estabd that there almost certainly wld be some activity by the Moslem delegates vis-à-vis the native Moslems which we cld not or we might not wish to emulate or associate ourselves with. This we believe is a natural consequence of their affinity with the Moslem world leaving aside the question of their personal ambitions or feelings. We wld be reluctant at this time (particularly in light of the fact that the Council will soon adjourn to Geneva) to approach the Pak Govt re Col. Rahim. 4 We are inclined to believe that strong stand against him and criticism his activities by AmEmb Karachi at this time might make Pak Govt irritated and consequently make your position vis-à-vis Rahim increasingly difficult. In any event we wld wish to have a clearly documented case before undertaking any action in Karachi. Re Egypt policy, as carried out by Kamel Bey, 5 Dept has been aware through your reports that he seems to have been attempting force situation where Tripoli wld have predominant control over all Libya and that Libya shld be unitary state, and that Egypt in turn might control Tripolitanians. As practical matter we doubt whether this cld be achieved by Egypts in view of ( a ) antipathy of Emir and Cyrenaicans toward control by Tripoli and ( b ) absence of any mandate in GA res that there wld be unitary state. In this connection, we note from Lidel 53 6 that Kamel Bey may now realize federal form govt only one acceptable Libyans. ( b ) Dept hopes that current series Council mtgs Tripoli can be concluded soon and that UN Council can adjourn to Geneva. During cooling off period in Geneva and while Ramadan 7 runs its course in Libya situation shld settle down considerably so that we can all determine in calmer atmosphere what courses of action shld be pursued. Acheson 1 The situation was that the representatives of Pakistan and Egypt had used various tactics regarding the Council meetings such as nonattendance, tabling resolutions without advance notice to the other members, promising support for the resolutions of the U.S. representatives, and going back on such promises during the voting on various procedures and resolutions in the Council meetings. This was reported in Tripoli’s telegram 153, to the Secretary of State, not printed (357.AG/6–1550). 2 Not printed. 3 Cyrenaican political leader. 2 Not printed. 4 Col. Abdur Rahim Khan, Representative of Pakistan on the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya. 5 Mohamed Kamel Selim Bey, Representative of Egypt on the Advisory Council for Libya. 6 Not printed. 7 The ninth month of the Moslem calendar. During that lunar month every Moslem is expected to fast from dawn to sunset. Editorial Note [Document 879] Editorial Note Toward the end of July 1950 the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, Mr. Pelt, drafted his report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for submission to the General Assembly at its Fifth Regular Session in September 1950. The Commissioner was required to prepare the draft report in consultation with the members of the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya. These consultations were held at Geneva in August 1950. Copies of the draft report were studied by the members of the United Nations Advisory Council for Libya during that month. The United States position on the draft report was that in general the report appeared to be a quite satisfactory document to which the United States need take no exception. This position is described in the Secretary of State’s telegram 159 to the Consulate at Geneva (357.AG/8–1150), in Geneva’s telegram 158 to the Secretary of State (357.AG/8–1850), and in the Secretary of State’s telegram 177 to the Consulate at Geneva (357.AG/8–1850); none printed. For the report of the Commissioner, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 15, Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya . Hereafter cited as GA (V), Suppl. No. 15 . The Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya , GA (V), Suppl. No. 15 , was transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on September 4, 1950, for submission to the General Assembly at its Fifth Regular Session, which met at Flushing Meadow, New York, from September 19 to December 15, 1950. The Commissioner’s report on Libya together with reports from the United Kingdom and France as the administering powers were referred to the Ad Hoc Political Committee for its consideration. The United States was a member of that Committee, which did not take up the subject of Libya until October 1950. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) 773.00/9–2850 [Document 880] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs ( Bourgerie ) 1 confidential [ Washington ,] September 28, 1950. Subject: Development of Libya Participants: The Mufti of Tripolitania, Sheikh Mohammed Abul As’Ad Al Alem Mr. George C. McGhee—NEA Mr. E. H. Bourgerie—AF Mr. McGhee asked the Mufti to express his view as to how the United States Government could help Libya. The Mufti said that Libya is a very poor but vast territory which is fit for pastures and agriculture and that its soil might contain mineral resources. He said that it would be useful to have American experts come to Libya and carry out surveys and studies on the spot so that the wealth of the country could be better developed. Mr. McGhee pointed out that President Truman’s Point IV Program has that very objective, and that the program includes Libya. The Mufti stressed that Libya relies upon the United States which has been showing some attention towards his country. He added that Mr. McGhee’s visit to Libya Was proof of the concern of the United States towards the country. Mr. McGhee asked the Mufti in what other fields the United States might help Libya. In reply, the Mufti mentioned in particular the educational field and said that the American Government could send teachers and open schools as had been done in the Near East (Beirut, Egypt, etc.). He observed that the United States, which once adopted the policy of isolation, is now concerned in helping the free nations to surmount their economic crises. In this connection the Mufti also said that both the Chief Administrator and Mr. Scott, Director of Education, have good intentions to improve educational conditions in the territory but that they lack sufficient funds, considering the small budget of the country. Mr. McGhee reassured the Mufti that the Point IV Program would help to provide assistance in the educational field. Mr. McGhee then asked if the Mufti was satisfied with the progress made in the political field since the UN resolution regarding the independence of Libya had been passed. The Mufti replied that he was satisfied but expressed his fear about the obstacles raised by foreign powers having territorial objectives in the country. Mr. McGhee asked him to name these powers and the Mufti specified France and Italy. He said that Great Britain and the United States had no territorial aims. Mr. McGhee agreed and said his Government’s desire is to see the establishment of a unified Libyan State. The Mufti praised Mr. Clark for his work on the UN Council for Libya. He said that he was surprised that the Fezzan, which is a region of only 40,000 inhabitants, can be considered equal to Tripolitania with 750,000 people, and Cyrenaica with 250,000. Mr. McGhee pointed out that the United States is a federal government with some states having small populations, but that they are all represented by an equal number of Senators in the American Congress. The Mufti said that the Tripolitanians had no direct contacts with the people of the Fezzan, although contacts are necessary for them to exchange ideas and to live together in harmony when Libya becomes independent. The Mufti said that it is easier to cross the Iron Curtain and to penetrate into Russia than to enter the Fezzan. He then declared that Communism had been forced to retreat and that its policy of world domination had been defeated by the United States which, by assisting and supporting the countries of Europe and elsewhere to overcome their postwar crises, had kept Communism and its destructive ideology away from them. Mr. McGhee said that he was glad to hear all this from the Mufti and emphasized that the United States is sparing no effort to save the free countries of the world from the Communist plague. Mr. McGhee said that the American Government would do its best to remove the obstacles mentioned by the Mufti through the UN. He emphasized that his Government wants to be a friend of the Libyan people and wants to cooperate with them. Referring to Wheelus Field, Mr. McGhee said that the American Government is keeping it not with the aim of interfering in the affairs of the country, but that it is spending money on the Field which constitutes an asset for the country itself. The Mufti agreed and said that the Libyans consider themselves lucky that the Americans are maintaining Mellaha Air Base because the enemies of Libya would never dare to attack the country for fear of their American friends. Mr. McGhee then told the Mufti that he and all the other leaders have a great responsibility placed on them in order to obtain skillful civil servants ready to manage the affairs of their country. The Mufti paid a high tribute to the kindness and spirit of cooperation and assistance of Mr. Lynch and Colonel Easley. The Mufti expressed an earnest desire to see four or five Tripolitanian boys, who could be selected from the neighborhood of the air field or from the sons of local workers employed by Wheelus Field, studying with American children at the base. The Mufti stressed that if the idea could become a reality, it would be a model of true democracy shown by the Americans in that African land. Mr. McGhee promised to talk the matter over with Colonel Easley and expressed hope that the idea could be realized. 1 The conversation took place September 18 at Benghazi. Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions in Connection With the Visit to London of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, September 19, 1950 780.00/9–1850 [Document 881] Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions in Connection With the Visit to London of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, September 19, 1950 1 top secret [ London , September 19, 1950?] Participants: Foreign Office: Mr. Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Mr. Roger Allen, Head, African Department Mr. R. H. G. Edmonds, African Department Mr. K. J. Simpson, African Department Department of State Hon. George C. McGhee Mr. Samuel Kopper Mr. Elmer Bourgerie American Embassy, London Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd Miss Margaret Tibbetts Mr. John F. Root [Here follows a discussion of Anglo-Egyptian relations and the Suez Canal.] Libya (Item 2 under Africa) Mr. Wright, reviewing the situation in Libya, said the UK’s forebodings with respect to the UN Advisory Council had been pretty well realized. As for the UN Commissioner, however, the UK had, as we knew, made great efforts to adjust its plans to his and on the whole the relationship with him had been a successful one. The UK understood that Mr. Pelt had failed to obtain agreement on a list of Tripolitanian representatives to the Constituent Assembly and felt that the Assembly could now not be convened until after the United Nations had had a chance to deal with the Libyan question. The UK hoped it would be possible to convene the Assembly shortly thereafter and that agreement would be reached on a loose federation under the Emir. As soon as possible following this, the UK hoped to conclude a treaty with the Emir, including a defense arrangement covering the whole of Libya. He thought the UK would probably be willing to agree, in this connection, to come to the defense of the whole of Libya and not just Cyrenaica. It might, however, want to limit itself to stationing troops in Cyrenaica only and furthermore he thought the UK would be unwilling to contribute to the budgetary deficit of the Libyan state beyond the proportion representing the deficit for Cyrenaica. The UN Commissioner had made clear to the UK he considered provision of defense facilities conditional on a contribution to the Libyan deficit, and Mr. Wright felt Mr. Pelt would take the same position with respect to our interests in Tripolitania. Mr. Allen said the UK estimated that the deficit for Cyrenaica was roughly in the nature of £1.25 million to £1.5 million annually, and that it was about the same for Tripolitania. It was, for example, calculated that the deficit for Cyrenaica would be £1.4 million in 1952 and decrease in the succeeding years until it approximated £800,000 in 1956. He felt this contribution was the maximum to which the Treasury would agree. Mr. McGhee stated that he thought it would be advisable to have the UK arrange for financial assistance to the new Libyan state, and not just Cyrenaica, otherwise the Libyans might play off one power against the other in an effort to secure additional financial aid. Mr. Wright noted that the US had confirmed in writing last year that it was US policy to maintain strategic facilities in Tripolitania. It was not yet clear, however, how we proposed to accomplish this. Mr. McGhee replied that we would probably want to reach some agreement with the Provisional Government of Libya for obtaining our base rights at Wheelus Field and subsequently to have this agreement ratified by the Libyan state. The exact form the agreement would take was not yet certain and would depend largely on future constitutional developments in Libya. Mr. Bourgerie explained that, while we wanted to reach some agreement covering Wheelus Field, we did not envisage having a defense treaty with Libya. Mr. McGhee indicated that the US preferred to leave any formal or comprehensive defense arrangement with Libya to the UK. The Fezzan was discussed briefly and the UK felt that the French had become pretty well reconciled to the idea of federation. In the meantime, of course, it was not giving any of its bargaining power away. Mr. Allen thought the officials in the Quai d’Orsay were, in their own thinking about Libyan constitutional development, somewhat ahead of political thinking in France and were somewhat circumscribed in their efforts by the political problem. The UK had no objection if we wanted to “jog the French along”. As for French interest in strategic facilities in the Fezzan, Mr. Wright said the UK had no objection whatsoever. Schuman had already told the UK he would not object to a special strategic position for the British in Tripolitania and made clear he was hoping to achieve a similar position in the Fezzan. Mr. Kopper said that we had indicated to the French in Washington that we had no objection either. In answer to a question from Kopper, Mr. Allen said the UK did not feel that Italy was trying to interfere with Libyan constitutional development and that what it was genuinely interested in was economic security for the Italians in Libya. [Here follows a discussion of Eritrea; for text, see page 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] .] 1 McGhee was en route to a conference of U.S. diplomatic officers in Tangiers; for documentation on this conference, see pp. 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] ff. Editorial Note [Document 882] Editorial Note The report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya (GA (V), Suppl. No. 15 ) was considered by the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly during October 1950. Interest centered chiefly on the constitutional development plans which had been prepared by Mr. Pelt. Three draft resolutions were submitted in the Ad Hoc Political Committee on the question of Libya’s progress toward independence. During the debate in the Committee, the U.S.S.R. and other Communist states took the line that the United Kingdom and France, backed by the United States, were trying to impede Libyan unity and independence and to use their position in Libya for allegedly militaristic and aggressive purposes. The United States commended the constructive work already accomplished in carrying forward the United Nations plan for Libya and indicated confidence that this plan would be faithfully carried forward to completion. It was pointed out that the form of government to be established must be of the Libyans’ own choosing. The United States also emphasized the importance of rendering adequate technical assistance to Libya. Eventually two groups of states (not including the Soviet Union) which had sponsored separate resolutions were able to reconcile and combine their proposals in a joint draft. The result, sponsored by 13 states, was a resolution which was adopted by the Ad Hoc Political Committee on October 19, 1950. The vote was 53 in favor, 1 against (France), with 5 abstentions. The Soviet proposal was rejected by 38 votes against, 13 in favor, and 7 abstentions. For the details on the discussions on Libya in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee , pages 41 ff. Hereafter cited as GA (V), Ad Hoc Political Committee . The Consul General at Tripoli (Lynch) to the Secretary of State 357.AG/11–150: Telegram [Document 883] The Consul General at Tripoli ( Lynch ) to the Secretary of State secret Tripoli , November 1, 1950—3 p. m. 122. While it may be correct to state as does Department’s 2136, October 24 to Paris 1 that UN resolution passed, in ad hoc political committee October 19 does not basically alter GA resolution November 21, 1949, it would appear from here that it does alter the sense of original resolution in some respects. It sets up a timetable. It seems also to make acceptance of AC advice mandatory upon commissioner and it places much more emphasis on “unity” than did original resolution. Committee 21, established by AC, has now completed job it was created to do (my unnumbered October 30 1 ). National Assembly has been named and November 25 date set for convening. Although far from perfect (i.e. absence of any opposition members on Cyrenaican list and absence small Kutla Party from Tripolitanian list) it might be expected that AC would welcome the step forward and encourage and assist new body get on with job preparing sound constitution. After long conversation with Abdur Rahim Khan, however, I have distinct impression there will be all-out attack in AC on National Assembly, spearheaded by Pakistan and Egypt. It will be based on section 3( a ) proposed new resolution on grounds National Assembly not “duly representative of the inhabitants of Libya.” An effort will be made, I believe, reopen whole question proportional representation on basis population three territories. Whether this attack succeeds in destroying already created machinery for constitutional development will probably depend on attitude Italian and minority representatives who during last session AC showed their willingness to fish in troubled waters. I gathered from conversation with Rahim, although he did not specifically so state, that both Pakistan and Egypt would welcome complete breakdown constitutional development Libya and whole question returned UNGA where sentiment, Rahim said, was growing for short time UN trusteeship for Libya. Such a trusteeship, he added, while delaying independence by one or two years would ensure that new state was established along “sound lines” and would be “truly independent” and not simply a “tool” of a “foreign power or powers.” While my speculations on line Pakistan and Egypt may take in AC may be unduly alarmist and even mistaken, I think Department should now give full consideration to possibilities set forth above. If I am right and we wait for reconvening AC November 28 it will probably be too late to take remedial action. The only way I can see to breakdown rather dangerous majority bloc which Egypt and Pakistan have been able command is by strongest pressure on Italy pointing out that breakdown constitutional development and returning of whole problem to GA would be damaging interest Western world as well as to Italian interests Libya. [Repeated to] London 51, Paris 48, Rome 45, Geneva 24. Lynch 1 Not printed. 1 Not printed. The First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Palmer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 711.56373/11–1550 [Document 884] The First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Palmer ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) top secret official informal London , November 15, 1950. Dear George : After our conversation the other day on Egypt (reported Embtels 2717 and 2718, November 9 1 ) Michael 2 stated that he would like to discuss informally with me a new idea on Libya which had occurred to the Foreign Office and which he outlined as follows: 1. Since your conversations here and since Brownell’s informal talks; reported in my letter of October 23, 3 the Foreign Office has been giving further consideration to the problem of obtaining the strategic rights which both the US and UK require in Libya. 2. During the course of this consideration, the idea has occurred to those concerned with the problem that there might be definite advantages in including Libya in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and solving our defense problems by obtaining our rights through a multilateral arrangement of this kind rather than through bilateral arrangements. 3. The idea had considerable appeal to him since it would, in addition to securing our base rights, greatly strengthen the whole Mediterranean area, by constituting an earnest of our good intentions towards the security of the area. He thought, moreover, that the idea would probably commend itself to the French, since it would simultaneously take care of their defense requirements in the Fezzan, and to the Italians who would undoubtedly like to be associated in a defense arrangement with Libya. Michael asked what I thought of the idea and whether I had any objections to putting it informally to you. I told Michael that I would be glad to ask you for an informal reaction as to whether you thought it worth pursuing the matter further. I added that speaking entirely personally, I found the idea interesting but one which raised a number of problems, for example: 1. How could we justify to the Greeks and Turks our inclusion of Libya as a full member of NATO while denying the same full role to Greece and Turkey? 4 2. Would the Libyans themselves want to be associated in a pact with Italy? 3. What provision would be made to contribute to the budgetary deficits of the territories under such an arrangement? 4. I recall that at the time the negotiations were taking place on the North Atlantic Treaty, the French desired the inclusion of all of Algeria instead of just the French departments. Would not the inclusion of Libya lead to renewed French demands for the inclusion of the rest of Algeria and perhaps Morocco and Tunisia as well? Michael’s replies were as follows: 1. During the discussions here on Turkey, 5 you indicated that the US was not opposed in principle to the inclusion of Turkey as a full partner in NATO, but that it was not thought that the present time was propitious since it might indicate the bareness of the cupboard to the Turks. Michael deduced from this that at such time as our strength increases, and we are in a position to make an effective commitment to Turkey, we would have no objection to Turkish participation. Libya will not obtain its independence for more than a year and perhaps by that time we will be in a position to admit Greece and Turkey to full membership. 2. The advantage which Libya would derive in the way of increased security from membership in the Atlantic Pact would probably outweigh any objections to association with Italy in such a pact. 3. Michael felt that in any event, the United Kingdom would be prepared to make up the Cyrenaican budgetary deficit and guardedly suggested that we might do the same thing in Tripolitania as payment for our use of NATO facilities. I pointed out that this raised a new problem and that I doubted that we would be willing to make such a payment for such a purpose, if for no other reason than the precedent which it might create for similar demands by other NATO countries. 4. Michael had no comment on the difficulty posed by French North Africa, other than to suggest that some means could probably be found for dealing with it. I am passing the foregoing on for what it is worth and would appreciate receiving in due course any informal observations which you might care to make to Michael on this subject. I should add that neither Julius nor I think very highly of the suggestion. The foregoing completes the burden of my conversation with Michael, but there are two other questions with respect to Libya that I would like to take this occasion to raise. Both arise from the Memorandum of Conversation of October 26th between George Brownell and you. 6 1. In the second paragraph, I have noted that Mr. Brownell stated that Michael Wright had indicated that there would seem to be no objection to the use of Castel Benito Air Field by the United States Air Force. This does not accord with my recollection of the conversation, which is to the effect that Michael replied that he was unable to give any immediate answer but that he would be glad to look into the matter informally. (See page 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] of my letter of October 23rd.) 2. Both Julius (with whom I have discussed this problem) and I are somewhat disturbed at the indications in the final paragraph of page 2 of the Memorandum of Conversation that it might be preferable for us to endeavor to obtain our defense requirements in Libya as the result of a sub-tenancy from the British. In the first place, I do not think that this line of action will commend itself at all to the British since it will complicate their negotiations. Secondly, I take it that a general third country clause would be required and I would doubt very much that any Government in Libya would agree to an arrangement which would permit the leasing of facilities to third countries. Finally, if there were a general third country clause, it seems to me that we could anticipate the possibility of similar requests to the British from the Soviets, which, while they could undoubtedly be knocked down, might nevertheless be embarrassing from a propaganda point of view. I am sending a copy of this letter to Wayne Jackson. 7 Sincerely yours, Joe 1 Neither printed; the former reported on British arms policy towards Egypt, while the latter reviewed the latest Anglo-Egyptian treaty developments (774.00/11–950 and 641.74/11–950). 2 Michael Wright, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Africa, British Foreign Office. 3 Not printed; it reported that George Brownell, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, had discussed with Wright the possible use by the United States of airfields at Castel Benito in Tripolitania and at Abu Suweir in Egypt (711.56373/10–2350). 4 For documentation on the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 5 For a record of McGhee’s discussion of Turkey, see the memorandum of informal U.S.-U.K. discussions, dated September 19, p. 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] . 6 No record of this memorandum of conversation has been found in Department of State files. 7 Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs. The Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) to the First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom (Palmer) 711.56373/11–1550 [Document 885] The Director of the Office of African Affairs ( Bourgerie ) to the First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Palmer ) top secret Washington , December 11, 1950. Dear Joe : Our reply to your letters of October 23 and November 15 1 concerning Wheelus Field has been withheld pending the despatch of Secretary Acheson’s letter of December 5 to Secretary Marshall 2 on this subject. A copy of the Secretary’s letter is enclosed for your information. The possibility of the Air Force wanting to use Castel Benito has been decided in the affirmative and hence our top secret telegram No. 2884 of December 4 to you. 3 We await the British reaction with interest. We realize that the situation at Castel Benito may be complicated (as compared to Wheelus Field) by the presence of RAF and/or civil aircraft with whom USAF would become co-users of the field. Air Force has raised no objection to co-usage, so it apparently does not consider the presence of these elements as a bar to obtaining its requirements at Castel Benito. We’ve heard rumors to the effect that certain civil air lines may cease operations at Castel Benito. In our letter to Secretary Marshall we tried to present impartially the two possible methods of obtaining base rights at Wheelus from the Libyans. George McGhee wants to receive the Defense Department’s views on this subject and you may rest assured that the views reported in your letters will be considered thoroughly in making a decision on this subject. Incidentally, Roger Allen was in town a few days ago and we took occasion to ask him whether the Emir will be in a position by January 1, 1951 or February 1951 to talk business with the British or ourselves on this question of our strategic requirements. Roger said he was recommending to the British Foreign Office that an approach to the Emir should await such time as the permanent Libyan Government is in operation under a final constitution. He feels that security is such in Libya that even the most guarded approach to the Emir would be known too widely in a short time, and that such knowledge of British and/or American negotiations in Libya would have an adverse effect at the next session of the UN, particularly since the establishment of the Libyan state will still be in process. Of course he advocates being prepared with drafts of agreements to be negotiated whenever the UN launches the Libyan state. We were impressed by his views in this regard. Apparently the time for negotiating base rights is not as imminent as we had thought. In any event we can’t get too excited about details of procedure so long as we’re still groping for an answer to the basic question of how the new Libyan Government’s operations are to be financed while it is getting strength in its legs. It was the consensus of a recent meeting within NEA that we must have more exact knowledge of Libya’s financial position, broken down as between Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, before we can know the scope of the operation which we and the British may have to finance. In this connection we will also have to find out how much the Air Force is prepared to pay in the future for rental of its facilities in Libya, what their estimated dollar expenditures in Libya are expected to be in 1951, 1952, etc. This is a real project involving concentrated study and we wonder how best to go about it. Any suggestions you may have would be appreciated. We should acquire this knowledge without delay, so that we will be prepared to proceed intelligently with negotiations whenever that becomes possible. Our reaction in NEA regarding inclusion of Libya in NATO is the same as yours. If you think the Foreign Office is serious about it, we will urgently explore it with other Bureaus of the Department and with the Defense Department. Sincerely yours, E. H. Bourgerie 1 Regarding Palmer’s letter of October 23, see footnote 3, supra . 2 Not printed; it asked for the views of the Department of Defense concerning leasing Wheelus Field directly from the Libyan Government or as a sublease from the British, indicating that the British preferred the former method. (711.56373/12–550) 3 Not printed; it informed Embassy London that the Department of Defense needed base rights at Castel Benito in Libya and at Nicosia in Cyprus and asked that the British be approached with the view to securing U.S. use of the bases under informal permissive agreements similar to those in effect at Wheelus Field. (711.56373/12–450) Eritrea Eritrea [886] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Achilles) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) [Washington,] January 27, 1950. 350/1–2750 [887] The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State Geneva, January 27, 1950—7 p. m. 350/1–2750: Telegram [888] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, March 23, 1950—5 p. m. 777.022/3–2350: Telegram [889] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred Wellons of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 10, 1950. 357.AH/4–650 [890] The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State Paris, April 30, 1950—1 p. m. 357.AH/4–3050: Telegram [891] The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Acting Secretary of State Rome, May 22, 1950—noon. 357.AH/5–2250: Telegram [892] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy Washington, May 25, 1950—3 p. m. 357.AH/5–2550: Telegram [893] Editorial Note [894] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, June 14, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AH/6–1450: Telegram [895] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, July 7, 1950—7 p. m. 777.00/7–750: Telegram [896] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) [Washington,] July 18, 1950. 357.AH/7–1850 [897] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, June 27, 1950—8 p. m. 777.00/6–2750: Telegram [898] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices in the American Republics Washington, July 11, 1950—5 a. m. 357.AH/7–1150: Circular telegram [899] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] August 7, 1950. 777.00/8–750 [900] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, August 24, 1950—11:25 p. m. 357.AH/8–2450: Telegram [901] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] September 5, 1950. 357.AH/9–550 [902] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) New York, September 15, 1950. 357.AH/12–2750 [903] Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions in Connection With the Visit to London of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, September 19, 1950 [London, September 19, 1950?] 780.00/9–1850 [904] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate in Tunisia Washington, September 26, 1950—7 p. m. 357.AH/9–2650: Telegram [905] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State New York, September 27, 1950—12:02 p. m. 320/9–2750: Telegram [906] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred E. Wellons of the Office of African Affairs Washington, November 1, 1950. 357.AH/11–150 [907] Editorial Note [908] Editorial Note [909] The Alternate United States Representative at the United Nations (Ross) to the Secretary of State New York, December 2, 1950—1 p. m. 320/12–250: Telegram Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Achilles) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk) 350/1–2750 [Document 886] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs ( Achilles ) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Rusk ) secret [ Washington ,] January 27, 1950. The Italian Ambassador 1 will call on you at 11:15 on January 27. I understand that he will wish to discuss with you the general subject of Italo-Ethiopian relations, in the light of recent developments at Geneva, where the Trusteeship Council has been writing a trust agreement for Italian administration of Somaliland and where Ethiopian-Italian representatives have been having private conversations looking toward Italo-Ethiopian rapprochement . You will recall that the UN General Assembly approved in November 1949 a resolution placing former Italian Somaliland under a 10-year trusteeship, with Italy as the administering power. The General Assembly also established an investigating commission to examine the question of the disposal of Eritrea. Both these actions 2 were contrary to the express wishes of Ethiopia, which regards the return of Italy to East Africa in any guise as a threat to Ethiopian security. It is believed that Ethiopia would have accepted the decision on Somaliland gracefully had the General Assembly approved the annexation by Ethiopia of the major portion of Eritrea. In the General Assembly, both the United States and the United Kingdom argued for Italian trusteeship in Somaliland and for annexation by Ethiopia of the Eastern Province of Eritrea. Since November, officers of the Department have informally been attempting to assist the Ethiopian and Italian Governments to resolve some of their outstanding differences. This assistance has taken the form of participation in informal private conversations, as in Washington, and now in Geneva. We have felt justified in taking this role in the interests of stability in East Africa and of contributing to an orderly transfer of the administration of Somaliland from the British to the Italians. Otherwise favorable prospects for the conclusion of a Trust Agreement and an orderly transition in Somaliland now hinge on Italo-Ethiopian agreement on a provisional boundary between Ethiopia and Somaliland. Our delegation at Geneva reports that there is substantial agreement on such a boundary, but that the Ethiopians intend to withhold their assent until some agreement satisfactory to Ethiopia can be reached on the question of Eritrea. We understand that the Italian Ambassador will wish today to discuss Ethiopia’s demand that as a price for agreement on the Somaliland issue, Italy renounce interest in Eritrea, to the extent of renouncing its position in favor of independence for Eritrea. Our reports from Rome and Geneva coincide with the Italian understanding here that the Italian Government desires the earliest reestablishment of good relations with Ethiopia and appreciates that the question of Eritrea is the keystone to rapprochement . The Italians feel, however, that they cannot definitively agree to any particular disposition of Eritrea, since to do so would be in contravention of the spirit and letter of the General Assembly’s resolution. As our Ambassador at Rome 3 has pointed out, to do so would also be politically impossible for the Italian Government at home. The Italians have told us that they can get by at home with acceptance of any decision of the UN Commission and the UN, and they also appear to be willing to agree to accept the Commission’s recommendations provided Ethiopia would agree to do likewise. The British are most anxious to effect an early transition in Somaliland, and, apparently in appreciation of the importance of the Eritrean issue to that desire, have been talking directly with the Italians in London in an attempt to work out an Italo-Ethiopian agreement on Eritrea. The British have also frankly told us that they will believe annexation of the Eastern Province of Eritrea to Ethiopia is desirable, and they intend to work for that solution. In these circumstances, it appears that Italy will be subjected to pressure by the British to renounce in at least secret agreement any interest in Eritrea beyond simple protection of Italian nationals and property there. Such pressure involves the serious risk of incurring the opprobrium of [the] Italian Government and people, and it is considered that the US should therefore scrupulously avoid any involvement therein. In order to avoid possible wire-crossing between the discussions at Geneva and those at London, as well as our implication in a diplomatic maneuver which will be unpalatable in Italy, we are instructing our delegation at Geneva to confine [its] further participation in private conversations there to the Somaliland question, leaving to the British, Italians, and Ethiopians where and how to discuss the Eritrea question. In this connection, it may be noted, that the British as administering authorities both in Eritrea and Somaliland have an interest in solving this question which can explain if not require their involvement. It is recommended that you respond to Ambassador Tarchiani’s observation along the following line. We continue to be interested in an orderly transition in Somaliland, and are gratified if our informal efforts to achieve that end have had a measure of success. 2. The position of the US on the future of Eritrea remains unchanged, that is, we believe the Eastern Province should be annexed to Ethiopia. We intend, however, to refrain from any activity or public statement on behalf of this position pending completion of the UN Commission study. 4 1 Alberto Tarchiani. 2 For documentation regarding the decisions made in 1949 on the disposition of the former Italian colonies in Africa, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. iv , pp. 526 ff. 3 James Clement Dunn. 4 At the meeting at 11:15 Tarchiani indicated that the Italian Government strongly opposed annexation of Eritrea by Ethiopia, but that it also was coming to believe that independence would not be the best system for protecting the Italians in Eritrea. The Italian Ambassador told Rusk that he had been instructed to ask for the views of the United States on a system of international administration similar to Tangiers, and Rusk promised that this “suggestion would be given prompt and sympathetic consideration.” Memorandum of conversation, January 27, not printed (777.022/1–2750). The Consul at Geneva (Troutman) to the Secretary of State 350/1–2750: Telegram [Document 887] The Consul at Geneva ( Troutman ) to the Secretary of State secret niact Geneva , January 27, 1950—7 p. m. 141. Tcdel 45. Tentative agreement between Ethiopia and Italian representatives reached today on text possible understanding re Eritrea. Text would be in form memoranda from Ethiopia and Italian Governments to US and UK Governments. Both Italy and Ethiopia desire text be kept secret from all other governments since each must obtain views his government before further discussions take place. Text follows: 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Embassy Addis please give above text Aklilou 2 and acknowledge delivery this and Spencer’s 3 telegram to Geneva. 4 Sent Department 141, repeated London 34, Rome 29, Addis Ababa unnumbered. Troutman 1 The draft agreement, not printed, was later known as the “Geneva formula” or “Geneva compromise”, and confirmed for the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom certain positions held by Italy and Ethiopia concerning conditions under which the General Assembly would settle the future of Eritrea through a U.N. investigating commission. 2 Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister. 3 John Spencer, Adviser to the Ethiopian Foreign Minister. 4 The telegram under reference here has not been identified further. In telegram 547, from London, January 31, not printed, Holmes reported that the Foreign office had reached agreement on the working level on a similar draft understanding between the Italians and the Ethiopians, but stressed that the Foreign Office felt the agreements only papered over the cracks since they did not consider the root of the problem, namely, a formula for the disposition of Eritrea. Embassy London transmitted the text of the draft understanding in telegram 549, January 31, not printed (350/1–3150). The agreement reached at Geneva became known as the “Geneva formula” or “Geneva compromise”. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 777.022/3–2350: Telegram [Document 888] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret Washington , March 23, 1950—5 p. m. 1302. Dept concerned over deterioration security situation Eritrea and also fears UNComInq may not reach clear recommendation. If, in addition, tension between Itals and Ethios increases in next weeks and months possibility any peaceful solution wld be greatly lessened since it is doubtful whether GA wld be able to adopt any recommendation by two-thirds majority. Therefore Dept considers US and UK shld again make known their position on disposition Eritrea and attempt persuade others concerned to adopt measures conducive to peaceful settlement this problem. McGhee has already assured Drew 2 in Asmara of US support UK re Eritrea (Asmara’s 28, Mar 20 3 ). In response London’s 1448 Mar 16 (rptd Addis 29) 4 Dept requests US Amb Addis 5 to inform members UNComInq, if they solicit our views, that pending consideration their report US continues to believe that best disposition Eritrea would be cession all except Western Province to Ethio and incorporation Western Province in Sudan. Embs Rome and Addis shld inform Ital and Ethio govts of foregoing. In discussions with UNComInq Amb Addis cld use arguments against other proposals recapitulated London’s 1448, as well as arguments supporting partition used by USDel in GA. However, Dept questions whether it wld be advisable to press case for partition to extent of emphasizing capabilities Ethios for stirring up trouble if decision adverse to them. Such arguments might have boomerang effect on some members UNComInq and GA whereas emphasis on positive merits Ethio case shld go long way towards obtaining result desired by both UK and US. We agree, and Amb Addis shld so inform Ethio Govt, that Ethios cld buttress their case by informing UNComInq partition wld be acceptable or at least indicating willingness accept recommendations which wld meet most, if not all, of their claims. Such expression by Ethios might well facilitate decision favorable to Ethios and solution of problem by peaceful methods which are surely in interests all parties concerned. At same time Dept continues desire steps be taken which wld facilitate Ital-Ethio rapprochement and solution Eritrea problem by procedure in which Itals cld at least acquiesce. Therefore Emb London shld ask FonOff if UK now willing to join US in providing friendly assistance for any further consultations between Itals and Ethios which they may desire in effort resolve outstanding differences. We propose following steps be taken promptly if UK agreeable. 1. Ital and Ethio govts wld be told UK and we are prepared continue provide friendly assistance toward composing their differences. Both Itals and Ethios wld be asked whether they are prepared to consult further on basis Geneva draft formula or on any other basis. 2. Re Rome’s 1147 Mar 20 (rptd Addis 54) Emb Addis wld inform Aklilou and Spencer of contents Rome’s 905 Mar 5 and of specific suggestions contained Rome’s 677 Feb 17, pointing out that our reports from Rome (especially Rome’s 905) indicate Ital Govt still desirous conclude agreement on basis Geneva formula. 6 3. Itals and Ethios wld be informed that if further consultations desired US wld favor holding them in London. 7 Acheson 1 Repeated to Addis Ababa, Rome, Paris, and Asmara. 2 Brigadier Drew, British Chief Administrator for Eritrea. 3 Not printed. For documentation on McGhee’s visit to Ethiopia and discussion of the problem of Eritrea with Emperor Haile Selassie, see pp. 1691 [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] ff. 4 Not printed. 5 George Robert Merrell. 6 None of the messages under reference in this paragraph, which dealt with various Italian statements on the draft Italian-Ethiopian agreement which had been worked out at Geneva, is printed (675.7731/3–2050, 777.00/3–550, and 675.7731/2–1750). Regarding the Geneva formula, see telegram 141, January 27, p. 1642 [ Pg. 1642 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] . 7 On March 25 Julius Holmes, the U.S. Minister in the United Kingdom, reported that he had discussed the substance of this telegram with Roger Allen, the Head of the African Department in the Foreign Office, who indicated that the Foreign Office had already sent instructions similar to those in the second and third paragraphs to Ambassador Lascelles at Addis Ababa. Telegram 1626, not printed (357.AH/3–2550). Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred Wellons of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 357.AH/4–650 [Document 889] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred Wellons of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] April 10, 1950. Subject: Italian views on Italian Emigration to Africa and Italo-Ethiopian Relations Participants: Mr. Alberto Tarchiani, the Italian Ambassador Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper, ANE Mr. A. E. Wellons, ANE The Italian Ambassador at his request called on Mr. McGhee this afternoon 1 to pay his respects and to discuss certain aspects of Mr. McGhee’s recent trip to Africa. He also raised the question of what action could be taken with respect to the resumption of consultations between Ethiopian and Italian representatives, particularly on the subject of Eritrea. The Ambassador asked if Mr. McGhee had had an opportunity to consider the possibilities of increased white settlement in Africa during his recent trip. Mr. McGhee said this had been considered very thoroughly at the Consular Conference held in Lourenco Marques, Mozambique, and the consensus was that relatively few areas in Africa were suitable for large-scale white settlement. The only areas open now are Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa with perhaps some possibilities in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. The other parts of Africa simply do not have the resources or the climate to support Europeans adequately. The Ambassador thought it might be possible under the Point Four program to assist white settlement in Africa, but Mr. McGhee said the officers at the conference were quite pessimistic about much being accomplished. He added that in large parts of Africa the problem is to find and develop adequate resources for the Africans and that Point Four assistance in those areas would be directed to the benefit of the inhabitants. Mr. McGhee also pointed out that the Point Four program could not be expected to solve the basic political problems with which those African territories are confronted. The Ambassador said that in regard to emigration to the Portuguese colonies the Italian Government would again approach the Portuguese Government in Lisbon on the matter. Mr. McGhee said that would be the best approach to the problem, and that in each case it would seem wise for the Italian Government to take it up directly with the metropolitan countries concerned. In response to a question, Mr. McGhee said that he greatly enjoyed his visit of several days in Ethiopia, and that he was particularly impressed with the Emperor with whom he had several long interviews. 2 The Emperor had assured Mr. McGhee that the Ethiopians had not and would not do anything to stir up trouble along the Somaliland border nor in Eritrea. He was eager that all possible steps be taken by all parties concerned to exercise a moderating influence on developments in Eritrea so that a reasonable solution of that problem could be achieved. With regard to Somaliland, Mr. McGhee said that he was pleased with the efficient manner in which the transfer of power from the British to the Italian administration had been completed. The Ambassador said there had been no particular difficulties but that the boundary with Ethiopia remained to be settled. He expressed the hope that it would be possible to leave the actual delimitation of that boundary to a UN Commission. In response to another question, Mr. McGhee said that he had found the situation in Asmara rather tense and that the UN Commission was having a difficult time in preparing its report. He said that many people in Asmara thought that the disturbances there had been due in large part to the activities of the Italians. The Ambassador interjected that the Italians had been the objects of the agitation and that Italians had been murdered. Furthermore, the Ambassador said that much of the rioting had been between Moslems and Christians. Mr. McGhee said that while this was true, many people on the spot believed the trouble had been incited by the proponents of independence who were being encouraged by the Italians. The Ambassador recalled that the Italian Government had been willing to agree to a nonintervention policy as outlined in the formula drafted in Geneva, but that the Ethiopians had never given them an answer on that formula. Mr. McGhee observed that while he did not know why the Ethiopians had not replied, the Emperor had emphasized to him that the Ethiopian Government was not involved in the agitation in Eritrea. The Ambassador said that the Italian Government is still willing to accept the Geneva formula. In particular, the Government is ready to go ahead with the second part of the formula which provided for further conversations with the Ethiopians after the report of the UN Commission on Eritrea had been completed. The Ambassador then read a telegram he had just received instructing him to inform the Department that the Italian Government is prepared to accept the recommendations of the UN Commission and to discuss the position to be taken on the disposition of Eritrea with the British, American, and Ethiopian Governments. Mr. McGhee said that the Department is willing to continue to provide friendly assistance for such purposes, but desires that any further steps should be taken in conjunction with the British Government. Mr. Kopper pointed out that we had suggested such talks to the British and were still awaiting a definite reply from the Foreign Office. Mr. McGhee said that the telegram which the Ambassador had read was very interesting and that we would be glad to pass the contents of it along to the Ethiopian Government, if he desired us to do so. The Ambassador said that he would have Mr. Catalano of the Italian Embassy prepare a memorandum on the contents of the telegram and bring it to the Department tomorrow. 3 1 April 6. 2 For documentation on McGhee’s conversations with Emperor Haile Selassie, see pp. 1691 [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] ff. 3 A copy of the memorandum, not printed, is in file 357.AH/4–650. Copies of it and this memorandum of conversation were transmitted to London, Rome, and Addis Ababa with the instruction that it be given to Aklilou and Spencer. (Telegram 76, to Addis Ababa, April 11, not printed, 357.AH/4–650), Merrel delivered a copy of the note on April 11, but on the 19th he reported that apparently there would be no answer to the Italian initiative to resume conversations with Ethiopia, (Telegram 94, from Addis Ababa, not printed, 357.AH/4–1950). The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 357.AH/4–3050: Telegram [Document 890] The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , April 30, 1950—1 p. m. 2009. From Utter. 1 From April 26 to 28, I held conversations in Geneva with members UN Commission for Eritrea, explaining US position and going into considerable detail reasons which led us take our decision. 2 All delegates received me cordially and expressed appreciation unofficial communication US views. Theron, 3 South African delegation, would like to have our views in writing and suggested that I send him under cover of personal letter aide-mémoire setting out our position in detail. Other delegates welcomed this proposal. Theron, Norwegian and Burmese delegates considered it inadvisable to raise in commission question of obtaining official US Government statement as this would perforce mean requesting views USSR. If Department approves Theron’s suggestion, please send me memorandum for forwarding to members of commission as soon as possible. Any such document should stress US opposition to UN trusteeship, for it is abundantly clear that this solution is paramount in minds of Pakistani and Guatemalans, who are aided and abetted by Secretariat. 4 Following are present views of various delegates and Secretariat: 1. South Africa inconsistent . While still toying with idea of federation for whole or two separate provinces (i.e., plateau and western province) with Ethiopia, it appears likely they would accept UK–US proposal for partition provided suitable guarantees for minorities could be obtained from Ethiopia. 2. Pakistan . Independence seems to have been definitely shelved in favor of UN trusteeship. Highly critical of Ethiopia’s treatment of Moslems and, therefore, opposed to subjecting any Eritrean Moslems to control Coptic Government Addis Ababa. Argue that after ten-year trusteeship, Eritreans would be free to join Ethiopia if they wished. Furthermore, if Ethiopians showed themselves progressive, tolerant and capable during that period, Eritreans including Moslems would be eager for union. Strong abhorrence of monarchy was expressed by Pakistan delegation. 3. Norway . Desires uncomplicated solution and, therefore, favors incorporation of all Eritrea in Ethiopia. However, would probably support partition if majority decision. 4. Burma . Delegation sincerely favored reunion eastern Eritrea with Ethiopia but had misgivings re western province where inhabitants had shown no desire incorporation in Sudan. He told Stafford 5 in all confidence that while he had received instructions to “go along with Pakistan as far as possible”, he had pointed out to his government that Pakistan had now shifted from independence (which found favor with Burmese Government) to trusteeship and he was, therefore, hopeful his government would revert to original instructions whereby he was given fairly free hand. (This information should be treated utmost secrecy.) 5. Guatemala . Every indication points to support of UN trusteeship. Abandoning of earlier predilection for independence may be due to change in Italian position. 6. Secretariat . Schmidt, Principal Secretary, optimistic that UN Commission for Eritrea will produce unanimous report; but his rather smug attitude based on conviction that, after earlier disagreement due to political approach each member to problem, commission would recommend UN trusteeship all Eritrea as only feasible solution likely to be acceptable to two-thirds majority GA. He seems unaware of South African delegate’s strong instructions from his government to oppose this solution and is perhaps overconfident in believing he can persuade Norwegian and perhaps Burmese to support UN trusteeship. While admitting that UN trusteeship was in effect postponing issue and not facing up to problem, Schmidt quite frankly stated it would provide more employment for UN personnel. Conclusions and Comments . A unanimous report from the commission seems to be utterly impossible. In my opinion the best that can be hoped for is a 3–2 majority in favor of something resembling US–UK position, provided, of course, Burmese Government allows its delegate to use own discretion. Stafford believes my visit useful in making clear to members commission that US–UK views on Eritrea are identical. On April 28, Stafford masterfully defended British position as set out in UK statement handed commission on March 18. 6 Press summary being airmailed. Most important points clarified were that (1) UK had never made official pledge during war that Eritrea should be united to Ethiopia and (2) UK did not wish to accept responsibility of trusteeship for whole or any part of Eritrea. French sent no representative to answer questions on their statement, which we are forwarding. 7 Commission will begin exchanging views on solution May 3 and delegates believe discussion previous to drafting report may be long, drawn-out. Meanwhile economic subcommission has prepared study intended to show whether Eritrea can become viable state or not. Only economist in group is South Africa Deputy who is apparently responsible for most of document. He is convinced that Eritrea cannot become economically viable. Repeated London 567, Rome 159. Department pass Asmara 1. [Utter.] Bruce 1 John E. Utter, Second Secretary of the Embassy in France. 2 In telegram 1817, to Paris, April 25, not printed, Utter had been instructed to emphasize in his conversations with the members of the Commission that the United States continued “to favor disposition of Eritrea by which eastern part wld be united with Ethiopia and western province joined with Sudan.” (357.AH/4–2050) 3 Gen. F. H. Theron, head of the South African Delegation to the United Nations Commission. 4 On May 3 Utter was advised that the Department of State approved his proposal for sending a personal letter aide-mémoire to the members of the Commission outlining the views of the United States on the disposition of Eritrea. Suggestions for the substance of the message were also sent that day. On May 9 Utter reported that he had sent each member of the Commission such a letter explaining the views of the United States along the lines quoted in footnote 2 above. Telegrams 2050 and 2051, to London, and 2548, from London, none printed (357.AH/4–3050, 5–350 and 5–1050). 5 Frank E. Stafford, Officer in charge of affairs dealing with the Italian Colonies, African Department, British Foreign Office, and Liaison Officer to the United Nations Commission. 6 Not printed; it stated that the British Government supported the incorporation of the central and eastern provinces of Eritrea in Ethiopia subject to safeguards for the minorities, and incorporation of the Western province in the Sudan. A copy of the British statement was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 1, from Asmara, April 17, not printed (357.AH/4–1750). 7 In this statement, dated April 15, Foreign Minister Schuman reiterated the French view that the only acceptable solution for Eritrea was one that satisfied the claims of the peoples involved and received the agreement of both the Italian and Ethiopian governments. A copy of the French statement was transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 952, from Paris, May 1, not printed (357.AH/5–150). The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Acting Secretary of State 357.AH/5–2250: Telegram [Document 891] The Ambassador in Italy ( Dunn ) to the Acting Secretary of State 1 secret priority Rome , May 22, 1950—noon. 2137. London’s 2751, May 18 2 to Department as well as more detailed reports from Stafford which British Embassy here has made available to us, confirm our earlier conviction UNComInq report at very best will be inconclusive. Unless a satisfactory compromise formula is put forward before drafting of final report of Commission, it seems apparent (despite Stafford’s persistent optimism) that Guatemala, Pakistan and Burma will support independence under one guise or another; South Africa, federation with almost complete local autonomy for Eritrea; and Norway, unification of all of Eritrea with Ethiopia. It would seem, therefore, that despite our best efforts to convince the Commission of the excellence of our position, literally the only enthusiastic support on horizon for US–UK position continues to be US and UK. Our experience at Lake Success during last two sessions of GA should leave no doubt in our minds as to attraction of idea of independence to great majority of delegates and inability of many others to vote against independence despite their private convictions that it might not be wisest course. We can certainly assume that Soviet bloc will again sponsor a resolution calling for immediate independence of Eritrea. If even one (not to mention three) of the members of the UNComInq recommend independence it would seem certain that the solution would receive wide support and the pro-independence delegates could almost surely muster the one-third plus one vote to block any other solution. Furthermore, if independence receives any support in UNComInq and wide support in IC and GA it is difficult to see how Italian Government could oppose it. It would seem, therefore, that if we are to avoid another stalemate (or worse) we must adopt a more realistic approach to this problem and try to find a solution which will not only meet our minimum requirements of contributing to, rather than endangering, the peace and security of East Africa, but a solution which also has at least an even chance of being accepted by two-thirds of GA. Such a solution must offer an appealing alternative to early outright independence. While this Embassy is not informed of discussions which have been proceeding in London in “sub-group” referred to in Depinfotel, May 16, 1 a. m., 3 we have been giving serious thought to problem and have discussed frequently and at length with Italian Foreign Office and British Embassy here. During informal discussion recently with Count Macchi di Cellere, Zoppi’s 4 deputy in charge of colonies, problem we have evolved outline formula which would appear to us to meet minimum requirements of situation from point of view of our interest and also reconcile enough of the many conflicting points of view so as to command necessary majority at UN. This formula has not been discussed with Zoppi or Sforza; 5 however, Count Cellere personally is of opinion that it might receive support of Italian Government should it find favor with the British and US. Foreign Office is uninformed of any conversations Sforza may have had on subject in London. 6 It is assumed that (A) Collective or direct UN trusteeship is undesirable for many reasons; (B) single power trusteeship would be bitterly opposed by Ethiopia; (and besides, who would take it?); (C) independence is impracticable as well as undesirable and; (D) there is not enough support for our preferred position to warrant further consideration of it. The following formula is suggested on presumption above assumption valid. 1. GA would find that findings of UNComInq are inconclusive as were findings of earlier Four Power Commission. 7 The principal reason for inconclusiveness of findings is difficulty if not impossibility of ascertaining true wishes of inhabitants due to their lack of political maturity and organization. 2. In order establish conditions prerequisite ascertaining wishes inhabitants GA would recommend that present administering authority establish institutions for local self-government in Eritrea (along the lines of provisions for development of self-government in preparation for independence of Libya 8 ). The administering authority would be assisted by a UN commissioner who in turn would be assisted and guided by a commission comprising representatives of other interested governments as well as representatives of inhabitants of territory. 3. GA would recommend that local self-government institutions be established within a minimum period of say 10 years (which would undoubtedly be reduced to a maximum of 5 years by Assembly in plenary session). Pending establishment of local self-government in territory administering authority would continue to bear its present responsibility but might be assisted in maintenance security and in expense economic development by such other governments represented on the Advisory Council as might be mutually agreed. 4. Immediately upon coming into force of this recommendation administering authority would be authorized undertake to negotiate customs union between territory and Ethiopia to permit complete freedom of movement of commerce between the two territories. 5. The administering authority would immediately undertake to establish free ports in Massawa and Asab to accommodate requirements of Ethiopian Government. 6. Upon the achievement of local self-government in Eritrea in accord this recommendation GA would further consider the ultimate disposition of territory taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed through their “government” without prejudice to the possibility of: establishment of full independence; any of various degrees of association, including full union of all or part of territory, with Ethiopia; or any other solution which might be preferred by the people of Eritrea. We believe that the above formula while obviously sketchy and certainly imperfect in some respects would still meet the imperative criteria of: ( a ) Acceptability to Ethiopia as being best they can hope to get at this time; ( b ) acceptability to pro-independence [Italians?] since preparation for self-government would be necessary prelude to independence in any event and this formula would not in any way prejudice eventual independence; ( c ) the peace and security of area would be maintained through the continuing British administration which would, inter alia , safeguard our own strategic interests in the area during coming critical years. Should Department consider this strictly working level suggestion a possible basis for satisfactory solution of problem Embassy will discuss it further with Foreign Office and explore possibility obtaining support therefor of Italian Government. 9 Department pass Asmara 7. Sent Department 2137, repeated information London 308, Paris 257, Addis Ababa 26. Dunn 1 Secretary Acheson was in London for meetings with Schuman and Bevin, May 11–13 and for the fourth session of the NATO Council, May 15–48. For documentation on these meetings, see vol. iii , pp. 828 ff. and 1 ff., respectively. 2 Not printed; it reported the views of the five members of the United Nations Commission, substantially along the lines of those reported in telegram 2009, supra . (357.AH/5–1850) 3 Not printed. For documentation on the work of the U.S.–U.K. subcommittee on the Middle East, see vol. iii , pp. 975 ff. 4 Vittorio Zoppi, Secretary General in the Italian Foreign Ministry. 5 Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister. 6 For documentation on the fourth session of the NATO Council, held May 15–18 at London, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 7 For documentation on the work of the Four-Power (United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union) Commission on the former Italian Colonies, see Foreign Relations , 1949, vol. iv , pp. 526 ff. 8 For documentation on the preparation of Libya for independence, see pp. 1601 [ Pg. 1601 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] ff. 9 On May 26 the Department of State informed Dunn that no proposal should be put forward before the drafting of the United Nations Commission report, and with regard to the compromise suggested by the Ambassador stated as follows: “While compromise formula suggested your reftel is ingenious, it appears unacceptable because: (1) it does not settle problem but merely postpones decision for 5 or 10 years during which situation could only grow worse; (2) it does not provide for minimum requirements Ethio and therefore wld not be acceptable that country; (3) it leaves Brit in position holding ‘squalling baby’ for several years and because of difficulty and expense of doing so, we feel Brit wld not agree to undertaking such task (you will remember when federation of Eritrea with Ethio was proposed during last GA and transitional period of some length was involved, Brit threatened withdraw completely and immed); and (4) it appears likely to facilitate movement towards eventual independence Eritrea which we have long considered unreasonable solution because Eritrea cld never become viable state.” For these reasons the Department of State requested the suspension of talks with the Italian Foreign Office. (Telegram 1880, to Rome, not printed, 357.AH/5–2250). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy 357.AH/5–2550: Telegram [Document 892] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy 1 top secret Washington , May 25, 1950—3 p. m. 1866. During recent mtgs London US and UK FonMins approved 9 point agreement re Eritrea drawn up by US–UK Comite. Text follows: “ a ) Subj to the results of ( c ) below, UK and US govts shld maintain their present position re Eritrea; b ) The two govts shld concert their actions in order to secure the adoption of their proposals, both in the Interim Comite and in the GA; c ) They shld encourage discussions between the Ital and Ethio govts with a view to an Italo-Ethio agreement on Eritrea. The UK and US govts might have to act, in the earlier stages, as intermediary between the Ital and Ethio govts; but eventually the latter wld probably have to hold conversations directly between themselves; d ) If these conversations took place, the UK and US govts shld endeavor to secure agreement by the Ital and Ethio govts on proposals as nearly as possible in line with the present UK and US proposals; e ) These conversations shld take place as soon as a firm indication was recd as to the nature of the UN Comm report; this might be some time before it was published; f ) The conversations shld take place wherever was most suitable. A decision on this point might depend to some extent on whether the conversations cld begin before pub of the Comm report; if this were not possible, they might have to be held in New York where the Interim Comite wld be discussing the report. g ) Lobbying through both dipl and UN channels shld be begun as soon as practicable; h ) If the report submitted by the majority of the UN Comm were not in line with the proposals of the UK and US govts, the latter shld consult together. In any case, possible fall-back positions shld be explored immediately, outside the scope of the current UK/US talks. This wld be useful both in connection with the Italo-Ethio talks, and with the possibility that the majority of the UN Comm might produce a report differing from the UK and US position. i ) The question of the provision of safeguards for the Ital community in Eritrea shld similarly be explored, outside the scope of the current talks. Note was taken of His Majesty’s Government’s view that the Western Province of Eritrea shld not be administered by His Majesty’s Govt if this solution cld possibly be avoided.” Webb 1 Repeated to Paris, Asmara, and Addis Ababa. Editorial Note [Document 893] Editorial Note The report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea to the General Assembly was completed at Geneva on June 8, 1950. The Commission was unable to reach agreed conclusions on the disposition of the territory. The Burmese, Norwegian, and South African members of the Commission joined in preparing a factual survey of the problem. The three delegations concluded that close political and economic association of some kind between Eritrea and Ethiopia was necessary in view of Eritrea’s poverty, its economic dependence on Ethiopia, and the close affinities between large sections of the Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples. Norway added its own proposal that Eritrea as a whole be reunited with Ethiopia. Burma and South Africa submitted a proposal for the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia under which Eritrea would be autonomous in local matters and which would offer effective safeguards for the rights and interests of the Moslems, the Italians, and other minorities. Guatemala and Pakistan on the other hand questioned whether a majority of Eritreans wished union with Ethiopia and suggested that the territory be placed under a direct United Nations trusteeship for 10 years, to be followed by independence. For the text of the report see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 8, Report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea . Hereafter cited as GA (V), Suppl. No. 8 . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 357.AH/6–1450: Telegram [Document 894] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 1 secret us urgent Washington , June 14, 1950—7 p. m. 2894. Reports that Itals and Ethios apparently willing resume discussions on Eritrea encouraging. 2 Dept hopes prelim conversations can be held. London to “break the ice” and pave way for discussion compromise formula (at Lake Success, if necessary). Fol raises certain considerations which you shld discuss with Brit re Italo-Ethio conversations: 1. Review recent reports this subj leads Dept to believe that one of major stumbling blocks to reaching agreement on any compromise formula will be disposition Western Province. While convinced most reasonable solution is its incorporation in Sudan, we are faced with fact that there is very little support for such proposal. Since our approach to problem has involved continuation Brit admin Western Province in one form or other we desire ascertain what alternatives, if any, wld be acceptable to UK. This is particularly important since in record of recent mtgs London of US–UK FonMin the 9 point agreement on Eritrea included fol: “Note was taken of HMG’s view that Western Province Eritrea shld not be administered by HMG if this solution cld possibly be avoided.” Therefore Emb shld raise question with FonOff of alternative solutions for Western Province on assumption that US and UK will continue favor solution whereby eastern Eritrea will in fact be controlled by Ethio, whether under an arrangement for incorporation, federation, or trusteeship. In particular, wld UK be willing agree to incorporation or federation all Eritrea with Ethio? We assume UK, like ourselves, wld not favor UN trusteeship for Western Province alone or for all Eritrea. Dept wld appreciate receiving views FonOff re proposals, or parts of proposals, in Report UN Comm (which Dept has not received) which might be acceptable to UK or suitable as basis for compromise. 2. In light recent reports, it appears some form federation cld be considered first as basis for compromise. In order be successfully implemented, any federation proposals shld be based on conditions acceptable to Ethio Govt and majority Eritreans. In this connection Dept has noted fol press report carried in Il Quotidiano Eritreo , 3 Asmara, on March 11, 1950: “On 9 March, the UN Comm of Inquiry in Eritrea heard the secy of the Unionist Liberal Party, Ato Seium Maashio, who favors union with Ethiopia on the basis of the conditions outlined below. According to Ato Seium, the Ethio Govt already has accepted these conditions. “1. Maintenance of the territorial integrity of Eritrea within her present land and sea borders. “2. Official languages to be authorized: Tigrina in the highlands and Arabic in the western and Red Sea territorial divisions. “3. Human rights to be upheld as provided by the UN Charter. “4. Minority rights to be safeguarded. “5. Creation of an Eritrean Parliament (Council of Elders). “6. The Eritreans must have their own reps in the Ethio Parliament. “7. The Governor-General of Eritrea must be an Eritrean, appointed by the Ethio Emperor upon proposal by the Eritrean Parliament. “8. No fon civil or mil official may be assigned to the admin of Eritrea without the approval of the Eritrean Governor-General. “Ato Seium explained that these conditions must be officially registered in the UN as further guarantee that they will be carried out and must apply even in the event that only a part of Eritrea is united with Ethio. He added that he had every reason to believe that the Ethio Govt wld keep its recently given promise to abide by these conditions.” Presumably Report of UN Comm, when recd, will explain foregoing and other similar statements so they can be put in proper perspective. Dept suggests, however, that above listed points might offer basis for sounding out both Ethios and Itals on what wld be initially acceptable to them. Dept believes it wld be best from point of view of tactics for US and UK to maintain their present positions publicly and officially as long as possible and not to give support to any modifications or alternatives until Itals and Ethios have been brought together. During Ital-Ethio conversations it is, of course, highly desirable that US and UK reps strongly maintain concerted position and fol similar tactics in order to get Itals and Ethios to agree. Acheson 1 Repeated to Paris, Rome, Addis Ababa, and Asmara. 2 At the beginning of June U.S. Embassies in London, Rome, and Addis Ababa had reported that conversations with officials of the governments to which they were accredited indicated that the Italians and Ethiopians apparently were prepared to discuss Eritrea. The United States supported the idea for direct conversations in telegram 2813, to London, June 10, not printed (357.AH/6–1050). 3 Italian language newspaper in Eritrea. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 777.00/7–750: Telegram [Document 895] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , July 7, 1950—7 p. m. 144. With conclusion London phase US–UK effort effect Italian-Ethiopian rapprochement , Embassy desires make following comments which may prove useful as indicating atmosphere conversations here: 1. Both Ethiopians and Italians appear sincerely desirous seeing settlement this question this session GA. 2. As we see situation, Italians occupy stronger parliamentary position in GA. On other hand, this offset to large degree by local situation in East Africa, where question Ethiopian co-operation in implementing decision gives it strong bargaining point. 3. We are not sure Ethiopians fully comprehend parliamentary situation in GA. They still appear place too much reliance on righteousness their cause and to be too optimistic re prospects their effecting favorable (to Ethiopia) settlement. 4. Italians, despite fact they hold many (perhaps most of) trump cards in GA, have shown frank and commendable realism in recognizing that Ethiopian agreement to solution of Eritrea problem is vital to implementation. Also in recognizing agreement on Eritrea key to settlement other outstanding problems between Ethiopia and Italy. 5. Although both parties have indicated willingness agree on basis federation, it is already apparent they have widely divergent views as to form federation should take. Italians appear have in mind something approximating personal union such as that between Denmark and Iceland prior 1944. Ethiopians, for their part, appear envisage close federation with ties more on Swiss model. These attitudes are logical extensions of independence and annexation respectively and it remains to be seen whether two sides are willing retreat sufficiently from present positions to find common middle ground. US and UK will have play strong catalytic role. 6. All present indications are that Italians not willing reach agreement with Ethiopia on detailed formula for federation, since, within certain limitations, they appear to desire retain maximum bargaining power and ability adjust any formula to shifting parliamentary situation at GA. We foresee danger Ethiopians may misunderstand Italian position this question and charge Italians with saying one thing and doing another. US and UK assistance will be sorely needed to induce moderation and understanding. 7. As we see problem, main difference between Italians and Ethiopians revolves around following points: a . closeness of association between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Subsidiary points involved degree of self-government in Eritrea, division of powers between federal and local governments, and presence Ethiopian forces and officials in Eritrea. b . Length of any transitional period and extent, if any, of UN participation in administering territory during such period. c . Question of who will draft and approve federal constitution. 8. Point 7 b also raises fundamental questions involving UK. 9. Assuming Italians and Ethiopians able reach agreement on federation, we foresee following dangers at IC and GA: a . Demand that trusteeship (perhaps UN) be set up for any transitional period in order prepare Eritrea for self-government in accordance article 76 ( b ) of Charter. b . Tendency for IC and GA to become immersed in details of drafting federal constitution and to incorporate features which, while laudable in the theory, will have little bearing in reality to present state of Eritrean political development. Department pass Asmara and USUN; repeated info Paris 47, Rome 10, Addis Ababa 8, Asmara 8, USUN NY 8. Douglas Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) 357.AH/7–1850 [Document 896] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs ( Perkins ) 1 confidential [ Washington ,] July 18, 1950. Subject: Italian Position on Eritrea. Participants: Mr. Giuseppe Brusasca, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy Mr. Leonardo Vitetti, Minister in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy Ambassador Alberto Tarchiani of Italy Mr. Perkins, EUR Mr. Hilton, WE The Italian Ambassador in opening the discussion mentioned that Mr. Brusasca had called at the Department last year following the completion of his good-will mission to South America. He was here now as Chairman of the Italian Delegation to participate in discussions to be held by the Interim Committee of the United Nations on the future of Eritrea. Mr. Brusasca, speaking in Italian, expressed the support of the Italian Government for the U.S. action in Korea. Mr. Vitetti translated Mr. Brusasca’s remarks. In reply to Mr. Brusasca’s statement, I mentioned that the United States had no alternative but to support the United Nations in opposing the aggression in Korea. Turning to the question of Eritrea, Mr. Brusasca and Mr. Vitetti stated that Italy no longer stood for the independence of Eritrea but desired in all spirit of cooperation to achieve a settlement of this question based upon federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. They pointed out that naturally the word federation had many different meanings. Although they felt that there were a number of technical problems to be settled regarding economic and political arrangements such as those affecting currency, taxation, citizenship, etc., which they implied should be subject to control of local government, the Italian Government, in supporting federation, agreed that both Eritrea and Ethiopia would be incorporated under the Emperor of Ethiopia and that foreign affairs, defense, and international trade would be centralized. They believed that a customs union should be established as soon as possible in order that the economies of the two countries could become adjusted and the entire area could form a viable unit. In their opinion the minimum conditions for federation require that (1) the Ethiopians should be satisfied, (2) the rights of the Italians in Eritrea should be protected, (3) the Eritrean state should exercise authority over local matters, and (4) conditions should be established whereby the Moslems and Coptic Christians can live in peace. The steps for achieving federation are the establishment of an Eritrean state, the calling of a constitutional convention, and a period of self-government lasting for some five years with the continuing existence of British administration. The British, in stating their position to the Italians, had, according to Mr. Brusasca and Mr. Vitetti, proposed the prompt formulation of a constitution providing for federation, the withdrawal of British troops within twelve months, and the issuance of a mandate to the Ethiopians and the Eritreans to work out together the details of federation. Mr. Brusasca and Mr. Vitetti felt that this was tantamont to outright annexation, for under such arrangements the Ethiopians would fully incorporate Eritrea with the Ethiopian Government. The only reason given the Italian Delegation by the British Delegation in support of the British proposal for withdrawal within twelve months was the cost of £500,000 per annum required to maintain British forces in the administration of Eritrea. Mr. Brusasca and Mr. Vitetti stated that this seemed an insufficient reason in view of the important issues at stake in that area of the world, and of the strategic position occupied by Eritrea. They felt that there must be some other reason, although none was advanced. In summarizing the factors which the Italian Government must consider in the settlement of the Eritrean question, they expressed concern over (1) the position of the Italians in Eritrea, (2) the possibility that any hasty settlement would produce conditions which could be exploited by communist propaganda, (3) the possible adverse reaction of the Italian people, (4) the attitude of the South American countries which had originally supported the Italian position favoring independence, and (5) the strategic position of Eritrea. They felt that due consideration of all of these factors justified a period under British administration during which Eritrea could develop self-government and then achieve full federation with Ethiopia which would satisfy the minimum conditions mentioned above. I thanked Mr. Brusasca, Mr. Vitetti, and the Italian Ambassador for coming to discuss this problem and for the pleasure of seeing them again. 2 1 The memorandum was drafted by Hilton. 2 Conversations similar to this one had been held in New York on July 8 between Tarchiani and John C. Ross, Alternate U.S. Representative at the United Nations, on July 13 in Washington between Tarchiani and Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson, and on July 18, presumably previous to this conversation, between the Italian participants and Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews. Records of these conversations are in file 357.AH/7–850, 7–1340, and 7–1850. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 777.00/6–2750: Telegram [Document 897] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , June 27, 1950—8 p. m. 3661. Following are results discussion on Eritrea today between Palmer and Wright and Allen: 1 1. Italian Ambassador 2 called Foreign Office yesterday and said he had received letter from Sforza in which latter approved conversations Ambassador has been conducting with Wright, indicated desire reach agreement with Ethiopians and mentioned federation as possible desirable solution. Italian Ambassador evinced desire hold further conversations with Wright prior arrival Italian delegation. Wright told him Foreign Office wished this Embassy be represented any future meetings. Italian Ambassador then stated he would like talk direct Ethiopian Ambassador 3 here, but he was at loss how go about it since Swedish Ambassador, 4 who might have acted as intermediary, absent from London. At end conversation, Ambassador stated he would like talk further to Wright alone on subject today. 2. Last evening, Wright saw Ethiopian Ambassador at party and told him of Italian Ambassador’s desire talk to him. Ethiopian Ambassador not unreceptive and also asked see Wright today. 3. Wright asked us if we saw any objection his seeing two Ambassadors (separately) this p. m., and to their possible meeting some time in future. We replied we did not think conversations through these channels likely be productive of success and we hoped there would not be any wire-crossing. On other hand we could not see any harm and we certainly would not wish suggest two ambassadors should not see Wright or each other. 4. We informed Wright and Allen of Rome’s 2679, June 26. 5 Wright concerned re timing Italian delegate’s arrival since he will not be in London June 30 through July 2. After meeting, Foreign Office received telegram from Rome saying final decision on date arrival London Italian delegate would be taken today. Allen asked us if we would object to Foreign Office asking British Embassy Rome to determine from Italian Foreign Office whether arrival Italian delegate here could not be postponed until July 3 and sailing date delayed, pointing out that if this is not practicable, we hoped delegation would arrive here as soon as possible. We said we had no objection provided it were made absolutely clear to Italians that suggestion re delay did not indicate any lukewarmness on our part and that, on contrary, we would warmly welcome decision send delegation here. Our agreement of suggested postponement prompted by belief that talks with Wright present hold greater prospects success. 5. We explained to Wright Department’s views on procedure here as outlined Allen yesterday (Embtel 3625, June 26 6 ). We said that in view limited time available here, we thought greatest contribution we could make would be to endeavor get both Italians and Ethiopians for purposes negotiations, agree restrict conversations to federation formula as holding best opportunity for compromise. Wright agreed this would be real and valuable accomplishment and that, depending on Italian line at time, we should seek this immediate objective. 6. Wright then asked whether we thought we should hand Italians copy of Aklilou’s draft federation formula (paragraph 3 Embtel 3380 7 ). We said we thought there was some danger if we gave Italians early opportunity knock down first Ethiopian suggested draft. Allen while agreeing, felt there was also danger if we worked ourselves into position of having Italian draft form basis discussions. We then suggested that it might be wise avoid use of drafts at outset and instead to ask each side to set forth their minimum (read maximum) objectives under a federation solution. With these in mind, we might then obtain agreement on non-contentious objectives (if any) and try bring about compromise on contentious ones. 7. Wright thought this suggested possible desirability of simple GA resolution establishing principle of federation and setting forth certain basic objectives to be accomplished thereunder. If this could be done, UN committee might be set up to draft federal constitution which would achieve objectives. We doubted practicability this suggestion, doubting Ethiopia would or could be expected permit UN committee draft constitution which would be basic organic law not only of Eritrea, but Ethiopia as well. We suggested resolution might state Ethiopia should draw up constitution with advice and assistance president National Court or some other eminent jurist. It might even be submitted to UN committee established by GA which, if it were satisfied constitution achieved basic objectives set forth in resolution, would approve it and federation would come into effect. Wright and Allen suggested possibility using IC for this purpose instead of UN committee. In either event, they questioned whether GA could or would delegate its responsibility to approve constitution either to special committee or to IC and thought they would like to have their lawyer’s opinion of this. 8. It was agreed that foregoing suggestions purely informal. Wright and Allen said FonOff would wish consider them further and we, for our part, said we would like to obtain Department’s reaction. 9. Wright noted that solution along these lines might, if it involved GA approval of constitution, necessitate continuing British administrative territory for additional year. He was uncertain whether HMG would be willing do this. He wished particularly to make point that if it were willing, it could never agree to accepting another advisory commission such as in Libya, although it might not object UN commissioner. He asked if we would inquire whether Department similarly would agree re undesirability AC. We pointed out that it was with idea in mind of minimizing period of continued British administration that we had suggested that GA might delegate to special UN committee its power approve constitution. Comment: We feel that simple federation formula, established principle of federation and setting forth few minor basic objectives would, if it could be sold to Italians, hold greatest promise of success. We fear that an attempt draft so detailed a resolution, which might in itself be in the nature of a constitution, would bog us down impossibly. We would appreciate Department’s early views re foregoing. 8 Repeated info Rome 310, Paris 1098, Addis Ababa 57, Department pass Asmara 10. Douglas 1 Joseph Palmer 2nd, First Secretary at Embassy London; Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Roger Allen, Head of the African Department, British Foreign Office. 2 Tommaso Galarati-Scotti. 3 Ato Abbebe Retta. 4 Gunnar Hagglof. 5 Not printed; it reported the plans of the Italian Delegation. (357.AH/6–2650) 6 Not printed; it reported that the way was presumably clear “to proceed in any future conversations with Italians to examination of federation suggestions after telling Italians that for purposes of negotiations Ethiopians are willing give up annexation if Italians willing give up independence.” (777.00/6–2650) 7 Not printed; the draft under reference would have given Ethiopia jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defense, police, communications, commerce, currency, and finance in Eritrea while providing for basic human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as adequate safeguards for the protection of minorities. (357.AH/6–1650) 8 On June 28 Retta and Gallarati-Scotti met in Wright’s office to discuss Eritrea. Wright informed them that in the forthcoming talks they should both discard unrealistic solutions and try to find a compromise federation proposal. The Ambassadors asked time to consider this suggestion, but the Italian Foreign Office indicated subsequently that it could not officially support any thesis other than independence although it was sympathetic to Wright’s proposal. Embassy London reported these developments in telegrams 3692, June 28, and 6, July 1, neither printed (777.00/6–2850 and 7–150). Following the failure of the meetings between the Italians and Ethiopians, Wright, Allen, and Palmer met four times with the Italian Delegation to explore thoroughly the Italian position and emphasize the British and American hope that Italy and Ethiopia could reach a general agreement on outstanding matters. Embassy London reported on the conversations in telegrams 7, 8, 9, and 44, July 1 and 3, none printed (357.AH/7–150 and 7–350). The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices in the American Republics 357.AH/7–1150: Circular telegram [Document 898] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices in the American Republics 1 secret Washington , July 11, 1950—5 a. m. Fol is position US will adopt in Interim Committee of UNGA during meetings beginning July 13 re report UN Commission for Eritrea. This for your info and in discretion for discussion FonOff. Pls report any comment offered including any indications Ital activity this matter or commitments FO may have made to Italy. We trust FonOff may be able avoid early commitment to position incompatible with that of US, thus contributing to keeping situation in IC fluid with view to UN members taking greatest possible advantage developments in event any opportunity should arise for agreed compromise solution. US rep will initially suggest that Interim Committee recommend to OA that Eritrea or at least eastern part that territory excluding Western Province be annexed to Ethiopia. Will add we desire however to see largest possible measure agreement reached in IC and would therefore be willing to consider a compromise solution along lines federation Eritrea with Ethiopia under sovereignty Ethiopian crown. US rep will consistently oppose proposals for future of Eritrea which this govt considers entirely unacceptable. These proposals are ( a ) independence; and ( b ) United Nations trusteeship with UN organization or any single state or group of states as administering authority; or ( c ) any combination these two. We regard independence as politically and economically impracticable, and trusteeship as not only impractical and costly but as representing not a permanent solution but postponement of solution precisely where definitive action is necessary. UN Commission of Inquiry which visited Eritrea has now presented its report, and we fully support conclusion reached by three of its five members to effect “in interest of peace and security for East Africa and of welfare Eritrean people best solution, for Eritrea must be based on close political association with Ethiopia;” “economic and financial association also a sine qua non .” We understand Guatemalan rep IC, who was also Guatemalan rep UN Commission Eritrea, seeking LA support for Commission minority proposal (offered by Guatemala and Pakistan) for UN trusteeship leading to independence. In view critical character present world situation with special reference Korea US regards definitive recommendation on Eritrea by IC at current meetings as indispensable. Such recommendation must be calculated enlist two-thirds majority support in GA. It must also be of such character that states such as United States having major concern in maintenance of security in area may participate with alacrity in its effectuation. Support such states also necessary in view fact they will be requested afford principal part any economic assistance which may be required in connection any solution adopted. Acheson 1 Sent to Guatemala for information only. Sent to all other US Missions in the other American Republics for action. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 777.00/8–750 [Document 899] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) 1 secret [ Washington ,] August 7, 1950. Subject: Ethiopian Views on Eritrea. Participants: Ato Abte-Wold Aklilou, Foreign Minister of Ethiopia Mr. John Spenser, Adviser to the Ethiopian Foreign Minister Assistant Secretary McGhee Mr. Elmer H. Bourgerie—AF Mr. S. K. C. Kopper—AF Foreign Minister Aklilou, accompanied by Mr. John Spenser, called on me today at his own request. After an exchange of amenities, I expressed my appreciation for the letter which I recently received from the Emperor (this letter dealt with Ethiopia’s desire to obtain certain airplanes). 2 The Ethiopian Foreign Minister replied that the Emperor appreciated very much the assistance which the United States had been giving Ethiopia in its efforts to obtain suitable military planes. Foreign Minister Aklilou also referred to my trip to Addis last spring in gracious terms. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister then spoke along the following lines concerning the problem of Eritrea: the Ethiopian Government appreciated the help which the American delegation had given to Ethiopia in the past. He said that Emperor Haile Selassie had appreciated Dr. Jessup’s assistance on the federation problem which the Emperor knew was designed to help Ethiopia, even though the Emperor was not at all enthusiastic about federation. The Emperor was disposed to accept the federation proposal made by Dr. Jessup principally because the United States had made the proposal and the Emperor had great faith in United States judgment. Unfortunately, a decision of the Italian Cabinet had caused the defeat of the federation proposal last fall. Continuing, Foreign Minister Aklilou stated that four things have happened since last fall: 1. The General Assembly action giving Italy a trusteeship over Italian Somaliland had deeply shocked the Emperor and the Ethiopian population. They found it exceedingly difficult to understand why Italy should have had her desires met while Ethiopia had to wait. Nevertheless, Ethiopia had made every effort not to have any incidents break out along the Ethiopia–Somaliland border. 2. There had been a large growth of the Unionist Party in Eritrea. This had been caused by several factors: ( a ) the activities of the Italians, ( b ) the difficulties of some of the Eritreans regarding the acceptance of union with Ethiopia had been worked out, and ( c ) the Independent Party had been disintegrating while the Unionist Party had been gaining strength. 3. The report of the UN Commission was a new factor. A majority of this Commission was in favor of closer association between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Emperor was quite surprised when he heard that the federation proposal was already being discussed in New York because when the federation proposal was discussed in New York last year, there had not been a UN report which recommended closer association between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Now there was. 4. Whereas there had never been a clearcut majority in favor of closer union between Eritrea and Ethiopia, it was now evident that only a small minority favored independence and that a majority did favor union. Foreign Minister Aklilou said he had explained to the Emperor that the United States and the United Kingdom were talking about federation now because of the difficulties which would be incurred in the UN in efforts to obtain the desired Ethiopian position of union. The Emperor had consented to Aklilou’s discussing federation because of the Emperor’s respect for the judgment of the United States and the United Kingdom. Aklilou felt that when discussing federation all of us should know exactly what we were talking about. During the London conversations in June the Italians did not wish to discuss details although he, Aklilou, desired to do so. As a result, it was necessary to start all over again when he reached New York. He then repeated that the Emperor was most grateful for United States support. The Foreign Minister said that he wanted no misunderstanding on this point. Ethiopia is grateful for the work which the United States and the United Kingdom have put into the draft resolution now being discussed in New York without committing ourselves. He said this was very helpful. He had cabled this draft back to Ethiopia and he was now happy to inform us in confidence that the Emperor had consented to discuss federation on the basis of the paper. 3 The Foreign Minister then said that, speaking personally and confidentially, he was concerned about the prestige of the Emperor as regards Eritrea. Many of the peoples in Eritrea had been clamoring for complete union with Ethiopia. It would be difficult for the Emperor to explain to them why federation should be accepted. Aklilou said that there was a lack of understanding as to what federation meant; one thing was definite however: the period of transition should be short and absolutely definite. Aklilou said he was willing to do everything possible to help out in the work in the Interim Committee. If no desirable solution came out, Ethiopia would have no choice but to go back to union. He said the Emperor was somewhat disappointed at the intransigent attitude of the Italians. Aklilou referred to a telegram which he understood the Italian delegation had received from Prime Minister De Gasperi instructing the Italian delegation to take a strong line against close federation. Aklilou said that if Ethiopia had to go back to the position of annexation of Eritrea, she would ask the United States to support her in her opposition to an unacceptable solution. Ethiopia would also ask the United States to support an arrangement along the lines adopted in Somaliland, i.e., a long term Ethiopian trusteeship over Eritrea. Aklilou concluded by saying that no solution would be disastrous. I replied along the following lines. We appreciated very much the full explanation which Foreign Minister Aklilou had given us regarding the Ethiopian position. I assured him that we would abide by our understanding with the Ethiopian Government. We were doing everything possible to get a solution adopted by the UN which could be acceptable to Ethiopia. We desired to have it settled quickly in such a manner that it would work. We would keep in confidence the fact that the Emperor had consented to discuss federation on the basis of the US–UK draft. Our delegation in New York had our full confidence and they would be more than willing to discuss any details. Italy seems to have receded. Because of this, it did not seem that Ethiopia had lost any bargaining power. Aklilou then interjected that although Italy had declared that she had no interest in Eritrea, she was certainly acting in a contrary fashion. I resumed by saying that any concessions that Ethiopia might make should be considered as concessions to the UN and not to Italy. I expressed the hope that Ethiopia would be willing to make minor concessions, if necessary, in order to satisfy all members of UN. We were encouraged by the reports of progress from the U.S. delegation in New York. As regards citizenship, I said that citizenship of the people living in Eritrea would have to be considered Ethiopian. In addition, we believe that national defense should be controlled by the federal government, but that Eritreans might desire to have a local police force. We appreciated the forbearance of Ethiopia with regard to Italian Somaliland. Foreign Minister Aklilou said that as far as policing was concerned, considerable international responsibility would fall upon Ethiopia on such questions as protection of minorities. He added that the Independence bloc have said that they would have no Italians in the Government. This might cause some difficulty. I said that these were all questions of give and take which would have to be worked out as time goes on. I assured him that we would continue to support a workable and acceptable solution. George C. McGhee 1 The memorandum was drafted by Kopper. 2 For documentation on Ethiopia’s interest in obtaining planes from the United States, see pp. 1691 [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] ff. 3 The paper under reference was drafted by the U.S. and U.K. delegations at the United Nations on July 25. After a preamble which stated that the wishes and rights of the inhabitants of Eritrea and Ethiopia and the security of East Africa should be taken into consideration, the paper read: “1. Eritrea and Ethiopia shall be federated under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown. 2. Eritrea shall be self-governing and shall possess local legislative and executive autonomy, and the right of Eritreans to manage their own affairs shall be protected. 3. Full authority shall be vested in the Federal Government with regard to such matters as defense and national security, external affairs, finance and currency, foreign and interstate commerce, and communications. Eritrea shall pay its proportionate share of the expenses of the Federal Government in carrying out the functions set forth above. 4. The area of the federation shall constitute a single area for customs purposes and there shall be no barriers to the free movement of goods and persons within the area. 5. A single nationality shall prevail throughout the federation. 6. No discrimination shall be practiced in Eritrea as regards the religious, personal and civic rights of the indigenous inhabitants. Basic human rights and fundamental freedoms for all inhabitants of Eritrea, including minorities, shall be guaranteed. All property rights shall be fully respected. 7. There shall be a United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea appointed by the General Assembly. 8. The Commissioner shall consult with the Government of Ethiopia, and advise and assist a representative assembly of Eritreans for the purpose of formulating a constitution giving effect to the provisions of paragraphs 1 through 6 above. 9. The constitution shall go into effect as soon as it shall have been approved by the commissioner, adopted by the Eritrean Assembly, and ratified by the Government of Ethiopia as an annex to its constitution. Every effort shall be made to bring it into effect as soon as possible, and, in any event, before the end of 1951. 10. The present administration shall continue to conduct the current affairs of Eritrea until the constitution is put into effect. During this transition period the administration shall, as rapidly as possible, induct Eritreans into all levels of the administration, form a representative assembly of Eritreans, and assist the Eritrean Assembly in formulating its views on the constitution. During the transition period the administration may, on behalf of the Eritreans, negotiate a customs union with Ethiopia to be put into effect as soon as practicable. 11. Arrangements shall be made by the Government of the United Kingdom as the present administering authority for the transfer of power to the appropriate authorities. The transfer of power shall take place as soon as the constitution comes into effect in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9 above. 12. The Commissioner shall reside within Eritrea until the transfer of authority has been completed and shall make appropriate reports to the Secretary General of the United Nations concerning the discharge of his functions. When the transfer of authority has been completed, he shall so certify to the Secretary General of the United Nations.” (Telegram 117, from New York, July 25; 357.AH/7–2550) The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 357.AH/8–2450: Telegram [Document 900] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority New York , August 24, 1950—11:25 p. m. 364. As a result of conversations yesterday and today between Ambassador Muniz, 1 Ambassador Padilla Nervo, Stafford and Noyes 2 on the one hand, and the Italian and Ethiopian delegations on the other, regarding Eritrea, it seems hopeful that the Italians and Ethiopians may be able to accept or acquiesce in the latest draft working paper annexed hereto. Both delegations are forwarding this paper to their Foreign Offices with careful explanations. Both delegations seem prepared, in the interests of a solution, not to pursue further the points which they had previously insisted upon. Both delegations have been urged strongly to attempt to obtain instructions authorizing them to acquiesce in this draft, and the group is hopeful that this may occur. Both delegations have been advised that in view of the short time left for the interim committee, this text will be submitted immediately, informally, to a number of delegations who have indicated an interest in acting as co-sponsors. Ambassador Muniz has called a meeting Friday at 11:30 and is attempting to get the Canadian, Netherlands, Turkish, Lebanese and South African delegations to attend the meeting. It is hoped that if all goes well, a resolution along the lines of the attached draft may be introduced in the IC by the middle of next week. Question will arise Friday as to the US attitude towards this document. We propose to state that it is the result of exhaustive negotiation; that we believe it is the best possible compromise; and that we have been and are prepared to continue pressing both the Italian and Ethiopian delegations and to urge upon all other delegations that they should accept or support a resolution along these lines. We shall reserve our right to recommend modifications to the other members of the group in the light of the instructions received by the Italian and Ethiopian delegations. We shall state that if both parties accept the resolution, we shall give it our full support in the IC and the GA and that in any case, if the co-sponsors introduce this resolution, we shall not ourselves propose amendments to it. We should like to be in a position, if necessary, to go beyond this fairly limited commitment which we do not believe will be wholly satisfactory. We recommend that Department authorize us to cosponsor this resolution if the Ethiopian Government agrees to it or the Ethiopian delegation has no objections and if it appears desirable for tactical reasons. In view of our large responsibility for the draft, we feel that whether or not we sponsor the resolution, we should be prepared to advise the co-sponsors that once the resolution is introduced we would give it our full support and would act as if we were co-sponsors, i.e., we would not support any amendments unless such amendments were agreed by all of the co-sponsors. 3 Annex Eritrea working paper . The interim committee, having considered the report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea, recommends to the General Assembly that it approve the following resolution: Whereas by paragraph 3 of Annex XI to the Treaty of Peace with Italy, 1947, the powers concerned have agreed to accept the recommendation of the General Assembly on the disposal of the former Italian colonies in Africa and to take appropriate measures for giving effect to it; and Whereas by paragraph 2 of the aforesaid Annex XI such disposal is to be made in the light of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security, taking into consideration the views of interested governments: Now therefore: The General Assembly , in the light of the report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea and the recommendations of the interim committee, and Taking into consideration ( a ) The wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea, including the views of the various racial, religious and political groups of the provinces of the territory and the capacity of the people for self-government; ( b ) The interests of peace and security in East Africa; ( c ) The rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic or economic reasons, including in particular Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate access to the sea; Taking into account the importance of assuring the continuing collaboration of the foreign communities in the economic development of Eritrea; Recognizing that the disposal of Eritrea should be based on its close political and economic association with Ethiopia; and Desiring that this association assure to the inhabitants of Eritrea the fullest respect and safeguards for their institutions, traditions, religions and languages, as well as the widest possible measures of self-government, while at the same time assuring to the empire of Ethiopia the maintenance of its international status and identity; A. Recommends that : 1. Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown. 2. The Eritrean Government shall possess legislative, executive and judicial powers in the field of domestic affairs. 3. The jurisdiction of the Federal Government shall extend to the following matters: defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, foreign and interstate commerce and external and inter-state communications including ports. The Federal Government shall have the power to maintain the integrity and internal security and good order of the Federation, and shall have the right to levy uniform taxes throughout the Federation to meet the expenses of Federal functions and services, provided that Eritrea shall bear only its just and equitable share of these expenses. The jurisdiction of the Eritrean Government shall extend to all matters not vested in the Federal Government, including the power to maintain internal police, to levy taxes to meet the expense for domestic functions and services, and to adopt its own budget. 4. The area of the Federation shall constitute a single area for customs purposes, and there shall be no barriers to the free movement of goods and persons within the area. Customs duties on goods entering or leaving the Federation which have their final destination or origin in Eritrea shall be assigned to Eritrea. 5. An Imperial Federal Council, composed of equal numbers of Ethiopian and Eritrean representatives shall meet at least once a year and shall advise upon the common affairs of the Federation referred to in Article 3. 6. A single nationality shall prevail throughout the Federation. All inhabitants of Eritrea, except persons possessing foreign nationality, shall be nationals of the Federation. The qualifications for exercising their rights as citizens of Eritrea shall be determined by the constitution and laws of Eritrea. All persons possessing foreign nationality who have resided in Eritrea for 10 years prior to the date of the adoption of this resolution shall have the right, without further requirements of residence, to apply for the nationality of the Federation in accordance with Federal laws. Such persons who do not thus acquire the nationality of the Federation shall be permitted to reside in and engage in peaceful and lawful pursuits in Eritrea. The rights and interests of foreign nationals resident in Eritrea shall be guaranteed in accordance with the provisions of Article 7. 7. All residents of Eritrea without distinction of nationality, race, sex, language or religion, shall enjoy human rights and fundamental liberties, including the following: ( a ) The right of equality before the law. No discrimination shall be made against foreign enterprises in existence in Eritrea, engaged in industrial, commercial, agricultural, artisan, educational or charitable activities, nor against banking institutions and insurance companies operating in Eritrea. ( b ) The right to life, liberty and security of person. ( c ) The right to own and dispose of property. No one shall be deprived of property including contractual rights, without due process of law and without payment of just and effective compensation. ( d ) The right to freedom of opinion and expression and of adopting and practicing any creed or religion. ( e ) The right of education. ( f ) The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. ( g ) The right to inviolability of correspondence and domicile, subject to requirements of the law. ( h ) The right to exercise any profession subject to the requirements of the law. ( i ) No one shall be subject to arrest or detention without an order of a competent authority, except in case of flagrant and serious violation of the law in force. No one shall be deported except in accordance with the law. ( j ) The right to a fair and equitable trial. ( k ) Retroactivity of penal law shall be excluded. The respect for the rights and freedoms of others and the requirements of public order and the general welfare alone will justify any limitations to the above rights. 8. Paragraphs 1 through 7 of this resolution shall constitute the Federal Act. 9. There shall be a transition period not exceeding ————— during which the Eritrean Government will be organized and the Eritrean constitution prepared and put into effect. 10. There shall be a United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea appointed by the General Assembly. 11. During the transition period, the present administering authority shall continue to conduct the affairs of Eritrea. It shall, in consultation with the United Nations Commissioner, prepare as rapidly as possible the organization of an Eritrean administration, induct Eritreans into all levels of the administration, and make arrangements for and convoke a representative assembly of Eritreans chosen by the people. It may, in agreement with the Commissioner negotiate on behalf of the Eritreans a temporary customs union with Ethiopia to be put into effect as soon as practicable. 12. The United Nations Commissioner shall, in consultation with the administering authority, the Government of Ethiopia, and representatives of the people of Eritrea, prepare a draft of the Eritrean constitution to be submitted to the Eritrean Assembly and shall advise and assist the Eritrean Assembly in its consideration of the constitution. The constitution of Eritrea shall also be based on the principles of Democratic government, shall be consistent with the provisions of the Federal Act and shall include the guarantees contained in its Article 7. 13. The Federal Act and the Eritrean constitution shall enter into effect simultaneously following ratification of the Federal Act by the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Eritrean Assembly, and following approval by the Commissioner, adoption by the Eritrean Assembly and ratification by the Emperor of Ethiopia of the Eritrean constitution. 14. Arrangements shall be made by the Government of the United Kingdom as the administering authority for the transfer of power to the appropriate authorities. The transfer of power shall take place as soon as the Eritrean constitution and the Federal Act enter into effect in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 13 above. 15. The Commissioner shall maintain his headquarters in Eritrea until the transfer of power has been completed, and shall make appropriate reports to the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the discharge of his functions. A. The Commissioner may consult, with the interim committee of the General Assembly with respect to the discharge of his functions in the light of developments and within the terms of the present resolution. When the transfer of authority has been completed, he shall so report to the General Assembly and submit to it the text of the Eritrean constitution. B. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in accordance with established practice: 1. To arrange for the payment of an appropriate remuneration to the United Nations Commissioner; 2. To assign to the United Nations Commissioner such expert staff and to provide such facilities as the Secretary-General may consider necessary to carry out the terms of the present resolution. Austin 1 Joao Carlo Muniz, Bolivian Representative at the United Nations. 2 Charles P. Noyes, U.S. Deputy Representative at the United Nations Interim Committee. 3 In telegram 189, to New York, August 25, not printed, Austin was authorized to proceed along the lines indicated in the third and fourth paragraphs of this telegram as long as the British Foreign Office raised no objections to the line of action. (357.AH/8–2450) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 357.AH/9–550 [Document 901] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) secret [ Washington ,] September 5, 1950. Subject: Eritrea Participants: The Honorable Alberto Tarchiani, Italian Ambassador Mr. George C. McGhee—NEA Mr. Leo G. Cyr—AF Mr. Alfred E. Wellons—AF Problem: Draft working paper on Eritrea Action required: Inform USUN and offices concerned in Department Action assigned to: AF The Italian Ambassador called on Mr. McGhee this afternoon to discuss the draft resolution on Eritrea prepared by various delegations to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly. Ambassador Tarchiani commented that the latest draft working paper was not satisfactory in several respects. He said the Italian Government had expressed its views to the British Government and that Prime Minister de Gasperi had sent a telegram on this subject to Foreign Minister Bevin—he gave Mr. McGhee a copy of the telegram which is attached. 1 The Ambassador mentioned that at a recent Latin American caucus in New York Ambassador Muniz of Brazil and Ambassador Nervo of Mexico had tried to persuade the other Latin American delegations to support the draft working paper but that they had failed. Ambassador Tarchiani implied that unless several changes are made in the working paper, it would not be supported by many Latin Americans and by most of the Arab representatives. Furthermore, he pointed out that once the matter is taken up in the Political Committee of the GA, it is sure to be opposed by the USSR and Soviet satellite delegations. He said that the Soviet votes would undoubtedly be cast in favor of immediate independence for Eritrea and that it would be very difficult for the Italians not to be associated with them on this matter, although it would be embarrassing to the Italian Government, because of the widespread public sentiment in Italy in favor of independence for Eritrea and against a federation which would be regarded as annexation by Ethiopia. Mr. McGhee observed several times that it was the judgment of our representatives at the Interim Committee that this draft working paper, which had been prepared during the course of two months of difficult negotiations in New York, was the best compromise possible under the circumstances and that it stood the best chance of being adopted. He added that the Department would, of course, check with our delegation in New York again in order to determine the degree of support for this draft. When Mr. McGhee commented that there was already a wide area of agreement on this text and asked what points remained unresolved, the Ambassador referred particularly to taxation and police. Mr. McGhee said that our latest information indicated that both of these matters were being satisfactorily resolved. Then the Ambassador vigorously presented the Italian point of view that a UN Commissioner during the transition period in Eritrea would not be sufficient. He said there must also be an advisory council or commission of experts which would be independent of the Commissioner in order to guarantee that the resolution would be properly implemented. He expressed distrust of the British Administration, felt they could not be relied on to do the job and that, therefore, a further check on the British was necessary. Mr. McGhee said that we had no desire to see another commission or council of experts installed in Eritrea and that the United States is confident that the British Administration will carry out the task entrusted to them. Mr. McGhee pointed out that, after all, the General Assembly would be asking the British to continue to carry a heavy burden for a longer period of time than they wanted to. The Ambassador mentioned several possibilities which he thought might prevent the adoption of this federation proposal in the General Assembly such as: the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Zafrullah Khan, might make long speeches favoring independence and criticizing the British; alternative draft resolutions might be submitted on which votes would have to be taken; and many members of the UN might insist on greater UN control during the transition period before the federation is established. Mr. McGhee emphasized that the details of the federation proposal should be worked out in consultations between the delegations in New York. He said it would be a mistake to allow bilateral discussions in Rome, London or Washington to interfere with the completion of the project in the Interim Committee. Furthermore, he pointed out that the United States Government is not prepared to go any further than this draft working paper in the direction of a solution it does not really consider the best solution. The Ambassador attacked the present draft on the grounds that it does not adequately define the term “federal government”. He said it did not specify what the federal government would be, unless it were the Ethiopian Government, which he considered autocratic. However, in response to a question by Mr. Cyr, the Ambassador readily admitted that any federation solution, in order to be acceptable, could not impair the sovereignty of Ethiopia or change the form of its government. When the Ambassador said that the Ethiopian Government is not a federal government and is a dictatorship, Mr. McGhee pointed but that the “facts of life” facing the General Assembly are that it cannot change the Ethiopian Government nor impose a new super government on top of the present Ethiopian regime. Ambassador Tarchiani said that many of the differences are just a matter of language in order to satisfy public opinion in Italy and, therefore, he hoped that another effort would be made to compromise on the text before the General Assembly considers the matter. The Ambassador and Mr. McGhee agreed that an immediate solution to the Eritrean problem is desirable and expressed hopes that it could be worked out quickly in New York. 1 Not printed. In it De Gasperi stated that the stripping away of Eritrea under any scheme less than federation would have a detrimental effect on Italy’s contribution to Western defense. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 357.AH/12–2750 [Document 902] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) secret New York , September 15, 1950. Subject: Conversation between Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee and the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Ato Aklilou, regarding the Eritrean Question. Conversation held at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, September 15, 1950. Participants: Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State. Mr. E. H. Bourgerie, Director, AF. Mr. Charles Noyes, USUNNY. Ato Aklilou, Ethiopian Foreign Minister. Mr. John Spencer, Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopian Government. Mr. McGhee opened his conversation with Ato Aklilou by stating that all of the conversations which we have had to date indicated that the Italians were genuinely interested in reaching a satisfactory solution to the Eritrean problem. Their most recent statements indicating that they were not willing to reach an agreement on any federation proposals had come as a distinct shock to us. Mr. McGhee told Ato Aklilou that he would make it clear to the Emperor through our Embassy in Addis Ababa how effective Ato Aklilou had been in conducting the negotiations with the Interim Committee in New York and also how cooperative he has been with the United States officials in trying to find a satisfactory solution to this problem. Ato Aklilou told Mr. McGhee that Mr. Muniz had assured him that the Latin American countries would vote for some compromise solution such as federation even though the Italians did not fully agree with the solution that had been worked out. He said that when he called on Mr. Muniz that he had been asked why he had not come to see him and Mr. Nervo sooner. At that time Mr. Muniz stated to Ato Aklilou that in view of the Korean episode and the critical world situation he felt that the Latin American Bloc would agree to a compromise solution. Ato Aklilou said that he told Mr. Nervo that he had no instructions from his Government or any authority to negotiate with Mr. Muniz or Mr. Nervo; and that his instructions only permitted him to negotiate with the US and UK. According to Ato Aklilou, Mr. Muniz assured him that the Latin American States would not let their sentimental attachment to Italy warp their judgment in arriving at a solution to the Eritrean problem. However, Ato Aklilou stated that at subsequent meetings with Mr. Noyes of USUNNY Mr. Muniz did not repeat these statements. Ato Aklilou told Mr. McGhee that prior to Mr. Brusasca’s visit to Rome, the Italians had accepted most of the points contained in the US–UK working paper as subsequently modified by Mr. Muniz and Mr. Nervo. After his return from Rome, however, everything had changed and the Italians had then taken a much different line. Just before Mr. McGhee’s visit to New York Ato Aklilou had talked to Mr. Muniz and said that Muniz had told him that he planned to see Count Sforza and try to get his agreement to the federation proposals. Mr. Muniz assured Ato Aklilou that he would talk to the Latin American Delegates after seeing Count Sforza. Ato Aklilou said that he then posed the direct question to Mr. Muniz as to what, if anything, he would do about it if the Italians refused to consider the federation proposals but he said that he did not receive a satisfactory answer to this question. Ato Aklilou stated that he felt that Mr. Muniz had not faced up to his responsibilities in not taking a stronger line with the Italians and with the Latin American group. According to Ato Aklilou Mr. Muniz was then taking a line that the Latin American States would not be willing to go ahead with the federation proposals unless they could be sure that the Italians were in complete agreement. Mr. McGhee asked Ato Aklilou how he explained the apparently inconsistent attitude which Mr. Muniz had shown in his talks with Ato Aklilou. In reply to this query Ato Aklilou stated that Mr. Muniz now claims that there would not be time before the Interim Committee’s work comes to an end for the Latin American Delegates to get new instructions from their Governments. Most of them apparently had received instructions that they could support a federation proposal if it was agreed to by both Ethiopia and Italy. Ato Aklilou remarked that he had told Mr. Muniz that he did not wish to press for a solution in the Interim Committee if it was likely by doing so to result in negotiations breaking down completely. Mr. Noyes agreed that any changes in the present draft would be dangerous and would no doubt result in a complete breakdown in negotiations. He added that it might not be impossible to get agreement in the General Assembly to the federation proposals and that USUN would exert all possible efforts to this end. Ato Aklilou then devoted considerable time to reviewing the background of his efforts to reach a satisfactory compromise on the Eritrean question. He said that when the subject was first raised that Ethiopia accepted the US–UK offer to attempt to mediate this problem between the Ethiopians and the Italians he had had a very difficult time convincing the Emperor of the desirability of this course of action for two reasons: (1) The Emperor’s distrust of the Italians; and (2) The Emperor’s feeling that the Italians would only drag out negotiations and then back out at the last minute. Despite these misgivings, Ato Aklilou had persuaded the Emperor that it would be in the best interests of Ethiopia to accept the US–UK offer to try to work out a solution. He said that the Italians had always opposed a solution to the Eritrean problem—at Lake Success in 1949, at Geneva and at London. The Italians, he said, had renounced all their interests in Eritrea and had consistently stated that their only interest in Eritrea was in safeguarding the rights of the 20,000 Italians who lived there. However, he did not believe that they were at all sincere in these statements. Ato Aklilou pointed out to Mr. McGhee as a result of what had happened in the Interim Committee he was now in a very difficult tactical position and would have a very hard time explaining developments to the Emperor. Everyone knew, he said, that federation proposals have been discussed by the Interim Committee and it would now be difficult to retreat to the original stand taken by the US and the UK, namely that Eritrea be annexed by Ethiopia. The Italians, he said, are now in a very good tactical position to veto any action on Eritrea in the General Assembly. Ato Aklilou told Mr. McGhee that they were not very happy about one aspect of the federation proposals, namely that there will be an interim period of about two years during which the British administration would remain there. Any such proposal, he remarked, plays directly into the hands of their adversaries. Ethiopia, Ato Aklilou said, has taken no action to foment trouble in Eritrea and they had lived up to their promise given to Mr. McGhee when he visited Addis Ababa in March, 1950. On the other hand, the Italians in Eritrea have done their best to undermine the Unionists’ support of Ethiopia by attempting to persuade them that federation proposals meant in effect independence for Eritrea. Ato Aklilou concluded his summary of recent developments by stating that the solution recently arrived at with Mr. Muniz and Mr. Nervo represented the maximum concessions that Ethiopia was prepared to make with respect to any federation proposal. The solution of this problem would now rest with the General Assembly. Mr. McGhee then asked Ato Aklilou what stand he felt the US should take, whether Ethiopia would like to have us revert to our original position of annexation of Eritrea or whether we should endeavor to secure some solution along the lines of federation which would be acceptable to Ethiopia. In reply Ato Aklilou said that he had the following definite suggestions: (1) He wondered whether Secretary Acheson would be willing to make some public declaration regarding the US views towards federation which would be designed to protect Count Sforza against public opinion in Italy. He said that he was sure that the French would go along with any such course of action and probably the British would also agree. Could the Foreign Ministers make a tripartite declaration on Eritrea urging that a compromise formula be accepted at this time; stating that each country including Italy should aim for a solution to this problem; and indicating that a satisfactory solution was urgent in view of the threat to peace and security in Eritrea if no solution was found. (2) The other suggestion which was advanced was that Secretary Acheson and Foreign Minister Bevin talk privately with Count Sforza and make it clear to him that it was essential that Italy agree to the federation proposals. The British, Ato Aklilou said, have for five years been seeking a solution to the Eritrean problem but to no avail. The British Government, through Mr. Bevin, might consider telling Sforza that they would leave Eritrea at some early date if the Italians could not see their way clear to reach a satisfactory compromise with the Ethiopians. The US and the UK, Ato Aklilou said, must take strong action now to influence the course of action in the General Assembly on Eritrea. Mr. McGhee pointed out to Ato Aklilou that since Eritrea was not on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in New York 1 it would be difficult to obtain a tripartite declaration along the lines suggested by Ato Aklilou. Another factor was that the formal meetings of the Foreign Ministers had already ended and their present conversations had to do with Atlantic Pact problems. 2 Mr. McGhee assured Ato Aklilou that the United States only agreed to consider federation proposals when it looked as though this might be the only solution to this problem. He said that the United States would not expect Ethiopia to recede from its present position. He assured Ato Aklilou that he would ask Secretary Acheson to take a very strong position with Count Sforza. In closing, Mr. McGhee said that the USUN would follow up on this matter and would keep in close touch with Ato Aklilou on developments. He assured Ato Aklilou that the United States would take any reasonable action which Ethiopia desired and that the United States would exert every effort in the General Assembly to reach a final solution to the problem of Eritrea. 1 For documentation on the meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France at New York, September 12–18, see vol. iii , pp. 1108 ff. 2 For documentation on the Fifth Session of the NATO Council at New York, September 15–26, see ibid. , pp. 1 ff. Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions in Connection With the Visit to London of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, September 19, 1950 780.00/9–1850 [Document 903] Memorandum of Informal United States–United Kingdom Discussions in Connection With the Visit to London of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, September 19, 1950 1 top secret [ London , September 19, 1950?] Participants: Foreign Office: Mr. Michael Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State Mr. Roger Allen, Head, African Department Mr. R. H. G. Edmonds, African Department Mr. K. J. Simpson, African Department Department of State Hon. George C. McGhee Mr. Samuel Kopper Mr. Elmer Bourgerie American Embassy, London Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd Miss Margaret Tibbetts Mr. John F. Root [Here follows a discussion of Anglo-Egyptian relations, the Suez Canal, and Libya. The record of the Libyan discussion is printed page 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] .] Eritrea (Item 1 under Africa) Mr. McGhee said it was now the general feeling of our UN observers that the Eritrean question could no longer be settled in the Interim Committee. He himself felt it was clear the Italians had been deliberately leading us down the garden path and had had no intention of accepting the federation formula even if it included the four points Italy had specified as necessary revisions. He believed this attitude was not really due to their fear of internal public opinion in Italy but to their desire to win a preferred position in Eritrea. It seemed clear also that the Latin American bloc would not support any federation proposal until the Italians indicated that they were willing to accept it. Mr. McGhee told Mr. Wright that at his meeting in New York with Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Ato Aklilou had pointed out the very difficult tactical position in which he had been placed as a result of the breakdown of negotiations in the I.C. and he indicated he would need the continued support of the US and the UK if the Eritrean question was to be settled satisfactorily. Mr. McGhee said that Ato Aklilou had suggested two steps which might be taken now: (1) To have the US, UK and France make either a tripartite statement, or parallel statements in the General Assembly emphasizing the importance they attached to reaching a settlement at this session; and (2) to have the UK Foreign Minister tell Count Sforza that if Italy was not willing to agree to some reasonable solution to the Eritrean question the UK would consider withdrawing from Eritrea. Mr. Wright said the British legal advisers felt there was no obligation on the UK to remain in Eritrea indefinitely in the absence of some settlement of the problem. It would not, of course, obstruct UN efforts in Eritrea, but its duties under the peace treaty were “permissive” in nature. This meant that if the GA proposed some unsatisfactory solution, such as independence or trusteeship, the UK would feel that it was free to leave immediately; or, if there were no solution at this time, the UK would feel justified in carrying out in Eritrea what it believes to be the real wishes of the inhabitants. Mr. Wright said the Chief Administrator had already warned that there would be great danger in trying to put into effect even the federative solution and Mr. Allen pointed out that the UK’s support for federation was contingent on Italian as well as Ethiopian agreement to this sort of settlement. Mr. McGhee and Mr. Kopper said this appeared to diverge considerably from our own concept of our responsibilities in the matter. We had made clear that the solution had to be acceptable to the Ethiopians but did not at all feel we were obligated in the same sense to the Italians. We felt that in the last analysis we would be entitled to push through federation, if possible, even against Italian opposition. Mr. Wright said that we must bear in mind, however, that the Italian elements in Eritrea could cause difficulties if the UK Government endeavored to put into effect a federation settlement which was not approved by the Italian Government. The discussion was resumed in the afternoon with Mr. Wright referring to the difficult and unstable internal situation within Eritrea. In the event that the GA failed to reach an agreement along the lines of the federation formula, Mr. Wright foresaw two alternative situations arising: 1. The GA might pass some undesirable resolution, such as one for independence after a period of trusteeship. In these circumstances, the United Kingdom would be inclined to withdraw from Eritrea and leave the implementation of the resolution to someone else, perhaps to the UN itself. It would, of course, be necessary for the United Kingdom to make clear beforehand that it did not agree with a decision which did not correspond with the clearly expressed wishes of the inhabitants. Withdrawal under these circumstances would, according to the views of the Foreign Office’s Legal Advisers, be justified. 2. The GA might fail to reach any decision whatsoever. If this were the case, there would be reason to fear trouble within the territory and the task of administering would be greatly complicated. The provisional thinking at the departmental level in the Foreign Office is that the United Kingdom would have three choices in such a contingency: a . To implement unilaterally the original US–UK proposal for partition of the territory with the cession of Eastern Eritrea to Ethiopia. b . To withdraw from the territory altogether soon after the General Assembly’s failure to reach a decision. c . To remain on the present basis until the next session of the General Assembly could consider the matter again, which the United Kingdom would be most reluctant to do. Mr. McGhee felt, and Mr. Wright concurred, that all of the alternatives involving unilateral action would have grave repercussions and that this high-lighted the necessity for a decision of this problem at this session of the General Assembly. It was agreed that both the United States and the United Kingdom should continue their efforts to promote a settlement along the lines of federation. It was also agreed, however, that we should not ask the Ethiopians to make further concessions for the sake of agreement. The most hopeful lines seem to be: 1. To endeavor to obtain Italian acceptance of the present federation formula; or, failing this, 2. To endeavor to push the present federation proposals through the General Assembly even in the face of Italian opposition by breaking up the Latin American bloc. Mr. McGhee felt that the United Kingdom should not hesitate to warn the Italians and other delegations of the probable repercussions in the territory if no decision or an undesirable decision is reached, placing particular emphasis on the fact that it may be impossible to restrain the inhabitants from seeking to realize their clearly expressed wishes. If, despite these warnings, the federation proposal failed, the justification for the United Kingdom proceeding to take unilateral action would appear to be enhanced. Mr. Wright pointed out that the United Kingdom has never regarded federation as the best solution for Eritrea. As administering authority in the territory, it does not want to be in the position of championing a solution which it was not convinced is best adapted for the country. Mr. McGhee felt that it could be left to the United States and other delegations to champion the federation formula, provided that the United Kingdom would not oppose it. Mr. Kopper inquired whether there would be any useful purpose in considering leaving the problem of the Western Province in abeyance for the time being. This might aid in securing Moslem support. Mr. Wright and Mr. Allen said that the UK would be willing to stay on for a longer period there if it would help solve the remainder of the problem satisfactorily to Ethiopia. It was agreed that the UK and US delegations should keep this possibility in mind during the coming UN discussions. Mr. Wright said that the Foreign Office would prepare a telegram to the UK Delegation in New York setting forth its understanding of the day’s discussion on Eritrea. Mr. McGhee agreed to look the telegram over before its despatch. 2 1 McGhee was en route to a conference of U.S. diplomatic officers in Tangiers; for documentation on this conference, see pp. 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] ff. 2 An abbreviated text of this memorandum, concurred in by McGhee, was transmitted from London in telegram 1754, September 22, not printed (357.AH/9–2250). The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate in Tunisia 357.AH/9–2650: Telegram [Document 904] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate in Tunisia secret night action Washington , September 26, 1950—7 p. m. 20. For McGhee. I. Progress report re Eritrea: Brit FonOff report of its conversation with you Sep 19 re Eritrea arrived Bevin’s Lake Success office Sep 21 as Sforza entered for Eritrea talk with Bevin so Stafford 1 unable show Bevin report first. Bevin appealed to Sforza to agree to draft res. Sforza explained grave polit risks ItalGovt wld run in accepting present proposal. He felt we were asking Itals to support a plan which wld be opposed in Assembly: nevertheless if Assembly passes such res without Ital support they wld bow to the decision. Bevin asked whether it wld help if Brit wld remain for three years instead of two and if para were inserted in res providing that administering power or Commissioner report to UN on any point where the rigid wording of res was operating in such way to make setting up of the federation unworkable and causing great difficulty. In such case, adjustments in res cld be considered and approved. Count Sforza agreed refer these questions his govt. It was made clear to Itals that if they like above suggestion it will be for them to take initiative to present it to four mediating dels for subsequent submission to Ethios. UKDel informally advised Ethios of Bevin’s suggestion. Ethios were extremely upset and state they wld not accept either of Bevin’s suggestions. Aklilou demanded mtg with Bevin and pressed for withdrawal Bevin’s suggestion. Bevin replied he was merely trying to help and if his suggestion not considered helpful by either party he wld not press it. At noon Sept 26 Noyes reported SecState has requested briefing paper 2 for talks Sept 26 or 27 with Aklilou, Bevin and Sforza. Itals have not accepted Bevin suggestion of Sept 22 but have come back requesting further concessions. Noyes did not specify what concessions were. This may provide opportunity drop Bevin suggestion. According to Noyes SecState plans make strong plea for federation formula and seems prepared to proceed with this formula with or without Itals. USUN considering campaign line up LADels for federation even in face Ital opposition. II. Spencer indicated to Noyes Sept 22 that EthioDel still hoping solution of Eritrean problem cld be reached on basis compromise federation formula. Ethios remain strongly opposed to any changes in Sept 9 working draft. 3 Spencer indicated that they had considered a deadlock in Assembly and a de facto solution as unattractive last resort and he recognized that there were certain risks involved for Ethiopia in pressing that course of action. Spencer seemed favorably inclined to explore all possible ways of getting present compromise accepted by GA. It was clear that they would seek for maximum assurances that res would be approved before it is introduced, but Spencer appeared to realize that as practical matter they wld have to accept certain risks if this course were attempted. In the course of conversation it developed that Ethios might conceivably be prepared to broaden present negot to include other matters with a view to helping Ital Govt face its polit problems and perhaps saving face. On an entirely personal basis, the fol program was developed: Spencer to consult Aklilou as to his attitude towards this; Noyes indicated he wld consult Dept. The program wld contemplate that US or US and UK or negots group of US and UK and Mexico wld submit to both Ethios and Itals a suggestion that they shld agree to fol points: (1) text of Sep 9 draft res on Eritrea; (2) that Ethio wld withdraw its objections to Ital Somalil trusteeship agreement and that suitable arrangement be made with re to Ital Somalil-Ethio boundary; (3) that Ethio wld send a reparations commission to Italy immed to work out and settle reparations question; (4) that Ethio wld retain the services of some fifty Ital experts within Ethio; (5) that the two govts agree to establish dipl relations. No effort was made to formulate above points but they were simply given as example of items which might conceivably be included in such agreement. Spencer seemed to conceive this agreement as doc which wld be published and which cld therefore be used by Ital Govt to justify itself before parliament. Spencer requested that this “package” plan be kept very confidential and entirely within US Govt until he had discussed it with Aklilou. Noyes indicated his personal view that a new approach to Eritrean problem along this line might well provide basis for solution. He agreed to take no further action without further consultation with Spencer except to obtain Dept’s views. On Sep 25 Dept informed Noyes by wire that Dept favored considering this plan provided: (1) Reference in published statement to Eritrea question shld be so phrased as leave no doubt that parties agree that authority to provide for future of Eritrea rests with UNGA. (2) Specific terms shld be as gen as possible and shld be worked out by Itals and Ethios themselves with such help as can appropriately be given them. Believed attempt to provide in detail for all matters outstanding bet Ital and Ethio wld entail prolonged argument and might jeopardize success of rapprochement . (3) USDel shld handle matter so as carefully to avoid US assuming commitment as patron of the arrangement which might later entail assertion by either or both sides that we must act as arbiters in this execution. Believer USDel shld work in closest consultation with UKDel and that both Ital and Ethio dels shld be brought into the picture at earliest practicable moment consonant with achieving success. Spencer has discussed this “pkg” plan with Aklilou who is agreeable to having Noyes outline “pkg” plan to Stafford to obtain Brit reaction. Noyes also reported noon Sept 26 that at same time that federation draft is being pushed he and Stafford will try to get Aklilou agreement to presentation “pkg” plan to Sforza. Approach to Itals wld be along line that while US and UK are prepared to push federation proposal without Itals, they much prefer reach solution acceptable to Itals and are proposing “pkg” plan as way of making federation proposal sufficiently palatable to Itals to permit acceptance. Webb 1 Frank E. Stafford, a member of the United Kingdom Delegation at the United Nations. 2 A copy of this briefing paper is in file 357.AH/9–2250. 3 The September 9 draft was a revision of the August 24 draft (telegram 364, p. 1667 [ Pg. 1667 includes portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] ) which attempted to meet the several Italian objections to the latter. The revisions were indicated in telegram 497, from New York, September 9, not printed (357.AH/9–950). The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 320/9–2750: Telegram [Document 905] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State secret priority New York , September 27, 1950—12:02 p. m. Delga 39. In a conversation between the Secretary and Mr. Bevin regarding Eritrea, Bevin said that he had made certain “procedural” suggestions which he had hoped would aid the solution of the problem. He said that the Italians and the Ethiopians did not like the suggestion, the US did not like the suggestion, and he was not wedded to it. He said he was willing to drop the proposals he had made. Bevin went on to say that the Eritrean problem had been going on for many years and that his government did not feel any progress was being made. He said that the British were inclined to want to withdraw from Eritrea. The Secretary said that he would get in touch with Count Sforza and talk to him forcefully about the problem. He said he would try to get the Italians to acquiesce in the compromise which was presently under consideration. The Secretary said that he would get Count Sforza to tell the South American countries that although the Italians did not like the compromise, they would acquiesce. The Secretary said that the US was opposed to the British threat to withdraw from Eritrea. He said that such a threat might boomerang and result in the Italians getting together enough votes to put through something which would not achieve useful purposes. Both Mr. Bevin and the Secretary agreed to cooperate in getting favorable action on the compromise as it exists. 1 Acheson 1 Secretary Acheson also discussed Eritrea with Sforza on September 27. After outlining the Italian position, Sforza said that they were not really satisfied with the federation proposal, but that they would bow to the decision of the General Assembly. Sforza further stated that he would not attempt to arouse other delegations against the compromise Muniz draft, but, if asked, he would have to say that he opposed it for good reasons, mentioning specifically the problems of police, taxation, and the protection of Italians in Ethiopia. The U.S. Mission at the United Nations reported this conversation in telegram 621, from New York, September 28, not printed (320/9–2850). Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred E. Wellons of the Office of African Affairs 357.AH/11–150 [Document 906] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alfred E. Wellons of the Office of African Affairs secret Washington , November 1, 1950. Subject: Eritrea Participants: The Secretary NEA—Mr. McGhee AF—Mr. Bourgerie AF—Mr. Wellons Since the Secretary had asked for an explanation of developments concerning the disposition of Eritrea in the General Assembly, Mr. McGhee summarized the events of the last few days. The Secretary mentioned that a recent telegram from Rome (1841, October 25 1 ) confirmed the position which Count Sforza had taken with him in a conversation in New York in September. 2 The Secretary asked what progress was being made to resolve the points at issue in the formula for the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. Mr. McGhee said that the latest information from our delegation in New York (he had discussed the matter with Mr. Noyes by telephone this afternoon) generally confirmed the new instructions which had been sent to Mr. Brusasca by the Italian Government authorizing public Italian support of the Muniz draft proposal provided certain changes were incorporated in it. He reported Mr. Noyes’ feeling that compromises could probably be worked out with regard to taxation, police, and the nationality of inhabitants of mixed Italian and Eritrean parentage. The most difficult point, however, would involve the right of the Federal Government to station troops in Eritrea. Mr. Noyes had reported that the first reaction of the Ethiopians was that they would not make any of the changes but that they were adamant only with regard to this matter of armed forces. The Secretary agreed that any federal government must have the right, if it is to defend the country, to station troops in any part of the territory. The Secretary recalled that Count Sforza had assured him (in their conversation on September 27, 1950) that if suitable changes were made in the federation formula on the remaining unsettled points, the Italian delegation would be able to support it. He also recalled that Count Sforza had assured him that if these points could not be met, the Italians still would not attempt to arouse other delegations to oppose the compromise plan. Mr. McGhee pointed out that since that conversation, the Italians had apparently made representations to certain governments to persuade them not to support the federation formula. In particular, he referred to the successful approach made by the Italian Ambassador at Ankara which resulted in the Turkish delegation withdrawing from cosponsorship of the draft resolution. Mr. McGhee said that the proof of this was contained in the memorandum of the conversation which Mr. Noyes had with Mr. Kural of the Turkish delegation in New York on October 19, 1950. Mr. Bourgerie brought up the report received today that the Italians had made representations in Wellington, New Zealand, against the Eritrean federation plan; he referred also to rumors that the Italians had approached other members of the UN. The Secretary stated that if this were the case, it was clearly a breach of faith on the basis of his understanding with Court Sforza and that he was quite prepared to bring the matter directly to the attention of the Italian Foreign Minister. Mr. McGhee said that the Italian delegation at Lake Success now appeared to be willing to give written assurances that if certain changes were made in the federation formula, they would be willing to support it publicly. He felt this was encouraging and said that if such assurances were made, then we could go to the Ethiopians and urge them to accept at least some of the changes desired by the Italians. However, Mr. McGhee felt that no further approach should be made to the Ethiopians until such specific assurances were obtained from the Italians—Mr. Noyes said that he had asked Mr. Brusasca for some such statement in a day or two. Mr. McGhee said that the Ethiopians had made many concessions over several months of negotiations and had discovered when it came to the last days of the Interim Committee early in September that the Italians had pulled the rug from under them by rejecting the federation formula at the last minute. He was certain that they would not agree to any changes unless a very strong statement of support was made by the Italians in advance. The Secretary stated that our course of action should be as follows: (1) To press the Italians to give adequate written assurances of their support, or of the circumstances under which they could support the federation formula, and then to urge the Ethiopians to accept the necessary changes in order to obtain a decision by the General Assembly this year. (2) If the Italians do not give such written assurances soon, then the Secretary said he would send a personal message to Count Sforza to remind him of the position he had taken during their conversation in September. 3 1 Not printed. It reported that the Italian Foreign Office was confident that the General Assembly would find a solution to the Eritrean problem and reaffirmed its position of accepting the Muniz draft federation proposal provided that safeguards were added concerning internal security, taxation, and the status of inhabitants of mixed Italian and Eritrean parentage. (765.02/10–2550) 2 Regarding Secretary Acheson’s conversation with Sforza on September 27, see footnote 1, supra . 3 On November 6 in Gadel 97, to Austin, signed personally by Secretary Acheson, the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations was informed of the substance of this position (320/11–650). Editorial Note [Document 907] Editorial Note On December 2, 1950, the General Assembly adopted the 14-nation federation plan for the disposition of Eritrea. The vote was 46 in favor, 10 against, and 4 abstentions. The General Assembly decisively rejected Soviet and Polish proposals for independence, previously defeated in the Ad Hoc Political Committee. At the same session, the General Assembly appointed a committee to nominate one or more candidates for the post of United Nations Commissioner for Eritrea. For the text of the final decision of the General Assembly on Eritrea, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Plenary Meetings , pages 529 ff. Hereafter cited as GA (V), Plenary . On December 2, 1950, the General Assembly also adopted the trusteeship agreement for Somaliland under Italian administration, previously approved by the Trusteeship Council on January 27, 1950. The vote in the General Assembly was 44 in favor, 6 against, and no abstentions. The agreement imposed on Italy as the administering authority the obligation to establish political institutions, to promote economic development, to further the social development of the inhabitants, to establish an educational system, and to guarantee civil rights in the trust territory. Attached to the agreement was a declaration of constitutional principles which formed an integral part of the agreement. The declaration guaranteed the rights of the inhabitants of Somaliland and the development of governmental institutions to aid in the achievement of self-government and independence by December 2, 1960, ten years from the date of the General Assembly’s approval of the agreement. For the text of the agreement approved by the General Assembly, see United Nations, Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Fifth Session, Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration as Approved by the General Assembly on 2 December, 1950 . For the proceedings of the General Assembly with respect to its vote on the agreement, see GA (V), Plenary , pages 547 ff. Editorial Note [Document 908] Editorial Note The problem of Eritrea was considered in the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the United Nations between November 9 and 26. At an early stage a number of delegations indicated support for a federation plan as suggested by the Burmese and South African members in the report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea, GA (V), Suppl. No. 8 . Ethiopia stated its distinct preference for union, while Italy, concerned with the future status of the Italian minority in Eritrea, argued in favor of independence. The United States initially stated that it favored incorporation of the territory into Ethiopia, but expressed willingness to support a compromise proposal for federation. After suspension of debate in the Committee for several days, a compromise federation plan was submitted under the sponsorship of 14 members of the Committee. The United States formally presented this plan to the Committee on November 20, 1950. The United States Delegate pointed out that the plan did much to reconcile the wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea, the interests of peace and security in East Africa, and the rights and claims of Ethiopia. Eritrean unity would be preserved and self-government for Eritrea would be assured by its establishment as an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the Ethiopian Crown. The federal government would have jurisdiction over defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, foreign and interstate commerce, and external and interstate communications, including ports. Eritrea would assess and collect the necessary taxes and maintain its own police system. The religious and civil rights of minorities in Eritrea would be guaranteed. A single nationality would prevail throughout the federation. The 14-state plan also provided for a United Nations Commissioner, assisted by experts, to prepare a draft constitution for Eritrea and to assist an Eritrean Assembly in its consideration of the constitution. The Federation would come into effect after approval of the Eritrean constitution by the Eritrean Assembly, the United Nations Commissioner, and the Ethiopian Emperor. During the transition period, until September 15, 1952, the United Kingdom would continue as the administering authority and would take the necessary steps leading to the convening of an Eritrean Assembly and the organization of governmental organs staffed by Eritreans. On November 26, the 14-state plan was adopted by the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the United Nations by a vote of 38 in favor, 14 against, and 8 abstentions. For the discussions on the 14-state plan in the Ad Hoc Political Committee from November 8 through November 25, see GA (V), Ad Hoc Political Committee , pages 221–355. The Alternate United States Representative at the United Nations (Ross) to the Secretary of State 320/12–250: Telegram [Document 909] The Alternate United States Representative at the United Nations ( Ross ) to the Secretary of State confidential New York , December 2, 1950—1 p. m. Delga 355. Eritrea—urtel 151. 1 US and UK delegates have been making every effort since passage of Eritrean resolution by ad hoc committee to bring Italian and Ethiopian delegates together. Agreement was reached in principle Wednesday afternoon that both delegates would attend luncheon shortly after passage by Plenary of Eritrean resolution. Invitations have been issued and accepted for luncheon on Tuesday. Aklilou has sent messages through us to Brusasca that he would like to discuss with him at that time question of re-opening diplomatic relations, as well as a number of other matters of interest to the two countries. Both delegates are very pleased at present arrangements. They have both agreed that this luncheon shall be given publicity and Aklilou has asked that some mention be made in public announcement that delegates discussed possibility of resuming diplomatic relations. Aklilou has given us informal indications that Ethiopian delegation will withdraw its proposal in respect to Somaliland trusteeship agreement to obtain a legal opinion on its validity. They have also given us indications that they will be conciliatory on question of finding a solution to Somaliland-Ethiopian boundary problem. We shall continue to do all we can to help two delegations achieve rapprochement . Ross 1 Not printed; it reported that Tarchiani had called on McGhee on November 30 to ask for U.S. help in bringing the Italians and Ethiopians together for informal conversations that might lead to the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two states. (320/12–150) Editorial Note [Document 910] Editorial Note During the month of January 1950 the United Nations Trusteeship Council, meeting in special session in New York, appointed a Committee for Italian Somaliland to seek agreement on the text of a draft trusteeship agreement for Italian Somaliland prior to the sixth session of the Trusteeship Council. The United States was a member of the Committee for Italian Somaliland, together with participating representatives of Italy, Egypt, and Colombia. With Ethiopia represented by observers, the committee negotiated a draft trusteeship agreement, the Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration , which was unanimously adopted by the Trusteeship Council on January 27, 1950. In accordance with the General Assembly Resolution of November 1949 on the former Italian colonies (see Foreign Relations , 1949, volume IV, pages 526 ff.), the United Kingdom turned over the administration of Somaliland to Italy on April 1, 1950. For additional information pertaining to the trust territory of Somaliland, see the editorial notes on pages 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] and 1688 [ Pg. 1688 is part of Doc. 908 ] . For the text of the draft trusteeship agreement, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement No. 10, Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration . Ethiopia Ethiopia Contents Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Ethiopia (Documents 911-919) Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Ethiopia Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Ethiopia [911] President Truman to the Emperor of Ethiopia (Haile Selassie) Washington [undated]. 110.15 Mc/2–2150 [912] Aide-Mémoire Prepared by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Addis Ababa,] March 16, 1950. 775.00/3–1550 [913] Aide-Mémoire by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie [Washington, April 13, 1950.] 110.15 Mc/4–2750 [914] The Ambassador in Ethiopia (Merrell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, August 12, 1950—3 p. m. 775.00/8–1250: Telegram [915] Editorial Note [916] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia Washington, October 4, 1950—9 p. m. 795b.5/9–550: Telegram [917] The Ambassador in Ethiopia (Merrell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, November 14, 1950—6 p. m. 775.00/11–1550: Telegram [918] The Ambassador in Ethiopia (Merrell) to the Secretary of State Addis Ababa, December 6, 1950—3 p. m. 775.00/12–650: Telegram [919] Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Office of African Affairs [Washington,] December 11, 1950. President Truman to the Emperor of Ethiopia (Haile Selassie) 110.15 Mc/2–2150 [Document 911] President Truman to the Emperor of Ethiopia ( Haile Selassie ) 1 Washington [undated]. Great and Good Friend : I am sending you this letter by Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of African affairs, who is making a visit to your country as a representative of this Government. The excellent relations which presently exist between our two countries are most gratifying to me. I take this occasion to reaffirm to you the whole-hearted desire of my Government to maintain and strengthen these relations. We in the United States have followed with interest and admiration the continued progress of your country, since the end of the war. I have been particularly impressed with your personal interest and success in expanding the educational facilities of Ethiopia. In this regard, I am informed that a new university is now in the process of being established. You have my sincere best wishes that upon its completion it will serve as a monument to your splendid efforts in this field. I avail myself of this opportunity to wish you much continued success and good health. Faithfully yours, [ Harry S. Truman ] 1 This draft letter was transmitted on February 21 by Secretary Acheson to President Truman for his signature (110.15 Mc/2–2150). Presumably the President signed the draft and McGhee delivered it to Emperor Haile Selassie during his audience on March 15. McGhee had arrived in Addis Ababa on March 14 after serving as chairman of the Conference of U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Officers in West and East Africa held in Lourengo Marques, Mozambique, from February 27 through March 2. Prior to the conference McGhee had visited Liberia, where he delivered a similar letter to President Tubman. Aide-Mémoire Prepared by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 775.00/3–1550 [Document 912] Aide-Mémoire Prepared by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Aide-Mémoire of the Audience Held on 15 th March , 1950 at the Imperial Palace, Addis Ababa, Granted by His Imperial Majesty to the Honourable George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Present: His Excellency Ato Aklilou Abte Wold, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, and the Honourable George S. Merrell, American Ambassador, Addis Ababa. His Majesty wished, first of all, to express His deep appreciation for the assistance which the American Government has continuously accorded Ethiopia as regards the Eritrean question. 1 This assistance, in so far as Eritrea is concerned, has been total and all that His Majesty could have desired. His Majesty repeated His most sincere expression of appreciation. 2) As regards the question of Eritrea, since the problem had been studied in 1947 by the Commission of Investigation of the Four Great Powers which visited that territory, the conditions have changed even more clearly in favour of Ethiopia. In the first place, the new Commission of the United Nations has already been able to determine that the followers of union with Ethiopia, with the exception, perhaps, of the Western Province, have a clear majority everywhere, even at Massawa, where recently it has been demonstrated and noted by the Commission itself that a very clear and in fact, an overwhelming majority exists in favour of Ethiopia. On the other hand, the opponents of union, under Italian pressure, had united in the so-called “Independence Front”. However, scarcely had that Front been established than the Eritreans themselves came to realize that they had been made the dupes of the Italian Government, and, in consequence, they did not fail thereupon to withdraw from this so-called Front as is evidenced by the establishment of the new Moslem League in the Western Province, the independent Moslem League in Massawa and by the recent defection of the liberal progressists. These defections had been promoted by the fact that the Italian system of bribery had become a matter of public notoriety. All the members of the Commission, the British Government, the Unionists, and His Imperial Majesty possess such undeniable and striking proofs of that bribery that no one attempts now to deny it. It has become an open secret. These activities on the part of Italy have disgusted the majority of the Eritreans, and have had as a result the practical break-up of the Independence Front. On the other hand, they have likewise been largely responsible for the disturbances of the peace in Eritrea. Not only has Italy sought to purchase the votes of the population, but also through her adherents to the so-called Independence Front she has provoked acts of violence in Eritrea, which in their turn have led to reactions of indignation on the part of a population, outraged by these actions of violence and of bribery. 3) His Imperial Majesty criticized sharply the attitude of Guatemala and Pakistan who refuse, as always, to recognize the realities of the situation. However, the other members of the United Nations Commission seem to be convinced of the strength of the demand for union in Eritrea. His Imperial Majesty recognized that Pakistan and Guatemala are simply playing the Italian game as they had done at the United Nations and that they would do everything in their power by fair means or foul to oppose union with Ethiopia. 4) His Majesty pointed out that three factors therefore contributed to the tense situation existing in Eritrea as well as on the southern frontiers of Ethiopia. There was in the first place the very marked increase in force of the unionist movement in Eritrea. On the other hand, there was the anxiety created throughout East Africa by the presence of Italy in Somaliland. Finally, there is the almost fanatic opposition of the Eritrean population to the Italian activities being carried on there under the formula of independence. These factors have produced such a state of tension in Eritrea that if the Commission of Investigation or the Interim Committee of the General Assembly itself under pressure from Pakistan or Guatemala or from the Secretariat of the United Nations which for some time has been seeking to influence the Assembly in favour of a United Nations Trusteeship, should fail in June to recognize the realities of the situation in Eritrea, the situation, now already critical, will become intolerable. In such a situation, without Ethiopia’s having the least degree of responsibility or initiative in the matter, there would certainly be a general uprising of the population now fanatic in its demand for union as a result of long delays and frustrations. His Imperial Majesty remarked that certainty the Honourable Assistant Secretary of State was in possession of reports on conditions in Eritrea and would certainly interpret the situation in the same way. 5) For all of these reasons, His Majesty has constantly been prepared to listen to all advice which the American Government—a government which His Majesty considers as animated by the most sincere feelings of friendship—may desire to furnish. Notwithstanding His Majesty’s pessimism stemming from Italian activities in Eritrea, he had never refused to examine the situation together with the Americans. However, one cannot ignore the fact that the Italian Government rejected the American formula for agreement presented at the end of January. It is time that the latter finally commence to recognize that, unless she immediately makes a volte face , she alone will be responsible for the uprising of the population and for a total impasse in the efforts to establish peace in East Africa. For these reasons and notwithstanding these instances of bad faith on the part of Italy, His Majesty feels that it would be highly desirable that the American Government should attempt now to settle the situation in favour of Ethiopia, a solution the necessity of which has already been recognized by the majority of the United Nations Commission, that is to say, by Norway, Burma, and South Africa. 6) Another question which His Majesty wished to raise with the Honourable Assistant Secretary of State was the granting of loans by the Export Import Bank and assistance under Point Four of the Truman Programme. 2 It was pointed out that the Assistant Secretary certainly did not ignore the fact that notwithstanding war devastations in the country, Ethiopia has been able to maintain a sound currency. Ethiopia, for example, has been the only country in the Middle East not to devaluate its currency with reference to the American dollar. Moreover, it is a rather striking fact that since the war, exports from Ethiopia to the United States have taken the first place in the foreign trade of Ethiopia far exceeding exports to other countries of the Middle East and to Europe. It is believed that this development is a healthy trend in international trade, and has been a cause of great satisfaction to His Imperial Majesty, the more so in that it strengthens the ties existing between the two countries. Ethiopia, however, stands in need of greatly increasing her means of production and of transportation and, certainly in this respect, the United States is in the best position for aiding in this development, by experts and capital. Already the Sinclair Petroleum Company is pursuing its activities in Ethiopia in complete freedom and tranquility. Also the Ethiopian Air Lines which is under American administration has already acquired an enviable reputation abroad. His Imperial Majesty is, therefore, confident that, with the co-operation of the United States through the investment of capital by the Export Import Bank and through Point Four of the Truman Programme, Ethiopia will enter upon a period of great economic development. In this connection, the problem has been carefully and fully studied during the past five years by American experts and detailed reports and plans have already been submitted to the American Government. The time has now come to place them into operation in the industrial and especially in the transport fields. This need is the more urgent in that His Majesty desires that Ethiopia endeavour without delay to bring about a simultaneous development of the two ports of Massawa and Assab as well as of the roads linking these two ports with the interior. Massawa is certainly the port which entails the greatest importance for Ethiopia, but Assab should not be ignored inasmuch as it should serve as the outlet for the pipeline which the Sinclair Petroleum Company would eventually wish to construct in Ethiopia. 7) It is for these reasons that His Imperial Majesty desires to see the earliest possible consummation of the loan by the Export Import Bank of a sum sufficient to constitute a serious and important contribution to the development of the country in the industrial and transport fields. As regards Point Four of the Truman Programme, His Majesty welcomed with great satisfaction the news that the Department of State had recommended to Congress the allocation of an important sum for a detailed programme of assistance in Ethiopia. His Majesty, therefore, wishes that the Assistant Secretary of State might bring his influence to bear for the prompt execution of this programme. It is the view of His Majesty that the assistance involved under Point Four might best be effected by arrangements concluded directly between the two countries in question rather than by the intermediary of third parties or of international organisations such as the United Nations. 8) His Majesty then raised the question of the request addressed to the American Government for permission to purchase certain arms and war materials as well as a small quantity of fighter planes. 3 It was recalled that the Ethiopian Government had sought permission to purchase approximately thirty fighter planes called Hell-Divers fully equipped and armed. It would appear, however, that the American Navy has been unable to grant the requested permission. In view of this difficulty, the Ethiopian Government has been obliged to seek for other types of fighter planes, likewise equipped with their armaments as, for example, the fighter plane called the “Corsair”, which would appear to be particularly well adapted to Ethiopia’s needs and to the programme of instruction being followed at the aviation school at Bishoftu. The Ethiopian army is now well trained and the military aviation is a cause of great satisfaction. With the increase in national and international responsibilities resulting from the eventual return of Eritrea, it is necessary that these purchase orders in the various fields of armament and aviation be completed with the least possible delay. His Majesty would, therefore, be grateful for such steps as might be taken to expedite these purchases. 9) In closing, His Majesty again reiterated his profound and sincere appreciation for the continued assistance and support which Ethiopia has received from the American Government dating from the dark period of the Italian occupation, when the United States was one of the few countries to refuse to recognize the Italian regime. 4 Since then, through Lend-Lease 5 and other means of economic as well as social and cultural assistance, the American Government has never failed to demonstrate its friendly attitude towards Ethiopia. The recent months during which the Department of State has so loyally supported the Ethiopian Delegation at the United Nations is therefore a period which His Majesty contemplates with the greatest satisfaction and which calls from Him the renewed expression of His sincere appreciation. [ Addis Ababa ,] March 16, 1950. 1 For documentation on Eritrea, see pp. 1640 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] ff. 2 For documentation on the Point Four Program, see vol. i , pp. 846 ff. 3 The Embassy in Addis Ababa was approached on March 6 by Ato Zaude Gabre Hetwot, Director General of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a request for assistance in procuring surplus military aircraft from the United States. (Telegram 46, from Addis Ababa, March 6, 775.5622/3–650). 4 For documentation relating to the nonrecognition by the United States of the Italian annexation of Ethiopia, see Foreign Relations , 1936, vol. iii , pp. 330 – 341 ; ibid. , 1937, vol. ii , pp. 679 – 717 ; and ibid. , 1938, vol. ii , pp. 723 – 726 . 5 For documentation relating to the Ethiopian request for Lend-Lease assistance, see ibid. , 1943, vol. iv , pp. 82 – 123 . Aide-Mémoire by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie 110.15 Mc/4–2750 [Document 913] Aide-Mémoire by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie confidential The Assistant Secretary of State wishes to express his sincere appreciation to His Imperial Majesty for granting him an audience on March 15, 1950, at the Imperial Palace in Addis Ababa for the purpose of discussing current political and economic issues of concern to the Governments of the United States of America and Ethiopia. 1. With reference to His Imperial Majesty’s statement concerning Eritrea, the Assistant Secretary assured His Imperial Majesty that the United States Government has not changed its point of view with respect to the future status of this territory and that it continues to support the cession to Ethiopia of all of Eritrea except, the Western Provinces, which it feels should be annexed to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. However, since the General Assembly at its last session established a Commission to investigate Eritrea and to submit a report with recommendations on the future of the territory to be considered by the Interim Committee and the General Assembly, Mr. McGhee said the United States will, of course, have to take the report of the Commission into consideration. 2. Mr. McGhee stated that the United States appreciates the action taken by the Ethiopian Government in using its influence to suppress tendencies on the part of those sympathetic to the Ethiopian point of view to engage in civil disorders in both Eritrea and Somaliland. Mr. McGhee also expressed the hope that the Ethiopian Government will continue to follow this policy until such time as a full settlement of the Eritrean problem can be reached. 3. His Imperial Majesty was assured that the Department would continue to support Ethiopia’s request for loans from the Export-Import Bank for projects which meet the standards set up by that organization. In this regard, His Imperial Majesty was further assured that similar requests made by the Ethiopian Government for loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would also receive the Department’s sympathetic consideration and support. 4. On the subject of Point IV assistance, His Imperial Majesty was assured that such assistance for Ethiopia had been included in the plans drawn up by the Department of State and that when the program is approved by the Congress of the United States the Department will be glad to enter into discussions with the Ethiopian Government on the details of implementing the Point IV program for Ethiopia. 5. Mr. McGhee commented on the good impression made in the United States by the cordial relations existing between the Ethiopian Government and those American firms now operating in that country. Mr. McGhee expressed the hope that the climate for the investment of American capital in Ethiopia would continue to be favorable and that it might be further improved through the negotiation of a Treaty of Commerce and Friendship between the two countries. 6. His Imperial Majesty was assured that the Department will reexamine Ethiopia’s request for fighter planes for its Air Force and will assist in every appropriate way the officers of the Ethiopian Government to find suitable planes through commercial channels. Mr. McGhee suggested that when the Ethiopian Government finds it possible to obtain the type of planes they require, the Department will endeavor to expedite the granting of licenses for the export of these aircraft. In conclusion, Mr. McGhee assured His Imperial Majesty of the importance which the United States attached to Ethiopia as a stabilizing influence in its part of the world, and of our desire to assist Ethiopia in its development. He expressed his keen satisfaction with the cordial relations which now exist between the two countries, and expressed his belief that this long standing friendship would continue to be maintained and strengthened. 1 [ Washington , April 13, 1950.] 1 A copy of this aide-mémoire was transmitted as an enclosure to instruction No. 10 to Addis Ababa, April 13, not printed (775.00/3–1550). Ambassador Merrell delivered the aide-mémoire on April 27 to the private secretary to the Emperor. (Despatch 89, April 27, from Addis Ababa, not printed; 110.15 Mc/4–2750). A summary of the discussion between the Emperor and McGhee and copies of the two aide-mémoires were sent to Secretary Acheson as attachments to a memorandum from McGhee which stated in part as follows: “In view of the present excellent relations which exist between Ethiopia and the United States, the growing interest of American business seeking to enter Ethiopia and the strategic location of that country, I believe that the substance of this conversation will be of interest to you and the President.” (110.15 Mc/4—1950) On April 27 Secretary Acheson left a copy of the summary with the President. (Memorandum for the President, April 27, not printed; 110.15 Mc/4–2750). The Ambassador in Ethiopia (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 775.00/8–1250: Telegram [Document 914] The Ambassador in Ethiopia ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Addis Ababa , August 12, 1950—3 p. m. 45. Emperor’s private secretary called and left following memorandum with me this morning: “His Imperial Majesty has expressed his will to help the friendly government of US in its struggle in Korea on behalf of UN. “As Ambassador is probably aware, principal difficulties which have prevented His Imperial Majesty from carrying out what he has in mind are the limited transport and total lack of port facilities of Ethiopia for the sending of troops and the continuous provisions thereafter of rations and supplies. “Ethiopia has respected her international obligations and has been and continues to be a firm believer in collective security. The stand Ethiopia took in 1935 and 36 against Fascist invasion is proof of this. He still believes in justice of UN and collective security and does not swerve from this belief. His Imperial Majesty is guiding the international affairs of Ethiopia along these lines. The assistance so far accorded Ethiopia by US has not enabled Ethiopia to do as much as she would have liked in carrying out these sacred principles. Ethiopia will always be found at side of democratic Governments either in war or peace, and particularly at side of her friends, US and UK and she is hopeful of receiving assistance from these governments in order to carry out her desires in this respect. His Imperial Majesty, informed of the assistance given to other countries, does not wish to conceal his surprise at Ethiopia not having received comparable assistance from US to enable him to carry forward his economic development plans. “Italy, who yesterday violated her obligations to the League of Nations and the principles of collective security and made a war of aggression against Ethiopia, and who today presents herself as another Italy, has received considerable military and economic assistance from America, in order to save herself from sinking into sea of Communism. But Ethiopia, who has held constantly to the same principles in the past and present and who nevertheless was victim of aggression, has not received any such assistance in her military and economic recovery from aggression. Italy has been allowed to return to Somalia, about which Ethiopia protested before UN and is now parading her tanks and airplanes in this neighboring territory as a threat to Ethiopia. His Imperial Majesty’s Government has not been able to buy such airplanes with armament from US. “Various propaganda reports and foreign comments have suggested that Ethiopia provides an open field for Communist infiltration. Although this problem has been left entirely to Ethiopia, and it is the duty of Ethiopia to suppress Communism, His Imperial Majesty considers that suppression of Communism depends upon successful carrying out of his program of economic development however, Ethiopia’s needs for economic assistance have been relatively ignored by US. “The message of the President US to Congress on 19 July was gratifying to all small countries such as Ethiopia, and it is good to note that Congress has approved content of message. Ethiopia does not wish to delay her assistance to the democratic governments and wishes to be at their side in order to share their fortunes or misfortunes and His Imperial Majesty would wish to make the following inquiries: “( a ) To what extent would US be able to assist in equipping and arming a unit of approximately 1,000 officers and men and to transport them to and supply them at the fighting front? “( b ). To what extent is US prepared to assist in further equipping and strengthening the Ethiopian Armed Forces in order that Ethiopia may be able to increase her usefulness in the common defense of democratic institutions and her friends and allies? “( c ) What practical steps may be taken by Ethiopia to obtain US financial assistance to enable her to develop more rapidly her economic resources for her own needs and the needs of the world in peace and in war? “His Imperial Majesty would be grateful to the American Ambassador if he would convey this message to US Government and obtain its reply.” Merrell Editorial Note [Document 915] Editorial Note In telegram 41 to the Embassy in Addis Ababa, August 22, not printed, the Secretary of State instructed Ambassador Merrell to inform the Emperor that the Ethiopian offer of troops for Korea constituted “striking evidence” of Ethiopia’s continued belief in obtaining justice through collective security under the auspices of the United Nations, and to suggest that, since military operations in Korea were being conducted as a result of decisions taken by the United Nations Security Council, the offer be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If the offer were accepted, representatives of the Ethiopian Government might meet with officials of the Defense and State Departments to discuss details of training, equipment, supplies, and transportation. The Secretary noted that the Ethiopian offer of troops would be an outstanding example to other nations of the importance placed on carrying out its international and United Nations obligations by a small country which was formerly a victim of aggression. (795b.5/8–2350) In telegram 55, from Addis Ababa, September 5, not printed, Ambassador Merrell reported on a further conversation with the Emperor concerning the details of the unit proposed for Korea. (775.00/9–550) The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia 795b.5/9–550: Telegram [Document 916] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia confidential Washington , October 4, 1950—9 p. m. 69. Your discretion inform HIM that US appreciates desire obtain equipment and improve ability participate actively in collective security measures. Re govt’s desire obtain arms equipment for two or three divisions by purchase (urtel 55 Sep 5) 1 you have recd Depcirtel Sept 21 2 which, in conjunction with FMACC doc described therein and being pouched to you, explains legal basis on which country may be eligible for reimbursable mil aid from US. In case Ethio such eligibility, if at all, wld rest upon clear demonstration that ability Ethio defend herself or participate in defense of area of which she is a part is important to security of US. Such determination by this govt will be made only upon clearest demonstration politically and militarily. Shld determination be made, which is extremely unlikely, certain assurances detailed in refd FMACC doc wld also have to be obtained from Ethio. You shld make it clear HIM that all countries seeking reimbursable aid under Sec. 408( e ) PL 329 as amended must fully reach requirements of law. FYI even if Pres determination wld indicate advisability extending Ethio reimbursable aid, present US requirements and prior commitments may preclude US furnishing in foreseeable future quantities equipment desired by Ethio. Furthermore, Mil Assistance Act prohibits long-term purchase arrangements if by long-term is meant cash payment later than actual receipt of trans. In most cases such cash payment wld be by law required well in advance trans. No connection between subj this tel and Ethio offer Korea forces discussed Deptel 65 Sep 27. 3 Webb 1 Not printed, but see editorial note, supra . 2 Not printed. 3 Not printed. The Ambassador in Ethiopia (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 775.00/11–1550: Telegram [Document 917] The Ambassador in Ethiopia ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State secret Addis Ababa , November 14, 1950—6 p. m. 102. Garretson, 1 American adviser to Foreign Office tells me Emperor is much worried about lack of military assistance. Emperor feels strongly presence of American planes and other equipment in Somalia and American assistance elsewhere in Africa. Although we do not know exactly what he fears, Garretson believes he is apprehensive that in case of general holocaust Ethiopia would become forgotten corner and prey to anyone who comes along. Emperor feels keenly criticism of younger elements of country for his lack of preparedness in 1935 and for what they consider too real a stand re Somalia and Eritrea. Garretson says Emperor intends renew his request for planes and equipment (Deptel 69, October 4) 2 and both he and I would like to avoid this since good case cannot be made considering legal provisions and prior commitments in US and repetition would put Emperor who is sincere in desiring security and welfare of country in fatuous and undignified light and might be contra producente . He is being told that Italy is reducing troops in Somalia before the end of fiscal year (June 30, 1951) from 5916 to 1400, 3200 of whom will have departed by end of 1950, but that is not enough. It is therefore suggested as best present means of satisfying Emperor who is good friend of US and with whom American prestige has been steadily increasing in last few years, but which may now be reaching point of decline, that an outstandingly well-known and high-ranking American general be sent here, perhaps accompanied by some small show of force such as two or three medium bombers in his flight, (1) to explain to the Emperor, what we conceive Ethiopia’s role to be in general matter of defense of non-Communist world, (2) if feasible, to assure him that US would not permit Ethiopia to be aggressed against, (3) to discuss possibility of sending military mission to Ethiopia similar to those sent number other countries, and (4) to dissuade him from military expense beyond economy of country. Garretson, who had discussed these matters extensively with Emperor, Acting Minister Foreign Affairs and Emperor’s private secretary has been informed by all three that such a visit would be most welcome and promising. It would also be consistent with recent visits of General Sir Brian Robertson, Commander-in-Chief Middle East 3 (Embtel 101, November 12), 4 Gaston Pawleski, 5 De Gaulle, 6 Lebdera, 7 and December 1947 visit of Field Marshal Montgomery. 8 In view of desirability of warding off repetition of plea for military assistance, embarrassing to both countries, urgent consideration of foregoing is requested. 9 Merrell 1 Albert H. Garretson, an American citizen, was legal adviser to the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 Supra . 3 General Sir Brian H. Robertson, Commander-in-Chief, British Middle East Land Forces, spent three days in Ethiopia in November. 4 Not printed, but see footnote 6, p. 1704 [ Pg. 1704 is part of Doc. 919 ] . 5 Gaston Palewski was a leader of the French political party Rassemblement du Peuple Français . 6 Maj. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, wartime leader of the Free France movement and French Prime Minister, 1944–1946. 7 Not further identified. 8 Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, 1946–1948. 9 In telegram 110, to Addis Ababa, November 22, not printed, the Secretary of State acknowledged the suggestion contained in this telegram, noted that it would require careful study with the Department of Defense, and promised to keep the Embassy informed on the matter (775.5–MAP/11–1450). The Ambassador in Ethiopia (Merrell) to the Secretary of State 775.00/12–650: Telegram [Document 918] The Ambassador in Ethiopia ( Merrell ) to the Secretary of State restricted Addis Ababa , December 6, 1950—3 p. m. 122. Emperor declared national holiday yesterday to celebrate UN decision on Eritrea. Populace genuinely happy about decision. Emperor gave huge luncheon “on occasion of UN decision to restore Eritrea to Ethiopia”, during which steady stream of women (Eritrean, according to Prime Minister at whose table I sat) approached Majesties and kissed their feet. When I congratulated Emperor’s private secretary and said what a fine thing decision was, he replied, “yes, and it is all due to you”, naturally meaning my country. When I congratulated Emperor, he requested with obvious emotion that I convey his deepest thanks to my government for all its assistance. Acting Minister Foreign Affairs and Minister of Commerce also expressed their warmest appreciation and made it clear that in their opinion credit for solution was mainly due US. Merrell Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Office of African Affairs McGhee Files: Lot 53D468: Box 71 1 [Document 919] Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Office of African Affairs top secret [ Washington ,] December 11, 1950. Subject: Visit of the Ethiopian Foreign Minister. Participants: Ato Aklilou, Foreign Minister of Ethiopia Mr. John Spencer, Adviser to the Ethiopian Government Assistant Secretary McGhee AF—Mr. Bourgerie 2 AF—Mr. Cyr 3 AF—Mr. Wellons 4 Discussion: His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia called on Mr. McGhee to thank him for the United States contribution to the solution of the Eritrean problem. He stated that he was returning to Addis Ababa soon and that he could not do this without indicating to his friends in the State Department how grateful he and the Emperor are for the untiring efforts of the United States representatives, Mr. McGhee in particular, in behalf of Ethiopia. He was particularly grateful, he stated, for the good offices of the United States representatives in bringing together Mr. Brusasca 5 and himself at a luncheon recently. He indicated that he and Mr. Brusasca have had long and constructive conversations on the question of resuming diplomatic relations. He asked Mr. Brusasca that any questions which may arise in the minds of the Italians on Italo-Ethio relations be frankly and fully presented to the Ethiopians for explanation, and stated that he on his part would do the same thing. For example, he had mentioned to Mr. Brusasca the fact that persons from Somalia had been detected smuggling hand grenades across the so-called Ethio-Somalia border. He had mentioned this to Mr. Brusasca as a friend and not as a complainant. Aklilou said he had also expressed the hope to Mr. Brusasca that the question of the boundary line between Ethiopia and Somaliland could be crystallized in a resolution so that upon his return to Addis Ababa there would merely remain the question of implementation. Mr. McGhee mentioned the resolution drafted on this subject by the United States, and Mr. Wellons indicated that the reaction of the Italians to this draft has not been received in the Department. Mr. McGhee expressed his pleasure at the prospect of the Italo-Ethio rapprochement and stated that he was convinced of the Italian sincerity in seeking closer relations with Ethiopia. He expressed considerable satisfaction over the fact that two countries which had been so far apart could through negotiations resolve their differences. He said that the negotiations in respect to Eritrea had reestablished his confidence in negotiations as a means of settling disputes. He said that the success of the negotiations was attributable to the Italians but more particularly to the high statesmanship of the Ethiopians and to the wisdom of the Emperor in allowing Aklilou the necessary latitude. He sounded a note of caution about placing too heavy a burden on the new found friendship and urged that an effort be made to raise as few questions as possible which might have the effect of straining relations. Mr. McGhee said that he would like to take advantage of Aklilou’s presence to mention a few problems. It is our understanding, he said, that the British Military Mission will soon be leaving Ethiopia. 6 He wondered whether the Ethiopians plan to replace it with another. Aklilou replied that he did not know of the plans to withdraw the British Mission and would cable Addis Ababa about it. Mr. McGhee said that this was not necessary. Mr. McGhee referred to the draft treaty of friendship which has been submitted to the Ethiopian Government. He referred to the fact that conditions have changed somewhat since its submission but that despite the world crisis it might be hoped that relations between the United States and Ethiopia might be permitted to remain sufficiently normal to witness increased United States investment under a new treaty of friendship. Aklilou indicated that upon his return he would expedite consideration of the treaty because the treaty was proposed in the first instance at the initiative of the Emperor. Mr. McGhee mentioned also the fact that a standard form of Point Four Agreement has been forwarded to Addis Ababa. Aklilou indicated that Point Four has been under considerable discussion in Addis Ababa but that he would try to bring things to a head on this subject too when he returns. Mr. McGhee mentioned in passing United States interest in continuing to operate Radio Marina in Asmara. He noted a report 7 from our Military Attaché to the effect that one Gabriel Tedros, Director of Radio Communications in the Ministry of PT and T of the Ethiopian Government, had stated that, “we will be very unhappy to have a foreign radio station in our territory.” Aklilou did not seem to know Mr. Gabriel Tedros. Mr. McGhee stated that some time before implementation of the Eritrean federation resolution is completed representatives of the United States and Ethiopia should get together to discuss United States interests in a telecommunications base facility at Asmara and in an air and naval base facility at Massawa for use in times of emergency. Aklilou nodded his agreement to such a procedure. Aklilou agreed that considerable progress has been made in achieving United States-Ethiopian objectives since the time of Mr. McGhee’s visit to Addis Ababa in March 1950. The Eritrean federation resolution, the IBRD loan, the passage of Point Four legislation, and the draft treaty of friendship are all evidences of the progress which has been made. Aklilou mentioned, however, that His Majesty will probably raise again the question of why Ethiopia has not been able to obtain military equipment from the United States. Mr. McGhee reviewed the Department’s efforts to obtain aircraft for Ethiopia and pointed out that the high cost of reconditioning surplus planes was a matter beyond the control of the United States Government. He referred to the higher priorities of countries now under attack, and Aklilou replied that he personally understands very well the great strain under which the United States procurement agencies are laboring. He merely wished to be able to tell the Emperor of the current status. Mr. Wellons indicated that there have been no developments making Ethiopian efforts to procure military equipment any nearer to success. 1 Lot 53D468 contains copies of memoranda and correspondence of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George C. McGhee for the years 1949–1951. 2 Elmer H. Bourgerie, Director of the Office of African Affairs. 3 Leo G. Cyr, Officer in Charge of Northern Africa Affairs, Office of African Affairs. 4 Alfred E. Wellons, county specialist in the Office of African Affairs. 5 Giuseppe Brusasca, Italian Under Secretary of State for Africa. 6 In telegram 101, November 12, not printed, Ambassador Merrell reported that the British Ambassador, Daniel W. Lascelles, had informed him that the British intended to withdraw their military mission from Ethiopia (741.58/11–1250). 7 Not found in Department of State files. Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Liberia Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with Liberia [920] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia Washington, January 10, 1950—4 p. m. 876.062/1–550: Telegram [921] The Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley) to the Secretary of State Monrovia, January 13, 1950—9 a. m. 876.062/1–1350: Telegram [922] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia Washington, February 1, 1950—7 p. m. 876.00A/1–550: Telegram [923] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] February 14, 1950. 976.524/2–1450 [924] President Truman to the President of Liberia (Tubman) [Washington,] February 15, 1950. 110.15 MC/4–2450 [925] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) [Washington,] February 16, 1950. 110.15 MCG/2–1650 [926] Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State [Washington, undated.] 110.15 MC/4–2450 [927] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Air Force (Symington) [Washington,] February 23, 1950. 976.524/2–2350 [928] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harold Sims of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs [Washington,] April 14, 1950. 110.15 MC/4–1450 [929] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia Washington, April 21, 1950—7 p. m. 876.10/4–2150: Telegram [930] The Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley) to the Secretary of State Monrovia, April 25, 1950—8 a. m. 876.10/4–2550: Telegram [931] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to Liberia (Dudley ) [Washington,] June 29, 1950. 876.00A/6–2950 [932] The Liberian Chargé (Bright) to the Secretary of State Washington, August 10, 1950. 776.5/8–1050 [933] The Liberian Chargé (Bright) to the Secretary of State Washington, August 10, 1950. 776.5/8–1050 [934] The Liberian Chargé (Bright) to the Secretary of State Washington, August 15, 1950. 876.00–TA/8–1550 [935] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President [Washington,] September 27, 1950. 776.5/9–2750 [936] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) Washington, September 27, 1950. 776.5/9–2750 [937] The President of Liberia (Tubman) to President Truman Monrovia, 5 October 1950. 876.00–TA/10–2050 [938] The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State Washington, 18 October 1950. 776.58/10–1850 [939] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President [Washington,] October 18, 1950. 776.58/10–1850 [940] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President Washington, October 19, 1950. 776.58/10–1950 [941] President Truman to the President of Liberia (Tubman) [Washington,] November 3, 1950. 811.05176/11–350 [942] Editorial Note [943] Editorial Note The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia 876.062/1–550: Telegram [Document 920] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia 1 secret Washington , January 10, 1950—4 p. m. 5. Urtel 2, Jan. 5. Firestone informs Dept strikes continue occur Harbel and that there are several versions for strikers action. 2 Firestone also reports Wilson has not been able obtain audience Tubman in order discuss new approach strike situation and present Firestone proposals for concessions. Firestone points out in its opinion situation cannot be controlled by Presidential Comm, and continued walkouts by employees merely reduces usefulness and effectiveness of Comm, which in actuality reflects on LibGovt, particularly since Tubman reportedly gave assurance there wld be no further stoppage work. As you are well aware it is not Depts intention interfere this matter. However, in view many factors involved, such as (1) threat production important raw product now being stockpiled by US (2) adverse effect on Libs principal source revenue and (3) possible creation labor precedents which might deter private Amer business from investing in Lib, particularly at time when we striving interest other private Amer capital in the country, Dept believes LibGovt shld exert every effort effect expeditious settlement dispute. We have endeavored impress upon Firestone reps need for reforms and believe considerable efforts will be made by Firestone this direction. Firestone has telegraphed instrs Wilson which wld appear dispel any misunderstanding on part Tubman that Firestone plans remain adamant and refuse deal properly and fairly with labor. Firestone reports Comm has requested info which wld reveal its business secrets. In this connection Dept believes LibGovt shld be careful recognize right civil or mercantile companies, without distinction as to nationality, to safeguard their business secrets, and grant such companies fair and unbiased treatment in controversy between labor and management. At your discretion you may discuss foregoing in most tactful manner with Tubman, and use your good influence impress upon him need settlement this matter before labor strife envelops entire Lib economy such as now prevails neighboring Brit territories. You shld exercise great caution not leave impression with Tubman that Dept supports Firestone; on contrary you shld make clear Depts concern applies immed and future impact on Lib economy by continued strikes at Firestone. Acheson 1 This telegram was drafted by Harold Sims of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, was concurred in by Leo G. Cyr, Officer in Charge of Southern African Affairs, and by William J. Handley, Acting Labor Adviser of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. 2 In early December 1949 a strike occurred at the Firestone Plantations at Harbel, Liberia. The strikers’ numerous grievances included wages, hours, and working conditions. Liberian President William V. S. Tubman appointed a Special Commission to determine the causes of the strike and make recommendations. A detailed report on the early stages of the Firestone Plantations strike was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 203, December 20, 1949, not printed. The telegram under reference here, not printed, reported that the strike had resumed on January 4 due to the firing of a supervisory native employee. The Presidential Commission was continuing to hold meetings but was making no apparent progress. Following discussions with both President Tubman and Ross Wilson, General Manager of the Firestone Plantations, the Embassy believed that the President was ready to take a personal interest in seeking a settlement of the strike provided Wilson would permit reasonable concessions to the workers (876.062/1–550). The information and comments exchanged between Department of State and Firestone officials set forth in this telegram summarize significant points made during a five-hour conversation on January 5 between Harold Sims of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and Byron H. Larabee, Executive Vice President of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (Memorandum of conversation by Sims, January 5, 1950: 876.2395/1–550). The Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley) to the Secretary of State 876.062/1–1350: Telegram [Document 921] The Ambassador in Liberia ( Dudley ) to the Secretary of State secret Monrovia , January 13, 1950—9 a. m. 8. Deptel 5, January 10. 1 In discussion Firestone strike with Tubman his position as follows: Settlement depends upon: (1) Whether present standard living worker is adequate; (2) ability to meet wage increases; (3) over all impact on economy of country. These are questions Commission was to look into. Its final report will be submitted shortly. Tubman promised give Wilson hearing early next week indicating that if they arrive at any reasonable position he will personally go to Firestone in effort obtain full cooperation employees. Tubman stated he agrees private companies should retain business secrets but does not consider profits or employee wage scales business secrets. States this is what Communism desires. Embassy believes Tubman purposely permitting strike drag along without his intervention in order soften Firestone at negotiation table. Tubman believes Firestone has missed boat in labor relations over period of years. Feels strike may give him chance become stronger politically if he can obtain and announce any positive concessions from Firestone. Situation now depends upon degree to which Wilson willing meet demands. Tubman not at all unreasonable personally and can be won over with logic and fairness. Embassy does not regard Tubman’s letter to Wilson as serious but a summation of Liberian attitude over period years toward Firestone, hence tactical move in present difficulty. 2 If Wilson remains adamant it may become serious. Tubman further stated he appreciated Department’s observation and agreed with all except question of business secrets (above). He assured he would do best get matter settled next week. 3 Dudley 1 Supra . 2 On December 31, 1949, the secretary to President Tubman sent a letter to Firestone General Manager Wilson accusing him of bad faith, disrespect for Liberian authority, libeling Liberian Government officials, refusing to bargain, and disparaging Liberian ability. The letter concluded with a threat of expulsion from the country unless Wilson changed his methods and approach to problems in general. The text of this letter was included as enclosure 2 to despatch 85, March 17, from Monrovia, not printed (876.062/3–1750). 3 The Presidential Special Commission looking into the Firestone Plantations strike situation on about January 16 recommended to President Tubman a 60 percent wage increase for labor and a 50 percent increase for salaried employees. President Tubman and Firestone General Manager Wilson met on January 18 to discuss the strike situation. Wilson was prepared to offer a 15 percent wage increase for labor. Following further discussions on January 31 between President Tubman and Byron H. Larabee, Executive Vice President of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, who had meanwhile arrived in Liberia from the United States, a compromise wage increase was announced by the Firestone Plantations. On February 4 rioting led by a small native group armed with clubs and cutlasses broke out on the Firestone Plantations. There was some vandalism and property damage but no American personnel were attacked. President Tubman promptly despatched a force of troops to the area, order was restored, strike leaders were arrested, and by February 8 all operations at the plantations had been resumed. A detailed report on events attending the strike at the Firestone Plantations was transmitted as despatch 85, cited in footnote 2 above. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia 876.00A/1–550: Telegram [Document 922] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia confidential Washington , February 1, 1950—7 p. m. 22. Embdes 5 Jan 5, 1950. 1 Dept gratified draft econ development plan presented to LibGovt and believes your discussion program with Pres Tubman and Lib Cabinet will provide valuable background info and experience useful to Dept in its consideration similar programs other regions. You shld re-emphasize, in further discussions, program purely suggestive and does not commit US Govt to aid of any kind or amt. LibGovt requests for aid in connection with specific projects will be considered in light of whatever US fon assistance may exist at time when requests are made. Dept considers Development Authority shld be a wholly Liberian Agency responsible to LibGovt. Ecomis wld not be represented on Authority but wld maintain close contact with it. For your info, Dept hopes Ecomis will play important role in Liberia’s econ development as available resources for assistance programs are increased under prospective legis and as banks and sources of private investment capital take increasing interest in development prospects. Since relationships under Pt 4 2 program are still in planning stage here, pls avoid any hint of commitments in talks with Liberians and keep Dept fully advised by cable on progress your conversations. Acheson 1 Not printed; it reported that the Embassy formally presented to the Liberian Government in late December 1949 a “Proposed Five Year Program for the Economic Development of Liberia” prepared by the U.S. Economic Mission to Liberia (which was attached to the Embassy). A copy of the draft plan accompanied the despatch as an enclosure. (876.00A/1–1550) For an indication of the scope of the program, see the memorandum of February 16 from Berry to McGhee, p. 1712 [ Pg. 1712 is part of Doc. 925 ] . Telegram 28, February 4, from Monrovia, not printed, reported that President Tubman had presented the draft plan to the Liberian Cabinet. The President indicated to Ambassador Dudley his enthusiasm for the plan in principle. (876.00A/2–450) Despatch 121, April 6, from Monrovia, transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure a 35-page Liberian Government report commenting upon the American draft plan (876.00 Five Year/4–650). 2 For documentation on Point Four and its application to Liberia, see vol. i , pp. 846 ff. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Secretary of State 976.524/2–1450 [Document 923] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) to the Secretary of State confidential [ Washington ,] February 14, 1950. Subject: Proposal to reconstruct the road between Roberts Field and Monrovia, Liberia Problem: To support the proposal now before the Department of the Air Force for the reconstruction of the road between Roberts Field and Monrovia in Liberia. 1 Discussion: The Air Force is currently financing the maintenance of Roberts Field, built by us during the war at a cost of $5,000,000. This air base, one of the most modern in Africa, is located about 50 miles from Monrovia, where we recently completed a modern seaport which remains under our ownership until fully amortized. Pan American World Airways, the operator of Roberts Field under contract to the Air Force, has requested that the Roberts-Monrovia road be macadamized. In addition to assisting their day to day work at the field, it will facilitate the gradual concentration of the PAA African operations at Roberts, which will be a great economic help to Liberia. NEA feels that from a military and business point of view valuable benefits would accrue to the United States. The Department has long regarded the maintenance of Roberts Field as being in the national interest, and an important factor in our political relations with Liberia. It does not appear practicable to have a modern air base and a modern seaport, both under U.S. control, separated by a dirt road, pitted and rutted, and almost impassable during the heavy rainy season. Recommendation: I recommend that you sign the attached letter to Mr. Symington. 2 1 During a call on Assistant Secretary of State McGhee on January 13, Juan Trippe, President of the Pan American Airways, Inc., mentioned that the 50-mile road from the port of Monrovia to Roberts Field was in very poor condition and would be particularly inadequate for use in a military emergency. Trippe, whose firm had contracted to operate Roberts Field, proposed that American military authorities undertake reconstruction of the road, and he asked for Department of State support for the proposal. Assistant Secretary McGhee informed Trippe that it was the policy of the U.S. Government to foster economic development in Liberia, and he indicated that the Department of State would urge the military authorities to undertake the road reconstruction. (Memorandum of conversation by Sims, January 13, 876.00/1–1350) On February 6 Trippe informed the Department of State that Pan American had addressed a letter on January 26 to Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington proposing reconstruction of the Monrovia-Roberts Field Road. Trippe observed that the time had come for the Department of State to approach the Air Force in the matter. (Memorandum from Berry to McGhee, February 7, 976.524/2–750) On February 7 Pan American Vice President John Leslie called at the Department of State to urge more positive action in the matter by the Department. (Memorandum of conversation by Cyr, February 7, 876.524/2–750) 2 For the letter as sent on February 23, see p. 1716 [ Pg. 1716 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] . President Truman to the President of Liberia (Tubman) 110.15 MC/4–2450 [Document 924] President Truman to the President of Liberia ( Tubman ) 1 [ Washington ,] February 15, 1950. My Dear Mr. President : I am sending you this letter by Mr. George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of African Affairs, who is making a visit to your country as a representative of this Government. I want to take this occasion to tell you how pleased I am at the continued close and cordial relations between our two countries, and to reaffirm our wholehearted desire further to strengthen these ties. The preservation of the ideals of peace so firmly embodied in the democratic way of life of our two peoples is today, more than ever, worthy of our strongest efforts. We are particularly pleased that Liberia is able to provide such an excellent example of the practical application of these ideals on the African continent. Recently I had occasion to observe very favorable reports on Liberia’s economic progress. I am particularly gratified with the strides that have been made in our joint endeavor to combine Liberia’s material resources with our own technical resources for the restoration of a sound world economy. It is my fervent hope that we may be able to expand our mutual efforts in this direction. I avail myself of this opportunity to wish you much continued success and good health. Faithfully yours, Harry S. Truman 1 The text of this letter in draft was transmitted to President Truman by Secretary of State Acheson on February 14 under cover a brief memorandum whose operative paragraphs read as follows: “There is attached a suggested draft of a letter from you to President William V. S. Tubman of Liberia. Our relations with Liberia are excellent, and the purpose of this letter is merely to express our recognition of the favored position which we enjoy with respect to Liberia. “If the letter meets your approval, it will be handed to President Tubman by Assistant Secretary McGhee when the latter visits Liberia this month.” (776.11/2–1450) A marginal notation on the Secretary’s memorandum of February 14 indicates that the proposed letter was signed by the President, dated February 15. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) 110.15 MCG/2–1650 [Document 925] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs ( Berry ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs ( McGhee ) confidential [ Washington ,] February 16, 1950. Subject: Briefing for your forthcoming visit to Liberia. 1 The following constitute the most important problems under current review by the Liberians and ourselves: 1. Proposed Export-Import Bank loan for Liberia . In early December, Ambassador Dudley, Mr. Meier 2 and Mr. Sims presented to President Tubman a “five-year economic development program” for Liberia. 3 The President indicated a keen interest in such a program, and expressed himself as being in accord with the principle of securing a loan from the U.S. government. He pointed out, however, that his government would wish to study carefully the proposed development program. This is now being done by the Liberian cabinet. The development program was first discussed with the Export-Import Bank, and the Bank has indicated that it would be receptive to applications from the Liberian government for loans to finance several development projects. Included among the projects acceptable for the Bank’s consideration are the following: (1) Road Development (new road construction; improvement of existing roads; hard surfacing; purchase of road maintenance equipment; and bridge replacement); (2) Rice Production Projects (a program designed to shift Liberia’s production of rice from dry to swamp land): (3) Monrovia Water Distribution System; (4) Monrovia Electric Power Distribution System; (5) Agricultural Credit Corporation; (6) Repair of River Landing Facilities; (7) Agricultural Extension Program. It is anticipated that these projects will entail loans of from one to two million dollars during the first year of the program. These would be twelve-year loans at 3½% interest. Amortization payments would begin three years after the date of the loan. The Bank has also indicated that additional projects in the same general field may be submitted for loan financing as they are developed and justified. 2. Proposal to utilize balance of funds in the Liberian Lend-Lease Account for improving the road ( approximately 200 miles ) between Monrovia and Ganta . We have now obtained clearance within the Department to proceed with talks with the General Accounting Office, and, if necessary, with the appropriate Congressional committees to determine whether the balance of funds in the Liberia Lend-Lease account can be used for building small bridges, box culverts and providing road maintenance machinery for the Monrovia–Ganta road. It is estimated that $700,000 will remain in the Liberia Lend-Lease account upon the completion of the port works project. The justification for using this money is based on the economic benefits which will accrue to the Monrovia port by making this trunk road usable throughout the year. By so doing, it will afford port facilities for those regions in French Guinea and the Ivory Coast which are now without proper port services. There is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum on this matter, 4 which will furnish you additional background information. Mr. Sims expects to join officers from the Legal Advisor’s Office and Mr. Thorp’s 5 office for discussion with the General Accounting Office on this matter within the next few days. 3. Pan American Airways’ request to the Department of the Air Force that the road between Monrovia and Roberts Field be reconstructed . The Department has expressed approval of the proposal now before the Department of the Air Force to pave the road between Monrovia and Roberts Field. It is too early to tell what will be the final outcome of this matter. 6 4. Monrovia Free Port operations . The Department was gratified to learn that the Port made a net profit of $132,000 for 1949. 5. Economic and Public Health Missions . Mr. Burns’ office is preparing for you a memorandum on the Economic Mission. We hope to strengthen both the Economic and the Public Health Missions if Point IV materializes. Additional personnel and equipment will be provided. Housing will be the Number One problem, and you might strengthen a request already made of President Tubman for the use of Camp Johnson as a site where our technicians can be housed, by emphasizing the importance of proper facilities for the program. Camp Johnson will become available about April, 1950. While Camp Johnson is a part of the Port facilities, we cannot use it without the concurrence of the Liberian government. 6. Strike at Firestone Plantation . For the first time in Firestone’s 26 years in Liberia, a serious strike broke out on its plantations in early December. At first, the Liberian government adopted a rather indifferent attitude toward the strike, and certain responsible Liberian officials were inclined to regard the strike as a natural development which goes along with economic advancement. Through Ambassador Dudley, we cautioned President Tubman regarding the adverse effects which this strike might have upon the Liberian economy, if it were not brought under control. In order that you may have a complete understanding of our position in this matter, there is attached hereto a copy of our telegram to Ambassador Dudley on the subject. The strike has not been settled, and new rioting has broken out. We feel, therefore, that the position expressed in the attached telegram 7 is still timely and fits the picture today equally as well as it did several weeks ago. Mr. Byron H. Larabee, Executive Vice President of Firestone, is now in Liberia, and you will have the opportunity to talk with him. 7. The Liberia Mining Company . This Company is moving ahead satisfactorily. Mr. Lansdell K. Christie, President of the Company, is now in Liberia, and he can furnish you detailed information on the Bomi Hills iron ore operation. As you know, the Liberia Mining Company is the recipient of a $4,000,000 loan from the Export-Import Bank. The majority stock of the Company is owned by the Republic Steel Corporation. 8. Subject for discussion with Ambassador Dudley . ( a ) FBO has written the Ambassador regarding its plans for moving ahead with the building program for Monrovia. They will send their top-flight man in Paris to confer with the Ambassador, after the latter returns from the Conference. ( b ) You will wish to discuss with the Ambassador the subject of a possible transfer for him. There are attached hereto two memoranda on this question. 8 ( c ) We are making every effort to find a military officer who can go to Liberia and make a survey of Liberia’s military needs. We sent a telegram to the Ambassador on February 15 on this subjects. 9 You may reassure him that the Department is working very closely with Mr. Evans 10 in Mr. Johnson’s office (Secretary of Defense). You will recall that Mr. Evans came to the luncheon you gave for Ambassador King. 11 ( d ) We recently telegraphed the Ambassador concerning our latest efforts to find a competent lawyer to go to Liberia for the purpose of codifying the Liberian laws. We are now awaiting a reply to our telegram before proceeding any further on this matter. 12 ( e ) In January, we were able to obtain a census expert to assist the Liberian government in making a population census. The only thing delaying this operation at present is the fact that the Liberian government has not deposited the amount required to defray the expenses of the technician. 1 Regarding Assistant Secretary McGhee’s visit to Liberia, February 21–25, see the memorandum prepared by the Department of State, infra . 2 Oscar W. Meier, Chief of the Economic Mission in Liberia (Mission for Economic Affairs). 3 Regarding the draft plan under reference here, see telegram 22, February 1, to Monrovia, p. 1709 [ Pg. 1709 is part of Doc. 922 ] . 4 Not printed. 5 Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. 6 Regarding the matter under reference here, see Assistant Secretary McGhee’s memorandum of February 14, to the Secretary of State, p. 1710 [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] . 7 The reference here is presumably to telegram 5, January 10, to Monrovia, p. 1706 [ Pg. 1706 is part of Doc. 920 ] . 8 Neither printed. 9 The reference here is presumably to telegram 39, February 15, to Monrovia, not printed (776.551/2–1550). Eventually, in March, the United States and the Liberian Government accepted the designation of Col. West A. Hamilton, Retired, as the officer to conduct a survey of Liberia’s military needs. 10 The reference here is to James C. Evans, Civilian Assistant to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. 11 Assistant Secretary McGhee gave a luncheon on January 24 in honor of Liberian Ambassador Charles D. B. King on the eve of the Ambassador’s departure for Liberia for consultation. During remarks at the luncheon, Ambassador King indicated that he had been received that morning by President Truman. 12 A project was initiated in November 1949 for the selection in the United States of a legal expert who would assist in the codifying of the laws of Liberia. Through February 1950 several applicants were interviewed by the Liberian Chargé in Washington. The project was subsequently delayed because of Liberian budgetary difficulties. Documentation on the project is included in file 776.34. Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State 110.15 MC/4–2450 [Document 926] Memorandum Prepared by the Department of State 1 confidential [ Washington , undated.] Visit to Liberia of Assistant Secretary George C. McGhee, February 21–25, 1950 Mr. McGhee’s visit to Liberia afforded him an excellent opportunity to meet President Tubman and his Cabinet, and to observe the activities in which our Government has been and is currently engaged in helping to improve Liberia’s economy. Mr. McGhee was most favorably impressed by President Tubman’s earnest efforts to improve the lot of his people. He seems to be a natural leader, able and extremely popular. There are no doubts whatever regarding the friendship of President Tubman and the Liberian people for the United States. Mr. McGhee emphasized to the President our awareness of the favored position we enjoy in Liberia, and expressed the strong hope that this relationship will grow stronger. President Tubman assured him that he felt the same way. We can take a great deal of pride in the modern port and port works which we recently constructed in Liberia with a $20,000,000 Lend-Lease loan. Mr. McGhee observed that our Economic Mission (staffed by American White and Negro technicians) and our Public Health Mission (staffed by American Negroes) have done notable work in furnishing Liberia much needed technical assistance. The accomplishments of these two Missions are excellent indications of what might be achieved under the proposed Point Four Program. Mr. McGhee discussed with President Tubman the proposed Five-Year Development Program for Liberia drawn up by our Economic Mission. It is believed that we will soon be faced with deciding whether we should grant Liberia some type of long-term loan for much needed public utility projects, as proposed in this program. Liberia cannot receive benefits under the European Recovery Program, although its neighbors, the French and British colonial territories, are recipients of such aid. In response to President Tubman’s request for military assistance in the form of a United States training mission, Mr. McGhee promised that steps would be taken to make available a reserve army officer who would, at Liberia’s expense, conduct a survey of Liberia’s military training needs. (Colonel West A. Hamilton, Negro Reserve Officer, has subsequently gone to Liberia for this purpose.) Mr. McGhee was most favorably impressed with Ambassador Dudley and is convinced that he is doing an excellent job as our diplomatic representative in Liberia. 1 The first draft of this memorandum, prepared in the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs in the form of a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the president, was submitted to the Secretary on April 24. In the form printed here, a revision prepared in cooperation with the Executive Secretariat, this memorandum was transmitted to President Truman by Secretary Acheson on May 9 for the information of the President. Assistant Secretary of State McGhee arrived in Monrovia on February 21, was received by President Tubman and Liberian Secretary of State Gabriel L. Dennis on February 22, subsequently luncheoned at the Presidential residence and met with other officials of the Liberian Government, visited several Liberian agricultural projects on February 24, and departed on February 25. No other records have been found of Assistant Secretary McGhee’s meetings with Liberian officials. The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Air Force (Symington) 976.524/2–2350 [Document 927] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Air Force ( Symington ) confidential [ Washington ,] February 23, 1950. My Dear Mr. Secretary : The Department of State has received from Pan American World Airways, Inc. a copy of their letter to you dated January 26, 1950 setting forth several proposals for improving the facilities at Roberts Field in Liberia, with particular reference to the need for improving the road which connects Roberts Field with the City of Monrovia. 1 The Department supports the proposal to reconstruct the road between Roberts Field and Monrovia. The Department has long regarded the maintenance of Roberts Field as being in the national interest, and an important factor in our political relations with Liberia. In support of its position the Department stretched its own appropriation to keep Roberts Field from falling into disrepair at a time when all financial support was withdrawn from other sources. Today, with the completion of the modern seaport at Monrovia, which is under United States ownership, and the financial support which the Department of the Air Force is providing for the maintenance of Roberts Field, there appears to be good justification for reconstructing the road connecting these two facilities. Apart from the military advantages of linking the air base with the seaport, which can best be judged by the Department of the Air Force, the paving of this road would greatly advance Liberia’s economic development, thereby adding considerable impetus to our official policy of assisting Liberia economically. Further, our role as the operator of Roberts Field, where we enjoy military and civil air rights, would be immeasurably strengthened. 2 Sincerely yours, Dean Acheson 1 Regarding the letter under reference here, see footnote 1, p. 1710 [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] . 2 On March 11 Secretary Symington replied to the Secretary of State that the Air Force recognized the desirability of the reconstruction of the Roberts Field-Monrovia road but could not embark upon the project because of the current limitation in construction funds. Symington said that the project would be considered by the Air Force in future programs (976.524/3–1150). Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harold Sims of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs 110.15 MC/4–1450 [Document 928] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Harold Sims of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] April 14, 1950. Subject: Mr. Byron H. Larabee’s Visit to Mr. McGhee on April 14, 1950 Participants: Mr. Byron H. Larabee, Executive Vice President of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company Mr. McGhee—NEA Mr. Sims—ANE Mr. Larabee came in today at his own request and expressed his interest in receiving Mr. McGhee’s impressions of the latter’s recent visit to Liberia. 1 Mr. McGhee first inquired regarding the status of the labor strikes which recently developed on the Firestone Rubber Plantations in Liberia. Mr. Larabee said the situation was quiet, and that when he left Liberia in March, all plantation and factory operations had returned to normal. He did not expect any further difficulty, now that the principal agitators (mostly British nationals from Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone) had been dismissed from the Plantation. Mr. McGhee said that he obtained the impression from his many talks with important Liberian officials, as well as with Ambassador Dudley, that considerable improvement could be made by Firestone in its treatment of its native employees. By this, Mr. McGhee explained that he was referring to better educational facilities, improved housing, and especially a more tolerant attitude toward the Liberian officials by the management personnel of the Plantation. Mr. McGhee inquired as to whether Mr. Larabee thought Mr. Ross Wilson, Manager of the Plantation, adopted the proper attitude toward the Liberians for the purpose of building and maintaining good public relations. Mr. Larabee remarked that Mr. Wilson was a businessman first, and a diplomat next, and that their enterprise in Liberia was strictly a business operation. He realized, however, that good relations with the local people are important, but that his company had not been able to find a man who possessed the proper amount of business ability as well as the attributes of a trained diplomat. As a result of recent labor difficulties, and in an attempt to improve the company’s public relations, Mr. Vipond and Mr. Smith, of the Plantation’s Management Staff, have been assigned new duties designed to bring about improvement in the public relations field. Mr. McGhee said he was aware of some of the factors responsible for the absence of closer relations with the Liberians. However, he felt that an organization like Firestone could not afford to lag behind the European nationals in bettering the living and working conditions of their native employees. He referred particularly to the strides which the Belgians have and are making in the Belgian Congo, especially in the great Katanga mineral belt. Mr. Larabee dwelt at some length on the labor system used at the Plantations and the benefits such as hospitalization, schools, subsidized food, household wares and clothing which his company makes available to its employees. He pointed out that the average daily wage paid the unskilled laborer amounts to about 28 cents, but that is not a true picture of what the laborer actually receives, since additional compensation is to be found in the many benefits made available to him. Mr. Larabee said that the wages on the Plantations are, in practically all categories, higher than those paid by other private business operators in Liberia. He further explained that experiments conducted by the Plantations revealed that the native laborers prefer the present system of working for part cash and subsidized food, housing, medical care, etc., than receiving full compensation. Mr. McGhee said he heard considerable criticism from the Liberian officials regarding the absence of Liberian nationals in positions of responsibility on the Plantation. He said that he obtained the impression that a sizable segment of Liberians feels that Firestone has not made a real effort to train Liberians for the more important skilled and supervisory positions. Mr. Larabee remarked that they had made some progress along this line, and that it was definitely the policy of his company to expand this phase of their operations. He explained that in the past when the Plantations trained mechanics, laboratory assistants, etc., they were invariably drafted into the service of the Liberian government, and his company had experienced a great deal of difficulty in retaining such people after they finished their training courses. Mr. McGhee referred once again to the great responsibility which rests upon Americans to pursue a progressive approach in their business relations with the African peoples, and expressed a strong hope that Firestone would evolve a new approach to its problem of management and native employee relationship. He offered the opinion that the recent labor disturbances at the Plantations should leave no doubt in anyone’s mind as to the need and urgency for a more progessive approach. Mr. Larabee referred briefly to his company’s concern over the Far Eastern rubber supply situation, and stated confidentially that he has received the approval of his Board to investigate the possibilities of obtaining additional natural rubber in French Guinea, the Gold Coast, and Nigeria. He explained that his company did not wish to establish plantations but desired to purchase from small rubber farmers, and from existing plantations. He said that he might, at a later date, need the advice of the Department on ways and means by which he could negotiate with the French and British in their respective territories. Mr. Sims suggested that Mr. Larabee present his plans to the Department and if the Department could assist him in any way it would, of course, be pleased to do so. Mr. Larabee said he would keep in touch with the Department on this matter. In conclusion, Mr. McGhee told Mr. Larabee that he had been thinking of him as a person who might serve on one of the Department’s missions, particularly one engaged in Point Four activity dealing with underdeveloped areas, and that the Department might call upon him sometime. Mr. Larabee expressed his appreciation for Mr. McGhee’s thoughtfulness in this regard, and said that he would be pleased to serve in such capacity at any time. 1 Regarding Assistant Secretary McGhee’s visit to Liberia, see the undated memorandum prepared by the Department of State, p. 1715 [ Pg. 1715 is part of Doc. 926 ] . The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia 876.10/4–2150: Telegram [Document 929] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Liberia 1 confidential Washington , April 21, 1950—7 p. m. 87. Urtel 94, Apr 18 and memo Apr 8 to Sims. 2 Present fin position LibGovt continues cause Dept concern. While situation may not be termed crisis, Dept nevertheless surprised LibGovt permitted its fin reach level necessitating $600,000 loan. It appears LibGovt has not abided by advice Fin Adviser, and this difficult understand view serious fin difficulties LibGovt encountered 1926 and 1933 resulting estab Financial Adviser position. US has consistently supported LibGovt efforts achieve greater econ stability. However laxity on part Lib officials maintain sound fin position weakens Dept efforts promote public and private econ assistance. In your discretion you may bring foregoing attention Tubman. Emphasize it is not Depts intention interfere internal affairs LibGovt, but view extraordinary close ties between two countries Dept feels strongly LibGovt shld exert every effort keep within its fin budget thereby eliminating need rely on private sources for fin aid. Acheson 1 This telegram was drafted in the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs. 2 Neither printed. They concerned reports that the Liberian Government was in a financial crisis and had requested a loan of $600,000 from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company to meet current obligations (876.14/4–1850 and 876.14/4–850). The Ambassador in Liberia (Dudley) to the Secretary of State 876.10/4–2550: Telegram [Document 930] The Ambassador in Liberia ( Dudley ) to the Secretary of State confidential Monrovia , April 25, 1950—8 a. m. 102. In conversation with Liberian Secretary State Dennis, Ambassador conveyed sense Deptel 87 April 21, 1 pointing out our observation should not be construed interference internal affairs Liberian Government but rather friendly advice from one friendly government to another based upon long years mutual interest. Ambassador’s decision discuss matter Secretary State first predicated upon inability see President today and desire feel out Secretary State on his attitude problem and what possibly might be Tubman’s attitude toward US concern purely internal matter. Secretary Dennis expressed surprise and frankly stated he had no knowledge Secretary Treasury had approached Firestone Bank for loan. In off-the-record discussion, he pointed out his advice not sought in matters this kind since politicians know he approves only sound fiscal practices and would speak out against many matters involving finance currently being practiced. He stated a small group of men surrounding President are giving him unsound advice including Attorney General Cassel, Richard Henries, Chairman House Foreign Affairs Committee and Secretary Treasury William Dennis, … Dennis compared Tubman with late President Harding, stating both honest but could not say no to friends, in this case politicians. He then arranged appointment for Ambassador to see Tubman. Secretary Dennis thinks and Ambassador agrees that new agreement whereby Firestone will pay income tax in lieu fixed percentage on gross exports. It may have some bearing on a possible loan request at this time, especially since it is generally believed this new method of payment will increase Firestone payments to government to approximately $500,000 to $750,000 per year. If this reasoning correct, government may rely on these increased payments take care short-term credit loans from bank. 2 Dudley 1 Supra . 2 In his telegram 104, April 26, from Monrovia, not printed, Ambassador Dudley reported that he discussed the Liberian financial position with President Tubman. The President accepted the Department of State’s strong feeling in the matter in a friendly spirit, but Ambassador Dudley concluded that the President did not anticipate a deficit nor any radical change in fiscal policy (876.10/4–2650). In May the Liberian Government did borrow $400,000 from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. Telegram 134, May 26, from Monrovia, not printed, reported that President Tubman had finally apparently realized the fiscal dangers confronting his government, and he had ordered a curtailment of all but necessary government expenditures (876.10/5–2650). Telegram 27, August 9, from Monrovia, not printed, reported that overall Liberian financial situation had greatly improved and that President Tubman was confident that the government was emerging from the financial crisis (876.00/8–950). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to Liberia (Dudley ) 876.00A/6–2950 [Document 931] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to Liberia ( Dudley 1 ) confidential [ Washington ,] June 29, 1950. Subject: Conversation with President Truman During a courtesy call on the President today, I discussed the present role of the United States Economic Mission and Public Health Mission vis-à-vis the Point Four Program as it is being proposed for Liberia. After I had expressed appreciation to the President for his remarks on the work of our Economic Mission in Liberia, delivered in a speech before a convention of the American Newspaper Guild yesterday, 2 the President replied that he was sincerely interested in the development of Liberia, not only from a standpoint of our historical ties, but because of the evidenced desire of the Liberian people to help themselves to a position of democratic affluence in the world today. I mentioned the oft-repeated request of the Liberian Government for assistance in transforming their local frontier force into a modern military unit capable of maintaining internal security, which, in addition to maintaining order throughout the country would also serve to protect the vast American investments in Liberia. The President assured me that it was also his desire that Liberia have some military guidance on the scene, and further stated that he would discuss the matter with the Secretary of Defense. In closing, he mentioned that a small military mission in Liberia would be desirable not only for the reasons stated, but to forestall the possibility of any future development in that area similar to the Korean situation today. 1 Ambassador Dudley was in Washington for consultation until late July. 2 For the text of the President’s address under reference here, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 498–502. The Liberian Chargé (Bright) to the Secretary of State 776.5/8–1050 [Document 932] The Liberian Chargé ( Bright ) to the Secretary of State 1 Washington , August 10, 1950. Mr. Secretary : Since the discussion which took place between the King–Tolbert Mission 2 and the United States Government in February of 1949, when the question of the defense of Liberia was taken up and the Government of Liberia sought the assistance of the United States of America in reorganizing and improving the status of its National Defense, World developments have taken such a trend as to convince the Government of Liberia beyond a doubt that wisdom dictates timely action be taken now as a safe-guard and a deterrent against what are happening elsewhere. It is the obligation of every Government to provide adequate protection for its citizens, and of the interests of other nationals within its borders; and when this protection is beyond its powers to provide, to seek it from some other and friendly source. The obligations which the Government of the United States of America through the United Nations has undertaken in the interest of World Order have caught the admiration of the entire Free World. In this period of World Crisis, Liberia is happy to find herself, as she has always been throughout the entire period of her history, at the side of the United States of America with which she has a common cultural and traditional tie. This is no matter of accident since both are peace loving peoples, abhor wars and long for a protracted period of World tranquility in order to achieve their destiny. The Government of Liberia therefore looks forward to a careful consideration of the proposals contained in the Memorandum appended 3 and is ready and willing at any time for action looking towards their consummation. Please accept [etc.] Richard S. S. Bright 1 Chargé Bright handed this note to Burton Y. Berry, Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, on August 10. 2 William R. Tolbert, member of the Liberian House of Representatives, visited the United States in February 1949 as a special representative of Liberian President Tubman. Together with then Liberian Minister Charles D. B. King, Tolbert held discussions with American officials on a Liberian request for military assistance. 3 Chargé Bright’s note of August 10, to the Secretary of State, infra . The Liberian Chargé (Bright) to the Secretary of State 776.5/8–1050 [Document 933] The Liberian Chargé ( Bright ) to the Secretary of State 1 The Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Liberia presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State of the United States of America and has the honor to bring to the attention of the Honorable the Secretary of State the requests of the Liberian Government which have previously been the subject of discussions between the United States Department of State and the King-Tolbert Mission of February, 1949. 2 The Government of Liberia in view of its strategic location which has been made more vulnerable by the construction and operation of a deep-water port at Monrovia, the development of rubber plantations, the operations of the Liberia Mining Company for the exploitation of iron ore and the establishment of the Roberts Field Airport, together with the request made of the Liberian Government by the Security Council for combat troops as well as the large communist influence across the borders of neighbouring territories, again resubmits for the consideration of the United States Government its request for assistance in its desire to improve its military and defense services. The Memorandum of February 14, 1949 3 of the King-Tolbert Mission is therefore modified and hereby submitted as a basis for this request: 1. ( a ) Procuring arms and ammunition and other military equipment from the Government of the United States of America for the use of the Liberian Army in training, and for use in combat since she has now become more vulnerable to attack; and ( b ) On what conditions would the United States Government be willing to assist the Liberian Government in this respect. 2. ( a ) Obtaining loan to the Government of Liberia of regular army officers to assist and advise in the training of the Liberian Army; and ( b ) On what conditions would the United States Government be willing to grant this request. 3. ( a ) Securing the assistance of the Government of the United States of America in the construction of coastal, frontier and general internal modern military defenses and in making a survey of the Republic for the purpose of formulating an overall national defense program; and ( b ) On what conditions would the United States Government be willing to render this assistance. In their consideration of the request of the Liberian Government, the United States Department of State indicated in their Note of March 28, 1949, 4 that there was no Congressional authorization for sending military missions to countries other than those for which they had such authorization, but that nevertheless, if, and when, such legislation as they were endeavouring to obtain was enacted the Liberian Government could be assured that every consideration would be given to its request for military aid and assistance of the type described in the Liberian Legation’s Memorandum. In the light of the hopeful gesture of Your Excellency’s Government, the Government of Liberia in view of the wanton invasion on South Korea by the armies of North Korea which has created a serious threat to world peace would be pleased and do hereby beseech the United States Government to give favourable consideration to the above mentioned requests of the Liberian Government which requests the Liberian Government considers vital to its safety and national security. The Secretary of State of Liberia also desires to state that in pursuance of provisions of Article V of the Defense Agreement concluded March 31, 1942 between the Governments of the United States and Liberia, 5 the Government of the United States was good enough to allocate the sum of $1,000,000.00, $750,000.00 of which was applied to training Liberian officers by officers of the United States Army then stationed at Roberts Field. In this connection the Liberian Government would appreciate the inclusion of any balance to such defense program as the two Governments may by agreement mutually agree to inaugurate. Washington , August 10, 1950. 1 This note was handed to Director Berry on August 10 as an attachment to Chargé Bright’s note printed supra . The identical note, mutatis mutandis , was addressed to Ambassador Dudley in Liberia by Liberian Secretary of State Dennis on August 7. In his despatch 45, August 7, from Monrovia, not printed, which transmitted the text of the Liberian note of August 7 as an enclosure, Ambassador Dudley urged that the Liberian requests for military assistance be carefully examined and speedily implemented by the Department of State. The Ambassador observed: “The Department is aware of the many facts which serve as justification for bolstering up the morale of this small Republic which for a hundred and three years has stood ready and willing (although not too able) to serve American interests in this area of the world.” 2 Regarding the mission under reference here, see footnote 2, supra. 3 Not printed. 4 Not printed. 5 For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 275, or 56 Stat, (pt 2) 1621. For documentation regarding the negotiation of the agreement, see Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. iv , pp. 355 ff. The Liberian Chargé (Bright) to the Secretary of State 876.00–TA/8–1550 [Document 934] The Liberian Chargé ( Bright ) to the Secretary of State Washington , August 15, 1950. Mr. Secretary : On August 11, 1950 this Embassy had the pleasure of submitting to Your Excellency a Memorandum concerning the defense of Liberia. 1 A similar Memorandum was handed concurrently to the United States Ambassador at Monrovia. On August 17th a Memorandum on the subject of financial and technical aid for implementing my Government’s Five Year Plan was handed at Monrovia to the United States Ambassador, a copy of which I have the honor to append. 2 Favorable consideration of and action on these Memorandums are regarded by the President of Liberia as necessary for the progress of the Nation and the questions are of such importance to the Government that I have been instructed to obtain consent of the Government of the United States of America for a visit of His Excellency the Secretary of State of Liberia and the Honorable the Attorney General of Liberia to this Capital to confer with The President of the United States of America, and with Your Excellency on the points raised in the two Memorandums mentioned herein. I shall be pleased if you will inform me if this request of my Government is granted and when the two Liberian officials may come to Washington. 3 I have [etc.] Richard S. S. Bright 1 The reference here is presumably to Chargé Bright’s note of August 10, supra . 2 The Liberian Embassy memorandum under reference here was not found attached to the source text, nor is there any evidence that such a memorandum was handed to Embassy in Monrovia on August 17. Under cover of despatch 66, August 28, the Embassy in Monrovia did transmit to the Department of State copies of a Liberian Department of State note of that date requesting U.S. Government financial aid and technical assistance in the further implementation of a proposed Liberian Five Year Plan. Despatch 66 also transmitted copies of the proposed Five Year Plan and appendices comprising 29 pages in the source text. (876.00–TA/8–2850) 3 In a note of September 28, not printed, Liberian Ambassador King advised Secretary of State Acheson that President Tubman had appointed a special Commission composed of Secretary of State Gabriel L. Dennis, Attorney General C. Abayomi Cassell, and Liberian Government economist Charles B. Sherman, to go to the United States and conduct discussions on Liberian defense needs and financial and technical assistance for the proposed Liberian Five Year Plan (876.00 Five Year Plan/9–2850). The Liberian Commission arrived in the United States on October 7. Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President 776.5/9–2750 [Document 935] Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President confidential [ Washington ,] September 27, 1950. Memorandum for the President Subject: Military, Financial and Technical Aid for Liberia The Liberian Government has officially requested that you receive the Secretary of State of Liberia, the Honorable Gabriel L. Dennis, and the Attorney General of Liberia, the Honorable Christian Abayomi Cassell, who wish to discuss Liberia’s need for a military training mission, and financial and technical aid to implement Liberia’s Five-Year Economic Development Plan. 1 I suggest, as a matter of courtesy, you receive the Liberians. There follows brief background information on the subjects which they will discuss with the Department. 1. We recognize Liberia’s need for assistance in training and equipping a small military force for internal security. Negotiations with Mr. Dennis and Mr. Cassell on this matter will be handled by the Department in conjunction with the Department of Defense. (We are now in consultation with Defense on this matter, and prior to the visit of the Liberians, I will inform you of the results of these consultations.) 2. We have for some time recognized Liberia’s need for greater advancement in developing its resources and strengthening its over-all economy. Evidence of our interest in this regard is to be found in the achievements of our Economic and Public Health Missions in Liberia in furnishing the Liberian Government and people much needed technical advice. 3. The Export-Import Bank will review applications from the Liberian Government for certain developmental-type projects; however, until the Bank reviews the data to be presented by Liberia, it cannot judge the merits of Liberia’s request. 4. We have worked out a Technical Assistance Program with the Liberians, and we plan to make available from Point IV funds, an amount substantially in excess of what we have been spending on our Economic and Public Health Missions in Liberia. The Department will, of course, furnish all appropriate guidance to Mr. Dennis and Mr. Cassell during their visit. 2 James E. Webb 1 Regarding the Liberian request under reference, see Liberian Chargé Bright’s note of August 15, supra . 2 On September 29, President Truman agreed to meet the Liberian Commission on October 18. The appointment was subsequently rescheduled for October 19. Regarding the meeting, see President Truman’s letter of November 3, to President Tubman, p. 1733 [ Pg. 1733 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) 776.5/9–2750 [Document 936] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense ( Marshall ) confidential Washington , September 27, 1950. My Dear Mr. Secretary : On June 29, 1950, the Honorable Edward R. Dudley, American Ambassador to Liberia, discussed with President Truman the official request of the Liberian Government that the United States provide Liberia with a small military training mission for the purpose of organizing the present ill-equipped and poorly-trained Liberian military force into an efficient military police force for internal security. The President expressed interest in this proposal, and a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Ambassador Dudley is enclosed herewith. 1 The Department is now in receipt of a note from the Liberian Embassy which sets forth an official request for military assistance. A copy of this note is enclosed herewith. 2 An official request has also been received from the Liberian Government that the Liberian Secretary of State and the Liberian Attorney General be received in Washington to discuss the question of military assistance. Within the past few weeks the Department has received information from the French Embassy, our Consulate General at Dakar, and Ambassador Dudley at Monrovia concerning increased activity among the Communist elements in the areas of French Guinea and the Ivory Coast bordering Liberia. Copies of these reports are enclosed herewith. 3 The Department refers to a letter from the Department of Defense dated November 3, 1949 4 on the subject of military assistance for Liberia, and as a result of Liberia’s official request for military assistance, and recent developments in West Africa, it is suggested that this matter be re-explored in a meeting between appropriate officers of Defense and the Department. A preliminary study of the legal authority under which military assistance could be rendered to Liberia reveals the following: 1. Public Law 152, 81st Congress, June 30, 1949, covering the sale of surplus equipment. 2. 10 USC 540. 5 It is the opinion of the Department that authority contained in this statute for the sending of a military mission to such a foreign country as the President deems it in the interest of national defense to assist in military matters might be applied to Liberia. Bases for this opinion are: a ) Information which we have received concerning recent activity among Communists’ elements in French Guinea and the Ivory Coast Ordering Liberia, indicates attempts might be made to disrupt Liberia’s political and economic stability, which would create a serious diversionary operation for us, provided we decided to assist Liberia. b ) The Department of the Air Force is financing the maintenance of Roberts Air Field in Liberia, which is regarded as a vital link in our lines of communication to the Belgian Congo, as well as to the territories east of West Africa. The newly constructed $20,000,000 Port and Port Works at Monrovia are also under our control. c ) United States Government and private investments in Liberia approximate $75,000,000. In Africa, only the Union of South Africa ranks ahead of Liberia in this regard. d ) Liberia is an important source of raw rubber. Outside of the Far East it is the only source of latex. High-grade iron ore (69.2% pure iron content) from Liberia will start moving to our market next year It is the opinion of the Department that Sec. 408 ( e ) of Public Law 329, 6 as amended, could not be utilized for military assistance to Liberia for the following reasons: 1. That Liberia does not have the financial capacity to engage in reimbursable assistance transactions. 2. That training and advising missions under 408 ( e ) must generally be, of necessity, an adjunct to equipment transferred under that Section. In preparation for a meeting between officers of Defense and the Department, reference is made to “A Survey of the Military Forces in Liberia”, prepared by Colonel West A. Hamilton, USA (Ret.), dated April 1–30, 1950, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. Reference is also made to a Summary of Colonel Hamilton’s Recommendation dated June 25, 1950, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. 7 Sincerely yours, James E. Webb 1 For the text of Ambassador Dudley’s memorandum of his conversation with President Truman on June 29, see p. 1721 [ Pg. 1721 includes portions of Doc. 930 and Doc. 931 ] . 2 The reference here is to Liberian Chargé Bright’s note of August 15, p. 1725 [ Pg. 1725 is part of Doc. 934 ] . 3 None of the reports under reference here (note of June 25, 1950, from the French Embassy to the Department of State, despatch 14, July 26, 1950, from Dakar, and telegram 22, August 2, 1950, from Monrovia) is printed. 4 In a letter of September 20, 1949, to then Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, not printed, Acting Secretary of State Webb recommended the establishment of a small United States military mission to Liberia in view of the unusual political relationship between the United States and Liberia. In his reply of November 3, 1949, under reference here (not printed), Secretary Johnson stated that the Department of Defense could not, under current circumstances, recommend that the President make a finding that the establishment of a military mission to Liberia was necessary in the interests of national defense in view of the fact that such a mission was to be established for purely political circumstances. (882.20 Mission/7–849) 5 The reference here is to the Act of May 19, 1926 (44 Stat. 565) which authorized the President to detail officers and enlisted men of the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to assist the governments of the Latin American republics in military and naval matters. By amendment of October 1, 1942 (56 Stat. 763) the President was authorized during war or national emergency to assist such other countries as the President deemed it in the interest of national defense to assist 6 Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949; Public Law 329, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (63 Stat. 714); for significant portions of the text, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 1356–1364. 7 Neither printed. The President of Liberia (Tubman) to President Truman 876.00–TA/10–2050 [Document 937] The President of Liberia ( Tubman ) to President Truman 1 Monrovia , 5 October 1950. Dear President Truman : It was very gracious of you to have set the 18th of the present month as the date on which you will receive the Liberian Delegation being sent by this Government to your great Country, to discuss a Five Year Economic Expansion Program, Financial Assistance for it and a Defense Program. The results obtained from the activities of your Health and Economic Missions in this Country for the past four years have already evidenced the vast benefits and possibilities of development that can be obtained by your liberal, farsighted and unselfish Point Four Program for which the Government and people of Liberia are profoundly grateful. I would be remiss if I did not mention the contributions which are also being made to the Economic Development of this Country by United States private investment which for the past twenty-five years have reflected itself not only in the economic life of the nation but also in some respects in its political stability. With further aid under the Memorandum submitted to your Department of State by this Government requesting assistance for the Expansion of her Five Year Program, undoubtedly, development in this Country will move forward by leaps and bounds. Together with development, there must necessarily be the ability to ensure safety and security of the new conditions created thereby, especially so in these days of anxiety and uncertainties. Because of these possibilities, we are seeking assistance in the line of Defense on business principles being willing to pay for the costs involved over a period of years, but as rapidly as the resources of our Country will permit and on conditions that may be agreed between the two Governments. 2 I respectfully implore your reasonably sympathetic consideration of these matters. Assuring Your Excellency again of the gratefulness and sincerity of the Liberian Government and people, I remain, Very sincerely yours, William V. S. Tubman 1 This letter was probably delivered to President Truman by the Liberian Commission during its call at the White House on October 19; see President Truman’s reply of November 3 to President Tubman, p. 1733 [ Pg. 1733 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] . The source text was a copy of the letter referred to the Department of State by the White House on October 20 for the preparation of an appropriate reply. 2 In a letter of October 5 to Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, not printed, President Tubman requested that the Liberian Commission be given a sympathetic hearing, and he set forth the arguments made in this paragraph (McGhee Files, Lot 53 D 468, File—Letters “T”). Lot 53 D 468 contains copies of memoranda and correspondence of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George C. McGhee for the years 1949–1951. The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Secretary of State 776.58/10–1850 [Document 938] The Secretary of Defense ( Marshall ) to the Secretary of State confidential Washington , 18 October 1950. Dear Mr. Secretary : In his letter of 27 September 1950 1 [Acting] Secretary Webb raises the subject of military assistance for Liberia. I requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study this question and their views, in which I concur, are set forth in the following paragraphs. The Joint Chiefs-of Staff consider that Liberia has some strategic value to the United States, since: a . Liberia itself now exports to the United States a substantial quantity of natural rubber and soon may also provide the United States with high grade iron ore; b . The use of Roberts Field would, in all probability, be necessary if during hostilities the United States should require a South Atlantic air route; and c . Monrovia provides the only port not controlled by a European nation in West Africa. From the United States military point of view it would be desirable for Liberia to remain free of the control of any European power and to continue to recognize American interests as of preponderant importance in that state. At this time there is no apparent external threat to the sovereignty of Liberia, and the military intelligence agencies have no information indicating any likelihood of subversion within that country even though the present military forces of Liberia are incapable of effective resistance against organized external or internal threats to that government. In the event of global war it would, in all probability, be necessary for the United States to provide some armed forces to insure the supply of strategic materials from Liberia and to protect the air base and other United States interests in Liberia. Conceivably, the strength of such United States units could be reduced by the extent that Liberia itself is able to contribute to its own security and its loyalty to the United States remains firm. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on this basis, feel that assistance to Liberia in the form of a very modest program of military aid, primarily through the provision of a limited number of instructor personnel, could be in the national defense interest of the United States, particularly if political considerations so warrant. In connection with the foregoing I would like to point out that Liberia apparently can only be made eligible to receive military equipment now on a reimbursable basis and that, even on this basis, only small amounts of light military equipment can be made available unless it were at the expense of other much higher priority military assistance programs. Faithfully yours, G. C. Marshall 1 Ante , p. 1727 [ Pg. 1727 is part of Doc. 936 ] . Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 776.58/10–1850 [Document 939] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President confidential [ Washington ,] October 18, 1950. Memorandum to the President Subject: Liberian Commission In connection with the call on you tomorrow at 12:00 p. m. by members of the Liberian Commission, there follows a summary of the negotiations which we have thus far conducted with them: 1 1. The Export-Import Bank is presently studying Liberia’s applications for: a ) $4,000,000 for a hydroelectric plant; b ) $5,000,000 for road improvements; and c ) $1,500,000 for a water and sewage system for the City of Monrovia. It is not possible to state, at this time, exactly what action the Bank will take on these applications, since it had previously indicated to the Department its willingness to consider improvement projects up to a total of approximately $2,000,000. The Bank will, of course, apply not only the usual tests of the usefulness of the proposed projects, but will carefully study Liberia’s capacity to repay any loans granted. 2. We are proposing a Point Four Technical Assistance program for Liberia which is expected to attain the operating level of $850,000 by the end of the current fiscal year. This will enable us to increase the personnel strength of our Economic and Public Health Missions which are already functioning in Liberia. Liberia will be the largest recipient of Point Four Technical Assistance in Africa. 3. The question of furnishing military assistance to Liberia to reorganize and train the present Liberian military force for proper internal security will be treated in a separate memorandum. 2 The Commission will be accompanied by the Liberian Ambassador, C. D. B. Bang, and Mr. McGhee, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. There are attached biographic sketches of the members of the Liberian Commission. 3 Dean Acheson 1 The Liberian Commission (Liberian Secretary of State Dennis, Liberian Attorney General Cassell, and Liberian government economist Sherman) arrived in Washington on October 11. On October 12 the Liberian Commission paid a courtesy call on Secretary of State Acheson and held informal discussions with officers of the Department of State regarding Liberia’s loan applications to the Export-Import Bank (Memoranda of conversations by Sims, October 12: 876.10/10–1250). On October 13 the Commission called on Capus M. Waynick, Ambassador to Nicaragua and Special Assistant for Technical Cooperation and Development to the Under Secretary of State, visited officers and staff members of the Export-Import Bank, and met with officers of the Department of State and the Public Health Service. Assistant Secretary of State McGhee gave a luncheon in honor of the Commission on October 17. 2 See infra . 3 Not printed. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 776.58/10–1950 [Document 940] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 1 confidential Washington , October 19, 1950. Memorandum for the President Subject: Liberian Commission With reference to my memorandum of October 18 2 there follows a summary of our position on the question of furnishing Liberia some military assistance in the form of a very modest program of military aid, primarily through the provision of a limited number of instructor personnel to reorganize and train the Liberian military force for much-needed internal security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have rendered a decision, in which the Secretary of Defense concurs, that it could be in the national defense interest of the United States, particularly if political considerations so warrant, to provide Liberia with such military assistance. 3 The Department is satisfied that ample political justification does exist to assist Liberia to reorganize and train its present military force for internal security. In order that we may furnish, without cost to Liberia, a small training mission for a period not to exceed three years, it will be necessary for you to grant approval for such a mission under the provisions of 10 USC 540, which authorizes you upon application, during war or national emergency, to detail military personnel to a foreign government which you deem it in the interest of national defense to assist in military matters. It is estimated that the annual cost of this mission will be about $50, 000. Mr. Pace 4 has informed the Department that subject to fiscal arrangements the Department of the Army is agreeable to move ahead on this matter. If you are in accord with the foregoing and so approve a small military training mission for Liberia, it is suggested that you make the announcement to the Liberian Commission during its visit with you that subject to fiscal arrangements to be worked out we will provide Liberia with a small military training mission. In connection with the foregoing it should be noted that Liberia can now be made eligible to receive military equipment on a reimbursable basis under the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 but that, even on this basis only small amounts of light military equipment can be made available unless it were at the expense of other much higher priority military assistance programs. Dean Acheson 1 The source text bears President Truman’s handwritten endorsement “Approved 10/19/50 Harry Truman”. Under cover of a brief letter to Secretary of Defense Marshall on October 27, not printed, Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews transmitted a copy of this memorandum as approved by the President with the request that the Department of State be advised when the Department of Defense was ready to proceed with the establishment of a military mission to Liberia (776.58/10–1850). Discussions regarding the agreement for the establishment of a military training mission to advise the Liberian Government got under way in December. Regarding the formal signing of the agreement on January 11, 1951, see the editorial note, p. 1735 [ Pg. 1735 is part of Doc. 943 ] . 2 Supra . 3 See the letter of October 18 from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, p. 1730 [ Pg. 1730 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] . 4 Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Army. President Truman to the President of Liberia (Tubman) 811.05176/11–350 [Document 941] President Truman to the President of Liberia ( Tubman ) 1 [ Washington ,] November 3, 1950. My Dear Mr. President : Thank you for your letter of October 5, 1950, 2 which was delivered to me by Mr. Dennis, concerning the Five-Year Economic Expansion Program and Defense program which your Government has proposed. I had a very pleasant visit with your Commission on October nineteenth, and during this meeting I announced the action of the United States Government in tentatively allotting $850,000 on an annual basis for technical assistance to Liberia under the Point IV program. I also informed your Commission that the United States is now prepared to furnish Liberia a military training mission which would assist your Government in reorganizing and training your present forces for the purposes described in your letter. Proposals concerning the size of such a mission, and the time it should devote to such a task are under active consideration. The Export–Import Bank is now in the process of studying your Government’s applications for loans for certain types of developmental projects. It is not known exactly when the Bank will reach decisions on these applications. You can be assured, however, that your proposals are receiving careful and sympathetic consideration. I deeply appreciate your kind remarks concerning the assistance which the United States Economic and Public Health Missions have rendered to the people of Liberia. The accomplishments of these two Missions are notable examples of what can be achieved elsewhere by Point IV Technical Assistance. The interest of the United States Government in continuing these Missions is evidenced by the large tentative allotment to your Country for expanding and strengthening technical assistance programs in Liberia. It is my firm hope that the type of work contemplated under the Point IV program will help to increase the flow of private American capital to those countries which are willing to receive such capital. In this respect Liberia stands as an excellent example of what can be accomplished by friendly cooperation between a government and private investors. I sincerely hope greater expansion can be realized in this particular field between your Government and my fellow countrymen. With full recognition of the deep friendship which exists between the people of Liberia and the people of the United States and assurances of my desire to work for the preservation of this happy relationship, I remain, with kindest personal regards, Very sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 1 The draft of this letter, as prepared in the Office of African Affairs of the Department of State, was transmitted to the White House by Acting Secretary of State Webb on November 1 (876.00 TA/10–2050). Assistant Secretary of State McGhee addressed a letter of similar content to President Tubman on October 19 (McGhee Files, Lot 53 D 468, File—Letters “T”). 2 Ante , p. 1729 [ Pg. 1729 includes portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] . Editorial Note [Document 942] Editorial Note On January 11, 1951, Secretary of State Acheson and Liberian Secretary of State Dennis signed in Washington on behalf of their respective governments an agreement providing for the sending of a United States military mission to Liberia. In a brief announcement issued to the press on January 11 (Department of State Bulletin , January 22, 1951, page 151) the Department of State announced that the purpose of the mission was to cooperate with Liberian military authorities and personnel in the training and organization of the Liberian armed forces and to assist in any matter with a view to enhancing the efficiency of those forces in maintaining Liberian internal security. For the text of the agreement, see 2 UST 1, TIAS 2171, or 122 UNTS 125. Documentation on the negotiation of this agreement between officers of the United States Government and members of the Liberian Commission during December 1950 and early January 1951 is included in Department of State file 776.5. Editorial Note [Document 943] Editorial Note On December 21, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson and Liberian Secretary of State Dennis signed in Washington on behalf of their respective governments a technical assistance agreement providing for a cooperative undertaking aimed at a comprehensive program for the economic development of Liberia. The agreement, which was intended to carry out provisions of the Act for International Development (Title IV of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950) establishing the machinery for the Point Four Program, defined the general conditions for economic cooperation between the United States and Liberia and prepared for future specific project agreements. Secretary Acheson and Secretary Dennis also signed on December 21 a memorandum of understanding providing for a Joint United States-Liberian Commission for Economic Development to survey the economic resources of Liberia as well as to plan and advise on the technical assistance program in Liberia. For the texts of the agreement and the memorandum of understanding (which were issued by the Department of State on December 22 as Press Release No. 1254) see United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST), volume 2, pages 476 and 478. For a lengthy statement issued to the press by the Department of State on December 21 describing the signing ceremony at the Department of State and reviewing in some detail aspects of the program to be undertaken, see the Department of State Bulletin , January 1, 1951, pages 27–28. Documentation on the negotiation of these agreements, which were carried out during October, November, and December between American officials and the Liberian Commission, is included in Department of State file 876.00 TA. Agreement between the United States and Liberia Agreement between the United States and Liberia [For text of Memorandum and Agreement, signed at Washington December 21, entered into force on that date, see 2 UST (1) 476 and 478.] Morocco Morocco Contents Policies of the United States toward the French Protectorate in Morocco (Documents 944-955) Policies of the United States toward the French Protectorate in Morocco Policies of the United States toward the French Protectorate in Morocco [944] Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State [Washington,] September 11, 1950. 611.71/9–1150 [945] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) [Washington,] November 8, 1950. 601.7111/11–850 [946] The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 19, 1950—9 p. m. 771.11/10–1950: Telegram [947] The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to the Secretary of State Rabat, October 23, 1950. 771.11/10–2350 [948] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Elsey) to the President Washington, October 24, 1950. [949] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President Washington, October 27, 1950. 471.006/10–2750 [950] Editorial Note [951] The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to the Secretary of State Rabat, November 6, 1950. 771.00/11–650 [952] The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State Paris, November 17, 1950. 771.11/11–1750 [953] The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 17, 1950—8 p. m. 711.56371A/12–1750: Telegram [954] The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 17, 1950—8 p. m. 711.56371A/12–1750: Telegram [955] The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to the Secretary of State Rabat, January 23, 1951. 771.00/1–2351 Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State 611.71/9–1150 [Document 944] Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] September 11, 1950. Morocco a. objectives Morocco is important to the security of the United States because of its strategic geographical position. Our primary objective is the maintenance of peaceful and stable conditions under a regime which is friendly to the United States. We wish to see Morocco developed both politically and economically, and we wish to maintain the interests and rights of the United States in Morocco. b. policies Since 1912 Morocco has been divided into three zones, the French Protectorate, the Spanish Protectorate, and the International Zone of Tangier, all nominally under the sovereignty of the Sultan, but actually largely governed by separate regimes with very little coordination. Our policies toward them are therefore distinct. French Morocco . There is considerable tension and lack of understanding between the French and the Moroccans, which may lead to serious unrest. The French are trying by every means to make their zone a part of the French Union. The Sultan and the nationalists have asked for an autonomous Moroccan state, independent of the French Union, preserving its traditional Moslem culture and enjoying a greater share of its wealth than it now does. The Moroccan Communist Party has been courting the Moroccan nationalists for a number of years, with little success, although the latter have on occasion stated that they would accept Communist assistance if their efforts to obtain help elsewhere were unavailing. This tendency has been emphasized recently, probably because of the slowness of the French political reforms, the diminished prestige of the Arab League and its failure to act on behalf of North African Moslems, and the action of the United States in temporarily waiving certain of our treaty rights in June 1949, an action which the nationalists consider to further weaken their claims to being an international entity. There have been a few indications that the Moroccans were becoming more favorably disposed toward Communist overtures. Our policy has been to encourage the French on all appropriate occasions to put forward a program of political, economic and social reforms which would lessen the resentment of the natives toward France and would assure their gradual evolution toward self-government. We believe, however that the strength of France depends in no small measure on the peaceful integration of Morocco into the French Union, and that France is the country best suited to have international responsibility for Morocco. We have therefore avoided putting pressure on France by giving aid and comfort to the natives directly, although we maintain open contact with them, and consider their friendship and good will very important. It is also our policy to assist directly in the economic development of French Morocco, and aid has been granted the French for this purpose by the ECA. This aid has consisted of dollar credits for the importation of capital goods and industrial material, and of counterpart funds which are loaned to French Morocco; both types of aid are expended almost entirely on large-scale industrial and agricultural development projects. The purpose of these grants is to raise French Morocco’s level of economic activity, including production both for local consumption and for export. Our treaty rights in Morocco are extensive, and include rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction and broad economic rights, which give us considerable influence in Morocco, especially in the economic sphere. The French have for many years been trying to diminish this US influence by altering our treaty rights. Immediately prior to World War II negotiations were undertaken for the relinquishment by the United States of our capitulatory and economic rights in return for a modern commercial treaty. These negotiations were halted by the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and have not been resumed. Our rights in Morocco have been the subject of discussion between the United States and France during the past year. These discussions were precipitated by a group of Americans who established themselves in business in Morocco after the war and who enjoyed a privileged trading position for a time prior to the inception of the European Recovery Program. The French have suggested, in connection with pressure put on them by the Department at the behest of these American businessmen, that the whole question of treaty rights in Morocco be reviewed by the International Court of Justice. The specific issue which has arisen is the trade and exchange controls exercised by the French Protectorate Government. We have assented to the temporary application of these controls to Americans, in the belief that a denial of such assent would have been prejudicial to the attainment of the objectives of the European Recovery Program. Unfortunately, however, the administration of the controls vis-à-vis Americans was being conducted in such a manner as to render the position of certain American interests difficult. We have reached agreement with the French on a modus vivendi designed to correct this situation, but it is not clear whether this arrangement will work out successfully. Our assent to the trade and exchange controls should be withdrawn as soon as it is possible to do so without serious harm to the economic and financial stability of the franc zone. The legislation authorizing the European Recovery Program passed by the Congress in May 1950 provides that the ECA shall take remedial action when the Department determines that any recipient country is discriminating against citizens of the United States except to the extent such discrimination may be reasonably required to meet balance of payments or national security requirements or as authorized by international agreements to which the United States and the country in question are parties. This provision may assist this Government in protecting the interests of American businessmen in Morocco. More recently Congress passed the following amendment to the ECA Appropriations Act: “… Provided further, that after November 1, 1950, no funds herein appropriated shall be made available to any nation of which a dependent area fails, in the opinion of the President, to comply with any treaty to which the United States and such dependent area are parties.” This amendment is directed at French Morocco, and as yet there is no indication of what its effect will be on our position in the French Protectorate. Spanish Morocco . Our policy toward the Spanish zone has necessarily been a negative one, since we have never recognized the Spanish zone of influence. We do not maintain any official representation there, and information received is therefore extremely meager. We have refused to recognize the Spanish zone chiefly because Spain, in discussions with us on this subject, has always demanded that our recognition be accompanied by abolition of our capitulatory rights. The International Zone of Tangier . Although the United States has not become a party to the Tangier Statute of 1923, we have since 1945 been taking an active part in the provisional international regime established by the Anglo-French Agreement of August 31, 1945. The special position of the United States in the International Zone and our participation in its administration are of political and strategic importance to the United States and should, for the foreseeable future, be maintained. Tangier will probably continue to serve purposes considered in the national interest. Tangier was the headquarters for the strategic preparatory work for the North African landings; there are now located in the International Zone the telecommunications relay stations on which our radiotelegraphic communications with the greater part of the Eastern Hemisphere (except the Far East) are dependent; Tangier is one of the important relay bases for the Voice of America broadcasts. The International Administration at Tangier is the only one of its kind in the world today which functions in an orderly and peaceful manner. We desire that it continue to do so. Continued participation in the international regime will also guarantee us additional control over our position in the area. When conditions permit the convocation of a conference of the parties to the Act of Algeciras to agree on a definitive Tangier Statute, it will be our policy to do everything possible to assure to the Zone and its inhabitants a more efficient and more truly international administration, and to protect the rights of the United States in the Zone. c. relations with other states France . French policy toward North Africa has fluctuated with the changes in the French Government. Traditionally, the right and center political groups within France have generally supported continuation of imperial domination and have opposed genuine concessions to the inhabitants of the territories, whereas the left has advocated many of the aims of the nationalists, short of independence. The French Government has been attempting to achieve a long-term political and economic policy for all North Africa, but the internal difficulties of the Republic together with the opposition of the French colons in Morocco, have served to sidetrack such plans. It has been maintained in some French circles that under the constitution of 1946 Morocco is an associated state within the framework of the French Union. The Sultan of Morocco has never accepted this view. The reforms actually instituted to date in French Morocco are either inadequate or controversial in nature. Some of the reforms proposed by Franco have been rejected by the Sultan because they have been designed to diminish his influence while failing to replace it with genuinely democratic power in the hands of the Moroccan people. Increased civil rights for Moroccans are promised for some time in the future, but so far the state of seige, which greatly restricts these rights is still being maintained. Censorship is heavy; freedom of speech and assembly are not granted to Moroccans; indigenous political parties and labor unions are proscribed. Adequate educational facilities for Moroccans have not been provided by the French, and attempts of the Moroccans to provide such facilities have been discouraged. The nationalists have charged that economic measures are unduly oppressive. France appears to be completely opposed to independence even as a distant goal and seems determined to integrate French Morocco into the French Union, with or without the consent of the Moroccans. The French believe that Morocco is absolutely vital to France’s political, military and economic objectives, and that the magnitude of the French investment and the substantial French population entitle France to permanent control of the area. French policy toward the nationalists seems to be growing more repressive, and apparently is following the rather dangerous line of attempting to identify the nationalists as being sympathetic to Communism. France acknowledged almost complete control of Spain over the Spanish zone by a treaty of 1912. French policy with regard to the Spanish zone appears to be primarily to prevent Spain from extending the zone to the Sebou River, where Spain has long maintained it should be. There have been recent reports that the French Resident General and the Spanish High Commissioner may have agreed to cooperate in security and military matters, and in controlling nationalism in both zones. French dominance and prestige in the International Zone of Tangier were almost completely eclipsed during the four war years when Spain was in illegal occupation. France’s policy now is to reassert its predominance and to reestablish its prestige. The French hope to accomplish this mainly by means of control over the Sultan’s representative at Tangier, and by maintaining permanent tenure of the two influential posts in the administration: the Assistant Administrator for Moroccan Affairs, and the Deputy Commandant of the Tangier International Police Force. United Kingdom . The British Government, while realizing the dangers inherent in France’s rigid policies in North Africa, has been reluctant to inject itself into the delicate North African situation. British representatives in North Africa now have instructions to play, as far as possible, a passive role. It is believed that the United Kingdom Government is genuinely anxious to support the French Government and to contribute toward the restoration of quiet, peaceful and harmonious relations between the French and Moslems in North Africa. However, even if the United Kingdom could be persuaded to follow a policy toward Morocco closely approximating US policy, it is believed that a joint approach or simultaneous conversations with the French, even on a high confidential level, would be interpreted by the French as a power play to impose a program rather than as a friendly suggestion. The United Kingdom’s policy toward the International Zone of Tangier is primarily the negative one of neutralizing the position of other powers so that the International Zone will not be dominated by any one nation. This has been British policy since the British fortress in Tangier, across the straits from Gibraltar, was given up over 250 years ago. Spain . Spain regards the Moroccan Empire as a myth, and in the administration of the Spanish zone pays only nominal respect to the sovereignty of the Sultan. Spain consistently has worked toward turning its zone into an outright colony. The Spanish Government pays little attention to US and UK capitulatory rights in Spanish Morocco, or to the principle of “economic liberty without any inequality” established by the Act of Algeciras. Spain exhibits interest in the French zone by perennial reminders of its desire to extend the boundaries of Spanish Morocco southward to the Sebou River, and by maintaining a considerable number of consulates throughout the French zone. Spain has been carrying on a campaign to bring about a revision of the provisional international administration in Tangier. The Spanish Consul General at meetings of the Committee of Control has urged amendments to the Anglo-French Agreement and changes in the international administration designed to strengthen Spain’s position. The Spanish are anxious to enhance their position to the point where it will be at least equal to that of France. USSR . Soviet policy and interests in Morocco are primarily reflected in the activities of the local Communist Party. Taking advantage of the present situation in French Morocco, they are using their propaganda and other tactics in an attempt to embarrass the French administration and strengthen their own movement among the Moroccans, while occasionally attacking the Sultan and wealthy nationalist leaders. The possibility of a working agreement between the nationalists and the Moroccan Communist Party, though still remote, seems more likely than it did a year or so ago. The Moroccan Communist Party is recognized by the Protectorate Government, although since the decline of Communist strength in France pressure on the Party by the Protectorate Government appears to be increasing. The membership is drawn largely from laboring-class Europeans and the lower echelons of government workers, although it is reported that it has gained increasing interest among rural Moroccans. Labor unions in Morocco are heavily infiltrated with Communists, and these are often instrumental in spreading propaganda among Moroccans, since the latter are not permitted to organize unions of their own but are permitted to join French unions. The Party has not committed itself openly and consistently to any political objective, but follows closely the line of French Communists. During periods of weakness in France, it seeks to foment separatist tendencies in the Protectorate. The USSR was invited to take part in the Conference of Experts on Tangier which met in Paris during August 1945 for the purpose of putting an end to the illegal Spanish occupation of Tangier and of reestablishing the international administration on a provisional basis. Although the USSR signed the final act of the Conference, it has not as yet accepted the invitation extended to it to adhere to the Anglo-French Agreement, or shown any interest in participating in the present Tangier regime. Presumably the Soviet Government considers the invitation outstanding, however, and could accept at any time and send a representative to Tangier. We have avoided any move which might encourage the Soviets to do this. Other European Countries . The interests of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden in Morocco are centered in the International Zone of Tangier. All of them are parties to the Act of Algeciras and are entitled to representation on the Tangier Committee of Control and in the International Legislative Assembly. Italy has only recently been re-admitted to the International Administration and is expected to attempt to regain some of its former position. Italy may ultimately play an important role in the administration, not only because of its strategic interests, but also because of the sizable Italian colony there and its churches, schools, and other investments. Portugal, on appropriate occasions, issues a mild statement regarding its traditional interest in the Zone, which dates back to 1661 when Portugal gave Tangier to the British. Sweden has shown no interest in Tangier, and has not sent the requisite career consul to assume membership on the Tangier Committee of Control. The Arab League . The Arab League has given some encouragement to North African nationalists in their aspirations for independence. Early in 1947 the League adopted a resolution calling for complete autonomy for Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Since that time individual Arab leaders have periodically reaffirmed their support of the North African cause. Although member countries do not all agree on certain Near Eastern questions, they can agree unreservedly on the North African question, and thus foster League unity. The Council of the League and prominent Near Eastern Arabs have so openly committed themselves to support the North African nationalists that they could not renounce their commitments without considerable loss of prestige throughout the Arab countries. It is believed that the League fully intends to implement those provisions of the Arab League Pact which oblige the Council of the League to adopt all possible political measures to advance the interest of dependent Arab peoples. It is not clear just when the League will take definite action, however. It has been involved for some time past in the Palestine question and is apparently not contemplating concrete action in the immediate future. The sharp divisions of opinion among the states who are members of the League on Near Eastern questions has diminished the strength of the League. This has had an apparent effect on the League’s attitude with regard to North Africa in that there has been no recent positive action taken regarding that area. The Committee for Freedom of North Africa, headed by Abd el Krim in Cairo, has been trying to persuade some member state of the League to present the case of Tunisia to the General Assembly of the United Nations, and it seems not impossible that it will succeed in this effort. The United Nations decision on Libya seems to have heartened the Moroccans, and to have renewed their hopes in their ability to achieve their goal through appeal to the United Nations. It may be expected, therefore, that they will continue their efforts to gain a hearing in that organization. d. policy evaluation Our policy of encouraging the French to institute political and constitutional reforms has to date not produced tangible results which could be called impressive. We have refrained from pressing them too hard because of the difficulties in which Metropolitan France has been ever since the end of the war, and because any discussions of change have caused what the French call “effervescence” among the Moroccan population. Nationalist pressure, which was at a low ebb in 1948 and 1949 is now beginning to increase. In light of this, the two forces which may lead to a change in the status quo are the policies of the French and the policies of the Communists. The present repressive policy of the French is a force which may lead to a disruption of the stability of Morocco or to discussion of the problem in the United Nations. The Communist policy is probably directed solely toward the encouragement of unlawful activity, which would result in unrest or disorders in Morocco. With respect to the first, the French have shown great reluctance to alter their policy. In response to an informal approach to the Foreign Office by the American Embassy at Paris in mid-1947, the French gave us the plans which they intended to follow in the development of Morocco. These indicated that their general approach followed our thinking on the subject. Certain political reforms were introduced in 1947, but these were extremely limited in scope and were accomplished only after difficult negotiations between the Resident General and the Sultan, which were accompanied by some unrest among the Moroccan population. The French have apparently not indicated to the Moroccans what their plans are, nor have they established a time-table according to which the plans would be carried out. As for the second, the Communists have for years been attempting to form a coalition with the Istiqlal (Independence) Nationalist Party, but have met with little success. During the latter part of 1949 there were indications that some Moroccan leaders were lending a more sympathetic ear to Communist overtures, and Abd el Krim, who is held in veneration by the Moroccans, and indeed by most North African natives, has stated publicly that he would, if necessary, accept the aid of the USSR. It is believed, however, that this is simply an attempt to force the attention of France and other countries. There is some danger, however, that the Communists will, ostensibly to further the cause of the Moroccans, incite disorders in Morocco among the less responsible segments of the population, either for the simple purpose of causing disturbances, or in order to make necessary even harsher action by the French. There is also a real danger that French efforts to tar the Moroccan nationalists with the Communist brush, combined with increasing pressure on both nationalists and Communists, may, in the long run, accomplish what the Communists have so far, without French assistance, failed to achieve, i.e., a working agreement between the two groups. It seems fairly certain that concrete action of some sort will be attempted by the nationalists in the near future. Events in Indochina, the UN action on Libya, the activities of Abd el Krim since his escape in May 1947, and the failure of the French to give the Moroccans any definite hope have all served to increase the pressure for a change in French Morocco. A widespread revolt in the near future is not considered probable, since the Moroccan nationalist leaders are aware that this could undoubtedly be suppressed by France, and they have, moreover, often expressed their desire to exhaust all peaceable means in the effort to gain their ends. If the Communists should succeed in inspiring a revolt, the result would only be to heighten the ill will between France and Morocco and we would, of course, discourage any tendency on the part of the nationalists to participate in violent action. The nationalists would like to have one of the member states of the Arab League introduce this question into the United Nations, and it is believed that the issue will be based on the claims of the Moroccan nationalists that the French administration in Morocco is oppressive and contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. If this should happen, it seems likely that the USSR would support the Moroccan nationalists, in spite of the fact that Moroccans are generally strongly anti-Communist, because either internal disturbances or a divorcement of Morocco from France would further Soviet objectives. Depending on how the matter were raised in the UN, the United States would be confronted with a serious question of policy determination. On the one hand, we believe that France is the nation best equipped to exercise international responsibility for the area. On the other hand, French policy in the Protectorate has not been entirely consistent with the policies of the United States or the principles of the United Nations Charter. We should point out at once to the French the difficult position in which the US would be placed, and continue to press them to institute political, economic and social reforms which would guarantee the evolution of Morocco toward self-government and which would concurrently safeguard the economic development of the area and the legitimate French interests by its peaceful and voluntary integration into the French Union. We should suggest again that the French Government give serious consideration to approaching leading nationalist elements in Morocco with constructive, concrete and long-range plans which will guarantee gradual but sure evolution toward something comparable to dominion status within the framework of the French Union. We believe that it would be most useful for the French to establish a time-table for any such plans. We wish the French Government and French officials in overseas areas to understand and be assured of the fact that the United States has no intention of pursuing a policy designed to weaken the relationships between France and Morocco. On the contrary, we wish to see these relationships strengthened. Our economic assistance, the activities of the USIE and other aspects of our policy are not in any way designed to undermine French influence. Recent difficulties with the French over the question of US treaty rights in Morocco, particularly re the application of trade and exchange controls to American ressortissants, may well justify our giving further consideration to the possibility of giving up our present rights in exchange for a new FCN Treaty with the Sultan. In considering this question, however, careful account must be taken of the political repercussions which such a move might have on our relations with the Sultan and his Government and our prestige with the Arab world. 1 Department of State Policy [Information] Statements were concise documents summarizing the current U.S. policy toward, the relations of the principal powers with, and the issues and trends in a particular country or region. The Statements were intended to provide information and guidance for officers in missions abroad. They were generally prepared by ad hoc working groups in the responsible geographic offices of the Department of State and were referred to appropriate diplomatic missions abroad, under cover of formal instructions from the Secretary of State, for comment and criticism. The Policy Statements were periodically revised. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) 601.7111/11–850 [Document 945] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of African Affairs ( Bourgerie ) 1 confidential [ Washington ,] November 8, 1950. Subject: Audience of the Honorable George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, with His Majesty, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, Sultan of Morocco, on September 30, 1950. Participants: Mr. McGhee, NEA Mr. Plitt, American Diplomatic Agent, Tangier Mr. Bourgerie, AF Mr. Kopper, NE 2 Mr. McBride, American Consul, Rabat M. de Blesson, Secretary General to the French Resident General M. Marchat, Diplomatic Counselor to the Resident General The Assistant Secretary and members of his party were presented to His Majesty by M. de Blesson. The audience opened with an expression of sympathy by the Assistant Secretary and the Diplomatic Agent on the recent catastrophe at Sefrou, Morocco. The Assistant Secretary and Mr. Plitt told His Majesty that they wished to convey to him their profound sympathy and to express their sincere condolences to the families of the victims of the flood at Sefrou. His Majesty welcomed the Assistant Secretary to Morocco and expressed the best wishes of the Moroccan Government on the visit. Assistant Secretary McGhee replied expressing his pleasure at being in Morocco and reiterating our friendship with the Moroccan people. He stated that the United States was placing a steadily increasing importance on its relationships with the Islamic world and that we were fully aware of the growing importance of this area in world relations. The Sultan expressed gratification at this statement and indicated that he was fully in accord therewith. The Sultan said that he was particularly pleased at the choice of Tangier for the regional conference of American diplomatic and consular officials, as he had great affection for this growing city of his empire. At the same time he emphasized the point that although Tangier was, at the present time, under a special international regime, it nevertheless formed an integral part of the Sherifian Empire. The Assistant Secretary thanked the Sultan for his welcome to the delegates to the Conference which was being held on Moroccan soil, and stated that we were, of course, fully aware that Tangier was a part of His Majesty’s empire. The Sultan recalled the friendship which had developed between the Moroccans and the American soldiers following their arrival in Morocco in 1942. He mentioned with much pleasure his visit with President Roosevelt 3 who, he said, was not only a great man at the time but had become a person of historical stature with the passage of time. He added that Mr. Truman had succeeded to a heavy charge following Mr. Roosevelt’s regretted decease. He asked Mr. McGhee to convey to Mr. Truman His Majesty’s best wishes for the President’s health, and the successful continuation of his presidency of the great nation which had been called upon to play such an important role in world affairs. The Assistant Secretary assured the Sultan that it would be a pleasant duty to convey His Majesty’s good wishes to Mr. Truman. Mr. McGhee voiced the hope that the friendship established during the last war between the Moroccans and Americans would continue, and that the Moroccans could be counted on in case it should again become necessary to take up arms against an aggressor. The Sultan replied that the Moroccan people’s friendship for the United States could be relied upon in the future as in the past; that it was a friendship of long standing; and that he saw no reason why it should not continue. The Assistant Secretary, expressing agreement with His Majesty, mentioned incidentally that our traditional friendship with the people of France must not be forgotten and observed that the French Government had assisted the American people in obtaining their independence. The Sultan stated that his country also owed a debt to France, since it had played such a large part in the economic development of his country. His Majesty also noted that the Moroccan Government had been the first to recognize the United States as an independent country in the eighteenth century. There followed an exchange of views in regard to Communist threats not only to the tranquility of Morocco, but also to the peace of the world in general. The Assistant Secretary stated that we consider Islam a very important barrier in the world struggle against Communism, and that he felt that the Moslem religion was antipathetic to the creed of Communism by its very nature. His Majesty pointed out that the tenets of Islam were fundamentally opposed to the Communist philosophy, and he added that god-worshipping people could never have anything in common with the godless. Mr. McGhee then discussed our world-wide commitments in the struggle against Communism, emphasizing that we had responsibilities over a very wide area and, accordingly, could not concentrate entirely on any one region. The Sultan stated that he was fully aware of our commitments throughout the world, and he wished to take this occasion to congratulate us on the success of our troops in Korea. 4 The Assistant Secretary told the Sultan that this was not his first visit to Morocco, since he had been there some fifteen years ago and spent six months in the country. He said that tremendous progress had been made in Morocco since that time, and he congratulated the Sultan on this fact. His Majesty confirmed that large scale development had taken place in Morocco during the past few years and was continuing at a rapid pace. The Assistant Secretary emphasized that cooperation between the Moroccans and the French in the domain of economic, educational, and social progress had been of inestimable benefit to the Sultan’s empire and had led to an integration of Arab and Western culture which could only redound to the benefit of both civilizations. The Assistant Secretary also commented on the differences in the development of our cultural backgrounds and the fact that there was much in the fields of artistic endeavor which we could learn from Islam. He made particular reference to the beauty of the Sultan’s palace and remarked that it would be impossible to create such a structure in the United States today. The Sultan referred to his projected trip to France, and indicated that he expected much good to come of it, particularly as a result of an exchange of views regarding Morocco with the President of the Republic of France. He said he hoped that, as a result of his trip, a better understanding of French-Moroccan relations would evolve for the benefit of both nations. The Assistant Secretary said that he hoped the Sultan would have a good voyage and a pleasant sojourn in France. The Sultan told the Assistant Secretary how much he appreciated what the Voice of America, through its station at Tangier, was doing to influence world opinion and thought, and to guide the peoples of the world along democratic paths. He said that the Moroccans had displayed considerable interest in the VOA Arab language broadcast, and that this effort of the Department of State was well received by his countrymen. The Assistant Secretary said that he was pleased that the Sultan looked with such favor on this activity of the American Government. The Sultan stated that it was his wish to decorate the Assistant Secretary with the Cross of Ouissam Alaouite, the highest order Morocco can offer, but he recalled from a previous experience that American diplomatic officials could not accept decorations. He asked whether the Assistant Secretary would be willing to receive an autographed photograph of himself. The Assistant Secretary expressed sympathy with the Sultan’s understanding of the restrictions on decorations and said that he would be very happy to have the Sultan’s photograph as a reminder of the gracious reception accorded him by His Majesty. In closing, the Assistant Secretary referred again to the close wartime collaboration which had existed between the Moroccan people and the United States and expressed the hope that this collaboration might continue. He also asked the Sultan whether there was any comment he wished to make as to means by which the United States might be helpful to Morocco. The Sultan replied that he believed that any additional comment by him was unnecessary, since he knew that we were already informed regarding the needs of Morocco. The Sultan then rose from his throne and terminated the meeting with the exchange of the usual courtesies, and with an invitation to Mr. McGhee to repeat his visit to the palace, where he would always find a very warm welcome. The meeting between Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and the Sultan exceeded the customary thirty or forty minutes usually allotted by palace protocol to such courtesy visits by more than a half hour, but the Sultan seemed quite content and anxious to have the meeting continue for a longer period of time. Throughout the meeting it was evident that the Sultan was somewhat inhibited by the presence of French officials, but as it progressed he seemed to relax considerably and shed some of the imperial restraint and formality that was evident in the early part of the interview. The Sultan made no secret of his understanding of what was being said to him in French before it had been translated into Arabic, as is customary in accordance with palace protocol. Some of the Sultan’s remarks were somewhat complimentary to the French, but at the same time, he lost no opportunity to extoll the merits of the United States Government and its people. It was also evident that the Sultan considered Mr. McGhee’s visit an event which would not be overlooked by Nationalist officials. It was also evident that the visit would be interpreted broadly by Moroccans as a means of lending emphasis to the view that Morocco is still considered as a sovereign state even though for the present it is under French and Spanish protection in two zones, and under an international administration at Tangier. 5 1 Prior to and in connection with his attendance at the North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, October 2–7, Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and a small party of advisers visited a number of cities in Europe and North Africa including Casablanca on September 29 and Rabat on September 30. Regarding the McGhee tour, see the editorial note, p. 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] ; for reports on the Conference at Tangier, see pp. 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] and 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] . The source text was drafted by Bourgerie (one of McGhee’s party en route to Tangier), Edwin A. Plitt, the Consul General at Tangier, and Robert H. McBride, the Consul at Rabat. Though dated November 8, this memorandum was obviously drafted in Morocco before the McGhee party left for Washington. On November 24 McGhee sent a copy of this memorandum of conversation to Secretary Acheson with the recommendation that it be forwarded to President Truman. (711.71/11–2850) On November 29, William D. Hassett, Secretary to President Truman, sent a memorandum to McGhee thanking him for the memorandum of conversation and assuring him that the President would read it with much interest. (771.11/11–2950) 2 Samuel K. C. Kopper, Acting Deputy Director, Near Eastern Affairs. 3 For documentation on President Roosevelt’s meeting with the Sultan on January 22, 1943, during the Casablanca Conference, January 14–25, 1943, see Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 692–693. 4 Documentation concerning the Korean War is presented in volume vii . 5 In despatch 117, from Rabat, October 2, the American Vice Consul Ernest L. Stanger also reported on McGhee’s visit. After summarizing the conversation with the Sultan, Stanger concluded: “Although the meeting took place under terms of strict protocol, it was nevertheless extremely useful for United States relations in Morocco. It can only be concluded that the net result of the Secretary’s remarks will be to improve relations with both the French and Moroccan elements in this country. Moroccans should take comfort from the extraordinarily friendly remarks which the Secretary made regarding the feeling of the United States for the people of this nation, while the French should be likewise gratified by his very friendly references to present and past relations between France and the United States. While as stated above, the Protectorate should certainly not in any sense be displeased by the visit of Secretary McGhee, the Moroccan people have also been indubitably pleased thereby, and there is no question that they would appreciate further and more extensive visits by Mr. McGhee to the French Zone. Unfortunately, however, immediately following his call on the Sultan, the exigencies of his schedule called for him to leave for Tangier. Nevertheless, the effect of even this brief visit to this city was of incomparable utility, both with regard to relations with the French Protectorate and vis-à-vis the Moroccans. Though it is fully realized that officials of our Government are undergoing a period of strain, it is still hoped that further visits of this nature may be undertaken.” (110.15 McG/10–250) The Chargé in France (Bonsal) to the Secretary of State 771.11/10–1950: Telegram [Document 946] The Chargé in France ( Bonsal ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential Paris , October 19, 1950—9 p. m. 2124. In seeking to learn substance of talks between Sultan of Morocco and French President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, we were told by Foreign Office that conversations had been cordial and Sultan had been moderate in his requests. According to Foreign Office, question of revision of treaty offer or replacement by new and broader treaty (as reported in Rabat’s despatch 110, September 28 2 ) had not been raised. Sultan is reported to have given memo to French which sought inter alia greater educational facilities for Moroccans, fuller Moroccan participation in administration, and permission for Moroccans to form own trade unions. Latour Dupin 3 stated that requests had been sympathetically received by French and would be given consideration. They were under impression Sultan anxious to have some concrete achievements which he could announce on return to Morocco on occasion of throne speech. Latour Dupin intimated that some program similar to that for Tunisia, although of longer range, was under study by Foreign Office, but reply to Sultan would await Juin’s 4 return from Indochina so that Foreign Office could have benefit General’s views. Bonsal 1 Repeated to Rabat and Tangier. 2 Not printed. 3 Geoffrey La Tour du Pin Verclause, Chief of Protectorate Affairs, Office of African and Levant Affairs, French Foreign Ministry. 4 General Alphonse Juin, French Resident-General in Morocco. The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to the Secretary of State 771.11/10–2350 [Document 947] The Consul at Rabat ( McBride ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential No. 147 Rabat , October 23, 1950. Ref: Consulate’s 110, September 28, 1950 2 Subject: Memorandum taken by Sultan to Paris Istiqlal sources have reported that, prior to his departure for France, the Sultan of Morocco had prepared a memorandum envisaging widespread political reforms in this country. These contacts have stated that, as has been previously reported, nationalist groups, including both the Istiqlal and Shoura Parties, were opposed to the trip at the present time. However, when the Sultan overruled their advice not to leave Morocco, he agreed at the same time to present a paper outlining the desires of the Moroccan people. This document was drafted in the Palace at Rabat by members of the Sultan’s entourage, but was seen and approved by the nationalists, after certain amendments had been recommended and inserted in the text. What was worrying the Istiqlal was whether His Majesty would really present this memorandum which represented their views. It would appear from Paris telegram 2124 of October 19 3 to the Department that he had at the last minute substituted something less far-reaching (and perhaps with a greater chance of being accepted at least partially by the French). We have been promised the text of the original plea, which will be transmitted to the Department when obtained. It is indicated that it contained a proposal for the rapid liquidation of the Protectorate and the restoration of full Moroccan sovereignty. A continued treaty relationship with France was envisaged if the latter would promise now to meet the outstanding demands of the nationalists, but insisted that France might remain in Morocco only in the status of an adviser. It will be interesting to compare the contents of the paper which the Sultan had informed the nationalists he would present, with the requests which he actually made. Unless of course some substantial concessions such as permitting Moroccan labor unions or carrying out a sincere educational reform plan are made the result of the trip will be a loss of prestige for the Sultan with the Moroccan people. Robert H. McBride 1 Copies sent to Paris and Tangier. 2 Not printed. 3 Supra . Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President (Elsey) to the President Truman Library, Elsey Papers 1 [Document 948] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President ( Elsey ) to the President Washington , October 24, 1950. Memorandum for the President Subject: U.S. Treaty Rights in Morocco 2 The current appropriation act for the European Recovery Program provides that after November 1, 1950, none of the funds for ECA may be used for aid “to any nation of which a dependent area fails, in the opinion of the President, to comply with any treaty to which the United States and such dependent area are parties.” The purpose of this provision (inserted by the Congress) was to force France to comply with certain treaty rights which a group of American businessmen, who have been operating in French Morocco since World War II, claim have been violated. In response to this rider, France has now filed an application with the International Court of Justice at The Hague for adjudication of U.S. treaty rights in Morocco. It is anticipated that the same business groups which were responsible for the insertion of the anti-French provision will bring pressure to bear for the President to block ECA aid to France on the grounds that France is not living up to the Moroccan treaty. It is the combined recommendation of the Department of State and all other interested agencies that, because the matter is now before the International Court, the President make no finding, and take no action under the terms of the new provision until after the matter has been adjudicated by the International Court. A proposed State Department press release on this subject is attached for your information. 3 Respectfully, George M. Elsey 1 In the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Mo. 2 According to a memorandum to Elsey by Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., of the Executive Office of the White House, dated October 17, Tannenwald thought that this subject should be cleared with the President because of the substantive point contained in the last paragraph of the press release under reference (see footnote 3 below). (Truman Library, Elsey Papers) 3 Not attached to the source text, however, see Annex B to the memorandum by Acheson, October 27, p. 1757 [ Pg. 1757 is part of Doc. 949 ] . Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 471.006/10–2750 [Document 949] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President 1 confidential Washington , October 27, 1950. Memorandum for the President Subject: Reference of the Question of United States Treaty Rights in French Morocco to the International Court of Justice at The Hague The ECA Appropriations Act prohibits the use of any of the ERP funds for aid to any country if, “in the opinion of the President”, a dependent area of that country is failing to comply with any treaty between the United States and such dependent area. This amendment is directed at French Morocco and requires a final resolution of long-smoldering differences between us and the French as to the extent of United States treaty rights there. With State Department and ECA approval, the French have decided to refer the issues to the International Court of Justice. I recommend that you withhold an expression of opinion regarding compliance with the treaties, pending the Court’s decision. It is appropriate for you to await the Court’s decision before you express an opinion on the issues before it. Attached hereto is a memorandum giving a summary of the background of this matter and a press release which will be issued by the Department, if you concur. Dean Acheson [Annex A] Background Memorandum Prepared by the Office of the Legal Adviser confidential [ Washington , undated.] Background Memorandum Regarding Moroccan Treaty Problem The French Government has advised us that it intends to submit to the International Court of Justice the question of the extent and interpretation of our treaty position in the French Zone of Morocco. United States treaty rights in Morocco stem from a series of treaties beginning with the treaty of 1836 with the Sultan. Under these treaties the United States has exercised the right of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and is entitled to most-favored-nation treatment for United States commerce and “economic liberty without any inequality”. In view of our treaty position, it has been customary for the French Protectorate Government of Morocco to obtain this Government’s assent before considering local laws or decrees as being applicable to American citizens. In 1939, the French Protectorate Government, in line with similar measures taken in France at the outbreak of war, instituted through various decrees a system of exchange and import controls in French Morocco. At that time, the United States reserved its position on these controls and withheld its assent to their application to Americans. In 1944, however, we assented to the exchange controls but this did not cover import controls. The withholding of our assent to the latter permitted Americans, most of whom established themselves in the import and export business in Morocco following the end of World War II, with their eyes on the liberal treaty rights, to import more or less freely from the United States provided they did not ask the French Protectorate for an official allocation of dollars to pay for such imports. Americans doing business in French Morocco have illegally transferred their franc earnings to Tangier to exchange them for dollars. Some thirty-seven Americans who established themselves in Morocco after the war (mostly American veterans) were thus able to do (according to their own figures) ten million dollars worth of business in 1948 alone. The French asserted that this situation was exerting pressure on the franc and exercised a strong attraction for dollars to move out of the hands of the French exchange control system. The French Protectorate Government, therefore, promulgated a decree on December 30, 1948, which had the effect of limiting those imports which do not require an official allocation of exchange to a list of essential items (this “free list” now includes twenty items), and subjected imports of these items to the requirement of an import license. Allocations of official dollars are, for the most part, made under a competitive bidding procedure in which Americans have an equal opportunity to participate. The controls apply to persons of all nationalities and to imports from all monetary zones with the exception of imports from the franc area (the French and Moroccan franc are freely interchangeable). We have recognized the temporary necessity for these import controls since their purpose is consistent with the objectives of the ERP and they conform to France’s commitments in its ECA bilateral agreement to take all steps necessary to stabilize the economy of the franc area and so forth. On this basis it was decided that temporary assent to their application to Americans was necessary even though the controls conflicted with the full realization of our asserted treaty rights in Morocco. At the same time we recognized that Americans in Morocco had legitimate complaints against certain aspects of the administration of French trade restrictions in Morocco and, accordingly, before assent was given to these controls, negotiations were conducted with the French for the purpose of eliminating these practices and for obtaining the best possible treatment for Americans consistent with ERP objectives. These negotiations resulted in an agreement incorporating certain concessions for Americans and establishing a joint consultative group to handle further complaints regarding administration of the controls. This group has effectively handled all matters brought to its attention. Since the inception of this agreement we have continued to seek the best possible treatment of Americans and to protect them against discrimination. Special investigations in the field have convinced us that there is now no ground to allege discrimination against Americans. If such should be discovered, adequate authority to deal with it would be found in the Connally amendment to the ERP law, which was specifically directed at discrimination. The American businessmen concerned have refused to recognize that important controls are necessary in Morocco for balance of payments reasons and allege that the controls discriminate against them. They have consistently opposed this Government’s position on this matter. Having failed to influence the Executive to change its position on this problem, they turned to Congress where their efforts culminated first in an enlargement of the Connally amendment and later in the passage of the following amendment to the ERP Appropriations Act: “… Provided further, that after November 1, 1950, no funds herein appropriated shall be made available to any nation of which a dependent area fails, in the opinion of the President, to comply with any treaty to which the United States and such dependent area are parties.” Full-fledged compliance with the treaties as interpreted by the sponsors of this amendment would require the French to lift import restrictions based on balance of payments requirements and to grant Americans in Morocco more favorable tax treatment than persons of other nationalities. Not only would it be inconsistent with our objectives in France in connection with ERP to ask the French to agree to such proposals, but the French would not be expected to concur. The French have contended during all recent negotiations on this subject that some of the treaty rights on which the Americans in Morocco have been relying are nonexistent or have been lost through the operation of law or custom. As a matter of law, our position respecting these treaty rights is uncertain. Last year the French wanted to take the issues to the International Court of Justice. We urged them not to do so because we felt that more satisfactory results would be obtained through mutual concessions made as a result of direct negotiations. The French agreed. The Hickenlooper amendment, however, is clearly intended to prevent us from assenting to restrictions that are not fully consistent with the treaties as we have interpreted them in the past. The French have now decided to take the case to the International Court of Justice. In discussions held before this decision was made, we told them that if this step were taken, the President would probably not make a finding of noncompliance while the issues were pending in the Court. The Legal Adviser’s Office of the Department of State has examined the question and has expressed the opinion that the President does not have to formulate an opinion on compliance while the case is pending before the Court. [Annex B] Draft Press Release Prepared in the Department of State [ Washington , undated.] (Not to be released before application has been submitted to the International Court of Justice by the French Government and until cleared by the President.) Yesterday, the French Government filed an application with the International Court of Justice at The Hague for adjudication of United States treaty rights in Morocco. This action has followed the passage, during the last session of Congress, of an amendment to the ERP Appropriation which provides that after November 1, 1950, none of the funds appropriated may be used for aid “to any nation of which a dependent area fails, in the opinion of the President, to comply with any treaty to which the United States and such dependent area are parties”. This amendment was adopted by Congress following complaints of a group of Americans, most of whom started business in Morocco after World War II, that trade restrictions imposed by the French Protectorate officials have, in violation of treaties between Morocco and the United States, limited their opportunity to carry on their businesses. The treaty rights of the United States in Morocco are based on a number of treaties and conventions starting with the treaty of 1836 between the Sultan of Morocco and the United States. One of the rights which the United States has regarded these treaties as granting to Americans is exemption from the jurisdiction of any courts in Morocco other than United States Consular Courts. In recognition of this fact, it has long been the understanding of the United States Government that Moroccan laws and regulations are not applicable to Americans unless the assent of the United States Government is first obtained. The French Government has submitted for the United States assent a number of recent decrees promulgating, among other things, import licensing restrictions and certain taxes. The United States Government considered that without its formal assent, these decrees were not applicable to its ressortissants. The French pointed out that, aside from the question of our treaty rights, these recent laws and regulations were temporarily necessitated by post-war economic conditions. It was also pointed out that the import licensing and foreign exchange restrictions are required by the French undertakings in the Economic Cooperation Agreement with the United States wherein the French Government agreed to take steps to maintain the stability of its currency. The French Government maintains that the United States treaty position in French Morocco is anachronistic, that certain of our treaty rights have ceased to exist, or have been superseded by later agreements and practices. In December of 1949 when negotiations with the French regarding the conditions of continuing United States assent to import regulations were meeting with difficulties, the French took steps to bring the whole problem before the International Court of Justice. However, France and the United States were able to reach an agreement respecting the terms of our assent and therefore the French application was not actually submitted to the Court. The recent amendment to the Act appropriating ERP funds has presented the question whether United States assent can be continued on the terms previously agreed upon. The French Government has, therefore, again proposed that the entire matter be submitted to the International Court of Justice in order to determine just what treaty rights exist and whether or not there is compliance. The United States is committed to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in cases of this type, and it is recognized that this is essentially an appropriate and democratic way of resolving the dispute. Accordingly, it is felt that a Court decision will provide the best means of establishing the rights of the interested parties. The French Government has agreed that the decision to take the case to the Court will not affect the position of Americans under the present agreement regarding the application of import controls to them in Morocco. In view of the fact that these very questions are pending before the International Court of Justice, the President 2 will not make a determination regarding compliance with our treaties until the decision of the Court has been received. 1 The source text, signed by Acheson, bears the following handwritten notation in the margin: “Approved 10/27/50 Harry Truman.” 2 The words “has announced that he” were deleted from the text at this point with the initials “H[arry] S. T[ruman].” handwritten in the margin. Editorial Note [Document 950] Editorial Note On October 28, France formally referred the dispute concerning United States treaty rights in Morocco to the International Court of Justice at The Hague and press releases on the subject were issued by the governments of the United States and France on the same day. For the text of the Department of State’s press release, see the Department of State Bulletin, December 11, 1950, page 950. For information concerning the decision of the International Court of Justice, which was issued on August 27, 1952, see the Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment of August 27th, 1952: I.C.J. Reports 1952 (Leyden, Sijthoff, 1952). The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to the Secretary of State 771.00/11–650 [Document 951] The Consul at Rabat ( McBride ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential No. 169 Rabat , November 6, 1950. Subject: First Impressions on Results of Sultan’s Trip to France Although His Majesty will not return to Rabat until Wednesday, November 8, and more detailed information as to the results of the trip will of course be forthcoming following his arrival in his capital, it is thought that certain preliminary impressions might be conveyed at this time in view of the obvious importance of the conversations that took place in Paris, and their aftermath in Morocco. It is apparent from the press coverage of the affairs and the very guarded comments of the French officials that the failure of the Sultan to agree to a joint communiqué with the French Government on the harmony of aims existing between the two is considered a sharp rebuke to France. Furthermore the statement which he issued declaring that “a divergence of views existed” wrecked the carefully planned purpose of the voyage which was of course to re-create the facade of harmonious cooperation which has gradually deteriorated since the war, as the sovereign has adopted a decided, albeit concealed, anti-French and pro-independence policy. Should the French plan have succeeded and a joint statement made, a wedge would have been driven between the Sultan and the nationalists and the position of unquestioned leadership of the former with his people weakened. The failure of the Moroccan Sultan to accept the French reply to his memorandum of October 11 and his despatching of another note via the Grand Vizier just before his departure from Paris, on the other hand, not only made up for the popularity which had been lost by his embarking for France in the first place, but gained him new respect for his refusal to knuckle under. His action was the more spectacular in that the nationalists had opposed the trip and claimed to be worried by the Sultan’s possible defection from the independence movement just now. His original note of October 11 was not strong enough either in the nationalist view, and the Sultan’s oral remarks which went much further, were not quoted until two weeks later. However, his communiqué issued separately before leaving Paris more than restored their faith in him, and his prestige has never been greater with the Moroccans even though he made the apparently appeasing gesture towards the French of accepting their invitation. The preliminary conclusion that can be drawn from the visit is that the French were duped by the Sultan into believing that a soothing conclusion to the conversations could be reached, when some crumbs of reform might be announced as a conciliatory gesture by the French. In return the Moroccans were to sign on the dotted line to observe the restrictions of the Treaty of Fez, which the French have long since by-passed in practice themselves. It should be recalled that the Sultan’s unilateral announcement was made just after General Juin’s return from Indochina and a precipitate return by His Majesty himself from Switzerland. The meaning of this is not definitely known, but it is generally assumed that when the Resident returned from his special mission, he opposed even such slight reforms as had been offered. Accordingly when the Sultan was sent for to be informed the French position had retroceded from that of a few weeks earlier, the Moroccan sovereign drew back and refused to maintain the harmonious front any longer. All of the reforms which have so far been discussed by the press and which have been reported in full appear to be fragmentary in nature, and to require further action before they can be made effective. For example, the news of the lifting of press censorship, reportedly to be granted by the French, was initially received with enthusiasm in the French Zone; however, this earlier feeling evaporated when it became clear that the present regime would be superseded by a law on press crimes which could be utilized to hamper anti-French pronouncements as effectively as actual censorship. Furthermore the more substantial measures which the Sultan requested such as the right of Moroccans to form their own labor unions seem to have been referred to a mixed commission to be established in Rabat. It should be borne in mind that any joint negotiations in Rabat are much less likely to succeed than those held in Paris because of General Juin’s rather intransigent policy, the fulminations of the French colony here on the spot against any reforms, and the less conciliatory attitude of the Protectorate officials than that of the corresponding French authorities. Thus, it must be concluded that the promised reforms will simmer down virtually to nothing. In any event they will be unilateral actions on the part of the French, it would seem in the light of the Sultan’s communiqué, and therefore could not be considered by him as even a partial solution to the Moroccan problem. While clarification of the exact situation must, therefore, await the return of the Moroccan group from France, it is already evident that no change is forthcoming and the almost universal predictions before the trip took place that it would prove nothing are amply borne out. To France what does this mean? It could be maintained nothing beyond the loss of face incurred by the Sultan’s statement which highlighted the French failure to satisfy the Moroccans. However, there is an added factor in what appears to be an increased tension in the French Zone of Morocco. The extent of this cannot be gauged yet. It is believed, though, that this renewed evidence of what the Moroccans consider French bad faith in discussing publicly reforms and then offering virtually nothing will solidify nationalism in this country. Furthermore such tricks as press stories virtually accusing the sovereign of duplicity in going beyond his written memorandum in his oral presentation of the Moroccan case have enraged some neutral and independent Moroccans. The Sultan’s last effort, despite opposition from his own people, to wring concessions for them from his masters has won him new admiration because of the interest shown for his people. Then also, of course his refusal to sign when the French reply to his proposals, delayed until the last possible moment before his departure, turned out to be a hollow affair was apparently in accord with the wishes of politically-conscious Moroccans. Therefore, in summary it would seem that France had lost prestige and increased, if possible, hatred of her presence in Morocco. Since Morocco is an utterly defenseless state, this has no meaning in terms of forthcoming uprising and revolution, but it does augur for increased bitterness and tension and a new seeking for a way out that could lead to an all-out effort to arm clandestinely on the part of the nationalists. Robert H. McBride 1 Copies sent to Paris, Tangier, Algiers, Tunis, and Casablanca. The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 771.11/11–1750 [Document 952] The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential No. 1244 Paris , November 17, 1950. Subject: Visit of the Sultan of Morocco to Paris The delirious enthusiasm of the Moroccan people for their returning sovereign contrasts sharply with the generally phlegmatic reception accorded him by the Paris populace. To most Parisians, the Sultan of Morocco was an exotic figure in a funny white hooded robe who, in his official wanderings, was largely responsible for traffic snarls in the western part of the city. The daily newspapers gave heavy coverage, both verbal and photographic, to the number of pheasants the Sultan bagged at the presidential shoot at Marly, his interest in the Automobile Show, the regal splendor of receptions and dinners at the Elysée, City Hall and the Quai d’Orsay, and on the second day of his visit indicated, by reference to political conversations between the Sultan and the President of the Republic, that the visit was not just a giddy round of festivities. Early reports stressed the cordial exchange of views and the Foreign Office itself was impressed by the moderation of the Sultan’s demands for his country. Such requests as expanded educational facilities for Moroccans, wider participation of Moroccans in the administration of their country, permission for Moroccans to form their own trade unions, lifting of press censorship, and allowing the Sultan to name his Caids and Pashas, appeared to the French as being tangible evidence that the Sultan was being reasonable and not heeding the extremist demand for independence put forth by the Istiqlal party. Reports that the Sultan had referred orally, when presenting his memorial to the President, to a change in treaty relations between France and Morocco, did not receive publicity until later. When the Sultan left the Elysée Palace, as a state guest of the President, on October 14 to retire to his Bagatelle Residence for the remainder of his stay in France, the Foreign Office, freed from protocolar obligations, set about preparing a reply to the Sultan’s note. It had been hoped that General Juin, temporarily absent on a special mission to Indochina, would be able to give his views before submitting the French rejoinder, but the Foreign Office hinted to us that, due to shortage of time, Cabinet clearance was obtained without benefit of Juin’s comments. Confident that the concessions which they were willing to make within the framework of the Protectorate Treaty, such as replacing press censorship by legislation on press crimes, reform of the judicial system, settling the problem of trade-unions, and easing the control over naming of Pashas and Caids, would be sufficient to satisfy the Sultan, the French were consternated by the reaction of the Moroccan sovereign to their note. The Foreign Office had previously told us that they were sure the Sultan would be loath to abrogate the Treaty of Fez which guaranteed the throne to him and his heirs, and they were consequently stunned by the unexpected response of the Sultan on November 2, in which he is reported to have pointed out that, while appreciating the new reforms which the French were ready to apply, the fundamental problem to be negotiated was that of the abolition of the Protectorate Treaty of 1912. The French are still hopeful that the apparent impasse reached in Paris as a result of the Sultan’s bombshell may be solved by the negotiations to be undertaken in Rabat by a Mixed Commission to be composed of Moroccans nominated by the Sultan and French representatives chosen by the Resident General. The Foreign Office, however, has expressed to us their apprehension that the Sultan may take a long time considering this proposition and that unless he is willing to participate, nothing will come of it. Meanwhile the Foreign Office intimated that the Resident General could go forward with certain of the reforms proposed in the French note of October 31 to the Sultan, and such action might convince the Sultan of France’s good intentions. In spite of the somewhat strained relations of the last days of his visit to Paris His Majesty Sidi Mohamed made a good impression on French officials, both because of his intelligence and his eminently courteous behavior. The French realize that they are dealing with a “grand seigneur” for whose exalted position in Morocco they consider themselves largely responsible. They are critical, however, of his feudal character, and believe that the development of Morocco along modern democratic lines can only be achieved by French guidance. … David Bruce 1 Copies sent to Tangier, Rabat, and Casablanca. The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 711.56371A/12–1750: Telegram [Document 953] The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority Paris , December 17, 1950—8 p. m. 3479. Please pass immediately Navy for CNO and Air Force for McCone. This message transmits proposed text Port Lyautey agreement. Subsequent message will contain Air Force Moroccan bases agreement which though of necessity differently organized since Air Force must cover certain matters covered for Navy in 1947 agreement exactly parallels Lyautey agreement wherever applicable. Please note that paragraph 9 reference customs exemption is subject to modification and possibly even reduction to “best efforts” clause depend results further Foreign Office and Treasury exploration as well as previously reported. Secondly, we have tentatively agreed that duration of agreement as established paragraph 3 will be adjusted by exchange of notes so to conform with whatever shorter period, if any, NATO Council may recommend in blanket “facilities interchange” resolution still under consideration by deputies; Text follows: 1. The Government of the USA and the Government of the French Republic having agreed to enlarge the naval and air installations of the US Navy at Port Lyautey in order to facilitate the common defense within the framework of the North Atlantic Pact, agree to complement the technical agreement of 15 September 1947, relative to this base in order to permit new construction and an increased use of facilities. 1 2. The technical agreements to be made in implementation of this agreement will be worked out by the navies of the two countries. The terms of the present agreement which may be in conflict with the terms of the agreement of 15 September 1947 shall prevail. Cases of disagreement will be submitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy. 3. The present agreement will remain in effect during the period of the validity of the North Atlantic Treaty, unless the two governments decide beforehand to terminate it by mutual consent, such decision being particularly appropriate upon advice of the North Atlantic Council. 4. In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have affixed their signatures and seals to the present agreement. Done in duplicate in English and French, the two texts equally valid. At Paris December—, 1950. Annex I Financing mid implementation. 1. The French Government shall put at the disposition of the US Navy without giving rise to costs or compensations the necessary areas for the carrying out of the contemplated works at Port Lyautey. These areas as well as the fixed properties which are there or which may be constructed there shall remain under all circumstances the property of the French Government and as such will be under the administration of the appropriate French governmental agency subject to use and occupancy arrangements for the duration of this agreement to be made between the US Navy and the French Navy in the technical agreements provided for in paragraph two (2) of the agreement to which this is attached as Annex I. At the expiration of the present agreement or upon written notification by the US Navy of its relinquishment of the facilities contemplated by this agreement these areas as well as all installations and fixed improvements or other permanent improvements which shall be situated or constructed there shall be relinquished to the French Navy or shall revert to it in some other manner without giving rise to costs, rights or compensations. The US Navy will, however, have the right at all times to remove all supplies, equipment and provisions or other movable property belonging to the US which are at any time during the period of this agreement located in the areas in question; provided that no equipment essential to the operation or maintenance of the airport or seaplane base shall be removed prior to the expiration of this agreement without the agreement of the French Navy. 2. Due to the practical problems involved in the contemplated construction and financing thereof the US Navy will be responsible for the execution of and payment for the contemplated construction and to this end will be permitted to use the services of an American principal contractor. 3. The construction will be carried out on the French state owned land in Morocco. The contract between the US Navy and principal American contractor will accordingly be signed or approved by the French Government. Such signature or approval will not involve any financial responsibility of the French Government but will be for the purpose of recording its authorization to undertake the construction. 4. The principal American contractor will preferably procure on Moroccan territory the goods and services necessary to the construction of the base, whenever these goods and services can be there obtained readily, and in required quantity and quality at prices not exceeding those obtainable elsewhere, it being understood that the latter will be calculated on a CIF basis, i.e., will include transportation costs. 5. A local French liaison mission attached to the central liaison mission in Paris will be established to aid and advise the American Navy or their representatives in the preparation of local contracts. This mission will have the following primary responsibilities: a . It will act as intermediary between the principal American contractor and local subcontractors with whom the principal American contractor may deal if the latter does not execute the work itself. It will particularly see to it that French and Sheriffian laws and interests are respected. It will approve the choice of local subcontractors and in cases where competitive bidding is necessary it will have the right to disapprove any prospective local bidder. It will also approve before signing proposed contracts between the principal American contractor and a corporation or individual subject to the French or Sheriffian law. b . The liaison mission may also if the principal American contractor agrees, give necessary instructions in order that any subcontracts contemplated in subparagraph “ a ” above may be signed jointly by the principal American contractor and the French service on the one hand and the local subcontractor on the other hand. 6. The principal American contractor and his representatives as well as all persons employed by him who are not members of the American armed forces will not benefit from the privileges granted to the members of said forces in the agreement dated 6 November 1950, (Annex I) but will be subject to local laws. 2 7. In cases of emergency the principal American contractor may procure locally supplies, facilities and services which are required at the time, in accordance with a procedure to be agreed upon between the chief of the French liaison mission and the principal American contractor. 8. The US Navy or the principal American contractor will be responsible for payment for work, goods, and services procured in Moroccan territory. Such payments will be made in conformity with Moroccan regulations, specifically so far as price and exchange control are concerned. A procedure will be worked out by agreement between the US Navy, the liaison mission, and the State Bank of Morocco to provide that payments to local subcontractors will be made by a bankers draft signed by the bank and delivered against receipts in the form required by applicable US Government regulations. Franc expenditures shall be covered by [apparent garble] an account opened at the State Bank of Morocco maintained as stipulated by the Moroccan exchange regulations; moreover it is understood that the principal American contractor will submit to the French liaison mission copies of the periodical accounting and supporting documents which it will submit to the US Navy Department in connection with its reimbursement for the work done in Morocco for the construction of the Port Lyautey base. 9. No import, excise, consumption or other tax or duty shall be charged on material, equipment, supplies or goods including food stores and clothing for exclusive use in the construction, maintenance or operation of the base covered by this agreement consigned to or destined for the US authorities or any contractor engaged in such construction, maintenance or operation and certified by the US to be for such purposes. 10. The US Navy will request the principal American contractor to engage the services of a French or Moroccan legal advisor approved by the French Protectorate authorities. Annex II Radio. A technical agreement between the American naval authorities and the competent French naval authority will determine the modifications of the provisions of the agreement of 15 September 1947 concerning the establishment and use of radio facilities of the aero-naval base at Port Lyautey which the execution of the works, the increase of air traffic or other causes might render necessary. Annex III Base operations. The technical agreement to be entered into between the US Navy and the French Navy shall explicitly set forth that the airport and seaplane base shall remain under the French flag and command, and that local air traffic control will remain the responsibility of the French authorities. The movements of formations of combat aircraft will be subject to prior notification by the American naval commanding officer at Port Lyautey to the French airbase commander at Port Lyautey, in accordance with a procedure to be determined between the two navies. The French Navy will be responsible for the safeguarding of naval installations at Port Lyautey as a whole. The US Navy, on the other hand, will be responsible for internal security in the areas or enclosures occupied by it. Each navy shall maintain and repair the buildings and facilities which it occupies or uses exclusively. The cost of operating and maintaining the facilities mutually used at the base at Port Lyautey will be equitably divided in accordance with a formula to be set forth in a technical agreement. End text. Service representatives concur in recommending urgent approval of Departments Defense and State and authority Ambassador to sign both agreements. 3 Repeated information Wiesbaden for CINCAFE 16, London for CINCNELM 850. Bruce 1 With the signature of the Line of Communication Agreement in Paris on November 6 between representatives of the United States and France, efforts were initiated to reach agreement with France regarding U.S. military projects in Morocco. (Telegram 2623, from Paris, November 10, 711.56371/11–1050) 2 The Department of State desired that the last seven words of paragraph 6 be omitted since it was feared that they would abrogate U.S. treaty rights as applied to American contractors. If the omitted words were not agreed to by the French, then the Department recommended that an agreed minute be exchanged at the time of the signing making the positions of the two governments clear on this issue. (Memorandum of conversation by Raymond T. Yingling, December 20, 711.56371A/12–2050). 3 In telegram 3334, to Paris, December 19, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Paris that the Air Force, Navy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of State concurred in the texts of the agreements as transmitted in telegrams 3479 and 3480 from Paris, December 17, and gave the Embassy authority to sign the agreements. The Department of State qualified its concurrence pending amendment of paragraph 6 as discussed in the preceding footnote. (711.56371/12–1950) The two agreements were signed in Paris on December 22 according to telegram 3590, from Paris, December 22. (711.56371/12–2250) The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 711.56371A/12–1750: Telegram [Document 954] The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State top secret priority Paris , December 17, 1950—8 p. m. 3480. Please pass immediately Air Force for McCone and Navy for CNO. Reference and supplementing our 3479, 1 text proposed Air Force agreement follows: The Government of the US of America and the Government of the French Republic, having regard to their respective responsibilities in defense of western Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty and, in particular, the requirement thereunder for the expansion of air base facilities in French Morocco, agree as follows: 1. The French Government grants to the US Government the rights, under conditions hereinafter set forth, to improve or to establish as may be appropriate, and to make use of air bases at the following locations: Casablanca (Cazes), Nauasseur, Khouribga, Meknes, Marrakech and Rabat-sale. It is understood that Cazes is to be used only until the development of the proposed airfield and depot at Nauasseur is completed. Included in this grant are the essential supporting facilities related to US Air Force operations from these bases including the establishment of a radio link in the US Air Force’s communications network. The said air bases and supporting facilities are hereinafter referred to as the air bases. 2. A detailed technical agreement or agreements in respect of the air bases will be drawn up and agreed to by the air forces of the two countries subject to the general provisions of this agreement. Such agreement or agreements will contain provisions for the mutual use of the air bases by the air forces of the two countries so as to provide for the accommodation of their respective needs at all times. Any point on which agreement cannot be reached will be submitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy in Paris. 3–12. (Transpose paragraph 1 through 10 of Annex I of Lyautey text after modifying them by ( a ) substituting “Air Force” for “Navy” and of “air bases” for “Port Lyautey” or ‘“seaplane base” wherever occurring and ( b ) substitute “above” for the words “of the agreement to which this is attached as Annex I” at end of second sentence of paragraph 1.) 13. The following general conditions will govern the agreement or agreements to be drawn up and agreed to by the air forces of the two countries: a . The air bases shall remain under the French flag and command, and local air traffic will remain the responsibility of the French authorities. b . In the exercise of its right to use the air bases the US Air Force will be authorized to operate its military aircraft into and from the air bases, and to overfly Moroccan, other French North African and French territories, subject only to the provisions of local flight rules and regulations. However, X the movements of formations of three or more combat aircraft will be subject to prior notification by the US Air Force commander in Morocco to the French Air Force commander in Morocco, in accordance with a procedure to be determined between the two air forces. c . The French Air Force will be responsible for the safeguarding of the installations as a whole at each of the air bases. The US Air Force on the other hand, will be responsible for internal security in the areas or enclosures occupied by it and for the safeguarding of its own equipment. d . Each air force will maintain and repair the buildings and facilities which it occupies or uses exclusively. The cost of operating and maintaining the facilities mutually used at each base will be equitably divided in accordance with a formula to be set forth in the aforesaid agreement or agreements. 14 and 15. (Same as paragraphs 3 and 4 of Lyautey text). Text ends. Self-evidently the remarks in our number 3479 relative to paragraphs 9 and 3 of Port Lyautey text apply equally to paragraphs 11 and 14 of above Air Force text. Cannot overemphasize importance here utmost caution against any publicity relative either agreement. 2 Repeated information London for CINCNELM 851, Wiesbaden for CINCAFE 17. Bruce 1 Supra. 2 See footnote 3, supra . The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to the Secretary of State 771.00/1–2351 [Document 955] The Consul at Rabat ( McBride ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential No. 269 Rabat , January 23, 1951. Ref: Consulate’s Desp. No. 169, November 6, 1950 2 Subject: Transmitting Memoranda Submitted by Sultan to French Government on Status of Morocco There are transmitted herewith copies in French and translations into English of the two memoranda 3 which were presented to the French Government by the Sultan of Morocco during his recent visit in Paris as the official guest of the French Government. They are dated October 3, 1950, and November 1, 1950, roughly the dates of the Sultan’s arrival in and departure from Paris. This office received the French copies through unofficial Palace channels and the texts should be considered confidential as they have never been made public by the Residency. In the light of the vigorous discussion of these documents which took place in the French and French Moroccan press, the texts are of considerable usefulness and importance. It will be recalled that the French press accused the Sultan of bad faith in raising with the Quai d’Orsay the question of the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez in his second memorandum while his original demands contained in the earlier one were more moderate and much less far-reaching. Moroccan opinion took the stand that the first presentation in the October 3 paper was in itself a request for the substitution of a system of mutual cooperation for the present stricter arrangement under the Protectorate. The texts of the notes are of course self-explanatory but a brief synopsis thereof is given here for convenience. The first document was delivered by the Sultan during his conference with President Auriol immediately after his arrival in France. We have been told that, while Socialists Auriol and Moch, Minister of Defense, who was present, were generally unsympathetic to the Moroccan cause, Foreign Minister Schuman was favorable to the Moroccan thesis throughout. The Sultan’s memorandum points out that Morocco remains legally an independent country which has had a legal basis for its relations with France over a period of several centuries and not just since 1911. It is stressed that the first Resident General of France in Morocco, Marshall Lyautey, felt that an arrangement should be worked out for the administration of the country by its own authorities under a simple overall control of the Protecting Power. Under this system, the Maghzen would itself administer the Sherifian Empire. Subsequently, the Sultan’s note of October 3 alleges, the French changed this concept and installed direct administration of Morocco ostensibly to prepare the country for self-government. The authority of the Maghzen has been steadily nibbled away, the note continues, to the point where now even the right of the Sultan to nominate pashas and caids is questioned, and Sherifian functionaries are appointed without prior consultation with Moroccan authorities. Insofar as the system of direct administration which has been installed by the French is concerned, the Sultan stressed that these foreign bureaucrats which have been put into Morocco have no understanding of local problems, and, by their ignorance and especially by their neglect of social and educational matters, have tended to drive the Moroccan people towards the support of extremist causes. It is unclear whether the Moroccan sovereign is referring to the nationalists or the Communists in this instance. It is added that profound differences of opinion have risen because of varying interpretations as to what Moroccan reforms are essential. Furthermore during the period since the establishment of the Protectorate, the Moroccan people have evolved rapidly because of increased contacts with the West and also because of the revitalization of Islam, with which such intimate contact of course occurs. In this connection note is taken of the development of purely Moroccan political parties which are anti-French in orientation. In continuation, the Sultan’s note states that open quarreling in Morocco, which is thought inevitable by some elements, cannot have favorable results for anyone. Therefore, profound reforms are necessary. The heart of this appeal to the French Government calls for changes, not merely in administrative structure, but for a basic and thorough revamping as called for by changed conditions in Morocco. The Sultan of Morocco states that, as the leader of his people, who is well aware of their demands and requirements, he feels himself a good interpreter especially since he has always sought to cooperate with France. As reason for France to give in to Moroccan wishes at this time, His Majesty cites the forthcoming war against the Soviet Union in which Moroccan blood will flow freely on the behalf of the western powers. He notes that liberties such as those requested have already been granted to less evolved peoples such as the Libyans, and that they should be given to the Moroccan people in order to establish a situation whereby the two nations concerned could progress tranquilly together. It is stated, in this section, that the existing difficulties should not be concealed, but rather that they should be examined together so that a solution can be worked out to satisfy the just demands of Morocco. It is concluded that Morocco has attained maturity and deserves and expects a happy solution to the political problems now existing with France, first of which is of course the re-establishment of her full independence. The second note is much briefer and is, in a sense, an interpretation of the first, which it explains as a document to demonstrate the profound changes which occurred in Franco-Moroccan relations as a result of the Treaty of Fez. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of this new relationship from the Moroccan viewpoint, a search for a new basis for reciprocity has been sought, it is said, and regret is expressed that no conferences have been scheduled in Paris in that sense. It is noted that the French reply to the first note merely stated that the French aim was to lead the Moroccan people towards self-government within the framework of the Fez Treaty. It is asserted, finally, that this proposal would not be likely to be satisfactory since what is required is some new treaty based on a genuine spirit of cooperation between the two countries, which would permit the fulfillment of Moroccan aspirations. Therefore, the hope is expressed that the French reply is not a final definition of national policy but that some more understanding spirit will be found. Despite the fact that the two notes are somewhat vague in terms, it is clear that the Sultan has intended to bring up the vital question of revamping the Treaty of Fez in his first note. Since he did not mention this unpopular matter of revision by name, possibly to appease the French and hope for a better reception of the document in question, however, there is some justification to French claims that the revision of the Protectorate was mentioned only in the second note, delivered just before His Majesty’s departure from Paris. Nevertheless, it can hardly be said, as Le Monde claimed, that the first note represented a series of generalities, and that it was not until the second that the extent of the Sultan’s wishes were known. Rather, it would seem that he definitely had a revision of the Treaty of Fez in mind from the beginning. Since, however, he did not so state, the story that he adopted an intransigent position only at the end, after apparently originally taking a reasonable stand, will continue. These documents are of importance in that they are the first written evidence of the efforts of the Sultan of Morocco to obtain a new basis for his relations with France in some years. It is repeated that the French reply indicating a willingness to establish a joint committee in Rabat has not been satisfactory to the sovereign because the commission would be an unilaterally appointed affair, and he does not believe that any result would be achieved thereby. On the contrary, he has suggested a truly joint Franco-Moroccan body to sit in Paris, but the French have not accepted this proposal either. In view of later developments which have further widened the breach, it does not appear that any further conciliatory developments can be expected at this time, and the Sultan’s memoranda may take on added significance as the last peaceful effort in some time on the part of the Moroccan Government to settle its principal outstanding differences with France. 4 Robert H. McBride 1 Copies sent to Paris, Tangier, Casablanca, Tunis, Algiers, and Cairo. 2 Ante , p. 1760 [ Pg. 1760 is part of Doc. 951 ] . 3 The four attachments under reference are not printed. 4 On February 21, 1951, the Embassy in France transmitted to the Department of State the text of the October 3 memoranda by the Sultan including seven annexes which were not a part of the source text and an English translation of the memoranda. (771.00/2–2151) Tunisia Tunisia Contents Interest of the United States in the evolution of Tunisia toward self-government (Documents 956-970) Interest of the United States in the evolution of Tunisia toward self-government Interest of the United States in the evolution of Tunisia toward self-government [956] The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 31, 1950—8 p. m. 772.00/3–3150: Telegram [957] The Consul General at Turns (Packer) to the Secretary of State Tunis, April 21, 1950—6 p. m. 772.00/4–2150: Telegram [958] Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of North African Affairs (Kopper) to the Acting Officer in Charge of United Nations Cultural and Human Rights Affairs (Cates) [Washington,] May 11, 1950. 772.00/5–1150 [959] The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State Paris, June 3, 1950—2 p. m. 772.00/6–350: Telegram [960] The Consul General at Tunis (Packer) to the Secretary of State Tunis, June 14, 1950. 772.00/6–1450: Telegram [961] The Consul General at Tunis (Packer) to the Secretary of State Tunis, July 10, 1950—7 p. m. 772.11/7–1050: Telegram [962] The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State Tunis, August 3, 1950—5 p. m. 772.11/8–350: Telegram [963] Memorandum by the Former Consul General at Tunis (Packer) Washington, August 23, 1950. [964] The Consul at Tunis (Dorman) to the Department of State Tunis, October 3, 1950. 110.15 MC G/10–350 [965] Department of State Policy Statement [Washington,] October 5, 1950. 611.72/10–550 [966] The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State Tunis, October 23, 1950. 772.00/10–2350 [967] Memorandum by the Deputy Directory, Office of Western European Affairs (Williamson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) [Washington,] November 17, 1950. 772.00/11–1750 [968] The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State Tunis, November 21, 1950. 772.00/11–2150 [969] The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 7, 1950—9 p. m. 772.00/12–750: Telegram [970] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tunis [Washington,] December 14, 1950. 772.00/11–2150: Airgram The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 772.00/3–3150: Telegram [Document 956] The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , March 31, 1950—8 p. m. 1515. In course conversation yesterday with Margerie, 1 Foreign Office, reference was made to French plans reform measures in Tunisia (Tunis 47 to Department March 27 2 ). He stated that Foreign Office hoped presence advisory council Libya in Tripoli would not cause agitation that part Africa since French intended introduce important reforms in Tunisia during coming year and wished to effect them in an atmosphere of calm and prosperity so that it would be clearly shown that French were leading from strength and not weakness. Paris press reports that Mons is holding conversations with high government officials (including Bidault, 3 Schuman, 4 General Koenig 5 ) re reform project. We are encouraged by these developments but we shall continue to reiterate to French on every appropriate occasion our desire to see them take effective steps toward greater autonomy local population. Repeated Tunis 29, London 435, Algiers 55, Rabat 19, Tangier 23. Bruce 1 Roland Jacquin de Margerie, Deputy Director of Political Affairs, in charge of African affairs, in the French Foreign Ministry, until July 1950. 2 Not printed. In it Consul General at Tunis Earl L. Packer reported that the French Resident General in Tunisia, Jean Mons, would possibly take up the question of reform measures for Tunisia during his current visit to Paris. Packer had learned from French officials in Tunis that the decision for such measures was pending in Paris. Packer added: “If US intends exert any pressure this might be appropriate moment. I have come conclusion my efforts here past 2 years practically futile.” (772.00/3–2750) There was no reply to Packer’s telegram from the Department of State. 3 French Prime Minister, October 1949–July 1950. 4 Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister, 1948–1953. 5 General Marie-Pierre Koenig, former French Commander in Chief in Germany (1945–1949). The Consul General at Turns (Packer) to the Secretary of State 772.00/4–2150: Telegram [Document 957] The Consul General at Turns ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tunis , April 21, 1950—6 p. m. 61. My Deptel, April 18. 1 Following summarizes statements made me by Resident General Mons April 19: French reform measures Tunisia expected be announced near future not later than July 14. Mons proceeding Paris near future consultation prior final decision. Three elements present situation: French in Tunisia some of whom like Colonna 2 oppose reforms others favor reforms; Nationalists headed by Bourghiba 3 who now in Paris hoping be able claim credit for reforms; Bey who wrote Auriol 4 in order be able make analogous claim. French problem is grant greater autonomy weighing all factors. Impossible give me details at this time scope reform measures as French communicating facts no one in order avoid subsequent claims by any group responsibility adoption reforms. Will however inform me earliest possible date precise facts. Bourghiba’s successively milder statements Paris press indicate increasing probability his demands reconcilable with reform measures. From discussion various Bourghiba statements published local press which I showed Mons, I gather reforms probably will include changes Tunisian cabinet ministers with considerably greater authority vested Tunisian Government and some diminution in practice administrative activities civil controllers whose future role exclusively one of control. Mons opposed publicity Bey’s letter Auriol at present but thinks publicity probably desirable after announcement reform measures; exact contents not described but Bey twice referred Tunisia’s gratitude, indebtedness France. Bey is not supporting Bourghiba. Mons said Nationalists obviously looking United States for sympathy and intimated desirable present circumstances our avoiding action here which might encourage Nationalists to believe any differences exist between French and Americans. This might mean that he is considerably more disturbed present situation here than was willing admit and that he hopes I will not see any Nationalist leaders. I did not inform him of recent talks with Boudali 5 and Ben Youssef 6 nor commit myself this matter. Reference Bey’s alleged support Nationalist (my Deptel 59) whether Bey is fooling French, fooling Nationalist or possibly himself is not clear. Repeated Paris 51. Packer 1 Not printed. In it Consul General Packer reported that several days earlier he had conversed with Salah Ben Youssef, Secretary General of the Néo-Destour (New Constitution) Party. Ben Youssef stated that the Bey of Tunisia, Sidi Mohammed al-Amin (or Sidi Mohammed Lamine Pacha), approved the Néo-Destour goal of an independent constitutional monarchy under the Bey but outside the French Union. (772.00/4–1550) 2 Antonie Colonna, French representative from Tunisia in the French Council of the Republic. 3 Habib Bourghiba, President of the Néo-Destour Party and leading Tunisian nationalist leader. 4 Vincent Auriol, President of the French Republic. 5 Nouri Boudali, Assistant Secretary-General of the Union Générale Tunisienne de Travail (UGTT), the principal Tunisian nationalist trade union organization. Consul General Packer’s conversation with Boudali on January 30 regarding conditions in Tunisia was reported upon in a memorandum of conversation transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 55, February 4, from Tunis, neither printed. (772.00/2–450) 6 Regarding the conversation with Ben Youssef, see footnote 1 above. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of North African Affairs (Kopper) to the Acting Officer in Charge of United Nations Cultural and Human Rights Affairs (Cates) 772.00/5–1150 [Document 958] Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of North African Affairs ( Kopper ) to the Acting Officer in Charge of United Nations Cultural and Human Rights Affairs ( Cates ) secret [ Washington ,] May 11, 1950. Subject: Request from Mrs. Roosevelt 1 Reports received from Tunis confirm that the Tunisian Nationalist leader, Habib Bourghiba, was prevented by the French Protectorate officials from entering the southern military district of Tunisia for the purpose of holding political meetings under authority of two laws: (1) a beylical decree prohibiting the holding of political meetings in the southern territory, and (2) a regulation issued in 1882, the year after the establishment of the Protectorate, which authorized the barring of individuals from the southern territory when such action was considered desirable. In addition to the protest over the French action in this matter which was received by Mrs. Roosevelt from Mongi Slim, the Director of the Political Bureau of Destour, the Secretary General of the Néo-Destour Party, Salah ben Youssef, also sent telegrams of protest to the Bey of Tunis, the Secretariat of the UN, Mr. Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the French Resident General of Tunisia. Habib Bourghiba was recently permitted to return to Tunisia by the French following a period of some five years of exile in Egypt. With the exception of the incident involving his trip into the southern territory, the French have not interfered in any way with his political activities since he returned to Tunisia. In addition, it would appear that he would have been allowed to conduct his meetings in the southern territory had he not given considerable publicity to the fact that he intended to hold meetings in that area. At the present time, the French in North Africa are extremely sensitive towards any action on the part of the United States Government which would indicate that we are giving support to the Nationalist movement in that area. While it has been the policy of this Government for some time to encourage the French to adopt a program of political reforms which would assure the gradual but sure evolution of that area toward self-government, and while our Consular representatives in that area maintain open contact with Nationalist leaders, it has not been the policy of this Government to lend active support or encouragement to the Nationalist cause. For these reasons, it is believed that any answer, which might be drafted for Mrs. Roosevelt’s use in replying to the communication from Mongi Slim, no matter how carefully worded, might well be misconstrued or misinterpreted by either the French or the Arabs, or both. It is ANE’s suggestion, therefore, that Mrs. Roosevelt simply acknowledge the receipt of this communication and state that she has forwarded a copy of Mr. Slim’s letter to the Department for its information. 2 1 On April 3, Mongi Slim, a leader of the Néo-Destour Party, addressed a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt (Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt) in her capacity as Chairman of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, protesting the action of French authorities in preventing Bourghiba from visiting towns in southern Tunisia. Mrs. Roosevelt referred Slim’s letter to the Department of State with the request that a draft of an appropriate reply be prepared. A translation of Slim’s letter together with memoranda concerning Mrs. Roosevelt’s request are filed under 772.00/4–1750. 2 In a letter of May 18 to Mrs. Roosevelt, not printed, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs Durward V. Sandifer suggested that she acknowledge Slim’s letter along the lines recommended here. (772.00/4–1750) The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 772.00/6–350: Telegram [Document 959] The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , June 3, 1950—2 p. m. 2664. Tunisian problem is regarded by Foreign Office with gravity and certain apprehension. 1 LaTour duPin 2 stated that growing uneasiness among not only Moslems but also French Colonists and functionaries in Tunisia requires firm handling on part of administration and reassurances to all sectors population. When questioned whether reform project of Mons would be implemented he said he could tell us frankly that there was actually no such plan as yet on paper. During recent discussions here Mons had merely put forth certain ideas and suggestions for reform but nothing definite had been formulated. He admitted that government, faced with interpellation by Socialists probably on June 6 and study of Tunisian problem by Radical and PRL Congresses coming week, would have to be prepared with some definite line of action. He added that no reforms could be undertaken without prior consultation with Bey and his Ministers. Foreign Office is actively studying question changing Bey’s Prime Minister apparently in effort have more Francophile Tunisian in this important post. Perillier, 3 according to LaTour duPin, would not initiate reforms immediately on arrival nor before Ramadan (June 15) but would give reassurances at safe time asserting authority of French administration. While Foreign Office recognizes need reforms, it is obviously not going to be railroaded into precipitous action whereby French would yield control. From conversation it seemed apparent that reforms at least initially would be confined to municipalities and a general shift of civil controllers and caids is evidently under consideration. LaTour duPin claimed that Mons was glad of change after three years and his transfer would have been effected earlier had there been suitable position available for him. Secretary General and Chef du Cabinet as already reported by Consulate General Tunis are also anxious for transfer. LaTour duPin believed that Socialists would not upset apple cart over Tunisian question and that other parties would support program less drastic than that proposed by Socialists. (Embtel 2632, June 1.) 4 Our impression is that Foreign Office caught unawares by Socialist resolutions and still undecided on what measures among those put forward by Mons should be adopted now in seeking formula which would placate French in Tunisia at same time giving satisfaction to Tunisians. In view of publicity given so called Mons reforms it is likely that government will be obliged to meet challenge and Perillier’s mission will be to instigate certain changes. However, no decisions on basic reforms have yet been made. Repeated info Tunis 37, London unnumbered, Algiers, Tangier, Rabat, Casablanca unnumbered. Bruce 1 In his telegram 71, May 12, from Tunis, not printed, Consul General Packer reported having been informed in great confidence by Pierre Chatenet, Chief of Cabinet of the Resident General, that Foreign Minister Schuman planned to submit Tunisian reform measures to the French Cabinet during May. Chatenet informed Packer that the primary French interest in Tunisia was: “prevent Tunisia, strategically so important, going Communist. Present low standard living and low cultural level offered opportunity fruitful Communist labor and best way combat Communism improve both. No longer safe assume Islam was wall which Communism could not capture.” (772.00/5–1250) 2 Geoffroy de la Tour du Pin, Chief of Protectorates Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry. 3 It was announced on June 1 that Jean Mons would be succeeded by Louis Perillier as French Resident General in Tunisia. Mons became a Permanent Secretary in the French Ministry of National Defense. 4 Not printed. The Consul General at Tunis (Packer) to the Secretary of State 772.00/6–1450: Telegram [Document 960] The Consul General at Tunis ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State plain Tunis , June 14, 1950. 85. Resident General Perillier arrived from Paris thirteenth, received by Bey prior broadcasting same evening. Speech summarized herewith: Conscious of difficult task ahead asked cooperation all men goodwill. Wished explain broad outlines measures which France decided implement or prepare immediately close accord Bey. Measures constitute necessary stages new evolution. Once measures applied, will seek solutions to perfect functioning administration. Evolution is law nature, but progress depends civic, political education. France feels all institutional evolution must be accomplished atmosphere calm without internal external pressures. Disorder means country immature, slows progress. France agreement Bey decided implement changes which country’s economic, social evolution make necessary to assure formation modern state. France decided Tunisian Government must undergo important changes strengthen its officials thereby demonstrating France’s wish support progressive evolution Tunisian people and aptitude elite take part administration affairs their country. France resolved open wider doors administrative employment all Tunisians capable assuming with competence desired technical responsibilities. France intends study transformation municipal organization permit all interested people participate more directly administration common interest. France, Tunisia fought two wars in 30 years. Mediterranean unites rather than separates two countries on whose two shores their people died for their national territory. Anxious follow maxim Foreign Minister to understand people aspirations needs. Is entirely impartial with no political affiliations. Convinced future of Tunisia can be constructed in union of those living here. Besides continuing reconstruction and economic development, sanitary and educational projects, will fight housing shortage and support agricultural, industrial and commercial activities and tourism. Today we live in world where progress of ideas, development civilization and scientific discoveries shatter more frontiers every day. Ancient dogma of principles of nationalities for which France has fought to liberate people from slavery now replaced by interdependence and international cooperation. Nationalism henceforth outmoded, therefore backward. 1 Plow can Tunisia shut herself in narrow outdated nationalism while Frenchmen in superior interest peace common prosperity agree cooperate even with former enemies in most tragic conflicts. Actually Tunis small country, unable do without help France. But logical that Tunisia proceed toward internal autonomy by progressive institutional modifications. France pursuing mission here has always favored oppressed, spread generous ideals of rights of man and Christian civilization. 2 Asks cooperation fulfillment task in cause solidarity interests and fraternal friendship. 3 Sent information Paris 70, repeated information Tripoli unnumbered, Algiers unnumbered, Rabat unnumbered. Packer 1 In the source text, this sentence is underscored in pencil and the phrase “This is not possible” is written in the margin. 2 In the source text, the words “Christian civilization” is underscored in pencil and the comment “In Moslem area this will hardly be appealing” is written in the margin. 3 In his telegram 87, June 14, from Tunis, Consul General Packer reported upon the effects of Périller’s speech and on some subsequent events in part as follows: “Périller’s speech small consolation Nationalist. If Bourghiba continues attempts collaborate French doubtful can hold allegiance followers. Speech probably approved Quai d’Orsay and aimed more at calming fear for factions than mollifying Nationalists. No reaction radio speech yet. “Reception 14th Resident General speaking Consular Corps stated Mediterranean peoples emotional, passionate, often speaking impulsively. Stated categorically France will remain Tunisia. “Later brief private conversation emphasized to me France needs time for successive stages development Tunisia.” (772.00/6–1450) The Consul General at Tunis (Packer) to the Secretary of State 772.11/7–1050: Telegram [Document 961] The Consul General at Tunis ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tunis , July 10, 1950—7 p. m. 7. During farewell call Resident General today he informed me following effect: He is now carrying on conversations with Bey which are going well concerning reform program. Reforms will consist various stages leading self-government. Announcement two measures may be made within next month or so. First measure will be re constitution Cabinet Ministers giving Tunisians majority 7 against 6 French. Cabinet sessions will be presided over by a new Prime Minister. Resident General will not attend sessions, even in his capacity Minister Foreign Affairs, even in Foreign Affairs of Bey, since Cabinet will deal only with internal affairs. Secretary General will no longer “visa” (that is approve) all measures adopted by Cabinet. New Secretary General will be appointed. Second measure will provide for larger number places for Tunisians in civil service including upper levels where however many French still be employed, particularly jobs requiring technical knowledge. I said US interested maintenance peace this area; that in view American people’s and Government’s interest in advancement non-self-governing peoples felt Washington would welcome any measures giving Tunisians greater measure self-government. Accomplished and projected personnel changes internal office, rearrangement within Residency and cockiness Resident General indicates new broom destined effect clean sweep. Departing for Paris and Washington tomorrow. 1 Repeated info Paris 6. Packer 1 Packer subsequently retired from the Foreign Service on August 31, after 30 years service. He was succeeded as Consul General at Tunis in late July by John D. Jernegan, until then Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs. The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State 772.11/8–350: Telegram [Document 962] The Consul General at Tunis ( Jernegan ) to the Secretary of State secret Tunis , August 3, 1950—5 p. m. 16. Following are main points made by Resident General Perillier during my call on him this morning: (1) He is still optimistic re possibility putting into effect reform program despite expressed opposition French inhabitants Tunisia on one hand and Nationalist group on other. Believes moderate “third force” can be developed which will accept gradual evolution projected by French Government. (2) However, much negotiating will be required, especially since he considers it essential reforms take place in atmosphere of calm. All important personalities must be consulted and persuaded these. Bey unenthusiastic about any reform program because years end result may be elimination of monarchy and is also unenthusiastic re current proposals because he fears acceptance would damage his popularity with Tunisian nationals. (4) First step Perillier intends attempt is introduce new set of Cabinet Ministers. May even include some representatives of Destour. Perillier believes personalities in government likely to be even more important in bringing about reforms that [ than? ] legal changes, also hopes right type of Cabinet would play important role in bringing about acceptance of proposed changes. 1 (5) Re character of reforms themselves, he reiterates previous statements that they would consist of ( a ) increase in number Tunisian Ministers, ( b ) gradual increase in number Tunisian Government employees and reduction French employees, and ( c ) gradual development representative local government outside city of Tunis. Only new element brought out was strong indication that he was prepared discontinue veto power hitherto exercised by French Secretary General over all acts of Tunisian Government. 2 (This last point has been subject much discussion and its concession might well have strong influence in bringing about acceptance of program at least by moderate Nationalists.) I told Resident General Washington was following his efforts with interest and sympathy and wished him success in his task. Repeated info Paris 14. Jernegan 1 A new Tunisian Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Mohamed Chenik and including Néo-Destour leader Salah Ben Youssef as Minister of Justice was invested on August 17, 1950. The investiture and its meaning was reported upon in some detail in despatch 57, August 19, from Tunis. (772.13/8–1950) 2 In his telegram 31, September 7, from Tunis, Jernegan reported having been informed by Resident General Perillier of the decree of that day abolishing the position of French Counselor to Tunisian Cabinet Ministers. Perillier regarded the reform as the second major step in his reform program. Jernegan pointed out that the French Secretary-General of the Tunisian Council of Ministers retained overall veto power. (772.00/9–750) Memorandum by the Former Consul General at Tunis (Packer) McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: Africa 1 [Document 963] Memorandum by the Former Consul General at Tunis ( Packer ) 2 confidential Washington , August 23, 1950. Memorandum on the Current Situation in Tunisia, With Appended Policy Recommendation Regarding Tunisia [Here follow sections entitled “Brief Historical Summary”, “Current French Reform Program”, “French Interests in Tunisia”, “Population Data”, “Foreign Trade”, and “Mineral Resources”, comprising 11 of the 16–page typewritten source text.] American Interests in Tunisia American interest in Tunisia is at present primarily strategic. The northern Tunisian coast is nearer Europe (Italy, not to mention Sicily) than any point along the Southern Mediterranean shoreline from some distance east of Gibraltar to the Suez Canal. Tunisia in unfriendly hands could prejudice control of the Mediterranean and American bases in Tripoli (Wheelus Field) and Morocco (Port Lyautey), as well as use of British and French Mediterranean and African air and naval bases (Gibraltar, Bizerte, Oran, Tripoli). Politically, American interest, private and State, is twofold: (1) private missionary efforts to proselytize the basically Mohammedan population; and (2) reconciliation of our basic foreign policy principle of facilitating insofar as practicable the attainment by dependent peoples of their ambition for self-government or independence with our desire to maintain very close relations with the protecting power (France) to maintain world peace, thereby permitting the development of wider trade and cultural (including Point IV) relationships with Tunisia. If the Tunisian or North African “problem” should be presented to a United Nations body for consideration, it is obvious that we should find ourselves in an embarrassing position. American economic interest in Tunisia is at present slight. American investments are negligible, including unimportant missionary holdings. Only one important American company (Gulf Oil Corporation) is at present actively engaged in making arrangements to explore and, if successful, to exploit Tunisian natural resources. The Armstrong Cork Company has just liquidated its relatively unimportant enterprise. Tunisian imports from the United States (which mounted from $1,611,000 in 1938 to $28,402,000 in 1947) are now on the decline, amounting to $9,610,000 in 1949. On the other hand, Tunisian exports to the United States (which amounted to $2,011,000 in 1938 and only $242,000 in 1947) offer some possibility of being increased; they totalled $1,470,000 in 1949. A United States Military Cemetery at Carthage holds the remains of some 2,800 Americans who lost their lives in the North African campaign in 1942–43. Policy Recommendation The United States recognized the establishment of the French Protectorate by the Franco-American treaty of 1904 by the terms of which the United States renounced the capitulatory rights granted in the American treaties of 1797 and 1824 with the Bey of Tunis. The President of the French Republic, in concluding the 1904 treaty, acted “in his own name as well as in that of His Highness the Bey of Tunis.” In 1947 our Ambassador at Paris broached the subject of reforms in Tunisia with the French Foreign Minister. Detailed information regarding the French attitude was made available to the Ambassador. 3 As fully reported to the Department subsequently, in various conversations which I had during my incumbency at Tunis (1948–50), I discussed with the Resident General and other French officials the possibility of adopting and implementing reform measures, particularly emphasizing the “time-table” factor. It is doubtful whether those discussions bore any fruit, although they may possibly have influenced somewhat the thinking of Mons and other Residency officials on the subject; as far as reaction in the Quai d’Orsay was concerned, they were probably sterile. The advocacy by Mons, the former Resident General, of reform measures contributed to, if they were not largely responsible for, his removal. Another factor, referred to above, with regard to which more information would be helpful, was the interplay of internal French politics. The new Resident General, Perillier, appears to be in favor of reforms and he has furnished some information as to his ideas on the subject. He is, however, dependent upon decisions to be made in Paris as to the scope and nature of the reforms; possibly their scope and nature will be influenced by his recommendations which, in turn, may be influenced by his conversations with the Bey, Bourghiba, etc. The present would, I believe, be an appropriate time for the United States Government, through Ambassador Bruce at Paris, once more to raise the question of Tunisian reforms with the French Government. It could be done, I believe, without unduly offending French susceptibilities, by frankly pointing out how awkward would be our position vis-à-vis France and vis-à-vis dependent peoples in general if the Tunisian question should reach a United Nations body for consideration. It might be stated that in that event, it would hardly be possible for the United States, in view of our present position of leadership and the existing international situation, to avoid taking some position on the Tunisian question; that, however much we might be tempted to straddle and thereby avoid taking a positive position, such an effort would be interpreted as indicating uncertainty, cowardice or fear vis-à-vis one party or other in this colonial-power versus subject-peoples problem; that the propaganda value to the Soviets of our failure to side with the dependent people in this instance would in the existing international situation, be enormous; that, consequently, we hope that the French will speedily reach a decision on what to do in Tunisia and that their decision will be a liberal one, bearing in mind Tunisia’s expectations and the current demands of the Nationalists, the UN decision on Libya 4 and recent French experiences in Indo-China and Madagascar. It might be added that French prestige will hardly suffer in French North Africa, in the French Union, or in the Arab world, not to mention the United Nations, by the announcement and implementation of reform measures which will draw a large measure of support from the Tunisians themselves, who constitute an overwhelming majority of the population of the Regency, even though they may be opposed by a small but influential French group in Tunisia. USIS activities in Tunis should be continued and as opportunity offers extended. The position of USIS in Tunis today is, I believe, good, although the work of the office there is always subject to suspicion in some French quarters; consequently, there is continuing need for great circumspection in regard to the scope and magnitude of USIS operations there. Continuing efforts should be made by the use of all possible mass media to present our story to the inhabitants of Tunisia, native and European. Through the PAO Tunis, the Department can best undertake and effect an exchange of persons program; it may become feasible to bring Arab students here for study purposes. Tunisia should continue to receive ECA aid. If practicable, more publicity should be given in Tunisia to the facts concerning the extent of such aid in the past; this applies also to future ECA aid as extended. If the French Government could be persuaded or coerced into giving greater publicity in Tunisia to the facts regarding such aid, benefits would accrue to us in Tunisia therefrom. The Consulate General in Tunis has not been kept adequately informed as to the details regarding the manner of extending or the identity of the beneficiaries of such aid, the volume or nature of the goods furnished or the terms under which ECA credits (including counterpart francs) are available. Some publicity in Tunisia on these points would be beneficial to us. Many Tunisians would like to receive ECA aid direct rather than through France. If French objections are not too evident, the question of the possible extension of Point Four aid to Tunisia should be given consideration (a report from Tunis is pending). The granting of Point Four aid might possibly be conditioned on real reforms in Tunisia, the aim of both being to improve the lot of a dependent people, although the French presumably will take the view that France will do all that is possible to assist the Tunisians to a better life. The nationalist-controlled trade union organization, the UGTT, might be induced to join the ICFTU if appropriate steps were undertaken at this time and continued by the CIO and AFL. These latter organizations might be appropriately approached in the matter by the proper Government authorities here. Getting the UGTT to join the ICFTU would be an important gain in the anti-Communist struggle in Tunisia. E. L. Packer 1 Lot 53 D 468 contains copies of memoranda and correspondence of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George C. McGhee for the years 1949–1951. 2 This memorandum was transmitted to Assistant Secretary McGhee under cover of a brief memorandum by Packer of August 23 requesting that copies be sent to the Embassy at Paris and the Consulate General at Tunis. 3 For documentation on the U.S. attitude in 1947 regarding reforms in Tunisia, see Foreign Relations , 1947, vol. v . pp. 669 ff. 4 For documentation on Libya, see pp. 1601 [ Pg. 1601 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] ff. The Consul at Tunis (Dorman) to the Department of State 110.15 MC G/10–350 [Document 964] The Consul at Tunis ( Dorman ) to the Department of State confidential No. 109 Tunis , October 3, 1950. Subject: Visit of Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and Party to Tunis, September 27–28, 1950 1 Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee, accompanied by Mr. Elmer H. Bourgerie, Director of the Office of African Affairs, and Samuel K. Kopper, Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, visited Tunisia on September 27–28, 1950. During the brief stay Mr. McGhee and his party, accompanied by Consul General Jernegan and a member of the Resident General’s Cabinet, visited the Resident General, the Bey, the Secretary General 2 and the Prime Minister. 3 A schedule of Mr. McGhee’s appointments is forwarded as enclosure No. 1 to this despatch. 4 Reception by the Resident General Mr. McGhee was greeted on his arrival at the airport by Mr. Darche, Near Eastern Specialist and Counsellor of Embassy at the Residency General, and by Mr. Mondoloni, Acting Chief of the Diplomatic Cabinet, as well as by officers from this Consulate General. The Residency placed a car at the disposal of Mr. McGhee and his party for the duration of the visit. The Resident General and Mrs. Perillier entertained Mr. McGhee and party, as well as officers from this Consulate General, at a small luncheon on September 27. Mr. McGhee and Mr. Bourgerie accepted the invitation of Mr. Perillier to live at the Residency General during their stay. Call on Resident General The first of the official calls was made on the Resident General on the morning of Mr. McGhee’s arrival in Tunis. During the call, which lasted forty minutes, Mr. McGhee expressed our great interest in the reform program which Mr. Perillier had inaugurated in Tunisia. He emphasized his belief that the forces of nationalism, widespread in the world, were not necessarily bad. They could be guided into constructive lines. The Resident General declared his agreement and said that this was precisely what the French Government was attempting to do in Tunisia. The French believed that it was necessary to make concessions to nationalist sentiment here in order to prevent the Tunisians from joining forces with the communists, who were promising them complete independence. However, Mr. Perillier warned that one should not overemphasize the importance of nationalism in the Tunisian picture. Nationalist sentiment was really strong only among the relatively small group of intellectuals, while the uneducated mass of the people had little interest in anything outside of its own daily problems of making a living. Mr. Perillier characterized the present French policy in this country as an “experiment”. They were endeavoring to carry out an evolutionary process with the collaboration of nationalist elements. It remained to be seen whether the Tunisians had sufficient maturity and grasp of the problems of government to make this policy a success. Their tendency was to try to grasp too much too fast and always to push beyond the terms of reference under which the collaboration had been undertaken. In any case, France had decided its course and would put the reforms into effect even without nationalist cooperation if that should become necessary. The task was a difficult one and the outcome was not certain, but he was hopeful of success. Mr. McGhee expressed his appreciation of the difficulty involved. Mr. McGhee explained that a principal reason for American interest in a satisfactory solution of the problem of Tunisia was the strategic importance of this country to the western powers. Tunisia had played an important role during the last war and would probably be again important if there should be another major conflict. We were anxious that the people of this country should be on the side of the western powers. The Resident General agreed that this was an important consideration and that it was much preferable to have the voluntary rather than the enforced cooperation of the Tunisians in case of war. At Mr. McGhee’s request, Mr. Jernegan told the Resident General of an approach made the night before by Mr. Hedi Nouira, Assistant Secretary General of the Néo Destour Party, who had requested that an interview be arranged with Mr. McGhee for himself and Mr. Salah ben Youssef, Minister of Justice and Secretary General of the Néo Destour. Mr. McGhee was doubtful of the wisdom of such an interview, since it might create misunderstandings, and was disposed to excuse himself from it. He would like to have the Resident General’s opinion on the matter. Mr. Perillier replied that he shared Mr. McGhee’s doubts in this regard and felt that it would be much better to avoid anything of the kind, which might only encourage unreasonable demands on the part of the nationalists while at the same time alarming the French colony and making it more uncompromising than ever in its opposition to reforms. The outcome might well be to delay the reform program, which would not be in the interest of the Néo Destour itself. Mr. Jernegan explained that he had had exactly these thoughts in mind and had expressed them himself to Mr. Nouira. The latter had indicated his full understanding and had said that his Party did not wish to do anything which would embarrass Mr. McGhee or interfere with the successful carrying out of the program of collaboration now in progress. He had also agreed that it would be well for Mr. McGhee to consult the Resident General in this connection. In the light of Mr. Perillier’s opinion, Mr. McGhee said that he had definitely decided not to have the proposed interview with Mr. Salah ben Youssef and Mr. Nouira. Calls on Prime Minister and Secretary General The calls on the Prime Minister and Secretary General were brief and devoted principally to an exchange of friendly remarks. Prime Minister Chenik emphasized the devotion of the Tunisian people to democracy and its determination to continue in support of the democratic principles, which he said were the principles upon which the Moslem religion was founded. Tunisia would continue to defend those principles at the side of France and the United States. Mr. McGhee said that the United States had a great interest in the welfare of the Tunisian people, to which the Prime Minister replied that he was deeply touched by Mr. McGhee’s assurances and by the friendly gesture of his visit to Tunis, which showed that the United States was not only a great country of high ideals but also “had a great heart which could find a place for even so small a country as Tunisia”. Secretary General Vimont, who made an excellent impression on the visitors, echoed the Resident General’s definition of the present program of cooperation with the nationalists as “an experiment”. He said that there were many difficulties to be overcome but that the French were putting into the task all the good faith and good sense that the situation required and had good hopes of a successful outcome. Call on His Highness the Bey The final protocol visit was made on the Bey at his palace in Carthage. The Tunisian ministers were present, as were the Chief of Protocol and the Bey’s second son. The usual formula of translation was followed, i.e. translation of Mr. McGhee’s remarks into French and then translation of French into Arabic. A portable radio, presented to the Bey by Mr. McGhee, had been delivered in advance and was placed on a table in the throne room. The Bey opened the audience by asking Mr. McGhee if he had visited Tunisia before. Mr. McGhee replied that he had been here briefly in 1935 and 1943. His Highness observed that his visits were too brief and too far apart; His Highness did not often have the pleasure of welcoming American “ministers” to Tunisia, and he wished they would call more often. Mr. McGhee then expressed his appreciation for having been received by the Bey and for the reception which he had received since his arrival that morning. Mr. McGhee stated that when he was in Washington he was daily reminded of Tunisia, since just opposite his desk hung a portrait of His Highness Sadok Bey, a portrait which was sent by the Bey of Tunis to President Johnson in 1865 congratulating the President on the end of the Civil War and expressing his condolences for the death of President Lincoln. Mr. McGhee said he wished to present His Highness a photograph of the portrait of his esteemed ancestor. The Bey replied that he was very honored by this gesture of friendship. He stated that he himself had a souvenir of the United States, a signed photograph of President Franklin D. Roosevelt which he kept in his private office. The Bey sent for the photograph and had it shown to Mr. McGhee. He then called for and began to inscribe a photograph of himself which he later presented to Mr. McGhee with the hope that this would be a further reminder of the close ties which exists between Tunisia and the United States. Mr. McGhee said this photograph would hang on his wall beside the portrait of Sadok Bey. His Highness then made a brief remark in Arabic which was translated into French by the Minister of Justice and Secretary General of the Néo Destour Party, Salah Ben Youssef, as follows: “The Tunisian people is Moslem and shares the characteristics of all Moslems. Islamic peoples have strong sentiments of dignity and pride. Such a people cannot live in servitude.” Mr. McGhee replied that the United States had close relations with the Moslem nations and we believe we understand their sentiments. We consider that there was a solidarity among the Moslem nations and ourselves in the present struggle between opposing forces in the world as there had been during the past war, when we had fought together against the common enemy. The Bey’s answer was again translated by Salah Ben Youssef. He agreed, he said, that there was a close relationship between the United States and Moslem peoples. Unfortunately, despite the wartime efforts of the Moslems, and especially the Tunisians, at the side of the Americans in the fight for liberty, six years had gone by since the war and there had been no change, no progress, no amelioration in the situation of the Tunisians. (During this exchange, while Salah Ben Youssef was speaking with marked emphasis, the Bey was devoting most of his attention to inscribing the photograph which he later presented to Mr. McGhee. There was no indication in his manner that he was saying anything more than polite platitudes.) Mr. McGhee then observed that he understood certain progressive steps had already been undertaken. He hoped that the Tunisian people would continue in the path of progress, in cooperation with the French. He knew that His Highness had the welfare of his people at heart and he wished him all success and prosperity. Dr. Ben Salem, Minister of Public Health, who understands English fairly well, quickly volunteered to interpret this statement of Mr. McGhee’s directly from English into Arabic. The Bey’s reply to this last statement, retransmitted directly through Dr. Ben Salem, indicated approval of Mr. McGhee’s observation. After the customary amenities the party took its leave of the Bey. In the ante-room of the palace the Bey’s Chief of Protocol presented to Mr. McGhee, on behalf of the Bey, a gold watch inscribed with the Bey’s name. Luncheon at the La Marsa Residency During the luncheon (at which no Tunisians were present) Resident General Perillier remarked to Mr. Jernegan that the aggressive attitude demonstrated by Salah Ben Youssef that morning was evidence of the difficulties confronting the French in trying to work out their program. Ben Youssef was a man “of no education”, he said, but the Bey and all the Cabinet members were afraid to say or do anything to check him. Mr. Mondoloni told Mr. Jernegan that the Residency was entirely satisfied with the way Mr. McGhee had handled the situation Ben Youssef had created. At the same luncheon, I asked Mr. Darche, who is an Arab specialist, whether Ben Youssef had given a correct translation of the Bey’s remarks. Mr. Darche replied that the translation had been far from correct and that the Bey had merely confined himself to general platitudes. He stated that he had already reported to the Resident General that Mr. McGhee had handled the situation extremely well and had said nothing that could be interpreted as being incorrect. He added that Salah ben Youssef’s deliberate mistranslation of the Bey’s remarks was evidence of the bad faith of the Néo Destour Party with which the Residency had to cope at every turn. The small luncheon given in honor of Mr. McGhee and his party at La Marsa included the newly arrived Secretary General, Mr. Vimont, Mr. Orsetti (Chief of the Resident General’s Civil Cabinet), Mr. Mondoloni, Mr. and Mrs. Jernegan, and Mr. and Mrs. Dorman. During the afternoon of September 27 Mr. McGhee and party, accompanied by officers of this Consulate General, visited Carthage, Sidi Bou Said, and the Arab Quarter of Tunis. That evening Mr. and Mrs. Jernegan entertained Mr. McGhee and his party at a small supper. On the morning of September 28 Mr. McGhee and his party left for Tripoli by special military Air Transport Service plane. Local Contacts On the afternoon prior to Mr. McGhee’s arrival, Mr. Hedi Nouira, editorial writer for the Néo Destour organ, Mission , requested an urgent interview with Mr. Jernegan. Mr. Nouira stated that he was coming on behalf of Salah Ben Youssef, who wished to interview Mr. McGhee during his stay in Tunisia. It was agreed that Mr. McGhee should be approached on this matter after his arrival and Mr. Nouira would be notified of Mr. McGhee’s decision in this matter. In conference with Mr. McGhee the following morning it was suggested that the matter be discussed with the Resident General that same morning and that his advice be sought. However, because of the difficult position in which the Resident General might find himself, it was decided that this proposition be put to the Resident General in such a way it would be easier for him to refuse than to accept. As indicated above, the Resident General subsequently discouraged the meeting. On the morning following Mr. McGhee’s departure a note was received from a certain Ahmed Alaoui, correspondent of Al Alam , apparently organ for the Moroccan Istiqlal Party. Mr. Alaoui requested that he be granted an interview with Mr. McGhee before the latter’s departure. Accompanying the note were several tracts dealing with the Istiqlal Party. Mr. Alaoui was notified by telephone through a clerk in the office that Mr. McGhee had already left Tunisia. [Here follows a review of press reaction in Tunis to the visit by McGhee and his party.] John Dorman 1 The visit of Assistant Secretary McGhee and his party to Tunis was one of several stops made by them in European and African capitals in connection with the Assistant Secretary’s attendance at the North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, October 2–7. Regarding the McGhee tour, see the editorial note, p. 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] . 2 Jacques Vimont. 3 Mohamed Chenik. 4 The enclosure is not printed. Department of State Policy Statement 611.72/10–550 [Document 965] Department of State Policy Statement 1 secret [ Washington ,] October 5, 1950. Tunisia a. objectives Tunisia is important to the security of the United States because of its strategic geographical position in the central Mediterranean area. The objectives of United States policy toward Tunisia are: (1) the maintenance of peaceful and stable conditions under a regime which is friendly to the United States; (2) an orderly development toward internal autonomy; (3) the maintenance of friendly relations with the Tunisian people; (4) the maintenance and, where practicable, advancement of United States commercial, financial and other interests. We believe that our objectives can be most satisfactorily achieved by agreement between the French and the Tunisian nationalists on a long-term modus vivendi which will assure the gradual but sure evolution of Tunisia toward self-government as an associated state within the French Union. b. policies The chief political problem in Tunisia is raised by the aspirations to independence of the Arab nationalists, the policy of France toward those aspirations in particular and French North Africa in general, and the efforts of the Communists to gain control of the area for the Soviet Union. It is a well known tenet of US foreign policy that we look with favor upon the orderly evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government when those peoples demonstrate a capacity for it. A by-product of the position taken by the United States in the UN General Assembly on the question of Libyan independence 2 was that it gave the Arab countries reason to believe that we were sincere in the practical application of this tenet of our foreign policy to the dependent peoples of North Africa. At the same time, however, the position of Tunisia differs from that in Libya in that Tunisia is a French Protectorate and we are committed to a policy of assisting and encouraging a friendly France to regain her strength and influence as a world power. It is necessary, therefore, to carry out a policy in Tunisia which will conform to the basic United States belief in the evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government, maintain the essentials of our policy toward France and block the efforts of the Communists to gain control of Tunisia. We recognize the legitimate interest which France has in Tunisia and we believe that France is the nation best suited to guide the people of Tunisia along the road to self-government as long as France has a non-Communist government and does not pursue policies in Tunisia which would be detrimental to the basic interests of the United States. Our policy, therefore, is to take advantage of all appropriate occasions to persuade the French Government, by high level, confidential approaches, of the need to resolve the conflict between the French administration and the nationalist movement in Tunisia, a conflict which is deep-rooted and one requiring utmost tact, patience, and persistence to resolve. We believe that a concrete, long-range program of reforms designed to lead Tunisia toward eventual self-government will permit Tunisia to develop into a friendly partner which will be a bulwark of a strong France rather than a weak and unwilling vassal which will only cause France trouble and expense. In conformity with these policies, our officials in Tunisia have maintained good relations not only with the Protectorate authorities but also with appropriate nationalist leaders in an open manner and with the full knowledge of the Protectorate Government. Through the medium of our USEE program, and in cooperation with the French we have sought to counteract Communist propaganda in Tunisia and to carry the story of the United States to the Tunisian people. It is also our policy to assist directly in the economic development of Tunisia and aid has been granted the French for the purpose by the ECA. This aid has consisted of dollar credits for the importation of capital goods and industrial materials, and of counterpart funds which are loaned to Tunisia; both types of aid are expended almost entirely on large-scale industrial and agricultural development projects. The purpose of these grants is to raise Tunisia’s level of economic activity, including production both for local consumption and for export. We should also attempt to obtain a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation with Tunisia by having Tunisia included in the treaty with France, if and when it is concluded. An alternative would be to negotiate such a treaty with Tunisia, as well as with Morocco, if we should decide to relinquish our present treaty rights in Morocco. c. relations with other states France . Technically, Tunisia is a sovereign state under French protection, governed by the Bey. In actual fact, control of the governmental administrative machinery and of policy determination is exercised by the French Resident General. A French protectorate over the country was established by the Treaty of Kasr es Said, concluded between France and Tunisia in 1881. In 1883, another treaty was signed at La Marsa, which extended the scope of French influence. These treaties, together with a decree of the President of the French Republic in 1885, requiring the approval of the French Resident General in Tunisia before decrees of the Bey may be promulgated, firmly established French control. The nationalists charge that France has made an outright colony of Tunisia under the guise of a protectorate and that French control over all phases of Tunisian external and internal affairs is a violation of the treaties. This charge is not without foundation. The French believe that Tunisia is absolutely vital to France’s political, military and economic objectives, and that the magnitude of the French investment and the substantial French population entitle France to permanent control of the area. The French have flatly rejected the demands of the nationalists for independence by stating that nationalist aspirations far exceed their present capabilities to manage their own affairs. In our judgment there is considerable truth in this statement. Since the end of World War 11 however, the French have pursued a more lenient policy toward nationalist activities, and the state of siege, though legally still in effect, has been largely lifted in practice. In the summer of 1950, following nationalist demands, a request to the French Government by the Bey, and political pressure by the French Socialist Party, it was announced that certain political reforms would be instituted in Tunisia. These would include a change in the personnel of the Tunisian cabinet, with the addition of one more Tunisian minister; priority for Tunisians in the civil service; abolition of the French advisors to the Tunisian Ministers; and reforms in the municipal administrations. A new cabinet has been installed, which includes the secretary general of the technically proscribed nationalist party, and the French advisors have been removed from the Ministers’ offices to the office of the Secretary General of the Government, where their influence will probably be somewhat less. Municipal reforms are still under study, and no changes have been made as yet. USSR. The long-range objective of the USSR in Tunisia is probably to gain complete control and domination of the area or, failing that, to prevent the exercise of any control or domination over the area by a government opposed to Soviet ideology. The Tunisian Communist Party, which is legally recognized, endeavors to implement this policy. The Communist Party line in Tunisia is flexible and opportunistic. It can be expected to shift in accordance with overall Soviet policy. The Communists are currently concentrating their efforts on the establishment of a national front in Tunisia, i.e., the union of the Communists, the nationalists, and all Tunisians “for the triumph of liberty and peace.” While there have been instances of Communist-nationalist collaboration in Tunisia, the efforts of the Communists to form a united front have not as yet been successful. One of the conditions which the French placed on nationalist participation in the new Government was that they break with the Communists, and the Tunisian nationalist labor union has decided to do so. The possibility always exists, however, that the nationalists may become dissatisfied with the present government, may therefore withdraw and turn to the Communists for assistance. The Communists may be expected to use all means at their disposal to discredit French implementation of the reforms, and stir up dissatisfaction among the nationalists. The French in Tunisia have indicated an increasing concern over Communist developments and activities in the Protectorate, and the local Communist Party is submitted to greater surveillance. This is in contrast to the French attitude in 1948 when they were inclined to dismiss the Communists with the statement that, “Islam and Communism do not mix.” Libya . The French have also indicated concern over the impending establishment of Libya as a sovereign and independent state. There seems little doubt that this event has had and will continue to have a definite effect not only on Tunisia but also on the rest of North Africa. United Kingdom . The British realize the dangers inherent in the rigid policy which France is pursuing with respect to her dependent areas in North Africa, and it is believed that the United Kingdom is anxious to support the French Government and to help establish harmonious relations between the French and Moslems. However, the United Kingdom has decided that it cannot afford to interject itself into the delicate North African situation, and British representatives in North Africa have instructions to appear as passive as possible. Italy . While there are some 87,000 Italians in Tunisia, they are inactive politically and have failed to regain the economic position they occupied prior to World War II. The Italian Government does not play an active role in present political developments in Tunisia, and has indicated that it has no desire to increase Italian influence. Arab League . The Arab League has given some encouragement to North African nationalists in their aspirations for independence. Early in 1947 the League adopted a resolution calling for complete autonomy for Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Since that time individual Arab leaders have periodically reaffirmed their support of the North African cause. Although member countries do not all agree on certain Near Eastern questions, they can agree unreservedly on the North African question, and thus foster League unity. The Council of the League and prominent Near Eastern Arabs have so openly committed themselves to support the North African nationalists that they could not renounce their commitments without considerable loss of prestige throughout the Arab countries. It is believed that the League fully intends to implement those provisions of the League Pact which oblige its Council to adopt all possible political measures to advance the interest of dependent Arab peoples. There is a possibility that one of the member states will place the question of North Africa on the agenda of the 1951 General Assembly. d. policy evaluation While we believe that the most satisfactory immediate solution of the problem of Tunisia is for the French and the Tunisians to agree on a modus vivendi , we have been unable to convince the French of the wisdom of accepting a program of political reforms such as we envisage. While the reforms undertaken in 1950 are limited in scope, they constitute a step in the right direction. It remains to be seen whether the nationalists’ representative in the Government will cooperate satisfactorily with the French, and whether the French will actually grant substantial responsibility to the Tunisians, both in the central Government and in the municipalities. If the question of French rule in North Africa is raised in the UN, the United States will be faced with a serious question of policy determination. On one hand, we believe that France is the nation best equipped to exercise international responsibility for the area. On the other hand, French policy in the Protectorate has in certain respects proved inconsistent with the policies of the United States and with the principles of the UN Charter. We should, therefore, while expressing to the French our gratification at the reforms instituted and projected and the hope that their implementation will proceed as rapidly and successfully as possible, continue to indicate to them our interest in further political reforms and social reforms (including education) which would guarantee the evolution of the Tunisians toward genuine self-government. We should at the same time make clear to the French that we understand their problems, and that we have no intention of pursuing a policy designed to weaken the ties between France and Tunisia. On the contrary, we wish to see these bonds strengthened, and our economic assistance, the activities of the USIE, and other aspects of our policy are not in any way designed to undermine French influence. 1 Department of State Policy Statements were concise summaries of current U.S. policy toward a country or region, relations of that country or region with the principal powers, and the issues and trends in that country or region. The statements, which were generally prepared by ad hoc working groups in the responsible bureaus of the Department of State and were periodically revised, provided information and guidance for officers in missions abroad. 2 For documentation on attitude of the United States with respect to Libyan independence, see pp. 1601 [ Pg. 1601 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] ff. The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State 772.00/10–2350 [Document 966] The Consul General at Tunis ( Jernegan ) to the Department of State confidential No. 131 Tunis , October 23, 1950. Subject: Resident General’s Views on Progress of Reform Program The French authorities in Tunisia have decided to proceed with political reforms in the Regency much more slowly than they at first gave the public, and myself, to understand. They are presently more interested in maintaining a firm control over all branches of the administration than in arriving at a real accord with the nationalists. This is the net impression I obtained from a lengthy conversation with Resident General Perillier on October 20. Although M. Perillier said that a “text” to modify the control powers of the Secretary General of the Tunisian Government was being prepared, it was implied in his remarks that the changes were unlikely to be drastic and that immediate action of any kind in this matter was not to be expected. He also said that he had proposed to Prime Minister Chenik the creation of two small commissions to study changes in municipal governments and the opening of greater opportunities for Tunisians to be employed in the national government, but here too it appeared that only tentative, preliminary steps were currently envisaged. The Resident General confirmed his recent public statements (see reference despatch 1 ) that he considered a pause necessary in the political reform program. He frankly admitted that this would be displeasing to the nationalists and might even cause the resignation of the present cabinet and a breakdown of the precarious collaboration between the French and the Néo-Destour. This prospect did not seem to trouble him greatly, however. If the nationalists were not willing to work with him on his own terms, he said, he could always find plenty of volunteers to fill the cabinet jobs and he would go ahead with his program, in his own good time, just the same. M. Perillier recognized that a definite break between the Néo-Destour and the French might produce considerable unrest and even possibly disturbances, but lie asserted that this could be easily controlled, whether it took the form of violence or peaceful resistance through something like a general strike. He evidently has a low opinion of the courage of the Tunisians and great confidence in the effectiveness of a show of French force. When I interjected that I was worried about the possibility of Arab League intervention in the UN in support of the nationalists, the Resident General dismissed this rather cavalierly as being no great problem even if such action should materialize. What, he asked, could the Arabs accomplish in the UN except to bring about a big debate? (Not wishing to press the question, I refrained from pointing out that such a debate could be very embarrassing, if not even more serious, to both France and the United States.) He admitted, however, that the existence of the UN forum and the development of world opinion made it desirable for France to avoid the use of open force in Tunisia if possible. M. Perillier also dismissed as unimportant the possibility (mentioned in at least one local newspaper) that the nationalist leaders might carry their complaints direct to the French Government in Paris. If they did this, he said, they might see President Auriol, who would receive them politely and ask them to see Prime Minister Pleven. 2 M. Pleven would receive them politely and suggest that they discuss matters with M. Schuman. M. Schuman would point out that the proper person to see was M. Perillier, who had his entire confidence, but that they might talk with M. Parodi 3 of the Foreign Office if they wished. M. Parodi would refer them in turn to M. Binoche, 4 in charge of Africa-Levant affairs, who would pass them on to M. Latour du Pin, and Latour du Pin would suggest that they go back to Tunis and talk to the Resident General. Our conversation, which took place at his request, consisted mostly of a monologue by M. Perillier in which he seemed to be trying to justify to me his decision to slow down the process of political change and to convince me that it was only a slowing-down, not an abandonment of the policy of reform. Unfortunately, he was not crystal-clear in his exposition of the reasons for this decision, but I believe I am correct in setting them down as follows: 1. The French inhabitants of Tunisia had been greatly disturbed by the first small reforms (new cabinet with an additional Tunisian member, suppression of French advisers to Tunisian ministers) and had had to be reassured by repeated emphatic statements about continued French control. Further immediate reform steps would set them off again. 2. The nationalists in the cabinet had tried to “cheat”, to go beyond the terms of the agreement under which the implementation of the reform program had been undertaken. This sort of tactics only caused M. Perillier to hold back still more. 3. The cabinet had not demonstrated its ability to handle its present administrative responsibilities; the work of the government was not being carried forward even as efficiently as under the formed Kaak cabinet. It would be illogical to give the Tunisians greater powers and responsibilities until they had proven they could measure up to their present duties. 4. Prime Minister Chenik had proven a disappointment. He was selected for the post because he had made a good showing in office under Moncef Bey, 5 but he now seemed to have lost the quality of leadership. In consequence it was Salah Ben Youssef, the Néo-Destour representative, who dominated the government. Instead of being just one-seventh of the cabinet, Ben Youssef had become “five-sevenths”, which was not at all what M. Perillier had planned. Apart from advancing these specific reasons, M. Perillier devoted a great deal of time to general justification of his go-slow policy. Reiterating previous statements about the political immaturity of the Tunisians, he dwelt on their asserted tendency to corruption in office. The nationalist leaders, he said, were really interested only in getting power and wealth for themselves. They had no interest in the true welfare of the people as a whole or in developing democratic institutions. As evidence of this point he quoted the Prime Minister as having said that he was not interested in preparing for more representative municipal governments, whereas the Resident General considered that this was a fundamental step in the education of the Tunisian people toward self-government. M. Perillier alluded repeatedly to Egypt, Syria and even Korea as examples of the bad results of giving backward peoples independence before they were ready for it. In Egypt, he said, corruption and inefficiency were rampant and the people as a whole were much worse off than they had been under British rule or than the Tunisian people were at present under French rule. Egyptians who visited Tunisia, he said, frankly admitted this. He emphasized his belief that the majority of the Tunisian people were not truly nationalists at heart but merely opportunists who followed whatever group seemed the strongest. They paid lip service to Bourguiba and the Néo-Destour because that party might one day be in power, but if the Destourians should get “a sharp knock on the head”, there would be a general rush to the other side of the fence. Aside from mentioning the possibility of Arab League action, my part in the conversation was limited to informing the Resident General that his program of reforms had been discussed with great interest at the Tangier Conference. 6 The delegates, I said, had regarded this program as the most promising sign on the North African horizon and had expressed the hope that his “experiment” would succeed, since its success might have a good influence not only in Tunisia but also in other parts of the area. M. Perillier picked up my word “experiment” and proceeded to stress that his program was just that, making plain that he considered its success still very doubtful. During the course of the talk, he made some vague allusions to American and British contacts with the Arabs (presumably North African as well as Near Eastern Arabs), apparently with the idea of cautioning me not to be taken in by their assurances of Arab friendship for America. My conclusion from all of this is that the prospect for an amicable and enduring modus vivendi between the French and Arabs in Tunisia is not so bright as it appeared a few weeks ago. The Resident General’s attitude does not seem fundamentally changed, but he certainly sounds more rigid than in his earlier conversations with me, and even his earlier attitude was considered too rigid by the nationalists. No matter how valid his reasons for the “pause” may be, French holding-back on reform moves already promised will certainly strike the nationalists as proof of bad faith. If the Néo-Destour pulls out of the cabinet and returns to all-out demands for independence, I fear that even actual implementation of the promised reforms by the French might not be sufficient to prevent a crisis of some sort. Furthermore, to judge by the Resident General’s own remarks, nationalist agitation only causes him to be that much more resistant to demands for changes. He does not seem to realize that strict, logical paternalism, regardless of how good its motives, has gone out of fashion in the world. Still worse, he gives no evidence of appreciating the dangers for France involved in an eventual full-fledged airing of nationalist claims before the UN. However, I am not yet disposed to write off the reform program and Arab-French collaboration as a lost cause. Tunisian reaction to the Resident General’s go-slow policy has not been so violent as I would have anticipated, and so long as the present cabinet stays in office the way is open for an understanding. Perillier still insists that reforms will come in due course. His record in handling the nationalists to date has been pretty good. Perhaps he can restrain their impatience long enough to prevent a rupture. John D. Jernegan 1 No. 129, October 17, from Tunis; not printed. 2 French Prime Minister, July 1950–March 1951. 3 Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry. 4 Jean Binoche, in charge of African-Levant affairs in the French Foreign Ministry from July 1950. 5 A former Tunisian Prime Minister. 6 The reference here is to the North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference, held at Tangier, October 2–7, 1950. For the summary report on the Conference, including the recommended policy toward Tunisia, see McGhee’s memorandum of November 6 to the Secretary of State, p. 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] . Memorandum by the Deputy Directory, Office of Western European Affairs (Williamson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) 772.00/11–1750 [Document 967] Memorandum by the Deputy Directory, Office of Western European Affairs ( Williamson ) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs ( Bonbright ) confidential [ Washington ,] November 17, 1950. Subject: Situation in Tunisia For some time now we have been hopeful that the reforms in Tunisia, consisting principally of enlarging the Nationalist participation in the government and the abolition of the French-appointed Secretaries General under each Minister, were the forerunners of a truly liberal reform policy in that area. This liberal program was devised under the regime of Resident General Mons, a capable and vigorous man who was replaced earlier this year by a former Prefect from Algiers named Perillier. It fell to the lot of the latter to officially announce the reforms and assure their constructive execution. At first all seemed well. On October 7th, however, Perillier announced a “pause” in the reform program and since then matters have gone from bad to worse. The attached two despatches 1 from Mr. Jernegan indicate that the reform program is now at a standstill and even one might say in retrogression. Mr. Jernegan has discussed this situation with Mr. Perillier, who appears to show no desire to move forward and who rather indicates that he will follow a get-tough policy with the Nationalists. Mr. Perillier also appears to be blind to the danger of the Arab League intervening in the UN in support of the Nationalists and has dismissed the possibility that the Nationalists might carry their complaints to Paris. For the time being I do not believe that we should take direct action in Paris with the French in an effort to inject new life into the reform program. I believe, however, that groundwork for such possible action in the future might be laid by showing these two reports, unofficially and informally, to Mr. Daridan. 2 In so doing we might point out that Mr. Jernegan is no dreamy-eyed, anti-colonial, pro-Nationalist idealist. He is, on the other hand, a capable matured observer in whom EUR has great confidence. Mr. Daridan might also be informed that we had hoped that the Tunisian reform program would be carried on and that we are seriously concerned over the turn that events have taken in Tunis. At the same time Mr. Daridan might be advised that if the Arab League were to intervene on behalf of the Nationalists in the UN the United States Government would be placed in an extremely difficult position and could at best only abstain in any such discussions. 3 1 There is no indication in the source text which despatches were attached to this memorandum. One of the despatches probably was despatch 131, October 23, from Tunis, supra . Perhaps the other despatch was No. 144, November 1, from Tunis, entitled “Growing Resistance by Tunisians to Resident General’s Inactivity Regarding Reforms”. (772.00/11–150) 2 Jean Daridan, First Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States. 3 The source text bears Bonbright’s handwritten notation in the bottom margin: “OK and tell Paris and Tunis what you have done. JCHB”. The files of the Department of State do not confirm that the recommended course of action was actually carried out. The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State 772.00/11–2150 [Document 968] The Consul General at Tunis ( Jernegan ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret No. 176 Tunis , November 21, 1950. Subject: Relations With the Residency General The cordial attitude which apparently existed a few months ago between the Residency General and the officers of the Consulate General seems to have given way to a feeling of suspicion and distrust on the French side which makes the frank exchange of political views difficult. The cause of this distrust appears to be the circulation by the French Security Services of entirely unfounded reports as to the alleged political activities of officers of this Consulate General. It will be recalled that soon after the arrival of Resident General Louis Perillier, I conferred with him on two occasions. During these conversations Mr. Perillier seemed entirely open and frank, interested to learn my reactions to his program and frank in explaining his difficulties. However, during my last conversation with him, held at his request (reference my despatch 131 2 ), I had the impression that the Resident General did not wish to take me so fully into his confidence, that he kept to a general justification of his policies, and was not interested in learning my reactions. Mr. Raymond Jacquet, Director of the Resident General’s Cabinet, was similarly very cordial to Consul Dorman soon after the former’s arrival in Tunis. At that time Mr. Jacquet suggested frequent meetings and frank exchanges of views on the current situation. In recent weeks, however, it has been difficult for Mr. Dorman to arrange an appointment with Mr. Jacquet. The last such appointment consisted in a brief question-answer period which lasted approximately half an hour and which was continually interrupted. Mr. Jacquet seemed anxious to terminate the interview and he volunteered almost no information of a political nature. Mr. Jean Darche, recently designated as Assistant Director of Cabinet, has also shown a certain reluctance to discuss the political situation except in the most general terms. Mr. Darche, like Mr. de la Chauviniere 3 and Mr. Jean-Louis Brisset, 4 is a Quai d’Orsay man and as such is not part of the Resident General’s personal entourage which consists of officers of the cadre of prefects. On the one occasion on which Mr. Dorman was able to lead out Mr. Darche, the latter commented simply that when he arrived in Tunisia, he thought the Tunisians should be granted their independence. Since that time he had revised his opinion, and he now felt that they were entirely incapable of handling even internal autonomy. When Mr. Brisset returned from a trip to Paris approximately two months ago, he indicated to Mr. Dorman that he would be pleased from time to time to discuss the political situation with him, that conversations of a political nature might be carried out, in his presence, with Mr. Darche or Mr. de la Chauviniere. He stated that these Quai d’Orsay officials were qualified to discuss the political situation in Tunisia with us, while such officials as Jacquet were not. Three days after the conversation Mr. Dorman telephoned Mr. Brisset for an appointment and was informed that Mr. Brisset was very busy but that if the matter was urgent he might spare a few minutes. Apparently the reason for suspicion toward the American Consulate General by the officials of the Residency General was revealed in a conversation between Mr. Jacquet and Mr. Dorman on November 2. After a few introductory remarks Mr. Dorman asked about the recent activities of Salah ben Youssef, to which Mr. Jacquet replied, “I should ask you that same question. You know more about him than we do.” By way of explanation, Mr. Jacquet stated that he had recently received reports which indicated that American consular officers had been seeing nationalist leaders. When asked for a specific example, Mr. Jacquet referred to one such report which stated that Salah ben Youssef had visited me at my villa in Gammarth approximately one month before. According to the report, ben Youssef arrived at my house at eleven o’clock one night and remained until four o’clock the next morning. Mr. Dorman assured Mr. Jacquet that such a report had no foundation whatsoever, that any such meetings with nationalist leaders would take place during office hours at the Consulate General, and that if such meetings should take place we would in all probability mention the fact to the appropriate “Residency official, thereby saving them the expense and the embarrassment of relying on obviously inaccurate informers. Mr. Dorman again emphasized the importance of close relationships between the American consular officers and the Residency officials and added that unless close personal contact was maintained, falsified reports such as the one cited would lead to suspicion and distrust. Mr. Jacquet asked if Mr. Dorman was aware of the request by the French authorities of Algeria for the recall of the American PAO. 5 Mr. Dorman replied that he had been informed of the incident, but that apparently the French authorities had leveled charges which were entirely unfounded and which they were consequently unable to prove. It was to avoid just such situations, Mr. Dorman added, that the Consulate General wished to be on close terms with the Residency General. Mr. Jacquet agreed and, although he stated his appointment calendar was extremely full these days, he hoped that such close relations could be maintained outside the office. Mr. Jacquet pointed out that any contacts which the American consular officers might have with Tunisians, no matter how discreet, might well be used by the Tunisians to forward their own interests. As an example, he referred to the distribution by the USIS office of the Arabic edition of “A Government by the People” which, he stated, had been distributed to every caid in Tunisia. This pamphlet, Mr. Jacquet continued, was innocuous, but one Tunisian newspaper lifted several sentences from their context and the result appeared to be a strong case for Tunisian independence. Mr. Dorman remarked that two weeks prior to the distribution of this pamphlet to the public, several copies had been deliberately sent to officials at the Residency. Since the Residency officials, and in particular the Chief of the Information Services, did not see fit to comment on what might appear to them to be inappropriate for further distribution, the PAO proceeded to distribute the pamphlet on a large scale. The following day I made a point of calling on Mr. Dufresne de la Chauviniere, Minister Delegate to the Resident General, Mr. Perillier being absent on his trip to Sfax, Gafsa, and Tozeur. My purpose in calling on Mr. de la Chauviniere was to help lay the ghost of my reported midnight visit from Salah ben Youssef, although my pretense was to continue the series of conversations on the political situation which I had been having with the Resident General. Mr. de la Chauviniere passed off my reported visit by Salah ben Youssef lightly and I was not sure that he was convinced of its falsity, although he said he had no criticism to make of my activities. From the point of view of eliciting political information, I felt that the conversation was even, more unsatisfactory. Mr. de la Chauviniere gave me a long, general dissertation on the situation, adding little or nothing to what the Resident General had told me two weeks before, and his answers to my questions tended to be indirect and unenlightening. On November 15 Mr. Dorman again talked with Mr. Jacquet, who had been apprised of my visit to Mr. de la Chauviniere. Mr. Jacquet asked Mr. Dorman if he was aware of the reports concerning the PAO officer in Tunis which were being circulated by a secretary whose services at the USIE office had recently been terminated. Mr. Dorman replied that he was aware of two such stories which the secretary concocted: (1) that the Tangier Conference, 6 which Mr. Sabini attended, was a ruse to get him out of the country gracefully at the request of the French Government and that he would continue on to the United States and (2) that the USIE was a center for nationalist propaganda. Mr. Dorman added that both these stories were ridiculously false since Mr. Sabini did return from Tangier, and prior to employing the only Tunisian translator at the USIE library we had requested the Director of Public Education for help in selecting a translator qualified in English, French, and Arabic—a request to which we had received no response. Mr. Jacquet did not pursue the subject further. For the record, it should be stated that all officers of the Consulate General have been careful to avoid becoming associated with Tunisian nationalists. We never seek them out, and our only contacts occur when they take the initiative in calling on us. These calls almost invariably take place during business hours and at the office. The American side of the conversation is limited to listening, asking occasional questions and, usually, getting in some sort of plug for Franco-Tunisian understanding. The only nationalist of importance with whom I have had an interview since my arrival in Tunis is Hedi Nouira, Assistant Secretary General of the Néo Destour, and, with Mr. Nouira’s consent, I reported the substance of that conversation to the Resident General the following day. It is believed that the unfounded reports from the Security Services are motivated by: (1) an inherent French distrust of the American Consulate General and (2) a group of overzealous, imaginative agents who hope for recognition or promotion by initiating reports, no matter how fantastic they may seem. John D. Jernegan 1 Copies of this despatch were sent to Paris, Algiers, Rabat, and Tangier. 2 Dated October 23, p. 1797 [ Pg. 1797 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] . 3 Edouard Dufresne de la Chauviniere, Minister Plenipotentiary Delegate to the Residency General at Tunis. 4 Chief of the Diplomatic and Cultural Section of the Cabinet of the Residency General. 5 The reference here is to John A. Sabini, Vice Consul at Tunis who served as Public Affairs Officer (PAO). 6 Regarding the Tangier Conference under reference here, see the summary report on the Conference in McGhee’s memorandum of November 6, p. 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] . The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State 772.00/12–750: Telegram [Document 969] The Ambassador in France ( Bruce ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , December 7, 1950—9 p. m. 3246. Binoche, Director Afrique-Levant section, Foreign Office volunteered following information on decisions resulting from discussions re Tunisian reforms which have taken place between Foreign Office and Resident General Perillier in Paris during past week. Perillier and Secretary General Vimont 1 will return to Tunis, accompanied by LaTour duPin, Foreign Office, December 9 and will submit extract reform measures decided by French Government to Bey Prime Minister December 11. Principal points in program are: 1. Governmental structure: ( a ) Abolition of Secretary General’s veto power over ministerial decisions. The Resident General will, however, be empowered to approve or disapprove all decisions (Arretes) of a political or judicial nature. Decisions of technical character will require no higher approval than that of Council of Ministers. It is felt that submission of certain category of decisions to highest French authority in Regency, instead to Secretary General as in past is essential in order to assure continued responsibility of French in development of Tunisian Democratic Government. French believe this compromise will go long way toward satisfying Tunisians and assuring them good intentions of France. ( b ) Removal of French commanding general of Tunisia from Council of Ministers. Foreign Office considers maintenance of military authority in Council might raise Tunisian suspicions, no matter how unwarranted, of French desire to keep firm army hold on government. Incidentally, while not enforced, state of siege has never been lifted in Tunisia. ( c ) Prime Minister will preside over Council of Ministers. 2. Increased participation of Tunisians in administration. ( a ) Recruitment of Tunisians for lower grade positions in government will be increased from present 60 percent to 70 percent; middle grades from 40 to 60 percent and higher posts from 25 to 50 percent. This increase will be operative of course only in so far as qualified candidates present themselves, and any deficiencies will be filled temporarily by French until eligible Tunisians are available. ( b ) Premium to be placed on applicants for positions who can pass special exam in Arabic. This should weigh heavily in favor of Tunisians. 3. Widening democratic structure of municipalities. Proposals to be studied by Franco-Tunisian mixed commission, which according to Binoche is already established with Dr. Materi, Minister of Labor and Cultural Relations representing Bey. Binoche expressed hope that this concrete evidence of French Government’s desire to promote self-government in Tunisia would find ready response among Tunisians and would give lie to misinterpretations of Perillier’s admittedly maladroit utterances proclaiming “pause” in October. He added that Tunisian leaders, concerned only own authority, show little interest in municipal reforms and would have to be pushed hard by French in this project to develop democratic processes at lowest level. In concluding conversation Binoche referred to Morocco and remarked on moderate tone of Sultan’s throne speech November 18 and French impression that pressure of Istiqlal for abrogation Treaty of Fez had been handled adroitly by Sultan, who by raising this question with French before leaving Paris, had satisfied Nationalists. 2 Foreign Office believes, however, that he has no intention at present of pursuing issue energetically, being satisfied with obtaining certain specific concessions. We are impressed by initiative of Binoche in taking us into confidence regarding North African matters and informing us in advance of measures French intend taking that area. Our oft-repeated expressions of interest in evolution those countries have apparently taken effect, and Foreign Office is increasingly willing to advise us of developments giving proof of what they consider to be their liberal and benevolent policy. 3 Repeated info Tunis 19, Rabat 30. Bruce 1 Jean Vimont, Secretary-General of the Tunisian Government. The Secretary-General was appointed by the Bey at the recommendation of the Resident General. 2 For documentation on the interest of the United States in the developments in Morocco, see pp. 1737 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] ff. 3 Telegram 42, December 13, from Tunis, reported that Resident General Perillier had presented to Prime Minister Chenik on December 11 the reform program outlined in the telegram printed here (772.00/12–1350). Telegram 35, December 14, to Tunis, repeated to Paris, replied as follows: “In your discretion you may see appropriate Nationalist contacts and informally express as your personal view that reforms offered by Fr are step in right direction and belief that acceptance of reforms will redound to benefit of Tunisian people. Residency shld be informed of this action if it is taken.” (772.00/12–1350) In his telegram 65, December 15, from Tunis, Consul General Jernegan expressed the hope to have the opportunity in the coming few days to express his personal views in appropriate quarters as suggested by the Department. Jernegan reported that the Resident General was most appreciative of the Department’s attitude. Telegram 3515, December 19, from Paris, reported that the Embassy had been informed by the French Foreign Ministry that Bourghiba had called on Secretary-General Parodi on December 13 and reiterated his desire to cooperate with France in developing self-government in Tunisia. Bourghiba noted with appreciation the initial steps taken by the French in Tunisia, but he regretted that the measures were so limited. Parodi reportedly pointed out that the reforms ought not to be effected too hastily, but Bourghiba maintained that only sweeping and dramatic changes could satisfy the nationalists. (772.00/12–1950) The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tunis 772.00/11–2150: Airgram [Document 970] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tunis 1 secret [ Washington ,] December 14, 1950. A–26. Reference Tunis Despatch No. 176 of November 21, 1950. 2 Department shares the Consulate General’s concern over the feeling of distrust and suspicion which Residency General officials are manifesting toward Consular personnel, as set forth in despatch under reference. In these critical times the Department attaches the utmost importance to a full and frank exchange of information and political views between the officers of the Consulate General and members of the Residency General. This is essential to ensure that we have an understanding of French problems and French thinking and that they have full benefit of US views. Such exchanges serve also to alleviate the very feeling of distrust and suspicion with which the French are inclined to view all US actions in French North Africa. At the same time, it is essential that we maintain our contacts with Nationalist leaders in order that we may have benefit of their thinking on and reaction to political developments in Tunisia. Department fails see how members of the Consulate General could handle Nationalist contacts in more open and aboveboard way than they have been handled in past. Dept, of course, has no intention of severing the limited contacts we now have with Nationalist leaders merely to alleviate French suspicion of our actions. Such action would be politically unwise in view our overall relations with Arab world, our policy in North Africa, and our common objective with France in combatting spread of communism in North African area. Dept also concerned at French attitude toward USIE program in Tunisia. We have no intention of curtailing our present USIE activities and, in fact, contemplate step-up in USIE program particularly as result of ECA interest and expected activity in this field in Tunisia. Dept wishes to give fullest possible backing to you in this matter. However, in view contents Paris telegram 3246, December 7, 3 repeated Tunis as 19, there would appear to be good possibility that Perillier will again take you into his confidence upon his return to Tunis. In view this possibility, we do not feel that Dept should make any approach to French regarding this matter at this time. Your comments on this proposed line of action would be appreciated. You are requested to keep Dept fully informed of developments re relations between your office and Residency General and French attitude toward USIE activities. Acheson 1 This airgram, was repeated to Paris. 2 Ante , p. 1802 [ Pg. 1802 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] . 3 Supra . Union of South Africa Union of South Africa Contents Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with the Union of South Africa (Documents 971-988) Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with the Union of South Africa Principal policies and problems in the relations of the United States with the Union of South Africa [971] The Consul General in Johannesburg (Redecker) to the Department of State Johannesburg, February 17, 1950. 745A.00/2–1750 [972] The Department of State to the Embassy of the Union of South Africa Washington, February 20, 1950. 611.45A/2–2150 [973] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) Capetown, March 6, 1950. 110.15 MC/3–2150 [974] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) Capetown, March 7, 1950. 110.15 MC/3–2150 [975] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) Washington, April 17, 1950. 845A.2547/4–1750 [976] The Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) to the Secretary of State Capetown, June 8, 1950. 845A.411/6–850 [977] The South African Minister of Defence (Erasmus) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) Capetown, June 15, 1950. 745A.5/7–1150 [978] The Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) to the Secretary of State Capetown, June 27, 1950—5 p. m. 845A.2547/6–2750: Telegram [979] Editorial Note [980] The Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) to the Secretary of State Pretoria, September 16, 1950—11 a. m. 845A.2547/9–1650: Telegram [981] Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the Embassy in South Africa (Connelly) Pretoria, September 27, 1950. 123 Erhardt, John G. [982] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] October 2, 1950. 745A.13/10–250 [983] The Ambassador in South Africa (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State Pretoria, October 3, 1950. 745A.001/10–350 [984] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [New York,] October 5, 1950 745A.5/10–550 [985] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) Washington, 5 October 1950. ISA/MDAP Files: Lot 52–26 [986] The South African Ambassador (Jooste) to the Secretary of State Washington, 9 October, 1950. 745A.5/10–950 [987] Editorial Note [988] Record of Meeting No. 169 of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, December 28, 1950 [Washington, undated.] The Consul General in Johannesburg (Redecker) to the Department of State 745A.00/2–1750 [Document 971] The Consul General in Johannesburg ( Redecker ) to the Department of State confidential No. 67 Johannesburg , February 17, 1950. Subject: Serious Native Riots in Johannesburg The most serious rioting by natives to occur in Johannesburg broke out in the native township of Newclare, Johannesburg, on the evening of February 13. It assumed considerable proportions and lasted for two nights, reaching a peak on February 14, and spreading to the adjoining township of Sophiatown. Hundreds of natives were involved in the rioting, Indian stores were wrecked, looted and set on fire, and the police were heavily stoned by natives. Large forces of strongly armed police were dispatched to the scene of the trouble, and it was necessary for the police to use pistols, rifles and even machine guns to disperse the rioters. Numbers of police were injured and some might have been killed by stones thrown by the natives but for the protection of their helmets. Police cars were considerably damaged. The natives impeded the work of firemen combating fires by uncoupling and damaging fire hoses and by other acts of violence, stoning the firemen, etc. Property damaged is estimated at around £20,000. Altogether, the rioting was the most serious to occur in Johannesburg. It was a continuation of a wave of violence and lawlessness by natives during recent months. Serious disturbances broke out on November 11, 1949, at Randfontein, Newlands and Krugersdorp, requiring vigorous police action. Renewed rioting broke out at Newclare on January 29 last, when a large force of 500 armed police raided the township and some 600 natives were arrested. Unlike the far more serious rioting occurring some months ago in Durban, which was directed exclusively against the large Indian population residing there, and which was stimulated by grievances and hostility of the natives towards the Indians, the riots in Johannesburg were directed against the white European police and grew from grievances of the native against the white authorities. The riots were therefore the most serious to occur thus far against the established European authority of South Africa. The wrecking of the Indian shops was only incidental to the main issues involved. Fortunately, the native rioters possessed few firearms, although some fired pistol shots at the police. But, in general, they used as weapons iron bars, clubs, stones and whatever missiles they could get hold of. Had the natives had firearms, the result undoubtedly would have been infinitely worse and incalculable, as the mobs were in a very angry and turbulent mood. While the rioting had ceased almost completely by the night of February 15, when only isolated cases of disorder occurred, there are indications that they have not definitely stopped, as the basic cause of them continues and there may be further unexpected outbreaks in the future when conditions again become acute and the natives are sufficiently aroused. The Government has become so concerned regarding the rioting that it became the subject of immediate debate in Parliament. More stringent measures have been taken for greatly increasing the forces of the police for dealing with renewed outbreaks. Even mechanized mobile units of the Union Defense Force have been made available and stationed at strategic points for instant action for meeting any further emergencies that may arise. The disturbances were confined to the native townships of Newel are and Sophiatown, situated in the western part of the City of Johannesburg, at some distance from the main European business center and residential districts, situated chiefly in the northern and eastern parts of the large metropolis, embracing a total area of 90 square miles. The rioting was complicated and intensified by armed European citizens living near the townships taking the law into their own hands and going to the scene of rioting to engage in armed clashes with the natives. It appears that the Europeans were actuated by feelings of fear and resentment that the police were not using sufficiently drastic measures and that the natives “should be taught a lesson”, and also that unless they assisted in restricting the fighting, it might spread to the neighborhoods where they lived. The Government issued stern orders to the Europeans to desist, giving assurance that the Government forces were adequate and would be used to the utmost to protect the lives and property of all peaceful persons, regardless of race. The spark that set off the riots was the action of the police in arresting a native in the Newclare Township who was without an official pass. The native resisted the police, other natives came to his assistance, and in a short time the entire Township was in a tumult. The police had to withdraw and call for reinforcements, which, with the spread of the rioting, were greatly increased. The natives barricaded the streets and for a time the police did not venture in the danger zone. The situation became so serious as to bring the highest national police authorities, including General Palmer, Commandant of the South African Police, to the scene. It is reported that even General Smuts, head of the United Party, went to the scene to observe conditions for himself. As can be imagined, the riots have caused considerable alarm to the white population of Johannesburg. Many citizens feel that, although the rioting has now quited down, there is no telling when another spark will cause another outburst. Many thoughtful observers feel that unless there is drastic improvement in the economic and living conditions of the natives and removal of the causes of their unrest, further and more serious disturbances may be in store for Johannesburg and South Africa. Some observers even predict that if present trends continue, conditions will build up for a serious social upheaval within the not distant future, which will rock all of South Africa. While the incident of the arrest of a native set off the latest riots, in a similar manner to preceding ones, the rioting really had its roots in much deeper causes of a fundamental and chronic nature and was an expression of the natives’ increasing restlessness and dissatisfaction with their entire status, economic and living conditions, and more immediately, the increasingly stringent police control measures to which they have been subjected during the last two years. One of the police controls which they most bitterly resent is the system of official passes, which they must have to live, work or move about in the city and the townships. The other chief irritant is the liquor control exercised by frequent and intensive police raids in the townships. Under the pass control system, any native not properly documented is subject to arrest and explusion from the city or compulsory labor on farms, in mines, industrial establishments, etc. The natives object to the liquor raids on the grounds that these deprive them of their tribal and traditional rights to make and use mild “Kaffir” beer, and also deprives them of all privacy in their homes, the raiding parties invading their homes at any hour of the day or night. They also complain that the police treat them in a harsh and even brutal manner. The police, on their side, state that the pass and liquor control regulations are essential, as the townships are hideouts for all manner of vagrant and criminal elements, while the native liquor trade is also supported by criminal elements who are the chief instigators of unrest among the natives. It is also evident that communist elements are very active among the natives and take every opportunity to intensify their feelings of injustice and frustration, and to foment trouble between the native and ruling European population. More fundamental than the provocative and irritating native pass and liquor control regulations is the extremely unsatisfactory living conditions of the natives in the Johannesburg native townships. To a very large extent, the natives’ living quarters consist of tin shacks, shanties, and miserable slums, deleterious alike for morals and health. Many of the streets lack lighting at night, the darkness being conducive to the commission of all manner of acts of lawlessness. Tens of thousands of natives are crowded together in slums unsuitable for human habitation. These conditions have converted parts of the townships into virtual warrens of vice and crime and law-abiding natives in the townships live in fear and terror of native gangsters and criminals. The inconvenient situation and distance of the townships, together with transport problems, with respect to their working places in the city, further contribute to the natives’ increasing dissatisfaction with having to live in the townships. The townships have contributed to the exceptionally high rate of crime of Johannesburg, which is higher than almost any other metropolis of the world. Owing to the lawless elements, persons may not safely venture forth on foot after dark in the streets in most sections of even the European part of the city, while most European houses are protected by iron bars, screens and other burglar-proof devices. It is generally conceded that the intensifying riots and high crime rate of Johannesburg can be effectively reduced and eliminated only by drastic amelioration of the basic living conditions of the natives, coupled with more judicious treatment of the natives by the police authorities. The absence of adequate recreational facilities, cinemas, places where natives can relax and gather socially, etc., in the township, further contributes to the general problem of the natives’ restlessness and discontent, finally finding expression in outbreaks of violence and lawlessness. The riots have revived and given renewed impetus to official discussions of large-scale projects for the complete reformation of the entire living conditions of the natives in Johannesburg and removal of the existing slums and establishment of entirely new native townships outside the city limits provided with decent houses, sanitary facilities, etc. These projects for improving native housing necessarily must be on a large scale, affecting as they do not less than 20,000 native families, or around 100,000 people. The cost of the project would be prodigious, being estimated at around 10 million pounds. The obtaining of such a large amount of capital presents a serious problem as the natives generally are indigent, while the European population, already burdened with heavy taxation, would be reluctant to contribute such a large amount of capital for dwellings for the natives. At all events, an official commission is working intensively upon the problem of native housing, a legislative bill has been drafted, and the entire project of improved housing is now supported by the realization that unless the living conditions of the natives are improved, all other measures, increased police controls, etc., will be merely palliatives for treating symptoms but not capable of effecting a permanent cure of the disease presented by the native living conditions, the malignancy of which will remain and grow. A new measure for relaxing restrictions upon native laborers performing skilled labor, all of which has been reserved exclusively for European artisans, so that natives can perform skilled labor upon purely native building projects should contribute to improving the natives’ living conditions by enabling native artisans to build native houses and thus enable the natives to improve the conditions of their own people with a minimum of European assistance. Sydney B. Redecker The Department of State to the Embassy of the Union of South Africa 611.45A/2–2150 [Document 972] The Department of State to the Embassy of the Union of South Africa confidential Aide-Mémoire In his conversation with His Excellency the Ambassador of South Africa on Friday afternoon February 17, Assistant Secretary of State Hickerson made the following points with respect to the problem of Southwest Africa. 1 The conversation should be construed as an entirely friendly one motivated solely by the desire of the United States to be as helpful as possible to the Union of South Africa in this matter. As the Ambassador knows, the United States has long felt South Africa has pursued an incorrect and injudicious course but we have pursued the policy of endeavoring to be helpful to the Union in the sense of moderating extreme criticisms. The United States has also felt that time is needed for South Africa to work out her difficulties on this problem and this was the primary motivation of the position the United States Delegation took at the last Assembly in supporting strongly the request for an advisory opinion of the Court. 2 The United States felt this procedure would gain needed time and in that respect would help South Africa. The Union Government should not, however, feel that the position was assumed merely to help her. The United States felt in view of the importance of gaining time that it was the correct position. Mr. Hickerson then said that the United States hoped that the Union would take advantage of the time gained to develop some formula which could be accepted internationally and which will be a step forward towards the solution of the Southwest African problem. Mr. Hickerson said that he recalled what the Ambassador had said to him in New York that in the Union there was the problem of persuading people on the merits of the United Nations rather than the reverse but that he wished to cite the importance of the Union doing something on this problem which will permit her to emerge from behind the international cloud where she now finds herself. Mr. Hickerson stressed the contribution which South Africa can and should be making to the United Nations. By way of illustration he referred to our support of South Africa for membership on the Eritrean Commission stating that we had done this not only because we felt that South Africa can make a contribution to the work of this Commission but that we had wanted to afford her an opportunity to participate as it should in some United Nations body. Mr. Hickerson urged and reiterated the point of view that the Union Government should attempt to get itself into a frame of mind which would permit some constructive action on Southwest Africa, certainly promptly following the rendering of the Court opinion if not before. Mr. Hickerson mentioned the resumption of the filing of reports as an example of constructive action. Mr. Hickerson pointed out that the opportunity of time may not recur. He also pointed out that in view of the new and powerful forces now emerging in the world that the United States itself would find it increasingly difficult in the future to take positions on this problem helpful to the Union. Mr. Hickerson also referred to the Court’s consideration of the request for an advisory opinion and the unfortunate international reaction to the attitude towards the Court which has been adopted by the satellite countries in the Human Rights case. He expressed the hope that any brief which the Union might file would be moderate in tone and not question the jurisdiction of the Court in this matter. In concluding Mr. Hickerson reiterated our friendship for the Union and our hope that the Union will get itself into a position so that she can play the international role which she is capable of and which she should play. 3 Washington , February 20, 1950. 1 With the exception of Southwest Africa, all territories held tinder mandate from the former League of Nations either had become independent or had been placed under the United Nations trusteeship system. South Africa had refused to submit a trusteeship agreement for Southwest Africa to the UN, and in July 1949 South Africa informed the UN Secretary-General that it would not submit any further reports to the UN on Southwest Africa. 2 On December 6, 1949, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the international status of Southwest Africa. 3 Regarding further developments in the Southwest Africa question, see the editorial note, p. 1828 [ Pg. 1828 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) 110.15 MC/3–2150 [Document 973] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in South Africa ( Connelly ) 1 confidential Capetown , March 6, 1950. Subject: General. Participants: Prime Minister Dr. D. F. Malan Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee B. C. Connelly, American Embassy Mr. McGhee expressed his appreciation of the Government’s invitation to visit Cape Town and said he had always looked forward to visiting the Union. He explained that while the Union did not fall within his own particular area, which was the Near East, South Asia, and Africa north of the Union, he would be very glad to report back to his associates in Washington anything that the Prime Minister might wish to say. The Prime Minister stated that South Africa had very friendly relations with the United States. Whereas in the past events occurring in the United States had been of worldwide interest and influence, today the Union was in a somewhat similar position with respect to the African continent. In the event of an East–West conflict, the Union would be able to provide supplies for vessels and furnish other assistance. Whether the Union would be in a position to send troops outside of its own boundaries was, of course, dependent upon the requirements for maintaining order within the Union and on attending circumstances. North Atlantic Pact. Dr. Malan referred to the Union’s desire, voiced both in Parliament and in the press, to join the North Atlantic Pact. He observed that he was sure his Government’s views on this matter have been made known to the United States and the British. Mr. McGhee pointed out that the NAP was but one regional pact and did not exclude the possibility of other similar arrangements for other areas. He replied in the negative to the Prime Minister’s questions as to whether a Far Eastern Pact was contemplated at this time. Mr. McGhee explained that the actions to be taken under the NAP were still not completed. For example, it was not yet known how much the European nations could contribute to the common program, and for that reason the extent of the United States’ commitments could not yet be determined. The Prime Minister acknowledged that the NAP specifically applied to the North Atlantic area, and Mr. McGhee remarked that the Turks were also very much interested in a similar pact. 2 Communism. The Prime Minister said that while Communism had not yet had any appreciable effect in the Union, the Government was endeavoring to take steps which would at least prevent it making any headway, particularly among the natives who were susceptible to Communist propaganda. He said that he believed the Soviet Consulate General in Pretoria, which was vastly overstaffed by Russians who kept exclusively to themselves, was the training school for Communist agitators who were then sent out to work among the natives, both in the Union and in neighboring areas such as South West Africa and the Congo Basin. In reply to Mr. McGhee’s question, Dr. Malan said that it was rather difficult to keep tabs on these Soviet activities. Apartheid. The Prime Minister referred to the fact that the Europeans in the Union were outnumbered 4 to 1 by the non-Europeans and that in order to ensure white survival, segregation measures were an absolute necessity. The Government was endeavoring to separate the whites and non-whites into individual residential areas. This did not mean removing all the non-whites from the urban areas and sending them back to the native reserves but rather to put each race together in its own area or areas. If the native could live exclusively among his own kind, there was a good chance that he would be able to live in accordance with his own tribal customs. Dr. Malan stressed that his policy was to treat the native “with justice”. He added that all whites in the Union were in favor of white supremacy and that recently it had been noted in Parliament that more and more members of the Opposition in fact agreed with the Government’s policy in respect to the natives. In reply to Mr. McGhee’s question, Dr. Malan said that his Government’s apartheid program was making progress. Mining Credits. The Prime Minister stated that the Union did not need United States Government credits to assist in the development of the Union’s mineral resources, particularly in the new fields in the Orange Free State. Private capital required for these purposes was adequate, both from local sources and from abroad. Dr. Malan did express a desire for further investment in the Union by private American concerns. No Specific Problems Between the US and the Union . Mr. McGhee, in stating that one of the attributes of friendship was the ability to speak frankly, asked if there were any particular problems between the US and South Africa. The Prime Minister agreed that frankness was one of the prerogatives of friendship but made no reference to any specific problems. Mr. McGhee, in thanking the Prime Minister for his courtesy in seeing him, stated that we viewed with tolerance the steps which the Government was taking to handle its problems and wished Doctor Malan success in their solution. United States Ambassador to the Union. Just before the lunch given by the Prime Minister for Mr. McGhee, Dr. Malan asked Mr. Connelly if there was any news of the appointment of a new US Ambassador, and commented “Isn’t it rather unusual that it takes such a long time?” Mr. Connelly said that there had been no word as yet, that he was expecting it any day, and that, of course, it took some time to complete these appointments as they were matters involving both the White House and the State Department and the new appointee had to obtain the approval of the United State Senate. 3 1 After serving as chairman of the West and East African Regional Conference of U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Officers, held at Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, February 27–March 2, 1950 (for information, see p. 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] ), Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs George C. McGhee visited a number of African and Near Eastern countries before returning to Washington. Regarding his African journey, see the editorial note, p. 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] . During his visit to South Africa, March 4–9, Assistant Secretary McGhee conferred with a number of high-ranking South African officials including Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts, Prime Minister Daniel F. Malan, External Affairs Secretary D. D. Forsyth, Minister for Economic Affairs Eric H. Louw, Minister of Finance N. C. Havenga, Minister of Native Affairs E. G. Jansen, and Minister of Interior T. E. Dönges. Memoranda of McGhee’s various conversations were transmitted to the Department of State as enclosures to despatch 54, March 21, from Cape Town. The source text was transmitted to the Department as enclosure 2 to despatch 54. 2 For documentation on the participation by the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the question of Turkey’s adherence to NATO, see vol. iii , pp. 1 ff. 3 On March 31, Under Secretary of State James C. Webb recommended to President Truman the appointment of John G. Erhardt, then serving as Minister in Austria, to become Ambassador in South Africa to succeed Ambassador North Winship who resigned in November 1949. Erhardt’s proposed appointment was approved by the President on April 11, the South African Government gave its agreement on April 22, and Erhardt was confirmed by the Senate on May 17. Erhardt left Vienna on June 26 and assumed charge of the Embassy in Pretoria on September 27. See Connelly’s memorandum of conversation of September 27, p. 1830 [ Pg. 1830 includes portions of Doc. 980 and Doc. 981 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) 110.15 MC/3–2150 [Document 974] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in South Africa ( Connelly ) 1 secret Capetown , March 7, 1950. Participants: D. D. Forsyth, Union Secretary for External Affairs; Honorable George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA; Bernard C. Connelly, American Embassy, Cape Town. Mr. McGhee, after expressing his pleasure at being in Cape Town, explained that the Union was not in his area so far as his work in the Department was concerned, but that he would be very pleased to tell his associates of any comments Mr. Forsyth might wish to make. Mr. Forsyth said that he realized that South Africa did not fall within Mr. McGhee’s jurisdiction but remarked that since Mr. McGhee was so close to the Union they wanted him to visit Cape Town and meet Government officials. Relations with the US. —Mr. Forsyth stated that South Africa’s relations with the US were “of the very best.” He added, however, that the US and South Africa did not always see eye to eye on certain matters and spoke of what he termed the “jiggling” attitude by the US. (Here he obviously had in mind the cases of South West Africa, Michael Scott 2 and the Ex–Im Bank loan application. 3 ) Mr. Forsyth observed that much of the outside world did not have a clear understanding of the various problems besetting the Union. With respect to US trade relations Mr. Forsyth reiterated Mr. Louw’s 4 remark that South Africa found that it had not understood the purpose of the EX–IM Bank and could not agree to the conditions attached to the loan. He likewise stated that the Union needed overseas capital for its development and hoped that private American capital would be invested in the Orange Free State gold mines and other projects. Mr. Forsyth mentioned in an offhand way that he believed there was some uneasiness throughout the world in regard to US aims, saying that the US was interested in every part of the world and was pouring money in everywhere. He asked “For what purpose is this being done?” Mr. McGhee asked if Mr. Forsyth really felt anyone believed the US had imperialistic ambitions, which our whole history had proved to be the contrary. Mr. Forsyth replied in the negative, but nonetheless still left the impression of possible doubt abroad as to our goal. United Nations. —South Africa, Mr. Forsyth said, feels very strongly that if UN continues its present course of interfering into the domestic affairs of member nations the UN will fail. Some of its recent actions with respect to the non-self-governing territories have defeated the purpose of Article 73( c ) of the United Nations Charter (“Members … accept as a sacred trust… to further international peace and security.”). This purpose cannot be and will not be achieved if the UN continues to meddle in the affairs of these areas. Mr. Forsyth stated he would like to give some background on this particular trusteeship article in the Charter. Prior to going to the San Francisco meeting, which Mr. Forsyth attended, he was present at a conference in London of the delegations of the several Commonwealth nations which was to determine the action they should take in respect to the forthcoming conference. There was no provision in the Dumbarton Oaks draft of the Charter for reports to the United Nations on the administration of non-self-governing territories or any thought of having such reports submitted by the trusteeship nations. Australia, however, proposed that a clause be put in the Charter calling for purely voluntary information being sent to the UN Library for circulation to members for their information in regard to various statistical data concerning the areas they were administering. South Africa and the United Kingdom, Mr. Forsyth continued, took a dim view of this proposal, but it was decided that at San Francisco Australia would raise this subject. It did so, the Article was inserted in the Charter, and the result is apparent. Recent developments such as UN mixing in South West African affairs and UN investigating bodies going to other non-self-governing areas are actions which were never even thought of by the framers of the Charter at San Francisco. This “interfering” process is the result of action by smaller nations, particularly in Latin America, who are in no way concerned directly in these areas and who are sufficiently numerous to outvote the major UN members who are directly responsible for these areas and who are opposed to such steps. If the numerical majority of minor nations in the UN insist on further action of this kind against the wishes of the countries directly concerned, the collapse of the UN, Mr. Forsyth believed, will follow. (This statement was presumably based on the possible withdrawal from the UN of South Africa, France, Belgium, the UK, etc.) South Africa considers that the United Nations has no right to interfere in the administration of SWA as it is contrary to the original purposes of the Charter and the terms under which South Africa originally received the Mandate. Mr. Forsyth explained that he had 14 years service in SWA and felt that he could speak with authority on the area. The European area in SWA has its own administration, officials, House of Assembly and will shortly have representation in the Union Parliament. A white person cannot cross the borders from the European section into the native reserves without a special pass. The blacks in the reserves run their own affairs themselves and in accordance with tribal custom. The SWA Administration has no say in running these tribal areas; the Chiefs can request the Administration’s advice, which is given in an advisory capacity only. Furthermore, the tribes are not homogeneous. There are a number of different tribes with different customs and different organizations. The only reference Mr. Forsyth made to the Michael Scott case was at the very end of the talk in which he stated that he had convincing evidence, the source of which he was not at liberty as yet to reveal, showing that Scott had become a member of the UK Communist Party in 1934 through the influence of one Emil Barnes and that Scott had come to South Africa in 1945 bearing a letter from the UK CP to the CP of South Africa. Mr. McGhee stated that if Mr. Forsyth wished we would endeavor to check that report, and as Mr. Forsyth had no objection, the Embassy’s cable No. 45 (Cape Town series) of March 8, 1950 was sent to the Department. 5 International Court of Justice. —Mr. Forsyth observed that South Africa still believed the SWA case should not have been referred to the ICJ, but since it has been, South Africa is preparing a brief for presentation. Mr. Forsyth stated that he felt South Africa had a good case, and would obtain a favorable decision if the judgment was made on purely legal grounds and was not influenced by other considerations. No decision as yet had been made as to who would represent South Africa before the Court; possibly the South African Minister at The Hague, or someone else, depending on circumstances at the time. The only doubt in Mr. Forsyth’s mind was that there might be some question of whether SWA was a non-self-governing territory. The European section is self-governing to the extent that it has its own administration, etc. The native reserves are likewise self-governing in accordance with tribal custom. This, however, is entirely a question of legal interpretation. 6 India. —Mr. McGhee referred to Mr. Forsyth’s presence at the Colombo Conference 7 and asked what he thought of Prime Minister Nehru. Mr. Forsyth replied he could not at first make him out, but had come to the conclusion that Nehru was an extremely able and ambitious man who was above all an opportunist. He felt Nehru wanted to head a group of middle and south Asian states with India as the principal member. Mr. Forsyth added that he felt India was remaining within the Commonwealth because Nehru considered that best suited his purpose at the present time. However, Nehru was not taking any clear stand against the Soviets, and Mr. Forsyth felt that if Nehru could achieve his goal by playing along with the Communists he would certainly do so. Mr. Forsyth said that he is considerably worried over the possibility of Indian expansionism. South Africa has a very serious problem in the Indians resident in the Union and he gave the impression that this group might serve as an eventual fifth column. Since the annual increase in India’s population of 5,000,000 persons could not possibly be absorbed in manufacturing or other fields in the subcontinent, they would have to go abroad. As Mr. Forsyth put it, one of the Singhalese Ministers at Colombo said to him “We, like you, also have an Indian problem. But you are 3,500 miles away.” Mr. Forsyth referred to the large Indian colonies in East Africa which might serve India as an excuse for seeking that area. From there it is but a step to the Union. 8 Commonwealth Relations. —The Colombo Conference, Mr. Forsyth continued, had been worthwhile. Southeast Asia had to be strengthened against the Communist advance, but the Union had no funds to spare for use there since there was a greater need within the Union for any moneys available. Mr. McGhee said he felt the Commonwealth organization was a powerful force in the struggle for world peace and prosperity and that we hoped South Africa would remain in the Commonwealth. Mr. Forsyth answered that all talk of establishing a South African “republic” was, in his opinion, for local consumption, and that South Africa had no intention of leaving the Commonwealth. He pointed out that the English-speaking nations—the United States and the Commonwealth—were the only safeguards against a Communist-dominated world. We had the same language, the same traditions, the same way of life, and aims, and we had to stick together. Impressions of Union Officials. —Mr. Forsyth asked Mr. McGhee what he thought of the Government officials whom he had met. Mr. McGhee replied that he hardly thought it appropriate for him to comment. Mr. Forsyth said he appreciated Mr. McGhee’s position, was pleased with his answer, but observed that nothing said would go beyond the four walls of the room. Mr. McGhee then observed that he was greatly impressed with the officials whom he had met, particularly with their sincerity in trying their best to work out a solution of their problems. Mr. Forsyth stated he was very pleased to hear this since, while he did not always agree with the Government’s policies and measures, he was convinced the Government officials were absolutely sincere in their desire to solve their problems in the way which seemed to them to be the best solution. Apartheid. —With respect to the Government’s policy Mr. Forsyth remarked he had once asked Doctor Malan what he conceived as the ultimate goal of apartheid. The Prime Minister’s reply was complete separation of whites and non-whites. The non-whites would be given all encouragement and help in improving their lot, economically and socially, but they would have to live by themselves. For example, in higher education the natives would receive identical instruction to the whites, given by the same teachers, but would be taught in completely separate buildings. Mr. Forsyth also mentioned that some of the extreme enthusiasts of apartheid even had in mind complete native states run exclusively by the natives. Conclusion. —In saying that he hoped Mr. McGhee had a pleasant and interesting visit, to which Mr. McGhee answered in the affirmative, Mr. Forsyth stated that he was sorry Mr. McGhee’s visit could not have been several days longer, but that he fully understood how impossible this was in view of Mr. McGhee’s tight schedule. He added that the Union Government would be pleased to see other senior officials of the State Department whenever they had an opportunity of visiting South Africa. Mr. McGhee again expressed his deep appreciation of the kindnesses shown him, and of his pleasure at having been able to talk with the Prime Minister and other Government officials. 1 The source text was transmitted as enclosure 7 to despatch 54, March 21, from Capetown. Regarding the circumstances of this and related meetings, held by South African officials with Assistant Secretary McGhee, see footnote 1, supra . 2 Rev. Michael Scott, Anglican clergyman, who appeared before the United Nations Trusteeship Council in 1949 to testify on behalf of native tribes in Southwest Africa and against the South African administration in that territory. 3 In 1949 South Africa sought unsuccessfully to obtain an Export-Import Bank loan of $100 million. In the loan negotiations, the South African Government objected to the gold deposit requirements for that portion of the loan taken by private banks and appeared to be of the opinion that because South Africa had an excellent credit record the Bank should act favorably on the application without going into the purposes for which the loan was to be used. (Department of State Policy Statement on the Union of South Africa, March 28, 1951: 611.45A/3–2851) 4 Regarding Economic Affairs Minister Louw’s conversation with McGhee, see footnote 1, supra . 5 The telegram under reference here, not printed, transmitted to the Department of State the information about Rev. Scott related by External Affairs Minister Forsyth (745A.001/6–550). Airgram A–24, June 5, to Capetown, not printed, informed that an agency of the U.S. Government generally confirmed the information related by Forsyth (745A.001/6–550). Despatch 16, July 17, from Pretoria reported that External Affairs Minister Forsyth expressed appreciation for the confirmation of his report and asked if it could be ascertained if Scott were still a Communist Party member (745A.001/7–1750). Airgram A–52, November 10, to Pretoria, not printed, stated that it had not proved possible to confirm Scott’s association with the British Communist Party (745A.001/7–1750). Despatch 202, October 17, from Pretoria, not printed, reported that the External Affairs Ministry had informed the Embassy that South Africa, at the request of the British Government, had decided not to announce to the United Nations that Rev. Scott was a member of the British Communist Party (745A.001/10–1750). 6 Regarding the attitude of the United States toward the United Nations decision to request the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to render an advisory opinion on the international status of Southwest Africa, see the aide-mémoire of February 20 from the Department of State to the South African Embassy, p. 1813 [ Pg. 1813 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] . 7 Reference to the meeting of the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers at Colombo, Ceylon, January 9–14, 1950. 8 For selected documentation on the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa, a topic considered by the United Nations General Assembly in November and December 1950, see vol. ii , pp. 559 ff. The Secretary of State to the Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) 845A.2547/4–1750 [Document 975] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in South Africa ( Connelly ) top secret No. 10 Washington , April 17, 1950. Sir : The National Security Council, on September 4, 1948, approved a project to examine the security of certain industrial operations in foreign countries with the objective of determining the measures; which should be taken for the protection against sabotage of such operations as produce materials of strategic importance to the security of the United States. Responsibility for coordination of the implementation of the project was assigned to the Secretary of State. In the case of South Africa, an examination of the production of metallurgical manganese is contemplated. The objects of such a security study of this industry would be: 1. To ascertain, if possible, the presence and strength of Soviet agents, Communist parties and Communist-dominated labor unions in the area of the industries; 2. To determine whether effective industrial security procedures are in force to minimize the vulnerability of the production and shipment of metallurgical manganese to sabotage or subversive activities. The enclosed memorandum concerns a conversation held in the Department with the South African Ambassador on April 5, 1950, 1 in which the interest of the Department was expressed in general terms. The Department would appreciate the Embassy’s comments on this problem and any information the Embassy may have on the following points: a . Have any industrial security surveys of the metallurgical manganese industry been made by government authorities or private concerns? (If such surveys are known to have been conducted, are reports available?) b . Are surveys of this industry contemplated in the foreseeable future by the authorities or others? Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: George W. Perkins 2 1 Not printed. 2 George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. The Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) to the Secretary of State 845A.411/6–850 [Document 976] The Chargé in South Africa ( Connelly ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] confidential Capetown , June 8, 1950. Cape Town Embassy Series 117 Subject: May Day Riots on the Rand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary: The clashes between Natives and police on May 1, 1950 at several locations in and around Johannesburg, despite the Government ban on demonstrations, were part of a pattern of racial tension which threatens the internal stability of the Union of South Africa. Overtly similar to previous riots, the May Day disturbances were uglier in mood than any in the recent past. Hostility between Natives and police reached a new high. Although elementary economic benefits, elimination of the pass system, and the right to present legitimate grievances constituted the immediate objectives of the Natives, there were signs of a new spirit of nationalism among the Natives, which, despite its vagueness, is becoming the basis of a growing faith. But for a growing number of Natives this goal of nationalism is not enough and these despondent ones are turning to Communism because it holds out the promise of equality—racial, economic and political. Content to do no more about this riot than blame it on Communist agitators and gird itself for the next one, the Malan Government pretended to be unshaken. The United Party supported all the Government’s precautionary measures, floundered briefly immediately after the riots, and then launched a political attack on the “apartheid-mad” Nationalists. A few liberals urged the initiation of a debate on the riots as an urgent matter of public importance, but received virtually no parliamentary support. And here the matter might have rested, if it were not for the fact that this was South Africa’s most serious postwar racial clash. A surprisingly large and vocal minority on the Band refused to allow the Government and the United Party to brush away without protest the subsequent Ballinger-Brookes 1 plea for a roundtable conference on the Native problem. They challenged the complacency of the majority of white South Africans who feel, as a simple expedient of self-preservation, that the Native must be “kept in his place”. But they were not successful. South Africa is reluctant to face this issue, and yet it is unmistakably clear. The Union can continue to practice uncompromising “white-supremacy” risking large scale Native uprising (which only the exercise of dictatorial repression can prevent), or recognition of the seriousness of the current racial tension can force all sides to sit down with the Natives and attempt to work out a compromise. The future of South Africa depends on the answer and only three answers are possible: Compromise, further riots, or a “police state”. Malan’s Government appears to be trending toward the latter. [Here follow 19 pages in the source text describing in detail the planning for the May Day demonstration, the South African Government decision to ban demonstrations, the course of the violence during the demonstration, and the reactions in South Africa to the riots.] VI. The Significance of the May Day Riots. The May Day riots are the most serious in recent South African history. They are an accurate clue to the tension between Natives and Whites. In this tension respect between the parties has virtually disappeared. The Government did not want any mass demonstrations, no matter how peaceful, and it did not want to see any inter-organizational unity on the part of the Natives. Most of those who took the trouble to examine the situation knew that trouble was coming and it came. The reason it was not worse is because the Native leaders restrained their people, and because they had no guns. What surprised the Government most was the number who stayed away from work. If further riots are to be avoided certain obvious steps must be taken such as securing higher wages, more housing, health benefits, lessening the stringency of the pass laws, and giving the Native a greater role in the Nation’s life. None of these steps will be taken. The obvious answer is more riots. The present Government will seek to prevent such riots by rigid control over the Natives. It can only exercise effective control through the passage of such legislation as the Population Registration Bill, the Group Areas Bill, 2 and similar anti-civil rights measures. Taken together these legislative acts and pending bills reflect all the traditional trappings of the police state. The South African police-state-in-the-making is not directed against other Whites, as yet, despite what the United Party says. Its aim is the legislation necessary to perpetuate White supremacy in an Afrikaans republic. For the Chargé d’Affaires, a.i.: Joseph Sweeney Attaché 1 In the omitted portion of this despatch, it is reported that on May 3 Mrs. Margaret L. Ballinger, Native Representative in the South African House of Assembly, and Senator Brookes, Native Representative in the South African Senate, called on Prime Minister Malan and requested the convening of a roundtable conference of all political leaders, including Africans, to discuss the Native problem on a level above politics. Malan refused. 2 Cape Town Embassy Series Despatch 118, June 8, described the South African Group Areas Act of June 1950 as follows: “The Group Areas Bill is a long and complicated proposal to set up a permanent scheme on a racial basis for the ownership and occupation of real property in South Africa. The Bill makes apartheid (segregation) a permanent part of South African law because it forces people to live in separate and distinct areas according to race. Thus, compulsion by law to restrict the use of land will be for the first time placed upon the Malay, Indian and Colored (mixed blood) peoples of the Cape, without need for further legislation or approval by Parliament. “(845A.411/6–850) The South African Minister of Defence (Erasmus) to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson) 745A.5/7–1150 [Document 977] The South African Minister of Defence ( Erasmus ) to the Secretary of Defense ( Johnson ) 1 secret Capetown , June 15, 1950. Dear Secretary Johnson : During my visit to Washington in August of last year, 2 I informed you of the attitude of my Government towards communism, that is, the Government is prepared to support the Powers opposed to communism. Because of the possibility of an unsatisfactory internal situation developing in the Union I explained to you that the Government had, however, not found itself able to commit itself in principle to Union Forces serving outside the Union. Communism might prove to be a serious danger in South Africa with its large non-European population and if an international conflict were to arise, our Forces might be needed to maintain order and to ensure the security of the Union in the first place. It was at the same time decided by the Government that should the position regarding the security of the Union be satisfactory, the question of sending Union Forces outside the Union would be considered in the light of the circumstances prevailing. Recently the position generally was reviewed and my Government has now decided that it will, in the event of war against communism, be prepared to recommend to Parliament that Union Forces should participate on and in the defence of the African continent. I have also advised Mr. Shinwell, British Minister of Defence in this sense and in view of the importance of the matter and our previous discussion, feel that you should know of this development. Yours very sincerely, F. C. Erasmus 1 The source text and other correspondence cited in this footnote were transmitted to the Secretary of State under cover of a brief explanatory letter of July 11 from Maj. Gen. Leven C. Alien, Executive Secretary to Secretary Johnson. Maj. Gen. Allen’s letter stated that President Truman had seen Minister of Defence Erasmus’ letter printed here. This letter was transmitted sealed to Secretary Johnson under cover of a brief transmittal letter from South African Ambassador Jooste on June 29. Secretary Johnson replied to Minister Erasmus on July 11 as follows: “Thank you very much for your letter of June 15, 1950, in which you indicate the position which your Government would follow for the defense of the African continent in the event of a war against communism. I am particularly grateful for your personal explanation of the development of this position, including the outline of your internal security problems. “I have taken the liberty of passing this information on to the President and the Secretary of State.” (745A.5/7–1150) 2 Regarding Minister of Defence Erasmus’ visit to Washington in August 1949, see Assistant Secretary Perkins’ memorandum of October 2, to the Secretary of State, p. 1832 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] . The Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) to the Secretary of State 845A.2547/6–2750: Telegram [Document 978] The Chargé in South Africa ( Connelly ) to the Secretary of State top secret Capetown , June 27, 1950—5 p. m. 82. Capetown series. Deptel 66 Capetown series June 14. 1 Embdes 133 Capetown series June 23 2 which left here by Cairo courier June 26 due Department about July 7, replies Department’s instruction 10, April 17, and states: 1. No postwar security survey Union’s manganese industry made and none contemplated. 2. As South African Ambassador Washington not yet reported his April 5 talk with Department officials, secretary for EA Forsyth requested written note, to which I replied my instruction did not provide for such communication and I would consult Department. 3. Despatch under reference includes draft such note. 4. While Forsyth merely said when informed our willingness furnish data on US experience in security techniques that such information would be of help to Union officials engaged these problems, he remarked in later talk he had mentioned whole matter to Prime Minister. 5. Embassy considers greatest threat subversive activity lies in field labor. No recognized native trade unions in mining industry but must be some illegal groups strength of which and Communist influence therein unknown. What might be taken for Communism among natives is often to great extent native discontent at and protest against authorities repressive measures. Sole Communist MP 3 who will lose seat under recently passed anti-Communist act, says of 10,000 Communist adherents during war peak days, only 1,500 paid dues. He states native apathy plus growing spirit African nationalism, which refuses trust any white leadership, prevents sizeable increase number Communist followers at this time. South African CP last week announced dissolution view anti-Communist act, 4 but since only CP program offers non-European hope equality and redress wrongs its attractiveness apparent and danger spread Communist influence among mine workers, although now relatively unimportant, remains. 6. Extent present industrial security measures practiced manganese industry unknown, but assume only usual safety precautions in force. Embassy requests instructions whether note be handed Forsyth and whether Embassy minerals attaché visit manganese area to report on present conditions. 5 Connelly 1 Not printed. It requested a reply to instruction 10, April 17, to Capetown, p. 1823 [ Pg. 1823 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] . 2 Not printed. The substance of the despatch is presented in the telegram printed here. Enclosed with the despatch was a memorandum of May 22 by William O. Vandenburg, Minerals Attaché at the Embassy in South Africa, on the problems of manganese procurement from South Africa. (845A.2547/6–2350) 3 Sam Kahn, described in despatch 133, June 23, from Capetown, as “the only Communist member of Parliament, and undoubtedly a member of the South African Communist Party’s Politbureau.” According to the despatch, Kahn’s remarks referred to here were made during a confidential conversation in the presence of an Embassy officer. 4 Regarding the dissolution of the South African Communist Party on June 20 and the entry into force of the South African Act for the Suppression of Communism on June 26, see also despatch 166, October 3, from Pretoria, p. 1834 [ Pg. 1834 includes portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] . 5 Telegram 10, July 21, to Pretoria, authorized the Embassy to transmit a formal communication to External Affairs Secretary Forsyth and also authorized Embassy Minerals Attaché Vandenburg to visit South African manganese producing areas, if it were possible for him to do so without arousing South African officials, in order to report on the current situation there (845A.2547/7–1050). Editorial Note [Document 979] Editorial Note On July 11 the International Court of Justice handed down an advisory opinion on the international status of Southwest Africa, as requested by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1949. The Court stated that the Union of South Africa was under no obligation to submit a trusteeship agreement for Southwest Africa to the UN but held that South Africa could not unilaterally alter the international status of Southwest Africa and was obliged to submit reports to the UN on its administration of the territory. The Court’s advisory opinion was considered at the Fifth United Nations General Assembly which opened in New York on September 17. On December 13 the General Assembly adopted a resolution, supported by the United States, which accepted the International Court’s opinion, urged South Africa to do the same, and set up a committee of five nations (including the United States) to negotiate with South Africa on the procedural arrangements necessary to give effect to the opinion. For documentation on the Southwest Africa question, from the handing down of the opinion of the International Court through the discussions in the UN General Assembly, see volume II, pages 474 ff. For views of the United States on the question, see also the aide-mémoire of February 20, from the Department of State to the South African Embassy, page 1813 [ Pg. 1813 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] . The Chargé in South Africa (Connelly) to the Secretary of State 845A.2547/9–1650: Telegram [Document 980] The Chargé in South Africa ( Connelly ) to the Secretary of State top secret Pretoria , September 16, 1950—11 a. m. 86. Absence Secretary External Affairs Forsyth, on leave, assistant chief Political Division Sole told me since original approach security measures South African manganese production had been made Ambassador Jooste, External Affairs telegraphed Jooste last week to inform Department. 1 1. Matter had been taken up with Railways and Harbors Board which reported had full list vulnerable spots and had everything under control. 2. Union Secret Service was aware sabotage possibilities no danger at present and felt itself capable handling any subversive or sabotage threats. 3. Union appreciated US offer provide information re counter sabotage measures and if written form would be glad have it. We consider written information more acceptable Union authorities (Deptel 28, August 24 2 ) because (1) present Nationalist Government only in power for two years extremely proud its achievements, resentful any outside unrequested offer assistance and newly set up Secret Service unwilling admit cannot fully handle whatever occurs. This follows from mentality Afrikaners who after nearly 150 years under British oriented governments now have come into their own and intend to do as they please. We recognize these growing pains but feel present government naive re dangers possible sabotage and personal visit expert desirable. Accordingly suggest after receipt minerals attaché’s report, matter be reviewed possibly with Jooste [and in?] light instruction Ambassador 3 take up with Prime Minister. Minerals attaché report goes forward next courier leaving about September 19 and indicates (1) no security measures taken versus possible sabotage manganese producing area (2) possible serious curtailment manganese production mines through sabotage remote (3) but single unguarded key bridge railway from production area to Kimberly is vulnerable to sabotage, if destroyed would bring manganese shipments destined seaports for export virtual standstill for some months. Despatch 4 will recommend (1) discussions most appropriate way Union Government guard bridge (2) further discussions re guarding dynamite magazines and tighter control sales dynamite (3) report by American Consul Durban on manganese conveyor belt loading plant that port which now believed somewhat vulnerable sabotage both from point view easy access and curtailment total volume manganese exports. Connelly 1 South African First Secretary W. Dirkse-van-Schalkwyk called at the Department of State on December 4 to present certain information received from his government concerning the security of manganese production and transport in South Africa. (Memorandum of conversation by J. H. Shullaw, December 4, 1950: 845A.2547/12–450) 2 Not printed. It asked why written information on American security techniques was more acceptable to South African authorities than a special visit by American officials. (845A.2547/7–2550) 3 Ambassador-designate John G. Erhardt arrived in Pretoria on September 19. 4 Reference here is to despatch 151, September 18, from Pretoria, on the subject of the possibility for sabotage of South African manganese production (845A.2547/9–1850). Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the Embassy in South Africa (Connelly) 123 Erhardt, John G. [Document 981] Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of the Embassy in South Africa ( Connelly ) confidential Pretoria , September 27, 1950. Subject: Ambassador’s courtesy calls on Acting Secretary for External Affairs, and on Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs. Participants: Ambassador Erhardt, 1 Prime Minister Malan, Acting Secretary for External Affairs Donald. Spies, 2 and Bernard C. Connelly, American Embassy. The Ambassador called by appointment on the Acting Secretary for External Affairs. After an exchange of pleasantries the Ambassador said that he hoped he would be able to call on officials of the Department of External Affairs, as occasion arose, in order to exchange views on pertinent matters. Mr. Spies said that he would welcome such visits and External Affairs would do its utmost to co-operate. Mr. Spies then took the Ambassador and Mr. Connelly into the Prime Minister’s office and after introducing them departed. The Ambassador stated that he had been looking forward to his assignment to the Union, and, in reply to the Prime Minister’s query, said that for the last six years he had been stationed in Vienna. He mentioned that the Russian Commanding General there, when apprised of the Ambassador’s forthcoming assignment, had remarked that in South Africa there were a lot of dissatisfied Natives. To this Dr. Malan observed that he was aware the Soviet Union felt there was a fertile field for Communist propaganda among the non-Europeans in the Union. In fact, there was a very large Soviet Consulate General not far down the road. Dr. Malan referred to the Union’s need for foreign capital to develop its mines and industries, and mentioned with pleasure the fact that American capital was taking part in development of the copper industry (at O’Keefe in northwestern Cape Province and Tsumab in South West Africa) and was also participating in the exploitation of the new gold mines in the Orange Free State. He mentioned that some hundreds of millions of pounds would have to be expended in that area before any substantial returns could be realized, but that even now one mine was producing to some extent and that all reports indicated the Orange Free State area was even richer than the Witwatersrand. Dr. Malan volunteered the statement that among the Union’s mineral wealth was uranium. The Ambassador then asked how the uranium matter was progressing (having in mind the current discussions on this subject between South African and U.S. officials 3 ). Dr. Malan replied that he believed the matter was progressing satisfactorily; he also said the Government realized it could only be delivered to us and not to those who would misuse it. Dr. Malan spoke of the satisfactory turn of events in Korea and the Ambassador, in agreeing, spoke of the gratification the United States had on learning of the Union’s decision to send a fighter squadron to Korea. 4 In conclusion, the Ambassador mentioned his hope that he might be able to see the Prime Minister on suitable occasions on topics of mutual interest, and the Prime Minister said that he would be very glad to have these visits. 1 Ambassador Erhardt arrived in Capetown, South Africa, on September 19, arrived in Pretoria on September 26, and assumed charge of the Embassy on September 27. Erhardt presented his credentials to the Governor General of South Africa, G. Brand van Zyl, on October 4. 2 Spies was South African Under Secretary for External Affairs. 3 Regarding the negotiations with South Africa for the procurement of uranium, see the editorial note, p. 1842 [ Pg. 1842 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] . 4 Joint Weeka No. 32, sent in despatch 75, August 11, from Pretoria, reported as follows upon the South African decision to send military aid to Korea: “After a six-hour Cabinet meeting on August 4 the Union Government reversed its previous stand and decided to offer a fighter squadron to the UN forces in Korea. This decision came as a surprise to all political observers in the Union as well as to the general public. Previously the Union Cabinet had indicated that it was both unpracticable and unrealistic for the Union to give any military assistance in Korea, and emphasized that the Far East was out of its sphere of influence. The reasons for the Cabinet’s change of opinion apear to be a combination of: (1) increasing public pressure for South African aid, (2) the belief that aid to Korea would influence the anti-Communist German vote in South West Africa, (3) the necessity for proving beyond any question the Government’s anti-Communism, (4) concern over possible U.S. Government economic reaction toward the Union’s unwillingness to help in Korea, and (5) a determination that under the circumstances the Cabinet should make the least possible acceptable gesture.” (745A.00(W)/8–1150) Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State 745A.13/10–250 [Document 982] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs ( Perkins ) to the Secretary of State 1 secret [ Washington ,] October 2, 1950. Subject: Visit of the Honorable F. C. Erasmus, Minister of Defense of the Union of South Africa Problem: Mr. Erasmus, Minister of Defense in the South African Government, is arriving in New York on October 3 and will be in this country until October 10. According to the South African Embassy, he desires to discuss with you and with the Secretary of Defense general questions of African defense planning. 2 Background: Mr. Erasmus has been in London for discussions with officials of the British Government of plans for the defense of Africa south of the Sahara. He has also explored the possibility of purchasing modern army and air force equipment. Before leaving South Africa a member of his party told our Embassy at Pretoria that if Britain were unable to supply the military equipment in the quantities desired they would seek to obtain the equipment in the United States. Mr. Erasmus is accompanied on his visit to the United States by General C. L. du Toit, Chief of the General Staff; Brigadier H. B. Klopper, Director General of the Land Forces; Mr. R. F. Cuff, Secretary for Defense; and Mr. D. D. Forsyth, Secretary for External Affairs. In August, 1949 Mr. Erasmus, accompanied by the then Chief of the General Staff, General Beyers, visited Washington and discussed with Mr. Webb the possibility of South Africa obtaining military equipment from the United States. Mr. Erasmus said at that time that, because of limited man power and financial resources, South Africa for the most part was interested only in obtaining training equipment which would enable South African forces to go into action, in the event of war, at an earlier date than would otherwise be the case. He was told that the MAP legislation, then in draft form, did not provide authority for the transfer of military equipment to South Africa on a reimbursable basis and that there was no legislative authority for grant assistance to South Africa. Mr. Erasmus also discussed South Africa’s strategic importance in time of war with Secretary Johnson and with General Bradley. In a letter to Mr. Erasmus in November 1949, Secretary Johnson stated, at the suggestion of Mr. Webb: “It is probable, however, that-early consideration will be given to an amendment to the MDA Act so that the United States can extend procurement assistance to free countries whose security is of importance to the United States.” This amendment was in fact accomplished through changes in Section 408 ( e ) of the Act which were made by Public Law 621. In view of the shortness of time, it would probably be impossible to arrive at a determination before Mr. Erasmus departs from the United States as to whether or not South Africa would be eligible for such procurement assistance in terms of the revised MDA Act. Since South Africa is in fact not eligible to join with the United States in any existing collective defense and regional arrangement, there would remain to be decided whether or not South Africa’s ability to defend itself, or to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, is important to the security of the United States. In any general discussions with Mr. Erasmus, however, it would be desirable to have in mind such a readily identifiable United States security interest as South African uranium. Ambassador Erhardt has been instructed to emphasize to Prime Minister Malan the urgency attached by the United States to the production of uranium in South Africa in quantity and in the shortest possible time. 3 We are also interested in South African manganese production. As regards South Africa’s willingness to shoulder defense responsibilities, the Union Government several months ago informed the British Government that it had decided, in the event of war, to make two divisions available for service outside South Africa in defense of the African continent. The South African Government also advised us officially of this decision. Furthermore South Africa has despatched an air squadron for service in Korea. Recommendations: We were frank in our discussions with Mr. Erasmus last year with the result that even though he obtained nothing tangible from his visit he went away with a better understanding and appreciation of the problems with which we are faced in meeting even the most urgent defense requirements of the free world. Furthermore, he returned to South Africa convinced that we were mindful of South Africa’s defense problems and of its strategic importance on the African continent. Continued frankness in discussing the strategic position of the United States and its world wide commitments with Mr. Erasmus will contribute to the maintenance of our present cordial relations with him. 1. It is recommended that you take the opportunity to express our warm appreciation of the South African decision to send an air squadron to Korea. 2. It is recommended you state, if the question is raised, that there is no legislative authority at the present time which would permit the United States to extend military assistance to South Africa on a grant basis. 3. It is suggested that you explain to Mr. Erasmus the changes made in the provisions of the MDA Act relating to eligibility for procurement assistance. It is further recommended that you state that this Government would be prepared, upon receipt of a formal request from the South African Government, to make a determination as to the eligibility of South Africa, in terms of the revised Act, for military assistance on a reimbursable basis. 4. It is recommended that in your discussions with Mr. Erasmus you stress the fact that supplies of military equipment now and in the immediate future will be insufficient to meet requirements, particularly in view of the Korean war and the needs of Western Europe. 1 A marginal notation on the source text indicates that this memorandum was sent to New York on October 2. Secretary of State Acheson was in New York where he was serving as the head of the U.S. Delegation to the Fifth Session of the U.N. General Assembly which opened on September 19. 2 For the record of the Secretary of State’s meeting with Defense Minister Erasmus in New York on October 4, see p. 1837 [ Pg. 1837 includes portions of Doc. 983 and Doc. 984 ] . For the record of Erasmus meeting with Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall (who succeeded Louis Johnson on September 21), see Gen. Lemnitzer’s memorandum of conversation, October 5, p. 1839 [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] . 3 Regarding the instructions of October 2 to Ambassador Erhardt on the matter of uranium procurement, see the editorial note, p. 1842 [ Pg. 1842 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] . The Ambassador in South Africa (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State 745A.001/10–350 [Document 983] The Ambassador in South Africa ( Erhardt ) to the Secretary of State * secret No. 166 Pretoria , October 3, 1950. Subject: Communist Influence in South African Trade Unions. The current influence of Communism in South African trade unions is complicated by recent developments which have resulted in the dissolution of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and the passage of an Act declaring the CPSA an unlawful organization. It was known early in the last session of the South African Parliament (the 3rd session of the 10th Parliament which commenced on January 20 and ended on June 24, 1950) that the Nationalist Government intended to pass an Act outlawing the Communist Party. As the debate on the anti-Communist legislation got under way, the Communist Party of South Africa, occasioned surprise throughout the country by dissolving itself through a unanimous resolution of its Central Committee on May 7, 1950. According to Communist spokesmen, this action was accepted unanimously by general meetings of every district subdivision of the organization. A public statement was issued under Communist auspices on June 20 announcing the dissolution of the CPSA and this announcement was read to the House of Assembly on the same day by Sam Kahn, Communist MP. Subsequently Parliament passed the Suppression of Communism Act which received the Governor General’s assent on June 26, 1950, thus coming into force on that date as Act No. 44 of 1950. As a result of the dissolution of the CPSA and the passage of the anti-Communism Act there can be no such thing—legally—as a Communist in South Africa. Anyone who professes Communism or is declared to be a Communist is subject to specific legal penalties. To refer to a person as a Communist, if that person is not a Communist, renders one legally liable to a charge of slander and defamation in the Union of South Africa. [Here follow those portions of the despatch, comprising 10 of the 16 pages of the source text, presenting a detailed review of the reaction in South Africa to the Suppression of Communism Act, an analysis of the numerical strength of Communist and non-Communist trade unions, the relative influence and effectiveness of Communist and non-Communist unions, and aspects of the strategy and internal activity of Communist-led unions.] 7. Sources of Communist Strength at the Present Time. The great source of Communist strength in South Africa at the present time is the restrictive and often repressive treatment of Natives. Until its dissolution the Communist Party was literally the only political party a Native was eligible to join, as he was not eligible to membership in any other recognized political party, and is still not eligible. The Native problem is a complicated one, but suffice it to say in the interests of brevity, the Native in South Africa receives low wages, has inadequate housing, limited opportunities, and under the apartheid (racial segregation) policy of the present government is considered a member of an inferior race which must be held clown in order to maintain white supremacy. The legitimate grievances of Natives are legion and among the few persons who espouse these grievances the majority of vocal ones are Communists. Racial relations have deteriorated so badly in South Africa since the advent of the Nationalist Government that there are few white people in the country who have anything like an adequate understanding of what is going on among Native leaders and Native organizations. Liberals like the Ballingers, Senator Brookes and others are fearful that in the final analysis the Natives will have to turn to Communism for help, because as their plight grows worse they are coming to the conclusion that, whether Communism is a good or bad thing, it is the only outside force that they can call upon for assistance. Even moderate Native leaders, such as Dr. Xuma, the former President General of the African National Congress, has admitted that his colleagues among Native leaders believed they must utilize Communist help in their struggle. They hope that African Nationalism will eventually win the day after the issue of white suppression has been settled by revolution. Alarming as these statements appear, it is a fact that moderate white opinion has been discredited among urban Natives because it has been so ineffective in securing any redress of legitimate grievances. As the tide of white opinion in South Africa grows overtly more pro- apartheid , the Communists are able to assert, “We are your friends, all other white people are your enemies and those who pretend to help you are hypocrites whose real aim is to maintain apartheid ” In the non-European unity movement (an attempt to unite Natives, Coloreds and Asiatics) a strong part of the incentive comes from Indian leaders, and the most prominent of these leaders, Dr. Y. M. Dadoo, President of the South African Indian Congress, was a member of the Central Executive of the legally defunct Communist Party of South Africa. One of the most optimisic signs on the horizon has been the plea, of prominent industrialists for better treatment of the Natives in order to use them more effectively in an expansion of the country’s industry. So far the Government has paid no heed to these industrial leaders. Their views are not taken seriously by Native opinion † which distrusts them. These industrialists do not talk to the Natives, and it is so easy for Communists who know the Natives, and often know them very well, to undermine the appeals of industrial leaders for a more tolerant attitude on race. Where Communists in South Africa have the advantage is that they are the only organization which is; assertedly in favor of complete racial equality . To say that they are not sincere carries no weight with the Natives because they know that even the white Liberals do not go this far, and the Natives want to believe in complete racial equality. It is difficult to speculate on what effect re-armament will have on Communist strength in the Union. Communist propaganda is hard at work preparing Native opinion to oppose the “white imperialist nations” if another world war comes. Present anti-Communist legislation and the dissolution of the CPSA will make any overt increase in Communist strength unlikely. It does seem probable, however, that in the event of another war, the Communists would attempt to provoke internal strife in the Union by agitating the Natives. [Here follows the concluding portion of this despatch examining the caliber of Communist and non-Communist union leadership.] For the Ambassador Joseph Sweeney Attaché * The Embassy wishes to acknowledge the assistance which it has received in the preparation of this report from members of the staff of the Consulate General in Johannesburg, particularly Charles O. Thompson, Consul, and Gideon A. R. Uys, locally employed economic analyst. [Footnote in the source text.] † Native opinion is a difficult term to define. Obviously it is a vague concept because of the limitedness of Native organization. It is confined to the urban Native who represents anywhere from a third to a half of the total Native population of some 8½ million. It is popular to say that Native opinion does not exist, but this is wishful thinking on the part of advocates of “white supremacy.” As the term is used here it means the expression of Native leaders, stretching from Professor Matthews of Fort Bare on the right, through the moderateness of Dr. Xuma in the center, to the progressive leftism of Dr. Moroka, the current President General of the African National Congress; the statements issued by Native organizations, such as the African National Congress, the All-African Convention, the Native Advisory Boards Congress, etc.; the editorials of representative Native newspapers such as Inkundla ya Bantu and The Voice of Moroka (Johannesburg) and the planned or spontaneous reaction of Natives in their protest against apartheid . The Embassy believes the cohesiveness of Native opinion is generally underestimated. [Footnote in the source text.] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 745A.5/10–550 [Document 984] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State top secret [ New York ,] October 5, 1950 Subject: South African Defense Problem Participants: Mr. Francois C. Erasmus, South African Defense. Minister Mr. Douglas D. Forsyth, Secretary of South African Department of External Affairs Ambassador G. P. Jooste, South African Delegation 1 The Hon. Dean Acheson, United States Delegation 2 Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, United States Delegation 3 I received South African Defense Minister Erasmus this morning 4 at the request of the South African Ambassador. He was accompanied by the Ambassador and by the Secretary of the South African Ministry of External Affairs Forsyth. The South African Defense Minister opened the conversation by expressing appreciation of my receiving him. I returned this amenity, and then expressed the warm appreciation of the United States Government for the South African action in sending combat air assistance for the united effort in Korea. Erasmus then said he would see Secretary of Defense Marshall tomorrow 5 and go into certain problems in more detail but that he wished to inform me of recent developments in South African defense policy and to let me know in a general way of certain problems facing the Union in this regard. I said that I would be very glad to have this general information. He elaborated the general theme by stating that South Africa had made a decision to assist in resisting aggression by communism in any part of Africa, by which term the Middle East was also included. He did not define their concept of the latter term. He said South Africa now regarded an attack by communism anywhere in this area as an attack on South Africa. He then said that they were planning how to implement this policy if the necessity arose. He had just been reviewing this with defense officials in the United Kingdom. He said he had told United Kingdom officials and also wished to tell us that the Union had decided to make available for service outside of the Union, in the event of this kind of emergency, one armored division and one combat air squadron. The problem then facing the Union was how to handle the financial burden of equipping the armored division which he said would be a very heavy one for a small state such as South Africa. He had discussed this in the UK and had been given assurance of assistance in procurement on a cash basis. They would also need procurement assistance here on certain items. He indicated that the Union would have the greatest difficulty in carrying out the program if they have to pay this heavy cost themselves. I explained the revision in the Military Defense Assistance Act which has been made which, under certain circumstances, would permit us, if a determination was made that South Africa was eligible, to assist in procurement on a reimbursable basis. I stated, however, that we had no existing legislative authority which would permit us to extend this kind of assistance on a grant basis. I also took occasion to point out the heavy demands now pressing upon us from all sides for military equipment outlining the needs in Korea, the program for rearming the Atlantic Pact countries, assistance to Latin American countries, and finally for our own increased rearmament here at home. I also pointed out the heavy increased financial burden this was placing on our own people. Mr. Forsyth interjected at this point that, in addition to the commitments outlined by Erasmus, South Africa was also undertaking the defense of the coasts of South Africa and also would undertake the protection of convoys farther north. This meant some increase in naval tonnage on their part. Mr. Erasmus then turned to another matter and said that the Union felt there should be consultations among the African states and the powers responsible for administering African territories on the subject of defense. He said specifically that the Union felt Egypt should either be included or consulted in some way on this matter. This was also raised in his visit to the United Kingdom. He said that when such a meeting was arranged, and they hoped to hold it shortly after the beginning of the next year somewhere in Africa, he hoped the United States would be able to have an observer attend the meeting. I replied that we would give consideration to this request. I indicated that we were greatly interested in the defense of Africa and that I had listened to the South African decision to play an active role therein with the greatest interest. On leaving, Ambassador Jooste said he would like to attempt to summarize in one sentence the point which his Government wants us to appreciate which is that they are prepared to undertake very serious responsibilities of importance with respect to the defense of Africa, but that they have very limited resources of their own with which to do this. 1 Ambassador Jooste served as Vice Chairman of the South African Delegation, to the 5th Session of the United Nations General Assembly which opened on September 19. 2 Secretary Acheson was head of the U.S. Delegation to the 5th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. 3 Ray nor was United Nations Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs of the Department of State. 4 Evidence in the files of the Department of State indicates that this conversation, which was apparently held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, took place on October 4. 5 See Gen. Lemnitzer’s record of that conversation, infra . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense (Lemnitzer) ISA/MDAP Files: Lot 52–26 [Document 985] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of Military Assistance, Department of Defense ( Lemnitzer ) 1 top secret Washington , 5 October 1950. Memorandum for the Record Subject: Record of Conversation between Secretary Marshall and Mr. Erasmus, South African Minister of Defense. Present u.s. south africa Secretary Marshall Mr. Francis C. Erasmus, Minister of Defense; Major General Lemnitzer, OSD Mr. Hubert F. Cuff, Secretary for Defense; Colonel A. Drexel Biddle, Army Major General Christian L. DuToit, Chief of General Staff; Captain Craig, OSD Brigadier Klopper Major George, OSD Ambassador G. P. Jooste Colonel DeVos, Combined Air Military Attaché 1. Mr. Erasmus discussed the strategic importance of South Africa and the security problems with which it is faced. He stated that South Africa is proposing to hold a conference somewhere on the African Continent during the early part of 1951 to discuss security problems with the nations concerned, particularly the British, French, and Belgians. He hoped that the U.S. would be able to send a representative to this conference as an observer. 2. Under present plans South Africa intends to make one armored division and one fighter bomber squadron available for the defense of the African Continent. He envisaged that the most likely threat existed in the Northeast part of the Continent and that the South African forces would also be available for employment in the Middle East. 3. The South African Government has a serious internal security problem which stems from the fact that the population comprises 2½ million whites and 8 million blacks or Indians. To meet this situation Home Guard units were organized and partially equipped. 4. At the present time the South African armed forces are practically “naked” as regards equipment. Their primary needs include tanks, weapons and other equipment for the armored division; radar for air defense purposes, Navy patrol aircraft for antisubmarine patrol of the 3,000 miles of coastal sea lanes adjacent to South Africa and jet fighters for the fighter bomber squadron. 5. He indicated that he and his delegation had been to London to discuss the South African equipment requirements with Defense Minister Shinwell and the British Staffs. He indicated that the required equipment could be built in the U.K. but the financial terms were such that South Africa was unable to meet them. He told Mr. Shinwell that he was coming on to Washington to discuss South African equipment requirements with U.S. officials. 6. Secretary Marshall explained that since the Minister’s last visit to Washington in August 1949, 2 Congress had approved an amendment to the MDAP legislation in such a way that it was now possible for reimbursable aid to be extended to South Africa, and had amended procedure on payments in such a way as to make it much more acceptable to nations obtaining assistance from us. 7. Secretary Marshall asked how we should proceed in dealing with this problem and I recommended that the subject is being explored by the South African staff with appropriate Defense staffs with a view to obtaining information regarding amounts of equipment involved, availabilities and costs. Upon receiving this information, if the South Africans decided to request U.S. equipment under Section 408 ( e ) of the MDA Act, a formal request could be submitted by the South African Embassy through the Department of State. I then explained the general features of Section 408( e ), as amended, and I agreed to furnish the South African Embassy with copies of Public Law 329 and 621 in order that they could study the provisions under which equipment would be provided (copies were furnished on the afternoon of 5 October). 8. During the discussions the South African delegation did not mention the possibility of a barter arrangement using uranium ore to pay for equipment purchased from the U.S., as was proposed during their visit in August 1949, nor did they indicate why they were unable to meet British financial requirements for any equipment purchased in the U.K. L. L. Lemnitzer Major General, U.S. Army 1 The source text was circulated in the Office of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Department of State, by its Deputy Director, John O. Bell. A copy was also provided to the Office of European Affairs of the Department of State. 2 Regarding the visit under reference, see Perkins’ memorandum to the Secretary of State, October 2, p. 1832 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] . The South African Ambassador (Jooste) to the Secretary of State 745A.5/10–950 [Document 986] The South African Ambassador ( Jooste ) to the Secretary of State secret Washington , 9 October, 1950. Sir : In implementation of the undertaking given by Mr. Erasmus, South African Minister of Defence to the Secretary for Defence in the course of the interview on October 5th, 1 I have to confirm in broad outline the policy of the Union Government with regard to the defence of Africa, viz.— 1. ( a ) Any military attack by a communistic power or powers on the Continent of Africa will be regarded by the Union of South Africa as a direct attack upon itself and will be resisted with all the force at the Union’s disposal. ( b ) A military threat to Africa might have to be met beyond the confines of the African Continent. 2. In furtherance of its continental defence policy as now enunciated the Union Government has in mind the provision of an expeditionary force consisting of one Armoured Division and an Air Fighter Group of nine Squadrons. 3. The strengthening of the South African Naval Forces to afford adequate protection for the lengthy South African seaboard. A strengthened South African Navy would permit of additional cover being given to allied convoys beyond the northern limits of South African waters. 4. ( a ) In order that full effect may be given to this policy it will be necessary for the Government of the Union of South Africa to procure the major portion of the equipment it requires from external sources. For all practical purposes this means from the United Kingdom or the United States of America. ( b ) The Union Government’s equipment requirements may conveniently be classified into two groups— (i) that required immediately for the training of its normal peace-time forces, and (ii) that required for equipping an expeditionary force. With regard to (i) the Government of the Union of South Africa would follow its normal practice of paying for equipment. Insofar as (ii) is concerned it is the hope of the Government of the Union of South Africa that the Government of the United States will find it possible to extend the least onerous financial terms bearing in mind the fact that the Union Government has already incurred and is committed to heavy expenditure on equipment for normal training purposes and for the equipping of 125,000 men in the event of war, and also that the South African Expeditionary Force will, if and when it is required in the Middle East, be undertaking “front line” responsibilities. The equipment for the Expeditionary Force would not be required until the Force arrives in the theatre of operations. 5. It is my Government’s understanding that informal discussions as to the Union’s requirements will now take place between the Service Attachés of this Embassy and representatives of the United States Department of Defence. Thereafter the matter will be dealt with further in the light of the information received. 2 Accept [etc.] G. P. Jooste 1 See General Lemnitzer’s record of the meeting under reference, supra . 2 In a note of November 9, Secretary Acheson acknowledged this note and expressed appreciation for the information contained therein concerning South Africa’s intentions in the event of a military attack by a communist power on the continent of Africa. The Secretary’s note concluded as follows: “It is the understanding of the Department that informal technical discussions are now taking place between the South African Service Attachés and representatives of the Department of Defense concerning the Union’s defense requirements and that the Ambassador will communicate with the Department again in the light of the information which these discussions develop.” (745A.5/10–950) Editorial Note [Document 987] Editorial Note In November 1949 representatives of the Combined Development Agency (an American-British body concerned with atomic energy development) and the South African Atomic Energy Board reached agreement for the basis of subsequent negotiations regarding contractual arrangements for the purchase of uranium. At its meeting on April 25, 1950, the Combined Policy Committee (American-British) approved policy guidance for the conduct of negotiations for the purchase of uranium from South Africa and the response to be made to any South African request for a “special position” in the atomic energy field. South African Ambassador Jooste called upon Secretary of State Acheson on July 12 in order to express his government’s desire, in view of the expected position of South Africa as a producer of uranium, “to associate itself with the ‘inner circle’ of Western countries in atomic energy.” Jooste made it explicitly clear that the South African Government had no interest in obtaining information regarding the manufacture of atomic bombs. Secretary Acheson took note of Jooste’s remarks and promised to give them sympathetic consideration. The Secretary took the opportunity to express the eagerness of the United States for an agreement on the contractual terms for the delivery of uranium from South Africa. In a note of August 24 to Ambassador Jooste, Secretary of State Acheson referred to their conversation of July 12 and gave reassurances that the South African request for a special position in the atomic energy field would be given sympathetic consideration in consultations with the United Kingdom. In the meanwhile the United States wished for rapid progress toward the understandings relating to a contract for the procurement of South African uranium. On October 2 Ambassador Erhardt was instructed (in telegram 61, October 2, to Pretoria) to deliver an aide-mémoire to the South African Prime Minister or his deputy in which the United States accepted a South African invitation for representatives of the Combined Development Agency to resume negotiations regarding the purchase of South African uranium after the middle of October. The aide-mémoire also invited South African Minister of Interior T. E. Dönges, who was serving as head of the South African Delegation to the Fifth United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York, to visit Washington in order to clarify the South African request for a closer association with the United States and United Kingdom in the field of atomic energy. Negotiations between representatives of the Combined Development Agency and the South African Atomic Energy Board in Pretoria, South Africa, during October and November 1950 resulted in the conclusion of an agreement on November 23 on uranium procurement. South African Minister of Interior Dönges visited Washington in December 1950. During a call upon Secretary of State Acheson on December 8, Dönges again raised the question of a special position for South Africa in the atomic energy field. The Secretary expressed certainty that “something could be worked out in the problem.” For further information on the meetings and texts of documents cited, see volume I, pages 493 ff. Record of Meeting No. 169 of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, December 28, 1950 NAC Files: Lot 60 D 137: NAC Meetings 1 [Document 988] Record of Meeting No. 169 of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, December 28, 1950 2 secret [ Washington , undated.] 1. Proposed International Bank Loans to South Africa Mr. Willis 3 pointed out that because of certain unusual conditions the Staff Committee had not submitted a formal recommendation to the Council on this matter. The loans had been under consideration for a considerable period of time, and it was important to note that worldwide economic and military conditions had changed since the original negotiations were begun. He observed that the British were very much in favor of these loans, since most of the goods to be purchased with the proceeds would come from the United Kingdom, and dollars would accordingly flow to the United Kingdom. Mr. Willis stated that the United States’ need for strategic materials seemed a very important consideration to the Staff Committee, and that the lack of adequate transport facilities for such materials could well be a limiting factor in their procurement. He also pointed out that short supplies in the United States must be taken into consideration, although most of the material scheduled for procurement under these loans had been contracted for in the United Kingdom. Mr. Willis also observed that most of the dollar proceeds of this loan would be paid to the United Kingdom, and noted the fact that the United Kingdom had released virtually none of its 18 percent contribution to the Bank’s capital. He pointed out that these loans would probably not completely satisfy the demand of the South Africans for loans, since their development plans envisaged far greater sums. In conclusion Mr. Willis said that the relation of these loans to the total available funds of the Bank ($71 million) had been discussed by the Staff Committee, and that no real problem seemed to exist in that connection. Secretary Snyder introduced Mr. Jesse Johnson of the Atomic Energy Commission who spoke unofficially on the subject of the Atomic Energy Commission’s interest in development projects in South Africa. Mr. Johnson stated that the development programs, especially power projects, contemplated through use of these loans were of importance to the over-all operations of the Atomic Energy Commission. 4 The Council agreed unanimously to advise the United States Executive Director of the Bank that it approved consideration of the loans. Action: The following action was taken: The National Advisory Council advises the United States Executive Director of the International Bank that it approves his consideration in the Board of Directors of a loan to the South African Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) of $30 million and a loan to the Government of South Africa of up to $30 million for the South African Railway System. 1 Lot 60 D 137 is a master file of the documents of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems for the years 1945–1958, as maintained by the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State. 2 For this meeting of the National Advisory Council, at which Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder served as Chairman, 27 persons were present including officials of the Department of State, Department of Commerce, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Export–Import Bank, Economic Cooperation Administration, Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Department of the Treasury. Two representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission (Jesse C. Johnson, Manager, Raw Materials Operations, and his Special Adviser, Frank W. McQuiston) were also present as “visitors”. 3 George H. Willis, Director of the Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury, and Acting Secretary of the National Advisory Council. 4 In a brief memorandum of December 28 to H. Merrell Benninghoff, Officer in Charge of Dominion Affairs in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (BNA), Norris S. Haselton, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in BNA, reported as follows on the National Advisory Council’s consideration of the proposed IBRD loan project for South Africa: “This case had been discussed two or three times at the staff level in the NAC where a number of questions had been raised. At today’s meeting of the top council a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission made a strong statement in support of the loan on the grounds that the projected expenditures would contribute to an increased production of gold-bearing ores of direct interest to the AEC. There was no discussion following this statement and the transaction was approved.” (398.14/12–2850) Index Index Abaza, Al Sayid Ahmed, 911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 477 ] Abbasi, Ali Haider, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Abdula, Prince, 1163–1165 [ Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1198 [ Pg. 1198 is part of Doc. 664 ] Abdul-Illan, Regent of Iraq, 642–643 [ Pgs. 642–643 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] Abdullah, Prince, 1358 [ Pg. 1358 is part of Doc. 755 ] , 1360–1361 [ Pgs. 1360–1361 include portions of Doc. 756 and Doc. 757 ] Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammad, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1381 [ Pg. 1381 is part of Doc. 769 ] , 1415 [ Pg. 1415 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1417 [ Pg. 1417 is part of Doc. 797 ] , 1424 [ Pg. 1424 is part of Doc. 802 ] , 1426 [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 803 and Doc. 804 ] , 1429–1431 [ Pgs. 1429–1431 include portions of Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 1433–1435 [ Pgs. 1433–1435 include portions of Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , and Doc. 810 ] , 1438 [ Pg. 1438 is part of Doc. 810 ] , 1440–1441 [ Pgs. 1440–1441 include portions of Doc. 811 and Doc. 812 ] Abdullah Effendi, 1125 n [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 1178–1180 [ Pgs. 1178–1180 include portions of Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649 ] Abdullah ibn Hussein, King of Jordan, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 674–678 [ Pgs. 674–678 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 699–704 [ Pgs. 699–704 include portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330 ] , 723 n [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 726–727 [ Pgs. 726–727 include portions of Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , and Doc. 348 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , and Doc. 357 ] , 745–748 [ Pgs. 745–748 include portions of Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 751–753 [ Pgs. 751–753 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] , 757–758 [ Pgs. 757–758 include portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 774–775 [ Pgs. 774–775 include portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , and Doc. 386 ] , 781–784 [ Pgs. 781–784 include portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , and Doc. 391 ] , 786–790 [ Pgs. 786–790 include portions of Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , and Doc. 395 ] , 796–798 [ Pgs. 796–798 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , and Doc. 401 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 821–822 [ Pgs. 821–822 include portions of Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 834–837 [ Pgs. 834–837 include portions of Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , and Doc. 430 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 842–843 [ Pgs. 842–843 include portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 846–847 [ Pgs. 846–847 include portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 849–851 [ Pgs. 849–851 include portions of Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , and Doc. 442 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 859–860 [ Pgs. 859–860 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 864–865 [ Pgs. 864–865 include portions of Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , and Doc. 451 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 452 ] , 870 n [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 872–874 [ Pgs. 872–874 include portions of Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , and Doc. 457 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] , 889–890 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 893–894 [ Pgs. 893–894 include portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 917 n [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 920 [ Pg. 920 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 489 and Doc. 490 ] , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 941–942 [ Pgs. 941–942 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 944–946 [ Pgs. 944–946 include portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 950–951 [ Pgs. 950–951 include portions of Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , and Doc. 513 ] , 968–970 [ Pgs. 968–970 include portions of Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , and Doc. 527 ] , 973–974 [ Pgs. 973–974 include portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 975 n [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 531 ] , 978–980 [ Pgs. 978–980 include portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 984–985 [ Pgs. 984–985 include portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1020–1021 [ Pgs. 1020–1021 include portions of Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , and Doc. 566 ] , 1027–1028 [ Pgs. 1027–1028 include portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 1064 n [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1069–1070 [ Pgs. 1069–1070 include portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1075–1076 [ Pgs. 1075–1076 include portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1098–1099 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 1216 n [ Pg. 1216 is part of Doc. 675 ] Abedine, Ali Hosni Zein El-, 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 116 ] Abu Dhabi, 10 n [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 19–20 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 37–42 [ Pgs. 37–42 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 45–46 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48 ] Acheson, Dean G.: Address at San Francisco, Mar. 15, 1950 , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 224 ] Africa, U.S. policies toward, 1509 n [ Pg. 1509 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1543–1545 [ Pgs. 1543–1545 include portions of Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , and Doc. 851 ] , 1569 n [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] Arab states, anti-Western attitudes of, 1106 [ Pg. 1106 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] Egypt: British relations with, 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 318–319 [ Pgs. 318–319 include portions of Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , and Doc. 120 ] , 321–323 [ Pgs. 321–323 include portions of Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , and Doc. 123 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 328–329 [ Pgs. 328–329 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] ; U.S. relations with, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 309–311 [ Pgs. 309–311 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] , 315–316 [ Pgs. 315–316 include portions of Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , and Doc. 118 ] Eritrea, U.S. interest in disposition of, 1642–1644 [ Pgs. 1642–1644 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , and Doc. 889 ] , 1647 [ Pg. 1647 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 1654–1656 [ Pgs. 1654–1656 include portions of Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] , 1659 [ Pg. 1659 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1662–1663 [ Pgs. 1662–1663 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1667 [ Pg. 1667 includes portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] , 1677–1678 [ Pgs. 1677–1678 include portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1682 [ Pg. 1682 is part of Doc. 904 ] , 1684–1685 [ Pgs. 1684–1685 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , and Doc. 906 ] , 1689 [ Pg. 1689 includes portions of Doc. 909 and Doc. 910 ] Ethiopia, U.S. relations with, 1691 n [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 1698–1702 [ Pgs. 1698–1702 include portions of Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , and Doc. 918 ] Foreign Ministers meetings: London, 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 158–162 [ Pgs. 158–162 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 1624 n [ Pg. 1624 includes portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1649 n [ Pg. 1649 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] ; New York, 588 n [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 274 ] Greece, U.S. relations with, 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 351–352 [ Pgs. 351–352 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 354–357 [ Pgs. 354–357 include portions of Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , and Doc. 151 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , and Doc. 155 ] , 378–380 [ Pgs. 378–380 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , and Doc. 163 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 398–399 [ Pgs. 398–399 include portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 401–406 [ Pgs. 401–406 include portions of Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 422–423 [ Pgs. 422–423 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 438–439 [ Pgs. 438–439 include portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , and Doc. 198 ] , 442–444 [ Pgs. 442–444 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] India, U.S. relations with, 1461 [ Pg. 1461 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] , 1464–1466 [ Pgs. 1464–1466 include portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 1468–1472 [ Pgs. 1468–1472 include portions of Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , and Doc. 831 ] , 1474 [ Pg. 1474 includes portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] , 1481–1482 [ Pgs. 1481–1482 include portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] Iran, U.S. relations with, 445–446 [ Pgs. 445–446 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 470–471 [ Pgs. 470–471 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , and Doc. 213 ] , 478–479 [ Pgs. 478–479 include portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] , 481–483 [ Pgs. 481–483 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 503–507 [ Pgs. 503–507 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231 ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 520–523 [ Pgs. 520–523 include portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 532–534 [ Pgs. 532–534 include portions of Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , and Doc. 238 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 556–558 [ Pgs. 556–558 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , and Doc. 251 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 562–564 [ Pgs. 562–564 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 569–570 [ Pgs. 569–570 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 574–578 [ Pgs. 574–578 include portions of Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 602–603 [ Pgs. 602–603 include portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 612–618 [ Pgs. 612–618 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Iraq, U.S. relations with, 644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 647–649 [ Pgs. 647–649 include portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] Israel, U.S. relations with, 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 667–668 [ Pgs. 667–668 include portions of Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , and Doc. 310 ] , 671–674 [ Pgs. 671–674 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 881–882 [ Pgs. 881–882 include portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 960–961 [ Pgs. 960–961 include portions of Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , and Doc. 520 ] , 966–968 [ Pgs. 966–968 include portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] , 1014 [ Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] , 1033–1035 [ Pgs. 1033–1035 include portions of Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , and Doc. 576 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 617 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] , 1091–1093 [ Pgs. 1091–1093 include portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 1362 [ Pg. 1362 is part of Doc. 758 ] , 1364–1372 [ Pgs. 1364–1372 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 1374–1378 [ Pgs. 1374–1378 include portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , and Doc. 769 ] , 1382–1387 [ Pgs. 1382–1387 include portions of Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 1389 [ Pg. 1389 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1394–1401 [ Pgs. 1394–1401 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] , 1404–1406 [ Pgs. 1404–1406 include portions of Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , and Doc. 790 ] , 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1411–1415 [ Pgs. 1411–1415 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 1417–1418 [ Pgs. 1417–1418 include portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 1420–1421 [ Pgs. 1420–1421 include portions of Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , and Doc. 800 ] , 1423 [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 1425–1427 [ Pgs. 1425–1427 include portions of Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , and Doc. 805 ] , 1429 [ Pg. 1429 includes portions of Doc. 805 and Doc. 806 ] , 1431 [ Pg. 1431 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1433 [ Pg. 1433 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1435–1439 [ Pgs. 1435–1439 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , and Doc. 811 ] , 1441–1442 [ Pgs. 1441–1442 include portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1444–1445 [ Pgs. 1444–1445 include portions of Doc. 813 and Doc. 814 ] , 1498 n [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 837 ] Korean war, 1110 [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] Liberia, U.S. relations with, 1706–1707 [ Pgs. 1706–1707 include portions of Doc. 920 and Doc. 921 ] , 1709 [ Pg. 1709 is part of Doc. 922 ] , 1711 [ Pg. 1711 includes portions of Doc. 923 and Doc. 924 ] , 1716–1717 [ Pgs. 1716–1717 include portions of Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , and Doc. 928 ] , 1719–1720 [ Pgs. 1719–1720 include portions of Doc. 928 , Doc. 929 , and Doc. 930 ] , 1722–1723 [ Pgs. 1722–1723 include portions of Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , and Doc. 933 ] , 1725 [ Pg. 1725 is part of Doc. 934 ] , 1727 n [ Pg. 1727 is part of Doc. 936 ] , 1731–1735 [ Pgs. 1731–1735 include portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] Libya, U.S. relations with, 1601–1606 [ Pgs. 1601–1606 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , and Doc. 869 ] , 1608 [ Pg. 1608 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1619–1623 [ Pgs. 1619–1623 include portions of Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , and Doc. 876 ] , 1626–1629 [ Pgs. 1626–1629 include portions of Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , and Doc. 880 ] , 1634 [ Pg. 1634 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] , 1638 [ Pg. 1638 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] Morocco, U.S. relations with, 1747 n [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 1752 [ Pg. 1752 includes portions of Doc. 946 and Doc. 947 ] , 1754–1755 [ Pgs. 1754–1755 include portions of Doc. 948 and Doc. 949 ] , 1760 [ Pg. 1760 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 1762 [ Pg. 1762 includes portions of Doc. 951 and Doc. 952 ] , 1764 [ Pg. 1764 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] , 1770 [ Pg. 1770 includes portions of Doc. 954 and Doc. 955 ] Near and Middle East: Security of, 140–141 [ Pgs. 140–141 include portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 152–153 [ Pgs. 152–153 include portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 156–162 [ Pgs. 156–162 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] ; U.S. military assistance for, 125–130 [ Pgs. 125–130 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 66 ] Near East, arms shipments to, 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 137–139 [ Pgs. 137–139 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , and Doc. 326 ] , 705–706 [ Pgs. 705–706 include portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 847–849 [ Pgs. 847–849 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 967–968 [ Pgs. 967–968 include portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 1122 n [ Pg. 1122 is part of Doc. 629 ] , 1123 [ Pg. 1123 includes portions of Doc. 629 and Doc. 630 ] Near East and South Asia, proposed U.S. economic assistance for, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 171–174 [ Pgs. 171–174 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , and Doc. 77 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 178 n [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 180–181 [ Pgs. 180–181 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 282–283 [ Pgs. 282–283 include portions of Doc. 104 and Doc. 105 ] Pakistan, U.S. relations with, 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] Palestine question, 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 665–668 [ Pgs. 665–668 include portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , and Doc. 310 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 677–679 [ Pgs. 677–679 include portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] , 684–685 [ Pgs. 684–685 include portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 690–691 [ Pgs. 690–691 include portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 705–707 [ Pgs. 705–707 include portions of Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 712–716 [ Pgs. 712–716 include portions of Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , and Doc. 340 ] , 718–723 [ Pgs. 718–723 include portions of Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] , 727–729 [ Pgs. 727–729 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350 ] , 734–737 [ Pgs. 734–737 include portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 740–745 [ Pgs. 740–745 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] , 747–748 [ Pgs. 747–748 include portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 750–755 [ Pgs. 750–755 include portions of Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , and Doc. 368 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 776–777 [ Pgs. 776–777 include portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 781–784 [ Pgs. 781–784 include portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , and Doc. 391 ] , 787–789 [ Pgs. 787–789 include portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , and Doc. 395 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 798–804 [ Pgs. 798–804 include portions of Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , and Doc. 405 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 includes portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 810–816 [ Pgs. 810–816 include portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , and Doc. 415 ] , 819–822 [ Pgs. 819–822 include portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 831–832 [ Pgs. 831–832 include portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 834–836 [ Pgs. 834–836 include portions of Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 839–840 [ Pgs. 839–840 include portions of Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , and Doc. 432 ] , 842–844 [ Pgs. 842–844 include portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 847–851 [ Pgs. 847–851 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , and Doc. 442 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 858–859 [ Pgs. 858–859 include portions of Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , and Doc. 447 ] , 872–875 [ Pgs. 872–875 include portions of Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] , 877–882 [ Pgs. 877–882 include portions of Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , and Doc. 464 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 892–893 [ Pgs. 892–893 include portions of Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , and Doc. 469 ] , 895 n [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 909–910 [ Pgs. 909–910 include portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 915–917 [ Pgs. 915–917 include portions of Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , and Doc. 483 ] , 923–926 [ Pgs. 923–926 include portions of Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 935–938 [ Pgs. 935–938 include portions of Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 942–947 [ Pgs. 942–947 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , and Doc. 509 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] , 964–965 [ Pgs. 964–965 include portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 975 n [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , and Doc. 533 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 989–991 [ Pgs. 989–991 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 995–997 [ Pgs. 995–997 include portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , and Doc. 548 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1018–1020 [ Pgs. 1018–1020 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , and Doc. 565 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 1038–1039 [ Pgs. 1038–1039 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] , 1059–1061 [ Pgs. 1059–1061 include portions of Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , and Doc. 594 ] , 1064–1066 [ Pgs. 1064–1066 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 1068–1069 [ Pgs. 1068–1069 include portions of Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , and Doc. 603 ] , 1074–1075 [ Pgs. 1074–1075 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , and Doc. 609 ] Palestinian refugees, 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , and Doc. 336 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 963–964 [ Pgs. 963–964 include portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 1039–1042 [ Pgs. 1039–1042 include portions of Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] , 1051–1052 [ Pgs. 1051–1052 include portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 1061–1063 [ Pgs. 1061–1063 include portions of Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , and Doc. 596 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1073–1075 [ Pgs. 1073–1075 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , and Doc. 609 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] Petroleum resources in the Near East, U.S. interest in development of, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 52–53 [ Pgs. 52–53 include portions of Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , and Doc. 21 ] , 56–58 [ Pgs. 56–58 include portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , and Doc. 24 ] , 60–62 [ Pgs. 60–62 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , and Doc. 27 ] , 69–71 [ Pgs. 69–71 include portions of Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , and Doc. 31 ] , 73–76 [ Pgs. 73–76 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , and Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 111–114 [ Pgs. 111–114 include portions of Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 116–121 [ Pgs. 116–121 include portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] Pushtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1448–1451 [ Pgs. 1448–1451 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 1453–1458 [ Pgs. 1453–1458 include portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , and Doc. 823 ] Saudi Arabia, U.S. relations with, 1112 n [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1120–1124 [ Pgs. 1120–1124 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1127 n [ Pg. 1127 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] , 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 1131 n [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 1155 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1157 [ Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1178 [ Pg. 1178 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 1184–1185 [ Pgs. 1184–1185 include portions of Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , and Doc. 654 ] , 1187 [ Pg. 1187 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 1190 n [ Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 1191–1192 [ Pgs. 1191–1192 include portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 1194–1197 [ Pgs. 1194–1197 include portions of Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] Soviet Union, U.S. relations with, 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 475 ] Syria, U.S. relations with, 1201–1205 [ Pgs. 1201–1205 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , and Doc. 669 ] , 1206 n [ Pg. 1206 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 1210–1215 [ Pgs. 1210–1215 include portions of Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , and Doc. 675 ] , 1217–1221 [ Pgs. 1217–1221 include portions of Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , and Doc. 679 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 680 ] Tunisia, U.S. policy toward, 1774–1775 [ Pgs. 1774–1775 include portions of Doc. 956 and Doc. 957 ] , 1777 [ Pg. 1777 includes portions of Doc. 958 and Doc. 959 ] , 1779–1781 [ Pgs. 1779–1781 include portions of Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , and Doc. 962 ] , 1800 n [ Pg. 1800 is part of Doc. 966 ] , 1802 [ Pg. 1802 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] , 1806 [ Pg. 1806 is part of Doc. 969 ] , 1808 [ Pg. 1808 is part of Doc. 970 ] Turkey, U.S. relations with, 1235 [ Pg. 1235 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] , 1238–1239 [ Pgs. 1238–1239 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 1242 [ Pg. 1242 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1247–1248 [ Pgs. 1247–1248 include portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 1250 n [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 1253–1254 [ Pgs. 1253–1254 include portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 1260 n [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 702 and Doc. 703 ] , 1264–1266 [ Pgs. 1264–1266 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , and Doc. 707 ] , 1269 [ Pg. 1269 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1272 [ Pg. 1272 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1280–1281 [ Pgs. 1280–1281 include portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] , 1284–1286 [ Pgs. 1284–1286 include portions of Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , and Doc. 718 ] , 1292 [ Pg. 1292 includes portions of Doc. 719 and Doc. 720 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 1302 [ Pg. 1302 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 1304–1306 [ Pgs. 1304–1306 include portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , and Doc. 730 ] , 1312–1313 [ Pgs. 1312–1313 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1315–1316 [ Pgs. 1315–1316 include portions of Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 1319–1322 [ Pgs. 1319–1322 include portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 1328 [ Pg. 1328 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1331 n [ Pg. 1331 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1332–1337 [ Pgs. 1332–1337 include portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] , 1340 [ Pg. 1340 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1353 [ Pg. 1353 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] Union of South Africa, U.S. relations with, 1823–1824 [ Pgs. 1823–1824 include portions of Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , and Doc. 976 ] , 1826 n [ Pg. 1826 includes portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] , 1827 [ Pg. 1827 includes portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] , 1829 [ Pg. 1829 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1832 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 1834 [ Pg. 1834 includes portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] , 1837–1839 [ Pgs. 1837–1839 include portions of Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , and Doc. 985 ] , 1840 n [ Pg. 1840 is part of Doc. 985 ] , 1841 [ Pg. 1841 includes portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] , 1842 n [ Pg. 1842 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] , 1843 [ Pg. 1843 is part of Doc. 987 ] U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, U.S. policy toward, 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Yemen, U.S. relations with, 1358–1359 [ Pgs. 1358–1359 include portions of Doc. 755 and Doc. 756 ] Yugoslavia, U.S. relations with, 340 [ Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Achilles, Theodore C., 1640–1642 [ Pgs. 1640–1642 include portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Adams, I. D., 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Addonizio, Hugh J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Aden, 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] Afghanistan ( see also Pushtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan): British military assistance, 199 [ Pg. 199 is part of Doc. 88 ] ; Helmand River Delta commission report, 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 1459–1460 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 824 ] ; political situation, 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; Saudi Arabia, relations with, 1148–1149 [ Pg. 1148 is part of Doc. 637 ] ; Soviet Union, policy toward, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] ; Turkish military mission, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 100 ] ; U.N. economic mission, 171 [ Pg. 171 is part of Doc. 74 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, 169–171 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 1448–1449 [ Pgs. 1448–1449 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] ; U.S. policy, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Africa ( see also individual African countries and territories ): Anglo-American political talks concerning, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 215–216 [ Pgs. 215–216 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 1550–1558 [ Pgs. 1550–1558 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , and Doc. 857 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] Belgian colonial policies, 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 841 ] , 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1522–1523 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1530–1533 [ Pg. 1530 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1536 [ Pg. 1536 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1546 [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 862 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] British colonial policies, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 215–216 [ Pgs. 215–216 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 841 ] , 1516 [ Pg. 1516 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1522–1523 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1528–1533 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1535–1538 [ Pgs. 1535–1538 include portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1542 [ Pg. 1542 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1546 [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1554–1558 [ Pgs. 1554–1558 include portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1587–1588 [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Central and Southern Africa Transport Conference, Johannesburg, Oct. 25–Nov. 16, 1950 , 1581–1586 [ Pgs. 1581–1586 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] Commission for Techinical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara, 1516 n [ Pg. 1516 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1533 [ Pg. 1533 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1564–1565 [ Pg. 1564 is part of Doc. 857 ] Communist movement and strength, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1516–1517 [ Pg. 1516 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1527 [ Pg. 1527 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1539–1540 [ Pgs. 1539–1540 include portions of Doc. 846 and Doc. 847 ] , 1550–1553 [ Pgs. 1550–1553 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , and Doc. 855 ] , 1559–1564 [ Pg. 1559 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1571–1572 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1576–1578 [ Pg. 1576 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1587 [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1594 [ Pg. 1594 is part of Doc. 863 ] European emigration to, question of, 1512–1514 [ Pgs. 1512–1514 include portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , and Doc. 844 ] , 1519 [ Pg. 1519 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1534–1536 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] Foreign Ministers meeting at London, discussions of African subjects at, 1524–1539 [ Pgs. 1524–1539 include portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1541–1546 [ Pgs. 1541–1546 include portions of Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , and Doc. 852 ] , 1559 [ Pg. 1559 is part of Doc. 857 ] Franco-American talks concerning, 1558–1569 [ Pgs. 1558–1569 include portions of Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , and Doc. 858 ] French colonial policies, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 841 ] , 1516 [ Pg. 1516 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1527–1529 [ Pg. 1527 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1531–1533 [ Pg. 1531 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1535–1540 [ Pgs. 1535–1540 include portions of Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] , 1542–1550 [ Pgs. 1542–1550 include portions of Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , and Doc. 854 ] , 1559–1560 [ Pg. 1559 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1564–1572 [ Pgs. 1564–1572 include portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] , 1574–1576 [ Pg. 1574 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1578–1579 [ Pg. 1578 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 862 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] Nationalist movements, 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1528–1529 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1548 [ Pg. 1548 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1552 [ Pg. 1552 is part of Doc. 855 ] , 1561 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1564 [ Pg. 1564 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1570–1572 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1574–1576 [ Pg. 1574 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 1587 [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, Oct. 2–7, 1950 , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 215–216 [ Pgs. 215–216 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 1545 [ Pg. 1545 includes portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] , 1549–1551 [ Pgs. 1549–1551 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , and Doc. 855 ] , 1569–1580 [ Pgs. 1569–1580 include portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1583–1584 [ Pgs. 1583–1584 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 1678 n [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1747 n [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 1748 [ Pg. 1748 is part of Doc. 945 ] , 1786 n [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1800 [ Pg. 1800 is part of Doc. 966 ] , 1805 [ Pg. 1805 is part of Doc. 968 ] North Atlantic Treaty, inclusion of North Africa in, 1300 [ Pg. 1300 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 1626–1637 [ Pgs. 1626–1637 include portions of Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] Portuguese colonial policies, 1513–1514 [ Pgs. 1513–1514 include portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1531 [ Pg. 1531 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1533 [ Pg. 1533 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1581–1582 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 862 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1598 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 863 ] Soviet policy, 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1552 [ Pg. 1552 is part of Doc. 855 ] Spanish colonial policies, 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1571 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1575–1576 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1583–1584 [ Pgs. 1583–1584 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] U.N. technical assistance, 1572 [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1578 [ Pg. 1578 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1594 [ Pg. 1594 is part of Doc. 863 ] U.N. trusteeship and non-self-governing territories, policies concerning, 1518–1519 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1536 [ Pg. 1536 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1591 [ Pg. 1591 is part of Doc. 863 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 1520–1521 [ Pg. 1520 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1527–1528 [ Pg. 1527 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1530–1532 [ Pg. 1530 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1539–1541 [ Pgs. 1539–1541 include portions of Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , and Doc. 849 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1557–1558 [ Pgs. 1557–1558 include portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1567 [ Pg. 1567 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1572–1573 [ Pgs. 1572–1573 include portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1578–1579 [ Pg. 1578 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1589 [ Pg. 1589 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1593–1594 [ Pg. 1593 is part of Doc. 863 ] U.S. information and educational exchange program, 1519–1520 [ Pg. 1519 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1580 [ Pg. 1580 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1593–1595 [ Pg. 1593 is part of Doc. 863 ] U.S. investments in, 1554–1556 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1567–1568 [ Pg. 1567 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1579 [ Pg. 1579 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1589 [ Pg. 1589 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1592 [ Pg. 1592 is part of Doc. 863 ] U.S. policy, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 1503–1509 [ Pgs. 1503–1509 include portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1540–1546 [ Pgs. 1540–1546 include portions of Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , and Doc. 852 ] , 1548 [ Pg. 1548 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1559 [ Pg. 1559 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1569–1580 [ Pgs. 1569–1580 include portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1587–1599 [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] West and East African Regional Conference of U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, Laurenço Marques, Feb. 27–Mar. 2, 1950 , 245 n [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 1503–1504 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1510 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 841 ] , 1512–1523 [ Pgs. 1512–1523 include portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , and Doc. 844 ] , 1534 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1552 [ Pg. 1552 is part of Doc. 855 ] , 1574 n [ Pg. 1574 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1691 n [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 1815 n [ Pg. 1815 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] Aǧaoǧlu, Samet, 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] Aglion, Raoul, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Ahmed, Iman of Yemen, 1356 [ Pg. 1356 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 1358–1360 [ Pgs. 1358–1360 include portions of Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , and Doc. 757 ] Ahmed Bey, 1607 [ Pg. 1607 is part of Doc. 869 ] Air Force, U.S. Department of the, 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1710 [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] , 1713 [ Pg. 1713 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1716 [ Pg. 1716 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 1728 [ Pg. 1728 is part of Doc. 936 ] Ajlani, Munir, 1216 [ Pg. 1216 is part of Doc. 675 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] Akdur, Faik Zihni, 1254 [ Pg. 1254 is part of Doc. 697 ] , 1257–1259 [ Pgs. 1257–1259 include portions of Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702 ] , 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 706 and Doc. 707 ] , 1281–1282 [ Pg. 1281 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1295 n [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 721 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1354 n [ Pg. 1354 is part of Doc. 753 ] Aklilou, Ato Abt-Wold, 1642 [ Pg. 1642 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 1644 [ Pg. 1644 includes portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] , 1646 n [ Pg. 1646 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1660 [ Pg. 1660 is part of Doc. 897 ] , 1663–1667 [ Pgs. 1663–1667 include portions of Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 1674–1679 [ Pgs. 1674–1679 include portions of Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , and Doc. 903 ] , 1682–1684 [ Pgs. 1682–1684 include portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] , 1689 [ Pg. 1689 includes portions of Doc. 909 and Doc. 910 ] , 1692 [ Pg. 1692 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1703–1705 [ Pg. 1703 is part of Doc. 919 ] Aknoz, Maj. Gen. Nurettin, 1294 [ Pg. 1294 is part of Doc. 721 ] Aksal, Ismail R., 1229 [ Pg. 1229 is part of Doc. 683 ] Aksalur, Gen. Izzet, 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 693 ] Ala, Hussein, 447–452 [ Pgs. 447–452 include portions of Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] , 455–458 [ Pgs. 455–458 include portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 500–501 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 526–529 [ Pgs. 526–529 include portions of Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , and Doc. 236 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] Alain, Mohammed Abul As’Ad Al, 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 1629–1631 [ Pgs. 1629–1631 include portions of Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , and Doc. 881 ] Alaoui, Ahmed, 1791 [ Pg. 1791 is part of Doc. 964 ] Albania, 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 391–392 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 411–412 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 1347–1349 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] Algeria, 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1537 [ Pg. 1537 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1542 [ Pg. 1542 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1575–1576 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1636 [ Pg. 1636 is part of Doc. 884 ] , 1744 [ Pg. 1744 is part of Doc. 944 ] Ali Mohd, 1449 [ Pg. 1449 is part of Doc. 816 ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] , 1456–1457 [ Pgs. 1456–1457 include portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] Allen, Francis O., 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 297 ] Allen, George, 340 [ Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 349–350 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , and Doc. 151 ] Allen, Maj. Gen. Leven C., 1826 n [ Pg. 1826 includes portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] Allen, Roger, 296–302 [ Pgs. 296–302 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , and Doc. 113 ] , 328–329 [ Pgs. 328–329 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 1551–1552 [ Pgs. 1551–1552 include portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 1631–1633 [ Pgs. 1631–1633 include portions of Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , and Doc. 882 ] , 1639 [ Pg. 1639 is part of Doc. 885 ] , 1644 n [ Pg. 1644 includes portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] , 1659–1661 [ Pgs. 1659–1661 include portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1678–1679 [ Pgs. 1678–1679 include portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1681 [ Pg. 1681 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] Alpar, Nahit, 1268 [ Pg. 1268 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 711 ] Altincan, Rear Adm. Sadik, 1280 [ Pg. 1280 is part of Doc. 714 ] American Federation of Labor, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 1785 [ Pg. 1785 is part of Doc. 963 ] American Friends Service Committee, 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] American Independent Oil Company, 29–33 [ Pgs. 29–33 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] American Middle East Relief, 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] American University of Beirut, 855 [ Pg. 855 is part of Doc. 443 ] Amini, Brig. Gen. Mahmoud, 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 226 ] Ammoun, Fouad, 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] Amr Pasha, 289–290 [ Pgs. 289–290 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 319–320 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 129 ] Amri, Qadi Mohamed al-, 1355–1359 [ Pgs. 1355–1359 include portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] Anabar Island, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 17 ] Angle, Germaine B., 488 n [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 222 ] Anglo-Iranian Oil Company ( see also under Iran), 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 47–48 [ Pgs. 47–48 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 77–79 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 82–83 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 85–86 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 97–99 [ Pgs. 97–99 include portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 264–265 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 460–462 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 491–492 [ Pgs. 491–492 include portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 494–496 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 527–532 [ Pgs. 527–532 include portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 545–548 [ Pgs. 545–548 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , and Doc. 244 ] , 550–551 [ Pgs. 550–551 include portions of Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , and Doc. 247 ] , 556–558 [ Pgs. 556–558 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , and Doc. 251 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 562–564 [ Pgs. 562–564 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] , 566–571 [ Pgs. 566–571 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 576–585 [ Pgs. 576–585 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 594–596 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 601–602 [ Pgs. 601–602 include portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 606–612 [ Pgs. 606–612 include portions of Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , and Doc. 285 ] , 614–615 [ Pgs. 614–615 include portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 617–618 [ Pgs. 617–618 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 631–635 [ Pgs. 631–635 include portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] Angola, 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 843 ] , 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1534 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1598–1599 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] Anschuetz, Norbert L., 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 170 ] Anslinger, Harry J., 1259 n [ Pg. 1259 includes portions of Doc. 701 and Doc. 702 ] Arab Higher Committee, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] Arab League ( see also under Palestine question), 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1572 [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1575–1576 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1621 [ Pg. 1621 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1738 [ Pg. 1738 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1743–1744 [ Pg. 1743 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1746 [ Pg. 1746 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1796 [ Pg. 1796 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1798–1799 [ Pg. 1798 is part of Doc. 966 ] , 1801 [ Pg. 1801 is part of Doc. 967 ] Arab League Collective Security Pact, Apr. 13, 1950 , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 857–858 [ Pgs. 857–858 include portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 1012 n [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 558 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 680 ] Arab League Council, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 770–771 [ Pgs. 770–771 include portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 822 n [ Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 856–858 [ Pgs. 856–858 include portions of Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , and Doc. 446 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1744 [ Pg. 1744 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1796 [ Pg. 1796 is part of Doc. 965 ] Arab League Political Committee, 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 771 n [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 856–857 [ Pgs. 856–857 include portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 858 n [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 452 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] Arab Legion. See under Jordan. Arab refugee problem. See Refugee problems under Palestine question. Arab states ( See also under Korean war and Palestine question): Armed forces, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 93 ] Armistice agreements with Israel, 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 101 ] British arms sales to, 125–127 [ Pgs. 125–127 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 132–133 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 136–137 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 161–162 [ Pgs. 161–162 include portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 164–166 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 705–706 [ Pgs. 705–706 include portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 712–714 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 723–724 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 750–751 [ Pgs. 750–751 include portions of Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 819–820 [ Pgs. 819–820 include portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 434 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 1122 n [ Pg. 1122 is part of Doc. 629 ] , 1123 [ Pg. 1123 includes portions of Doc. 629 and Doc. 630 ] , 1204 n [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] British policy, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Communist movement and strength, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 222–223 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 is part of Doc. 637 ] Foreign policies, 221–223 [ Pgs. 221–223 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 225–228 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] Iran, reaction to U.S. assistance for, 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Israel, economic boycott of. See Arab economic boycott under Israel. Israeli visas, restrictions on, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] Jews, treatment of, 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 553 ] Petroleum pipeline, negotiations concerning, 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Political situation, 271–272 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] Rearmament of, 738–741 [ Pgs. 738–741 include portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 434 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 465 ] Security of, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 194–195 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 224–225 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 1348 [ Pg. 1348 is part of Doc. 752 ] Situation in, 217–218 [ Pgs. 217–218 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Tripartite (Anglo-American-French) declaration of May 25, 1950 , reaction to, 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 78 ] U.N. role, 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] United States, attitude toward, 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 1003 [ Pg. 1003 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1057–1058 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1100–1104 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1106–1110 [ Pgs. 1106–1110 include portions of Doc. 624 , Doc. 625 , and Doc. 626 ] U.S. arms shipments to, 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 134–138 [ Pgs. 134–138 include portions of Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 163–164 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 810 n [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 436 and Doc. 437 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 906–907 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 475 ] , 913–916 [ Pgs. 913–916 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , and Doc. 482 ] , 942–943 [ Pgs. 942–943 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , and Doc. 505 ] , 967 [ Pg. 967 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 1002–1003 [ Pgs. 1002–1003 include portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1204 [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 281–283 [ Pgs. 281–283 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , and Doc. 105 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 1050–1051 [ Pgs. 1050–1051 include portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1058–1060 [ Pgs. 1058–1060 include portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] U.S. military assistance, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 220–221 [ Pgs. 220–221 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] U.S. policy, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 273–274 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 763–766 [ Pgs. 763–766 include portions of Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 1002–1006 [ Pgs. 1002–1006 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , and Doc. 554 ] , 1092 [ Pg. 1092 is part of Doc. 622 ] , 1109 [ Pg. 1109 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1621 [ Pg. 1621 is part of Doc. 875 ] Arabi Island, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 17 ] Arabian-American Oil Company ( see also under Saudi Arabia), 10 n [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 11–13 [ Pgs. 11–13 include portions of Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , and Doc. 6 ] , 23–29 [ Pgs. 23–29 include portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 36–45 [ Pgs. 36–45 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 52–58 [ Pgs. 52–58 include portions of Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , and Doc. 24 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 75–76 [ Pgs. 75–76 include portions of Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , and Doc. 36 ] , 82–83 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95–97 [ Pgs. 95–97 include portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] , 101–114 [ Pgs. 101–114 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 118–121 [ Pgs. 118–121 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 1113–1114 [ Pg. 1113 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1142–1143 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1155 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1167 [ Pg. 1167 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 1186 [ Pg. 1186 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 660 ] Aram, G.A., 68–69 [ Pgs. 68–69 include portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 541–545 [ Pgs. 541–545 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] Ard, Madhat Sheikh al, 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] Ardalan, 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 250 ] Ardalan, Ali Gholi, 471–472 [ Pgs. 471–472 include portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 478–479 [ Pgs. 478–479 include portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , and Doc. 217 ] , 480 n [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 485–487 [ Pgs. 485–487 include portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] Argentina, 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] Armstrong, W. Park, 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 233 ] Armstrong Cork Company, 1783 [ Pg. 1783 is part of Doc. 963 ] Army, U.S. Department of the, 608–609 [ Pgs. 608–609 include portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 1733 [ Pg. 1733 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] Arnold, Maj. Gen. William H., 1249–1250 [ Pgs. 1249–1250 include portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 1293–1297 [ Pgs. 1293–1297 include portions of Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 1305 [ Pg. 1305 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 1329–1330 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1340 [ Pg. 1340 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1344–1346 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1349–1353 [ Pgs. 1349–1353 include portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] Asia, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 1443 [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 813 ] , 1461 [ Pg. 1461 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] , 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 825 ] , 1468–1470 [ Pgs. 1468–1470 include portions of Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , and Doc. 829 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] , 1561 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 857 ] Atassi, 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] Ataturk, Kemal, 1262 [ Pg. 1262 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] Athenagoras I, Archbishop of Constantinople, 1251–1252 [ Pgs. 1251–1252 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 1292–1293 [ Pgs. 1292–1293 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] Atomic Energy Commission, U.S., 1845 [ Pg. 1845 is part of Doc. 988 ] Attlee, Clement R., 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 1337 n [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1431 n [ Pg. 1431 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1443 [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 813 ] Auriol, Vincent, 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 1750 [ Pg. 1750 is part of Doc. 945 ] , 1752 [ Pg. 1752 includes portions of Doc. 946 and Doc. 947 ] , 1762–1763 [ Pgs. 1762–1763 include portions of Doc. 951 and Doc. 952 ] , 1775 [ Pg. 1775 is part of Doc. 957 ] , 1798 [ Pg. 1798 is part of Doc. 966 ] Austin, Warren R.: Eritrean question, 1667–1671 [ Pgs. 1667–1671 include portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] , 1687 n [ Pg. 1687 includes portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] ; Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 1362–1364 [ Pgs. 1362–1364 include portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1367–1372 [ Pgs. 1367–1372 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 1374–1375 [ Pgs. 1374–1375 include portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , and Doc. 767 ] , 1438 [ Pg. 1438 is part of Doc. 810 ] ; Palestine question, 903–905 [ Pgs. 903–905 include portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] , 1011 [ Pg. 1011 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 1065 n [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , and Doc. 599 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] ; Palestinian refugees, 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 1041–1043 [ Pgs. 1041–1043 include portions of Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , and Doc. 585 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1075–1076 [ Pgs. 1075–1076 include portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] ; U.N. arms embargo, lifting of, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] Australia, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] , 1819 [ Pg. 1819 is part of Doc. 974 ] Aver of, Evangelos, 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] Avidor, Maj. Emanuel, 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] Await, Fred H., 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 100–105 [ Pgs. 100–105 include portions of Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 1128 n [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 1169–1173 [ Pgs. 1169–1173 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 1183–1184 [ Pgs. 1183–1184 include portions of Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 1355–1357 [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 754 ] Ayub, Ali Jawdat Al-, 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 299 ] Ayub, Mohamad, 1437 n [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 810 ] Ayyangar, N. Gopalaswami, 1392 [ Pg. 1392 is part of Doc. 777 ] , 1426 [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 803 and Doc. 804 ] Azcarate, Pablo, 687 n [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 835 [ Pg. 835 includes portions of Doc. 427 and Doc. 428 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 858–859 [ Pgs. 858–859 include portions of Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , and Doc. 447 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] Azerbaijan. See under Iran. Aziz, Abdul Hamid, 1457 n [ Pg. 1457 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] Azm, Khalid al’, 778–780 [ Pgs. 778–780 include portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 804–805 [ Pgs. 804–805 include portions of Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , and Doc. 406 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 822–825 [ Pgs. 822–825 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] , 852–853 [ Pgs. 852–853 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 905–909 [ Pgs. 905–909 include portions of Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , and Doc. 476 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 1201–1204 [ Pgs. 1201–1204 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] Azmara, 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 249 ] Azzam Pasha, Abdul Rahman, 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 776 n [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 521 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 1048–1050 [ Pgs. 1048–1050 include portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 1056–1061 [ Pgs. 1056–1061 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , and Doc. 594 ] , 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1216–1217 [ Pgs. 1216–1217 include portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 1219 [ Pg. 1219 is part of Doc. 677 ] , 1221–1222 [ Pgs. 1221–1222 include portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] Bader, 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 227 ] Bagge, Algot J. F., 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 811 ] Bahamas, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Bahrein: Iranian claim to, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] ; petroleum facilities, security of, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 32 ] ; petroleum production and resources, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 1149 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] ; Saudi Arabia, territorial dispute with, 10 n [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 38–39 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] /44–46 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] Bahrein Petroleum Company, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 73–74 [ Pgs. 73–74 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] Bajahji, Muzahim Bey, 1171 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 643 ] Bajpai, Sir Girja Shankar, 1366–1372 [ Pgs. 1366–1372 include portions of Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 1375 [ Pg. 1375 includes portions of Doc. 766 and Doc. 767 ] , 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 1389–1390 [ Pgs. 1389–1390 include portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1394 n [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 1395–1403 [ Pgs. 1395–1403 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , and Doc. 787 ] , 1405 n [ Pg. 1405 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] , 1406–1408 [ Pgs. 1406–1408 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 1414 [ Pg. 1414 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1419 [ Pg. 1419 is part of Doc. 798 ] , 1421 [ Pg. 1421 includes portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] , 1424 [ Pg. 1424 is part of Doc. 802 ] , 1426–1427 [ Pgs. 1426–1427 include portions of Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , and Doc. 805 ] , 1439 [ Pg. 1439 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] , 1464 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 826 ] , 1466–1467 [ Pgs. 1466–1467 include portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] Bakr, Abdullah Ibrahim, 636–638 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 682–684 [ Pgs. 682–684 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] Balay, Georges, 1606 [ Pg. 1606 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 1620 [ Pg. 1620 is part of Doc. 874 ] Baldwin, Charles, 1554–1555 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] Baldwin, La Verne, 1251 [ Pg. 1251 is part of Doc. 695 ] , 1292 n [ Pg. 1292 includes portions of Doc. 719 and Doc. 720 ] Ballard, B. C., 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Ballentine, Vice Adm. John J., 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1345 [ Pg. 1345 is part of Doc. 752 ] Ballinger, Margaret L., 1824 [ Pg. 1824 is part of Doc. 976 ] , 1835 [ Pg. 1835 is part of Doc. 983 ] Baltadzis, Alexander, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Bancroft, Harding F., 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Bandak, Issa, 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 597 ] Bao Dai, 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 833 ] Barco, James W., 661–664 [ Pgs. 661–664 include portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 759–763 [ Pgs. 759–763 include portions of Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , and Doc. 373 ] , 784–785 [ Pgs. 784–785 include portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 825–826 [ Pgs. 825–826 include portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] , 832–834 [ Pgs. 832–834 include portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 936–939 [ Pgs. 936–939 include portions of Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 528 ] Barkley, Alben W., 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] Barnes, Emil, 1820 [ Pg. 1820 is part of Doc. 974 ] Barnett, L., 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Barrett, Edward W., 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 233 ] Barrett, William A., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Barrow, John R., 648 n [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] Basra Petroleum Company, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] Basutoland, 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] Battle, Lucius D., 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 572 n [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 913 n [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] Baxter, William O., 1275 n [ Pg. 1275 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] Bayar, Celâl, 1263 [ Pg. 1263 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 1280 [ Pg. 1280 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1282 [ Pg. 1282 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1286 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1312–1313 [ Pgs. 1312–1313 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1320 [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] Beach, William H., 1523 n [ Pg. 1523 is part of Doc. 844 ] Bechuanaland, 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] Bele, Gen. Refet, 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] Belgian Congo ( see also Belgian colonial policies under Africa), 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1530 [ Pg. 1530 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1533 [ Pg. 1533 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1595–1599 [ Pg. 1595 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1718 [ Pg. 1718 is part of Doc. 928 ] , 1728 [ Pg. 1728 is part of Doc. 936 ] Belgium, 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 767 [ Pg. 767 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 1225 [ Pg. 1225 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 1743 [ Pg. 1743 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1820 [ Pg. 1820 is part of Doc. 974 ] Bell, John O., 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1839 n [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Benard, Jean, 21 [ Pg. 21 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 955–956 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 1545 [ Pg. 1545 includes portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] , 1603 [ Pg. 1603 is part of Doc. 866 ] Ben-Arzi, Col. Efraim, 792–794 [ Pgs. 792–794 include portions of Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , and Doc. 397 ] Bendall, D. V., 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] Ben Gurion, David, 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 667 n [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 721 n [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 745–746 [ Pgs. 745–746 include portions of Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , and Doc. 359 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 797 n [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 960–961 [ Pgs. 960–961 include portions of Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , and Doc. 520 ] , 965–966 [ Pgs. 965–966 include portions of Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , and Doc. 524 ] , 967 n [ Pg. 967 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 537 ] , 987–990 [ Pgs. 987–990 include portions of Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , and Doc. 541 ] , 1014 [ Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] Banninghoff, H. Merrell, 1845 n [ Pg. 1845 is part of Doc. 988 ] Ben Salem, Dr., 1790 [ Pg. 1790 is part of Doc. 964 ] Ben Youssef, Salah, 1775 n [ Pg. 1775 is part of Doc. 957 ] , 1776 [ Pg. 1776 includes portions of Doc. 957 and Doc. 958 ] , 1781 n [ Pg. 1781 includes portions of Doc. 961 and Doc. 962 ] , 1787–1791 [ Pg. 1787 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1799 [ Pg. 1799 is part of Doc. 966 ] , 1803–1804 [ Pg. 1803 is part of Doc. 968 ] Berlin, western sectors of, 191–192 [ Pgs. 191–192 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 1243 [ Pg. 1243 is part of Doc. 691 ] Berry, Burton Y., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 n [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 36–39 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41–42 [ Pgs. 41–42 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 100–101 [ Pgs. 100–101 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 292–293 [ Pgs. 292–293 include portions of Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , and Doc. 110 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 645–646 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 674–677 [ Pgs. 674–677 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 723–725 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 511 ] , 1015–1017 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 1289 n [ Pg. 1289 includes portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] , 1310–1311 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 1322 n [ Pg. 1322 includes portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 1325–1327 [ Pgs. 1325–1327 include portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 1332 n [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1359 n [ Pg. 1359 includes portions of Doc. 755 and Doc. 756 ] , 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1709 n [ Pg. 1709 is part of Doc. 922 ] , 1710 n [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] , 1712–1714 [ Pg. 1712 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1722 n [ Pg. 1722 includes portions of Doc. 931 and Doc. 932 ] , 1723 n [ Pg. 1723 is part of Doc. 933 ] Bevin, Ernest: British arms sales to the Near East, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 137–138 [ Pgs. 137–138 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 159–161 [ Pgs. 159–161 include portions of Doc. 69 and Doc. 70 ] , 167 n [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 672–673 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 434 ] Egypt, British relations with, 288–290 [ Pgs. 288–290 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 319–320 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 322–325 [ Pgs. 322–325 include portions of Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 331–333 [ Pgs. 331–333 include portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] Eritrean question, 1672 [ Pg. 1672 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1677 [ Pg. 1677 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1679 [ Pg. 1679 is part of Doc. 903 ] , 1681–1682 [ Pgs. 1681–1682 include portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 1684 [ Pg. 1684 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] Foreign Ministers meetings, 588 n [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 1264–1265 [ Pgs. 1264–1265 include portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 1543 [ Pg. 1543 includes portions of Doc. 847 and Doc. 848 ] , 1649 n [ Pg. 1649 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] Iran, British policy toward, 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 541 n [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 545–546 [ Pgs. 545–546 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 580–582 [ Pgs. 580–582 include portions of Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 602–603 [ Pgs. 602–603 include portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 609–610 [ Pgs. 609–610 include portions of Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , and Doc. 284 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 618 n [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Israel, British policy toward, 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 58 ] Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 1366 [ Pg. 1366 is part of Doc. 760 ] , 1385–1387 [ Pgs. 1385–1387 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 1442–1443 [ Pgs. 1442–1443 include portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] Libya, British policy toward, 1616 [ Pg. 1616 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1620 [ Pg. 1620 is part of Doc. 874 ] , 1623–1624 [ Pgs. 1623–1624 include portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] Near and Middle East: Anglo-American cooperation concerning, 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] ; security of, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 150–152 [ Pgs. 150–152 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 159–160 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] ; Syrian-Iraqi union, attitude toward proposed, 1209 [ Pg. 1209 is part of Doc. 670 ] ; Turkish role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1286 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] Beyers, Gen. L., 1832 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] Bidault, Georges, 1607 [ Pg. 1607 is part of Doc. 869 ] , 1774 [ Pg. 1774 is part of Doc. 956 ] Biddle, Col. A. Drexel, 1839 [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Biemiller, Andrew J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Biggs, Rear Adm. Burton B., 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Binoche, Jean, 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1564 [ Pg. 1564 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1798 [ Pg. 1798 is part of Doc. 966 ] , 1806–1807 [ Pg. 1806 is part of Doc. 969 ] Biran, Abraham, 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 537 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 540 ] Birch, John A., 1581 n [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1582 [ Pg. 1582 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1586 [ Pg. 1586 is part of Doc. 862 ] Bissell, Richard M., 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Blackley, T. R., 1601 [ Pg. 1601 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] , 1609 [ Pg. 1609 is part of Doc. 870 ] Blaisdell, William M., 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] Blandford, John B., 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 280 n [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 282 n [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 104 ] , 860–861 [ Pgs. 860–861 include portions of Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , and Doc. 449 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 956 n [ Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 958 n [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] , 963–964 [ Pgs. 963–964 include portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 1036–1037 [ Pgs. 1036–1037 include portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] , 1075 n [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , and Doc. 609 ] Boggs, Samuel W., 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 18–19 [ Pgs. 18–19 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] Bohlen, Charles E., 1541–1542 [ Pg. 1541 is part of Doc. 848 ] Boisanger, Claude de, 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 813–814 [ Pgs. 813–814 include portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 825–826 [ Pgs. 825–826 include portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 835–836 [ Pgs. 835–836 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] , 851–852 [ Pgs. 851–852 include portions of Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , and Doc. 443 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] , 865–867 [ Pgs. 865–867 include portions of Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , and Doc. 452 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 955–956 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 990 n [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] Bolton, Frances, 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 81 ] Bonbright, J. C. H., 1801 [ Pg. 1801 is part of Doc. 967 ] , 1802 n [ Pg. 1802 includes portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] Bonnet, Henri, 1544 n [ Pg. 1544 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 1546 [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] Bonsai, Philip W., 1752 [ Pg. 1752 includes portions of Doc. 946 and Doc. 947 ] Bossavy, Georges, 820 n [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 418 ] Boudali, Nouri, 1776 [ Pg. 1776 includes portions of Doc. 957 and Doc. 958 ] Bougerie, Elmer H., 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 1514 n [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1523 [ Pg. 1523 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1547–1552 [ Pgs. 1547–1552 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , and Doc. 855 ] , 1554–1558 [ Pgs. 1554–1558 include portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1563 [ Pg. 1563 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1565 [ Pg. 1565 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1568 [ Pg. 1568 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1573 n [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1583–1584 [ Pgs. 1583–1584 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 1629–1631 [ Pgs. 1629–1631 include portions of Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , and Doc. 881 ] , 1633 [ Pg. 1633 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 1638–1639 [ Pgs. 1638–1639 include portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] , 1663 [ Pg. 1663 includes portions of Doc. 898 and Doc. 899 ] , 1674 [ Pg. 1674 includes portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1685–1686 [ Pg. 1685 is part of Doc. 906 ] , 1703 [ Pg. 1703 is part of Doc. 919 ] , 1747–1751 [ Pgs. 1747–1751 include portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 1786 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] Bourghiba, Habib, 1775–1777 [ Pgs. 1775–1777 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] , 1780 n [ Pg. 1780 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1799 [ Pg. 1799 is part of Doc. 966 ] , 1807 n [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] Bradley, Gen. Omar N., 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 233–237 [ Pgs. 233–237 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 447 n [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1282 [ Pg. 1282 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1344–1345 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1833 [ Pg. 1833 is part of Doc. 982 ] Brazil, 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 605 ] Breen, Edward, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Brewer, William D., 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] Brewster, C. S., 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Brewster, Herbert D., 367–369 [ Pgs. 367–369 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] Bright, Richard S. S., 1722–1725 [ Pgs. 1722–1725 include portions of Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , and Doc. 934 ] , 1726 n [ Pg. 1726 is part of Doc. 935 ] , 1727 n [ Pg. 1727 is part of Doc. 936 ] Brisset, Jean-Louis, 1803 [ Pg. 1803 is part of Doc. 968 ] British Broadcasting Company, 615 n [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 293 ] British East Africa, 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 844 ] British Middle East Office, 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 326 ] Brittain, Sir Herbert, 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 277 ] Broadmead, P.M., 1201–1202 [ Pgs. 1201–1202 include portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 1219 [ Pg. 1219 is part of Doc. 677 ] Bromley, Thomas E., 645–646 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 299 ] Brougham, R. I., 12 n [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Brown, Aaron S., 521 n [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] Brown, Ben H., 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 66 ] Brown, James D., 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] Brown, Russell M., 73–74 [ Pgs. 73–74 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] Brownell, George, 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 1636–1637 [ Pg. 1636 is part of Doc. 884 ] Bruce, David K. E., 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 1544–1545 [ Pgs. 1544–1545 include portions of Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , and Doc. 851 ] , 1606–1607 [ Pgs. 1606–1607 include portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 1647–1649 [ Pgs. 1647–1649 include portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1762–1768 [ Pgs. 1762–1768 include portions of Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , and Doc. 954 ] , 1774 [ Pg. 1774 is part of Doc. 956 ] , 1777–1778 [ Pgs. 1777–1778 include portions of Doc. 958 and Doc. 959 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1806–1807 [ Pg. 1806 is part of Doc. 969 ] Bruce, James, 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 1234–1235 [ Pgs. 1234–1235 include portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] Brusasca, Giuseppe, 1657–1659 [ Pgs. 1657–1659 include portions of Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , and Doc. 897 ] , 1675 [ Pg. 1675 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1685–1686 [ Pg. 1685 is part of Doc. 906 ] , 1689 [ Pg. 1689 includes portions of Doc. 909 and Doc. 910 ] , 1703 [ Pg. 1703 is part of Doc. 919 ] Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 606 ] , 1129 n [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 1175–1176 [ Pgs. 1175–1176 include portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 1196 [ Pg. 1196 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] , 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] Bulgaria (see also under Greece and Turkey): Greece, relations with, 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 719 ] ; Greek guerrillas, assistance for, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 168 ] ; political situation, 1145 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 636 ] ; Soviet policy, 1290 [ Pg. 1290 is part of Doc. 719 ] ; U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, noncooperation with, 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 168 ] ; United States, break in relations with, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 132 ] ; Yugoslavia, relations with, 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 719 ] Bunche, Ralph J., 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 782 [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] , 821–822 [ Pgs. 821–822 include portions of Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 423 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 425 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 434 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 1383 [ Pg. 1383 is part of Doc. 770 ] , 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 1404 [ Pg. 1404 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] Buraimi, 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 8 ] Burleson, Omar, 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Burma ( see also Burmese position under Eritrea): Chinese People’s Republic, policy of the, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] ; Commonwealth economic assistance, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 88 ] ; foreign policy, 240–241 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] ; political situation, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] ; U.S. economic assistance, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 149–150 [ Pgs. 149–150 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] ; U.S. policy, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1467 n [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Burns, Maj. Gen. James H., 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 1084–1085 [ Pg. 1084 is part of Doc. 616 ] , 1124 n [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] Burns, Norman, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 1166–1167 [ Pgs. 1166–1167 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1713 [ Pg. 1713 is part of Doc. 925 ] Burrows, B.A.B., 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 32 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 230–233 [ Pgs. 230–233 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , and Doc. 95 ] , 844–847 [ Pgs. 844–847 include portions of Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , and Doc. 436 ] , 868–871 [ Pgs. 868–871 include portions of Doc. 452 and Doc. 453 ] , 875–876 [ Pgs. 875–876 include portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] Butler, George H., 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] Butrick, Richard P., 1514 n [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] Butter, Victor S., 594–595 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] Butterworth, W. Walton, 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] Byrnes, James F., 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Cable and wireless, 32–33 [ Pgs. 32–33 include portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Cadogan, Sir Alexander G.M., 1374 [ Pg. 1374 is part of Doc. 765 ] , 1376 [ Pg. 1376 includes portions of Doc. 767 and Doc. 768 ] , 1385–1387 [ Pgs. 1385–1387 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] Caffery, Jefferson, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 n [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 302–303 [ Pgs. 302–303 include portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 321–325 [ Pgs. 321–325 include portions of Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 329–330 [ Pgs. 329–330 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] , 332–334 [ Pgs. 332–334 include portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 666–667 [ Pgs. 666–667 include portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 721 n [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 776 n [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 796 n [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 822 n [ Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 839–840 [ Pgs. 839–840 include portions of Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , and Doc. 432 ] , 858–859 [ Pgs. 858–859 include portions of Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , and Doc. 447 ] , 879 n [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 910–911 [ Pgs. 910–911 include portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 922–923 [ Pgs. 922–923 include portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 934–935 [ Pgs. 934–935 include portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 999 n [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 1032–1033 [ Pgs. 1032–1033 include portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , and Doc. 575 ] , 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 1216 n [ Pg. 1216 is part of Doc. 675 ] , 1219 [ Pg. 1219 is part of Doc. 677 ] , 1221 n [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] Cain, Harry P., 1281–1282 [ Pg. 1281 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1286 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] Qakir, Husnü, 1234 n [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 1247 [ Pg. 1247 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 693 ] California Texas Oil Company, 73–74 [ Pgs. 73–74 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] Calligas, Stephen T., 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 418–422 [ Pgs. 418–422 include portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , and Doc. 185 ] Campbell, Sir Ronald Ian, 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] Canada, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 1363–1364 [ Pgs. 1363–1364 include portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1376–1377 [ Pgs. 1376–1377 include portions of Doc. 767 and Doc. 768 ] , 1385 [ Pg. 1385 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] Canellopoulos. See Kanellopoulos. Canfield, Frank, 51–52 [ Pgs. 51–52 include portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] Cannon, Cavendish W., 1215–1217 [ Pgs. 1215–1217 include portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 1219–1221 [ Pgs. 1219–1221 include portions of Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , and Doc. 679 ] Carlos Magno, Paschoal, 444 n [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] Carnahan, A.S.J., 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Carnegie Foundation, 1593 [ Pg. 1593 is part of Doc. 863 ] Carney, Adm. Robert B., 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1343 [ Pg. 1343 includes portions of Doc. 750 and Doc. 751 ] , 1345–1346 [ Pg. 1345 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1351–1354 [ Pgs. 1351–1354 include portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] Carr, Robert M., 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Cassel, C. Abayomi, 1720 [ Pg. 1720 includes portions of Doc. 929 and Doc. 930 ] , 1725 n [ Pg. 1725 is part of Doc. 934 ] , 1726–1727 [ Pgs. 1726–1727 include portions of Doc. 935 and Doc. 936 ] , 1731 n [ Pg. 1731 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] Castillo Najera, Francisco, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Catalano, Felice, 1646 [ Pg. 1646 is part of Doc. 889 ] Cates, John Martin, Jr., 1776 [ Pg. 1776 includes portions of Doc. 957 and Doc. 958 ] Callere, Count Macchi di, 1650 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] Central Intelligence Agency, U.S., 1517 [ Pg. 1517 is part of Doc. 844 ] Ceylon. See Sri Lanka. Chadwick, John E., 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] Chambard, Roger, 1601–1602 [ Pgs. 1601–1602 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] Chapman, Wilbert M., 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] Charles, Sir Noel H.H., 1300 [ Pg. 1300 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 1303–1304 [ Pgs. 1303–1304 include portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 1333 [ Pg. 1333 includes portions of Doc. 743 and Doc. 744 ] , 1335 [ Pg. 1335 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] Charpentier, Pierre-Albert, 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] Charvériat, Émile, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Chatenet, Pierre, 1777 n [ Pg. 1777 includes portions of Doc. 958 and Doc. 959 ] Chatham, Richard T., 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Chauvel, Jean Michel Henri, 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 1608 [ Pg. 1608 is part of Doc. 870 ] Chenik, Mohamed, 1781 n [ Pg. 1781 includes portions of Doc. 961 and Doc. 962 ] , 1786 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1788 [ Pg. 1788 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1797 [ Pg. 1797 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] , 1799 [ Pg. 1799 is part of Doc. 966 ] , 1806 [ Pg. 1806 is part of Doc. 969 ] , 1807 n [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] Chesney, Chester A., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Chevallier, R.B., 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Childs, J. Rives, 25–29 [ Pgs. 25–29 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 53–68 [ Pgs. 53–68 include portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , and Doc. 28 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 106–107 [ Pgs. 106–107 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 816–817 [ Pgs. 816–817 include portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 879 n [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 905–910 [ Pgs. 905–910 include portions of Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , and Doc. 477 ] , 1112 n [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1120 n [ Pg. 1120 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 1122–1129 [ Pgs. 1122–1129 include portions of Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 1139–1140 [ Pg. 1139 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1146–1156 [ Pgs. 1146–1156 include portions of Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , and Doc. 639 ] , 1158–1161 [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1164–1166 [ Pgs. 1164–1166 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] , 1173–1174 [ Pgs. 1173–1174 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 1176–1180 [ Pgs. 1176–1180 include portions of Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649 ] , 1185 [ Pg. 1185 includes portions of Doc. 653 and Doc. 654 ] , 1187 n [ Pg. 1187 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 656 ] , 1359–1360 [ Pgs. 1359–1360 include portions of Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , and Doc. 757 ] Chile, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] China, People’s Republic of ( see also Chinese People’s Republic subheadings under individual countries ): British recognition, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] ; Indian policy, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 202–203 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1474–1475 [ Pgs. 1474–1475 include portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] , 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 833 ] ; situation in, 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1434 [ Pg. 1434 is part of Doc. 809 ] , 1478 [ Pg. 1478 is part of Doc. 833 ] ; U.N. membership, question of, 1470 [ Pg. 1470 is part of Doc. 829 ] ; U.S. nonrecognition, 732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 351 ] ; U.S. policy, 202–203 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 319 ] China, Republic of: Kuomintang, 1434 [ Pg. 1434 is part of Doc. 809 ] ; U.N. Trusteeship Council, matters pertaining to, 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 58 ] Chiperfield, Robert B., 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 183–184 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] Chipman, Warwick F., 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 1394 n [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] Chirine. See Shirine. Christie, Lansdell K., 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] Christopher, Patriarch of Alexandria, 1251 [ Pg. 1251 is part of Doc. 695 ] Chudoff, Earl, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Churchill, Winston, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] Civil Aeronautics Administration, U.S., 1190 [ Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Clapp, Gordon R., 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 671 n [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 501 ] , 959–960 [ Pgs. 959–960 include portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] , 963–964 [ Pgs. 963–964 include portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 1144–1146 [ Pgs. 1144–1146 include portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] Clark, Harlan B., 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 636–637 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 645–646 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 682–683 [ Pgs. 682–683 include portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 690 n [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 852–855 [ Pgs. 852–855 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 981–982 [ Pgs. 981–982 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] , 1100–1106 [ Pgs. 1100–1106 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1210 n [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 1355–1356 [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 754 ] Clark, Lewis, 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 1620 [ Pg. 1620 is part of Doc. 874 ] , 1624 [ Pg. 1624 includes portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1626 n [ Pg. 1626 includes portions of Doc. 877 and Doc. 878 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] Clark, W. Marshall, 1585–1586 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 862 ] Clarke, R. W. B., 213–214 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 90 ] Clauson, Sir Gerard, 1554 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1557 [ Pg. 1557 is part of Doc. 856 ] Claxton, Philander, 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Cleland, William W., 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 977 [ Pg. 977 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] Clemens, George, 1582 [ Pg. 1582 is part of Doc. 860 ] Clemente, L. Gary, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Clermont-Tonnere, Thierry de, 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1567–1568 [ Pg. 1567 is part of Doc. 857 ] Glutton, George L., 1609 [ Pg. 1609 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1610 n [ Pg. 1610 includes portions of Doc. 870 and Doc. 871 ] Coggin, H. L., 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] Cohen, Andrew, 1554–1555 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] Cohen, Benjamin V., 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] Colban, Erik A., 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] Coleridge, Capt. R. D., 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Collins, F. D., 1441 n [ Pg. 1441 includes portions of Doc. 811 and Doc. 812 ] Collins, Gen. J. Lawton, 124–125 [ Pgs. 124–125 include portions of Doc. 56 , Doc. 57 , and Doc. 58 ] , 233–234 [ Pgs. 233–234 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 236 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 362–364 [ Pgs. 362–364 include portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 507–509 [ Pgs. 507–509 include portions of Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , and Doc. 232 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 1130 n [ Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1158–1166 [ Pgs. 1158–1166 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 645 ] , 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 1186 [ Pg. 1186 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 1239 n [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 1241–1250 [ Pgs. 1241–1250 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , and Doc. 694 ] , 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1625 [ Pg. 1625 is part of Doc. 877 ] Colombo plan, 204 n [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 252 n [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] Colonna, Antonie, 1775 [ Pg. 1775 is part of Doc. 957 ] Colquitt, Adrian, 349–350 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 139 ] Comay, Michael, 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] Combined Development Agency, 1842–1843 [ Pgs. 1842–1843 include portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] Combined Policy Committee, 1842 [ Pg. 1842 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] Commerce, U.S. Department of, 1583 [ Pg. 1583 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1592 [ Pg. 1592 is part of Doc. 863 ] Committee for American Relief for Europe, 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] Commonwealth, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 198–199 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 250–252 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 1363 [ Pg. 1363 is part of Doc. 758 ] , 1370 [ Pg. 1370 is part of Doc. 763 ] , 1382 [ Pg. 1382 includes portions of Doc. 769 and Doc. 770 ] , 1385–1386 [ Pgs. 1385–1386 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , and Doc. 774 ] , 1395–1397 [ Pgs. 1395–1397 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , and Doc. 781 ] , 1399 [ Pg. 1399 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 1404 [ Pg. 1404 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 1428 [ Pg. 1428 is part of Doc. 805 ] , 1490 [ Pg. 1490 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1495 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1819 [ Pg. 1819 is part of Doc. 974 ] Commonwealth Conference of Foreign Ministers at Colombo, Jan. 9–14, 1950 , 1363–1364 [ Pgs. 1363–1364 include portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1366 [ Pg. 1366 is part of Doc. 760 ] , 1821–1822 [ Pg. 1821 is part of Doc. 974 ] Commonwealth Conference of Prime Ministers, London, 1949 , 1495 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 837 ] ; 1951 , 1442–1445 [ Pgs. 1442–1445 include portions of Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , and Doc. 814 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] Commonwealth Consultative Committee, 252 n [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] Commonwealth Council for Technical Cooperation, 214–215 [ Pgs. 214–215 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] Communist Information Bureau, 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 383–385 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 412–414 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 442–444 [ Pgs. 442–444 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 539 ] Compagnie Française Petroles , 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] Congress, U.S.: Copyright Act, 1947 , 1088–1089 [ Pgs. 1088–1089 include portions of Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , and Doc. 620 ] Ethiopia, U.S. economic and technical assistance for, 1695 [ Pg. 1695 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1697 [ Pg. 1697 is part of Doc. 913 ] European Recovery Program, authorizations for, 1739 [ Pg. 1739 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1753–1754 [ Pgs. 1753–1754 include portions of Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , and Doc. 949 ] , 1756–1759 [ Pgs. 1756–1759 include portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Greece and Turkey, U.S. economic and military assistance for, 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 518 ] Indian wheat loan, proposed, 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] Investment guarantee program, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 207 ] Iran, U.S. relations with, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 628–630 [ Pgs. 628–630 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Israel, U.S. policy toward, 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] Military assistance programs, 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 1121 [ Pg. 1121 is part of Doc. 628 ] , 1123 [ Pg. 1123 includes portions of Doc. 629 and Doc. 630 ] , 1129 n [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 1136 [ Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1139 [ Pg. 1139 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1159–1160 [ Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1164–1166 [ Pgs. 1164–1166 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 645 ] , 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1194 [ Pg. 1194 includes portions of Doc. 661 and Doc. 662 ] , 1244–1245 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 1414 [ Pg. 1414 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1724 [ Pg. 1724 is part of Doc. 933 ] , 1840 [ Pg. 1840 is part of Doc. 985 ] Moroccan trade problem, 1548–1549 [ Pg. 1548 is part of Doc. 853 ] Near and Middle East, arms sale to, 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 906–907 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 475 ] Near East and South Asia, proposed U.S. economic and technical assistance for, 180–181 [ Pgs. 180–181 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 183–186 [ Pgs. 183–186 include portions of Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 1140–1141 [ Pg. 1140 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 1380 [ Pg. 1380 is part of Doc. 769 ] Palestine refugee problem, 669–670 [ Pgs. 669–670 include portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , and Doc. 336 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 806–807 [ Pgs. 806–807 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , and Doc. 408 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 958–959 [ Pgs. 958–959 include portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 606 ] , 1145 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 636 ] Point Four program, 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 207 ] Senate, 1817 [ Pg. 1817 is part of Doc. 973 ] Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 518 ] Trade policies, 1556–1557 [ Pg. 1556 is part of Doc. 856 ] Turkey, U.S. economic and military assistance for, 1225 [ Pg. 1225 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 1231 [ Pg. 1231 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 711 ] , 1302 [ Pg. 1302 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] War powers, 1246 [ Pg. 1246 is part of Doc. 691 ] Congress of Industrial Organizations, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 1785 [ Pg. 1785 is part of Doc. 963 ] Connally, Tom, 1556 [ Pg. 1556 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1756–1757 [ Pg. 1756 is part of Doc. 949 ] Connelly, B. C., 1815–1831 [ Pgs. 1815–1831 include portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , and Doc. 981 ] Conolly, Adm. Richard L., 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 1128–1129 [ Pgs. 1128–1129 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 1255 [ Pg. 1255 is part of Doc. 698 ] , 1334 n [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] , 1343 n [ Pg. 1343 includes portions of Doc. 750 and Doc. 751 ] , 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] Contoumas, Alexander, 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Cooley, Harold D., 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] Cordier, Andrew W., 950 n [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] Cotton, John, 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] Council of Europe, 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 1286 n [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 is part of Doc. 725 ] Couve de Murville, Maurice, 1604 [ Pg. 1604 includes portions of Doc. 866 and Doc. 867 ] , 1606 [ Pg. 1606 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] Craig, Capt. Clifford V., 1839 [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Crain, Darrell C., 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] Creole Petroleum Corporation, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 277 ] Crocker, Edward S., 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 70–71 [ Pgs. 70–71 include portions of Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , and Doc. 31 ] , 639–642 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 647–650 [ Pgs. 647–650 include portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] Cromie, Leonard J., 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 359–362 [ Pgs. 359–362 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Cuba, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] Cuff, R. F., 1832 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 1839 [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Cyprus: British policy and position, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] ; communist movement, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] ; Greek claim to, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] ; situation in, 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 1349 [ Pg. 1349 is part of Doc. 752 ] ; status of, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 95 ] ; U.S. policy, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 1638 n [ Pg. 1638 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] Cyr, Leo G., 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1514 n [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1672 [ Pg. 1672 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1674 [ Pg. 1674 includes portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1703 [ Pg. 1703 is part of Doc. 919 ] , 1706 n [ Pg. 1706 is part of Doc. 920 ] , 1710 n [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] Cyrenaica. See under Libya. Czechoslovakia, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 725–726 [ Pgs. 725–726 include portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 1145 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 837 ] Dabbagh, Said Abdul Rahim, 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] Dadoo, Y. M., 1836 [ Pg. 1836 is part of Doc. 983 ] Dalientos, Alexander, 374 n [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] Dalton, Hugh, 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] Danzig, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 321 ] Darche, Jean, 1786 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1790–1791 [ Pg. 1790 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1803 [ Pg. 1803 is part of Doc. 968 ] Daridan, Jean, 1801 [ Pg. 1801 is part of Doc. 967 ] Davenport, Harry J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Davies, Ernest A. J., 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 180 ] Davies, Fred, 27–28 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 56–57 [ Pgs. 56–57 include portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 66–67 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 100–104 [ Pgs. 100–104 include portions of Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 106–107 [ Pgs. 106–107 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 111–114 [ Pgs. 111–114 include portions of Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 119–121 [ Pgs. 119–121 include portions of Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] Davies, Rodger P., 892 n [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] Davis, Rear Adm. A. C., 1306–1309 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 730 ] Davis, Richard, 1341–1342 [ Pgs. 1341–1342 include portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] Dawalibi, Marouf al-, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 896–898 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 475 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 1205–1206 [ Pgs. 1205–1206 include portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 1211 n [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] Day, Arthur R., 186 n [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 956 n [ Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 965 n [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] Day, Brig. Gen. Edwin M., 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] Dayan, Brig. Gen. Moshe, 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 704 n [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 944–945 [ Pgs. 944–945 include portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , and Doc. 507 ] , 997 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 548 ] De Blesson, Jacques, 1747 [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] Defense, U.S. Department of: Africa, situation in, 1517 [ Pg. 1517 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 863 ] Central and Southern Africa Transport Conference, 1583 [ Pg. 1583 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1586 [ Pg. 1586 is part of Doc. 862 ] Egypt, arms sales to, 292 n [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 128 ] Ethiopia, proposed U.S. military assistance for, 1702 n [ Pg. 1702 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] Greece, U.S. military assistance for, 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Iran, U.S. military assistance for, 458–459 [ Pgs. 458–459 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 474–478 [ Pgs. 474–478 include portions of Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , and Doc. 216 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 290 ] Iraq, proposed, U.S. military assistance for, 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 301 ] Israel: Arms sales by, 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 617 ] ; arms sales to, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 793 n [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 480 ] , 965 n [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 1078 [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] Liberia, U.S. military assistance for, 1726 [ Pg. 1726 is part of Doc. 935 ] , 1732 n [ Pg. 1732 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] Libya, U.S. military base rights in, 1624 [ Pg. 1624 includes portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1638 n [ Pg. 1638 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] , 1639 [ Pg. 1639 is part of Doc. 885 ] Near and Middle East: Arms sales to, 802 n [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 848–849 [ Pgs. 848–849 include portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 480 ] ; U.S. military assistance, proposed, 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] ; U.S. policy, 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 238–239 [ Pgs. 238–239 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] Palestine refugee problem, 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 581 ] Petroleum resources in the Middle East, 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 42 ] Saudi Arabia, U.S. military assistance for, 1113 [ Pg. 1113 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 1126–1127 [ Pgs. 1126–1127 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 1164 [ Pg. 1164 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1175–1177 [ Pgs. 1175–1177 include portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] , 1186–1187 [ Pgs. 1186–1187 include portions of Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] , 1199 [ Pg. 1199 is part of Doc. 664 ] Tangier, defense of International Zone of, 1577 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] Turkey: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, proposed membership in, 1306 n [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1313–1314 [ Pgs. 1313–1314 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 1234–1236 [ Pgs. 1234–1236 include portions of Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , and Doc. 688 ] , 1256 n [ Pg. 1256 is part of Doc. 699 ] , 1271 [ Pg. 1271 is part of Doc. 709 ] , 1314 [ Pg. 1314 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 1323 [ Pg. 1323 is part of Doc. 738 ] ; U.S. military staff talks, proposed, 1238–1239 [ Pgs. 1238–1239 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] De Gasperi, Alcide, 1666 [ Pg. 1666 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1672 [ Pg. 1672 is part of Doc. 901 ] De Gaulle, Gen. Charles, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 1702 [ Pg. 1702 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] Deimel, Harry L., Jr., 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] De Kiewiet, Cornelius W., 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] De la Chauviniere, Edouard Dufresne, 1803–1805 [ Pg. 1803 is part of Doc. 968 ] Delaney, James J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] De la Tour du Pin Verclause, Geoffroy, 1539 [ Pg. 1539 is part of Doc. 846 ] , 1604 [ Pg. 1604 includes portions of Doc. 866 and Doc. 867 ] , 1606–1607 [ Pgs. 1606–1607 include portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 1752 [ Pg. 1752 includes portions of Doc. 946 and Doc. 947 ] , 1777–1778 [ Pgs. 1777–1778 include portions of Doc. 958 and Doc. 959 ] , 1798 [ Pg. 1798 is part of Doc. 966 ] , 1806 [ Pg. 1806 is part of Doc. 969 ] De la Tournelle, Baron Guy, 1558–1559 [ Pgs. 1558–1559 include portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1561–1562 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 857 ] Delteil, 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1562 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 857 ] De Margerie, Roland Jacquin, 1606–1607 [ Pgs. 1606–1607 include portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 1774 [ Pg. 1774 is part of Doc. 956 ] De Metz, 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] Dendramis, Vassili G., 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 352–353 [ Pgs. 352–353 include portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 357–362 [ Pgs. 357–362 include portions of Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Dening, M. E., 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 85 ] Denmark, 1656 [ Pg. 1656 includes portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] Dennis, Gabriel L., 1720 [ Pg. 1720 includes portions of Doc. 929 and Doc. 930 ] , 1723 n [ Pg. 1723 is part of Doc. 933 ] , 1724–1727 [ Pgs. 1724–1727 include portions of Doc. 933 , Doc. 934 , Doc. 935 , and Doc. 936 ] , 1731 n [ Pg. 1731 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] , 1733–1735 [ Pgs. 1733–1735 include portions of Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] Dennis, William, 1720 [ Pg. 1720 includes portions of Doc. 929 and Doc. 930 ] De Paul, Carter N., 402 n [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] De Ridder, Col. ( also de Ritter), 997–998 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] Deshmukh, Sir Chintaman D., 1465 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 826 ] De Vos, Col. J. A., 1839 [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Dhofar, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 18 ] Dialou, 1560–1561 [ Pg. 1560 is part of Doc. 857 ] Dickens, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 278 ] Dickinson, E. T., 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] Diomedes, Alexander, 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 130 ] Dirkse-van-Schalkwyk, W., 1829 n [ Pg. 1829 is part of Doc. 980 ] Dixon, Ben F., 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Dixon, Sir Owen, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 200–202 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1404–1405 [ Pgs. 1404–1405 include portions of Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , and Doc. 789 ] , 1411–1412 [ Pgs. 1411–1412 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , and Doc. 795 ] , 1414–1430 [ Pgs. 1414–1430 include portions of Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1432–1433 [ Pgs. 1432–1433 include portions of Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , and Doc. 809 ] , 1435–1440 [ Pgs. 1435–1440 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , and Doc. 811 ] Dodge, Col., 1159 [ Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 641 ] Dollinger, Isidore, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Dominican Republic, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] Dominquez, Francisco J., 1459 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 824 ] Dönges, T. E., 1815 n [ Pg. 1815 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 1843 [ Pg. 1843 is part of Doc. 987 ] Dooher, Gerald F. P., 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 471 n [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Dorman, John, 1786–1791 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1802–1805 [ Pgs. 1802–1805 include portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] Dorr, Russell H., 1227–1231 [ Pgs. 1227–1231 include portions of Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] , 1267 n [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 1268–1269 [ Pg. 1268 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1274–1275 [ Pgs. 1274–1275 include portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 1287–1288 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] Dort, Dallas W., 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 627–629 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 291 ] Dorz, E. J., 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 290 ] Douglas, Lewis W., 60–61 [ Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 69–70 [ Pgs. 69–70 include portions of Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , and Doc. 30 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 150–152 [ Pgs. 150–152 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 296 n [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 316–320 [ Pgs. 316–320 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , and Doc. 120 ] , 323–324 [ Pgs. 323–324 include portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 570–571 [ Pgs. 570–571 include portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 578–585 [ Pgs. 578–585 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 609–610 [ Pgs. 609–610 include portions of Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , and Doc. 284 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 1302–1304 [ Pgs. 1302–1304 include portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 1451 n [ Pg. 1451 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 1452–1453 [ Pgs. 1452–1453 include portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 1656–1657 [ Pgs. 1656–1657 include portions of Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] , 1659–1662 [ Pgs. 1659–1662 include portions of Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , and Doc. 898 ] Downey, Lt. Col. S.W., 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] Drew, Brigadier, 1643 [ Pg. 1643 is part of Doc. 888 ] Drew, Gerald A., 773–774 [ Pgs. 773–774 include portions of Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , and Doc. 386 ] , 784 [ Pg. 784 includes portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 803–804 [ Pgs. 803–804 include portions of Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , and Doc. 405 ] , 836–837 [ Pgs. 836–837 include portions of Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , and Doc. 430 ] , 850 n [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 851–852 [ Pgs. 851–852 include portions of Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , and Doc. 443 ] , 859–860 [ Pgs. 859–860 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 872–874 [ Pgs. 872–874 include portions of Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , and Doc. 457 ] , 875 n [ Pg. 875 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 941–942 [ Pgs. 941–942 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 945–947 [ Pgs. 945–947 include portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , and Doc. 509 ] , 993–995 [ Pgs. 993–995 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , and Doc. 546 ] , 999–1000 [ Pgs. 999–1000 include portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 1064 n [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 1066–1067 [ Pgs. 1066–1067 include portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 1069–1070 [ Pgs. 1069–1070 include portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] Dreyfus, Louis G., 1447 [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 1449 [ Pg. 1449 is part of Doc. 816 ] , 1451 n [ Pg. 1451 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 1454 n [ Pg. 1454 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] , 1456–1457 [ Pgs. 1456–1457 include portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] Drury, Col. Frederick W., 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Dubai, 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41–42 [ Pgs. 41–42 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Duce, James Terry, 11–13 [ Pgs. 11–13 include portions of Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , and Doc. 6 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 36–37 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 102–104 [ Pgs. 102–104 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 106–107 [ Pgs. 106–107 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] Dudley, Edward R., 1514 n [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1523 [ Pg. 1523 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1707–1708 [ Pgs. 1707–1708 include portions of Doc. 920 and Doc. 921 ] , 1712 [ Pg. 1712 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1716–1717 [ Pgs. 1716–1717 include portions of Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , and Doc. 928 ] , 1720–1722 [ Pgs. 1720–1722 include portions of Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , and Doc. 932 ] , 1723 n [ Pg. 1723 is part of Doc. 933 ] , 1725 [ Pg. 1725 is part of Doc. 934 ] , 1727 [ Pg. 1727 is part of Doc. 936 ] Duff, Maj. Gen. Robinson Earl, 543 [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 241 ] Dulles, John Foster, 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 254 ] Dumarçay, Jacques, 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] Dunn, James Clement, 878–879 [ Pgs. 878–879 include portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 1605–1606 [ Pgs. 1605–1606 include portions of Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , and Doc. 869 ] , 1620 [ Pg. 1620 is part of Doc. 874 ] , 1641 [ Pg. 1641 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1649–1652 [ Pgs. 1649–1652 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] Du Toit, Gen. C.L., 1832 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 1839 [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Easley, Col. Fred O., Jr., 1625 [ Pg. 1625 is part of Doc. 877 ] , 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] Eastern Mediterranean, defense and security of, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 152–158 [ Pgs. 152–158 include portions of Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 1253 [ Pg. 1253 is part of Doc. 696 ] , 1307 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1313–1314 [ Pgs. 1313–1314 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1341 [ Pg. 1341 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] , 1344–1349 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] Eban, Abba, 735–736 [ Pgs. 735–736 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 753–754 [ Pgs. 753–754 include portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 785–786 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 830 n [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 424 ] , 833–834 [ Pgs. 833–834 include portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 840–841 [ Pgs. 840–841 include portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] , 861–864 [ Pgs. 861–864 include portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 451 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 903–905 [ Pgs. 903–905 include portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 501 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 524 ] , 982–984 [ Pgs. 982–984 include portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537 ] , 1025–1027 [ Pgs. 1025–1027 include portions of Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , and Doc. 571 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1035–1038 [ Pgs. 1035–1038 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1051 n [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1052–1056 [ Pgs. 1052–1056 include portions of Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , and Doc. 592 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , and Doc. 599 ] , 1068 n [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1078 [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 617 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] EBASCO Services, Inc., 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 190 ] Eberharter, Herman P., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Ebtehaj, Abol H., 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 493–494 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 539–540 [ Pgs. 539–540 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 553–555 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 293 ] Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] Economic Cooperation Administration, U.S., 6–7 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 169–170 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 173–175 [ Pgs. 173–175 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , and Doc. 77 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 261–262 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 343–344 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 359–362 [ Pgs. 359–362 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 405–407 [ Pgs. 405–407 include portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] , 411–413 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 416–418 [ Pgs. 416–418 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 426–432 [ Pgs. 426–432 include portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 1190 [ Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 1229–1231 [ Pgs. 1229–1231 include portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] , 1237–1238 [ Pgs. 1237–1238 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 1267–1269 [ Pgs. 1267–1269 include portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 1273–1275 [ Pgs. 1273–1275 include portions of Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , and Doc. 712 ] , 1278–1279 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1285 [ Pg. 1285 includes portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1288 [ Pg. 1288 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1294 [ Pg. 1294 is part of Doc. 721 ] , 1301–1302 [ Pgs. 1301–1302 include portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 1318–1319 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1325–1331 [ Pgs. 1325–1331 include portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] , 1350–1351 [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1469 [ Pg. 1469 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 839 ] , 1504–1506 [ Pg. 1504 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1509–1511 [ Pgs. 1509–1511 include portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1515 [ Pg. 1515 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1517 [ Pg. 1517 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1520–1522 [ Pg. 1520 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1527–1528 [ Pg. 1527 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1530–1531 [ Pg. 1530 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1541 [ Pg. 1541 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 1549 [ Pg. 1549 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1565 [ Pg. 1565 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1567 [ Pg. 1567 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1572–1573 [ Pgs. 1572–1573 include portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1577–1580 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1583 [ Pg. 1583 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 862 ] , 1589 [ Pg. 1589 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1593–1594 [ Pg. 1593 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1624 [ Pg. 1624 includes portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1738–1739 [ Pg. 1738 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1754–1755 [ Pgs. 1754–1755 include portions of Doc. 948 and Doc. 949 ] , 1785 [ Pg. 1785 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1793 [ Pg. 1793 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1808 [ Pg. 1808 is part of Doc. 970 ] Economou-Gouras, Paul, 350 n [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] Ecuador, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] Eddy, William A., 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 56–57 [ Pgs. 56–57 include portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 100–106 [ Pgs. 100–106 include portions of Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Edelstine, Julius C., 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] Edmonds, R.H.G., 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] Egeli, Lt. Gen. Yusuf A., 1282 n [ Pg. 1282 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1340 [ Pg. 1340 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1344–1345 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] Egypt ( see also Egyptian subheadings under Foreign Ministers meeting, Korean war, Libya, Palestine question, United Nations: General Assembly, and United Nations, Security Council): Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 , negotiations concerning, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 288–295 [ Pgs. 288–295 include portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , and Doc. 111 ] , 297–305 [ Pgs. 297–305 include portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 308–312 [ Pgs. 308–312 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] , 319–321 [ Pgs. 319–321 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 327–334 [ Pgs. 327–334 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , and Doc. 129 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 1059–1060 [ Pgs. 1059–1060 include portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1632 [ Pg. 1632 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 1635 n [ Pg. 1635 includes portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] , 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] Army, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] British arms sales to, 126–127 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 132–134 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 164–166 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 287–288 [ Pgs. 287–288 include portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 292–293 [ Pgs. 292–293 include portions of Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , and Doc. 110 ] , 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 302–304 [ Pgs. 302–304 include portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 307–308 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 311–313 [ Pgs. 311–313 include portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 672–673 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 693–694 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 737–739 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 881–882 [ Pgs. 881–882 include portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1635 n [ Pg. 1635 includes portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] British military assistance 132–134 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] British military bases and forces, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 233–234 [ Pgs. 233–234 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 298–300 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 304–305 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 310–311 [ Pgs. 310–311 include portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 321–324 [ Pgs. 321–324 include portions of Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 326–329 [ Pgs. 326–329 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 333–334 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 129 ] British policy, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 1199 [ Pg. 1199 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 1347–1348 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] Communist movement and strength, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 is part of Doc. 637 ] Iraq, relations with, 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] Israel, policy toward, 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 885–886 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] Israeli visas, restrictions on, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] Jews, lifting of restrictions against, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Jordan, relations with, 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] Lend-lease retransfer of ammunition to, 292–293 [ Pgs. 292–293 include portions of Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , and Doc. 110 ] Military expenditures, 737–738 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] Moslem Brotherhood, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, proposed association with, 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 306–307 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 319–320 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 128 ] Petroleum facilities, security of, 72 [ Pg. 72 is part of Doc. 32 ] Petroleum policy, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 116 ] Political situation, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] Rearmament of, 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 476 ] Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, termination of exploratory rights by, 15–18 [ Pgs. 15–18 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Sterling balances, negotiations concerning utilization of, 284–285 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 106 ] Suez Canal: British bases and forces in the area of the, Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerning, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 288–290 [ Pgs. 288–290 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 297–298 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 300–303 [ Pgs. 300–303 include portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 323–325 [ Pgs. 323–325 include portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 329–332 [ Pgs. 329–332 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , and Doc. 129 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1632 [ Pg. 1632 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] ; restrictions on traffic through, 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 315–318 [ Pgs. 315–318 include portions of Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 591 ] ; revenues from, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] Syria, relations with, 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] Syrian-Iraqi union, policy toward proposed, 285–286 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 1208–1209 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 1214 n [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] United States, attitude toward, 897–898 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 470 ] U.S. arms sales, proposed, 810 n [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 848–849 [ Pgs. 848–849 include portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 480 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] U.S. cotton quota, negotiations concerning, 286–287 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 279–280 [ Pgs. 279–280 include portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] U.S. military assistance, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 292–293 [ Pgs. 292–293 include portions of Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , and Doc. 110 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 308–309 [ Pgs. 308–309 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] U.S. policy, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 303–309 [ Pgs. 303–309 include portions of Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 315–316 [ Pgs. 315–316 include portions of Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , and Doc. 118 ] , 326–329 [ Pgs. 326–329 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] Elath, Eliahu, 674–677 [ Pgs. 674–677 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 712–715 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 723–726 [ Pgs. 723–726 include portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 736–741 [ Pgs. 736–741 include portions of Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , and Doc. 356 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 789–793 [ Pgs. 789–793 include portions of Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , and Doc. 396 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 842–844 [ Pgs. 842–844 include portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 848 n [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 436 and Doc. 437 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 449 ] , 881 n [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 474 ] Elliot, Air Marshal Sir William, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Elliott, John C., 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 792–794 [ Pgs. 792–794 include portions of Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , and Doc. 397 ] El Salvador, 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 605 ] Elsey, George M., 1753–1754 [ Pgs. 1753–1754 include portions of Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , and Doc. 949 ] Ely, Gen. Paul H.R., 1344–1345 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] Emanuel, A., 1554–1555 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] Emery, George H., 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 290 ] Enemark, Lt. Col. William A., 1323 [ Pg. 1323 is part of Doc. 738 ] Entezam, Nasrollah, 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 239 ] Eqbal, Manuchehi, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 218 ] Eralp, Orhan, 866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 451 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 493 ] Erasmus, F.C., 1826–1827 [ Pgs. 1826–1827 include portions of Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] , 1832–1834 [ Pgs. 1832–1834 include portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] , 1837–1841 [ Pgs. 1837–1841 include portions of Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] Erhardt, John G., 1581–1586 [ Pgs. 1581–1586 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 1817 n [ Pg. 1817 is part of Doc. 973 ] , 1829–1831 [ Pgs. 1829–1831 include portions of Doc. 980 and Doc. 981 ] , 1833–1837 [ Pgs. 1833–1837 include portions of Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , and Doc. 984 ] , 1843 [ Pg. 1843 is part of Doc. 987 ] Erian, Abdullah A. al-, 1355 [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 754 ] Eritrea ( see also under United Nations: General Assembly and also Eritrean question under Foreign Ministers meeting at London): British policy, 1641 [ Pg. 1641 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1649–1650 [ Pgs. 1649–1650 include portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1652–1656 [ Pgs. 1652–1656 include portions of Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] , 1658 [ Pg. 1658 is part of Doc. 896 ] , 1664–1666 [ Pg. 1664 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1676–1677 [ Pg. 1676 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1679–1682 [ Pgs. 1679–1682 include portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 1684 [ Pg. 1684 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] Burmese position, 1648–1649 [ Pgs. 1648–1649 include portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1653–1654 [ Pgs. 1653–1654 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1687 [ Pg. 1687 includes portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 1694 [ Pg. 1694 is part of Doc. 912 ] Ethiopia: Proposed annexation to, 1577 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1640–1643 [ Pgs. 1640–1643 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , and Doc. 888 ] , 1645–1649 [ Pgs. 1645–1649 include portions of Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , and Doc. 891 ] , 1651–1658 [ Pgs. 1651–1658 include portions of Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] , 1660 n [ Pg. 1660 is part of Doc. 897 ] , 1661–1667 [ Pgs. 1661–1667 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 1669 [ Pg. 1669 is part of Doc. 900 ] , 1676–1677 [ Pg. 1676 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1692–1694 [ Pg. 1692 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1696 [ Pg. 1696 includes portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] , 1701 [ Pg. 1701 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] ; proposed federation with, 1658–1661 [ Pgs. 1658–1661 include portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1663–1666 [ Pgs. 1663–1666 include portions of Doc. 898 and Doc. 899 ] , 1669–1688 [ Pgs. 1669–1688 include portions of Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 1702–1705 [ Pgs. 1702–1705 include portions of Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , and Doc. 919 ] French policy, 1649 [ Pg. 1649 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1677 [ Pg. 1677 is part of Doc. 902 ] Geneva formula, 1642 n [ Pg. 1642 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 1644 [ Pg. 1644 includes portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] , 1646 [ Pg. 1646 is part of Doc. 889 ] Guatemalan position, 1647–1649 [ Pgs. 1647–1649 include portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1654 [ Pg. 1654 includes portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] , 1662–1663 [ Pgs. 1662–1663 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1693 [ Pg. 1693 is part of Doc. 912 ] Independence proposals, 1647–1652 [ Pgs. 1647–1652 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 1654 [ Pg. 1654 includes portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] , 1658–1659 [ Pgs. 1658–1659 include portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1660 n [ Pg. 1660 is part of Doc. 897 ] , 1662–1664 [ Pgs. 1662–1664 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1672–1673 [ Pg. 1672 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1677 [ Pg. 1677 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1679–1680 [ Pg. 1679 is part of Doc. 903 ] , 1687–1688 [ Pgs. 1687–1688 include portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] Italian policy, 1642–1644 [ Pgs. 1642–1644 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , and Doc. 889 ] , 1646 [ Pg. 1646 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1650–1652 [ Pgs. 1650–1652 include portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 1656–1662 [ Pgs. 1656–1662 include portions of Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , and Doc. 898 ] , 1664 [ Pg. 1664 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1666–1667 [ Pgs. 1666–1667 include portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] , 1672–1679 [ Pgs. 1672–1679 include portions of Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , and Doc. 903 ] , 1682 [ Pg. 1682 is part of Doc. 904 ] , 1684–1687 [ Pgs. 1684–1687 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 1692–1694 [ Pg. 1692 is part of Doc. 912 ] Negotiations concerning, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 1513–1514 [ Pgs. 1513–1514 include portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1572 [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1577–1579 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1633 [ Pg. 1633 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 1640–1689 [ Pgs. 1640–1689 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , and Doc. 910 ] Norwegian position, 1648 [ Pg. 1648 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 1650 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1653–1654 [ Pgs. 1653–1654 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1694 [ Pg. 1694 is part of Doc. 912 ] Pakistan position, 1647–1649 [ Pgs. 1647–1649 include portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1654 [ Pg. 1654 includes portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] , 1663 [ Pg. 1663 includes portions of Doc. 898 and Doc. 899 ] , 1673 [ Pg. 1673 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1693 [ Pg. 1693 is part of Doc. 912 ] Partition proposals, 1643 [ Pg. 1643 is part of Doc. 888 ] , 1647–1648 [ Pg. 1647 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 1680 [ Pg. 1680 is part of Doc. 903 ] Soviet policy, 1650 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1672 [ Pg. 1672 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1688 [ Pg. 1688 is part of Doc. 908 ] Sudan, proposed annexation of western portion to, 1643 [ Pg. 1643 is part of Doc. 888 ] , 1647 n [ Pg. 1647 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 1648 [ Pg. 1648 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 1649 n [ Pg. 1649 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1654 [ Pg. 1654 includes portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] , 1696 [ Pg. 1696 includes portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] Union of South African, position, 1647–1648 [ Pg. 1647 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 1650 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1653–1654 [ Pgs. 1653–1654 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1687 [ Pg. 1687 includes portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 1694 [ Pg. 1694 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1814 [ Pg. 1814 is part of Doc. 972 ] U.N. Commission of Inquiry in Eritrea, 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 1640–1643 [ Pgs. 1640–1643 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , and Doc. 888 ] , 1646–1651 [ Pgs. 1646–1651 include portions of Doc. 889 , Doc. 890 , and Doc. 891 ] , 1652 n [ Pg. 1652 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 1653–1655 [ Pgs. 1653–1655 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1662 [ Pg. 1662 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] , 1664 [ Pg. 1664 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1668 [ Pg. 1668 is part of Doc. 900 ] , 1687 [ Pg. 1687 includes portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 1692–1694 [ Pg. 1692 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1696–1697 [ Pgs. 1696–1697 include portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] , 1814 [ Pg. 1814 is part of Doc. 972 ] U.N. trusteeship, proposed, 1647–1649 [ Pgs. 1647–1649 include portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1651 [ Pg. 1651 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1654–1655 [ Pgs. 1654–1655 include portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] , 1657 [ Pg. 1657 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1662–1663 [ Pgs. 1662–1663 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1666 [ Pg. 1666 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1679–1680 [ Pg. 1679 is part of Doc. 903 ] , 1693 [ Pg. 1693 is part of Doc. 912 ] U.S. policy, 1642–1644 [ Pgs. 1642–1644 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , and Doc. 889 ] , 1647 [ Pg. 1647 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 1650 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1652–1656 [ Pgs. 1652–1656 include portions of Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , and Doc. 895 ] , 1662–1668 [ Pgs. 1662–1668 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 1676 [ Pg. 1676 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1678–1679 [ Pgs. 1678–1679 include portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1681–1687 [ Pgs. 1681–1687 include portions of Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 1692 [ Pg. 1692 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1694 [ Pg. 1694 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1696–1697 [ Pgs. 1696–1697 include portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] Erkin, Feridun C., 1231–1232 [ Pgs. 1231–1232 include portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 1252–1253 [ Pgs. 1252–1253 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 1264–1269 [ Pgs. 1264–1269 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] , 1272–1274 [ Pgs. 1272–1274 include portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 1300–1302 [ Pgs. 1300–1302 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , and Doc. 726 ] , 1310–1311 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 1320–1322 [ Pgs. 1320–1322 include portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 1325 [ Pg. 1325 includes portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 1345 [ Pg. 1345 is part of Doc. 752 ] Esenbel, Melih, 1272 [ Pg. 1272 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1278 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1285 [ Pg. 1285 includes portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 1332 n [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] Ethopia ( see also Ethiopia and Ethiopian subheadings under Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Korean war): Communist movement, 1561–1562 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1699 [ Pg. 1699 includes portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] ; International Bank loan, proposed, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 1705 [ Pg. 1705 is part of Doc. 919 ] ; Italy, relations with, 1640–1641 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1643 [ Pg. 1643 is part of Doc. 888 ] , 1703–1704 [ Pg. 1703 is part of Doc. 919 ] ; Saudi Arabia, relations with, 1149 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] ; trade policies, 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 844 ] ; U.S. communications facilities at Asmara, 1704–1705 [ Pg. 1704 is part of Doc. 919 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1578 [ Pg. 1578 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1694–1695 [ Pg. 1694 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1697–1699 [ Pgs. 1697–1699 include portions of Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , and Doc. 915 ] , 1704 [ Pg. 1704 is part of Doc. 919 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 1663 [ Pg. 1663 includes portions of Doc. 898 and Doc. 899 ] , 1695–1697 [ Pgs. 1695–1697 include portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] , 1699–1702 [ Pgs. 1699–1702 include portions of Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , and Doc. 918 ] , 1705 [ Pg. 1705 is part of Doc. 919 ] ; U.S. policies, 1691–1705 [ Pgs. 1691–1705 include portions of Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , and Doc. 919 ] Ethridge, Mark F., 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] Europe, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1297–1298 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1346 [ Pg. 1346 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1349 [ Pg. 1349 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1461 [ Pg. 1461 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] , 1468 [ Pg. 1468 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 1477 [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. 833 ] European Payments Union, 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 1278 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1285 [ Pg. 1285 includes portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1319 n [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 736 ] European Recovery Program (Marshall plan), 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1225–1228 [ Pgs. 1225–1228 include portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 1302 [ Pg. 1302 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 1464–1465 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 826 ] , 1504–1505 [ Pg. 1504 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1521 [ Pg. 1521 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1531 [ Pg. 1531 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1716 [ Pg. 1716 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 1739 [ Pg. 1739 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1753–1754 [ Pgs. 1753–1754 include portions of Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , and Doc. 949 ] , 1756–1759 [ Pgs. 1756–1759 include portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Evans, Harold, 687 n [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 321 ] Evans, James C., 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] Evans, T. E., 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 209–210 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] Evans, Maj. Gen. Vernon, 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 474–475 [ Pgs. 474–475 include portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 507–509 [ Pgs. 507–509 include portions of Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , and Doc. 232 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 623–624 [ Pgs. 623–624 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 1345–1346 [ Pg. 1345 is part of Doc. 752 ] Ewing, Oscar E., 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Export-Import Bank of Washington, 169–170 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 175–176 [ Pgs. 175–176 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 219–220 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 470 n [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 498–499 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 524–525 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 526 n [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 547–548 [ Pgs. 547–548 include portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 589–591 [ Pgs. 589–591 include portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 597–598 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 600–606 [ Pgs. 600–606 include portions of Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 609–610 [ Pgs. 609–610 include portions of Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , and Doc. 284 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 616 n [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 288 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 524 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1140–1141 [ Pg. 1140 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1166–1168 [ Pgs. 1166–1168 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1180–1184 [ Pgs. 1180–1184 include portions of Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 1206 [ Pg. 1206 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 1212 [ Pg. 1212 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] , 1218 [ Pg. 1218 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] , 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 756 and Doc. 757 ] , 1448–1449 [ Pgs. 1448–1449 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 1494 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1694–1695 [ Pg. 1694 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1697 [ Pg. 1697 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 1712 [ Pg. 1712 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1726 [ Pg. 1726 is part of Doc. 935 ] , 1731–1732 [ Pgs. 1731–1732 include portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , and Doc. 940 ] , 1734 [ Pg. 1734 includes portions of Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] , 1818 [ Pg. 1818 is part of Doc. 974 ] Eytan, Walter, 706–707 [ Pgs. 706–707 include portions of Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 721 n [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 722 n [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 451 ] , 926 n [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 1020–1021 [ Pgs. 1020–1021 include portions of Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , and Doc. 566 ] , 1027–1028 [ Pgs. 1027–1028 include portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] Faisal II, King of Iraq, 1207–1208 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 670 ] Faqih, Sheikh Asad al-, 103–104 [ Pgs. 103–104 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 112 n [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 1128 n [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 1157 [ Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1166 [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1168 [ Pg. 1168 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 1183–1184 [ Pgs. 1183–1184 include portions of Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] Far East, 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1561 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1831 n [ Pg. 1831 is part of Doc. 981 ] Farhan, Hamed Bey, 975–976 [ Pgs. 975–976 include portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] Farouk, King of Egypt, 288–291 [ Pgs. 288–291 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 329 n [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 797 n [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1132 n [ Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 636 ] Farrell, James A., 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] Farsi Island, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 36–38 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 42–44 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 42 ] Fawzi Bey, Mahmoud, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 585 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 1054 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 591 ] Fawzia, Princess, 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] Federal Housing Agency, U.S., 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] Federal Reserve System, U.S., 1596 [ Pg. 1596 is part of Doc. 863 ] Feisal ( also Faisal), Prince, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 113–114 [ Pgs. 113–114 include portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 118–120 [ Pgs. 118–120 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , and Doc. 53 ] , 840 n [ Pg. 840 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 1131–1133 [ Pgs. 1131–1133 include portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 1135–1146 [ Pgs. 1135–1146 include portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 1172–1174 [ Pgs. 1172–1174 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 1179 [ Pg. 1179 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 1187–1188 [ Pgs. 1187–1188 include portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] Ferguson, C. Vaughn, 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 447–451 [ Pgs. 447–451 include portions of Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] , 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 500–501 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 526–529 [ Pgs. 526–529 include portions of Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , and Doc. 236 ] , 532–534 [ Pgs. 532–534 include portions of Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , and Doc. 238 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 540–543 [ Pgs. 540–543 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 572 n [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 616 n [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 620–630 [ Pgs. 620–630 include portions of Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , and Doc. 292 ] , 634 n [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 294 ] Ferguson, Homer, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 82 ] Ferris, Walton C., 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Fezzan. See under Libya. Finland, 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 1706–1708 [ Pgs. 1706–1708 include portions of Doc. 920 and Doc. 921 ] , 1713–1714 [ Pg. 1713 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1717–1721 [ Pgs. 1717–1721 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , and Doc. 931 ] Fisher, 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 834–835 [ Pgs. 834–835 include portions of Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , and Doc. 428 ] Fisher, Adrian S., 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1260–1262 [ Pgs. 1260–1262 include portions of Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , and Doc. 704 ] , 1303 n [ Pg. 1303 is part of Doc. 726 ] Fitz Gerald, Sir William, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 340 ] Fletcher-Cooke, J., 924 [ Pg. 924 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] Food and Agriculture Organization, 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1564 [ Pg. 1564 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1615 [ Pg. 1615 is part of Doc. 872 ] Ford, Lt. Col. Blair A., 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 170 ] Ford, Richard, 961–962 [ Pgs. 961–962 include portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 965 n [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 977 n [ Pg. 977 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 984–985 [ Pgs. 984–985 include portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 990–991 [ Pgs. 990–991 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 998 n [ Pg. 998 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 999 n [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 1006–1011 [ Pgs. 1006–1011 include portions of Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , and Doc. 557 ] , 1014 [ Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] , 1020–1021 [ Pgs. 1020–1021 include portions of Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , and Doc. 566 ] , 1027–1029 [ Pgs. 1027–1029 include portions of Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , and Doc. 572 ] , 1075–1076 [ Pgs. 1075–1076 include portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] Ford Foundation, 1593 [ Pg. 1593 is part of Doc. 863 ] Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee, 1234 n [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 686 ] Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950 , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 1735 [ Pg. 1735 is part of Doc. 943 ] Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee, 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 1234 [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 1271 [ Pg. 1271 is part of Doc. 709 ] , 1322–1323 [ Pgs. 1322–1323 include portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 1700 [ Pg. 1700 includes portions of Doc. 915 and Doc. 916 ] Foreign Ministers meeting at London, May 1950: Activities of, 36–37 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 137–141 [ Pgs. 137–141 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 870–871 [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 1206 n [ Pg. 1206 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 1314 [ Pg. 1314 is part of Doc. 733 ] African questions, 1524–1539 [ Pgs. 1524–1539 include portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1541–1546 [ Pgs. 1541–1546 include portions of Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , and Doc. 852 ] , 1559 [ Pg. 1559 is part of Doc. 857 ] Egyptian question, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] Eritrean question, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 1652–1654 [ Pgs. 1652–1654 include portions of Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] Greek security, 151–152 [ Pgs. 151–152 include portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 1264–1265 [ Pgs. 1264–1265 include portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] Indochina, U.S. military assistance for, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 241 ] Iranian question, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 151–152 [ Pgs. 151–152 include portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 529–532 [ Pgs. 529–532 include portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 540–541 [ Pgs. 540–541 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] , 545–548 [ Pgs. 545–548 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , and Doc. 244 ] , 550–551 [ Pgs. 550–551 include portions of Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , and Doc. 247 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 569–570 [ Pgs. 569–570 include portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 1264–1265 [ Pgs. 1264–1265 include portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] Libyan question, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 1623 [ Pg. 1623 is part of Doc. 876 ] Near and Middle East security, 141–146 [ Pgs. 141–146 include portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] , 150–152 [ Pgs. 150–152 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 158–162 [ Pgs. 158–162 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 167–168 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 1003 [ Pg. 1003 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] Near East, arms shipments to, 144–146 [ Pgs. 144–146 include portions of Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] , 150–152 [ Pgs. 150–152 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 158–162 [ Pgs. 158–162 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 167–168 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 221 n [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] Palestine question, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 63 ] Palestine Relief Organization, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] Saudi Arabia, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] Syrian-Iraqi union, proposed, 1206 n [ Pg. 1206 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] Tripartite declaration, May 25, 1950 . See under Near and Middle East. Turkish security, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 151–152 [ Pgs. 151–152 include portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 1253 [ Pg. 1253 is part of Doc. 696 ] , 1264–1265 [ Pgs. 1264–1265 include portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 1272 [ Pg. 1272 is part of Doc. 710 ] Foreign Ministers meeting at New York, Sept. 1950 , 423 n [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 1286 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 1306 n [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1313–1316 [ Pgs. 1313–1316 include portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 1677 [ Pg. 1677 is part of Doc. 902 ] Foroukar, 590 [ Pg. 590 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 286 ] Forsyth, D. D., 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] , 1815 n [ Pg. 1815 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 1818–1823 [ Pgs. 1818–1823 include portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] , 1827–1829 [ Pgs. 1827–1829 include portions of Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , and Doc. 980 ] , 1832 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 1837–1838 [ Pgs. 1837–1838 include portions of Doc. 983 and Doc. 984 ] Foster, William C., 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 1268–1269 [ Pg. 1268 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1273–1275 [ Pgs. 1273–1275 include portions of Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , and Doc. 712 ] Fowler, Robert, 1439–1441 [ Pgs. 1439–1441 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] France ( see also France and French subheadings under individual countries and subjects ), 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 881 n [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 1163 [ Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1225 [ Pg. 1225 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 1487 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] , 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1820 [ Pg. 1820 is part of Doc. 974 ] Francfort, Pierre, 1558–1564 [ Pgs. 1558–1564 include portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] Franco, Generalissimo Francisco, 1576 [ Pg. 1576 is part of Doc. 859 ] Franks, Sir Oliver, 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 233–237 [ Pgs. 233–237 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 602–604 [ Pgs. 602–604 include portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , and Doc. 280 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 616 n [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 1404–1405 [ Pgs. 1404–1405 include portions of Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , and Doc. 789 ] , 1546 [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] Fraser, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Bruce Austin, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Fraser, Sir William, 576–577 [ Pgs. 576–577 include portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Frederika, Queen of Greece, 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 416–417 [ Pgs. 416–417 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] French Cameroons, 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1532 [ Pg. 1532 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1547 [ Pg. 1547 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 862 ] French Equatorial Africa, 1528–1529 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1547 [ Pg. 1547 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1598–1599 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 863 ] French Morocco. See Morocco, French Protectorate of. French North Africa: French policy and position, 1548 [ Pg. 1548 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1569–1572 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1577 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1579 [ Pg. 1579 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1620 [ Pg. 1620 is part of Doc. 874 ] , 1740–1742 [ Pg. 1740 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1792 [ Pg. 1792 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1796 [ Pg. 1796 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1808 [ Pg. 1808 is part of Doc. 970 ] ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, inclusion in, 1300 [ Pg. 1300 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 1636–1637 [ Pg. 1636 is part of Doc. 884 ] ; U.S. policy, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1537 [ Pg. 1537 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1573–1580 [ Pgs. 1573–1580 include portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1808 [ Pg. 1808 is part of Doc. 970 ] French Union, 1527–1529 [ Pg. 1527 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1531 [ Pg. 1531 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1537 [ Pg. 1537 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1561 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1564–1565 [ Pg. 1564 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1572 [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1737–1738 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1740–1741 [ Pg. 1740 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1746 [ Pg. 1746 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1775 n [ Pg. 1775 is part of Doc. 957 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1792 [ Pg. 1792 is part of Doc. 965 ] French West Africa, 1528–1529 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1547 [ Pg. 1547 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1559 [ Pg. 1559 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1567–1568 [ Pg. 1567 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1577 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1579 [ Pg. 1579 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1598 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 863 ] Fritzlan, A. David, 666 n [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 703–704 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 716–718 [ Pgs. 716–718 include portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , and Doc. 341 ] , 727–728 [ Pgs. 727–728 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , and Doc. 357 ] , 752–753 [ Pgs. 752–753 include portions of Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] Fry, L.A.C., 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 1452 [ Pg. 1452 is part of Doc. 818 ] Frye, Lt. Col. Arthur H., 1351 [ Pg. 1351 is part of Doc. 752 ] Fulbright Act, 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] Funkhouser, Richard, 9–18 [ Pgs. 9–18 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] , 21–23 [ Pgs. 21–23 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 29–34 [ Pgs. 29–34 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 47–52 [ Pgs. 47–52 include portions of Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 97–99 [ Pgs. 97–99 include portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 104–109 [ Pgs. 104–109 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 1144 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 636 ] Furlonge, Geoffrey W., 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 193–195 [ Pgs. 193–195 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 580 n [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 632–633 [ Pgs. 632–633 include portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 697–699 [ Pgs. 697–699 include portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 750–751 [ Pgs. 750–751 include portions of Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 782 n [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 918 n [ Pg. 918 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 940 n [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 977 n [ Pg. 977 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 978 n [ Pg. 978 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] Galarati-Scotti, Tommaso, 1659–1660 [ Pgs. 1659–1660 include portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1661 n [ Pg. 1661 is part of Doc. 897 ] Gandhi, Mohandas K., 1474 [ Pg. 1474 includes portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] Gardiner, Arthur Z., 181–186 [ Pgs. 181–186 include portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 951–952 [ Pgs. 951–952 include portions of Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , and Doc. 514 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 1051 n [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] Gargani, Khalid Bey, 1197–1198 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] Garner, J.J.S., 196–198 [ Pgs. 196–198 include portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 201–202 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1386 [ Pg. 1386 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] Garreau, Roger, 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , and Doc. 337 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 718–720 [ Pgs. 718–720 include portions of Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , and Doc. 342 ] , 729–730 [ Pgs. 729–730 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 768–770 [ Pgs. 768–770 include portions of Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 827–829 [ Pgs. 827–829 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , and Doc. 424 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 425 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 878–879 [ Pgs. 878–879 include portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 903–904 [ Pgs. 903–904 include portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , and Doc. 492 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] , 1030 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 572 ] Garretson, Albert H., 1701–1702 [ Pgs. 1701–1702 include portions of Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , and Doc. 918 ] Gaston, Herbert, 604 n [ Pg. 604 includes portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 1166 [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1168 [ Pg. 1168 is part of Doc. 642 ] Gee, H. G., 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] General Accounting Office, U.S., 1712–1713 [ Pg. 1712 is part of Doc. 925 ] George, Maj. Thomas R., 1839 [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Gerig, O. Benjamin, 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 1240–1244 [ Pgs. 1240–1244 include portions of Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , and Doc. 691 ] , 1495 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 837 ] Germany, Soviet policy toward, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 132 ] Getty, George, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 38 ] Ghani, Dr. Ghassem, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Ghulam Mohammed, 1420 [ Pg. 1420 includes portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] Gibson, 48–49 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Gibson, Raleigh A., 722 n [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 745–746 [ Pgs. 745–746 include portions of Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , and Doc. 359 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] , 843–944 [ Pgs. 843–944 include portions of Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , and Doc. 506 ] , 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 537 ] , 997–998 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 1065–1066 [ Pgs. 1065–1066 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] Ginder, Rear Adm. Samuel P., 1254 [ Pg. 1254 is part of Doc. 697 ] , 1266 n [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 706 and Doc. 707 ] , 1267 [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 1305 [ Pg. 1305 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] , 1341–1343 [ Pgs. 1341–1343 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] Gleason, S. Everett, 131 n [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 59 ] Glidden, Harold W., 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Glubb, Maj. Gen. John Bagot, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 944–946 [ Pgs. 944–946 include portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 603 ] Godwin, Lt. Col. C.S., 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Göksenin, Lt. Gen. Muzaffer, 1280 [ Pg. 1280 is part of Doc. 714 ] Gold Coast, 1554 n [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1719 [ Pg. 1719 includes portions of Doc. 928 and Doc. 929 ] Goldmann, Nahum, 819–821 [ Pgs. 819–821 include portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419 ] Goldstein, Mortimer, 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] Golshayan, Abbas, Qoli, 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Gordon, Lincoln, 1559 [ Pg. 1559 is part of Doc. 857 ] Gordon-Walker, Patrick C., 1443 [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 813 ] Gorlitz, Samuel, 1166–1168 [ Pgs. 1166–1168 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] Grady, Henry F., 173–176 [ Pgs. 173–176 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] , 335–338 [ Pgs. 335–338 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 345–347 [ Pgs. 345–347 include portions of Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , and Doc. 137 ] , 351–361 [ Pgs. 351–361 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148 ] , 364–370 [ Pgs. 364–370 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] , 375–376 [ Pgs. 375–376 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 396–397 [ Pgs. 396–397 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 519–520 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 562–564 [ Pgs. 562–564 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] , 566–571 [ Pgs. 566–571 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 574–577 [ Pgs. 574–577 include portions of Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 is part of Doc. 267 ] , 581–584 [ Pgs. 581–584 include portions of Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 586–591 [ Pgs. 586–591 include portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 605–609 [ Pgs. 605–609 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , and Doc. 283 ] , 612–613 [ Pgs. 612–613 include portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 618–626 [ Pgs. 618–626 include portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] , 629–630 [ Pgs. 629–630 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Grafftey-Smith, Sir Laurence, 1391 [ Pg. 1391 is part of Doc. 776 ] , 1398 [ Pg. 1398 includes portions of Doc. 781 and Doc. 782 ] Graham, Brig. Gen. Wallace H., 1157 n [ Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1169–1170 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] Granahan, William T., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Gray, Gordon, 171–172 [ Pgs. 171–172 include portions of Doc. 74 and Doc. 75 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 523 n [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 543 n [ Pg. 543 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 1158 [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1241 n [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] Greater Syria proposals, 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1216 [ Pg. 1216 is part of Doc. 675 ] , 1218 [ Pg. 1218 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] Greece ( see also Greek policy under Korean war): Armed forces, matters pertaining to, 335–338 [ Pgs. 335–338 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 387–389 [ Pgs. 387–389 include portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 397–399 [ Pgs. 397–399 include portions of Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , and Doc. 172 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 409–412 [ Pgs. 409–412 include portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 424–426 [ Pgs. 424–426 include portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 621–622 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 290 ] British policy, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Bulgaria: Possibility of an attack by, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 254–255 [ Pgs. 254–255 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 383–385 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 397–398 [ Pgs. 397–398 include portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 411–412 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1340–1341 [ Pgs. 1340–1341 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 1349 [ Pg. 1349 is part of Doc. 752 ] ; relations with, 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 719 ] Communist movement and strength, 3–5 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 380–382 [ Pgs. 380–382 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 415–417 [ Pgs. 415–417 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 193 ] Cyprus question, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] Defense expenditures, 335–336 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 130 ] EBASCO Services, Inc., 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 190 ] Elections, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 346–347 [ Pgs. 346–347 include portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 352–355 [ Pgs. 352–355 include portions of Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , and Doc. 143 ] , 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , and Doc. 151 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] Greek-Turkish military staff talks, 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] Greek children, efforts concerning repatriation of, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 392–393 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] International refugee problem, 350–351 [ Pgs. 350–351 include portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 168 ] Italy, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning Group, 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 163 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 411 n [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, negotiations concerning proposed relationship to, 306–307 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 1306–1309 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1313–1315 [ Pgs. 1313–1315 include portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1636–1637 [ Pg. 1636 is part of Doc. 884 ] Orthodox church, matters pertaining to, 1251 [ Pg. 1251 is part of Doc. 695 ] Political situation, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 344–348 [ Pgs. 344–348 include portions of Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] , 351–359 [ Pgs. 351–359 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , and Doc. 147 ] , 364–373 [ Pgs. 364–373 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 375–377 [ Pgs. 375–377 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 380–381 [ Pgs. 380–381 include portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163 ] , 396–397 [ Pgs. 396–397 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 399–402 [ Pgs. 399–402 include portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , and Doc. 174 ] , 404–405 [ Pgs. 404–405 include portions of Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , and Doc. 177 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 414–421 [ Pgs. 414–421 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] , 432–435 [ Pgs. 432–435 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , and Doc. 194 ] Regional security pact, policy toward, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 68 ] Security of, 151–152 [ Pgs. 151–152 include portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 1264–1265 [ Pgs. 1264–1265 include portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 1306 n [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1313–1314 [ Pgs. 1313–1314 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1316–1317 [ Pgs. 1316–1317 include portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1348–1349 [ Pg. 1348 is part of Doc. 752 ] Soviet policy, 254–255 [ Pgs. 254–255 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 374 n [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 383–384 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 415–416 [ Pgs. 415–416 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] , 1304 [ Pg. 1304 includes portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] Soviet satellite forces, U.S. policy in event of attack by, 382–386 [ Pgs. 382–386 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 398–399 [ Pgs. 398–399 include portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] Turkey, relations with, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 422–425 [ Pgs. 422–425 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] , 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1340–1341 [ Pgs. 1340–1341 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 1348–1349 [ Pg. 1348 is part of Doc. 752 ] U.S. economic assistance, 3–4 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254–255 [ Pgs. 254–255 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 261–263 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 274 n [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 336 [ Pg. 336 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 338 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 131 ] , 343–344 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 356–362 [ Pgs. 356–362 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 366–369 [ Pgs. 366–369 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] , 376–377 [ Pgs. 376–377 include portions of Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 405–407 [ Pgs. 405–407 include portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] , 412–413 [ Pg. 412 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 417–419 [ Pgs. 417–419 include portions of Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 426–431 [ Pgs. 426–431 include portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 436–437 [ Pgs. 436–437 include portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 199 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 is part of Doc. 732 ] U.S. military air rights, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] U.S. military assistance, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 265–266 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 336–338 [ Pgs. 336–338 include portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 342–344 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 387–389 [ Pgs. 387–389 include portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 398–399 [ Pgs. 398–399 include portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 410–412 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 439–442 [ Pgs. 439–442 include portions of Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , and Doc. 200 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 575 n [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 622–623 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 628–629 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 1134 [ Pg. 1134 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1163 [ Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1236 [ Pg. 1236 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1304 [ Pg. 1304 includes portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1314 [ Pg. 1314 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 1317 [ Pg. 1317 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] U.S. policy, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 254–262 [ Pgs. 254–262 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 265–267 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 378–379 [ Pgs. 378–379 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 387–390 [ Pgs. 387–390 include portions of Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 402–403 [ Pgs. 402–403 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] , 410–416 [ Pgs. 410–416 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 554–555 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 592–593 [ Pgs. 592–593 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 1236 [ Pg. 1236 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 1307–1308 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1317 [ Pg. 1317 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Yugoslavia, relations with, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 344–345 [ Pgs. 344–345 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 349–350 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , and Doc. 151 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 391–392 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 408–409 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] Green, William J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Greenhill, Dennis A., 75 n [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 645–646 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 648 n [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 844–847 [ Pgs. 844–847 include portions of Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , and Doc. 436 ] , 868–869 [ Pgs. 868–869 include portions of Doc. 452 and Doc. 453 ] Gregoriades, Neokosmos, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 155 ] Gross, Ernest A., 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 1368–1372 [ Pgs. 1368–1372 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 1374 [ Pg. 1374 is part of Doc. 765 ] , 1376–1378 [ Pgs. 1376–1378 include portions of Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , and Doc. 769 ] , 1387–1389 [ Pgs. 1387–1389 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 1423 [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] Gruenther, Lt. Gen. Alfred M., 362–363 [ Pgs. 362–363 include portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 1248 [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693 ] Guatemala, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 1647–1649 [ Pgs. 1647–1649 include portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1654 [ Pg. 1654 includes portions of Doc. 893 and Doc. 894 ] , 1662–1663 [ Pgs. 1662–1663 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1693 [ Pg. 1693 is part of Doc. 912 ] Guinea, 1563 [ Pg. 1563 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1719 [ Pg. 1719 includes portions of Doc. 928 and Doc. 929 ] , 1729–1730 [ Pgs. 1729–1730 include portions of Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] Gulbenkian, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] Gulf Oil Company, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 1783 [ Pg. 1783 is part of Doc. 963 ] Gürman, Gen. Abdurrahman, 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 1247 [ Pg. 1247 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 693 ] Gurmani, Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad, 1419–1420 [ Pgs. 1419–1420 include portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] , 1422 [ Pg. 1422 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] Gustin, James R., 1251–1252 [ Pgs. 1251–1252 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] Hadi, Abdul, 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 936–937 [ Pgs. 936–937 include portions of Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , and Doc. 500 ] Hagglof, Gunnar, 1659 [ Pg. 1659 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] Haikal, Yusuf, 680–681 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 699–702 [ Pgs. 699–702 include portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] , 864–865 [ Pgs. 864–865 include portions of Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , and Doc. 451 ] , 1001–1002 [ Pgs. 1001–1002 include portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 1012–1013 [ Pgs. 1012–1013 include portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 1068 n [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia 1132 n [ Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] , 1643 n [ Pg. 1643 is part of Doc. 888 ] , 1645–1646 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1663–1666 [ Pgs. 1663–1666 include portions of Doc. 898 and Doc. 899 ] , 1671 [ Pg. 1671 is part of Doc. 900 ] , 1674 [ Pg. 1674 includes portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1676 [ Pg. 1676 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1687 [ Pg. 1687 includes portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 1691–1696 [ Pgs. 1691–1696 include portions of Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , and Doc. 913 ] , 1698–1705 [ Pgs. 1698–1705 include portions of Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , Doc. 918 , and Doc. 919 ] Haislip, Gen. Wade, 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] Hajir, Abol Hosein, 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 209 ] Hakimi, Ibrahim, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Hakki Bey, 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] Halaby, Najeeb E., 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 214 ] Halderman, John W., 661–664 [ Pgs. 661–664 include portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 760 n [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] Hall, William O., 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] Halla, P., 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] Hamilton, Minard, 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] Hamilton, Col. West A., 1714 n [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1716 [ Pg. 1716 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 1729 [ Pg. 1729 includes portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] Hamza, Fuad Bey, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 1115 [ Pg. 1115 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1125–1126 [ Pgs. 1125–1126 include portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1146–1147 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1149–1152 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1159–1162 [ Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] , 1198 [ Pg. 1198 is part of Doc. 664 ] Handley, William J., 1706 n [ Pg. 1706 is part of Doc. 920 ] Harding, Charles, 22–23 [ Pgs. 22–23 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 47–51 [ Pgs. 47–51 include portions of Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , and Doc. 19 ] Harding, Warren G., 1720 [ Pg. 1720 includes portions of Doc. 929 and Doc. 930 ] Hare, Raymond A., 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 112–121 [ Pgs. 112–121 include portions of Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 141–143 [ Pgs. 141–143 include portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 is part of Doc. 64 ] , 146 n [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 482–483 [ Pgs. 482–483 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] , 500–501 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 545–547 [ Pgs. 545–547 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 646 n [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 667 n [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 742–745 [ Pgs. 742–745 include portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 787–792 [ Pgs. 787–792 include portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , and Doc. 396 ] , 802 n [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 844–847 [ Pgs. 844–847 include portions of Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , and Doc. 436 ] , 868–871 [ Pgs. 868–871 include portions of Doc. 452 and Doc. 453 ] , 875–876 [ Pgs. 875–876 include portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 511 ] , 1126 n [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1129–1131 [ Pgs. 1129–1131 include portions of Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 1180–1181 [ Pgs. 1180–1181 include portions of Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , and Doc. 650 ] , 1185 [ Pg. 1185 includes portions of Doc. 653 and Doc. 654 ] , 1187–1194 [ Pgs. 1187–1194 include portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , and Doc. 662 ] , 1195 n [ Pg. 1195 is part of Doc. 662 ] , 1197–1200 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 1219 n [ Pg. 1219 is part of Doc. 677 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] , 1231–1232 [ Pgs. 1231–1232 include portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 1264–1267 [ Pgs. 1264–1267 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] , 1355–1357 [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 1392–1394 [ Pgs. 1392–1394 include portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 1466–1468 [ Pgs. 1466–1468 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1524 n [ Pg. 1524 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1538–1540 [ Pgs. 1538–1540 include portions of Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] , 1542 [ Pg. 1542 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1545 [ Pg. 1545 includes portions of Doc. 850 and Doc. 851 ] Harkus Island, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] Harriman, W. Averell, 1225–1227 [ Pg. 1225 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 1273 [ Pg. 1273 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] Harrison, Rudolph, 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 386 ] Hart, Parker T., 73–74 [ Pgs. 73–74 include portions of Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] , 1131 n [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] Haselton, Norris S., 1845 n [ Pg. 1845 is part of Doc. 988 ] Hashim, Adib, 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] Hassett, William D., 658 n [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 1747 n [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] Havenga, N.C., 1815 n [ Pg. 1815 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] Hawar Island, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] Hawrani, Akram, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1215–1216 [ Pgs. 1215–1216 include portions of Doc. 674 and Doc. 675 ] Hays, Samuel P., 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] Heath-Ives, 13–14 [ Pgs. 13–14 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Hefferman, James J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Hekmat, Reza, 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Heller, Louis B., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Helm, Sir Alexander Knox, 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 1028 [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 571 ] Helmand River Delta commission, report of, 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 1459–1460 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 824 ] H.E.L.P., 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] Hemba, Alton W., 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 244–245 [ Pgs. 244–245 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] Henderson, Loy W., 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 1370 [ Pg. 1370 is part of Doc. 763 ] , 1372–1373 [ Pgs. 1372–1373 include portions of Doc. 763 and Doc. 764 ] , 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 1389–1391 [ Pgs. 1389–1391 include portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1395–1412 [ Pgs. 1395–1412 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , and Doc. 795 ] , 1414 [ Pg. 1414 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1417–1418 [ Pgs. 1417–1418 include portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 1420–1422 [ Pgs. 1420–1422 include portions of Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , and Doc. 801 ] , 1426–1429 [ Pgs. 1426–1429 include portions of Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1433–1435 [ Pgs. 1433–1435 include portions of Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , and Doc. 810 ] , 1437 [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 810 ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] , 1461–1463 [ Pgs. 1461–1463 include portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 827 ] , 1469–1475 [ Pgs. 1469–1475 include portions of Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] Henries, Richard, 1720 [ Pg. 1720 includes portions of Doc. 929 and Doc. 930 ] Henry, David H., 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] Herlitz, Esther, 1020 [ Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] Herman, Leopold, 618 n [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Herzog, Col. Chaim, 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1078 [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 1084–1086 [ Pgs. 1084–1086 include portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617 ] Hetwot, Ato Zaude Gabre, 1695 n [ Pg. 1695 is part of Doc. 912 ] Heyd, Uriel, 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 537 ] Hickenlooper, Bourke, 1556 [ Pg. 1556 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1757 [ Pg. 1757 is part of Doc. 949 ] Hickerson, John D., 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 1378–1382 [ Pgs. 1378–1382 include portions of Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 1423 [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 1432–1433 [ Pgs. 1432–1433 include portions of Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , and Doc. 809 ] , 1509 n [ Pg. 1509 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1546 n [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1659 n [ Pg. 1659 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1813–1815 [ Pgs. 1813–1815 include portions of Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , and Doc. 973 ] Hill, Heyward G., 23–25 [ Pgs. 23–25 include portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] , 1185–1188 [ Pgs. 1185–1188 include portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] , 1361 [ Pg. 1361 is part of Doc. 757 ] Hilmy Pasha, Ahmed, 911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 477 ] Hilton, Howard J., Jr., 1657 [ Pg. 1657 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] Ho Chi Minh, 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 833 ] Hodges, Gen., 1423–1424 [ Pgs. 1423–1424 include portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] Hoffman, Paul G., 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 1225–1228 [ Pgs. 1225–1228 include portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 1268 [ Pg. 1268 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1273–1275 [ Pgs. 1273–1275 include portions of Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , and Doc. 712 ] Holmes, Julius C., 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] , 116–117 [ Pgs. 116–117 include portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 632–633 [ Pgs. 632–633 include portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 697–699 [ Pgs. 697–699 include portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 750–751 [ Pgs. 750–751 include portions of Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 1385–1386 [ Pgs. 1385–1386 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , and Doc. 774 ] , 1442–1444 [ Pgs. 1442–1444 include portions of Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , and Doc. 814 ] , 1608–1610 [ Pgs. 1608–1610 include portions of Doc. 870 and Doc. 871 ] , 1637 [ Pg. 1637 is part of Doc. 884 ] , 1644 n [ Pg. 1644 includes portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] Hooper, Malcolm P., 1087–1088 [ Pgs. 1087–1088 include portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619 ] Hope, Mary E., 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 1569 n [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] Hopkins, William J., 1190 n [ Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Hoskins, Harold B., 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] Howard, Harry N., 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 536 ] Howard, John B., 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 230–233 [ Pgs. 230–233 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , and Doc. 95 ] , 1322 n [ Pg. 1322 includes portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 1341 [ Pg. 1341 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] Howard, Ltd., 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Howze, Col. Roy, 1159 [ Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 641 ] Hubbard, Capt. H. D., 1128–1129 [ Pgs. 1128–1129 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] Huda, Tewfiq ( also Tawfiq) Abd El, 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 704 n [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , and Doc. 357 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 782 n [ Pg. 782 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 859 n [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] Hudson, Maj., 997 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 548 ] Hudson, Manley O., 18–20 [ Pgs. 18–20 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 36–37 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41–42 [ Pgs. 41–42 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 44–47 [ Pgs. 44–47 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 53–54 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] Humelsine, Carlisle H., 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] Hurd, Volney, 1543 [ Pg. 1543 includes portions of Doc. 847 and Doc. 848 ] Husseini, Haj Amin al-, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 435 ] Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 31–32 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 43–45 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 101–102 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44 ] , 114–117 [ Pgs. 114–117 include portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 119–120 [ Pgs. 119–120 include portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 329 n [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 907–909 [ Pgs. 907–909 include portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1112–1114 [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1116 [ Pg. 1116 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1122–1130 [ Pgs. 1122–1130 include portions of Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 1132–1133 [ Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1136–1139 [ Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1141 [ Pg. 1141 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1146–1155 [ Pgs. 1146–1155 include portions of Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , and Doc. 639 ] , 1157–1159 [ Pgs. 1157–1159 include portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 1161 n [ Pg. 1161 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1163–1164 [ Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1166 n [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1169–1170 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] , 1172–1174 [ Pgs. 1172–1174 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 1178–1179 [ Pgs. 1178–1179 include portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 1185–1188 [ Pgs. 1185–1188 include portions of Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] , 1190–1193 [ Pgs. 1190–1193 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 1197–1199 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 1205 [ Pg. 1205 is part of Doc. 669 ] , 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 1219–1220 [ Pgs. 1219–1220 include portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] Iceland, 1656 [ Pg. 1656 includes portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] Ikramullah, Mohammed, 1431 n [ Pg. 1431 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] Ince, Refik Sevket, 1263 n [ Pg. 1263 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 1280 [ Pg. 1280 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1281 n [ Pg. 1281 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1282 [ Pg. 1282 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1293 n [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 1328 [ Pg. 1328 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1344–1345 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1350–1354 [ Pgs. 1350–1354 include portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] India ( see also Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and Indian subheadings under individual countries and subjects ): Agreements with the United States concerning: Educational exchange program, Feb. 2, 1950 , 1483 [ Pg. 1483 is part of India ] ; technical cooperation, Dec. 28, 1950 , 1483 [ Pg. 1483 is part of India ] British military assistance, 198–200 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 88 ] British policy, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] Chinese People’s Republic, policy toward, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 202–203 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1474–1475 [ Pgs. 1474–1475 include portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] , 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 833 ] Commonwealth role, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1495 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 837 ] Communist movement and strength, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1390 [ Pg. 1390 is part of Doc. 776 ] , 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 825 ] , 1466–1467 [ Pgs. 1466–1467 include portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] East Pakistan, communal disturbances in, 1389–1391 [ Pgs. 1389–1391 include portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1395–1401 [ Pgs. 1395–1401 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] , 1403 [ Pg. 1403 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1406–1408 [ Pgs. 1406–1408 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] Economic situation, 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 1476–1478 [ Pg. 1476 is part of Doc. 833 ] Food shortages, 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] Foreign policy, 240–241 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 825 ] , 1466–1475 [ Pgs. 1466–1475 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] , 1480–1481 [ Pgs. 1480–1481 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , and Doc. 835 ] , 1821 [ Pg. 1821 is part of Doc. 974 ] International Bank loans, 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1464 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 826 ] , 1477 [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. 833 ] Neutrality policy, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] Pakistan, relations with, 196–200 [ Pgs. 196–200 include portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 1406–1407 [ Pg. 1406 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1478–1479 [ Pg. 1478 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1492–1493 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1498–1500 [ Pgs. 1498–1500 include portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] Political situation, 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 99 ] Regional South Asian and Southeast Asian organization, attitude toward, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] Security of, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] Soviet Union, policy toward, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 1476 [ Pg. 1476 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] U.N. technical assistance, 1477 [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. 833 ] United States, attitude toward, 1461–1466 [ Pgs. 1461–1466 include portions of Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , and Doc. 827 ] U.S. arms sales to, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 1414 [ Pg. 1414 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 1461–1462 [ Pgs. 1461–1462 include portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] , 1464–1465 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 826 ] , 1469–1470 [ Pgs. 1469–1470 include portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] , 1477–1478 [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. 833 ] U.S. military air transit rights, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 99 ] U.S. military assistance, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 1475 [ Pg. 1475 is part of Doc. 832 ] , 1478 [ Pg. 1478 is part of Doc. 833 ] U.S. policy, 243–244 [ Pgs. 243–244 include portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 1464–1466 [ Pgs. 1464–1466 include portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 1476–1482 [ Pgs. 1476–1482 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , and Doc. 835 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] U.S. wheat loan, negotiations concerning, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 1461 [ Pg. 1461 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] , 1464–1465 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 826 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] Indochina: Chinese People’s Republic, policy of, 1481 [ Pg. 1481 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] ; French policy and position, 1565 [ Pg. 1565 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1571 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] ; Indian policy, 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 833 ] ; Indonesian policy, 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 827 ] ; situation in, 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1745 [ Pg. 1745 is part of Doc. 944 ] ; Soviet policy, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 1480 [ Pg. 1480 is part of Doc. 833 ] ; U.S. policy, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1468 [ Pg. 1468 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] ; Viet Minh, 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 827 ] Indonesia, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 827 ] Inönü, Ismet, 1158 n [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1239 n [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 1240–1247 [ Pgs. 1240–1247 include portions of Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , and Doc. 692 ] , 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 693 ] , 1262 [ Pg. 1262 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 1263 n [ Pg. 1263 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] Institute of Latin American Affairs, 1511 [ Pg. 1511 is part of Doc. 841 ] Interior, U.S. Department of the, 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 is part of Doc. 77 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 209–210 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] , 449–450 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 454–456 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 597–598 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 606–608 [ Pgs. 606–608 include portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 639–643 [ Pgs. 639–643 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 1206 [ Pg. 1206 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 1212 [ Pg. 1212 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] , 1218 [ Pg. 1218 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] , 1268 n [ Pg. 1268 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1464 [ Pg. 1464 is part of Doc. 826 ] , 1477 [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1493–1494 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1499 [ Pg. 1499 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1697 [ Pg. 1697 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 1705 [ Pg. 1705 is part of Doc. 919 ] , 1844–1845 [ Pg. 1844 is part of Doc. 988 ] International Bechtel, Inc., 1166–1168 [ Pgs. 1166–1168 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1171–1172 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 643 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] International Civil Aviation Organization, 263–264 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1495 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 837 ] International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 1785 [ Pg. 1785 is part of Doc. 963 ] International Court of Justice, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 998 [ Pg. 998 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 1448 [ Pg. 1448 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 1452 [ Pg. 1452 is part of Doc. 818 ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 1739 [ Pg. 1739 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1754–1755 [ Pgs. 1754–1755 include portions of Doc. 948 and Doc. 949 ] , 1757–1759 [ Pgs. 1757–1759 include portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] , 1814 [ Pg. 1814 is part of Doc. 972 ] , 1820–1821 [ Pg. 1820 is part of Doc. 974 ] , 1828 [ Pg. 1828 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] International Islamic Economic Conference at Karachi, 1949 , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 89 ] International Labor Organization, 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] International Monetary Fund, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 1477 [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 837 ] International Red Cross Committee, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 892 n [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] International Refugee Organization, 350–351 [ Pgs. 350–351 include portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 892 n [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] Iran ( see also Iranian subheadings under Foreign Ministers meeting at London, Korean war, and United Nations: Security Council): Agreements with the United States concerning: American Advisory Mission to Imperial Ministry of War, Nov. 29, 1949 and Jan. 10, 1950 , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 294 ] ; memorandum of understanding for technical cooperation on rural improvement, Oct. 19, 1950 , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 294 ] ; Mutual Defense Assistance agreement, May 23, 1950 , 542 n [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 551–552 [ Pgs. 551–552 include portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 294 ] ; U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Army, Sept. 17 and Nov. 18, 1950 , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] American Advisory Mission to Imperial Minister of War, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] Anglo-American discussions concerning, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 233–235 [ Pgs. 233–235 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 529–532 [ Pgs. 529–532 include portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 540–541 [ Pgs. 540–541 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] , 545–548 [ Pgs. 545–548 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , and Doc. 244 ] , 550–551 [ Pgs. 550–551 include portions of Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , and Doc. 247 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 591–602 [ Pgs. 591–602 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279 ] , 610–611 [ Pgs. 610–611 include portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, negotiations regarding concession of the, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 14–15 [ Pgs. 14–15 include portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 85–86 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 97–99 [ Pgs. 97–99 include portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 264–265 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 460–464 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 494–496 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 527–532 [ Pgs. 527–532 include portions of Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , and Doc. 237 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 545–548 [ Pgs. 545–548 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , and Doc. 244 ] , 550–551 [ Pgs. 550–551 include portions of Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , and Doc. 247 ] , 556–558 [ Pgs. 556–558 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , and Doc. 251 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 562–564 [ Pgs. 562–564 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] , 566–571 [ Pgs. 566–571 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 576–585 [ Pgs. 576–585 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 594–597 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 606–612 [ Pgs. 606–612 include portions of Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , and Doc. 285 ] , 614–615 [ Pgs. 614–615 include portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 617–618 [ Pgs. 617–618 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 631–635 [ Pgs. 631–635 include portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] Armed forces, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] Azerbaijan, 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 1848 [ Pg. 1848 is part of Index ] Bahrein, claim to, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] British Broadcasting Corporation, termination of relays by, 615 n [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 293 ] British policy toward and relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 190–191 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 558–559 [ Pgs. 558–559 include portions of Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] , 561–562 [ Pgs. 561–562 include portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 609–615 [ Pgs. 609–615 include portions of Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] , 617–618 [ Pgs. 617–618 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 634–635 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] Chinese People’s Republic, policy toward, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] Communist movement and strength, 3–5 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 492–494 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 510–511 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 286 ] Economic and financial situation, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 492–497 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 231 ] , 512–516 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 518–519 [ Pgs. 518–519 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 522–523 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 527–528 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 532–537 [ Pgs. 532–537 include portions of Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239 ] , 539 [ Pg. 539 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Economic development plan, seven-year, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 462–463 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 465–467 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 479–480 [ Pgs. 479–480 include portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 493–497 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 512–514 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 539–540 [ Pgs. 539–540 include portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 288 ] Farsi Island, claim to, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 42 ] Food shortages, 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Gendarmerie , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] Helmand River Delta commission, report of, 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 1459–1460 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 824 ] International Bank: Proposed loan, 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 277 ] ; survey mission, 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 606–608 [ Pgs. 606–608 include portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Joint declaration by President Truman and the Shah, 1949 , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] Kurdish minority, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1348 [ Pg. 1348 is part of Doc. 752 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, question of relationship to, 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 1299 [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 1309 [ Pg. 1309 is part of Doc. 730 ] Pakistan, relations with, 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 837 ] Petroleum production and resources, 77–78 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 290 ] Pipeline projects, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] Political situation, 260–261 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 461–464 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 479–482 [ Pgs. 479–482 include portions of Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , and Doc. 219 ] , 490–492 [ Pgs. 490–492 include portions of Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , and Doc. 224 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 503–505 [ Pgs. 503–505 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229 ] , 510–513 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 518–519 [ Pgs. 518–519 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 522–523 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 530–531 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 548–550 [ Pgs. 548–550 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , and Doc. 246 ] , 557–565 [ Pgs. 557–565 include portions of Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 630–631 [ Pgs. 630–631 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Regional security pact, policy toward, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 210 ] Security of, 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 190–196 [ Pgs. 190–196 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 466–467 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 473–475 [ Pgs. 473–475 include portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 591–593 [ Pgs. 591–593 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 600–601 [ Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 1314–1315 [ Pgs. 1314–1315 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 1316 n [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 735 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 736 ] Soviet attack on, U.S. policy in event of, 572–575 [ Pgs. 572–575 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] Soviet policy, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 254–255 [ Pgs. 254–255 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 459–460 [ Pgs. 459–460 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 466–468 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 470–471 [ Pgs. 470–471 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , and Doc. 213 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 509–511 [ Pgs. 509–511 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 522–523 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 563–566 [ Pgs. 563–566 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] , 572–575 [ Pgs. 572–575 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 586–590 [ Pgs. 586–590 include portions of Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , and Doc. 275 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 626–627 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] Soviet Union, policy toward, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 504–505 [ Pgs. 504–505 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 510–511 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 615–616 [ Pgs. 615–616 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 293 ] Trade agreement with the Soviet Union, Nov. 4, 1950 , 615–616 [ Pgs. 615–616 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 293 ] Turkey, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 693 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 173–176 [ Pgs. 173–176 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 241–243 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 264–265 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 447–451 [ Pgs. 447–451 include portions of Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] , 454–457 [ Pgs. 454–457 include portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 496–499 [ Pg. 496 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 506–508 [ Pgs. 506–508 include portions of Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231 ] , 510–511 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 515–519 [ Pgs. 515–519 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 522–528 [ Pgs. 522–528 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 536–541 [ Pgs. 536–541 include portions of Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] , 547–551 [ Pgs. 547–551 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , and Doc. 247 ] , 555–556 [ Pgs. 555–556 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 559–560 [ Pgs. 559–560 include portions of Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 588–591 [ Pgs. 588–591 include portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 595–598 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 600–608 [ Pgs. 600–608 include portions of Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 612–614 [ Pgs. 612–614 include portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 616 n [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 617–619 [ Pgs. 617–619 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 624–629 [ Pgs. 624–629 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 631–632 [ Pgs. 631–632 include portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] U.S. military assistance, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 265–267 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 445–452 [ Pgs. 445–452 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] , 457–459 [ Pgs. 457–459 include portions of Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 465–472 [ Pgs. 465–472 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , and Doc. 213 ] , 474–481 [ Pgs. 474–481 include portions of Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , and Doc. 218 ] , 483–490 [ Pgs. 483–490 include portions of Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , and Doc. 223 ] , 500–502 [ Pgs. 500–502 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 506–508 [ Pgs. 506–508 include portions of Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 517–519 [ Pgs. 517–519 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 522–524 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 526–528 [ Pgs. 526–528 include portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 530–531 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 541–545 [ Pgs. 541–545 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 551–556 [ Pgs. 551–556 include portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 575–576 [ Pgs. 575–576 include portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 605–606 [ Pgs. 605–606 include portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 286 ] , 619–624 [ Pgs. 619–624 include portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 1163 [ Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1191 [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1248 [ Pg. 1248 includes portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693 ] , 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1314 [ Pg. 1314 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 1317 [ Pg. 1317 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Army, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 225 ] U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Gendarmerie , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 231 ] U.S. policy, 4–5 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 154–155 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 234–235 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 254–261 [ Pgs. 254–261 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 264–267 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 447–448 [ Pgs. 447–448 include portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 453–454 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 465–471 [ Pgs. 465–471 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , and Doc. 213 ] , 474–475 [ Pgs. 474–475 include portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 503–507 [ Pgs. 503–507 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , and Doc. 231 ] , 519–520 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 524–525 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 533–534 [ Pgs. 533–534 include portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 562–563 [ Pgs. 562–563 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 614–618 [ Pgs. 614–618 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 1299 n [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 1307–1308 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1314–1315 [ Pgs. 1314–1315 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Visit to the United States by the Shah, 1949 , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 555–556 [ Pgs. 555–556 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] Voice of America, termination of relays by, 615–616 [ Pgs. 615–616 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 293 ] Iraq ( see also Iraqi subheadings under Palestine question and United Nations: General Assembly): Anglo-American consultations concerning, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 639–643 [ Pgs. 639–643 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 303 ] British arms sales to, 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 881 n [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] British bases and military forces, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 592–593 [ Pgs. 592–593 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 303 ] British economic and financial assistance, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 311 ] British military assistance, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 652 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 303 ] British policy and positions, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 211–212 [ Pgs. 211–212 include portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 639–643 [ Pgs. 639–643 include portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1199 [ Pg. 1199 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] Communist movement and strength, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 651–652 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 is part of Doc. 637 ] Egypt, relations with, 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] International Bank loan, proposed, 78 [ Pg. 78 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 456–457 [ Pgs. 456–457 include portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 639–642 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 652–653 [ Pg. 652 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] Iraq Petroleum Company concession, proposed changes in, 47–50 [ Pgs. 47–50 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 68–71 [ Pgs. 68–71 include portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , and Doc. 31 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 296 ] Israel, policy toward, 655–656 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] Jews, situation of, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 764–765 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 553 ] Jordan, relations with, 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] Kurdish minority, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 226–228 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 651–652 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1348 [ Pg. 1348 is part of Doc. 752 ] Petroleum policy, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] Petroleum production and resources, 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 653–654 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 303 ] Petroleum revenues, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] Pipeline negotiations, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] , 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 47–49 [ Pgs. 47–49 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 70 n [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 71 n [ Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 654–656 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] Political situation, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] Rearmament of, 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] Security of, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 303 ] Soviet policy, 651–652 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 303 ] Syria, proposed union with, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 157–158 [ Pgs. 157–158 include portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 285–286 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 636 n [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1144–1145 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1171 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 643 ] , 1201–1202 [ Pgs. 1201–1202 include portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 1206–1210 [ Pgs. 1206–1210 include portions of Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] , 1214 n [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1216–1218 [ Pgs. 1216–1218 include portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 680 ] United States, attitude toward, 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 636–638 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 644–646 [ Pgs. 644–646 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 682–683 [ Pgs. 682–683 include portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 1227 [ Pg. 1227 is part of Doc. 682 ] U.S. military assistance, proposed, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 300 and Doc. 301 ] U.S. policy, 643 [ Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 297 ] , 651–657 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 is part of Doc. 618 ] Iraq Petroleum Company, 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 47–52 [ Pgs. 47–52 include portions of Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 68–71 [ Pgs. 68–71 include portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , and Doc. 31 ] , 82–85 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 639–641 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 653–654 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 303 ] Ireland, Philip W., 883–888 [ Pgs. 883–888 include portions of Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , and Doc. 466 ] Islami, Abbas, 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Ispahani, M.A.H., 1392–1394 [ Pgs. 1392–1394 include portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 1431 n [ Pg. 1431 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1435 [ Pg. 1435 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1437 n [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 810 ] , 1457–1458 [ Pgs. 1457–1458 include portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] Israel ( see also Israeli subheadings under Korean war, Palestine question, United Nations: General Assembly, and United Nations: Security Council): Agreements with the United States concerning: Air transport, June 13, 1950 , 1087–1090 [ Pgs. 1087–1090 include portions of Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , and Doc. 621 ] ; copyright arrangement, May 4, 1950 , 1088–1089 [ Pgs. 1088–1089 include portions of Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , and Doc. 620 ] Arab economic boycott of, 655–656 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 781–782 [ Pgs. 781–782 include portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , and Doc. 388 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] Arab minority, treatment of, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] Arab states, nonrecognition by, 732 [ Pg. 732 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 443 ] Armed forces, 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 480 ] Armistice agreements with Arab states, 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 882–883 [ Pgs. 882–883 include portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] Arms sales, discussions concerning, 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1083–1086 [ Pgs. 1083–1086 include portions of Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , and Doc. 617 ] British arms sales, question of, 187 n [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 84 ] 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 475 ] British policy, 195–196 [ Pgs. 195–196 include portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 869 [ Pg. 869 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] Communist movement and strength, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 539 ] Consular exequaturs in Jerusalem, policies concerning, 686–689 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 321 ] Egyptian policy, 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 885–886 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] Foreign policy, 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 221–222 [ Pgs. 221–222 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 225–228 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 272–274 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 961–962 [ Pgs. 961–962 include portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 987–988 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 1083–1086 [ Pgs. 1083–1086 include portions of Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , and Doc. 617 ] General Zionist party, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] Haifa pipeline, negotiations regarding proposed reopening of, 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 47–49 [ Pgs. 47–49 include portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 70 n [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 71 n [ Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 654–656 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 303 ] Haifa refinery, policy toward, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] Immigration policy and program, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 273–274 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 742–743 [ Pgs. 742–743 include portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 960–961 [ Pgs. 960–961 include portions of Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , and Doc. 520 ] , 965–966 [ Pgs. 965–966 include portions of Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , and Doc. 524 ] , 967 n [ Pg. 967 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 1005–1006 [ Pgs. 1005–1006 include portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 1034–1035 [ Pgs. 1034–1035 include portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 1078–1079 [ Pg. 1078 is part of Doc. 613 ] Iraqi policy, 655–656 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] Jerusalem, efforts to establish capital at, 667–668 [ Pgs. 667–668 include portions of Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , and Doc. 310 ] , 686–689 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 706–707 [ Pgs. 706–707 include portions of Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 990–991 [ Pgs. 990–991 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 1014 [ Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] , 1028 n [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 571 ] Jordan, relations with, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] Mapai party, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 967 n [ Pg. 967 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] Mapam party, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 539 ] Political situation, 272–273 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] Security of, 151 [ Pg. 151 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 194–196 [ Pgs. 194–196 include portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 224–225 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 740–743 [ Pgs. 740–743 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , and Doc. 357 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 667 ] Situation in, 217–218 [ Pgs. 217–218 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Soviet policy, 988 [ Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 539 ] Syrian-Iraqi union, attitude toward proposed, 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 1208–1209 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 670 ] Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the United States, negotiations concerning, 1090–1093 [ Pgs. 1090–1093 include portions of Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , and Doc. 622 ] Tripartite declaration of May 25, 1950 , reaction to, 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 is part of Doc. 78 ] U.S. Ambassador, proposed appointment of, 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 1007–1008 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 554 ] U.S. arms sales and shipments, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 134–138 [ Pgs. 134–138 include portions of Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 161–164 [ Pgs. 161–164 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 166 [ Pg. 166 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 292–293 [ Pgs. 292–293 include portions of Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , and Doc. 110 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 includes portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 713–715 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 724–725 [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 737 n [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 743–744 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 779–780 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 791–994 [ Pgs. 791–994 include portions of Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 818 [ Pg. 818 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417 ] , 847–850 [ Pgs. 847–850 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 881–883 [ Pgs. 881–883 include portions of Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , and Doc. 465 ] , 891–892 [ Pgs. 891–892 include portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 905–906 [ Pgs. 905–906 include portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 913–916 [ Pgs. 913–916 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , and Doc. 482 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 942–943 [ Pgs. 942–943 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , and Doc. 505 ] , 960 [ Pg. 960 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] , 967–968 [ Pgs. 967–968 include portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 1002–1003 [ Pgs. 1002–1003 include portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , and Doc. 599 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1204 [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 169–170 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 242–243 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 283 [ Pg. 283 is part of Doc. 105 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 637–638 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 671–672 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 960–961 [ Pgs. 960–961 include portions of Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , and Doc. 520 ] , 966–967 [ Pgs. 966–967 include portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 972 [ Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] U.S. military assistance, 126 [ Pg. 126 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 148–149 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 220–221 [ Pgs. 220–221 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 1077–1078 [ Pgs. 1077–1078 include portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 is part of Doc. 613 ] U.S. policy, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 222–223 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 667–668 [ Pgs. 667–668 include portions of Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , and Doc. 310 ] , 763–766 [ Pgs. 763–766 include portions of Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 895–897 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 990–991 [ Pgs. 990–991 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 1002–1009 [ Pgs. 1002–1009 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , and Doc. 555 ] , 1014 [ Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] , 1101 [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1106–1107 [ Pgs. 1106–1107 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1211 n [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Italian colonies, former ( see also Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Libya and under United Nations: General Assembly): British expenditures in, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 89 ] ; disposition of, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1517–1518 [ Pg. 1517 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1571–1572 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1577 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] ; Four-Power Commission, 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 1692 [ Pg. 1692 is part of Doc. 912 ] ; U.S. policy, 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] Italian Somaliland: Ethiopian position, 1640–1641 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1664 [ Pg. 1664 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1666–1667 [ Pgs. 1666–1667 include portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] , 1683 [ Pg. 1683 is part of Doc. 904 ] , 1689 [ Pg. 1689 includes portions of Doc. 909 and Doc. 910 ] , 1697 [ Pg. 1697 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 1699 [ Pg. 1699 includes portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] , 1701 [ Pg. 1701 includes portions of Doc. 916 and Doc. 917 ] ; Italian trusteeship, proposed, 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 1640 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1664 [ Pg. 1664 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1666 [ Pg. 1666 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1683 [ Pg. 1683 is part of Doc. 904 ] , 1688–1690 [ Pgs. 1688–1690 include portions of Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , and Doc. 910 ] , 1699 [ Pg. 1699 includes portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] ; trust territory proposals, 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 1517 [ Pg. 1517 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1577–1578 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 1640 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1664 [ Pg. 1664 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1666 [ Pg. 1666 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1688–1690 [ Pgs. 1688–1690 include portions of Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , and Doc. 910 ] ; U.N. Trusteeship Council meetings concerning, 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 1688–1690 [ Pgs. 1688–1690 include portions of Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , and Doc. 910 ] ; U.S. policy, 1641–1642 [ Pgs. 1641–1642 include portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Italy ( see also Italian subheadings under Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Libya), 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 350–351 [ Pgs. 350–351 include portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 1163 [ Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1242 [ Pg. 1242 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1300–1301 [ Pgs. 1300–1301 include portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 1345 [ Pg. 1345 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1347–1348 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1534 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1577 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1640–1641 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1643 [ Pg. 1643 is part of Doc. 888 ] , 1657 [ Pg. 1657 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1699 [ Pg. 1699 includes portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] , 1703–1704 [ Pg. 1703 is part of Doc. 919 ] , 1743 [ Pg. 1743 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1795 [ Pg. 1795 is part of Doc. 965 ] Ivory Coast, 1560 [ Pg. 1560 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1562–1564 [ Pg. 1562 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1727–1728 [ Pg. 1727 is part of Doc. 936 ] Jaber, Saleh, 781 [ Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] Jackling, Roger, 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Jackson, Basil R., 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] Jackson, W. G., 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , and Doc. 5 ] , 1638 [ Pg. 1638 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] Jacquet, Raymond, 1802–1805 [ Pgs. 1802–1805 include portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] Jaffar, Dhia, 68 n [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Jamali, Mohamed Fadhil al-, 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] Japan, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1477 [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1495 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 837 ] Japanese peace treaty, 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] Javits, Jacob K., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 331 ] , 712–715 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 1122–1123 [ Pgs. 1122–1123 include portions of Doc. 629 and Doc. 630 ] Jenkins, Maj. Gen. Reuben E., 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 380–382 [ Pgs. 380–382 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 387–390 [ Pgs. 387–390 include portions of Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 403 [ Pg. 403 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 423–425 [ Pgs. 423–425 include portions of Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 439 n [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 1345 [ Pg. 1345 is part of Doc. 752 ] Jennings, Brewster, 22–23 [ Pgs. 22–23 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] Jernegan, John D., 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 359–362 [ Pgs. 359–362 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 473–475 [ Pgs. 473–475 include portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 482–485 [ Pgs. 482–485 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , and Doc. 221 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 500–501 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] , 1238 n [ Pg. 1238 includes portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 1260 [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 702 and Doc. 703 ] , 1303 n [ Pg. 1303 is part of Doc. 726 ] , 1781–1782 [ Pgs. 1781–1782 include portions of Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , and Doc. 963 ] , 1786–1788 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1790–1791 [ Pg. 1790 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1797–1805 [ Pgs. 1797–1805 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , and Doc. 968 ] , 1807 n [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] Jerusalem. See under Israel, Palestine question, and United Nations: General Assembly. Jessup, Philip C., 141–146 [ Pgs. 141–146 include portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] , 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 217–218 [ Pgs. 217–218 include portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 230–231 [ Pgs. 230–231 include portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 233–238 [ Pgs. 233–238 include portions of Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 526 n [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1390–1391 [ Pg. 1390 is part of Doc. 776 ] , 1663–1664 [ Pgs. 1663–1664 include portions of Doc. 898 and Doc. 899 ] Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 837 ] Johnson, Col., 1159 [ Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 641 ] Johnson, Col. Douglas V., 1241 [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] Johnson, George, 1113 [ Pg. 1113 is part of Doc. 627 ] Johnson, Herschel, 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] Johnson, Jesse C., 1844 n [ Pg. 1844 is part of Doc. 988 ] , 1845 [ Pg. 1845 is part of Doc. 988 ] Johnson, Louis: Iran, U.S. military assistance for, 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] Liberia, U.S. military assistance for, 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1727 n [ Pg. 1727 is part of Doc. 936 ] Libya, U.S. military base rights in, 1623 [ Pg. 1623 is part of Doc. 876 ] Near East: Arms shipments to, 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 891–892 [ Pgs. 891–892 include portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 942–943 [ Pgs. 942–943 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , and Doc. 505 ] ; security of, 141 n [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] Pakistan, U.S. military assistance for, 1415 [ Pg. 1415 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] Saudi Arabia: Dhahran airbase agreement, extension of, 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 1129–1130 [ Pgs. 1129–1130 include portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] ; Joint U.S. Survey Group, report of, 1112 n [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1159 [ Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 641 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 1126 n [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] Turkey: General staff talks, proposed, 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 688 ] ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, proposed membership in, 1306 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1309 n [ Pg. 1309 is part of Doc. 730 ] ; U.S. military assistance for, 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] Union of South Africa, U.S. relations with, 1826 [ Pg. 1826 includes portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] , 1833 [ Pg. 1833 is part of Doc. 982 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.: Africa, U.S. policy toward, 1524 n [ Pg. 1524 is part of Doc. 845 ] Anglo-American military talks, Oct 1960 , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 610–611 [ Pgs. 610–611 include portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Egypt, British relations with, 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] Greece: Armed forces, strength of, 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 439 n [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] Iran, U.S. military assistance for, 447 n [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 484 n [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 290 ] Liberia, U.S. military assistance for, 1730–1733 [ Pgs. 1730–1733 include portions of Doc. 937 , Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , and Doc. 941 ] Libya, U.S. military base rights in, 1623–1624 [ Pgs. 1623–1624 include portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] Near and Middle East: Arms shipments to, 134 n [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 60 ] ; U.S. forces, proposed commitment of, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 122–123 [ Pgs. 122–123 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Saudi Arabia: Joint U.S. Survey Group, report of, 1112 n [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1121–1124 [ Pgs. 1121–1124 include portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 1126 [ Pg. 1126 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 1136 [ Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1159 [ Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1164 [ Pg. 1164 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1176–1177 [ Pgs. 1176–1177 include portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 1187 [ Pg. 1187 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] ; U.S. military assistance for, 1130 n [ Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 635 ] 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 645 ] , 1184–1185 [ Pgs. 1184–1185 include portions of Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , and Doc. 654 ] , 1199 [ Pg. 1199 is part of Doc. 664 ] Turkey: General staff talks, proposed, 1238 [ Pg. 1238 includes portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] ; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, proposed membership in, 1306–1309 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 730 ] ; strategic military role of, 1346 [ Pg. 1346 is part of Doc. 752 ] ; U.S. military assistance for, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 100 ] Jones, G. Lewis, 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 1082–1083 [ Pgs. 1082–1083 include portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , and Doc. 615 ] , 1194 [ Pg. 1194 includes portions of Doc. 661 and Doc. 662 ] Jones, Malcolm H., 1459 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 824 ] Jones, Owen T., 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1218 n [ Pg. 1218 is part of Doc. 676 ] Jooste, G. P., 1813–1814 [ Pgs. 1813–1814 include portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 1823 [ Pg. 1823 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] , 1826 n [ Pg. 1826 includes portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] , 1827 [ Pg. 1827 includes portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] , 1829 [ Pg. 1829 is part of Doc. 980 ] , 1837 [ Pg. 1837 includes portions of Doc. 983 and Doc. 984 ] , 1839 [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] , 1841–1843 [ Pgs. 1841–1843 include portions of Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , and Doc. 987 ] Jordan ( see also Jordanian subheadings under Korean war, Palestine question, and United Nations: General Assembly): Arab Legion, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 includes portions of Doc. 545 and Doc. 546 ] , 997 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 1065–1066 [ Pgs. 1065–1066 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 603 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] British arms sales, 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 881 n [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] British bases and military forces, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] British military assistance, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] British policy, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 531 ] , 1094–1095 [ Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1098–1099 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 is part of Doc. 624 ] Communist party, status of, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] Economic and financial situation, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 1097–1098 [ Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 623 ] Egypt, relations with, 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] Greater Syria proposals, 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1216 [ Pg. 1216 is part of Doc. 675 ] , 1218 [ Pg. 1218 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] Iraq, relations with, 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] Israel, relations with, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] Palestine, Arab: Annexation of, proposed, 770 [ Pg. 770 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 771 n [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 845–846 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 857 [ Pg. 857 is part of Doc. 445 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 452 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 531 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 1095–1097 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] ; union with, 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 859–860 [ Pgs. 859–860 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 868–876 [ Pgs. 868–876 include portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 941–942 [ Pgs. 941–942 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] Petroleum concessions, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 18 ] Petroleum policy, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] Political situation, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , and Doc. 386 ] , 781–784 [ Pgs. 781–784 include portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , and Doc. 391 ] , 789–790 [ Pgs. 789–790 include portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 941–942 [ Pgs. 941–942 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] Rearmament of, 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 355 ] Saudi Arabia, relations with, 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1134–1135 [ Pg. 1134 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1138 [ Pg. 1138 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 637 ] Syria, relations with, 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] Syrian-Iraqi union, attitude toward proposed, 1208–1209 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 670 ] U.N. membership, proposed, 1097 [ Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] , 1097–1098 [ Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 623 ] U.S. policy, 1094–1099 [ Pg. 1094 is part of Doc. 623 ] Juin, Marshal of the Army Alphonse, 1571 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1752 [ Pg. 1752 includes portions of Doc. 946 and Doc. 947 ] , 1761–1763 [ Pgs. 1761–1763 include portions of Doc. 951 and Doc. 952 ] Juliana, Queen of the Netherlands, 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Jundi, Col. A. Sidki, 997–998 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 585 ] Kabler, Capt. William L., 1254 [ Pg. 1254 is part of Doc. 697 ] , 1267 [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Kahany, Menahem, 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] Kahn, Sam, 1827 n [ Pg. 1827 includes portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] , 1835 [ Pg. 1835 is part of Doc. 983 ] Kallas, Lt. Col. Bahij, 1216 [ Pg. 1216 is part of Doc. 675 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] Kallerghi, John D., 367 [ Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Kanellopoulos ( also Canellopoulos), Papayotis 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 142 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] Kaplan, Eliezer, 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] Karamanlis, Constantine, 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Karan Island, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] Karaosmanoǧlue, Fevzi, Lütfi, 1288 [ Pg. 1288 is part of Doc. 718 ] Karst, Raymond W., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Kartalis, George, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] Karu Island, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan ( see also under United Nations: General Assembly and United Nations: Security Council): Australian position, 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] British position, 1363 [ Pg. 1363 is part of Doc. 758 ] , 1382 [ Pg. 1382 includes portions of Doc. 769 and Doc. 770 ] , 1385–1387 [ Pgs. 1385–1387 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 1397 [ Pg. 1397 includes portions of Doc. 780 and Doc. 781 ] , 1399 [ Pg. 1399 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] , 1404 [ Pg. 1404 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 1428 [ Pg. 1428 is part of Doc. 805 ] , 1439–1444 [ Pgs. 1439–1444 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , and Doc. 814 ] Canadian position, 1363–1364 [ Pgs. 1363–1364 include portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1376–1377 [ Pgs. 1376–1377 include portions of Doc. 767 and Doc. 768 ] , 1385 [ Pg. 1385 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] Cease-fire arrangements, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1382 [ Pg. 1382 includes portions of Doc. 769 and Doc. 770 ] , 1388–1389 [ Pgs. 1388–1389 include portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] Communist influence, 1433–1435 [ Pgs. 1433–1435 include portions of Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , and Doc. 810 ] Constituent assembly, Kashmir national conference resolution regarding formation of, 1440–1442 [ Pgs. 1440–1442 include portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1444 n [ Pg. 1444 includes portions of Doc. 813 and Doc. 814 ] Cuban position, 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] Demilitarization proposals, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1365 [ Pg. 1365 is part of Doc. 759 ] , 1367–1383 [ Pgs. 1367–1383 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 1385 [ Pg. 1385 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 1388–1389 [ Pgs. 1388–1389 include portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1393 [ Pg. 1393 is part of Doc. 777 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 1415 [ Pg. 1415 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1417 [ Pg. 1417 is part of Doc. 797 ] , 1436 [ Pg. 1436 is part of Doc. 810 ] Ecuadoran position, 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] Elections in Kashmir, proposed, 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 1441 [ Pg. 1441 includes portions of Doc. 811 and Doc. 812 ] French position, 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] Independence proposals, 1381 [ Pg. 1381 is part of Doc. 769 ] , 1434–1435 [ Pgs. 1434–1435 include portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] Indian position, 197–198 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 201–202 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1363–1367 [ Pgs. 1363–1367 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. 761 ] , 1369–1374 [ Pgs. 1369–1374 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , and Doc. 765 ] , 1377–1384 [ Pgs. 1377–1384 include portions of Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , and Doc. 771 ] , 1387–1388 [ Pgs. 1387–1388 include portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 1391–1393 [ Pgs. 1391–1393 include portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1409 [ Pg. 1409 is part of Doc. 792 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 1415–1421 [ Pgs. 1415–1421 include portions of Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , and Doc. 800 ] , 1423–1426 [ Pgs. 1423–1426 include portions of Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , and Doc. 804 ] , 1428–1430 [ Pgs. 1428–1430 include portions of Doc. 805 and Doc. 806 ] , 1433 [ Pg. 1433 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1436–1442 [ Pgs. 1436–1442 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1462 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 825 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] Meetings between Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan at New Delhi: April 8, 1950 , 1406–1407 [ Pg. 1406 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1409–1410 [ Pgs. 1409–1410 include portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 1412–1414 [ Pgs. 1412–1414 include portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] ; July 20–24, 1950 , 1415–1417 [ Pgs. 1415–1417 include portions of Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , and Doc. 797 ] National conference party, 1434 [ Pg. 1434 is part of Doc. 809 ] Norwegian position, 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 811 ] Pakistan position, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1364 [ Pg. 1364 includes portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1366–1367 [ Pgs. 1366–1367 include portions of Doc. 760 and Doc. 761 ] , 1372 [ Pg. 1372 includes portions of Doc. 763 and Doc. 764 ] , 1376 [ Pg. 1376 includes portions of Doc. 767 and Doc. 768 ] , 1378–1383 [ Pgs. 1378–1383 include portions of Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 1394–1395 [ Pgs. 1394–1395 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , and Doc. 779 ] , 1402–1403 [ Pgs. 1402–1403 include portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] , 1414 [ Pg. 1414 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1417 [ Pg. 1417 is part of Doc. 797 ] , 1419–1423 [ Pgs. 1419–1423 include portions of Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , and Doc. 802 ] , 1429–1431 [ Pgs. 1429–1431 include portions of Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 1436–1439 [ Pgs. 1436–1439 include portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 1441 [ Pg. 1441 includes portions of Doc. 811 and Doc. 812 ] , 1442 n [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 1443–1444 [ Pgs. 1443–1444 include portions of Doc. 813 and Doc. 814 ] , 1446–1447 [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1498 [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] Partition proposals, 201–202 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1367–1368 [ Pgs. 1367–1368 include portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 1381 [ Pg. 1381 is part of Doc. 769 ] , 1383–1384 [ Pgs. 1383–1384 include portions of Doc. 770 and Doc. 771 ] , 1386–1387 [ Pgs. 1386–1387 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1417–1422 [ Pgs. 1417–1422 include portions of Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , and Doc. 801 ] , 1424–1427 [ Pgs. 1424–1427 include portions of Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , and Doc. 805 ] , 1430–1431 [ Pgs. 1430–1431 include portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1435–1436 [ Pgs. 1435–1436 include portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1438–1440 [ Pgs. 1438–1440 include portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] Plebiscite administrator, 1365 [ Pg. 1365 is part of Doc. 759 ] , 1388–1389 [ Pgs. 1388–1389 include portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1423 [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 1427–1428 [ Pgs. 1427–1428 include portions of Doc. 804 and Doc. 805 ] , 1436 [ Pg. 1436 is part of Doc. 810 ] Plebiscite proposals, 201–202 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1367–1368 [ Pgs. 1367–1368 include portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 1372–1373 [ Pgs. 1372–1373 include portions of Doc. 763 and Doc. 764 ] , 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 1379–1384 [ Pgs. 1379–1384 include portions of Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , and Doc. 771 ] , 1386–1388 [ Pgs. 1386–1388 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 1415–1431 [ Pgs. 1415–1431 include portions of Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 1433 [ Pg. 1433 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1435–1440 [ Pgs. 1435–1440 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , and Doc. 811 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] Soviet position, 1436 [ Pg. 1436 is part of Doc. 810 ] Troop movements along borders, 1394–1403 [ Pgs. 1394–1403 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , and Doc. 787 ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1409–1411 [ Pgs. 1409–1411 include portions of Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , and Doc. 794 ] U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan, 1362 n [ Pg. 1362 is part of Doc. 758 ] , 1367 [ Pg. 1367 is part of Doc. 761 ] , 1373 [ Pg. 1373 is part of Doc. 764 ] , 1378–1383 [ Pgs. 1378–1383 include portions of Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 1388–1389 [ Pgs. 1388–1389 include portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1392–1393 [ Pg. 1392 is part of Doc. 777 ] , 1436 [ Pg. 1436 is part of Doc. 810 ] , 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 811 ] U.N. military observers, 1380 [ Pg. 1380 is part of Doc. 769 ] U.N. Representative for India and Pakistan ( see also Dixon, Sir Owen), 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 201–202 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1362 n [ Pg. 1362 is part of Doc. 758 ] , 1383 [ Pg. 1383 is part of Doc. 770 ] , 1385–1389 [ Pgs. 1385–1389 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 1404–1405 [ Pgs. 1404–1405 include portions of Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , and Doc. 789 ] , 1411–1412 [ Pgs. 1411–1412 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , and Doc. 795 ] U.S. policy, 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1362 [ Pg. 1362 is part of Doc. 758 ] , 1365–1370 [ Pgs. 1365–1370 include portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , and Doc. 763 ] , 1375–1376 [ Pgs. 1375–1376 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 1382–1387 [ Pgs. 1382–1387 include portions of Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 1405 [ Pg. 1405 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] , 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1414 [ Pg. 1414 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1431–1432 [ Pgs. 1431–1432 include portions of Doc. 806 , Doc. 807 , and Doc. 808 ] , 1441–1442 [ Pgs. 1441–1442 include portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1462 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 825 ] , 1465 [ Pg. 1465 is part of Doc. 826 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1496–1498 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 839 ] Yugoslav position, 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 1436 [ Pg. 1436 is part of Doc. 810 ] Kasimatis, Gregory, 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 153 ] Katz, Milton, 1273 [ Pg. 1273 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] Kaukonen, Jorma L., 51 [ Pg. 51 includes portions of Doc. 18 and Doc. 19 ] Kaul, T. N., 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] , 1415 [ Pg. 1415 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] Keeley, James Hugh, 778–781 [ Pgs. 778–781 include portions of Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , and Doc. 387 ] , 804–805 [ Pgs. 804–805 include portions of Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , and Doc. 406 ] , 822–825 [ Pgs. 822–825 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] , 851–853 [ Pgs. 851–853 include portions of Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , and Doc. 443 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 906–908 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 475 ] , 933–934 [ Pgs. 933–934 include portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] , 1202–1206 [ Pgs. 1202–1206 include portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 1215 n [ Pg. 1215 includes portions of Doc. 674 and Doc. 675 ] Keen, James, 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] Keet, Lt. Col. Kalman, 820 n [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 418 ] Keith, Gerald, 1278 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] Kelley, Augustine B., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Kelley, Edna F., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Kelly, Henry H., 1581 n [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1582 [ Pg. 1582 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1586 [ Pg. 1586 is part of Doc. 862 ] Kennedy, Commander, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] Kennedy, Donald D., 147 n [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 66 ] Kennedy, Howard, 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 951–952 [ Pgs. 951–952 include portions of Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , and Doc. 514 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 1023–1024 [ Pgs. 1023–1024 include portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , and Doc. 583 ] Kenya, 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] Keren, Moshe, 723 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 789–791 [ Pgs. 789–791 include portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] , 1068 n [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] Kerr, Richard, 1113 [ Pg. 1113 is part of Doc. 627 ] Khairradin Bey, ( also Khairadeen) 1155–1157 [ Pgs. 1155–1157 include portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] Khalidi, Sabit Bey, 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] Kheiri, Khulusi, 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 340 ] Khermy, Abdul Gany, 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 537 ] Khomais, Bakur A., 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] Khouri, Faiz El-, 690 n [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 981–982 [ Pgs. 981–982 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] , 1212–1213 [ Pgs. 1212–1213 include portions of Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , and Doc. 673 ] King, Charles D. B., 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1722–1723 [ Pgs. 1722–1723 include portions of Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , and Doc. 933 ] , 1725 n [ Pg. 1725 is part of Doc. 934 ] , 1732 [ Pg. 1732 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] Kirk, Alan G., 374 n [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 588–589 [ Pgs. 588–589 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Kirkbride, Sir Alec S., 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 716–718 [ Pgs. 716–718 include portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , and Doc. 341 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 752–753 [ Pgs. 752–753 include portions of Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] , 774–775 [ Pgs. 774–775 include portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 890 n [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 917 n [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508 ] , 978–980 [ Pgs. 978–980 include portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 includes portions of Doc. 545 and Doc. 546 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 1064–1065 [ Pgs. 1064–1065 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , and Doc. 599 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 603 ] Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] Kitrilakis, Lt. Gen. Stylianos, 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] Klein, Arthur G., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Klopper, Brig. Gen. H. B., 1832 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 1839 [ Pg. 1839 includes portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Knight, Sir Henry, 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] Knight, W. L. C., 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Koenig, Brig. Gen. Egmont Francis, 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 225 ] Koenig, Gen. Marie-Pierre, 1774 [ Pg. 1774 is part of Doc. 956 ] Kollek, Theodore, 704 n [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 926 n [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 965 n [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 967 n [ Pg. 967 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 986–988 [ Pgs. 986–988 include portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] , 1014 [ Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] , 1083–1086 [ Pgs. 1083–1086 include portions of Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , and Doc. 617 ] Komisarov, Daniel Simonovitch, 459–460 [ Pgs. 459–460 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 224 ] Koplowitz, Wilfred, 1166–1168 [ Pgs. 1166–1168 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] Kopper, Samuel K. C., 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 211–212 [ Pgs. 211–212 include portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 271 n [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 843 ] , 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1539 n [ Pg. 1539 is part of Doc. 846 ] , 1551–1552 [ Pgs. 1551–1552 include portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 1573 n [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1633 [ Pg. 1633 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 1644 [ Pg. 1644 includes portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] , 1646 [ Pg. 1646 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1663 [ Pg. 1663 includes portions of Doc. 898 and Doc. 899 ] , 1678–1679 [ Pgs. 1678–1679 include portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1681 [ Pg. 1681 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 1747 [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 1776–1777 [ Pgs. 1776–1777 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] , 1786 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] Köprülü, Fuat, 1263 n [ Pg. 1263 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 1273 [ Pg. 1273 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 1275–1277 [ Pgs. 1275–1277 include portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 1280–1282 [ Pgs. 1280–1282 include portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] , 1285–1288 [ Pgs. 1285–1288 include portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] , 1295–1298 [ Pgs. 1295–1298 include portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 1310 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 1337–1338 [ Pgs. 1337–1338 include portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1345 [ Pg. 1345 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1351–1352 [ Pg. 1351 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 is part of Doc. 753 ] Korea, future status of, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] Korea, Republic of, U.S. military assistance for, 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] Korean war (see also under United Nations: General Assembly and United Nations: Security Council): Arab states, attitude of, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 227–228 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 93 ] ; British policy and position, 299–300 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 112 ] ; cease-fire proposals, 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] ; Chinese People’s Republic, intervention by the, 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1481–1482 [ Pgs. 1481–1482 include portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] ; Egyptian policy, 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , Ethiopian policy, 1698–1701 [ Pgs. 1698–1701 include portions of Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , and Doc. 917 ] ; Greek policy, 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 435–436 [ Pgs. 435–436 include portions of Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , and Doc. 195 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 is part of Doc. 199 ] ; Indian policy, 182–183 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1416 [ Pg. 1416 is part of Doc. 796 ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 827 ] ; Iranian reaction, 563–564 [ Pgs. 563–564 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] ; Israeli policy, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 227–228 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 961–962 [ Pgs. 961–962 include portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] ; Italian policy, 1657 [ Pg. 1657 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] ; Jordanian policy, 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] ; Lebanese policy, 1100–1102 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1110–1111 [ Pgs. 1110–1111 include portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] ; Pakistan policy, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1416 [ Pg. 1416 is part of Doc. 796 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] ; petroleum supplies for, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 38 ] ; Soviet policy, 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 1275–1276 [ Pgs. 1275–1276 include portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 1304 [ Pg. 1304 includes portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] ; Truman–Attlee meetings in Washington, 1337 n [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] ; Turkish policy, 1275–1276 [ Pgs. 1275–1276 include portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 1281–1282 [ Pg. 1281 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1285 n [ Pg. 1285 includes portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1286 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1288–1289 [ Pgs. 1288–1289 include portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 1312–1313 [ Pgs. 1312–1313 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1320 [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 1329 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1351–1353 [ Pgs. 1351–1353 include portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] ; Union of South African policy, 1831 [ Pg. 1831 is part of Doc. 981 ] , 1833–1834 [ Pgs. 1833–1834 include portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] , 1837 [ Pg. 1837 includes portions of Doc. 983 and Doc. 984 ] ; U.S. policy and position, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 402–403 [ Pgs. 402–403 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] , 414–415 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 1009–1010 [ Pgs. 1009–1010 include portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 1275–1276 [ Pgs. 1275–1276 include portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 1304 [ Pg. 1304 includes portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 1317 [ Pg. 1317 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1337 n [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1435 [ Pg. 1435 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1439 [ Pg. 1439 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 1468 [ Pg. 1468 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1657–1658 [ Pgs. 1657–1658 include portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1749 [ Pg. 1749 is part of Doc. 945 ] Kotzias, Constantine, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Kouny, Mohamed El, 982 n [ Pg. 982 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] Kreuz, Capt. Frank P., 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] Krim, Abd el, 1744–1745 [ Pg. 1744 is part of Doc. 944 ] Kubbar Island, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] Kuniholm, Bertel E., 1275 n [ Pg. 1275 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] Kurain Island, 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] Kural, Adnan, 1686 [ Pg. 1686 is part of Doc. 906 ] Kurdish problem, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 225–226 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 651–652 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 303 ] Kurtbek, Seyfi, 1312 [ Pg. 1312 is part of Doc. 732 ] Kuwait, 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 31–32 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 38–40 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 43–44 [ Pg. 43 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 77–78 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 1149 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] Kuwait Neutral Zone, 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 29–33 [ Pgs. 29–33 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Kuwait Oil Company, 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] Labbane, Abdel Shafi El, 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 982 n [ Pg. 982 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] Labonne, Eirik, 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] Labouisse, Henry R., 10 [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 12 n [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 5 ] , 33–34 [ Pgs. 33–34 include portions of Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 616 n [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Ladue, Col. L. K., 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] Lager, Albert F., 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 569 [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 259 and Doc. 260 ] Lalor, Adm. William George, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Lambrakis, Demetrius, 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Lapham, Roger D., 436–437 [ Pgs. 436–437 include portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Larabee, Byron H., 1706 n [ Pg. 1706 is part of Doc. 920 ] , 1708 n [ Pg. 1708 is part of Doc. 921 ] , 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1717–1719 [ Pgs. 1717–1719 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] Larsen, Lt. Col. Stanley R., 1158 n [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] Lascelles, Daniel W., 1644 n [ Pg. 1644 includes portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] , 1704 n [ Pg. 1704 is part of Doc. 919 ] Lash, Brig. Norman O., 997 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 548 ] Latham, Henry J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Laurentie, Henri, 1547–1548 [ Pg. 1547 is part of Doc. 853 ] Lavallee, Jerome R., 1544 n [ Pg. 1544 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 1547 [ Pg. 1547 is part of Doc. 853 ] Lawford, Valentine G., 460–461 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 209 ] Lawton, Frederick J., 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 606 ] Lay, James S., 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 163 n [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 220 n [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 954 n [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 1002 [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 1236 [ Pg. 1236 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 1317 [ Pg. 1317 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] Leach, R. S., 1457 n [ Pg. 1457 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] League of Nations, 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 1699 [ Pg. 1699 includes portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] , 1813 n [ Pg. 1813 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] League of Red Cross Societies, 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] Leavett, Alan, 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] Lebanon (see also Lebanese subheadings under Korean war, Palestine question, and United Nations: General Assembly): Communist movement and strength, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1107–1109 [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 1111 [ Pg. 1111 is part of Doc. 626 ] ; French influence, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 1335–1336 [ Pgs. 1335–1336 include portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] ; Israel, restrictions on shipping with, 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 746–747 [ Pgs. 746–747 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , and Doc. 360 ] ; Israeli visas, restrictions on, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] ; petroleum concession, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 18 ] ; petroleum policy, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] ; rearmament of, 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] ; regional security pact, policy toward, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 68 ] ; Syrian-Iraqi union, attitude toward proposed, 1208–1209 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 670 ] ; United States, attitude toward the, 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 1100–1102 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1106–1108 [ Pgs. 1106–1108 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] ; U.S. Legation, bombing of, Apr. 18, 1950 , 871 n [ Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] ; U.S. policy, 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] Lebdera, 1702 [ Pg. 1702 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] Lehman, Herbert, 799–802 [ Pgs. 799–802 include portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Lemnitzer, Maj. Gen. Lyman L., 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 475–478 [ Pgs. 475–478 include portions of Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , and Doc. 216 ] , 483 n [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 545 n [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 1182–1183 [ Pg. 1182 is part of Doc. 651 ] , 1234 [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 1270 [ Pg. 1270 is part of Doc. 709 ] , 1838 n [ Pg. 1838 is part of Doc. 984 ] , 1839–1841 [ Pgs. 1839–1841 include portions of Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] Lenahan, William J., 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] Lend-lease, 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 1478 [ Pg. 1478 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1696 [ Pg. 1696 includes portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] , 1712–1713 [ Pg. 1712 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1715 [ Pg. 1715 is part of Doc. 926 ] Le Rougetel, Sir John, 460–462 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 209 ] Lescuyer, Jean, 1310 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 731 ] Leslie, John, 1710 n [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] Letourneau, Jean, 1543–1545 [ Pgs. 1543–1545 include portions of Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , and Doc. 851 ] Lewis, Charles W., 1251 [ Pg. 1251 is part of Doc. 695 ] , 1292–1293 [ Pgs. 1292–1293 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] Liaquat Ali Khan, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1390 [ Pg. 1390 is part of Doc. 776 ] , 1395 n [ Pg. 1395 includes portions of Doc. 778 and Doc. 779 ] , 1396–1403 [ Pgs. 1396–1403 include portions of Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , and Doc. 787 ] , 1405–1422 [ Pgs. 1405–1422 include portions of Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , and Doc. 801 ] , 1425 [ Pg. 1425 includes portions of Doc. 802 and Doc. 803 ] , 1431–1433 [ Pgs. 1431–1433 include portions of Doc. 806 , Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , and Doc. 809 ] , 1443–1444 [ Pgs. 1443–1444 include portions of Doc. 813 and Doc. 814 ] , 1447 [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 1451 n [ Pg. 1451 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 1454 [ Pg. 1454 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] , 1468 [ Pg. 1468 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1497–1498 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] Liberia: Agreements with the United States concerning: Joint Liberian-United States Commission for Economic Development, Dec. 21, 1950 , 1735–1736 [ Pg. 1735 is part of Doc. 943 ] ; technical assistance, Dec. 21, 1950 , 1734–1736 [ Pgs. 1734–1736 include portions of Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] ; U.S. Military Mission to Liberia, Jan.11, 1951 , 1735 [ Pg. 1735 is part of Doc. 943 ] Arms smuggling, 1563 [ Pg. 1563 is part of Doc. 857 ] Firestone plantations, strike at”, 1706–1708 [ Pgs. 1706–1708 include portions of Doc. 920 and Doc. 921 ] , 1713–1714 [ Pg. 1713 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1717–1719 [ Pgs. 1717–1719 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] Road between Roberts field and Monrovia, proposed, 1710–1711 [ Pgs. 1710–1711 include portions of Doc. 923 and Doc. 924 ] , 1713 [ Pg. 1713 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1716–1717 [ Pgs. 1716–1717 include portions of Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , and Doc. 928 ] Roberts field, U.S. maintenance of, 1710 [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] , 1716–1717 [ Pgs. 1716–1717 include portions of Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , and Doc. 928 ] , 1723 [ Pg. 1723 is part of Doc. 933 ] , 1728 [ Pg. 1728 is part of Doc. 936 ] , 1730 [ Pg. 1730 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] Special commission to visit the United States, 1725–1727 [ Pgs. 1725–1727 include portions of Doc. 934 , Doc. 935 , and Doc. 936 ] , 1729 [ Pg. 1729 includes portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] , 1731–1735 [ Pgs. 1731–1735 include portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1596 [ Pg. 1596 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1709 [ Pg. 1709 is part of Doc. 922 ] , 1712–1713 [ Pg. 1712 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1715–1716 [ Pgs. 1715–1716 include portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 1721 [ Pg. 1721 includes portions of Doc. 930 and Doc. 931 ] , 1725–1726 [ Pgs. 1725–1726 include portions of Doc. 934 and Doc. 935 ] , 1729 [ Pg. 1729 includes portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] , 1731–1732 [ Pgs. 1731–1732 include portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , and Doc. 940 ] , 1734–1736 [ Pgs. 1734–1736 include portions of Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] U.S. information and educational exchange program, 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 863 ] U.S. investments in, 1568 [ Pg. 1568 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1589 [ Pg. 1589 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1596 [ Pg. 1596 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1728–1729 [ Pgs. 1728–1729 include portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] U.S. military assistance, 148–149 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 1596–1597 [ Pg. 1596 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1716 [ Pg. 1716 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 1721–1724 [ Pgs. 1721–1724 include portions of Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , and Doc. 933 ] , 1726–1734 [ Pgs. 1726–1734 include portions of Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] U.S. policy, 1508 [ Pg. 1508 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1595–1597 [ Pg. 1595 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1706–1735 [ Pgs. 1706–1735 include portions of Doc. 920 , Doc. 921 , Doc. 922 , Doc. 923 , Doc. 924 , Doc. 925 , Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , Doc. 933 , Doc. 934 , Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] Liberia Mining Company, 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1723 [ Pg. 1723 is part of Doc. 933 ] Libya ( see also Libyan question under Foreign Ministers meeting at London and United Nations: General Assembly): British policy and position, 1601–1604 [ Pgs. 1601–1604 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , and Doc. 867 ] , 1606 [ Pg. 1606 includes portions of Doc. 868 and Doc. 869 ] , 1608–1621 [ Pgs. 1608–1621 include portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , and Doc. 875 ] , 1623–1624 [ Pgs. 1623–1624 include portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1627 [ Pg. 1627 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1632 [ Pg. 1632 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 1635–1638 [ Pgs. 1635–1638 include portions of Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] ; Cyrenaica, 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 299–300 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 1601 [ Pg. 1601 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] , 1603–1604 [ Pgs. 1603–1604 include portions of Doc. 866 and Doc. 867 ] , 1607–1609 [ Pgs. 1607–1609 include portions of Doc. 869 and Doc. 870 ] , 1611–1619 [ Pgs. 1611–1619 include portions of Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , and Doc. 873 ] , 1622 [ Pg. 1622 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1627 [ Pg. 1627 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1632 [ Pg. 1632 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 1637 [ Pg. 1637 is part of Doc. 884 ] , 1639 [ Pg. 1639 is part of Doc. 885 ] ; defense arrangements, 1619 [ Pg. 1619 is part of Doc. 873 ] , 1632–1633 [ Pgs. 1632–1633 include portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] ; disposition of, negotiations concerning, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 299–300 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1552 [ Pg. 1552 is part of Doc. 855 ] , 1571–1575 [ Pgs. 1571–1575 include portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1577–1580 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1601–1639 [ Pgs. 1601–1639 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] ; Egyptian policy, 1612–1613 [ Pgs. 1612–1613 include portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] , 1621 [ Pg. 1621 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1626–1628 [ Pgs. 1626–1628 include portions of Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , and Doc. 879 ] , 1634–1635 [ Pgs. 1634–1635 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] ; Fezzan, 1601–1603 [ Pgs. 1601–1603 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] , 1607–1608 [ Pgs. 1607–1608 include portions of Doc. 869 and Doc. 870 ] , 1611 [ Pg. 1611 is part of Doc. 871 ] , 1613 [ Pg. 1613 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1615–1617 [ Pg. 1615 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1622 [ Pg. 1622 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1627 [ Pg. 1627 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1633 [ Pg. 1633 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 1636 [ Pg. 1636 is part of Doc. 884 ] , 1639 [ Pg. 1639 is part of Doc. 885 ] ; French policy, 1601–1604 [ Pgs. 1601–1604 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , and Doc. 867 ] , 1606–1608 [ Pgs. 1606–1608 include portions of Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] , 1613 [ Pg. 1613 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1616–1617 [ Pg. 1616 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1620 [ Pg. 1620 is part of Doc. 874 ] , 1627 [ Pg. 1627 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1633–1634 [ Pgs. 1633–1634 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , and Doc. 883 ] , 1636 [ Pg. 1636 is part of Doc. 884 ] , 1774 [ Pg. 1774 is part of Doc. 956 ] , 1795 [ Pg. 1795 is part of Doc. 965 ] ; independence proposals, 1600–1602 [ Pgs. 1600–1602 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] , 1617 [ Pg. 1617 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1619 n [ Pg. 1619 is part of Doc. 873 ] , 1621–1622 [ Pg. 1621 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1625 [ Pg. 1625 is part of Doc. 877 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1633 [ Pg. 1633 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 1635 [ Pg. 1635 includes portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] , 1651 [ Pg. 1651 is part of Doc. 891 ] ; Italian interests, 1613–1614 [ Pg. 1613 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1616–1617 [ Pg. 1616 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1619 n [ Pg. 1619 is part of Doc. 873 ] , 1620 [ Pg. 1620 is part of Doc. 874 ] , 1627 [ Pg. 1627 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1633 [ Pg. 1633 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 1635–1636 [ Pgs. 1635–1636 include portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] ; Pakistan policy, 1626–1628 [ Pgs. 1626–1628 include portions of Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , and Doc. 879 ] , 1634–1635 [ Pgs. 1634–1635 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] ; Soviet policy, 1625 [ Pg. 1625 is part of Doc. 877 ] , 1633–1634 [ Pgs. 1633–1634 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , and Doc. 883 ] ; Tripolitania, 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 1601 [ Pg. 1601 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] , 1603 [ Pg. 1603 is part of Doc. 866 ] , 1608–1610 [ Pgs. 1608–1610 include portions of Doc. 870 and Doc. 871 ] , 1612 [ Pg. 1612 includes portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] , 1614–1615 [ Pg. 1614 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1617 [ Pg. 1617 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1622 [ Pg. 1622 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1624 [ Pg. 1624 includes portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1627 [ Pg. 1627 is part of Doc. 878 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1632–1633 [ Pgs. 1632–1633 include portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] , 1637 [ Pg. 1637 is part of Doc. 884 ] , 1639 [ Pg. 1639 is part of Doc. 885 ] ; U.N. Advisory Council for Libya, 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 1605–1606 [ Pgs. 1605–1606 include portions of Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , and Doc. 869 ] , 1608 [ Pg. 1608 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1612 [ Pg. 1612 includes portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] , 1621–1622 [ Pg. 1621 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1626–1628 [ Pgs. 1626–1628 include portions of Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , and Doc. 879 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1632 [ Pg. 1632 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 1634–1635 [ Pgs. 1634–1635 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] , 1661 [ Pg. 1661 is part of Doc. 897 ] , 1774 [ Pg. 1774 is part of Doc. 956 ] ; U.N. Commissioner in Libya, 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 1604–1605 [ Pgs. 1604–1605 include portions of Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , and Doc. 868 ] , 1610 n [ Pg. 1610 includes portions of Doc. 870 and Doc. 871 ] , 1613 [ Pg. 1613 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1621–1622 [ Pg. 1621 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1628–1629 [ Pgs. 1628–1629 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , and Doc. 880 ] , 1632–1633 [ Pgs. 1632–1633 include portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] ; U.N. technical assistance, proposed, 1615–1616 [ Pg. 1615 is part of Doc. 872 ] ; U.S. airbase rights at Wheelus field in Tripoli, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 1619 [ Pg. 1619 is part of Doc. 873 ] , 1621 [ Pg. 1621 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1623–1626 [ Pgs. 1623–1626 include portions of Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , and Doc. 878 ] , 1631–1633 [ Pgs. 1631–1633 include portions of Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , and Doc. 882 ] , 1636–1638 [ Pgs. 1636–1638 include portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, proposed, 1615 [ Pg. 1615 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1623–1625 [ Pgs. 1623–1625 include portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1629–1630 [ Pgs. 1629–1630 include portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] ; U.S. policy, 1602–1605 [ Pgs. 1602–1605 include portions of Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , and Doc. 868 ] , 1610–1612 [ Pgs. 1610–1612 include portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] , 1615 [ Pg. 1615 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1619 [ Pg. 1619 is part of Doc. 873 ] , 1621–1624 [ Pgs. 1621–1624 include portions of Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 1626–1628 [ Pgs. 1626–1628 include portions of Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , and Doc. 879 ] , 1630 [ Pg. 1630 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1633–1634 [ Pgs. 1633–1634 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , and Doc. 883 ] , 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] Lie, Trygve ( see also United Nations: Secretary-General), 314–315 [ Pgs. 314–315 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194 ] , 444 n [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] , 669 n [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 1281–1282 [ Pg. 1281 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1296 n [ Pg. 1296 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] Lincoln, Francis F., 402 n [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 1267 [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 1278 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] Lippman, Walter, 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 790 ] Lloyd, J. O., 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 1442–1443 [ Pgs. 1442–1443 include portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1558–1568 [ Pgs. 1558–1568 include portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] Lockett, Charles, 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Loftus, John A., 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] Looney, Warren F., 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] Lourie, Arthur, 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] Louw, Eric H., 1815 n [ Pg. 1815 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 1818 [ Pg. 1818 is part of Doc. 974 ] Lowry, Robert L., 1459 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 824 ] Ludkin Khan, Mohammad Kabir, 1448–1449 [ Pgs. 1448–1449 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] Ludlow, James M., 971–973 [ Pgs. 971–973 include portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 1029 n [ Pg. 1029 includes portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572 ] , 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] Lyautey, Marshal, 1771 [ Pg. 1771 is part of Doc. 955 ] Lynch, Andrew G., 1601–1602 [ Pgs. 1601–1602 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] , 1616 n [ Pg. 1616 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1624–1626 [ Pgs. 1624–1626 include portions of Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , and Doc. 878 ] , 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1634–1635 [ Pgs. 1634–1635 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] Maashio, Ato Seium, 1655 [ Pg. 1655 is part of Doc. 894 ] MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 1352 [ Pg. 1352 is part of Doc. 752 ] Maccas, Leon, 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 155 ] Madagascar, 1516 [ Pg. 1516 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] Maddox, Maj. Gen. Ray T., 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 214 ] Maffitt, Edward P., 927–928 [ Pgs. 927–928 include portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1439 [ Pg. 1439 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] Mahmoud, 1612 [ Pg. 1612 includes portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] Majid Khan, Abdul, 1447 [ Pg. 1447 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 1450 [ Pg. 1450 includes portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] Malan, D. F., 1512 [ Pg. 1512 includes portions of Doc. 841 and Doc. 842 ] , 1815–1817 [ Pgs. 1815–1817 include portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] , 1822–1825 [ Pgs. 1822–1825 include portions of Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , and Doc. 976 ] , 1827 [ Pg. 1827 includes portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] , 1829–1831 [ Pgs. 1829–1831 include portions of Doc. 980 and Doc. 981 ] , 1833 [ Pg. 1833 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 1843 [ Pg. 1843 is part of Doc. 987 ] Malaya, 1103 [ Pg. 1103 is part of Doc. 624 ] Malenbaum, Wilfred, 1181 [ Pg. 1181 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] Malik, Charles, 730–734 [ Pgs. 730–734 include portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 1100–1108 [ Pgs. 1100–1108 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] Malta, 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] Mandis, George, 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] Maniadakis, Constantine, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Mansour ( also Mansur), Prince, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 1128 [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 1155 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1159 [ Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1179 [ Pg. 1179 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 1187–1188 [ Pgs. 1187–1188 include portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 1199 [ Pg. 1199 is part of Doc. 664 ] Mansur, Ali, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 490–491 [ Pgs. 490–491 include portions of Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , and Doc. 224 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 503–504 [ Pgs. 503–504 include portions of Doc. 227 and Doc. 228 ] , 512–513 [ Pg. 512 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 534–536 [ Pgs. 534–536 include portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , and Doc. 239 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 548–550 [ Pgs. 548–550 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , and Doc. 246 ] , 556–560 [ Pgs. 556–560 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Maqta Island, 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] Maradim Island, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] Marchat, Henry, 1747 [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] Mardam Bey, Jamil, 1216–1217 [ Pgs. 1216–1217 include portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] Marei, Ali Bey, 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] Marjolin, Robert E., 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 is part of Doc. 713 ] Markezinis, Spyridon B., 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Markos Vafiades, 340 [ Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Marnham, J. E., 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 1553 [ Pg. 1553 is part of Doc. 855 ] Marquardt, Gilbert H., 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] Marshall, 1554 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] Marshall, George C: Anglo-Egyptian problem, 303 [ Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] ; Israel, U.S. military assistance for, 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 1080 [ Pg. 1080 is part of Doc. 613 ] ; Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 1404 [ Pg. 1404 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] ; Liberia, U.S. military assistance for, 1727 [ Pg. 1727 is part of Doc. 936 ] , 1730–1732 [ Pgs. 1730–1732 include portions of Doc. 937 , Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , and Doc. 940 ] , 1733 n [ Pg. 1733 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] ; Libya, U.S. military base rights in, 1638 [ Pg. 1638 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] ; Palestine question, 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] ; Union of South Africa, U.S. relations with, 1832 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 1838–1840 [ Pgs. 1838–1840 include portions of Doc. 984 and Doc. 985 ] Massigli, Rene, 1607–1608 [ Pgs. 1607–1608 include portions of Doc. 869 and Doc. 870 ] Massoud, Mohammed Effendi, 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 1156 [ Pg. 1156 is part of Doc. 639 ] Materi, Dr. Mohammed, 1807 [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] Mathews, Elbert G., 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 200–203 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 245 n [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 253 n [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1392–1393 [ Pg. 1392 is part of Doc. 777 ] , 1404 [ Pg. 1404 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 1423 [ Pg. 1423 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 1439–1440 [ Pgs. 1439–1440 include portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 1446–1448 [ Pgs. 1446–1448 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 1449 n [ Pg. 1449 is part of Doc. 816 ] , 1457 n [ Pg. 1457 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] Mathieson, W. A., 1554 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] Matthews, H. Freeman, 186–188 [ Pgs. 186–188 include portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 326–328 [ Pgs. 326–328 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 953–954 [ Pgs. 953–954 include portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 1289 [ Pg. 1289 includes portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] , 1659 n [ Pg. 1659 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] Maynard, David M., 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] Mazhari, Brig. Gen. Mohammad, 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 545 n [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] McBride, Maj. Gen. Horace L., 424 n [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 1235 [ Pg. 1235 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] , 1240–1241 [ Pgs. 1240–1241 include portions of Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , and Doc. 691 ] , 1244–1245 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1247 [ Pg. 1247 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 1256 n [ Pg. 1256 is part of Doc. 699 ] , 1258–1259 [ Pgs. 1258–1259 include portions of Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702 ] , 1275–1277 [ Pgs. 1275–1277 include portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 1280–1282 [ Pgs. 1280–1282 include portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] , 1284–1288 [ Pgs. 1284–1288 include portions of Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , and Doc. 718 ] , 1293–1295 [ Pgs. 1293–1295 include portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1322–1324 [ Pgs. 1322–1324 include portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] McBride, Robert H., 1747 [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 1752–1753 [ Pgs. 1752–1753 include portions of Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , and Doc. 948 ] , 1760–1762 [ Pgs. 1760–1762 include portions of Doc. 951 and Doc. 952 ] , 1770–1773 [ Pgs. 1770–1773 include portions of Doc. 954 and Doc. 955 ] McCloy, John J., 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] McCone, John A., 1764 [ Pg. 1764 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] , 1768 [ Pg. 1768 includes portions of Doc. 953 and Doc. 954 ] McDaniel, Joseph M., 1268–1269 [ Pg. 1268 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 711 ] McDermott, Michael J., 690 n [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 733 n [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 874–875 [ Pgs. 874–875 include portions of Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] McDonald, James G., 667 n [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 704 n [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 705–706 [ Pgs. 705–706 include portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 721 n [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 722 n [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 724 n [ Pg. 724 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 729–730 [ Pgs. 729–730 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 747–748 [ Pgs. 747–748 include portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 751–752 [ Pgs. 751–752 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 757–758 [ Pgs. 757–758 include portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 774–775 [ Pgs. 774–775 include portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 781–783 [ Pgs. 781–783 include portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , and Doc. 389 ] , 787–788 [ Pgs. 787–788 include portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , and Doc. 394 ] , 792 n [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] , 796–797 [ Pgs. 796–797 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] , 882–883 [ Pgs. 882–883 include portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 925–926 [ Pgs. 925–926 include portions of Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] , 935–936 [ Pgs. 935–936 include portions of Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , and Doc. 499 ] , 944–945 [ Pgs. 944–945 include portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , and Doc. 507 ] , 950–951 [ Pgs. 950–951 include portions of Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , and Doc. 513 ] , 960–961 [ Pgs. 960–961 include portions of Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , and Doc. 520 ] , 965–967 [ Pgs. 965–967 include portions of Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , and Doc. 525 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 1087–1088 [ Pgs. 1087–1088 include portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619 ] McFall, Jack K., 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 173 n [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 233 ] McGhee, George C.: Africa, U.S. policy toward, 1503 [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1509–1523 [ Pgs. 1509–1523 include portions of Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , and Doc. 844 ] , 1540–1541 [ Pgs. 1540–1541 include portions of Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , and Doc. 849 ] , 1543–1544 [ Pgs. 1543–1544 include portions of Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , and Doc. 850 ] , 1547–1554 [ Pgs. 1547–1554 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] , 1556–1559 [ Pgs. 1556–1559 include portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1561–1565 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1567–1580 [ Pgs. 1567–1580 include portions of Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] , 1583 n [ Pg. 1583 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Conference of American diplomatic and consular officers involved in Near Eastern affairs, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] Egypt: British relations with, 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 293–295 [ Pgs. 293–295 include portions of Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , and Doc. 111 ] , 297–298 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] ; U.S. relations with, 292 [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 310–315 [ Pgs. 310–315 include portions of Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] Eritrea, U.S. interest in disposition of, 1643–1646 [ Pgs. 1643–1646 include portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] , 1663–1667 [ Pgs. 1663–1667 include portions of Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 1672–1681 [ Pgs. 1672–1681 include portions of Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] , 1685–1686 [ Pg. 1685 is part of Doc. 906 ] , 1689 n [ Pg. 1689 includes portions of Doc. 909 and Doc. 910 ] Ethiopia, U.S. relations with, 1691–1698 [ Pgs. 1691–1698 include portions of Doc. 910 , Doc. 911 , Doc. 912 , Doc. 913 , and Doc. 914 ] , 1703–1705 [ Pg. 1703 is part of Doc. 919 ] Greece, U.S. relations with, 348 [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 359–363 [ Pgs. 359–363 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 365–367 [ Pgs. 365–367 include portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , and Doc. 155 ] , 375–377 [ Pgs. 375–377 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 382–386 [ Pgs. 382–386 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , and Doc. 165 ] , 395–397 [ Pgs. 395–397 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] India, U.S. relations with, 1482 [ Pg. 1482 is part of Doc. 835 ] Iran, U.S. relations with, 447–451 [ Pgs. 447–451 include portions of Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 491 n [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 509 n [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 519–529 [ Pgs. 519–529 include portions of Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , and Doc. 236 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 536–539 [ Pgs. 536–539 include portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 564–566 [ Pgs. 564–566 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] , 572–574 [ Pgs. 572–574 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 591–601 [ Pgs. 591–601 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , and Doc. 278 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 616 n [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 624–629 [ Pgs. 624–629 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 294 ] Iraq, U.S. relations with, 636–639 [ Pgs. 636–639 include portions of Doc. 295 and Doc. 296 ] , 645–646 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 299 ] Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 1378–1382 [ Pgs. 1378–1382 include portions of Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 1435–1439 [ Pgs. 1435–1439 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , and Doc. 811 ] Lebanon, U.S. relations with, 1100–1106 [ Pgs. 1100–1106 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] Liberia, U.S. relations with, 1709 n [ Pg. 1709 is part of Doc. 922 ] , 1710–1712 [ Pgs. 1710–1712 include portions of Doc. 923 , Doc. 924 , and Doc. 925 ] , 1715–1719 [ Pgs. 1715–1719 include portions of Doc. 926 , Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] , 1730 n [ Pg. 1730 includes portions of Doc. 937 and Doc. 938 ] , 1731 n [ Pg. 1731 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] , 1732 [ Pg. 1732 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] , 1733 n [ Pg. 1733 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] Libya, U.S. relations with, 1629–1631 [ Pgs. 1629–1631 include portions of Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , and Doc. 881 ] , 1635 [ Pg. 1635 includes portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] , 1639 [ Pg. 1639 is part of Doc. 885 ] Morocco, U.S. relations with, 1747–1751 [ Pgs. 1747–1751 include portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] Near and Middle East: Arms shipments to, 138 n [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] ; U.S. military assistance for, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 147–150 [ Pgs. 147–150 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] Near East and North Africa, Franco-American talks concerning, Sept. 25–26, 1950 , 192–193 [ Pgs. 192–193 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , and Doc. 87 ] , 215–216 [ Pgs. 215–216 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] Near East and South Asia: Anglo-American talks concerning, 192–211 [ Pgs. 192–211 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 213–215 [ Pgs. 213–215 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 230–233 [ Pgs. 230–233 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , and Doc. 95 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 297–302 [ Pgs. 297–302 include portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 407–409 [ Pgs. 407–409 include portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] ; U.S. economic assistance for, proposed, 169–174 [ Pgs. 169–174 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , and Doc. 77 ] , 178–185 [ Pgs. 178–185 include portions of Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , and Doc. 82 ] North African Diplomatic and Consular Conference at Tangier, 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] Palestine question, 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 680–684 [ Pgs. 680–684 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] , 690 n [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 692–696 [ Pgs. 692–696 include portions of Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , and Doc. 325 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 730–734 [ Pgs. 730–734 include portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 746–747 [ Pgs. 746–747 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , and Doc. 360 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 852–855 [ Pgs. 852–855 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 861–865 [ Pgs. 861–865 include portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , and Doc. 451 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 452 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 891–892 [ Pgs. 891–892 include portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 895 n [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 474 ] , 958–960 [ Pgs. 958–960 include portions of Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 968–969 [ Pgs. 968–969 include portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 981–982 [ Pgs. 981–982 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1052–1059 [ Pgs. 1052–1059 include portions of Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 1083 n [ Pg. 1083 is part of Doc. 615 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 617 ] Petroleum resources of the Near East, U.S. policy regarding, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 3 ] , 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 9 and Doc. 10 ] , 36–37 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 50–52 [ Pgs. 50–52 include portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 76 n [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 106–109 [ Pgs. 106–109 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] Pushtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1446 [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 1448–1449 [ Pgs. 1448–1449 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 1457–1458 [ Pgs. 1457–1458 include portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] Saudi Arabia, U.S. relations with, 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 1127 [ Pg. 1127 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] , 1129 n [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 1130–1154 [ Pgs. 1130–1154 include portions of Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] , 1158 n [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1164–1165 [ Pg. 1164 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1167 [ Pg. 1167 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 645 ] , 1177 [ Pg. 1177 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 1180 [ Pg. 1180 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 1186 [ Pg. 1186 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 1190 n [ Pg. 1190 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 1359 [ Pg. 1359 includes portions of Doc. 755 and Doc. 756 ] Syria, U.S. relations with, 1212 [ Pg. 1212 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] , 1221–1222 [ Pgs. 1221–1222 include portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] Tunisia, U.S. policy toward, 1782 n [ Pg. 1782 includes portions of Doc. 962 and Doc. 963 ] , 1786–1791 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1800 n [ Pg. 1800 is part of Doc. 966 ] Turkey, U.S. relations with, 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 1231 [ Pg. 1231 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 1248–1249 [ Pgs. 1248–1249 include portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693 ] , 1251–1252 [ Pgs. 1251–1252 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 1253 n [ Pg. 1253 is part of Doc. 696 ] , 1267 n [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 1272 n [ Pg. 1272 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1278–1279 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1287 n [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1289–1292 [ Pgs. 1289–1292 include portions of Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , and Doc. 720 ] , 1300 [ Pg. 1300 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 1302 [ Pg. 1302 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 1310 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 1316–1317 [ Pgs. 1316–1317 include portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1325 [ Pg. 1325 includes portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] Union of South Africa, U.S. relations with, 1815–1823 [ Pgs. 1815–1823 include portions of Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , and Doc. 975 ] McGrath, Christopher C., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] McGrath, Earl Jones, 990–991 [ Pgs. 990–991 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] McKay, D. Vernon, 1514 n [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1517 n [ Pg. 1517 is part of Doc. 844 ] McNaughton, Gen. A. G. L., 1362–1368 [ Pgs. 1362–1368 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , and Doc. 762 ] , 1370–1379 [ Pgs. 1370–1379 include portions of Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , and Doc. 769 ] , 1382–1383 [ Pgs. 1382–1383 include portions of Doc. 769 and Doc. 770 ] , 1385–1389 [ Pgs. 1385–1389 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 1392–1394 [ Pgs. 1392–1394 include portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 1438 [ Pg. 1438 is part of Doc. 810 ] McNeil, Hector, 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 1608–1609 [ Pg. 1608 is part of Doc. 870 ] McQuiston, Frank W., 1844 n [ Pg. 1844 is part of Doc. 988 ] McSweeney, John, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] McWilliams, William J., 482–483 [ Pgs. 482–483 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] Mediterranean, security of the, 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1315–1316 [ Pgs. 1315–1316 include portions of Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 1320–1321 [ Pgs. 1320–1321 include portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 1335 [ Pg. 1335 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] Mediteranean security pact, proposed, 1253 [ Pg. 1253 is part of Doc. 696 ] , 1313–1314 [ Pgs. 1313–1314 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] Meeker, Leonard C., 686–689 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 321 ] Meier, Oscar W., 1712 [ Pg. 1712 is part of Doc. 925 ] Meloy, Francis E., 41–47 [ Pgs. 41–47 include portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 1158 n [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] Menderes, Adnan, 1263 [ Pg. 1263 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 1267 n [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 1269 [ Pg. 1269 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1277 [ Pg. 1277 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 1280 [ Pg. 1280 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1282 [ Pg. 1282 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1285–1288 [ Pgs. 1285–1288 include portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] , 1295–1299 [ Pgs. 1295–1299 include portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , and Doc. 724 ] , 1312–1313 [ Pgs. 1312–1313 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1323 [ Pg. 1323 is part of Doc. 738 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1352 [ Pg. 1352 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 is part of Doc. 753 ] Menemencioǧlu, Numan, 1224 [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 1227–1228 [ Pgs. 1227–1228 include portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 1310–1311 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 731 ] Menon, V. P., 1408–1411 [ Pgs. 1408–1411 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , and Doc. 794 ] Merchant, Livingston T., 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] Merrell, George R., 1514 n [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1523 [ Pg. 1523 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1643 [ Pg. 1643 is part of Doc. 888 ] , 1646 n [ Pg. 1646 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1698–1702 [ Pgs. 1698–1702 include portions of Doc. 913 , Doc. 914 , Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , Doc. 917 , and Doc. 918 ] Metaxas, Col. Aristides S., 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 351–352 [ Pgs. 351–352 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 400–401 [ Pgs. 400–401 include portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 434 n [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 193 ] Mexico, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 321 ] Meyers, Howard, 1433 n [ Pg. 1433 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1439–1441 [ Pgs. 1439–1441 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , and Doc. 812 ] Middle East Pipeline Company, 14 [ Pg. 14 is part of Doc. 6 ] Mikaoui, 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 493 ] Miller, Edward G., 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] Milmi, Ahmad, 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Milwit, Col. H., 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] Miner, Robert G., 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] Minor, Harold B., 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 351–353 [ Pgs. 351–353 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 370 n [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 371–373 [ Pgs. 371–373 include portions of Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 377–378 [ Pgs. 377–378 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 380–382 [ Pgs. 380–382 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 386–387 [ Pgs. 386–387 include portions of Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 399–401 [ Pgs. 399–401 include portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , and Doc. 173 ] , 403–407 [ Pgs. 403–407 include portions of Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Mitchell, Col. Lawrence C., 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 386 ] Moatsis, John, 386 n [ Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165 ] Moch, Jules, 1771 [ Pg. 1771 is part of Doc. 955 ] Moffett, Lt. Col. Oscar P., 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] Mohamed, Lt. Col. Mahmoud Riad, 820 n [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 418 ] Mohammed al-Amin, Sidi ( also Mohammed Lamine Pasha), 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1775–1776 [ Pgs. 1775–1776 include portions of Doc. 957 and Doc. 958 ] , 1778–1780 [ Pgs. 1778–1780 include portions of Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , and Doc. 961 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1786 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1788–1791 [ Pg. 1788 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1794 [ Pg. 1794 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1806 [ Pg. 1806 is part of Doc. 969 ] Mohammed Ali, 1364–1365 [ Pgs. 1364–1365 include portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1366 n [ Pg. 1366 is part of Doc. 760 ] , 1407 [ Pg. 1407 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1419 [ Pg. 1419 is part of Doc. 798 ] , 1422 [ Pg. 1422 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1435 [ Pg. 1435 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1437–1438 [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 810 ] , 1444 [ Pg. 1444 includes portions of Doc. 813 and Doc. 814 ] , 1457 [ Pg. 1457 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] , 1498 [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 837 ] Mohammed Ben-Youssef, Sultan of Morocco, 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 1529 [ Pg. 1529 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 1737 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1740–1742 [ Pg. 1740 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1745 [ Pg. 1745 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1747–1753 [ Pgs. 1747–1753 include portions of Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , and Doc. 948 ] , 1760–1764 [ Pgs. 1760–1764 include portions of Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] , 1770–1773 [ Pgs. 1770–1773 include portions of Doc. 954 and Doc. 955 ] , 1807 [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] Moline, Edward G., 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] Moncef Bey, Sidi Mohammed al, 1799 [ Pg. 1799 is part of Doc. 966 ] Mondoloni, 1786 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1790–1791 [ Pg. 1790 is part of Doc. 964 ] Moniem ( also Moneim, Monem, Munim), 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 707–709 [ Pgs. 707–709 include portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , and Doc. 335 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 928–929 [ Pgs. 928–929 include portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] Monod, Guy, 1539 [ Pg. 1539 is part of Doc. 846 ] , 1544–1545 [ Pgs. 1544–1545 include portions of Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , and Doc. 851 ] , 1547–1549 [ Pg. 1547 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1564–1565 [ Pg. 1564 is part of Doc. 857 ] Mons, Jean, 1774–1776 [ Pgs. 1774–1776 include portions of Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , and Doc. 958 ] , 1778 [ Pg. 1778 is part of Doc. 959 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1801 [ Pg. 1801 is part of Doc. 967 ] Montgomery of Alamein, Field Marshal Viscount, 1702 [ Pg. 1702 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] Moore, Ben, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 1554 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] Moore, C. Robert, 1228–1231 [ Pgs. 1228–1231 include portions of Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] , 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] , 1252 [ Pg. 1252 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 1263 n [ Pg. 1263 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 1267–1269 [ Pgs. 1267–1269 include portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 1272 [ Pg. 1272 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1273 n [ Pg. 1273 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 1278 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1289 n [ Pg. 1289 includes portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] , 1319 n [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1322–1324 [ Pgs. 1322–1324 include portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 1332 n [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1341 [ Pg. 1341 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] Moore, Col. Howard, 1124 n [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] Moore, Ross E., 644 [ Pg. 644 is part of Doc. 298 ] Moore, W. F., 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 24 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Moraka, 1836 n [ Pg. 1836 is part of Doc. 983 ] Moreland, A. B., 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Morgenthau, Henry, 671–674 [ Pgs. 671–674 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 742–745 [ Pgs. 742–745 include portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] Morocco, French Protectorate of: Agreement between France and the United States regarding U.S. Air Force bases in Morocco, Dec. 22, 1950 , 1764 [ Pg. 1764 includes portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] , 1768–1770 [ Pgs. 1768–1770 include portions of Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , and Doc. 955 ] ; agreement between France and the United States regarding utilization of facilities at Port Lyautey by U.S. forces, Dec. 22, 1950 , 1764–1770 [ Pgs. 1764–1770 include portions of Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , and Doc. 955 ] ; British policy, 1741–1742 [ Pg. 1741 is part of Doc. 944 ] ; communist movement and strength, 1738 [ Pg. 1738 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1742–1746 [ Pg. 1742 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1749 [ Pg. 1749 is part of Doc. 945 ] , 1771 [ Pg. 1771 is part of Doc. 955 ] ; French policy and position, 1528–1529 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1542 [ Pg. 1542 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1571–1573 [ Pgs. 1571–1573 include portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1575–1576 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1737–1738 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1740–1741 [ Pg. 1740 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1744–1746 [ Pg. 1744 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1751 [ Pg. 1751 is part of Doc. 945 ] , 1761–1764 [ Pgs. 1761–1764 include portions of Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , and Doc. 953 ] , 1771–1773 [ Pg. 1771 is part of Doc. 955 ] , 1807 [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] ; French trade and exchange control policies, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 1548–1550 [ Pgs. 1548–1550 include portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1573 [ Pg. 1573 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1584 [ Pg. 1584 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 1739 [ Pg. 1739 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1747 [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 1755–1759 [ Pgs. 1755–1759 include portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] ; nationalist movement, 1737–1738 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1741–1742 [ Pg. 1741 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1744–1746 [ Pg. 1744 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1753 [ Pg. 1753 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] , 1760 [ Pg. 1760 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 1762 [ Pg. 1762 includes portions of Doc. 951 and Doc. 952 ] , 1771 [ Pg. 1771 is part of Doc. 955 ] , 1807 [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] ; Soviet policy, 1742 [ Pg. 1742 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1746 [ Pg. 1746 is part of Doc. 944 ] ; U.S. military air rights, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] ; U.S. policy toward, 1537 [ Pg. 1537 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1737–1773 [ Pgs. 1737–1773 include portions of Doc. 944 , Doc. 945 , Doc. 946 , Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , Doc. 949 , Doc. 950 , Doc. 951 , Doc. 952 , Doc. 953 , Doc. 954 , and Doc. 955 ] ; U.S. treaty rights, 1738–1739 [ Pg. 1738 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1742 [ Pg. 1742 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1747 [ Pg. 1747 includes portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 1753–1759 [ Pgs. 1753–1759 include portions of Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , Doc. 949 , and Doc. 950 ] , 1766 n [ Pg. 1766 is part of Doc. 953 ] , 1793 [ Pg. 1793 is part of Doc. 965 ] Morocco, Spanish Protectorate of, 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 1571 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1575–1576 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1583–1584 [ Pgs. 1583–1584 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 1737 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1739–1742 [ Pg. 1739 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1751 [ Pg. 1751 is part of Doc. 945 ] Morrison, John, 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] Morton, Desmond, 670 [ Pg. 670 is part of Doc. 311 ] Morton, Col. Terrence G., 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] Mossadeq, Mohammad, 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 250 ] Most-favored-nation treatment, 1495 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1555 [ Pg. 1555 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1755 [ Pg. 1755 is part of Doc. 949 ] Mozambique, 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 843 ] , 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1598–1599 [ Pg. 1598 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] Mueller, Hans, 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] Mufti, Said Pasha, 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 859–860 [ Pgs. 859–860 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 973–974 [ Pgs. 973–974 include portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 975 n [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 531 ] , 978–980 [ Pgs. 978–980 include portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] Mulki, Fawzi el-, 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 704 n [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 716–717 [ Pgs. 716–717 include portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 772–773 [ Pgs. 772–773 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 796–797 [ Pgs. 796–797 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 1069 n [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] Mulligan, William, 54 n [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 21 ] Multer, Abraham J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Muniz, Joao Carlo, 1667 [ Pg. 1667 includes portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] , 1672 [ Pg. 1672 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1674–1675 [ Pgs. 1674–1675 include portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1677 [ Pg. 1677 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1684 n [ Pg. 1684 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] , 1685 [ Pg. 1685 is part of Doc. 906 ] Murphy, Charles S., 783 n [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 389 ] Murray, J. D., 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 1458 [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 823 ] Murray, Wallace, 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] Muscat, 10 n [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 38–39 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] Mustafa, Mulla, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 93 ] Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 , 147–148 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 154–155 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 551–552 [ Pgs. 551–552 include portions of Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] , 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1195 [ Pg. 1195 is part of Doc. 662 ] , 1478 [ Pg. 1478 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1728 [ Pg. 1728 is part of Doc. 936 ] , 1733 [ Pg. 1733 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] ; 1950 , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1187–1188 [ Pgs. 1187–1188 include portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 1195 [ Pg. 1195 is part of Doc. 662 ] , 1317 [ Pg. 1317 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1478 [ Pg. 1478 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1833–1834 [ Pgs. 1833–1834 include portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] , 1838 [ Pg. 1838 is part of Doc. 984 ] , 1840–1841 [ Pgs. 1840–1841 include portions of Doc. 985 and Doc. 986 ] Mylonas, Alexander, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Nafici, Mosharraf, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] Nagshabandi, Lt. Col. Salim, 1156 [ Pg. 1156 is part of Doc. 639 ] Nahas Pasha, 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 323 n [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 693–695 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 810 n [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Naim, Mohammad, 1446–1448 [ Pgs. 1446–1448 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] Napper, Maj. Frank E., 1200 [ Pg. 1200 is part of Doc. 664 ] Nashashibi, Azmi Bey, 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 975–976 [ Pgs. 975–976 include portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] Nasr, Bey Ahmed Seif Al, 1613 [ Pg. 1613 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1615 [ Pg. 1615 is part of Doc. 872 ] Nasr, Taqi, 479–480 [ Pgs. 479–480 include portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 490–491 [ Pgs. 490–491 include portions of Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , and Doc. 224 ] , 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 is part of Doc. 259 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 606 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1181–1182 [ Pgs. 1181–1182 include portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652 ] , 1274 [ Pg. 1274 is part of Doc. 711 ] , 1326 n [ Pg. 1326 is part of Doc. 740 ] , 1844–1845 [ Pg. 1844 is part of Doc. 988 ] National Geographic Society, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] National Security Council, U.S.: Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, basic U.S. position in (NSC 5, 42, and 47 series), 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] Greece, position of the United States with respect to the use of U.S. military power in (NSC 5 series), 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 181 ] Greece and Turkey, U.S. objectives with respect to (NSC 42 series), 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 410–416 [ Pgs. 410–416 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 1236–1238 [ Pgs. 1236–1238 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 1317–1320 [ Pgs. 1317–1320 include portions of Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , and Doc. 737 ] Greece, Turkey, and Iran, U.S. policy toward, 1947 , 254 n [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] Industrial security policies, 1823 [ Pg. 1823 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] Iran, U.S. policy toward (NSC 54 series), 519–520 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 263 ] Israel and Arab states, U.S. policy toward (NSC 47 series), 131–133 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 163–165 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 763–766 [ Pgs. 763–766 include portions of Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 793 n [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 1002–1006 [ Pgs. 1002–1006 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , and Doc. 554 ] Jerusalem, proposed provision of a police force for (NSC 27 series), 953–954 [ Pgs. 953–954 include portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] Korean situation, position and action of the United States with respect to possible further Soviet moves in light of (NSC 73 series), 402–403 [ Pgs. 402–403 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 1304 [ Pg. 1304 includes portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 1318 n [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] Near and Middle East, security of, 152 n [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] Near East, U.S. policy toward arms shipments to the (NSC 65 series), 131–134 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 162–166 [ Pgs. 162–166 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 176–178 [ Pgs. 176–178 include portions of Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] , 186–188 [ Pgs. 186–188 include portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 818–819 [ Pgs. 818–819 include portions of Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] Near East and South Asia, proposed U.S. economic and technical assistance for, 180–181 [ Pgs. 180–181 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] Petroleum facilities in the Middle East, security of (NSC 26 series), 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] Turkey, proposed reconstruction of military airfields in (NSC 36 series), 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] National security problems with respect to the Near and Middle East and South Asia, 239–245 [ Pgs. 239–245 include portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] National Security Resources Board, U.S., 134 [ Pg. 134 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] Near and Middle East ( see also individual countries and Palestine question): Anglo-American consultations and cooperation concerning, 123–124 [ Pgs. 123–124 include portions of Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] Anglo-American military and political talks: July 20–24, 1950 , 188–193 [ Pgs. 188–193 include portions of Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , and Doc. 87 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] ; Sept. 16–23, 1950 , 192–216 [ Pgs. 192–216 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 296–302 [ Pgs. 296–302 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , and Doc. 113 ] , 407–409 [ Pgs. 407–409 include portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 591–593 [ Pgs. 591–593 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 600–602 [ Pgs. 600–602 include portions of Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279 ] ; Oct. 23–26, 1950 , 193 n [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 230–239 [ Pgs. 230–239 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] , 321 n [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 610–611 [ Pgs. 610–611 include portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Arms shipments to ( see also Near East, arms shipments to under Foreign Ministers meeting at London), 131–138 [ Pgs. 131–138 include portions of Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 162–168 [ Pgs. 162–168 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73 ] , 176–178 [ Pgs. 176–178 include portions of Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] , 186–188 [ Pgs. 186–188 include portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , and Doc. 326 ] , 705–706 [ Pgs. 705–706 include portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 744–745 [ Pgs. 744–745 include portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 779–780 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 818–819 [ Pgs. 818–819 include portions of Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 847–849 [ Pgs. 847–849 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 913–915 [ Pgs. 913–915 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 942–943 [ Pgs. 942–943 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , and Doc. 505 ] , 967 [ Pg. 967 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 1002–1003 [ Pgs. 1002–1003 include portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 645 ] , 1204 [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] British arms shipments to, 131 [ Pg. 131 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 144–145 [ Pgs. 144–145 include portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 165 [ Pg. 165 is part of Doc. 72 ] British policy, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 217–221 [ Pgs. 217–221 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 231–232 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 844–845 [ Pgs. 844–845 include portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] Commonwealth role in defense of, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 94 ] Communist movement and strength, 3–4 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 852–853 [ Pgs. 852–853 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 624 ] Conference of American diplomatic and consular officials involved in Near Eastern affairs, Cairo, Mar. 7–11, 1950 , 1–8 [ Pgs. 1–8 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] Economic situation, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] Franco-American talks concerning, Sept. 25–26, 1950 , 192–193 [ Pgs. 192–193 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , and Doc. 87 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] Military forces in, 224 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] Nationalist movement, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Persian Gulf: British influence in the, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] ; petroleum development in the, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 76–79 [ Pgs. 76–79 include portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] ; territorial claims and disputes, 10–12 [ Pgs. 10–12 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , and Doc. 5 ] , 18–20 [ Pgs. 18–20 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 36–47 [ Pgs. 36–47 include portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 53–55 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] , 114–116 [ Pgs. 114–116 include portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49 ] , 1141–1143 [ Pg. 1141 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 637 ] Petroleum resources: Anglo-American talks concerning, 9–10 [ Pgs. 9–10 include portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 33–34 [ Pgs. 33–34 include portions of Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] ; British policy, 9–11 [ Pgs. 9–11 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , and Doc. 5 ] , 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 34–35 [ Pgs. 34–35 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 60–62 [ Pgs. 60–62 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , and Doc. 27 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] ; security of, 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 236–237 [ Pg. 236 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 1165 [ Pg. 1165 is part of Doc. 641 ] ; Soviet policy, 79–80 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 85–86 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 36 ] ; Tapline operations, 12–14 [ Pgs. 12–14 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 21–23 [ Pgs. 21–23 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 25–29 [ Pgs. 25–29 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 77–78 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 42 ] ; U.S. interest in the development of the, 9–121 [ Pgs. 9–121 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 1132 [ Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 636 ] Regional pacts, proposed, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 152–158 [ Pgs. 152–158 include portions of Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1307–1308 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 730 ] Security of, 138–146 [ Pgs. 138–146 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] , 150–162 [ Pgs. 150–162 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 166–168 [ Pgs. 166–168 include portions of Doc. 72 and Doc. 73 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 193–196 [ Pgs. 193–196 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 221–222 [ Pgs. 221–222 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 299–300 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 309–311 [ Pgs. 309–311 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , and Doc. 116 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 320–321 [ Pgs. 320–321 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 591–593 [ Pgs. 591–593 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 656–657 [ Pg. 656 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 870–871 [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 875–876 [ Pgs. 875–876 include portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 includes portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] , 1003 [ Pg. 1003 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1264 [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 730 ] Soviet policy, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 224–230 [ Pgs. 224–230 include portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 443 ] Tripartite (Anglo-American-French) declaration on arms for and security of the Near East, May 25, 1950 , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 167–168 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 176–177 [ Pgs. 176–177 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 292 n [ Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 299 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 308–309 [ Pgs. 308–309 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 929–930 [ Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 932–935 [ Pgs. 932–935 include portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 967–968 [ Pgs. 967–968 include portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 531 ] , 993–996 [ Pgs. 993–996 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 1002–1003 [ Pgs. 1002–1003 include portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 1012–1013 [ Pgs. 1012–1013 include portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1178 n [ Pg. 1178 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 1212 [ Pg. 1212 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] , 1217 [ Pg. 1217 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 1220–1221 [ Pgs. 1220–1221 include portions of Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , and Doc. 679 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 680 ] U.N. arms embargo, lifting of, 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 63 ] U.N. technical assistance program, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 6–7 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 169–173 [ Pgs. 169–173 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , and Doc. 76 ] , 178–186 [ Pgs. 178–186 include portions of Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 209–210 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 279–283 [ Pgs. 279–283 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , and Doc. 105 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1140–1141 [ Pg. 1140 is part of Doc. 636 ] U.S. military assistance, 122–123 [ Pgs. 122–123 include portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 125–130 [ Pgs. 125–130 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 147–150 [ Pgs. 147–150 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] U.S. policy, 2–8 [ Pgs. 2–8 include portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 195–196 [ Pgs. 195–196 include portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 239–245 [ Pgs. 239–245 include portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , and Doc. 99 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 271–278 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 743–744 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 852–853 [ Pgs. 852–853 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] U.S. stockpiling of strategic materials program, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] Near East College Association, 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] Near East Foundation, 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 513 and Doc. 514 ] Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal: Chinese People’s Republic, policy toward, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 1474–1475 [ Pgs. 1474–1475 include portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] ; East Pakistan, communal disturbances in, 1389–1391 [ Pgs. 1389–1391 include portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1395–1396 [ Pgs. 1395–1396 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 1400–1401 [ Pgs. 1400–1401 include portions of Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] , 1406–1407 [ Pg. 1406 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1408 n [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] ; Indian foreign policy, 1463 [ Pg. 1463 is part of Doc. 825 ] , 1466–1468 [ Pgs. 1466–1468 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 1470–1475 [ Pgs. 1470–1475 include portions of Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] , 1481 [ Pg. 1481 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] , 1821 [ Pg. 1821 is part of Doc. 974 ] ; Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1363 [ Pg. 1363 is part of Doc. 758 ] , 1369–1375 [ Pgs. 1369–1375 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , and Doc. 767 ] , 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 1384 [ Pg. 1384 is part of Doc. 771 ] , 1391 [ Pg. 1391 is part of Doc. 776 ] , 1393 [ Pg. 1393 is part of Doc. 777 ] , 1394 n [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 1395–1397 [ Pgs. 1395–1397 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , and Doc. 781 ] , 1399–1400 [ Pgs. 1399–1400 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , and Doc. 784 ] , 1402–1403 [ Pgs. 1402–1403 include portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1405–1409 [ Pgs. 1405–1409 include portions of Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 1413–1426 [ Pgs. 1413–1426 include portions of Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , and Doc. 804 ] , 1428–1430 [ Pgs. 1428–1430 include portions of Doc. 805 and Doc. 806 ] , 1436 [ Pg. 1436 is part of Doc. 810 ] , 1438 [ Pg. 1438 is part of Doc. 810 ] , 1443 [ Pg. 1443 is part of Doc. 813 ] ; Korean war, Indian policy toward, 182–184 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 197–198 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1416 [ Pg. 1416 is part of Doc. 796 ] ; Nepal, Indian policy toward, 1488 [ Pg. 1488 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; Soviet Union, Indian policy toward, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] ; United States, attitude toward, 1462 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 825 ] ; visit to the United States, 1949 , 1410–1411 [ Pgs. 1410–1411 include portions of Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , and Doc. 794 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1498 [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 837 ] Nelson, Stuart D., 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 284–287 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 692–696 [ Pgs. 692–696 include portions of Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , and Doc. 325 ] Nemazee, Mohammad, 447 [ Pg. 447 includes portions of Doc. 205 and Doc. 206 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 528–529 [ Pgs. 528–529 include portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] Nepal: British policy, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1487–1488 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; communist movement, 1484–1485 [ Pg. 1484 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1488–1489 [ Pg. 1488 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; Indian policy toward, 1474 [ Pg. 1474 includes portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] , 1487–1488 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; political situation, 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1484–1485 [ Pg. 1484 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; regional association, attitude toward, 247–248 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; Soviet policy, 1485 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1488 [ Pg. 1488 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; Tibet, relations with, 1487–1488 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; U.N. membership, proposed, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1485 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1488 [ Pg. 1488 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 1486–1487 [ Pg. 1486 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1489 [ Pg. 1489 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; U.S. policy, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1435 [ Pg. 1435 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1439 [ Pg. 1439 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 1484–1489 [ Pg. 1484 is part of Doc. 836 ] Netherlands, 1487 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] , 1743 [ Pg. 1743 is part of Doc. 944 ] New Zealand 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] Nigeria, 1554 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1719 [ Pg. 1719 includes portions of Doc. 928 and Doc. 929 ] Nikpur, Abdol Hosein, 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] Nimitz, Fleet Adm. Chester W., 1365 n [ Pg. 1365 is part of Doc. 759 ] , 1383 [ Pg. 1383 is part of Doc. 770 ] , 1386–1388 [ Pgs. 1386–1388 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 1404 [ Pg. 1404 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 1428 [ Pg. 1428 is part of Doc. 805 ] Nitze, Paul, 169 n [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 172–173 [ Pgs. 172–173 include portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 526 n [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 1509 n [ Pg. 1509 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] Noble, John, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] Noel-Baker, Philip J., 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 768 ] Nokrashi Pasha, 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] Nolting, Frederick E., 147 n [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 230 n [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Activities of, 265 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 295–296 [ Pgs. 295–296 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 306–307 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 318–327 [ Pgs. 318–327 include portions of Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , and Doc. 125 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 600–601 [ Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 1242 [ Pg. 1242 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1285 n [ Pg. 1285 includes portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1286–1288 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1297–1301 [ Pgs. 1297–1301 include portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 1306–1313 [ Pgs. 1306–1313 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] , 1316 [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 735 ] , 1319–1322 [ Pgs. 1319–1322 include portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 1335 [ Pg. 1335 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1344–1345 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1442 n [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 1636–1637 [ Pg. 1636 is part of Doc. 884 ] , 1639 [ Pg. 1639 is part of Doc. 885 ] , 1816 n [ Pg. 1816 is part of Doc. 973 ] ; Council, 306–307 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 549 n [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 1243 [ Pg. 1243 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1264 n [ Pg. 1264 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 1265 [ Pg. 1265 is part of Doc. 706 ] , 1272 n [ Pg. 1272 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 1314–1315 [ Pgs. 1314–1315 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 1320–1322 [ Pgs. 1320–1322 include portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 1538 n [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1649 n [ Pg. 1649 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1651 n [ Pg. 1651 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1677 n [ Pg. 1677 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1764–1765 [ Pgs. 1764–1765 include portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] ; Defense Committee, 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 1314–1315 [ Pgs. 1314–1315 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] ; Military Committee, 1344 n [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] ; military forces, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] ; Ocean Shipping Planning Board, 1315 [ Pg. 1315 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] ; Standing Group of the Military Committee, 1344–1346 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] Northcroft, V. J., 566–568 [ Pgs. 566–568 include portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 293 ] Northern Rhodesia, 1522 [ Pg. 1522 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 863 ] Northrup, Col. G.G., 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] Norway, 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 811 ] , 1648 [ Pg. 1648 is part of Doc. 890 ] , 1650 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1653–1654 [ Pgs. 1653–1654 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1694 [ Pg. 1694 is part of Doc. 912 ] Nosrat Bey, Msutafa, 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] Nouira, Hedi, 1787–1788 [ Pg. 1787 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1791 [ Pg. 1791 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1805 [ Pg. 1805 is part of Doc. 968 ] Nourse, Edwin G., 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 206 ] Novomeysky, Moses A., 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 328 ] Noyes, Charles P., 1667 [ Pg. 1667 includes portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] , 1674–1676 [ Pgs. 1674–1676 include portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1682–1686 [ Pgs. 1682–1686 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , and Doc. 906 ] Nuri Said, 68 n [ Pg. 68 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 70–71 [ Pgs. 70–71 include portions of Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , and Doc. 31 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] Nyasaland, 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] Nye, Sir Archibald, 1391 [ Pg. 1391 is part of Doc. 776 ] , 1394 n [ Pg. 1394 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 1395 [ Pg. 1395 includes portions of Doc. 778 and Doc. 779 ] , 1398–1399 [ Pgs. 1398–1399 include portions of Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] Oden, Lt. Col. Delk M., 1344–1353 [ Pgs. 1344–1353 include portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] O’Gara, John E., 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 1181 [ Pg. 1181 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] O’Hara, Barratt, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Ohliger, Floyd, 27–28 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 1113 [ Pg. 1113 is part of Doc. 627 ] Ohly, John H., 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 123 n [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 55 and Doc. 56 ] , 147–150 [ Pgs. 147–150 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 483–484 [ Pgs. 483–484 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 488–490 [ Pgs. 488–490 include portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 545 n [ Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 620–624 [ Pgs. 620–624 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 1234–1235 [ Pgs. 1234–1235 include portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] , 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 1270–1271 [ Pg. 1270 is part of Doc. 709 ] , 1331 n [ Pg. 1331 is part of Doc. 741 ] Okan, Lt. Gen. Zekai, 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] O’Keefe, Brig. Gen. Richard J., 1112 n [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1121–1124 [ Pgs. 1121–1124 include portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 1126–1127 [ Pgs. 1126–1127 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 1129–1130 [ Pgs. 1129–1130 include portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 1135–1137 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1140 [ Pg. 1140 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1150–1151 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1156 [ Pg. 1156 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1158–1162 [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1164 [ Pg. 1164 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1174 [ Pg. 1174 is part of Doc. 644 ] , 1176–1177 [ Pgs. 1176–1177 include portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 1184–1186 [ Pgs. 1184–1186 include portions of Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655 ] , 1188–1189 [ Pgs. 1188–1189 include portions of Doc. 656 and Doc. 657 ] , 1192 [ Pg. 1192 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] Oldham, John, 1421 [ Pg. 1421 includes portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] Olver, S. J. L., 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 1442–1443 [ Pgs. 1442–1443 include portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] Oman, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 36–39 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] O’Neill, Harry P., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 627–628 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 1225 n [ Pg. 1225 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 1226–1227 [ Pg. 1226 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 1229 n [ Pg. 1229 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1301–1302 [ Pgs. 1301–1302 include portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 1565 [ Pg. 1565 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1582 [ Pg. 1582 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 862 ] Osborn, Lt. Col., 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 is part of Doc. 290 ] Overseas Consultants, Inc., 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 494–496 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 238 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 254 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Owen, Garry, 23–28 [ Pgs. 23–28 include portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 112–113 [ Pgs. 112–113 include portions of Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , and Doc. 47 ] , 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] Özyörük, Halil, 1263 n [ Pg. 1263 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] Pace, Frank, 1733 [ Pg. 1733 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] Pacific security pact, proposed, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 68 ] Pacific Western Oil Company, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 30–32 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 107–108 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 43 ] Packer, Earl L., 1774 n [ Pg. 1774 is part of Doc. 956 ] , 1775–1776 [ Pgs. 1775–1776 include portions of Doc. 957 and Doc. 958 ] , 1777 n [ Pg. 1777 includes portions of Doc. 958 and Doc. 959 ] , 1779–1785 [ Pgs. 1779–1785 include portions of Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , and Doc. 963 ] Padilla Nervo, 1667 [ Pg. 1667 includes portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] , 1672 [ Pg. 1672 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1674 [ Pg. 1674 includes portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1677 [ Pg. 1677 is part of Doc. 902 ] Pakistan ( see also Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and Pushtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Pakistan subheadings under Eritrea, Korean war, Libya, and Palestine question): Agreements with the United States concerning: Educational exchange program, Sept 23, 1950 , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 839 ] ; mutual defense assistance, Nov. 29 and Dec. 15, 1950 , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 839 ] British military assistance, 198–200 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 88 ] British policy, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] Commonwealth role, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1495 [ Pg. 1495 is part of Doc. 837 ] Communist movement and strength, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] East Pakistan, communal disturbances in, 1390–1391 [ Pg. 1390 is part of Doc. 776 ] , 1395–1401 [ Pgs. 1395–1401 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] , 1403 [ Pg. 1403 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1406–1408 [ Pgs. 1406–1408 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1410 [ Pg. 1410 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] Economic situation, 181–182 [ Pgs. 181–182 include portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 1492–1493 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] India, relations with, 196–200 [ Pgs. 196–200 include portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 1406–1407 [ Pg. 1406 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1478–1479 [ Pg. 1478 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1492–1493 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1498–1500 [ Pgs. 1498–1500 include portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] Iran, relations with, 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 837 ] Middle East role, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 1497–1499 [ Pgs. 1497–1499 include portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] Political situation, 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 837 ] Regional association, attitude toward, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 99 ] Saudi Arabia, relations with, 1149 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] Security of, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 837 ] Soviet Union, relations with, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1497–1498 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 837 ] U.S. arms sales to, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1411 [ Pg. 1411 includes portions of Doc. 793 and Doc. 794 ] , 1413–1414 [ Pg. 1413 is part of Doc. 795 ] U.S. base facilities, proposed, 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 175–176 [ Pgs. 175–176 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 1409 [ Pg. 1409 is part of Doc. 792 ] , 1493–1494 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1499–1500 [ Pgs. 1499–1500 include portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] U.S. military air transit rights, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 99 ] U.S. military assistance, 200 [ Pg. 200 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 544 [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 1409–1410 [ Pgs. 1409–1410 include portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 1414–1415 [ Pgs. 1414–1415 include portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1491–1492 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 837 ] U.S. policy, 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 is part of Doc. 241 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 1490–1500 [ Pgs. 1490–1500 include portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Visit to the United States by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, 1409–1415 [ Pgs. 1409–1415 include portions of Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 1431 [ Pg. 1431 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1498 [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 837 ] Palestine, Arab ( see also under Jordan), 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 139–140 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 770–771 [ Pgs. 770–771 include portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 845–846 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 857–860 [ Pgs. 857–860 include portions of Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 867–876 [ Pgs. 867–876 include portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 910–912 [ Pgs. 910–912 include portions of Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , and Doc. 478 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497 ] , 941–942 [ Pgs. 941–942 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 948 n [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 531 ] , 978–979 [ Pgs. 978–979 include portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1095–1096 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] Palestine question ( see also under Foreign Ministers meeting at London, United Nations: General Assembly and United Nations: Security Council): Anglo-American talks concerning, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 1003 [ Pg. 1003 is part of Doc. 553 ] Arab accounts, blocked, 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 493 ] Arab League, policies and position of the, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 208 n [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 281–282 [ Pgs. 281–282 include portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 746–747 [ Pgs. 746–747 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , and Doc. 360 ] , 770–771 [ Pgs. 770–771 include portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 796 n [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 includes portions of Doc. 404 and Doc. 405 ] , 805 n [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 822–823 [ Pgs. 822–823 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , and Doc. 430 ] , 839–844 [ Pgs. 839–844 include portions of Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 846–847 [ Pgs. 846–847 include portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 849–851 [ Pgs. 849–851 include portions of Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , and Doc. 442 ] , 856–859 [ Pgs. 856–859 include portions of Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , and Doc. 447 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 452 ] , 870 n [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 873 n [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 475 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 475 ] , 910–911 [ Pgs. 910–911 include portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 922–923 [ Pgs. 922–923 include portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 includes portions of Doc. 489 and Doc. 490 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497 ] , 940–942 [ Pgs. 940–942 include portions of Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , and Doc. 504 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 970 n [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 531 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 1048–1050 [ Pgs. 1048–1050 include portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 1056–1060 [ Pgs. 1056–1060 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1146 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1208 [ Pg. 1208 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1216 [ Pg. 1216 is part of Doc. 675 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] , 1744 [ Pg. 1744 is part of Doc. 944 ] Arab refugee properties: Proposed compensation for, 728–729 [ Pgs. 728–729 include portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 934–937 [ Pgs. 934–937 include portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , and Doc. 500 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 501 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 952–953 [ Pgs. 952–953 include portions of Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , and Doc. 515 ] , 972 [ Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 540 ] , 990 n [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 992–993 [ Pgs. 992–993 include portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 is part of Doc. 564 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1037–1038 [ Pgs. 1037–1038 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1050–1051 [ Pgs. 1050–1051 include portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] ; proposed Israeli sale of, 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 791–792 [ Pgs. 791–792 include portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] Arab shipping restrictions, 857–858 [ Pgs. 857–858 include portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] Arab states, policies and position of the, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 661–662 [ Pgs. 661–662 include portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 670–671 [ Pgs. 670–671 include portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 701–702 [ Pgs. 701–702 include portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 714–715 [ Pg. 714 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 340 ] , 723–724 [ Pg. 723 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 731–733 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 746–747 [ Pgs. 746–747 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , and Doc. 360 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 760–763 [ Pgs. 760–763 include portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 770–771 [ Pgs. 770–771 include portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 783–786 [ Pgs. 783–786 include portions of Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , and Doc. 391 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396 ] , 794–795 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 802–805 [ Pgs. 802–805 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , and Doc. 406 ] , 812–813 [ Pgs. 812–813 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 816–817 [ Pgs. 816–817 include portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 826–827 [ Pgs. 826–827 include portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 832–833 [ Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 835 [ Pg. 835 includes portions of Doc. 427 and Doc. 428 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] , 839–844 [ Pgs. 839–844 include portions of Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 846–847 [ Pgs. 846–847 include portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 852–859 [ Pgs. 852–859 include portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , and Doc. 447 ] , 866–868 [ Pgs. 866–868 include portions of Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , and Doc. 453 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] , 885–890 [ Pgs. 885–890 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 893–899 [ Pgs. 893–899 include portions of Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , and Doc. 471 ] , 906–912 [ Pgs. 906–912 include portions of Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , and Doc. 478 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 928–930 [ Pgs. 928–930 include portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 934–935 [ Pgs. 934–935 include portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 937–939 [ Pgs. 937–939 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 956 n [ Pg. 956 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 524 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 972 [ Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 529 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 531 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 989–990 [ Pgs. 989–990 include portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 992–993 [ Pgs. 992–993 include portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 1004–1005 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1008 [ Pg. 1008 is part of Doc. 554 ] , 1013–1014 [ Pgs. 1013–1014 include portions of Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , and Doc. 560 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1019–1020 [ Pgs. 1019–1020 include portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 581 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 585 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1054 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1056–1058 [ Pgs. 1056–1058 include portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 1060 [ Pg. 1060 is part of Doc. 593 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 1090–1091 [ Pgs. 1090–1091 include portions of Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , and Doc. 622 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1105–1107 [ Pgs. 1105–1107 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1145 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1205 [ Pg. 1205 is part of Doc. 669 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 670 ] Armistice agreements, matters pertaining to, 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 820 n [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 885–886 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 918 n [ Pg. 918 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 926 n [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 943–946 [ Pgs. 943–946 include portions of Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 529 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 is part of Doc. 531 ] , 992–1002 [ Pgs. 992–1002 include portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , and Doc. 553 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1010–1014 [ Pgs. 1010–1014 include portions of Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , and Doc. 560 ] , 1016–1017 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1019–1023 [ Pgs. 1019–1023 include portions of Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 1027–1028 [ Pgs. 1027–1028 include portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1053–1054 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1064–1066 [ Pgs. 1064–1066 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 1068–1070 [ Pgs. 1068–1070 include portions of Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , and Doc. 603 ] British policy and position, 669–670 [ Pgs. 669–670 include portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 844–845 [ Pgs. 844–845 include portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 860–861 [ Pgs. 860–861 include portions of Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , and Doc. 449 ] , 869–871 [ Pg. 869 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 875–876 [ Pgs. 875–876 include portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 924–925 [ Pgs. 924–925 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , and Doc. 490 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 1014 [ Pg. 1014 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560 ] , 1062 n [ Pg. 1062 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 606 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] Egyptian policy and position, 293 [ Pg. 293 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 662–663 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 666–667 [ Pgs. 666–667 include portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 707–709 [ Pgs. 707–709 include portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , and Doc. 335 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 761–762 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 784–785 [ Pgs. 784–785 include portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394 ] , 796–801 [ Pgs. 796–801 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , and Doc. 402 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 858–859 [ Pgs. 858–859 include portions of Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , and Doc. 447 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 884–889 [ Pgs. 884–889 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 897–898 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 909–911 [ Pgs. 909–911 include portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 928–929 [ Pgs. 928–929 include portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 999–1000 [ Pgs. 999–1000 include portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 585 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1054–1055 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] French policy, 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , and Doc. 337 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 718–719 [ Pgs. 718–719 include portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 729–730 [ Pgs. 729–730 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 767–770 [ Pgs. 767–770 include portions of Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 785–786 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 828–829 [ Pgs. 828–829 include portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 860–861 [ Pgs. 860–861 include portions of Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , and Doc. 449 ] , 918–919 [ Pgs. 918–919 include portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 955–956 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] Gaza strip plan, 298–299 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 922–923 [ Pgs. 922–923 include portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] Holy places, proposals concerning, 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , and Doc. 337 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 720 n [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 728 [ Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 753–754 [ Pgs. 753–754 include portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 790–791 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 821–822 [ Pgs. 821–822 include portions of Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 424 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 862–863 [ Pg. 862 is part of Doc. 449 ] , 899 [ Pg. 899 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 903 n [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 is part of Doc. 474 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 920 [ Pg. 920 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 982–983 [ Pgs. 982–983 include portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1031–1032 [ Pgs. 1031–1032 include portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] Iraqi policy and position, 655–656 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 682–684 [ Pgs. 682–684 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , and Doc. 337 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 910 n [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1021–1023 [ Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 605 ] Israeli-Jordanian negotiations, 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 671–672 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 674–678 [ Pgs. 674–678 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 680–681 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 697–704 [ Pgs. 697–704 include portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 716–717 [ Pgs. 716–717 include portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 720–722 [ Pgs. 720–722 include portions of Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , and Doc. 345 ] , 726–730 [ Pgs. 726–730 include portions of Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 735–736 [ Pgs. 735–736 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , and Doc. 357 ] , 745–748 [ Pgs. 745–748 include portions of Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 751–754 [ Pgs. 751–754 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] , 757–758 [ Pgs. 757–758 include portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 764–766 [ Pgs. 764–766 include portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 772–775 [ Pgs. 772–775 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , and Doc. 386 ] , 781–792 [ Pgs. 781–792 include portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , and Doc. 396 ] , 796–799 [ Pgs. 796–799 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , and Doc. 402 ] , 802–805 [ Pgs. 802–805 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , and Doc. 406 ] , 807–809 [ Pgs. 807–809 include portions of Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , and Doc. 409 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 822–824 [ Pgs. 822–824 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , and Doc. 430 ] , 839 n [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 852–853 [ Pgs. 852–853 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 859–860 [ Pgs. 859–860 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 863–864 [ Pgs. 863–864 include portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 452 ] , 869 [ Pg. 869 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 873–874 [ Pgs. 873–874 include portions of Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , and Doc. 457 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 889–890 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 469 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 917–918 [ Pgs. 917–918 include portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 925–926 [ Pgs. 925–926 include portions of Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 501 ] , 941–947 [ Pgs. 941–947 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , and Doc. 509 ] , 950–951 [ Pgs. 950–951 include portions of Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , and Doc. 513 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 977–980 [ Pgs. 977–980 include portions of Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , and Doc. 533 ] , 984–985 [ Pgs. 984–985 include portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 includes portions of Doc. 546 and Doc. 547 ] , 1004–1005 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1020–1021 [ Pgs. 1020–1021 include portions of Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , and Doc. 566 ] , 1095–1096 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] Israeli policy and position, 655–656 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 658–663 [ Pgs. 658–663 include portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 673–676 [ Pgs. 673–676 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 712–713 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 719 n [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 341 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 731–732 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 735–736 [ Pgs. 735–736 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 760–763 [ Pgs. 760–763 include portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 784–786 [ Pgs. 784–786 include portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 794–795 [ Pg. 794 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 812–813 [ Pgs. 812–813 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 826–827 [ Pgs. 826–827 include portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 832–834 [ Pgs. 832–834 include portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] , 842–844 [ Pgs. 842–844 include portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 862–868 [ Pgs. 862–868 include portions of Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , and Doc. 453 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 885–886 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 888–889 [ Pgs. 888–889 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 893–894 [ Pgs. 893–894 include portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 899–905 [ Pgs. 899–905 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 475 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 918–919 [ Pgs. 918–919 include portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 922–925 [ Pgs. 922–925 include portions of Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , and Doc. 490 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] , 933–935 [ Pgs. 933–935 include portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 950–954 [ Pgs. 950–954 include portions of Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , and Doc. 515 ] , 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] , 966–967 [ Pgs. 966–967 include portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 976–977 [ Pgs. 976–977 include portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 982–984 [ Pgs. 982–984 include portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 540 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1010–1021 [ Pgs. 1010–1021 include portions of Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , and Doc. 566 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 1026–1028 [ Pgs. 1026–1028 include portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 1030–1031 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 572 ] , 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1036 n [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 1037–1038 [ Pgs. 1037–1038 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 585 ] , 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1053–1056 [ Pgs. 1053–1056 include portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 1072–1073 [ Pgs. 1072–1073 include portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1145 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1204 n [ Pg. 1204 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 is part of Doc. 673 ] Israeli visas, Arab restrictions on, 857–858 [ Pgs. 857–858 include portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] Jerusalem, proposed internationalisation of ( see also U.N. Trusteeship Council infra and Jerusalem subheadings under United Nations: General Assembly and Vatican), 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 655–656 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 659–661 [ Pgs. 659–661 include portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 665–668 [ Pgs. 665–668 include portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , and Doc. 310 ] , 673–674 [ Pgs. 673–674 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 682–683 [ Pgs. 682–683 include portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 686–690 [ Pgs. 686–690 include portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 692–693 [ Pgs. 692–693 include portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 703–704 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 706–707 [ Pgs. 706–707 include portions of Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , and Doc. 337 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 716–720 [ Pgs. 716–720 include portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , and Doc. 342 ] , 726–727 [ Pgs. 726–727 include portions of Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , and Doc. 348 ] , 729–730 [ Pgs. 729–730 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 733–735 [ Pgs. 733–735 include portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , and Doc. 354 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , and Doc. 357 ] , 748–750 [ Pgs. 748–750 include portions of Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] , 752–755 [ Pgs. 752–755 include portions of Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , and Doc. 368 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 370 ] , 765–770 [ Pgs. 765–770 include portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 775–777 [ Pgs. 775–777 include portions of Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] , 789–791 [ Pgs. 789–791 include portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 805–806 [ Pgs. 805–806 include portions of Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , and Doc. 407 ] , 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 814–815 [ Pgs. 814–815 include portions of Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , and Doc. 414 ] , 821–822 [ Pgs. 821–822 include portions of Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 827–831 [ Pgs. 827–831 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , and Doc. 425 ] , 837–839 [ Pgs. 837–839 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 841–843 [ Pgs. 841–843 include portions of Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 857–858 [ Pgs. 857–858 include portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 860 [ Pg. 860 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] , 862–865 [ Pgs. 862–865 include portions of Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , and Doc. 451 ] , 869–870 [ Pg. 869 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] , 878–879 [ Pgs. 878–879 include portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 899–905 [ Pgs. 899–905 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 918–921 [ Pgs. 918–921 include portions of Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , and Doc. 485 ] , 924–928 [ Pgs. 924–928 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 953–954 [ Pgs. 953–954 include portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] , 969–970 [ Pgs. 969–970 include portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , and Doc. 533 ] , 981–984 [ Pgs. 981–984 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537 ] , 990–991 [ Pgs. 990–991 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1014–1015 [ Pgs. 1014–1015 include portions of Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , and Doc. 561 ] , 1017 n [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] 1022 [ Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 566 ] , 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 1029–1032 [ Pgs. 1029–1032 include portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1064–1067 [ Pgs. 1064–1067 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074–1076 [ Pgs. 1074–1076 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 1095–1097 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 624 ] Jordanian policy and position, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 655–656 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 662–663 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , and Doc. 357 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , and Doc. 430 ] , 839–840 [ Pgs. 839–840 include portions of Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , and Doc. 432 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 899–902 [ Pgs. 899–902 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 910–912 [ Pgs. 910–912 include portions of Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , and Doc. 478 ] , 924–925 [ Pgs. 924–925 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , and Doc. 490 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 936–938 [ Pgs. 936–938 include portions of Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 521 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 524 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 973–976 [ Pgs. 973–976 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 978–981 [ Pgs. 978–981 include portions of Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 993–995 [ Pgs. 993–995 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , and Doc. 546 ] , 1001–1002 [ Pgs. 1001–1002 include portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 1004–1005 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 558 ] , 1015–1017 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 is part of Doc. 564 ] , 1021–1023 [ Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1064–1070 [ Pgs. 1064–1070 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , and Doc. 603 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 605 ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 624 ] Lebanese policy and position, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 730–732 [ Pgs. 730–732 include portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 746–747 [ Pgs. 746–747 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , and Doc. 360 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 980 n [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 986 n [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 1076–1077 [ Pgs. 1076–1077 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 1106–1107 [ Pgs. 1106–1107 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1110–1111 [ Pgs. 1110–1111 include portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] Mediterranean, corridor to the, negotations concerning Jordanian request for, 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 680–681 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 701 [ Pg. 701 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 975 n [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 623 ] Pakistan position, 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 837 ] Palestine, U.S. interest in the Arab-Israeli controversy over future status of, 658–1086 [ Pgs. 658–1086 include portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , Doc. 461 , Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , and Doc. 617 ] Refugee problems ( see also U.N. Relief and Works Agency infra and Palestine refugee subheadings under United Nations: General Assembly), 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 298 [ Pg. 298 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 662–664 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 669–671 [ Pgs. 669–671 include portions of Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , and Doc. 312 ] , 680–682 [ Pgs. 680–682 include portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , and Doc. 336 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 749–750 [ Pgs. 749–750 include portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] , 761–764 [ Pgs. 761–764 include portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 771 n [ Pg. 771 is part of Doc. 378 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 449 ] , 885 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 895–896 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 921–922 [ Pgs. 921–922 include portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 933–935 [ Pgs. 933–935 include portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 951–952 [ Pgs. 951–952 include portions of Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , and Doc. 514 ] , 966–967 [ Pgs. 966–967 include portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 972–974 [ Pgs. 972–974 include portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 975 n [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 980 n [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 986–987 [ Pgs. 986–987 include portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 is part of Doc. 540 ] , 990 n [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 992–993 [ Pgs. 992–993 include portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1018–1020 [ Pgs. 1018–1020 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , and Doc. 565 ] , 1022 [ Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 566 ] , 1024–1027 [ Pgs. 1024–1027 include portions of Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , and Doc. 571 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 1037–1043 [ Pgs. 1037–1043 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , and Doc. 585 ] , 1045–1055 [ Pgs. 1045–1055 include portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1060–1063 [ Pgs. 1060–1063 include portions of Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , and Doc. 596 ] , 1073–1074 [ Pgs. 1073–1074 include portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 1076–1077 [ Pgs. 1076–1077 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1097–1098 [ Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1105–1106 [ Pgs. 1105–1106 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1109 [ Pg. 1109 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 1144–1146 [ Pgs. 1144–1146 include portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 1205–1206 [ Pgs. 1205–1206 include portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] Refugee reintegration, proposed, 1037–1040 [ Pgs. 1037–1040 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] , 1045–1046 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1051 n [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] Refugee repatriation, proposed, 763–764 [ Pgs. 763–764 include portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 934–935 [ Pgs. 934–935 include portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 990 n [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 992 n [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 is part of Doc. 570 ] , 1033 n [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1037–1039 [ Pgs. 1037–1039 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1206 [ Pg. 1206 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] Refugee resettlement, proposed, 763–764 [ Pgs. 763–764 include portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 992 n [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 is part of Doc. 564 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 1037–1039 [ Pgs. 1037–1039 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] , 1206 [ Pg. 1206 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] Saudi Arabian position, 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 415 ] , 840 [ Pg. 840 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 907–910 [ Pgs. 907–910 include portions of Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , and Doc. 477 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 1146 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 637 ] Senafir and Tiran Islands, Egyptian occupation of, 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Soviet policy, 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1076–1077 [ Pgs. 1076–1077 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] Syrian policy and position, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 783–784 [ Pgs. 783–784 include portions of Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , and Doc. 391 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 804–805 [ Pgs. 804–805 include portions of Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , and Doc. 406 ] , 807–808 [ Pgs. 807–808 include portions of Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , and Doc. 409 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 822–825 [ Pgs. 822–825 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , and Doc. 422 ] , 851–853 [ Pgs. 851–853 include portions of Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , and Doc. 443 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 886 [ Pg. 886 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 896–897 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 905–908 [ Pgs. 905–908 include portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 929–930 [ Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 521 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 980 n [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 981–982 [ Pgs. 981–982 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] , 1013 n [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1145 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1205–1206 [ Pgs. 1205–1206 include portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] Territorial questions, 662 [ Pg. 662 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 703–704 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 726–727 [ Pgs. 726–727 include portions of Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , and Doc. 348 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 529 ] , 976–977 [ Pgs. 976–977 include portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] U.N. Economic Survey Mission (Clapp mission), 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 670–672 [ Pgs. 670–672 include portions of Doc. 311 and Doc. 312 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 763–764 [ Pgs. 763–764 include portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 501 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 959–960 [ Pgs. 959–960 include portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] , 963–964 [ Pgs. 963–964 include portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 1144–1146 [ Pgs. 1144–1146 include portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] U.N. Mixed Armistice Commissions, 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 885 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498 ] , 943–946 [ Pgs. 943–946 include portions of Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 974–975 [ Pgs. 974–975 include portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 997–998 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1020–1023 [ Pgs. 1020–1023 include portions of Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 585 ] , 1053–1055 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 661–664 [ Pgs. 661–664 include portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 673–677 [ Pgs. 673–677 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 687 n [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 699–700 [ Pgs. 699–700 include portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 707–709 [ Pgs. 707–709 include portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , and Doc. 335 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 728–733 [ Pgs. 728–733 include portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 759–765 [ Pgs. 759–765 include portions of Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , and Doc. 373 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 785–786 [ Pg. 785 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 794–796 [ Pgs. 794–796 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 802–803 [ Pgs. 802–803 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 812–814 [ Pgs. 812–814 include portions of Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , and Doc. 413 ] , 825–827 [ Pgs. 825–827 include portions of Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , and Doc. 423 ] , 832–836 [ Pgs. 832–836 include portions of Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 840–841 [ Pgs. 840–841 include portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] , 845–847 [ Pgs. 845–847 include portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] , 851–852 [ Pgs. 851–852 include portions of Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , and Doc. 443 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 858–859 [ Pgs. 858–859 include portions of Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , and Doc. 447 ] , 865–868 [ Pgs. 865–868 include portions of Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , and Doc. 453 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 877 n [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] , 888–890 [ Pgs. 888–890 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 892 n [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 893–894 [ Pgs. 893–894 include portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , and Doc. 474 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 475 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 915–916 [ Pgs. 915–916 include portions of Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , and Doc. 482 ] , 928–931 [ Pgs. 928–931 include portions of Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , and Doc. 494 ] , 935–939 [ Pgs. 935–939 include portions of Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 949–953 [ Pgs. 949–953 include portions of Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , and Doc. 515 ] , 955–958 [ Pgs. 955–958 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 971–980 [ Pgs. 971–980 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , and Doc. 533 ] , 982 n [ Pg. 982 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 989–993 [ Pgs. 989–993 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 1004–1005 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1015–1016 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1025–1027 [ Pgs. 1025–1027 include portions of Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , and Doc. 571 ] , 1030 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 572 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 1054 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1096 [ Pg. 1096 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1212 [ Pg. 1212 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 669–670 [ Pgs. 669–670 include portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 326 ] , 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , and Doc. 336 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 756–757 [ Pgs. 756–757 include portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 806–807 [ Pgs. 806–807 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , and Doc. 408 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 412 ] , 860–861 [ Pgs. 860–861 include portions of Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , and Doc. 449 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 892–893 [ Pgs. 892–893 include portions of Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , and Doc. 469 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 950–952 [ Pgs. 950–952 include portions of Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , and Doc. 514 ] , 958–960 [ Pgs. 958–960 include portions of Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 963–965 [ Pgs. 963–965 include portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 973–974 [ Pgs. 973–974 include portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 includes portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1018–1019 [ Pgs. 1018–1019 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , and Doc. 564 ] , 1023–1025 [ Pgs. 1023–1025 include portions of Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , and Doc. 570 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 1037–1041 [ Pgs. 1037–1041 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , and Doc. 583 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1073–1077 [ Pgs. 1073–1077 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1211–1212 [ Pgs. 1211–1212 include portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] U.N. Trusteeship Council, considerations concerning Jerusalem by the, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 319 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , and Doc. 337 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 718–720 [ Pgs. 718–720 include portions of Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , and Doc. 342 ] , 726–730 [ Pgs. 726–730 include portions of Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 733–736 [ Pgs. 733–736 include portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 748–750 [ Pgs. 748–750 include portions of Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] , 752–755 [ Pgs. 752–755 include portions of Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , and Doc. 368 ] , 765–770 [ Pgs. 765–770 include portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 776–777 [ Pgs. 776–777 include portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] , 784–786 [ Pgs. 784–786 include portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 790–791 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 805–806 [ Pgs. 805–806 include portions of Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , and Doc. 407 ] , 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 814–815 [ Pgs. 814–815 include portions of Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , and Doc. 414 ] , 821–822 [ Pgs. 821–822 include portions of Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 827–831 [ Pgs. 827–831 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , and Doc. 425 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 837–839 [ Pgs. 837–839 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 841–843 [ Pgs. 841–843 include portions of Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 862–864 [ Pgs. 862–864 include portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 878–879 [ Pgs. 878–879 include portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 899–905 [ Pgs. 899–905 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 918–920 [ Pgs. 918–920 include portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 924–927 [ Pgs. 924–927 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , and Doc. 492 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1029–1031 [ Pgs. 1029–1031 include portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 is part of Doc. 624 ] U.S. policy, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 655–656 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 667–668 [ Pgs. 667–668 include portions of Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , and Doc. 310 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 683–690 [ Pgs. 683–690 include portions of Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 699–702 [ Pgs. 699–702 include portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] , 706–707 [ Pgs. 706–707 include portions of Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 709–710 [ Pgs. 709–710 include portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , and Doc. 336 ] , 718–719 [ Pgs. 718–719 include portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 721–722 [ Pgs. 721–722 include portions of Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , and Doc. 345 ] , 728–733 [ Pgs. 728–733 include portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 756–757 [ Pgs. 756–757 include portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 763–766 [ Pgs. 763–766 include portions of Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 776–777 [ Pgs. 776–777 include portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 802–803 [ Pgs. 802–803 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 806–808 [ Pgs. 806–808 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , and Doc. 409 ] , 811–816 [ Pgs. 811–816 include portions of Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , and Doc. 415 ] , 823–824 [ Pg. 823 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 425 ] , 835–838 [ Pgs. 835–838 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , and Doc. 430 ] , 854–855 [ Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 895–896 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 899–902 [ Pgs. 899–902 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 924 [ Pg. 924 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 927–928 [ Pgs. 927–928 include portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 953–954 [ Pgs. 953–954 include portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 963–965 [ Pgs. 963–965 include portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , and Doc. 523 ] , 971–973 [ Pgs. 971–973 include portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , and Doc. 533 ] , 995–996 [ Pgs. 995–996 include portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 1009–1010 [ Pgs. 1009–1010 include portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 1012–1015 [ Pgs. 1012–1015 include portions of Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , and Doc. 561 ] , 1018–1019 [ Pgs. 1018–1019 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , and Doc. 564 ] , 1021–1023 [ Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 1029–1032 [ Pgs. 1029–1032 include portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 1051–1052 [ Pgs. 1051–1052 include portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 1064–1065 [ Pgs. 1064–1065 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , and Doc. 599 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1073–1077 [ Pgs. 1073–1077 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 1101–1102 [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1104–1108 [ Pgs. 1104–1108 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 1212 [ Pg. 1212 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 858 ] Yemeni policy, 910 n [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 1005–1006 [ Pgs. 1005–1006 include portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 is part of Doc. 575 ] Palestine Relief Agency. See U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees under Palestine question. Palmer, Ely E., 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 735–736 [ Pgs. 735–736 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 784–786 [ Pgs. 784–786 include portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 794–796 [ Pgs. 794–796 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 825–827 [ Pgs. 825–827 include portions of Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , and Doc. 423 ] , 832–836 [ Pgs. 832–836 include portions of Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 840–841 [ Pgs. 840–841 include portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 865–868 [ Pgs. 865–868 include portions of Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , and Doc. 453 ] , 888–890 [ Pgs. 888–890 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 893–894 [ Pgs. 893–894 include portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 915–916 [ Pgs. 915–916 include portions of Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , and Doc. 482 ] , 928–931 [ Pgs. 928–931 include portions of Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , and Doc. 494 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 939 n [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 501 ] , 952–953 [ Pgs. 952–953 include portions of Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , and Doc. 515 ] , 964 n [ Pg. 964 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 973–980 [ Pgs. 973–980 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , and Doc. 533 ] , 989–993 [ Pgs. 989–993 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] Palmer, Joseph, 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 591–594 [ Pgs. 591–594 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1635–1638 [ Pgs. 1635–1638 include portions of Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] , 1659 [ Pg. 1659 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1661 n [ Pg. 1661 is part of Doc. 897 ] , 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] Palmer, Gen. R. J., 1811 [ Pg. 1811 is part of Doc. 971 ] Panama Canal, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Pan American Airways, 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1710 [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] , 1713 [ Pg. 1713 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1716 [ Pg. 1716 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] Pandit, Vijayalakshmi, 184 n [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 1366–1368 [ Pgs. 1366–1368 include portions of Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , and Doc. 762 ] , 1371 [ Pg. 1371 is part of Doc. 763 ] , 1400 [ Pg. 1400 includes portions of Doc. 783 and Doc. 784 ] , 1412–1415 [ Pgs. 1412–1415 include portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 1481–1482 [ Pgs. 1481–1482 include portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] Pannill, 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 17 [ Pg. 17 is part of Doc. 7 ] Papagos, Field Marshal Alexander, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 363–364 [ Pgs. 363–364 include portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 153 ] , 372–373 [ Pgs. 372–373 include portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 380–382 [ Pgs. 380–382 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 387–388 [ Pgs. 387–388 include portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 396–397 [ Pgs. 396–397 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 400–403 [ Pgs. 400–403 include portions of Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 423–425 [ Pgs. 423–425 include portions of Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] , 432–434 [ Pgs. 432–434 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , and Doc. 193 ] Papandreou, George, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 347 n [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 352–353 [ Pgs. 352–353 include portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 is part of Doc. 151 ] , 371–373 [ Pgs. 371–373 include portions of Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 includes portions of Doc. 156 and Doc. 157 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 405 n [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 420 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 436 n [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 443–444 [ Pgs. 443–444 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] Parker, 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 598–601 [ Pgs. 598–601 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 1196 n [ Pg. 1196 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] Parodi, Alexandre, 762 [ Pg. 762 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 423 ] , 1798 [ Pg. 1798 is part of Doc. 966 ] , 1807 n [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] Parsons, James G., 1408–1410 [ Pgs. 1408–1410 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , and Doc. 793 ] Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 1366 [ Pg. 1366 is part of Doc. 760 ] , 1372–1373 [ Pgs. 1372–1373 include portions of Doc. 763 and Doc. 764 ] , 1377 [ Pg. 1377 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 1389 [ Pg. 1389 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1402–1403 [ Pgs. 1402–1403 include portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1406 [ Pg. 1406 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 1408–1409 [ Pgs. 1408–1409 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1418–1419 [ Pgs. 1418–1419 include portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 1422 [ Pg. 1422 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1425–1426 [ Pgs. 1425–1426 include portions of Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , and Doc. 804 ] , 1430 [ Pg. 1430 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1474–1475 [ Pgs. 1474–1475 include portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] , 1481–1482 [ Pgs. 1481–1482 include portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] Patrick, Capt. G. Serpell, 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] Patterson, Jefferson, 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 349–351 [ Pgs. 349–351 include portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 364 n [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 includes portions of Doc. 155 and Doc. 156 ] , 374 n [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 385 n [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202 ] Paul, Norman S., 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 290 ] Paul I, King of Greece, 345–348 [ Pgs. 345–348 include portions of Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] , 351–357 [ Pgs. 351–357 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 364–367 [ Pgs. 364–367 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 369 n [ Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 370–373 [ Pgs. 370–373 include portions of Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 169 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 416–417 [ Pgs. 416–417 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 432–435 [ Pgs. 432–435 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , and Doc. 194 ] Pawleski, Gaston, 1702 [ Pg. 1702 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] Pearson, Drew, 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] Pearson, Lester B., 1363–1364 [ Pgs. 1363–1364 include portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1366 [ Pg. 1366 is part of Doc. 760 ] , 1375–1378 [ Pgs. 1375–1378 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , and Doc. 769 ] , 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] Peck, E. H., 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] Pelt, Adrian, 1600–1609 [ Pgs. 1600–1609 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , and Doc. 870 ] , 1621–1622 [ Pg. 1621 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1624–1625 [ Pgs. 1624–1625 include portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1626 n [ Pg. 1626 includes portions of Doc. 877 and Doc. 878 ] , 1627–1629 [ Pgs. 1627–1629 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , and Doc. 880 ] , 1632–1633 [ Pgs. 1632–1633 include portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] Penrose, Stephen B. L., 852–855 [ Pgs. 852–855 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] Pepper, Claude, 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 1028 n [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 571 ] Périllier, Louis, 1778–1782 [ Pgs. 1778–1782 include portions of Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , and Doc. 963 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1786–1788 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1790–1791 [ Pg. 1790 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1797–1802 [ Pgs. 1797–1802 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , and Doc. 968 ] , 1804–1808 [ Pgs. 1804–1808 include portions of Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] Perkins, George W., 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 602–604 [ Pgs. 602–604 include portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , and Doc. 280 ] , 1509 n [ Pg. 1509 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1657–1659 [ Pgs. 1657–1659 include portions of Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , and Doc. 897 ] , 1823 [ Pg. 1823 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] , 1826 n [ Pg. 1826 includes portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] , 1832–1834 [ Pgs. 1832–1834 include portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] , 1840 n [ Pg. 1840 is part of Doc. 985 ] Perkins, Warwick, 1254 n [ Pg. 1254 is part of Doc. 697 ] , 1255 n [ Pg. 1255 is part of Doc. 698 ] , 1258 [ Pg. 1258 includes portions of Doc. 700 and Doc. 701 ] Persian Gulf. See under Near and Middle East. Peru, 15–16 [ Pgs. 15–16 include portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Petroleum Development, Ltd., 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 17 ] Peurifoy, John E., 387 n [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 416–426 [ Pgs. 416–426 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , and Doc. 193 ] , 434 n [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 438–440 [ Pgs. 438–440 include portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] , 443–444 [ Pgs. 443–444 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 526 n [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] Pezopoulos, George, 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 152 ] Pharaon Island, 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Philippines, 501 n [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 814–815 [ Pgs. 814–815 include portions of Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , and Doc. 414 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] Phillips, Wendell, 1357 [ Pg. 1357 is part of Doc. 754 ] Phrantzes, John A., 351 n [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] Pierce, Col. James R., 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] Pinchot, Cornelia Bryce, 483 [ Pg. 483 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Pincus, L.A., 1088 [ Pg. 1088 includes portions of Doc. 618 and Doc. 619 ] , 1089 n [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] Pinkerton, Lowell C., 856 [ Pg. 856 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 1106–1111 [ Pgs. 1106–1111 include portions of Doc. 624 , Doc. 625 , and Doc. 626 ] Pipinelis, Panayotis, 352–353 [ Pgs. 352–353 include portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] , 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , and Doc. 151 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] Pistolakis, Sylianos, 381 [ Pg. 381 is part of Doc. 163 ] Plastiras, Gen. Nicholas, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346–348 [ Pgs. 346–348 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] , 351–356 [ Pgs. 351–356 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] , 359–361 [ Pgs. 359–361 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148 ] , 365–370 [ Pgs. 365–370 include portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 380–382 [ Pgs. 380–382 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 386–387 [ Pgs. 386–387 include portions of Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] , 396–397 [ Pgs. 396–397 include portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 399–402 [ Pgs. 399–402 include portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , and Doc. 174 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 414–416 [ Pgs. 414–416 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 419–421 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 193 ] Plaza Lasso, Galo, 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Pleven, René, 1798 [ Pg. 1798 is part of Doc. 966 ] Plitt, Edward A., 1583 [ Pg. 1583 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1747–1748 [ Pgs. 1747–1748 include portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] Poage, William R., 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 82 ] , 186 n [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] Point Four program, U.S., 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 6–7 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 30 and Doc. 31 ] , 169–171 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 174–175 [ Pgs. 174–175 include portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 214–216 [ Pgs. 214–216 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 219–220 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 279–283 [ Pgs. 279–283 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , and Doc. 105 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 606–607 [ Pgs. 606–607 include portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 644–646 [ Pgs. 644–646 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 is part of Doc. 521 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 1049 n [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1051 [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1140–1141 [ Pg. 1140 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1192–1193 [ Pgs. 1192–1193 include portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 1196 n [ Pg. 1196 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] , 1206 [ Pg. 1206 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 1218 n [ Pg. 1218 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 1327 [ Pg. 1327 is part of Doc. 740 ] , 1360–1361 [ Pgs. 1360–1361 include portions of Doc. 756 and Doc. 757 ] , 1462 [ Pg. 1462 is part of Doc. 825 ] , 1470 [ Pg. 1470 is part of Doc. 829 ] , 1477–1478 [ Pg. 1477 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1486 [ Pg. 1486 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1499–1500 [ Pgs. 1499–1500 include portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 839 ] , 1504–1506 [ Pg. 1504 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1510–1511 [ Pg. 1510 is part of Doc. 841 ] , 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 843 ] , 1515–1518 [ Pg. 1515 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1520–1521 [ Pg. 1520 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1527 [ Pg. 1527 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1530–1532 [ Pg. 1530 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1540–1541 [ Pgs. 1540–1541 include portions of Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , and Doc. 849 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1557–1558 [ Pgs. 1557–1558 include portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1572 [ Pg. 1572 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1577–1578 [ Pg. 1577 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1589 [ Pg. 1589 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1593–1594 [ Pg. 1593 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1615 [ Pg. 1615 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1629–1630 [ Pgs. 1629–1630 include portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1694–1695 [ Pg. 1694 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1697 [ Pg. 1697 is part of Doc. 913 ] , 1704–1705 [ Pg. 1704 is part of Doc. 919 ] , 1709 [ Pg. 1709 is part of Doc. 922 ] , 1713 [ Pg. 1713 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1715 [ Pg. 1715 is part of Doc. 926 ] , 1719 [ Pg. 1719 includes portions of Doc. 928 and Doc. 929 ] , 1721 [ Pg. 1721 includes portions of Doc. 930 and Doc. 931 ] , 1726 [ Pg. 1726 is part of Doc. 935 ] , 1729 [ Pg. 1729 includes portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] , 1732 [ Pg. 1732 includes portions of Doc. 939 and Doc. 940 ] , 1734–1735 [ Pgs. 1734–1735 include portions of Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] , 1783 [ Pg. 1783 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1785 [ Pg. 1785 is part of Doc. 963 ] Poland, 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1688 [ Pg. 1688 is part of Doc. 908 ] Politis, Athanase G., 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 417–418 [ Pgs. 417–418 include portions of Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] Politis, John, 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 378 n [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Polk, Judd, 1153 [ Pg. 1153 is part of Doc. 637 ] Popper, David, 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 1252 [ Pg. 1252 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] Porter, Paul R., 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 364 [ Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 366–369 [ Pgs. 366–369 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 380–382 [ Pgs. 380–382 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 404–407 [ Pgs. 404–407 include portions of Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 436–437 [ Pgs. 436–437 include portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 434 ] , 936 [ Pg. 936 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] Portugal ( see also Portuguese colonial policies under Africa), 1743 [ Pg. 1743 is part of Doc. 944 ] Power, Thomas F., Jr., 1604–1605 [ Pgs. 1604–1605 include portions of Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , and Doc. 868 ] , 1612–1618 [ Pgs. 1612–1618 include portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] Poynton, Sir Hilton, 1554–1555 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] Prasad, Rajendra, 1402 [ Pg. 1402 is part of Doc. 786 ] President’s War Powers Act, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] Prica, Srdja, 340 [ Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Price, Brigadier, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Price, Harry, 1521 n [ Pg. 1521 is part of Doc. 844 ] Pushtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan: Afghan policy and position, 205–206 [ Pgs. 205–206 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1148–1149 [ Pg. 1148 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1446–1451 [ Pgs. 1446–1451 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 1453 [ Pg. 1453 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 1456–1457 [ Pgs. 1456–1457 include portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] , 1496–1497 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] ; British policy, 1452–1453 [ Pgs. 1452–1453 include portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] ; Durand line, 1446–1447 [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 1452–1454 [ Pgs. 1452–1454 include portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] , 1457–1458 [ Pgs. 1457–1458 include portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] ; Indian policy, 1454 [ Pg. 1454 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] ; mediation efforts, 205 [ Pg. 205 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1448–1449 [ Pgs. 1448–1449 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 1455–1456 [ Pgs. 1455–1456 include portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] ; Pakistan policy and position, 205–206 [ Pgs. 205–206 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1446–1449 [ Pgs. 1446–1449 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 1451 n [ Pg. 1451 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 1452 [ Pg. 1452 is part of Doc. 818 ] , 1457 [ Pg. 1457 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] , 1491 [ Pg. 1491 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1496–1497 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] ; U.S. policy, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1435 [ Pg. 1435 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1439 [ Pg. 1439 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 1446–1458 [ Pgs. 1446–1458 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , and Doc. 823 ] , 1496–1497 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] Pyman, Lancelot F.L., 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 209 ] Qaru Island, 30 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 13 ] Qatar, 10 n [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 36–40 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 45–46 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] Qavam, Ahmad, 460–462 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 237 ] Qudsi, Nazim, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527 ] , 980 n [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 1013 n [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1212–1213 [ Pgs. 1212–1213 include portions of Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , and Doc. 673 ] , 1215–1223 [ Pgs. 1215–1223 include portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , and Doc. 680 ] Queuille, Henri, 1607 [ Pg. 1607 is part of Doc. 869 ] Quimper, 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 503 ] Quinn, T. Vincent, 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Quwatly, Shukri, 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1216–1217 [ Pgs. 1216–1217 include portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] Radio Corporation of America, 33 [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14 ] Radji, 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 249 ] Rafael, Gideon, 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 718 n [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 735–736 [ Pgs. 735–736 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 760–761 [ Pg. 760 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 784–786 [ Pgs. 784–786 include portions of Doc. 390 and Doc. 391 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 is part of Doc. 409 ] , 825–827 [ Pgs. 825–827 include portions of Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , and Doc. 423 ] , 832–834 [ Pgs. 832–834 include portions of Doc. 426 and Doc. 427 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 866–868 [ Pgs. 866–868 include portions of Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , and Doc. 453 ] , 890 [ Pg. 890 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 501 ] , 1025–1026 [ Pgs. 1025–1026 include portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] Rahim, Mohamed Kamil Bey Adbul, 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 293–295 [ Pgs. 293–295 include portions of Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , and Doc. 111 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 692–696 [ Pgs. 692–696 include portions of Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , and Doc. 325 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] Rahim Khan, Col. Abdur, 1627–1628 [ Pgs. 1627–1628 include portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 1634–1635 [ Pgs. 1634–1635 include portions of Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] Rajagopalachari, Chakravarti, 1418–1419 [ Pgs. 1418–1419 include portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 1422 [ Pg. 1422 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1426 [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 803 and Doc. 804 ] Ramatti, Col., 1066 [ Pg. 1066 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] Ramsbotham, P., 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Rangel de Gastro, Sylvio, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Ranney, F. Garvin, 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 123–124 [ Pgs. 123–124 include portions of Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] , 142 n [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 63 ] Rashid Ali al Kilani, 1170–1172 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] Rau, Sir Benegal N., 1370–1371 [ Pg. 1370 is part of Doc. 763 ] , 1392 [ Pg. 1392 is part of Doc. 777 ] , 1393 n [ Pg. 1393 is part of Doc. 777 ] Rawi, Abdul Jalil, 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] Ray, George W., 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 42–43 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 53–55 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54 ] Rayburn, Sam, 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] Raynor, G. Hayden, 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1837 [ Pg. 1837 includes portions of Doc. 983 and Doc. 984 ] Razmara, Lt. Gen. Ali, 97–98 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 463–464 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 473–475 [ Pgs. 473–475 include portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 552–553 [ Pgs. 552–553 include portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 557–571 [ Pgs. 557–571 include portions of Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261 ] , 573–575 [ Pgs. 573–575 include portions of Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 576 n [ Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 579–585 [ Pgs. 579–585 include portions of Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 588–590 [ Pgs. 588–590 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 595–596 [ Pg. 595 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 609 n [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 615 n [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 630–633 [ Pgs. 630–633 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] Reber, James Q., 482–483 [ Pgs. 482–483 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] Redecker, Sydney B., 1809–1813 [ Pgs. 1809–1813 include portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] Redman, Maj. Gen. Harold, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] Rees, Re ar Adm. William L., 1334 [ Pg. 1334 includes portions of Doc. 744 and Doc. 745 ] Reilly, D.oP., 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] Rendis, Constantine, 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] Rentz, Ge rge, 45 [ Pg. 45 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 21 ] Republic Steel Corporation, 1714 [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] Retta, Ato Abbebe, 1659–1660 [ Pgs. 1659–1660 include portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1661 n [ Pg. 1661 is part of Doc. 897 ] Reza Pahlavi, Prince Abdor, 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 includes portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 463–464 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 289 ] Reza Pahlavi, Mohammed, Shah of Iran, 445–447 [ Pgs. 445–447 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , and Doc. 206 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 452–455 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 457–459 [ Pgs. 457–459 include portions of Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 461–464 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 466–468 [ Pg. 466 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 472–473 [ Pgs. 472–473 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 484–485 [ Pgs. 484–485 include portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 490–491 [ Pgs. 490–491 include portions of Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , and Doc. 224 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 503–505 [ Pgs. 503–505 include portions of Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , and Doc. 229 ] , 508–512 [ Pgs. 508–512 include portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 236 ] , 534–535 [ Pgs. 534–535 include portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 543–545 [ Pgs. 543–545 include portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242 ] , 547–549 [ Pgs. 547–549 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 553–564 [ Pgs. 553–564 include portions of Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] , 566–567 [ Pgs. 566–567 include portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 575–576 [ Pgs. 575–576 include portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 is part of Doc. 266 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 587 n [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 592–593 [ Pgs. 592–593 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 618–619 [ Pgs. 618–619 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 630–632 [ Pgs. 630–632 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] Reza Shah Pahlavi, 463–464 [ Pg. 463 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 552 n [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Rich, Ralph D., 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] Richards, Arthur L., 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 560–563 [ Pgs. 560–563 include portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 615 n [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 616 n [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 618–619 [ Pgs. 618–619 include portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 630–632 [ Pgs. 630–632 include portions of Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , and Doc. 293 ] Rifai, Abdel Monem, 918–921 [ Pgs. 918–921 include portions of Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , and Doc. 485 ] , 968–969 [ Pgs. 968–969 include portions of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526 ] Rifai, Samir Pasha, 666 n [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 703–704 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 716–717 [ Pgs. 716–717 include portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 727–730 [ Pgs. 727–730 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 747–748 [ Pgs. 747–748 include portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 751–752 [ Pgs. 751–752 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 773–775 [ Pgs. 773–775 include portions of Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , and Doc. 386 ] , 783–784 [ Pgs. 783–784 include portions of Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , and Doc. 391 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 919–920 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 979–980 [ Pg. 979 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] , 1075–1076 [ Pgs. 1075–1076 include portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] Riley, Maj. Gen. William E., 129 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 668–669 [ Pgs. 668–669 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 399 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 877 n [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] , 885 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 922–923 [ Pgs. 922–923 include portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 935–936 [ Pgs. 935–936 include portions of Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , and Doc. 499 ] , 944 n [ Pg. 944 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 511 and Doc. 512 ] , 977 [ Pg. 977 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 980–981 [ Pgs. 980–981 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 537 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 996–998 [ Pgs. 996–998 include portions of Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , and Doc. 548 ] , 1002 [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 1011 [ Pg. 1011 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 1022 [ Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 566 ] , 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] Ringwalt, Arthur R., 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 90 ] Robertson, Sir Brian H., 1337 n [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1702 [ Pg. 1702 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] Robertson, David A., 147–150 [ Pgs. 147–150 include portions of Doc. 66 and Doc. 67 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] , 362–364 [ Pgs. 362–364 include portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 793 n [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 1241 n [ Pg. 1241 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 1248–1250 [ Pgs. 1248–1250 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , and Doc. 694 ] Robertson, Norman A., 1383 [ Pg. 1383 is part of Doc. 770 ] , 1404–1405 [ Pgs. 1404–1405 include portions of Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , and Doc. 789 ] Robinson, Virginia M., 1582 [ Pg. 1582 is part of Doc. 860 ] Rockefeller Foundation, 1593 [ Pg. 1593 is part of Doc. 863 ] Rockwell, Stuart W., Ill, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 661 n [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 671–673 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 323 and Doc. 324 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 699–702 [ Pgs. 699–702 include portions of Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] , 712 [ Pg. 712 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 723–726 [ Pgs. 723–726 include portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 789–792 [ Pgs. 789–792 include portions of Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , and Doc. 396 ] , 793 n [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 799–802 [ Pgs. 799–802 include portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 819–821 [ Pgs. 819–821 include portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 844–846 [ Pgs. 844–846 include portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 861–865 [ Pgs. 861–865 include portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , and Doc. 451 ] , 868–871 [ Pgs. 868–871 include portions of Doc. 452 and Doc. 453 ] , 891 n [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 918–921 [ Pgs. 918–921 include portions of Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , and Doc. 485 ] , 927–928 [ Pgs. 927–928 include portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 is part of Doc. 495 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 511 ] , 955–958 [ Pgs. 955–958 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 982–984 [ Pgs. 982–984 include portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537 ] , 986–988 [ Pgs. 986–988 include portions of Doc. 538 and Doc. 539 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] , 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1083–1085 [ Pgs. 1083–1085 include portions of Doc. 615 and Doc. 616 ] Rodes, Robert, 1548 [ Pg. 1548 is part of Doc. 853 ] Rodino, Peter W., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Rogers, 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] Romania, 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 1145 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 636 ] Rooney, John J., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] Roosevelt, Eleanor (Mrs. Franklin D.), 1776–1777 [ Pgs. 1776–1777 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D., 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 1132 [ Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1748 [ Pg. 1748 is part of Doc. 945 ] , 1789 [ Pg. 1789 is part of Doc. 964 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., 125 n [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 129–130 [ Pg. 129 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 443 ] Roosevelt, Kermit, 1292 [ Pg. 1292 includes portions of Doc. 719 and Doc. 720 ] Root, John F., 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] , 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] Rosaz, Gabriel, 918–919 [ Pgs. 918–919 include portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] Ross, Emory, 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] Ross, John C., 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 1025–1026 [ Pgs. 1025–1026 include portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 1036–1037 [ Pgs. 1036–1037 include portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1376 [ Pg. 1376 includes portions of Doc. 767 and Doc. 768 ] , 1659 n [ Pg. 1659 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1689 [ Pg. 1689 includes portions of Doc. 909 and Doc. 910 ] Rountree, William M., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2 n [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 68–69 [ Pgs. 68–69 include portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 491–499 [ Pgs. 491–499 include portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 564 n [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 602–604 [ Pgs. 602–604 include portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , and Doc. 280 ] , 624–626 [ Pgs. 624–626 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 629–630 [ Pgs. 629–630 include portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 634–635 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 294 ] , 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 1300 [ Pg. 1300 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 1322 n [ Pg. 1322 includes portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 1339 [ Pg. 1339 is part of Doc. 748 ] , 1341–1342 [ Pgs. 1341–1342 include portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] Rowe-Dutton, Sir Ernest, 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 597–598 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 600–601 [ Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Ruanda Urundi, 1599 [ Pg. 1599 is part of Doc. 863 ] Rumbold, Sir Anthony, 407–409 [ Pgs. 407–409 include portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 1303 [ Pg. 1303 is part of Doc. 726 ] , 1316 [ Pg. 1316 is part of Doc. 735 ] Rushdi Bey, 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] Rusk, Dean: Africa, U.S. policy toward, 1509 [ Pg. 1509 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] ; Eritrea, U.S. policy regarding disposition of, 1640 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1642 n [ Pg. 1642 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] ; Iran, U.S. relations with, 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 474 n [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 482–483 [ Pgs. 482–483 include portions of Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] ; Israel, U.S. relations with, 667 n [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 810 n [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] ; Near and Middle East, proposed U.S. military assistance for, 125 [ Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 128–129 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 58 ] ; Palestine question, 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 342 ] ; Turkey, U.S. relations with, 1231–1232 [ Pgs. 1231–1232 include portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 1238 [ Pg. 1238 includes portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] ; U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Russell, Francis H., 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] Russell, H. Earle, 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 110–111 [ Pgs. 110–111 include portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] Rutenberg, Pinhas, 994 n [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 545 ] Ryckmans, Pierre, 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 425 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] Saadawi, Bashir, 1603–1604 [ Pgs. 1603–1604 include portions of Doc. 866 and Doc. 867 ] , 1614 [ Pg. 1614 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1627 [ Pg. 1627 is part of Doc. 878 ] Sabini, John A., 1804 n [ Pg. 1804 is part of Doc. 968 ] , 1805 [ Pg. 1805 is part of Doc. 968 ] Sadak, Necmeddin, 1224–1228 [ Pgs. 1224–1228 include portions of Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , and Doc. 683 ] , 1238–1239 [ Pgs. 1238–1239 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 1242 [ Pg. 1242 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 is part of Doc. 725 ] Sadaka Ka’ki, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] Sadchikov, Ivan Vassilievitch, 459–460 [ Pgs. 459–460 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 574–575 [ Pgs. 574–575 include portions of Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 589 n [ Pg. 589 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Sadr, Keshavarz, 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] Saed, Mohammad, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 460–462 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] Safwat Bey, Abdel Karim, 928 [ Pg. 928 includes portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] Sakellariou, Vice Adm. Alexander, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Salaheddin Bey, Mohamed, 290–291 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 297–298 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 303–305 [ Pgs. 303–305 include portions of Doc. 113 and Doc. 114 ] , 307–315 [ Pgs. 307–315 include portions of Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 329–331 [ Pgs. 329–331 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , and Doc. 128 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] 702 [ Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 776 n [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 781 n [ Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 922 n [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 848 n [ Pg. 848 includes portions of Doc. 436 and Doc. 437 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 is part of Doc. 458 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 is part of Doc. 469 ] , 909–911 [ Pgs. 909–911 include portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1612–1613 [ Pgs. 1612–1613 include portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] Salaza, Antonio de Oliveira, 1585 [ Pg. 1585 is part of Doc. 862 ] Salha, Najib Bey, 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 10 and Doc. 11 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 27–29 [ Pgs. 27–29 include portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 59–60 [ Pgs. 59–60 include portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 112 [ Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 1179 [ Pg. 1179 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 1188 n [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 656 ] , 1192–1193 [ Pgs. 1192–1193 include portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] Sandifer, Durward V., 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1777 n [ Pg. 1777 includes portions of Doc. 958 and Doc. 959 ] Sands, W., 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 211–212 [ Pgs. 211–212 include portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Saner, Lt. Col. Hayri, 1344 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] Sanger, Richard, 1358 n [ Pg. 1358 is part of Doc. 755 ] Sassoon ( also Sasson), Elias, 674–675 [ Pgs. 674–675 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 537 ] Sassoon Moshe, 985 n [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 537 ] Saud, Crown Prince, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 22 ] , 60–61 [ Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 475 ] , 1124–1126 [ Pgs. 1124–1126 include portions of Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , and Doc. 632 ] , 1129 [ Pg. 1129 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 1146 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1151–1153 [ Pg. 1151 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1159–1160 [ Pg. 1159 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1166 [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1170–1173 [ Pgs. 1170–1173 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 1178–1180 [ Pgs. 1178–1180 include portions of Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649 ] , 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 656 ] Saud bin Jelui, Abdullah, 1148 [ Pg. 1148 is part of Doc. 637 ] Saud Ibn Jiluwi, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] Saudi Arabia ( see also under Foreign Ministers meeting at London and also Saudi Arabian position under Palestine question): Afghanistan, relations with, 1148–1149 [ Pg. 1148 is part of Doc. 637 ] Arabian-American Oil Company: Concession, negotiations concerning, 11–13 [ Pgs. 11–13 include portions of Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , and Doc. 6 ] , 27–28 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 56–68 [ Pgs. 56–68 include portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , and Doc. 28 ] , 75–76 [ Pgs. 75–76 include portions of Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , and Doc. 36 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95–97 [ Pgs. 95–97 include portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] , 101–114 [ Pgs. 101–114 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 118–121 [ Pgs. 118–121 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 1113 [ Pg. 1113 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1142–1143 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1155 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1167 [ Pg. 1167 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 1186 [ Pg. 1186 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 660 ] ; loan from, 12–13 [ Pgs. 12–13 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 23–25 [ Pgs. 23–25 include portions of Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 27–28 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 is part of Doc. 27 ] Armed forces, 1112–1119 [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1158 [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1160–1163 [ Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 641 ] British policy, 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 60–62 [ Pgs. 60–62 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , and Doc. 27 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 99–101 [ Pgs. 99–101 include portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] , 114–117 [ Pgs. 114–117 include portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 1135 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1139 [ Pg. 1139 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1142–1143 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 637 ] Christian religious services, policy toward, 1155–1156 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1173–1174 [ Pgs. 1173–1174 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] Civil air agreement with the United States, negotiations concerning, 1120–1121 [ Pgs. 1120–1121 include portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 1191 [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] Communist party, lack of, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1134 [ Pg. 1134 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 is part of Doc. 637 ] Defense requirements, 1113–1119 [ Pg. 1113 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1127 [ Pg. 1127 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1160–1161 [ Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1188 [ Pg. 1188 is part of Doc. 656 ] Dhahran airbase, negotiations concerning extension of agreement on, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 149 [ Pg. 149 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 194–195 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 219–221 [ Pgs. 219–221 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 224–225 [ Pg. 224 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 322 [ Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122 ] , 1112–1113 [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1117 [ Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1119–1124 [ Pgs. 1119–1124 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 1126–1127 [ Pgs. 1126–1127 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 1129–1131 [ Pgs. 1129–1131 include portions of Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 1136 [ Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1154–1159 [ Pgs. 1154–1159 include portions of Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , and Doc. 641 ] , 1166 [ Pg. 1166 includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1175–1178 [ Pgs. 1175–1178 include portions of Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] , 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1184–1192 [ Pgs. 1184–1192 include portions of Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 1194 [ Pg. 1194 includes portions of Doc. 661 and Doc. 662 ] , 1195 n [ Pg. 1195 is part of Doc. 662 ] , 1197–1200 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 1359 [ Pg. 1359 includes portions of Doc. 755 and Doc. 756 ] Economic and financial situation, 1124–1126 [ Pgs. 1124–1126 include portions of Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , and Doc. 632 ] , 1178–1179 [ Pgs. 1178–1179 include portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] Ethiopia, relations with, 1149 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] Iraq, relations with, 1134–1135 [ Pg. 1134 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1138 [ Pg. 1138 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 637 ] Israeli visas, restrictions on, 817 [ Pg. 817 is part of Doc. 415 ] Joint U.S. survey group, report and recommendations of, 1112–1124 [ Pgs. 1112–1124 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 1126–1128 [ Pgs. 1126–1128 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , and Doc. 634 ] , 1130 [ Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 1135–1137 [ Pg. 1135 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1140 [ Pg. 1140 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1150–1151 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1158–1162 [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1164 [ Pg. 1164 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1176–1177 [ Pgs. 1176–1177 include portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] , 1186 [ Pg. 1186 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] Jordan, relations with, 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1134–1135 [ Pg. 1134 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1138 [ Pg. 1138 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 637 ] Pakistan, relations with, 1149 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] Persian Gulf, territorial claims in the, 10–12 [ Pgs. 10–12 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , and Doc. 5 ] , 18–20 [ Pgs. 18–20 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 30–32 [ Pg. 30 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 36–49 [ Pgs. 36–49 include portions of Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 53–55 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 is part of Doc. 44 ] , 114–118 [ Pgs. 114–118 include portions of Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , and Doc. 51 ] , 1141–1143 [ Pg. 1141 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 637 ] Petroleum production and resources, 35 [ Pg. 35 is part of Doc. 15 ] , 77–78 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 1132 [ Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1149 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1160–1161 [ Pg. 1160 is part of Doc. 641 ] Petroleum revenues, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 1143–1144 [ Pg. 1143 is part of Doc. 636 ] Political situation, 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 1137–1138 [ Pg. 1137 is part of Doc. 636 ] Regional security pact, policy toward, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 68 ] Security of, 1120–1121 [ Pgs. 1120–1121 include portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 1133–1139 [ Pg. 1133 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1146–1147 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1149–1151 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1158–1159 [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1175 [ Pg. 1175 is part of Doc. 645 ] , 1192 [ Pg. 1192 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] Syria: Loan to, 24–25 [ Pgs. 24–25 include portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 1144 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1214 n [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] ; policy toward, 1145 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1219–1220 [ Pgs. 1219–1220 include portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] Syrian-Iraqi union, attitude toward proposed, 1144–1145 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1208–1210 [ Pgs. 1208–1210 include portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 1214 n [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] Tapline route, problems concerning protection of, 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] , 25–29 [ Pgs. 25–29 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 42 ] Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with the United States, negotiations concerning, 1120–1121 [ Pgs. 1120–1121 include portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 1141 [ Pg. 1141 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1191 [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] United States, attitude toward, 898–899 [ Pgs. 898–899 include portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 1112 [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1140–1141 [ Pg. 1140 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1150 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1166–1168 [ Pgs. 1166–1168 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1180–1184 [ Pgs. 1180–1184 include portions of Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 1192–1193 [ Pgs. 1192–1193 include portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 1196 [ Pg. 1196 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] U.S. medical team mission, 1157 [ Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1169–1173 [ Pgs. 1169–1173 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] U.S. military assistance, 101–102 [ Pg. 101 is part of Doc. 40 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 148–149 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 84 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 220–221 [ Pgs. 220–221 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 1112–1113 [ Pg. 1112 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1117–1124 [ Pgs. 1117–1124 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 1126–1127 [ Pgs. 1126–1127 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 1130–1131 [ Pgs. 1130–1131 include portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 1138 [ Pg. 1138 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1150–1152 [ Pg. 1150 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1158–1160 [ Pg. 1158 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1163–1166 [ Pgs. 1163–1166 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1175–1176 [ Pgs. 1175–1176 include portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 1178 [ Pg. 1178 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 1182–1188 [ Pgs. 1182–1188 include portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] , 1191–1192 [ Pgs. 1191–1192 include portions of Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 1194–1200 [ Pgs. 1194–1200 include portions of Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] U.S. policy, 34–35 [ Pgs. 34–35 include portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1120–1121 [ Pgs. 1120–1121 include portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 1132–1133 [ Pg. 1132 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1139–1140 [ Pg. 1139 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1147 [ Pg. 1147 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1149–1152 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 670 ] Sayre, Francis B., 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 682–683 [ Pgs. 682–683 include portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 325 and Doc. 326 ] , 718 n [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 734 n [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 750 n [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 811 n [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 821–822 [ Pgs. 821–822 include portions of Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 827 n [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 837–839 [ Pgs. 837–839 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 924–925 [ Pgs. 924–925 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , and Doc. 490 ] Schehab, Emir Farid, 1111 [ Pg. 1111 is part of Doc. 626 ] Schmidt, Petrus J., 1648 [ Pg. 1648 is part of Doc. 890 ] Schuman, Robert: Eritrea, French policy regarding disposition of, 1649 n [ Pg. 1649 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] ; Foreign Ministers meetings, 588 n [ Pg. 588 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 1543 [ Pg. 1543 includes portions of Doc. 847 and Doc. 848 ] , 1649 n [ Pg. 1649 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] ; Libya, French policy toward, 1633 [ Pg. 1633 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] ; Morocco, French policy toward, 1771 [ Pg. 1771 is part of Doc. 955 ] ; Near and Middle East, security of, 140 [ Pg. 140 is part of Doc. 61 ] ; Near East, arms shipment to, 137–138 [ Pgs. 137–138 include portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 168 n [ Pg. 168 is part of Doc. 73 ] ; Palestine question, 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 423 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 536 ] ; Tunisia, French policy toward, 1774 [ Pg. 1774 is part of Doc. 956 ] , 1776 [ Pg. 1776 includes portions of Doc. 957 and Doc. 958 ] , 1777 n [ Pg. 1777 includes portions of Doc. 958 and Doc. 959 ] , 1798 [ Pg. 1798 is part of Doc. 966 ] ; Turkish role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1286 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1310 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 731 ] Scoones, Gen. Sir Geoffrey, 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 198–200 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 205–206 [ Pgs. 205–206 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] Scott, Michael, 1818 [ Pg. 1818 is part of Doc. 974 ] , 1820 [ Pg. 1820 is part of Doc. 974 ] Scott, R. H., 196–198 [ Pgs. 196–198 include portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] , 202–206 [ Pgs. 202–206 include portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 1442 [ Pg. 1442 includes portions of Doc. 812 and Doc. 813 ] , 1452 [ Pg. 1452 is part of Doc. 818 ] Scott, Maj. Gen. Stanley L., 620 [ Pg. 620 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 623–624 [ Pgs. 623–624 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] Seager, 104–106 [ Pgs. 104–106 include portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] Sedden, 13–14 [ Pgs. 13–14 include portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6 ] Selim Bey, Mohamed Kamel, 1628 [ Pg. 1628 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] Senafir Islands, 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] Seraggedin, Fuad, 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 129 ] Sethian, Robert D., 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] Sforza, Count Carlo, 1538 [ Pg. 1538 includes portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1613 [ Pg. 1613 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1616 [ Pg. 1616 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1620 [ Pg. 1620 is part of Doc. 874 ] , 1650–1651 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1659 [ Pg. 1659 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1675 [ Pg. 1675 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1677–1679 [ Pgs. 1677–1679 include portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1681–1682 [ Pgs. 1681–1682 include portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 1684–1687 [ Pgs. 1684–1687 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] Shahbakhti, Brig. Gen. Mohammad, 464 [ Pg. 464 is part of Doc. 209 ] Shahrokh, Bahrain, 490 [ Pg. 490 includes portions of Doc. 222 and Doc. 223 ] , 558 [ Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] Sharett, Moshe, 667 n [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 is part of Doc. 333 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 342 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 757 n [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 781–782 [ Pgs. 781–782 include portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , and Doc. 388 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 452 ] , 882–883 [ Pgs. 882–883 include portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465 ] , 893 [ Pg. 893 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 952–953 [ Pgs. 952–953 include portions of Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , and Doc. 515 ] , 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 966–967 [ Pgs. 966–967 include portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 975–976 [ Pgs. 975–976 include portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 is part of Doc. 537 ] , 990 n [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 1033–1035 [ Pgs. 1033–1035 include portions of Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , and Doc. 576 ] , 1051 n [ Pg. 1051 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590 ] , 1077–1078 [ Pgs. 1077–1078 include portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 1080 [ Pg. 1080 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 617 ] , 1089 n [ Pg. 1089 includes portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] Shawa, Issedine Bey, 1171 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 643 ] Shell Oil Company, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] Shepherd, Sir Francis, 546 [ Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 570–571 [ Pgs. 570–571 include portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 577–578 [ Pgs. 577–578 include portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 271 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] Sheringham, J. G. T., 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 917–918 [ Pgs. 917–918 include portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] Sherman, 15–18 [ Pgs. 15–18 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] Sherman, Charles B., 1725 n [ Pg. 1725 is part of Doc. 934 ] , 1731 n [ Pg. 1731 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] Sherman, Adm. Forrest P., 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 235–236 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 is part of Doc. 518 ] Shiloah, Reuven, 677–678 [ Pgs. 677–678 include portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 323 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 704 n [ Pg. 704 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] , 729–730 [ Pgs. 729–730 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , and Doc. 351 ] , 745–748 [ Pgs. 745–748 include portions of Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 751–752 [ Pgs. 751–752 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 757–758 [ Pgs. 757–758 include portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 774–775 [ Pgs. 774–775 include portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 796–797 [ Pgs. 796–797 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , and Doc. 399 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 850 n [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 452 ] , 873 n [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 is part of Doc. 459 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 893–894 [ Pgs. 893–894 include portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 902 [ Pg. 902 includes portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 925–926 [ Pgs. 925–926 include portions of Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 944–945 [ Pgs. 944–945 include portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , and Doc. 507 ] , 946 n [ Pg. 946 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508 ] , 950–951 [ Pgs. 950–951 include portions of Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , and Doc. 513 ] , 967 n [ Pg. 967 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] , 976–978 [ Pgs. 976–978 include portions of Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , and Doc. 533 ] , 984–985 [ Pgs. 984–985 include portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 1019–1020 [ Pgs. 1019–1020 include portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 585 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 is part of Doc. 603 ] , 1075–1076 [ Pgs. 1075–1076 include portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] Shinwell, Emanuel, 1827 [ Pg. 1827 includes portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] , 1840 [ Pg. 1840 is part of Doc. 985 ] Shirine ( also Chirine), Col. Ismail, 883–888 [ Pgs. 883–888 include portions of Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , and Doc. 466 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 1032–1033 [ Pgs. 1032–1033 include portions of Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , and Doc. 575 ] Shishakli, Lt. Col. Adib, 1214 n [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1215–1216 [ Pgs. 1215–1216 include portions of Doc. 674 and Doc. 675 ] , 1218 [ Pg. 1218 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 1219 n [ Pg. 1219 is part of Doc. 677 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] Shone, Sir Terence, 1440 [ Pg. 1440 is part of Doc. 811 ] Shoukairi, Ahmad, 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 929–930 [ Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 is part of Doc. 501 ] , 971–972 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 528 ] Shullaw, J. H., 1829 n [ Pg. 1829 is part of Doc. 980 ] Shureiki ( also Shuraiki), 859 n [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 919–920 [ Pg. 919 is part of Doc. 484 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 975 n [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] , 993–996 [ Pgs. 993–996 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 999–1001 [ Pgs. 999–1001 include portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , and Doc. 552 ] , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] , 1036 n [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] Shuttack, Stephen J., 1582 [ Pg. 1582 is part of Doc. 860 ] Siantos, George, 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] Siassi, Ali Akbar, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 217 ] Sidky, Ismail, 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] Silver, Abba Hillel, 819 [ Pg. 819 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] Silvercruys, Baron, 1546 [ Pg. 1546 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] Simons, T. W., 1441 n [ Pg. 1441 includes portions of Doc. 811 and Doc. 812 ] , 1457 n [ Pg. 1457 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] Simpson, K. J., 296 [ Pg. 296 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] Sims, Harold, 1706 n [ Pg. 1706 is part of Doc. 920 ] , 1710 n [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] , 1712–1713 [ Pg. 1712 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1717–1719 [ Pgs. 1717–1719 include portions of Doc. 927 , Doc. 928 , and Doc. 929 ] , 1731 n [ Pg. 1731 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] Sinclair Petroleum Company, 1694–1695 [ Pg. 1694 is part of Doc. 912 ] Siragusa, Charles, 1260 n [ Pg. 1260 includes portions of Doc. 702 and Doc. 703 ] Sirry, Hussein, 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] Slessor, Marshal of the Air Force Sir John, 233–235 [ Pgs. 233–235 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] Slim, Mongi, 1776–1777 [ Pgs. 1776–1777 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] Slim, Field Marshal Sir William J., 233–234 [ Pgs. 233–234 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 289–290 [ Pgs. 289–290 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 110 ] Sloan, Capt. 1155–1156 [ Pg. 1155 is part of Doc. 639 ] , 1173–1174 [ Pgs. 1173–1174 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] Smith, Allan H., 1581 n [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1582 [ Pg. 1582 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1586 [ Pg. 1586 is part of Doc. 862 ] Smith, H. Alexander, 185–186 [ Pgs. 185–186 include portions of Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] Smith-Mundt act, 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1478 [ Pg. 1478 is part of Doc. 833 ] Smuts, Field Marshal Jan Christian, 1811 [ Pg. 1811 is part of Doc. 971 ] , 1815 n [ Pg. 1815 includes portions of Doc. 972 and Doc. 973 ] Snodgrass, 1166–1168 [ Pgs. 1166–1168 include portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642 ] , 1183–1184 [ Pgs. 1183–1184 include portions of Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] Snow, Conrad, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] Snoy et d’Oppuers, Baron Jean-Charles, 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 1279 [ Pg. 1279 is part of Doc. 713 ] Snyder, John W., 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 1844 n [ Pg. 1844 is part of Doc. 988 ] , 1845 [ Pg. 1845 is part of Doc. 988 ] Snyder, Lucille, 1341–1343 [ Pgs. 1341–1343 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] Sofianopoulos, John, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 193 ] Solh, Riad, 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] South Asia ( see also individual countries ): Anglo-American political and military talks concerning, 188 [ Pg. 188 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 196–206 [ Pgs. 196–206 include portions of Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 212–215 [ Pgs. 212–215 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] ; British economic assistance, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; Chinese People’s Republic, policy of, 182 [ Pg. 182 is part of Doc. 81 ] ; Commonwealth economic assistance program, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 250–252 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1569 [ Pg. 1569 is part of Doc. 858 ] ; communist movement and strength, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 827 ] ; Japan, proposed trade with, 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; regional association, proposed, 203–204 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 241–242 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 247–248 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; Soviet policy, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1499 [ Pg. 1499 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] ; U.N. assistance, 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 169–173 [ Pgs. 169–173 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , and Doc. 76 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 180–186 [ Pgs. 180–186 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , and Doc. 84 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 250–252 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 1469 [ Pg. 1469 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] ; U.S. military assistance, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; U.S. policy, 1502 [ Pg. 1502 is part of Doc. 839 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] Southeast Asia: Commonwealth economic assistance program, 204 [ Pg. 204 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 213–214 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 90 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; communist movement, 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 827 ] ; regional association, proposed, 203–204 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; situation in, 1103 [ Pg. 1103 is part of Doc. 624 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, 169–173 [ Pgs. 169–173 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , and Doc. 76 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 235 ] ; U.S. policy, 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 245–254 [ Pgs. 245–254 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 1493 [ Pg. 1493 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1496 [ Pg. 1496 is part of Doc. 837 ] Southern Rhodesia, 1513 [ Pg. 1513 is part of Doc. 843 ] , 1534 [ Pg. 1534 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1597 [ Pg. 1597 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] Southwest Africa. See under Union of South Africa and United Nations: General Assembly. Sovereignty, matters pertaining to, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 324 [ Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 128 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 680–681 [ Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 318 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , and Doc. 337 ] , 727–728 [ Pgs. 727–728 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 845–846 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 869 [ Pg. 869 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1143 [ Pg. 1143 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1189 [ Pg. 1189 is part of Doc. 657 ] , 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 1198 n [ Pg. 1198 is part of Doc. 664 ] , 1261–1262 [ Pgs. 1261–1262 include portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 1608 [ Pg. 1608 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1662 [ Pg. 1662 includes portions of Doc. 897 and Doc. 898 ] , 1665 n [ Pg. 1665 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1669 [ Pg. 1669 is part of Doc. 900 ] , 1674 [ Pg. 1674 includes portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1737 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1742 [ Pg. 1742 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1753 [ Pg. 1753 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] Soviet Union ( see also Soviet Union and Soviet subheadings under individual countries and subjects ): Peace offensive, 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 583 n [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] ; political and military objectives, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 221–222 [ Pgs. 221–222 include portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] , 224–230 [ Pgs. 224–230 include portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 254–256 [ Pgs. 254–256 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 374 n [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 383–384 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 1133–1134 [ Pg. 1133 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1165 [ Pg. 1165 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 1253 [ Pg. 1253 is part of Doc. 696 ] , 1273 [ Pg. 1273 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 1275 [ Pg. 1275 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1305 [ Pg. 1305 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 1307 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1317 [ Pg. 1317 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1340 [ Pg. 1340 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1342 [ Pg. 1342 is part of Doc. 750 ] , 1468–1469 [ Pgs. 1468–1469 include portions of Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , and Doc. 829 ] , 1472–1474 [ Pgs. 1472–1474 include portions of Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , and Doc. 832 ] , 1478 [ Pg. 1478 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1501 [ Pg. 1501 is part of Doc. 839 ] , 1574 [ Pg. 1574 is part of Doc. 859 ] ; U.S. recognition policy, 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 321 ] Spain ( see also Spanish colonial policies under Africa), 1347 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1506 [ Pg. 1506 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1742 [ Pg. 1742 is part of Doc. 944 ] Sparks, Joseph S., 1412 [ Pg. 1412 includes portions of Doc. 794 and Doc. 795 ] Spencer, John, 1642 [ Pg. 1642 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 1644 [ Pg. 1644 includes portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] , 1646 n [ Pg. 1646 is part of Doc. 889 ] , 1663 [ Pg. 1663 includes portions of Doc. 898 and Doc. 899 ] , 1674 [ Pg. 1674 includes portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1682–1683 [ Pg. 1682 is part of Doc. 904 ] , 1703 [ Pg. 1703 is part of Doc. 919 ] Spies, Donald, 1830 [ Pg. 1830 includes portions of Doc. 980 and Doc. 981 ] Springs, L. Pittman, 1361 [ Pg. 1361 is part of Doc. 757 ] Spry, Gen. James W., 1625 [ Pg. 1625 is part of Doc. 877 ] Spurlock, W., 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 100–102 [ Pgs. 100–102 include portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 108–109 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 113 n [ Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47 ] Sri Lanka (Ceylon): British military assistance, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 88 ] ; British policy, 329 [ Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] ; Commonwealth role, 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; communist movement and strength, 246 [ Pg. 246 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; political situation, 245 [ Pg. 245 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99 ] ; regional association, attitude toward, 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 247–248 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; U.N. membership, proposed, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, 170–171 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 103 ] ; U.S. military air transit rights, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 99 ] ; U.S. policy, 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Srole, Saul R., 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] Stabler, Wells, 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 221–230 [ Pgs. 221–230 include portions of Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , and Doc. 94 ] , 289–295 [ Pgs. 289–295 include portions of Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , and Doc. 111 ] , 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 125 ] , 330–332 [ Pgs. 330–332 include portions of Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , and Doc. 129 ] , 968–970 [ Pgs. 968–970 include portions of Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , and Doc. 527 ] , 982 n [ Pg. 982 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 1025–1027 [ Pgs. 1025–1027 include portions of Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , and Doc. 571 ] , 1036–1038 [ Pgs. 1036–1038 include portions of Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1049 n [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1056–1061 [ Pgs. 1056–1061 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , and Doc. 594 ] Stafford, Frank E., 1648–1649 [ Pgs. 1648–1649 include portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1667 [ Pg. 1667 includes portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] , 1681 [ Pg. 1681 includes portions of Doc. 903 and Doc. 904 ] , 1683–1684 [ Pgs. 1683–1684 include portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] Stalin, Iosif V., 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 1416 [ Pg. 1416 is part of Doc. 796 ] Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 15–18 [ Pgs. 15–18 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] Standard Oil Company of New York, 22–23 [ Pgs. 22–23 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] Stanger, Ernest L., 1751 n [ Pg. 1751 is part of Doc. 945 ] Stark, Kelvin, 1554–1556 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] Stenger, Jerome J., 1181 [ Pg. 1181 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] Stephanopoulos, Stephen, 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 is part of Doc. 184 ] Stephen, David C., 351 [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] Stephenson, H. S., 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Stevens, Harley C., 29–33 [ Pgs. 29–33 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , and Doc. 14 ] Stevenson, Sir Ralph C., 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 299–300 [ Pg. 299 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118 ] , 317 n [ Pg. 317 is part of Doc. 118 ] , 318–320 [ Pgs. 318–320 include portions of Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , and Doc. 120 ] , 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 332–333 [ Pgs. 332–333 include portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] Stinebower, Leroy D., 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 628–629 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 1167 [ Pg. 1167 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 1181 [ Pg. 1181 includes portions of Doc. 649 and Doc. 650 ] Strang, Sir William, 1608 [ Pg. 1608 is part of Doc. 870 ] Stucki, Walter, 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 is part of Doc. 425 ] Stults, Edward E., 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] Subah, Shaikh Abdullah as-Salmi al, 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] Sudan ( see also under Eritrea): Status of, Anglo-Egyptian negotiations regarding, 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 288–291 [ Pgs. 288–291 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 302 [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 112 and Doc. 113 ] , 304–305 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 324–325 [ Pgs. 324–325 include portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124 ] , 330–331 [ Pgs. 330–331 include portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128 ] ; U.S. policy, 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 305 [ Pg. 305 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] Suez Canal ( see also under Egypt), 77–78 [ Pg. 77 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 is part of Doc. 59 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 is part of Doc. 357 ] , 800–801 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1347 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] Sukarno, Achmed, 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] Sulaiman, Sheik Abdullah, 26 n [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 27–28 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 56–60 [ Pgs. 56–60 include portions of Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , and Doc. 25 ] , 63–68 [ Pgs. 63–68 include portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 118–121 [ Pgs. 118–121 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 1125 [ Pg. 1125 is part of Doc. 631 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 1179 [ Pg. 1179 is part of Doc. 648 ] , 1192–1193 [ Pgs. 1192–1193 include portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] Sulzberger, C. L., 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 348 n [ Pg. 348 includes portions of Doc. 137 and Doc. 138 ] , 1409 [ Pg. 1409 is part of Doc. 792 ] Superior Oil Company, 40 [ Pg. 40 is part of Doc. 16 ] Suroor, 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , and Doc. 54 ] Suweidi, Tawfiq, 645–647 [ Pgs. 645–647 include portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 1214 n [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] Svolos, Alexander, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Swaziland, 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] Sweden, 1327 [ Pg. 1327 is part of Doc. 740 ] , 1344 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1743 [ Pg. 1743 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Sweeney, Joseph, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 1824–1826 [ Pgs. 1824–1826 include portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] , 1834–1837 [ Pgs. 1834–1837 include portions of Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , and Doc. 984 ] Switzerland, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] Symington, W. Stuart, 1710 n [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] , 1711 [ Pg. 1711 includes portions of Doc. 923 and Doc. 924 ] , 1716 [ Pg. 1716 includes portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 1717 n [ Pg. 1717 includes portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] Syria ( see also Syrian policy and position under Palestine question): Airfields, reconnaissance of, 221 [ Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 92 and Doc. 93 ] ; armistice agreement with Israel, 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 421 ] ; British military assistance, 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 93 ] ; British policy, 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 1201–1204 [ Pgs. 1201–1204 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 1209–1210 [ Pgs. 1209–1210 include portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 1217 [ Pg. 1217 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 1221 [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 680 ] ; communist movement, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 is part of Doc. 443 ] ; Egypt, relations with, 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] ; French arms shipments to, 136 [ Pg. 136 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 1203–1204 [ Pgs. 1203–1204 include portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] ; French influence and position, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1202 n [ Pg. 1202 is part of Doc. 666 ] , 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 667 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 1209–1210 [ Pgs. 1209–1210 include portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 1217 [ Pg. 1217 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 1221 [ Pg. 1221 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 680 ] , 1335–1336 [ Pgs. 1335–1336 include portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] ; International Bank loan, proposed, 210 [ Pg. 210 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 1218 [ Pg. 1218 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] ; Iraq, proposed union with, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 157–158 [ Pgs. 157–158 include portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 285–286 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 676 [ Pg. 676 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 1050 [ Pg. 1050 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1144–1145 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1171 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 643 ] , 1201–1202 [ Pgs. 1201–1202 include portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 1206–1210 [ Pgs. 1206–1210 include portions of Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] , 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1216–1218 [ Pgs. 1216–1218 include portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 1223 [ Pg. 1223 is part of Doc. 680 ] ; Jordan, relations with, 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , Kurdish minority problem, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 226–228 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 651–652 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1348 [ Pg. 1348 is part of Doc. 752 ] ; petroleum pipeline, problems concerning, 49 [ Pg. 49 is part of Doc. 18 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 is part of Doc. 36 ] ; petroleum policy, 84 [ Pg. 84 is part of Doc. 36 ] ; political situation, 271–273 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1201–1202 [ Pgs. 1201–1202 include portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 1214–1216 [ Pgs. 1214–1216 include portions of Doc. 674 and Doc. 675 ] , 1222 [ Pg. 1222 is part of Doc. 679 ] , 1356 [ Pg. 1356 is part of Doc. 754 ] ; rearmament of, 737–738 [ Pg. 737 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 463 ] ; regional security pact, policy toward, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 68 ] ; Saudi Arabian loan and policy, 24–25 [ Pgs. 24–25 include portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 includes portions of Doc. 22 and Doc. 23 ] , 1144–1145 [ Pg. 1144 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1214 [ Pg. 1214 is part of Doc. 674 ] , 1219–1220 [ Pgs. 1219–1220 include portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] ; United States, attitude toward, 896–897 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 905–907 [ Pgs. 905–907 include portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 1205 [ Pg. 1205 is part of Doc. 669 ] , 1210–1211 [ Pgs. 1210–1211 include portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] ; U.S. arms sales, question of, 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 480 ] , 1203–1204 [ Pgs. 1203–1204 include portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, 2 [ Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 209 [ Pg. 209 is part of Doc. 89 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 665 ] , 1206 [ Pg. 1206 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 1218 [ Pg. 1218 is part of Doc. 676 ] ; U.S. Legation at Damascus, bombing of Apr. 18, 1950 , 871 n [ Pg. 871 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 897 [ Pg. 897 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 1211 n [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] ; U.S. military assistance, request for, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 is part of Doc. 300 ] , 778–781 [ Pgs. 778–781 include portions of Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , and Doc. 387 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438 ] , 1201 [ Pg. 1201 is part of Doc. 665 ] , 1203–1204 [ Pgs. 1203–1204 include portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] ; U.S. policy, 1201–1223 [ Pgs. 1201–1223 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , and Doc. 680 ] , 1356 [ Pg. 1356 is part of Doc. 754 ] Tacla, Philip, 980 n [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 533 ] Taft, Robert, 854 [ Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 443 ] Tahir Bey, 1187 [ Pg. 1187 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] Taiwan, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1468 [ Pg. 1468 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] Talbot de Malahide, Lord, 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Tallal, Prince, 24 [ Pg. 24 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 1171 [ Pg. 1171 is part of Doc. 643 ] Tanganyika, 1516 [ Pg. 1516 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] Tangier, International Zone of, 1575–1576 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1579 [ Pg. 1579 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1642 n [ Pg. 1642 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 1737 [ Pg. 1737 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1740–1743 [ Pg. 1740 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1748 [ Pg. 1748 is part of Doc. 945 ] , 1751 [ Pg. 1751 is part of Doc. 945 ] Tannenwald, Theodore, 1753 n [ Pg. 1753 includes portions of Doc. 947 and Doc. 948 ] Taqezadeh, Seyed Hasan, 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] Tarazi, Salaheddin, 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] Tarbe de Saint Hardouin, Jacques, 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] Tarchiani, Alberto, 1513–1514 [ Pgs. 1513–1514 include portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1640–1641 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1642 n [ Pg. 1642 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 1644–1646 [ Pgs. 1644–1646 include portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] , 1657 [ Pg. 1657 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1659 [ Pg. 1659 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1672–1675 [ Pgs. 1672–1675 include portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1689 n [ Pg. 1689 includes portions of Doc. 909 and Doc. 910 ] Tardini, Domenico, 878–879 [ Pgs. 878–879 include portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] Tariff Commission, U.S., 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 106 ] Tate, Brig. Gen. Robert F., 1345–1346 [ Pg. 1345 is part of Doc. 752 ] Tauriello, Anthonv F., 125–126 [ Pgs. 125–126 include portions of Doc. 57 and Doc. 58 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 58 ] Taylor, Fred E., 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] Taylor, Wainhouse, 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] Tebbit, D. C., 1602 [ Pg. 1602 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] Tebni, Adib, 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] Tedder, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord, 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 1344–1348 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] Tedros, Gabriel, 1704–1705 [ Pg. 1704 is part of Doc. 919 ] Tel, Abdullah El-, 944 [ Pg. 944 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] Tewfik, Ahmed, 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 50 and Doc. 51 ] Thailand, 1103 [ Pg. 1103 is part of Doc. 624 ] Thayer, Robert, 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 1189–1190 [ Pgs. 1189–1190 include portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Theotakis, John G., 335 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 130 ] , 337 n [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 140 and Doc. 141 ] Theron, Gen. F. H., 1647 [ Pg. 1647 is part of Doc. 890 ] Thompson, Charles O., 1834 n [ Pg. 1834 includes portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] Thomson, J., 213–215 [ Pgs. 213–215 include portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] Thornburg, Max W., 32 [ Pg. 32 is part of Doc. 13 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] Thorp, Willard L., 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 526 n [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 1180 [ Pg. 1180 includes portions of Doc. 648 and Doc. 649 ] , 1509 n [ Pg. 1509 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1713 [ Pg. 1713 is part of Doc. 925 ] Thurston, Ray L., 196 [ Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 87 and Doc. 88 ] Tibbetts, Margaret J., 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 112 ] , 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 1554 [ Pg. 1554 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1631 [ Pg. 1631 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1678 [ Pg. 1678 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] Tibet: Chinese People’s Republic, policy of, 1431 [ Pg. 1431 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1474 [ Pg. 1474 includes portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] ; Indian policy, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1474 [ Pg. 1474 includes portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] ; Nepal, relations with, 1487–1488 [ Pg. 1487 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; U.S. policy, 184 [ Pg. 184 is part of Doc. 81 ] , 1435 [ Pg. 1435 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1439 [ Pg. 1439 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 1485–1486 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 836 ] Tiney, 1273 [ Pg. 1273 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] Tiran Island, 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 336 and Doc. 337 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Tito, Josip Broz, 344–345 [ Pgs. 344–345 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 166 ] Tobias, Channing, 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] Togoland, 1528 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1547 [ Pg. 1547 is part of Doc. 853 ] Tolbert, William R., 1722–1723 [ Pgs. 1722–1723 include portions of Doc. 931 , Doc. 932 , and Doc. 933 ] Torre, 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1565–1568 [ Pg. 1565 is part of Doc. 857 ] Toukan, Jamal Bey, 773 [ Pg. 773 includes portions of Doc. 380 and Doc. 381 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 835 [ Pg. 835 includes portions of Doc. 427 and Doc. 428 ] Tourkovassilis, Theodore, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Tranos, Constantine, 349–351 [ Pgs. 349–351 include portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] Trans-World Airlines, 1191 [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] Travers, Howard K., 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Treasury, U.S. Department of, 107–108 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 1196 [ Pg. 1196 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] , 1247 [ Pg. 1247 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 1259 [ Pg. 1259 includes portions of Doc. 701 and Doc. 702 ] , 1596 [ Pg. 1596 is part of Doc. 863 ] Treaties, conventions, agreements, etc. ( see also under individual countries): Act of Algeciras, 1740 [ Pg. 1740 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1742–1743 [ Pg. 1742 is part of Doc. 944 ] Agreement between the United States and: France regarding utilization of Port Lyautey facilities by U.S. forces, 1947 , 1764–1765 [ Pgs. 1764–1765 include portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] , 1767 [ Pg. 1767 is part of Doc. 953 ] ; Iran, 1943 , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 221 ] ; Turkey, 1947 , 1256 [ Pg. 1256 is part of Doc. 699 ] Agreement of commerce and friendship between the United States and: Nepal, 1947 , 1484 [ Pg. 1484 is part of Doc. 836 ] ; Yemen, 1946 , 1358 [ Pg. 1358 is part of Doc. 755 ] Air transport agreements between the United States and: Burma, Egypt, Lebanon, and Turkey, 1946 , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621 ] ; Syria, 1947 , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621 ] American Advisory Mission to Imperial Ministry of War, agreement between Iran and the United States concerning, 1947 , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 is part of Doc. 294 ] Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 ( see also under Egypt), 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] Anglo-French agreement on provisional international regime for Tangier, 1945 , 1740 [ Pg. 1740 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1742–1743 [ Pg. 1742 is part of Doc. 944 ] Anglo-French-Turkish treaty of alliance, 1939 , 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 1231 [ Pg. 1231 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 1304 [ Pg. 1304 includes portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 1320 [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 1335–1337 [ Pgs. 1335–1337 include portions of Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] Anglo-Iraq treaty, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 639–640 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 is part of Doc. 301 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 670 ] , 1210 [ Pg. 1210 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] Anglo-Jordanian treaty, 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 845–846 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 868–871 [ Pgs. 868–871 include portions of Doc. 452 and Doc. 453 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 994–995 [ Pgs. 994–995 include portions of Doc. 545 and Doc. 546 ] Anglo-Nepalese treaty of 1923 , 1488 [ Pg. 1488 is part of Doc. 836 ] Anglo-Saudi Arabian treaty of 1915 , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50 ] Anglo-Turkish convention of 1913 , 10 n [ Pg. 10 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 117–118 [ Pgs. 117–118 include portions of Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , and Doc. 51 ] Armistice agreement between: Egypt and Israel, 1949 , 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 722 [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 820 n [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 418 ] , 885–887 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 1011 [ Pg. 1011 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575 ] ; Israel and Jordan, 1949 , 139 [ Pg. 139 is part of Doc. 61 ] , 722 n [ Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 428 and Doc. 429 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 is part of Doc. 453 ] , 873 n [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 943–944 [ Pgs. 943–944 include portions of Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , and Doc. 506 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 529 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 545 ] , 997–998 [ Pg. 997 is part of Doc. 548 ] , 1000–1001 [ Pgs. 1000–1001 include portions of Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , and Doc. 552 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] , 1012–1014 [ Pgs. 1012–1014 include portions of Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , and Doc. 560 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] ; Israel and Syria, 1949 , 1012 n [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 558 ] Arms credit agreement between Iran and the United States, 1948 , 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] Defense agreement between Liberia and the United States, 1942 , 1724 [ Pg. 1724 is part of Doc. 933 ] Economic cooperation agreement between Turkey and the United States, 1948 , 1224 [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 1229 [ Pg. 1229 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 is part of Doc. 753 ] , 1756 [ Pg. 1756 is part of Doc. 949 ] , 1758 [ Pg. 1758 is part of Doc. 949 ] Franco-American treaty, 1904 , 1783 [ Pg. 1783 is part of Doc. 963 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947 , 263–264 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1091 [ Pg. 1091 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 1479 [ Pg. 1479 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1494 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1556 [ Pg. 1556 is part of Doc. 856 ] Hay-Pauncefote treaty, 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] International Trade Organization Charter, 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1091 [ Pg. 1091 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 1479 [ Pg. 1479 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1494 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 837 ] International wheat agreements, 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 100 ] Italian peace treaty, 1947 , 1668 [ Pg. 1668 is part of Doc. 900 ] Lausanne Convention of 1924 regarding the Regime of the Straits, 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 1261 [ Pg. 1261 is part of Doc. 703 ] , 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 706 and Doc. 707 ] League of Nations Covenant, 1919 , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 321 ] Montreux Convention regarding Regime of the Straits, 1936 , 1253–1254 [ Pgs. 1253–1254 include portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 1261–1262 [ Pgs. 1261–1262 include portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 1266 [ Pg. 1266 includes portions of Doc. 706 and Doc. 707 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 721 ] , 1299–1300 [ Pgs. 1299–1300 include portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 1302 n [ Pg. 1302 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 1303–1304 [ Pgs. 1303–1304 include portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1332 n [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1339 [ Pg. 1339 is part of Doc. 748 ] , 1342 [ Pg. 1342 is part of Doc. 750 ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 is part of Doc. 753 ] Mutual defense assistance agreements between North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and the United States, Jan. 27, 1950 , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 208 ] North Atlantic Treaty, 1949 , 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 152–154 [ Pgs. 152–154 include portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 156–157 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 319–320 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 1134 [ Pg. 1134 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 1242 [ Pg. 1242 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1253 [ Pg. 1253 is part of Doc. 696 ] , 1286 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1288 [ Pg. 1288 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1297–1301 [ Pgs. 1297–1301 include portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 1306–1308 [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1310–1316 [ Pgs. 1310–1316 include portions of Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1324 [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 738 ] , 1344 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1565 [ Pg. 1565 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1570 [ Pg. 1570 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1575 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1636–1637 [ Pg. 1636 is part of Doc. 884 ] , 1677 [ Pg. 1677 is part of Doc. 902 ] , 1764–1765 [ Pgs. 1764–1765 include portions of Doc. 952 and Doc. 953 ] , 1769 [ Pg. 1769 is part of Doc. 954 ] , 1816 [ Pg. 1816 is part of Doc. 973 ] Pact of the League of Arab States, 1945 , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 101 ] Portsmouth treaty between Iraq and the United Kingdom, 1947 , 639–640 [ Pg. 639 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 646 [ Pg. 646 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 303 ] Railway agreement between Iraq and the United Kingdom, 1936 , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 296 ] Saadabad Pact, 1937 , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] Saudi Arabian-Iraqi Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance, 1936 , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 is part of Doc. 101 ] Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 572–574 [ Pgs. 572–574 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , and Doc. 264 ] , 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] Suez Canal Convention, 1888 , 315–316 [ Pgs. 315–316 include portions of Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , and Doc. 118 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 591 ] Tangier Statute, 1923 , 1740 [ Pg. 1740 is part of Doc. 944 ] Teheran Declaration, 1943 , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 453–454 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 457 n [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] Treaty between the United States and: Morocco, 1836 , 1755 [ Pg. 1755 is part of Doc. 949 ] , 1758 [ Pg. 1758 is part of Doc. 949 ] ; Tunis, 1797 , 1783 [ Pg. 1783 is part of Doc. 963 ] ; Tunis, 1824 , 1783 [ Pg. 1783 is part of Doc. 963 ] Treaty of Fez between France and Morocco, 1912 , 1761 [ Pg. 1761 is part of Doc. 951 ] , 1763 [ Pg. 1763 is part of Doc. 952 ] , 1770 [ Pg. 1770 includes portions of Doc. 954 and Doc. 955 ] , 1772–1773 [ Pg. 1772 is part of Doc. 955 ] , 1807 [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] Treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and: China, Ireland, Italy, and Uruguay, 1092 [ Pg. 1092 is part of Doc. 622 ] ; Iraq, 1938 , 649–650 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 is part of Doc. 303 ] Treaty of Jidda, 1927 , 54 [ Pg. 54 is part of Doc. 21 ] Treaty of Kasr es Said between France and Tunis, 1881 , 1794 [ Pg. 1794 is part of Doc. 965 ] Treaty of La Marsa between France and Tunis, 1883 , 1794 [ Pg. 1794 is part of Doc. 965 ] Treaty of Lausanne. See Lausanne Convention supra . Treaty of Oqair, 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 13 ] Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, 1919 , 1523 [ Pg. 1523 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1556 [ Pg. 1556 is part of Doc. 856 ] , 1591–1592 [ Pg. 1591 is part of Doc. 863 ] United Nations Charter, 1945 , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 64 and Doc. 65 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 is part of Doc. 221 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 424 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 1022 [ Pg. 1022 is part of Doc. 566 ] , 1195 [ Pg. 1195 is part of Doc. 662 ] , 1450–1451 [ Pgs. 1450–1451 include portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] , 1504 [ Pg. 1504 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1518 n [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1541 [ Pg. 1541 includes portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 1655 [ Pg. 1655 is part of Doc. 894 ] , 1657 [ Pg. 1657 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1746 [ Pg. 1746 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1796 [ Pg. 1796 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1819–1820 [ Pg. 1819 is part of Doc. 974 ] U.S. Military Mission with the Iranian Army, agreement between Iran and the United States concerning, 1947 , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 475 n [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] Trieste, 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 85 ] Tripolitania. See under Libya. Trippe, Juan T., 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1710 n [ Pg. 1710 is part of Doc. 923 ] Trott, Alan C., 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 115–117 [ Pgs. 115–117 include portions of Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , and Doc. 50 ] , 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 756 and Doc. 757 ] Troutbeck, Sir John Monro, 698 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 326 ] Troutman, Harry L., 1642 [ Pg. 1642 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Trucial sheikhdoms: British protection over, 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , and Doc. 5 ] , 36–37 [ Pg. 36 is part of Doc. 16 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] ; petroleum problems, 83 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] ; Saudi Arabian territorial claims, 38–43 [ Pgs. 38–43 include portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 53–55 [ Pg. 53 is part of Doc. 21 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 includes portions of Doc. 39 and Doc. 40 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 117–118 [ Pgs. 117–118 include portions of Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , and Doc. 51 ] ; U.S. policy, 88 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 117–118 [ Pgs. 117–118 include portions of Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , and Doc. 51 ] Truman, Harry S.: Address to: American Newspaper Guild, June 28, 1950 , 1721 [ Pg. 1721 includes portions of Doc. 930 and Doc. 931 ] ; Congress, July 19, 1950 , 1699 [ Pg. 1699 includes portions of Doc. 914 and Doc. 915 ] ; Congress on Greek-Turkish aid program, 1947 , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 1246 n [ Pg. 1246 is part of Doc. 691 ] 1311 n [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 731 ] Correspondence with: Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie, 1691 [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] ; Israeli President Weizmann, 658–661 [ Pgs. 658–661 include portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] ; Jordanian King Abdullah, 666 n [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 is part of Doc. 328 ] , 798 n [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] ; Liberian President Tubman, 1691 n [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 1711 [ Pg. 1711 includes portions of Doc. 923 and Doc. 924 ] , 1726 n [ Pg. 1726 is part of Doc. 935 ] , 1729–1730 [ Pgs. 1729–1730 include portions of Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] , 1733–1734 [ Pgs. 1733–1734 include portions of Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] ; Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, 1431–1432 [ Pgs. 1431–1432 include portions of Doc. 806 , Doc. 807 , and Doc. 808 ] ; Saudi Arabian King Ibn Saud, 1127–1128 [ Pgs. 1127–1128 include portions of Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , and Doc. 634 ] , 1136 [ Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1190–1191 [ Pgs. 1190–1191 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , and Doc. 659 ] , 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] ; Turkish President Bayar, 1263–1264 [ Pgs. 1263–1264 include portions of Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , and Doc. 706 ] Egypt, British relations with, 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] Ethiopia, U.S. relations with, 1691 [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 1698 n [ Pg. 1698 includes portions of Doc. 913 and Doc. 914 ] Greece, U.S. policy toward, 410 n [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] Inaugural address, Jan. 20, 1949 , 279 [ Pg. 279 is part of Doc. 102 ] , 1140 [ Pg. 1140 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1153 [ Pg. 1153 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1504 n [ Pg. 1504 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1629 [ Pg. 1629 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] Iran, U.S. relations with, 445 [ Pg. 445 is part of Doc. 203 ] , 448–449 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 469 n [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 250 ] , 575–576 [ Pgs. 575–576 include portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] Israel, U.S. relations with, 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 965 n [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 is part of Doc. 524 ] , 972 [ Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 982 n [ Pg. 982 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1088–1089 [ Pgs. 1088–1089 include portions of Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , and Doc. 620 ] Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 1404–1405 [ Pgs. 1404–1405 include portions of Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , and Doc. 789 ] , 1408 [ Pg. 1408 includes portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1432 [ Pg. 1432 includes portions of Doc. 807 and Doc. 808 ] Korean war, 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] Liberia, U.S. relations with, 1691 n [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 1711 [ Pg. 1711 includes portions of Doc. 923 and Doc. 924 ] , 1714 n [ Pg. 1714 is part of Doc. 925 ] , 1726 [ Pg. 1726 is part of Doc. 935 ] , 1729 [ Pg. 1729 includes portions of Doc. 936 and Doc. 937 ] , 1731–1734 [ Pgs. 1731–1734 include portions of Doc. 938 , Doc. 939 , Doc. 940 , Doc. 941 , Doc. 942 , and Doc. 943 ] Morocco, U.S. relations with, 1747–1748 [ Pgs. 1747–1748 include portions of Doc. 944 and Doc. 945 ] , 1753–1754 [ Pgs. 1753–1754 include portions of Doc. 947 , Doc. 948 , and Doc. 949 ] , 1757–1759 [ Pgs. 1757–1759 include portions of Doc. 949 and Doc. 950 ] Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 , signature of an act to amend the, 1182 [ Pg. 1182 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 1187–1188 [ Pgs. 1187–1188 include portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] Near East, arms shipments to, 135 n [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 137 n [ Pg. 137 is part of Doc. 60 ] , 138 n [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 162–163 [ Pgs. 162–163 include portions of Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 167 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 913–914 [ Pgs. 913–914 include portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] Near East and South Asia, proposed U.S. assistance for, 178 [ Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 78 and Doc. 79 ] , 180–181 [ Pgs. 180–181 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 184–185 [ Pgs. 184–185 include portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 1361 [ Pg. 1361 is part of Doc. 757 ] Palestine question, 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 781–782 [ Pgs. 781–782 include portions of Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , and Doc. 388 ] , 783 n [ Pg. 783 is part of Doc. 389 ] , 787–789 [ Pgs. 787–789 include portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , and Doc. 395 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 837–839 [ Pgs. 837–839 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 is part of Doc. 592 ] Palestinian refugees, 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 806–807 [ Pgs. 806–807 include portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , and Doc. 408 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 1040 n [ Pg. 1040 is part of Doc. 581 ] , 1061 [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 606 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 includes portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] Saudi Arabia, U.S. relations with, 1127–1128 [ Pgs. 1127–1128 include portions of Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , and Doc. 634 ] , 1130 n [ Pg. 1130 is part of Doc. 635 ] , 1136 [ Pg. 1136 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1154 [ Pg. 1154 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 1157 [ Pg. 1157 is part of Doc. 640 ] , 1164 [ Pg. 1164 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1169 [ Pg. 1169 is part of Doc. 643 ] , 1176–1177 [ Pgs. 1176–1177 include portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 1187 n [ Pg. 1187 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 1190–1192 [ Pgs. 1190–1192 include portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , and Doc. 660 ] , 1197 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] Speech to Women’s National Democratic Club, 1949 , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 207 ] Territorial waters, proclamation on, 1945 , 19 [ Pg. 19 is part of Doc. 8 ] Turkey, U.S. relations with, 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1246 [ Pg. 1246 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1262–1264 [ Pgs. 1262–1264 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , and Doc. 706 ] Union of South Africa, U.S. relations with, 1817 [ Pg. 1817 is part of Doc. 973 ] , 1826 n [ Pg. 1826 includes portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] Visits to the United States by foreign leaders, 390 n [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 1498 [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 837 ] Yemen, U.S. relations with, 1355 n [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 1358–1359 [ Pgs. 1358–1359 include portions of Doc. 755 and Doc. 756 ] Truman doctrine, 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 1311 [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 731 ] Tsaldaris, Constantine, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 is part of Doc. 147 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 421–423 [ Pgs. 421–423 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] Tsiang, Tingfu F., 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 585 ] Tsouderos, Emmanuel, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346 n [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 351 n [ Pg. 351 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 146 and Doc. 147 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 147 and Doc. 148 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 152 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 172 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 416–417 [ Pgs. 416–417 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 420–421 [ Pg. 420 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 433–434 [ Pgs. 433–434 include portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] Tubeshi, Abdul Rahman, 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] Tubman, William V. S., 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 1691 [ Pg. 1691 includes portions of Doc. 910 and Doc. 911 ] , 1706–1709 [ Pgs. 1706–1709 include portions of Doc. 920 , Doc. 921 , and Doc. 922 ] , 1711–1713 [ Pgs. 1711–1713 include portions of Doc. 923 , Doc. 924 , and Doc. 925 ] , 1715–1716 [ Pgs. 1715–1716 include portions of Doc. 926 and Doc. 927 ] , 1720–1722 [ Pgs. 1720–1722 include portions of Doc. 929 , Doc. 930 , Doc. 931 , and Doc. 932 ] , 1725 [ Pg. 1725 is part of Doc. 934 ] , 1726 n [ Pg. 1726 is part of Doc. 935 ] , 1727 [ Pg. 1727 is part of Doc. 936 ] , 1729–1730 [ Pgs. 1729–1730 include portions of Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] , 1733 [ Pg. 1733 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] Tucker, Capt. T. T., 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] Tukan ( also Tuqan), 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] Tunisia: British policy, 1795 [ Pg. 1795 is part of Doc. 965 ] Communist movement, 1792–1793 [ Pg. 1792 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1795 [ Pg. 1795 is part of Doc. 965 ] French policy and position, 1774–1784 [ Pgs. 1774–1784 include portions of Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , and Doc. 963 ] , 1786–1788 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1792–1801 [ Pgs. 1792–1801 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] , 1806–1807 [ Pg. 1806 is part of Doc. 969 ] Nationalist movement, 1775–1777 [ Pgs. 1775–1777 include portions of Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , and Doc. 959 ] , 1779 [ Pg. 1779 is part of Doc. 960 ] , 1780 n [ Pg. 1780 includes portions of Doc. 960 and Doc. 961 ] , 1781–1782 [ Pgs. 1781–1782 include portions of Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , and Doc. 963 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1787–1788 [ Pg. 1787 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1792–1795 [ Pg. 1792 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1797–1801 [ Pgs. 1797–1801 include portions of Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , and Doc. 967 ] , 1807 n [ Pg. 1807 is part of Doc. 969 ] Self-government of, U.S. interest in the evolution toward, 1774–1808 [ Pgs. 1774–1808 include portions of Doc. 956 , Doc. 957 , Doc. 958 , Doc. 959 , Doc. 960 , Doc. 961 , Doc. 962 , Doc. 963 , Doc. 964 , Doc. 965 , Doc. 966 , Doc. 967 , Doc. 968 , Doc. 969 , and Doc. 970 ] Situation in, 1528–1529 [ Pg. 1528 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1537 [ Pg. 1537 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1542 [ Pg. 1542 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1571–1572 [ Pg. 1571 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1575–1577 [ Pg. 1575 is part of Doc. 859 ] , 1744 [ Pg. 1744 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1752 [ Pg. 1752 includes portions of Doc. 946 and Doc. 947 ] Soviet policy, 1794–1795 [ Pg. 1794 is part of Doc. 965 ] U.S. economic and technical assistance, 1785 [ Pg. 1785 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1793 [ Pg. 1793 is part of Doc. 965 ] , 1797 [ Pg. 1797 includes portions of Doc. 965 and Doc. 966 ] Turkey ( see also Turkish policy under Korean war): Afghanistan, military mission in, 266 [ Pg. 266 is part of Doc. 100 ] Agreements with the United States concerning: Economic assistance, Jan. 31, 1950 , 1224 [ Pg. 1224 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 is part of Doc. 753 ] ; U.S. Educational Commission, Dec. 27, 1949 , 1240–1241 [ Pgs. 1240–1241 include portions of Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , and Doc. 691 ] Armed forces, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 1236 [ Pg. 1236 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 1240 [ Pg. 1240 includes portions of Doc. 689 and Doc. 690 ] , 1276–1277 [ Pg. 1276 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 1280 [ Pg. 1280 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1284 [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1289–1291 [ Pgs. 1289–1291 include portions of Doc. 718 and Doc. 719 ] , 1293–1294 [ Pgs. 1293–1294 include portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1323 [ Pg. 1323 is part of Doc. 738 ] , 1328 [ Pg. 1328 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1331 [ Pg. 1331 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1346 [ Pg. 1346 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1351 [ Pg. 1351 is part of Doc. 752 ] British policy, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 129 ] , 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 721 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1299–1300 [ Pgs. 1299–1300 include portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 1302–1305 [ Pgs. 1302–1305 include portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , and Doc. 729 ] , 1316–1317 [ Pgs. 1316–1317 include portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1333–1337 [ Pgs. 1333–1337 include portions of Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] , 1339–1340 [ Pgs. 1339–1340 include portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1342–1343 [ Pgs. 1342–1343 include portions of Doc. 750 and Doc. 751 ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 is part of Doc. 753 ] Bulgaria, possibility of an attack by, 191 [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 1289–1292 [ Pgs. 1289–1292 include portions of Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , and Doc. 720 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1340–1341 [ Pgs. 1340–1341 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] Bulgarian Turks, repatriation of, 1293 [ Pg. 1293 includes portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] , 1329 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1333–1334 [ Pgs. 1333–1334 include portions of Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , and Doc. 745 ] , 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1351 [ Pg. 1351 is part of Doc. 752 ] Communist movement, 3 [ Pg. 3 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 688 ] Counterpart funds, negotiations regarding utilization of, 1229–1231 [ Pgs. 1229–1231 include portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 1267–1269 [ Pgs. 1267–1269 include portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 1273–1275 [ Pgs. 1273–1275 include portions of Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , and Doc. 712 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 721 ] , 1326 [ Pg. 1326 is part of Doc. 740 ] , 1350 [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 752 ] Cyprus question, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Defense expenditures, 1225–1228 [ Pgs. 1225–1228 include portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 1230 [ Pg. 1230 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 1285 [ Pg. 1285 includes portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1288 [ Pg. 1288 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 721 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1325 [ Pg. 1325 includes portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 1328–1329 [ Pg. 1328 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1331 [ Pg. 1331 is part of Doc. 741 ] Economic development program, 1229–1230 [ Pg. 1229 is part of Doc. 683 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 1325 [ Pg. 1325 includes portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] French policy, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 1297–1298 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 1304 [ Pg. 1304 includes portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 1310 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 1335–1337 [ Pgs. 1335–1337 include portions of Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] General staff talks, proposals concerning, 1237–1247 [ Pgs. 1237–1247 include portions of Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , and Doc. 692 ] , 1249–1250 [ Pgs. 1249–1250 include portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1318 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] German external assets, negotiations regarding disposition of, 1283–1284 [ Pgs. 1283–1284 include portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] Germany, Federal Republic of, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Greece, relations with, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 422–425 [ Pgs. 422–425 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] , 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1340–1341 [ Pgs. 1340–1341 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 1348–1349 [ Pg. 1348 is part of Doc. 752 ] Iran, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 1249 [ Pg. 1249 is part of Doc. 693 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] Italy, relations with, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, 1240 n [ Pg. 1240 includes portions of Doc. 689 and Doc. 690 ] , 1296 [ Pg. 1296 includes portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 1298 [ Pg. 1298 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1329–1330 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1333 [ Pg. 1333 includes portions of Doc. 743 and Doc. 744 ] , 1341 [ Pg. 1341 includes portions of Doc. 749 and Doc. 750 ] Kurdish minority, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 651–652 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 1348 [ Pg. 1348 is part of Doc. 752 ] Military airfields, proposed reconstruction of, 1234–1235 [ Pgs. 1234–1235 include portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] , 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 1256–1259 [ Pgs. 1256–1259 include portions of Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702 ] , 1270–1271 [ Pg. 1270 is part of Doc. 709 ] , 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 721 ] , 1350–1351 [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 752 ] Narcotics traffic, 1247–1248 [ Pgs. 1247–1248 include portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 1250–1251 [ Pgs. 1250–1251 include portions of Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , and Doc. 695 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, relationship to, 306–307 [ Pg. 306 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , and Doc. 190 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 is part of Doc. 272 ] , 587 n [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273 ] , 600–601 [ Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 1239–1240 [ Pgs. 1239–1240 include portions of Doc. 689 and Doc. 690 ] , 1285 n [ Pg. 1285 includes portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1286–1288 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1297–1301 [ Pgs. 1297–1301 include portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 1306–1316 [ Pgs. 1306–1316 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 1319–1322 [ Pgs. 1319–1322 include portions of Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 1324 [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 738 ] , 1335 [ Pg. 1335 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1344–1345 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1636–1637 [ Pg. 1636 is part of Doc. 884 ] , 1816 [ Pg. 1816 is part of Doc. 973 ] Orthodox church, matters pertaining to, 1251–1252 [ Pgs. 1251–1252 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] Petroleum policy, 83–84 [ Pg. 83 is part of Doc. 36 ] Photographic mapping projects, proposed, 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] Political situation, 1262–1263 [ Pgs. 1262–1263 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , and Doc. 705 ] , 1320 [ Pg. 1320 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] Regional security pact, policy toward, 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 157 [ Pg. 157 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1237 [ Pg. 1237 is part of Doc. 688 ] , 1240 [ Pg. 1240 includes portions of Doc. 689 and Doc. 690 ] , 1252–1253 [ Pgs. 1252–1253 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 1264–1266 [ Pgs. 1264–1266 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , and Doc. 707 ] , 1270 [ Pg. 1270 is part of Doc. 709 ] , 1272–1273 [ Pgs. 1272–1273 include portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 1310 [ Pg. 1310 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 1313 [ Pg. 1313 includes portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] Security of, 142 [ Pg. 142 is part of Doc. 63 ] , 151–152 [ Pgs. 151–152 include portions of Doc. 67 and Doc. 68 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 190–192 [ Pgs. 190–192 include portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 237–238 [ Pgs. 237–238 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1239 [ Pg. 1239 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 1246 [ Pg. 1246 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1248–1249 [ Pgs. 1248–1249 include portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693 ] , 1252–1253 [ Pgs. 1252–1253 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 1256 [ Pg. 1256 is part of Doc. 699 ] , 1264–1265 [ Pgs. 1264–1265 include portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 1272–1273 [ Pgs. 1272–1273 include portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 1286–1288 [ Pg. 1286 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1301 [ Pg. 1301 is part of Doc. 725 ] , 1306 n [ Pg. 1306 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1313–1314 [ Pgs. 1313–1314 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1316–1317 [ Pgs. 1316–1317 include portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1319 [ Pg. 1319 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1343–1346 [ Pgs. 1343–1346 include portions of Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 1348–1349 [ Pg. 1348 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 is part of Doc. 753 ] Situation in, 217 [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] Soviet policy, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254–256 [ Pgs. 254–256 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 1225–1226 [ Pg. 1225 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 1235 [ Pg. 1235 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] , 1237–1239 [ Pgs. 1237–1239 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 1246 [ Pg. 1246 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1252–1253 [ Pgs. 1252–1253 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 1262 [ Pg. 1262 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 1289–1292 [ Pgs. 1289–1292 include portions of Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , and Doc. 720 ] , 1298–1299 [ Pgs. 1298–1299 include portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 1304–1305 [ Pgs. 1304–1305 include portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , and Doc. 729 ] , 1308–1309 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1311 [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 1313 [ Pg. 1313 includes portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1318–1319 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 737 ] , 1330 [ Pg. 1330 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1337 [ Pg. 1337 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1341–1343 [ Pgs. 1341–1343 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 1346 [ Pg. 1346 is part of Doc. 752 ] Soviet Union, policy toward, 85 [ Pg. 85 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] Straits, defense measures concerning the, 1254 [ Pg. 1254 is part of Doc. 697 ] , 1260–1262 [ Pgs. 1260–1262 include portions of Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , and Doc. 704 ] , 1266–1267 [ Pgs. 1266–1267 include portions of Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] , 1295 [ Pg. 1295 is part of Doc. 721 ] , 1299–1300 [ Pgs. 1299–1300 include portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 1302 n [ Pg. 1302 includes portions of Doc. 725 and Doc. 726 ] , 1303–1305 [ Pgs. 1303–1305 include portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , and Doc. 729 ] , 1332–1335 [ Pgs. 1332–1335 include portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , and Doc. 746 ] , 1339–1343 [ Pgs. 1339–1343 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 1352–1354 [ Pgs. 1352–1354 include portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] U.N. Security Council seat, election to, 1313 [ Pg. 1313 includes portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1325 [ Pg. 1325 includes portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] U.S. economic assistance, 4 [ Pg. 4 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 173 [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 is part of Doc. 79 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 261–263 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 274 n [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 is part of Doc. 289 ] , 625–626 [ Pg. 625 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 1225–1231 [ Pgs. 1225–1231 include portions of Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] , 1237–1238 [ Pgs. 1237–1238 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1256 [ Pg. 1256 is part of Doc. 699 ] , 1267–1269 [ Pgs. 1267–1269 include portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 1273–1275 [ Pgs. 1273–1275 include portions of Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , and Doc. 712 ] , 1278–1279 [ Pg. 1278 is part of Doc. 713 ] , 1285–1288 [ Pgs. 1285–1288 include portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1300–1302 [ Pgs. 1300–1302 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , and Doc. 726 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 1318–1319 [ Pg. 1318 is part of Doc. 736 ] , 1325–1327 [ Pgs. 1325–1327 include portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 1350–1351 [ Pg. 1350 is part of Doc. 752 ] U.S. military air transit rights, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] U.S. military assistance, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 154 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 is part of Doc. 87 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 265–266 [ Pg. 265 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 313 [ Pg. 313 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 is part of Doc. 166 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 is part of Doc. 206 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 575 n [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 621–623 [ Pg. 621 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 628–629 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 695 [ Pg. 695 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 is part of Doc. 475 ] , 1134 [ Pg. 1134 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1163 [ Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1225 [ Pg. 1225 is part of Doc. 682 ] , 1234–1238 [ Pgs. 1234–1238 include portions of Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , and Doc. 689 ] , 1240 [ Pg. 1240 includes portions of Doc. 689 and Doc. 690 ] , 1242 [ Pg. 1242 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1244 [ Pg. 1244 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1248–1250 [ Pgs. 1248–1250 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , and Doc. 694 ] , 1256–1258 [ Pgs. 1256–1258 include portions of Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , and Doc. 701 ] , 1270–1271 [ Pg. 1270 is part of Doc. 709 ] , 1277 [ Pg. 1277 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 1280–1281 [ Pgs. 1280–1281 include portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] , 1284–1285 [ Pgs. 1284–1285 include portions of Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , and Doc. 718 ] , 1287–1288 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 1294–1295 [ Pg. 1294 is part of Doc. 721 ] , 1297 [ Pg. 1297 is part of Doc. 723 ] , 1299 [ Pg. 1299 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 1304 [ Pg. 1304 includes portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , and Doc. 728 ] , 1308 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 1314 [ Pg. 1314 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 1317–1318 [ Pgs. 1317–1318 include portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1322–1324 [ Pgs. 1322–1324 include portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 1328–1331 [ Pg. 1328 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1342 [ Pg. 1342 is part of Doc. 750 ] , 1349–1350 [ Pg. 1349 is part of Doc. 752 ] U.S. policy, 5 [ Pg. 5 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 154–155 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 68 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 244 n [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 254–267 [ Pgs. 254–267 include portions of Doc. 99 and Doc. 100 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 402–403 [ Pgs. 402–403 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 414–416 [ Pgs. 414–416 include portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 212 and Doc. 213 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 554–555 [ Pg. 554 is part of Doc. 248 ] , 592–593 [ Pgs. 592–593 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 291 and Doc. 292 ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1236–1239 [ Pgs. 1236–1239 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 1242–1243 [ Pg. 1242 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1246 [ Pg. 1246 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1248–1249 [ Pgs. 1248–1249 include portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693 ] , 1264–1266 [ Pgs. 1264–1266 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , and Doc. 707 ] , 1283–1284 [ Pgs. 1283–1284 include portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 1305 [ Pg. 1305 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 1307–1309 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1313–1315 [ Pgs. 1313–1315 include portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] , 1317–1322 [ Pgs. 1317–1322 include portions of Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 1324–1325 [ Pgs. 1324–1325 include portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 1332 [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1343 [ Pg. 1343 includes portions of Doc. 750 and Doc. 751 ] , 1354 [ Pg. 1354 is part of Doc. 753 ] , 1550 [ Pg. 1550 includes portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] , 1587 n [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] Visit to Turkish ports by U.S. naval units, 1255 [ Pg. 1255 is part of Doc. 698 ] Uganda, 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] Ulusan, Adm. Aziz, 1340 [ Pg. 1340 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1344 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] Union of South Africa ( see also Union of South African subheadings under Eritrea and Korean war): Central and Southern Africa Transport Conference, 1581–1582 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara, 1533 [ Pg. 1533 is part of Doc. 845 ] Commonwealth role, 247 [ Pg. 247 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1821–1822 [ Pg. 1821 is part of Doc. 974 ] Communist movement, 1552–1553 [ Pg. 1552 is part of Doc. 855 ] , 1816 [ Pg. 1816 is part of Doc. 973 ] , 1826–1828 [ Pgs. 1826–1828 include portions of Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , and Doc. 979 ] , 1834–1837 [ Pgs. 1834–1837 include portions of Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , and Doc. 984 ] Defense and security plans, 1826–1827 [ Pgs. 1826–1827 include portions of Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , and Doc. 978 ] , 1832–1834 [ Pgs. 1832–1834 include portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] , 1837–1841 [ Pgs. 1837–1841 include portions of Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , and Doc. 986 ] Export-Import Bank loan, negotiations concerning, 1818 [ Pg. 1818 is part of Doc. 974 ] Immigration question, 1512–1513 [ Pgs. 1512–1513 include portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1645 [ Pg. 1645 is part of Doc. 889 ] Industrial security, 1823 [ Pg. 1823 includes portions of Doc. 974 and Doc. 975 ] , 1827–1830 [ Pgs. 1827–1830 include portions of Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , and Doc. 981 ] International Bank loan, proposed, 1844–1845 [ Pg. 1844 is part of Doc. 988 ] Middle East, defense commitments for the, 190 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 94 ] , 1840 [ Pg. 1840 is part of Doc. 985 ] , 1842 [ Pg. 1842 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, interest in the, 1816 [ Pg. 1816 is part of Doc. 973 ] Racial policies and problems, 1587 [ Pg. 1587 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1809–1813 [ Pgs. 1809–1813 include portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] , 1816–1817 [ Pg. 1816 is part of Doc. 973 ] , 1821 n [ Pg. 1821 is part of Doc. 974 ] , 1822 [ Pg. 1822 is part of Doc. 974 ] , 1824–1826 [ Pgs. 1824–1826 include portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] , 1835–1836 [ Pg. 1835 is part of Doc. 983 ] Southwest Africa, status of ( see also under United Nations: General Assembly), 1581 [ Pg. 1581 is part of Doc. 860 ] , 1813–1816 [ Pgs. 1813–1816 include portions of Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , and Doc. 973 ] , 1818–1821 [ Pg. 1818 is part of Doc. 974 ] , 1828 [ Pg. 1828 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] , 1831 n [ Pg. 1831 is part of Doc. 981 ] United Nations, attitude toward, 1819–1820 [ Pg. 1819 is part of Doc. 974 ] U.S. investments in, 1568 [ Pg. 1568 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1589 [ Pg. 1589 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1728 [ Pg. 1728 is part of Doc. 936 ] , 1817–1818 [ Pgs. 1817–1818 include portions of Doc. 973 and Doc. 974 ] , 1831 [ Pg. 1831 is part of Doc. 981 ] U.S. military assistance, proposed, 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 1832–1834 [ Pgs. 1832–1834 include portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] , 1838 [ Pg. 1838 is part of Doc. 984 ] , 1840–1842 [ Pgs. 1840–1842 include portions of Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , and Doc. 987 ] U.S. policies and problems in relations with, 1809–1845 [ Pgs. 1809–1845 include portions of Doc. 971 , Doc. 972 , Doc. 973 , Doc. 974 , Doc. 975 , Doc. 976 , Doc. 977 , Doc. 978 , Doc. 979 , Doc. 980 , Doc. 981 , Doc. 982 , Doc. 983 , Doc. 984 , Doc. 985 , Doc. 986 , Doc. 987 , and Doc. 988 ] Uranium procurement by the United States, 1831 [ Pg. 1831 is part of Doc. 981 ] , 1833 [ Pg. 1833 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 1842–1843 [ Pgs. 1842–1843 include portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union. United Jewish Appeal, 671 [ Pg. 671 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 443 ] United Kingdom ( see also British subheadings under inividual countries and subjects ), 1819–1820 [ Pg. 1819 is part of Doc. 974 ] United Nations: Chinese representation question, 251 [ Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 99 ] General Assembly: Ad Hoc Political Committee, 1041–1043 [ Pgs. 1041–1043 include portions of Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , and Doc. 585 ] , 1045–1047 [ Pgs. 1045–1047 include portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , and Doc. 588 ] , 1054 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 1629 [ Pg. 1629 includes portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 1633–1634 [ Pgs. 1633–1634 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , and Doc. 883 ] , 1687–1689 [ Pgs. 1687–1689 include portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , and Doc. 910 ] Aggression, 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 528 ] Arab refugee problem ( see also Palestine refugee question infra ), 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 663–664 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 763–764 [ Pgs. 763–764 include portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 972 [ Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 528 ] Australian position, 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] Belgian position, 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Brazilian position, 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 605 ] British position, 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] Chilean position, 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Committee I, 437–438 [ Pgs. 437–438 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197 ] , 1672 [ Pg. 1672 is part of Doc. 901 ] Committee II, 972 [ Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 528 ] Committee IV, 1507 [ Pg. 1507 is part of Doc. 840 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] Committee V, 1041 [ Pg. 1041 includes portions of Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , and Doc. 583 ] , 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1047–1048 [ Pgs. 1047–1048 include portions of Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] Cuban item on representation, 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] Egyptian position, 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 115 ] El Salvadoran position, 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 605 ] Eritrea, disposition of, 1641 [ Pg. 1641 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1642 n [ Pg. 1642 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 1643 [ Pg. 1643 is part of Doc. 888 ] , 1650–1651 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1653–1654 [ Pgs. 1653–1654 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1656–1657 [ Pgs. 1656–1657 include portions of Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , and Doc. 896 ] , 1661–1663 [ Pgs. 1661–1663 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1666–1678 [ Pgs. 1666–1678 include portions of Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , and Doc. 903 ] , 1671–1689 [ Pgs. 1671–1689 include portions of Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , and Doc. 910 ] , 1693 [ Pg. 1693 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1696–1697 [ Pgs. 1696–1697 include portions of Doc. 912 and Doc. 913 ] , 1702 [ Pg. 1702 includes portions of Doc. 917 and Doc. 918 ] Essentials of peace resolution, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] French position, 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] Greek case, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 168 ] Greek children, repatriation of: 1949 resolution on, 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 181 ] ; 1950 resolution 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] (V), 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Greek military personnel, repatriation of, resolution 382A (V), 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Interim Committee, 374 [ Pg. 374 is part of Doc. 156 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 1650 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] , 1653 [ Pg. 1653 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. 893 ] , 1657 [ Pg. 1657 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1661–1663 [ Pgs. 1661–1663 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1666–1668 [ Pgs. 1666–1668 include portions of Doc. 899 and Doc. 900 ] , 1672–1676 [ Pgs. 1672–1676 include portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1678–1679 [ Pgs. 1678–1679 include portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1686 [ Pg. 1686 is part of Doc. 906 ] , 1693 [ Pg. 1693 is part of Doc. 912 ] , 1697 [ Pg. 1697 is part of Doc. 913 ] Iraqi position, 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 605 ] Israeli position, 659–660 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 is part of Doc. 600 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 605 ] Italian colonies, former, disposition of, 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 1601 [ Pg. 1601 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] Italian Somaliland, disposition of, 1640 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1664 [ Pg. 1664 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1688–1690 [ Pgs. 1688–1690 include portions of Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , and Doc. 910 ] Jerusalem question, 1029–1032 [ Pgs. 1029–1032 include portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1064–1067 [ Pgs. 1064–1067 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074–1076 [ Pgs. 1074–1076 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1104–1105 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] Jerusalem resolutions concerning internationalization, May 6, 1948, Dec. 11, 1948, Dec. 9, 1949 , 636 [ Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 655–656 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 659–660 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 682–684 [ Pgs. 682–684 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] , 686–690 [ Pgs. 686–690 include portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 is part of Doc. 324 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , and Doc. 337 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 718–720 [ Pgs. 718–720 include portions of Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , and Doc. 342 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 351 and Doc. 352 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 765–769 [ Pgs. 765–769 include portions of Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , and Doc. 377 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 790–791 [ Pg. 790 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 814–815 [ Pgs. 814–815 include portions of Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , and Doc. 414 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 837–838 [ Pgs. 837–838 include portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] , 841–842 [ Pgs. 841–842 include portions of Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , and Doc. 434 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 is part of Doc. 460 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 899–902 [ Pgs. 899–902 include portions of Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 924 [ Pg. 924 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 490 and Doc. 491 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 982–983 [ Pgs. 982–983 include portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1029–1030 [ Pgs. 1029–1030 include portions of Doc. 571 and Doc. 572 ] , 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] Jordanian position, 1064–1067 [ Pgs. 1064–1067 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 is part of Doc. 605 ] Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 1362 n [ Pg. 1362 is part of Doc. 758 ] Korean war, 971 [ Pg. 971 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] , 1042 [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] Lebanese position, 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Libyan question, 1601–1605 [ Pgs. 1601–1605 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , and Doc. 868 ] , 1608–1609 [ Pg. 1608 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1611–1612 [ Pgs. 1611–1612 include portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] , 1615–1619 [ Pgs. 1615–1619 include portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 1621–1622 [ Pg. 1621 is part of Doc. 875 ] , 1625–1626 [ Pgs. 1625–1626 include portions of Doc. 877 and Doc. 878 ] , 1628–1630 [ Pgs. 1628–1630 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , and Doc. 880 ] , 1632–1635 [ Pgs. 1632–1635 include portions of Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , and Doc. 884 ] , 1744–1745 [ Pg. 1744 is part of Doc. 944 ] , 1784 [ Pg. 1784 is part of Doc. 963 ] , 1792 [ Pg. 1792 is part of Doc. 965 ] | Palestine question, 931 n [ Pg. 931 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] , 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] , 971–973 [ Pgs. 971–973 include portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 977 n [ Pg. 977 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 978 n [ Pg. 978 includes portions of Doc. 532 and Doc. 533 ] , 982–983 [ Pgs. 982–983 include portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 992 n [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 1010–1011 [ Pgs. 1010–1011 include portions of Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , and Doc. 557 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1021–1022 [ Pgs. 1021–1022 include portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 1025–1027 [ Pgs. 1025–1027 include portions of Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , and Doc. 571 ] , 1036–1038 [ Pgs. 1036–1038 include portions of Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 592 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603 ] , 1104–1106 [ Pgs. 1104–1106 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1110–1111 [ Pgs. 1110–1111 include portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 1434 [ Pg. 1434 is part of Doc. 809 ] Palestine refugee question, 1041–1043 [ Pgs. 1041–1043 include portions of Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , and Doc. 585 ] , 1045–1050 [ Pgs. 1045–1050 include portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] , 1054–1055 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1061–1063 [ Pgs. 1061–1063 include portions of Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , and Doc. 596 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 1104–1106 [ Pgs. 1104–1106 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] Palestine refugee resolution 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 168 ] (V), Dec. 2, 1950 , 1062 [ Pg. 1062 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] Palestine refugee resolutions, 1948 , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 407 and Doc. 408 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 is part of Doc. 451 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 includes portions of Doc. 480 and Doc. 481 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 is part of Doc. 486 ] , 928–930 [ Pgs. 928–930 include portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] , 933–934 [ Pgs. 933–934 include portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , and Doc. 497 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500 ] , 972 [ Pg. 972 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 is part of Doc. 529 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 536 and Doc. 537 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 is part of Doc. 539 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 is part of Doc. 553 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1054 [ Pg. 1054 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1104–1106 [ Pgs. 1104–1106 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1145 [ Pg. 1145 is part of Doc. 636 ] Palestine resolution of Nov. 29, 1947 , 687 [ Pg. 687 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 731–732 [ Pg. 731 is part of Doc. 351 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 is part of Doc. 373 ] , 857–858 [ Pgs. 857–858 include portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 954 [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 is part of Doc. 673 ] Palestine resolution 302 (IV), Dec. 8, 1949 , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 includes portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 is part of Doc. 361 ] , 763–764 [ Pgs. 763–764 include portions of Doc. 372 and Doc. 373 ] , 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 1045 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 is part of Doc. 623 ] , 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] Southwest Africa, status of, 1814 [ Pg. 1814 is part of Doc. 972 ] , 1819–1820 [ Pg. 1819 is part of Doc. 974 ] , 1828 [ Pg. 1828 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] Soviet position, 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 includes portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 1625 [ Pg. 1625 is part of Doc. 877 ] , 1633 [ Pg. 1633 includes portions of Doc. 881 and Doc. 882 ] Special Committee on Information transmitted under article 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 32 and Doc. 33 ] e of the Charter, 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1591 [ Pg. 1591 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1819 [ Pg. 1819 is part of Doc. 974 ] Swedish position, 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Union of South Africa, treatment of people of Indian origin by, 1821 n [ Pg. 1821 is part of Doc. 974 ] U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, continuation of: 1949 resolution 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 107 ] (IV), 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 96 and Doc. 97 ] , 373–375 [ Pgs. 373–375 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] , 379 [ Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 437–438 [ Pgs. 437–438 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197 ] ; 1950 resolution 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] B (V), 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] Uniting for peace resolution 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] (V), 111 [ Pg. 111 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 309–310 [ Pgs. 309–310 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] U.S. position, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 305 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 is part of Doc. 322 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 430 ] , 1029–1032 [ Pgs. 1029–1032 include portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , and Doc. 574 ] , 1064–1065 [ Pgs. 1064–1065 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , and Doc. 599 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074–1076 [ Pgs. 1074–1076 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 1104–1105 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] Uruguayan position, 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Secretary-General ( see also Lie, Trygve), 314–315 [ Pgs. 314–315 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 443–444 [ Pgs. 443–444 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 is part of Doc. 306 ] , 756–757 [ Pgs. 756–757 include portions of Doc. 369 and Doc. 370 ] , 1016–1018 [ Pgs. 1016–1018 include portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] , 1030 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 572 ] , 1045–1046 [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 includes portions of Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , and Doc. 609 ] , 1429 [ Pg. 1429 includes portions of Doc. 805 and Doc. 806 ] , 1450–1452 [ Pgs. 1450–1452 include portions of Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , and Doc. 818 ] , 1628 [ Pg. 1628 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 1665 n [ Pg. 1665 is part of Doc. 899 ] , 1671 [ Pg. 1671 is part of Doc. 900 ] , 1700 [ Pg. 1700 includes portions of Doc. 915 and Doc. 916 ] , 1813 n [ Pg. 1813 includes portions of Doc. 971 and Doc. 972 ] Security Council: Arms embargo to Palestine area: Imposition of by resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948 , 685 n [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 913–914 [ Pgs. 913–914 include portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 967 [ Pg. 967 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525 ] ; lifting of, 1949 , 127 [ Pg. 127 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 129–131 [ Pgs. 129–131 include portions of Doc. 58 and Doc. 59 ] , 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 307–309 [ Pgs. 307–309 include portions of Doc. 114 and Doc. 115 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 is part of Doc. 320 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 464 ] Egyptian question, 1947 , 304 [ Pg. 304 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 is part of Doc. 477 ] Indian position, 314–315 [ Pgs. 314–315 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Iranian case, 1945–1940 , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 68 ] Israeli position, 1053–1054 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 591 ] . Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 198 [ Pg. 198 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 201–202 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1362–1365 [ Pgs. 1362–1365 include portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1367–1368 [ Pgs. 1367–1368 include portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 1370–1372 [ Pgs. 1370–1372 include portions of Doc. 763 and Doc. 764 ] , 1374–1383 [ Pgs. 1374–1383 include portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , and Doc. 770 ] , 1385–1389 [ Pgs. 1385–1389 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 1391–1393 [ Pgs. 1391–1393 include portions of Doc. 776 and Doc. 777 ] , 1405 [ Pg. 1405 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] , 1415–1416 [ Pgs. 1415–1416 include portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1419 [ Pg. 1419 is part of Doc. 798 ] , 1426 [ Pg. 1426 includes portions of Doc. 803 and Doc. 804 ] , 1429–1430 [ Pgs. 1429–1430 include portions of Doc. 805 and Doc. 806 ] , 1432–1433 [ Pgs. 1432–1433 include portions of Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , and Doc. 809 ] , 1436–1444 [ Pgs. 1436–1444 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , and Doc. 814 ] Kashmir resolutions: Jan. 20, 1948 , 1388 [ Pg. 1388 is part of Doc. 775 ] ; Apr. 21, 1948 , 1388 [ Pg. 1388 is part of Doc. 775 ] ; Aug. 13, 1948 , 1365 [ Pg. 1365 is part of Doc. 759 ] ; Jan. 5, 1949 , 1365 [ Pg. 1365 is part of Doc. 759 ] , 1441 [ Pg. 1441 includes portions of Doc. 811 and Doc. 812 ] ; Mar. 14, 1950 , 197 n [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1415 [ Pg. 1415 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] Korean war, 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 1106 [ Pg. 1106 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1416 [ Pg. 1416 is part of Doc. 796 ] , 1441 [ Pg. 1441 includes portions of Doc. 811 and Doc. 812 ] , 1467–1468 [ Pgs. 1467–1468 include portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 1700 [ Pg. 1700 includes portions of Doc. 915 and Doc. 916 ] Korean war resolutions, 197 [ Pg. 197 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 is part of Doc. 88 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 is part of Doc. 673 ] , 1467 [ Pg. 1467 is part of Doc. 827 ] Palestine question, 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 1011 [ Pg. 1011 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 1013 n [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1021–1023 [ Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 1025–1027 [ Pgs. 1025–1027 include portions of Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , and Doc. 571 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 is part of Doc. 585 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 is part of Doc. 597 ] Palestine resolution, Nov. 17, 1950 , 1053–1054 [ Pg. 1053 is part of Doc. 591 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] Reappointment of Lie as Secretary-General, 314–315 [ Pgs. 314–315 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] Soviet position, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 314–315 [ Pgs. 314–315 include portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 1485 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1488 [ Pg. 1488 is part of Doc. 836 ] Syria, resolution of 1946 regarding withdrawal of foreign troops from, 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] Turkey, election to seat on, 1313 [ Pg. 1313 includes portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1325 [ Pg. 1325 includes portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] U.S. position, 1106 [ Pg. 1106 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 1211 [ Pg. 1211 is part of Doc. 671 ] , 1213 [ Pg. 1213 is part of Doc. 673 ] Veto question, 248 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 315 [ Pg. 315 includes portions of Doc. 116 and Doc. 117 ] , 1485 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1488 [ Pg. 1488 is part of Doc. 836 ] Trusteeship Council ( see also U.N. Trusteeship Council under Palestine question), 1518 [ Pg. 1518 is part of Doc. 844 ] , 1525 [ Pg. 1525 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1591 [ Pg. 1591 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1600 [ Pg. 1600 is part of Doc. 864 ] , 1640 [ Pg. 1640 is part of Doc. 886 ] , 1688–1690 [ Pgs. 1688–1690 include portions of Doc. 908 , Doc. 909 , and Doc. 910 ] , 1818 n [ Pg. 1818 is part of Doc. 974 ] U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan. See under Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. U.N. Commission of Inquiry in Eritrea. See under Eritrea. U.N. Commission on Narcotics, 1259–1260 [ Pgs. 1259–1260 include portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 1485 [ Pg. 1485 is part of Doc. 836 ] , 1494 [ Pg. 1494 is part of Doc. 837 ] U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] U.N. International Children’s Emergency Fund, 349 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 892 n [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission. See under Palestine question. U.N. Peace Observation Commission, 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 is part of Doc. 575 ] U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 183 [ Pg. 183 is part of Doc. 81 ] U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees. See under Palestine question. U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, activities and report of ( see also under United Nations: General Assembly), 339–340 [ Pgs. 339–340 include portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 373–375 [ Pgs. 373–375 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] , 377–379 [ Pgs. 377–379 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 391–395 [ Pgs. 391–395 include portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 413–414 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 437–438 [ Pgs. 437–438 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197 ] , 443–444 [ Pgs. 443–444 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] , 1314 [ Pg. 1314 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 1497 [ Pg. 1497 is part of Doc. 837 ] Universal Postal Union, 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] Upton, G. N., 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] Uruguay, 1071 [ Pg. 1071 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 1074 n [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Usakligil, A. Bülent, 1255 n [ Pg. 1255 is part of Doc. 698 ] Utter, John E., 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 1539 [ Pg. 1539 is part of Doc. 846 ] , 1559 [ Pg. 1559 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1604 [ Pg. 1604 includes portions of Doc. 866 and Doc. 867 ] , 1647–1649 [ Pgs. 1647–1649 include portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] Uys, Gideon A. R., 1834 n [ Pg. 1834 includes portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] Uzdes, Adm., 1313 [ Pg. 1313 includes portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] Uzri, Abdul Karim al-, 70–71 [ Pgs. 70–71 include portions of Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , and Doc. 31 ] , 649–650 [ Pg. 649 is part of Doc. 302 ] Vahid, Gholam Ali, 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] Vallance, William R., 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 17 ] Vandenberg, Gen. Hoyt S., 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 95 ] Vandenburg, William O., 1827 n [ Pg. 1827 includes portions of Doc. 977 and Doc. 978 ] , 1828 n [ Pg. 1828 includes portions of Doc. 978 and Doc. 979 ] Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A., 363 [ Pg. 363 is part of Doc. 149 ] , 380–382 [ Pgs. 380–382 include portions of Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 166 and Doc. 167 ] , 395–397 [ Pgs. 395–397 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 552–555 [ Pgs. 552–555 include portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Van Laethem, Gabriel, 1538–1540 [ Pgs. 1538–1540 include portions of Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , and Doc. 847 ] , 1547 [ Pg. 1547 is part of Doc. 853 ] Van Zyl, G. Brand, 1830 n [ Pg. 1830 includes portions of Doc. 980 and Doc. 981 ] Vatican: Jerusalem, policy regarding, 673 [ Pg. 673 is part of Doc. 312 ] , 713 [ Pg. 713 is part of Doc. 338 ] , 719 n [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 341 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 395 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 is part of Doc. 423 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 is part of Doc. 434 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 is part of Doc. 449 ] , 878–879 [ Pgs. 878–879 include portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492 ] , 957 [ Pg. 957 is part of Doc. 517 ] , 982 n [ Pg. 982 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 591 ] ; U.S. representation at the, 180 n [ Pg. 180 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] Vaurs, Roger, 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1565 [ Pg. 1565 is part of Doc. 857 ] , 1567 [ Pg. 1567 is part of Doc. 857 ] Venezuela, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] , 22–23 [ Pgs. 22–23 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 88–90 [ Pg. 88 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 is part of Doc. 36 ] , 97–98 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 38 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 is part of Doc. 43 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 is part of Doc. 235 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 641 [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 296 ] Venizelos, Sophocles, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 is part of Doc. 136 ] , 347 n [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 136 and Doc. 137 ] , 351–372 [ Pgs. 351–372 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , and Doc. 155 ] , 375–376 [ Pgs. 375–376 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 is part of Doc. 170 ] , 399 n [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 405 n [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 176 and Doc. 177 ] , 414–415 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 418–423 [ Pgs. 418–423 include portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 is part of Doc. 190 ] , 430–432 [ Pgs. 430–432 include portions of Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 435–437 [ Pgs. 435–437 include portions of Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196 ] , 439–440 [ Pgs. 439–440 include portions of Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Ventiris, George, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 434 [ Pg. 434 is part of Doc. 193 ] Vigderman, A. G., 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 66 ] Vimont, Jacques, 1786 [ Pg. 1786 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1788 [ Pg. 1788 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1791 [ Pg. 1791 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1806 [ Pg. 1806 is part of Doc. 969 ] Visser, P. C., 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Vitetti, Leonardo, 1657–1659 [ Pgs. 1657–1659 include portions of Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , and Doc. 897 ] Voice of America, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 218 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 232 ] , 615–616 [ Pgs. 615–616 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] Wadsworth, George, 422–423 [ Pgs. 422–423 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 1230–1231 [ Pgs. 1230–1231 include portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 1233 [ Pg. 1233 is part of Doc. 685 ] , 1234 n [ Pg. 1234 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 1235 [ Pg. 1235 includes portions of Doc. 686 and Doc. 687 ] , 1238–1244 [ Pgs. 1238–1244 include portions of Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , and Doc. 691 ] , 1247 n [ Pg. 1247 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 1250 [ Pg. 1250 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694 ] , 1254–1255 [ Pgs. 1254–1255 include portions of Doc. 697 and Doc. 698 ] , 1257–1259 [ Pgs. 1257–1259 include portions of Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702 ] , 1266–1267 [ Pgs. 1266–1267 include portions of Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] , 1273 n [ Pg. 1273 includes portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 1275 n [ Pg. 1275 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 1276 n [ Pg. 1276 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 1280–1282 [ Pgs. 1280–1282 include portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] , 1285–1289 [ Pgs. 1285–1289 include portions of Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , and Doc. 719 ] , 1293–1300 [ Pgs. 1293–1300 include portions of Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 1303 n [ Pg. 1303 is part of Doc. 726 ] , 1304–1305 [ Pgs. 1304–1305 include portions of Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , and Doc. 729 ] , 1312–1313 [ Pgs. 1312–1313 include portions of Doc. 732 and Doc. 733 ] , 1315 n [ Pg. 1315 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 1328–1335 [ Pgs. 1328–1335 include portions of Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , and Doc. 746 ] , 1337–1338 [ Pgs. 1337–1338 include portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 1340–1341 [ Pgs. 1340–1341 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 1344–1345 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1347–1354 [ Pgs. 1347–1354 include portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] Wagner, Joseph J., 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 208 ] Wainhouse, David W., 436 [ Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] Waldo, John A., 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 516 ] , 1052–1053 [ Pgs. 1052–1053 include portions of Doc. 590 and Doc. 591 ] , 1068 n [ Pg. 1068 is part of Doc. 601 ] Walker, Michael, 1439 [ Pg. 1439 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] Wallace, V. A., 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] Walsh-Atkins, L. B., 1551–1553 [ Pgs. 1551–1553 include portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] Waltherscheid, Frederick, 1170 [ Pg. 1170 is part of Doc. 643 ] War, possibility of total, 190–191 [ Pg. 190 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 91 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 92 ] , 231–233 [ Pgs. 231–233 include portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 235–237 [ Pg. 235 is part of Doc. 95 ] , 240 [ Pg. 240 is part of Doc. 97 ] , 248–249 [ Pg. 248 is part of Doc. 99 ] , 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 is part of Doc. 120 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 383–384 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , and Doc. 212 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 475–476 [ Pgs. 475–476 include portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , and Doc. 263 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 is part of Doc. 292 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 293 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 962 [ Pg. 962 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 is part of Doc. 564 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 1101 [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1134 [ Pg. 1134 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1165 [ Pg. 1165 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1243 [ Pg. 1243 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1246 [ Pg. 1246 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1280 [ Pg. 1280 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1287 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1291–1292 [ Pgs. 1291–1292 include portions of Doc. 719 and Doc. 720 ] , 1303 [ Pg. 1303 is part of Doc. 726 ] , 1308–1309 [ Pg. 1308 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 737 ] , 1332 n [ Pg. 1332 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1473 [ Pg. 1473 is part of Doc. 831 ] , 1476 [ Pg. 1476 is part of Doc. 833 ] , 1492 [ Pg. 1492 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1548 [ Pg. 1548 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1572–1573 [ Pgs. 1572–1573 include portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1588–1589 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1591 [ Pg. 1591 is part of Doc. 863 ] , 1731 [ Pg. 1731 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] , 1772 [ Pg. 1772 is part of Doc. 955 ] , 1787 [ Pg. 1787 is part of Doc. 964 ] , 1826 [ Pg. 1826 includes portions of Doc. 976 and Doc. 977 ] , 1832–1833 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] , 1837 [ Pg. 1837 includes portions of Doc. 983 and Doc. 984 ] , 1842 [ Pg. 1842 includes portions of Doc. 986 and Doc. 987 ] Ward, Angus, 350 [ Pg. 350 is part of Doc. 139 ] Warren, Avra M., 1394–1399 [ Pgs. 1394–1399 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 1401 [ Pg. 1401 includes portions of Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] , 1403 [ Pg. 1403 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1405 [ Pg. 1405 includes portions of Doc. 788 and Doc. 789 ] , 1408–1409 [ Pgs. 1408–1409 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1415–1416 [ Pgs. 1415–1416 include portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1418–1425 [ Pgs. 1418–1425 include portions of Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , and Doc. 803 ] , 1427 n [ Pg. 1427 includes portions of Doc. 804 and Doc. 805 ] , 1429–1431 [ Pgs. 1429–1431 include portions of Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 1433 [ Pg. 1433 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1451 n [ Pg. 1451 is part of Doc. 817 ] , 1458 n [ Pg. 1458 is part of Doc. 823 ] , 1499–1502 [ Pgs. 1499–1502 include portions of Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , and Doc. 839 ] Wavell, Field Marshal Archibald P., 1336 [ Pg. 1336 is part of Doc. 746 ] Waynick, Capus M., 169 n [ Pg. 169 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 1731 n [ Pg. 1731 includes portions of Doc. 938 and Doc. 939 ] Webb, Christopher E., 1459 [ Pg. 1459 is part of Doc. 824 ] Webb, James E.: Africa, U.S. policies toward, 1509 n [ Pg. 1509 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1514 [ Pg. 1514 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1543–1544 [ Pgs. 1543–1544 include portions of Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , and Doc. 850 ] ; Egypt, British relations with, 288 [ Pg. 288 is part of Doc. 107 ] , 289 n [ Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108 ] ; Eritrea, U.S. interest in the disposition of, 1649 [ Pg. 1649 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1652–1653 [ Pgs. 1652–1653 include portions of Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , and Doc. 893 ] , 1681–1684 [ Pgs. 1681–1684 include portions of Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , and Doc. 905 ] ; Ethiopia, U.S. relations with, 1700–1701 [ Pgs. 1700–1701 include portions of Doc. 915 , Doc. 916 , and Doc. 917 ] ; Greece, U.S. relations with, 342–345 [ Pgs. 342–345 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 347–348 [ Pgs. 347–348 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] , 369–371 [ Pgs. 369–371 include portions of Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , and Doc. 155 ] , 375–377 [ Pgs. 375–377 include portions of Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 410–418 [ Pgs. 410–418 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] , 424–425 [ Pgs. 424–425 include portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] ; Iran, U.S. relations with, 482 [ Pg. 482 includes portions of Doc. 218 and Doc. 219 ] , 518–520 [ Pgs. 518–520 include portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 521 n [ Pg. 521 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 545–551 [ Pgs. 545–551 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , and Doc. 247 ] , 588–589 [ Pgs. 588–589 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 604–605 [ Pgs. 604–605 include portions of Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281 ] ; Israel, U.S. relations with, 1038 [ Pg. 1038 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] ; Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, 1410–1411 [ Pgs. 1410–1411 include portions of Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , and Doc. 794 ] , 1431–1432 [ Pgs. 1431–1432 include portions of Doc. 806 , Doc. 807 , and Doc. 808 ] ; Liberia, U.S. relations with, 1726–1730 [ Pgs. 1726–1730 include portions of Doc. 935 , Doc. 936 , Doc. 937 , and Doc. 938 ] , 1733 n [ Pg. 1733 includes portions of Doc. 940 and Doc. 941 ] ; Libya, U.S. policy toward, 1610–1612 [ Pgs. 1610–1612 include portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] , 1623–1624 [ Pgs. 1623–1624 include portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] ; Near East, arms shipments to, 138 n [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 158 [ Pg. 158 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 is part of Doc. 70 ] , 167–168 [ Pg. 167 is part of Doc. 73 ] , 176–178 [ Pgs. 176–178 include portions of Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , and Doc. 79 ] , 913–915 [ Pgs. 913–915 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] ; Near East and South Asia, U.S. economic assistance for, 173 n [ Pg. 173 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 280–281 [ Pgs. 280–281 include portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] ; Palestine question, 763–766 [ Pgs. 763–766 include portions of Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , and Doc. 375 ] , 807–808 [ Pgs. 807–808 include portions of Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , and Doc. 409 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 is part of Doc. 467 ] , 895 n [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480 ] , 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] , 954 n [ Pg. 954 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 1001–1006 [ Pgs. 1001–1006 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , and Doc. 554 ] , 1011–1014 [ Pgs. 1011–1014 include portions of Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , and Doc. 560 ] , 1018–1023 [ Pgs. 1018–1023 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 1076–1077 [ Pgs. 1076–1077 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] ; Saudi Arabia, U.S. relations with, 1175–1176 [ Pgs. 1175–1176 include portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 1186–1187 [ Pgs. 1186–1187 include portions of Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] , 1191 n [ Pg. 1191 includes portions of Doc. 658 and Doc. 659 ] , 1196 [ Pg. 1196 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] ; Turkey, U.S. relations with, 1236–1238 [ Pgs. 1236–1238 include portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689 ] , 1252–1253 [ Pgs. 1252–1253 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 1259–1260 [ Pgs. 1259–1260 include portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 1262–1263 [ Pgs. 1262–1263 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , and Doc. 705 ] , 1269 n [ Pg. 1269 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1272–1273 [ Pgs. 1272–1273 include portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] , 1284 n [ Pg. 1284 includes portions of Doc. 716 and Doc. 717 ] , 1313–1315 [ Pgs. 1313–1315 include portions of Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , and Doc. 734 ] , 1317–1320 [ Pgs. 1317–1320 include portions of Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , and Doc. 737 ] , 1343 [ Pg. 1343 includes portions of Doc. 750 and Doc. 751 ] ; Union of South Africa, U.S. relations with, 1817 n [ Pg. 1817 is part of Doc. 973 ] , 1832–1833 [ Pg. 1832 is part of Doc. 982 ] ; U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, U.S. policy regarding, 373–375 [ Pgs. 373–375 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C., 474 [ Pg. 474 is part of Doc. 214 ] Weil, T. Eliot, 1364–1365 [ Pgs. 1364–1365 include portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1392–1394 [ Pgs. 1392–1394 include portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 1435 [ Pg. 1435 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1437 n [ Pg. 1437 is part of Doc. 810 ] , 1446 n [ Pg. 1446 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 1449 n [ Pg. 1449 is part of Doc. 816 ] , 1457 [ Pg. 1457 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] Weizmann, Chaim, 658–661 [ Pgs. 658–661 include portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] Wellons, Alfred E., 1513–1514 [ Pgs. 1513–1514 include portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1644–1646 [ Pgs. 1644–1646 include portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] , 1672 [ Pg. 1672 is part of Doc. 901 ] , 1685–1687 [ Pgs. 1685–1687 include portions of Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] , 1703–1705 [ Pg. 1703 is part of Doc. 919 ] Wentworth, Col. Richard D., 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 1184 [ Pg. 1184 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] Wen Yuan-ning, 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] Western Europe: Defense and security of, 1242–1244 [ Pg. 1242 is part of Doc. 691 ] , 1307–1308 [ Pg. 1307 is part of Doc. 730 ] ; Soviet policy toward, 1321 [ Pg. 1321 is part of Doc. 737 ] ; U.S. military assistance for, 469 [ Pg. 469 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 1134 [ Pg. 1134 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1163 [ Pg. 1163 is part of Doc. 641 ] , 1322 [ Pg. 1322 includes portions of Doc. 737 and Doc. 738 ] , 1834 [ Pg. 1834 includes portions of Doc. 982 and Doc. 983 ] ; U.S. policy, 1311 [ Pg. 1311 is part of Doc. 731 ] , 1588 [ Pg. 1588 is part of Doc. 863 ] Western European Union, 1242 [ Pg. 1242 is part of Doc. 691 ] Weygand, Gen. Maxime, 1336 [ Pg. 1336 is part of Doc. 746 ] Wheatley, 48–49 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 18 ] White, Ogden, 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] Whitehouse, Frank H., 1582 [ Pg. 1582 is part of Doc. 860 ] Whittlesey, Derwent, 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] Wilcox, Francis, 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 517 and Doc. 518 ] Wiley, John C., 445–447 [ Pgs. 445–447 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , and Doc. 206 ] , 457–464 [ Pgs. 457–464 include portions of Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , and Doc. 209 ] , 470–475 [ Pgs. 470–475 include portions of Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , and Doc. 215 ] , 478–483 [ Pgs. 478–483 include portions of Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , and Doc. 220 ] , 485–487 [ Pgs. 485–487 include portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221 ] , 490–491 [ Pgs. 490–491 include portions of Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , and Doc. 224 ] , 497–498 [ Pg. 497 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 506–509 [ Pgs. 506–509 include portions of Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , and Doc. 232 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 is part of Doc. 234 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 547–549 [ Pgs. 547–549 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 556–559 [ Pgs. 556–559 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 290 ] Wilkins, Fraser, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 34–37 [ Pgs. 34–37 include portions of Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , and Doc. 16 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 17 ] , 52 n [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20 ] , 101–104 [ Pgs. 101–104 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 66 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 91 and Doc. 92 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 116 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 511 ] , 965 n [ Pg. 965 includes portions of Doc. 522 and Doc. 523 ] , 1128 n [ Pg. 1128 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 1167 [ Pg. 1167 is part of Doc. 642 ] Willard, Edwin A., 408 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] Williams, Alan Meredith, 69–70 [ Pgs. 69–70 include portions of Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , and Doc. 30 ] Williamson, Francis T., 1801–1802 [ Pgs. 1801–1802 include portions of Doc. 967 and Doc. 968 ] Willis, George H., 1844 [ Pg. 1844 is part of Doc. 988 ] Willoughby, Woodbury, 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] Wilson, Ross, 1706–1708 [ Pgs. 1706–1708 include portions of Doc. 920 and Doc. 921 ] , 1717–1718 [ Pgs. 1717–1718 include portions of Doc. 927 and Doc. 928 ] Winship, North, 1817 n [ Pg. 1817 is part of Doc. 973 ] Wolf, Franklin W., 1394–1395 [ Pgs. 1394–1395 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , and Doc. 779 ] Wolf, Joseph J., 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 55 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 500–501 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 is part of Doc. 226 ] , 541–545 [ Pgs. 541–545 include portions of Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , and Doc. 242 ] Woodbridge, George, 478 [ Pg. 478 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 includes portions of Doc. 234 and Doc. 235 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 600–601 [ Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 628–629 [ Pg. 628 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 1228 [ Pg. 1228 includes portions of Doc. 682 and Doc. 683 ] , 1267 [ Pg. 1267 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Woolbert, Robert G., 1503 n [ Pg. 1503 is part of Doc. 840 ] World Federation of Trade Unions, 1561 [ Pg. 1561 is part of Doc. 857 ] World Health Organization, 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 586 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 is part of Doc. 623 ] Wormser, Olivier, 1558 [ Pg. 1558 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] Wright, Michael R., 124 [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] , 141–146 [ Pgs. 141–146 include portions of Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , and Doc. 65 ] , 150–152 [ Pgs. 150–152 include portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , and Doc. 68 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 is part of Doc. 69 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 70 and Doc. 71 ] , 193–194 [ Pgs. 193–194 include portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 208–212 [ Pgs. 208–212 include portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 295–301 [ Pgs. 295–301 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 318–320 [ Pgs. 318–320 include portions of Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , and Doc. 120 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 546–547 [ Pgs. 546–547 include portions of Doc. 242 and Doc. 243 ] , 570–571 [ Pgs. 570–571 include portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 580 n [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 591–593 [ Pgs. 591–593 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 599–602 [ Pgs. 599–602 include portions of Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 includes portions of Doc. 282 and Doc. 283 ] , 640 [ Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 296 ] , 645–646 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311 ] , 750–751 [ Pgs. 750–751 include portions of Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 1316–1317 [ Pgs. 1316–1317 include portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 1551 [ Pg. 1551 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] , 1610 n [ Pg. 1610 includes portions of Doc. 870 and Doc. 871 ] , 1611 [ Pg. 1611 is part of Doc. 871 ] , 1631–1633 [ Pgs. 1631–1633 include portions of Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , and Doc. 882 ] , 1635–1637 [ Pgs. 1635–1637 include portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] , 1659–1661 [ Pgs. 1659–1661 include portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1678–1681 [ Pgs. 1678–1681 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] Yadin, Gen. Yigael, 944 [ Pg. 944 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 555 and Doc. 556 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] Yahya, Iman, 1356 [ Pg. 1356 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 1358 [ Pg. 1358 is part of Doc. 755 ] Yalcin, Hussein, 674–675 [ Pgs. 674–675 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 408 and Doc. 409 ] , 813–814 [ Pgs. 813–814 include portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 825 [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 421 and Doc. 422 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] Yamut, Gen. Nuri, 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 197 and Doc. 198 ] , 1270 [ Pg. 1270 is part of Doc. 709 ] , 1276–1277 [ Pg. 1276 is part of Doc. 712 ] , 1280 [ Pg. 1280 is part of Doc. 714 ] , 1282 [ Pg. 1282 is part of Doc. 715 ] , 1285 [ Pg. 1285 includes portions of Doc. 717 and Doc. 718 ] , 1287–1288 [ Pg. 1287 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 1293–1294 [ Pgs. 1293–1294 include portions of Doc. 720 and Doc. 721 ] , 1296–1297 [ Pgs. 1296–1297 include portions of Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , and Doc. 723 ] , 1312 [ Pg. 1312 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 1324 [ Pg. 1324 is part of Doc. 738 ] , 1329 [ Pg. 1329 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] , 1340 [ Pg. 1340 includes portions of Doc. 748 and Doc. 749 ] , 1344 [ Pg. 1344 is part of Doc. 752 ] , 1346–1353 [ Pgs. 1346–1353 include portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] Yassin, Shaikh Yusef, 25 n [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 is part of Doc. 12 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 is part of Doc. 27 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 115 [ Pg. 115 is part of Doc. 48 ] , 816–817 [ Pgs. 816–817 include portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 474 and Doc. 475 ] , 907–910 [ Pgs. 907–910 include portions of Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , and Doc. 477 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 554 and Doc. 555 ] , 1115 [ Pg. 1115 is part of Doc. 627 ] , 1120 n [ Pg. 1120 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 1128–1129 [ Pgs. 1128–1129 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 1131 [ Pg. 1131 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 1142 [ Pg. 1142 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 1146–1147 [ Pg. 1146 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1149 [ Pg. 1149 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1151 [ Pg. 1151 is part of Doc. 637 ] , 1176 n [ Pg. 1176 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 1178 [ Pg. 1178 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 1185 [ Pg. 1185 includes portions of Doc. 653 and Doc. 654 ] , 1187 [ Pg. 1187 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 1193 [ Pg. 1193 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 1197–1200 [ Pg. 1197 is part of Doc. 664 ] Yater, Sidney R., 124 n [ Pg. 124 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57 ] Yazdanpanah, Morteza, 494 [ Pg. 494 is part of Doc. 224 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Yemen: British relations with, 1355 [ Pg. 1355 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 1357 [ Pg. 1357 is part of Doc. 754 ] , 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 756 and Doc. 757 ] ; Communist movement, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 101 ] ; Palestine question, policy toward, 910 n [ Pg. 910 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 1005–1006 [ Pgs. 1005–1006 include portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 is part of Doc. 575 ] ; situation in, 1152 [ Pg. 1152 is part of Doc. 637 ] ; U.S. economic and technical assistance, 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 1360 [ Pg. 1360 includes portions of Doc. 756 and Doc. 757 ] ; U.S. recognition, 1355–1359 [ Pgs. 1355–1359 include portions of Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] ; U.S. policy, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 1220 [ Pg. 1220 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] Yingling, Raymund T., 1339–1342 [ Pgs. 1339–1342 include portions of Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , and Doc. 750 ] , 1766 n [ Pg. 1766 is part of Doc. 953 ] Yost, Charles W., 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95 ] , 238–239 [ Pgs. 238–239 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , and Doc. 97 ] Young, Norman, 594 [ Pg. 594 is part of Doc. 277 ] Young, Richard, 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Younger, Kenneth G., 570 [ Pg. 570 includes portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] Youssef, Hassan, 658 [ Pg. 658 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] Yugoslavia: Bulgaria, relations with, 1291 [ Pg. 1291 is part of Doc. 719 ] ; Cominform, rift with, 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 181 ] ; Greece, relations with, 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 100 ] , 344–345 [ Pgs. 344–345 include portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 349–350 [ Pg. 349 is part of Doc. 139 ] , 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , and Doc. 151 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 378 [ Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 391–392 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 408–409 [ Pg. 408 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 184 and Doc. 185 ] , 442 [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 1338 [ Pg. 1338 is part of Doc. 747 ] ; Greek children and guerrilla elements, 340 [ Pg. 340 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 349–351 [ Pgs. 349–351 include portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 is part of Doc. 155 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 is part of Doc. 180 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 is part of Doc. 181 ] ; Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, position regarding, 1387 [ Pg. 1387 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 1436 [ Pg. 1436 is part of Doc. 810 ] ; security of, 414 [ Pg. 414 is part of Doc. 181 ] , 1347–1349 [ Pg. 1347 is part of Doc. 752 ] ; Soviet policy, 191 n [ Pg. 191 is part of Doc. 85 ] , 339 [ Pg. 339 is part of Doc. 132 ] , 383–384 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] ; U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, non-cooperation with, 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 168 ] ; U.S. policy, 416 [ Pg. 416 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 1232 [ Pg. 1232 is part of Doc. 684 ] Zablocki, Clement J., 181 [ Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] Zachariades, Nicholas ( also Nikos), 383 [ Pg. 383 is part of Doc. 164 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 442–444 [ Pgs. 442–444 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , and Doc. 202 ] Zafrulla Khan, Mohammad, 1364–1365 [ Pgs. 1364–1365 include portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 1366 n [ Pg. 1366 is part of Doc. 760 ] , 1376 [ Pg. 1376 includes portions of Doc. 767 and Doc. 768 ] , 1393 [ Pg. 1393 is part of Doc. 777 ] , 1411–1412 [ Pgs. 1411–1412 include portions of Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , and Doc. 795 ] , 1419–1420 [ Pgs. 1419–1420 include portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] , 1422 [ Pg. 1422 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1429 [ Pg. 1429 includes portions of Doc. 805 and Doc. 806 ] , 1435–1439 [ Pgs. 1435–1439 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , and Doc. 811 ] , 1441 [ Pg. 1441 includes portions of Doc. 811 and Doc. 812 ] , 1457 [ Pg. 1457 includes portions of Doc. 822 and Doc. 823 ] , 1498 [ Pg. 1498 is part of Doc. 837 ] , 1673 [ Pg. 1673 is part of Doc. 901 ] Zaim, Col. Husni, 285 [ Pg. 285 is part of Doc. 106 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 1203 [ Pg. 1203 is part of Doc. 667 ] , 1215 [ Pg. 1215 includes portions of Doc. 674 and Doc. 675 ] Zeid, Abu, 16 [ Pg. 16 is part of Doc. 7 ] Zeineddine, Farid, 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] Zervas, Gen. Napoleon, 341 [ Pg. 341 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] Zia ed-Din, Tabatabai Seyid, 462 [ Pg. 462 is part of Doc. 209 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 250 ] Zionism, 1205 [ Pg. 1205 is part of Doc. 669 ] Zionist movement, 223 [ Pg. 223 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 is part of Doc. 443 ] , 896–898 [ Pg. 896 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 1012 n [ Pg. 1012 is part of Doc. 558 ] Zionist Organization of America, 947 n [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509 ] Zionist policies, 928–929 [ Pgs. 928–929 include portions of Doc. 492 and Doc. 493 ] Zionist pressures, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 is part of Doc. 101 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 995 n [ Pg. 995 includes portions of Doc. 545 and Doc. 546 ] , 1104–1105 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1207 [ Pg. 1207 is part of Doc. 670 ] Zionists, 779 [ Pg. 779 is part of Doc. 386 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 961–962 [ Pgs. 961–962 include portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 1101 [ Pg. 1101 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 1205 [ Pg. 1205 is part of Doc. 669 ] Zoppi, Vittorio, 1613 [ Pg. 1613 is part of Doc. 872 ] , 1620 [ Pg. 1620 is part of Doc. 874 ] , 1650 [ Pg. 1650 is part of Doc. 891 ] Zorlu, Fatin Rüstü, 1268 [ Pg. 1268 is part of Doc. 708 ] , 1273–1274 [ Pgs. 1273–1274 include portions of Doc. 710 and Doc. 711 ] Errata Errata The following error has been identified in Foreign Relations , 1950, Volume V, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa. Please be aware that printed volumes have not been revised. 1. List of Abbreviations and Symbols (date of errata entry: January 7, 2016) The abbreviation GNA is incorrectly defined as "Greek National Army." The correct definition in the context of this volume is "Grand National Assembly (Turkey)."