FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1947, THE FAR EAST, VOLUME VI Foreign Relations of the United States Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State Title page Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947 Volume VI The Far East United States Government Printing Office Washington U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian Bureau of Public Affairs Please visit the Office of the Historian ebooks web page to access updates. The Far East (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume VI) Contents Preface List of Abbreviations and Symbols Burma Establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Burma (Documents 1-57) China French Indochina The interest of the United States in nationalist opposition to the restoration of French rule in Indochina (Documents 58-166) Japan Occupation and control of Japan (Documents 167-287) War claims: reparations, restitution, levels of industry and of production (Documents 288-365) The efforts of the United States in behalf of a peace treaty with Japan (Documents 366-461) Korea General political policies of the United States toward Korea and appeal to the United Nations General Assembly (Documents 462-689) Netherlands East Indies The interest of the United States in nationalist opposition to the restoration of Netherlands rule in the East Indies and consideration by the United Nations Security Council of the Indonesian case (Documents 690-889) Philippines Cooperation of the United States with the Republic of the Philippines (Documents 890-909) Siam Exchange of Ambassadors between the United States and Siam Index List of Abbreviations and Symbols List of Abbreviations and Symbols ( Editors Note —This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context. ACC, Allied Council for Japan AFPFL, Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (Burma) A–H, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) AMFOGE, Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections AMG, American Military Government (Korea) AP, Associated Press CA, Division of Chinese Affairs, Department of State CAD, Civil Affairs Division, War Department CA/MG, Civil Affairs/Military Government, War Department CC, Military message indicator CE, Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State CFM, Council of Foreign Ministers CG, Commanding General CIC, Counter Intelligence Corps CID, (Army) Counter Intelligence Division, or Criminal Investigation Department (Burma) CINCAFPAC, Commander-in-chief, Army Forces in Pacific CINCFE, Commander-in-chief, Far East (U.S. Army Forces) ComGen, Commission General (N.E.I.) CP, Communist Party, or Division of Commercial Policy, Department of State CSGPO, Chief of Staff, G–3, Plans and Operations Division daerah, autonomous area (NEI) Delsec, indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers at meetings during 1947 Deptel, Department’s telegram DRF, Division of Research for Far East, Department of State DS, Division of Protective Services, Department of State ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council (UN) EE, Division of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State ERP, European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) ETA, Estimated time of arrival EUR, Office of European Affairs, Department of State ExtAff, Ministry of External Affairs (Australia) EXIM, Export-Import Bank of Washington FE, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State FEB, Far Eastern Bureau (Office) of Netherlands Foreign Office, Batavia FEC, Far Eastern Commission FEO, Far Eastern Office of Netherlands Foreign Office (Batavia) FIC, French Indochina FonOff, Foreign Office FSO, Foreign Service officer FY, Fiscal year G–2, Military intelligence (U.S. Army) GA, Division of German and Austrian Economic Affairs, Department of State, or (UN) General Assembly Gadel, indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nation’s General Assembly GARIOA, Government and Relief in Occupied Areas GHQ, General Headquarters GOB, Government of Burma GOC, General Officer Commanding, or Good Offices Committee (NEI) GOI, Government of India HM, His Majesty HMG, His (Britannic) Majesty’s Government IATB, Inter-Allied Trade Board ICJ, International Court of Justice (The Hague) IEFC, International Emergency Food Council IGP, Inspector General of Police (Burma) ILH, Division of International Labor, Social and Health Affairs, Department of State Indo, Indonesian Info, Information Intercross, International Red Cross IR, International Resources Division, Department of State IRCA, independence for Indonesian peoples IS, Division of International Security Affairs, Department of State ITO, International Trade Organization JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JFC, Joint (Philippine-American) Financial Commission JK, Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, Department of State KILA, (see SKILA) KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines KMT, Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) of China KNIP, Central National Indonesian Committee Kosmos, indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation for non-Council of Foreign Ministers business at Fourth Session meetings in Moscow ky, Administrative district in French Indochina (e.g., Cochin-China) Le (or L), Legal Adviser’s Office, Department of State Le/M (or L/M), Assistant Legal Adviser for military affairs and occupied areas, Department of State Martel, indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Marshall (abroad) Masjoemi, Moslem League (NEI) Moskco, indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation for non-Council of Foreign Ministers business at Fourth Session meetings in Moscow NA, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems NEA, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State Negara, state (NEI) NEI, Netherlands East Indies Niact, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night NMU, National Maritime Union NOE, Division of Northern European Affairs, Department of State OAC, Advisory Committee on Occupied Areas Affairs, Department of State OCI, Overseas Consultants, Inc. OE, Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs, Department of State OFLC, Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State OIC, Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, Department of State OIR, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State OSS, Office of Strategic Services P&O, Plans and Operations, War Department PHILRYCOM, Philippines-Ryukyus Command PI, Division of Philippine Affairs, Department of State PNB, Philippine National Bank PNI, Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian nationalist party) PolAd, Political Adviser POW, Prisoner of War PRO, Public Relations Office RDC, Representative Democratic Council (unofficial group in south Korea) reDeptel, regarding Department’s telegram reourtel, regarding our telegram reurad, regarding your radiogram RFC, Reconstruction Finance Corporation RTAC, Reparations Technical Advisory Committee (SCAP) SANACC, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (successor of SWNCC) SC, (UN) Security Council SCAP, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan Scapin, SCAP instruction SCINR, Special Committee for Implementation of November 1 Resolution (UN Security Council) SEA, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, or Southeast Asia Secdel, indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation to Council of Foreign Ministers at meetings during 1947 SFE, Subcommittee on the Far East of SWNCC SKIG, South Korean Interim Government SKILA (or Skila), South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly SPA, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State S/S–PR, Protocol Staff, Department of State SWNCC, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee SYGUN, Secretary-General of United Nations telecon, teletype conversation TelMar, indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Marshall (abroad) TFGCG, military message indicator UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration urad, your radiogram urtel, your telegram USAFIK, U.S. Army Forces in Korea USAMGIK, U.S. Army Military Government in Korea USCC, U.S. Commercial Company USI, United States of Indonesia USIS, United States Information Service USPolAd, United States Political Adviser USRepDel, United States Reparations Delegate V-J Day, the day of Japanese capitulation (September 2, 1945) VN, Vietnam VNQDD, Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang (Vietnam Kumintang) VOUSA, Voice of America WD, War Department WE, Division of Western European Affairs, Department of State WFTU, World Federation of Trade Unions ZGBI, military message indicator ZGCG, military message indicator ZPOL, military message indicator Burma Burma Contents Establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Burma (Documents 1-57) Establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Burma Establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Burma 1 1 For previous documentation on the interest of the United States in independence for Burma, see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , pp. 1 ff. [1] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, January 14, 1947—1 p.m. 845C.00/1–1447: Telegram [2] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, January 15, 1947—6 p.m. 845C.00/1–1547: Telegram [3] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, January 22, 1947—6 p.m. 845C.00/1–2247: Telegram [4] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington, 22nd January, 1947. 701.45C11/1–2247 [5] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington, January 23, 1947. 701.45C11/1–2247 [6] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 23, 1947—6 p.m. 701.45C11/1–2347: Telegram [7] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, January 23, 1947—4 p.m. 845C.00/1–2347: Telegram [8] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, January 27, 1947—9 p.m. 845C.00/1–2747: Telegram [9] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, January 28, 1947—7 p.m. 845C.00/1–2847: Telegram [10] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, January 29, 1947—1 p.m. 845C.00/1–2747: Telegram [11] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, January 29, 1947—6 p.m. S45C.00/1–2947: Telegram [12] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, February 2, 1947—noon. 845C.00/2–247: Telegram [13] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, February 5, 1947—6 p.m. 811.42745C SE/2–547: Telegram [14] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, February 7, 1947—10 p.m. 845C.00/2–747: Telegram [15] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, February 10, 1947—11 a.m. 845C.00/2–1047: Telegram [16] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] February 10, 1947. 845C.00/2–247 [17] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, February 11, 1947—10 a.m. 845C.00/2–247: Telegram [18] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, February 12, 1947—6 p.m. 845C.00/2–1247: Telegram [19] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, February 14, 1947. 845C.00/2–1347: Telegram [20] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, February 27, 1947. 845C.00/2–2747: Telegram [21] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in China Washington, March 5, 1947—7 p.m. 701.45C11/3–547: Telegram [22] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, March 25, 1947—11 a.m. 845C.00/3–2547: Telegram [23] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, March 27, 1947. 845C.00/3–1947 [24] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, April 10, 1947—1 p.m. 701.4145C/4–1047: Telegram [25] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, April 19, 1947. 845C.9111 RR/4–1947: Telegram [26] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, April 22, 1947—5 a.m. 701.45C00/4–2247: Telegram [27] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman Washington, May 28, 1947. 701.45C11/5–3147 [28] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) [Rangoon,] May 28, 1947. 845C.011/5–2947 [29] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) [Rangoon,] May 28, 1947. 845C.00/5–3147 [30] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, June 2, 1947—4 p.m. 711.45C21/5–2747: Telegram [31] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, June 5, 1947—7 p.m. 845C.00/5–2847: Telegram [32] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel) Washington, June 6, 1947. 701.45C11/6–247 [33] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, June 6, 1947—7 p.m. 701.45C11/6–647: Telegram [34] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, June 10, 1947—10 a.m. 845C.00B/6–1047: Telegram [35] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, June 14, 1947—3 p.m. 711.45C21/6–1447: Telegram [36] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, June 17, 1947—9 a.m. 845C.00/6–1747: Telegram [37] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, June 18, 1947—4 p.m. 845C.00/6–1847: Telegram [38] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, June 28, 1947. 845C.00/6–2847: Telegram [39] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, July 7, 1947—5 p.m. 711.45C21/7–347: Telegram [40] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, July 10, 1947—7 p.m. 845C.00/7–1047: Telegram [41] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, July 19, 1947—5 p.m. 845C.00/7–1947: Telegram [42] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, July 22, 1947—7 p.m. 845C.00/7–2247: Telegram [43] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, July 25, 1947—6 p.m. 711.45C21/7–347: Telegram [44] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, August 2, 1947—noon. 845C.00/8–247: Telegram [45] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, August 4, 1947—3 p.m. 845C.00/8–447: Telegram [46] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, August 6, 1947—6 p.m. 845C.00/8–547: Telegram [47] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, August 21, 1947—7 p.m. 125.7557/8–947: Telegram [48] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, September 16, 1947—10 a.m. 711.45C21/9–1647: Telegram [49] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, September 19, 1947—9 a.m. 711.45C/9–1947: Telegram [50] The Chargé in Burma (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, September 19, 1947—11 a.m. [p.m.] 845C.00/9–1947: Telegram [51] The Chargé in Burma (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, September 26, 1947. 845C.01/9–2647: Telegram [52] The Chargé in Burma (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, October 24, 1947—5 p.m. 845C.00/10–2447: Telegram [53] Memorandum by Mr. Edward Dahl, of the Division of South Asian Affairs, to the Chief of the Division (Hare) [Washington,] November 10, 1947. 845C.01/11–1047 [54] The Chargé in Burma (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, November 13, 1947—3 p.m. 845C.00/11–1347: Telegram [55] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma Washington, December 19, 1947—6 p.m. 811.42745C/12–1347: Telegram [56] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma Washington, December 29, 1947—1 p.m. 845C.00/12–2947: Telegram [57] Editorial Note The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/1–1447: Telegram [Document 1] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State secret London , January 14, 1947—1 p.m. 246. 1. Both Laithwaite 2 and Smith 3 expressed fervent hopes last night at impressive British Govt reception for Burmese leaders that talks with Burmese leaders will be successful. Smith said that at second meeting yesterday British suggested division of work among committees. (Emb’s 228, January 13. 4 ) Burmese replied that they preferred to operate as single group, implication being, according to Smith, that members Burmese delegation desire to watch each other. 2. Aung San 5 and Tin Tut 6 spoke cordially of Packer 7 and of interest in Burmese problems. They promised to get in touch with Embassy when talks are further advanced. 3. Dalton, Chancellor of Exchequer, was overheard to say to Aung San that he should come along to British Treasury for talks “after everything else has been decided”. 4. Temperate character Aung San’s response to Attlee’s 8 speech of welcome pleased both Laithwaite and Smith. Gallman 2 Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Burma. 3 F. W. H. Smith, British Acting Assistant Under Secretary of State for Burma. 4 Not printed; it reported that the first meeting was “purely formal.” (845C.00/1–1347) 5 Head of the Burma Mission to London and Deputy Chairman of the Burmese Executive Council; also Counselor for Defense and External Affairs and President of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) of Burma. 6 Counselor for Finance of the Burmese Executive Council and member of the Burma Mission to London. 7 Earl L. Packer, Consul General at Rangoon. 8 Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/1–1547: Telegram [Document 2] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State secret London , January 15, 1947—6 p.m. 295. Following his policy of personally keeping Embassy informed re Burma talk developments, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite had following to say this morning: 1. Aung San’s opening speech January 13 was restrained and helpful. Speech of Thakin Ba Sein 9 was more political and “tub thumping”. Other members of delegation have disassociated themselves from Ba Sein’s remarks. 2. Little has happened so far. Delegation was supposed to have presented yesterday to British its agreed demands but at meeting Aung San reported that his colleagues could not reach agreement among themselves re demands. Laithwaite understood that delegates reached agreement only at 2 a.m. this morning. Burma delegation will file its demands at today’s meeting when discussions point by point will begin. 3. Laithwaite said that while text Burmese demands could not be made available to Embassy at this time they differed little from various public statements made by Burmese leaders. Delegation appears to feel strongly that elections for legislature should not be held but that indigenous inhabitants Burma should instead elect Constituent Assembly. Laithwaite said that it seemed more reasonable to Burma Office, and would be far easier from parliamentary point of view, if legislature is elected first and then that part of it representing indigenous inhabitants is transformed into Constituent Assembly. However, Burmans seem to set great store by this point which probably will be discussed at length. In view of charges from some quarters that AFPFL has certain totalitarian tendencies, he did not feel that abandonment of legislature elections was a particularly sound AFPFL move. 4. Re tribal areas, Burmans have demanded free access with view to persuading inhabitants to become willingly part of Burma proper. Apparently a kind of whirlwind political campaign in tribal areas by leading Burmese parties is contemplated. To some degree Aung San’s reassuring statements paragraph 2 Embassy’s 252, January 14, 10 re full freedom for all races and religions were window dressing. British had no objection to free access but “it will be hard to prove either way whether people tribal areas are willing to join Burma proper”. Before giving up their special responsibilities in these areas British will have to be convinced that inhabitants have exercised their free choice. 5. Laithwaite characterized situation described Rangoon’s 29, January 11 10a as part of AFPFL’s policy of keeping up a good head of steam in Burma for emergency use. Aung San is not convinced that talks will be successful and is anxious to be able to move as outcome London conversations may require. 6. Laithwaite said that he was increasingly impressed by Aung San’s ability and strength of character. 7. Laithwaite promised Embassy another report Friday. 11 Gallman 9 Member of Burma Mission to London and of the Burmese Executive Council (Transport and Communications), leader of the Dobama Asiayone Party. 10 Not printed. 10a Not printed. 11 This telegram was repeated by the Department as No. 25, January 16, 7 p.m., to Rangoon and as No. 32 to New Delhi. The Department in its 285, January 17, 6 p.m., to London, welcomed the British attitude as “eminently reasonable”. (845C.00/1–1547) Further British reports were made on January 18 and 21 (not printed), and progress was reported. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/1–2247: Telegram [Document 3] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State confidential London , January 22, 1947—6 p.m. 465. U Saw 12 presented Packer’s letters of introduction at Embassy London January 21 and talked very freely. 2. U Saw feels strongly that Governor of Burma 13 erred in giving leadership to Aung San instead of to himself whose party is really majority party eclipsed by terrorist tactics of AFPFL Fascists who are “really Communists at heart”. This view plus his long internment by British Government (he believes his movements are closely watched in London) appear to color all his thinking. 3. U Saw is not convinced that anything will come of the London talks but he admits that while he suspects British good faith no evidence has come to his attention in course of talks which would justify these suspicions. 4. U Saw thinks that proof of British good faith will be the manner in which they handle tribal areas. He is convinced that tribal areas are willing to come in with Burma proper on satisfactory guarantees which his own party is perfectly willing to give. 5. U Saw described Communist strength in Burma as “small” and said that Communists were divided between those in touch with Moscow via China and those working with Indian Communists. 14 6. U Saw expressed deepest distrust of Aung San, who he said is wearing to meetings “the uniform of a Japanese officer from which the Order of the Rising Sun has been removed so recently that the marks of it can still be seen”. 7. Questioned re strength of Pan-Asianism in Burma, U Saw said that he did not think that it had much hold largely because the Burmese people hate Japanese so thoroughly and consider it to be a made-in-Japan idea. U Saw thought that China with help of U.S. would eventually assume leadership of Asia. 8. U Saw said that as Minister of Education he was anxious to appoint an education officer in U.S. to look after Burmese Government students, the number of which he hopes to increase. 9. U Saw is consulting London eye specialist re removal of two remaining particles of glass from right eye and will remain here for treatment after Burma delegation departs. He is also considering visit to American eye specialist. Gallman 12 Member of Burma Mission to London and of Burmese Executive Council (Education); leader of Myochit Party and former Premier. 13 Maj. Gen. Sir Hubert E. Rance. 14 On January 24 the Communist Party Burma and the Red Flag Cultivators Union were declared illegal and several leaders were arrested. The British Embassy to the Department of State 701.45C11/1–2247 [Document 4] The British Embassy to the Department of State confidential G48/2/47 Aide-Mémoire As the United States Government are aware, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are engaged in discussions in London with a representative delegation of Burmese political leaders on the constitutional future of Burma. In the course of their discussions, it has transpired that the Burmese delegation attach great importance to Burma’s being represented diplomatically in Washington, Nanking and Bangkok. The delegation claim to have received an intimation that the United States Government would be disposed to consider favourably an exchange of diplomatic representatives between Burma and the United States. 2. His Majesty’s Government would accordingly be grateful to learn whether, in anticipation of the probable early realisation of full self-government by Burma, when she will enjoy a position similar to that now enjoyed by India, the Government of the United States would be prepared to accept, in principle, the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Burma. They consider that the representatives might appropriately have ministerial rank, but wish to suggest that the determination of the precise status to be accorded to them be left until a later date. His Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador is instructed to give an assurance that the Government of Burma would be prepared to accept the appointment of a diplomatic representative of the United States on a reciprocal basis. 3. The discussions which are being held with the Burmese Delegation in London are likely to be concluded by the 28th January. When a statement on the outcome of the conversations is prepared, the Burmese Delegation will almost certainly wish to include a reference to the question of the exchange of diplomatic representatives with certain countries. His Majesty’s Government would therefore be grateful if a very early answer could be returned to this enquiry and if in the meantime it could be treated as strictly confidential. Washington , 22nd January, 1947. The Department of State to the British Embassy 701.45C11/1–2247 [Document 5] The Department of State to the British Embassy confidential Aide-Mémoire With reference to the second paragraph of the British Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire (G48/2/47) of January 22, 1947, the United States Government accepts in principle the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Burma. It might be preferable, pending the holding of elections and the clarification of the Burmese political and constitutional situation, that in the initial stage the representation be of a character indicated by the titles diplomatic agent or agent general, it being understood that the officers concerned would hold the personal rank of minister. The United States Government has no objection to the announcement on January 28 or at the conclusion of the discussions with the Burma delegation in London that the exchange of diplomatic representatives between Burma and the United States was taking place at once. The public announcement would not state the exact character of representation, which would be determined by subsequent developments and negotiations. Washington , January 23, 1947. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 701.45C11/1–2347: Telegram [Document 6] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom confidential Washington , January 23, 1947—6 p.m. 391. [Here follows report of an exchange of views between the United States and British Governments regarding Burmese diplomatic representation.] Dept desires leave question exact titles open until last moment. If Burma situation and wishes Burmese indicate unusually great importance attached immediate exchange fully accredited ministers, situation may be reconsidered. In accordance Depairgram to Rangoon A–100 Dec. 30, 15 Dept informed Brit Emb informally that prior exchange diplomatic representatives GOB must define Rangoon consular district as including all Burma, This connection Dept proposes that U.S. diplomatic agent Rangoon also have title Consul General. Andrus 16 left for London Jan 24 with background latest Dept thinking this question. Sent London, rptd Nanking 89 Bangkok 44 Delhi 48. Marshall 15 Not printed. 16 J. Russell Andrus, of the Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/1–2347: Telegram [Document 7] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State secret London , January 23, 1947—4 p.m. 483. U Ba Pe 17 of Burma delegation presented Packer’s letter of introduction to Embassy today and in general conversation made following points: 1. While he had only attended two meetings so far Ba Pe said that he had been favorably impressed by sincerity with which Prime Minister was conducting talks. 2. Ba Pe feels that purpose London talks is to decide how, rather than whether, 1935 axe [ Act 18 ] will be buried. 3. Ba Pe volunteered that “British have their own difficulties” re Parliament and British public opinion and said that Burma delegation would agree to convention mentioned by Laithwaite (Embassy’s 382, January 18, paragraph 4 19 ) “there being no alternative”. 4. There were “very few” Communists in Burma “but they have loud mouths” which gives them false appearance of importance. He said Communists were split into two groups, one of which works closely with Indian Communists. 5. The “frontier areas” are a British creation. He thought the “really backward people” of these areas probably did not exceed 100,000. Although there were difficulties he thought that the greater part of tribal area wanted independence and wanted it within the structure of Burma proper. 6. He said that conversations regarding financial questions began yesterday. He hoped they would prove fruitful and that at early date US-Burman trade relations could progress. 7. Ba Pe said that as soon as dollars were available Burma wanted to increase number of Burma Government students attending US colleges and in this connection Burma desired to send official to US to look after their welfare. Asked whether this official would be attached to the British Embassy in Washington temporarily, Ba Pe replied that “this is just what we want to avoid”. 8. Ba Pe approved secrecy with which talks have been conducted so far. He thought that within few days enough progress will have been made to issue a joint communiqué. Gallman 17 Member of the Burmese Executive Council (Commerce and Supply) and of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League. He had arrived late for the London meetings. 18 The Government of Burma Act, 1935. 19 Telegram not printed; paragraph 4 concerned a suggested temporary convention under which the Governor would withhold the use of his powers (845C.00/1–1847). The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/1–2747: Telegram [Document 8] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent London , January 27, 1947—9 p.m. 570. Embassy’s 533, January 25. 20 Following is Laithwaite’s fifth report re Burma talks: 1. Laithwaite, tired but triumphant, said that he was “well pleased” with talk results which will be published tomorrow following Prime Minister’s full statement to Parliament. He said agreement is as outlined previously to Embassy and is being telegraphed in full to British Embassy, Washington tonight for early delivery to Dept. 2. At 11:15 p.m. last night when delegations had apparently reached agreement all points, U Saw and Ba Sein, who had previously given no evidence of their disagreement, announced that time had come when they must disassociate themselves from the agreement. They said they had kept silent up to now in deference to majority opinion and that if withdrawing at this point caused inconvenience they were sorry but they had misunderstood procedure of talks. Prime Minister and Aung San pressed both U Saw and Ba Sein for reasons for disassociation. Neither produced any alternatives but said that agreement “did not go far enough”. Further questioning elicited from U Saw fact that he would like to see elections held for legislature even though British Govt (Embassy’s 533, January 25, paragraph 3 21 ) and other members Burma delegation had reached agreement far beyond this point. Aung San raised question of immediate resignations of U Saw and Ba Sein but British said this should be dealt with after delegation’s return to Burma. 3. Commenting upon this last minute action, Laithwaite said that it was too bad that unanimity of Burma delegation had been broken at very end by their two politicians who desire to make political capital of their disassociation after their return to Burma. Their action probably will be seized upon in Commons tomorrow by Churchill 22 opposition as a stick with which to beat Govt. Actually disaffection these two could not mar the solid work accomplished. As outside estimate he considered that Ba Sein and U Saw together do not represent more than 10% of politically conscious Burmese, remaining 90% being AFPFL or Communist sympathizers. 4. One section of agreement reads: “There shall be appointed forthwith a high commissioner for Burma to represent Burma Govt in London. HMG will request govts of countries with which Burma wishes to exchange diplomatic representatives to agree to such an exchange.” Laithwaite said that Burma delegation had accepted this, which might be somewhat less than impression conveyed to Dept by British Aide-Mémoire . 23 (Dept’s 390, Jan 23. 24 ) Actually Aung San has been informed of US acceptance in principle of exchange of diplomatic representatives and of US thought that agent-general or diplomatic agent might be suitable title at outset. China has also accepted in principle without comment. Siam has accepted in principle but without enthusiasm. As Laithwaite understands situation, Burmans have no fixed ideas regarding when, how or with what title their diplomatic representatives other than to UK will go abroad. Details re above will be worked out in Burma during coming weeks. Laithwaite said that Dening, Assistant Under-Secretary State, FonOff, wished to talk to Embassy about US intentions so that “We will not go astray on timing”. 5. Dening, seen immediately afterwards, expressed thanks for Dept’s acceptance in principle of exchange of diplomatic representatives with Burma. He referred to telegrams reporting conversations between British Embassy, Washington and officers of Dept in which Dept indicated its willingness to appoint its Consul General Rangoon diplomatic agent immediately upon announcement of a favorable outcome of London talks. He mentioned also a conversation in which it had been indicated in Washington that possibility existed of US ambassador being appointed to Siam in which case US might follow similar line of [ in ?] Burma. Dening said that while US course of action is entirely up to US, FonOff thought in circumstances announcement by US tomorrow of appointment diplomatic representative might be “a bit hasty”. FonOff considered in light of portion of agreement quoted above that every purpose would be served by US statement that exchange of diplomatic representatives with Burma had been agreed upon in principle. He thought it preferable to leave questions of time, title, et cetera, to be worked out later with Burmese Govt which, presumably, having now made informal approaches via British Govt would soon present through British Govt formal requests to US, China and Siam for exchange of representatives indicating rank they had in mind. He thought that after delegation returns Burmans might also discuss question with Packer. Dening said that he was telegraphing tonight to British Embassy, Washington to approach Dept in this sense. (Note: Thanks presence Andrus, Embassy has been in fortunate position to correct faulty impression given Dening by British Embassy, Washington that Dept is pressing for earliest possible exchange of diplomatic representatives and contemplated unilateral action this regard.) 6. Both Laithwaite and Dening felt that any publicity or comment favorable to new agreement would be helpful, particularly in light of disaffection U Saw and Ba Sein, and possibility Parliamentary debate. If, after seeing text of agreement Dept issues any statement, Embassy would appreciate receiving it telegraphically. 7. Rangoon may be interested paragraphs 4 and 5 above. 8. Sent Dept only. Gallman 20 Not printed: it reported conversations with Laithwaite and MacDougall. The former had been informed of the Department’s attitude as given in telegram 391, January 23, to London, p. 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , and had assured the Embassy that he understood and agreed (845C.00/1–2547). 21 This paragraph provided for elections to a constituent assembly only. 22 Winston S. Churchill was leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Commons. 23 Dated January 22. p. 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] . 24 See telegram 391, January 23, p. 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/1–2847: Telegram [Document 9] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State restricted us urgent London , January 28, 1947—7 p.m. 606. Prime Minister read to packed and attentive Commons today a statement summarizing provisions of the agreement reached between British and Burma delegations (Lord Pethick-Lawrence 25 at same time read same statement before Lords). Text of this agreement was issued simultaneously. 26 (2) Prime Minister mentioned that two of Burmese delegation had seen fit to disassociate themselves from agreement at last minute but that they had no constructive alternatives to offer and their refusal to sign did not impair solid accomplishments contained in agreement. Mr. Churchill immediately rose and asked Prime Minister whether his statement meant simply “go” or whether it meant both “go and pay”. Attlee who appeared to have great measure of support on both sides of House refused to be drawn by Churchill into an exchange of type which latter led on December 20. Attlee said that at this stage there was no question of either going or paying because people of Burma would make their free choice as to whether to remain in British Commonwealth and because financial matters were covered by loans which were fully justified by ravages of war suffered by Burma, both at the hands of enemy and by orders of British commanders in prosecution of war. (3) Prime Minister’s statement indicated that Parliamentary Under Secretary for Dominions, Mr. A. G. Bottomley, would depart in near future for Burma to study wishes for future of Burmese people in general and tribal areas in particular. He would be available for consultation with Burmese nationals but he would not carry with him comprehensive instructions or powers. 27 (4) General impression received by Embassy observers present was that Prime Minister’s deft handling of opposition obviated difficulties inherent in disaffection of two Burmese delegates and forestalled any phrase making by Churchill. Sent Dept 606, repeated New Delhi 10; Department please pass to Rangoon as our No. 6. Gallman 25 British Secretary of State for India and Burma. 26 British Cmd. 7029: Conclusions reached in the Conversations between His Majesty’s Government and the Delegation from the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, Presented by the Prime Minister to Parliament by Command of His Majesty January 1947 . 27 In an analysis of the agreement, Mr. Andrus in telegram 612, January 28, 7 p.m., from London, stated that “Burma’s interim status fully equal to India’s. External affairs and defense no longer given special reserved treatment.” (845C.00/1–2847) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 845C.00/1–2747: Telegram [Document 10] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom secret us urgent Washington , January 29, 1947—1 p.m. 461. Following press release issued Jan 28 re Burma settlement. “The Department of State welcomes the announcement that the conversations between the British Government and Burmese political leaders in London have ended with a mutually satisfactory settlement placing Burma well on the road to full self-government. We look forward to increasingly cordial relations with this emerging Asiatic country.” Re exchange diplomatic reps Dept will await formal approach from Brit Govt and GOB before taking any action this matter. Urtel 570 Jan 27. We are inclined believe in view certain differences authority proposed Burma Interim Govt and that present Indian Interim Govt in fields finance, defense and foreign affairs it would be more appropriate initiate representation on diplomatic agent level pending further developments. Your discretion this tentative view may be conveyed to Brit Govt and GOB when formal approach made in order their reactions may be cabled when you request Dept’s instructions. Rangoon requested cable its appraisal significance abstention U Saw and Ba Sein from London settlement. Sent London 461, rptd Rangoon 48, 28 Nanking 110, Bangkok 59. Marshall 28 In telegram 48 to Rangoon, paragraphs 2–5 of telegram 570, January 27, from London (p. 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] ), were repeated. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State S45C.00/1–2947: Telegram [Document 11] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State confidential London , January 29, 1947—6 p.m. 639. Embtels 606 and 612 of January 28. 29 At first opportunity after conclusion Burma talks Tin Tut and Thakin Mya 30 called at Embassy. Both seemed highly pleased regarding success of talks. Tin Tut said delegation would not have signed agreement unless, as was the case, it was confident of obtaining widespread support for it in Burma. Following points arose in conversation: 1. April elections for Constituent Assembly will proceed as scheduled. Assembly is expected to convene May and may require “from 6 months to a year” for constitution framing. 2. Bottomley participated London talks and left for Panglong yesterday to sound out tribal leaders and to be chairman Committee of Enquiry. This Committee is scheduled to report by May. Tin Tut stressed fact that he and his colleagues intended leave minorities no legitimate grounds for dissatisfaction. 3. Aung San held press conference this morning, at which reporters were eager to know whether Burma would remain in Empire. Aung San replied cautiously that this would be settled later. Tin Tut expressed to Embassy his belief there was considerable prospect Burma choosing dominion status. 4. Tin Tut said that projects boards would be either wound-up completely or taken over by Government of Burma as promptly as possible. Tin Tut confirmed that 87,000,000 pounds loan never realized in full, and said that now much lower total will be fixed without string. He said no decision yet as to how many projects boards functions would be retained by GOB after British companies retire from projects’ management. 5. U Saw and Ba Sein were said to have taken little active part in discussion and to have indicated disagreement only late Sunday night. Apparently, according to Tin Tut, they hoped there would be no agreement and that they would be chosen by Governor to form new government. Tin Tut said both will be ejected from Cabinet if they do not resign. 6. Tin Tut raised question exchange diplomatic representatives and said British Government would formally approach Department soon this subject. Embassy reiterated Department’s position as conveyed British Embassy, Washington, pointing out Indian precedent for diplomatic agents with personal rank minister pending Constituent Assembly elections. Tin Tut seemed to appreciate Indian analogy and said that in any case it was doubtful that Burmese Minister could reach Washington “for at least 3 months”, by which time he “hoped Department would agree to exchange fully accredited Minister”. 7. Tin Tut raised also Burma’s desire for early membership in International Bank and International Fund. He said British have agreed support Burma’s applications and expressed hope US support would also be forthcoming. 8. Ba Pe left for Burma 29th. Remainder delegation except U Saw returning special plane 30th. 9. Embassy referred to desire to [ of? ] both US and British Governments that one or more Burmese participate lend-lease talks here beginning February 4 and inquired whether San Lin now in London as Junior Burmese representative on Burma Currency Board might be assigned to participate. Tin Tut said San Lin wished return with delegation but Tin Tut would decide during day whether San Lin would remain for talks. 31 Embassy understands similar suggestion was made to Tin Tut yesterday by Burma Office. Sent Department 639; Department repeat to Rangoon 9 and New Delhi 13. Gallman 29 Latter not printed, but see footnote 27, p. 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 9 ] . 30 Latter was a member of the Burma Mission in London and of the Burmese Executive Council (Home); he was a leading member of the Thakin, later Socialist Party and of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League. 31 In telegram 645, January 30, 11 a.m., from London, it was reported that N. R. Chakravarti, Secretary of the Finance and Revenue Department (Pay Commission) of Burma, would represent Burma (845C.00/1–3047). The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/2–247: Telegram [Document 12] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , February 2, 1947—noon. 88. While there is feeling in some quarters Aung San has lost prestige because he signed agreement embodying much less than he had demanded (some say he got nothing, others that he got 75 per cent), it appears doubtful he will suffer greatly within AFPFL itself. Test will come at forthcoming AFPFL Supreme Council meeting; if passed successfully he must then ease off popular enthusiasm (which he has aroused) for direct action (my 75, 29th 32 ). Seems to me he can to his followers logically plug Constitutent Assembly as means to independence before January 31, 1948, and plug momentarily at least Panglong Conference (which will include other than Shan leaders and will be followed immediately by Shan council at Taunggyi; which Governor plans attend later) as meeting place to gain hill peoples’ support of thesis must now adopt that they should get simultaneously what Burma gets; and if any success at Panglong, he can plug it accordingly. Obviously British have picked him for immediate future Burma ship of state, and it seems unlikely he can renege on agreement since (1) he would thereby lose British support and consequently any early hope to bring hill peoples into any close degree of union with Burma proper under AFPFL administration and (2) his immediate political future would seem to hang on ability to popularize agreement. 33 U Saw and Thakin Ba Sein may possibly have to resign or have their resignations accepted by Governor (for failure to go along with AFPFL setup); 34 out of office they are not likely to be very dangerous to AFPFL in immediate future; if Aung San star later begins to set, they will be ready for comeback (Deptel 48 35 ). Possibility inclusion Ba Maw 36 in revamped Executive Council as well as Communist representative (if AFPFL and Thein Pe-Than-Tun 37 group patch differences) not to be overlooked. Sent Department 88; repeated London 21. Packer 32 Not printed. 33 The Governor’s Executive Council on February 5 ratified the London agreement, and the AFPFL Supreme Council next accepted it as an instrument by which to work for speedy attainment of independence. 34 Both men resigned from the Executive Council in February, and the Council was then reorganized to fill the vacancies. 35 See footnote 28, p. 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] . 36 Burmese Premier during the Japanese occupation. 37 Leaders of the so-called White Flag Communists who had left the AFPFL in 1946. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 811.42745C SE/2–547: Telegram [Document 13] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State restricted London , February 5, 1947—6 p.m. 786. To Packer from Boyd: 38 During opening talks Burma settlement February 4, we agreed present Chakravarti letter describing general proposals cultural exchange. He will attempt secure immediate approval Government of Burma. Letter briefly describes possible joint arrangements for professorial and student exchange, for sending scientists and other American specialists to Burma, for translation and publication American books in Burmese, and purchase Burmese documents and museum exhibits, emphasizing fact that Government of Burma would be consulted regarding each project. Letter concludes: “I am sure that our Consulate General Rangoon will be able explain Fulbright Act 39 more fully if requested by your Government.” If consulted by Government of Burma we prefer Consulate General avoid discussion financial aspects these proposals. Department please send Rangoon as 11. [Boyd.] Gallman 38 Alden W. Boyd, representing the Lend-Lease Administrator (Lane). 39 Approved August 1, 1946; 60 Stat. 754; see Department press release of February 14, 1947, Department of State Bulletin , February 23, 1947, p. 364. The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/2–747: Telegram [Document 14] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , February 7, 1947—10 p.m. 103. Governor informed me following effect 5th: He is hopeful irresponsible youth in AFPFL will listen to reason and follow lead of Aung San whom he considers entirely sincere but whose ability to carry out his program and put over London agreement is open to question. It will be difficult for Aung San apply brakes effectively to movement which he started against constituted authority and which in places has reached stage of incipient rebellion. Communists likely to give Aung San further trouble. AFPFL second string men recently sent into districts having some success in restoring order but dacoits 40 still have lots of arms despite surrender of many since amnesty. Governor recently informed Aung San that as soon as elections are won latter will have to be firm and stop strikes which are ruining country. Thakin Ba Sein and U Saw not considered to head organization sufficiently strong at present to be source of polling danger to Aung San. Is hopeful something can be worked out between hill peoples and Burmese to make Burma one country. Intends to go to Shan Federal Council at Taung-Gyi which opens on 15th. Elections postponed week until April 9. Sent to Department as 103, Department relay to London as 24. Packer 40 Murderous robbers acting in gangs in Burma. The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/2–1047: Telegram [Document 15] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , February 10, 1947—11 a.m. 112. Made short call on Aung San morning 6[th]. He seemed less confident than when I saw him last, some weeks ago. He was very tired and not very communicative. He said two most important subjects for immediate attention are reaching agreement with hill peoples and convening of Constituent Assembly at which Burma’s future will be decided. When asked about military provisions of agreement he smiled and said British troops might be stationed in Burma “for a long time to come.” I asked how he felt about London Mission. He said constitutional processes sometimes produce difficulties in achieving desired action. U Tin Tut was informed in London, he said, that rank Burmese representative Washington might be Diplomatic Agent at beginning but would be raised to Minister after elections. In response to his query, I informed him Indian representative in Washington will be Ambassador; this interested him. He said Burmese representative when selected in near, but not immediate, future could hardly reach Washington until after elections. Immediately after my departure he had meeting scheduled to discuss continuing spread of strikes which may soon include clerks various enterprises. I asked what he could tell me re Communists from Burma attending Empire Communist Conference scheduled London shortly. He replied both Burmese groups 41 had been invited but he thought there might be difficulties in their getting to UK. Sent Dept 112, repeated London as 26. Packer 41 The Red Flag Communists were led by Thakin Soe. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/2–247 [Document 16] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Henderson ) to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] February 10, 1947. It is not believed that the policy outlined in the attached telegram 42 is inconsistent with our policy in China. The communists in various countries and areas of the world pursue tactics which differ widely according to the political, economic and social situation in these territories. Since their tactics vary, it is not possible for us to approach the communist problem in each country in the same manner. The situation in Burma differs widely from that in China and the communist tactics also differ: 1. In the first place, the communists in China are in physical control of large portions of that country; they are fairly well supplied with arms and are in a position, if they so desire, to wage civil war on a large scale. In Burma, on the other hand, the communists are not as yet in possession of any defined areas, but are dispersed throughout the whole country. 2. Burma, which has heretofore been under British rule, is in the process of achieving full self-government. We are anxious that this process will be completed without the outbreak of civil war. On the other hand, the communists, if permitted to strengthen their influence in Burma, would not be adverse to armed conflict. Our policy, therefore, of preventing them from gaining influence by obtaining a foothold in the government is similar to that in China in that it is one of preventing, if possible, civil war. 3. In this connection, it should be pointed out that an amicable understanding with the British has recently been reached in London only because the Burmese national leaders broke away from a united front with the communists several months ago. Restoration of this united front is almost sure to mean the sabotaging of the agreement and of a return to a policy based upon threat of force. 4. The present Burmese national leadership is by no means reactionary and advocates a liberal program of social and economic reform. In this respect these leaders differ from the more reactionary elements in the Kuomintang. In our opinion, therefore, only by excluding the communists will the nationalist democratic elements in Burma be able to unite among themselves to an extent which will make possible the setting up of enlightened self-government in that country. It is, of course, possible that the communists will in any event endeavor to stir up armed conflict. Nevertheless, their exclusion from the government offers our best hope that this conflict will not develop into hostilities on a broad scale. Loy W. Henderson 42 Infra . The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 845C.00/2–247: Telegram [Document 17] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 43 secret Washington , February 11, 1947—10 a.m. 58. For action by Packer only. We have noted statement contained urtel 88 Feb 2 re possibility inclusion communist representative in revamped Executive Council. Experiences other govts in similar position cause us believe inclusion of communists in a Burmese govt is likely to add to difficulties of Burmese in setting up genuinely democratic form of self-govt. It has been found in general that although communists are glib in advocating democracy and self-govt they endeavor in practice to prevent dependent peoples from setting up any kind of govt not susceptible to communist influence or control. Furthermore it seems clear that they are anxious that Burma should attain independence from Brit Empire by violence rather than by peaceful means in order to injure Brit prestige in Far East, to encourage violence elsewhere in Asia, and to facilitate strengthening of communist influence in Burma. We believe that unless Burmans are able to isolate communists at once latter may be successful in penetrating politically inexperienced liberal and intellectual groups and bringing disunity among patriotic democratic Burmans, and in creating much difficulty for Burma in future. You are authorized therefore in your discretion to take advantage of such informal opportunities as may present themselves to let Aung San and other responsible Burman leaders understand that for them to include communists in high govt positions would afford latter opportunity for disruptive activities, would give them added importance in eyes Burmese people and might eventually prove disastrous to Burmans as well as to other peace-loving peoples in Asia. Marshall 43 Repeated to London as telegram 790, February 17, 7 p.m. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/2–1247: Telegram [Document 18] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State confidential London , February 12, 1947—6 p.m. 978. Embassy today presented Andrus to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite and F. W. H. Smith, Burma Office, who made following points in general conversation: 1. Aung San and co-signers have somewhat to British surprise “behaved like gentlemen” since their return. Laithwaite has noted with pleasure fact that Aung San has resisted temptation to parade in Burma as victor over vanquished British. As example of good feeling which Burma Delegation appears to have for British, Laithwaite cited a “purely gratuitous” telegram sent to Attlee by Burma Delegation expressing its thanks for friendly reception and treatment accorded it while in London. A.F.P.F.L. recently cabled condolences regarding death Ellen Wilkinson. 44 2. Present prospects from Panglong were “excellent”. 45 Laithwaite understood that arrangements are likely to be made for appointment Shan Councillor and Kachin and Chin Deputy Counsellors. 3. Sir Gilbert discounts opposition U Saw and other “ex-Premiers”. 4. Communists next to A.F.P.F.L. in strength, with Thein Pe group representing about ⅔ Communist strength. Laithwaite understood there was possibility this group re-entering Cabinet if A.F.P.F.L. will agree to receive it. He sees group as right wing of Burmese Communists, who probably place Burma above international communism. He said that there was no evidence link between Burmese communism and Russia, except perhaps through Joshi and Indian Communists. 5. Laithwaite believes it politically impossible Aung San or other Burmese politician to come out for dominion status this time, which accounts for Aung San’s noncommittal statements this subject. He thought that while logically Constituent Assembly might settle this issue early its deliberations, it was likely that for same political reasons, decision might be deferred as long as possible. 6. Laithwaite said that his greatest immediate concern was Rangoon strike, which may be attributed to agitation in Burma during London talks which could not be shut off immediately. He hoped Aung San on return from Panglong would get to grips with situation. Sent Dept 978; repeated Rangoon 13. Gallman 44 British Minister of Education. 45 The Panglong agreement was reported in telegram 119, February 13, from Rangoon, not printed; for text of agreement, signed at Maymyo, April 24, 1947, see British Cmd. 7138: Burma, Frontier Areas Committee of Inquiry, 1947, Report to His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and to the Government of Burma, Presented by the Secretary of State for Burma to Parliament by Command of His Majesty June, 1947 , p. 13. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 845C.00/2–1347: Telegram [Document 19] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington , February 14, 1947. 767. Following text 121 Feb 13 Rangoon to Dept: New Times 13th reports Saw Tha Hto secretary All Burma Karen Congress cabled HMG through governor saying Karen Congress emphatically protests against London agreement because of “inadequate Karen quota” in proposed Constituent Assembly and “undefined” number Karen seats in interim legislature; also failure recognize claim for separate Karen state; also failure consult Karen opinion. Karen Congress decided for non-participation unless satisfactory modifications London agreement are made by March 3rd. Marshall The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/2–2747: Telegram [Document 20] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State Rangoon , February 27, 1947. 150. New Times 27th reports Than Tun Communist Party hag announced intention of participating in elections 46 and also desire “to work in unity with AFPFL to make elections successful also to prevent opportunist Mahabama, Myochits, Thakins and others from wrecking Constituent Assembly”. Statement continued “we desire to put an end to civil strifes which are likely to help imperialist”. Statement concluded said Times “Communist Party would not oppose AFPFL but would contest only in those places where party had a strong majority.” Packer 46 Scheduled for April 9 and 11. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in China 701.45C11/3–547: Telegram [Document 21] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in China confidential Washington , March 5, 1947—7 p.m. 271. Burma seems unlikely propose diplomatic exchange with US and China until after April elections. Question level diplomatic exchange still unsettled. Recent change US establishment Bangkok to embassy may cause Burmans wish same treatment. Please ascertain discreetly whether Chinese expect exchange ministers or ambassadors with Burma. 47 Sent Nanking, repeated Rangoon 48 and London. 49 Acheson 47 Telegram 495, March 9, 1 p.m., from Nanking, reported that the Chinese Foreign Office expected that the diplomatic representative to Burma would be an ambassador, as in the case of India and Siam, which were contiguous countries (701.45C11/3–947). This telegram was repeated by the Department on March 12 as No. 1139 to London and as No. 86 to Rangoon. 48 As No. 78. 49 As No. 1050. The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/3–2547: Telegram [Document 22] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , March 25, 1947—11 a.m. 234. Supreme Council United Hill Peoples now in session at Tounggyi has just decided Hill Peoples will participate in work of Constituent Assembly. Manner of participation still to be worked out. 50 Repeated London as 51. Packer 50 Telegram 335, April 28, from Rangoon, reported the signing on April 24 at Maymyo of the “unanimous report Frontier Areas Inquiry Committee on best method associating frontier areas peoples with framing Burma’s new constitution”. (845C.9111 RR/4–2847) This Committee was headed by Lt. Col. D. R. Rees-Williams, member of the British House of Commons; for text of report, see British Cmd. 7138. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 845C.00/3–1947 [Document 23] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon confidential Washington , March 27, 1947. The Acting Secretary of State refers to the Consulate General’s telegram 206 of March 19, 1947 and to the Department’s telegram 100 of March 21, 1947 51 and forwards herewith two copies of the proposed consular convention with the United Kingdom. 52 Changes have been made in the United Kingdom draft convention in order to enable this draft to be more suitable as the basis of a consular convention between the United States and Burma. It is requested that this draft be studied to ascertain whether any of its provisions require revision before submission to the appropriate Burmese authorities and that the Department be informed by cable, referring to page and line number, of any suggested changes. 53 If no amendments are deemed necessary, a copy of the draft should be presented to the appropriate Burmese authorities with the explanation that it is hoped that the consular convention can be signed following and on the same day as the exchange of notes which establishes diplomatic relations between the United States and Burma. At an appropriate stage of the negotiations the Burmese authorities should be informed in writing that the sentence at the end of Article I, paragraph 1 “The sending state may prescribe the consular district to correspond to each consular office” will be interpreted by the United States to mean that this country may, if it wishes, prescribe the Rangoon consular district as comprising the whole of Burma—Shan States, Kachin hills, Chin hills, etc. The consular convention should be prepared for signature at the appropriate time by either the Burmese Department of External Affairs or the Consulate General. For information regarding the negotiation and conclusion of treaties and other international agreements, including information regarding preparation of documents for signature, see Foreign Service Regulations, Chapter XI. It will be necessary to have a full power issued by the President authorizing the United States plenipotentiary to sign the convention. The Officer in Charge will be informed by cable when the full power has been issued and when he may proceed to the signature of the convention. 51 Neither printed. In telegram 206 Mr. Packer advised the inclusion of all Burma in the American consular district in advance of taking up the question of establishing diplomatic relations; in telegram 100 the Department replied that it was defining the Rangoon consular district as all Burma in a draft of a Burmese-American consular convention to be sent to Rangoon, copies of which would be airmailed early with the aim of signing the consular convention simultaneously with the exchange of notes establishing diplomatic relations (845C00/3–1947). 52 Not printed. 53 Telegram 300, April 17, 8 a.m., from Rangoon suggested some changes in the draft and pointed out that all of Burma was not yet under the same administration (711.45C21/4–1747). The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 701.4145C/4–1047: Telegram [Document 24] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon confidential Washington , April 10, 1947—1 p.m. 127. If Aung San successful in elections 54 and election outcome indicates probability peaceful transition to reasonably stable Burmese national govt, please seek early opportunity ascertain from him on informal basis his estimate date when Brit will present formal GOB request exchange dip reps and level representation he prefers. You may tell him such info would be helpful connection advanced personnel planning by Dept. Sent Rangoon, repeated London. 55 Acheson 54 In the elections the AFPFL won 191 seats, the Communists 7, and Independents 12. The 7 Communists represented 4 constituencies; 22 had been candidates in 13 constituencies. One of the 7 later was lost at sea and replaced by a non-Communist. 55 As No. 1583. The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.9111 RR/4–1947: Telegram [Document 25] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State Rangoon , April 19, 1947. 304. New Times , 19th, reports Aung San in addressing record crowd on Burmese New Year Day said first step in AFPFL program is arrangement for withdrawal foreign troops. Also said question dominion status or independence immaterial but alliance foreign powers will be essential when full self-government achieved. 56 “At present there is only Britain and America to whom Burmese can turn as they are only two great foreign powers.” Favored formation of southeast Asia Union with Indonesia, Siam, Indochina, Malaya for “establishment economic solidarity.” Said “Those persons creating disturbances in country are not resisters imperialism but Communists”. New Times also reports Aung San said, 17th, at luncheon honoring Siamese delegation Inter-Asian Conference, “Our mutual interest and our past experience require we stand together. With this end in view we propose appoint diplomatic representative in Siam early date.” Packer 56 At the AFPFL convention on May 20 a 12-point resolution regarding Burma’s constitutional organization was adopted, and amended soon afterward. This was reported in telegrams 412, May 22, and 425, May 24, from Rangoon. It provided that “Independent Sovereign Republic of Burma shall be a union comprising” the various areas of Burma. This resolution would be introduced at the outset of the session of the Constituent Assembly, and a committee would be formed to negotiate with the British Government for transfer of power to Burma. (845C.00/5–2247 and /5–2447) The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 701.45C00/4–2247: Telegram [Document 26] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential immediate Rangoon , April 22, 1947—5 a.m. 314. As Aung San will not return Rangoon from trip up-country until May 2, I today raised with Shwe Baw, Secretary Dept Foreign Affairs who same time Secretary to Executive Council, subject matter Department’s telegram 127, April 10. He informed me as follows: Government of Burma has decided not appoint Ambassadors abroad this time but start representation with Ministers who will be sent Delhi, Nanking, Bangkok and Washington. Matter raising their rank to Ambassador probably be considered in couple years. He understands HMG has already undertaken arrange exchange Ministers; in fact telegram already received indicating China already agreed that basis. 57 I did not mention receipt Department instructions but based my inquiries several current press reports subject diplomatic representatives abroad including United Press despatch from Washington and local Reuter reports. Consequently any use Department may wish make of above vis-à-vis British Foreign Office could be on basis voluntary report. Please relay London as 63. Packer 57 In telegram 370, May 10, Mr. Packer reported a conversation on May 8 with U Aung San who seemed to be thinking of an ambassadorship to the United States for U So Nyun, Commissioner of the Corporation of Rangoon (701.45C11/5–1047). Mr. Packer mentioned the matter of a consular convention also and reported in telegram 433, May 27, 10 a.m., that the Burmese Government was ready to examine a draft (711.45C21/5–2747). Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman 701.45C11/5–3147 [Document 27] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman 58 Washington , May 28, 1947. Subject: Proposed Exchange of Ambassadors with Burma It is probable that, in the near future, the British will request this Government to agree to an exchange of ambassadors between Burma and the United States. This move would be in accord with the January 27 agreement between Burmese political leaders and members of the British Cabinet. The recent Burmese elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the moderate Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League. The elected members will form a constituent assembly and an interim legislature along lines similar to the assembly and legislature in India. I believe that Burma’s constitutional status is now as advanced as that of India and that we should agree to an exchange of ambassadors. 59 Although American trade with Burma was not large before the war, the expected abolition of Imperial Preference makes expansion possible. Scheduled American airline service through Burma is starting this month and will be expanded in the near future. Burma’s strategic position between India and China is an important consideration. Please inform me whether you agree to an exchange of ambassadors if the expected request is received from the British. G. C. Marshall 58 Notation on the original by President Truman: “Approved Harry S. Truman May 31, 1947”. 59 In telegram 197, May 27, 1 p.m., to Rangoon, the Department stated that the Burmese Government should ask the British Government to make a new approach to the United States with a specific request for exchange of ambassadors if representation at that level was desired (701.45C11/5–2147). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) 845C.011/5–2947 [Document 28] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) 60 confidential [ Rangoon ,] May 28, 1947. U Chan Htoon 61 called this morning to suggest the desirability of a message being sent by the American Government to the President of the Constituent Assembly along the lines of our message to the President of the Indian Constituent Assembly last December. He said that such messages were expected from the Governments of the Netherlands, China, and India. I said that I would be glad to bring the matter to the attention of my Government. We then discussed at some length the AFPFL draft constitution. I said that I understood the provisions regarding religion had caused something of a stir. He said that this was true, and went on to say that the provisions were opposed by the All-Burma Buddhist Association and the All-Burma Pongyi Association, both of which desire to have Buddhism adopted as the state religion in view of the fact that perhaps 80 or more percent of the population of the whole of Burma (including the frontier areas) are Buddhists. He said that unless the old-line politicians pick up this topic as a point in respect of which to criticize the AFPFL, he thought it was easily possible that the provisions of the draft would be so altered before the Constituent Assembly finishes its work as to make Buddhism the state religion. If, however, the old-line politicians (Ba Maw, U Saw, etc.) oppose the present provisions of the draft constitution, it is probable the country will consider the objection purely a political one and not one of principle, and consequently the present provisions may stand. In respect of the provisions concerning the formation of political units within the Union of Burma, he thought the following might be the ultimate classification of the units named: Union State — Shan States Federation Autonomous State — Kachin State; Karenni State National Area — Chin Hills National Minority — Karens (outside Karenni) I asked to what extent the Yugoslav Constitution had been used in drafting the AFPFL draft. He replied that it had been used very little. He then went on to say that the American Constitution had been used largely in the drafting of the provisions relating to citizenship, rights of equality and rights of freedom; that the South African Constitution had been of help in the drafting of the provisions relating to the Autonomous State and National Areas, and that the Canadian Constitution had been used in drafting the provisions relating to the Union State. The Soviet Constitution had furnished the title “Chamber of Nationalities”. He said a point that was to receive further consideration was that relating to the tenure of office of the Judiciary. He thought also that the provisions relating to the Frontier Areas were likely to be changed before the Constituent Assembly concludes its work, revisions being contemplated in pre-Assembly work scheduled between the AFPFL committee and representatives of the Frontier Areas. He said that there would probably be only three sessions of the Constituent Assembly: the opening session when the Assembly would organize and divide itself into committees; the second session when the committees would report and their work would be considered; the third session when the Constitution would be adopted, clause by clause. He said further that he did not know what might be done with regard to establishing a relationship between the Nagas and Was and the Union of Burma. E[ arl ] L. P[ acker ] 60 Copy transmitted to the Department in covering despatch 344, May 29, from Rangoon; received June 16. 61 Constitutional Adviser to the Government of Burma. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) 845C.00/5–3147 [Document 29] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) 62 confidential [ Rangoon ,] May 28, 1947. I called on U Aung San today by appointment at 3:00 o’clock. [Here follow three paragraphs on minor matters of interest.] I referred to the AFPFL draft constitution and said that I had gathered from the constitution and press reports that it was proposed that a declaration of independence be made at the first session of the Constituent Assembly. He said that this would take place and that a Negotiations Committee would be appointed to negotiate with HMG for the transfer of power. I asked him when the transfer of power would occur. He said, possibly by May of next year. I asked if this date might also see the end of General Briggs’ forces in Burma. 63 He did not reply definitely on this point. I asked if he could tell me what attitude was going to be adopted concerning the investment of foreign capital. He said that he had planned a conference which would meet the end of the first week in June to consider Burma’s rehabilitation. * It would be composed of officials of the Government and others who would go into the question of Burma’s needs and work out some sort of a program. Their work would go on coterminously with the work of the Constituent Assembly. It would consider the question of foreign financial aid. I said that I supposed that in view of his remarks about nationalization, foreign capital would want to know exactly how far he expected to go in his nationalization program before risking entering Burma. I asked if he could tell me how far he planned to go. He said his plans had not been mapped out very definitely; that he thought that the major industries would ultimately be nationalized, but that the whole program would have to be approached cautiously and taken up over a considerable period. He mentioned oil as one of the industries to be nationalized. He said that posts and telegraphs, as well as railways, were already nationalized and operated by the State. I asked if he could define his attitude toward such enterprises as the American Baptist Mission and other American missionary organizations in Burma. He said the attitude would be to let any and all religions work here. I said that I had heard mention of difficulties developing regarding the creation in Burma of a State religion under the proposed new Constitution and that opposition had developed to the provisions of the proposed draft Constitution. He said that it was true—it was again a political move—that there were a good many pongyis on the AFPFL side, and if necessary they would come out for the AFPFL; that he did not actually expect any difficulties to develop. The provisions of the draft Constitution would be adopted without important change. . . . . . . . I asked if he could tell me anything about his ideas concerning a Southeast Asia Federation. He said, smilingly, it was a propaganda matter, a long range affair; and it would have to be worked out according to circumstances over the years. I asked if he could tell me whether the provisions in the draft Constitution concerning Frontier Areas were substantially what was proposed in the Committee of Enquiry’s report. He said the report had made some recommendations along this general line; that the terms of reference of the Committee were limited; that it had recommended a scheme for representation of the Shans, Kachins and others in the Assembly. (He did not appear to attach much weight to the report.) I asked if he could estimate for me the strength of the People’s Volunteer Organization, the Socialist party, and the All-Burma Peasant Union. He gave these figures: P.V.O. 200,000; the Peasant Union and Socialist party each about 800,000 (N.B. these figures differ considerably from the estimate given by U Kyaw Nyein, Member for Home Affairs; see Rangoon Despatch No. 335 dated May 27, 1947 64 ). I said that as he undoubtedly knew, I should be glad at any time to be of any assistance possible in connection with Burma’s establishing a Foreign Service; that I had asked for a copy of our Foreign Service Regulations, which I would give to U Shwe Baw when received; that it might be helpful. I said that another matter which I thought might be of interest to him was the possibility in connection with the training of a Foreign Service of sending members of the staff of the Burma diplomatic mission in Washington to classes given at several universities in Washington which catered especially to students of government and intending Foreign Service Officers. I said that I knew from personal experience that several of the legations and embassies in Washington sent their junior officers to these schools for courses in which they were especially interested, and it might be that were advantage taken of these facilities, a number of junior Burmese Foreign Service Officers could obtain training and courses of study that would not be available to them elsewhere; that perhaps more officers could be assigned in order to take advantage of these facilities than actually would be needed to do the work of the mission. I said that I had received the notification which he had had sent to me expressing the willingness of the Government of Burma to consider a draft consular convention, and that I had informed Washington to that effect. I said that I knew that one point in which Washington was particularly interested was the scope of the consular district of the American Consulate General in Rangoon which was limited to the city of Rangoon. Consequently when I went to northern Burma on a trip (Aung San and I had met at Panglong in February), I was from the HMG point of view out of my district. Washington did not like it and had taken the matter up with London, but the Burma Office remained adamant. He would recall that I had mentioned this matter to him in one of our conversations last fall. Aung San called in U Shwe Baw, and after they conversed together in Burmese for a few minutes, he said that the matter had been more or less decided in principle, and that there would be no difficulty in the matter. U Shwe Baw nodded concurrence. I referred to our recent conversation in which the matter of the Kachin Memorial Agricultural and Mechanical School had been discussed. He said that this matter had been decided favorably and that I would receive notice of it in a few days. 65 E[ arl ] L. P[ acker ] 62 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 345, May 31, from Rangoon; received June 18. 63 Gen. H. R. Briggs was in command of British and Indian troops in Burma. * Mention of this appeared in the press of May 30, and May 31, 1947. [Footnote in the original.] 64 Not printed. 65 In despatch 356, June 5, from Rangoon, Mr. Packer reported on this matter and transmitted an unsigned, undated communication from the Burmese Department of Foreign Affairs, to the effect that the proposed school would be welcome to both Burma and the Kachin community (811.42745C/6–547). The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 711.45C21/5–2747: Telegram [Document 30] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon confidential Washington , June 2, 1947—4 p.m. 204. Urtels 433 May 27, 66 423 May 24, 385 May 13 67 and 300, Apr 18 [ 17 ]. 68 Dept expects forward revised draft consular convention near future. Since draft unlikely to be cleared necessary GOB departments by date exchange notes establishing Dip representation, you may exchange notes on consular district with GOB prior that time. Following draft suggested: Have honor refer conversations and communications relative extent consular district American Consulate General Rangoon. As you are aware my Govt has prescribed the whole of Burma as consular district its Rangoon office. I would appreciate note from you indicating your agreement this position. At such time as GOB may establish Consulate US, my Govt will recognize comparable right GOB prescribe limits its consular district. Marshall 66 See footnote 57, p. 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] . 67 Neither printed. 68 See footnote 53, p. 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 845C.00/5–2847: Telegram [Document 31] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon secret Washington , June 5, 1947—7 p.m. 209. Urtel 439 May 28. 69 When you know name president (or other presiding officer) Constituent Assembly kindly convey following message to that official. “With approach June 10 70 I extend to you as president Constituent Assembly and through you to Burmese people sincere good wishes US Govt and people of US for successful conclusion important task you are about to undertake. Burma’s peaceful and steady progress in rehabilitation being watched with sympathetic interest. Freedom loving people throughout the world hope that you will lay foundation for stable and peaceful nation. Signed George Marshall, Secretary of State.” 71 Acheson 69 Not printed, but see opening paragraph of memorandum of May 28, p. 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] . 70 Telegram 471, June 9, from Rangoon reported that this phrase was changed to “On this historic occasion” in the text transmitted by Mr. Packer to the Chairman of the Assembly, Thakin Mya, for the opening ceremony on June 10 (845C.00/6–947); see Department of State Bulletin , June 29, 1947, p. 1314. 71 An appreciative reply from the Chairman, dated June 13, was quoted in telegram 544, July 1, 11 a.m., from Rangoon (845C.00/7–147). For text of reply, see Department of State Bulletin , July 13, 1947, p. 101. The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel) 701.45C11/6–247 [Document 32] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Inverchapel ) The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Great Britain and has the honor to inform him that the United States Government agrees to exchange diplomatic representatives with Burma with the rank of Ambassador. 72 The Secretary will be grateful if the British Government will ascertain whether the Government of Burma desires that the United States Consulate General at Rangoon be raised to the rank of Embassy immediately with the present incumbent as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim. It would also be appreciated if the British Government would ascertain the wishes of the Government of Burma with respect to the nature and timing of public announcements concerning the foregoing. Washington , June 6, 1947. 72 In note 301, June 2, the British Ambassador had requested information regarding this matter (701.45C11/6–247). The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 701.45C11/6–647: Telegram [Document 33] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon confidential Washington , June 6, 1947—7 p.m. 211. [Here follow report of British note of June 2 and text of reply, supra .] Ref Para 3 of reply Dept will suggest following draft public statement at appropriate time: “The US Govt has responded favorably to request of GOB that ambassadors be exchanged between two countries. By agreeing to establishment of Dip relations US Govt recognizes Burma’s new international status arising from agreement concluded between Brit Govt and Burmese leaders on Jan 27, 1947. Elections have been held pursuant to that agreement and Constituent Assembly is now in session. Mr. Earl L. Packer, at present US Consul General at Rangoon, will act as Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the US Emb pending the designation and arrival in Burma of an American Amb. It is expected that a newly-appointed Burmese Ambassador will leave for Washington in near future.” Your discretion inform GOB that, ref Para 2 of reply to Brit Emb, Dept is quite willing postpone raising ConGen to Emb until Burmese Amb arrives Washington if GOB so prefers. Ref public statement every care will be taken to prevent premature release to radio. Sent Rangoon 211 repeated London 2437. Marshall The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00B/6–1047: Telegram [Document 34] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , June 10, 1947—10 a.m. 472. Usher 73 and I have recently made calls on important contacts designed obtain information and opinions relative current strength of Communists in Burma. Inter alia , we have seen member for Home Department, Inspector General of Police, latter’s deputy (CID), Tin Tut, Ba Pe, Shwe Baw, Kyaw Nyein, election officials, newspaper editors. Difficult gauge Communists’ true strength. Member Home Affairs considers both Red and White Flag groups number not exceed 20,000. CID considers their total strength neighborhood 100,000 (10,000 Red Flag, 90,000 White Flag). IGP considers Communists and supporters constituted 20 percent (roughly 3 million) entire population Burma proper, this figure seems exaggerated. Roughly 125,000 voters voted Communist recent election. GOB recently considered banning White Flag Communists but apparently feels to do so would drive two underground organizations together (significant this connection underground Red Flag ranks recently augmented by White Flag deserters, perhaps indicating chiefly Burman love of the illicit). AFPFL has recently considered and rejected suggestions in press for AFPFL Communist reunion (now appears probable neither banning or reunion likely near future, consequently equally unlikely early entry of Communist into Executive Council). I have not overlooked contents Deptel 58, February 11, in my conversation and have expressed personal not official opinions friend of Burma that would be inopportune effect reunion with Communist or entry of Communists into Government at present moment when Burma is seeking establish diplomatic relations foreign countries and enter UN, adding any such happening would be interpreted as indicating either Communist strength is greater than had been thought.… Two informants thought if reunion effected it would mean Communists would have to discard Communist label possibly joining left wing Socialists (Socialists now only political party in AFPFL, there are nine mass organizations in AFPFL). Indian Communist Goshal 74 is now in Burma, probably representing Joshi. Efforts apprehend him have been unavailing but some of his papers have been seized. Aung Gyi who attended Empire Communist Conference London (mytel 145, February 25 75 ) believe be still in UK. Assumed here he is in touch with Moscow representatives there. Perhaps Embassy London could uncover something of interest regarding both Goshal and Aung Gyi. In light of Ba Pe’s recent expulsion and of charges against him his statement of interest that left wing Socialists maneuvered him out of AFPFL because of his outspoke opposition their efforts insert Communist doctrine into AFPFL policies and effect readmission White Flag Communists to AFPFL. That such was cause expulsion specifically denied by Aung San and others, who attribute Ba Pe’s expulsion to graft. It would be helpful in connection Deptel 58, February 11, if Department would forward me in several copies data descriptive specific instances recent Communist maneuvers US or elsewhere—something authentic, for instance, along line described page 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] airmail edition Newsweek April 14. 76 Relay London as 110. Packer 73 Richard E. Usher, Vice Consul at Rangoon. 74 Known also as Maung Ba Tin. 75 Not printed. 76 An informal letter dated June 24 by Raymond E. Murphy of the Department stated that no material of the type desired was available, but certain publications were transmitted as of possible help. The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 711.45C21/6–1447: Telegram [Document 35] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , June 14, 1947—3 p.m. 486. June 5 handed Shwe Baw letter addressed to Aung San re consular district along line Deptel 204, June 2.1 referred conversation reported mytel 385, May 13, 77 and subsequent conversation with Aung San (my confdes 345, May 31 78 ) at which Shwe Baw was present during which Aung San said would be no difficulty in the matter. Shwe Baw to my surprise then (June 5) said Aung San understood I had been referring proposed consular convention. (I had covered matter consular district in informal memorandum re consular convention left with Aung San May 8—mytel 385.) Shwe Baw added, however, he foresaw no difficulties re consular district matter. I requested prompt action of [ on ] my letter. Questioned by me on subsequent occasion Shwe Baw referred old question of China. I recalled to him Dept’s conversations British Embassy Washington (Deptel 286, November 26 77 ) substance of which I sent to Bickford 79 at the time in letter Shwe Baw had seen, emphatically said I felt Washington would take very unfavorable view any refusal our request and read him penultimate sentence Dept’s A–10, December 30. 77 He said he would see what could be done. I believe favorable reply will be received shortly but nevertheless suggest Dept refrain from fixing time for public announcement (Deptel 211, June 6) re exchange diplomatic representatives until receipt information from me consular district matter settled satisfactorily. Copies above-mentioned memorandum and GOB memorandum in reply (mytel 433, May 27 80 ) by pouch. 81 Packer 77 Not printed. 78 See footnote 62, p. 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] . 77 Not printed. 79 W. R. Bickford; then British Secretary of the Department of Defense and External Affairs. 77 Not printed. 80 See footnote 57, p. 23 [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] . 81 Despatch 365, June 14, from Rangoon, not printed. The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/6–1747: Telegram [Document 36] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , June 17, 1947—9 a.m. 499. Following, inter alia , are recommendations contained Frontier Areas Commission report 81a mentioned my 491, June 14. 82 “We recommend Frontier Areas members Constituent Assembly have same status in Assembly as members elected from Ministerial Burma and be entitled participate fully deliberations of Assembly and be eligible for places on such committees as Assembly may appoint. We further recommend participation representatives from various parts Frontier Areas in work Constituent Assembly should not be regarded as committing them to union or federation with Burma. As further protection to Frontier Areas we recommend no proposal relating mode of government in federated Shan states, Kachin Hills, Chin Hills and Karenni States shall be deemed to have been carried in Assembly unless it has been voted for not only by majority of members of Assembly present, but also by majority of members present of the unit concerned. Similarly, we recommend no proposal relating constitution of federated Burma shall be deemed to have been carried unless it has been voted for not only by majority of members of Assembly present, but also by majority of members present of Frontier Areas which will form states in federation.” Relay London as 122. Packer 81a British Cmd.7138, cited in footnote 45, p. 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] . 82 Not printed. The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/6–1847: Telegram [Document 37] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential immediate Rangoon , June 18, 1947—4 p.m. 507. Thakin Nu 83 who is proceeding London 19[th] by air informs me he is heading “good will” mission. When I stated BBC announced this morning mission had to do with transfer of power, he replied “Oh, Tin Tut already has instructions regarding that”. He stated no question of Burma accepting dominion status exists, decision leave Commonwealth having already been taken some time ago. I questioned him as to significance of omission frontier areas representative from his mission. He said there was no significance; that mission was hurriedly arranged; that Wolkt [ new? ] proposal had just been made to him that he include a Karen in mission; that frontier areas and Karen representatives would go on other good will missions abroad in near future. Shan Sawbwa knew nothing last night of Thakin Nu’s mission, indicating thoughtlessness or deliberate intention omit them on part of AFPFL. Thakin Nu will be accompanied by Kyaw Nyein, member for home and judicial affairs, and U Ko Ko Gyi who is AFPFL leader. Shwe Baw informs me Tin Tut already in London will become third ranking member of mission. More details when available. 84 Sent Dept as 507, repeated London as 126. Packer 83 Elected on June 14 as President of the Constituent Assembly. On June 16 Aung San introduced his resolution declaring Burma’s status as an independent sovereign republic, and the resolution was unanimously adopted the next day. During the presiding officer’s absence, his duties were to be rotated among eight other members of the Assembly. 84 The Embassy in London reported in telegram 3408, June 21, 2 p.m., that Tin Tut in London had suggested that Dominion-status legislation be prepared in the British Parliament, along with that for India, pending completion of the Burmese constitution in the autumn (845C.01/6–2147). Similar information was contained in telegram 546, July 2, 10 a.m., from Rangoon (845C.00/7–247). The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/6–2847: Telegram [Document 38] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State Rangoon , June 28, 1947. 539. Following is summarized translation of communiqué issued [by] General Secretary AFPFL 26th. 85 “For information public hereby announce: That since passage resolution by Constituent Assembly that Burma become sovereign republic question dominion status does not arise, this point should be clearly understood; That because at present sovereign powers reside with HMG it will be necessary when constitution independent republic been drawn send official negotiating committee England arrange transfer of power. Thakin Nu delegation now in England is goodwill mission to smooth way for future negotiations of official negotiation committee; That because in pursuance Constituent Assembly’s corollary resolution Burma will secede from British Empire, future relationship Burma and United Kingdom becomes important problem. Delegation will make preliminary arrangement regarding this relationship in unofficial and friendly manner; That present interim government exercises only those powers transferred to it by Attlee-Aung San agreement; That therefore present interim government desires HMG transfer powers of government to it during interim period without waiting for conclusion discussions Constituent Assembly, but it wishes have dominion powers transferred in same manner as powers have been transferred to Indian interim government. This will form one of subjects for discussion by Nu delegation with HMG; That for reasons set forth above Nu delegation is urged obtain for Burma interim government as great a degree of supreme power as possible and that this delegation’s work will not prove detrimental to interests of independence and on contrary will speed achievement of independence.” Sent Department as 539; repeated London as 136. Packer 85 The full text was transmitted to the Department in despatch 444, August 4, from Rangoon, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 711.45C21/7–347: Telegram [Document 39] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon confidential Washington , July 7, 1947—5 p.m. 252. Urtel 550, July 3. 86 Revised draft consular convention sent with Vice Consul Thurgood 87 may be presented GOB unless you believe presentation now would delay receipt satisfactory reply your letter June 5 to Aung San on subject extent consular jurisdiction. 88 Re your last para Dept expects GOB suggest date. (See final sentence Dept reply Brit Emb Deptel 211 June 6) Dept considers that 1. Brit note June 2 86 2. Dept reply June 6 3. Brit answer to questions asked by Dept and Brit request for agreement on So Nyun 4. Dept reply through Brit Emb will constitute “notes establishing diplomatic relations”. Only additional prerequisite public announcement is receipt by you of satisfactory answer your June 5 letter. Your proposed title: “Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the United States of America.” Marshall 86 Not printed. 87 Harriet C. Thurgood, Vice Consul at Colombo, on June 6 was appointed temporarily as Vice Consul at Rangoon. 88 See telegram 486, June 14, from Rangoon, p. 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] . 86 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/7–1047: Telegram [Document 40] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , July 10, 1947—7 p.m. 3791. Following obtained informally July 9 from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Burma Office: 1. There have been no positive developments in connection with Burmese good will mission visit to London now terminated. Thakin Nu has returned to Burma with an appreciation of parliamentary difficulties entailed for British Govt in connection with extending interim Dominion status to Burma as requested by mission. British have firmly and politely said “no” to mission’s suggestion, but have undertaken, after Thakin Nu’s report to Aung San, to announce British willingness to expedite Burma legislation as soon as Burma constitution is ready. If legislation is to be introduced this fall, great deal of work this summer regarding defence, finance, nationality problems, treaty obligations, winding up of services, contractual obligations, passports, etc., etc., will be required. 2. Thakin Nu will point out to Aung San that if Burma legislation is completed by January 1948 this will be considerable advance on June 1948, the date originally contemplated for India, and with which, until India speed-up, Burmans were satisfied. Members good will mission have reiterated their reluctance as individuals to see Burma leave Commonwealth but have expressed view that public feeling is such in Burma that idea of Commonwealth status could not be made popular at this time. Mission stressed fact that Communists would make capital of such a swing in AFPFL policies (Embassy’s 3514, June 26, paragraph 4 89 ). 3. Laithwaite said that excellent evidence that Burmans now enjoy full powers in [ is ] fact that Governor signed immigration bill although he advised strongly against it. Burma has had a very bad press in India regarding this bill and Laithwaite thought Burma would be well-advised to avoid treating Indian and Chinese feelings lightly. Laithwaite was repeatedly hearing tales of Chinese infiltration and troop concentrations. He said that these were the kind of difficult problems which Burmans must expect henceforth now that they have chosen to travel alone. 4. Laithwaite said that spirit of talks with good-will mission was excellent throughout. 90 Sent Dept 3791; please relay Rangoon as 38. Douglas 89 Not printed. 90 Telegram 3727, July 8, from London, reported that the Burma Office issued an announcement on July 7 regarding the mission and stated that an exchange of high commissioners had been agreed upon (845C.00/7–847). The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/7–1947: Telegram [Document 41] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential immediate Rangoon , July 19, 1947—5 p.m. 603. I saw Governor Rance at 3 p.m. He confirmed death of six members Executive Council named mytel 601, July 19 91 and said another person killed was U Ohn Maung, Deputy Secretary Transport and Communication Department (who recently returned Rangoon for duty and [who had] mytel 244, March 31 92 been selected be member staff of [So] Nyun’s Embassy, Washington). Governor said further four so far unidentified bodies at morgue; U Ba Gyan, member for rehabilitation and public works, only slightly wounded. Assailants who escaped wore 12th Army uniforms and drove through town and into Secretariat grounds in military jeep. Governor stated further: Thakin Nu has agreed form new Executive Council members to be announced shortly. British intelligence officer reported yesterday Thakin Soe Communists issued report there would be important news today. Two members Executive Council who were present but escaped injury (Aung Zan Wei and U Mya) suspect U Saw of responsibility for assassinations. 93 I saw both a moment at Government House and expressed shock and regret today’s events; both considerably shaken; assume they will continue as members Council. Governor been seriously worried last few days by reports reaching him of possible disturbances; anyone’s guess who really responsible for assassinations; been fearful opposition groups would band together against AFPFL with view achieving its downfall; future is uncertain. Government House issuing this evening announcement today’s events; curfew will be imposed beginning 7 o’clock tonight. Now reported 1,000 Sten guns also obtained when 200 Sten guns mentioned my 601 released. Relay London as 145. Packer 91 Not printed; among the six members killed were Aung San and Thakin Mya. 92 Not printed. 93 Telegram 605, July 20, noon, from Rangoon, reported the arrest of U Saw and the formation of a new Executive Council under Thakin Nu, who would also be Counselor for Foreign Affairs (845C.00/7–2047). Further incriminating evidence against U Saw was reported in telegram 621, July 23, 2 p.m., from Rangoon (845C.00/7–2347). The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/7–2247: Telegram [Document 42] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret U.S. urgent London , July 22, 1947—7 p.m. 3993. Following obtained informally today from Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Burma Office. 1. While Rangoon murders have been great shock, Laithwaite found promptitude with which new government was formed under Thakin Nu, for whom he had a great respect and regard, a good augury for future. So far he has received no reports of trouble in Burmese countryside although “obviously Burma is powder keg at moment”. Both Government and Thakin Nu deserve great credit for their quick action in crisis. 2. Murders were “very puzzling business” particularly since they not associated with any opposition Putsch . He was reserving judgment on U Saw’s complicity but he thought quantity of arms uncovered in U Saw’s house is large even for present day Burma. He read Embassy impressive list of weapons, ammunition and hand grenades found at U Saw’s. Laithwaite regards it quite possible, as Tin Tut thinks (Embassy’s 3975 of July 21 94 ), that motive behind killings was political vendetta. When first report came in, Burma Office officials suspected Communists but no evidence has yet come to hand confirming these suspicions, and Than Tun, leader White Flag Communists who is Aung San’s brother-in-law, has issued statement of sympathy and appears to be working with new Government. No recent reports have been received regarding recent operations of Red Flag Communists. 3. As Attlee stated in Commons yesterday, murders will cause no change in British policy vis-à-vis Burma. 4. Only new development in immediate future will be agreed announcement to be issued in Rangoon and London in time for morning papers July 24. When goodwill mission to London finished talks July 2 an agreed announcement was worked out and referred to Aung San for approval. Aung San raised “some minor drafting points” and Thakin Nu returned to Burma to iron these out. After telegraphic exchanges of views with London, announcement was approved by Aung San and his government, probably one of Aung San’s last acts. Thakin Nu is anxious to get out announcement as soon as possible and July 24 is agreed date. Laithwaite hopes announcement will be of some help to Thakin Nu who led goodwill mission and upon whom credit may redound. 5. With explanation that text would be handed Department by British Embassy Washington prior to publication, 95 Laithwaite read announcement to Embassy representative. 6. Announcement indicates goodwill mission London reached agreement with British Government on following points. a . British Government is pledged to earliest possible transfer of power and to working out with Burmese representatives intermediate steps covering such questions as nationality, defense, finance, etc., while constituent assembly is sitting with a view to completing these talks by September when Burmese constitution is expected to be ready. b . British Government pledges itself to introduce Burmese independence legislation at beginning next session of Parliament. It is indicated clearly that Burmese themselves will choose their form of government. c . From date of announcement, interim government in Burma will be known as the Provisional Government. The announcement refers to the Burmese “Cabinet” and indicates that the title “councilor” will be replaced by the title “minister”. 7. Laithwaite said that c above is the section to which goodwill mission attaches importance since it will be cited as the measure of goodwill mission’s success. He said it was pretty obviously “just a change of labels”, constitutionally speaking the Councilors would be Ministers in name only, although actually they have full powers. Department please pass to Rangoon as 41. Douglas 94 Not printed; it mentioned an attempt some months earlier on the life of U Saw (845C.00/7–2147). 95 This was done on July 24. The agreement was made public the same day in London and Rangoon, and the new Burmese Provisional Government with Thakin Nu as Prime Minister was announced the same day. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 711.45C21/7–347: Telegram [Document 43] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon confidential Washington , July 25, 1947—6 p.m. 281. Deptel 279, July 25. 96 Note to Brit Emb agreeing appointment So Nyun did not raise question extent consular jurisdiction although Brit Emb was told informally that US position was unchanged. Make every effort secure from Thakin Nu satisfactory written answer along lines indicated urtel 550 July 3. 97 Answer should precede issuance press release suggested Deptel 211 June 6. Sent Rangoon, repeated London 3182. Marshall 96 Not printed; it reported that the Department was informing the British Embassy on July 25 that the request for agrément to appointment of U So Nyun as Ambassador of Burma to the United States had been approved (701.45C11/7–2547). 97 Not printed. In telegram 610, July 22, 8 a.m., from Rangoon, Mr. Packer reported he had suggested to the Burmese that his Government might find acceptable written assurance from the Government of Burma that it would (1) inform the British Government of its desire to recognize the consular district as including the whole of Burma and (2) in any case to recognize it at the earliest practicable moment (845C.00/7–2247). The Department replied in telegram 285, July 30, 1 p.m., that such assurance was satisfactory and should be obtained before, announcement of exchange of diplomatic representatives (845C.00/7–2247). The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/8–247: Telegram [Document 44] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , August 2, 1947—noon. 661. I called on Thakin Nu August 1. He was very cautious all his comments which summarized as follows: (1) Responsibility for assassinations. Does not feel he should comment concerning anyone’s guilt this stage. Special tribunal will be established try accused persons. (2) Legislative Council. No useful purpose served now by appointment Legislative Council; presumably Constituent Assembly will convert itself into provisional legislature after adoption constitution. 98 (3) Burma and Empire. Timing of transfer of Power to Burma dependent upon completion work Constituent Assembly September and action thereafter British Parliament in adopting necessary legislation. (4) Nationalization and attitude toward foreign capital. Premature state what policy be decided upon regarding nationalization. Regarding foreign capital, he asked what I had in mind. I said American nationals own stock in, for example, Burma Corporation and probably others including petroleum companies and asked attitude toward such American investments; also toward new capital which might help Burma’s reconstruction. He was reluctant give forthright answer, but indicated this question has been considered by Government. (His reluctance possibly due situation vis-à-vis Communists—see subsequent telegram—or possibly merely desire be evasive this time.) (5) Missionaries and their work. No reason to assume there will be any change Burma’s long-time policy toward missionaries; they are doing useful work. More follows. 99 Relay London 159. Packer 98 Telegram 781, September 16, from Rangoon, reported that the draft constitution, as approved by the Constitution Committee, was presented by Thakin Nu to the third session of the Constituent Assembly which convened on September 15 (845C.011/9–1647). 99 Telegram 666, infra . The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/8–447: Telegram [Document 45] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , August 4, 1947—3 p.m. 666. Continuing series mytel 661, August 2. 6. Unity with Communists. I referred Joshi letter (mytel 643, July 29 1 ) and asked if it were true that negotiations taking place for Communist unity. Thakin Nu replied little he could tell me on subject; since tragedy there was demand throughout country for unity for some satisfaction of this demand required; a strong leader generally recognized as such, like Aung San, in position act in certain way but his own position not yet established. Replying my hypothetical question he said if Communists rejoin AFPFL, some Communists probably be given portfolios in government. I commented on Communist tactics along lines Deptel 581 [ 58 ] 2 and suggested further it might be worth while considering what foreign reaction would be to inclusion Communists in new government if consideration not already given matter. I mentioned situation in Italy and France, also Communist obstructive tactics Security Council. He asked if I had any definite proof Communists in Burma in contact Moscow. I said been trying obtain information re existence or nonexistence such contact for months but with little success; he possibly had more information than I on subject; I personally thought probable some connection exists. I cited Joshi’s letter as evidence existence one source from which directions being sent from outside Burma to Communists in Burma and added Joshi presumably in touch Moscow (I inferred AFPFL decision on readmission Communists not yet taken. Am inclined basis foregoing believe such readmission and early appointment Communists to government portfolios likely. At present Thakin Nu apparently not member any political party). Thakin Nu said he had seen in London Aung Gyi (mytel 145, February 25 3 ) who had visited continent including Yugoslavia but not Russia. I asked if Aung Gyi had applied for Soviet visa; he replied he did not know. I said I assumed Aung Gyi had been in touch during empire Communist conference with Communists from Moscow which might be partial response his inquiry regarding contacts with Moscow. Relay London 160. Packer 1 Not printed. 2 February 11, p. 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] . 3 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 845C.00/8–547: Telegram [Document 46] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom confidential Washington , August 6, 1947—6 p.m. 3370. Rangoon’s telegram 672 Aug 5 follows: “Shwe Baw informs me that after his exposition at Cabinet meeting Aug 2 matter of US desire have all Burma included in consular district this office, telegram was sent HMG setting forth Burma’s desire accede our request. I told him Dept had recently again expressed its views (Deptel 281 July 25) to Brit Emb Washington. Shwe Baw has temporarily resumed his duties as Secretary Foreign Affairs Department at urgent request Thakin Nu. He hopes obtain long leave in about a month and may visit US. He believes So Nyun who now Secretary Council Ministers will relieve him as Secretary Foreign Affairs Department.” Dept would appreciate information re Brit reaction Burmese request for advice. Marshall The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 125.7557/8–947: Telegram [Document 47] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon confidential Washington , August 21, 1947—7 p.m. 314. Deptel 312 Aug. 20, repeated London 3590. 4 Brit Emb rep was informed Aug 20 of Dept’s hope remaining steps toward establishment Emb Rangoon and Bur Emb Washington would be taken promptly. He promised inquire of FonOff whether Agrément on So Nyun had been communicated GOB (urtel 693 Aug 13 5 ). In discussing matter we referred to your conversations with GOB re Rangoon consular district and stated we were somewhat surprised at seeming necessity for lengthy deliberations Rangoon and London this subject, Brit Emb rep stated his view this was matter for GOB decide and we agreed. We pointed out it was not our intention magnify consular district question into major political issue but it was our earnest hope GOB, would in due course concur in our viewpoint. We agreed in conclusion, negotiations should not continue be prolonged because of consular district question. In view foregoing Dept has no objection prompt, announcement (Deptel 211 June 6) at time suggested by GOB. 4 Sent Rangoon, repeated London 3611. Lovett 4 Not printed. 5 For statement released to the press simultaneously in Washington and Rangoon on September 18, see Department of State Bulletin , September 28, 1947, p. 648. 4 Not printed. The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 711.45C21/9–1647: Telegram [Document 48] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State restricted immediate Rangoon , September 16, 1947—10 a.m. 780. Received letter from So Nyun, Acting Secretary, Department Foreign Affairs, dated September 12, reading as follows (abbreviated verbatim text): “In reply your letter June 5, am directed ask you convey United States Government agreement Government of Burma remove in due course present limits consular district United States Consul General Rangoon. Formal action achieve that purpose will not however be taken till agreement is reached on text consular convention between two Governments.” See my despatch 365, June 14. 6 While I consider this reply somewhat ungraciously phrased, I recommend Department accept it as satisfactory in view all circumstances. 7 If Department approves, I will now present text (Department’s instruction June 20) proposed consular convention urging prompt action. Packer 6 Not printed, but see telegram 486, June 14, from Rangoon, p. 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] . 7 Mr. Packer explained in telegram 4, September 19, 1 p.m., that he was told the Burmese “intend give us what we asked for”. (711.45C21/9–1947) The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 711.45C/9–1947: Telegram [Document 49] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State restricted immediate Rangoon , September 19, 1947—9 a.m. 786. I am releasing following statement to press for publication Rangoon morning 20th (verbatim text). “Earl L. Packer, American Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, today issued the following statement: ‘The establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of diplomatic representatives between the United States and Burma is a milestone in the development of relations between the two countries, signifying American recognition of Burma’s changing political status. The Government of the United States is deeply interested in developments in Burma and west coast Asia and looks forward to Burma’s early emergence into full and independent statehood, with resulting possibilities for international collaboration in a peaceful world. The United States Government is hopeful that cultural and economic relations between Burma and the United States may develop to the mutual benefit of both countries.’” 8 Packer 8 Mr. Packer’s next telegram was numbered 1, September 19, 5:10 a.m., beginning a new series; it reported establishment of the Embassy on September 19, with himself in charge. Telegram 2, September 19, 10 a.m., indicated that the Consulate General had ceased to exist, but a consular section had been set up in the Embassy. In telegram 3, the same day, Mr. Packer reported that the Government of Burma would grant immediate agrément to appointment of a U.S. ambassador. (124.45C/9–1947) The Chargé in Burma (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/9–1947: Telegram [Document 50] The Chargé in Burma ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , September 19, 1947—11 a.m. [ p.m. ] 11. Made formal call as Chargé on FonMin afternoon 19th leaving with him formal note concerning my assumption Chargé and advance copy text release contained mytel 2 [ 786 ], September 19. In course conversation he stated reply not yet received from Russia concerning proposed diplomatic representatives. On question AFPFL-Communist reunion, he said such reunion would not occur in any case until after elections (note—probably 18 months or more away). Decision at that dependent Communist election strength. He said differences with Communists are personal. I expressed astonishment and said I thought they resulted largely from Communist attacks on Government while participating therein. He repeated assertion that differences personal, saying Communist “dirty fellows” and resorted unfair tactics. Purport Deptel 58, February 11, discreetly mentioned. He remarked is a Socialist and familiar with Communist tactics. Packer The Chargé in Burma (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.01/9–2647: Telegram [Document 51] The Chargé in Burma ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State Rangoon , September 26, 1947. 32. Yawnghwe Saopha unanimously elected Provisional President Union Burma and Thakin Nu unanimously elected Provisional Prime Minister Union Burma by Constituent Assembly 25th effective when constitution becomes effective. 9 Thakin Nu also authorized sign treaties. Assembly adjourned sine die . Packer 9 The draft constitution was adopted unanimously on September 24. In despatch 67, October 21, from Rangoon, Mr. Packer transmitted a text of Prime Minister Nu’s speech on this occasion and observed: “Russia’s unremitting propaganda regarding the ‘workers paradise’ has been effective among Burma’s present day AFPFL leaders.” (845C.011/10–2147) The Chargé in Burma (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/10–2447: Telegram [Document 52] The Chargé in Burma ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential Rangoon , October 24, 1947—5 p.m. 92. Mytels 77 and 78, October 17. 10 Called on Governor 18th accompanied by Acly. 11 Governor confirmed seriousness Karen situation (mytels 68, 13 and 70, October 14 12 ) said he had received letter from Karens for transmission Prime Minister Attlee stating they are in possession arms which do not intend surrender. He refused transmit officially but sent copy London informally. Burmese know situation exists but seem feel less serious than it actually is: they are making Smithdun, who is Karen and Sandhurst graduate, head of Burma Army which still under General Thomas. Latter will relinquish command Burma Army when British Military Mission shortly (mytel 46, October 2 13 ) begins function. This fact should tend allay Karen’s mistrust as Smithdun would not while filling this position use army against Karen. Burmese also appointing Karens to important local positions in Karen areas for purpose overcoming Karen suspicions. Karens continued distrustful particularly fearing long term situation not knowing what may be policy future Burmese leaders. Re Karenni states, representatives of which visited Rangoon some of whom participated work Constituent Assembly (mytel 13, September 22 13 ) Governor said, did not see how more representative delegation could have been sent from Karenni states. Ten representatives had come including all local Chiefs of State except in one case where brother of Saw Bwa had come instead of Saw Bwa, who had remained behind deal with any situation that might arise from return to Karenni of Boki, Karen leader who been causing difficulties some time. Relay to London as 13. Packer 10 Neither printed. 11 Robert A. Acly, Second Secretary of Embassy in Burma and Consul at Rangoon. 12 None printed. 13 Not printed. 13 Not printed. Memorandum by Mr. Edward Dahl, of the Division of South Asian Affairs, to the Chief of the Division (Hare) 845C.01/11–1047 [Document 53] Memorandum by Mr. Edward Dahl, of the Division of South Asian Affairs, to the Chief of the Division ( Hare ) 14 secret [ Washington ,] November 10, 1947. January 6, 1948 has been mentioned a number of times as the date on which Burma will achieve independence. Parliament is debating the treaty signed by Thakin Nu and Mr. Attlee on October 17, 1947. 15 The constitution which was approved by the Constituent Assembly on September 24, 1946 will be the basis of the Republic of the Union of Burma. 16 In the treaty the UK agreed to cancel £15,000,000 of the loan to Burma for ordinary budget and the frontier areas budget. This will leave a balance of only £5,000,000 in this category. There is, however, an additional loan of £25,000,000 (Total £30,000,000) expenditure on projects. There will be some nationalization as soon as the new government is in power, but it is not anticipated that this will be as drastic as one might believe. The outcome is unpredictable as this time, but it is believed that nationalization of industry, agriculture, etc. will be handled on different bases. The tribal situation has not been entirely solved by the acquiescence of the various leaders of the Shans, Kachins and Karens to join the union. The opposition among the Karens is particularly strong that the group of Karens who agreed to join the union were not a representative group. The Mons are also writing to various governments putting forward their plea for independence from the Union of Burma. The dacoity situation 17 has improved somewhat since the trip taken by Thakin Nu, the Prime Minister, and Than Tun, the Communist leader. The latest information we have is that the Government is organizing semi-private vigilante bands in order to capture or kill the dacoity leaders. The economic situation is particularly optimistic in that Burma anticipates exporting 1,500,000 tons of rice during the 1947–48 season. There is little doubt that the rice will be produced, but there may be a large carry-over because of the lack of shipping facilities. At the present time the First Secretary, U Myat Tun, is in Washington attending the IEFC conferences. 18 U Myat Tun is very anxious to, ship to Europe and has completed agreements to ship to some of the European countries. This is a very optimistic move as it shows Burma is eager to return to a pre-war shipping basis as soon as possible. The election of the Sawbwa of Yawnghwe, a Shan Chieftain, as Provisional President and later first President of the Union of Burma leads one to believe that the new Government of Burma will in truth he a union of the tribes and the Burmese. Although imports from the United States are restricted at the present time because of dollar shortage, these restrictions will be lifted in the case of non-luxury items soon after independence. There is every indication, however, that the spirit of nationalism is strong enough in Burma that the restrictions will not be lifted on luxury consumer items. 14 Notation on the original by Mr. Hare: “Ret’d with thanks. RAH”. 15 British Cmd. 7360: Burma—Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of Burma. 16 The Burma independence bill received royal assent on December 10; the act of Parliament was entitled “Burma Independence Act, 1947”, chapter 3 being “An Act to provide for the independence of Burma as a country not within His Majesty’s dominions and not entitled to His Majesty’s protection and for consequential and connected matters.” (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1947). 17 Reference to murderous robbers acting in gangs. 18 The Burmese Ambassador, U So Nyun, presented his credentials to President Truman on December 10. The Chargé in Burma (Packer) to the Secretary of State 845C.00/11–1347: Telegram [Document 54] The Chargé in Burma ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential immediate Rangoon , November 13, 1947—3 p.m. 151. Prime Minister informed me yesterday plans invite Communists to join AFPFL after Communists disarmed. Aware danger Trojan horse tactics but feels Burmese Communists not directed by Moscow while religiosity of masses precludes strong support for Communists. Indicated timing Communist readmission not immediate. 19 Re volume anti-U.S. stories in Burmese press suggesting launching counteroffensive but doubted potency mass propaganda since masses do not read press. Alternatively suggested concrete US assistance maternal and infant welfare as most efficient means winning favor masses. Indicated his retirement would occur 6 months after independence achieved and successor would be Bo Let Ya. 20 Stated recovery of arms from Karens would not be commenced at this time but politically impossible make public statement that effect. Packer 19 Telegram 163, November 19, 11 a.m., from Rangoon, reported the breakdown of negotiations between the AFPFL and Communists, with the former blaming the latter for student strikes, rice robberies, and opposition to the agreement with the United Kingdom (845C.00/11–1947). 20 Deputy Prime Minister after resignation from Burmese Army in September; Counselor for Defense since July. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma 811.42745C/12–1347: Telegram [Document 55] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma restricted Washington , December 19, 1947—6 p.m. 125. Suggest following re speech Embtel 200 Dec 13: 21 “Burma and the US today agreed to a program of educational exchanges whereby $200,000 (RS 660,000) per annum will be spent on projects of mutual benefit to the two countries. This is Burma’s first treaty with any foreign country to be signed in Burma. Blank signed for the Government of Burma, and R. Austin Acly, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the American Embassy, for the US. 22 The agreement sets up a US educational foundation in Burma to administer certain funds due the US Govt under the surplus property agreement signed at London on Feb 28, 1947, signed for Burma by U Kyin, Chief Secretary. That agreement provided for the payment of Burma of the rupee equivalent of $5,000,000 for railway locomotives and equipment, jeeps, trucks, river vessels, cranes, generators, and other equipment turned over by the US Govt to the Govt of Burma for civilian use. This agreement is very similar to the one signed with China on Nov 10, 1947. 23 Agreements are also being negotiated with the Republic of the Philippines, New Zealand, and are proposed for Iran, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Belgium, and other countries. The Fulbright Act, under which the educational foundation will operate, is predicated on a desire to cement international understanding and goodwill by developing interchanges of students, specialists, and scholars on an unprecedented scale. The Act provides that partial payment may be made in local currencies which will then be used by the US for educational purposes. The present agreement provides that $200,000 (RS 660,000) per year will be made available to the educational foundation for certain educational enterprises. These include the financing of ‘studies, research, instruction, and other educational activities of or for citizens of the USA in schools and institutions of higher learning located in Burma, or of the citizens of Burma in US schools and institutions of higher learning located outside the continental US, including payment for transportation, tuition, maintenance, and other expenses incidental to scholastic activities; or furnishing transportation for citizens of Burma who desire attend United States schools and institutions of higher learning in the continental US.’ It should be noted that only such enterprises as can be financed by grants of Burmese currency can be carried out in this program. Furthermore, grants may be made only to individuals, not to institutions. Due wartime losses suffered by Burmese institutions, this program may be of great importance to rehabilitation of the Burmese nation. However Americans will be sent only on invitation of Burmese institution concerned. One of greatest benefits lies in increasing knowledge, understanding, of Burma in US through American scholars who have taught or studied in Burma. The Fulbright program may make possible the translation of American text books into Burmese, payment of round trip passage in rupees to America for Burmese scholars proceeding for further education to the US, as well as teaching and research in institutions in Burma. The Foundation will have eight directors under the chairmanship of Dr. Frederick L. Jochem, Public Affairs Officer of the US Embassy. Doctor Tin Aung, U Cho, and Sao Saimong have been nominated by the GOB and appointed by the Chargé d’Affaires of the AmEmbassy as Burmese representatives on the Board. Other members will be Dr. J. Russell Andrus of AmEmbassy, Mr. Martin P. Detels, Jr., of the AmEmbassy Treasurer, and two American educators resident in Burma, as yet to be appointed. Agreement and program which it makes possible are a manifestation of the keen interest of the US and people in the welfare of Burma and her people.” Lovett 21 Not printed. 22 The agreement was signed by Tin Tut, Counselor for Foreign Affairs of Burma, and Chargé Acly at Rangoon, December 22; 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1814. Mr. Acly transmitted the original to the Department in despatch 304, December 23 (not printed). 23 61 Stat. (pt. 4) 3582. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma 845C.00/12–2947: Telegram [Document 56] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Burma 24 restricted Washington , December 29, 1947—1 p.m. 134. Deliver following message from President Truman to Sao Shwe Thaike, Saopha of Yawnghwe, President Union Burma January 4: “It is fitting that on this day, the day of the birth of a new nation, a sovereign independent republic, the Union of Burma, I should extend to you, to the Prime Minister and to the people of the Union, on behalf of the people of the United States of America, my sincere best wishes. We welcome you into the brotherhood of free and democratic nations and assure you of our firm friendship and goodwill, anticipating that the Union of Burma will take its rightful place among the nations of the world and by constructive participation will assist in the advancement of the welfare of all mankind. We in this country have confidence in the people of Burma and in their leaders. I am sure that our friendship will continue in the future and will be expressed in the same close and cordial relations as have existed in the past. Signed Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America.” The above will be released to the press for publication Washington papers morning 4th. Arrange release Rangoon papers. Lovett 24 Initialed by President Truman prior to dispatch. Editorial Note [Document 57] Editorial Note On December 29, Ambassador Edwin F. Stanton in Siam was designated President Truman’s Personal Representative with rank of Special Ambassador to attend the celebrations incident to the independence of Burma at Rangoon January 4 to 7, 1948. China China [For documentation regarding relations of the United States with China in 1947, see volume VII .] French Indochina French Indochina Contents The interest of the United States in nationalist opposition to the restoration of French rule in Indochina (Documents 58-166) The interest of the United States in nationalist opposition to the restoration of French rule in Indochina The interest of the United States in nationalist opposition to the restoration of French rule in Indochina 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , pp. 15 – 84 . For additional documentation on United States policy with respect to Indochina during 1947, see United States Department of Defense, United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967 , in 12 volumes (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971), Books 1 and 8. [58] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs [Washington,] January 3, 1947. 851G.00/1–347 [59] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, January 3, 1947—11 a.m. 851G.00/1–347: Telegram [60] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, January 3, 1947—7 p.m. 851G.00/1–347: Telegram [61] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, [January 3, 1947.] 851G.00/1–347: Telegram [62] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, January 6, 1947—9 a.m. 851G.00/1–647: Telegram [63] The Consul General at Singapore (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State Singapore, January 7, 1947—3 p.m. 851G.00/1–747: Telegram [64] The Secretary of state to certain Diplomatic Officers Washington, January 7, 1947—3 p.m. 851G.00/1–417: Circular telegram [65] The Minister in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State Bangkok, January 7, 1947—4 p.m. 851G.00/1–747: Telegram [66] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, January 8, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/1–347: Telegram [67] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) [Washington,] January 8, 1947. 851G.00/1–847 [68] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, January 8, 1947—7 p.m. 851G.00/1–747: Telegram [69] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, January 9, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/1–947: Telegram [70] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, January 9, 1947. 851G.00/1–947: Telegram [71] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, January 11, 1947—3 p.m. 851G.00/1–1147: Telegram [72] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, January 15, 1947—2 p.m. 851G.00/1–1547: Telegram [73] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, January 16, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/1–1647: Telegram [74] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, January 21, 1947—7 p.m. 851G.00/1–2147: Telegram [75] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, January 22, 1947—7 p.m. 851G.00/1–2247: Telegram [76] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, January 22, 1947—8 p.m. 851G.00/1–2247: Telegram [77] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, January 25, 1947—noon. 851G.711/1–2547: Telegram [78] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, February 3, 1947—8 p.m. 851G.00/2–347: Telegram [79] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, February 6, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/2–347: Telegram [80] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, February 6, 1947—2 p.m. 851G.00/2–647: Telegram [81] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, February 7, 1947—7 p.m. 851G.00/2–747: Telegram [82] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, February 7, 1947—10 p.m. 851G.00/2–747: Telegram [83] The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi Washington, February 12, 1947—6 p.m. 851G.00/2–1047: Telegram [84] The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi Washington, February 14, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/2–1047: Telegram [85] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, February 15, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/2–1547: Telegram [86] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, February 16, 1947—3 p.m. 851G.00/2–1647: Telegram [87] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, February 20, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/2–2047: Telegram [88] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, February 21, 1947—10 a.m. [Received February 25—12:35 a.m.] 851G.00/2–2147: Telegram [89] The Consul at saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, February 27, 1947—noon. 851G.00/2–2747: Telegram [90] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 3, 1947—7 p.m. 851G.00/3–347: Telegram [91] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 6, 1947—3 p.m. 851G.00/3–647: Telegram [92] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 6, 1947—4 p.m. 851G.00/3–647: Telegram [93] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 7, 1947—6 p.m. 851G.00/3–747: Telegram [94] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 19, 1947—7 p.m. 851G.00/3–1947: Telegram [95] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, March 24, 1947—6 p.m. 851G.00/3–1947: Telegram [96] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 27, 1947—2 p.m. 851G.00/3–2747: Telegram [97] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, March 28, 1947—8 a.m. 851G.00/3–2847: Telegram [98] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of state Hanoi, March 28, 1947—2 p.m. 851G.00/3–2847: Telegram [99] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, April 4, 1947—3 p.m. 851G.00/4–447: Telegram [100] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, April 4, 1947—4 p.m. 851G.00/4–447: Telegram [101] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi Washington, April 4, 1947—8 p.m. 851G.00/4–147: Telegram [102] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, April 11, 1947—8 a.m. 851G.00/4–1147: Telegram [103] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, April 11, 1947—11 a.m. 851G.00/4–1147: Telegram [104] The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State Bangkok, April 17, 1947—3 p.m. [Received April 19—8:35 p.m.] 851G.00/4–1747: Telegram [105] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, April 26, 1947—noon. 851G.00/4–2647: Telegram [106] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, April 28, 1947—3 p.m. 851G.00/4–2847: Telegram [107] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, May 2, 1947—11 a.m. 851G.00/5–247: Telegram [108] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon Washington, May 3, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/4–2947: Telegram [109] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, May 6, 1947—8 a.m. 851G.00/5–647: Telegram [110] The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State Bangkok, May 7, 1947—9 a.m. 851G.00/5–747: Telegram [111] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, May 7, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/5–747: Telegram [112] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, May 7, 1947—6 p.m. [Received May 10—10:18 a.m.] 851G.00/5–747: Telegram [113] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, May 9, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/5–947: Telegram [114] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, May 13, 1947—8 p.m. 851G.00/5–1347: Telegram [115] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, May 15, 1947—noon. 851G.00/5–1547: Telegram [116] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, May 21, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/5–2147: Telegram [117] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, May 23, 1947—6 p.m. 851G.00/5–2347: Telegram [118] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, May 29, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/5–2947: Telegram [119] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, June 5, 1947—2 p.m. 851G.00/6–547: Telegram [120] The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State Bangkok, June 13, 1947—2 p.m. [Received June 17—4:17 p.m.] 851G.00/6–1347: Telegram [121] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, June 14, 1947. 851G.00/6–1447 [122] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, June 17, 1947—7 p.m. 851G.00/6–1747: Telegram [123] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, June 24, 1947. [Received July 16.] 851G.00/6–2447 [124] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, July 3, 1947—4 p.m. 851G.00/7 347: Telegram [125] The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State Bangkok, July 9, 1947. 851G.00/7–947 [126] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, July 11, 1947. 851G.00/7–1147 [127] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, July 16, 1947—7 p.m. 851G.00/7–1647: Telegram [128] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, July 17, 1947—11 a.m. 851G.00/7–1747: Telegram [129] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon Washington, July 17, 1947—8 p.m. 851G.00/7–1747: Telegram [130] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 18, 1947. 851G.00/7–1847: Telegram [131] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, July 19, 1947—noon. 851G.00/7–1947: Telegram [132] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, July 19, 1947—6 p.m. 851G.00/7–1947: Telegram [133] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, July 21, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/7–2147: Telegram [134] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, July 24, 1947—noon. 851G.00/7–2447: Telegram [135] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, July 24, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/7–2447: Telegram [136] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, July 28, 1947—3 p.m. 851G.01/7–2847: Telegram [137] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, July 29, 1947. 851G.00/7–2947: Airgram [138] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, July 31, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/7–3147: Telegram [139] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) [Washington,] August 4, 1947. 851G.00/7–3147 [140] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 5, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/8–547: Telegram [141] The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State Bangkok, August 8, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/8–847: Telegram [142] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 11, 1947—1 p.m. 851G.00/8–1147: Telegram [143] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, August 12, 1947—8 a.m. 851G.00/8–1247: Telegram [144] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, August 19, 1947—noon. 851G.00/8–1947: Telegram [145] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, August 31, 1947—noon. 851G.00/8–3147: Telegram [146] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, September 11, 1947—noon. 851G.00/9–1147: Telegram [147] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, September 11, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/9–1147: Telegram [148] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France Washington, September 11, 1947—6 p.m. 851G.00/9–1147: Telegram [149] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, September 15, 1947—4 p.m. 851G.00/9–1547: Telegram [150] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, September 15, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/9–1547: Telegram [151] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon Washington, September 19, 1947—2 p.m. 851G.00/9–1547: Telegram [152] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, September 22, 1947—4 p.m. 851G.01/9–2247: Telegram [153] The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State Hanoi, September 24, 1947—8 a.m. 851G.00/9–2447: Telegram [154] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, September 26, 1947—11 a.m. 851G.00/9–2647: Telegram [155] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon Washington, September 29, 1947. 851G.00/9–1747 [156] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, October 6, 1947—noon. 851G.00/10–647: Telegram [157] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, October 18, 1947—2 p.m. 851G.01/10–1847: Telegram [158] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi Washington, October 22, 1947—noon. 851G.00/10–1747: Telegram [159] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, October 28, 1947—5 p.m. 851G.00/10–2847: Telegram [160] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, November 17, 1947—4 p.m. 851G.00/11–1747: Telegram [161] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, November 20, 1947. 851G.50/11–2047 [162] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, December 4, 1947—4 p.m. 851G.00/12–447: Telegram [163] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 16, 1947—6 p.m. 851G.00/12–1647: Telegram [164] The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 24, 1947—3 p.m. 851G.01/12–2447: Telegram [165] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State Saigon, December 26, 1947—11 a.m. 851G.00/12–2647: Telegram [166] The Consul General at Hong Kong (Hopper) to the Secretary of State Hong Kong, December 30, 1947. 851G.00/12–3047 Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs 851G.00/1–347 [Document 58] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs [ Washington ,] January 3, 1947. Participants: Mr. Tswen-ling Tsui, Counselor, Chinese Embassy Mr. Kenneth P. Landon 2 Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr. In the course of a conversation with Mr. Tsui, we referred to his previous suggestion that the American, British, and Chinese consuls in Hanoi 3 might independently and informally make known to the French authorities that their services were available if it appeared that they might be useful in the cause of peace. (Memorandum of Conversation of December 31 4 ). We said that we believed that our respective consuls were already acting along the lines of his suggestion in a practical situation which threatened needless suffering and pointed out that we had heard that the Chinese Consul General in Hanoi had received a proposal from the Vietnam military commander that, subject to French agreement, the Vietnam troops withdraw from the Chinese section of Hanoi, which might obviate a costly struggle and save many Chinese lives. We added that our Consul in Hanoi had asked if the Department perceived any objection to his being present unofficially as an observer of the withdrawal inasmuch as the Vietnamese might request his presence for the sake of the added sense of security which it might give them. We told Mr. Tsui that we had informed our Consul that we had no objection to his acting on humanitarian grounds in such a situation as that which he described, or—always with the agreement of the French—in any other strictly local, military, non-political situation with the object of saving lives. We emphasized, however, that we had instructed him in no circumstances to become involved in any situation in any manner which could be interpreted as an attempt to mediate a political issue. We further informed Mr. Tsui of our understanding that the British Consul in Hanoi had been authorized to lend his services in the withdrawal of the Vietnam troops, should this take place. Mr. Tsui stated that he had heard of none of these developments and expressed his appreciation of being informed of them. We pointed out that we had had no information as to whether anything had come of the Vietnam proposal to withdraw from the Chinese section of Hanoi. Mr. Tsui stated that if he received any news on this, point he would let us know. 2 Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs. 3 James L. O’Sullivan, Vice Consul; Arthur G. T. Wilson, Consul; and Yuen Tse-kien, Consul General, respectively. 4 Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 83 . The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–347: Telegram [Document 59] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State restricted Saigon , January 3, 1947—11 a.m. 4. Moutet 5 went to Hanoi yesterday; reportedly will return today. Official reticence as to whether will meet Ho 6 or other representative Vietnam Government but known French hope arrange cease-fire. In conversation with representative Socialist press, Moutet stressed desire settle conflict but reiterated French stand willing to give autonomy internal affairs but France to handle external relations and to maintain her legitimate economic interests. All this far less than Vietnam has claimed and far short of independence, but many Cochin-Chinese who formerly spoke of union and outright independence now speak of progressive independence. Continuance of isolated incidents in Cambodia and restored territories but on the whole, situation not unfavorable and French not uneasy. Dept please repeat to Paris. 7 Reed 5 Marius Moutet, Socialist, French Minister of Overseas France on a visit to Indochina. 6 Ho Chi Minh, “President of the Provisional Government of Vietnam Democratic Republic”. 7 Repeated to Paris January 4. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/1–347: Telegram [Document 60] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France confidential Washington , January 3, 1947—7 p.m. 21. Newsweek Jan 6 stated that though news not yet announced, US has already taken steps halt fighting Indochina and that last week Bonnet 8 was called in by Dept and told that (1) Indochinese settlement imperative, (2) affair could be brought up UN any time by any power and that US would not necessarily support France, (3) that US wishes ensure no lend-lease weapons being used suppress Vietnam and suspects they are being used, and (4) Moffat 9 is in area and would be glad assist both sides. For your info, of four numbered statements, three and one-half completely false. Only element truth was fact ActSecy suggested dispute might be brought up UN by third power. Dept replying press queries that ActSecy discussed Indochina with Bonnet Dec 23 (Deptel 6586 Dec 24 10 ). Tenor his remarks made public press conf Dec 27. (Radio bulletin No. 309). To this Dept has nothing add except statement Newsweek story pure specimen think-piece. You may make similar reply queries. Sent Paris 21. Repeated Saigon 1. Byrnes 8 Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador. 9 Abbot Low Moffat, Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs. 10 Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 77 . The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–347: Telegram [Document 61] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State secret Hanoi , [January 3, 1947.] 1. Have recently learned that Federal Information Service Saigon published news that Chinese Consul (actually Consul General) and myself in interview with General Morlière 11 December 21 “expressed without restriction their indignation at conduct of VN which they qualified as criminal and bestial folly”. On that date General Morlière, Acting Commissioner as Sainteny then in hospital with wound, called conference British Consul, Chinese Consul General, and myself (British Consul unable attend as he could not because of gun fire safely leave his residence). General Morlière expounded details Vietnamese attack night December 19 upon French. I made no statements (nor did Chinese Consul General) re Vietnamese, or their actions. I considered interview one of information which called for no declarations on my part. That General Morlière or Federal Information Service in Saigon should have seen fit to publish communiqué on meeting without consent or knowledge of participants I find most unusual. I do not understand at all fact that he (or Information Service) should attribute to them statements they did not make. O’Sullivan 11 Acting French Commissioner for Tonkin and North Annam and commanding French troops in that area. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–647: Telegram [Document 62] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State secret Hanoi , January 6, 1947—9 a.m. 6. Sainteny told me in recent interview that policy of France in northern Indochina is: a . to restore order; after order is restored, to allow Vietnamese to choose govt they desire, altho he said govt Vietnamese selected would have to respect accords signed. From recent conversations with various officials and military officers, it is apparent that they are agreed a period of military operations will be necessary. There is disagreement on length of such period but all agree it may be very long, at least 6 months to year. There is no agreement among them on what will follow period of military operations, that is on what kind of govt will result in northern Indochina. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan The Consul General at Singapore (Josselyn) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–747: Telegram [Document 63] The Consul General at Singapore ( Josselyn ) to the Secretary of State secret Singapore , January 7, 1947—3 p.m. 3. From Moffat. Revisited Bangkok yesterday, received latest information FIC from Hunter. 12 Although have not seen Reed and O’Sullivan reports, feel impelled as chief SEA urge prompt US action aimed terminate war Vietnam not only save countless lives but protect position US and other democracies SEA. Hands-off policy seems here based European considerations and temporary French political situation and appears as US approval French military reconquest Vietnam although in fact Vietnam record no worse than French. Even if French military campaigns successful, hatreds engendered will defeat French civil and economic objectives and threaten all western interests SEA. Doubt French ability establish effective puppet govt, proposal use Kuomintang trained personnel may prove trojan horse. Indo-China situation exceeds domestic issue. Developments already threaten adverse effect NEI. Soviet not directly active SEA and need not be as democracies performing most effectively their behalf. Moral leadership by US essential this area, hundred million people increasing nationalist. Better French elements FIC reported disgusted policy pursued by d’Argehlieu, 13 military and Colonials. Even these apparently would like, pull back if face can be saved. Earnestly urge US—even this late date—endeavor mediate seek truce and political settlement. For Reasons stated mytel from Saigon, 14 third party action seems essential. Because of recent French action believe permanent political Solution can now be based only on independent Vietnam (alternative is giganic armed colonial camp), but confident still possible secure full protection French property, interests and culture, predominance French foreign advisers, members FIC Economic Union Cambodia and Laos, and close treaties with or even membership in French Union. Repeat again deep need for US moral leadership increasingly critical situation this political, economic and strategic area. Urge again I return Dept instead Canberra. [Moffat] 15 Josselyn 12 Lt. William H. Hunter, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in Siam. 13 Adm. Thierry d’Argenlieu, French High Commissioner in Indochina. 14 Telegram 479, December 12, 1946, not printed. 15 The Department replied to Mr. Moffat in telegram 13, January 10, 4 p.m., to Singapore, that this suggestions had been carefully studied. In this telegram the efforts made to date were reviewed and the opinion expressed that everything possible was being done. It was also indicated that no other qualified officer was available for the Canberra Conference at that late date. (851G.00/1–747) With regard to the conference to consider establishment of a regional advisory commission for non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific, see Department press release of January 4, Department of State Bulletin , January 12, 1947, p. 51; for report on the conference, see ibid. , March 16, 1947, p. 459. The Secretary of state to certain Diplomatic Officers 851G.00/1–417: Circular telegram [Document 64] The Secretary of state to certain Diplomatic Officers 16 secret Washington , January 7, 1947—3 p.m. Nav Attaché Bangkok 17 reports French now trying clear lines Saigon to Cambodian border using all French Indochina reserves. These troops and 16,000 now en route from France then be thrown into all out reconquest Tonkin where puppet Govt may be set up. This is plan of d’Argenlieu and LeClerc, 18 with Moutet wavering as leftists Saigou reportedly favor reopening negotiations with Ho. Final decision be made when Moutet returns Paris Jan 16. Byrnes 16 At Paris. 17 Comdr. Alfred W. Gardes, Jr. 18 Maj. Gen. Jacques-Philippe Leclerc, Inspector General of French Armies in North Africa, formerly Commander in Chief of French Forces in the Far East. The Minister in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–747: Telegram [Document 65] The Minister in Siam ( Stanton ) to the Secretary of State confidential Bangkok , January 7, 1947—4 p.m. 28. 1. For some time representatives in Bangkok of free Lao and free Cambodian Govts have been working on memo which would set out in brief form history of relation of states of Lao[s] and Cambodia with France, their grievances against French Govt and conclude with statement their hopes for independence and ultimate establishment federation of states of Southeast Asia. More recently local representatives Vietnam Govt have been drawn into and participated in preparation and drafting this document. 2. This document after many revisions signed on January 1, 1947 by principal representatives in Bangkok of free Lao and free Cambodian groups as well as representative Vietnam Govt and contained appeal to US and UN intervene without delay in situation Indo-China. However, after further consideration, these representatives decided address appeal directly to Secretary General UN 19 omitting request for intervention by US. 3. This document given recently by Prince Suphanavan, one of free Lao leaders Bangkok, to Military Attaché 20 at which time former expressed hope it might be transmitted to Secretary General of UN thru diplomatic channels. In view present developments Indo-China and other impending developments mentioned following paragraphs it seems advisable to me this document reach Secretary General at early date. I have therefore told Military Attaché he might tell Prince Suphanavan that Legation will endeavor to see that this memo reaches Secretary General of UN. Copy of memo being forwarded to Dept by Legation. 21 4. Memo as finally drafted is fairly objective presentation of views and aspirations of the three states. Perhaps two most significant features of document are firstly advocacy of United States or federation of countries of Southeast Asia comprising Burma, Siam, the Malay Federation, United States of Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and secondly that memo is joint document signed by representatives of free Cambodians, free Laos and Vietnam Govt. 5. As indicated in mytel 7, January 4, 22 conditions in provinces of Battambang and Lao territories recently returned to French have been reasonably quiet since retrocession but as indicated in that message it could hardly be expected that free Laos and free Cambodians would remain inactive for any length time. Vietnam Govt by radio and thru its various agents has naturally been working among free Cambodians and free Laos in effort enlist their open support against French and there are numerous indications these efforts have met with favorable and in some instances enthusiastic response. As further indication of probable action by these groups, Military Attaché reports that Tao Au and Prince Suphanavan, two free Lao leaders, have left Bangkok and are headed for Lao territory and that they and their subordinates have dropped vague hints indicating that free Laos hope to be able to oust French from Luang Prabang, force abdication present Lao King and place on throne one of their own number, possibly Prince Petseath. 23 6. While Legation has only limited knowledge of recent development in Indo-China, particularly Tonkin area, it appears to me that situation is steadily deteriorating, that present hostilities between Vietnamese and French are likely to spread and that free Laos and free Cambodians may be expected at any time to join in attacks on French, feeling that present developments furnish opportunity achieving their aspirations by force. Result therefore may well be that virtually all of Indo-China will be engulfed in vengeful strife which will still further embitter relations between native peoples of Indo-China and French and result in general chaos. It is also conceivable that neighboring countries in Southeast Asia may become either directly or indirectly involved. It is certain that sympathies of such neighboring countries as Siam, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia lie with Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians. Serious and widespread conflagration in Indo-China is therefore matter which may very definitely affect peace of Southeast Asia. In these circumstances it appears to me that situation in Indo-China is one which very definitely comes within purview of UN and more particularly of Security Council. It also raises the question of what if anything US could do by way of offering its good offices to assist in preventing spread of hostilities and in working out of just and equitable solution. It is therefore my earnest hope that Dept will give this whole problem most careful consideration with view to taking such steps as seem desirable and advisable either by offering its good offices or causing this serious situation to be considered by Security Council at early date. 24 7. Dept please repeat to Saigon and Paris. Stanton 19 Trygve Lie. 20 Col. Reginald F. C. Vance. 21 Despatch 244, January 13, not printed. 22 Not printed. 23 Prince Phetsarat, former Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Luang-Prabang, living in Bangkok. 24 The Department replied in telegram 14, January 8, 7 p.m., in part as follows: “Dept approves efforts secure info concerning current developments Indochina but does not consider Dept proper channel transmit memoranda to SC from ‘free’ groups claiming represent nationalist movements Indochina. You should therefore return document in question.” (851G.00/1–747) A circular telegram dated January 9, 4 p.m., was sent to London, Moscow, and Nanking, reporting this exchange and adding: “Before taking further action re Indochina we await French official statement after Moutet’s return Paris.” (851G.00/1–947) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/1–347: Telegram [Document 66] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France secret Washington , January 8, 1947—1 p.m. 59. Following is text of unnumbered, undated tel from Hanoi received Jan 3: [Here follows text of telegram 1, January 3, page 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] .] Saigon Tel 494, Dec 23, 25 reported official communiqué had quoted Amer, Chinese Consuls Hanoi as characterizing Vietnam action as criminal folly and bestial. Dept extremely surprised this attempt local French place US in partisan position. Request you call attention FonOff this matter, taking view, in consideration O’Sullivan’s denial, that correction should be made through Federal Information Service Saigon if such was channel of distribution original communiqué, and through whatever other channels were employed. You may say Consul Saigon expressing same view High Commissioner. 26 Saigon be guided by above Sent to Paris 59. Repeated Saigon 4. Byrnes 25 Not printed. 26 In telegram 192, January 16, noon, from Paris, the Embassy reported taking up this matter with the Foreign Office which felt it could best be arranged in Saigon between Admiral d’Atgenlieu and Consul Reed (8510.00/1–1647). Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) 851G.00/1–847 [Document 67] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Acheson ) [ Washington ,] January 8, 1947. Mr. Acheson : Lacoste, Minister in the French Embassy, called this afternoon by appointment. He referred to your conversation of some two weeks ago with Ambassador Bonnet and to the Ambassador’s statement at the time that he would inform the French Government of our views and communicate back to us the views of the French Government. Lacoste said he was under instructions to state that the French Government appreciated the understanding attitude that Mr. Acheson had shown in discussing the problem of Indochina; that it had taken note of Mr. Acheson’s offer of “good offices” and appreciated the spirit in which the offer was made; and that the French Government did not feel that it could avail itself of our offer but must continue to handle the situation single-handedly along the lines stated by Moutet. Lacoste went on to say that the principal objective of the French military was to restore order and reopen communications. He said that after this was done the French Government would be prepared to discuss matters with the Vietnamese. He said that the French Government had every intention of living up to the agreement of, last March 6 27 and the modus vivendi of September 15, 28 once order was restored. I asked him whether he thought the French military could restore order within any foreseeable future time. He seemed to think, without much evidence of conviction, that they could. 29 Mr. Lacoste then described to me at some length the acts of perfidy and cruelty on the part of the Vietnamese. He gave me detailed accounts of atrocities, etc., etc. I expressed my sympathy for the French who had suffered in this manner. I then repeated to him that, although we had no ready-made solution for the Indochina problem, we were greatly concerned over it and continued ready to be helpful should an appropriate occasion arise. Speaking personally, I told him that I thought there was one flaw in the French approach to the problem worth mentioning. I had in mind an apparent assumption by the French that there was an equality of responsibility as between the French and the Vietnamese. I said that this did not seem to me to be the case; that the responsibility of France as a world power to achieve a solution of the problem was far greater than that of the Vietnamese; and that the situation was not one which could be localized as a purely French-Vietnamese one but might affect adversely conditions throughout Southeast Asia. Mr. Lacoste quickly substituted the word “authority” for “responsibility” and said that the French were now faced with the problem of reasserting their authority and that we must share the responsibility for their delay in doing so because we had not acceded to French requests in the autumn of 1945 for material assistance. Seeing that I was more amused than impressed with his argument, he said that he fully understood what I was driving at and that he knew it was the earnest hope of the French Government to arrive at a peaceful solution for the Indochinese situation as soon as possible. J[ ohn ] C[ arter ] V[ incent ] 27 See telegram 20, March 7, 1946, 7 p.m., from Saigon, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 32 . 28 See telegram 4671, September 17, 1946, 5 p.m., from Paris, ibid. , p. 59 . 29 In reporting this interview in telegram 89, January 9, 3 p.m., to Paris, the Department said it hoped “this does not represent definitive crystallization Fr view that problem is purely internal. Less dangerous situations have been raised in SC in past.” (851G.00/1–947). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/1–747: Telegram [Document 68] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France secret Washington , January 8, 1947—7 p.m. 74. Bangkok’s Jan 7 reptd to you. In the light of reports from Saigon, Hanoi and Bangkok we are increasingly concerned about the situation as it has developed in Indochina. The press knows of Bonnet’s call at the Dept on Dec 24 and we have indicated to the press (see Bulletin 309) that we are awaiting the Moutet reports. With the situation in Indochina we can (therefore expect increased public interest over here. In the light of reports we have been receiving from the area and which have been repeated to you the situation in Indochina can no longer be considered to be a purely local or internal matter. We are therefore vitally interested in such decisions as the French Govt may reach following Moutet’s return to Paris and as a result of the reports which he will no doubt make. We naturally hope that an equitable solution can be found which will bring an end to hostilities in Indochina. I feel that it will be useful for you to have an informal talk with Blum reiterating our interest in this matter as was done here with Bonnet (Embtel [ Deptel ] 6586 Dec. 24 30 ) and express the hope that the French will be willing to keep us fully informed of developments. 31 Sent Paris as 74 reptd for info to Saigon as 5, Hanoi as 4, Bangkok as 16. Byrnes 30 Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 77 . 31 The Ambassador in France, Caffery, reported in telegram 237, January 17, 9 p.m., as follows: “I spoke of the Indo-Chinese situation with Leon Blum today. He fully appreciates our point of view and will, I feel sure, convey that fact to President Auriol as well as to the ministers in the new government.” (851G.00/1–1747) This was reported by the Department in telegram 14, January 20, 7 p.m., to Saigon and repeated in 9 to Hanoi. The French National Assembly and the Council of the Republic had elected Vincent Auriol as President on January 16, and a new cabinet under Premier Paul Ramadier was confirmed on January 21. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–947: Telegram [Document 69] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State secret Hanoi , January 9, 1947—1 p.m. 11. Vietnam Government appears working for Chinese intervention in Indo-China. Vietnamese seem to be taking every precaution possible to protect Chinese lives and property (as they have also tried to protect other foreigners—one American caught in battle area was even given turkey for Christmas by Vietnamese authorities). Ho Chi Minh recently addressed via Vietnamese radio very conciliatory letter to Vietnam’s friend “China” in marked contrast to Ho’s attitude when Chinese forces occupation here. Within last week, Chinese Consul General has grown increasingly critical French inability protect Chinese citizens of whom he claims there are 150,000 in Tonkin with 100,000 in areas not controlled by French (pre-war census lists 50,000 Chinese in Tonkin and it seems doubtful number has tripled since that time). Should Chinese Consul General[’s] negotiation for peaceful settlement [of] fate Chinese [quarter] Hanoi break down and French attack, Chinese protest would seem possible. 32 Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 32 For solution, see telegram 19, January 16, and footnote 37, p. 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] . The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–947: Telegram [Document 70] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State Saigon , January 9, 1947. 11. In the final broadcast before departure, Moutet said in summary that purpose French Government remains, as always, peace; that France does not renounce policy of agreements; that France opposes campaign of oppression; that France will protect herself, and will not yield to violence; that France has always desired the free association in the French Union and Indo-Chinese federation between the peoples who can freely govern themselves; that reestablishment of peaceful order means protection of lives and property of French, Chinese, and Indo-Chinese, and does not mean colonial war; that France will not go back on her word, and desires negotiate in security with true representatives of Vietnam people who are decided to apply loyally agreements freely entered into; that he has never considered military decision as substitute for peace, so hopes will come soon. Not repeated to Paris. Reed The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–1147: Telegram [Document 71] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State secret Hanoi , January 11, 1947—3 p.m. 13. Have received from Viet-Namese sources copies of documents Ho Chi Minh wished to present Moutet (Viet-Namese Government apparently bitterly disappointed Moutet and Ho did not meet. Viet-Namese state messenger bearing letter of invitation for Moutet disappeared. French say letter never received). Paragraph from document which seems authentic, Ho was prepared to propose following to resolve present crisis: ( a ) Cease fire order supervised by mixed commissions on all fronts, troops returning to positions defined, by accord March 6 and staff agreement April 3 with release all prisoners political and otherwise; ( b ) Stop all reinforcements en route Indo-China; ( c ) Immediate meeting qualified representatives both Govts (Moutet and Ho) to organize referendum Cochin-China, treat diplomatic relations Viet-Nam with exterior, question of Indo-China Federation and place of Viet-Nam in French Union. 33 In view evolution situation French would have refused accept return of troops to positions defined April 3 agreement which Ho obviously knew. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 33 Copies of documents were forwarded in despatch 179, February 7, from Saigon; they were finally delivered to Commissioner Sainteny about February 3, according to despatch 7666, February 20, from Paris, which also reported that the covering letter was dated January 9, the day after Minister Moutet’s departure (851G.00/2–2047). Consul Reed pointed out that only the Vietnamese side was presented in these documents. He concluded that “In the last analysis, it is certain that both sides have made mistakes, have violated the various agreements, and have thus precipitated the present conflict.” (851G.00/2–747) In his telegram 56, February 12, from Saigon, he reported that the press had published a Vietnamese communiqué at Paris which declared the conflict was becoming an international question and repeated earlier arguments (851G.00/2–1147). The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–1547: Telegram [Document 72] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , January 15, 1947—2 p.m. 181. Moutet, on his own suggestion, gave me last night a detailed account of what he had heard and seen in Indo-China, also showing me a number of pictures of mutilated persons as well as a number of captured papers and documents showing how the Vietnam planned and prepared the surprise attack on the evening of December 19. According to these papers and Moutet’s declaration, it seems reasonably certain that the Vietnam had planned a general Massacre of French troops and civilians as Well as native and Only 2 hours before the time fixed for the general attack, the French authorities were warned by their agents that the attack was impending and therefore a general massacre was avoided. Most of what Moutet told me and much of the contents of the papers I saw have appeared in one way or another in public print. Moutet went on to remind me of his well-known advanced Views as well as his life-long activities on behalf of native inhabitants of French overseas possessions. However, he alleges he was struck by the fact that the massacre was planned for the day it had been publicly announced that he was due to arrive in Indo-China and he affirms that he was so shocked at what he heard and saw there that he is now convinced that it is essential that the French carry out successful military activities at a very early date; not involving, however, anything in the nature of a military conquest of the country Which he declares is unnecessary because most of the Annamite not behind the small Communist group which now dominates, and which is composed, he says, of a coterie of Moscow-trained young men. He does not believe that Ho Chi Minh or his Government have any real authority now. He says that he believes that Ho Chi Minh and most of his colleagues did not approve the attempted massacre but “went along” when they saw that they had been out-maneuvered and outplayed by the extremists. He says that no attempt, whatever, was made by anyone either in the Vietnam Government or extremist group (he is vague about this “group”) to get in touch with him and he is not at all clear as to how or with whom they must eventually negotiate. In any event, once the military situation takes a definite turn for the better, France must carry out its promises in regard to future relations with the Governments of Indo-China. He described his visit to the regions recently retroceded by Siam 34 and was effusive in his thanks for what our Government had done in that connection. I stated with emphasis our concern over the Indo-Chinese situation and told him that obviously that situation affects other areas also and that we are frankly perturbed at the way things are going. Moutet said that he could well appreciate our point of view. As the Department is aware, it is hot yet known who will take part in the next French Government which is to be formed within the next few days and Moutet may not remain in the Cabinet; also Blum is to return from London tomorrow but it is not now known whether he will remain in office. 35 Caffery 34 For documentation on the settlement of the Siamese-French Indochina boundary dispute, see Foreign Relations , 1946, Vol. viii , pp. 978 ff. 35 With regard to the new French Government, see footnote 31, p. 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] . Minister Moutet remained in office in the new Cabinet. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–1647: Telegram [Document 73] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State secret Hanoi , January 16, 1947—1 p.m. 19. About 6,000 Vietnamese (all of whom departed for Vietnam controlled areas) and 500 Chinese (most of whom remained Hanoi) left Chinese quarter Hanoi yesterday under arrangements made by Chinese Consul General with Tu Ve 36 in that area. Chinese Consul General very vague about how he made these arrangements but I believe bribery may have been used. This leaves about 10,000 Chinese, 600 Hindus, and unknown numbers Vietnamese still in quarter. Yesterday’s scheduled meeting of Consuls with Vietnamese authorities, reference questions of remaining neutrals Chinese quarter and French hostages, was postponed by military operations. It is now tentatively set for January 17. 37 Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 36 Armed anti-French force holding the Chinese quarter of Hanoi. 37 The meeting took place on January 21 when the Vietnamese promised to release “neutrals” (non-French) and hinted that French persons might be visited by the International Red Cross. On January 24 a further evacuation of the Chinese quarter at Hanoi occurred. Before the final evacuation on February 20 could take place, the quarter was abandoned by armed Vietnamese. In telegram 62, February 18, from Hanoi, Vice Consul O’Sullivan stated: “This solves thorny military and political problems for France and is due largely efforts of Chinese Consul General.” (851G.00/2–1847) The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–2147: Telegram [Document 74] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State secret London , January 21, 1947—7 p.m. 444. Department’s telegram 335, January 20. 38 1. Indo-China situation discussed at Foreign Office 21st. Following highlights discussion: ( a ) British were prepared discuss Indo-Chinese situation with Blum provided he raised question. Blum did not do so and therefore Indo-China was not discussed in Blum talks here. ( b ) Foreign Office unable to predict whether Indians propose raise Indo-China issue UN. Foreign Office has no evidence Indians will do so but points out Indian politicians unpredictable and now virtually independent of British influence. ( c ) French Embassy complained informally to Foreign Office over anti-French and pro-Vietnam statements attributed Nehru 39 and Aung San, 40 but was told British Government could accept no responsibility therefor. ( d ) During last fortnight or so French have flown about 20 aircraft through India and Burma to Indo-China. British approved flights but requested French to space flights so as not to create undue attention India and Burma and possibility of Indian and Burmese objection. ( e ) Foreign Office unable hazard prediction whether India and Burma will endeavor provide substantial material support Vietnam regime. Thus far India has given no such support while in Burma support limited to about 100 volunteers. Foreign Office view is neither India nor Burma in position grant any important support Vietnam. ( f ) British Embassy Paris after discussions with French Foreign Office sees little prospect clarification French policy for fortnight after formation new government, it being felt at least that much time will be needed consider Moutet’s report and recommendations. Meantime French probably will continue military operations and strengthening of forces in Indo-China. ( g ) Foreign Office has no evidence Siam Government overtly supporting Vietnam or other anti-French elements Indo-China. Foreign Office of view Siamese would scarcely risk such activities at this juncture but might adopt such policy in event of disintegration French authority Indo-China. 2. Foreign Office states it much concerned over Indo-China situation particularly in reference possible adverse repercussions in India, Burma and Indonesia. But we gather from our talks with Foreign Office officials that Foreign Office has formulated no clear and positive proposals for coping with situation should it continue to deteriorate. British obviously hope French and Vietnam will be able speedily to reconcile differences but they apparently feel such hopes have little chance of materializing in light present developments. Meanwhile British await policy clarification new French Government and trust it will devise policy mutually satisfactory to France and Vietnam. 3. Foreign Office states it would welcome our views on steps that might be taken to harmonize French-Vietnam relations. Sent Department 444, repeated Paris 99. Gallman 38 Not printed; it requested that the British Foreign Office views be sounded out and stated that the French Government was “fully advised our concern and Caffery has personally reiterated Blum informally our interest and desire be kept fully informed”. (851G.00/1–2047) 39 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Executive Councilor for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of the Indian Interim Government. 40 U Aung San, Deputy Chairman of the Burman Executive Council and head of Burma Mission to London. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–2247: Telegram [Document 75] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential Paris , January 22, 1947—7 p.m. 289. Careful reading of that portion of Ramadier’s speech yesterday re Indochina disclose certain points of interest: (1) Prime Minister was extremely firm and categoric on necessity of putting down present disorders and restoring order and security. “We must relieve our garrisons, re-establish essential communications and assure the security of the peoples who have taken refuge with us”. (2) He confirmed indications that France will not negotiate with present Vietnam Government in anticipation that new more moderate leaders will arise. (3) At such time France will consent to inclusion of Cochinchina in Vietnam and will not insist on Vietnam membership in French Union being indirect through membership in Indochinese federation. (When time conies for negotiations) “France will not fear, if the population desires it, the union of the three Annamite countries, nor will she refuse to accept the independence of the Vietnam in the framework of the French Union”. 41 Department please repeat to Saigon as 2 from Paris. Caffery 41 Telegram 334, January 24, 9 p.m., from Paris reported that the words “and the Indo-Chinese Federation” were added to this quotation as published in the Journal Officiel of January 21 (851G.00/1–2447). The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/1–2247: Telegram [Document 76] The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State secret Nanking , January 22, 1947—8 p.m. 122. During course of a call by Embassy officer on Foreign Office official in connection with another matter, latter vouchsafed information that French in Indo-China had felt out Chinese officials there regarding possibility of a new regime headed by Bao Dai 42 (reported to be in Hong Kong) in executive capacity with support of Annamite Nationalist Party. Foreign Office official indicated any revival imperial idea in this area would be unsatisfactory to China. Informant also gave his opinion that French were determined not to treat with Ho Chi-Minh, and that calculated purpose of Moutet’s recent mission to Indo-China was to retrieve French position by rupture of agreement with Ho, which Moutet had signed. Stuart 42 Former Emperor of Annam, known also as Nguyen Vinh Thuy. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.711/1–2547: Telegram [Document 77] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential Paris , January 25, 1947—noon. 336. Question of censorship in Indochina discussed with Baudet 43 last evening. He said that a message had been sent to d’Argenlieu pointing out the possible injurious effect on American public opinion of censorship policy recently adopted. Baudet added, however, that Foreign Office did not feel it had the authority to issue instructions to d’Argenlieu on a matter which is considered to be a military question. 44 Caffery 43 Philippe Baudet, Director of the Asiatic Division of the French Foreign Office. 44 Despatch 187, February 19, from Saigon, gave a detailed account of steps taken since mid-November to control the dissemination of information in Indochina and the flow of information out of Indochina. As the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat) commented in a memorandum of March 7, “the picture of the censorship exercised by the French as it appears in this despatch is that of a totalitarian regime at its worst.” The Department on April 28 commended the writer of the despatch for compiling “this discerning and comprehensive report on a subject of the greatest interest to the Department.” (851G.918/2–1947) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/2–347: Telegram [Document 78] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France secret us urgent Washington , February 3, 1947—8 p.m. 431. There is reason for increasing concern over situation as it is developing in Indochina and for that reason I feel you might well take early occasion to have frank talk with Ramadier or Bidault 45 or both somewhat along lines conversations you have already had with Blum, but at this time going in fact beyond position you took in those talks. We have only very friendliest feelings toward France and we are anxious in every way we can to support France in her fight to regain her economic, political and military strength and to restore herself as in fact one of major powers of world. In spite any misunderstanding which might have arisen in minds French in regard to our position concerning Indochina they must appreciate that we have fully recognized France’s sovereign position in that area and we do not wish to have it appear that we are in any way endeavoring undermine that position, and French should know it is our desire to be helpful and we stand ready assist any appropriate way we can to find solution for Indochinese problem. At same time we cannot shut our eyes to fact that there are two sides this problem and that our reports indicate both a lack French understanding of other side (more in Saigon than in Paris) and continued existence dangerously outmoded colonial outlook and methods in area. Furthermore, there is no escape from fact that trend of times is to effect that colonial empires in XIX Century sense are rapidly becoming thing of past. Action Brit in India and Burma and Dutch in Indonesia are outstanding examples this trend, and French themselves took cognizance of it both in new Constitution and in their agreements with Vietnam. On other hand we do not lose sight fact that Ho Chi Minh has direct Communist connections and it should be obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial empire administrations supplanted by philosophy and political organizations emanating from and controlled by Kremlin. Fact does remain, however, that a situation does exist in Indochina which can no longer be considered, if it ever was considered, to be of a local character. If that situation continues deteriorate some country in direct interest is very likely to bring matter before Security Council under Chapter 11 of Charter. We have no intention taking such action ourselves at this time, but French will surely appreciate that we do have a vital interest in political and economic well being this area. If some country should bring matter before Security Council we would find it difficult to oppose an investigation Indochinese problem unless negotiations between parties were going on. It might be added that it would not in our estimation be in France’s long-range interest to use her veto position to keep matter from coming before Council. Frankly we have no solution of problem to suggest. It is basically matter for two parties to work out themselves and from your reports and those from Indochina we are led to feel that both parties have endeavored to keep door open to some sort of settlement. We appreciate fact that Vietnam started present fighting in Indochina on December 19 and that this action has made it more difficult for French to adopt a position of generosity and conciliation. Nevertheless we hope that French will find it possible to be more than generous in trying to find a solution. 46 Marshall 45 Georges Bidault, French Minister for Foreign Affair. 46 This telegram was repeated in 612, February 6, 4 p.m., to London, for the information of the British Foreign Office. The Department added that it would be interested in British views with regard to possible settlement of the Indochina problem and also as to any steps looking toward establishment of peace if the impasse were to continue. (851G.00/1–2947) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/2–347: Telegram [Document 79] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 47 secret us urgent Washington , February 6, 1947—1 p.m. 469. Reference to Chapter XI of Charter contained in Deptel 431, Feb. 3, did not mean to indicate that matter could be brought to SC attention under Chapter XI as violation of declaration regarding non-self-governing territories. Before situation in Indochina could be brought to SC’s attention, conditions of Chapter VI must be met, i.e., complaining state must allege a dispute or situation of the nature referred to in Art 34 of Charter. It is possible that state bringing complaint might argue before SC that France has violated the principles of Chapter XI. Such a line of argument was put forward in Indonesian case before SC in London. 48 Re reference to possible use of veto, by France, it should be made clear that under Four Power Declaration made at San Francisco and SC practice veto cannot be used to prevent matters coming before Council and that Dept believes it would not be in France’s long-range interest to use her veto to prevent substantive Council action. Marshall 47 Repeated in telegram 671, February 10, 6 p.m., to London. 48 For American position on Indonesian case at the United Nations Security Council, see footnote 2, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 787 . The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/2–647: Telegram [Document 80] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State 49 secret Paris , February 6, 1947—2 p.m. 524. This morning I put squarely before Bidault the matters set out in Department’s 431, February 3. He said that he was appreciative of our interest and grateful for our friendly expressions but that he wanted to make the most express reservations from a juridical point of view in regard to a country in direct interest bringing the matter before the Security Council under Chapter II of the Charter observing that if that were done for Indochina some other country might do it also for Algeria or even Corsica. The French Government he said is perfectly aware that the day of colonial empires in the Nineteenth Century sense of the word is a thing of the past. He added that the French Government has kept the door open to some sort of settlement; that the French Government would without question be generous and conciliatory in trying to find a solution: in fact, Admiral Thierry D’Argenlieu’s secret recommendation that the French Government make a public statement that it would not deal with Ho Chi Minh’s Government has been categorically rejected and the Admiral’s resignation is being accepted. He is to be replaced by General Leclerc who Bidault remarked dislikes D’Argenlieu and will adopt a policy as far removed from D’Argenlieu’s as possible. “However” he said “please keep this extremely confidential because if de Gaulle 50 finds out that Leclerc is going out there he will get hold of him, poison his mind and upset our apple cart”. “You may assure your Government that we are more than anxious to find a peaceable liberal solution in Indochina and to find it as soon as possible.” 51 Caffery 49 Repeated in telegram 643, February 7, 7 p.m., to London. 50 Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Provisional Government, November 1945–January 26, 1946. 51 A summary of the exchange with Foreign Minister Bidault was sent in telegram 30, February 7, 6 p.m., to Saigon, and repeated as No. 13 to Hanoi and No. 153 to Nanking. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/2–747: Telegram [Document 81] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State secret London , February 7, 1947—7 p.m. 865. 1. Substance Deptel 431, February 3, to Paris communicated FonOff 7th for which it expressed appreciation. 2. Reference last paragraph Deptel 612, February 6, 52 FonOff states Allen 53 has been in Java for some days and has had no reports from him recently on Indochina. However, based on recent discussions with French Embassy here and on reports from Paris, FonOff is of view that French are preparing ground for renewal, of conversations with Ho Chi-Minh. As evidence of more conciliatory trend in French policy FonOff cites decision of French Govt to recall D’Argenlieu as well as intimation by French Embassy here that Moutet report recommends resumption of negotiations with Vietnam. Moreover, FonOff states French now more cognizant of unrest stirred up in India, Burma, Ceylon and Singapore over Indochina and threat to line of communications. Additionally Moutet report said to indicate inability of France to carry on large scale protracted hostilities Indochina And to set forth that present French operations being carried on primarily to induce Vietnamese to moderate present policies after which French feel basis for satisfactory solution may be reached. As indicated above, FonOff considers French have failed in efforts to win over “moderate” Vietnamese and consequently preparing to resume negotiations with Ho. 3. FonOff feels Dept’s representations may lend impetus apparent trend of French policy to resume Negotiations with Ho. FonOff intimates it has no present intention of following our lead pointing out French still suspicious of British policy witness what happened in Syria. As FonOff now believes prospects are good for resumption by French of conversations with Ho, it feels Indochinese situation may improve rather than deteriorate and that in light of this expectation FonOff has not given consideration to steps that might be taken should situation worsen. 4. FonOff states according British Embassy Paris General Morlière has been relieved of his command. Repeated Paris 90. Gallman 52 See footnote 46, p. 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 78 ] . 53 Richard H. S. Allen, Head of the Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/2–747: Telegram [Document 82] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Paris , February 7, 1947—10 p.m. 573. Baudet today confirmed to us that, as reported in press, local representatives of Vietnam yesterday transmitted unofficially to French Government another peace offer, somewhat similar in content to that received in December. He said principal points in document Were substantially as follows: immediate cessation of hostilities on all fronts; appointment of armistice commissions to insure ceasefire order is observed; withdrawal of all troops to positions previously defined by Franco-Vietnamese accords of March 6 and April 3, 1946; immediate halt to all reinforcements for French troops in Indo-China; Government of Ho Chi-minh to be only representative of Vietnam during negotiations; negotiations to be based on previously signed agreements between France and Vietnam; Moutet to proceed at early, date to Indo-China to reach agreement in principle with Ho Chi-minh regarding basis for negotiations, which should be based on recognition of political and territorial integrity of Vietnam Republic within framework of French Union. Baudet did not indicate what French position would be With respect to individual points of Vietnamese message but indicated French Government “might agree to enter into discussions with Vietnamese”. Caffery The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi 851G.00/2–1047: Telegram [Document 83] The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi secret Washington , February 12, 1947—6 p.m. 14. Urtel 48 Feb. 10. 55 Nanking reported Jan 22 that FonOff official vouchsafed info that French in Indochina had felt out Chinese officials there regarding possibility new regime headed by Baodai with support Annamite Nationalist Party. Official indicated revival imperial idea would be unsatisfactory China. Reed Dec 27 reported considerable talk French endeavoring contact Baodai and urge form new govt and such rumors not infrequent. However, no evidence here any concrete French proposals and Dept inclined agree urtel 9 Jan 7 55 that return-Baodai as head Govt only remote possibility. Presumably his past close association Ho and reported efforts China obtain Chinese backing Vietnam independence would weigh against him. Appears unlikely restoration monarchy under other pretender would be favored by present French Govt. Official Socialist organ Populaire has warned against any plan “dig up group reactionary mandarins representing out-of-date social system”. Marshall 55 Not printed. 55 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi 851G.00/2–1047: Telegram [Document 84] The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi confidential Washington , February 14, 1947—5 p.m. 15. Urtel 51 Feb. 10. 55 Re Vietnam report that Secy’s declaration showed that international opinion does not wish see war in Vietnam, Secy in Feb 7 press conf said for attribution but not quotation “We are naturally deeply interested troubled situation Indochina and naturally are hopeful they can find pacific basis for its adjustment”. Sent Hanoi 15. Repeated Saigon 32. Marshall 55 Not printed. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/2–1547: Telegram [Document 85] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , February 15, 1947—1 p.m. 688. During lengthy conversation yesterday, Gustave Moutet, son and head of personal “Cabinet” of Minister Overseas France, insisted on fact that “no one in French Government has any thought of reconquering area or re-establishing 1939 status quo ”. He said that French wanted to negotiate as soon as possible with Vietnam but that this would only be possible after military successes which would prove to Vietnam its impossibility of obtaining military decision. Gustave Moutet said current French military policy is destruction of Vietnam’s Armed Forces with little consideration to expand territory occupied, and he added military situation had “greatly improved” recently and that Vietnam’s military resistance now generally weakening. He said Vietnam losses in killed were between 8,000 and 10,000. He believes arrival of reinforcements will permit further military advantages, but uncertain whether these would be sufficient to permit successful negotiations. Combined operations by French forces on the spot, plus reinforcements, will not be possible for extensive period, as French Government most anxious repatriate certain units which have been in Indo-China for long while. Concerning Vietnam’s possible appeal to UNO, Gustave Moutet confirmed French would oppose this move energetically, alleging Vietnam has no international status, and that France is “only foreign power which has recognized Vietnam’s entity and this only as part of French Union”. D’Argenlieu’s removal was commented on in these terms: “Notwithstanding his many qualities he has now outlived his usefulness. Furthermore his proud and solitary character has resulted in difficulties between himself and all elements in Indo-China.” Choice of successor will only be made by Government after D’Argenlieu’s return, but it was clearly indicated military would be chosen “at least for a while as civilian High Commissioner would be considered a loss of face”. Caffery The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/2–1647: Telegram [Document 86] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , February 16, 1947—3 p.m. 705. I reviewed in some detail yesterday with Ramadier the situation in Indochina, restating our point of view and emphasizing especially the outmoded colonial outlook of many French officials, especially in Saigon. Ramadier agreed; in fact, he agreed that our point of view was reasonable all along the line. He told me that Leclerc has definitely turned down the Government’s request to go to Indochina as High Commissioner and that he, Ramadier, had offered the job only a few minutes before to General Juin, 56 who promised to think it over and reply at an early date. Ramadier observed: “Of course no one wants that job at this juncture, but I very much hope that Juin will take it”. (Juin came out of Ramadier’s office as I went in). 57 Repeated London 136. Caffery 56 Gen. Alphonse Pierre Juin, Chief of the French Army General Staff. 57 Telegram 839, February 24, 2 p.m., from Paris, reported that General Juin declined the offer (851G.00/2–2447). The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/2–2047: Telegram [Document 87] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State restricted Hanoi , February 20, 1947—5 p.m. 64. By Viet Nam radio today and also letter of February 19, I with British, Chinese colleagues and Indian Vice Consul as well as International Red Cross representative, invited to attend meeting February 21 by Giam. 58 I, of course, will not attend. 59 Understand British Consul and Chinese Consul General probably will not attend although Indian Vice Consul has requested permission from Sainteny to keep rendezvous. Giam gave no reason for meeting but from tone Viet Nam radio lately, he may wish protest against French “atrocities” in Cochin China and south Annam. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 58 Hoang Minh, Giam, Vietnamese Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 59 In telegram 22, February 28, 3 p.m., to Hanoi, the Department replied: “Believe would be desirable for you whenever possible maintain contact Vietnam leaders provided French authorities not object.” The telegram added that discretion would need to be used to “prevent political abuse such contacts”. (851G.00/2–2047) The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/2–2147: Telegram [Document 88] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State confidential Hanoi , February 21, 1947—10 a.m. [Received February 25—12:35 a.m.] 67. This French text Ho Chi Minh appeal of February 20 to French people and French President (have seen original letter and have verified Ho’s signature thereon). 60 [Translation:] “Once again I address an urgent appeal to the Government and people of France. Much French and Vietnamese blood has been shed. Numerous Vietnamese towns and villages are destroyed and French enterprises ruined. Each day that this fratricidal war lasts multiplies the misery and increases the devastation. It is claimed that the French forces are used only to establish peace and order. This is not true. The truth is that where there are no French troops there is no conflict arid peace and order reign. Once more we solemnly declare that the people of Vietnam desire only their unity and independence within the French Union, and we pledge ourselves to respect French economic and cultural interests in Vietnam. Can France, the champion of liberty, continue to make war on a people who are claiming only the most legitimate rights and who wish to cooperate with her? France has only to give the word for hostilities to cease immediately, for so many lives and so much property to be saved, for friendship and confidence to reign. If in spite of our sincere desire for peace, France insists upon continuing the war, she will lose all without gaining anything for the war will result only in the creation of hatred and bitterness between our two peoples. It is true that the French troops have airplanes and tanks but we have on our side the justice of our cause and the firm intention to resist until the end. We do not believe that France desires to continue this war which is the anti-constitutional, disastrous and without glory. We beg the French Government to be so good as to make known clearly its policy with regard to Vietnam. We beg the French people to be so good as to make known their opinion of this bloody and stupid conflict. As for ourselves our position is clear: we want our unity and our independence within the French Union; we want a just peace which will do honor both to France and to Vietnam.” (Signed) Ho Chi Minh Transmission copy this document apparently reason Giam requesting meeting for today with Consuls. Original this message in hands French authorities. O’Sullivan 60 In repeating this telegram in 789, February 28, noon, to Paris, the Department added: In view of O’Sullivan’s verification signature and Ramadier’s reluctance concede authenticity previous proposals Dept anxious learn French reaction and intentions.” (851G.00/2–2147) The Consul at saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/2–2747: Telegram [Document 89] The Consul at saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State secret Saigon , February 27, 1947—noon. 80. Chinese Consul General informs me Communist agents (including several agents recently arrived from Yenan) have been stirring up trouble among the thousands of Chinese made homeless by fires on outskirts Saigon and yesterday planned demonstration in front of his office with intention create incident with French police. He warned French and measures were taken to prevent demonstration but he believes this attempt is latest of what may be anticipated. He had previously told me that undoubted increase in Chinese Communists due agents who worked upon dissatisfied elements, also that many students being converted to Communism to extent that he was tempted to ask schools be closed down. He added two, possibly three, Communist elements working in French Indo-China; first, French (only a few); second, Chinese (numerous); and third, Russian (but no confirmation) but that these elements did not appear to be working together very closely. In his opinion Vietminh party completely controlled by Communist elements whose idea of nationalist state is but prelude to an eventual Communist state. While I agree in part I feel that Annamite Communism perhaps over emphasized as a present danger although it is definitely a potential one. My opinion Communist trained leaders took control of nationalist movement by advocating “throw out the French” but if Communist leaders removed nationalist movement would remain as such. Danger then would be Chinese imperialism and eventual taking over large part of trade. Please repeat to Nanking, Paris. Reed The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/3–347: Telegram [Document 90] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , March 3, 1947—7 p.m. 956. Department’s telegram 789, of February 28, 1947. 61 Marius Moutet, Minister Overseas France, informs us that Vietnam appeal of February 20 to French people and French President has never been officially received by Government in Paris. However, both Minister and his son, Gustave Moutet, Chief of Cabinet, seemed completely familiar with text of appeal which they said had been received in Paris “through Reuters”. Moutet termed the appeal “a small step forward” in that it omitted previous demand for return to military status quo ante . However, he regretted comminatory tone of appeal, terming it “psychological warfare”, and deplored that Vietnam, if it wishes to negotiate with French Government, does not do so through official channels instead of merely diffusing it through radio and newspaper channels. Moutet stressed sincere desire of French Government to negotiate but in view necessity to “save face” in the Far East and in view of way in which French were “caught napping and nearly evicted on December 19”, he is obliged, he says, to take precautions against a second Vietnam “trap” and must insist on certain security guarantees before real negotiations start. While not attempting to deny partial responsibility of “certain French officials in Indo-China”, Socialist Moutet alleges high indignation over Vietnam duplicity and mentioned that the French Government security demands would include the retention of certain number of military bases in Vietnam territory as well as on “some kind of control” over the Vietnam Army. The Overseas Minister reacted unfavorably to Vietminh demand for “unity” in last sentence of Ho’s appeal, as meaning insistence on obtaining Cochin-China. Moutet strongly defended position that France was protector of Cochin-Chinese people and would not turn them over against their will to a “ruthless Communist dictatorship”. He observed that this last Ho “message” might be brought by “a political party” in the Assembly during the debate on Indo-China scheduled for March 6. In view of fact that both Bidault and Moutet have (I think sincerely) denied receiving letter in question, Department may wish to inquire of O’Sullivan the basis for his belief that letter was actually delivered to the French. 62 Caffery 61 See footnote 60, p. 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] . 62 The Department in its telegram 24, March 6, noon, to Hanoi (38 to Saigon) asked for information in this regard and repeated 956 from Paris (851G.00/3–347). Vice Consul O’Sullivan reported in telegram 87, March 12, 10 a.m., from Hanoi, that Ho’s letter was received by the British Consul through the International Red Cross representative who had seen the Vietnamese on February 21; the letter was then given to French authorities for transmission to Paris (851G.00/3–1247). Vice Consul O’Sullivan reported in telegram 100, March 23, 5 p.m., that French refusal to allow the Consuls to contact Vietnamese authorities in regard to the question of hostages might be explained on the ground that the French “did not wish to receive peace proposal authenticity of which Consuls might be in position to confirm”. (851G.00/3–2347) The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/3–647: Telegram [Document 91] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential Paris , March 6, 1947—3 p.m. 1007. French Cabinet yesterday named Emile Bollaert High Commissioner to Indochina to replace Admiral D’Argenlieu. Communiqué adds D’Argenlieu will accompany Bollaert to Indochina and transfer office there. Baudet characterized temporary return of D’Argenlieu as compromise designed to save Admiral’s face and satisfy his supporters in Cabinet. Bollaert is Career Prefect who took active part in resistance movement as representative de Gaulle: was appointed Regional Commissioned at Stuttgart and Prefect of Vosges after liberation; recently named to Council of Republic representing Rassemblement des Gauches as one of 50 members chosen by Assembly. While Bollaert is repotted to be able and energetic man, he is relatively unknown and his Appointment is obviously expedient determined by refusal of General Leclerc, General Juin and perhaps other personalities to accept post. While no sensational developments are expected from assembly debate on Indochinese policy opening March 7, some clarification of Government policy will probably emerge. This, with appointment of Bollaert, may end status of indecision and drifting which has been apparent in recent weeks. Department please repeat Saigon as Paris’ No. 5. Caffery The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/3–647: Telegram [Document 92] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , March 6, 1947—4 p.m. 1008. Deptel 818, March 3 and A–343, February 25. 63 Baudet, director of Far Eastern Division of Foreign Office, confirms ex-Emperor Baodai in Hong Kong. Baudet doubted practicability of reestablishing monarchy but admitted existence of some sentiment in “Annamite” circles (apparently distinct from Tonkinese and Cochin-Chinese) for return of a mandarin government caused by reaction to authoritarian methods of Viet-Minh. Baudet stated that in any event no steps towards restoration of Emperor would be taken without “consultation with Annamese people”. Department please repeat Hanoi as Paris’ 3 and Saigon as Paris’ 6. Caffery 63 Neither printed. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/3–747: Telegram [Document 93] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential Paris , March 7, 1947—6 p.m. 1031. Ramadier, at his regular weekly press conference yesterday, anticipated Assembly debate scheduled today on Indo-China by devoting entire conference to that subject. Summary of Ramadier’s lengthy statement indicates he first emphasized favorable development of military situation; French forces have cleared area around Hanoi, Haiphong, Hue and other centers and in central Annam have joined up with forces coming from Laos, thus cutting Vietnam in two. These successes, said Premier, have demonstrated to Vietminh they cannot impose their solution Indo-Chinese problem by force. Indo-Chinese problem, continued Premier, had thus become primarily constitutional and political one and France had accordingly named US, [ as? ] High Commissioner, M. Bollaert, civilian and member of Parliament. Summarizing provisions of new constitution for organization of French union, Ramadier emphasized members of union were obligated to unite their efforts and resources for its joint defense and French Government has responsibility of coordinating these resources and directing general defense policy. Thus, French Republic will retain direction of military and diplomatic policy of French Union. Prime Minister re-emphasized this point in discussing plans for future political developments in territories of Indo-China. After defending somewhat feebly representative character of Cochin-Chinese Government, Ramadier said French would not oppose evolution of countries of Indo-China in conformance with their national aspirations: “We see no objection to union of three Annamite countries on condition that it does not take place to the exclusive advantage of one part of these territories, which would establish its suzerainty over the others”. France would act as mediator between desires of different countries. In conclusion Ramadier referred to Indo-Chinese federation as necessary to regulate certain common problems as, for example, currency and transport. Nevertheless such federation should not restrict interior development of each country. 64 In analyzing Prime Minister’s statement it is apparent there is nothing essentially new in it. However, certain points are clarified and others are for first time given official expression. Thus Ramadier made it clear France intends to retain control of military establishment and foreign diplomatic relations not only in Indo-China but in entire French Union. Union of Cochin-China with Vietnam which has been one of fundamental points of difference in past negotiations is admitted but in federal form through which French obviously hope to retain certain special rights and privileges in rich Cochin-Chinese area where bulk of French economic interests are concentrated. Idea Indo-Chinese federation should be political entity through which influence and authority of Vietnam could be restricted has apparently been abandoned in accordance with long-held views of Foreign Office. Thus another serious bone of contention between France and Vietnam may have been eliminated. Interesting to note Ramadier made no mention of referendum in Cochin-China provided for in agreement of March 6, 1946. Finally, no attacks were made on Ho Chi-minh or other Vietminh leaders and no statements were made re what authorities French would or would not negotiate with. Department please repeat to Saigon as Paris 7. Sent Department as 1031, repeated London as 205. Caffery 64 Telegram 95, March 18, 10 a.m., from Hanoi, reported the reaction of Ho Chi Minh as broadcast March 15. Ho regarded Ramadier’s statement that France was not opposed to Vietnam’s independence and unity as a declaration not in accord with the facts and concluded that continued war would cause losses to France and inevitable perishing of the French Union. (851G.00/3–1847) The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/3–1947: Telegram [Document 94] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , March 19, 1947—7 p.m. 1186. I talked last evening with Bollaert, new High Commissioner for Indochina. He talked very sensibly and in realistic fashion about his job. He assures me that he is well aware that any attempt to return to previous colonial practice is inconceivable and that he leaves with the determined intention of carrying out all promises hitherto made by the French Government in regard to the “independence of various countries within the French Union”. He said that he hoped particularly to maintain cordial relations with our consular representatives in Indochina and he asked me to communicate this fact to them. He will get into touch with them soon after his arrival. He said that he realizes also the importance of good relations with our press representatives and that they be given ample opportunity to send out news. It is not his intention to stay there indefinitely. He is going out only to do a job: That is, to come to an agreement with “whatever authorities really represent the people of Indochina”. Repeated Moscow 154. Department please repeat to Saigon as Paris 9. 65 Caffery 65 Repeated also to Hanoi as No. 29, March 24, 3 p.m. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/3–1947: Telegram [Document 95] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France confidential Washington , March 24, 1947—6 p.m. 1078. Urtel 1184 Mar 19. 66 According NY Times , Ramadier interrupted Moutet speech to say France had received no propositions from any authentic representative Vietnam and that letter signed Ho and addressed Blum had been declared fraudulent by experts. Does this refer letter authenticated by Consul Hanoi (Hanoi tel 87 Mar 12 67 ), which was transmitted by Giam? Obscure news item Mar 19 quotes Moutet to effect negotiations with officials Annam and Tonkin close to Vietnam Govt have already begun with Cochinchina PriMin as intermediary. If true, would welcome your confirmation and elucidation. If not, Dept interested learning, without wishing you raise question any official manner, exactly what French expect to happen to permit resumption negotiations, view French refusal acknowledge value any Vietnamese appeals. Sent Paris 1078. Repeated Saigon 51 and Hanoi 30. Acheson 66 Not printed. 67 See footnote 62, p. 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] . The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/3–2747: Telegram [Document 96] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential Paris , March 27, 1947—2 p.m. 1313. Deptel 1078, March 24. Question of authenticity of peace proposals emanating from Ho Chi Minh was discussed with Baudet last evening. After admitting Ho’s letter of February 20 had been received in Paris, Baudet stated this letter, together with other messages to French, signed Ho, as well as number of orders and instructions to Viet-Nam officials recently seized in Indo-China had been examined by number of French handwriting experts who were unanimous and positive in their belief all signatures were forged. Baudet confirmed recent reports in press that no one had been found who had seen Ho Chi Minh since November [ December? ] 20. While French authorities do not place much credence in reports of Ho’s murder or death they are puzzled by his complete disappearance. Remarks attributed to Moutet, mentioned in Department’s telegram under reference, were made March 19 at Socialist National Congress which took place during same period as Assembly debate on Indo-China. Baudet said he felt Moutet’s statement was hardly justified by information available to Government and pointed out that following day Hoach 68 issued statement which, while cautious in phrasing, could only be interpreted as denial of Moutet’s allegations. Baudet expressed opinion Moutet’s remarks were designed to take some of edge off Communist attacks in Assembly on his policy. Embassy is inclined to believe Moutet was defending himself from criticism within his own party. It will be recalled that while Socialist deputies unanimously supported Moutet and Ramadier in Assembly, debate in party Congress on Indo-Chinese policy was bitter with left-wing leader Boutvien leading strong opposition to Moutet. Baudet added that instructions to new High Commissioner Bollaert had been approved and he would presumably leave March 28 as scheduled. Baudet said, except for administrative matters, these instructions are general father than detailed. Bollaert is not being told he must or must not negotiate with any individuals or groups but his instructions provide that any conversations entered into must be with persons representing and having confidence of broad mass of people. France cannot assist in or condone establishment of Government of Viet-Nam which will not follow democratic principles as these are understood in West. France feels it would be dangerous for all concerned if small minority should be permitted to establish dictatorship over bulk of population by authoritarian and terroristic methods such as had been practiced by Viet-Minh in recent months. If Ho Chi Minh should emerge from his retirement and establish contact with Bollaert he would be told, according to Baudet, that he must first broaden base of his government and eliminate extremists. Baudet admitted reported appointment, of Hoang Minh Giam as Foreign Secretary, if confirmed, 69 would appear to be step in that direction. Re persistent rumors of possible return of ex-Emperor Bao Dai, Baudet again denied any negotiations with Bao were going on. He remarked that ex-Emperor is extremely cautious person and would certainly not consider returning to Indo-China until Viet-Minh had surrendered or been eliminated from political picture. While instructions to Bollaert did not entirely exclude possibility of return of Bao Dai, they make clear that any move for his return must originate with Annamite people. Sent Department 1313; repeated to London 259, Moscow for delegation 188. 70 Caffery 68 Dr. Le Van Hoach, President of the Provisional Government of Cochin China. 69 Telegram 98, March 22, 8 a.m., from Hanoi, reported Giam’s confirmation on March 17; he filled the post previously held by Ho Chi Minh concurrently. Mr. O’Sullivan pointed out, “If French wish to deal with Vietnam, Giam is person who could be considered as outside Vietminh Party.” (851G.00/3–2247) 70 Repeated in telegram 56, March 28, 7 p.m., to Saigon, and in 33 to Hanoi. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/3–2847: Telegram [Document 97] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State confidential Hanoi , March 28, 1947—8 a.m. 110. According French monitoring service, Radio Vietnam 26 March states Giam Made following declaration upon assuming office minister Foreign Affairs: “I continue faithfully president Ho’s policy with democratic peoples of world and primarily with people of France. We have no race hatred and we accept independence of Vietnam in frame work French Union.” This Statement seems designed to enforce impression that Giam is “moderate” with whom French might deal. Coming on eve of Bollaert’s arrival in Indochina, it appears to indicate Vietnamese are not unwilling negotiate. O’Sullivan The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of state 851G.00/3–2847: Telegram [Document 98] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of state 71 secret Hanoi , March 28, 1947—2 p.m. 111. Re second paragraph Deptel 30, March 24, 72 I believe Ramadier referred to December 19 letter which Ho Chi Mint addressed jointly to Blum and Auriol, as letter I authenticated was dated February 20 and addressed to President French Republic. Copy of December 19 letter from Ho to Blum and Auriol will be found as December [ document? ] No. 76 attached to memoranda and supporting documents which I forwarded Saigon in January with suggestion it be transmitted Department. This memorandum with documents I received from Giam January 9 together with package which Giam said contained original memorandum (prepared by Vietnamese for presentation to Moutet on his visit here in early January; see mytel 13, January 11) and which he requested I transmit together with 2 letters to Sainteny. This I did without however opening package or letters and I have no knowledge of what they contained other than what Giam told me. Ramadier or Moutet later said in Assembly that signature on memorandum was typewritten. As for what French expect to happen to permit resumption negotiations, it might be noted that French military position in Tonkin improving and that there are indications that Vietnam Government is encountering serious difficulties. Some of these indications are thin but steady trickle of people flowing back to area controlled by French, incomplete evacuation of populace in areas into which French have moved last 10 days, increasing difficulty of communication for Vietnam Government as French extend military control, apparent success of French in developing partisans among ethnic minorities to operate against Vietnamese, and growing munition shortage in Vietnam Government (there is for example report that recent executions by Vietnam Government done with hammers instead of firing squads). French may consider Vietnam Government will weaken further in near future to such extent that Ho Chi Minh will drop “extremists” or that “moderates” will split from Tongbo group. O’Sullivan 71 Repeated in telegram 1168, April 1, 1 p.m., to Paris. 72 Same as telegram 1078, March 24, p. 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] . The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/4–447: Telegram [Document 99] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State restricted Saigon , April 4, 1947—3 p.m. 105. Returning from Hanoi where attended funeral General [ Colonel ] Debes, 73 Bollaert has begun series of consultations to put self in contact with overall situation. No developments expected immediate future. According to report military situation in north is excellent but widespread sabotage, guerrilla activities continue in Cochin-China and there are reports continuing trouble Cambodia, also outbreak some trouble Laos. Apparent that Viet Minh Army does not intend major battle but confine self to sabotage, guerrilla activities. Native press generally insistent French must deal with Ho and decries talk of restoration Baodai although mentioning he might act as go-between French and Ho—equally insistent union three “Kys.” 74 Representatives many native political elements gathering Saigon for anticipated conversations with Bollaert and his political advisors. There is a general air of conciliation and majority hope for a speedy settlement of the situation. Dept please repeat to Paris. Reed 73 Commanding officer in Tonkin since the departure of General Morlière; killed March 30 in a plane crash. 74 Administrative districts (or countries), Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/4–447: Telegram [Document 100] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State confidential Hanoi , April 4, 1947—4 p.m. 115. With much confusion, French authorities instituted customs collections at Haiphong and other ports of Indochina under their control end of last week. There is great uncertainty regarding rates to be applied but effectively collections are being made by “federal” agents with monies apparently reverting to “federal” funds. It will be recalled that French regulations for control Haiphong were precipitating cause of incident that city November 20 and question customs loomed very large in all French-Vietnamese discussions. French authorities also have instituted “federal” sûreté on approximately same basis as before war with all Vietnamese required carry identity cards. While there is good reason in terms military security to justify this practice, its effect is reestablishment of pre-war administration. In this connection, it might be noted that both customs and police could be considered by French only “administrative matters” to which Baudet had reference in fourth paragraph Deptel 33, March 28 75 yet they actually are policy decisions shaping future structure of “Indochinese Federation”. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 75 See third paragraph of telegram 1313, March 27, p. 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi 851G.00/4–147: Telegram [Document 101] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi confidential Washington , April 4, 1947—8 p.m. 36. Urtel 113 Apr 1. 76 Dept has received no indication Ho in disfavor Moscow. On contrary, criticism Ho in Communist press has been absent. Latest issues L’Humanité available Dept (Feb 11 and previous) feature articles by Indochina correspondent L’Hermite quoting Ho with approval, which would hardly be case if Ho expelled from party. L’Humanité probably most authoritative Communist organ outside Russia. Sent Hanoi 36. Repeated Paris 1234 and Moscow 818. Acheson 76 Not printed. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/4–1147: Telegram [Document 102] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State confidential Hanoi , April 11, 1947—8 a.m. 124. According French monitoring service, Radio Vietnam March 10 [ 30? ] reported that Ho Chi Minh, upon learning death of Colonels Debes and Gufflet 77 (previously said by Radio Vietnam to have been shot down by VN anti-aircraft guns) declared: “As French they were our friends, as soldiers they were brave, as colonialists they were our opponents. But before God and humanity everyone is a brother and equal. That is why I bow before their souls. I deeply regret that men of valor such as they are sacrificed in this fratricidal war. Otherwise they would have been very useful in common work between France and Vietnam.” This declaration continues tenor of remarks attributed by Radio Vietnam to Ho since December 19. During that time remarks alleged to have originated with Ho have never been directed against France but when critical to “reactionary colonialists”. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 77 Colonel Gufflet, chief of staff to General Jean Valluy, was killed in the same plane crash as Colonel Debes on March 30. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/4–1147: Telegram [Document 103] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , April 11, 1947—11 a.m. 1489. During private conversation Gustave Moutet, son of Minister for Overseas France, continued to insist that no negotiations are now in progress in Indochina but he added that he believed “a suitable approach from the Viet-Minh may well be made in the not too distant future”. Answering a question as to what would constitute in French eyes duly accredited plenipotentiary” (my 1409 of April 3 78 ), he said that in addition to being a person representing in fact elements dominant “throughout the Vietnam” he would have to carry an authentic communication indicating willingness to Accept France’s minimum security requirements: “In such a case we would agree to an armistice.” (These are thought to be the same as reported previously.) From the above conversation the impression was derived that the French authorities may be playing with words when they state that no negotiations are in progress in Indochina, and that secret negotiations may even be taking place at the present time. If this impression is correct, what the French Government terms the “opening of negotiations” may really be the conclusion of the present suspected ones, marked by the arrival of a Vietnam plenipotentiary with the acceptance of France’s armistice terms which, according to Moute, are “well known to the Vietnam leaders.” Referring to ex-Emperor Bao-Dai, Gustave Moutet declared that the French were in a quandary as while they felt the former still retained a considerable influence in Annam, he carried little weight elsewhere in Indochina. This [“ Thus? ”], added Moutet, “in availing ourselves of Bao-Dai’s service, we would be using an instrument of most uncertain value”. Sent Department as 1489, repeated London as 286. Department please repeat to Saigon as Paris No. 12. Caffery 78 Not printed. The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/4–1747: Telegram [Document 104] The Ambassador in Siam ( Stanton ) to the Secretary of State confidential Bangkok , April 17, 1947—3 p.m. [Received April 19—8:35 p.m.] 289. Embassy’s telegram 260, April 7. 79 1. Colonel Law, 80 who has been in informal contact with Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach who describes himself as Vietnam Undersecretary of State and who arrived Bangkok recently has received from latter two letters addressed to me. The first letter dated April 12 transmits memo regarding conflict in Indo-China and it is stated was sent to Vice Consul O’Sullivan at Hanoi in January this year for transmission Department. 81 If Department hasn’t received memo, will forward same airmail. Attached memo are 76 documents consisting exchange correspondence between Vietnam Government and French authorities, instructions allegedly issued by French authorities to their military, an account the Haiphong incident and various recent communications addressed by Ho Chi Minh to French Government proposing cessation of hostilities and resumption of negotiations. These documents are of considerable interest but inasmuch as Embassy unable to reproduce them because of lack clerical help we propose forward them Department by courier and would appreciate receiving due course hectograph copies these documents. It is also requested hectograph copies be sent to War, Navy Departments. 2. Second letter dated April 13 encloses letter addressed General MacArthur 82 and informs him that the Vietminh Government reserves all rights connection with question disposition Indo-China’s gold now held Tokyo and estimated amount $37,498,000. Rights also reserved connection Jap reparations which may be due to Indo-China. What disposition does Department wish made letter addressed MacArthur? 3. I am not acknowledging in writing these communications from Dr. Thach but have asked Colonel Law to inform him orally that I received them and that their substance will be communicated Department State. 83 4. Department please repeat Paris and Saigon. Stanton 79 Not printed. 80 Lt. Col. William Law, Assistant Military Attaché in Siam. 81 See telegram 13, January 11, 3 p.m., from Hanoi, p. 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] . 82 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. 83 In telegram 220, April 25, 8 p.m., to Bangkok, the Department replied that the memorandum mentioned in paragraph 1 had been received and the letter mentioned in paragraph 2 should be returned and could be mailed to the addressee if desired (851G.00/4–1747). In despatch 366, April 24 (received May 29), the Embassy in Siam transmitted the documents referred to in this telegram and added that Dr. Thach deemed the United States to be the only power able to stop hostilities in Indochina (851G.00/4–2447). The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/4–2647: Telegram [Document 105] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , April 26, 1947—noon. 132. Bollaert in course long conversation this morning said still investigating and having conversations, mentioning talks yesterday with certain Tonkinese who represent less extreme elements. In principle Bollaert says it is for three “Kys” to decide whether want union or not but, in any case, France feels has right to maintain interests which has built up in FIC—specifically economic and cultural—in return for benefits France has brought to FIC. He feels it is better as both sides want find solution but danger is continuing double dealing of Vietnam particularly Ho and close supporters. France must have security against this and attacks such as in December. He said big change will be noted in 3 months as he has recommended many social and agrarian reforms which will improve lot of natives and this should gain support and convince natives France’s good intentions. Up to French Government to approve. Spoke highly of progress Cambodia and Laos where democratic constitutions will govern with a minimum of French tutelage. Reed The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/4–2847: Telegram [Document 106] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , April 28, 1947—3 p.m. 134. Continuing mytel 132, April 26. Bollaert added proper safeguards to be taken that rights Cambodia [and] Laos be protected if union three “Kys”, mentioning customs currency. He blamed many French who came here for profit with no attempt understand natives; also blamed natives no appreciation what France has done nor realization they not ready for independence. General impression from conversation earnest effort find some solution, that federation idea except for customs currency, other economic, cultural matters being discarded and French Union being stressed, that reorganization French official setup FIC in progress. May [ My? ] comment increasing guerrilla activity (mytel 133 today date 84 ) will not help smooth negotiations either side. Bollaert deplored anti-American press attacks, would do his best stop them; also would give personal attention other problems of Consulate General, asking me to write to him “personal” letters. Reed 84 Not printed. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–247: Telegram [Document 107] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , May 2, 1947—11 a.m. 141. Source who often gives correct information states French-Vietnam negotiations proceeding faster than anticipated and anticipates definite change in situation in not too distant future, also believes Ho will remain. Definitely two trends to negotiations: (1) to recognize Ho because of undoubted influence with bulk of natives but eliminating extreme elements and (2) to deal with Bao Dai who apparently has Chinese backing and who enjoys growing popularity. Changes in high Government personnel and apparent scrapping of ideas, projects former High Commissioner is disturbing to many French who feel Bollaert to arrive at quick solution will go too far in yielding to Vietnam desires. Anti-French activities on increase and April 29 night 20 grenades thrown in city and 1 land mine exploded near city center—this after city-wide raid led to detention over 1200 natives. Contacts descending from north express concern over possible famine conditions and lack of repairs to dikes. Please pass Paris. Reed The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon 851G.00/4–2947: Telegram [Document 108] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon confidential Washington , May 3, 1947—1 p.m. 71. Annamese businessman Canton rated fairly reliable stated Mar 18 Chinese Govt (1) not yet committed either French or Baodai and is negotiating Ho’s representative Nanking, (2) would support Ho if he guarantees abandon communism, allow eradication Chinese Communists Indochina and reaffirms Chinese rights Haiphong and Yunnan railway and economic privileges, and (3) would prefer make this deal and abandon Baodai owing Ho’s popular support. Dept would appreciate being kept fully up date on views Chinese officials and ConGens Indochina on present Vietnam Govt and French policies and on their appraisal situation Indochina. Consider this important not only because significance position Chinese Indochina but because Chinese, who would be among chief losers should Kremlin-orientated state emerge Indochina, should prove a weathervane of trends within Vietnam connected with influence Communists in Vietnam Govt. Dept recognizes, however, that since all three extra-national elements in Indochina (Kmt Chinese, French, and Communists) would each tend naturally be engaged on separate fronts with aim eliminating other two, Chinese cannot be expected follow clear and simple policy, but Dept assumes any Vietnam Govt acceptable Chinese Govt, may be considered on face free of predominant connections Communist International. Evidence so far conflicting. Urtel 136 Apr 29 85 and other reports indicate Chinese supporting Baodai in hope supplanting Ho’s Govt with one under Chinese influence, and urtel 80 Feb 27 quotes Chinese ConGen Saigon as believing Vietminh completely controlled by Communist elements whose idea of nationalist state is but prelude to eventual Communist state. O’Sullivan, however, after dinner with Tu Ve authorities Hanoi in company Chinese ConGen Hanoi, Jan 22, stated he amazed close relationship Chinese and Vietnamese. Further, report which Dept treats with great reserve quotes Annamese businessman in China Apr 2 as stating Wu Tieh Chen, Kmt secretary, promised Ho’s representative Chinese Govt would not interfere Vietminh purchases arms Kwangsi or their shipment Tonkin. Sent Saigon 71. Repeated Nanking 526 and Hanoi 44 for action and Paris 1632 for info. Marshall 85 Not printed. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–647: Telegram [Document 109] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State confidential Hanoi , May 6, 1947—8 a.m. 151. ReDeptel 44, May 3, 1 p.m. 86 Mytel May 3, 11 a.m., 87 explained attitude Chinese Consul General immediately before his departure for Shanghai. Chinese Consul General here (Yuen) apparently has always been considerably less disturbed by activities of both Chinese and Vietnam Communists than his confrere (Ing) in Saigon, which may account for discrepancy in official Chinese attitude here and that in Saigon. However, Chinese circles here state that Yuen is higher ranking officer than Ing and that Foreign Office has given Yuen very wide discretionary powers re Chinese policy here. Yuen, who has been here since October ’45, has never waivered in his support Vietnam Government against French. He has stated over and over again during past year that one people should not hold another in bondage (conveniently forgetting Chinese presence in Sinkiang). He believes March 6 agreement reached simply by desire both French and Vietnam to rid country of Chinese armies occupation. But he maintains that Vietnam, even though it be Communist dominated, should be given its independence. He reasons that if Vietnam were independent and began to play Moscow game too strongly Chinese would be able to handle situation. However, he has expressed fear of results here if France retains its place in Indochina and French Communist Party subsequently gains control French Government. Under such circumstances he believes Chinese Government would have much more difficulty in containing situation. He considers: (1) French wish reinstall same regime as previous to war; (2) Ho has almost complete support of people; (3) French have insufficient troops and material to reach military decision here; (4) French do not understand world has changed in past 7 years. It should be recalled in appraising Yuen’s attitude that [area?] with 100,000 Chinese in Tonkin he has probably more and better sources of information than even French. His attitude toward French seems conditioned by trying to prove that China, not France, is fourth of Big Five. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 86 Same as telegram 71, May 3, 1 p.m., supra . 87 Not printed. The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–747: Telegram [Document 110] The Ambassador in Siam ( Stanton ) to the Secretary of State secret Bangkok , May 7, 1947—9 a.m. 361. 1. Deptel 230, May 2, 88 received here May 5. Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach left Bangkok for Indo-China about 10 days ago. Colonel Law who saw him a number of times feels no doubt person visiting Bangkok and representing himself to be Thach was in fact Under Secretary of State Pham Ngoc Thach (Hanoi’s 136, April 24 88 ). Specimen of Dr. Thach’s signature will be found on letter dated April 12 addressed to me, original of which forwarded to Department by courier with my despatch No. 363, April 23. 89 2. Referring information concerning Viet Nam internal situation, Colonel Law and myself propounded a number of questions and the following are Dr. Thach’s replies in summary: ( a ) Ho Chi Minh is in good health; ( b ) President Ho continues to direct the affairs of the Viet Nam Government and presides regularly over the weekly meetings of the Council of Ministers; ( c ) There have been number important changes in the composition of the Viet Nam Government since outbreak of present hostilities; ( d ) The Communist Party in Indo-China, according to Dr. Thach, is devoting its energies to fostering a triumph of the national cause and Communism for majority of members is merely a means of achieving independence. Text of questions and answers being forwarded by airmail both State and War Departments. 90 3. Fully appreciating delicacy of situation in Indo-China and that utmost discretion essential in dealings with Viet Nam officials or representatives, Embassy’s contacts with local representatives or visiting Viet Nam officials has been through Colonel Law, who some 6 months ago established contact with local representatives of Viet Nam, Free Laos and Free Cambodians. Through these contacts, which are entirely informal and personal, Law has been able to obtain much interesting information without attracting much attention, although these contacts are well known to local French Legation officials. Colonel Law has worked closely with me in these matters which we have discussed fully in every instance and I have utmost confidence in his discretion and ability. Upon Dr. Thach’s arrival he wished call on me, but it seemed to me, in view delicacy situation, much better for Law to make informal contact with him in view his previous contacts with Viet Nam representatives here. 4. Referring suggestion that O’Sullivan visit Bangkok on vacation, I would be happy to have him do so for although Thach no longer here principal Viet Nam representative here Tran Van Giau, alias Dr. Ouang, alias Nguyen Due Quon, might be useful contact. Dr. Ouang understood formerly to have been Ho Chi Minh’s chief lieutenant in Cochin China and recently attended New Delhi conference as the Viet Nam representative. However, wish to point out that arrival of O’Sullivan and any conversations he might have with Viet Nam representatives here would certainly come to attention French Legation officials who might attach undue significance such meetings. 91 5. Department please repeat to Saigon and Hanoi. Stanton 88 Not printed. 88 Not printed. 89 Not printed, but see telegram 289, April 17, p. 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] . 90 Despatch 386, May 14, from Bangkok, not printed. 91 In telegram 45, May 9, 5 p.m., to Hanoi, the Department advised the Vice Consul that his proposed visit to Bangkok did not appear wise at that time (851G.00/5–747). The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–747: Telegram [Document 111] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State secret Saigon , May 7, 1947—5 p.m. 145. Usually reliable source states today’s meeting Mus 92 and Giam near Hanoi (1) to arrange armistice and (2) arrange basis for future negotiations. Valluy’s Chief of Staff has proceeded Hanoi for details armistice probably contacting Giap. 93 Informant says French not committed treat solely with Ho but want to enlarge negotiations include other elements, Bao Dai backers, et cetera—also French have no concrete plan for future except (1) abandon political federation and (2) insist upon economic [and] cultural agreement covering all French Indochina including free ports and transit rights for Cambodia and Laos. Confirming this lack of plan, he states Bollaert has called for final report organization needs, et cetera, various federal services now operating French Indochina to be submitted May 10th and when asked what will be future jurisdiction [and] scope such services, Bollaert replied he had no idea. Informant believes French will try sell idea Vietnam federation with each of three “Kys” having autonomy. Hoach he states gaining ground in Cochin China and Bao Dai might go back Annam. He states movement Annam reported mytel 144, May 5, 94 not organized Government but only grouping of pro-Bao Dai elements. This informant says Chinese flocking into French Indochina at rate of from 6 to 10 thousand per month and adds he voices sentiment majority of French in stating China is eventual danger to French and whites in French Indochina, that Communists and Kuomintang while fighting each other have single purpose as regards French Indochina. His sources in China indicate might be Chinese intervention Tonkin if not for difficulties with Communists. He forsees eventual Chinese domination Vietnam with Cambodia [and] Laos forced towards Siam and Buddhist country bloc and is frankly less apprehensive Communist danger than before, however feels outcome political situation in France will influence development Communist possibilities in French Indochina. With reference Deptel 71, May 3, believe Chinese Consul General here playing with Bao Dai element and Chinese Consul General Hanoi playing with Vietnam so China will have two strings to her bow—no question Chinese Consul General here is contact man for Bao Dai and National Democratic front elements. Please pass Paris Nanking. Reed 92 Paul Mus, of the French School of the Extreme Orient, was in charge of economic matters in the Cabinet of High Commissioner Bollaert. 93 Vo Nguyen Giap, Vietnamese Minister of Defense. 94 Not printed. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–747: Telegram [Document 112] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State secret Hanoi , May 7, 1947—6 p.m. [Received May 10—10:18 a.m.] 154. Remytel 141, April 26, 95 following is believed to be text letter delivered April 25 by International Red Cross representative to De Pereyra: 96 “Official message to the French Government: Vietnam is fighting for its unity and its independence. France, President Ramadier has declared, is not opposed to this unity and independence. The interest of the two peoples lies in collaborating fraternally within the French Union, an association of free peoples ‘who understand and love one another’. If the war is continued, it can only increase hatred, entail new sacrifices in human lives, make the situation of French enterprises and the economy of Vietnam worse, without solving the problem of Franco-Vietnamese relations. The French Government, by the appointment of the new High Commissioner of France in Indochina, appears to have shown its desire to direct its policy with respect to Vietnam into a new channel, worthy of the New France. Persuaded that the motion of the National Council of the S.F.I.O. of March 21, 1947 ‘not to let an opportunity pass to enter into negotiations with Vietnam’ expresses not only the sentiments of the French Socialists but also those of all the people of France; to prove Vietnam’s sincere devotion to peace and its friendship for the people of France; the Vietnamese Government proposes to the French Government the immediate cessation of hostilities and the opening of negotiations with a view to ‘peaceful settlement of the conflict’. Dated Hanoi, April 18, 1947, signed Hoang Minh Giam, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Democratic Republic Vietnam.” O’Sullivan 95 Not printed; it reported that a meeting took place April 25 between Vietnam and International Red Cross representatives (851G.00/4–2647). 96 Miguel de Pereyra, French commissioner for North Annam and Tonkin. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–947: Telegram [Document 113] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State confidential Hanoi , May 9, 1947—5 p.m. 156. According French monitoring service, Radio Vietnam stated May 8 that Giam made following declaration ( Summary ): Three years ago United States recognized independence Philippines. If in near future we learn recognition of Indonesian and Vietnam Republics by great American Republic, that measure will surprise no one. Such measure would do honor to United States, increase United States prestige and influence in world and contribute effectively establishment peace Southeast Asia. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/5–1347: Telegram [Document 114] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France secret Washington , May 13, 1947—8 p.m. 1737. We becoming increasingly concerned by slow progress toward settlement Indochina dispute. We fully appreciate French are making effort reach satisfactory settlement and hope visit Commissioner Bollaert to Indochina will produce concrete results. The following considerations, however, are submitted for your use any conversations you may have with French authorities at appropriate time this subject. We recognize it might not be desirable make such approach to newly constituted government in first days its reorganization, but nevertheless feel early appropriate opportunity might be found inform French Gov of our concern in this matter. Key our position is our awareness that in respect developments affecting position Western democratic powers in southern Asia, we essentially in same boat as French, also as British and Dutch. We cannot conceive setbacks to long-range interests France which would not also be setbacks our own. Conversely we should regard close association France and members French Union as not only to advantage peoples concerned, but indirectly our own. In our view, southern Asia in critical phase its history with seven new nations in process achieving or struggling independence or autonomy. These nations include quarter inhabitants world and their future course, owing sheer weight populations, resources they command, and strategic location, will be momentous factor world stability. Following relaxation European controls, internal racial, religious and national differences could plunge new nations into violent discord, or already apparent anti-Western Pan-Asiatic tendencies could become dominant political force, or Communists could capture control. We consider as best safeguard against these eventualities a continued close association between newly-autonomous peoples and powers which have long been responsible their welfare. In particular we recognize Vietnamese will for indefinite period require French material and technical assistance and enlightened political guidance which can be provided only by nation steeped like France in democratic tradition and confirmed in respect human liberties and worth individual. We equally convinced, however, such association must be voluntary to be lasting and achieve results, and that protraction present situation Indochina can only destroy basis voluntary cooperation, leave legacy permanent bitterness, and irrevocably alienate Vietnamese from France and those values represented by France and other Western democracies. While fully appreciating difficulties French position this conflict, we feel there is danger in any arrangement which might provide Vietnamese opportunity compare unfavorably their own position and that of other peoples southern Asia who have made tremendous strides toward autonomy since war. While we are still ready and willing do anything we can which might be considered helpful, French will understand we not attempting come forward with any solution our own or intervene in situation. However, they will also understand we inescapably concerned with situation Far East generally, upon which developments Indochina likely have profound effect. Plain fact is that Western democratic system is on defensive in almost all emergent nations southern Asia and, because identified by peoples these nations with what they have considered former denial their rights, is particularly vulnerable to attacks by demagogic leaders political movements of either ultra-nationalist or Communist nature which promise redress and revenge past so-called wrongs and inequalities. Signs development anti-Western Asiatic consciousness already multiplying, of which Inter-Asian Conf 97 an example. Unanimity support for Vietnamese among other Asiatic countries very striking, even leading to moves Burma, India, and Malaya send volunteer forces their assistance. Vietnam cause proving rallying-cry for all anti-Western forces and playing in hands Communists all areas. We fear continuation conflict may jeopardize position all Western democratic powers in southern Asia and lead to very eventualities of which we most apprehensive. We confident French fully aware dangers inherent in situation and therefore venture express renewed hope they will be most generous attempt find early solution which, by recognizing legitimate desires Vietnamese, will restore peace and deprive anti-democratic forces of powerful weapon. For your info, evidence that French Communists are being directed accelerate their agitation French colonies even extent lose much popular support France (urtel 1719 Apr 25 98 ) may be indication Kremlin prepared sacrifice temporary gains with 40 million French to long range colonial strategy with 600 million dependent people, which lends great urgency foregoing views. French position Indochina dispute since Dec 19, which based on Vietnam initiative attack, seems Dept dangerously one-sided in ignoring Debes attack Haiphong Nov 23 and understandable Vietnam contention that stand had be made some point view steady French encroachments after Mar 6 on authority and territory Vietnam (e.g., establishment Cochinchinese Rep, occupation southern Annam and Moi Plateau, and Dalat plan French-dominated Federation to which Vietnam would be subservient,) Dept much concerned lest French efforts find “true representatives Vietnam” with whom negotiate result creation impotent puppet Govt along lines Cochinchina regime, or that restoration Baodai may be attempted, implying democracies reduced resort monarchy as weapon against Communism. You may refer these further views if nature your conversations French appears warrant. 99 Saigon and Hanoi should be guided by this tel in any conversations Bollaert. Sent Paris 1737. Repeated Saigon 78 and Hanoi 46. Marshall 97 An unofficial Asian relations conference was held at New Delhi in March and attended by delegates from Asian countries. 98 Not printed. 99 Telegram 2081, May 22, 3 p.m., from Paris, reported that Foreign Minister Bidault assured Ambassador Caffery that the French Government understood perfectly the American point of view and added that they did not contemplate any sort of a puppet government under Bao Dai (851G.00/5–2247). The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–1547: Telegram [Document 115] The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State secret Nanking , May 15, 1947—noon. 1054. Prior to his departure for Paris on leave, the French Ambassador 1 in conversation with Minister-Counselor 2 briefly reviewed Sino-French Indo-China situation. In his opinion before 1946 the Chinese Govt definitely had designs of infiltration and control but that about the beginning of that year it made a volte-face due to: (1) the difficulties Chinese authorities were experiencing in reestablishing themselves in other areas and in particular Manchuria; (2) the difficulties and opposition they had experienced in attempting to carry out their designs in Indo-China, particularly with the Annamites; (3) the necessity for having clean hands before the court of world opinion and UN. French Ambassador feels they have never wavered in that latter decision since it was made. He also stated his conviction, which he indicated he had reiterated to Paris, that both Gimo 3 and Foreign Minister 4 profoundly fear a Communist dominated Vietnam Govt and accordingly prefer the reestablishment of an enlightened French colonial administration of a modern type. French Ambassador cited the notably negligible amount of criticism in Chinese Govt controlled and influenced press of French actions in Indo-China, despite such occurrences as bombing and shooting of Chinese civilians. In this connection he welcomed decision of French Govt (reference Paris’ telegram 4, May 9 to Nanking, sent Dept as 1905 5 ) to compensate Chinese, although not required to do so under international law, and indicated that he had urged his Govt to take this course as an act of statesmanship. He added that of course the Chinese would exaggerate their claims and appear to be dissatisfied with the eventual settlement but he felt that end result would nevertheless redound to France’s interests. An opportunity was made to query French Counselor regarding actions and attitude of Chinese Consul General at Hanoi without divulging info contained in Deptcirc May 8, 11 a.m., 5 and he too reiterated conviction that Chinese were not playing a double game but vouchsafed the opinion that Chinese Consul General was attempting to play his own game acting perhaps under pressure from powerful Chinese community interest. He cited fact that at least on one occasion French Embassy had definite proof that he had reported incorrectly to Chinese Foreign Office statements to him by French authorities in Indo-China. Dept please repeat to Hanoi, Saigon, and Paris. Stuart 1 Jacques Meyrier. 2 W. Walton Butterworth, Jr. 3 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China. 4 Dr. Wang Shih-chieh. 5 Not printed. 5 Not printed. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–2147: Telegram [Document 116] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , May 21, 1947—5 p.m. 162. As matters stand there are two main contenders for position of power in Vietnam (1) Vietminh with Ho—still leading figure, and (2) National Union Front, with Bao Dai—not personally popular but important only through former position, but must be noted not much fundamental difference between parties as both claim unity and independence with guaranty France’s “legitimate” economic cultural interests in French Indo-China. Bollaert’s Hanoi speech and Front’s proclamation (my telegram 161, May 20 6 ) present definite statements of position and when Ho’s terms are known road to negotiation will be open; many believe terms already communicated Bollaert through Mus-Giam meeting 7 and Bollaert prepared make definite recommendations upon return Paris end of month. Progress has been made and several official sources intimate all will be settled in 3 months. Reasonably certain French will not install any puppet regime and in fact am not certain how long will maintain Cochin-Chinese regime. Bollaert’s speech (my telegram 155, May 17 6 ) and Front’s proclamation indicate unlikelihood French dealing solely with Ho and some indication communication between Bao Dai and Ho. British Vice Consul Hanoi informs British Consul General Saigon [that] Bollaert so shocked by destruction and so fearful possible floods, famine, that will go far in recommendations restore peace and order and increasing activity near Saigon can only help convince French their hold French Indo-China still precarious. Opinion Saigon press is divided as to Front proclamation but majority believe it helps clarify situation. Please pass Paris. Reed 6 Not printed. 7 In airgram A–13, June 20, from Hanoi (received July 21), Vice Consul O’Sullivan gave the text of a Vietnamese account of this meeting between Ho Chi Minh, Hoang Minh Giam, and Paul Mus. He stated that this text conformed with various Vietnamese reports and concluded: “If these were the conditions actually proposed upon which French would admit no discussion, it can only mean that Bollaert had no intention of treating with the Viet Nam Government.” (851G.00/6–2047). 6 Not printed. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–2347: Telegram [Document 117] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , May 23, 1947—6 p.m. 165. In course interview with De Marolles, 10 at his request, saying Bollaert asked him discuss situation with me, took occasion convey gist Deptel 78, May 13. 11 He said Bollaert would appreciate views expressed especially as they coincided with his and said Bollaert doing his best bring about speedy settlement FIC situation. This difficult as he believes to treat with Ho solely, which latter reported to insist, is to deliver Vietnam into hands totalitarian regime, which, if now soft pedals Communist ideology because people not ready for it, has such ideology in mind as long range policy. Moreover, any change in Ho’s govt to eliminate extremist, professed Communist elements would be only gesture, as “Tongbo” 12 is possibly real power. He felt National Union Front not as important, as leaders would have it, but agreed Front does represent certain minority elements, chiefly in Annam, Cochin-China, which must be considered, as Bollaert wants all Vietnam elements consulted, without which little likelihood really democratic regime. He said Bollaert’s departure for France may be delayed and intimated slow progress negotiations is cause thereof, 13 In De Marolles’ opinion, China is future danger for independent Vietnam, which may well become as elsewhere Southeast Asia eventual scene struggle between Chinese interests and Communist ideas. My impression Bollaert trying find satisfactory solution, but finding it all but impossible treat with anyone except Ho; also finding it difficult find formula protect French interests, as has no confidence in Ho or his group—as reported members Bollaert’s Cabinet have rather divergent ideas and was rumored very profound; also impressed, Bollaert realized puppet regime only lead to further troubles; and in this connection, although still backing Cochin Chinese Govt, he is finding existence this Govt very embarrassing, as Govt while professing favor federation, wants autonomy. 14 Please pass Paris, Nanking. Reed 10 Claude de Marolles, assistant director of the High Commissioner’s cabinet, in charge of foreign relations. 11 Same as telegram 1737, May 13, p. 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] . 12 Party bureau of Vietminh. 13 The High Commissioner left Saigon on June 11. 14 In telegram 166, May 24, 11 a.m., from Saigon, Consul Reed noted that, in turning over the French official residence in Cochin China to President Hoach, Commissioner Bollaert stated that this was for the Vietnam people: “You will give it to those who are able to speak and rule in the name of the people.” (851G.00/5–2447) The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/5–2947: Telegram [Document 118] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential Paris , May 29, 1947—1 p.m. 2124. In conversation with Baudet last evening he expressed discouragement regarding Indo-China. Referring to recent press reports of supposed negotiations with Viet-nam Govt carried on by Professor Mus, Baudet explained that Mus is director of colonial school in Paris and accompanied Bollaert to Indo-China; has lived 25 years in that colony, speaks perfect Annamese and has many close friends among native population. While continuing to deny any negotiations with Ho Chi Minh Govt had occurred, Baudet admitted Mus had made certain soundings; regarding agency reports of Viet-nam broadcast rejecting supposed French terms, including demand for surrender by Viet-nam of all arms, Baudet admitted certain military guarantees had been demanded. He contended these were entirely justified in view intercepted messages proving Ho regarded armistice as merely opportunity to reform his forces and acquire additional arms from China. 15 Department please repeat Saigon as Paris’ 15. Sent Dept as 2124, repeated London as 411. Caffery 15 In telegram 2189, June 3, 6 p.m., from Paris, the Ambassador reported that Foreign Minister Bidault had told him that decoded Vietnamese messages showed a definite pro-Soviet orientation and that Ho’s aim was to drive the French out of Indochina (851G.00/6–347). The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/6–547: Telegram [Document 119] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State restricted Hanoi , June 5, 1947—2 p.m. 184. Destruction in Tonkin is literally appalling. Damage is due very largely to Vietnam Government policy of “scorched earth” although French bombing and shelling have contributed. Of small cities I have seen personally, Haiduong is about 60 to 70 percent destroyed, Hoabinh 100 percent razed, Hadong has perhaps a dozen buildings of several hundred standing. French aerial observers state that Tuyenquang and Thainguyen have been destroyed by Vietnamese (French troops have not attacked these points). Correspondents state that Septpagodes and Quangyen are also wiped out. No estimate available of number of villages destroyed. Destruction of course will be increased and famine made inevitable if dikes of Red River break or are cut by Vietnamese during flood waters which usually occur in August. Earthen dike system requires year round maintenance and military-like mobilization of population during flood waters to build reinforcements at threatened points and maintenance of dikes, of course, has not been done to any great extent during past 6 months of hostilities and mobilization of population seems impossible if hostilities continue. Even if dikes not cut, they will probably break if Red River floods surpasses 11 meter mark. O’Sullivan The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/6–1347: Telegram [Document 120] The Ambassador in Siam ( Stanton ) to the Secretary of State 16 confidential Bangkok , June 13, 1947—2 p.m. [Received June 17—4:17 p.m.] 466. Daridan 17 who just returned Bangkok from Paris via Saigon where discussed Indochina situation with Bollaert made following personal confidential observations: 1. Recent French demands Ho Chi Minh were purposely made very stiff because French authorities do not want treat with present Vietnam Govt which they do not regard as being representative of people of Annam and Tonkin. French authorities still hoping either Vietnam Govt will be reorganized to exclude Communist elements or overthrown and replaced by conservative regime, possibly under Bao Dai. Above development French hope may take place during next few months rainy season but if not then French military think they are sufficiently strong destroy Vietnam Govt and gain control and hold principal lines communication, this to be followed by creating new govt. Bollaert favors union Cochin China with Annam and Tonkin and independence for united republic Vietnam but within French Union. On question independence Vietnam, Daridan said it was his observation recent visit Paris that French people particularly Parliament not prepared grant more than independence in French Union. Added he was reasonably optimistic settlement would be effected within few months and stressed Bollaert’s desire achieve settlement. 2. Situation Cambodia steadily improving according Daridan. Only two bands of Cambodians remain Siemreap area, all other having surrendered to French or dispersed. 3. Situation in Laos also quiet. Briefly discussed free Laos representatives here. Daridan thinks they and their activities not much import and apparently does not expect continue talks with them. 4. Discussed question confederation SEA countries. Daridan said he did not find much support this in Paris, that French Foreign Office was divided on question, that even proponents were thinking only terms economic [and] cultural matters and that there was definitely no thought political confederation. In this connection he said Laos feared Siam domination confederation. 5. Daridan slated head Asia Dept French Foreign Office but said Bollaert who is old and close friend insisting he accept position Indochina assist him. Matter being decided Paris. According Daridan, French Minister Siam will probably be Gilbert, presently Chief Personnel Dept, Foreign Office. Sent Dept 466, Saigon by courier 15. Dept. please repeat Paris. Stanton 16 Repeated by the Department to Hanoi as telegram 55, June 19, 3 p.m. 17 Jean Daridan, French Chargé in Siam. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/6–1447 [Document 121] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] confidential No. 256 Saigon , June 14, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to summarize and analyze, as of possible interest to the Department, the chronological development of the situation in Indochina from the arrival at Saigon of Mr. Emile Bollaert, High Commissioner of the Republic in Indochina, on April 1, 1947, to his departure for France on June 11. This period of 70 days was a particularly critical one, as Mr. Bollaert had the unenviable task of endeavoring to counteract the effect of errors of omission and commission popularly attributed to the regime of Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu, former High Commissioner, and of attempting to find a solution of the complex Indochinese political problem which would be acceptable to both the French and the Annamite peoples. The extent of his success, of course, cannot be measured at this time save in relation to the state of affairs obtaining at the date of his arrival in Indochina, and only time will tell whether or not he has carried back to France a feasible plan for the restoration of peace and security and a workable recommendation for the future status of Annamite Indochina. . . . . . . . This then was Mr. Bollaert’s heritage on the French side, a people sharply divided as to the best means of dealing with the situation, as to the concessions to be made, and as to the person or persons whom France should recognize as the representatives of the Annamite peoples; on the Annamite side, a people almost universally distrustful of French intentions, convinced that the French would stop at nothing to deny the fulfilment of native aspirations, and cherishing a hatred and rancor engendered by decades of exploitation by a thoroughly selfish colonial regime. In several respects, however, he was fortunate. The situation could not have been worse—I may say with confidence that the present situation is far worse than when I arrived in February 1946. In his consideration of the thorny problem, he could disregard any idea of military reconquest, as France as a whole had neither the will nor the means to embark upon such a vast undertaking, one that would be condemned by the world at large—the French were surely aware that the hard won successes of their military in Tonkin were more apparent than real. And he could count on the Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos being content to accept French guidance, inspiration and tutelage—the Issarak movements could largely be dismissed as attempts to make dynastic changes rather than revolts against the French position in those countries. Moreover, the High Commissioner had the good fortune to arrive at a time when people were tired of fighting and destruction. . . . . . . . What plan if any the High Commissioner has taken back to France is of course not known. Logically, however, any plan likely to succeed will represent a great concession on the part of France and the unquestionable sacrifice of many of her interests. France has already jettisoned the idea of a Federation of the five entities making up the French Indochina of the past, France may well be prepared to throw overboard the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cochin-china, and France appears to be willing to accept a Vietnam Federation so long as both French and native rights are protected and not to be the spoil of an admittedly totalitarian regime. What security France can exact for such protection in the future is difficult to say. France, if Mr. Bollaert’s declaration is to be given credence, will refuse to deal with any one faction. On the other hand Ho Chi Minh has always said he is not fighting the French but only the colonialists, and he has given some indication of willingness to make concessions in his acknowledgement of the right of each of three Kys to have local autonomy. How far communist-trained Ho Chi Minh is to be trusted is problematic and his concession of local autonomy may be merely a blind. Unfortunately, the majority of natives stoutly maintain that Ho Chi Minh is the man, and the only one , who represents them and they will oppose the putting forward of any other candidate as the creation of but another puppet and the erecting of a smoke screen for France’s real intentions. While the natives are tired of fighting and are apprehensive of the destruction and famine that impend for the future there is still a determined nucleus who are prepared to wage a bitter and ruthless warfare if the greater part of their claims is not met. To reconcile these differences will be difficult, but for the future of Indochina, for the stability of Southeast Asia, for the good of the whole Far East, and for the prestige of western democracy, whatever plan is adopted must be put into operation without great loss of time. From a purely practical point of view too great concessions on the part of France might be very disastrous, if such concessions give the natives virtually a free hand. Many observers doubt whether they are capable of running an independent state and point to the fact that the Philippines after 40 odd years of benevolent tutelage, in which the advantages of education and instruction were available to all, are still not a model of good government. How much less chance would the Annamites have of making a success? The majority of these observers opine that without Occidental check or control the result would be chaos—and in that chaos either the Soviet or the Chinese would find their opportunity. The former would be able to establish their ideology in the very heart of teeming Southeast Asia, with millions of people to indoctrinate and to prepare for the ultimate struggle with the western democracies. The latter would be able to realize their age-old desire to dominate if not to take over this part of the Far East, a desire which is even now manifest. To many observers, the Chinese danger is the greater, even if not imminent because of China’s preoccupation with her own political problems. Be that as it may, something must be done to eradicate the distrust and almost contempt of the French for the natives, and to eradicate the distrust and hatred of the natives for the French; something must be done to bring home to the French the fact that times have changed and that the natives have a right to more than a semblance of independence, and to bring home to the natives that the French have a legitimate interest and place in Indochina. Mr. Bollaert must have learned that the above are imperative and that they are the stones in the foundation of peace in Indochina. The High Commissioner has now gathered the necessary data and it is the task of the French Government to supply and apply the answer. While that Government may continue to procrastinate in the hopes of wearing down the native opposition, I believe that that Government will be led to accept a Federated Republic of Vietnam, in which each of the three Kys will have autonomy, freely associated with the French Union. And Ho Chi Minh, if he is really the nationalist and patriot that he claims to be, must accept that his totalitarian government and Tonkin cannot speak for all Annamites. Respectfully yours, Charles S. Reed , II The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/6–1747: Telegram [Document 122] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France restricted u.s. urgent Washington , June 17, 1947—7 p.m. 2201. Kenneth Campbell N Y Times dispatch datelined Paris June 16 quoted authoritative French sources to effect US has urged French terminate conflict with Vietnam, pointedly referring to undesirability prolonged conflict strategic Indochina and to possibility unrest might spread beyond Indochina. Dept replying press inquiries along following lines: “We are continuing to keep in touch with the French Govt concerning the disturbed situation in Indochina as indicated by Mr. Acheson in his press conference of 27 Dec last. Our deep concern that a pacific basis be found for the adjustment of the situation was voiced by Secretary Marshall in his press conference of Feb. 7. 18 Ambassador Caffery maintains contact with the French Govt on developments in the situation and has, of course, expressed similar views.” (Sent Paris as 2201; rept Saigon as 98, and Hanoi as 54.) Marshall 18 See telegram 15, February 14, 5 p.m., p. 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] . The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/6–2447 [Document 123] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 260 Saigon , June 24, 1947. [Received July 16.] Sir : I have the honor to report, as of possible interest to the Department, the report appearing in the June 23 issue of the Echo of Vietnam , a daily advocating the cause of Ho Chi Minh and his Government, that one of the leaders of the National Union Front of Vietnam, the party advocating the return of Bao Dai, has been sentenced to death in absentia by a military court of the Executive Committee of Nambo, the control body of the Viet Minh in Cochinchina. The leader in question, Mr. Nguyen Van Sam, self styled diplomatic delegate of the National Union Front, has been accused of (1) sabotage of the national defense, (2) dealing with the enemy, and (3) disobeying the order of April 18, 1947, dissolving the Social Democratic Party. The military court is reported to have consisted of Nguyen Binh, Commander in Chief of the 7th Military Zone, Ta Minh Kien and Le Dinh Chi, Assessors, and Nguyen Van Tri, Director of the Political Committee in the 7th Military Zone. While the court order order reads that Nguyen Van Sam is to be brought before the court to make his defense, it adds that if he refuses to appear before the court the verdict of death may be carried out anywhere. This is but one indication of the possible fate that awaits persons who are for one reason or another in opposition to the program of the Viet Minh Party and the publicity given to the verdict, and to the threat of assassination, may well be a hint to all those who oppose the aspirations announced by Ho Chi Minh and his Government. The fact that such pressure is brought to bear on political opponents is rather disturbing to those who do not want Cochinchina, or all of Annamite Indochina, at the mercy of the totalitarian group now holding forth in Tonkin. In fact, native sources, who confirm there is a growing sentiment in Cochinchina away from Ho and his party, assert that just such intimidation may well influence many Cochinchinese to join what is now called a Cochinchinese front. In this same vein there are reports to the effect that there is a split in the ranks of the Executive Committee of Nambo, that a number of the members, particularly Pham Van Bach, President of the Committee, are opposed to the terrorist activities of Nguyen Binh and have asked the Government in Hanoi to suppress the position of Commander in Chief and to place the resistance movement largely in the hands of the civilian authorities. These reports speak of the split as a grouping of the strictly Cochinchinese nationalists in opposition to the communist and extremist elements of the Viet Minh. According to report there are 24 brigades in the resistance army in Cochinchina, of which four are composed of mostly Tonkinese, are the best armed, and are well provided with money. The Cochinchinese nationalists are said to be endeavoring to gain control of the remaining brigades but admit they do not have the funds to keep things going. Well informed French sources are inclined to discount the above reports and are reasonably certain that, even if there are a few dissidents in the ranks, the Viet Minh and the so-called Army of Resistance are stronger than ever—these sources feel that while the numbers in that Army have not increased these troops have now advanced in training and have profited from many months of experience in actual warfare. These sources, and among these I may mention the Chief of the French Sûreté , also stress that the communist complexion of the Viet Minh and the Army of Resistance is becoming more and more apparent, even though Ho Chi Minh endeavors to show that he is a nationalist and not a communist. Respectfully yours, Charles S. Reed , II The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7 347: Telegram [Document 124] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State 19 secret Hanoi , July 3, 1947—4 p.m. 213. Aide of General Salan 20 called this morning to offer use band and honor guard at July 4 reception. Under cover this offer, he talked considerable length making following points: (1) Viet Minh is exclusively communistic. French intelligence reports during last week indicate group of eight Russians now on Indochina border at unidentified spot under leadership character whose name phonetically spelled Karkov. Group designed reorganize Vietnam military forces which not operating too effectively. 21 (2) If Viet Minh took power, there would be no democratic liberties (I remarked that French Sûreté here gave little evidence of respect for them also). (3) Question of Indochina is question which affects entire white race and policy of “firmness” is necessary. (4) Vietnam was really last part Axis set up by Japs which was proved by fact that Japs now fighting in Vietnam ranks (to this, I said that because Germans were fighting for French in Indochina, no one accused France being Axis creation and expressed doubt as to whether what Japs there may be among Vietnam military forces had important position, or if they did, French would certainly have great deal more difficulty militarily). (5) Check Paris Conference on Marshall Plan made evident necessity for world choose between American and Russian philosophies. I have noted in past 2 weeks increasing French official talk both here and in Saigon that Viet Minh is communistic. While it appears that there may be Communist flavor to troubles in Kwangtung and it reasonable to assume that Vietnam Govt will turn more and more toward Russia if aid not available other sources, there has been no recent evidence of high credibility which adds to what was known of character of Vietnam Govt 6 months ago. This task [ talk? ], coming on heels Dept declaration re Indochina (Deptel 54, June 17 22 ) and recent note Indonesian Govt, seems designed prepare for new turn French policy probably of repressive nature. What makes it doubly auspicious is fact French tried same tactics during months which preceded Haiphong incident in fall last year. O’Sullivan 19 Repeated to Paris as telegram 2529, July 10, 1 p.m., and to Saigon as 117. 20 Gen. Raoul Salan, commanding officer of French forces in north Indochina. 21 In airgram A–191, September 30, from Nanking, the Embassy in China reported on a group of White Russian musicians traveling in China as probably the reason for this report. The French Consul General at Kunming informed the American Vice Consul there that he regarded the report as a fabrication of French military intelligence in Indochina. (851G.00/9–3047) 22 Same as telegram 2201, June 17, p. 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] . The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–947 [Document 125] The Ambassador in Siam ( Stanton ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 463 Bangkok , July 9, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to report that Dr. Pham Ngoc Thach, who describes himself as Under Secretary of State of the Vietnam Government, returned to Bangkok about two weeks ago and that he departed for Indochina a few days ago. While here Dr. Thach handed to Col. Law, Assistant Military Attaché who, on Dr. Thach’s previous visit, had established informal contact with him, a questionnaire which is in the nature of a plea by the Vietnam Government for the assistance of the United States. For the information of the Department, copies of the questionnaire mentioned are enclosed herewith. 23 It will be observed that the questionnaire, which is understood to have been prepared by Dr. Thach himself, poses the question of whether or not the United States would be willing to use its influence to mediate between the two parties. It is recognized that because of the present international political situation the United States could not adopt an anti-French position by supplying arms and munitions to Vietnam. However, the question is asked whether or not it would be possible for the United States to make a loan ($10,000,000–$20,000,000) for the purchase of textiles, medicines and machinery for the use of the Vietnam people. Reference is also made to lack of capital and of technicians for the reconstruction and modernization of the country, and inquiry is made as to whether or not the United States would be willing to render such assistance and the terms and conditions under which such aid might be granted. Reference is also made to the possibility of Vietnam’s case being presented to the United Nations and inquiry is made as to whether the Vietnam Government can count on the United States or the Philippines to place its case before that body. The further query is made as to the attitude of the United States in the event that their case were presented to the United Nations by some other nation. Paragraph 7 of the questionnaire refers to the fact that American culture can now only be seen through a French “prism” and inquiry is made whether the United States would be willing to institute a cultural program vis-à-vis Vietnam. The final paragraph makes reference to the Federation of Southeast Asia which is characterized as an American idea and interest is expressed in receiving some indication of the American conception of such a federation. I asked Col. Law not to answer any of the questions posed, but simply to explain orally and informally to Dr. Thach that as he well knew the United States Government is not unsympathetic toward the aspirations of the Vietnam people; that it is most anxious to see peace and tranquillity restored in Indochina; and that it has been endeavoring through appropriate diplomatic channels to be of assistance in effecting a settlement of present differences. Respectfully yours, Edwin F. Stanton 23 Not printed. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–1147 [Document 126] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 273 Saigon , July 11, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Charlton Ogburn Jr., of the Division of Southeast Asia Affairs, and Mr. William C. Bullitt, former American Ambassador at Paris, dated May 29, 1947, 24 in which the latter related his impressions of the attitude of certain French officials in France towards the present conflict in Indochina. It is curious to note that, according to Mr. Bullitt, the present conflict, or war, appears to be popular in France, and that his contacts expressed optimism as to the ability of the French military not only to have the situation under control within two months but also that all questions will be settled within two years. With few exceptions the above does not represent the attitude of the French in Indochina, who are perhaps more realistic in their evaluation of the situation and of the ability of the French military to cope adequately with the situation. The few exceptions are, of course, the perennial optimists and the dyed in the wool colonialists, who, at any price, want to see the good old days restored, when natives had few rights and were subjected to an almost merciless exploitation. On the whole, the French in Indochina find the war too near to home to feel comfortable and life under existing conditions, while superficially hectic, is far from pleasant. In theory, perhaps, the conflict may be popular, as vindicating the power and glory of France, but a person who has seen his life work go up in smoke is either determined to continue the fight at all costs or to pull out—and in the opinion of most observers the majority of French if not altogether of the latter frame of mind are convinced of the futility of an all out war. The American Vice Consul at Hanoi has reported his opinion that the French military successes in the north are more apparent than real and, as I have reported, the French successes in the south have achieved but a very small part of the task that confronts the military. It would appear that the native strategy is not to force an open battle but rather to engage in hit and run tactics for which the terrain is well suited. So long as Vietnam has the will to fight the French will find themselves mightily mistaken if they think they can control the country and restore its shattered economy by holding only the larger urban centers and by using small mobile units for countryside cleanups. The present campaign, including the extensive use of parachute troops, has proved that by the time a French unit arrives at the scene of action the opponents have quitted the field and are many miles away. What generally happens then is that the French military summarily punish all the natives in the neighborhood, a practice which has not endeared them to the population. Frankly, with the forces now at their disposal the French have little chance to win a decisive battle or to make the countryside safe for living or for enterprise. The attitude of the French in France regarding the Indochina situation may, of course, be based on the optimistic utterances of persons like Tran Van Ty, Vice President of the Provisional Government of Cochinchina, or on the incomprehensible statement of the High Commissioner, Mr. Emile Bollaert, upon his arrival back in France, that the situation had improved. The latter appears to be far from the case. The French contacts of Mr. Bullitt mentioned that the resistance would collapse with the exhaustion of arms and munitions at its disposal. This would appear to be somewhat of an exaggeration—the loss of arms and munitions might cause a decrease in an open type of warfare but enough will remain and filter in from China, or from other sources, to keep alive the flames of sabotage and guerrilla activities. That is the type of warfare for which the natives are best suited, the type of warfare the French are less able to combat successfully, and so long as the natives do not win at least the major part of their political and social desiderata there will always be the will to fight the French on the part of a not inconsiderable number of natives. The situation in Indochina will not be settled until the countryside is safe, until people can travel other than in heavily armed convoys, until the production of this rich and fertile land can be sure of reaching markets and ports of exportation, and a very few active and determined resistants can prevent this from being achieved. Perhaps the French in France do not realize the heritage of hatred that their colonialists have created—nor do they realize that French actions and political manoeuvering since their return to Indochina under the cover of British arms have detracted nothing from that heritage. Moreover, alongside of this hatred runs a current of frank distrust that the French ever intend to give them the measure of liberty and self-determination that they claim. Apart from the attitude that a military solution is possible, the most interesting comment was that concerning the investment of United States capital in the rehabilitation of Indochina, and equally Mr. Bullitt’s thought that the French were in a frame of mind to relax their economic grasp and to allow the United States to participate in the commerce and production of Indochina. Observers here feel that any concessions the French will make, in admitting participation in what could be a most lucrative economy, will be forced from them or will be so conditioned as to ensure more than substantial benefits for the French. The past record certainly shows no willingness on the part of the French to lightly give up any part of her former policy of economic exclusivism—any concessions made in the past to American business and enterprise have been literally wrung from the authorities in Indochina. It is possible that the French, while in France, are more liberal minded, but something seems to happen to them when they get to Indochina and American businessmen can relate from bitter experience the difficulty of doing business here. The Department has only to recall the background and long drawnout discussions which finally resulted in the Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Company being allowed to open an office for the distribution of films in this country. Inter alia I might mention that the Department has reported that the French are not inclined to enter into a reciprocal agreement providing for duty free treatment of consular officers—this is a small matter but it is indicative of the French attitude of squeezing out revenue by all possible means. There is of course a political aspect to this question of the investment of foreign capital. I am convinced that the French would not willingly encourage the investment of such capital, particularly American, for fear that the results of such investment would be to further emancipate the natives from French control. Thus, the Department is aware that many French, in Indochina at least, are suspicious of American motives and the Department will recall newspaper articles charging American interference in affairs in this area for the purpose of securing a position of economic domination. Many of these articles, if not officially inspired, were with the tacit blessing of the authorities, for these articles appeared when the authorities exercised a very large degree of control over the press. The French, at least in Indochina, have always believed that the Americans favored the native cause and this belief has colored their actions and reactions to Americans and to American organizations and institutions. The Department has only to recall the difficulties that have beset the United States Information Service to be convinced of the suspicion that many of these French hold of the United States and American motives. Corroboratory of this suspicion are the activities in Indochina of the Sûreté and the French Military Security Service, which for example have hinted to consular personnel that any information obtained in the consular establishments should be passed on. As mentioned above, the French in France may regard Americans differently from many of the French in Indochina, but the intrigues of these latter and their often open campaign against Americans are too apparent but to fail to instill any great amount of confidence in a sincere welcome of American investment and the correlative influx of American businessmen. Laws in the past have been, if not discriminatory, so phrased as to make it difficult for foreign companies to work in Indochina. Some of these are understood to be still valid although force of circumstances and their own financial and commercial plight have caused the French not to insist upon their enforcement. An interesting comment was made to me recently by a French businessman, who has spent considerable time in the United States and who may be considered as definitely pro-American. He said you Americans are much too easy—you give help and financial support to many countries, including France, and what do you get out of it? You should publicize the help you are so generously extending and you should insist that some quid pro quo be given you. Instead, you Americans follow a straight path, open and frank, and you do not realize, or at least ignore, that many people do not like you just because you have done them favors or because you oppose those people trying to do things that are not exactly “according to Hoyle”. He then spoke of the situation in Indochina and made the same comment as I have made above, regarding the difference between the French in France and the French in Indochina—some opposition to the Americans arises from the fact that the Americans did not back the French for the reconquering of Indochina, that the Americans wanted to be fair towards native aspirations, and because many French here fear that the United States, by opening up this country, will reap a part of the rich profits that formerly flowed into French coffers. The only saving grace, he added, was that in France there were a few sane people who recognized their debt to the United States and who might be willing, but they must be pressed, to give the United States more commercial opportunity in Indochina than in the past. The only saving grace, so far as the French in Indochina are concerned, is the fact that they would prefer American participation in the Indochinese economy to Chinese participation, perhaps because they believe the Americans would be easier to deal with than the Chinese. The reaction of Mr. Bullitt’s contacts regarding dealing with Ho Chi Minh is, of course, stereotyped. The French do not want to deal with him despite the fact that he is still the outstanding representative of the native peoples and despite their heralded desire to treat with the real representatives of those peoples. Instead, stressing Ho’s Communist background, they are still dickering with the idea of bringing Bao Dai back to power, to set up a government with a front of independence, but which will be completely French dominated and which will protect French interests, protect the business of those powerful French concerns which if they did not “play ball” with the Japanese at least made a handsome profit from their transactions with them. Thus, at the present time, we have in the press articles which appear to be building up to the return of the late Emperor, the reputed playboy of Hong Kong, whose only sincere following appears to be a few of his former cohorts in Annam and whose greatest following are those whose pockets will be benefited if he should return. If the French believe that their position is stronger than that of the British and the Dutch, as they explained to Mr. Bullitt, they can only be anticipating a French return to power in Indochina—and a French return to power will not be exactly for the benefit of the natives. I agree, however, with Mr. Bullitt that the alternatives are not entirely pleasing, i.e., (1) allowing an independent Vietnam State which would be run by orders from Moscow, and (2) keeping the natives down by force of arms. For the good of the world, as we Americans see it, perhaps intervention as discussed in my despatch no. 267 of July 1, 25 may be the only possible solution. I say this with Mr. Bullitt’s comment regarding the character of the Annamites in mind. Here too, the Annamites that Mr. Bullitt met in France are apparently different from those in their native land. While there are of course numerous exceptions I do not believe that many people find the Annamites attractive and even lovable. With the exception of the Tonkinese, whose poverty has forced them to be so, few of the Annamites are particularly industrious. Including the Tonkinese, the Annamites are generally not noted for their honesty, loyalty or veracity. As an example, before the war it was impossible to obtain burglary and theft insurance in Indochina, because of the frequency with which native servants robbed their employers or were concerned with such robberies, and I am given to understand that the same condition exists today. Certainly theft and armed robbery are on the increase—and I must say that during the period following the fall of Japan few native servants showed themselves loyal to employers even after years of service. It may well be, however, that the abovementioned lack of admirable traits is a direct and pernicious result of decades of French maltreatment and lack of consideration. The corruption, intrigues and scandals of the colonialist era, and even now, were certainly no moral lesson. Nevertheless, whatever the cause, most observers feel that the real trouble with the Annamite is that he lacks “face”, and an Oriental who lacks this attribute is a pretty hopeless sort of person. That is not to say that there are not many worthwhile natives and that the natives should not have more of an opportunity than they have had in the past. They should! But knowing the rank and file it is queried as to what would happen in Indochina if they were given independence with no measure of check and control, A great many observers believe that there would be misgovernment and chaos and, as has been repeatedly proffered, a fine opportunity for a third party, be it Soviet or Chinese, to gain a foothold in this country. Perhaps the best way to obtain a fair deal for the natives, and also to protect legitimate French and other interests from a native oppression and venality, would be to insist upon some sort of intervention and subsequent period of control. As it is, settlement of the situation is no farther progressed than almost two years ago, the French are trying to regain their position by procrastination and double dealing, and the Tonkinese group is still intransigent in its desire to have complete power over all this land, despite what a substantial number of Annamese and Cochinchinese may think and want. One cannot blame the French for wanting to return if not to the status quo of before the war then to a political setup in which they will still have the balance of power, nor for not wanting to turn this country over to a group which may indeed draw strength and direction from anti-democratic sources. One cannot blame the natives for wanting at least a substantial share in the determination of their lives and futures, nor, after years of exploitation and poverty, for wanting a fair share of the fruits of their own lands. But one must reconcile these two positions and, unless the High Commissioner is able to pull a political rabbit from his hat in the not too distant future, it seems that intervention and possibly a period of tutelage may be the only way to end this conflict equitably and, it is hoped, to prevent the creation here of a Soviet-dominated state. However, I am loath to believe that the French will be so foolish as to stubbornly insist on conditions that can only mean a continuance of conflict and I am more inclined to believe that they will accept a Federated Republic of Viet Nam, as previously described. It then remains for the native leaders to make concessions, unless at all costs those leaders, like their Soviet mentors, will continue to insist on their program, come what may. In the latter contingency the only possible solution would appear to be pressure on the Vietnam to play the game fairly and reasonably. Mention has been made of intervention and supervision. The form of this, if both the French and the natives should prove politically irreconcilable, might well be determined and imposed by the United Nations, under the urge of bringing security and peace to this troubled area. A neutral commission could be set up which would oversee the establishment of an acceptable form of government, which would watch that neither side encroached upon the rights of the other, and which would be able to guard, authoritatively, against the setting up of a totalitarian regime. Although the natives have agitated for some such intervention, but not for supervision, the French, I feel, would consider this a loss of prestige and would resist any such procedure so long as they have any cards to play, say the bringing back of Bao Dai. Respectfully yours, Charles S. Reed , II 24 Not printed. 25 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/7–1647: Telegram [Document 127] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France restricted Washington , July 16, 1947—7 p.m. 2621. New York Times despatch datelined Paris July 13 states Bollaert on return Indochina will offer terms to Indochina states including “full internal autonomy to the three countries of Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina” within French union, end French administration with French offering “technical advisers to Indochinese administrations and associated states, such as Cambodia” but with control of army and foreign policy vested in French High Commissioner. Vietnam army to be disallowed to prevent repetition December 19 revolt. Despatch explains French consider Ho Chi Minh working for independence Indochina with sole purpose making country a vassal to Moscow and that Bollaert’s policy has been “to dispute with Ho Chi Minh and the Communists the support of Indochina’s nationalists”. Contact with Boadai is mentioned connection with French effort “regroup nationalist parties to counterbalance Communism”. Can you confirm as indication French policy? Sent Paris 2621. Repeated Saigon 121 and Hanoi 64. Marshall The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–1747: Telegram [Document 128] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State confidential Hanoi , July 17, 1947—11 a.m. 229. French monitoring service reports Viet Nam radio, “Voix du Sudun”, in French on July 14 stated that Giam made speech to cultural association of Tonkin and Annam. He reportedly said Moutet’s recent declaration regarding cessation hostilities in Indochina contained errors of fact. Textually radio reportedly stated: “April 25 Viet Nam Government sent French Government note proposing cessation hostilities with view seeking solution for peace. After note sent, about May 12, Paul Mus, delegate of High Commissioner, requested meeting with Ho, at which Giam was present. Mus stated, Giam said, armistice conditions he brought, under reserve of confirmation by official note from French to VN Government. Among conditions proposed by representative High Commissioner two are acceptable: (1) liberation of French hostages and (2) free circulation French troops on all territory of Viet Nam. Regarding dissolution Viet Namese Army and delivery of arms to French authorities, President Ho has already replied to Mus.” In absence full details of conditions proposed by French, it difficult make estimate the meaning Ho’s reply, particularly acceptance second condition (freedom circulation French troops). If this true position of Ho, it may be indication weakness. However, there had been then no evidence to confirm that Viet Nam Govt weakening seriously. Believe in absence of fuller details that Ho agreed to free circulation, knowing that French were not for military reasons interested in dispersing strength throughout country and multiplying supply problem in face of the then coming rainy season while Ho was able to wage fight. Ho in effect may have been trying to induce them to spread forces thin as in Cochin China. O’Sullivan The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon 851G.00/7–1747: Telegram [Document 129] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon secret Washington , July 17, 1947—8 p.m. 122. Request your and Hanoi’s appraisal implications relation US objectives stable Southeast Asia friendly to democratic West in event French should be forced deal present Vietnam Govt and this Govt should eventually emerge as controlling power three Annamese provinces. Refer particularly the following: 1. Whether influence Communists in present coalition Govt and behind-scenes Communists like Dang Xuan Khu and Ha Ba Cang would be sufficient put Vietnam in Soviet camp. 2. Position Ho respect above. Whether your opinion evidence increasing opposition to Ho by militants tends substantiate repeated reports his abandonment Party line and to corroborate reported letter to Chiang Kai Shek in which Ho excused past Communists connections on grounds nowhere else turn, and stated only interest now independence his country. (Impression here Ho publicly attempting walk chalked line between nationalism and Communism effort retain backing both forces.) 3. Whether intellectuals backing Vietnam realize what Communism means as international political force distinct its economic aspects and whether nationalists among them feel they can cope in future with Communist leaders Vietnam. 4. Whether, with removal solidifying effect French pressure, coherent Govt likely be extended over Vietnam representing real interests Annamese and allowing reasonably free political expression or whether coalition would break in factions which would settle differences by terrorism and armed force, resulting chronic disorders or eventual police state under one-party rule. 5. Sensitivity Vietnamese to US opinion and importance this factor future orientation Vietnam Govt. While French Communists exploit every show of US interest developments Indochina to warn of US intervention, Vietnamese apparently welcome this interest. 6. Effect on Laotians and Cambodians should Soviet-oriented Vietnam emerge. Dept fully realizes paucity solid info on which base appraisal. Sent Saigon 122. Repeated Hanoi 66. Repeated Paris for info 2649. Marshall The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–1847: Telegram [Document 130] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State confidential Paris , July 18, 1947. 2865. Deptel 2621, July 16. New York Times dispatch from Paris, July 13, re Indo-China is believed to give fairly accurate but superficial presentation of present French thinking. French policy in recent months has centered on attempt to get around dilemma with which they are faced, to wit, ( a ) Ho Chi-Minh is only native leader with any widespread following and support; ( b ) French are convinced events of December 19 proved Ho Chi-Minh cannot be trusted and any government headed by him would be under Communist control. High Commissioner Bollaert’s activities during his stay in Indo-China show clearly his main objective was to find other elements or groups of elements with which French could safely deal (see Saigon’s excellent despatch 256, June 14). Judging by info recently received in Paris from Ministry of Overseas France and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bollaert’s efforts have not been crowned with success and there is considerable soul-searching going on among officials connected with Indo-Chinese affairs as to what next step should be with growing awareness of seriousness of situation both from French and international point of view. [ Caffery ] The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–1947: Telegram [Document 131] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , July 19, 1947—noon. 226. Commenting re Deptel 121, July 16, 26 may say Times despatch closely parallels my reported beliefs (despatch 256, June 14, mytel 207, June 27 27 ) re terms French will offer substantially federation three autonomous “Kys”. However, in place strong central government demanded by Ho and Liaison Committee advocated by popular movement nationalists, French appear to be proposing over-all French administration in re which difficult to evaluate reaction until its power and scope are defined. But in the main such administration will be opposed by Ho and by most nationalists, for keynote both Ho and nationalists is independence. Opposition will be the more pronounced with French endeavoring retain control army and foreign affairs and insisting disbanding Vietnam Army. Unquestionably Times dispatch correct, French do not want Ho to have over-all power in FIC and proposed administration is to block Ho getting control of any central government that might be established. Proposed administration may be admission failure French to win over Bao Dai or to gather behind him any important nationalist following—but French are certainly still trying to build up such following (petitions, manifestos, declarations) which would give them excuse treat with that following rather than with Ho. While French publicize their dislike treat with Ho because of Communist danger and their duty protect interests other peoples FIC, little doubt they have eye to their own interests and future, hence divide and rule. Most French officials in one form or other admit above but comment difficulty by-pass Ho who does represent very considerable element. They believe only solution treating with Ho, Bao Dai and any other leaders they can dig up so as to reduce Ho’s power to minimum and also not lose face by treating with him alone. Those officials well as neutral observers query possibility workable solution until representatives all political elements can be brought together. My personal comment: in justice to French, Ho and his group controlling FIC to be avoided but proposed setup (overall administration control Army, Foreign Affairs, possibly Customs, Finance) approaches pre-war setup or at most is form of tutelage to which natives object as they feel French not to be trusted. If French terms are on take-it-or-leave-it basis, fear settlement situation will be long deferred with Vietminh turning more and more to Communists for support—if terms on that basis may be French feel can reconquer country or at very least feel can so divide country as to counteract militant objections to their policy. Please pass to Paris. Reed 26 Same as telegram 2621, July 16, p. 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] . 27 Latter not printed. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–1947: Telegram [Document 132] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State 28 restricted Hanoi , July 19, 1947—6 p.m. 233. ReDeptel 64, July 16. 29 Indications here of future French policy are obscured by virtual state of siege which exists and struggle between French military and civil authorities. However, it remains curious that French discovered no Communist menace in Ho Chi Minh Govt until after September 1946, when it became apparent that VN Govt would not bow to French wishes. Break between French and VN Govt developed not because VN Govt was Communist but because it was too strong for French to impose conditions they desired. It is further apparent that Ho’s support (which French to present have consistently underestimated) derives from fact he represents symbol of fight for independence. He is supported because he is acting like nationalist, not because he was or is Communist. As stated in mytel 197, June 20, 30 I believe that French ability to diverse [ divert? ] nationalist support from Ho remains theoretical possibility but that this will require giving to some govt what was refused VN Govt. To present, if French policy is to win nationalist support from Ho Chi Minh, it is failure in Tonkin, With reinforced Sûreté using very repressive measures, arbitrary arrests, widespread torturing in prisons according to International Red Cross representative visited them, Administrative Committee which is literally laughing stock of populace, reestablishment of direct French administration by use of “ délégués ” etc., heavy handed custom controls, and widespread graft, particularly in lower echelons French services, French have gained very little support in zone they control. French desire to set (built around Bao Dai or nationalists or Catholics or various combinations of this) up group in opposition to Ho seems clear. It is logical step, after admission by Coste-Floret 31 that French have insufficient forces to reconquer country, to increase their relative strength by dividing Vietnamese. However, it seems improbable that French intend to offer “complete internal autonomy” (unless French define “autonomy” very narrowly) to Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China, particularly if this means leaving present “federal” services such as Sûreté and customs hanging in air. It is highly doubtful that colonial French would accept policing by Vietnamese nor would they accept that Vietnamese courts have jurisdiction over them. There has been, however, considerably less talk of Indochinese federation in recent past. If French define control “military affairs and foreign relations” as broadly as to mean French control of Sûreté , customs and justice, there exists possibility that they intend eliminate federation at least in name. O’Sullivan 28 Repeated to Paris as telegram 2744, July 24, 6 p.m. 29 Same as telegram 2621, July 16, to Paris, p. 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] . 30 Not printed. 31 Paul Coste-Floret, French Minister of War. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–2147: Telegram [Document 133] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State 32 secret Hanoi , July 21, 1947—5 p.m. 235. Reference Department’s telegram 66, July 17. 33 Department’s assumptions do not make clear how much French influence it expects would remain event French are forced deal directly with Ho Chi Minh. But assuming French will deal with Ho only in last extremity and their control would tend become negligible thereafter: 1. Influence Communists in present government would not be sufficient to put Viet Nam squarely in Soviet camp although there would be pull in that direction. Agreement with French which would satisfy nationalism of Viet Namese people would probably lead to decrease in under-cover activities of characters such as Ha Ba Cang and Dang Xuan Khu and Tongbo members who would tend to emerge from shadows. Geographic isolation Indochina from Russia and realization by Ho Chi Minh of United States power based in Philippines would be sufficient to prevent him or any government formed here from entering whole-heartedly Soviet camp. 2. Until further information available, am very skeptical regarding apparent opposition of militants to Ho. However, Ho’s very great reluctance to admit that he is Nguyen Ai Quoc or to show any connection whatsoever with Russia is indicative of his realization that he must deal with West. Ho wrote 25 years ago that national revolution must precede Communist revolution in Indochina and it is obvious his first concern is get rid of French here. He is trying to obtain aid wherever he can and will tend be oriented toward source from whence assistance comes. 3. Have impression that intellectuals backing Viet Nam do not realize what is meaning Communism as international force and that they really would not care if it was thoroughly explained to them. They have been driven to Communism by French colonial policy here and they consider that nothing can be any worse. Hate for French blinds them to many things and makes them accept others they do not like. Intellectuals backing Viet Nam government hate French so much that any future without French is attractive. 4. Removal French pressure would unquestionably have effect of causing present government in first instance to break into factions which would then for time tend develop into more or less full-blown party movements as those understood in Indochina. There probably then would be demand use armed force to some extent as country has widely distributed arms, has held exactly one general election in last 80 years, has no democratic tradition (outside of villages) which would enable it withstand strain political differences. There unquestionably would be danger police state under one-party rule which danger would have to be combatted by whatever French influence might remain and by United States through propaganda, student exchange, etc. 5. Viet Namese people here still regard United States as promised land and earthly paradise. American flag is still best protection available. Viet Namese are exceeding sensitive to United States opinion and unquestionably would accept United States advice and/or advisers and would be more than willing to have United States intervene if such intervention were directed toward satisfaction their political and economic needs. 6. Should Soviet oriented Viet Nam emerge, Cambodia and Laos would probably be subjected to considerable pressure to overthrow present regimes there. Independent Viet Nam, whether Soviet oriented or not, and absence of protecting power such as France, could be expected to resume encroachment upon Mekong delta which was interrupted by French occupation in 1860. Viet Namese migration to southern plains has gone on for ten centuries and probably will continue. Independent Viet Nam, not oriented toward Soviet, would probably leave Laos to its own devices. In effect, there are dangers in French dealing with Viet Nam Government. There are dangers equally as great in French dealing with series of puppets in continuing effort to establish, despite all statements to contrary, something which strongly resembles status quo of before war. Problem was and remains primarily nationalist problem in overpopulated area with illiterate populace which has no democratic traditions on national level largely because colonial power gave populace no opportunity express itself politically. With middle-class small, intellectuals who are generally ineffective, and Catholics who are split, best possibility of retaining some stability and preventing development of police state seems to be retention some degree French or international control to act as arbiter between parties. Communist problem here results from fact French have allowed Communist group to seize and monopolize fight for felt necessity of people and Communist problem will remain without hope solution as long as this necessity is not satisfied elsewhere. O’Sullivan 32 Repeated to Paris by the Department as telegram 2745, July 24, 6 p.m. 33 Same as telegram 122, July 17, to Saigon, p. 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] . The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–2447: Telegram [Document 134] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State 34 secret Saigon , July 24, 1947—noon. 230. Have given considerable thought Deptel 122, July 17, and feel if French compelled treat with present Vietnam Govt their position in French Indo China will be definitely weakened, also if this Govt emerges as controlling power in three Kys gradual deterioration of ties with democratic West may be expected. Unquestionably aid from western democracies, especially US, will be welcomed at first but query whether this Govt and in fact any native govt not subject to check or control will not develop a definitely oriental orientation and will not become a prey for non-democratic influences. Such a govt without considerable economic and moral support will not be strong enough to resist the impact of a concerted move by either the Communists or the Chinese for both of whom this part of Asia is indeed a happy hunting ground, fertile field for the inculcation of anti-western sentiment, and expansion. However, it appears improbable that solution situation can be found without treating with present Vietnam Govt but as noted above and hereafter to treat with that Govt alone is a danger but there is equal danger in treating only with puppets. If French cannot reconcile all political elements or if they try to retain any large degree control, denying independence in regard which both present Vietnam Govt and Nationalist Front elements are united, only solution may be neutral intervention to establish a Vietnam state satisfactory to majority Annamites and to exercise control to see the state is run on democratic and equitable lines. If present Vietnam Govt is honestly nationalistic, it should welcome such solution but am reasonably sure French, particularly French Communists, will view such suggestion with alarm. Replying ad seriatim . 1. While tendency is toward Soviet camp as result Communist orientation Vietnam leaders, do not believe Vietnam will come out openly on side of Soviets until ground is prepared; present Soviet policy toward Vietnam appears to be one of remote control rather than open support and such policy will probably be pursued until time is ripe for avowal Soviet affiliation; in meantime Ho is straddling the fence and hopes to win support of west on platform dedicated to fulfillment nationalist aspirations. 2. As I have reported, very possible so-called militant opposition to Ho as being too moderate is only a blind; there is no proof he has renounced his Communist training but it is reasonably certain his indoctrination will be soft pedalled until independence is won and the French are out; a wily opportunist, Ho will take any aid coming his way to gain his ends without disclosing ultimate intentions. 3. Most Annamite intellectuals do not realize what communism means except that it symbolizes revolution, nor do they care; as their conflict with French is basically revolutionary, they will accept communism or any other “is[m]” as a means to the end. This part 1—continued part 2 mytel 231, same date. 35 Reed 34 Repeated to Paris by the Department as telegram 2780, July 28, 6 p.m. 35 Infra . The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–2447: Telegram [Document 135] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State 36 secret Saigon , July 24, 1947—5 p.m. 231. Continuing mytel 230, today: Pure nationalists among these intellectuals want independence and the future can take care of itself; average Annamite not good Communist prospect but strong leaders of aggressive minority can easily bring about evolution Communist state. 4. Removal French pressure and absence Western democracy control will result in chaos as factional fighting with accompanying terrorism will ensue; great bulk of population not prepared for self-government and destinies of country would be in hands of few, those now strongly suspected of Communist leanings; unless active steps were taken, through economic and political pressure, there would be little possibility preventing and combatting resultant police state. 5. American opinion still highly valued by all Annamites, including present Vietnam Government, and American aid is definitely desired to any other; however, if American advice and action run counter to what they think is full sum their desiderata, US might not be so popular; this difference must be noted—present Vietnam Government welcomes American aid in gaining independence, getting rid of French and helping establish national economy but Nationalist Front elements in addition to foregoing want American aid to get rid of present Vietnam Government and Communists; if firmly applied, American pressure can be the strongest influence in the country but there can be no temporizing. 6. Strong Vietnam state whether or not Soviet oriented will bring pressure on Laos and Cambodia and definite political and economic encroachments are to be expected; unless full protection given those countries, they would be forced into orbit Buddhist countries to the west and there would follow indefinite period political readjustment and dispute. While Communist danger exists, it is future one and only when Vietnam Government is firmly established and in position disregard opinion and aid Western democracies will such government align itself with Soviet satellites—events elsewhere may make such alignment only far distant possibility. French overstress this danger. Present dangers are (1) French terms will be such as to prevent any peaceful solution and (2) if Annamites turned loose, only way combatting resultant economic and political chaos will be totalitarian police state, with ruthless suppression opposition. Both alternatives are alarming. Also must not overlook Chinese ambitions in this area which are only inactive because of China’s internal situation. Reed 36 Repeated to Paris by the Department as telegram 2778, July 28, 6 p.m. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.01/7–2847: Telegram [Document 136] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State secret Hanoi , July 28, 1947—3 p.m. 244. Radio Viet Nam today, in English, French and Viet Namese, announced following changes result decree July 19 by Government and approved by permanent committee of National Assembly: (compare with my A–4, May 7 37 ). 1. Communist Minister of Interior, Ton Due Thang, made “inspector general” (which puts him on political shelf) and will be replaced by “someone from Cochin China” as yet unnamed. 2. Ta Quang Buu, Vice Minister of National Defense, replaces Vo Nguyen Giap who is named Commander in Chief Armed Forces including Tuve. 3. New Ministry War Invalids and Victims created with Minister Vu Dinh Tuy (Catholic said be ablest Viet Namese surgeon), Vice Minister Ngo Tu Ha, Catholic (both politically unimportant). 4. Ton That Tung, head of Red Cross, replaced Nguyen Kinh Chi as Vice Minister Public Health “during latter’s absence”. 5. Cu Huy Can, Vice Minister of Agriculture, becomes Second Vice Minister National Economy and is replaced in Agriculture by Nghiem Xuan Yem, irrigation expert and non-Communist. 6. Le Aung (from Annam) replaced Dang Phuc Thong (who still retains title apparently) as Vice Minister Public Works during “temporary absence of latter”. Internally changes represent swing from Communists and attempted appeasement Cochin Chinese resistants (who will have important Ministry of Interior) as well as Catholics and particularly Bishop Le Huu Tu. Giap still runs army but some concession apparently made to prepare grounds for regulation of latent conflict between Giap and Nguyen Kinh which may break out in future. Changes represent no fundamental shift in power, however. Externally reorganization is apparently designed to open way for talks with French (see last paragraph my telegram 63, February 19 38 ). One well-informed Viet Namese believes reorganization also indicates Ho’s advances to Bao Dai have fallen through. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 37 Not printed. 38 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/7–2947: Airgram [Document 137] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 39 restricted Washington , July 29, 1947. A–1044. The following is a report from the US Military Attaché, Bangkok, Siam, dated July 3, 1947: “Mr. Charles Aeschlimann, International Red Cross, stated that he still intended upon arrival in Switzerland this week, to report to the International Red Cross the absolute necessity of having a cessation of hostilities in French Indo China. He, however, will continue to try to force arrangements for the import of medical supplies to Vietnam. This is still an embarrassing matter to the French who see complications arising out of permitting the International Red Cross to operate in what is strictly an ‘affaire intérieur’.” Marshall 39 Copies sent to Saigon and Hanoi. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/7–3147: Telegram [Document 138] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , July 31, 1947—1 p.m. 3046. Embassy has read with interest Hanoi’s 233 40 and 235, July 21st, to Department, and would like to make certain comments. It is not believed curious that French first became particularly aware of Communist menace in Ho Chi-Minh Government after September 1946. It will be recalled that beginning shortly after withdrawal of Chinese forces from Tonkin in March 1946, change began in Vietnam Government tending to eliminate both pro-Chinese VNQDD 41 and other moderate elements, which culminated in reorganization of Government by Ho Chi-Minh upon his return from France in September. This resulted in considerable increase in influence of Extremist and pro-Communist elements in Viet-Minh. It must further be remembered that in France itself realization of world-wide menace of Communism developed rapidly from about end of Paris Peace Conference. Eviction of Communists from French Government, increasingly open anti-Communist stand of all other French political parties have naturally increased interest and distrust of Communist tendencies in Ho Chi-Minh’s Government. In addition, knowledge of Ho’s long and prominent connection with world Communism has only slowly become generally known in France. Evidence of Communist confidence in political views and aims of Ho Chi-Minh and his Government is furnished by attitude of French Communist Party. In conformity with fundamental Leninist doctrine, French Communist Party supports nationalist movements in all French colonies but it is only in Indochina that this support is given exclusively and openly to one man and one party. French Communists have never varied in their slogan that independence of Vietnam must be entrusted to Ho Chi-Minh and to Viet-Minh and to no others. In North Africa they support nationalist aims of oppressed Arab people but they do not support Istiqlal 42 or Bourguiba 43 or Messali Haj (who also has Communist background). Absence of any widespread belief in or sympathy for Communism among masses of Ho Chi-Minh’s admirers and their apparent apathy towards Communist teachings cannot seriously be regarded in these times as potent factors against establishment of government which would follow Moscow’s directions. Recent experiences have shown only too well how relatively small, but well-trained and determined, minority can take over power in area where democratic traditions are weak. Nor can remoteness of Moscow be regarded as adequate safeguard. From Ho Chi-Minh’s past career there can be little doubt but that he maintains close connections in Communist circles not only in China and India but throughout world. Department please repeat to Hanoi as Paris 8 and Saigon as Paris 19. Caffery 40 Dated July 19, p. 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] . 41 Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang, the Vietnamese Kuomintang (Nationalist Party). 42 Independence Party in Morocco. 43 Habib Bourguiba, leader of Independence Party in Tunisia. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) 851G.00/7–3147 [Document 139] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs ( Landon ) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfield ) secret [ Washington ,] August 4, 1947. The underlying telegram to the Chief of Naval Operations from the Assistant Naval Attaché in Bangkok (Saigon’s 239 of July 31 44 ) refers to a possible good will visit to Indochina by units of the US Navy. 45 Despite Reed’s reported opinion that such a visit would be desirable, I feel that any action by the United States at this time that could possibly be construed as lending moral support to the French in Indochina would be most ill-advised—particularly since developments in Indochina appear to be coming to a head, with the French reported preparing to set up a constitutional monarchy under Baodai in opposition to Ho’s Government. It may be recalled that last May we expressed our concern to the French that a restoration of Baodai might be attempted and were assured that the French were not contemplating any sort of puppet government under Baodai. 44 Not printed. 45 There was no goodwill naval visit to Indochina in 1947. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/8–547: Telegram [Document 140] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Paris , August 5, 1947—1 p.m. 3103. In conversation with Baudet regarding situation Indochina, he said while recent reorganization of Ho Chi Minh’s government did not fundamentally make much change, nevertheless it was obviously conciliatory gesture and he “felt sure” it would be followed shortly by announcement either by Bollaert in Saigon or Ramadier in Paris redefining French policy regarding Indochina. Baudet hopes this will be followed by armistice and reopening of negotiations. Regarding reported appointment of Bao Dai as “Supreme Counselor”, 46 Baudet pointed out this represents no change since Bao Dai held this position in theory since his abdication in 1945. It is obvious from conversation with Baudet, as well as recent comment in press, French are following with great attention and some nervousness developments in Indonesia, 47 since there are many parallels between situation there and that in Indochina. Department please repeat to Saigon as Paris’ No. 21 and Hanoi as No. 9. Caffery 46 In the regime of Ho Chi Minh. 47 For documentation on the situation in the Netherlands East Indies, see pp. 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] ff. In July the Netherlands resorted to force in the East Indies, and the matter was then brought up in the United Nations Security Council. The Ambassador in Siam (Stanton) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/8–847: Telegram [Document 141] The Ambassador in Siam ( Stanton ) to the Secretary of State confidential Bangkok , August 8, 1947—5 p.m. 603.1. In long conversation with Gilbert, new French Minister, he expressed following views and observations re Indochina. He said in his opinion which perhaps reflects view some portion of French Foreign Office settlement difficulties with Vietnam could only be accomplished by dealing with Ho Chi Minh. He said that although there danger dealing with Ho view his well-known Communistic leanings that was possible he could be induced reorganize government to exclude more radical elements and include conservatives and liberals. He added recent reorganization Vietnam Government on July 19 eliminating Giap no doubt represented gesture by Ho. He went on to say that in any event settlement this problem must be effected without delay since present stalemate serious disadvantage to France and was subject constant criticism by Communist and other elements in France. 2. Re Laos and Cambodians, he stated new constitution granted these states within recent months giving them greater autonomy. He said goal was grant them same measure independence granted Philippines 48 with orientation in economic and political matters toward France. Gilbert continuing efforts initiated by Daridan persuade Free Cambodians and Free Laos leaders Bangkok to return their respective countries; these efforts believed meeting with some success but these representatives insist any formal agreement reached with authorities Indochina must be certified in presence French Minister here, indicating little confidence French authorities Indochina. 3. Gilbert mentioned recommendation conciliation commission regarding establishment international consultative commission with headquarters Bangkok and inquired our attitude re such commission. I replied no instructions received re this matter. Thompson 49 informed me later he had made similar reply Gilbert. For Department’s information, I gather Siam attitude is that such commission would be of little value inasmuch as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodian Governments would not under present conditions be able participate as free and independent states. Understand this and other recommendations conciliation commission be submitted to Parliament by Siam Government in next week or 10 days. At such time full report of work of Siam representatives to conciliation commission will be submitted. Understood government intends leave up to Parliament decision whether commission’s recommendation should be accepted and position Siam Government should adopt. This repeated Saigon as No. 30, to Hanoi as M 80 by courier. Department please repeat Paris. Stanton 48 Telegram 458, August 13, 5 p.m., to Bangkok, asked that the French Minister be informed that the Philippines was wholly independent and that any special arrangements with the United States were based on the free decision of the people through plebiscite or their elected representatives (851G.00/8–847). 49 Geoffrey H. Thompson, British Ambassador in Siam. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/8–1147: Telegram [Document 142] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , August 11, 1947—1 p.m. 3202. Bidault tells me that there is very general disagreement in the Government as to what should be done about Indochina. In fact, no two Ministers are in accord, not even he and Ramadier. However, they have decided to get together before the 15th and send Bollaert policy instructions for the important speech he is to make on that date. Also Bidault says there is a possibility that the French Govt will change its attitude to Bao Dai as there would now be no question of his being a French puppet in view of fact that he may be put forth by Viet-Nam as their candidate; but no definite decision has yet been taken by French in that regard. Caffery The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/8–1247: Telegram [Document 143] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State secret Hanoi , August 12, 1947—8 a.m. 257. Bollaert’s precipitous departure, official announcement of which delayed until his plane left this morning, still not fully comprehensible. “L’Entente” states simply that he wishes to “mettre au point” with govt “important” speech he scheduled to make near future. It now seems clear that night August 8 or morning August 9 he received orders from Paris, presumably Moutet and/or Ramadier, to clear text fully his “important” speech with Govt. Bollaert then decided to return, with scheduled ETA Indochina August 25. I am inclined to believe, however, that his return due to differences of opinion between Bollaert and officials in Paris, probably along lines indicated mytel 247, August 1. 50 Bollaert, I feel, not wanted treat with Ho and is prepared make proposition similar to Mus proposal in May wath such conditions that Ho would refuse. He was then prepared to inform Paris that no agreement with Ho possible and have French military authorities launch full scale military campaign in dry fall season. It seems probable that he wishes to support this policy in Paris personally. In this connection, ranking brass now in Hanoi, possibly planning details of such autumn campaign in event negotiations fail. Prevalent French military opinion which Bollaert may have accepted, altho it has been consistently wrong in past 18 months, is that, in 3 months’ fall campaign, Viet Nam Government would be crushed. In this connection see my telegram 159, May 10. 1 Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 50 Not printed. 1 Not printed. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/8–1947: Telegram [Document 144] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , August 19, 1947—noon. 260. There has been increasing political activity in last week with each party trying create impression it has support population, all this possibly to influence attitude Paris will adopt vis-à-vis French charter for French Indochina. National Front especially active with large gatherings Hue on 10th and elsewhere while party leaders, particularly Nguyen Van Sam, are negotiating with Hoach for share in his govt, having asked for Ministries Interior and Defense. Hoach still somewhat undecided what to do re his new govt but certain he has connections with all political camps. One result this manoeuvring is acceptance on August 16 of Cochin-China front (hitherto strongly separatist) of principle of union of three Kys but still holding out for central liaison committee to deal with cultural and economic matters rather than strong central govt. This swing was anticipated in Hoach’s interview with Paris correspondent in which he spoke of federation with annual revolving presidency among three Kys and Congress dealing only with cultural and economic matters. While local Vietnam press finds Hoach’s idea of federation too narrow, it suggests signs of rapprochement between Hoach’s and his views with National Front holding middle ground. Interesting development is statement [Caodaist Pope] Pham Cong Tac, 1a hitherto noncommittal re politics, in favor National Front, also return Bao Dai as constitutional monarch. Sam (see above) told me yesterday that despite growing strength his party there might have to be some compromise with Ho but Sam’s front definitely anti-Communist and would fight prevent Ho getting absolute control FIC, said front now has some 10,000 armed troops. Inter alia , new French general Boyer de la Tour, commanding in south, using these troops extensively. Sam as well as others deplore seeming ignorance in France re actual conditions in FIC, also seeming unwillingness of French [High Commissioner] to accept realities and his resentment of opinions contrary to his own. Thus, he willingly granted leave to Dufour, French Commissioner in Cochin-China, and replace[d] him with General Boyer as from August 16. From this welter political agitation following points stand out: (1) Ho is still Strongest figure; (2) National Front with French backing gaining some ground; (3) French exhausting all means get Bao Dai return and obviate their having to treat with Ho; (4) part National Front wants Bao Dai and constitutional monarchy but other part wants republic; (5) Hoach playing his cards to remain on but his government most embarrasing for French; (6) any idea French military operations can succeed restore prewar status or enable French dictate terms untenable; (7) all native parties united for union and independence. 2 Please pass Paris. Reed 1a This Vietnamese religious sect had its holy seat at Tayninh and also had an armed force commanded by Tran Quang Vinh. Another religious sect, likewise with an armed force, was the Hoa Hao, which followed similar aims. 2 Telegram 268, August 23, noon, from Saigon, reported the National Union Front Committee had delegated its powers to President Hoach to contact the former Emperor Bao Dai with a view to directing the nationalist movement for independence and territorial unity (851G.00/8–2347). Despatch 332, September 10, from Saigon, reported that on September 5, Bao Dai announced he wished to consult with Indochinese leaders before taking a position, and the Front delegated Nguyen Van Sam to visit Bao Dai in Hong Kong (851G.00/9–1047). The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/8–3147: Telegram [Document 145] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State top secret Paris , August 31, 1947—noon. 3542. For Department’s eyes only. Chauvel 3 told me last evening that on condition it was not disclosed to our representatives in Indochina he would tell me about the present plans of the French Government for Indochina. He gave me an account of the recent difficulties within the French Government as to whether or not Bollaert should make a speech and if he made the speech what he should say. It was finally decided that he should make the speech on September 7. He will say that it is up to the populations of the three Kys to decide whether or not they want to “fuse” the Governments of the three Kys, and in any event for foreign affairs and defense “Indochina would act as a unit within the French Union”. Otherwise the speech will be along the vague lines set out in my 3419 of August 23. 4 On September 17 he will set up provisional governments in the three Kys. Chauvel asked Bollaert if these would be puppet governments. Bollaert said no, they would be representative governments, but did not say exactly how he would bring that about. Chauvel asked Bollaert if the present government in Cochin-China would continue. He replied “probably”. Chauvel then saisd, “What will you do next?” Bollaert replied, “Obviously if we negotiate with Ho Chi Minh, that will inevitably end in setting up a Soviet state in Indochina and we will be ousted. Strong sentiment has developed recently in favor of Bao Dai and practically everyone who is not pro-Communist is turning towards him, not that they think highly of Bao Dai, but because they are afraid of the Communists and he is the only man in sight we can build up to face Ho Chi Minh and his Communist gang. Therefore, inevitably the provisional governments in the Kys will desire to enter into communication with Bao Dai, and if negotiations with him progress he will eventually be invited to return as head of the three Kys.” Chauvel went on to say that the French are not enthusiastic about Bao Dai. When he was Emperor he took little or no interest in government affairs, preferring “to play tennis and drive his car and stay a lot around the palace with his wife, to whom he is devoted”. I repeat that Chauvel stressed the top secret character of this information. Caffery 3 Jean Chauvel, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Office. 4 Telegram not printed; the lines set forth were as follows: “ a ) Form in which union of the three Vietnam provinces is to be achieved, b ) the question of separate diplomatic relations, c ) the question of joint federal services in Indochina, d ) question of how the overall authority of France is to be exercised, which of course includes question of military bases.” (851G.00/8–2347) The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/9–1147: Telegram [Document 146] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State restricted Saigon , September 11, 1947—noon. 290. Full text Bollaert’s speech going forward tomorrow by air. 5 In essence, speech is as follows: Defines status of states associated in French Union; states diplomatic representation and defense is matter for Union and not for individual states; accepts question of union of three Kys for people to decide themselves; promises full internal autonomy but exacts high commissioner and commissioners shall oversee relations of the states and safeguard French interests; proposes common money customs and immigration policy; intimates Vietnam would do well follow example Cambodia and Laos and suggest same states; asks people to choose representatives for negotiation but says choosing certain leaders may not be to advantage of Vietnam; declares peace cannot be reestablished through medium only one political party; and appeals all parties come forward and accept full share responsibility in reconstruction of country. Noteworthy speech states must accept French offer in entirety and must be no haggling; also that appeal is made for last time. Comment and reaction to follow. Reed 5 The speech was delivered the night of September 10 at Hadong; text transmitted to the Department in despatch 335, September 11, from Saigon, not printed. Telegram 286, September 11, 8 a.m., from Hanoi, remarked that the speech indicated a “very considerable retreat from even most narrow interpretation March 6 agreement”. (851G.00/9–1147) The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/9–1147: Telegram [Document 147] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , September 11, 1947—5 p.m. 291. Most apt comment Bollaert’s speech is “one begins to see what French Union will be but one does not see a solution to the conflict”. General comment is to effect political setup envisaged in speech is practicable and in many ways fair both to natives and French but it falls far short of independence and contains parts which are seemingly contrary to assertion that Union of three Kys is internal problem; statement that French offer must be accepted in entirety or not at all and that this is last appeal sound like threats. In summary speech presents no solution and as there is no mention armistice, French military plan will go into effect unless Bao Dai comes forward “if my presence is desired by the people”. It would be embarrassing for French if Ho accepted cooperate along lines of speech but most people think this unlikely and terms of speech appear preclude any dealings with Ho alone. More change [ chance ] Bao Dai accepting what appears to be return to virtual pre-war status under new guise but if does so he will believe [ belie ] his vaunted desire achieve independence for his people. Please pass Paris. Reed The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 851G.00/9–1147: Telegram [Document 148] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France secret us urgent Washington , September 11, 1947—6 p.m. 3433. For the Ambassador. We have read with concern recent telegrams from our officers in Indochina (repeated to you) to the effect that local French military are seriously contemplating an offensive against Vietnamese in dry season beginning at end this month. It is difficult for us give credence these reports in light French economic, financial and food position. It is obvious that such an offensive, if it took place under these conditions, would have serious effect on public opinion here which would be reflected in a Congress which will be called upon to consider extensive financial aid for western European nations, including France. Please make appropriate informal inquiries and report urgently. 6 For your info Dept considering approach French on apparently rapidly deteriorating prospects for Franco-Vietnam settlement and is awaiting your reply this point. Marshall 6 in telegram 3715, September 12, 4 p.m., from Paris, Ambassador Caffery reported his talk with Foreign Minister Bidault who said he understood the American viewpoint and that he knew of no plans for a military offensive against the Vietnamese in the dry season. The French Minister (Lacoste), in a lengthy conversation on September 12 with Charlton Ogburn, mentioned, inter alia , that only the French army in Indochina was preventing creation of a Soviet satellite state forming part of a Red band around nationalist China. (851G.00/9–1247) The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/9–1547: Telegram [Document 149] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State confidential Hanoi , September 15, 1947—4 p.m. 291. At his request, I called on Bollaert this afternoon. After exchange pleasantries, he talked of Indochina. Said he thought Ho Chi Minh had lost ground past 6 months but that he unsure this giant [ meant ] gain for Bao Dai. He said he thought peasants really wanted only security, order, peace, that politics were played only by small group elite. He asked my impressions country. I said unfamiliar Cochin-China, that Tonkin composed 7,000 villages, each one closed entity, that had seen only few of them, that was impressed by difficulties discovering sentiment people. I noted, however, that educational program, as I had seen it last year, was very widely developed and I believed it possible sentiment villages might well be profoundly affected. He said he had stopped at various places during his several trips to and from France (Cairo, Karachi, New Delhi, Rangoon, Calcutta) and that he found situations with which that of Indochina compared favorably. He asked whether I had noted any connection between Viet Nam and Moscow. I replied that while I considered Ho was Nguyen Ai Quoc and that I thought there was Chinese Red network in Hong Kong [ Haiphong? ], I was unable discover any direct connection Viet Nam and Moscow. He said he agreed with me and that he was unable himself to find any direct connection. However, he warned that US should be wary Rusian influence in Asia and pointed Russian representation India and Singapore. He said was prepared remove French administrators when local government so requested, that if independence came too quickly to any people disorder resulted. I asked if that meant France was prepared to give Viet Nam independence at some future time date when people more prepared. He promptly hedged and said that when people learned to use liberty they would be given more. He added he was preparing statute for currency emitting agency of which all states would be represented. He concluded he thought Viet Namese gave impression being disappointed with his Hadong speech. He noted however that so far he had detected no questioning of his good faith in what he promised. Had distinct impression that he felt revolutionary sentiment was declining, that the [ he ] prepared play waiting game long time if necessary. Copy sent Saigon air courier. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/9–1547: Telegram [Document 150] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State secret Saigon , September 15, 1947—5 p.m. 299. Continued study Bollaert’s speech and talks with many natives (both pro-Ho and pro-Bao Dai), French and others lead to following conclusions: French now offer less than March 6 agreement, deliberately so in order to make offer unacceptable, so army can put its plan into operation to try eliminate Ho. French putting pressure on Bao Dai to accept negotiate with them but although they probably prepared enlarge terms of offer (member High Commissariat’s [admits?] poor offer as point of departure for negotiations) there is no question of independence. Accordingly French continuing divide and rule policy and show little inclination go much beyond pre-war status. On other hand, natives are not united and even in National Front ranks there is dissension. Also so far Ho has adopted negative attitude to National Front invitation form new combined government, Ho claiming he represents people and National Front must come to him. Until natives can agree, French have some justification at this stage limiting offer to internal autonomy with supervision to see one party or another does not gain control by totalitarian methods. Moreover number of native personalities admit French offer not too bad if could be sure French would be honest in carrying out terms of offer and could be counted on to progressively accord further attributes independence. This lack of confidence in French is keynote native attitude. Unless French prepared act honestly, sincerely, to enlarge terms of offer to place natives on equality with French in internal matters, and unless natives can sink differences and can insure internal liberty will not be signal for civil war, it does not appear there can be any immediate acceptable solution FIC situation derived through direct French-Annamite efforts. If present trouble conditions drag on, perhaps intervention (my despatch 267, July 11 [ 1 ]) 7 may be desirable and necessary, as it is inadmissible for American prestige in this part Asia let French restore virtually pre-war status quo by arms and equally bad let natives run wild, which would be signal for civil conflict and possible Communist or Chinese intervention of a kind [ sic ]. Please pass Paris. Reed 7 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon 851G.00/9–1547: Telegram [Document 151] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon secret Washington , September 19, 1947—2 p.m. 160. In telegram to Paris, 8 Dept (1) expressed concern recent telegrams from you and Hanoi indicating French military contemplating offensive with start dry season, (2) stated difficult believe French contemplating such action view their economic situation, (3) noted serious effect military offensive would have on public opinion here and hence Congressional consideration US financial aid Western Europe, including France, (4) requested Emb make informal inquiries. French FonOff has informed Emb while local military actions might take place view improving communications and eliminating Vietnam salients, it knew no plans for military offensive, for which sufficient French forces lacking. Dept assumes, however, in absence negotiations Ho’s Govt, hostilities will continue. Paris Mil Attaché report Aug 27, based apparently authentic figures, shows French Army Indochina composed 95,000 whites and 25,000 natives with additional 22,000 natives in para-military organizations and 3,000 amphibious naval troops. Your excellent appraisal Sep 15 (urtel 299) states inadmissible for American prestige this part Asia let French restore virtually pre-war status quo by arms. Have French in fact this capability? Urtel 285 Sep 9 9 quotes Chief of Staff as believing campaign would take only 3 or 4 months. O’Sullivan, noting amazing confidence French officials regarding outcome renewed military actions, has doubted possibility success but in tel 290 Sep 13 9 indicates French may have info military situation Tonkin not available him, perhaps including possibility large scale disaffections from Ho. Your and Hanoi’s opinion requested. Sent Saigon 160. Repeated Hanoi 73. Lovett 8 No. 3433, September 11, 6 p.m., p. 135 [ Pg. 135 includes portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148 ] . 9 Not printed. 9 Not printed. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.01/9–2247: Telegram [Document 152] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State secret Saigon , September 22, 1947—4 p.m. 307. Chief of Sûreté , just back from Hanoi, called and in brief conversation told me: Bao Dai had agreed to come back negotiate some time ago but was agreed with French he not to do so at that time to avoid appearance his agreement put-up job; not optimistic Bao Dai can succeed but under present plan Bao Dai will set up provisional government and try win over sufficient supporters to insure outcome any possible referendum in his favor; French military still want take things their hands but now seems possible military operations will be in cooperation Bao Dai’s govt and political manoeuverings; seems clear certain amount defection from Viet Minh ranks but not enough greatly weaken Ho and no lasting peace solution FIC situation without taking Ho in consideration—this why French military hope “unfortunate accident” may happen to Ho. Source stated he now being consulted by Bollaert whereas formerly was ignored, also latter somewhat “disgusted” with “childish” political manoeuvers present Councillor Political Affairs who has been carrying out some negotiations with “Petsaratjue” [ Phetsarat? ] which have disturbed matters in Laos. Source said situation vis-à-vis Chinese in Tonkin rather disturbing as in place former congregations Chinese forces brought about dissolution these congregations and installed association of overseas Chinese which is organ “Kuomintang” and to be feared. French trying to reintroduce congregation scheme but this opposed by Chinese, especially Consuls in Tonkin, and matter has been referred to Foreign Office Paris. Hope see source again tomorrow when he has more time but may comment that while some progress made toward solution everything not yet clear and French are still trying put over their ideas. Source concluded Bollaert deliberately staying away from Saigon so as to avoid being drawn in local squabble in Cochin Chinese Govt. 10 This telegram answers in part Deptel 160, September 19. Another source just in from Hong Kong says Bao Dai, despite certain measure working with French, will insist much larger degree independence than that offered by Bollaert. Please pass Paris. Reed 10 Dr. Hoach, having been outvoted, was replaced on October 1 by General Nguyen Van Xuan as President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Cochin China. The Vice Consul at Hanoi (O’Sullivan) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/9–2447: Telegram [Document 153] The Vice Consul at Hanoi ( O’Sullivan ) to the Secretary of State secret Hanoi , September 24, 1947—8 a.m. 301. ReDeptel 73, September 19. 11 French military in both Saigon and Hanoi, when they speak campaign 3 or 4 months, seem refer campaign in middle and upper Tonkin directed against present Vietnam Government. Believe military feels confident such campaign would result (1) seizure Lao Kay and Caobang, thereby closing Chinese frontier to in-trickle arms and supplies Vietnam Govt; (2) disruption Vietnam Government with at least some if not most leaders such as Ho and Giap killed, captured or effectively neutralized; (3) destruction of major portion regular Vietnam army and capture most its arms; (4) destruction Vietnam communications including broadcasting facilities. Throughout summer, felt French unable with troops then here to accomplish this campaign. In light reports of recent influx troops in apparently sizable numbers from south, believe it possible French have capacity at least close Chinese frontier and serious[ly] disrupt Vietnam Government. Doubt, however, if even French military feel situation can be stabilized on their terms immediately following such campaign. They point out complete pacification Morocco took 20 years, and Tonkin took 10 or more. However, they believe after organized Vietnam Government dislocated sufficiently, armed units will tend disintegrate to piracy. While elimination present Vietnam Government as organized armed force would seriously weaken position other Nationalists vis-à-vis French (which Bao Dai from his recent Hong Kong statement regarding urgency of opening negotiations seems to realize), it would not enable French immediately reinstall something which resembles prewar regime. However, French administrative history Indochina such that promised concessions are eaten away by administrative practice despite sincerity in which concessions originally offered. This tendency has shown no evidence changing in past 2 years. French ability reinstall prewar regime in coming years would depend largely on factors external to Indochina. Am inclined believe, however, in long period, given among other things a [ no? ] third world war or third party intervention, continued instability China and India, reasonable economic recovery France and world, French could reinstall something which minus trimmings would resemble status quo before war. Such action would, of course, be catastrophic US prestige, would turn Vietnamese who distrust and hate French into violent anti-white bloc, and would insure irretrievable orientation intellectuals and people toward communism and Moscow and against West. Summary sent Saigon. Repeat to Paris. O’Sullivan 11 Same as telegram 160, September 19, p. 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] . The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/9–2647: Telegram [Document 154] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State secret Saigon , September 26, 1947—11 a.m. 318. ReDeptel 160, September 19. While French at present do not have capability restore prewar status by force arms, their overall tactics, combining military operations with political manoeuvering, give rise grave suspicion that restoration that status by any means possible is the end in view—and great majority natives are convinced of this. French record in past, especially past 2 years, impingement on and unilateral derogation of native rights, certainly inspires no great confidence that French will willingly grant more than such minimum as will satisfy world opinion. Unless some international element should intervene, it seems likely French will achieve eventually and substantially the end in view, although certainly under superficially different setup than prewar regime. French are aided to this achievement by various factors: (1) strongest opponent is Communist and at this stage in world politics the elimination of Communist menace is to be welcomed; (2) other leaders are wasting time bickering and scrambling for positions of prestige and profit and seem to have in common only the catch phrase “union and independence”; (3) time element, as French well know if they can only hang on their chances for obtaining more favorable peace are greatly bettered—hence present sit-tight attitude. Morally, end French believed have in view and tactics to achieve such end are to be condemned and US cannot be party to return prewar status or even give such appearance without risking destroying large amount confidence natives still have in US. Practically, however, it is of paramount importance that Indochina does not become prey to an imposed totalitarian regime by use recognized weapons of repression, reprisal and terrorism—natives are divided and majority unprepared for democratic freedom and in such division and unpreparedness the single-minded purpose of the 80 to 100 real Communists could easily gain upper hand. No brief can be held for any solution that would put France and Western democracy influence out of Indochina or lead natives believe US indifferent. Factually situation is substantially same as in mytels 299 and 307, September 15 and 22—big questions being if Ho can be successfully by-passed and if Bao Dai despite reported agreement with French will hold out for real independence. Meantime, all sources agree French military believe they can work serious damage Ho’s organization, mainspring of resistance, in 3 or 4 months, especially cutting flow supplies from China and by sea, also agree French military appear be on point putting their belief to trial in Tonkin and further agree military operations may have fair measure success. Present increased native activities in south aimed prevent French sending large reinforcements to north. Please pass Paris. Reed The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon 851G.00/9–1747 [Document 155] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon restricted Washington , September 29, 1947. The Secretary of State informs the Officer in Charge that a telegram from the Vietnam National Union Front addressed to President Truman datelined Hong Kong September 17 requesting United States intervention in Indochina has been received. The text of the telegram, in translation, is as follows: “Faced with unacceptable peace proposals of French Government set forth in address of High Commissioner of Indochina Bollaert September 10, disregarding principles Atlantic Charter, we beg your intervention in the Franco-Vietnamese problem for establishment lasting peace on foundations of justice and equality. We appeal to American people, champion of liberty, for support in struggle of people of Vietnam for same ideal.” The Officer in Charge is authorized, if he deems it advisable, to inform a suitable officer of the National Union Front that the telegram had been received, and has been transmitted to the appropriate officials of the Department of State. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/10–647: Telegram [Document 156] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State restricted Saigon , October 6, 1947—noon. 329. Little change overall situation, French sitting tight and next move up to natives who don’t seem to be getting together. Conflicting reports re Bao Dai and his attitude but some native contacts complain he doing nothing but talk, all of which in French favor. More and more French businessmen disgusted with whole show and want action, attitude being give natives what they want if French interests really protected. New Cochin-Chinese Govt being organized with perhaps better overall political party grouping than under Hoach regime. Hoach will be one of two Vice Presidents and Govt will include National Union Front Minister of Information and Propaganda as well as Popular Movement Minister of Education. Very little publicity given renewal Bollaert’s mandate as High Commissioner but much given Ho’s statement Bao Dai does not speak for country. Seems to be some political activity Cambodia with cousin of King trying organize party in opposition Democratic Party. Reed The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 851G.01/10–1847: Telegram [Document 157] The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State 12 secret Nanking , October 18, 1947—2 p.m. 2096. In conversation with Embassy officer on subject of Indochina, Vice FonMin George Yeh and Director of European Dept FonOff expressed following views: It is difficult to foresee a settlement of Indochina question under current French policy, which is making position of other powers, particularly China and US, extremely difficult. It is unlikely that a govt can successfully be formed without participation of Ho Chi Minh, as Ho and his group are the only ones having a genuinely popular following. Attempts to alienate Ho’s adherents under present circumstances unlikely of success. Persistence of French in present military course carries danger of forcing entire freedom movement into hands of extreme, Communist elements. Ho is regarded as Communist but many Vietminh leaders are not. Vice Minister is impressed with Ho’s personality and commented that Ho was an abler individual for example than Sjahrir 13 of Indonesian Govt, both men being personally known to him. The question of possible danger to China from a Communist-influenced regime adjacent to her southern border did not appear to be of critical importance. The National Union Front does not have a solid popular base. It consists in the main of a group of prominent figures and if these leaders were removed from the picture (the recent assassinations in Saigon and Hanoi were recalled 14 ) the movement would probably have little force left. As regards Bao Dai, “the Chinese people” would not regard favorably the reestablishment of a monarchy in Indochina. Bao Dai has not recently been in Nanking (reDeptel 1205, September 29 15 ) and FonOff officials made oblique reference to a “French story” to that effect. Embassy comment: While no direct statement was vouchsafed by FonOff officials as to Chinese attitude toward National Union or Nguyen Hai Than, 16 foregoing would appear to indicate FonOff does not contemplate support of Bao Dai who would seem to be an indispensable element in present French plans and that a dubious view, at best, is taken of National Union movement. As Dept is aware, there are diverse Chinese elements interested in the Indochina situation and views given above do not purport to represent crystallized Chinese attitude. No allusion was made during interview to possible mediation by third power or powers. Stuart 12 Repeated to Paris as telegram 4003, October 22, noon. 13 Sutan Sjahrir, Indonesian Prime Minister, November 14, 1945–June 27, 1947. 14 Nguyen Van Sam, leader of the National Union Front Party, and Dr. Truong Dinh Tri, president of the Hanoi Comité Provisoire de Gestion Administrative et d’Action Sociale, were both assassinated on October 10. 15 Not printed. 16 Formerly leader of the Vietnam Revolutionary League (Viet Nam Cach Menh Dong Minh Hoi). The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi 851G.00/10–1747: Telegram [Document 158] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi confidential Washington , October 22, 1947—noon. 78. Following is Embassy Paris comments on Ministry of Overseas France communiqué on Indochina Oct 17: 17 “As far as the Embassy is aware the word ‘independence’ has not previously been used in any official communiqué dealing with the future Vietnam Government. In commenting on this, Baudet, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the Foreign Office, pointed out that in the context the word does not indicate that France is prepared to give independence to the Vietnam at this time. But he agreed that the use of the word was deliberate and indicated a more liberal attitude on the part of the Ministry of Overseas France which would make more easy negotiations with the numerous non-Communist nationalist groups which include independence in their program.” Lovett 17 Telegram 4480, October 17, 2 p.m., not printed. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/10–2847: Telegram [Document 159] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State 18 secret Paris , October 28, 1947—5 p.m. 4618. In a conversation with Baudet, he stated that Foreign Office is now much better informed regarding recent developments in Indochina following conversations with Messmer, 19 who explained that recent military operations are not a major offensive but have been in the nature of extended but small scale raids with following objectives: 1. To seize the Vietnam radio broadcasting posts. Three of the four main posts have been captured and the fourth is no longer operating. 2. To seize and destroy certain known arms and munition dumps. Over 5,000 tons of small arms and munitions have been captured. 3. To occupy certain posts along the Chinese frontier and thus cut off arms smuggling and communications with friendly forces in China. These successful operations have been carried out with small forces and in many cases through parachute action. Total French losses have been only 50 killed (20 were in one airplane accident) which is little larger than would normally occur in a similar period. There is no intention of occupying and holding any territory and even the posts on the Chinese frontier will probably eventually be withdrawn. Baudet stated that the political situation looks somewhat more promising. The groups supporting Bao Dai consist of the two pro-Chinese parties, the religious communities of Bao [ Cao ]-Daists and the Hoa Hao, various groups of “intellectuals” and Bao Dai’s personal following in Annam. These groups are united in their opposition to the Vietminh and while small individually taken together form an important minority, perhaps a third of the entire population. In spite of Bao Dai’s statements regarding complete independence, etc., indications are that it will be possible to reach an acceptable agreement with him. Baudet indicated that the French would probably have to make some additional concessions regarding diplomatic representation and control of the army and that the negotiations will have to be carefully and skillfully conducted. Once an agreement with Bao Dai has been reached, the French anticipate two developments: ( a ) a considerable increase in the strength of Bao Dai’s followers, ( b ) A tendency for elements of the Vietminh and perhaps Ho Chi Minh himself to reach an agreement with Bao Dai and the French. Referring to the internal political situation in France, Baudet was uncertain of the effect on the above perspectives of a return of de Gaulle to power. Sent Department as 4618, repeated London as 814. Department please repeat to Saigon. Caffery 18 Repeated to Hanoi as telegram 86, October 30, 7 p.m. 19 Pierre Messmer, director of the Bollaert Cabinet in Indochina. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/11–1747: Telegram [Document 160] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , November 17, 1947—4 p.m. 382. Mytel 378, November 14. 20 Considerable comment President Xuan’s plan for Dalat meeting of representatives all political elements and reaction guardedly favorable. Minister for Information and Propaganda called to explain plan more fully and stated about 160 delegates to be named, meeting scheduled late December [or] early January, appeal to Ho and other Resistance leaders to name delegate already in process, in meantime propaganda to inform populace of purpose and scope of plan. Critics of plan (1) question how delegates to be apportioned to various parties and groups and how to be named and (2) suggest plan might better be worked out on smaller scale, say in Cochinchina, before trying it for whole country. Leaders two groups intellectuals also called and while not optimistic of plan’s success Said they would not oppose and would even cooperate. They voiced belief, unless French made arms available to Nationalist forces to offset strength Viet Minh forces in countryside, Viet Minh would effectively control countryside in (1) naming delegates, (2) influencing result referendum and (3) winning elections. In comment may say there is widespread complaint that French arm partisan forces of uncertain loyalty but refuse to equip Nationalist anti-Communist forces. Department will be interested in comment these leaders that complete withdrawal France from FIC would be disaster and lead to internal conflict (mytel 231, July 24), that France had a place in FIC, but that France cannot be trusted to apply honestly and loyally any agreements she many enter into. In comment may stress again that this lack of trust in France is keynote present impasse and present French manoeuvering and procrastination inspires no great confidence that policy divide and rule is in discard. Believe Xuan’s plan has some small chance success and from conversations with both French and Vietnamese personalities consider that federation plan mentioned mydes 256, June 14, is in process of being worked out but realization this plan will be long delayed particularly as Vietnamese so divided. Fuller details plan forthcoming. Please pass Paris. Reed 20 Not printed. The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.50/11–2047 [Document 161] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 395 Saigon , November 20, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to report, in advance of a detailed report upon the recent Economic Conference at Dalat, a resolution adopted unanimously by the assembled delegates of the States of Indochina (Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos) and of France, addressed to the Government of the French Union, in which it is asked that a part of the reparations in kind due from Japan to the United States be diverted to Indochina in the form of a loan. The text of the resolution is as follows: “Fully conscious of the immensity of the task of reconstruction and of re-equipment in an Indochina ruined by Japanese aggression and its consequences and of the paucity of primary resources of the Federation it is strongly insisted that the Government of the French Union: 1. Defend in international conferences with absolute firmness the right of Indochina to reparations and to obtain that the needs of reconstruction of victim peoples be satisfied before those of the Japanese aggressors; 2. Undertake when the moment is propitious negotiations with the Government of the United States with a view to borrowing a part of the Japanese reparations in kind which will be allocated to that Government and which it will not use; 3. Ask in the course of the peace negotiations that the peacetime level of the Japanese economy be fixed in such a way as to prohibit to Japan the reconstruction, directly or indirectly, of its war potential and of an economy not corresponding to its natural resources; and 4. Prohibit upon the occasion of those negotiations the pre-war Japanese commercial practices which, specifically through dumping, constituted economic aggression and which resulted, as has been shown, in compromising the peace.” There is no doubt but that such a loan would serve a most useful and worthy purpose, as the progressive and systematic rehabilitation and re-equipment of Indochina is being hampered by the lack of primary products from France and by the lack of foreign exchange with which to purchase such products from foreign countries. However, until political stability is obtained in Indochina it would appear to be a wasted effort to make available large amounts of primary products which might only remain on the docks and deteriorate, as has been the case with many items shipped to Indochina during the past two years. It would also appear that coincident with such a loan it should be exacted that American business and enterprise be given equal opportunity in this country and that it not be permitted that the French economic exclusivism of the pre-war period be re-established. That the French will endeavor to do so is reasonably certain, despite protestations to the contrary, and, after almost two years of observing French tactics to regain and maintain their economic ascendency and monopoly, I feel that all possible means should be invoked to prevent that any loan, in kind or in money, obtained through American cooperation and generosity be used to further French economic and commercial interests to the detriment of legitimate American interests, not to mention to the detriment of Vietnamese interests. At the present time, although French interests are being granted licenses to import films from the United States, the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Company has been refused such licenses, even though the American company has offered not to ask for exchange to remit its profits until conditions are more favorable. From what the representative of that company relates it is reasonably patent that French interests are behind the refusal. This is but one example of the difficulties that American companies encounter under an economy directed to regain and maintain the French economic hegemony. The above is not to say that I am unsympathetic to the French in their efforts to re-establish the shattered economy in Indochina. As a matter of fact it is in the interest of the world that that economy be put upon its feet and that its many products again flow into world markets. But having in mind the waste and the senseless expenditure of foreign exchange in the past two years I am inclined to believe that to give vast amounts of material goods to this country, without any degree of control, is but to repeat this waste and to stimulate what a French observer termed a seemingly systematic mismanagement. Notoriously, the French Purchasing Mission expended large sums for items not required nor useful in French Indochina—as witness some thousands of drums of asphalt purchased at a high price for one purpose and now found to be useless for any purpose. Today all French of position and all Vietnamese in the good graces of the French have their new American automobiles and their new frigidaires, while the bulk of the population is struggling along as best it can and the city of Saigon does not have running water half of the time. How can the touted French directors of Indochina’s economic program explain that medicines are lacking but there is no rationing of gasoline? How can they explain that many basic items of life are unavailable whereas the shops of Saigon are glutted with luxury items, perfumes, costume jewelry, brandy and champagne? The loan of the nature in mind has much in its favor as there are may items of Japanese manufacture which the United States would not want but which would assist the restoration of the economy of French Indochina. But until the political situation is settled and there is definite assurance that the flow of such goods will not be directed through the hands of a favored few, for their exclusive benefit, the possibility of such a loan is a matter of future consideration. In any event a loan in the form of material items appears to have more in its favor than a loan of money. Remarks upon French shortcomings should not be taken as an endorsement that the Vietnamese would do better by themselves and the majority of unbiased observers view with doubt any appreciable amount of materials or any substantial sum of money being turned over unreservedly to a strictly Vietnamese regime. The same waste would occur, the same channeling of distribution for the profit of a favored few would take place, the same misappropriations would be noted—with the added danger that the ubiquitous Chinese man of affairs would soon have the commerce and economy of Viet Nam in his capable hands. The Vietnamese are not to be blamed entirely for what one might call economic and financial untrustworthiness. They have, under the French “colonialist” regime of the past 60 years, witnessed the creation of a most efficient machine of exploitation and self-interest, centering in the Bank of Indochina and the fabulous French import-export firms, but also extending throughout all grades and ranks of French commerce and officialdom. The laxness and self-seeking of the past has had its effect, the present day example has strengthened this effect. And, with this in mind, who can blame the Vietnamese, from the highest to the lowest, for wanting to get aboard the “gravy train.” The above is a pessimistic picture, but it is a reality, and much must be done to create a sense of responsibility, an atmosphere of confidence, and a basis for uncontrolled credit, before one can be certain that Indochina, either under its present ruling class or under a native regime, will be a sound and going concern. It is a pity, as both the French and the Vietnamese have much in their favor and as the country itself, if properly ruled and developed, would be a rich source of many things for which the world has need in these critical times. There are men of good will and of honest intentions in both French and Vietnamese ranks. But the confusion of the political situation makes it difficult for these to emerge to the foreground and to take the necessary steps to ensure an economy directed not to the benefit of the few but to the benefit of the country as a whole. Respectfully yours, Charles S. Reed , II The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/12–447: Telegram [Document 162] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , December 4, 1947—4 p.m. 400. Provisional Deliberative Committee Annam on 24 November adopted resolution asking Bao Dai appoint liaison committee for three Kys which will study possibility convening Nationalist Congress and, with reference Xuan’s proposal Dalat Conference, resolution states Bao Dai only person who should take initiative in such matter. Xuan’s plan has evidently inspired various elements with idea uniting various political elements to study situation, make suggestions but any idea of strictly Nationalist Conference without Ho representation can hardly reach satisfactory overall settlement nor any conference which insists unreservedly that Bao Dai come back as emperor as many want republic. Reed The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/12–1647: Telegram [Document 163] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , December 16, 1947—6 p.m. 5398. Following is Foreign Office version of meetings on December 6 and 7 between Bollaert and Bao Dai. Additional reports will follow. Bollaert and Bao Dai reached agreement in principle on future status of Vietnam (Embtel 5282, December 9 21 ). At outset Bao Dai demanded as prerequisite to any understanding guarantee that French will not negotiate with Ho Chi-minh at any time and make public announcement to this effect. Under agreement Bao Dai is to return to FIC and establish new government. Vietnam, which will include Tonkin, Annam and Cochin-China, is to be granted independence within French Union; foreign relations are to be conducted by France with Vietnamese being incorporated in French Foreign Service. Vietnam will have independent army which will, however, be “available for defense of any part of French Union”. There will be common customs and integration of transportation and communication systems. Details of agreement presently being studied by French Government and no public statements will be made until Bollaert returns to Indochina and Bao Dai government established. Foreign Office source sees as principal difficulties the formula for return of Bao Dai to FIC without being branded as French “stooge” and formation of representative and effective government. Source adds that inclusion of Cochin-China (because of its constitutional status as a “Crown Colony”) in Vietnam will require act of Parliament and expects that this bill would be subject of attack by Communists. Latter who up to now have actively campaigned for union of “three Kys” as part of their all-out campaign of support for Ho Chi-minh would doubtless reverse themselves on this issue if uncompromising anti-Ho statement as demanded by Bao Dai is made. Department pass to Saigon as Paris 37. 22 Caffery 21 Not printed. 22 Also to be repeated by Saigon to Hanoi. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State 851G.01/12–2447: Telegram [Document 164] The Ambassador in France ( Caffery ) to the Secretary of State secret Paris , December 24, 1947—3 p.m. 5536. Mytel 5398, December 16. Council of Ministers yesterday issued communiqué announcing Bollaert given “full powers to undertake all action and negotiation necessary for re-establishment of peace and liberty in Vietnam”. Communiqué states that in view of failure of government of Ho Chi-minh to reply to offer of negotiations made in Bollaert’s September 10 Haiphong [ Hadong ] speech and Viet-minh radio’s rejection his offer, no negotiations will be undertaken with government of Ho Chi-minh. Auriol, as President French Union, informed Council yesterday of receipt of “active adherence” of Kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos to French Union. Department pass to Saigon as Paris 38. Caffery The Consul at Saigon (Reed) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/12–2647: Telegram [Document 165] The Consul at Saigon ( Reed ) to the Secretary of State confidential Saigon , December 26, 1947—11 a.m. 422. News of Bao Dai’s actual departure for Europe 23 given much publicity, also fact that he and President Xuan said to have agreed re status Cochin-China, latter to have large measure autonomy, but comment very guarded awaiting Xuan’s return from Hong Kong. Manoeuvers Hoach being watched with interest as generally believed he has organized support of many Caodaist and Hoa Hao troops and he remains very anti-Xuan. New President Cochin-China Council is Beziat, unquestioned colonialist, and an informed liberal candidate defeated by “inducements” to vote for Beziat. Reed 23 Bao Dai left Hong Kong by air for Switzerland via London and did not expect to visit France. The Consul General at Hong Kong (Hopper) to the Secretary of State 851G.00/12–3047 [Document 166] The Consul General at Hong Kong ( Hopper ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 450 Hong Kong , December 30, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to inform the Department that on December 24, 1947, I received a visit from Mr. Ngo-Dinh-Giem 24 of Saigon, who stated that he had come to Hong Kong for the purpose of consulting with Bao Dai, ex-Emperor of Annam, and that while in this city he wished to talk with me about conditions in Indo-China. Ngo-Dinh-Giem stated that he knew Mr. Charles S. Reed, American Consul at Saigon, and understood that I was a friend of Mr. Reed. I may state that on December 18, I received a telegram from Mr. Reed to the effect that Ngo-Dinh-Giem was coming to Hong Kong to see Bao Dai, and that he might call on me while here. Ngo-Dinh-Giem stated at the outset of our interview that while he was aware that my duties did not concern affairs in Indo-China he wished to take advantage of his visit to Hong Kong to talk with me and to let me know his views concerning the protracted negotiations which French authorities have been conducting with Bao Dai and other political groups in his country in an effort to put an end to the strife and to set up a stable government. Ngo-Dinh-Giem impressed me as a nervous young man of about forty years of age, but who was very serious in his desire to help to solve the impasse prevailing at present in the above negotiations. He was suffering from a bad cold, but spoke fairly good French, as he did not desire that an interpreter or third party be present during our interview. He stated that he believed it to be in the interest of his cause that American officials everywhere be fully informed as to developments. I replied that I would be only too glad to learn his views. Ngo-Dinh-Giem stated that Bao Dai had sent for him in order to have reliable and current information on present conditions in Indo-China as both of them had found that due to strict censorship in Indo-China on communications of all kinds it was very difficult to communicate with Hong Kong and other places, particularly on subjects of a political nature. As the Department is probably aware, Bao Dai left Hong Kong on December 24 for Europe to join his family in Switzerland, I am informed. Ngo-Dinh-Giem asked me if I had followed the course of negotiations in Hong Kong among various political groups from Saigon within recent weeks. I replied that at first I attempted to keep informed but that as the conference dragged for weeks without any apparent result, I had to curtail my interest due to pressure of work, but that I naturally read with deep interest the daily press reports on the progress of the conferences. (As a matter of fact I have forwarded Hong Kong press articles, and other notes obtained from various sources, to Consul Reed at Saigon, in view of French censorship of mails entering that country.) Ngo-Dinh-Giem gave me his opinion of the terms of the offer submitted some time ago by the French Government to Bao Dai and to the political groups in Indo-China. In brief Ngo-Dinh-Giem considered the terms of the proposal as falling far short of real independence, which is the ultimate desire of his people; he stated that the Bollaert offer was entirely unacceptable to his chief, Bao Dai, but he then stated that Bao Dai was a poor man without resources with which to conduct a political campaign. I gathered the impression at this point that Ngo-Dinh-Giem was worried lest Bao Dai might accept the French offer for personal and financial reasons, plus his desire to regain his throne as emperor of Annam. Ngo-Dinh-Giem claimed that he was an old friend of Bao Dai, had served as his Prime Minister in former years, and that their families enjoyed close relations. He said that when Bao Dai left Hong Kong he suggested that if Ngo-Dinh-Giem found conditions ripe upon his return to Saigon he might go ahead and attempt to form a government within the framework of the French proposal, with as many amendments as possible in order to satisfy nationalistic aspirations. When I asked Ngo-Dinh-Giem if this meant that Bao Dai intended to accede to the French terms regardless of public opinion in his country, he replied: “I hope not as it would mean continued slavery for my people.” He then said that an outright refusal to accept the French offer might result in continued strife in Indo-China. He said that even though a compromise solution may be reached with the French they still had the Communist group to reckon with; and that this group seemed well supplied with money and arms, and had received much help from “foreign sources”. He feared that if an agreement was reached with the French that the latter would expect the newly organized government to assume most of the burden of exterminating the Communists, as the French were “getting fed up” with fighting and the continued losses which they have suffered. I might observe at this point that the French Consul in Hong Kong, M. Jobez, had remarked to me some time ago that he thought that French authorities would be only too pleased to turn over the job of fighting Communists in Indo-China to any newly organized native government, as the present guerrilla style of warfare was something the French did not relish, and had proved very costly in men and material. Ngo-Dinh-Giem spoke then of the sad state of the economy of his country; that the French had for many years exploited the riches of Indo-China, without giving much in return; that although the French realised that they could no longer continue exploitation in such highhanded manner as before they had no intention of turning over the resources of Indo-China to all comers, and that they would never agree to an “Open Door” principle. Ngo-Dinh-Giem then stated that the only hope for his country, if it ever expected to escape from French domination, is to enlist the sympathy and support of the other great democracies and that the United States was in best position to extend the needed aid. I then realised that my visitor was approaching the actual purpose of his interview, and that he was appealing to me as an American official to use my influence in his behalf. He spoke of how we had extended moral and financial aid to other “small oppressed countries” in order to prevent their exploitation by a great power, and, more recently, to prevent the spread of Communism. I refrained from expressing any opinion on these statements of my visitor, but asked him if the majority of the people of Indo-China were united in their efforts to reach an agreement with the French. He hesitated before replying, but finally stated that he “thought that unity might be reached were it not for the Communist element”. The opinion of Ngo-Dinh-Giem may be summarized as follows: 1. That the French offer made sometime ago falls short of native aspirations in that the French wish to retain control of foreign relations and defense (meaning retention of troops in the country). 2. That the French do not honestly intend to relinquish control of the economy of Indo-China, but expect to keep it within the “French Union”. 3. That Bao Dai may weaken and be more directly under French influence, as he naturally desires to revive his dynasty and lead his people into better days. 4. That any native government must look to outside sources for means to exist—at least for a few years. 5. That the Communist danger is very evident, and that any seizure of power in France by the Communist Party would result in similar action in Indo-China. 6. That continued resistance to French proposals to join the “French Union” will only make matters worse in Indo-China, and will not improve the tragic condition of the people, with increasing numbers turning to Communism. 7. Finally, that only concerted representations by other great powers will cause the French to agree to more acceptable terms for the formation of a local government, and that such a new government must obtain financial aid from abroad until such time when it can stand upon its own feet. Respectfully yours, George D. Hopper 24 Usually known as Ngo Dinh Diem. Occupation and control of Japan Occupation and control of Japan 1 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , pp. 85 – 471 . For additional documentation on war claims and on U.S. efforts on behalf of a peace treaty with Japan; see post , pp. 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] ff., and pp. 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] ff. [167] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, January 3, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/1–347: Telegram [168] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to President Truman Tokyo, January 5, 1947. 894.50/1–547 [169] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, January 13, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC(Info)/1–1347: Telegram [170] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, January 13, 1947—7 p.m. 894.628/1–1347: Telegram [171] The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee [Washington, January 16, 1947.] 740.00116 P.W./1–1647 [172] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, January 18, 1947. 894.628/1–1847: Telegram [173] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, January 21, 1947—6 p.m. 894.414/1–2147: Telegram [174] The Director of the Office, of Economic Security Policy (Robinson) to the Acting Director of Foreign Funds Control (Richards) Washington, January 22, 1947. 894.5151/1–2247 [175] The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Officers Washington, January 28, 1947—11:30 a.m. 694.0031/1–2847: Circular airgram [176] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) Washington, January 28, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/1–2847 [177] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) to the Department of State Tokyo, January 29, 1947. 740.00115 PW/1–2947 [178] General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Tokyo, 30 January 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–347 [179] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines Washington, January 31, 1947—1 p.m. 694.9631/1–2347: Telegram [180] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo [Washington,] 3 February 1947. Department of Defense files [181] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) Tokyo, February 4, 1947—1 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/2–447: Telegram [182] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Tokyo, 7 February 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–1047 [183] Report by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) Tokyo, February 7, 1947. 894.00/3–3147 [184] Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division (Flory) to the Informal Interagency Committee on Japanese Fishing and Marine Industry [Washington,] February 14, 1947. 894.628/2–1447 [185] The Chairman of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (Hilldring) to the Secretary of State Washington, 20 February 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–2047 [186] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, February 25, 1947—4 a.m. 894.512/2–2547: Telegram [187] Memorandum by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Japanese Government [Tokyo,] 25 February 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–2847 [188] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) [Washington,] March 12, 1947. 894.50/3–1247 [189] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 14, 1947. [Received March 18—11:30 p.m.] 740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1447: Telegram [190] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, March 18, 1947—7 p.m. 694.0031/3–1847: Telegram [191] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 20, 1947. [Received April 2—5:22 p.m.] 894.628/3–2047: Telegram [192] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Japanese Prime Minister (Yoshida) [Tokyo,] March 22, 1947. 894.50/6–1447 [193] The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel) Washington, March 24, 1947. 740.00115 PW/3–1947 [194] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, March 24, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/3–2447: Telegram [195] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 24, 1947. 894.414/3–2447: Telegram [196] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, March 25, 1947. 894.628/3–2547: Telegram [197] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) Washington, March 26, 1947. 740.00119 FEAC/3–2647 [198] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the War Department for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for General McCoy [Tokyo,] 2 April 1947. 894.00/4–747 [199] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union (Tsarapkin) Washington, April 3, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–1247 [200] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, April 3, 1947. [Received April 10.] 894.014/4–347 [201] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson) Washington, April 14, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–1447 [202] Memorandum by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Japanese Government [Tokyo,] 14 April 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–1847 [203] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) Washington, April 15, 1947. 740.00119 FEAC/4–747 [204] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, April 23, 1947. [Received April 26—6:25 a.m.] 894.628/4–2347: Telegram [205] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, April 25, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–2547: Telegram [206] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) [Washington,] April 29, 1947. 894.00/4–2947 [207] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington, 30 April, 1947. 894.628/4–3047 [208] The Department of State to the Swiss Legation Washington, May 2, 1947. 894.512/3–2647 [209] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Shanghai Washington, May 5, 1947. 693.9431/3–347 [210] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Novikov) Washington, May 10, 1947. 894.002/3–3147 [211] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 20, 1947. 894.628/5–2047: Telegram [212] The Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs (Snow) to the Legal Adviser (Fahy) [Washington,] May 22, 1947. 894.628/5–2247 [213] The Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) Washington, May 27, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–2747 [214] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division (Flory) [Washington,] May 27, 1947. 894.628/5–2747 [215] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) [Washington,] May 29, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–2947 [216] The Department of State to the Norwegian Embassy Washington, June 9, 1947. 894.628/6–2047 [217] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, June 9, 1947—7 p.m. 694.0031/6–947: Telegram [218] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) Washington, June 12, 1947. 694.0031/6–347 [219] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, June 15, 1947. 740.00119 Control(Japan)/6–1547: Telegram [220] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division (VanSant) [Washington,] June 17, 1947. 894.628/6–1747 [221] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, June 18, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC/6–1847: Telegram [222] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, June 19, 1947. 894.628/6–1947: Telegram [223] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, June 19, 1947. 740.00119 Control(Japan)/6–1947 [224] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) [Washington,] June 20, 1947. 894.628/6–2047 [225] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, June 20, 1947—5 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC/6–2047: Telegram [226] Press Release Issued by the Headquarters of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur [Tokyo,] 22 June 1947. 894.628/6–2347 [227] The Department of State to the Australian Embassy Washington, June 23, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–2947 [228] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, [June 24, 1947.] 740.00119 Control (Japan)/7–947: Telegram [229] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, June 26, 1947. 894.628/6–2647: Telegram [230] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, June 28, 1947 [—7 p.m.] 394.635/6–2847: Telegram [231] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, June 29, 1947—7 p.m. 894.635/6–2947: Telegram [232] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, June 30, 1947—7 p.m. 894.628/6–3047: Telegram [233] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) [Washington,] July 1, 1947. 894.628/7–147 [234] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, July 2, 1947—8 p.m. 694.0031/7–247: Telegram [235] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) [Washington,] July 3, 1947—2:30 p.m. 894.628/7–347 [236] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, July 3, 1947—9 p.m. 862K.6377/7–347: Telegram [237] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 5, 1947—8 p.m. 894.628/7–547: Telegram [238] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, July 8, 1947—4 p.m. 501.BD/7–847: Telegram [239] The Department of State to the Australian Embassy Washington, July 9, 1947. 894.628/6–2347 [240] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 10, 1947. 894.60/7–1047 [241] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, July 11, 1947—6 p.m. 740.00119 Control(Japan)/6–1547: Telegram [242] The Associate Chief of the Division of Occupied Areas (Schuler) to the Secretary of the International Missionary Council in New York (Decker) Washington, July 11, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/6–2747: Telegram [243] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 15, 1947. 740.00115 PW/7–1547 [244] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 21, 1947. [Received August 1.] 894.50/7–2147 [245] The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Officers Washington, July 22, 1947—8:35 a.m. 694.0031/7–2247: Circular airgram [246] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington, July 23, 1947. 894.628/7–147 [247] The Department of State to the Australian Embassy Washington, July 24, 1947. 740.00119 Control(Japan)/5–2947 [248] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) Washington, July 25, 1947. 894.50/7–2247 [249] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 26, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/7–2647 [250] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 1, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/8–147: Telegram [251] Memorandum of Conversation, by Miss Katherine B. Fite of the Office of the Legal Adviser (Fahy) [Washington,] August 6, 1947. 740.00116 PW/8–647 [252] The United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) Washington, August 11, 1947. 894.50/8–1147 [253] The United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) Washington, August 11, 1947. 894.50/8–1147 [254] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Clark) to the Secretary of State London, August 15, 1947. [Received August 26—8:12 a.m.] 894.628/8–1547: Airgram [255] Extract From Circular No. 9 Issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, August 15, 1947 Tokyo, August 15, 1947 894.5151/12–1147 [256] Memorandum of Conversation, by Miss Katherine B. Fite of the Office of the Legal Adviser (Gross) [Washington,] August 20, 1947. 740.00116 PW/8–2047 [257] Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Saltzman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) washington, August 20, 1947. 694.0031/8–1347 [258] The Embassy in Australia to the Department of State Canberra, August 22, 1947. [Received September 9.] 740.00119 Control(Japan)/8–2247 [259] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil Washington, August 25, 1947—5 p.m. 694.0031/8–1247: Telegram [260] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State Moscow, September 5, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/9–547: Telegram [261] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 5, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/9–547 [262] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Associate Chief of the Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs (Whitman) [Washington,] September 16, 1947. 894.50/8–2847 [263] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 16, 1947. 694.0031/9–1647: Telegram [264] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) Washington, September 25, 1947—7 p.m. 894.628/9–447: Telegram [265] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 29, 1947. 894.60/9–2947 [266] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) [Washington,] October 6, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–647 [267] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington, October 8, 1947. 894.628/8–2047 [268] The State Member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Saltzman) to the Committee Washington, October 9, 1947. 894.50/10–947 [269] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington, 9th October, 1947. 740.00116 PW/10–947 [270] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Reparations Delegate in Japan (Hodge) Washington, October 9, 1947—6 p.m. 740.00119 PW/10–947: Telegram [271] The Department of State to the Swiss Legation Washington, October 13, 1947. 894.512/9–1847 [272] The State Member of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (Saltzman) to the Committee [Washington, October 16, 1947.] 894.50/10–1647 [273] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Toyko, October 16, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–1647 [274] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 24, 1947. 501.BD–Asia/10–2447 [275] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, October 31, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–3147 [276] The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to the Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) Washington, November 12, 1947. 894.50/11–1247 [277] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, November 14, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/11–1447 [278] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Army (Royall) Washington, November 25, 1947. 894.602/11–2447 [279] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 1, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/12–147 [280] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Gay) [Washington,] December 3, 1947. 694.0031/12–347 [281] Mr. Frank G, Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) Washington, December 11, 1947. 894.5151/12–1147 [282] Memorandum by Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, to the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee [Washington, December 18, 1947.] 894.5018/12–1847 [283] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 19, 1947. 894.602/12–1947 [284] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 23, 1947. 894.5151/12–2347 [285] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 24, 1947. 761.94114/12–2447 [286] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 29, 1947. 694.0031/12–2947 [287] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 30, 1947. 894.50/12–3047 The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/1–347: Telegram [Document 167] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , January 3, 1947—8 p.m. 5. This is FEC 3. Urtel 553, Dec 24. 2 Following may help to explain FEC attitude regarding legislation implementing or supplementing constitution: 3 New constitution had large gaps to be filled in by subsequent legislation which would then become part of new constitutional structure. Some members of FEC (probably majority, although vote never taken) considered constitution unacceptable unless FEC could review implementing legislation in same manner as had reviewed constitution itself, to determine if inconsistent with Potsdam Declaration and policy decisions of FEC. General opinion was that FEC may pass policy decisions with respect to implementing legislation prior to, during, or subsequent to consideration of legislation by Diet. US Govt interposed no objection to this view. At same time members of FEC believed that, as in case of constitution, it would be very much better to require amendments or alterations to legislation, if such deemed advisable by FEC, before rather than after enactment by Diet, because if amendments required after enactment Allies would lay themselves open to accusations of interference with free will of Japanese people and prestige of SCAP, who would have to order amendments, might be injured. Therefore FEC desired that draft implementing legislation, either in Japanese or English, be made available to it at earliest possible moment after drafting or after submission to Diet. Consequently on August 24 and again on September 19 US representative on FEC assured Commission that draft legislation would be filed with FEC by US Govt. With this understanding objections of some members of FEC were removed and drive for disapproval of constitution was avoided. On September 24 General McCoy wrote Acting SecState 4 explaining situation, naming draft laws desired and concluding “These might be requested from the Supreme Commander 5 for filing with the Commission as the first step in honoring our commitment”. It is understood that in accordance this request War Dept sent several telegrams to SCAP re making draft legislation available to FEC. On November 30 SCAP telegraphed (SCAP’s 67693) “drafts of laws implementing new constitution will be forwarded air courier after introduction in Diet as requested”. First bill introduced Diet December 3 but only received in English translation by FEC on December 27, too late for changes to be made by informal action of SCAP should changes be desired. Japanese text not yet received. Presumably changes if necessary can now only be made by order of SCAP to next Diet session, which might be embarrassing to SCAP. Hence Australia and New Zealand desired that passage of bills be delayed. Australian member served notice December 30 in Constitutional Reform Committee that he will bring up in full Commission general question of treatment, which he termed “gross breach of faith”, accorded FEC by SCAP in connection with implementing legislation. Byrnes 2 Not printed. 3 See annex to memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring, December 16, 1946, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 375 . 4 Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy was U.S. member of the Far Eastern Commission and also its Chairman; for letter, see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 317 . 5 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to President Truman 894.50/1–547 [Document 168] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to President Truman 6 personal and confidential Tokyo , January 5, 1947. Dear Mr. President : Since my last letter (October 4, 1946 7 ) the new Constitution has been promulgated to go into effect in May; the Government has been formulating laws to implement it; elections of prefectural and municipal officials have been projected (this is something new in the history of Japan); the purge has been greatly extended to reach economic as well as new political fields; and the Japanese have continued to give the Occupation authorities good cooperation. On the other side of the ledger, the general economic situation has seriously deteriorated. There exists an accelerated currency inflation; the revival and reconversion of industry continues to be obstructed by non-settlement of the reparations question. We have had a strike crisis almost as serious as that in the United States. The aggressive minority which has been seeking with unfortunate success to control Japanese labor unions has injected a new element into the situation by encouraging labor unions to participate actively in political matters. The Communist press in various countries and the “liberal” press in the United States have continued to criticize the Occupation authorities for allegedly supporting conservative elements in the Government. This criticism is unfounded; General MacArthur has adhered to the wise policy of non-intervention in domestic governmental affairs except in cases of necessity pursuant to his directives. The Yoshida 8 Cabinet came into being as a result of the general elections of April 10, 1946. Those were the first really free elections ever held in Japan and were participated in by over 75 per cent of the electorate. Irrespective of the wisdom or political experience of the individual voters the elections were democratic and the small number of irregularities compared favorably with elections in western democracies. Out of the elections the conservative parties—the so-called Progressive and Liberal Parties—became the plurality parties and after the Liberal Party leader Hatoyama was eliminated by SCAP order the leader of the Progressives, Yoshida, was asked by the Emperor to form a Cabinet. Thus, whatever its limitations, the present Government came into being through a democratic process, and when the Cabinet was finally composed it received neither approval nor disapproval from the Supreme Commander—merely “no objection”. The Supreme Commander has been directed that it is not the responsibility of the Allies to impose upon the Japanese any Government which does not reflect the freely expressed will of the people. In the light of all circumstances, the present Government comes as close to reflecting the freely expressed will of the Japanese people as any Government could at the present time. It is a fact, unacknowledged by the leftists, that the great majority of the Japanese people are conservative in their political and social thinking. About a year ago there was considerable sentiment in some foreign circles against holding general elections as early as April 1946 on the ground that the Japanese were not yet sufficiently educated for democracy. There was later similar sentiment in regard to the adoption of a new Constitution. Only time will tell whether democracy, which President Wilson so aptly described as a state of mind, will take firm hold of the minds of the Japanese people. But it seems to me that the sooner the Japanese try the tools of democracy the more quickly they will learn how to use them. China has just adopted a Constitution after 35 years of “political tutelage” during which the seeds of democracy sown by Sun Yat Sen did not flourish as he hoped. When the Japanese Constitution comes into effect the Japanese people, with our initial guidance and help, will have been given the essential framework for democracy and what they do with it eventually will in any case depend upon themselves. I believe that the average Japanese possesses his share of the average human being’s love of freedom. I believe also that the Japanese have turned their faces toward us and, in their knowledge that the past betrayed them, they look to a new kind of future and to the United States and American democracy as their example for that future. Democracy cannot be beaten into the mind nor can it be absorbed on an empty stomach. If we continue to treat the Japanese in a democratic way and if they can have hope of reasonable economic security—a decent livelihood as well as a free political life—there is good prospect that the American objectives of the Occupation will succeed. I do not think that the importance of the economic considerations can be over-emphasized. It is apparently difficult for some of our foreign friends who do not see Japan at first hand to realize that, notwithstanding the happy condition of peace and order, Japan is facing desperate economic conditions wherein lie grave dangers to the accomplishment of our objectives. The Japanese economy is bankrupt and whether we like it or not Japan has become an economic responsibility of the United States. If there is a shortage of food the deficit is made up by the United States and by no one else. If Japan cannot support itself the burden falls upon us. Settlement of reparations and development of foreign trade are accordingly vital. The Japanese industrialists, as eager as they are to get to work, cannot afford to do so until they know what equipment will be left to them. Meanwhile the plants which constitute the principal assets in the home islands are deteriorating. I am told on competent authority that these plants are worth but one-sixth of the external assets in Manchuria, Karafuto and the Kuriles. The Occupation authorities want to see Japan self-supporting because that is necessary for the accomplishment of our overall objectives and is in the interest of the American tax-payer who otherwise foots the bill. The United States has already imported into Japan over $300,000,000 worth of goods more than it has been paid in kind. If the Japanese do not produce exports they have no means of paying for imports. There is no question of building up Japan to the disadvantage of any other country; the question is simply one of endeavoring to develop an economy by which Japan will be self-supporting (without cost to us), and will eventually participate in mutually beneficial economic exchanges with the United States and other countries. I expect to be in Washington for consultation with the State Department in February. General MacArthur and I hope that it may be possible for you to let me have an opportunity of paying my respects, endeavoring to answer any questions which you may have and receiving such instructions as you may wish to give me. Respectfully yours, George Atcheson, Jr. 6 Copy transmitted to the Department in letter of January 5, in which Mr. Atcheson stated: “We are hoping very much for the earliest possible settlement of the reparations question because that is one of the necessary factors for revival of industry and because the Japanese must manufacture exports with which to pay for necessary imports of food and other products.” 7 Not printed. 8 Shigeru Yoshida, Japanese Prime Minister since May 22, 1946. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC(Info)/1–1347: Telegram [Document 169] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , January 13, 1947—7 p.m. 12. This is FEC 4. Reparations . Ambassador Novikov 9 in conversation General McCoy expressed concern over U.S. plan to take unilateral action by issuing interim directives and implied serious consequences might ensue. Implementing legislation . At meeting of FEC January 2 Sir Carl Berendsen New Zealand representative stated re implementing legislation that degree of cooperation between FEC and SCAP highly unsatisfactory and that consequently functions of FEC have been stultified; expressed great admiration for Supreme Commander and stated “I cannot believe that what have from time to time appeared to be deliberate discourtesies have indeed been intended to be such”; reviewed history of case of late arrival of implementing legislation and stated “I should think it proper to ask the United States Government what their views are on this particular incident and what action if any they would think it proper for the Commission to take”. Australian representative also spoke along same lines. He pointed out that reason for wish to examine implementing legislation before passage by Diet was to save Supreme Commander embarrassment which would be caused should it become necessary to request him to have Japanese Government revoke laws already passed; stated that “Commission had no intention of worrying Supreme Commander by sniping at him or by caustic criticism. But by referring matters to Commission the Supreme Commander was drawing on fund of knowledge and experience relating to working of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary executive not available within his own staff of exclusively American officers”; stated should be greatly extended exchange of views and suggestions between SCAP and FEC; asserted FEC had treated SCAP as partner but that there should be reciprocity and that “Commission should not always be the one to make the concessions”; and stated Australian Government felt FEC had not been given adequate opportunity to examine implementing legislation and that while FEC still vested with right to amend legislation it was probable Commission would find it extremely difficult to effect changes in legislation already passed. Indian representative expressed agreement with statements of New Zealand and Australian representatives. Byrnes 9 Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov, Ambassador of the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 894.628/1–1347: Telegram [Document 170] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , January 13, 1947—7 p.m. 13. Draft text as follows sent to War Dept for approval and transmission by separate War Dept telegram to SCAP: “Australian member FEC has submitted draft revision fisheries policy (FEC–035) proposing Jap fishing operations be limited area authorized Scapin 1033, June 22, 1946 unless extension authorized FEC; whaling from land stations and pearl fishing limited same area; no whaling from factory ships anywhere except under authorization FEC and agreement international authority for whaling. Foregoing discussed meeting special subcommittee FEC Dec 19. At second meeting subcommittee, Jan 10, US member submitted following draft: ‘1. In view of the significant economic and social importance to Japan of the fishing, whaling, pearl fishing and other aquatic industries ( a ) as a source of food, ( b ) as a means of employment, and ( c ) as a source of exports to provide foreign exchange for essential imports, the Japanese should be encouraged to develop these industries, subject ( a ) to such precautions as to security as SCAP may deem appropriate in addition to those required under policies determined by FEC, and ( b ) to the provisions enumerated below. 2. Japanese fishing operations should not be permitted within 50 miles of any land area under jurisdiction of any foreign government, having permanent populations or military or naval establishments, except as specified in paragraph 3, without special arrangements, having the approval of FEC, between SCAP and the country concerned. 3. (This paragraph provides exceptions for Tsushima and north coast Hokkaido, following lines specified Scapin 1033, June 22, 1946.) 4. Japanese fishing vessels should have the right of innocent passage through areas of the high seas where their fishing operations are prohibited (as specified in paragraphs 2 and 3), but notice to the littoral state should be given by SCAP in advance of such passage. 5. Japanese fishing vessels in distress should not enter territorial waters except by special arrangement with appropriate authorities of the littoral state, and then under such terms as the littoral authorities may impose. 6. Policy with respect to repair, construction or conversion of fishing vessels should conform to other policies determined by FEC. 7. Japanese fishing operations should conform strictly to: ( a ) The provisions of the international whaling agreements; ( b ) The provisions of other international agreements relating to conservation of fisheries; ( c ) Recognized conservation practices, including abstinence from pelagic sealing or interference with conservation measures instituted by littoral states. 8. The present policy with respect to fishing and aquatic industries of Japan is without prejudice to any decisions by FEC on any other matters, including reparations.’ At Jan 10 meeting subcommittee, other members expressed desire consult their governments prior next meeting, Jan 21. Australian member expressed strong disapproval US draft, desires no Jap fishing south equator, fears SCAP already preparing authorize another Antarctic whaling expedition. All members except US appear favor same restricted areas as in Scapin 1033. Dept would welcome SCAP comments prior Jan 21 meeting subcommittee.” Byrnes The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 740.00116 P.W./1–1647 [Document 171] The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Hilldring ) 10 to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 11 top secret [ Washington , January 16, 1947.] Subject: Disposition of Property of Convicted War Criminals, Japan. The annexed memorandum is submitted for the consideration of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee & has the approval of the Dept of State. J. H. Hilldring [Annex] top secret Reference: JCS 1380/15 Memorandum by the State Department Member , SWNCC Subject: Disposition of Property of Convicted War Criminals, Japan. the problem 1. To present to FEC through SWNCC the question of the disposition of the property of war criminals who die before completion of trial and of the property of convicted war criminals. facts bearing on the problem . . . . . . . discussion 6. The forfeiture of the property of convicted war criminals as such is a form of punishment and should be inflicted by the tribunal as part of the sentence if considered appropriate. 7. In principle forfeited property of convicted criminals and fines paid by them should be used to alleviate the wrongs of which they were convicted and, failing that, should be applied to the general purposes of the punishing authority. It is not feasible to single out among all those who suffered from Japanese acts victims of the particular convicted persons. Their injuries are included in the reparations bills of the aggrieved nations. So far as the forfeited property is capable of yielding foreign exchange, it will in any event be subject to measures for controlling foreign exchange. It would be unwise to earmark the proceeds of confiscated property in yen, because the Japanese Government is required in any event to supply yen for such purposes as SCAP directs. Accordingly the proceeds of fines and confiscated property should be applied to the benefit of the occupying forces to help defray the costs of the occupation. 8. With respect to the property of accused who die pending trial, no reason is perceived for a treatment different from property of acquitted persons, unless the offenses charged relate specifically to the property, or unless its acquisition or disposition is covered by other policy directives, in which case appropriate measures can be taken by SCAP. conclusions 9. The property of convicted war criminals should not be forfeited in absence of an order by the tribunal. 10. Property forfeited and fines levied pursuant to an order of a war crimes tribunal should be applied by SCAP to defray costs of the occupation. 11. The property of accused who die before completion of trial should be returned to the legal heirs, unless it is claimed that its acquisition was unlawful, or inconsistent with occupation policy directives, or unless its release to the legal heirs would be inconsistent with such directives. In such cases, the death should not prevent its forfeiture or other treatment pursuant to occupation policy directives. recommendations “12. It is recommended that: “ a . The foregoing conclusions be approved by SWNCC; “ b . After approval by SWNCC the State Department be requested to forward the substance of the paper to the US representative on the Far Eastern Commission for presentation to that Commission with a view to obtaining a policy decision on this matter; “ c . Copies of the approved paper be forwarded to the War and Navy Departments for their information; “ d . The Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested to transmit the substance of the Conclusions to SCAP for his information.” 10 Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring was also alternate U.S. member of the Far Eastern Commission and Chairman of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. 11 Sent to the U.S. member of the Far Eastern Commission, February 19 as SWNCC 347; it had been informally approved by SWNCC on February 13 for the Commission “as a basis for a Far Eastern Commission policy decision on the subject”; also sent as instruction 431, February 20, to Tokyo for the information of the Political Adviser. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the conclusions to SCAP in War 92073 on February 14. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.628/1–1847: Telegram [Document 172] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Tokyo , January 18, 1947. 13. Reourtel 3, January 4. 12 Following comments concerning proposed FEC 035/1 Jap fishing, whaling and pearl fishing are offered with recommendation that US strongly resist efforts of Australian representative to have this paper adopted. Present SCAP policy re fisheries is governed by FEC 035 and SWNNC 99/3. It does not appear that any change to this policy under prevailing conditions in Japan is warranted. Present administration of Jap fisheries results in interim actions only and no precedent for permanent rights is thereby established or contemplated. Existing directives cover every contingency which might affect security of marine industries of Allied countries. These industries are adequately and reasonably protected. Proposed appropriations by FEC of administrative responsibility in fishing and whaling appears to be unwarranted reflection upon past and present administration by SCAP whose decisions have not prejudiced Allied security or economy in slightest measure. Proposed changes ignore humanitarian considerations by practically insuring reduced marine production when world overall food shortage promises to remain acute. US has a vital stake in augmenting this food supply as demonstrated by burden which Jap shortages of food has placed upon US alone. Also mandatory reference to FEC will unduly hamper and complicate fishery administration by causing lengthy and costly delays when emergency action is required. Detailed comments on objectionable paragraphs in proposed FEC 035/1 follows: 2( a ) Fishing and whaling operations, subject to security considerations, are being carried out in defined area at present. Effective supervision of Jap fishing and whaling industries requires timely decisions to take advantage of fluctuations in fish and whale occurrences and insure efficient use distribution available fishing equipment. 2( b ) Would make it mandatory for SCAP to request an amendment if for any reason a change were desired. Amendment might require months of negotiation and needlessly complicate administrative process in Japan. Authorization of fishing in present area under existing directives is specifically stated in Scapin 1033 not to be an expression of Allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction or fishing rights should be peace treaty matter and that FEC decision present time would in fact again merely amount to an interim measure. 3 ( a ) and 3 ( b ) Same comments as above. 3( c ) Would preclude exploitation whale occurrences in Bonin Island area. These islands are too distant from Japan to permit use of Jap shore stations. Experts here estimate that approximately 300 whales may be taken annually in Bonin Island area by operating factory ships, a catch which can ill be spared at time of critical world shortages. In addition humanitarian principles of augmenting supply of protein foods in Japan (as well as world supply of fats and oils) cannot be over-looked. It is felt here that Australian proposal undoubtedly in part arises out of present SCAP-administered and Japmanned Antarctic whaling project. As the Department is aware, however, this whaling fleet was dispatched as an emergency measure, was authorized for one season only, and no precedent for future authorization was intended or implied. 4 No comment. In summation, it is felt that adoption by FEC of policy contemplated in FEC 035/1 would be tantamount to placing undue restriction upon administrative processes which are inherent in SCAP authority. Existing directives already amply protect interests of all Allied Nations, including Australia, and proposed changes would appear to result in “tinkering” with the administration of present satisfactory policy, thereby adding unnecessary confusion and restriction which precedent indicates are unnecessary and unwarranted. Atcheson 12 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 894.414/1–2147: Telegram [Document 173] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , January 21, 1947—6 p.m. 18. Brit and Chinese FonOffs agreed sometime ago with Dept plan for treatment Jap archives, consular and diplomatic property, etc., outlined Deptels 6148, 6149 Aug 20 to London repeated Tokyo as 456, 457. 13 Soviet comment now reed states no objection in principle, offers minor readily concedable changes in text proposed note and continues (in translation). “Moreover, Soviet Govt would consider it necessary that central Japanese archives (of Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other Ministries, General Staffs of Army and Navy, Parliament, Imperial Court, etc.) located in Japan, should be available for study by representatives of four allied powers, USSR, USA, Great Britain and China. In this connection Soviet Govt assumes that necessary instructions will be issued by Govt of US to the Supreme Commander in Chief of allied powers in Japan regarding access also for representatives of USSR to study of central Japanese archives on an equal level with representatives of US.” Your comment and that of SCAP re this proposal USSR and re present procedures for use Jap archives urgently requested. Marshall 13 Neither printed. The Director of the Office, of Economic Security Policy (Robinson) to the Acting Director of Foreign Funds Control (Richards) 894.5151/1–2247 [Document 174] The Director of the Office, of Economic Security Policy ( Robinson ) to the Acting Director of Foreign Funds Control ( Richards ) Washington , January 22, 1947. My Dear Mr. Richards : In connection with the reestablishment of remittance facilities between the United States and Japan, Foreign Funds Control recently has brought to the attention of this Department a number of applications involving the remittance of funds from the United States to Japan with a view to determining the treatment to be accorded such applications. It is the view of this Department that to the extent that proceeds of remittances to Japan are intended for purposes not detrimental to occupation policies and not likely to disrupt the internal economy of Japan or jeopardize the political development of Japan along democratic lines, remittances should not be discouraged in the interest of producing foreign exchange which is needed to meet Japan’s essential import requirements, and which is at present largely supplied by this Government. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan has the ultimate responsibility and authority to determine the conditions and circumstances under which remittances to Japan may be effected. It would be the intent of this Department, therefore, to weed out and prevent those types of remittances which obviously would not be acceptable to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. The following considerations are offered as a guide with respect to the action this Department believes should be taken on those applications which do not appear to fall within the categories provided for in the cable dispatched to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan under date of November 21, 1946 (No. W–86109), a copy of which is no doubt in your possession. It is understood that on the basis of that cable, Foreign Funds Control has issued to the National City Bank of New York, New York City, a new blanket license authorizing remittances of the nature envisaged therein. In general, this Department would interpose no objection to the granting of licenses without specific consultation in each case to recognized religious, charitable and educational organizations for the remittance of funds to Japan through the commercial facilities presently available, provided the amounts involved and the purposes for which the funds would be used appear to be reasonable and consistent with the objectives of the occupation. On the other hand, this Department at present would withhold its approval of any remittance to Japan involving foreign investments in Japan and the continuation or promotion of activities which cannot be engaged in on a general basis, except in cases where such activities have already had the specific approval of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. With respect to applications for licenses filed by business or financial concerns, or by private individuals to effect remittances to Japan for other than charitable, educational or religious purposes, it would be appreciated if this Department were informed of such applications before action on them is taken. Sincerely yours, Hamilton Robinson The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Officers 694.0031/1–2847: Circular airgram [Document 175] The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Officers 14 Washington , January 28, 1947—11:30 a.m. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has requested assistance of US State Department in ascertaining trade possibilities between Japan and other countries, especially those not now represented in Tokyo by official Liaison Missions and trade representatives. SCAP now preparing Japanese import and export programs for fiscal year 1948. Governments should be advised that trade with Japan will be greatly facilitated if information regarding trade possibilities, including some indication of quantities of particular commodities desired from or available for sale to Japan, is available to Tokyo before these programs are in final form. [Here follow lists of commodities which were among those tentatively scheduled for export and for import, respectively, during fiscal year 1948.] 2. For information regarding the procedures to be followed by third countries in trading with Japan please refer to the Department’s circular airgram of July 2, 1946. 15 There has been no substantial change in policies and procedures outlined therein. Pending establishment of procedures under which participation by private individuals and corporations in Japanese foreign trade may be authorized (which will be as soon as conditions permit) exports from and imports to Japan may be arranged in any of three ways outlined under A, B, C, below: A. Through duly authorized buying and selling agencies of interested governments. It should be emphasized, however, that it is neither desire nor intention of SCAP to encourage governments to establish new purchasing agencies or to engage in governmental bulk procurement of Japanese goods. It is entirely possible for governments to limit their relationship to Japanese trade to Liaison activities as described in B, below. Such agencies may maintain Liaison with SCAP either through (1) An accredited Liaison Mission and trade representative in Tokyo. (2) Accredited Liaison Mission of some other government which is willing to render this service, or (3) Direct correspondence either by Postal service or telegraph. B. Through agencies, departments, or ministries of interested governments which are authorized to maintain Liaison with SCAP on trade matters. Such departments or ministries need not act as buyers from or sellers to Japan; they need only sponsor and endorse buyers and sellers of their respective countries and take specified responsibilities in connection with export or import transactions involving their countries. Such departments or ministries may maintain Liaison with SCAP in one of three ways specified under A, above. C. Through U.S. Commercial Company. If a government does not care to make use of services of an authorized buying agency or a department authorized to sponsor and endorse transactions between a sales agency of Japanese Government and nationals of its own country, USCC, an agency of the U.S. Government, is prepared to act as an intermediary. Private firms and individuals in such countries may negotiate imports and exports through USCC, subject of course to pertinent import, export, and exchange regulations. Such firms should communicate with USCC in Washington D.C. either through regular diplomatic or consular channels or directly. 3. Government to which you are accredited should be advised of these policies and procedures. If such government designates a department, ministry, or other agency through which its nationals may negotiate sales and purchases with SCAP, that government should so inform Department, SCAP, and general public. Thereafter either authorized agency or SCAP may initiate correspondence directly with other and begin flow of inquiries and information which necessarily precede trade transactions. In event a government prefers to have all or most negotiations relating to trade with Japan handled by having its nationals deal through US Commercial Company, Department, SCAP and general public should be informed to this effect. 4. A government which maintained a diplomatic or consular mission in Japan before war or which can reasonably anticipate a considerable volume of trade with Japan during next few years but which has not yet established a Liaison Mission or trade representative in Tokyo should be advised that an inquiry regarding possibility of sending missions and trade representatives to Tokyo should be addressed to Department either through you (in which event you should forward to Washington and Tokyo simultaneously) or through its Washington Mission. All such requests will be forwarded to SCAP, who has responsibility of determining when arrangements can be made to accommodate additional missions. 5. It should be explained in your approach to United Nations governments to which you may be accredited that the above information and facilities are provided by your Government with two objects in mind: to make available in world trade Japanese export products previously in demand abroad, and to reduce the burden of the occupation by placing Japan as soon as possible on a self-sustaining basis through the revival of trade in peace time goods. Preference in the revival of Japanese economy and trade over the economies and trade of United Nations is neither desired nor intended. Marshall 14 Correspondence in reply to this circular not printed. 15 Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 264 . The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 740.00119 Control (Japan)/1–2847 [Document 176] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) Washington , January 28, 1947. My Dear General McCoy : The Australian representative on the Far Eastern Commission Committee No. 4 has proposed the creation of an International Advisory Board, to be composed of educational experts representing the different nations of the FEC, and to serve under General MacArthur on the Civil Information and Education Section of the SCAP Staff. It is understood that the proposal has the support of the New Zealand, Soviet and Chinese representatives on the Committee, and that the United Kingdom representative, although not pressing for such a Board, strongly urges, nevertheless, that some way be found to permit representatives of other countries to work on SCAP staff. The United States representative on Committee No. 4, Mr. F. A. Schuler, Jr., of the State Department, urgently desires instructions as to the position he should take at the forthcoming meeting of the Committee. It is assumed that the proposal grows out of SCAP’s original invitation for the nomination of experts by the countries represented in the FEC, to serve on his staff, and the fact that all nominations have been met by statements of General MacArthur that there were no vacancies. The situation, however unsatisfactory to the nations in question, and however embarrassing to the United States, which requested nominations in good faith, will have to be met in the light of the fact that the invitation has now been withdrawn, and that SCAP does not now desire international representation on his staff. It is the opinion of the Department of State that the United States representative in the FEC should take the position that the present proposal is being made in the wrong forum. The function of the FEC is limited to the formulation of policies, principles and standards to enable Japan to fulfill its obligations under the Terms of Surrender, which formulations are transmitted to the Supreme Commander in the form of directives prepared by the United States. The Supreme Commander alone is charged with the implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the Commission. The FEC has no jurisdiction under its Terms of Reference to propose modifications in, or to participate in, the existing control machinery in Japan. In fact, by paragraph II–C of the Terms of Reference the Commission is expressly directed to “proceed from” the fact that an Allied Council for Japan has been formed, and to “respect existing control machinery in Japan”. The Allied Council for Japan, on the other hand, is by its Terms of Reference, established in Tokyo under the Chairmanship of the Supreme Commander, for the express purpose of consulting with and advising the Supreme Commander in regard to “the occupation and control of Japan”, and the implementation of the Terms of Surrender “and of directives supplementary thereto”. If it appears desirable for General MacArthur to have international advice to assist him in the control of Japan in the educational field, it would appear that the proposal should be made to the Allied Council for Japan, which is already established in Japan to advise the Supreme Commander in regard to the control of Japan. It would be unthinkable for the FEC to sponsor another international advisory body in Japan to advise General MacArthur on educational matters. Each member of the Allied Council for Japan is entitled to have an appropriate staff of military and civilian advisers, and the nations represented on the Allied Council are entirely free to attach educational experts to their respective staffs, and to consult with and advise the Supreme Commander in this field as in any other. Any proposition that these educational experts be actually attached to General MacArthur’s staff should come from the Allied Council for Japan. It is recommended that the American representative on the FEC oppose the present proposal as not being within the competency of the FEC. Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) to the Department of State 740.00115 PW/1–2947 [Document 177] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) to the Department of State No. 839 Tokyo , January 29, 1947. The Counselor of Mission in Charge 16 has the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch No. 800, January 7, 1947, 17 concerning repatriation of Japanese, with which were transmitted five copies of an agreement, signed on December 19, 1946, by Major General Paul J. Mueller, acting for the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, acting for the Soviet authorities. The agreement contemplated a comprehensive program for the repatriation of Japanese nationals from Soviet and Soviet-controlled areas, and of Korean nationals in Japan to their homes north of 38 degrees North Latitude. There are enclosed five copies of Scapin 1421, December 26, 1946, from General Headquarters to the Japanese Government, 17 which sets forth the manner in which the repatriation is to be accomplished. 16 Max W. Bishop was Acting Political Adviser in the absence of Mr. Atcheson who was on home leave. 17 Not printed. 17 Not printed. General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–347 [Document 178] General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 18 confidential Tokyo , 30 January 1947. C 69653. Reurad War 90220 January 22 [ 21 ]. 19 Sufficiently detailed schedules of the holdings of the Imperial Household Ministry and of all members of the Imperial Household and [ as? ] of the period of surrender are submitted herewith to make clear the manner of their disposition. That disposition is now in process and will not be formally and legally completed before 3rd May 1947 when the Imperial Household Economy Law goes into effect. The implication of urad that there have been efforts to conceal assets in order to leave in the hands of the Imperial family directly or indirectly unauthorized assets beyond control of the Diet are without foundation. Both the Emperor and the Imperial Household Ministry throughout the divesture procedure have acted with dignity and decorum, and there is no slightest indication to the contrary. The application of the capital tax levy law to Imperial Household property will result in the formal transfer to the State by 15th March upwards of 80 to 90 percent of the total assets of yen 1,675,267,073. The remainder consisting of Imperial palaces, villas and preserves to a value of yen 169,299,890 will become automatically State property on 3rd May 1947 and will be designated as State property assigned to the throne to be administered and accounted for to the Diet in accordance with the provisions of the Imperial House Economy Law and the State Property Law. The property thus transferred under capital tax levy will include all the Imperial forest and farm lands including all equipment for upkeep and exploitation which will henceforth be administered by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The Tax Levy Law will take nearly all the cash, bonds, stocks and debentures to the value of yen 344,144,297, leaving only some 30,000,000 yen to 50,000,000 yen in cash which the Household Ministry will use to meet current expenses until the Diet votes the first annual civil list under the new constitution. The surplus existing at that time will be transferred to the national accounts. There will be left to the Emperor and the immediate members of his family cash in the amount of 3,000,000 yen to 5,000,000 yen which is due them out of unexpended sums from their privy purse over the past several years, and personal property to the value of yen 9,452,205 as follows: [Here follows detailed report on assets to be turned over to the Emperor and members of his family.] The assets of the 3 Imperial princes and 11 princely families as of 1st September 1945 are set out hereunder. All figures are shown in yen. Information tabulated in following order: A Name of prince. B Cash and negotiable property. C Lands. D Buildings. E Jewels. F Total. [Here follows list of assets of the three Imperial princes and eleven princely families.] These assets have already been turned over to them together with some yen 7,836,220 which they had entrusted to the Household Ministry for “Safe keeping” prior to the surrender. This action was ordered by SCAP (Scapin 1298–A) on 21 May 1946 which also directed the Government to divest these families of all right, title and interest in and to all property of the Imperial Household and also to divest them of all special privileges and immunities. As a result, the members of all these 11 families will shortly become commoners. Moreover their assets are subject to taxation including the capital tax levy. The latter tax will reduce their assets some 40 to 50%. It is apparent from the above that the only property in possession of the Imperial Household Ministry and all members of the Imperial Family and their nominees at the time of the surrender which will not be under the control of the Diet after 3rd May 1947 will be the personal property of the members of the Imperial Family and even this property will be subject to taxation in the future and will also be subject to action in the courts. Moreover, the Emperor and the members of the Imperial Family will be subject to Diet control in the giving and receiving of property and personal gifts under article 2 of the Household Economy Bill which is designed to implement article 8 of the constitution. The foregoing specific information is given in response to the request of the Far Eastern Commission, although it is not clear how the same can serve to assist in assaying the democratic character of the Imperial House Economy Law or the constitutional provision which it implements. [ MacArthur ] 18 This document was in reply to a message to SCAP from the Far Eastern Commission; copy transmitted to the Department by SWNCC in its SWN–5110, February 3, and forwarded to the Far Eastern Commission by the Department on February 7. 19 Not printed; it transmitted the Far Eastern Commission’s FEC–104, January 16, which requested further information from SCAP on the Imperial House Economy Law assigning state properties (740.00119 Control (Japan)/1–1647). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines 694.9631/1–2347: Telegram [Document 179] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines confidential Washington , January 31, 1947—1 p.m. 137. Your 133, January 23, 1947. 20 U.S. position re reopening Japan to private trade approximately as follows: Conduct of Japanese foreign trade should be placed in hands private business rapidly as possible. First steps this direction should be taken soon as adequate system of export, import and exchange controls has been developed and put into effect. Reopening Japan to private trade will not mean immediate and complete elimination present system government to government trading because for some time to come private traders will be handicapped by shortage or lack of food, housing, transportation, communication, and banking and other business services within Japan. Trading agencies of Japanese Government on one hand and of U.S. and possibly other outside government [on the] other will be essential in order trade be carried on in spite these difficulties. Restoring Japanese foreign trade to private firms within and outside Japan does not mean such trade will thereafter be free and uncontrolled. SCAP must continue to exercise close supervision and control over formulation and implementation of Japanese export and import programs. Sent to Manila, repeated to Tokyo. 21 Marshall 20 Not printed. 21 As telegram 31. The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Department of Defense files [Document 180] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 22 restricted War 91201. [ Washington ,] 3 February 1947. The following communication from the Far Eastern Commission forwarded through its Chairman under the provisions of paragraph VI of its terms of reference, is transmitted to you at the request of the State, War and Navy Departments: “The Far Eastern Commission is making a study of the Draft Diet law and requests the Chairman to convey to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the substance of the following communication and also to state to him that the Commission would appreciate his views on the following matters. 1. Chapter 7. Ministers of State and Representatives of the Government. Articles 69 to 73 . To assist Japan in developing along democratic lines, it is desirable that the position of the Legislature be strengthened as much as possible. This is particularly important both in a system of responsible cabinet government such as that contemplated under the new constitution, and in the light of Japanese experience in the past, where the Diet was subordinate in fact to both the Cabinet and the Bureaucracy. In raising the following point, the Commission has had in mind the problems which must inevitably arise in the framing of a new constitution based upon a variety of democratic practices. In this connection, the provisions of chapter seven would appear to indicate that the drafters of this bill may have in mind the former system in Japan where the Ministers of State were not expected necessarily to be present in the Diet and to take full responsibility for leadership of its debates. Article 69 would appear to allow the appointment as ‘representatives of the government’ of persons who are not members of the Diet. It is queried whether it is desirable for a representative of the government other than a Minister of State or a member of the Diet to have the right to speak before the Diet. Where the Executive is responsible to the Legislature, it is the universal practice that ministers themselves, or members of the Legislature appointed as their parliamentary deputies, should be present in the House to explain and defend the actions of their departments and the legislation they are sponsoring, and that they themselves should participate in debates. If persons other than members of the Diet were allowed to attend and speak in the place of ministers, it might be contrary to the principle of cabinet responsibility to the Diet inherent in the Far Eastern Commission policy laid down in FEC–031/19. (Serial number 54, approved 6 July 1946). 23 In making the foregoing comments, the Commission is not raising an objection to the right of any committee to hear any person it desires, including government employees and private individuals. 2. Article 35. Allowance of Diet members . The Commission is uncertain as to the effect of the provision linking the allowances of Diet members to the salaries of government officials, as ‘Kanri’ may be interpreted, and in the context may be intended, to include all appointed officials of the national government, even those of the highest rank such as the Chief Justice. Would this provision be likely to prevent adequate remuneration being offered to those holding the most senior and important government posts?” 22 Copy transmitted to the Department of State by SWNCC in its SWN–5123, February 7; copy also transmitted by General Hilldring to the Far Eastern Commission on February 11. 23 For text, see SCAP, Report of Government Section: Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 661. The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/2–447: Telegram [Document 181] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) confidential Tokyo , February 4, 1947—1 p.m. 33. FEC 6: Atomic Research . U.S. Govt policy in past has been to prohibit all Japanese research in field of atomic energy but owing to severe criticism connected with destruction of Japanese cyclotrons U.S. Govt desired FEC decision on matter. Consequently introduced into FEC policy paper permitting very restricted Japanese research into fundamental nuclear fission similar to that permitted in Germany. This policy emphatically rejected by FEC which on Jan 30 adopted policy 24 prohibiting for present all Japanese research in field of atomic energy, all development or construction in Japan for utilization of atomic energy and mining, processing and refining of radioactive materials except under specific approval and surveillance of SCAP. Policy decision contemplates future control of atomic research and development in Japan will be governed by United Nations decisions and especial restrictive policies established for disarmament of Japan. Policy will be published after communication to SCAP. Publication of Review Policy . AP dispatch dated Tokyo Jan 10, published in some U.S. newspapers, contained some facts regarding FEC policy decision regarding review of new Japanese constitution. FEC took note of this leakage in Tokyo and at Steering Committee Jan 14 motion introduced that Commission publish review decision in view of partial leakage and misleading impression given of FEC in dispatch under reference. Motion carried by eight votes to one, U.S. member voting in negative in accordance with SWNCC decision and China and Philippines abstaining. Matter since tabled in full Commission at request U.S. representative pending review of publication decision by SWNCC. Marshall 24 For text, see Department of State, Far Eastern Series No. 24: Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, Report by the Secretary General, February 26, 1946–July 10, 1947 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 109. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–1047 [Document 182] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 25 restricted Tokyo , 7 February 1947. C 69876. Reurad W 91201 February 5th [ 3d ]. 26 The provision contained in Article 69 of the Diet Law is in accord with long established custom and practice in Japanese legislative history. It is a provision which was inserted on the sole initiative of the House of Representatives and unanimously approved by that chamber—a legislative body which has shown the most zealous desire to secure and preserve in fullest detail its power in government accorded by the new constitution. The provision is merely one within the body of rules established by the Diet to govern its own procedures, and is susceptible to amendment should experience deem amendment necessary. As it is not violative of any democratic principle and cannot possibly compromise the principle of cabinet responsibility to the Diet, I consider it a most dangerous departure from established occupational policy to force a change upon the Diet in such detail. The interpretation given by the Far Eastern Commission is not in accord with past Japanese practice nor with the intent of the article, namely, that the cabinet members would delegate their representative authority in the Diet. On the contrary, it is intended to permit them to bolster themselves by the technical aid of civil service subordinates of the respective ministries in presenting in complete detail factual matters which might be demanded by the Diet. While it differs somewhat from the British parliamentary procedure, it can hardly be said that it is less democratic or less efficient. I do not believe, under the circumstances, that it would be possible to persuade a voluntary modification. With respect to the allowances for Diet members prescribed under Article 35 of the Diet, our interpretation here and the interpretation and intent of the Diet itself is that the provision questioned is not that “a government official’s allowance shall be limited to that of a Diet member”, but that “a Diet member’s allowance shall equal common or ordinary national government officials’ highest allowance”—in other words, that pertaining to the highest official under the civil service, viz. vice minister. Thus, there is no limitation placed upon the remuneration of any government official however, but rather does it provide a minimum basis for the remuneration of Diet members. This too is a provision merely concerned with internal administration without involving any democratic principle and in which interference by the Allied Powers would be most difficult of justification. [ MacArthur ] 25 Copy transmitted to the Department of State by SWNCC in its SWN–5128, February 10; copy transmitted by the Department to General McCoy for the Far Eastern Commission on February 13. 26 Ante , p. 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] Report by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) 894.00/3–3147 [Document 183] Report by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) 27 restricted Tokyo , February 7, 1947. Meeting of General MacArthur With Members of the Allied Council for Japan Participants: General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur. Members of the Allied Council for Japan. Subject: General Election in Japan: Letter of Instruction to the Japanese Prime Minister General MacArthur called the Members of the Allied Council to consult with him at his office at 11 a.m. on February 7, 1947. In addition to General MacArthur, those present were: Max W. Bishop, Chairman pro tempore and representative of the Member for the United States; Lieutenant General Chu Shih-Ming, Member for China; Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who was accompanied by two interpreters; and Mr. E. E. Ward, who was designated by Mr. W. MacMahon Ball, Member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India, as his representative. General MacArthur in opening the discussion stated that he had asked the members to come in order to obtain any comment they might have on a letter which he proposed to send to the Japanese Prime Minister. General MacArthur then read the following letter: “Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I believe the time has come for a general election. Momentous changes in internal structure, in economic outlook, and in the whole fabric and pattern of Japanese life have occurred since the last general election nearly a year ago. It is necessary, in the near future, to obtain another democratic expression of the people’s will on the fundamental issues with which Japanese society is now confronted. In this way we will once more advance in the process of democracy which now governs this state. The exact time and details are matters which I leave to the discretion of the Japanese Government, but the election should take place as soon as practicable after the close of the present session of the diet so that a new legislative body may initiate and synchronize with the introduction and effectivation of the new constitution. The past year has been one of accomplishment. I look with equal confidence to the future. Very sincerely, Douglas MacArthur.” After reading the letter General MacArthur called on each of the members in turn for his comment. Mr. Bishop, General Chu, Mr. Ward and General Derevyanko each in turn expressed views in full accord with the letter which General MacArthur had read. Thus there was complete unanimity of agreement that it was desirable to issue such a directive to the Japanese Government regarding the holding of a general election. In discussing the matter with the Members, General MacArthur pointed out inter alia that this action was an administrative one made necessary to assure a new diet and a new expression of the will of the Japanese people in synchronization with the coming into effect of the Constitution; that the action in no way reflected upon the present Diet which had done, on the whole, a good job; that the present Japanese Cabinet had not taken the initiative in calling such an election; that the matter of timing had been left flexible in order to assure a sufficient period for the Japanese people to acquaint themselves with the problems at issue and to express their free opinion; that being an administrative action, it was important once the decision had been made, that it be carried out promptly in order that it not interfere with the functioning of Government; and that he was glad to have the comments of the Members of the Council. General Derevyanko after expression agreement requested some additional time to consider details. Upon General MacArthur’s explanation of the urgency of the matter, General Derevyanko made no further request for delay. General Chu expressed his view of the importance of timing the coming elections and expressed complete concurrence in General MacArthur’s flexible program. After asking the Members if there were any other matters which they wished to discuss, General MacArthur cordially invited each one to call upon him at any time to discuss any matter. The foregoing record was prepared by the Chairman pro tempore immediately upon conclusion of the meeting. Max W. Bishop Chairman pro tempore and Representative of the Member for the United States 27 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 952, March 31, from Tokyo, which noted that “no objection to the Supreme Commander’s letter and proposal to hold a general election was raised by any Member of the Council.” Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division (Flory) to the Informal Interagency Committee on Japanese Fishing and Marine Industry 894.628/2–1447 [Document 184] Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division ( Flory ) to the Informal Interagency Committee on Japanese Fishing and Marine Industry confidential [ Washington ,] February 14, 1947. Subject: Policy with respect to Japanese fishing. The Committee held a meeting on February 11, 1947, at 3:00 p.m., in Mr. Flory’s office, for further consideration of the U.S. position with respect to Japanese fishing policy. This meeting was called as a consequence of developments at the last meeting of Committee 2, of the Far Eastern Commission, February 6, 1947, when all members of Committee 2 except the member for the U.S. expressed support of the Australian proposal that the fisheries policy directive under which SCAP is currently operating be revised to specify a limited area in which the Japanese may conduct fishing and whaling operations, and to provide that Japanese whaling operations be restricted to such area. The U.S. had submitted a counterproposal which would provide, in brief, that subject to security provisions and Japanese adherence to conservation measures, the areas where the Japanese should be permitted to fish be a matter for the administrative discretion of SCAP, except that the Japanese should not fish in waters within 50 miles of areas under the jurisdiction of foreign governments without the consent of such governments. The U.S. member of Committee 2 agreed that the U.S. would further consider the possibility of consent to a limitation of area, but indicated that any such area would probably be considerably larger than the area proposed by Australia. Following is the substance of the discussion at the meeting of the informal interagency committee: Mr. Flory stated that the current controversy in the FEC points up two conflicting philosophies with respect to the future of Japan. On the one hand there is the view, as expressed by most members of the FEC, that the Japanese should be rather rigidly controlled and their economic activities restricted. This view arises in part out of psychological fears engendered by Japanese activities in the pre-war period, by their disregard for the conservation policies and the rights of other nations, by their utilization of fishing operations as a cloak for spying activities and other preparations for war; in part out of a fear of economic competition from the Japanese in the future, a fear that they may again flood the world with cheaply-made products. On the other hand is the view that the Japanese must be permitted such a degree of economic activity as to enable them to feed themselves, to maintain a standard of living that will at least be high enough not to constitute an urge to foreign aggression, and eventually to take their place in the family of nations. It is the latter view which has formed the basis of our thinking in the formulation of the existing fisheries policy paper, FEC–035, 28 and our counterproposal to the Australian paper. It is our feeling that the fact that Japan is a defeated nation should not be the determining factor in decisions relating to her future economic development. The establishment of a 50–mile zone around foreign countries in which Japanese might not fish without specific consent of the coastal state, was suggested by the U.S. counterproposal as an interim measure to avoid possible armed conflicts between the coastal and Japanese fishermen. As has been repeatedly stated, the existing fisheries policy directive, and any new directives that FEC may agree upon, are only interim measures, pending the final decisions to be made at the peace conference. But interim measures unavoidably are construed as precedents. Our consent now to a limitation of fishing areas and a restriction of whaling activity would constitute a capitulation to the philosophy of restriction—a temporary capitulation perhaps, but nevertheless a step which would make that much more difficult an eventual agreement on a more liberal policy toward the Japanese economy. Moreover, any restriction on Japanese fishing areas should be considered only in relation to the total of economic activity to be permitted the Japanese. It may well be (as the U.K. member of the FEC committee has suggested), that an expansion of the fishing industry, in compensation for other industries to be disallowed, would constitute less of a threat to the security or to the economies of other nations than, an expansion of other industries that may be permitted to the Japanese. Mr. Flory felt that the present situation might be summed up in these two questions: Are we going to bring out these fundamental policy differences now, and fight them through to the bitter end? Or should we work out each situation on an ad hoc basis, waiting until the peace conference to argue the general policy? Other members of the committee suggested that this raised another question: Would it be preferable for the U.S. to “hold out” on this present question before the FEC (which is already torn by other controversies on which agreement has not been reached), or to attempt some form of compromise in the interest of international cooperation and good will? Along the lines of the latter alternative, Mr. Bowman 29 suggested the possibility of agreeing to that part of the Australian paper which proposes a limited fishing area, but resisting the move, to restrict pelagic whaling. Mr. Van Sant 30 suggested that, since fishing was probably of more vital importance than whaling to the Japanese economy, it might be preferable to press for continuance of the existing directive, but agree to a proviso that any future Japanese, whaling activities in the Antarctic be subject to FEC approval. Mr. Allison 31 felt that the security factor might be taken care of by limitation on the size of Japanese vessels, and all agreed that it would be useful to inquire as to the direction of the thinking of the Shipping Division on this question. Mr. Allison also suggested that it would be helpful to discuss this question with Mr. George Atcheson, Political Adviser to SCAP, who is presently in Washington. The members representing the Departments of Commerce, Interior, and Agriculture stated that there would probably be within their Departments pressures for the restrictive policy, but they felt that there might possibly be eventual concurrence in the broader view. It was agreed that Mr. Flory would prepare a summation of the, views discussed at the meeting, for circulation to the members before further action is taken. It is suggested that another meeting of the informal interagency, committee be held on February 19 or 20. In the meantime the committee members may wish to consult with other officers in their Departments on this subject. 32 28 Not printed. 29 Dean O. Bowman, Chief of the Foreign Trade Section, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs. 30 Edward R. Van Sant, Assistant Chief of Fisheries Section, International Resources Division. 31 John M. Allison, Assistant Chief, Division of Japanese Affairs. 32 The committee met on February 26 and approved a statement that the policy in FEC–035 should continue except that the FEC should be consulted and should approve Japanese whaling operations outside the area prescribed in Scapin 1033, June 22, 1946. (894.628/2–2647) The Chairman of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (Hilldring) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–2047 [Document 185] The Chairman of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee ( Hilldring ) to the Secretary of State confidential SWN–5161 Washington , 20 February 1947. At its 54th Meeting on 19 February 1947 the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 150/10, copies of which are enclosed. 33 It is requested that the Department of State forward the memorandum in Enclosure “B”, with a copy of Enclosure “A” as an enclosure, to the U.S. representative on the Far Eastern Commission for guidance in connection with the review of the United States Initial Post-Defeat Policy by that Commission. 34 For the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee: J. H. Hilldring 33 For original text of this document, see Department of State Bulletin , September 23, 1945, p. 423; for text as sent to General MacArthur on August 29, 1945, see Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 423. For document adopted by the Far Eastern Commission after review and revision on June 19, 1947, see Department of State Bulletin , August 3, 1947, p. 216, or Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 49. For General MacArthur’s comment on the final version of June 19, 1947, see Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 774. For related comment by the Department of State, see telegram 230 to Tokyo, June 20, 1947, p. 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] . 34 Two memoranda not printed; they were forwarded on February 27. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) to the Secretary of State 894.512/2–2547: Telegram [Document 186] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tokyo , February 25, 1947—4 a.m. 41. ReDeptel 45, February 11. 35 In view of FEC statement of policy (FEC 055/6) exemptions from capital levy or other extraordinary taxes are apparently determined by FEC. Current FEC policy provides exemption only for property owned by United Nations nationals. Authority has not been given to exempt other persons. Neutrals, former belligerents later considered friendly, stateless individuals, and liberated persons all are presently subject to the capital levy. It is estimated there are 561,000 Koreans now in Japan who have refused repatriation. Of this number some 20,000, many of whom have sizeable assets, are believed to be subject to the capital levy. Should Formosans be determined to be Chinese and thus United Nations nationals, they would automatically be exempt under present FEC policy; but this question is understood to be still under intergovernmental discussion and involves many complications, reourtel 492, October 29, 1946 36 and other correspondence to and from Department regarding Formosans in Japan. If Department is considering proposing changes in FEC policy re exemption from capital levy or other extraordinary taxes request SCAP be fully advised of Department’s views soonest and given opportunity to comment thereof prior to final decision US position and before presentation to FEC. Whitman 37 presently absent from Japan. [ Bishop ] 35 Not printed; it suggested consideration by SCAP of a 100,000 yen exemption from a capital levy only for Koreans intending to remain in Japan (894.512/2–1147). 36 Not printed. 37 Roswell H. Whitman, Associate Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, was a member of the American Food Mission to Japan. Memorandum by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Japanese Government 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–2847 [Document 187] Memorandum by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Japanese Government 38 AG 014.33 (25 Feb 47) LS–L (Scapin 1543) [ Tokyo ,] 25 February 1947. Subject: Registration of Chinese Nationals. 1. The Chinese Mission in Japan has undertaken the registration and documentation of persons in Japan who claim Chinese nationality and has issued registration certificates similar to the sample copy inclosed herein. 2. Legitimate bearers of these registration certificates will be presumptively considered as Chinese subjects and hence United Nations Nationals for purposes of the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Japanese authorities. For the Supreme Commander John B. Cooley Colonel, AGD Adjutant General 38 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 885, February 28, from Tokyo; received March 12. In the despatch, Mr. Bishop stated: “There is every reason to believe that with the completion of the registration of Chinese citizens (including Formosans) in Japan, many of the vexatious problems concerning treatment of Formosans by Japanese police authorities will be obviated.” (740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–2847) Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) 894.50/3–1247 [Document 188] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs ( Martin ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Hilldring ) secret [ Washington ,] March 12, 1947. Subject: A Positive Economic Program for Japan. I am enclosing three documents: 39 1. The report of the Japanese Reparations Policy Committee appointed by you and Assistant Secretary Thorp on January 15. 2. An outline of an export-import program for Japan for the calendar years 1948–50, designed to make Japan self-sustaining in the latter year (and including a more tentative projection for 1952). 3. An economic program for Japan integrating conclusions of the two previous documents and taking account of other related considerations. The economic program for Japan proposes steps designed to accomplish the following purposes: 1. To eliminate United States expenditures in support of the Japanese economy as soon as possible and facilitate Japanese repayment of those expenditures. 2. To create a viable Japanese economy such as would be conductive to the emergence of a peaceful and democratic Japan. 3. To permit a substantial Japanese contribution to the economic recovery of the Far East, which is desperately in need of the products of Japanese industry. These purposes must be accomplished in cooperation with our Allies and in such a way as to avoid charges that the United States is building up Japan, either as a buffer against the Soviets, or as a replacement for a currently disorganized China as our principal friend and customer in the Far East. The course of action proposed for accomplishing these purposes is as follows: 1. Future Japanese Imports . Food and raw material imports in excess of disease and unrest requirements should be provided in 1948 and 1949 on the scale necessary to “crank up” the Japanese economy within the limits of world food and commodity shortages. The cost of these additional imports should be met: ( a ) By active promotion of barter arrangements or short-term financing of Japanese imports to be used to produce goods for export, a portion of which would be assigned to pay for the necessary imports. These arrangements should be encouraged particularly with countries which do not require repayment in dollars. ( b ) To the extent that credit from private sources is not available for the purpose described above, the liquid assets available to SCAP in Japan should be converted into a revolving trust fund to finance such transactions, and if necessary RFC and Export-Import Bank financing should be sought. ( c ) Japanese liquid resources should also be considered available to pay for imports such as food, which cannot be incorporated, in the self-liquidating program. 2. Future Japanese Exports . The proceeds of future Japanese exports and their contribution to the revival of the Japanese economy should be maximized by the following steps: ( a ) SCAP should, with the aid of the Allied Trade Representative in Japan develop a detailed export-import and production plan under which Japan might use the increased imports to be made available during 1948 and 1949 to achieve self-sufficiency by 1950, assuming no reparations removals beyond Interim levels and restrictions on Jap consumption of items other than food, especially of textiles. ( b ) SCAP should implement this plan by appropriate steps, including controls over the distribution of food imports designed to maximize industrial production, and restrictions on the domestic consumption of exportable items. The goals of this plan should be made public to the Japanese people, and their responsibility for and interest in its success emphasized. They should be notified that U.S. Government import advances will cease after 1949. ( c ) Sales of Japanese goods should be facilitated by resumption of controlled private trade, including travel of business men to Japan and probably travel—but not permanent residence—of Japanese business men abroad. ( d ) The United States should be repaid for imports financed from War Department funds by a first charge on any liquid assets remaining in Japan on January 1, 1950, and by a lien on all proceeds of raw silk exports—silk being generally sold for dollars. 3. Inducements to Other Far Eastern Countries . ( a ) The support of other Far Eastern countries for the program outlined above should be enlisted, as recommended in the report to the Japanese Reparations Policy Committee, by assigning them current reparations credits in an amount equal to twice the value of the unclaimed part of their share of the Interim Reparations Program. These credits should not be realized while U.S. advances to Japan are continuing, or out of Japanese export proceeds which are to constitute the U.S. repayments described in the previous paragraph. If, by some given date (e.g., 1955) Japan has not furnished the required amount of current reparations, the claimant countries should be authorized to remove Japanese capital equipment equal in value to one-half the Japanese default. ( b ) Security fears of these countries should also be forestalled by revealing in detail the U.S. plan for control of Japanese rearmament after the peace treaty. 39 First two documents listed not attached to file copy; third not printed. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1447: Telegram [Document 189] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State priority Tokyo , March 14, 1947. [Received March 18—11:30 p.m.] 59. This headquarters PRO will issue press release Tokyo time 10:30 Wednesday morning, 19 March, as follows: Under heading “Substance of remarks to Allied Council of Ambassador George Atcheson, Junior, Chairman and United States member, in regard to American attitudes toward the occupation as observed on his visit to the United States”, Mister Atcheson said: “The Supreme Commander has suggested that I lay before the Council my observations during my recent visit to the United States as to the general attitudes and opinions of American governmental officials and the American people in regard to the Allied occupation of Japan. I am very glad to do this. General . I was privileged to have an opportunity to discuss the occupation and some of its problems with a number of the highest officials of the United States Government. As I recently stated to the press, the American Government is solidly behind the Supreme Commander. Also in discussions with a wide variety of people in different parts of the United States I gained a definite impression that the American people as a whole are much gratified at the progress of the occupation and are giving General MacArthur their fullest support. The American people are proud of what the Supreme Commander has accomplished; they are proud of the Allied occupation; they look upon the occupation as a bright spot in a troubled world and one where wholehearted Allied cooperation can achieve Allied goals to the benefit of the entire world. There was not as complete news coverage of events and developments in Japan as I should like to see in the American press. But I found among the American people at large a very keen interest in our problems here and also what seemed to me to be a very common sense attitude toward both the present and the future. There is very naturally a feeling among the American people that the Japanese must prove themselves. So far, the American people are impressed by the spirit of cooperation which the Japanese have shown and by the energy and diligence of the average Japanese in working to rehabilitate his life and the economic life of this country. The great difficulties facing the Japanese are appreciated. American commercial firms, notably those who previously have had interests in this part of the world, are prepared to assist in practical and mutually beneficial ways in the development of the peace time economy in Japan and in international trade. This readiness can be, I think, encouraged by Japanese determination to do everything possible to make the most of their commercial and economic resources, including labor, and the development of productive cooperation between capital and labor. American businessmen, as well as the rest of the American people, hope for and look forward to a peaceful and prosperous world. American businessmen desire to do their part in furthering the establishment of peaceful and prosperous relationships between all countries. But American businessmen seeking markets for American goods abroad or for foreign products to sell in the United States have grown through experience to be much more hardheaded than they sometimes have been in the past. They do not seek large profits. They seek the development I of sound business—but they cannot be expected to speculate or sink money into enterprises when stability and reasonable security are lacking. Workable and stringent steps by the Japanese to control inflation in general, and practical progress in such specific problems as the establishment of a fair and realistic relationship between prices and wages could, it was felt, do much toward this end. I found a general realization among those interested in the occupation that Japanese industrialists must be informed without delay what plants are to remain so that they can produce goods for their own peace time needs and for export to pay for necessary imports for food and greatly needed raw materials and other essentials to ordinary life. When this question is settled—and I hope that it will be very soon—Japanese economy can make a considerable stride forward if Japanese industrial interests and workers are willing, as I think they are, to put forward their best efforts to revive peace time production. While speaking of the general attitude of the American people, 40 I might add that my impression is that most of them have an objective and non-emotional attitude toward Japan. While they do not forget, they are not vengeful and their eyes are turned to the future. They expect Japan to be given access to the resources of raw materials and exports of other countries for Japan’s peacetime needs; they expect the Japanese to do their share in the eventual development of mutually beneficial economic exchanges with other countries. The American people expect the Japanese people to fashion Japan into a truly democratic and cooperative member of the commonwealth of nations. Effective Japanese political and economic efforts to this end will continue to meet with favorable American interest and assistance. Allied Council for Japan . I was interested to find how closely the proceedings of this Council are followed by persons of high place in the United States. I had the privilege of meeting with the Far Eastern Commission and while its proceedings are as you know confidential, I am sure that there is no breach of faith if I tell you that the members take a very keen interest in what goes on among us here. I heard expressed a general view that the Council affords the Allies represented here a favorable opportunity to voice constructive advice and suggestions for consideration by the Supreme Commander to assist him in his tremendous task, so important to all of us, in showing the Japanese people and nation the way to becoming a democratic, peace-loving member in good standing of the United Nations. General strike . I was in the United States at the time of the recent threatened strike of Japanese Government employees. I heard considerable surprise expressed that in the midst of severe economic crisis, unions of government employees should contemplate a strike which would be ruinous to Japanese economy. People in general seem to feel that the Japanese deserve help if they are willing to help themselves. Opinion was unanimous in supporting General MacArthur’s intervention and stoppage of the strike. 41 A number of people considered that a good deal of ground has been lost in healing the wounds of war as a result of a situation engendered by the strike threat and the endeavors, as reported in the press, of some of the misguided strike leaders to circumvent the Supreme Commander by appealing to members of the Allied Council. The strike threat was generally regarded in the United States as purely political in purpose and not motivated by the natural desire of the workers to bring about improvements in their conditions of living or to work needed reforms in the bureaucracy which has had a feudalistic stranglehold on much of the governmental machinery of this country. The union members were regarded as dupes and tools of the aggressive minority which in so many cases has been manipulating unions in this country for selfish and ulterior political purposes. The Japanese are considered in the United States to be a very patriotic people and any action taken by individual Japanese or Japanese groups which is harmful to Japan in this period of economic emergency causes both surprise and concern—concern because it causes Americans to wonder whether, with all their organizational genius, the Japanese people are capable of organizing a peacetime economy and of integrating themselves into the new post-war world. I believe that the Japanese people are in fact capable of achieving these objectives. Trade unions . I encountered condemnation of the wide tendency on the part of Japanese trade unions, in their new-found freedom, to place emphasis upon political aims. Gratification was expressed that such rapid progress had been made in the organization of labor unions but it seemed generally felt that the unions in Japan are somewhat lacking in discipline, fail to appreciate the full obligations which unionization entails and appear to be concerned too unilaterally with the rights which are granted to union organizations. As you know, encouragement of union organization so that unions can bargain in an orderly way for the just rights labor was one of the earliest actions of the Supreme Commander. In consonance with the general sentiment of the American people, the United States Government felt that one of the first freedoms to be given the Japanese people should be the right to organize unions and protect the rights of workers which had been largely suppressed. The American Government expected that the newly-created unions would contribute much to the democratization of Japan. It is felt now that the Unions themselves must adopt democratic practices and become truly democratic bodies if they are to make such contribution. Education . The several educators with whom I spoke were in full accord with the direction given by the Supreme Commander in the decentralization and liberalization of the Japanese educational system. These educators were of the opinion that Japan’s future lies largely in its young people who are now in school and who are beginning to receive a liberalized education which is, in addition, teaching them how to think. There was some feeling that the Japanese educational authorities could take more determined steps to hasten the process. One step I heard mentioned was the improvement of the livelihood of the teachers and related measures to make the teaching profession sufficiently attractive so that it could be assured of always attracting capable and zealous people. I heard hope expressed that the problem of language simplification would be solved by the Japanese in a common-sense and workable way as it is felt that only in this manner could the Japanese take full and equal advantage of the great literature and scientific knowledge of the Western World. The new constitution . The American people are also much gratified with the progress toward democratization of Japan as revealed in their new constitution. They look forward with interest to the forthcoming elections which will provide the Japanese people with opportunity to select their representatives for the Parliament which is to operate under this constitution when it comes into effect.” Atcheson 40 In telegram 61, March 17, the Political Adviser in Tokyo indicated that the phrase “In conclusion” had been substituted for the foregoing words, and that this paragraph had been shifted to the end of the statement (700.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1747). 41 For General MacArthur’s statement of January 31, 1947, calling off the threatened general strike, see Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 762. The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 694.0031/3–1847: Telegram [Document 190] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , March 18, 1947—7 p.m. 94. FEC 12. Allied Trade Representatives in Japan . Policy paper of above title approved by FEC March 13. 42 Paper defines functions of official trade representatives in Japan substantially same as recommended by SCAP. Publication of Policy Decision re Review of New Japanese Constitution . U.S. Govt March 11 adopted following position re above subject “The U.S. Govt withdraws its objection to the publication outside of Japan of the policy decision contained in FEC–031/41 and will not oppose a motion in the FEC to publish the decision outside of Japan provided the release of the decision to the press by the FEC will not be made until 48 hours after receipt of notification from SCAP of the receipt of the FEC’s decision.” This U.S. decision conveyed to FEC March 13 but not favorably received as majority of members regard publication in Japan as of primary importance, especially in view of forthcoming general elections. They believe that Japanese electorate should know of review decision before they elect representatives who probably will have to carry out review. Australian representative proposed that FEC release policy decision to press with same condition re time as contained in U.S. position. U.S. representative stated could accept this proposal if it could be recorded in minutes that “U.S. Govt accepts this decision subject to its understanding that question of publication within Japan is matter of implementation by Supreme Commander”. Soviet objected to U.S. reservation and consequently matter carried over to next meeting. Advance Transfers of Reparations . 43 Soviet position revealed at meeting of Reparations Committee March 12. Soviet position is (1) USSR be included in program of advance transfers; (2) would welcome inclusion of all eleven countries; (3) in such case percentage of assets to be delivered as advance transfers be raised to 40 or 50; and (4) Soviet to receive 5 to 7 per cent. UK position not yet received. Acheson 42 For text, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 89. 43 For additional documentation, see pp. 345 [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] ff. passim . The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.628/3–2047: Telegram [Document 191] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State confidential Tokyo , March 20, 1947. [Received April 2—5:22 p.m.] 64. Cite C 51420. With reference to our despatches numbers 481, July 1 44 and 657 October 18, 1946 45 and related telegrams regarding desired Japanese fishing and fish processing operations in Kamchatka and in or near Soviet-controlled areas, especially radio number W 97610, 16 August, from the War Department to CINCAFPAC stating that steps will be taken to negotiate whole question of Japanese fishing areas before 1947 season opens. SCAP is preparing and forwarding to Washington detailed plan of desired minimum Japanese operations in or near Soviet-controlled areas. In view of extreme protein food shortages in Japan and elsewhere and great marine wealth of these areas not at present being fully exploited for world needs, above report has recommendation that these areas be included as source of fish for Japanese. We are not in position to evaluate whether pressing Soviets now to accept minimum operations will raise question of renewal of Japanese fishing operations off Alaska and Aleutians or affect FEC negotiations. Unless these factors make it unwise to do so, recommend that Department urgently consider, upon receipt of plan, obtaining Soviet Government acceptance for these minimum operations. Full report will be airmailed. Atcheson 44 Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 262 . 45 Ibid , p. 345 . General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Japanese Prime Minister (Yoshida) 894.50/6–1447 [Document 192] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Japanese Prime Minister ( Yoshida ) 46 [ Tokyo ,] March 22, 1947. Mr. Prime Minister : Last year at this time the Japanese people were confronted with a serious food crisis which disrupted the entire economy and brought severe hardships to the people. In this emergency, the United States shipped substantial quantities of food to Japan which enabled the Japanese people to escape widespread starvation. Food imports have been scheduled for Japan again this year in order to supplement indigenous supplies and to meet the essential minimum requirements of the Japanese people. However, I must advise you that these food imports are calculated on a minimum basis and presuppose the maximum utilization of these supplies. To maximize collections of food into official channels and to bring about a proper transfer of food from surplus to deficit prefectures so as to achieve continuation of food rationing are clear responsibilities of the Japanese Government. At this time I wish to call to you[r] attention Directive No. 3, which I issued to the Imperial Japanese Government on 22 September 1945. This directive made it the responsibility of the Japanese Government to maintain a firm control over wages and prices and to initiate and maintain a strict rationing program for essential commodities in short supply so as to insure that such commodities are equitably distributed. It is imperative that the Japanese Government carry out this responsibility to the Japanese people. The Allied Powers, of course, are under no obligation to maintain or to have maintained any particular standard of living in Japan, nor is there any responsibility to import foodstuffs to meet deficits arising from the failure of Japan to assure the just and efficient distribution of its own food supplies. The food problem, though basic to the peaceful reconstruction of Japan, is not an isolated phenomenon, but is on the contrary only one part of the overall problem of economic stabilization which includes the additional factors of increased production of raw materials and industrial products, stabilized wages and prices, maximum exports, and sound public finance. By the same token, black marketing of food and failure to realize full collections are only two manifestations of general maldistribution. These problems are so inextricably inter-woven that it is not practical to think in terms of a solution for one independent of the others. What is required is an integrated approach across the entire economic front. Accordingly, it is essential that the Japanese Government, through the Economic Stabilization Board which was created for this purpose, take early and vigorous steps to develop and implement the integrated series of economic and financial controls which the current situation demands. These economic objectives are national in scope, transcending the special interests of any group, and therefore should be non-partisan. Unless determined measures are undertaken at once by the Japanese Government, the inflationary condition of the economy together with its attendant maldistribution of food and other necessities, will become increasingly serious, industrial recovery will be further retarded, and the achievement of the social and political objectives toward which the Japanese people have made such an encouraging start will be endangered. The social and economic welfare of Japan will depend largely on Japan’s own efforts in the redirection of its human and natural resources to peaceful living and upon competent public administration of democratic and effective economic controls. Aid to Japan cannot be expected upon a scale sufficiently great to overcome maldistribution and inflation within Japan. Outside assistance is contingent upon full utilization of indigenous resources, which is entirely a responsibility of the Japanese Government. Sincerely yours, Douglas MacArthur 46 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 1112, June 14, from Tokyo; received June 30. The despatch transmitted also a copy of the Japanese Government’s statement on its economic program, dated June 11 (not printed). The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel) 740.00115 PW/3–1947 [Document 193] The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Inverchapel ) 47 The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the British Ambassador’s note of October 7, 1946, 48 regarding the retention of 82,000 Japanese prisoners of war in British-controlled areas of Southeast Asia, the last of whom would not be repatriated until the end of 1947. The British Ambassador in his note of October stated that the phased release of Japanese prisoners retained in British territories in Southeast Asia would continue through 1947 and would be carried out in British shipping. In a telegram of January 17, 1947, from the Commander in Chief, Southeast Asia Command to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers it was pointed out, however, that the term “British shipping” was intended to include Japanese ships at the disposal of the Commander in Chief Southeast Asia Command. In a telegram of January 25, 1947, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers informed the Commander in Chief Southeast Asia Command that this interpretation of the term “British shipping” had caused him considerable concern inasmuch as his repatriation facilities, including shipping, had been reduced to a minimum upon the assumption that His Majesty’s Government intended to furnish shipping and crews for deferred repatriation from the Southeast Asia Command. The Supreme Commander added that the Commander in Chief Southeast Asia would appreciate that the maintenance of shipping for repatriation and of reception centers in Japan over an indefinite period of time would be a unwarranted extravagance. In conclusion the Supreme Commander offered to furnish the necessary shipping to complete the repatriation of Japanese in British territories in Southeast Asia provided that such repatriation (apart from those Japanese being held in connection with war crimes) would be completed before June 1, 1947; that shipping requirements for any one month would not exceed 30,000 spaces and that His Majesty’s Government would agree to furnish fuel on a round trip basis and emergency supplies to repatriation ships as in the past. While noting the circumstances which had led His Majesty’s Government to feel impelled to postpone the repatriation of Japanese prisoners retained in British territories of Southeast Asia, this Government, in view of the clear intent of the Potsdam Declaration and of the burdens which would be placed upon repatriation facilities under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers by the prolonged retention of Japanese in Southeast Asia, considers it highly desirable that the repatriation of these Japanese be completed as rapidly as possible and hopes that His Majesty’s Government will give favorable consideration to the proposals made by the Supreme Commander. Washington , March 24, 1947. 47 Draft approved by SWNCC on March 18 and transmission to British Ambassador requested by their SWN–5236, March 19; it was forwarded to Tokyo in instruction 461, March 28. 48 Not printed, but see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 312 , footnote 87. The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/3–2447: Telegram [Document 194] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , March 24, 1947—7 p.m. 100. FEC 13. Publication of Policy Decision re Review of New Jap Constitution . 49 FEC Mar 20 approved motion to release to press outside Japan above policy decision. 50 US Govt condition re time of release read into minutes by US rep and accepted by other members. In adopting motion several members expressed unhappiness that publication in Japan not provided for although publication outside Japan considered step in right direction. Supply of foods for civilian relief in Japan . At FEC meeting Mar 20 US rep made it clear that he would veto FEC committee paper on food policy if brought to vote unless obnoxious paragraph deleted. No move therefore made to force vote. US rep as Chairman then called for motion to adopt US version of food paper but no response. Chairman then ruled that both papers defeated. Matter will therefore be removed from agenda unless reintroduced by some member. Acheson 49 For text of FEC policy decision, FEC–099/3, December 12, 1946, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 68. 50 See Department of State Bulletin , May 5, 1947, p. 802; the text was released April 18 and a directive was sent to SCAP. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.414/3–2447: Telegram [Document 195] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , March 24, 1947. 68. Reference Department’s telegram 18, January 21. 1. It is believed that question of central archives in Japan should not become involved with the treatment of Japanese archives, consular and diplomatic archives, properties, et cetera, held in Allied custody outside Japan. Soviet comment would appear obvious attempt to obtain an entering wedge for interference in administration by seeking full access to Japanese Government offices. 2. Blanket authorization to make central archives to [ of ] Japanese Government available to four Allied Powers is impracticable. Archives have already been exploited by principally United States and British Technical Mission, viz.: strategic bomb survey; British Naval Technical Mission; United States Naval Technical Mission; [apparent garble] Washington Document Center; War Department Intelligence Target Division; the record of large shipments is reported separately. Dissemination of information can only be made on basis of policy and definitive limitations expressed in War Department radios WX 78417, October 26, 1945, reaffirmed in WX 95147, July 24, 1946. Control and surveillance of contacts of foreign missions with Japanese Government, scrutiny and approval of inquiries and research in Japanese archives will place an undue burden on the limited personnel of SCAP. 3. Recommend that entire question be fully discussed and coordinated with War Department representatives who are familiar with present situation regarding Japanese central archives. Some archives have already been largely depleted as a result of Japanese destruction or result of bombing or shipment of large numbers of documents to Washington Document Center. Making available these incomplete files will prove embarrassing to the United States. Statistics on present status of archives contained Nr. 67, March 22. 51 Atcheson 51 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.628/3–2547: Telegram [Document 196] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , March 25, 1947. 69. Suggested basis for resolving impasse in Committee 2 52 appears satisfactory in so far as SCAP’s administrative control over Japanese fishing areas remains unchange[d]. Likewise, should any extension of fishing areas specified in paper become necessary, consultation would be had with Allied Council should it appear that such extension is a matter of substance and is not the result of a bilateral agreement. On other hand we have been unable from outset to perceive valid basis for Allied objection to SCAP emergency Antarctic whaling operations carried out by Japanese vessels and crews, especially as there can be no threat to security and such operations conform strictly to all international conventions and obligations accepted by any country engaging in whaling. Last operation with only two factory ships produced the following: (in metric tons) whale oil 12,260; salted meat and blubber 16,560; frozen meat 1,822 liver oil 4.4; liver 132; other products (includes bone, entrails, skin, glands, et cetera) 9550. Fuel oil for Antarctic whaling expedition just completed cost estimated $800,000. Value of whale and vitamin A oil obtained estimated at no less than $3,300,000. These protein food products and the whale oil, which will more than pay for the cost (other than yen costs), are vitally necessary to Japan’s economy. If these products are not obtained from whaling operations, it will fall upon United States alone to supply equivalent of resulting deficit. Only commitment regarding whaling operations by United States Government of which SCAP is aware is that reported in War Service 6349 (State serial 516, October 8, 1946 53 ) that “no future Japanese whaling expeditions would be authorized without prior consultation interested nations particularly regarding security aspects involved”. SCAP emergency whaling operations using Japanese vessels and crews in no way prejudice future Allied action regarding Japanese whaling industry following termination of occupation. United States presumably committed only to extent that interested nations will be consulted before future expeditions are authorized. There would be no insuperable objection to proposed compromise plan outlined in W 94394 if it could be determined before final approval that Far Eastern Commission agreement will be forthcoming to SCAP emergency whaling operations using Japanese vessels and crews during next season. SCAP would authorize such whaling operations only if emergency conditions made such operations necessary. At present time, however, continued shortage of protein foods makes almost inevitable that such operations must be conducted during forthcoming season. If it should become apparent that Far Eastern Commission agreement to SCAP whaling operations during forthcoming season can not be obtained and therefore desirable, in order to make such operations in Antarctic possible, to abandon suggested compromise plan, it may be that commitment which American Government gave for consultation would be satisfied merely upon individual consultation with interested governments regarding any security aspects they may consider involved. Providing Far Eastern Commission agreement to such emergency whaling operations can not be obtained and it is still believed necessary to accept proposed compromise plan, adequate assurances are requested that equivalent of marine products and resultant foreign exchange which will thus be lost to occupation and to Japanese economy will be forthcoming from American and Allied sources. It would appear that failure of any Allied countries to offer an equivalent substitute to products obtained from emergency whaling operations (including foreign exchange from whale oil) and absence of any security threat or other mitigating factor would be of primary importance in rebutting Allied objections to SCAP operations which are for emergency only and designed solely to obtain food and vital oil, without any commitment whatsoever regarding future of Japanese whaling industry. 54 Atcheson 52 On Economic and Financial Affairs, Far Eastern Commission. 53 Not printed. 54 Telegram 107, May 1, from Tokyo, proposed a second SCAP-administered, Japanese-manned Antarctic whaling expedition and requested that interested governments be consulted and their anticipated objections be removed (804.628/5–147). Telegram 121, May 10, from Tokyo, suggested that the subject be placed on the agenda of the Allied Council for Japan (894.628/5–1047). The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) 740.00119 FEAC/3–2647 [Document 197] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) Washington , March 26, 1947. My Dear Mr. Petersen : General McCoy, Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission, has taken up with me 55 two matters which he believes are closely related to the question of improved liaison between the FEC and General MacArthur. General McCoy states that it is a generally held opinion among the members of the Far Eastern Commission that the Commission suffers in its work because of poor liaison between it and the Supreme Commander. General McCoy suggests that there would be much to be gained if he were authorized to inform the Commission at an early meeting that the United States Government will be prepared to facilitate the sending of one or more representatives of the Commission to Tokyo for the purpose of consulting with the Supreme Commander about matters of mutual concern. General McCoy realizes that any such offer should be conditioned by requiring each Government concerned to defray the cost incurred by any representative of that Government in making the trip. I should very much appreciate your comment concerning the feasibility of authorizing General McCoy to issue such an invitation on the condition stated. General McCoy also points out that members of the Commission, including himself have felt that considerable value could be derived from closer contact between members of the Commission and persons on the Staff of the Supreme Commander who visit Washington from time to time. If you agree, I think it might be worthwhile for the War Department to impress upon visitors from General MacArthur’s Staff who happen to be in Washington that they should make a point of meeting with the Chairman of the Commission and perhaps visit the Commission while they are here. This suggestion has been made several times to General McCoy’s Civil Affairs adviser and I am advised that he is quite sympathetic to the idea. Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring 55 Letter of March 12, not printed. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the War Department for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for General McCoy 894.00/4–747 [Document 198] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the War Department for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for General McCoy 56 restricted [ Tokyo ,] 2 April 1947. Reurad War 94856 March 27th [ 26th ]. 57 The Diet on 31st March passed amendments extending the provisions of article two of the additional provisions of the House of Councillors election law to the election of the House of Representatives. Forthcoming election of House of Representatives will be held under the same liberal provisions as the House of Councillors election law. The franchise for the House of Representatives is now extended to all of voting age except incompetents or quasi-incompetents and those in prison or those who have received a sentence involving penal servitude or confinement and have not yet served their term. English and Japanese copies of bill for amendment of the House of Representatives election law were airmailed to War Department on 14th March. Japanese copies of amendments to bill were airmailed 31st March. English translation of amendments as passed by the Diet will be airmailed on 3rd April. Other substantial changes in House of Representatives election law include: A. Election districts increased in number from 53 to 117 with each district returning from 3 to 5 members to the lower house for a total membership of 466. B. Supervision of elections has been removed from the House [ Home ] Ministry and placed in the hands of democratically chosen election administration committees who will appoint election officials and supervise polling and counting. C. Filing deposits have been raised from 2,000 Yen to 5,000 Yen, and fines for violations have generally been increased about 10 times. D. Restricted plural voting has been replaced by the single ballot. E. Use of school children below the age of 20 in campaigns illegal. All changes will be applied to the forthcoming general elections. 56 Copy forwarded by General Hilldring on April 11 to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) for members of that body, in response to a consultative message dated March 26 to SCAP “relative to the House of Representatives Election Law”. 57 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union (Tsarapkin) 740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–1247 [Document 199] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé of the Soviet Union ( Tsarapkin ) The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and refers to the Embassy’s note of February 12, 1947, 58 in which a reply is requested to the Soviet Government’s communications of July 1, 1946, and August 17, 1946, addressed to the Chairman and American Member of the Far Eastern Commission, regarding the nominations of persons by the Soviet Government for positions on the staff of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo. The Department has been informed that in February, 1946, when General MacArthur invited the Allied Missions in Japan to nominate their nationals for integration into the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, he needed competent assistance in many of his Headquarters sections. However, a considerable period of time elapsed before any nominations of Allied personnel were received by the Supreme Commander, and for the sake of the efficient operation of the occupation it was necessary for him to fill all existing vacancies from available American sources. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has pointed out that during the past year the situation with respect to Allied representation in Tokyo has been greatly improved. Now, all of the Far Eastern Commission member governments are represented in Tokyo either on the Allied Council or by separate Missions. In the opinion of the Supreme Commander there are great difficulties attendant upon the adoption of a policy of integrating the personnel of other nations into his staff caused by differences in methods, procedures, organization, language, and conditions of service. Therefore in the interests of maintaining an efficient headquarters for the occupation of Japan, the Supreme Commander cannot at the present time accede to the request of the Soviet Government for the assignment to his staff of the men nominated. Washington , April 3, 1947. 58 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.014/4–347 [Document 200] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State No. 957 Tokyo , April 3, 1947. [Received April 10.] Subject: Forwarding Copy of Petition for Restoration of Islands Belonging to Hokkaido. The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch no. 891 dated March 4, 1947, 58 and to previous correspondence regarding the return from Russian jurisdiction to Japanese jurisdiction of certain islands adjacent to Hokkaido, and to forward a copy of the English text of a petition dated March 24, 1947, 59 filed at this Headquarters by Honna Takeshi, representing the members of the House of Representatives from Hokkaido. The petition requests the return of the following named islands of the Kurile Archipelago to Japanese jurisdiction: The Shikotan Group (including Shikotan, Taraku, Shibotsu, Suisho, Yuri, and Akiyuri), constituting a part of Nemuro Province on the main island of Hokkaido; and The Islands of Southern Kuriles, i.e., Etorofu and Kunashiri. 58 Not printed. 59 Not printed; similar petitions regarding the Habomai, Etorofu, and Kunashiri Islands were transmitted to the Department in despatches 1284, September 18, and 1311, October 2 (not printed). The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson) 740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–1447 [Document 201] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Patterson ) confidential Washington , April 14, 1947. My Dear Mr. Secretary : On September 6, 1945, after approval by the President, there was transmitted to General MacArthur the United State Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan. 60 This Policy Statement, which sets forth the ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan, envisages resumption of peaceful economic activity in Japan as rapidly as possible, consistent with the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation. In addition to providing that Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces, the basic policy requires that Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs necessary to avoid acute economic distress, to assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies, to meet the requirements for reparations deliveries and to facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied. In the period which has elapsed since the beginning of the occupation, the War Department and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers have faced administrative difficulties of the greatest complexity and magnitude. The achievements of the Supreme Commander in the face of these difficulties have been of decisive importance and represent an historic contribution to the execution of the foreign policy of the United States. Moreover, these achievements have been gained on the basis of maximum utilization of Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, in accordance with the principle underlying the Policy Statement. The Department of State, however, is concerned by signs of increasing difficulties with respect to the internal economic and financial structure of Japan. Japanese governmental machinery must inevitably play a major role in minimizing or avoiding these difficulties and the occupation authorities accordingly face problems of supervision requiring the highest technical and managerial skills. Numerous reports which have reached the Department, such as the report of Mr. Clifford Strike 61 concerning certain aspects of Theater planning and administration in connection with the reparations program and of Colonel Harrison 62 concerning food and agriculture, appear to indicate the necessity for making available to General MacArthur civilian personnel of outstanding skill and experience to deal with the economic and financial aspects of the occupation. The Department does not, of course, minimize the accomplishments of the personnel who have been working conscientiously and vigorously to make a success of the occupation. Moreover, the difficulties in the way of recruitment of high calibre civilian personnel are well known to the Department. It remains true, nevertheless, that the furtherance of United States objectives in Japan inevitably depends upon the efficiency with which Japanese agencies of government carry out the instructions of the Supreme Commander. Supervision of their performance clearly requires constant vigilance on the part of American civilian personnel in requisite numbers and of appropriate skills. This is particularly vital in such matters as the handling of food and agriculture, rationing and price controls, restoration of trade and industry, allocation of raw materials, currency and public finance, labor relations and the effectuation of the reparations program. I should like, as a matter of great urgency, to explore with you all possible steps to introduce into the staff of the Supreme Commander a quality of personnel and experience comparable to that which has been made available to the Office of Military Government for Germany. The Department of State stands ready to assist the War Department in all practicable action to this end and will undertake to mobilize the civilian agencies of the Government behind the effort. Sincerely yours, Dean Acheson 60 See Department of State Bulletin , September 23, 1945, p. 423, or Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 423. 61 Clifford S. Strike, head of F. H. McGraw & Co., and of Overseas Consultants. Inc., both of New York. In January 1947, Mr. Strike and Edwin W. Pauley headed reparations groups to Japan. 62 Col. Raymond L. Harrison, representing the Department of Agriculture on the Food Mission to Japan. Memorandum by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Japanese Government 740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–1847 [Document 202] Memorandum by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Japanese Government 63 AG 009.74 (14 Apr 47) GA (Scapin 1609) [ Tokyo ,] 14 April 1947. Subject: Travel Documents for Japanese Nationals Traveling Abroad 1. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers contemplates authorizing the travel of selected Japanese nationals to destinations outside the limits of Japan. It is desired that the Imperial Japanese Government, upon specific direction, issue travel documents in the nature of a passport to individuals whom it finds to be Japanese subjects. 2. In addition to procedures normally followed in the issuance of a passport, these documents shall be issued in conformance with the following instructions: a . Travel documents shall be issued to individuals specifically designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. b . Each document shall bear a statement to the effect that it is issued by the authority and under the instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and shall contain a reference to this directive and to the directive specifically authorizing its issuance to the individual concerned. c . Each document shall contain a statement of the purpose and period for which the travel has been approved as indicated in the directive authorizing the issuance of a travel document. d . Wording shall not be used in these documents which directly, or indirectly, constitutes an address by the Imperial Japanese Government to foreign authorities. For the Supreme Commander: E. M. Levy Colonel, AGD Adjutant General 63 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Political Adviser in Japan in his despatch 985, April 18; received May 1. The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 740.00119 FEAC/4–747 [Document 203] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) Washington , April 15, 1947. My Dear General McCoy : Recently you discussed with me the problem of liaison between the Far Eastern Commission and General MacArthur and suggested that much would be gained if you were able to inform the Commission that the United States Government would be prepared to facilitate the sending of one or more representatives of the Commission to Tokyo for the purpose of consulting the Supreme Commander about matters of mutual concern. I have taken up your suggestion with Mr. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War, 64 and am pleased to inform you that he has received a message from General MacArthur stating that he “would be delighted” to receive a visit of one or more members of the Commission. You may therefore wish to extend to the members of the Commission an invitation on behalf of the United States Government to send representatives to Tokyo, informing them that the Supreme Commander has expressed himself as delighted at the prospect of such a visit. It is felt that you should make clear to the Commission that the number of such a group should be kept to a minimum, in view of the restricted accommodations and facilities available in Japan, and that the expenses of the trip should be borne by the respective Governments whose representatives travel to Japan. Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring 64 See letter of March 26, p. 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] . The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.628/4–2347: Telegram [Document 204] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , April 23, 1947. [Received April 26—6:25 a.m.] 100. 1. In discharging responsibility to maximize Japanese fish production to alleviate continued food shortage in Japan, SCAP has encouraged and assisted in fullest utilization fishery resources within present authorized fishing area. Any considerable increase in fish production would require temporary opening additional areas to SCAP administered fishing operations. Studies indicate several fishing grounds outside present authorized areas, formerly fished by Japanese boats, not now being fully or in some cases even partially utilized by others. Principal of these fisheries and grounds are: a . Trawl fishery for cod and flat fish off east coast of Kamchatka between 60 degrees north and 64 degrees north latitude, and 173 degrees and 180 degrees east longitude, between 12 to 50 miles from shore. Season June to August inclusive. b . Pelagic fishery for salmon off east coast Kamchatka from 48 degrees to 56 degrees north latitude, 12 miles off shore. Season May 20 to August 20. c . Trawl fishery in Yellow Sea and east China Sea beyond present areas. 2. Japanese are in position to place in operation by opening of respective seasons fishing expeditions as follows: a . For trawl fishing described in paragraph 1 a : four trawlers, four transfer boats, one cargo saltery and one carrier boat. Estimated that in 75-day season boats will produce about 2800 tons of salted fish and 56 tons cod liver oil. b . For pelagic salmon fishery described in paragraph 1, b : two factory ships, 50 fishing boats, four transfer boats, two transports and one small oil tanker. Estimated that in 80-day season boats will produce 3300 tons salted salmon and 100 tons salmon roe. 3. Assuming that bilateral agreement would obviate necessity submission to Far Eastern Commission of proposal for extension presently authorized fishing areas, Department is requested, should no objection be perceived, to seek concurrence on temporary basis from USSR for SCAP administered fishing operations in areas described in parts 1 a and 1 b on scales respectively indicated in paragraphs 2 a and 2 b above. It would be satisfactory if bilateral agreement for fishing season 1947 and/or 1948 were obtained. 4. Bilateral agreements with China and USAMGIX [ USAMGIK? ] for SCAP sponsored trawling operations in areas mentioned in paragraph 1 c have been completed. Operations will commence upon completion administrative details this headquarters. Atcheson The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–2547: Telegram [Document 205] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , April 25, 1947. 105. Reourtel 78, April 10. 65 Communication dated April 16 from Japanese Government states information received that commandeered Japanese nationals, approximately 30,000 including families, in portion Manchuria controlled by Chinese National Government forces slowly being released by Chinese authorities and requests SCAP investigate and if information verified take action for early repatriation. Information in premises being requested of Chinese Mission here. Department may desire instruct Nanking to approach Chinese Government for purpose securing latter’s collaboration. 66 Atcheson 65 Not printed; it reported an earlier Japanese request for assistance in repatriating Japanese from Chinese territory indicating that about 40,000 Japanese were in Communist-controlled areas (740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–1047). 66 This the Department did in telegram 548, May 8, 7 p.m., to Nanking (740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–2547). Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) 894.00/4–2947 [Document 206] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Allison ) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) 67 [ Washington ,] April 29, 1947. The elections to the Japanese House of Representatives on April 25 returned 132 Liberals, 122 Democrats, 143 Socialists, 4 Communists and 65 minor party representatives and independents. Although the conservative Liberal and Democratic Parties, the parliamentary basis of the present Yoshida Government, thus retain a working majority if they continue to act together, the moderately leftish Social Democratic Party has markedly improved its position. The Communist Party lost two of the six seats it possessed in the last Diet. The elections to the new upper house of the Diet, the House of Councillors, on April 20, returned 35 Liberals and 29 Democrats (out of a total membership of 250), plus 120 successful independent candidates of predominantly conservative stamp. The Socialists with their increased popular following achieved a plurality, winning 46 seats. The Communists elected 4. The character of the next Japanese government and future course of Japanese politics would appear to depend on whether the two conservative parties continue to work together or whether the Democrats, some of whose leaders are ideologically closer to the Socialists than to the Liberals, decide to work with the Socialists. The Democratic Party holds the balance of power in the current negotiations for the formation of the new Cabinet. It is gratifying that the Japanese should have rejected the extreme left even more decisively than a year ago, while at the same time moving a step further away from the extreme right. The Socialist pluralities in both houses of the Diet, the third ranking position of the new right-centrist Democratic Party, and the poor Communist showing all indicate a strengthening of the moderate right and left over the extreme right and left. 67 Seen by the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State. The British Embassy to the Department of State 894.628/4–3047 [Document 207] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire Ref: 9/ /47 In their aide-mémoire of the 4th October, 1946, 68 the Department of State informed the British Embassy that the Japanese whaling expedition which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was then planning to despatch to the Antarctic was of an emergency character and in no way prejudiced decisions as to the future of Japanese whaling. The United States Government expressed their complete accord with the view that long-range consideration of the right of Japan to conduct whaling operations was a matter for Allied discussion and decision. The Embassy was informed that no authorisation for any future Japanese whaling expeditions in the Antarctic or elsewhere would be given without prior consultation with the interested governments. 2. Bearing in mind these considerations and in view of the fact that expeditions planned by all countries for the season 1946–1947 were unlikely to catch 16,000 blue whale units, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom waived the objections which they had raised to the Japanese expedition. 3. The position during the 1947–1948 season will, however, be different. It is now known that, exclusive of any Japanese vessels, 16 factory ships will be operating in the Antarctic in the 1947–1948 season and these vessels will be capable of treating 16,000 blue whale units in the course of the season. Any proposal, therefore, to allow Japanese vessels to operate would mean that the catch of the vessels of other countries would be diminished. Furthermore, the total yield of whale products which might be obtained from 16,000 blue whale units would be reduced if any Japanese vessels were allowed to participate since the average yield of each blue whale unit treated by Japanese methods is much inferior to the average yield obtained by the vessels of Allied nations. Thus even if all the oil produced by a Japanese expedition were allocated by the International Emergency Food Council, to which the United States Government would presumably agree as they did last year, there would be less whale oil and other products available to the world than would be the case if no Japanese expedition were despatched. 4. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have so far had no report on the Japanese expedition to the Antarctic in the 1946–1947 season. The Japanese may have complied with the requirements of the International Whaling Agreements during that expedition. But good behaviour under such conditions can be held to offer no guarantee that the Japanese will continue to comply with the International Agreements. A main object of Japanese whaling expeditions is to obtain whale meat and the Japanese are therefore prone to kill young whales, as they did on a large scale in the past. The stocks of whales in the Antarctic were seriously diminished by the unrestricted whaling and wasteful methods adopted by the Japanese to such a pitch that international action was necessary to prevent the extinction of the species. The Governments who became parties to the International Whaling Agreements voluntarily limited the catches of their own nationals in order to conserve whale stocks while the Japanese deliberately continued their unrestricted and wasteful methods. It is most unlikely, in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government, that the nations which took part in the International Whaling Conference held at Washington in November, 1946, would now be prepared to agree to Japan’s accession to the International Whaling Agreements or, because of the past behaviour of the Japanese in regard to whaling, to allow them to operate even within the ceiling imposed by international agreement, to the continued and further detriment of the operations of the nationals of governments who have adhered throughout to the limitations imposed by the whaling agreements. A continuance of Japanese whaling would again endanger the world’s supply of whales with no corresponding advantage, immediate or otherwise, to the world’s supply of food. 5. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are therefore of the opinion that no further Japanese whaling expeditions to the Antarctic should be permitted. 6. Consequently they consider that the allocation of Japanese whaling factories as reparations should be made without further delay. An additional reason for proposing this course is that the Japanese whaling fleet constituted a reserve of speedy vessels specially constructed so as to make their adaptation for naval uses a simple matter, and the fact that so many of these vessels were lost during the war is proof that they were so used. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom consider it most undesirable that this war potential should be re-created. 7. His Majesty’s Government understand that the estimated production of whale oil by the Japanese as a result of the 1946–1947 season was provisionally earmarked by the International Emergency Food Council equally between Japan and Germany. They would be grateful if they might receive at an early date a full report on the operations and outcome of the expedition including an indication as to when delivery of the whale oil allocated to Germany will be made. 8. After due consultation with the United States Government, His Majesty’s Government will instruct their representative on the Far Eastern Commission to propose there the adoption of policies which would implement the views set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above. 69 Washington , 30 April, 1947. 68 Not printed. 69 The New Zealand Legation on May 6 and the Australian Embassy on May 7 likewise made representations to the Department and stressed their belief that Japanese whaling vessels should be allocated as reparations. The Department of State to the Swiss Legation 894.512/3–2647 [Document 208] The Department of State to the Swiss Legation Memorandum The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum from the Legation of Switzerland dated March 26, 1947, 70 requesting that the American Authorities use their good offices to obtain a revision of the policy respecting the applicability of certain Japanese taxes to Swiss property in Japan. The memorandum refers to certain communications recently exchanged between the Swiss Diplomatic Mission in Japan and the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo, in which it was ascertained that the enforcement measures of the Capital Levy Law and the War Indemnity Special Measures Laws do not exempt the property of nationals of neutral countries from these measures, whereas property of members of the United Nations is so exempt. It is stated further that according to information supplied to the Swiss Diplomatic Representative in Tokyo, this policy originated in Washington. The policy to which reference is made, was established pursuant to a decision of the Far Eastern Commission, and not of the Government of the United States. Prior to this decision by the Far Eastern Commission, 71 the position taken by this Government with respect to Japanese extraordinary tax laws in relation to non-Japanese individuals and corporations, was that no objection would be taken to the application of such taxes to all property in Japan, regardless of the nationality of the owner. The decision of the Far Eastern Commission was transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as a basis for instructions to the Japanese Government to exempt property of members of the United Nations from this tax. In as much as the action, in respect to the exemption of the property of members of the United Nations from the Capital Levy, was taken by the Japanese Diet, pursuant to a policy thus determined by the Far Eastern Commission, the Department of State is taking steps to transmit the memorandum of March 26, 1947 of the Swiss Legation, together with this reply, to the Far Eastern Commission for its consideration. As soon as is possible, the Government of the United States will transmit the comments of the Far Eastern Commission to the Legation of Switzerland. In respect to the War Indemnities Special Measures Laws, the Japanese Government has exempted claims arising out of losses of the United Nations’ property, and has guaranteed bank deposits of United Nations’ nationals and other persons whose property was seized, confiscated or sequestered, or who were arrested or interned by the Japanese during the war, from losses arising out of the reorganization of Japanese financial institutions, necessitated by the application of the War Indemnities Special Measures Laws. This action was taken to afford protection to those persons who were denied access to and control of their property by the Japanese during the war, and it is considered consistent with the general policy that such property should be preserved and protected pending its return to the legitimate owners. Washington , May 2, 1947. 70 Not printed. 71 See FEC–055/4, July 18, 1946, Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 105. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Shanghai 693.9431/3–347 [Document 209] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Shanghai 72 confidential Washington , May 5, 1947. The Acting Secretary of State acknowledges the receipt of the Consulate General’s despatch no. 893 of March 3, 1947 73 reporting the results of recent discussions between United States officials and members of the SCAP Food Mission to Shanghai concerning Sino-Japanese trade, together with the request for an expression of Departmental policy with regard to the responsibility of United States representatives in China in connection with the development and expansion of Sino-Japanese trade. The Department concurs in the opinion expressed by the Officer in Charge to the effect that an increase in the present trade between China and Japan is economically desirable. The suggestion that a Sino-Japanese trade conference should be held for the purpose of promoting the expansion and balanced growth of Sino-Japanese trade will be brought to the attention of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for his information. Encouragement of Sino-Japanese trade by United States representatives in China through participation in exploratory conferences and discussions and by presentation of advisory opinions as to methods of stimulating Sino-Japanese trade when deemed proper, would be considered desirable by the Department and within the scope of responsibility delegated to United States representatives in China. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should be informed of all developments in China pertaining to Sino-Japanese trade, and in the event that the Supreme Commander wishes to delegate certain responsibilities in connection with the furtherance of such trade to United States representatives in China, affirmative action taken by such representatives in this respect would be coordinated, and carried out in close conjunction with, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 72 Copies sent to the Embassy in China and to the Political Adviser in Japan. 73 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Novikov) 894.002/3–3147 [Document 210] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union ( Novikov ) Washington , May 10, 1947. Excellency : I have the honor to refer to this Department’s note of April 11, 1947 to the Chargé d’Affaires of the Soviet Embassy acknowledging his note of March 31, 1947 74 which invited the attention of the United States Government to a certain alleged statement derogatory to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reported in the United States press 75 as having been made by Premier Yoshida of Japan. After a thorough investigation of this matter, I am able to inform Your Excellency as follows: (1) No evidence exists that Premier Yoshida made the remark attributed to him, namely, that “We (Japan) have a very dangerous enemy to the north”, nor that he made any comment of similar implications. Only one American correspondent present at the interview reported such a remark and it appears that his inaccurate reporting was due to language difficulties. (2) The remark cited in the Embassy’s note was never published in Japan. As your Excellency is aware, the strictest orders of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers prohibit any press or radio criticism in Japan of any of the Allied Nations, either officially or informally. Every effort has been and is continuing to be made to see that these regulations are scrupulously and meticulously followed. (3) In this connection, I should like to invite the attention of the Soviet Government to the numerous instances of attacks upon the United States and upon the administration of the occupation of Japan broadcast to Japan from the USSR and published in Japanese language newspapers circulated extensively in Southern Sakhalin and in Japan. (4) Out of a vast number of examples of radio broadcasts and of articles derogatory to the United States, the following excerpts have been selected at random. Radio Broadcasts Moscow in English to Japan, March 27, 1947, 6:00 a.m. EST: “The intrigues of Japanese reaction threaten to turn the elections of April 25 into an antidemocratic farce like those staged in Japan on April 10, 1946. This farce, which has been prepared by the Japanese reaction with the sanction and approval of the American occupation authorities, is fraught with dire consequences if the democratic Japanese public does not cast the reaction aside which, contrary to the surrender, is pulling the country backwards toward the sinister days of police terror and fascism.” Moscow in Japanese to Japan, December 23, 1946, 4:00 a.m. EST: “… Can it be that the Japanese militarists will be able, with impunity, to carry out their undermining work and prepare for fresh aggression in the Far East, not only utilizing the shortsightedness, but even enjoying the protection, of certain representatives of the American military authorities? That is what all true lovers of peace are asking themselves. They sharply condemn the present practice of the American occupation authorities in Japan who are giving the Japanese military elements a chance to continue their undermining work.” Japanese Language Newspapers: Shinseimei , Yuzhno Sakalinsk (Toyohara), Southern Sakhalin, November 16, 1946: “For what reasons did Stalin not recognize the occupation policy as satisfactory? It was because the American officials in Japan did not establish policies for building up the foundation of Allied victory, but focused their endeavors in supporting America’s imperialism, which is a great danger to world peace … “The reason why America is acting like this is because of a desire to rule the Pacific by exploiting Japan. The anti-democratic circles in America are planning to use Japan as a weapon for imperialism. Not only the Allied Powers, but also the Japanese people must prevent this.” Shinseimei , Yuzhno Sakalinsk (Toyohara), Southern Sakhalin, January 11, 1947: “The demonstrations, meetings, and strikes which are increasing within the country every day show that the administration of the Yoshida Cabinet, which is supported by the American Occupation authorities, is not only piling crime upon crime and following a course opposite to that of Japan’s transformation into a democratic nation, but is even promoting the maintenance of the order which prevailed in the militaristic period.” The United States Government requests that the fact of these hostile attacks be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government and anticipates that appropriate measures will be taken to ensure that they do not recur. Accept [etc.] Dean Acheson 74 Neither printed. 75 On March 20. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.628/5–2047: Telegram [Document 211] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , May 20, 1947. 132. Cite C 52805. Reourtels 107, May 1 76 and 69, March 25. 1. Notwithstanding considerations mentioned in British aide-mémoire , April 30, 1947 (similar note May 16, 1947 received from local Australian Mission) and recent press reports opposition New Zealand and Australia to another SCAP sponsored, Japanese manned whaling expedition, we are most reluctant for considerations mentioned in reference telegrams as well as those detailed below to abandon plans for expedition during 1947–1948 season. Department’s handling of this difficult question is greatly appreciated but it is hoped in view of food shortage here that satisfactory solution can be found to make another expedition possible. 2. Views here are that United States Government has never given clear-cut commitment which would prohibit another operation and it is believed that minimum consultation with interested governments, with primary emphasis upon security aspects of expedition, would fulfill any partial commitments made such consultations (even assuming proposed policy paper in opposition has been filed with Far Eastern Commission by United Kingdom or other interested government) would clear way for interim directive to be issued to SCAP by United States Government ordering whaling expedition on grounds of urgency of food situation in Japan and maximization of Japanese resources. 3. It is apparent that a whaling expedition affords most efficient employment of indigenous Japanese resources by use of available ships, trained crews, supplies, and readily obtainable petroleum products. Not to take advantage these resources would be tantamount deliberately wasting opportunity profitable employment and result in void which American taxpayer would be called upon to fill by supplementing critical shortage protein foods in Japan. 4. There is also involved question of United States and SCAP’s prestige vis-à-vis the Japanese people. Previous whaling expedition has been so successful in Japanese eyes that abandonment of proposed expedition would strongly suggest to Japanese that SCAP and United States are unable to withstand selfish and venal pressure of governments which, in fact, are making little if any direct contribution toward attainment allied objectives in Japan and whose main objection is based upon desire to maintain monopoly of whaling industry and profit therefrom at our expense. 5. It is appreciated that United States as signatory to Whaling Convention may be criticized for pressing for Japanese manned whaling expedition to possible detriment in catch of other signatories. In positive sense, however, no material gain would accrue to United States by its proposed action, except that burden on United States of feeding Japan would be eased by amount of additional food and foreign exchange thereby brought to Japan. Even among signatories, competition is free and no undue advantage would accrue to the Japanese, nor would American sponsorship be inconsistent with United State world policy of opposing monopoly in all industries, including that of whaling. It is also submitted that ultimate determination of Japanese right to whale in Antarctic or question of Japan’s admission to convention are questions which do not presently arise. Likewise, ultimate use and disposition of Japanese whaling fleet are matters for appropriate determination peace treaty. 6. Note from Australian Mission in Japan of May 6, 1947 states Australian observer (Mr. King J. Coonan) with last Japanese whaling expedition stated that expedition was conducted in accordance with international whaling convention except in one particular, which was “the discarding of certain poor oil bearing bones during processing, since the facilities of the factory ship did not permit this to be done and at the same time ensure a maximum recovery of whale meat”. The facilities of Hashidate Maru , the factory ship in question, would be modified to permit necessary processing in complete conformity with convention and assurance is given that Japanese will observe all regulations of convention during proposed expedition. 7. Although the economic and food aspects of the 1947–1948 expedition have been commented upon in our 107, it may additionally be observed that previous expedition produced about 46.5 million pounds meat amounting to 34 per cent of total Japanese meat consumption from farm sources in 1946 and having protein equivalent of 122 million and 75 million pounds of rice and wheat respectively. Prior to war soy beans accounted for much of Japan’s protein foods, a supply not now available and therefore necessarily substituted by meat products. 8. In view of probable difficulties obtaining appropriate agreement, it may be possible for Department to effect compromise whereby in consideration for agreement 1947–1948 expedition, United States would commit itself to agree to no further Japanese manned whaling expedition to Antarctic without previously having obtained approval of Far Eastern Commission. It appears to us that anticipated critical food situation in Japan during ensuing year would be partially ameliorated by this compromise. At same time, problem of agreement concerning future Japanese whaling would be matter for determination at Peace Conference which we envisage will probably meet prior to another whaling expedition being proposed. Compromise proposal to above effect would be acceptable to SCAP and there would be no objection to such compromise plan being given appropriate publicity at time of its acceptance. 9. As intimated our 107, time is of essence and Department’s decision is urgently requested. Atcheson 76 See footnote 54, p. 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] . The Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs (Snow) to the Legal Adviser (Fahy) 894.628/5–2247 [Document 212] The Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs ( Snow ) to the Legal Adviser ( Fahy ) secret [ Washington ,] May 22, 1947. Subject: Authority of SCAP to Direct an Antarctic Whaling Expedition Question: Has SCAP the authority, vis-à-vis the Far Eastern Commission, to conduct a “SCAP-administered, Japanese-manned” whaling expedition to the Antarctic? 1. SCAP’s authority to take any action in Japan may spring from any one of three sources: ( a ) His position as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan; ( b ) An interim directive from the United States on an urgent matter not covered by a policy already formulated by the Far Eastern Commission; ( c ) His power to implement a directive prepared by the U.S. Government to express a policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission. The question at issue is, under which of the three heads should action of the nature mentioned fall? 2. It seems to be best argued that SCAP’s authority to conduct such a whaling expedition is inherent in his position as Supreme Commander. Paragraph 5 of the Terms of Reference for the Allied Council (Agreement of Foreign Ministers at Moscow on Establishing Far Eastern Commission and Allied Council for Japan, December 27, 1945) 77 provides that the Supreme Commander will issue all orders for the occupation and control of Japan, that “in all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander, who is the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan”; that although he is to consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders, on matters of substance and the exigencies of the situation permitting, his decisions on these matters shall be controlling. This expression of SCAP’s complete authority to issue orders for the occupation and control of Japan is the culmination of a series of documents. a . In the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, it was proclaimed that points in Japan designated by the Allies were to be occupied, and that the occupying forces of the Allies would be withdrawn when the objectives had been accomplished. This document establishes that it was to be an Allied occupation, not an occupation by the United States. b . In Secretary Byrnes’ reply, for the President, to the Japanese offer of surrender, August 11, 1945, it was stated that from the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State should be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, who would take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms, and that the armed forces of the Allied Powers would remain in Japan until the purposes of the Potsdam Declaration were achieved. c . The Japanese Government was notified on August 14, 1945 that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has been designated as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. d . The final paragraph of the Instrument of Surrender of September 2, 1945, which was signed not only by Japan, but also by nine Allied Powers, repeats the statement made by Secretary Byrnes (par b above) as to the subjection of the Japanese Government to SCAP, and that the Supreme Commander would take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the terms of surrender. 3. The function of the Far Eastern Commission, as contrasted with SCAP’s power, as sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan, to issue all orders for the occupation and control of Japan, is to formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished. (Agreement of Foreign Ministers at Moscow, December 27, 1945, Par. A, II A 1). In accordance with these policy decisions of the Commission, the U. S. Government prepares directives to SCAP who is charged with their implementation (Par. A III 1). The United States Government, however, as expressly empowered, “pending action by the Commission whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by the Commission,” to issue interim directives to SCAP (Par. A III 3), which directives, on the request of any member, may be subsequently reviewed by the Commission (Par. A II A 2), and if the Commission decides that any such directive should be modified, its decision must be regarded as a policy decision (Par. A III 2). Accordingly, even if the question whether or not there shall be a second whaling expedition be considered a question of policy rather than of administration, nevertheless if the matter be considered urgent, and since the Far Eastern Commission has as yet formulated no policy, the United States may proceed unilaterally by way of interim directive to SCAP, to direct such an expedition, and then, if necessary to veto any modification of the directive on review. 4. Procedure by interim U. S. directive, as suggested in the previous paragraph, seems unnecessarily labored, however. SCAP’s fundamental power to issue all orders for the occupation and control of Japan, includes the power to make policy decisions, assuming, of course, that the Commission has formulated no policy to the contrary. This was apparently forseen by the Foreign Ministers at Moscow, who specifically provided for the review by the Commission, of “any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission” (Par. A II, A 2), and that if the Commission decides that any such action so reviewed should be modified, its decision should be regarded as a policy decision (Par. A III 2). Accordingly, even if the whaling expedition involves a policy decision within the jurisdiction of the Commission, nevertheless, since the Commission has formulated no policy, SCAP may act in the premises, and without any directive from the United States. 5. It is clear that there has been no policy decision by the Far Eastern Commission on the matter of Japanese whaling. A copy of FEC–035/1, December 13, 1946, is appended, which is a statement of policy proposed by the Australian representative, but never adopted. It will be noted that the paper provides [Par. 3( c )] 78 that no Japanese pelagic whaling should be permitted anywhere, and that the FEC will not authorize eventual Japanese re-entry into pelagic whaling without agreement being reached in the international authority for whaling. Even this document, however, does not purport to forbid the Supreme Commander from conducting a whaling expedition. 6. It is concluded that, for the purpose of providing food and oil needed for the successful occupation of Japan, SCAP has the power, as sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan, to order and administer a second Antarctic whaling expedition. Even if there are questions of policy in connection with such an expedition, which would be within the jurisdiction of the Commission, nevertheless, pending action by the Commission, such questions can be resolved by SCAP, or if preferred as a matter of U.S. policy, by an interim directive of the United States Government. 77 See Communiqué on the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers, Foreign Relations , 1945, vol. ii , p. 815 . 78 Brackets appear in the original. The Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–2747 [Document 213] The Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) Washington , May 27, 1947. My Dear General Hilldring : At the meeting of the Far Eastern Commission on Thursday, May 22, the representative of France, 79 referring to paragraph 2 of FEC–204/11, Property of War Criminals, 80 said: “Mr. Chairman, on paragraph 2 of this paper it has been the view of the French delegation that the paragraph in question, that is paragraph 2, should read at the end ‘should become available for reparations’ instead of ‘occupation costs.’ There was a lengthy discussion on this point and several representatives of various governments also thought the same. The reason why the French delegation insisted on that is that ‘reparations’ is a thing which we know. It is in our mind as a definition. ‘Occupation costs’ has no definition at all. We do not know how the American Government considers the question of occupation costs and what it contains. That was sort of an academic stand but a logical stand. However, the proceeds of the property of war criminals which may be turned to occupation costs may be very little and there is no reason why such a paper should be delayed for such a difference of opinion, which, after all, as I said, is mainly academic. However, we will not, of course, vote against this paper. We will vote for it, but with the hope that the American delegation, in one of the competent committees, will be ready very soon to give us a strict definition and a very clear definition of what is meant by the American Government by ‘occupation costs.’ ” Gen. McCoy : “I will make a note of that point.” Mr. Douteau : “Thank you.” Gen. McCoy : “I don’t know myself but we will try to find out. I think it is a proper request to make of the American Government however unclear the proposition is now.” This desire for a definition of what is meant by the American Government by the term “occupation costs” is general in the Commission; and, while I have not committed the American Government in the matter, other than to undertake to communicate the query to the United States Government, I wonder whether the United States is prepared to define “occupation costs.” 81 Sincerely yours, Frank R. McCoy 79 Robert Douteau. 80 See paragraph 2 of text printed in Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 101. 81 On June 5 General Hilldring replied that he expected in the near future to be able to communicate the U.S. position on claims upon Japan, occupation costs included (740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–2747). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division (Flory) 894.628/5–2747 [Document 214] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division ( Flory ) restricted [ Washington ,] May 27, 1947. Subject: 1947–1948 Japanese Antarctic Whaling Expedition. Participants: General Hilldring—A–H Mr. F. C. Everson, First Secretary—British Embassy Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor—British Embassy Mr. G. R. Powles, First Secretary—New Zealand Legation Major Plimsoll—Australia Mr. Knut Lykke—Counselor of Norwegian Embassy NA—Mr. Allison IR—Mr. Flory This Conference was called at 3:30 p.m. in General Hilldring’s office for the purpose of consulting on the above subject. General Hilldring indicated that, in accordance with certain commitments which had been made in connection with the 1946–1947 SCAP Antarctic whaling expedition, he was now consulting with respect to a proposed 1947–1948 expedition. General Hilldring said that the views of his Government were as follows: 1. A SCAP whaling expedition in 1947–1948 would provide food for the Japanese occupation and foreign exchange, thereby decreasing the obligations on the US taxpayers to supply Japan with an equivalent amount of food and foreign exchange. 2. The expedition proposed would be a SCAP expedition, not a Japanese expedition. This follows from the consideration that the Supreme Commander has the responsibility for an effective occupation. The question of rehabilitating the Japanese economy, per se, is not a factor except as it contributes to effectiveness of the occupation and to relieving the US taxpayers. 3. All the provisions of the whaling agreements will be carefully adhered to and the issue as it appears is basically one of a conflict of interests between the US taxpayers and the Norwegian, British and Australian whaling industries and economies. 4. The future of Japanese whaling after the occupation is not involved in this question. He indicated, and all the representatives present agreed, that any post-war limitations on Japanese whaling would be decided in the peace treaty, not at the present time. Virtually all of the arguments against Japanese whaling previously made by Australia, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom were brought up at some time or another during the course of the conversations. In addition the following points were urged: 1. Mr. Graves stated his belief that it would be hard for the nations which are members of the international whaling conventions to hold the Antarctic limit to 16,000 blue whale units inasmuch as it was anticipated, at the time the limitation was fixed, that there would be no Japanese or German whaling. General Hilldring suggested that the normal increase in the number of whaling expeditions would contribute to the pressure for increasing the limit even though Japanese and German expeditions were not involved. 2. Mr. Everson indicated that the British had cooperated fully with the US in the furtherance of economic policies with respect to Japan and they were prepared “to go along with almost any US economic policy” but that they could not concur in a SCAP expedition for 1947–1948. 3. Major Plimsoll stated that the Australians had cooperated with the US in economic policy in Japan but that Australia objected most vigorously to Japanese whaling. He pointed out that in the FEC meeting all nations, except the United States, had concurred in opposing Japanese Antarctic whaling and that Australia had suspended pressure for an FEC ban on Japanese Antarctic whaling on the personal assurance of a US representative that the US was considering making a counter-proposal which would ban SCAP Antarctic whaling. Major Plimsoll urged most strongly the view that the US would lose much more in terms of friendship with the allied powers by authorizing Japanese whaling for 1947–1948 than it would gain in dollars by forbidding [ permitting? ] such an expedition. 4. The Norwegian representative pointed out that the United States had given considerable assistance to Norway in supply and in reconstruction and that Japanese whaling would seriously affect the reconstruction of the Norwegian economy and would sharply curtail the amount of foreign exchange that it would have at its disposal. 5. Colonel Powles observed that in the pre-war period the Japanese had operated their shore stations year round. He inquired whether this was still the Japanese practice. Mr. Flory indicated that a specific inquiry on this point would be directed to SCAP. 6. Mr. Lykke inquired whether a report had been received on the 1946–1947 Antarctic expedition. Mr. Flory stated that no report had as yet been received but that SCAP would, in due course, send to Sandefjord the report which it is obligated to transmit under the whaling agreements. General Hilldring indicated that this consultation was of a preliminary nature and stated that he would consult with these representatives again before any final action was taken. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) 740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–2947 [Document 215] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) secret [ Washington ,] May 29, 1947. Subject: Developments Connected With the Occupation and Control of Japan. Participants: The Honorable Norman J. O. Makin, Ambassador of Australia The Honorable Alfred Stirling, Minister of Australia Major James Plimsoll, Australian Representative on the Far Eastern Commission Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State Hugh Borton, Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs Ambassador Makin called at his request to present an aide-mémoire (see Tab A) 82 on various developments connected with the occupation and control of Japan which the Australian Government believes should not be decided in advance of the Japanese peace settlement, and to discuss orally the question of the voting procedure in the Japanese peace conference (see Tab B), 83 The points raised were as follows: 1. Japanese Participation in Phosphate Industry in the Palau Islands. The Ambassador stated that the Australian Government was concerned over a “Kyoto radio broadcast” to the effect that the Japanese Government would have charge, under the Supreme Commander’s control, of all work with regard to management of the rock phosphate industry on Anguar Island in the Palau Group and that the existence and penetration of Japanese in the area under United States’ trusteeship was counter to the trusteeship agreement and threatened the future security of the region. Mr. Acheson stated that he had no information on this point but would look into the matter. 2. Ambassador Makin referred to Japanese participation, in an advisory capacity, in international conferences such as the Rice Study Group in India, the World Federation of Trade Unions in Prague, and the Universal Postal Union Congress in Paris. Mr. Acheson asked whether these representatives were attending at our request, which the Ambassador stated was not the case. Mr. Acheson commented that he did not think it was the policy of this Government to encourage Japanese participation in such conferences. 3. On the question of the proposed whaling expedition, the Ambassador stated that he wished to reassert the objections raised by the Australian Government to an expedition last year and that they felt no further expedition should be undertaken until after the question is settled at the peace conference. Mr. Acheson replied that the security aspects of the question were unimportant and that there was little validity to the argument that the Japanese would violate international whaling agreements as they had not done so during the expedition last year and as the expedition would again be supervised by SCAP. Mr. Acheson further stated that he thought it inappropriate to expect the American taxpayer to pay for imports of proteins equivalent to the food the Japanese would catch on such a whaling expedition. The Ambassador suggested that conversations might be entered into between our Governments on the question of Australia’s undertaking the expedition. Mr. Acheson answered that little progress had been made on that question last year and that we had been expected to pay the cost of approximately $15 million. He concluded that he would be glad to consider any specific suggestions they might have to make. The Ambassador replied that he would convey to his Government the position of the United States on this question. 4. Ambassador Makin referred to reports from Japan indicating that officials of the Japanese Foreign Office are preparing draft clauses for the peace treaty providing for the establishment of a Japanese Army, Navy, and Air Force. He added that his Government considered retention of armed forces by Japan as counter to Article I A of the proposed 25-year treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan. Mr. Acheson replied that the United States does not approve of the idea of Japan’s having armed forces. If, however, members of the Japanese Foreign Office wish to work on plans for future Japanese armed forces there was little we could do to prevent them from doing so. Such work would not necessarily have any real connection with the peace treaty. 5. Ambassador Makin referred to the note of the United States of December 13, 1946, to the Australian Government, concerning Australia’s participation in the peace conference. Ambassador Makin interpreted the reference to the peace conference being held outside the Far Eastern Commission as a commitment on our part to oppose the use of the veto in the treaty negotiations. He reiterated the firm position of the Australian Government that the treaty should be kept outside the Far Eastern Commission and that there be no veto. Mr. Acheson replied that this Government naturally had a strong interest in the peace settlement and that we would not be satisfied with a mere majority vote. H[ ugh ] B[ orton ] 82 Dated May 29, not printed. 83 Dated December 13, 1946, not printed; for documentation on proposed peace settlement, see pp. 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] ff. The Department of State to the Norwegian Embassy 894.628/6–2047 [Document 216] The Department of State to the Norwegian Embassy 84 Aide-Mémoire In consideration of Norway’s long-standing interest in Antarctic whaling operations, and pursuant to the consultations between Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring and a representative of the Norwegian Embassy on May 27, 1947, regarding the authorization of a second Antarctic whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, the Department of State wishes to inform the Norwegian Embassy that, after careful consideration, it has found it advisable to authorize the expedition for the following reasons: (1) The protein food products and whale oil provided by the expedition will be a vitally necessary component of Japanese food and oil supplies during the calendar year 1948. The 1946–47 expedition produced a quantity of meat equal to 34 percent of the total Japanese meat consumption from indigenous farm sources in 1946. With Japan’s principal normal source of proteins, Manchurian soybeans, cut off, this meat, having a protein equivalent of 122 million pounds of rice or 75 million pounds of wheat, cannot be dispensed with in the Japanese diet. If the requisite protein foods and oil for calendar 1948 are not obtained from whaling operations, it will fall upon the United States, which continues in the interest and to the advantage of all the Allies to supply the entire Japanese food deficit, to make up the deficiency, something which, in view of the manifold demands on its fats and oils resources, it can ill afford to do. (2) Exclusion of the Japanese from Antarctic whaling operations would be contrary to this Government’s fixed policy that Japan’s position as a defeated nation should not be taken advantage of to gain economic and trade advantages for the victors. (3) The United States Government cannot accept the thesis that the total yield of whale products available for world consumption from the 16,000 blue whale unit Conventional catch would be reduced in consequence of Japan’s participation. The Supreme Commander reports that the Australian observer accompanying the last expedition informed him through the Australian Mission in Japan that the expedition was conducted in accordance with the International Whaling Convention except in one particular, which was “the discarding of certain poor oil-bearing bones during processing, since the facilities of the factory ships did not permit this to be done and at the same time ensure a maximum recovery of whale meat.” The Supreme Commander has assured the Department of State that the factory ship in question will be modified before the 1947–48 expedition to permit necessary processing in complete conformity with the Convention, and that all regulations of the Convention will be observed. (4) The United States Government cannot agree that the Japanese should be penalized in future because of their past bad record in pelagic whaling. Acceptance of the principle that future disabilities should be placed on the Japanese because of their manifold past violations of the rules of international comity in the commercial and other fields could only retard the reorientation of Japan as a peace-loving and law-abiding member of the family of nations. As noted above, the Supreme Commander has undertaken to ensure that the Japanese comply with all international regulations during the forthcoming expedition. The assignment of Allied inspectors will be welcomed as before. (5) No significant present or future security threat to any nation can be perceived in a second SCAP-directed expedition. As with the previous expedition, representatives of the Supreme Commander will be present to see that no security regulations are violated, the expedition’s Japanese personnel will be screened, and no vessels will be permitted to enter the waters of Allied nations, unless with their consent. It is difficult to conceive how two Japanese whaling ships, even though they might be adaptable to naval use, could be considered to constitute a security threat in Japan’s present disarmed and impotent state. The Department of State desires to re-emphasize the position expressed in its aide-mémoire of October 4, 1946, 85 that the long-range future of the Japanese whaling industry is a matter for Allied discussion and decision. At the same time it must state in all frankness that it will oppose prohibition or special restriction of Japanese whaling operations on any other than valid security grounds or refusal by Japan to participate in and faithfully observe all relevant whaling conventions. The Government of the United States sincerely hopes that the Norwegian Government will appreciate the compelling nature of the considerations which have caused it to authorize a second whaling expedition, particularly the fact that this Government cannot justifiably call upon the American taxpayer, already bearing in the interest of all the Allies the entire burden of Japanese relief supplies, to furnish large additional quantities of protein foods which the Japanese can practicably and at minor sacrifice to other whaling nations provide for themselves. Washington , June 9, 1947. 84 In telegram 209, June 10, 7 p.m., the Department informed Tokyo that “ aide-mémoires delivered 9 June. Although no intention here withdrawing authorization whaling expedition, in view strenuous protests powers concerned, request you take no public action until 17 June.” (894.628/6–1047) Similar aide-mémoires were delivered to the British and Australian Embassies and the New Zealand Legation. 85 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 694.0031/6–947: Telegram [Document 217] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) restricted Washington , June 9, 1947—7 p.m. 205. 1. Inform Bowman. 86 Memo of understanding between SCAP and Eberle 87 Mission and proposed press release discussed in Trade Board June 6. Practically no criticism of memo of understanding and gratification expressed at decision for immediate entry service firms and 15–day time lag after entry of traders prior finalization transactions. Text of press release 88 generally satisfactory but members upset over June 9 release as it did not permit consideration Government comments in advance. 2. Following specific IATB comments of interest: a . Although 21 days might be basic period of entry permits, Board members believe provision should be made for countries to request permits valid for longer period for particular individuals. Believe SCAP should be willing under proper circumstances and at request of sponsoring government to grant original entry permits or extensions valid for specific periods of more than 21 days, or indefinitely. b . Members raised questions regarding prepayment of telegrams from Japan in currencies other than dollars only currency to be so used according to para 27 of memo. Whitman 89 stated he understood para 27 to imply no change in present procedure under which telegrams are prepaid in military payment certificates. He suggested if present procedures re prepaid telegrams were unsatisfactory to anyone problem should be raised with SCAP. c . Members requested assurance transactional communications if permitted prior Sept 1 would not permit evasion Sept 1 starting date specified para 35 of memo. Such assurance was given in general terms but further clarification of SCAP’s position on this point would be appreciated. Similarly definition of “finalized” in para 35 would be helpful. 3. U.S. agencies represented by Trade Mission have agreed to following wording of para 8 of memo of understanding: “Selection of trade representatives to be admitted to Japan will be made by the governments concerned from among applications submitted to them by their nationals. Selections will be based upon criteria established by the FEC and on the basis of information transmitted from SCAP indicating goods available, raw materials required and potential trading and other opportunities open to development. Selections will be forwarded by the respective governments to SCAP for final approval for entry into Japan.” Marshall 86 Dean O. Bowman, U.S. member of the Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan. 87 Brig. Gen. George L. Eberle. 88 Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 771. 89 Roswell H. Whitman, Associate Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, was also a member of the Inter-Allied Trade Board. The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 694.0031/6–347 [Document 218] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) Washington , June 12, 1947. My Dear General McCoy : On March 13, 1947 the Far Eastern Commission adopted a policy statement on “Allied Trade Representatives in Japan”. 90 On receipt of the Directive implementing the decision of the Commission, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers sent the following query to the United States Government: “Are Neutral Nations having missions in Japan authorised trade representatives on same basis as Allied Nations, as outlined in ref radio? If not authorised by ref rad, request such authority be granted as it is considered highly desirable to accord neutral Nations this privilege.” It is requested that the Far Eastern Commission be informed of this communication. In this connection, the United States Government wishes to propose the following amendments to FEC 088/2, Allied Trade Representatives in Japan: 1. The Far Eastern Commission establishes as a policy decision the following status for the trade representatives in Japan. 2. Trade representatives may be appointed to represent any member of the United Nations or other country having an official mission in Japan. 3. Previous paragraph 2 of FEC 088/2 without amendment. 4. The functions of the trade representatives defined in this interim document may subsequently be reviewed by the Far Eastern Commission in the light of experience. Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring 90 For text, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 89. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control(Japan)/6–1547: Telegram [Document 219] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Tokyo , June 15, 1947. 158. For the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Hilldring. Cite C 53370. Part 1 , Wire services are carrying charges against American occupation authorities by Soviet delegate Vladimir Koretsky at June 14 session United Nations Committee for International Bill of Eights. Koretsky reportedly charged that “American-controlled Japanese Government is closing its eyes to Fascist activities in this country;” that “old Japanese military clique remains in power and is arresting political leaders and militarists [ anti-militarists? ];” and that “no modification of the feudal landlord system has yet taken place in Japan.” No mention is made refutation these charges either by American delegate or any American Government spokesman. It is strongly felt in highest circles here that such refutation should be made by some Government agency citing facts to counteract what appears to be first Soviet attempt to make open charges against American occupation before United Nations group. Allegations in question are entirely groundless and false. They are a repetition of Soviet propaganda line which has long been familiar to us in Japan. Part 2 . Since earliest days of occupation we have been attacked by Soviet press and other sources with similar empty charges. Allied Council for Japan, set up as an advisory body to give Supreme Commander constructive advice, has often been improperly used as a sounding board for this kind unproven and unprovable propaganda. The Khabarovsk radio beams five broadcasts daily to Japan carrying anti-American, anti-occupation and Communist propaganda. Four of these broadcasts are in Japanese language and one in English. We do not know purpose of the English language broadcasts unless designed, with hope as false as the charges themselves, to affect morale of our young American soldiers here who are setting splendid example to Japanese population by their democratic conduct. As result of closest surveillance we know that the only false activities in this country are those being conducted by the Japanese Communist Party. The Communists recently launched a widespread underground campaign to expand their organization and develop and coordinate with it an organization of extreme Rightist elements. Latter have been sought by the Communists among repatriated Japanese officers and soldiers. Even for propaganda purposes it is difficult to see how Koretsky could expect allegation concerning “feudal landlord system” to stand light of day. Striking at roots of feudalism, agrarian reform was got under way October 1946 to enable some 2 million tenant-farmers to purchase the lands they now work. Shaped to break down large landholdings into 2½ to 10-acre parcels, this program involves transfer of ownership of from 4½ to 5 million acres. It is 2-year program gradually increasing in momentum and by early March 1948, 2½ million acres will have been transferred to farmer ownership. The threatened but abortive general strike set for February 1 was organized by Communist elements. Notwithstanding, strike would have restricted electricity, coal, food and transportation, water and sanitary services and would have thrown the unstable Japanese economy into chaos, neither SCAP nor Japanese authorities took any action against the leaders other than General MacArthur’s oral prohibition of the strike. There has been no police interference with labor, or political demonstrators except in the case of individuals who have turned to open violence. May Day demonstrations in which approximately one million Japanese participated were conducted without police or other interference. Part 3 . As Koretsky’s attacks may constitute opening of campaign in United Nations Organizations which we cannot readily answer here on basis of fragmentary news reports, we urge that State and War Departments adopt appropriate means of meeting false Soviet and other propaganda against the occupation. Atcheson Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division (VanSant) 894.628/6–1747 [Document 220] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the International Resources Division ( VanSant ) [ Washington ,] June 17, 1947. Participants: Members Sub-Committee on Fishing, of Committee 2, FEC: China: Dr. Koo, Chairman United States: Mr. Whitman, Mr. Bowman, JK; Mr. VanSant, IR Australia: Major Plimsoll Netherlands: Dr. Hart, Capt. Stam USSR: Mr. Korobochkin Philippines: Mr. Jovellanos This meeting was convened in an effort to effect a compromise of the impasse which developed last January and February in Committee 2, FEC, over the Australian proposal that any further extension of the Japanese fishing areas, as authorized June 22, 1946, be subject to prior approval by the FEC. The Chairman, Dr. Koo, suggested that FEC Paper No. C2–014/3 (this is a revision of the paper originally submitted by the member for Australia) be used as the basis for discussion. Since whaling is to be considered in a separate paper, that subject is eliminated from the present paper, and discussion was confined to the problem of fishing areas, and particularly to paragraph 2( b ) which reads “No extension of Japanese fishing beyond the foregoing area should be permitted without prior authorization by the FEC.” The Soviet member repeated his support of the provision as it stands. Mr. Whitman presented the U.S. position, emphasizing the importance of fish in the protein diet of the Japanese in view of the present impossibility of obtaining more than a very small quantity of soybeans, and the importance of permitting SCAP’s freedom, within the recognized considerations of security, to adjust fishing areas to meet the situation. The Netherlands members desired a copy of the report of the Harrison Mission on Japanese food supply, and the latest figures ‘on the Japanese fish catch and the prospective catch in the presently authorized area; he wanted evidence as to whether more intensive fishing in the present area would lead to serious depletion of the area, as is suggested in the Harrison Report. The member for the Philippines thought that the FEC–035 phrase “near areas under Allied jurisdiction” would be covered by keeping the Japanese at least 50 miles away. The Australian member repeated a former statement: that he felt that “near” would be “anywhere south of the equator.” He also desired that the Japanese be prohibited from pearl-fishing outside the present area. The Chairman presented the following redraft of paragraph 2( b ) as a suggested basis of compromise: “Extension of Japanese fishing beyond the foregoing area should be permitted in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission but no Japanese fishing operations should be permitted within . . . . . miles of any land area under jurisdiction of any foreign government without prior permission from the government concerned.” Mr. Whitman agreed to make an effort to obtain copies of the fisheries part of the Harrison Report and the statistics that the Netherlands member requested, all members will give consideration to the redraft of paragraph 2( b ), and another meeting will be held within the next two weeks. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC/6–1847: Telegram [Document 221] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) restricted Washington , June 18, 1947—7 p.m. 223. FEC 21. Property of War Criminals . FEC June 12 adopted policy decision of above title. Text follows: [Here follows text of FEC decision (204/11) printed in Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , page 101.] This policy paper was delayed for some weeks in Commission because of contention of some members that proceeds of confiscated property and fines should be available for reparations rather than occupation costs. Eventually four veto powers agreed on availability for occupation costs and dissenting members had to accept decision. 91 Marshall 91 The policy decision was embodied in a directive, serial 81, June 20, sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SCAP as War 80637 on June 20, and a copy was sent by the Department of State to the Far Eastern Commission on July 3. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.628/6–1947: Telegram [Document 222] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , June 19, 1947. 163. Cite 53489. 1. Following memorandum dated 17 June received today from Australian Mission: [“]The Australian Mission in Japan presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and has the honour to refer to the proposal for a second Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic. The Australian Government is deeply concerned that this proposal should have been made. It feels that this is a question of great importance to the future of Australia. It accepts the view that the food products of whaling expeditions are important for Japan but it believes that this objective can be achieved more effectively by other means which would be free of the undesirable and dangerous features associated with this proposal. Australian Government is confident that it could arrange and conduct a successful whaling expedition to the Antarctic during the coming summer if whaling vessels in the possession of Japan were quickly made available to it. It would be prepared to make appropriate arrangements with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the distribution of the food products to the Japanese people. It believes that an expedition conducted in this way would produce the maximum extraction of oil which would, of course, be distributed in accordance with world needs. The Australian Government most earnestly desires that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should give sympathetic consideration to this request.” 92 2. We are replying under this date as follows: “The Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, presents its compliments to the Australian Mission in Japan and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the latter’s memorandum of 17 June 1947 in regard to the question of a second Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic. As the Australian Mission is doubtless aware, this question has been and is at present a matter of discussion between the governments concerned. Nevertheless, in an endeavor to explore every possible area of agreement, the Mission’s proposal has been given the most careful study by this headquarters. On the basis of expert opinion it appears that the proposal is technically impracticable. It is assumed that it is the Australian concept that under the proposal Japanese whaling crews would man the vessels in question as the accommodations on the vessels are unsuitable to any but Japanese whalers accustomed to them. In such case the principal difference in conduct of the expedition would be that it would be under Australian control rather than under Allied control as was the first Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic. This Headquarters can perceive no advantage to the operation of a Japanese-manned and equipped expedition under Australian control rather than under SCAP control. On the contrary it is believed that any such arrangement would violate the underlying principle of the occupation that it shall have the character of an Allied operation under the executive authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Furthermore, to attain the maximum results for a 1947 expedition, active preparations therefor would [ therefor should ] have been initiated by May 15. The delay which would be involved in seeking Allied agreement to turn over Japanese whaling vessels to the Australian Government and in organizing any such expedition would obviate any possibility of obtaining from the forthcoming whaling season the needed food to assist the United States in supplying the deficit in this country. If in consequence of such agreement it were desired to use non-Japanese crews, the making of necessary alteration in the vessels would itself preclude any expedition during the forthcoming season. It is believed that the Australian Mission will readily appreciate these considerations. As mentioned above, the question of a second Japanese whaling expedition is under discussion between the United States, Australian and other interested governments and as such involves basic policies which can only be determined on the highest governmental level.” Atcheson 92 In its aide-mémoire of June 23 the Australian Embassy informed the Department of its concern and regret that action had been authorized without first considering the Australian protest and offer of an alternative. The latter included turning over to Australia for use in the whaling season of a Japanese factory ship and chasers. (894.628/6–2347) On June 25 the New Zealand Legation added its warm support to the Australian proposal of an alternative (894.628/6–2547). The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control(Japan)/6–1947 [Document 223] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State personal and confidential Tokyo , June 19, 1947. Dear Mr. Secretary : I enclose a copy of a letter of identic date addressed to the President making report on the current situation, principally economic, as we see it here. For the future, I believe that the ultimate success of the Occupation will depend to a great extent upon economic factors. I have not entered into any discussion of the question of formulating the peace. As you may know, the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Evatt, is planning to visit General MacArthur about July 6. This visit is being made at Mr. Evatt’s instance and as it will occur not long before the British Commonwealth conference at Canberra, we assume that Mr. Evatt’s primary purpose is to discuss plans for a peace treaty. While some exchange of ideas in broad outline may be inevitable, we propose to confine ourselves chiefly to listening. In the absence of instructions, I myself shall remain outside of any discussions so far as possible. My British colleague has several times indicated to me that he is without instructions as regards United Kingdom plans in connection with the Canberra conference—which leads to the assumption that the British are leaving leadership in the matter to the Australians. Sincerely yours, George Atcheson, Jr. [Enclosure] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to President Truman personal and confidential Tokyo , June 19, 1947. Dear Mr. President : We have been encouraged by recent statements of American officials at home reflecting growing interest in the development of a peace-time Japanese economy and in the question of formulating the peace. How long it will take Japan to become self-supporting no one can say. Even under the best of circumstances and with considerable foreign assistance—official and private—the Japanese will meet serious difficulties in re-vamping their shattered economy. Whether we like it or not, Japan is at present an economic responsibility of the United States and it is to our interest to assist in the process of getting the country on at least a minimum self-supporting basis. The partial reopening of Japan to private trade on August 15 will start a process which should be productive of good results in due course. Plans are under consideration for the setting up of some kind of self-liquidating revolving fund to finance the import of raw materials necessary for the manufacture of consumer goods to pay for necessary imports. Materialization of such plan will be of great help. Defeat left Japan with an unbalanced and broken economy cut off from the Asiatic mainland with which it had become integrated. There was little left. Industry lacked workers and raw materials and was at a standstill. Even before the war the Japanese had to import some 15 per cent of their food. After 21 months of occupation, industry has now inched its way toward recovery only some 30 per cent of the 1930–34 level. Lack of coal limits all industrial output including manufacture of needed coal-mining machinery. The rayon industry has come almost to a standstill. Cotton yarn output is about five per cent of 1937. Silk is only one–sixth pre-war and exports meet with poor sales because of the competition of synthetics. The development of the labor movement has been one of the greatest democratization processes in this country and has resulted in raising the cost of labor to the British level. This means that Japan will not be able to flood foreign markets with cheap goods. This of course is a good thing in the eyes of many foreign competitors, especially textile manufacturers, but it is also an important factor which will militate against rapid economic recovery here. Definitive settlement of reparations will give Japanese industry a considerable impetus, especially if ready means are found of financing the importation of raw materials. Conversely, some foreign claimants are unfortunately going to be disappointed in what they get and there are indications of resentment which is creating opposition to the recovery of Japanese economy to peace-time needs. Due to obsolescence, deterioration and other factors the available internal assets may not reach a roughly estimated basic value of more than US $625,000,000, with the estimated market value about one–fifth of that figure. While the external assets in Northern Korea, Manchuria and formerly occupied China and Formosa had a locally estimated value of US $27,000,000,000, I am afraid that the Chinese and others will not let that circumstance modify their resentment against us—and against Japan—in the matter. The new Japanese Cabinet has published its economic program and we are hopeful that it will have definitely good results in time. Meanwhile the dependents of our Occupation population are increasing with the constant addition of several hundred a month. This means that we are taking more and more houses, furniture, etc. from the middle class Japanese. In Tokyo we have taken most of the houses suitable under Occidental standards except those belonging to active Japanese Government officials. There is no question that the burden on the Japanese economy is increasing, and cannot be readily absorbed in an inflationary situation characterized by lack of goods and resulting black market control of supplies. I believe we are coming to a turning point in the Occupation. General MacArthur has remarked to me several times that there inevitably comes a time when a military occupation no longer serves its purpose and becomes a deterrent to its own objectives. We have not yet, of course, reached that stage. But there are signs that it is approaching. Recent remarks of the new Foreign Minister (Ashida) indicating that the Japanese wish the return of the southern Kuriles and Okinawa have caused an easily understood resentment in some foreign quarters. We do not believe Ashida speaks in this matter for the Japanese masses or even the Japanese Government. It seems to us here that retention by the United States of Okinawa (under the aegis of the United Nations or otherwise) is an essential to the maintenance of our future influence in this general area. Okinawa is of no economic value to Japan; on the contrary it was an economic liability. To us it is the western [remainder of text is missing from the files.] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) 894.628/6–2047 [Document 224] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Allison ) [ Washington ,] June 20, 1947. Participants: Mr. Knut Lykke, Counselor of Norwegian Embassy, and Mr. Allison Mr. Lykke called at his request this morning and handed me the attached aide-mémoire 94 presenting an official protest from his Government against the decision of the United States Government to authorize the second Antarctic whaling expedition under the control of SCAP. Mr. Lykke said he wished to emphasize the statement in the Norwegian aide-mémoire that his Government was not convinced of the vital necessity of Antarctic whaling for the purpose of supplying the Japanese population with proteins and that the necessary proteins might more economically be provided through an intensification of the Japanese fisheries. I told Mr. Lykke that I did not feel able to say any more at this time than had been told him before, but that I would pass on his remarks and copies of the aide-mémoire at once to the interested American authorities. 94 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC/6–2047: Telegram [Document 225] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) restricted Washington , June 20, 1947—5 p.m. 230. FEC 22. Basic Post-Surrender Policy . Policy paper of above title, which is amended version of U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy and with which you are undoubtedly familiar, accepted unanimously by Commission June 19 95 after having overcome 18 months of vicissitudes and delays. Latest was attempt by Australian representative to abandon paper because events have overtaken it and because peace conference may be held before long. This proposal received no support from other members who desired to confirm basic U.S. policies. U.S. also desired acceptance of paper by FEC because paper as amended contains certain principles advantageous to U.S. and not hitherto accepted by Allies. Australia then proposed to introduce amendment to effect that policies laid down in paper would not prejudice peace treaty discussions. After informal bilateral discussions Australia abandoned proposed amendment but read similar statement into record. This statement endorsed by Canada, New Zealand and United Kingdom and more or less agreed to by U.S., China and U.S.S.R. After some inconclusive discussion re period of validity of policy, paper was adopted. Policy paper will be published in U.S. after notification of receipt by SCAP, probably accompanied by press release embodying statements of delegates re connection with peace conference. Japanese Whaling . U.K. representative recently introduced into FEC policy paper which would restrict Japanese whaling to areas in which they are permitted to fish and would prohibit entirely Japanese pelagic whaling. Economic Committee June 12 approved policy by vote of seven to one, with U.S. disapproving and China, Philippines and U.S.S.R. reserving positions. Policy paper then sent to Steering Committee by vote of ten to one. At Steering Committee June 17 Blakeslee 96 American member made eloquent defense of U.S. position but received no support. Policy paper then sent to full Commission by same vote as in Economic Committee with Blakeslee disapproving policy but interposing no objection to passing it up to Commission. At FEC meeting June 19 General McCoy made statement to effect that U.S. views already made clear to interested governments by diplomatic exchanges; that “participation in Antarctic whaling by Japanese-manned ships under SCAP’s supervision is important in interest of Allied occupation”; and that U.S. Govt has “concluded that SCAP has authority to authorize another Antarctic whaling expedition and that he should do so”. Faced with this dictum other members abandoned discussion but voted to retain British policy paper on agenda. Marshall 95 For text, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 49. The document was embodied in a directive, serial 82, June 26, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SCAP, and a copy was sent by the Department to the Far Eastern Commission on July 8. Despatch 1174, July 17, from Tokyo (not printed) transmitted General MacArthur’s statement on the subject, which was released to the press at Tokyo July 13 at 7 a.m.; for text, see Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 774. 96 Dr. George H. Blakeslee, member of the U.S. delegation, Far Eastern Commission. Press Release Issued by the Headquarters of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 894.628/6–2347 [Document 226] Press Release Issued by the Headquarters of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 97 [ Tokyo ,] 22 June 1947. A second SCAP-controlled and Japanese-manned Antarctic whaling expedition has been authorized by the Supreme Commander pursuant to instructions from the United States Government. The reasons for this action are obvious. The last whaling expedition produced for Japanese consumption some 21,000 metric tons of needed protein foods which helped make up the food deficit in Japan. It also produced for the world market, which is in short supply, over 12,000 tons of whale oil and 11 tons of Vitamin A and D oil. It is expected that the second expedition will produce an equivalent amount of whale meat for consumption in Japan and an equivalent amount of needed oils for allocation to other parts of the world by the International Emergency Food Council. There is a continuing food shortage in Japan. The burden of supplying the deficit imports of food continues to fall upon the United States, which is also endeavoring to meet demands for food from many other countries. With their whaling fleets and trained crews the Japanese possess a means of providing additional food for themselves and of helping to meet a world deficit in oils. These utilities at this moment of need must be used. Not to do so would mean a direct cost to the United States of over U.S. $10,000,000, the equivalent of approximately 40,000 tons of wheat and an additional loss of approximately U.S. $6,000,000 in foreign exchange from the sale of whale oil. There was no Antarctic whaling during the war and the supply of whales there has accordingly increased so that no undue diminution of the whaling potential is involved. The second expedition, as was the case with the first, is being organized under the immediate supervision of Colonel Hubert G. Schenck, Chief of SCAP’s Natural Resources Section. Allied observers will supervise as before. The Antarctic waters in which the whaling is to be conducted are international. The SCAP observers accompanying the vessels will submit full radio reports daily and will require implicit observance of international whaling regulations. As SCAP-controlled Japanese manned ships operating to repatriate 5–½ million Japanese prisoners of war and civilians have during the past 18 months entered numerous Allied ports in the West and Southwest Pacific without incident, it is believed that no problem of security is involved in this second whaling expedition. 97 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 1133, June 23, from Tokyo, in which Mr. Atcheson reported his memorandum of June 21 to the members of the Allied Council for Japan, which transmitted to them the SCAP directive to the Japanese Government authorizing the whaling operations in question. The Department of State to the Australian Embassy 740.00119 Control (Japan)/5–2947 [Document 227] The Department of State to the Australian Embassy Aide-Mémoire The questions raised by the Australian Ambassador in his aide-mémoire left with the Under Secretary of State on May 29, 1947, 98 have been considered, and in reply the Australian Government is informed as follows: The Angaur Island phosphate industry has been operated by the United States Navy, employing American contractors to mine the phosphate rock. The output has been shipped to Japan to relieve the fertilizer shortage there, and a certain number of Japanese laborers have been employed in loading the rock for shipment. It is expected that control of the industry will shortly be transferred to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan. The Supreme Commander has indicated that when and if this transfer is effected, he intends to employ Japanese technicians, labor and equipment in place of the American personnel and facilities presently working the deposits, in order to reduce the dollar cost of the operations. He has not indicated that responsibility for the management of the enterprise will be transferred to the Japanese Government or to Japanese private interests, or that he has any other intention than to retain this responsibility in his own hands. However, in order that his precise intentions may be ascertained, and in order that he may be acquainted with the Australian Government’s views in the matter, the substance of those views is being transmitted to the Supreme Commander, and all pertinent information, with his comments, requested. The Australian Embassy will be advised of the United States position in the matter following receipt of the Supreme Commander’s reply. Regarding the second point raised in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire , Japanese have been invited to several international conferences abroad, in every case at the instance of the sponsoring organizations, and a Japanese recently attended the Rice Study Conference held under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization in India. This Japanese was authorized to advise on technical problems of rice production but on no other problems, and was in no sense a representative of the Japanese Government. It is the Department of State’s understanding that authorization for Japanese to attend the World Federation of Trade Unions Conference in Prague and the Union Postale Universale Conference in Paris has not yet been granted by the Supreme Commander in Tokyo. A comprehensive program, subject to appropriate limitations, for the interchange of persons between Japan and other nations to assist Japan’s reorientation and democratization is now under consideration by the United States Government, and will shortly be submitted to the Far Eastern Commission. The Australian Embassy was advised in a separate note dated June 9, 1947, 99 of this Government’s decision in the matter of a second SCAP operated, Japanese-manned Antarctic whaling expedition. Regarding the final point in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire , the Australian Government may be assured that the United States Government’s position in the matter of Japanese disarmament and demilitarization remains as stated in Article I( a ) of the Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan 1 submitted to the Governments of China, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom in April 1946. The Japanese Constitution, moreover, provides that “the maintenance of land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be authorized”. If, contrary to this provision of the Japanese Constitution, Japanese officials are indeed preparing proposals for a Japanese army, navy and air force for submission to the peace conference, the Embassy may be assured that such proposals will in no way influence the position of the United States in the matter. Washington , June 23, 1947. 98 See memorandum of May 29 by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, p. 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] . 99 See footnote 84, p. 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] . 1 See telegram 348, February 28, 1946, to Moscow, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 152 . The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/7–947: Telegram [Document 228] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , [June 24, 1947.] 170. CX 53602. 1. Reourtel 158, June 15th, Soviet charges against American occupation authorities and our top secret despatch No. 692, November 7th, 1946, 2 last two paragraphs. 2. DepartmentAs Department is aware from Nanking’s frequent reports, American occupation authorities are under almost daily false attack by Chinese Government-controlled press which repeatedly carries charges that we are building up Japan at expense of China; that General MacArthur is too lenient with the Japanese; that United States has abandoned ancient ally China for treasonable enemy Japan, et cetera. This propaganda is not only harmful to the occupation but undoubtedly is injurious to Sino-American relations. During recent visits here of Monnett Davis, 3 and Butterworth, 4 suggestion was made that we furnish USIS Shanghai with appropriate material for dissemination to Chinese press giving pertinent factual information concerning the occupation and our policies and also appropriate refutations of the constant stream of charges and allegations. 3. With present staff we are unable undertake task this nature, just as we have been unable for personnel reasons to meet numerous requests from Department for routine information of various kinds. Most practicable solution would be to assign here competent and experienced information officer, possibly one from Shanghai who understands Chinese press and problem of dealing therewith, and I request such assignment be made. This request has full endorsement of General MacArthur. 4. Such officer, working with appropriate SCAP officers, could also despatch radio information to USIS Shanghai regarding SCAP press releases and undertake preparation and despatch appropriate material to Canberra, Wellington, and New Delhi, all of which are sources of strong anti-American propaganda in connection with our Japan policies. In general, he would develop systematic flow of needed information concerning American policies and activities here to Pacific area sources of anti-American propaganda. With appropriate cooperation by our missions those places, much harmful misunderstanding of American policies and activities would be dispelled. 5. Meanwhile, suggest Department may wish to consider taking up with Chinese Government anti-American propaganda in Government-controlled press, especially in light of long standing American friendship with and assistance to China which has been concretely evidenced in the last few years, especially during wartime. 6. Please instruct. 5 Atcheson 2 Not printed. 3 Consul General at Shanghai. 4 W. Walton Butterworth, Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China. 5 In telegram 320, August 13, 6 p.m., to Tokyo, the Department indicated that it was sending a series of articles meant to counteract criticism of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Japan, but that the assignment of an information officer to Tokyo was not possible at the time due to budget cuts (740.00119 Control (Japan)/7–1547). The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.628/6–2647: Telegram [Document 229] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State restricted Tokyo , June 26, 1947. 171. Cite C–53639. We understand Australian Mission here is releasing to local foreign and Japanese press statement made in Canberra by Evatt 23 June as follows: “On 7th August, 1946 the Japanese Government was authorized by SCAP to undertake a whaling expedition to the Antarctic during the 1946–47 season. The principal reasons given for the authorization were the shortage of food in Japan and the world shortage of oils and fats. This action was taken unilaterally. There was no prior consultation with interested Allied Governments such as Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Norway. The Australian Government immediately made strong representations to the United States against the proposed form of the expedition, basing its objections on grounds of past prejudicial action by Japanese ships to Australian security, on earlier violations by the Japanese of the international whaling regulations and the inefficiency and wastefulness of Japanese whaling methods. It was a matter for special concern to Australia that decisions of this kind should be made unilaterally, while the occupation of Japan was still proceeding and in advance of the peace settlement and without reference to the overall question of reparations. The Australian protest was supported by Norway, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. It was brought forward in reply that in the interests of the world food and oil situation at the time and in face of the food situation in Japan, use should be made at once of available Japanese equipment for purpose of an expedition. After the Australian representations had been made, it was agreed that an Australian observer should accompany the expedition, furthermore, that an international flag should be substituted for a Japanese insignia, that the routes to be taken by the expedition to and from the Antarctic should be notified to interested governments and that the oil obtained as a result of the expedition should be subject to allocation by the International Emergency Food Council wherein the result authorization of the expedition became operative, but for the 1946–47 season only, the United States undertaking that other interested Allied governments would be fully consulted should any further Japanese fishing or whaling activities outside Japanese waters be contemplated. In addition, the United States agreed that the future of the Japanese whaling industry and the disposal of Japanese whaling equipment was a matter for decision by the Allies, including Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The Australian Government is resolutely opposed to the reestablishment of the Japanese whaling industry in Antarctic waters. Such reestablishment, which in effect means the creation again of a naval potential, is opposed to a just settlement with Japan and should be strenuously resisted by every Allied country which contributed to victory in the Pacific war. When it became apparent recently that notwithstanding the undertaking regarding consultation which had been given and notwithstanding the adverse report by the Australian observer with the first expedition on Japanese wastefulness and their disregard of international whaling regulations, it was proposed to send a second Japanese expedition to the Antarctic, the Australian Government made the positive and practical suggestion to the United States that a unit of the Japanese whaling fleet be operated by Australia, possibly with the aid of the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Norway. It was pointed out to the United States State Department that crews would be available from Australia and that all food, fats and oils from the expedition would be on account of and at the disposal of SCAP for distribution. The Australian offer was communicated to the State Department and while it was actually under consideration the announcement of a second expedition was made. In view of the assurances given on more than one occasion that a further Japanese expedition to the Antarctic would not be authorized without adequate prior consultation with interested powers, the decision yesterday to approve of a second Japanese whaling expedition for 1947–48, thereby by-passing the Far Eastern Commission, which alone is supposed to determine questions of policy and which actually has this matter on its business sheet for next Thursday, is opposed to the best long-term Allied interests. The Australian Government intends to press this question in the Far Eastern Commission in an endeavor to secure a review of the present proposal. The ultimate disposition of Japanese whaling facilities and equipment, as well as the question of the future of the Japanese whaling industry, must be a matter for Allied consultation and decision. The appropriate place for any decision that may be taken is the peace table. Meanwhile, the Far Eastern Commission should be permitted the opportunity to examine why so fair an offer as that of Australia should not be accepted in principle, subject to such safeguards as SCAP may suggest.” Atcheson The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 394.635/6–2847: Telegram [Document 230] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Tokyo , June 28, 1947 [—7 p.m.] [173.] C 53689. 1. SCAP Headquarters is issuing following to press: “A spokesman for General MacArthur’s Headquarters said: There has been brought to the attention of this Headquarters an Associated Press dispatch from London, dated 28 June, quoting a spokesman of the British Foreign Office as saying, ‘General MacArthur presumably did not consult the Far Eastern Commission or the British Government before authorizing the Japanese to operate a phosphate project on Angaur Island in the Palaus. Press reports of the decision represented the first intimation the British Government has received of the question.’ The facts of this matter are as follows: The operation of a phosphate rock project on Angaur, formerly a Japanese mandated island, has been in progress for over a year in order to supply Japan with required fertilizer to increase indigenous food production and reduce the amount of United States appropriated funds required to meet the food deficit in Japan. Such use of stockpiles of phosphate rock on Angaur Island was initially authorized by the Fertilizer Committee of the Combined Food Board, an international body on which the British Government has been represented. Subsequently, a contract was made with J. H. Pomeroy and Company, an American concern, for the mining of additional phosphate rock. When funds for this purpose expired, Washington authorized General MacArthur as Commander in Chief of the Far East Command to take over the project and operate it for occupation purposes with Japanese labor. The new arrangement for the conduct of the mining ensures the continuance of this essential enterprise. All expenses involved are being met by the Japanese. The mining equipment, which is American, is to be returned to the United States upon completion of the project. Angaur is a part of the Caroline Islands, formerly mandated to Japan but now under the trusteeship of the United States. As Anguar was captured by force of United States arms and is under United States control, there is no question as to the propriety of the United States utilizing the indigenous resources of the island to meet the vital needs of the Allied occupation of Japan. The Headquarters spokesman also stated that the reference made by the British Foreign Office to the Far Eastern Commission in connection with the Angaur project is not understood, as the Far Eastern Commission deals only with Japan proper.” End press release. 2. News story in question also stated, “Earlier the spokesman was reported to have said SCAP did not consult the Far Eastern Commission before allocating to the United States 100 of 400 permits for foreign businessmen to enter Japan. This was incorrect, the spokesman having misunderstood a question.” 3. British Foreign Office action appears to reflect an attitude (probably arising from disappointment over whaling decision) of seeking any possible chink in occupation administration to exploit as public criticism. This is corollary to Australian attitude manifest inter alia by Evatt’s June 23 statement which contained dishonesties in implication. It is felt in highest circles this Headquarters that this evident British Government tendency toward sharp open criticism of the occupation is especially deplorable at juncture when important issues depend upon maintenance of United States and British Commonwealth solidarity. It gives propaganda ammunition to those who for their own ulterior ends oppose our vital policies in world affairs and is exceedingly harmful to Allied interests in this part of the world. 4. Request this telegram be repeated to London 6 and that Department consider instructing Embassy make appropriate representations to British Government. [ Atcheson ] 6 This telegram was not repeated to London. In telegram 177, June 30, from Tokyo, Mr. Atcheson reported a conversation that day with the British Ambassador who had received an inquiry from London dated June 28 for information on the matter (862K.6377/6–3047). The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.635/6–2947: Telegram [Document 231] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , June 29, 1947—7 p.m. 174. Cite C 53696. Reference War 81105 received 28 June, Angaur Island phosphate project. 1. Suggest information in SCAP statement to press 28 June quoted in my 173, June 28, 7 p.m. be communicated to Australian Embassy and that Embassy be further advised: ( a ) That this Headquarters had no knowledge of Australian aide-mémoire of 29 May 7 and would have been glad at any time furnish complete information regarding the project which has been in process for more than one year; ( b ) that information furnished Embassy by Department regarding employment Jap technicians et cetera is correct except, as mentioned in press release, equipment is American which will be returned to United States upon project’s completion; ( c ) that, while Japs will be responsible for supply and maintenance sufficient personnel to insure non-retarding of operations presently under contract to Pomeroy Company, all aspects of operation are and will be under closest continuous observation and supervision by SCAP personnel; ( d ) that Jap personnel is being and throughout has been segregated in specific area under military government inspection and control; ( e ) that all Jap personnel will be returned to Japan on completion of project. 2. Australian aide-mémoire casts new light on British Foreign Office spokesman’s statement cited in my telegram under reference as, notwithstanding discussion between Department and Australian Embassy, it says incorrectly in so many words there was no discussion with any ally. This reinforces our impression that at Australian instance British Government is deliberately looking for possibilities of criticism of SCAP. Another example appears in MA 8 Melbourne message C 3547 quoting Melbourne Herald: “The manner in which General MacArthur has granted the Japanese permission to send a second whaling expedition to the Antarctic, with what appears to be a brusque disregard of America’s undertaking to consult other interested powers, is a justification for the protest that Australia has made.” 3. Telegrams from WD this subject since March give no indication any international problems in connection with it. Although Australian aide-mémoire was presented 29 May this headquarters had no knowledge thereof until receipt of War 81105 as routine message today, subsequent to issuance our press release and despatch my telegram under reference. Scapin 1736 to Japanese Government on Angaur project was issued 21 June and could have been withheld pending clarification with Australian Embassy if we had known Australia was raising objection. It is extremely embarrassing to this Headquarters to proceed on instructions from Washington and later learn of foreign objections and find itself the target of false and unwarranted foreign criticism. 9 Atcheson 7 Not printed. 8 Military Attaché. 9 In telegram 175, June 29, Mr. Atcheson expressed the hope that the Department would be in a position to counteract unwarranted British and Australian criticism of SCAP in connection with the second Antarctic whaling expedition and the Angaur phosphate project (894.628/6–2947). The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 894.628/6–3047: Telegram [Document 232] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) restricted Washington , June 30, 1947—7 p.m. 246. FEC 23. Japanese whaling . At FEC meeting June 26 Australian Ambassador made strong plea for adoption of UK proposal (see FEC 22 10 ). He asserted inter alia that presence of Japs in Antarctic waters is threat to security of Australia; that past depredations of Japan have reduced whales now available; that Jap methods of whaling are wasteful resulting in less oil available to world; that Jap whaling vessels are ill equipped; that US has ignored offer of Australia to man ships to secure meat and oil for Japan; that US has not fulfilled assurances given in 1946 that Australia would be fully consulted re future proposals concerning Jap whaling; and that question of Jap whaling in Antarctic is matter for decision by FEC and not for unilateral action by one government. Sir Carl Berendsen supported Australian views asserting that New Zealand realizes US responsibilities re feeding Japan and is willing to share those responsibilities but wants no Japs in Antarctic. UK representative endorsed Australian views but expressed opinion that pushing matter to conclusive vote now when diplomatic conversations are proceeding would only complicate situation. Canadian representative stated would support UK proposal; Canada realizes economic difficulties of US occupation of Japan but regrets unilateral action of US. Netherlands Ambassador stated his Govt holds opinion that whaling should be free but considers Japan still enemy country; Jap whaling should therefore be restricted to absolute necessity for food and limited to two Antarctic expeditions. Chinese Ambassador stated that he appreciated need for food in Japan but that security aspect of whaling expeditions should also be considered. French delegate asserted that Jap Antarctic expedition is matter of international and FEC concern. US representative stated that position his Government had been made clear and that he had nothing to add. Other members had no comments to make at this time. In view of fact that interested Govts are taking up matter of expedition with US Government through diplomatic channels FEC decided to postpone further consideration of UK proposal. Temporary Retention of Electric Steel Furnaces . FEC June 26 decided authorize SCAP continue utilization of electric steel furnaces; (see FEC 059/34) until July 31 pending decision by FEC on utilization for another year. 11 Marshall 10 Telegram 230, June 20, p. 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] . 11 For text of FEC decision, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 77. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) 894.628/7–147 [Document 233] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) [ Washington ,] July 1, 1947. Participants: Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State Sir John Balfour, Counselor, British Embassy Harold [ Hubert ] A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy Hugh Borton, Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs Sir John Balfour called at his request to present a note 12 on the subject of the second Japanese Antarctic whaling expedition objecting to the action taken by the United States Government authorizing a second whaling expedition without what they consider proper prior consultation and believing that the decision of the whaling expedition should be left to the Far Eastern Commission. The British note concludes that it hopes General MacArthur’s instructions can be countermanded and the question referred back for decision to the FEC and examination of alternative proposals made. The Under Secretary then pointed out that the problem seemed to divide itself into two aspects, namely, that of procedure and that revolving around the question as to whether or not the Japanese should be permitted to whale in the Antarctic. On the procedural question he stated that he regretted any difference of interpretation which might have been given to the action of this Government on May 27 when General Hilldring discussed the problem with representatives of the interested countries, the handing of our aide-mémoire of June 9 to representatives of the same countries and final instruction to SCAP on June 16 concerning authorization of the expedition. Mr. Graves then stated that in discussing the question of whaling in the Far Eastern Commission they had been led to believe that the United States would present a paper on whaling for consideration of the Commission. Mr. Borton then referred to an extract of the minutes of Committee #2 of the Far Eastern Commission of April 4, 1947 which stated that “The United States Member referred to the unofficial proposal made at the 48th meeting that if the Commission would agree to accept a fishing policy based substantially on FEC–035, the United States would give favorable consideration to an FEC paper providing that whaling beyond the area contained in Scapin 1033 should be subject to FEC approval.” Mr. Borton added that when such a statement was made it was not the intention of this Government to present the paper in question and that this may have been the cause for some of the misunderstanding. Mr. Lovett then outlined the difficulties confronting the Department vis-à-vis Congress in any program which requires expenditure of U.S. funds for assistance abroad and pointed out that the Department would be in an untenable position if it did not support a whaling expedition this year whereby the Japanese would be able to provide themselves with the necessary protein and oil without expenditure to the United States Government. In answer to a question as to whether enough Allied ships were available this year for catching the total maximum 16,000 blue whale units provided for in the whaling Convention, Mr. Graves answered that both the British and the Norwegians had begun construction of additional factory ships on the assumption that the consultations and Allied decisions mentioned in the note of this Government of October 4, 1946 13 would mean that no whaling expedition would take place this year. Mr. Lovett then remarked that if the British had acted on such an assumption they themselves were disregarding the significance of the phrase “Allied decision” and had themselves already decided there should be no expedition regardless of our views in the matter. Mr. Lovett further stated that he felt any action the British might have taken concerning the construction of additional ships should be considered as an ordinary business risk. So far as he could see the issue resolved itself into the simple question as to whether or not the Japanese would be allowed to whale. Mr. Graves stated that if they were allowed to whale in the place of the Japanese they would make available to Japan its normal whale oil requirements, but made no mention of whale meat nor would the proceeds from the other whale oil be available. Mr. Borton added that such an arrangement would not make available as credit in Japan the proceeds from the sale of the remainder of the whale oil. Mr. Lovett concluded by saying that he saw no solution to the problem unless agreement could be reached among the members of the whaling Convention to allow for a catch above the 16,000 blue whale units which, in all probability, would be equivalent to the difference between the 16,000 units and actual amount caught last year. Sir John Balfour thanked the Under Secretary for his explanation of the position of this Government and requested that this note be given careful consideration. 12 Not printed. 13 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 694.0031/7–247: Telegram [Document 234] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) restricted niact Washington , July 2, 1947—8 p.m. 252. Please inform SCAP. Press release quoted below will be released 12 noon 3 July. Number of entrants per country listed in press release may be accepted by SCAP as official allocations for his guidance. Cables relating to neutrals already in Japan and to traders entering from Russia have been given War Dept for transmission and press release below does not obviate need for SCAP’s answer to cables. Press release follows: [Here follows text of press release printed in Department of State Bulletin , July 13, 1947, page 102.] Marshall Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) 894.628/7–347 [Document 235] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) [ Washington ,] July 3, 1947—2:30 p.m. Participants: Norman J. O. Makin, Ambassador of Australia Alfred Stirling, Minister of Australia The Secretary J. H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State Hugh Borton, Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs Ambassador Makin called at his request to express further the views of his Government in reference to the proposed second SCAP-sponsored Antarctic whaling expedition. Ambassador Makin requested that he be allowed to read some notes which he had made in order that he could express more clearly the thought of his Government and people in reference to the whaling expedition. Ambassador Makin then read the attached, 14 adding only that Mr. Menzies, the minority leader in Parliament, had recently strongly supported Mr. Evatt’s stand on whaling so that the Australian people took a united stand on the matter. The Secretary replied that he was not prepared to answer Ambassador Makin today but that he would take his points into serious consideration. The conversation terminated at 2:39 P.M. 14 Not printed; it was a restatement of the Australian objections to a second whaling expedition involving Japan, a former enemy. The statement concluded with an expression of hope that the United States would review the matter which was regarded by Australia as of major importance and which deeply stirred the entire people of that country. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 862K.6377/7–347: Telegram [Document 236] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) restricted Washington , July 3, 1947—9 p.m. 255. Reurtel 175 June 29. 15 Reference Angaur project SecState at July 2 press conference made fol statement: [Here follows quotation of text printed in Department of State Bulletin , July 13, 1947, page 101.] Reference Antarctic whaling expedition Dept has consistently supported SCAP’s position in conversations with Ambassadors and other officials interested govts and in press conferences. Marshall 15 See footnote 9, p. 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] . The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.628/7–547: Telegram [Document 237] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Tokyo , July 5, 1947—8 p.m. 183. Cite C 58820. Reference War 81470 16 received 5 July subject Antarctic whaling. 1. Difficulty encountered by State Department this matter thoroughly appreciated here. Our concern has now gone beyond questions, important and compelling as they are, of food deficit and burden on American tax-payer. Australian distorted pronouncements and unwarranted criticisms have been so violent and so widely publicized in the Far East that, US decisions having been made and announced, question has resolved itself into one of upholding prestige of US in Japan and throughout Far East. 2. Our detailed views as follows: With reference penultimate substantive paragraph urtel we do not perceive that Australian proposal has any merit as indicated in our memorandum 19 June to Australian Mission quoted in our 163, 19 June to Department in part as follows: “On the basis of expert opinion it appears that the proposal is technically impracticable. It is assumed that it is the Australian concept that under the proposal Japanese whaling crews would man the vessels in question as the accommodations on the vessels are unsuitable to any but Japanese whalers accustomed to them. In such case, the principal difference in the conduct of the expedition would be that it would be under Australian control rather than under Allied control as was the first Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic. This Headquarters can perceive no advantage to the operation of a Japanese manned and equipped expedition under Australian control rather than under SCAP control. On the contrary, it is believed that any such arrangement would violate the underlying principle of the occupation that it shall have the character of an Allied operation under the executive authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Furthermore, to attain the maximum results for a 1947 expedition, active preparations therefor should have been initiated by May 15. “The delay which would be involved in seeking Allied agreement to turn over Japanese whaling vessels to the Australian Government and in organizing any such expedition would obviate any possibility of obtaining from the forthcoming whaling season the needed food to assist the United States in supplying the deficit in this country. If in consequence of such agreement it were desired to use non-Japanese crews, the making of necessary alterations in the vessels would itself preclude any expedition during the forthcoming season.” Australian statements that ships to be manned by Australians “and operated more efficiently than by Japanese,” and the “supplies at least as adequate as those which would be obtained from proposed Japanese expedition” are based on unjustified assumptions and do not conform to experience and results which might reasonably be expected from Australian crews and officers entirely lacking in whaling experience. 3. As regards final paragraph urtel it is our opinion that if Australia were willing to approve any SCAP-sponsored expedition, their complaints in regard to security and other aspects against full scale expedition would be completely vitiated. Technical reasons cited above ( a ) would make it impracticable to turn over remainder of equipment to Australians to operate in forthcoming season, ( b ) would mean giving Australians preference over other Allies which are presenting claims for Jap factory ships and auxiliaries and ( c ) would violate accepted principle of allocation of Japanese commercial shipping as matter for peace settlement. SCAP is without authority to allocate to any country Jap commercial vessels and ultimate fate of Jap whaling vessels will depend in first instance on Allied determination at Peace Conference of future of Jap whaling. 4. Australian contention that Australian people are up in arms is not accepted here. Not only have some Australian papers stated editorially that project is sound but local Australian officials other than MacMahon Ball have privately characterized Australian politicians’ sound and fury as tempest in teapot. It is the opinion here of those closely familiar with Australian political scene, that Australian protests flow from policy of endeavoring by loud assertion to bring Australia to place of effective predominance in the Far East. This in turn stems from internal Australian politics and political maneuvers of Australian officials who have made so much ill-considered public clamor in this matter. In the eyes of the Japanese people and other peoples in the Far East the carrying through of the second expedition has been blown up by the Australians into a matter of the prestige of the US and of SCAP; that is, having made a decision that is entirely just, humanitarian and practical, whether US and SCAP can or cannot be overridden by the unreasonable demands of officials of a small nation which desires Jap whaling vessels for own venal commercial interests. (It will be recalled that Australian Minister in China went so far as to issue statement to the Chinese people in the matter.) 5. Question of security interlaced with references to past Jap treachery et cetera which the Australians seem to have adopted as emotional foundation of their complaints is one which does not actually exist. It was correctly stated in this Headquarters press release 22 June: “As SCAP-controlled Japanese-manned ships operating to repatriate 5½ million Japanese prisoners of war and civilians have during the past 18 months entered numerous Allied ports in the west and southwest Pacific without incident, it is believed that no problem of security is involved in this second whaling expedition.” Sydney was one of such ports. Furthermore, while the Antarctic Ocean is not an Australian lake, appeasement of the Australians in this particular matter will undoubtedly support them in making factual their implied contention that freedom of the seas and use by others, of those international waters is subject to Australian approval. 6. Instructions to the Japanese Government in the matter have already been given and active preparations for the expedition have begun. The Jap Government and newly elected Diet have tendered formal expressions of gratitude for assistance to their problems which has been provided by the authorization. Due to its importance in the food deficit, authorization of the expedition has been featured most prominently by Japanese press and has provided very desirable and needed boost to Japanese morale to help carry them through the critical food situation. Reversal would have exceedingly unfortunate repercussions. 7. There seems to us to be involved also a simple question of right and wrong. This is the question whether we should uphold a decision that is based entirely on considerations of right. I have in mind not only the merits of the matter, which have been previously discussed, but also the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, notably: “(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the execution of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.” This principle was recently reaffirmed by Far Eastern Commission in its basic post-surrender policy for Japan: “1.2. d . Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials should be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations will be permitted.” The foregoing also follows the fourth basic principle laid down in: the Atlantic Charter as follows: “They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.” This principle is also one of those incorporated in the Declaration by the United Nations. 8. Any compromise of these principles or any appeasement of the Australians will without question seriously undermine American prestige in this part of the world. Appeasement will have most adverse effects on the occupation which has been so successfully carried forward by the prestige of the United States. Moreover, such appeasement would prejudice our position at the Peace conference not only because it would crown Australia’s unfair methods with success and encourage them to further utilization of such methods but would also point way to the Japs to seek selfish ends through the medium of loud complaint. Atcheson 16 Not found in Department files. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 501.BD/7–847: Telegram [Document 238] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) 17 restricted Washington , July 8, 1947—4 p.m. 260. Deptel 167 May 9. 18 In discussing terms of reference for ECAFE at meeting July 10 of Committee of the Whole in New York this Govt will propose the following terms of reference covering relationship between ECAFE, USAMGIK and SCAP. “The Commission may consult with representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan and with representatives of the US Army Military Govt in Korea and may be consulted by them for the purpose of mutual information and advice on matters concerning economies of Japan and Korea in relation to rest of Asiatic and Far Eastern economy.” Your comment requested. Marshall 17 Repeated to Seoul as No. 139. 18 Not printed. The Department of State to the Australian Embassy 894.628/6–2347 [Document 239] The Department of State to the Australian Embassy Aide-Mémoire The Department of State has considered the Australian Embassy’s aide-mémoire of June 23, 1947, 19 together with the points made orally by the Australian Ambassador to the Secretary of State on July 3, 1947, 20 and desires to state its position as follows: The great importance which the Australian Government attaches to the question of a second Japanese-manned Antarctic whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is noted. The Australian Government’s views regarding such an expedition were first made known in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of May 7 21 following reports in Japan that a second expedition was under consideration. On May 27 Assistant Secretary Hilldring acquainted representatives of the Australian, New Zealand, United Kingdom and Norwegian Governments with the United States position in the matter. On May 29 Ambassador Makin suggested the possibility to the Under Secretary of State that Australia undertake the expedition on behalf of Japan, and was informed by the Under Secretary that this Government would be glad to consider any specific proposals the Australian Government might wish to submit along these lines. On June 9 an aide-mémoire was handed a representative of the Australian Embassy 22 informing it that the United States Government had found it advisable to approve a second expedition on the urgent request of SCAP as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan. On June 17, six weeks after the Australian Government had become aware that a second expedition was under consideration, and three weeks after the United States position had been clarified to the representative of the Australian Government by Assistant Secretary Hilldring, an officer of the Embassy approached an officer of the Department of State to request the informal reaction of the United States Government to a proposal of the Australian Government to operate a Japanese whaling unit during the forthcoming whaling season in place of another Japanese-manned expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander. The United States Government would have been ready fully and promptly to state its views on this proposal at any time during the previous six weeks, but its position by June 18, when the proposal was placed before the responsible officers of the Department, had reached a definitive form in the statement already prepared and approved for reading by General McCoy to the Far Eastern Commission on June 19. Although the Supreme Commander requested authority by May 15 to conduct a second expedition in order to allow adequate time for the necessary preparations, it was not until June 19, over a month after this date, that final approval of the expedition was dispatdhed to him, affording the interested Governments ample time to submit any views or counterproposals they might have. The United States Government has been guided in its reply by the fact that the expedition last year under the Supreme Commander’s control resulted in the acquisition of considerable quantities of foreign exchange through the sale abroad of part of the whale oil obtained on the expedition. These funds have been available for the purchase of other foods needed in Japan, permitting a significant reduction of the occupation burden on the American taxpayer, and would not be obtained by the United States from the 1947–48 expedition under the Australian proposal. As indicated in the United States Government’s aide-mémoire of June 9 to the Australian Embassy, this Government perceives no security threat to any nation in a second whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander. In the absence of apparent security risk, or of any probability that international whaling regulations will not be fully observed, there appears to be no justification for the abandonment of the second expedition. The United States regards the expedition as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan, which is the policy of this Government. It is regretted that under the circumstances the United States Government does not feel free to accept the Australian Government’s proposal contained in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of June 23. 23 Washington , July 9, 1947. 19 See footnote 92, p. 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 222 ] . 20 See footnote 14, p. 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] . 21 See footnote 69, p. 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 207 ] . 22 See footnote 84, p. 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] . 23 This concluding paragraph was quoted in telegram 264, July 10, 7 p.m., to Tokyo (894.628/7–1047). The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.60/7–1047 [Document 240] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State restricted No. 1163 Tokyo , July 10, 1947. The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose copy of a memorandum to the Japanese Government (Scapin 1741) subject: “Dissolution of Trading Companies”, issued by this Headquarters on July 3, 1947. 24 This directive, providing specific instructions for the dissolution of the Mitsubishi and Mitsui Trading Companies by the Japanese Holding Company Liquidation Commission, is an addition to directives dated November 6, 1945 (Scapin 244) 25 and July 23, 1946 (Scapin 1079) 26 respectively, dealing with the dissolution of large holding companies in Japan. In conversation with an officer of this Mission, the Chief of the Anti-trust and Cartels Division, Economic and Scientific Section of this Headquarters, has stated that, with the exception of the two large trading companies mentioned above and a very few others which are not essential to the Japanese economy and which produce no goods, it is intended that individual components of restricted companies (so-called “Zaibatsu” concerns) will be reorganized rather than dissolved. However, he believes that the directive of July 3 will impress the Japanese business world with the possibility of prompt and effective dissolution, and will spur other restricted concerns to submit plans for reorganization as requested by this Headquarters. In addition, he feels that permitting firms such as the Mitsubishi and Mitsui Trading Companies to enter into foreign trade with the advantage of their foreign contacts and previous informal cartels might result in such trade being directed to former subsidiary companies in Japan, leaving new businesses and small manufacturers in a disadvantageous position. 24 For text, see Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 569. 25 Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 565. 26 Ibid. , p. 567. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 Control(Japan)/6–1547: Telegram [Document 241] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , July 11, 1947—6 p.m. 268. Dept has made extensive investigation of circumstances surrounding charge made by USSR delegate Koretsky at June 14 session United Nations Committee for International Bill of Rights as reported in urtel 158, June 15. It has only recently been possible to obtain direct statements from members of delegation who were present at meeting in New York. From their testimony it appears that statement regarding Japan made by Koretsky occupied not more than 5 minutes of long tirade which lasted approximately one hour. Official summary record of proceedings devote approximately 3½ pages to speech of Koretsky of which only 8½ lines are occupied with his remarks on Japan. Koretsky’s whole statement, including that part referring to Japan, was so intemperate that American delegation at meeting felt it was more dignified to ignore the charges made rather than to give them prominence by making an answer. Dept is developing mechanism for furnishing US delegations on various UN commissions with information about US policies and administration in Japan which will make it possible for immediate answers to be given to unjustified criticism when this appears to be warranted. Marshall The Associate Chief of the Division of Occupied Areas (Schuler) to the Secretary of the International Missionary Council in New York (Decker) 740.00119 Control (Japan)/6–2747: Telegram [Document 242] The Associate Chief of the Division of Occupied Areas ( Schuler ) to the Secretary of the International Missionary Council in New York ( Decker ) Washington , July 11, 1947. Reference your telegram June 28 addressed to the Secretary. 27 Department is deeply aware of importance reestablishing cultural ties between Japan and other countries earliest possible date and deems it unfortunate that absence Japanese delegates at International Missionary Council meeting might be interpreted as United States fear of allowing Japanese Christians have friendly intercourse with Christians of other lands. Interchange of persons policy with respect to Germany adopted of course on October 16, 1946. Department is endeavoring every way possible to expedite policy decision with respect to Japan now being considered in Far Eastern Commission. Toward that end your telegram has already been brought to attention of Commission. However successful conclusion of delicate international negotiations on broader issues involved would appear preclude at present time requesting that any exceptions be made to general rule of not permitting movement of Japanese nationals prior to Allied policy decision. Frank A. Schuler, Jr. 27 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.00115 PW/7–1547 [Document 243] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 1170 Tokyo , July 15, 1947. The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch No. 1140, June 30, 1947, with which were enclosed copies of an exchange of correspondence between this Headquarters, the Japanese Government, and the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan 28 regarding Japanese prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. A reply dated July 10 has just been received from the United Kingdom Liaison Mission to Japanese Government memorandum No. CLO 3941 (RJ), May 24, 1947, in which it is stated that “it is hoped that the repatriation of Japanese personnel under British control in South East Asia will be completed by December 1947”. The Japanese Government has been informed accordingly. 28 None printed. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 894.50/7–2147 [Document 244] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State No. 1180 Tokyo , July 21, 1947. [Received August 1.] The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose 29 copy of a translation of an eight-point economic policy statement made by the Katayama 30 Cabinet on June 11, 1947. The successful implementation of this policy, which makes broad general promises, appears most difficult in the face of a severe shortage of basic materials and the continued inability of appropriate Japanese agencies to enforce economic controls. There are also enclosed five copies in English translation and one copy in Japanese of a so-called “white paper” published July 4, 1947 in which the Economic Stabilization Board draws certain general conclusions from a statistical analysis of the present critical economic situation in Japan. In the paper an attempt is made to explain national economic and financial difficulties to the public by comparing them to similar problems faced by Japanese families. The Board’s research into the matter is presumed to have been instituted as a result of a letter dated March 22, 1947 from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to former Prime Minister Yoshida, drawing attention to the necessity for economic stabilization. It is probable that the Cabinet published the study in an attempt to explain increasingly stringent economic conditions to the Japanese public, a considerable part of which seems to have expected miraculous results from the new Cabinet. A more pressing reason for publication of the “white paper” became apparent on July 5, 1947 with the announcement by the Japanese Price Board of a wage-price policy supporting an average wage one-third less than that demanded by the labor unions. There is enclosed a copy of this statement in Japanese with a translation thereof. Inasmuch as the Social Democratic Party derives its principal support from labor it may have been felt politically necessary to explain the refusal of the latter’s wage demands in the light of Japan’s deplorable economic state and to justify beforehand a low-wage policy. The wage-price policy statement points out that the worker is benefited from an increase in “real” wages rather than “money” wages and declares that the best method of increasing the former is to freeze the latter, improve distribution, and increase production. With regard to the “white paper”, editorials in the Yomiuri, Jiji, Mainichi, Nippon Keizai , and Asahi newspapers of July 5, 1947 (enclosed in Japanese original together with a summary thereof by Interpreter Y. Kamii of this Mission) welcomed the publication of an admittedly unfavorable statistical study, a new departure in Japanese governmental tradition. Several of the newspapers saw in the publication of such a study a possible attempt on the part of the Katayama Cabinet to prepare an excuse usable in the event of future failure of its economic policy. Most of the editorials warned of the necessity for forbearance and patience on the part of the public and one newspaper drew the conclusion that only by such patience could foreign economic aid so necessary to economic rehabilitation be obtained. 29 Enclosures mentioned in this despatch not printed. 30 Tetsu Katayama, Japanese Prime Minister since May 24, 1947. The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Officers 694.0031/7–2247: Circular airgram [Document 245] The Secretary of State to Diplomatic and Consular Officers Washington , July 22, 1947—8:35 a.m. I. Opening of Limited Private Trade in Japan Limited private international commercial relations with Japan will be available after August 15, when private traders may enter Japan for trade purposes, although no contracts may be consummated until September 1. While Japan remains in status of enemy nation it will be necessary that controls be maintained; however, they will be relinquished earliest feasible, many of them before signing of peace treaty. Quotas and Entry Permits: —Due to shortage of accommodations, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) has provided overall limitation of 400 traders during initial stages. Inter-Allied Trade Board of FEC has established quotas for various countries as follows: US 102; UK and colonies 64; China 64; Netherlands and colonies 27; India 39; Australia 23; France and colonies 16; Canada 8; Philippines 6; New Zealand 6; all other countries 45. 31 SCAP will probably arrange for representatives of USSR trading organizations to be included in USSR mission presently in Tokyo. Within its established quota, US through Dept of Commerce selects American business firms on basis of commercial competence, past experience, availability of desired goods in Japan, and on basis of probable contribution to Japan’s trade. Although primary consideration given to applicants who will expand Japanese exports, sellers of raw materials which are needed and essential in Japan will be given consideration. Applications for entry for purpose of property inspection and pursuit of substantial investment interests will also be given consideration. Nationals of other FEC countries should apply to their governments, who will select on bases similar to those of U.S., and request SCAP to issue entry permits for those selected. Nationals of non-FEC countries should apply to SCAP through their Governments. Where such country has no mission in Tokyo, Dept of State will upon request transmit application to SCAP. All Governments will presumably issue passports to applicants upon receipt of SCAP’s approval. U.S. nationals outside continental U.S. should apply Dept Commerce through Dept State facilities unless they are representatives of U.S. firms, in which case application must be made by the firm on behalf the representative. If representing foreign firm, must go on that country’s quota. Method of transportation responsibility of applicant, entrance permits valid for 21 days, subject to renewal upon application to SCAP and Government of applicant. It is not anticipated that dependents will be permitted entry at this time. Each trader must bring two copies passport photographs 13/8΄΄ x 17/8΄΄ for issuance identification cards on arrival. Innoculation for Japan and Korea as follows: Typhoid and smallpox within a year before arrival, typhus and cholera within six months. Accommodations and Services: —Hotel accommodations, transportation, and communication facilities within Japan will be handled by Japanese, under SCAP supervision. Food for trade representatives will be provided from imports in order that critically short subsistence supplies of Japanese will not be further depleted. During the initial period visitors will pay in U.S. dollars for services rendered and cost may be estimated to approximate commercial rates. Until more accommodations are available, traders will be billeted in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, with other trips to nearby cities permissible by arrangement. Recreational, entertainment, and medical facilities will be provided to extent possible. Business services such as banking, shipping, and insurance will be offered as rapidly as available. To extent required, international interests to provide such service will be permitted entry prior to and after August 15 without counting against quota. Applications by such firms should be made directly to State Dept. Pricing, Payment, and Other Business Arrangements: —Initially there will be no foreign exchange rate established but this will be done as soon as practicable. An arbitrary rate set now would be unrealistic and unfavorable to some transactions because of wide range of prices within Japan and consequently would restrict total volume of trade. In so far as possible prices will be negotiated by SCAP commodity specialists, based upon world prices, competitive bids, etc., but this will not prevent individual traders from discussing prices and other contract terms with Japanese producers. Prices will be quoted in dollars, but sales may be consummated in any currency acceptable to SCAP to whom payment is made, Pricing will be transferred to Japanese at earliest practicable date. Transactions approved by SCAP will be licensed by the Japanese Government and validated by SCAP. SCAP will not become a party to the transaction, which is strictly between buyer and Boeki Cho, the Japanese Board of Trade. SCAP will endeavor to prevent undue advantage to Allied and neutral nationals now residing in Japan in connection with closing of transactions. SCAP will not provide warranty on any merchandise and Japanese Government will assume full responsibility for fulfillment of contracts. SCAP will receive matters of dispute or adjustment forwarded through Allied governments and will take all possible steps to cause Japanese government to make proper adjustments. In so far as it is feasible to do so Japan’s foreign trade is to be administered in accordance with the relevant principles of the draft charter for an International Trade Organization. In adopting draft Charter principles to problems peculiar to Japan, emphasis will be placed upon specific Charter principles barring trade restrictions and discriminations, rather than upon its permitted exceptions which are designed, in the main, to cover emergency and temporary situations. In case of some items in world short supply, sales will conform with allocations established by international control agencies. Traders entering Japan to purchase exports should provide themselves with irrevocable letter of credit for purpose of payment. In determining acceptability of foreign currencies SCAP will be guided by the FEC directive, which specifies that payment for Japanese exports may be made in currencies: (“ a ) Freely convertible into currencies which can be used for purpose of procuring necessary imports. (“ b ) Inconvertible, but usable to pay for imports already or concurrently purchased, but not paid for. “( c ) Inconvertible but stable in value and subject to specific agreement with areas within which the currency is valid subject to the condition that excess balances of the currency in question arising from sale of Japanese exports, not usable for purchase of imports within a reasonable time period, will be made convertible into dollars.” Anticipated that transactional communications will be available in near future although mail for ascertaining facts and exchanging information is now permissible. Transactional mail will include privilege to exchange samples. Air mail transactions will be available at the earliest date consistent with establishment of commercial air mail facilities. Information on U.S. customs and tariffs will be available to traders in Tokyo. Insurance on export shipments may be provided either through the offices of insurance companies permitted to enter Japan or by the necessary coverage supplied by the consignee in his home country. Telegraph communications will be permitted. Messages will be paid for in Japan in dollars or at the receiving end in the currency of the country concerned. Governments having missions in Japan should be urged to have their missions maintain close liaison with SCAP for latest developments on procedures and lists of items available. General List of Goods Available: —Raw silk, cotton textiles, and the 1947 tea crop will continue to be sold and purchased through the medium of governmental agencies. The following list (by principal category) is subject to revision upon notice from the theater: [Here follows list of items available.] Marshall 31 In circular airgram of September 4, 8:55 a.m., the Department indicated that the statement that all other countries would share 45 places had been changed as follows: “Six places have been reserved for USSR and quotas have been established for 9 non-FEC countries as follows: Belgium and Luxembourg 3; Sweden 3; Egypt 3; Switzerland 2; Norway 2; Argentina 2; Siam 2; Union of South Africa 2; all other countries one each (first come first served).” (694.0031/9–447) The Department of State to the British Embassy 894.628/7–147 [Document 246] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The Department of State has considered the British Embassy’s notes of June 17 32 and July 1, 1947, 33 in which it is stated to be the view of the British Government that the United States Government did not abide by its commitment to consult with other interested governments before authorizing a second SCAP-administered whaling expedition; that discussion of policy with regard to whaling and fishing in the Economic Committee of the Far Eastern Commission was adjourned in February, 1947, on the understanding that the United States member would put forward fresh draft policies for Japanese fishing and whaling, respectively, which was not subsequently done; that an alternative proposal by the Australian Government for the conduct of an expedition under Australian and other Allied auspices did not appear to have received any consideration by this Government; and that because of these and other considerations the instructions to the Supreme Commander authorizing a second expedition should be countermanded and the question referred back for decision by the Far Eastern Commission and for examination of alternative proposals. The British Government’s opposition to a second Antarctic whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander was first made known to this Government in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of April 30 following reports in Japan that a second expedition was under consideration. The contents of this aide-mémoire had been thoroughly considered when on May 27 Assistant Secretary Hilldring consulted with representatives of the British, Australian, New Zealand and Norwegian Governments to obtain a full expression of those Governments’ views regarding a second expedition, and to acquaint them with United States thinking on the subject at that time. After further careful consideration of the four Governments’ views, aide-mémoire were handed their representatives on June 9 stating that it had been found advisable to authorize the expedition notwithstanding their objections, with which this Government could not concur, because of the expedition’s importance to the reestablishment of a self-supporting economy for Japan. In order that the various Governments might have additional opportunity to present their views it was decided to withhold authorization of the expedition for another week, in spite of the fact that the Supreme Commander had informed the Department that the Japanese would need to know before May 15, one month previously, whether the expedition was to be permitted if they were to have adequate time to complete the necessary preparations. By June 17, when the first British protest was received, the United States position had reached a definitive form in the statement already prepared and approved for reading by General McCoy to the Far Eastern Commission on June 19. It is the view of the United States Government on the basis of the above record of events extending from late April to June 20, when authorization for the expedition was finally given, that this Government fully complied with its commitment to consult with other interested governments, and that ample time was afforded for the presentation by those governments of their views in the matter and any counterproposals they might wish to make. It is a cause of some concern to the United States Government that in the light of these events, particularly the consultations in Assistant Secretary Hilldring’s office on May 27, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have stated in the House of Commons on June 30 that “The United States Government did not consult with the other interested governments, which include the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, before authorizing the second Japanese whaling expedition in the Antarctic.” As regards the understanding in the Economic Committee of the Far Eastern Commission that the United States member would put forward fresh draft policies for Japanese fishing and whaling, respectively, the United States Government regrets that this assurance should have been given, even orally and informally, and the promised papers not subsequently submitted. Work on the papers was begun, but exchanges of view with the Supreme Commander and among the concerned agencies of the Government required more time than had been expected, with the result that the United States position had not yet been determined when a message from the Supreme Commander requesting authorization for a second whaling expedition was received. It was never the intention of the United States Government, or of its representative in the Economic Committee, to forestall discussion of the matter in the Committee, or to deter members who disapproved of this Government’s whaling policy filed with the Commission as FEC–035 to submit alternative proposals for consideration by the Commission. Regarding the Australian Government’s proposal for the conduct of an expedition under Australian and other Allied auspices, the United States Government would have been ready fully and promptly to state its views on this proposal at any time during the six weeks intervening between the time when the interested Governments first became aware that a second expedition was under consideration and the time when the Australian Government’s proposal was received on June 18. As earlier stated, the United States position had by that time reached a definitive form in the statement prepared for reading by General McCoy the following day to the Far Eastern Commission. Nevertheless, in view of the Australian Government’s proposal and of the British Embassy’s notes of June 17 and July 1, 1947, the position of the United States Government was carefully reviewed by the highest officers of the Department and further consultations held with the Supreme Commander in the matter. A reply, of which the concluding paragraphs are quoted below, was addressed to the Australian Embassy on July 9: “The United States Government has been guided in its reply by the fact that the expedition last year under the Supreme Commander’s control resulted in the acquisition of considerable quantities of foreign exchange through the sale abroad of part of the whale oil obtained on the expedition. These funds have been available for the purchase of other foods needed in Japan, permitting a significant reduction of the occupation burden on the American taxpayer, and would not be obtained by the United States from the 1947–48 expedition under the Australian proposal. “As indicated in the United States Government’s aide-mémoire of June 9 to the Australian Embassy, this Government perceives no security threat to any nation in a second whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander. In the absence of apparent security risk, or of any probability that international whaling regulations will not be fully observed, there appears to be no justification for the abandonment of the second expedition. The United States regards the expedition as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan which is the policy of this Government. It is regretted that under the circumstances the United States Government does not feel free to accept the Australian Government’s proposal contained in the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of June 23.” The United States position with regard to the projected second whaling expedition has been finally determined after full consideration of the British Government’s and other interested governments’ views and counterproposals. The United States Government accordingly regrets that it is unable to comply with the British Government’s request that General MacArthur’s instructions be countermanded and that the matter be referred back to the Far Eastern Commission. 34 Washington , July 23, 1947. [For text of Far Eastern Commission policy decision (FEC–032/26) approved July 24, 1947, regarding “Interim Import-Export Policies for Japan”, see Department of State, Far Eastern Series No. 29: The Far Eastern Commission, Second Report by the Secretary General, July 10, 1947–December 23, 1948 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pages 31–34. It was embodied in a directive, serial 84, August 1, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SCAP, and a copy sent by the Department on August 14 to the Far Eastern Commission (694.0031/8–847).] 32 Not printed. 33 See memorandum of July 1, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, p. 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] . 34 A reply in similar terms was made to the New Zealand Legation on the same date (894.628/6–2547). In a briefer reply to the Norwegian Embassy, also on the same date, the Department stated: “Since the Norwegian Government is already aware of the compelling considerations which caused this Government to authorize the expedition, as this Government is aware of the Norwegian Government’s opposing arguments, it is believed there can be no advantage in further elaboration of the respective ‘positions.” (894.628/6–2047) The Department of State to the Australian Embassy 740.00119 Control(Japan)/5–2947 [Document 247] The Department of State to the Australian Embassy Aide-Mémoire The Department of State desires to refer to the Australian Embassy’s aide-mémoire of May 29, 1947, 35 and to this Government’s reply of June 23, 1947, regarding the operation of the rock phosphate industry on Angaur Island. The Embassy was informed that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan would be advised of the Australian Government’s views in the matter, that all pertinent information would be requested from the Supreme Commander with his comments, and that the Embassy would be advised of the United States position following receipt of the Supreme Commander’s reply. In his reply the Supreme Commander has called the Department of State’s attention to a press release issued by his Headquarters on June 28, 1947, the pertinent portions of which are quoted below: “The operation of a phosphate rock project on Angaur, formerly a Japanese mandated island, has been in progress for over a year in order to supply Japan with required fertilizer to increase indigenous food production and reduce the amount of United States appropriated funds required to meet the food deficit in Japan. Such use of stock piles of phosphate rock on Angaur Island was initially authorized by the Fertilizer Committee of the Combined Food Board, an international body on which the British Government has been represented. Subsequently, a contract was made with J. H. Pomeroy and Company, an American concern, for the mining of additional phosphate rock. When funds for this purpose expired, Washington authorized General MacArthur as Commander in Chief of the Far East Command to take over the project and operate it for occupation purposes with Japanese labor. The new arrangement for the conduct of the mining ensures the continuance of this essential enterprise. All expenses involved are being met by the Japanese. The mining equipment, which is American, is to be returned to the United States upon completion of the project. “Angaur is a part of the Caroline Islands, formerly mandated to Japan out now under the trusteeship of the United States. As Angaur was captured by force of United States arms and is under United States control, there is no question as to the propriety of the United States utilizing the indigenous resources of the island to meet the vital needs of the Allied occupation in Japan.” The Department of State has further been informed by the Supreme Commander that his Headquarters would have been glad at any time to furnish the Australian Government with complete information regarding the Angaur phosphate project, which has been in operation for more than a year; that the information furnished the Embassy by the Department of State in its aide-mémoire of June 23 regarding employment of Japanese technicians and laborers in order to reduce the dollar cost of the operation was correct, but that, as mentioned in the above-quoted press release, American-owned equipment is being employed rather than Japanese; that all aspects of the operation are and will remain under the close and continuous observation and supervision of personnel of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters; that Japanese personnel on the island are and throughout the operation have been segregated in a particular area under military government inspection and control; and that all Japanese personnel will be returned to Japan on completion of the project. It is the view of the United States Government that operation of the Angaur Island phosphate industry by a small number of Japanese technicians and laborers under the strict supervision and control of the Supreme Commander does not threaten the security of or otherwise injure any nation, while permitting a significant saving in occupation costs. Washington , July 24, 1947. 35 See memorandum of May 29, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, p. 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] . The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) 894.50/7–2247 [Document 248] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) Washington , July 25, 1947. Dear Mr. Petersen : This is in further reference to my letters in regard to the appointment of a War Department expediter. The Department of State has just submitted to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee a proposed SWNCC paper No. 381 entitled “Revival of the Japanese Economy”. 36 The Department of State considers that the program proposed in this paper is of the utmost importance and that it should be treated as a matter of the highest priority within the United States Government. Past experience, for example with reference to the Greek and Turkish Aid Program, 37 would seem to indicate that the many and varied Washington functions necessary to this program’s success will only be performed adequately if one person is specifically responsible for that performance and has sufficient time and authority to take the initiative in bringing it about. It is believed that the above program is too important, too large, and too specialized to be included among the functions of some existing group or persons. It is therefore suggested that an executive of unquestionable stature and ability be appointed to coordinate all operations in the United States relating to the program for rendering Japanese self-supporting proposed in SWNCC 381. This executive could also very well function as Expediter for Japanese trade developments in cooperation with the Advisory Committee on Occupied Areas Affairs thereby permitting the present Expediter to specialize in problems relating to German trade development. I shall appreciate your views on the possibility of an early appointment of such an additional executive. Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring 36 Dated July 22; a copy was sent in instruction 538, July 30, to Tokyo for the information of the Political Adviser in Japan. 37 For documentation on this subject, see vol. v , pp. 1 ff. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/7–2647 [Document 249] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State restricted No. 1191 Tokyo , July 26, 1947. The Political Adviser for Japan has the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch no. 1164, July 10, 1947, 38 and to previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, and to forward as enclosures five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the Thirty-seventh Meeting of the Council held on July 23, 1947. 38 “Progress of the Implementation of the Rural Land Reform of 1945”, proposed by the Soviet Member, was the only subject on the Agenda under official matters. While the Soviet Member had lodged no complaints against the Land Reform Law at the time of its promulgation, it became readily apparent that his purpose in placing the matter on the Agenda was to emphasize, without supporting facts, his allegations that the program was a “halfway program”; that it was entirely “unsatisfactory”; and that its implementation was being unduly prolonged. As is well known to those who have studied this subject, the program is a complex one of great scope and cuts deeply through the basic traditions of the Japanese people, the majority of whom gain their living by tilling the soil. The principal objectives of the land transfer phase of the reform program are twofold: one, purchase by the Japanese Government of the great portion of the tillable land previously owned by landlords rather than by working farmers and, two, the re-sale of this land to tenant-cultivators. This program is moving forward according to plan; indeed purchase of land by the Japanese Government is ahead of schedule. However, presentation of facts (as was the case when the subject was previously discussed in the Council) appeared to have no effect upon the Soviet Member’s determination to brand the program as unsatisfactory. His prepared introductory statement begins on page 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] of the Minutes and his final statement begins on page 16 [ Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] . Dr. L. I. Hewes, Scientific Consultant with the Agricultural Division of Natural Resources Section of Headquarters attended the meeting and at the request of the Chairman made pertinent comment on various of the Soviet allegations. The main body of Dr. Hewes’ remarks is to be found commencing on page 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] of the Minutes. The Chairman, by way of summarizing his opinion which is a considered one, stated that we (referring to the American Occupation authorities) were very much pleased with the way the program is progressing, especially in the light of the democratic methods being followed (page 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] ) and that he regarded the program as one of the really great accomplishments of the Occupation and one of which all the Allies could be proud (page 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 11 ] ). The Chairman mentioned that the program was a short two-year program but nevertheless had avoided the difficulties encountered in many other countries and mentioned that there has been no widespread violence or bloodshed, no terrorist activities, no repressions and no liquidation of peasants or landlords; that the peasant has stayed on the land; that the products have continued to be grown; and there has been no resettlement of farm families, no seizure of farm products or personal belongings, and no confiscation of land without compensation. The British Commonwealth Member (Mr. MacMahon Ball of Australia) went to the aid of the Soviet Member and raised objections to the reading by Dr. Hewes of a paper outlining in general and entirely inoffensive terms the difficulties encountered and the length of time required in various countries in seeking land reform. One of the results of this ostensible endeavor to block what he erroneously anticipated would be an attack upon Soviet methods was that Reuters’ account of the meeting was to the effect that on the eve of the visit to Japan of Dr. Evatt, Australian Foreign Minister, a “clash” occurred in the Council between the British Commonwealth Member and the American Member. The paper to which Mr. Ball objected is inserted in the Minutes beginning on page 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] . In response to a sarcastic reference by Mr. Ball to his experience in the Council, the Chairman made the following remarks: “I, for one, would be very happy to avoid a good many of the discussions we have had here in this Council. But if the Members of the Council wish to use, or mis-use, the Council as a springboard for making allegations against Occupation programs, not for the purpose of giving constructive advice but for other purposes, we have to sit here and discuss them. The Council is what the Members make of it.” This meeting—the Soviet Member’s determined propaganda efforts directed to the peasants as against the landlords combined with his unwarranted criticism of the Occupation program and Mr. Ball’s inadventitious siding with the Soviet Member reflects a condition which has long obtained in the Council. It gives clear example of why General Headquarters has not been able to rely on the Council for assistance and is reluctant to seek its advice. It also exemplifies why the Council has, so far as its officially stated purpose is concerned, failed to achieve any practical usefulness under its Terms of Reference. 38 Not printed. 38 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/8–147: Telegram [Document 250] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State top secret Tokyo , August 1, 1947. 209. For the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Hilldring. Remytel 202, July 28. 39 1. We have not raised with Doctor Evatt any question concerning Allied Council. This morning I called on Doctor Evatt at his request and in course of conversation he said he realized now that the Council could and should have performed a useful function by giving constructive advice and recommendation; that it had been misused for propaganda purposes and as a springboard for criticism; that he had not given MacMahon Ball any instructions except that he should avoid giving offense and being critical; and that he now proposed to replace Ball by Lieutenant General Robertson, Australian commander of British Commonwealth Forces in Japan. While such replacement has been announced by Melbourne Radio, Doctor Evatt indicated that consultation with Australian Prime Minister 40 was necessary before actual change could be effected and officially made public. 41 2. Doctor Evatt’s visit is regarded here as having been highly satisfactory. Everything possible was done to make the visit pleasant and the atmosphere throughout has been one of gratifying friendliness and cordiality. In our conversations with him, we for our part made no commitments and put forth no affirmative suggestions in regard to the peace treaty. I have the impression from what Doctor Evatt has said to me that he has found the visit useful to himself politically (we believe that consideration was a prime one in his asking to come at this time) and also that he has found it educational as regards the occupation. His attitude now is one of praise and admiration and he seems to have gained sympathetic understanding of occupation problems not heretofore apparent in his public statements. He continues to speak privately of the whaling question, on which his attitude has not altered. This morning, he remarked again that the whole question of the future of Japanese whaling should be a matter for the peace settlement. Principal burden of his remarks this morning was again question of the peace settlement. He expressed himself most anxious that we move forward rapidly; that preliminary conference be held early in September; that we avoid delays and complexities which he envisages in having preliminary conference of experts; and that it be a conference of foreign ministers and plenipotentiary delegates. He made the sound observation that the time is propitious for the peace settlement and that the situation will deteriorate if a settlement is unduly delayed. He said the whole matter should be concluded by March 1948. In general his ideas in regard to the peace settlement appear sound and consonant with ours here and—we assume and hope—with those of the Department. At the conclusion of conversation, he expressed appreciation in highest terms of courtesies shown him and Mrs. Evatt by General and Mrs. MacArthur and those of us who participated in arrangements and entertainment for them. He said he had come with some apprehension as regards the character of the conversations he might have and had been delighted to encounter in us only thorough friendliness and frankness. He indicated that his desire was that British Commonwealth cooperate with the United States to the fullest in connection with Japan. 3. Please repeat to Canberra. 42 Atcheson 39 Not printed. 40 Joseph B. Chifley. 41 Telegram 242, August 18, noon, from Canberra reported the resignation of Mr. Ball (740.00119 Control (Japan)/8–1847). 42 Repeated to Canberra on August 2. Memorandum of Conversation, by Miss Katherine B. Fite of the Office of the Legal Adviser (Fahy) 740.00116 PW/8–647 [Document 251] Memorandum of Conversation, by Miss Katherine B. Fite of the Office of the Legal Adviser ( Fahy ) confidential [ Washington ,] August 6, 1947. Mr. Everson called and inquired first as to whether Mr. Keenan, the chief prosecutor of the international war crimes trial in Tokyo, was still in this country. I told him that I understood he was on his way to Tokyo. Mr. Everson, referring to his previous inquiry to the same effect last March, stated that he wished this time to speak more freely and confidentially, and said that the associate British prosecutor felt that the prosecution was more smoothly handled when Mr. Keenan was not in Tokyo. He then said that the Embassy was informed that Mr. Keenan had instructed his American deputies in Tokyo to prepare dossiers on fifty war crimes suspects still being held in Tokyo. He said that though the British prosecuting staff was assisting in preparing dossiers in these cases, they did so reluctantly and that the British did not wish to share the responsibility for the suspects having been held so long without trial. He said further that the British Government wished us to know that they did not wish to participate in any further international war crimes trial in the Far East. I explained to Mr. Everson, for his confidential information, that General MacArthur had raised the question of the disposition of the fifty suspects, that the War Department was ascertaining the background as to their detention, and that the interested Departments were considering the question of their disposition. I also pointed out that it was possible that some of the fifty suspects had been arrested at the request of Governments other than the American. I explained that I personally anticipated that this Government would not wish any further international war crimes trial. I told him that the question had arisen as to the necessity of obtaining an amendment of the Far Eastern Commission policy decision which appeared to require an international trial of persons charged with crimes against the peace (aggressive war), 43 Mr. Everson said that he hoped that the matter would not have to come before the Far Eastern Commission, and that he thought the Soviets would block any amendment and insist on an international trial of Japanese industrialists. He said that he would study the Far Eastern Commission policy decision and get in touch with me again. Meanwhile he said that I was free to inform the War Department that we had received an inquiry from the British Embassy as to the use that was to be made of the dossiers now being prepared by the International Prosecution Section in Tokyo. 43 Notation on the original by Mr. Fahy: “We should take steps to obtain a policy decision. C. F.” The United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 894.50/8–1147 [Document 252] The United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) Washington , August 11, 1947. Dear General Hilldring : I have read with care the paper on Unilateral Action on Japanese Economic Problems (SWNCC 380), a memorandum, with enclosures, submitted to SWNCC by the War Member. The paper, as you know, states that U.S. policies, after adoption by SWNCC, “frequently encounter lengthy delay before adoption as policy by the Far Eastern Commission.” The War Member is quoted as stating, “we must … no longer be balked by the FEC.” In his memorandum he says: “I further believe it desirable for the United States to adopt the policy of exercising this power [of issuing Interim Directives to the Supreme Commander] 44 whenever possible in the solution of economic problems presented by the occupation of Japan.” In the draft paper, it is concluded: “ c. In subsequent determinations of U.S. policy proposals, decisions and statements, there should be included a stipulation of a date by which time such proposal, decision, or statement shall be issued unilaterally by the U.S. Government to the SCAP for implementation should FEC approval thereof not be obtained by that date.” I wish to submit for your consideration the following comments on this paper: 1. The United States Government has frequently stated that it supports as a basic policy the principle of international cooperation; and that national action in accordance with this principle lays the foundation for international peace. In line with this policy the United States took the lead in establishing the Far Eastern Commission and in granting to it the authority to formulate the policies and principles in accordance with which Japan should fulfill its obligations under the Terms of Surrender. A clause in the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission states that the United States may issue interim directives, but only in cases of urgency and pending action by the Commission. 2. An international body, such as the Far Eastern Commission, normally reaches its conclusions more slowly than does a single state. The United States Government could make policy decisions much more quickly than the Far Eastern Commission. This delay, however, is the price which any state must pay for the recognized advantages of the policy of international cooperation. 3. The assumption in the paper by the War Member of SWNCC that the Far Eastern Commission is under an obligation to approve within a few days, such as 21 days, United States policies submitted to it, when the United States Government has often taken months to determine these policies, is obviously inconsistent with the basic requirements of international cooperation. 4. The Far Eastern Commission, despite delays, has passed some 45 policy decisions. The British acting representative on the FEC has commented that the Far Eastern Commission has accomplished more than any other international commission of which he has any knowledge. A number of these policy decisions have been approved within a relatively short period of time. Most of them have been based upon papers submitted by the United States and, in general, have been in accordance with them. The approval by eleven states of these U.S. policies is an asset for the United States of much importance in the Far East and helps to establish more firmly the principle of international cooperation. 5. An international commission normally needs considerable time before it reaches a final policy decision on an important subject. After a paper is introduced the members must consult their respective Governments; the resulting views of the Governments have to be discussed by the representatives of other states; probably renewed requests for instructions are made; and finally a commission decision is reached. Even the United States Government has often taken several months for the preparation of initial policy proposals for submission to the FEC. After U.S. members had requested working committees to postpone consideration of various subjects pending the presentation of U.S. policy proposals then under preparation, the U.S. Government has needed the following number of months to complete the papers: Policy for the Revision of the Japanese Educational System, nearly five months; Zaibatsu Dissolution, six months; Interchange of Persons between Japan and other Countries, ten months. U.S. policy papers are overdue as follows: Agrarian Reform, seven months; Occupation Costs, 45 nine months; Restitution of Looted Cultural Objects, nine months; and Japanese Patents, nine months. 6. Such delays as have occurred within the FEC have been due to a number of causes, one of the most important of which has been the length of time needed by the U.S. Government to determine or to reformulate its own position. A few instances may be cited as typical. [Here follow six instances of delays, and causes of each.] 7. Long delays have occasionally taken place in Japan in executing directives which have been sent to SCAP as matters of urgency. The only important U.S. Interim Directive under the Commission’s Terms of Reference, on Advance Transfers of Japanese Reparations, was issued on April 4, 1947. It provided for immediate delivery of advance reparations to the states named in the directive. After four months no article has been delivered as reparations. The FEC policy decision on Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan was passed on February 20, 1947. Although its adoption by the FEC was pressed as a matter of urgent importance, it has not yet been put into effect. 8. These instances of delay are cited in no spirit of criticism of my own Government. I am calling them to your attention to show that if the U.S., with its stores of information, its personnel in all important positions, and its earnest desire for speed in completing the occupation of Japan, needs, sometimes, months for the formulation, revision and execution of its policies in regard to Japan, the Far Eastern Commission, composed of eleven states, obviously needs much time too. 9. In conclusion, I recognize that a situation may arise in which it may be advisable for the U.S. Government to issue an interim directive to SCAP as a matter of genuine urgency and as a last resort after protracted discussion in the Far Eastern Commission has made it apparent that no prospect exists of an agreement on a policy decision. However, I cannot agree with the recommendation of the War Member of SWNCC that the U.S. Government should issue interim directives as a normal procedure in economic matters and that it should give the Far Eastern Commission a specified and limited number of days in which to approve U.S. policy proposals under the threat of the issuance of a U.S. directive if the dead line is passed. The recommendation, if carried out, would antagonize the other states on the Far Eastern Commission; it would violate the spirit and probably the letter of the Terms of Reference of the Commission, to which the U.S. is a party; and above all it would be inconsistent with a basic policy of the United States and my own instructions: to support the principle of International Cooperation. 46 Sincerely yours, Frank R. McCoy 44 Brackets appear in the original letter. 45 The FEO by a decision on August 7 approved a policy on disposition of funds covering fines collected by Allied military occupation courts; a directive, based on this decision, was sent as serial 86, August 12, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SCAP, and a copy was sent the FEC by the Department on August 21. For text of the decision, see The Far Eastern Commission , p. 42. 46 General Hilldring replied on August 15 that he was in full agreement that the War Department proposal was neither necessary nor consistent with the implementation, in the FEC, of the principle of international cooperation, and enclosed a copy of his memorandum of August 7 (not printed), proposing a procedure which would permit consideration of the time factor without setting deadlines for issuing interim directives (894.50/8–1147). The United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 894.50/8–1147 [Document 253] The United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) Washington , August 11, 1947. Dear General Hilldring : During our last conference, on July 23, you may remember that you raised the question of the desirability of obtaining an early policy decision on The Level of Economic Life in Japan (FEC–218). You wished to have this policy decision before August 15 when you would be leaving the Department, even if it should be necessary to issue a U.S. interim directive for this purpose. I presented the views which I have long held, that a situation may arise which would justify the U.S. in issuing an interim directive, but that this should be done only in cases of genuine urgency and as a last resort. Now that the date of your departure is approaching I have been giving careful consideration to this paper and have been pondering the question whether it would be advisable for the United States Government to send the paper to SCAP as a U.S. interim directive. I have reached the conclusion that for the following reasons it would be inadvisable for the United States Government to issue an interim directive on this subject at the present time: 1. There appears to be no urgency in sending this policy decision to SCAP at this time. I believe that the next step in executing reparations policy is to put into effect the previous U.S. interim directive on Advanced Transfers of Japanese Reparations. 47 This directive was sent to SCAP over four months ago, but as yet no delivery of reparations has been made, and, I am informed that it will probably be several weeks before deliveries will begin. Until these advanced transfers have been completed there would seem to be no real need of this pending paper on the complete Level of Economic Life in Japan. I am also informed that the immediate and serious obstacles to the revival of Japanese industry are not to be found in the absence of a final determination of the levels of Japanese industry, but in the shortage of coal and raw materials, which will continue for some months to come. 2. The Far Eastern Commission has worked hard on this paper and has it now under continuing consideration. There is a good prospect that the Commission will reach an agreement on it in normal course. Already it is evident that a majority of the Commission wish to modify the provisions of the paper in certain respects. Under these circumstances, if the United States Government should send the original U.S. policy proposal (FEC–218) as an interim directive, it would be acting in opposition to the expressed views of a majority of our colleagues on the Commission. 3. The immediate issuance of a U.S. interim directive on this subject would be resented by the other states on the Far Eastern Commission and would arouse an antagonism on the part of some of the other Governments which would be unnecessary and would be prejudicial to the United States in the coming Peace Conference. The states on the Far Eastern Commission are opposed to U.S. interim directives except when issued as a matter of urgency and, possibly, as a last resort. 4. The problem whether the United States Government should send the pending paper to SCAP at the present time as an interim directive raises a fundamental issue regarding international cooperation. The United States Government strongly supports as a basic policy the principle of international cooperation. It would appear to be inconsistent with this policy and this principle for the United States, after taking over a year to formulate its own views on this subject, to send this paper as an interim directive when the Far Eastern Commission has been studying it for only four months and before the final views of all the other states on the Commission have been received. In view of these considerations I believe that it will best serve the interests of the United States to postpone the issuance of an interim directive and to avoid interrupting the work of the Far Eastern Commission looking toward an agreement on a policy decision on this subject in accordance with its normal procedure. 48 Yours sincerely, Frank R. McCoy 47 Serial 75, April 4, to SCAP, p. 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] . 48 General Hilldring’s successor, Charles E. Saltzman, replied to General McCoy on September 9 that the Acting Secretary of State had met with the Secretary of War (Royall) on August 26, when it was agreed that both the War and State Departments would increase their efforts to obtain an early Far Eastern Commission decision establishing a level of economic life in Japan (894.50/8–1147). The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Clark) to the Secretary of State 894.628/8–1547: Airgram [Document 254] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Clark ) to the Secretary of State confidential London , August 15, 1947. [Received August 26—8:12 a.m.] A–1804. 1. Reference Embassy’s airgram A–1697, August 5, 1947, 49 and previous on Japanese whaling. 2. In course of an informal discussion August 15, 1947, MacDermot, Head, Japan and Pacific Department, Foreign Office, stated to Embassy officer that about a week ago the UK Government had telegraphed to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand stating that while it shared their position on the second Japanese whaling expedition it thought the matter was not one of any great consequence and that it would be just as well if the three Governments dropped their dispute with the US Government over the issue. 3. MacDermot went on to say that New Zealand had replied at once that it was agreeable to the UK proposal. The Australian reply had come in later, and while replete with argumentative contentions, it had ended up with an implicit and grudging acceptance of the UK suggestion. 4. MacDermot summed up by remarking that the whaling question now seemed a rather dead issue, and that we should in future probably hear very little of it either in the Far Eastern Commission or by way of diplomatic approach. Clark 49 Not printed. Extract From Circular No. 9 Issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, August 15, 1947 894.5151/12–1147 [Document 255] Extract From Circular No. 9 Issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, August 15, 1947 Tokyo, August 15, 1947 Establishment of Occupied Japan Export-Import Revolving Fund 1. There is hereby created an Occupied Japan Export-Import Revolving Fund (hereinafter referred to as “The Fund”). The Fund is established as a means of financing, primarily on a self-liquidating basis, Japanese imports and exports of commodities and services which are required for the achievement of the objectives and policies of the Occupation and for the mutual benefit of the United Nations and Japan. 2. The Fund shall be managed and operated by a Controller designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The Controller shall have such deputy or deputies as may be similarly designated. 3. The Controller shall be responsible and accountable to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the safe custody, management, operation and control of The Fund. He shall have authority to make all collections of moneys due The Fund, to make disbursements from The Fund, to make any commitments, allotments, allocations or incur obligations involving The Fund, to borrow monies on the credit of The Fund, and to perform all other acts which he shall determine to be necessary, appropriate or convenient to accomplish the purposes for which The Fund is created. 4. The Fund shall consist of the following: a . Gold and its equivalent in the approximate value of one hundred thirty-seven million ($137,000,000) dollars, made available to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the purpose stated herein. b . The export proceeds of all products, including textiles, manufactured from materials the import of which was financed by The Fund, or by credits based thereon. c . The export proceeds (in excess of the amount necessary to liquidate CCC 1 and CCC 2 accounts) derived from the sale of textiles manufactured from cotton imported under CCC 1 and CCC 2 contracts. d . Any monies otherwise accruing from any operation of The Fund. e . That proportion of the total export proceeds as the respective value of the material purchased through the use of The Fund bears to the total value of all materials used, when any material, the import of which into Japan is financed through the use of The Fund, is mixed with any other material not acquired through the use of The Fund. f . Other assets as may be designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. g . Any monies borrowed on the credit of the foregoing assets. 5. The Fund shall be used for the payment of the following only: a . Fidelity and surety bond premiums of the Controller, any deputy Controller and such other employees as may be deemed necessary. b . Materials imported for the purpose of directly deriving goods for export therefrom, which will, in the judgment of the Controller, have an anticipated value in excess of the cost of such materials realizable within one year after the date of arrival in Japan of such materials. c . Raw materials, processing materials or operating supplies needed for the production of such exports. d . Services and general imports of machinery or machine parts, supplies, or other materials deemed necessary by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the general Japanese economy; provided that any funds advanced for these purposes shall not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the value of the assets of The Fund specified in Paragraphs 4 a , 4 c , and 4 f , above. e . Monies borrowed and interest and other charges in connection therewith. f . Fees, service or other charges arising out of any transaction specified in Paragraphs 5 b , 5 c , and 5 d , above. 6. The Fund shall be subject to the following special restrictions: a . No obligation arising out of the operation of The Fund shall be secured by a special lien on any of the assets thereof; but those to whom The Fund is so obligated shall have a first claim against the assets thereof, prior to any other claim against such assets. b . The Fund shall not be expended or obligated unless after such expenditure is made or obligation is incurred, a cash reserve consisting of gold and its equivalent, dollars, and freely convertible currency is equal to 30 percent (30%) of the initial value of the assets specified in Paragraphs 4 a , 4 c , and 4 f , above, or of the outstanding liabilities, whichever is greater; provided, however, that the foregoing restriction shall not apply to expenditures made to discharge obligations previously incurred within such limitations. c . In the event he deems it necessary to export and sell any of the assets referred to in 4 a to obtain currencies to pay obligations of The Fund, the Controller shall, prior to making the sale, first offer to sell such assets to member nations of the Far Eastern Commission for currencies required to discharge such obligations of The Fund. 7. Subject to the terms and provisions of Paragraphs 5 and 6, above, at such times as the net worth of The Fund exceeds forty percent (40%) of the total liabilities as reflected by the last current statement of the status of The Fund then, and in that event, and in that event only, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may, at his discretion, withdraw from The Fund any amount so long as such withdrawals do not reduce the net worth of The Fund to less than forty (40%) percent of the total liabilities. For the purposes of this Paragraph 7: a . In addition to assets described in Paragraph 4, above, assets shall include, but shall not be limited to, all of the following resulting from the operation of The Fund, (1) Receivables arising from firm forward export sales, (2) The value of raw materials at cost or market (whichever is lower), (3) Goods in process at the value of the raw materials, and, (4) Finished goods at their export market value or forward sales value. b . Liabilities shall include, but shall not be limited to, the initial value of Paragraphs 4 a , 4 c and 4 f , above, plus all accounts payable and commitments made. 8. The Controller shall render a monthly statement of the status of The Fund to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers within thirty (30) days after the last business day of the month for which such statement is rendered. Copies of such statement will be made available to such parties as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may direct, or as may be entitled thereto pursuant to the terms of any contract approved by him. 9. In the event of a transfer of authority prior to a peace treaty or upon the proclamation of a peace treaty to which the United States Government and the Japanese Government are signatories, the Controller upon the occurrence of either of the stipulated contingencies shall liquidate, as soon as may be practicable, all proper claims (including commitments) arising out of the operations of The Fund against the assets of The Fund. The balance of The Fund shall be retained for appropriate ultimate disposition in accordance with controlling directives. Memorandum of Conversation, by Miss Katherine B. Fite of the Office of the Legal Adviser (Gross) 740.00116 PW/8–2047 [Document 256] Memorandum of Conversation, by Miss Katherine B. Fite of the Office of the Legal Adviser ( Gross ) secret [ Washington ,] August 20, 1947. Participants: Le—Mr. Gross Le/M—Mr. Yingling, 51 Miss Fite A–H—Mr. Hemmendinger 52 CAD, War Crimes Branch—Colonel Young 53 Legal Section, SCAP—Mr. Carpenter 54 The problem raised by SCAP in his telegram C52563, 12 May, 1947, CMIN 1908 regarding the disposition of the fifty class A Japanese war crimes suspects still being held in Tokyo was discussed. It was indicated that the competent authorities felt that approximately 25 of the 50 suspects should be brought to trial on class A (aggressive war) charges. This number would include a few industrialists. It was possible, Mr. Carpenter said, that 3 or 4 of the 25 suspects could be tried on B and C charges under the program under his jurisdiction. It was generally agreed that it was desirable to avoid further international trials. However, since the existing policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission requires the trial of class A charges by an “international court”, and in order to avoid having to go to the Commission for a new decision, Mr. Gross suggested that it might be suggested to General MacArthur that at his discretion a plan might be worked out in Tokyo with the appropriate representatives of the interested countries for setting up small panels of judges of two or three countries to try the remaining cases. He also suggested that if General MacArthur did not consider this feasible he might be advised that at his recommendation the Department of State would be prepared to go before the Far Eastern Commission to recommend an amendment of the policy decision. In doing this, he said, we might anticipate the possible Soviet position that no industrialists are now being tried internationally and that they should be, by announcing that the United States was prepared to try certain Japanese industrialists in American tribunals, and that it was desired to amend the policy decision to allow General MacArthur discretion in the type of tribunal to be utilized. Mr. Gross added that we might then be prepared to recede to a position permitting international prosecuting teams. Colonel Young indicated that the War Department was awaiting a cable on the subject from Mr. Keenan, the Chief Prosecutor in the current international trial, and that upon its receipt, a cable along the lines suggested by Mr. Gross might be sent to SCAP. He said that he would keep the State Department informed of developments in the matter. 51 Raymond T. Yingling, Assistant Legal Adviser for military affairs and occupied areas. 52 Noel Hemmendinger, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas. 53 Col. Edward H. Young, Chief, War Crimes Branch, Civil Affairs Division, War Department. 54 Col. Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP. Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Saltzman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 694.0031/8–1347 [Document 257] Memorandum by Mr. Charles E. Saltzman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) confidential washington , August 20, 1947. In accordance with a memorandum dated August 13, 1947, from the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, there is enclosed a statement of United States Policy with respect to the Restoration of Private Trade with Japan, comprising the Conclusions of SWNCC 373/1 which was approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on August 12, 1947. The United States Member is requested to submit the statement of United States Policy to the Far Eastern Commission with a view to obtaining from the Commission a policy decision on the subject and is authorized to permit any such modifications as do not change its meaning and substance. The United States Member is informed that paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 of the statement of United States Policy are compatible with the views of the Department of State. He is advised not to press for their approval if it appears that obtaining acceptance of these points would delay passage by the Far Eastern Commission of the remainder of the statement of United States Policy. Philander P. Claxton, Jr . for Charles E. Saltzman [Annex] Statement of United States Policy With Respect to Restoration of Private Trade With Japan confidential I. Long-Range Policy Objectives 1. To foster the development of conditions in Japan which will contribute to the expansion and balanced growth of international private trade. 2. To promote the reduction of trade barriers and the progressive elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce. 3. To encourage an increase in Japanese exports, compatible with occupational objectives, in order that these exports may, as soon as possible, pay for the imports required for the prevention of disease and unrest within Japan, and the reestablishment of a self-sustaining Japanese economy; and, in order that Japan may provide goods required throughout the world—particularly in areas which have suffered deprivation as a result of Japanese aggression. II. Adherence to Draft Charter for an International Trade Organization 4. Japan’s foreign trade should be conducted in a non-discriminatory manner with respect to all purchases and sales and with respect to all persons or nations participating in, or affected by such trade. Controls over Japan’s foreign trade, deemed necessary during the transitional phase, should be administered in accordance with the relevant principles of the Draft Charter for an International Trade Organization 55 embodied in the Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (issued by the United Nations Economic and Social Council March 5, 1947, at Lake Success, New York, with the identification E/TC/T/34), and every effort should be made to secure the removal of such controls as soon as conditions giving rise to them have ceased. In adopting [ adapting? ] draft charter principles to problems peculiar to Japan, emphasis should be placed upon specific charter principles barring trade restriction and discriminations, rather than upon its permitted exceptions which are designed in the main, to cover emergency and temporary situations. 5. The following principles of the draft Charter are considered to be particularly relevant: Those principles concerning the elimination of quantitative restrictions (Articles 25, 26 and 27), exchange arrangements (Article 29), subsidies (Article 30), and state trading (Article 31). III. Entry of Private Businessmen 6. On and after August 15, 1947, the following categories of businessmen should be permitted entry into Japan: a . Merchants and other traders who are prepared to purchase or to make arrangements for future purchases of potential exports, or to provide raw materials or other commodities which Japan must import. b . Representatives of banks, insurance companies, airlines, and shipping companies who are prepared to render necessary services in connection with Japan’s foreign trade either to private non-Japanese businessmen, to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or to Japanese persons or agencies approved by him. c . Representatives of companies or individuals with substantial prewar property interests in Japan, particularly representatives of property owners who cannot make satisfactory provision through the use of powers-of-attorney to relieve SCAP of custodial responsibility. 7. In the initial stages permission to enter Japan should be granted only to those whose business activities can be expected to contribute to the fulfillment of Japan’s export and import programs and to the achievement of the objectives of the occupation sufficiently to justify the burden which their presence will impose on Japan’s domestic economy and on the occupying forces. 8. If the number of businessmen who can qualify to enter Japan are, in the initial stages, greater than the number that can be accommodated in Japan, the distribution of entry permits should be in accordance with country quotas established on the recommendation of the Inter-Allied Trade Board. Such quotas should be established with due regard to such factors as relative prewar commercial interests in Japan and the current situation as to potential markets for Japanese exports and sources of imports. Within established quotas each country should be expected to recommend those of its nationals desiring to enter Japan who should be given priority of entry. However, such recommendations should not affect SCAP’s right to grant or withhold permission to enter or to remain in Japan on an individual case-by-case basis. Entry of private traders under a quota system will not affect the arrangements for entry of such government officials or representatives of semi-governmental trading organizations as may be required to facilitate trade between Japan and such country. The number of such representatives to be admitted for such trading should continue to be a matter of mutual agreement between SCAP and the country concerned. 9. There should be no discrimination on grounds of nationality against any foreign businessman admitted to Japan, and all should be accorded equality of opportunity to transact business and obtain available accommodations. IV. Methods of Conducting Business in Japan 10. Occupation policy should oppose excessive concentration of economic power in Japan. To this end, businessmen admitted to Japan should be encouraged to operate so as to enlarge the number of Japanese firms engaged in foreign trade. Any limitations or controls on the participation of Japanese firms in foreign trade should be based upon criteria established by or under the supervision of SCAP and should operate only to the extent required to meet the objectives of the occupation. The fostering of monoply by any agency of the Japanese Government participating in foreign trade should be prevented. Contracts between Japanese and foreign businessmen should not result in undue restrictions on the flow of international trade. The distribution of export and import licenses should be on a fair and equitable basis. V. General 11. Trading should be continued—during the transitional period, as may be necessary in the interest of maximizing export proceeds—by the Japanese Government and through the medium of governmental agencies with some areas and in some commodities. In so far as possible, Japanese governmental trading through the medium of governmental agencies and private trading should not overlap for the same commodity in the same market. 12. The Japanese Government should be encouraged to take an increasing responsibility and initiative for planning of foreign trade, subject to necessary SCAP controls. 13. A commercial exchange rate for the yen should be established as soon as practicable. 55 Text of proposed Charter was released by the Department of State on December 30, 1946; for summary, see Department of State Bulletin , January 12, 1947, pp. 69–73, and for discussion, see ibid. , February 16, 1947, pp. 271–274. The Embassy in Australia to the Department of State 740.00119 Control(Japan)/8–2247 [Document 258] The Embassy in Australia to the Department of State restricted No. 299 Canberra , August 22, 1947. [Received September 9.] The Embassy has the honor to enclose a copy of Dr. Evatt’s report on his mission to Japan which was released August 17, 1947. 56 This statement is noteworthy for Dr. Evatt’s commendation of the accomplishments of the occupation authorities and failure to take exception to any phase of their work. After reviewing outstanding features of the occupation Dr. Evatt called for an early peace settlement, stating “the time has come to terminate the present phase of the occupation. General MacArthur and General Robertson have done their primary task of disarmament and demilitarization, and have done it well. The next task, of building on these foundations and creating a peaceful, democratic Japan, requires a different type of supervision and Allied decisions incorporated in a peace treaty.” Dr. Evatt concluded his five-page statement by saying “Australia desires a peace settlement which will be in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations, give real security from future Japanese aggression, and gradually help to raise the standards of welfare in South and East Asia and the Pacific. This is a policy which all Australians can unite in supporting. It is a firm policy and at the same time a just policy. There is no reason why the Pacific settlement should not provide an example which could be followed in the peace settlement in Europe.” The Federal Cabinet on August 16 endorsed Dr. Evatt’s recommendation that a peace treaty with Japan be completed at the earliest possible moment. Prime Minister Chifley told the press that the Cabinet had expressed satisfaction with the progress made towards the peace settlement as a result of Dr. Evatt’s mission and approved the general principles and procedures proposed for the peace conference. Mr. Chifley also endorsed the United States suggestion for a two-thirds majority voting procedure and said that any attempt to introduce the veto system must be resisted. He said that the settlement for Japan need not be protracted but could be completed early in 1948. He said further that “the future of Japan depends first on the determination of the Allies to pursue vigorously the objectives set by the Far Eastern Commission, and secondly upon the energy, sincerity and co-operation of the Japanese in carrying out great reforms already planned.” “The peace treaty should, therefore, be not vindictive, but just and firm. Australia desires to achieve democratically a stable and permanent peace in the Pacific based on security and general welfare. This objective will be furthered if the peace conference is expedited.” Upon his return from Japan on August 12 Dr. Evatt issued a press statement in the nature of a short summary of the fuller report enclosed. He stated that all his discussions and observations in Japan amply confirmed the soundness of the policy which the Australian Government has consistently advocated towards Japan. A few days later Tokyo despatches announced the resignation of MacMahon Ball, British Commonwealth representative on the Allied Council, and quoted him as saying that he found it impossible to work under Dr. Evatt and would tell why when he returns to Australia. Dr. Evatt’s apparently complete conversion to support of the policies of General MacArthur caused some eyebrow-lifting in Australia. Prior to Dr. Evatt’s departure leading Australian dailies carried articles condemning American policy in Japan; accusing General MacArthur of making Japan an American colony; making major issues out of the questions of Japanese whaling and Japanese working of phosphate deposits on Angaur Island; and in general giving the impression that Dr. Evatt was going to Japan to “tell off MacArthur.” This publicity was of such volume that Prime Minister Chifley, just before Dr. Evatt’s departure, was impelled to issue a statement denying that there was any friction between Australia and the United States, and expressing gratitude for General MacArthur’s help to Australia. On arriving in Japan Dr. Evatt voiced approval of the work of MacMahon Ball and the Australian public was therefore mildly surprised at subsequent developments. Some papers handled the matter by suggesting their satisfaction with Dr. Evatt’s discovery that General MacArthur had been following Australian policies all along. A few commentators implied that Dr. Evatt was “taken in” by General MacArthur and still referred to United States policy toward Japan as “soft”; but the former widespread press criticism has been notably lacking during the past few weeks. 56 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil 694.0031/8–1247: Telegram [Document 259] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil restricted Washington , August 25, 1947—5 p.m. 964. Your 1088 August 12. 57 Radio Bulletin 189 was based on announcement of final FEC action on a policy statement which altho providing for govt to govt trading did not prevent resumption private trading. From September 1, 1947 forward occupation authorities in Japan are prepared to authorize export and import transactions between competent Japanese agencies (for time being these will be Japanese government agencies) and private foreign business firms and individuals. Sent to Rio de Janeiro. Repeated to Tokyo as 343. Lovett 57 Not printed. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/9–547: Telegram [Document 260] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Smith ) to the Secretary of State secret Moscow , September 5, 1947. 2795. Recent Soviet comment on Japan is representative increasing all-out attack on US policy throughout world. All Moscow papers September 3 carried lengthy anniversary articles glorifying Soviet role in Japanese defeat and accusing US of building up and exploiting Japan, supporting militarists, reactionaries, Zaibatsu, luring Japanese with food, suppressing democratic movements and acting unilaterally ignoring FEC and Allied Council. Venom directed Socialist Government Katayama who is called tried servant of militarists. (Summary by airgram.) Such comment indicates Soviet interest Japan does not lag. Having refused participate 11-power peace conference, Kremlin must now contemplate consequences treaty negotiated without Soviets. While such eventuality would prevent participation Allied post-treaty control machinery Japan, Soviets might consider this dubious advantage since they would not be in position to dominate or effectively influence control organ. With acquisition south Sanghallen [ Sakhalin ] and Kuriles, described by Soviet writer as “bases for defense against attack by aggressors”, firm control of north Korea and Port Arthur area and satisfactory influence in Manchuria, USSR may feel aloofness to Allied peace conference will not seriously harm her position in Far East. On contrary continued legal state of war with Japan not only provides immediate convenient excuse maintain unchanged present regime Dairen but leaves USSR without obligations in post-treaty Japan and free to exploit fully every difficulty and dissatisfaction which may develop. In such case Soviets may be expected to pull all propaganda stops on theme of US unilateral dominating action in Japan, discrediting acts of peace conference and encouraging opposition US policy all parts of the world. Theme would be exploited to justify their own unilateral action in retaining and strengthening control where now exercised and building up their own influence or even directly intervening in other Far East areas notably Manchuria. At same time USSR may be expected to redouble efforts to infiltrate Japan and foment social and political unrest to maximum. Department pass Tokyo. 58 Smith 58 Relayed to Tokyo, September 6, 3 p.m. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/9–547 [Document 261] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) 59 to the Secretary of State restricted No. 1262 Tokyo , September 5, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to refer to my despatch 1243, August 23, 1947 60 and to previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, and to forward as enclosures 60 five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the Fortieth Meeting of the Council held on September 3, 1947. Although there were no procedural or official matters on the Agenda, the Soviet Member 61 had, in a letter dated August 13, 1947 (page 4 of the Minutes), objected to the Acting Secretary-General’s 62 announcement by a memorandum of August 8, 1947 (page 3 of the Minutes) concerning changes to be made in the form of the Agenda. In his letter, the Soviet Member charged the Chairman 63 with unilateral action in directing a change in procedure which “entered into the competency of the entire Allied Council”. From the Minutes of previous meetings, it will be noted that one of the items removed from the agenda form (No. V, “Scope of Information Desired”) has consistently been used by the Soviet Member to obtain detailed information on a variety of subjects and in turn to use the information so obtained to discredit the motives and actions of the Supreme Commander and his Headquarters, and to direct criticism at Occupation policy in general. In his opening statement the Acting Soviet Member reiterated the charges made in his letter of August 13, 1947, and maintained that the rules of procedure, having been agreed upon by all Members of the Council, were binding in this case and could be revised or altered only in similar fashion. He further charged that the Chairman’s direction to the Acting Secretary-General amounted to unilateral action, is incorrect, and basically contradicts the aims of the Council. He stated that this action is “an obvious attempt to disrupt and complicate the normal functioning of the Allied Council and practically to reduce it to nothing”, and desired discussion of this question “in order to take necessary measures to eliminate the present abnormal situation”. As Chairman, in an extemporaneous statement, I replied that the form of the Agenda is not governed by any procedural rule and that a search of the Minutes of earlier meetings had failed to reveal any previous discussion or specific agreement upon such form; that the form of the Agenda had originally been prepared by the Secretary-General; that this whole question “is a minutia which had best be left to the Secretary in the normal exercise of his functions”; and that there is no point in using a form which has become obsolete and which has endeavored to commit the Supreme Commander or his General Headquarters to the rules of procedure of the Council. As it is clear from earlier meetings that the Council has strayed far from the original concept as set forth in the terms of reference of the Council, a circumstance primarily attributable to the tactics employed by the Soviet Member, I took occasion to state that “I know of no occasion when the Soviet Member has ever given helpful or constructive advice. On the contrary he has used this Council to further his ends of obstructionism. He has used this Council to support an ideology which is not wanted in Japan and … by indirection, to criticize the Supreme Commander.” (Page 6 et seq . of the Minutes). The newly-arrived British Commonwealth Member, Mr. Patrick Shaw, commented that the question at issue appears one of availability of information to Members of the Council and stated that as assurance has been given that Members are not precluded from making reasonable inquiries of General Headquarters, such assurance seems to cover the only matter at issue. The Chinese Member 64 stated that he was agreeable to “leaving the job to the Secretary-General” but later remarked that the result should be subject to the approval of the Members. Respectfully yours, W. J. Sebald Counselor of Mission 59 W. J. Sebald, Chief of the Diplomatic Section, GHQ, SCAP, and Acting Political Adviser after the death of George Atcheson, whose plane crashed at sea en route to Hawaii from Japan. For statement by the Acting Secretary of State on Mr. Atcheson’s death, see Department of State Bulletin , August 31, 1947, p. 437. 60 Not printed. 60 Not printed. 61 Maj. Gen. A. P. Kislenko, representing the Soviet Union’s member. 62 Col. John W. Hammond. 63 George Atcheson was chairman at that time. 64 Gen. Shang Chen Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Associate Chief of the Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs (Whitman) 894.50/8–2847 [Document 262] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Associate Chief of the Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs ( Whitman ) [ Washington ,] September 16, 1947. Participants: Mr. Everson—British Embassy; Mr. Christelow—UK Treasury Delegation; Mr. McDiarmid, OE, for part of discussion; and Mr. Whitman 1. Use of Japanese-owned gold and silver as revolving fund . Mr. Everson called at my request to discuss the use of Japanese-owned gold and silver as a revolving fund. I asked whether he felt the provisions of Circular no. 9 (recently issued by SCAP establishing the fund) 65 were within the terms of the FEC policy decision in FEC–032/26. 66 Mr. Everson replied that while the circular might have emphasized maintaining the value of the fund somewhat more, he felt in general it met the requirements of the FEC policy. I then asked whether, in view of SCAP’s responsibility to preserve the value of the fund, SCAP had the authority to pledge these assets to lenders and liquidate them if necessary to meet the pledge. Mr. Everson stated it seemed clear that the purpose of establishing the fund was to finance trade and that trade could not be conducted without risk. Therefore, as long as SCAP was acting in good faith, he thought the fund might be pledged and reduced if necessary to meet losses. I stated this agreed with the U.S. interpretation and we were glad to learn of his concurrence. I then stated that some banks felt they would be prepared to make loans more readily if the assets were located outside Japan. Mr. Everson suggested that if it was only a matter of differences in rate of interest, it might be better not to move the gold since it would cause a political outcry from the Soviets and since, in any case, fund assets would shortly accumulate outside of Japan which would make the borrowing possibilities simpler. In addition, movement of the gold would affect Japanese confidence. Mr. Christelow stated he was reasonably sure that credits could be obtained on the basis of the assets in the fund and thought we should try to implement the program as outlined in SCAP’s Circular no. 9. 2. Progress of C2–242 in Committee no. 2 . Mr. Everson stated he had discussed the problem of failure of many members of Committee no. 2 to vote on amendments with some of the Dominions and thought some of the representatives were interpreting their instructions too narrowly. He agreed that I should also speak to various members of the committee about expediting progress on committee action on the paper. With regard to the most recent U.S. amendments, Mr. Everson thought he might be able to support some of the U.S. proposals but he was doubtful that his government would agree to increase the petroleum refining figure to more than four and one-half million barrels. 65 August 15, p. 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] . 66 July 24; The Far Eastern Commission , p. 31. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 694.0031/9–1647: Telegram [Document 263] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State restricted Tokyo , September 16, 1947. 246. CX 55513. Following is verbatim statement to be made by Chairman at 41st meeting Allied Council September 17, 1947 under Official Matters “Preliminary Report by the Chairman on the Opening of Japan to Private Trade”. 67 Foreign trade historically has been Japan’s economic lifeblood. Before the war, Japan ranked fifth among the great trading nations of the world. With a population of over 70,000,000 living on the small arable area afforded by the four main islands, and with relatively meager natural resources, Japan maintained herself in large part by importing raw materials, processing them, and exporting the finished products in exchange for food and additional raw materials. It has therefore been clear, from the beginning of the occupation, that a revived Japanese foreign trade is an indispensable prerequisite to the reconstruction of a stable economy which will strengthen democratic institutions and enable the Japanese people to support themselves peaceably by their own efforts. From the inception of the occupation, the Supreme Commander was confronted with this vital foreign commerce at a complete standstill and with an industrial establishment subsisting on dwindling stockpiles and running rapidly downhill. Energetic steps were therefore taken to initiate trading with the outside world at the earliest possible moment by the only method then feasible, the establishment of government-to-government trade channels. Since September 1945, government-to-government trading has been utilized to supply Japan’s immediate requirements. These channels have been necessarily few. On the far side, the Boeki-Cho, or Board of Trade, established in the Commerce and Industry Ministry pursuant to a SCAP directive of 9 October 1945, has been responsible for the physical handling of export and import commodities within Japan and for the necessary financial arrangements with Japanese buyers and sellers. Conversely, trade missions from a number of allied and neutral countries have represented their governments in Tokyo. In the case of trade with the US, which has thus far constituted the largest portion of post-war Japanese foreign commerce, SCAP has utilized the services of the US Commercial Company, a subsidiary of the US Government-Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to receive, ship, and sell Japanese exports to the US. Preliminary estimates of the value of trade passing through government-to-government channels up to 1 July 1947 amount to somewhat over US $200,000,000 for exports and US $500,000,000 for imports, the latter largely accounted for by the substantial US Government-financed shipments of food, medical supplies, petroleum products, and fertilizer brought to Japan to prevent disease and unrest. Although successful as an interim measure, government-to-government trading was primarily an expedient, and could not substitute for normal competitive private trade. Japan was still under partial blockade. Accordingly, the Supreme Commander, in January 1947, took the intermediate step of reopening international correspondence of a non-transactional nature with private Japanese citizens, and, after some months of intensive preparation, on 15 August 1947, the earliest moment permitted by circumstances, Japan was reopened to limited private trade. Only a short time has elapsed since then, and it is still premature to report the results of this trade in detail, but it is now possible and appropriate to describe to the Council the procedures being followed, the progress being made, and the considerable problems confronting the occupation in expanding Japan’s foreign trade. With the opening of Japan to limited private trade, the categories of commercial entrants were increased to four, as follows: (1). Private trade representatives, or those engaged in buying or selling on behalf of private firms. Their overall quota has been initially limited by available accommodations to 400. Within this overall quota, national quotas have been set by the Inter-Allied Trade Board. Individual private trade representatives are selected by each government and approved by SCAP for 21–day visits, subject to renewal. (2). Service representatives, or those engaged in shipping, insurance, banking, and other commercial services necessary to facilitate private trade. This number is much smaller, with actual entrants now numbering 25. (3) Investment representatives, or those washing to make private capital investments or resume pre-war business in Japan, who will be permitted to enter at a later date. (4) Government trade representatives, who have already been participating in government-to-government trade for some time. The private trade representatives, of whom some 102 have already entered Japan, are free to negotiate individually with Japanese suppliers and the Japanese Board of Trade on all matters, including price. The Board of Trade is the signatory to each contract with private foreign traders and, subject to SCAP validation, also issues the export licenses required in the case of each transaction to insure conservation of items critically needed for the Japanese economy. In the absence of a commercial rate of exchange, prices are quoted to private traders in dollars or other “acceptable foreign exchange”, f.o.b. Japan, while Japanese suppliers are paid in yen on the basis of production costs plus a reasonable profit. Dollar prices for Japanese exports are established by the Board of Trade in consultation with SCAP pricing specialists to bring a fair return for value. Basic criteria used are current world markets prices or prices established in principal international markets for the same prototype or substitute merchandise. Where no such prices exist, pre-war prices, adjusted by the change in dollar price index for the commodity group in which the merchandise falls, are used. Firm purchase offers are taken into consideration where necessary. In addition, as trade expands, actual previous sales prices will be used as pricing guides. Market quotations and other data for use in pricing are received regularly in the form of trade journals and catalogs, radio-transmitted reports and statistical series of the US Department of Commerce, Agriculture and Labor, and reports of market conditions by recently arrived commodity specialists from the US and trade representatives of foreign missions in Japan. Allowances are made for differences in quality and reputation, as well as for duties, shipping costs, and the like in accordance with established formulae. Where necessary, adjustments are made upon receipt of pertinent information represented by private traders. In accordance with Far Eastern Commission policies, payments for Japanese products are made to a trust fund account in acceptable foreign currency, that is, US dollars, freely convertible currency as announced by the US Treasury, or the currency of nations with which there exist relevant convertibility agreements. To facilitate trading, the Board of Trade has arranged for merchandise show-rooms in Osaka and Tokyo and has prepared trade directories and other informational literature. In other respects as well, the Japanese Government has been encouraged to play the greatest practicable role in the operation of trade facilities in preparation for its responsibilities in the post-treaty period. Satisfactory progress has been made under these arrangements. Already considerable impetus has been given to the manufacture and sale of a wide variety of items unsuitable for government-to-government trade because of the small value of each sale, but substantial in aggregate value. Contracts totalling more than $1,860,000 have resulted in the first two weeks. Pre-war commercial contracts have been renewed and both Japanese and foreign private traders have had the opportunity to explore future business possibilities. With the increase in the number of traders up to quota allowances and the development of initial negotiations, further progress may be expected. The reopening of private trade brings a number of vital problems to the fore. The first of these is financial: How can Japan pay for the raw material imports needed to produce manufactured exports, the proceeds from which can then finance continuing trade? The establishment by SCAP of the occupied Japan export-import revolving fund on 14 August, 1947, is the ingenious solution to the initial financing problem. Utilizing some $137,000,000 of gold and silver of Japanese ownership as a credit base, it is hoped to obtain loans which may reasonably approximate up to $500,000,000. Financial institutions of allied and neutral countries are permitted to participate equally in such loans to the extent that their currencies are usable and are required for Japanese foreign trade. An additional major obstacle to the further development of foreign trade has been the world shortage of those raw materials needed for Japanese export industry. Among those badly needed are wool, rayon pulp, dye stuffs, jute, coking coal, iron ore, tinplate, hides and skins, and tanning materials. As the world supply situation eases, however, it is anticipated that this problem will be resolved. Another problem of considerable importance in foreign trade expansion has been the readjustment of Japan to new world commercial conditions after almost a decade of commercial isolation. Not the least of the necessary adjustments are to new styles, new customers and supplies, and the technological displacement of certain Japanese products, such as silk, by new synthetics developed elsewhere. The advice of SCAP specialists on these matters has been valuable, but only actual contact and negotiation with foreign private traders can truly educate Japanese merchants and manufacturers to post-war trade realities of this kind. Internally, the basic obstacle to the rehabilitation of Japan’s foreign trade has been the economic disruption resulting from a disastrous war, including deteriorated, cannibalized and bombed-out industrial capacity; deterioration of railroad rolling stock and the poor state of domestic transport generally; shortages of coal, reflected in severe seasonal curtailment of electric power; shortages of domestic raw materials, steel and cement; and disrupted labor supply caused by the food situation. It may be anticipated, however, that with general improvement in the domestic economic situation, assisted by reviving foreign trade, many of these obstacles to export production will be overcome. As one consequence of a disrupted economy, the unstabilized Japanese currency and price structure have imposed difficulties seriously handicapping international commercial transactions. As discussed in the Allied Council at its 29th meeting on 2 April, 1947, the Japanese domestic price level had been rising steadily. Since that time certain improvements have been noted, particularly following upon the recent release of 600,000 metric tons of American imported food and vigorous anti-black market measures by the Japanese Government. Nevertheless, the price structure of Japan is still far from stable and domestic prices are often out of line with each other. Under these circumstances the establishment of an immediate commercial exchange rate would be highly speculative. Instead, to maximize export and the acquisition of foreign exchange, the system of parallel accounts in yen and foreign currencies mentioned earlier has thus far proved to be the most feasible. Nevertheless, until a commercial exchange rate can be established, an obstacle to free trade expansion will remain. Finally, among the major problems facing the healthy development of Japanese commerce is the restriction of economic activities resulting from the unstable political situation in various countries of the Far East which, rich in natural resources but poor in industry, would naturally be expected to complement Japan’s economy by mutually beneficial trade. The road to self-support of Japan through foreign trade is still long, but the goal is in sight. Certain obstacles have already been surmounted, but many problems remain to be resolved. What has been accomplished has been done from a full stop. On the basis of what has been achieved, there is ample ground for confidence that Japan’s foreign trade will be developed into adequate instrument for supporting a sound internal peaceful economy and hastening the return of a democratic Japan into the comity of nations. Sebald 67 In despatch 1207, September 22, from Tokyo, Mr. Sebald noted that his statement was favorably commented upon at the meeting on September 17, both Chinese and British members of the Council stressing the value of Japanese trade (740.00119 Control (Japan)/9–2247). The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) 894.628/9–447: Telegram [Document 264] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) secret Washington , September 25, 1947—7 p.m. 381. Reur 235 Sept. 4. 69 In view such considerations as nearness Japanese peace treaty discussions, possible repercussions from threat of increased US importation Japanese marine products, especially salmon, and FEC policy discussions, Dept inclined believe SCAP proposals now might make more difficult foreign acceptance US views respecting Japanese fisheries. If, however, your estimate of situation suggests off-Kamchatka proposal might be acceded to, and if Japanese prepared with equipment and labor force to maximize advantages of agreement, Dept has no objection exploratory conversations there. 70 In latter event transmit outline of objectives and your estimate of situation prior to conclusion negotiations. Lovett 69 Not printed; it requested the Department’s views on a proposed extension northward of Japanese fishing operations to include the off-Kamchatka area (894.628/9–447). 70 In telegram 255, September 30, from Tokyo, Mr. Sebald replied that any local conversations with representatives of power concerned were not believed advisable (894.628/9–3047). The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 894.60/9–2947 [Document 265] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State No. 1307 Tokyo , September 29, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to forward as an enclosure copy of a statement to be made by myself as Chairman and Member for the United States at the Forty-Second Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan to be held on October 1, 1947. This statement, which has the approval of General MacArthur, is to be made pursuant to the Agenda item under Official Matters, “Report by the Chairman on Japanese Industrial Production”, and was proposed for discussion by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 71 Respectfully yours, W. J. Sebald Counselor of Mission [Enclosure] Proposed Statement for Meeting of Allied Council for Japan One of SCAP’s major objectives in Japan has been the realization of a sound and self-supporting economy in a reformed and democratized institutional framework. Of the infinitely varied and enormously complicated problems confronting the Occupation, the task of securing the rehabilitation of the Japanese industrial machine along peaceable lines has clearly been among those most difficult of attainment. In appraising Japan’s present position, it is of interest to recall that the remarkable expansion and alteration of the character of the Japanese industrial machine was the outcome of plans formulated and executed beginning in the early 1930’s. With the invasion of Manchuria, Japan shifted her emphasis from the production of textiles and other light manufactures for export to the development of heavy machinery industries, including machine tools and the creation of a complete chemicals industry. The program was continued throughout the ‘30s and for Japan’s purposes, was successful. The machine tool industry, capable of turning out more than 60,000 units a year, and the heavy machinery industry, which produced the largest industrial units needed in her Empire, plus a chemicals industry, which in some phases included production of synthetic nitrates, were all developed during that period and were exceeded only by the industries of the United States and Germany. While Japan’s peak industrial production level was achieved in 1941, her war production capacity reached a plateau probably in 1943, after which all efforts were turned to the fabrication of end items. In 1944, her production reached such impressive totals as more than 1,500,000 gross tons of shipping and 25,000 aircraft. Initially, the Occupation was confronted with an industrial establishment virtually at a standstill. The effect of the Allied blockade of Japan by sea and by air had throttled all supply lines from Asia and the island portions of her former Empire, while bombing raids had destroyed perhaps 30% of her overall plant capacity and had greatly disorganized all industrial effort through the burning of cities and disruption to essential services. With surrender and entrance of the occupying armies, industrial chaos became even more pronounced. The Munitions Ministry, somewhat comparable to the American War Production Board, has been dissolved with no governmental organization of adequate scope to replace it in directing industrial production. At the time of surrender, most war industries were shut down and workers discharged and paid off with large yen allowances. Much of the industrial labor force had already fled the urban areas, while shipping and other services had come almost to a complete stop. The textile and chemical industries were found almost at a standstill. Less than 30% of the machinery and metal-working plants were in operation. Steel production fell likewise, and reached an all-time low of less than 5,000 tons of rolled products in October 1945. Attendant upon the release of several hundred thousand Korean and Chinese impressed mineworkers, who rioted throughout mining communities while awaiting repatriation, the coal mining industry had degenerated into chaos. SCAP, in this situation, in September 1945, issued Directive No. 3, calling upon the Japanese to maximize production of consumers’ goods and other essentials, and specified a list of some ten war industries in which production was prohibited. This was followed later by the designation of a large number of industrial plants for eventual reparations removals. Since that time, the inability to import even the greatly reduced peacetime material requirements of such commodities as high-grade iron ore, high-grade coking coal, wood pulp, wool, soy beans, industrial salt, minerals, hides and skins, and tanning materials has obliged Japan to subsist on meager stockpiles and her own inadequate resources. Failure of the resumption of a flow of raw materials sufficient at least to meet Japan’s minimum requirements has imposed an insuperable obstacle in the way of an emergence of a self-supporting economy and, further, has deprived Japan’s neighbors of urgently required manufactured products—for Japan still represents the chief prospective source of fabricated products for the Asiatic area. Further factors complicating Japan’s industrial recovery have been the critical shortages of food and consumers’ goods and the inflationary price spiral. Very substantial recovery has taken place since then. The index of industrial production has risen from a low point in the fall of 1945 to present levels of approximately 45 calculated upon a base period of the average for the years 1930–34. This base period is used since it represents the Far Eastern Commission’s appraisal as to what constitutes normal peacetime requirements. This five-year average in every case understimates current peacetime requirements because of the 20% population increase. The wartime peak production index was approximately twice the 1930–1934 average. The major production handicap throughout the Occupation has been the coal shortage. By the war’s end, Japanese mines were in an extremely debilitated condition requiring extensive repairs and replacements as a result of destructive wartime stripping and grossly inadequate maintenance for many years. Machinery and tool shortages were, and are, a serious obstacle to recovery. Replacement of the large numbers of repatriated Korean and Chinese laborers who had been impressed into service in pits constituted a major initial problem. Although 130,000 Japanese were recruited as replacements by spring of 1946, through intensive SCAP and Japanese Government efforts, labor turnover has been high and miners relatively unskilled. The decrease in working hours from ten- and twelve-hour shifts to eight hours resulted in a much greater loss in working time at the coal face. Output per worker has fallen from 17 tons per month for the period 1935–1938 to a present level of about 5.5 tons. Working conditions are the most hazardous of any major coal-producing country in the world, creating serious difficulties in maintaining a stable labor force. Coal output in November 1945 was only 500,000 tons, only one-tenth of peak wartime production, or less than the requirements merely to run the railways for one month. In March 1947, SCAP embarked on a program of restoring the mines mechanically by greatly increasing deliveries of machinery and equipment. Output has now risen to the point where it has been averaging 2,200,000 tons in recent months. Minimum requirements for a balanced peacetime economy are well over 3,000,000 tons monthly. Present production is largely consumed by transportation, thermal electric power, gas and coke requirements and at the mines; industrial users have been obliged to sustain the bulk of the disparity from normal requirements. In part, the inadequate deliveries to industrial consumers results from the necessary use of domestic coal to replace unobtainable imports of high-grade coal normally consumed by the iron and steel and chemical industries. Under these conditions, it has been impossible to stockpile adequate reserves for the critical winter months. It is also obvious that any appreciable rise in coal available for industrial consumption would have immediate salutary effects. Recovery in iron and steel production has been critically handicapped by the coal shortage. Steel production has recovered from practically zero at the outset of the Occupation to a level of some 90,000 tons of ingot per month, or approximately one-third of minimum requirements. Steel output per unit of coal used is substantially below normal because of the low quality of iron ore and coal; this has been further aggravated by the low level of operation and consequent inefficient use of fuel. Production of chemicals has been confronted with the same short supplies as other basic industry, principally the lack of coal, salt, iron pyrites and, seasonally, electric power. Production of soda ash and caustic soda, basic to rayon and many other industries, remains so low as to constitute a major handicap to recovery. Fertilizer production has been maximized by SCAP action through concentration of production in and channeling of available materials to a small number of designated efficient plants. As a result, synthetic nitrogen fertilizer production has been quadrupled since early 1946. It is now running at more than 80% of former peak production but, due to the loss of imports from Korea, present output meets only some 50% of Japan’s calculated requirements. Shortage of fats and oils is particularly acute in Japan in view of her dependence on soy beans as a source and in view of the fact that soy bean imports have been abysmally low, averaging less than 200 tons a month in 1946 compared to more than 75,000 tons a month in the pre-war period. As a result, the soap, paint, fatty acid, and similar industries are seriously prejudiced. The textile industry is the very heart of the Japanese economy. Japan in pre-war years led the world in volume of raw silk production, and manufactured cotton and rayon exports. Failure of these industries thus far to make a more substantial recovery has depressed the entire Japanese economy. Raw silk output, while more than doubling since early 1946, is currently operating at only one-sixth of the 1930 level. The silk industry virtually disappeared during the war by reason of the inaccessibility of Japan’s markets, and reeling establishments came to a virtual standstill. Most important, however, this industry, which during its peak was able to sell annually over $300 million worth of raw silk to the United States, is in effect a casualty to technological change, namely, the development and widespread use of synthetics. Shortages of raw wool have frustrated recovery in the woolen industry. Production in 1946 and 1947 has been undertaken on the basis of inventory stocks. However, substantial capacity is available and resumption of raw wool imports will permit a quick rise in productive activity. Rayon, yarn and fabric output, one of Japan’s best pre-war sources of foreign exchange, has been seriously handicapped because of deficiencies of caustic soda, rayon pulp, and coal. The recovery in cotton textiles has been impressive even though levels are still depressed. Imports of cotton from the United States began in June 1946 and the industry now has some 2.2 million spindles in operation of almost 3 million on hand. This latter figure compares with a pre-war high of 13 million spindles available. Further anticipated cotton imports resulting from the removal of various financing obstacles should accelerate activity, although the large number of spindles scrapped during the war will impose a very low production ceiling. In order to alleviate Japan’s need for dollar markets in a dollar-short world, substantial imports of non-American cotton have been arranged by recent agreements. The production of machinery and mechanical equipment has been limited by scarce supply of fuel, power, and minerals. While Japan needs machinery and mechanical items of every type, production has been concentrated in accordance with priority programs for the rehabilitation of coal mines and fertilizer production. Generally, the machinery production index is about the same as that for industry as a whole. However, since machinery constitutes one of Japan’s main hopes for replacement of probably reduced exports in textiles and raw silk, the production of machinery will necessarily have to be increased relatively more than most other categories. Generation of electric energy by public utilities since the Occupation has been above the 1930–34 annual average. Since the cessation of hostilities, however, there has been an enormous increase in residential consumption, in part a consequence of the shortage of charcoal. During the first five months of 1947, thermal power plants produced an average of 107 million KWH per month to supplement the monthly average of 2,428 million KWH generated by hydro plants. Thermalgenerated energy was only 4 per cent of total electric energy. Coal deliveries to the thermal power plants in the same period are reported to have been 720,000 tons (by contrast, coal deliveries to the iron and steel industry, the largest industrial consumer of coal, in this period were 790,000 tons). Consumption of electric energy by the primary metals, metals, machinery and tools, and chemical industries has been disproportionate to the output of products. The Chairman, in the last session of the Allied Council, reported on the reopening of private foreign trade in Japan. Details were submitted at that time concerning the efforts by the Supreme Commander to rejuvenate foreign trade as the indispensable prerequisite to the creation of a stable and self-supporting economy. It is anticipated that considerable progress towards securing a more adequate flow of essential industrial raw materials will be achieved in the coming year. However, continuing world shortages of those raw materials and the political and economic disruption prevailing in Asiatic sources of supply to Japan will not, for some time, permit the volume of imports required to meet minimum essential needs. In conclusion, while it is obvious that industrial recovery in Japan, in the face of desperate shortages of materials, has been truly impressive, the desired recovery can be brought to fruition only with the reemergence of normal foreign trade conditions as a result of the treaty of peace opening the broad avenues of peaceful trade with all countries. 71 In despatch 1321, October 8, from Tokyo, Mr. Sebald reported comment by other members of the Allied Council. The Chinese member expressed interest in a regulated economic recovery for Japan and stated that the supply of raw materials from China could be increased by Japanese assistance in rehabilitating China’s damaged industries. The British member implied that successful conclusion of negotiations concerning payment for Japanese trade with sterling-bloc countries would make possible an increased supply of raw materials for Japan. (740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–847) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) 740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–647 [Document 266] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfield ) [ Washington ,] October 6, 1947. During the course of a call this afternoon Mr. Graves 72 stated that he was instructed to explain the unfortunate press leak in regard to the withdrawal of the remaining British forces in Japan. He said that the British have been consulting with the Australians regarding their desire to withdraw the remaining British troops from Japan and that they intended, as soon as agreement with the Australians was achieved, to approach SCAP and the US Government in accordance with established procedures. 73 The news apparently got into the press as a result of an entirely improper and unauthorized statement by the Australian War Minister. Mr. Graves expressed his regrets for this occurrence and stated that the necessary approaches in Tokyo and Washington would be expedited. 74 72 Hubert A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy. 73 On May 21 the Department had answered notes from the Australian Embassy and accepted proposed withdrawal of British Indian forces and reduction of New Zealand forces in Japan, arrangements to be effected with SCAP (740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–1047). 74 On January 14, 1948, the Department replied to the Australian Embassy’s communication of November 24 (not printed) accepting the proposal to reduce substantially the United Kingdom force in Japan (740.00119 Control (Japan)/11–2447). The Department of State to the British Embassy 894.628/8–2047 [Document 267] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire The Department of State desires to refer to the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of August 20, 1947, 75 in which it is stated that the British Government would be grateful if the United States would provide certain assurances regarding the forthcoming Japanese-manned Antarctic whaling expedition and regarding the manner of authorization of any further such expeditions prior to the peace settlement. The Government of the United States reaffims its assurance that adequate steps, including the assignment of SCAP representatives, will be taken by the Supreme Commander during the 1947–48 whaling expedition to ensure scrupulous observance of all pertinent international whaling regulations, and that Allied observers will be welcomed as before. The British Government is further assured that all supplies of whale oil obtained by the expedition will be made available for allocation by the International Emergency Food Council. The Government of the United States regrets, however, that it cannot provide the requested assurance that no further Japanese Antarctic whaling expeditions will be authorized prior to the peace settlement without the concurrence of the Far Eastern Commission. The United States Government must take account of the possibility that the considerations which necessitated authorization of the forthcoming expedition will be present in equally pressing form next year, and believes that the Supreme Commander’s freedom of action to meet the situation presented at that time should be preserved. The British Government and other interested governments will be immediately advised should the Supreme Commander contemplate authorization of an expedition next year, and such views as they may care to submit in the matter will be forwarded to him for his careful consideration. Washington , October 8, 1947. 75 Not printed. The State Member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Saltzman) to the Committee 894.50/10–947 [Document 268] The State Member of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee ( Saltzman ) to the Committee Washington , October 9, 1947. Subject: The Economic Recovery of Japan—SWNCC 384. I cannot approve SWNCC 384 for the following reasons. There is no disagreement between the Department[s] as to the urgent need for making Japan self-supporting or as to the need for SCAP to place more emphasis on recovery. However, it should be pointed out that since there is already another paper before SWNCC—The Revival of the Japanese Economy, SWNCC 381, submitted by the Department of State on July 22, 1947, 76 a new paper on this same subject does not seem appropriate. The comprehensive economic recovery program contained in SWNCC 381 includes the “Japanese recovery plan” suggested in SWNCC 384, but the Department of State regards such a “Japanese plan” standing by itself as of doubtful value. If the Department of the Army considers the comprehensive recovery program contained in SWNCC 381 to be incomplete in any respect, the Department of State would be happy to study specific amendments. For over two months the Department of State has been engaged in detailed discussions with the Department of the Army and has already incorporated in SWNCC 381 many changes which have been requested. I would like to comment generally on the proposal that a directive seeking to foster Japanese recovery be issued unilaterally. Even if there were no objections to the content of the directive the Department of State would oppose the proposed procedure since unilateral action by the United States is bitterly resented by other countries in the Far East whose cooperation is absolutely essential to Japanese recovery in the long run. Many of these countries are concerned that the United States is apparently placing Japanese recovery ahead of the recovery of the rest of Asia. Rational or not, this concern must be reckoned with when commerical planning inherent in the Japanese recovery program is being worked out. The approach to obtaining international cooperation in Japanese recovery suggested by SWNCC 381 has somewhat greater possibility of success than a unilateral directive to SCAP. There is also the need for obtaining maximum cooperation of other countries in drafting a Japanese Peace Settlement. 77 A blatant assertion of United States emphasis on Japanese recovery at this time would hardly be conducive to the attainment of our objectives at the Conference. If the purpose of SWNCC 384 (final paragraph) is to modify the responsibilities of SCAP under established Far Eastern Commission policies covering demilitarization, reform, etc., it is suggested that a proper procedure would be to invite SCAP to offer for SWNCC study proposals for modification of specific reform policies which seem to conflict with economic recovery. The language of the final paragraph of SWNCC 384 is so general as to give SCAP a blank check, which is objectionable to the Department of State, and would impose without adequate guidance extremely difficult implementing decisions upon the SCAP. It should be pointed out, in addition, that the United States has the authority to issue emergency interim directives only in areas of policy not covered by Far Eastern Commission decisions. If it is not the intent of SWNCC 384 to propose modification of existing policy directives, then no directive to SCAP would appear necessary. Further, if a purpose of SWNCC 384 is to reopen consideration of the United States position on level of industry as set forth in SWNCC 236/43, 78 the Department of State takes strong exception. The position in SWNCC 236/43 was reached after prolonged study and discussion and represents agreement not only among the Departments concerned but also by Mr. Strike and Mr. Pauley, and has been transmitted to Overseas Consultants in Tokyo as their policy reference in determining the availability of industrial facilities for reparations. It represents, in the view of the Department of State, a soundly conceived United States policy on this question. Furthermore, the United States is already engaged in negotiations to obtain Allied agreement on SWNCC 236/43. In the light of these negotiations it is clear that any new United States proposals for level of industry more lenient to Japan than those in SWNCC 236/43 would be regarded as a repudiation of existing United States commitments and might be resisted so strenuously by our Allies as to rule out any possibility of agreement. At the very least, reaching Allied agreement would be greatly delayed. Yet it has always been agreed by the Departments of State and the Army that failure to reach level of industry decisions in the Far Eastern Commission has complicated Japanese recovery. 79 The Department of State considers the first three and one-half pages of SWNCC 384 to be inappropriate in a directive to SCAP, especially in an interim directive. If publicity for SCAP’s fine performance is desired, this can be accomplished as previously by comments and speeches of appropriate officials in the United States Government. Charles E. Saltzman 76 See General Hilldring’s letter of July 25, p. 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] . 77 For documentation on this subject, see pp. 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] ff. 78 See memorandum of April 7 by the Army member of SWNCC, p. 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] . 79 For further discussion, see paragraph entitled “New Subject” in memorandum of October 29, p. 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] . The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.00116 PW/10–947 [Document 269] The British Embassy to the Department of State Aide-Mémoire Ref: 302/34/47 The Foreign Office have heard from Tokyo that the United States Chief Prosecutor to the International Military Tribunal which is trying Japanese war criminals has been considering whether further trials of Japanese who might be charged with crimes under paragraph 1 ( a ) of the Far Eastern Commission’s policy, FEC–007/7, 80 are necessary. 2. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom feel that the trial at present in progress has gone on so long as to detract seriously from its value and they would not wish to take part in any further international trials of Japanese war criminals, if indeed any are envisaged. They hold the view that the Far Eastern Commission’s policy does not make it obligatory to hold further international trials for the following reasons: ( a ) The Prosecuting Agency has already selected the defendants against whom there was thought to be a case in respect of crimes against the peace when the defendants in the present trial were selected. The presumption is that the other suspects were not charged because the case against them was considered to be insufficient. ( b ) Whatever case there may be against some of the suspects under detention in Japan in respect of offences under paragraph 1 ( a ), of the Commission’s policy, it is the view of the Foreign Office that the case is no stronger than that against the less important defendants in the trial at present in progress. It now seems unlikely that all the defendants in the present trial will be convicted of crimes against the peace; moreover at Nuremberg ten of the twenty-two German defendants were acquitted of such crimes. It therefore seems that it would be futile to set in motion the elaborate machinery of an international trial if, as for these reasons seems likely, the case against those who might be accused is either no better or weaker than that against those defendants in the present trial who are likely to be acquitted. ( c ) Experience has shown that the present type of international tribunal with eleven different countries represented on the tribunal and on the prosecution is slow and inefficient. On practical grounds alone, therefore, the Prosecuting Agency should recommend that any further trials should be held before national courts under paragraph 7 of FEC–007/7. 3. The Foreign Office hope that these considerations will be taken into account by the appropriate United States authorities and that it will not be found necessary to hold further international trials. Washington , 9th October, 1947. 80 April 3, 1946; for text, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 97. The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Reparations Delegate in Japan (Hodge) 740.00119 PW/10–947: Telegram [Document 270] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Reparations Delegate in Japan ( Hodge ) confidential Washington , October 9, 1947—6 p.m. 400. USRepDel 1. Subj. UN property. 1. In Telcon 8457, Aug 25, SCAP was requested forward final comments and recommendations re SWNCC 357. Understanding here such comments available immediately necessary clearances obtained by CPC. No further info recd here. Assume delay due problem treatment UN holdings in Jap companies which are or may be subj liquidation under Zaibatsu program. As guide your discussions this problem and to assist securing early submission SCAP comments and recommendations re SWNCC 357, fol is view here: a . In cases UN Natls are eligible for return of shares in concerns which may be subj liquidation, but not yet liquidated under Zaibatsu program, consider such return should be effected and any compensation for damages paid accordance SWNCC 357. Subsequent treatment such UN investors whose shares are returned should conform policies estab for other non-Zaibatsu investors these concerns. b . Responsibility Jap Govt for protection UN interests should not impede Zaibatsu liquidation program re firms being liquidated prior return shares to UN owners. In event implementation liquidation program requires disposal UN shares or assets of companies in which UN shares held prior to return such shares UN owners, latter should receive compensation accordance para 8( f ), SWNCC 357, to extent not otherwise compensated under terms Zaibatsu liquidation program. Above implies natl treatment UN investments in Zaibatsu concerns, apart from obligation Jap Govt provide adequate compensation for loss or damage UN interests as result of war as provided SWNCC 357. Reinvestment yen balances derived from compensation UN shareholders subj Zaibatsu program should conform same limitations as apply Jap natls under applicable Jap regulations. Lovett The Department of State to the Swiss Legation 894.512/9–1847 [Document 271] The Department of State to the Swiss Legation Memorandum The Department of State refers to the memorandum from the Legation of Switzerland dated March 26, 1947, and to the Department’s reply thereto dated May 2, 1947, 81 respecting the applicability of certain Japanese taxes to Swiss property in Japan. In the latter communication, the Department of State informed the Legation that the Legation’s memorandum of March 26, 1947 was being transmitted to the Far Eastern Commission for its consideration, and that the Government of the United States would transmit the comments of the Far Eastern Commission to the Legation as soon as possible. The Department is now in receipt of the following letter from the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission: “Reference is made to General Hilldring’s letter of June 4, 1947, enclosing a copy of the memorandum from the Legation of Switzerland, dated March 26, 1947, requesting that the United States Government use its good offices to obtain a revision of the policy respecting the application of certain Japanese taxes to Swiss property in Japan. “The Far Eastern Commission has given sympathetic consideration to the request presented by the Legation of Switzerland on behalf of its Government and has carefully weighed the reasons set forth in the aforesaid memorandum with a view to supporting its claim. After due examination of all factors involved, the Commission regrets that it cannot accede to the request of the Swiss Government. It believes that the nationals of neutral countries, who were able to do business in Japan during the war years and thus derived the benefits accruing therefrom, should continue to be subject to local laws, including laws imposing taxation, which have as their object the raising of revenue for the vitally necessary economic rehabilitation of Japan. “The Far Eastern Commission considers that it does not fall within the Terms of Reference of the Commission to determine the effect of the Swiss-Japanese Treaty of Settlement of June 21, 1911 in the present circumstances.” Washington , October 13, 1947. 81 Memorandum of March 26 not printed; the Department’s reply is printed ante , pp. 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] . The State Member of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (Saltzman) to the Committee 894.50/10–1647 [Document 272] The State Member of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee ( Saltzman ) to the Committee secret [ Washington , October 16, 1947.] Subject: SWNCC 380 82 and SWNCC 380/1 Unilateral Action on Japanese Economic Problems The inclosure, submitted by the State Department, 83 is a redraft of and a proposed substitute for SWNCC 380 and SWNCC 380/1. It is believed that this paper achieves the objective of SWNCC 380 and incorporates a procedure in substance identical with that suggested by the Army member at the meeting of SANACC of October 3, 1947. At the same time the inclosure omits those portions of SWNCC 380 which contain or imply criticism of FEC procedures. It will be noted that the inclosure provides for written memoranda rather than the informal check, suggested by the Army member, as the means by which the Secretary of SANACC shall determine whether any member objects to the issuance of a U.S. policy proposal, decision or statement as a unilateral directive. Such a provision is believed desirable in view of the seriousness of the action involved in the issuance of a unilateral directive. It will be noted also that the inclosure provides that the U.S. member of FEC be informed of the date stipulated for consideration of unilateral action and consulted with regard to such action. 84 Charles E. Saltzman 82 See General McCoy’s letter of August 11, p. 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 252 ] . 83 Not printed. 84 SANACC 380/2 was approved October 23 and a copy sent by the Department on November 19 to General McCoy for his guidance. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–1647 [Document 273] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State restricted No. 1340 Toyko , October 16, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1321 of October 8, 1947 85 and previous correspondence in regard to the meetings of the Allied Council for Japan and to forward herewith five copies of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the Forty-third Meeting of the Council held on October “15, 1947. 86 The only official matter on the Agenda was a “Report by the Chairman on the Establishment of a Foreign Exchange Rate for Japan”, proposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The report was designed to highlight the importance of determining an exchange rate as soon as possible, not only to facilitate the expansion of Japan’s foreign trade but also to assist in the rehabilitation and stabilization of her economy. Emphasis was placed upon the difficulties and problems involved in an immediate determination of such a rate, as well as the serious consequences which would follow upon the establishment of a premature and unrealistic rate. It was nevertheless emphasized that the Supreme Commander intends to institute some form of an exchange rate, in connection with necessary auxiliary controls, at the earliest practicable date. The other Members of the Council were in unanimous agreement as to the importance of determining a rate of exchange in the near future. The Chinese Member expressed the belief that extreme precautions should be taken to prevent an unfavorable effect upon the internal economy of Japan. The Acting Soviet Member emphasized the desirability of a thorough investigation before the establishment of an exchange rate. The British Commonwealth Member, after commenting upon the problems involved, agreed that a rate should be established, as soon as the economy of Japan is sufficiently stabilized, in order that she may reestablish normal commercial relations with the rest of the world. He recommended that the responsibility for proposing an exchange rate be placed upon the Japanese Government. At his request, and with the concurrence of all the Members, the subject was retained on the Agenda for discussion at the next meeting of the Council. Respectfully yours, W. J. Sebald 85 See footnote 71, p. 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] . 86 None printed. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 501.BD–Asia/10–2447 [Document 274] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State restricted No. 1348 Tokyo , October 24, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram No. 393 of October 7, 1947 87 and to report that Dr. P. S. Lokanathan, Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and Colonel James Keen, Executive Assistant of that organization, have completed a series of consultations with General Mac Arthur and members of his staff. These United Nations officials were warmly welcomed, and offered wholehearted cooperation in the exchange of information and advice on matters concerning the relationship between the economies of Japan and the other countries of Asia and the Far East. Dr. Lokanathan and Colonel Keen stated that during their interview, General MacArthur expressed great interest in the commission and indicated his approval of the suggestion that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers send representatives to the next conference of ECAFE which is to be held at Baguio, beginning November 24, 1947. As the Department will recognize, this is a substantive change from the first conference at Shanghai in June 1947 at which representatives from this Headquarters acted as advisers to the American delegation. This change is believed to be a logical step, in view of the Allied character of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Dr. Lokanathan has submitted a formal request (copy enclosed) 87a that this Headquarters be represented in an appropriate capacity. 88 While the provisional agenda and papers relating to the session have not yet been received, discussions with Dr. Lokanathan indicate that representation will be desirable from the Economic and Scientific Section of this Headquarters. Dr. Lokanathan and Colonel Keen conferred with members of this Mission as the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and conferences were also arranged and attended by an officer of this Mission with members of the Economic and Scientific Section and of the Government Section of this Headquarters. Both ECAFE officials stated they were greatly pleased at the enthusiastic and sympathetic reception accorded them by General MacArthur and other members of this Headquarters. They were further encouraged by the willingness and frankness with which questions were answered, and at the realization of the wealth of data available upon the economy of Japan, especially in contrast with that available in other areas of Asia and the Far East. The conferences with the Economic and Scientific Section covered the present status of Japan with emphasis upon the major problems confronting this country in efforts being made to promote its economic recovery. Foreign trade, raw material requirements, and industry in Japan were of special interest. Officials of the Economic and Scientific Section were in agreement with the ECAFE representatives that the recovery of Japan is inextricably bound up with the economies of other areas of the Far East. Dr. Lokanathan declared that there could be no recovery of the economies of the rest of Asia without the economic recovery of Japan. The officials of the Economic and Scientific Section expressed the opinion that Dr. Lokanathan had come to Tokyo at an opportune time, because the need for finding ways of meshing the economy of Japan with the economies of Asia and specifically the Far East is now an important aspect of their planning. The opening of Japan to limited private foreign trade and the lack of raw materials have accentuated this realization. The present dependence upon the United States for the major portion of imports into Japan and the restriction of exports to areas which can pay in dollars was stated to be abnormal and temporary, as present thought is focused upon eventual integration of the economy of Japan with the economies of Asia and the Far East rather than with the economy of the United States. Dr. Lokanathan is confident that despite handicaps Japan will rise again economically, because the Japanese have determination and ability, provided they are given access to raw materials and markets. After a tour of Tokyo, small villages, and agricultural areas, Dr. Lokanathan indicated confirmation of his belief that the standard of living in Japan, even at the present time, is higher than in China and India. A conference with officials of the Government Section was held primarily because Dr. Lokanathan had many questions concerning the efforts being made by that Section in democratizing the Japanese. He expressed the conviction that political stability in Japan as well as in the rest of Asia is of vital importance to economic recovery. He was not only interested in Japan’s new constitution, but also in how its provisions are being implemented. His long study of Oriental and other peoples has convinced him that reforms are lasting only if fully desired by the people concerned. Dr. Lokanathan raised the question of Japanese representation at meetings of international organizations, such as ECAFE. It was pointed out to him that the United States favors the attendance of Japanese as observers, but that other members of the Far Eastern Commission do not share this view. Although representatives of the Supreme Commander attending international conferences are familiar with Japanese views, it would appear preferable to have Japanese in close touch with international affairs in preparation for their eventual assumption of international responsibilities. This initial consultation between this Headquarters and ECAFE officials was devoted to obtaining as broad a picture of the present status of Japanese economy as the limited time allowed. Should occasion arise, it would be desirable for ECAFE representatives to come to Tokyo to consult upon specific problems with particular Sections and divisions of this Headquarters. It is also anticipated that experts in certain fields might at some future date be requested to confer at the Headquarters of ECAFE when their advice would be particularly helpful, as, for example, textile experts. In response to a request of Dr. Lokanathan, efforts will be made to ensure a steady flow of economic data on Japan to ECAFE as it becomes available. ECAFE in turn has agreed to forward pertinent data to SCAP. Officials of this Headquarters were impressed at the penetrating nature of Dr. Lokanathan’s questions and his appreciation and knowledge of the role which Japan should play in the economic recovery of Asia and the Far East. It is believed that an auspicious beginning was made during this first visit for consultation. As of possible interest, a copy of the press release approved by General MacArthur concerning the visit of Dr. Lokanathan and Colonel Keen is enclosed. 89 Respectfully yours, W. J. Sebald 87 Not printed. 87a Not printed. 88 Despatch 1368, November 4, from Tokyo, reported that SCAP accepted the invitation to the second session of ECAFE, and Dr. Sherwood M. Fine, Economic Adviser of the Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, SCAP, was designated as his representative (501.BD Asia/11–447). In a statement made before the Commission on December 3, the chief U.S. delegate (Monnett B. Davis) stated that the U.S. delegation favored establishment of adequate consultative arrangements between ECAFE and control authorities in Japan and Korea, for their mutual assistance (501.BD Asia/12–447). 89 Not printed. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/10–3147 [Document 275] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State restricted No. 1363 Tokyo , October 31, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch No. 1340 of October 16, 1947 and previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan and to forward herewith five copies of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the Forty-fourth Meeting of the Council held on October 29, 1947. 90 Under official matters, the subject “Report by the Chairman on the Establishment of a Foreign Exchange Rate for Japan”, had been held over from the previous meeting. The British Commonwealth Member, after stating that it was his Government’s view that establishment of a uniform rate of exchange is a practicable proposition, recommended the establishment of a variable rate in conjunction with stringent controls in foreign exchange dealing and import licensing. The Chinese Member suggested that a committee be designated by the Council to prepare a report to the Council on the matter, in view of its highly technical nature. At the request of the Acting Soviet Member, the subject was retained on the Agenda for further discussion at the next meeting. The second subject on the Agenda was a “Report by the Chairman on the Problem of Repatriation”, proposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In my statement (page 3 et seq. ), I pointed out the importance of the problem of repatriation and stated that repatriation from all areas except Manchuria and Soviet-controlled areas has been practically completed. An agreement relating to repatriation between this Headquarters and the Soviet Member, as well as subsequent correspondence based thereon, was described and made part of the record. In view of Soviet charges that the slow rate of repatriation was caused by the American authorities in Japan, I stated that the Supreme Commander was prepared, within forty-eight hours after the receipt of notice, to increase the number of Japanese repatriated from Soviet-controlled areas to 131,500 during the first month, and thereafter to increase the number to 160,000 per month. By such an increase, every Japanese now in Soviet-controlled areas could be repatriated within five months. In reply, the Acting Soviet Member, after asserting that the question of repatriation of Japanese from Soviet areas does not lie within the purview of the Council, made the accusation that “definite political considerations” must have dictated the presentation of this subject for discussion. In an obvious effort to provide material for propaganda organs and apparently to divert attention from his Goverment’s responsibility for delay in returning Japanese from Soviet-controlled areas, he alleged that “repatriates get no proper assistance from the Japanese Government and the Occupation authorities with regard to getting employment …”, and quoted from press reports concerning the so-called “deplorable state” in which repatriates find themselves. In rebuttal, I submitted that it was fully within the province of the Council to discuss repatriation problems since they affect the lives of so many Japanese. I pointed out that little cognizance can be taken of a few isolated complaints concerning treatment accorded repatriates, and took the opportunity to imply that only in a comparatively free press could such reports have been printed. In addition, I remarked that the Acting Soviet Member was actually pleading for preferential treatment of repatriates despite the fact that in a previous Council meeting it was the consensus that such treatment should be avoided. As a matter of course, a categorical denial was made that this Headquarters had ever sponsored Japanese meetings to accelerate repatriation. The Chinese Member, after stating that certain Japanese technicians had volunteered to remain in China, agreed that prompt action should be taken to complete repatriation of all Japanese. The British Commonwealth Member set forth those parts of various governmental agreements from which the authority of the Council is derived for the discussion of repatriation and similar matters and urged acceleration of repatriation from Soviet-controlled areas for humanitarian reasons. Respectfully yours, W. J. Sebald 90 Enclosures not printed. The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to the Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) 894.50/11–1247 [Document 276] The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Saltzman ) to the Under Secretary of the Army ( Draper ) secret Washington , November 12, 1947. Dear Mr. Draper : The State Department has given careful consideration to the revision, which you sent me on October 29th, of SWNCC 384, “Economic Recovery of Japan.” The State Department is in full agreement with the desire of the Department of the Army to make it known to SCAP, to the U.S. public, to Congress, and to the Far Eastern Commission that the United States Government desires to accelerate the processes of economic recovery in Japan. There is agreement also that any statement of U.S. policy on this subject should be formulated in such terms as to make clear the desirability of a “shift in emphasis” toward a more positive attitude, as far as increasing trade and industrial productivity are concerned. Such a statement, it is believed, should be so worded as to minimize fears that this “shift of emphasis” implies in any way reversal or repudiation of the broad principles and policies which have underlain long term occupation objectives. It should seek to elicit maximum support of allied countries in the Far East for those practical measures and commitments essential to any program of actual economic reconstruction in Japan and in their own countries. At the same time, it should be sufficiently specific and clear in its intent to assist in obtaining Congressional support for the financial assistance required to attain our ends. With these considerations in mind the State Department has prepared the enclosed statement which, it is believed, includes all the points of substantial importance contained in the latest version by the Department of the Army of SWNCC 384. These points, however, are presented in a manner suitable for delivery as a formal statement by the U.S. Member of the Far Eastern Commission. In addition to the points taken from SWNCC 384, the enclosure contains a resolution and a proposal to the FEC for policy action designed to impress upon the FEC two facts. The first is that FEC policy decisions already adopted clearly imply the desirability of placing emphasis upon Japan’s economic recovery. The second is that FEC, as such, and the individual countries thereof, are recognized as having effective jurisdiction over policy matters upon which their decision is an essential prerequisite to setting in motion a successful recovery program for Japan and for other Far Eastern countries. The statement for the U.S. Member of FEC is couched in such terms as to make it suitable for release to the Press, if that should be deemed desirable, and for use in Congress if there should arise in that quarter a desire for evidence demonstrating that the U.S. Government is taking positive steps to assist Japan to become economically self-supporting. 91 Sincerely yours, Charles E. Saltzman [Enclosure] Proposed Statement by General McCoy to the Far Eastern Commission on the Role of Japan’s Economic Recovery in Far Eastern Economic Reconstruction My Government has instructed me to place before the Far Eastern Commission a resolution and proposals for Far Eastern Commission policy decision on several specific matters. The U.S. Government has reviewed the accomplishments of the first two years of the occupation of Japan in the light of the Potsdam Declaration and of those ultimate objectives which the Far Eastern Commission has incorporated in its Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan. Member countries of the Far Eastern Commission have shown a deep and continuing interest in programs which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has set in motion to accomplish those objectives. There can be little question in your minds, I am sure, that SCAP has taken effective measures to disarm Japan so that Japan’s ability to make war on the land, on the sea and in the air, has been destroyed, and that SCAP has taken vigorous steps to eliminate from positions of prominence and responsibility in Japanese society exponents of Japanese militarism and ultra-nationalism. Under the Allied regime of control Japan cannot menace the peace and security of the world. A peaceful Japanese government, established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, has begun to put in motion through legislation and executive action processes for development in Japan of democratic institutions and ways of life. In the economic sphere Japan lacks both the strength and stability to meet its needs or to carry out its responsibilities either to its own people or to the peoples of the Far East. Many causes contribute to Japan’s economic instability, its lack of industrial productivity and its inadequate commercial operations. When the Far Eastern Commission can reach decisions on unresolved policy matters in the field of reparations, that action can contribute to reconstruction in Far Eastern countries. It can also lay the basis for healthy recovery of industrial activity within Japan. Nevertheless, pending those decisions, important both to Japan and reparations claimant countries, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government, the U.S. Government, and each of the other countries members of the Far Eastern Commission, can take certain economic measures which could contribute towards accomplishment of the basic objectives of the occupation. Both Japan and those Far Eastern countries which continue to suffer from the impact or ravages of Japanese aggression can benefit from positive and immediate exploration of all appropriate means and methods whereby economic recovery in Japan and throughout the Far East can be accelerated. I must mention here that it is well known that the American people have borne the costs of importing into a Japan, at first prostrate and subsequently unstable and inadequately productive, those foods and materials required to prevent widespread disease and unrest. The load of those costs is one which the American people will not willingly carry indefinitely. For a temporary period continued assistance can be expected, but through greater efforts by the Japanese people and through early restoration of mutually profitable commercial relations between Japan and the rest of the world, Japan should move towards that self-support which can remove this burden on the U.S. taxpayer. Existing Far Eastern Commission policies, the economic interests of all of the Far Eastern Commission countries, and the immediate requirements of Japan combine to emphasize the great need for recognizing the importance of taking all appropriate measures which can contribute to self-support in Japan and maximum trade between a peaceful and increasingly democratic Japan and those countries of the Far East and of the world which can benefit from early and broad expansion of commerce. My Government therefore has instructed me to put before the Far Eastern Commission the following resolution and the following proposals for Far Eastern Commission as a recommended policy decision: “Whereas the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has disarmed Japan and has taken vigorous and effective steps to suppress or eliminate from Japanese life institutions and persons expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression; “Whereas the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has encouraged the Japanese people to desire individual liberties, respect fundamental human rights and form democratic and representative organizations; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission has declared that Japan should be permitted eventual participation in world trade relations and access to raw materials necessary for a peaceful economy; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission has authorized the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to designate for assured retention under Japanese ownership industrial capacity capable of practical use to meet current needs; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission has determined that the peaceful needs of the Japanese people should be defined as being substantially the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the period of 1930–34; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission has declared that reparations shall be in such a form as would not endanger the fulfillment of the program of demilitarization of Japan and which would not prejudice defraying of the costs of occupation and the maintenance of a minimum civilian standard of living; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission has declared that measures should be continued or taken to stimulate Japan’s production of goods required for export and to insure that goods produced are those in demand in countries requiring supplies from Japan; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission has directed the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be responsible for ascertaining the types and amounts of goods in Japan available for export and for recommending the types and amounts of goods to be imported and to develop a trade program; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission has established an Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan to recommend to the U. S. Government on the best arrangements for facilitating Japanese exports and imports generally; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission has authorized the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to establish a revolving fund to aid in financing production designed to contribute to the revival of productivity in a Japanese peace economy; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission is conscious that the development of a sound and self-supporting economy is essential to the establishment of a democratic and peaceful government which will carry out its international responsibilities, respect the rights of other states and support the objectives of the United Nations; “Whereas the Far Eastern Commission is conscious that the fulfillment of Japanese obligations to the Allied Powers requires help to the people of Japan in their own interest as well as that of the world at large in finding means whereby they may develop within the framework of a democratic society an intercourse among themselves and with other countries along economic lines that will enable them to satisfy their reasonable individual and national needs and bring them into permanently peaceful relationship with all nations; “The Far Eastern Commission, therefore, resolves that the U. S. Government, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the Far Eastern Commission and its Member states, should each and collectively take such positive measures as are appropriate within their respective jurisdictions as will contribute to prompt and healthy economic reconstruction in Japan and throughout the Far East as a whole, and to this end approves the following proposals as matters of policy: “I. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should take steps, as soon as practical, to remove restrictions upon the entry in Japan of Allied personnel for business purposes; “II. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should permit the movement from Japan of Japanese business men to any Allied country; Providing arrangements for such movement are supervised by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in accordance with such standards on types of business men and restrictions on numbers of business men as may be laid down by such particular Allied countries as may permit Japanese business men to enter. “III. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should prepare long-range import-export plans, for appropriate consideration by the Far Eastern Commission and the Inter-Allied Trade Board in accordance with their respective terms of reference, in such a way as to assure that authorized amounts of imports, in excess of requirements for the prevention of disease and unrest, can contribute effectively towards Japan’s self-support and economic reconstruction throughout the Far East as a whole.” 91 In a letter dated December 19, General Draper wrote Mr. Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, offering a revision of the paper on “The Economic Recovery of Japan” to be sent to SCAP, and requested early approval of its recommendations (894.50/12–1947). The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/11–1447 [Document 277] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State restricted No. 1391 Tokyo , November 14, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch No. 1363 of October 31, 1947 and previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan and to forward herewith five copies of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the Forty-fifth Meeting of the Council held on November 12, 1947. 92 Under official matters, the subject “Report by the Chairman on the Establishment of a Foreign Exchange Rate for Japan” had been held over from the previous meeting. The Acting Soviet Member recommended the establishment of an exchange rate at the earliest possible moment to assist in the development of foreign trade. In that connection, he urged that Japan be given an opportunity greatly to increase output in peacetime industries. The second subject on the Agenda was a “Report by the Chairman on Fundamental Changes in the Japanese Educational System”, proposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In my statement (page 2 et seq. ), I drew attention to the abuses which existed in the highly centralized Japanese educational system before the Occupation. After summarizing early steps taken by this Headquarters to correct the most objectionable aspects of this system, I described the development of a long-range program to transform the educational system into an effective instrument for the furtherance of a democratic society. This program is based upon recommendations made by the United States Education Mission to Japan and the Japanese Education Reform Council, and upon the policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission regarding revision of the educational system. 93 Implementation is founded upon three documents: ( a ) the new Constitution of Japan; 94 ( b ) the Fundamental Law of Education; 95 and ( c ) the School Education Law. I explained in some detail the various aspects of the reforms being undertaken and concluded by emphasizing that the success of the program depends upon the will of the Japanese people to achieve improvement, and the extent to which essential materials and adequate financial support may be furnished. The Acting Soviet Member inquired as to what extent foreign books and publications are available to Japanese teachers and students and from what countries such publications are received. In reply, I stated that, in accordance with a policy statement adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on March 27, 1947, this Headquarters gives due weight to furnishing foreign books in central libraries, subject to import requirements and the availability of supplies. The British Commonwealth Member agreed upon the advisability of decentralizing educational activity, with the exception of such matters as financial administration and the establishment of a regularized system of appointment, promotion, and dismissal of teachers. In response to his inquiry concerning a recommendation made by the United States Education Mission with regard to language reform, I suggested that the Council avoid discussion of that subject in view of its technical and highly controversial character. The British Commonwealth Member stated that, in new Japanese history textbooks, treatment accorded recent events is of a perfunctory and sometimes contentious nature. I briefly summarized the difficulties which had been encountered in searching for Japanese scholars who could write an objective history and submitted that those texts, the best now available, will be revised and improved as a result of further experience. At the request of the Member for China, this subject was retained on the Agenda for further discussion at the next meeting. Respectfully yours, W. J. Sebald 92 Enclosures not printed. 93 March 27; for text, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 94. 94 Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 671. 95 Law 25, March 31, ibid. , p. 865. The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Army (Royall) 894.602/11–2447 [Document 278] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Army ( Royall ) secret Washington , November 25, 1947. Dear Ken : You will remember that in our telephone conversation of Monday, November 24, I indicated there had been prepared in the State Department a memorandum which reviews the development of the Zaibatsu Program and evaluates the chief points which have been raised in recent discussions concerning the implementation of that Program. In the light of this memorandum, a copy of which is enclosed, I should like to suggest that it is not necessary or desirable at this time to undertake a complete revision of the basic policy involved in the Program. This is not to say, however, that the paper as now written cannot be improved. The State Department is in fact currently preparing a new draft of the paper (FEC 230) for the purpose of removing or changing any passages which may go beyond the real intent of the policy and which may thereby leave it open to justifiable public criticism. In so doing, I want to be sure that the fullest consideration is given to any criticisms you may have to the paper as it now stands. I should like to suggest, therefore, that as soon as convenient you send me in as detailed and specific form as possible, your objections to the Program together with any alterations you think should be made. Sincerely yours, [ Robert A. Lovett ] [Enclosure] Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State secret Dissolution of Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power in Japan ( Zaibatsu Program ) The purpose of this memorandum is to outline briefly the steps taken to date in the Zaibatsu Program and the current position of the Department of State with respect to such Program. The Zaibatsu Program originated with the President’s Policy Statement on Japan of August 29, 1945 and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP 96 in which he was directed to require the Japanese to dissolve large industrial and banking combines or other concentrations of private business control and to take other action to encourage a wide distribution of income and ownership of the means of production and trade. This policy has since been adopted by the Far Eastern Commission. 97 The means for executing the program were developed two years ago by a combined State-Army Mission to Japan, and a policy paper embodying its report was approved by SCAP and SWNCC, and after being considered by Assistant Secretary Petersen and by General Hilldring. This paper is currently being considered by Far Eastern Commission. Implementation has been proceeding in Japan for the past two years on the basis of the original Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive and is now well advanced. Essentially, the program seeks to establish a system of competitive enterprise in Japan with substantial diffusion of ownership and control. To this end, certain laws and ordinances have been passed and others are currently being considered. The major Zaibatsu holding companies have been liquidated. The securities held by such companies have been turned over to a Holding Company Liquidation Commission which is now in the process of disposing of the securities to Japanese buyers. An anti-trust law designed to prevent future development of excessive concentrations of economic power has also been passed. The Japanese Diet has before it an Ordinance which sets up the standards and procedures for dissolution of excessive concentrations of power not effected by the holding company liquidation, such as single corporations holding monopoly or near-monopoly positions in an industry and large corporations with many technologically unrelated lines. Japanese corporations likely to be affected by the Ordinance are now preparing reorganization plans. These measures necessarily place substantial administrative discretion in the hands of SCAP and the Japanese Government. Analogous laws in the U.S. and Canada are similarly constructed and the Department believes that no adequate program can be drafted without placing such discretion in the administrator. Until recently there has been general agreement in the government on the Zaibatsu Program. Several weeks ago, however, the Department of the Army raised certain questions concerning the policy paper now before the Far Eastern Commission and the Ordinance now before the Japanese Diet, referred to above. By agreement between officials in the two Departments, a cable (Tab A) 98 was sent to SCAP suggesting that the administrative powers given by the Ordinance to the liquidating agency be restricted in certain added respects. SCAP was also informed that the Far Eastern Commission policy paper was under review by the two Departments and was requested to delay adoption of the Ordinance. The Secretary of the Army followed this cable with a personal message from himself to General Mac Arthur (Tab B) also requesting delay on the Ordinance. General MacArthur replied (Tab C) that the procedures of the Ordinance are designed to accomplish most effectively the implementation of existing policy and detailed his reasons for giving the Japanese authorities, under his supervision, the maximum of direct responsibility in carrying out Allied decisions. Shortly thereafter a more up-to-date draft of the Ordinance became available in Washington and was found by working levels in both Departments to satisfy most of the questions which had been raised. The exchanges of views between the Army and State Departments and between Washington and Tokyo have not answered, to the satisfaction of the Army Department, a number of questions which have been raised by the program. These questions seem to arise from a number of general apprehensions. The first of these is, apparently, that the program is “un-American”. The specific objection is thought to be the fact that the compensation to be paid to former Zaibatsu owners for their divested property is inadequate. It is inadequate and inevitably must be, for if full compensation were paid the former owners would retain the financial power to resume their former positions of economic domination. Certainly the objective of the program—the breaking of the identity of interest between monopolistic business and the totalitarian state by encouraging a system of free enterprise—is soundly American. As General MacArthur has pointed out, (Tab C), “this program, if successful in transforming a small number of monopolistic combines into numerous competing units and in bringing about widespread ownership of the instruments of production and trade, will erect a solid bulwark against the spread of ideologies or systems destructive of both free enterprise and political freedom under democratic capitalism.” Another fear appears to be that the program has been or may be carried too far. The basic directives, however, contain no instructions to SCAP to take extreme action. Criticism of the Ordinance is apparently based on the fear that it might, however, be administered in too drastic manner. It seems doubtful that General MacArthur, who as Theater Commander is responsible for implementation, would permit this. The third fear is that the Program may interfere with economic recovery. It is SCAP’s conclusion, with which the Department of State agrees, that Japanese recovery would on the contrary be seriously jeopardized by delay in carrying out the Program. As long as the divested securities of former Zaibatsu concerns remain in the hands of the Japanese Government, where they now are, opportunity for free enterprise is restricted and recovery is consequently hampered. A further important consideration is that delay would create uncertainty among Japanese businessmen and others as to whether we really intend to free them from the domination of the Zaibatsu, and whether they may now assume positions of responsibility in the Japanese economy without fear of reprisal at the hands of resurgent Zaibatsu interests. Finally, delay would prevent the reorganization of many technologically incongruous combines which, under their existing sprawling organization, cannot obtain intelligent guidance from this top management. It has been suggested that, in view of these apprehensions, the Program be re-examined by prominent persons not now in government positions. A primary disadvantage of this proposal is that a review by prominent citizens could not possibly be kept secret, and the knowledge in Japan that the United States was uncertain about the program would greatly endanger its successful implementation. The Program’s success depends on encouraging Japanese businessmen to take independent measures towards Japanese recovery, and upon minimizing their fear of taking action inimical to Zaibatsu interests. Since the program would inevitably have to be held up pending reexamination, the success of the program and economic recovery would both be imperiled in the interval. Also, the continued retention by the Japanese Government of the divested securities for any longer period than necessary would strengthen the groups in Japan and those countries of the Far Eastern Commission who prefer that ownership and control of enterprises remain permanently in the hands of the Japanese Government. General MacArthur has pointed out (Tab A) that “involved in the failure or success of the program is the choice between a system of free competitive enterprise which goes hand in hand with political freedom and a socialism of one kind or another under which political freedom is a myth”, and that “reopening the policy for discussion at this time might well result in altering not only procedural or policy matters but in sacrificing the essential objective.” 96 See Political Reorientation of Japan , p. 423. 97 June 19; for text, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 49. 98 Tabs A, B, and C, referred to in this paragraph, not attached to file copy of memorandum. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Japan)/12–147 [Document 279] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 1423 Tokyo , December 1, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch no. 1421, November 28, 1947, 99 on the subject of the forty-sixth meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, and to invite the Department’s attention to the discussion in that meeting as contained in the Corrected Verbatim Minutes forwarded with the reference despatch as an enclosure. (Reference is also made to previous despatches concerning meetings of the Allied Council.) In placing the subject “Report by the Chairman on Fundamental Changes in the Japanese Educational System” on the agenda for discussion, the Supreme Commander was following a policy of placing subjects on the agenda with a view to evoking helpful and constructive discussion by the Members of the Council, and to illustrate progress which has been made in various aspects of the process of democratization in Japan. The instant topic was placed on the agenda with a view to reporting upon fundamental reforms in the system of Japanese education. While it is fully realized by most responsible officers in General Headquarters that the reform of Japanese education is not yet complete and that many difficult major problems remain to be solved, it appears beyond question that tremendous gains have been made in effecting fundamental changes along democratic lines. Unfortunately, the meeting under report aptly illustrates a tendency on the part of the Members of the Council to high-light criticisms along their respective national lines, and the conclusion is inescapable that many of these criticisms are voiced, not with a view to being helpful or constructive, but rather solely to further the national interests of the Members. It had been my hope, by placing a series of subjects on the agenda of the Council, to raise the level of discussion and to evolve a body which would be helpful to the Supreme Commander in the solution of the many difficult problems with which he is faced, and at the same time to lend encouragement to the Japanese people by advising them of the great strides which have been made under the Supreme Commander’s leadership. This hope has not been realized and it appears doubtful whether the Council as presently constituted is capable of sufficient forthrightness to raise its own standards above national or selfish interests. The general tenor of the remarks made at the last meeting by the Chinese and Soviet Members indicates an inability on their part publicly to acknowledge even in limited scope, the accomplishments of the Occupation. Their respective remarks were so formulated as to focus attention upon matters of detail from which adverse inferences might be drawn that the Occupation authorities, as well as the Japanese Government, have failed in implementing policies formulated by the Far Eastern Commission. Their remarks were, furthermore, obviously designed to impress certain broad elements of the Japanese people with Chinese and Soviet preoccupation in evolving “democratic principles” in Japan. The meeting under discussion also suggests that the Members are taking advantage, in their own national interests, of topics placed on the agenda by the Supreme Commander to voice unjustified and unfair criticism by the use of captious statements unwarranted in fact. In view of the above considerations and based upon close observation of the tactics employed by the several Members in the Council since its inception, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that any attempt by the Supreme Commander to stimulate constructive and helpful discussion in the Council is foredoomed to failure. As the Department is aware, the Allied Council provides an efficient sounding board for Soviet (and Communistic) aspirations in Japan, and also serves as a stage to which the Japanese people look for guidance but find instead an advancement of selfish national interests at the expense of the furtherance of processes of democratization. In consequence and in consonance with the realities of the situation in Japan, it is felt here that the need for an Allied Council for Japan, with its fictitious implications of Allied control over the implementation of policy directives, has passed. It is, therefore, my considered opinion that the time has arrived when consideration should be given to whether the fiction of Allied Control in Japan should not at the earliest opportunity be abolished and, in place thereof, the Occupation placed upon a footing of control more nearly in conformity with existing factualities. It is indisputable that the interests of the major Allies in Japan, similarly with those of other non-occupying Allies and neutral nations, can efficiently and expeditiously be served through normal relations between the respective Chiefs of Mission and the Supreme Commander. The advantages of such an arrangement are obvious. The Soviet and Chinese Governments would no longer be in the position of accepting all the rights and privileges (without assuming any of the obligations) presently accruing to them through their memberships in the Allied Council, and their representatives would not be in the privileged and unassailable positions accorded by the provisions of the Moscow Agreement. The British Commonwealth position would in effect remain unchanged in that the Commander-in-Chief of the British Commonwealth Forces would continue to exercise his functions of command through normal military channels, with political liaison continuing as at present through the Chiefs of the several British Commonwealth Missions. While it is realized, in view of the pending Peace Treaty negotiations, that the Department may be reluctant at this time to raise the question involved, it is believed here that a proposal as envisaged above would place into the hands of United States’ negotiators a powerful weapon in any pre-treaty negotiations. It is further believed that full advantage could be taken in this regard of Soviet intransigence in the Korean situation which, in the final analysis, also stems from the provisions of the Moscow Agreement. General MacArthur has seen and concurs with this despatch. 1 Sincerely yours, W. J. Sebald 99 Not printed. 1 In airgram of January 2, 1948, the Acting Secretary of State informed Mr. Sebald that John M. Allison, Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, would discuss with him upon arriving in Tokyo the views of the Department concerning the subject of this despatch (740.00119 Control (Japan)/12–147). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Gay) 694.0031/12–347 [Document 280] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy ( Gay ) [ Washington ,] December 3, 1947. Participants: Frank E. Pickelle, SCAP 2 Colonel Schockner, CAD, Army Mr. Moreland, A–S Mr. Bowman, OE Mr. Fassberg, OE Mr. Weiss, CP Mr. Gay, CP Mr. White, CP Mr. Shaw, CP To acquaint the Department with recent developments, Mr. Pickelle was asked to review the present tariff policy of Japan. In reply he stated he had just learned that Japan’s pre-war tariff, including customs regulations, with some modifications had been proclaimed. This action, while approved by the Financial Division of SCAP, was not cleared by other interested divisions; as a result, considerable confusion exists. However, on the basis of the latest information, import duties are being collected only on GARIOA items (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas). These items include such products as petroleum, sugar, serums and vaccines, insecticides, drugs and medicines, agricultural implements and miso (bean paste). For all practical purposes the Japanese tariff is not in effect. Replying to Mr. Pickelle’s question as to the position of FEC with respect to the ITO Charter, Mr. Bowman pointed out that the position of the United States Government is set forth in SWNCC No. 373, which provides that “controls of Japan’s foreign trade deemed necessary during the transitional phase should be administered in accordance with the relevant principles of the Draft Charter for an International Trade Organization …” At the present time, he said, the United States is trying to obtain approval in FEC of policy paper No. 273, “Operation of Private Trade in Japan”. When the paper was first introduced in FEC in October of this year, certain delegates (particularly the Chinese and New Zealand delegates) raised objection to the paper on the ground that it was directed toward committing SCAP to a long range policy, whereas the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission limits formulation of policy by this body to a short run period. The ITO Charter was also objected to on ground that it is still a document of international discussion. This paper has now been redrafted and the United States plans to reintroduce it shortly, having reworded the document to meet certain of the objections raised by other delegates. It will still contain a commitment to the effect that Japan’s foreign trade should be administered in accordance with relevant principles of the Charter. The US delegate is hopeful that the new policy paper will be accepted by FEC. However, approval may not be obtained for a month or two. Speaking unofficially, Mr. Pickelle stated that the Geneva draft Charter as it now stands is acceptable to SCAP; that Japan’s foreign trade can be conducted in accordance with the principles of the Charter; and that no special exceptions to the Draft Charter are required. An official position, however, has not been taken by SCAP and a telegram prepared before his departure has yet to be cleared by SCAP. Until this telegram has been cleared and he has been notified, his remarks will have to be taken as unofficial views. For the benefit of the officers of the Department, Mr. Pickelle read a position paper which had been drafted in SCAP on the subject of feasibility of compliance with the Charter and also a position paper of the Japanese Government. Following the reading of these papers, specific problems arising from current SCAP practices in conducting foreign trade were discussed. With respect to provisions of the Charter relating to communication of information concerning trade and employment to the proposed ITO and ECOSOC, Mr. Pickelle felt that a policy decision would be necessary from the Far Eastern Commission regarding the scope and channels for passing such information during the occupational phase. Mr. Bowman replied that FEC could not undertake a policy decision regarding the scope and the channel of communicating trade and employment information to ITO. Both Mr. Bowman and Colonel Schockner felt that SCAP could follow the usual practice of transmitting such information through CAD to the ITO. It was agreed that Article 94 a provided an exception to furnishing information which SCAP might consider contrary to security interests of the occupation. At the present time, Mr. Pickelle said, there is an export embargo on reproductive silkworm eggs which SCAP considers to be a violation of Article 11, although possibly justified under Article 14. The purpose of this Japanese export embargo is to prevent development of sericulture in other countries. Mr. Weiss replied that this prohibition was really a violation of Article 20 and that while SCAP might desire to argue the continuation of this policy under Article 14, it would have to be prepared to drop the practice if a negative ruling should be made by the Organization. Mr. Bowman felt that the advantages which would accrue to Japan by participating in the ITO and complying with provisions of the Organization would far outweigh the benefits to be gained from maintaining this export prohibition on reproductive silkworm eggs. During the occupational phase it might be necessary, Mr. Pickelle stated, to extend governmental assistance to aid development and reconstruction of particular industries by the use of measures not specially permitted by the Charter. It was understood that such measures would require prior approval of the ITO under Article 13. Mr. Weiss noted that these measures fall under two categories: (1) measures inconsistent with obligations made through tariff concessions pursuant to Chapter IV which require approval of the ITO and the Member or Members with which the obligations were assumed, and (2) measures inconsistent with obligations under Chapter IV other than those arising from tariff concessions which require the approval of the ITO. To relieve conditions of distress caused by severe shortages of foodstuffs and other essential products, Mr. Pickelle stated that it may be necessary for SCAP to take advantage of such export prohibitions or restrictions as are permitted by the Charter under Article 20(2) ( a ). Until equilibrium is restored in Japan’s balance of payments it was pointed out that SCAP considered maintenance of import restrictions a necessity. This was recognized as permitted by Article 21 and not subject to prior approval of the Organization. On this subject, Mr. Weiss pointed out that Article 22 provides that quantitative restrictions shall be applied on a non-discriminatory basis; Article 23, on the other hand, does permit discrimination during periods of widespread disequilibrium in international trade and payments. Under such conditions quantitative restrictions can be applied in a discriminatory manner in a number of specified situations without prior approval of the Organization until March 1, 1952. However, countries practicing discrimination must keep the ITO regularly informed of what they are doing; after March 1, 1952, prior approval of the Organization must be obtained if they are to continue the practice. Pending restoration of equilibrium in Japan’s balance of payments, Mr. Pickelle stated SCAP felt that it will be necessary to restrict payments for current international transactions. In this connection, it was agreed that provisions of Article 24(9) (a) would permit such practices as may be required. With respect to Japan’s present restrictions upon the import of gold and silver and upon the importation or exportation of narcotics, it was felt that these restrictions come within provisions of Article 43 of the Charter. With respect to requirements of Article 37 on the subject of publication and administration of trade regulations and also Article 38 on supplying information and statistics, no difficulties were thought to exist. On the subject of freedom of transit, Mr. Pickelle felt that SCAP might have to make certain exceptions under Article 94. With respect to fair labor standards (Chapter II, Article 4) Mr. Pickelle stated that SCAP can comply with the chapter as it now stands. Mr. Pickelle noted that certain items exported from Japan are in effect being subsidized indirectly by the Japanese Government through the subsidization of certain basic production materials as part of the over-all price stabilization program. However, since the yen sales price charged for an exportable item is the same as that charged for like items sold in the domestic market, no preferential treatment is accorded through subsidy to exportable products. It was pointed out that SCAP felt that rayon may have to be subsidized, in which case Japanese exports might exceed the pre-war level. Subsidization of import of raw material, if it should result in a substantial increase of Japanese exports, may require consultation with ITO members. Subsidization of imports of iron, steel, copper and food indirectly results in subsidization of exports. However, in these categories there does not appear to be a problem. The absence of an exchange rate and the present system of yen pricing make it highly impracticable to determine accurately whether indirect subsidization will result in sale for export at a dollar price lower than the comparable dollar price for the like production to buyers in the domestic market (Article 26). The establishment of an exchange rate in Japan is not expected to occur until some time in 1948. It had originally been hoped that such a rate could be announced by January 1. However, plans have been postponed. Mr. Weiss pointed out that there may be some changes in the subsidization chapter of the Charter, with the US delegation taking the lead in eliminating the difference with which domestic subsidies and export subsidies are treated under Section C of Chapter IV. At the present time, Japan’s foreign trade is conducted through a state monopoly. However, insofar as the present situation permits, purchases and sales are currently being conducted in accordance with commercial considerations; it is felt that SCAP is complying with the provisions of the Charter on this subject. Recent purchase of Indian and Egyptian raw cotton, as well as U.S. cotton, were pointed to by Mr. Pickelle as an indication of adherence to this policy, as well as to efforts of SCAP to sell Japanese cotton textiles for sterling as well as dollars. 2 Maj. Frank E. Pickelle, Deputy Chief of the Import and Export Division, Economic and Scientific Section, GHQ, SCAP. Mr. Frank G, Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 894.5151/12–1147 [Document 281] Mr. Frank G, Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) Washington , December 11, 1947. My Dear General McCoy : I enclose herewith a statement which the United States Government desires be made to the Far Eastern Commission on December 11, 1947, together with a memorandum of information with accompanying SCAP Circular. 3 The memorandum of information with attachment should, if possible, be distributed to the members of the Commission prior to the meeting at which the statement is made. The purpose of this statement and memorandum of information is to acquaint the members of the Commission with the steps being taken by the Supreme Commander in connection with the implementation by him of paragraph 16 c , FEC–032/26 entitled “Interim Import-Export Policies for Japan”. 4 This action is considered necessary because the implementation of this policy statement involves the obtaining of bank loans for financing Japanese foreign trade and the interested banks have requested that the members of the Commission be informed as to the course of action contemplated by the Supreme Commander, prior to the finalizing of the necessary loan agreements. I regret the necessity of such early action on this matter but, in order to maintain supplies for Japan, it will be necessary to have these bank funds available by the beginning of the year. Since the possibility exists that other Commission members may wish to comment on the memorandum it is felt that the matter should be introduced at least one meeting prior to the last meeting of the Commission this year. Messrs. Barnett, Whitman and McDiarmid 5 of the Department of State are fully conversant with the problem and will be available for such briefing as may be required. Sincerely yours, Frank G. Wisner [Enclosure 1] Statement by General McCoy The members of the Commission will recall that paragraph 16 c , FEC–032/26, “Interim Import-Export Policies for Japan”, adopted by the Commission on July 24, 1947, provided for the use of certain Japanese-owned stocks of precious metals and stones, for acquiring foreign exchange to assist in financing a portion of the Japanese trade program. The Supreme Commander has now forwarded to the Commission Circular No. 9, which has been issued to implement the Commission’s policy statement. This Circular, together with an explanatory statement thereof, has been circulated as MI-. … The Supreme Commander is about to take such steps as are necessary for the accomplishment of this program, and I am therefore calling it to the attention of the Commission at this time. [Enclosure 2] Memorandum of Information —FEC implementation of paragraph 16 c , FEC–032/26 The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has now taken steps to implement paragraph 16 c , FEC–032/26, “Interim Import-Export Policies for Japan”, which authorizes the use of stocks of gold, silver and certain precious stones of established Japanese ownership, for the purpose of acquiring foreign exchange to purchase imports necessary for Japan’s peace economy. A copy of the implementing SCAP Circular No. 9, 15 August 1947, including proposed amendments, is annexed hereto. This instrument creates a separate fund, including gold and silver, from such stocks with which to finance imports of materials to be used in self-liquidating programs, and permits the borrowing of such currencies as may be needed for this purpose. If, under circumstances now deemed unlikely, proceeds of Japanese exports or other funds are not available to pay maturing obligations of the fund, the stocks of precious metals referred to in paragraph 16 c , will be sold for the currencies required to the extent necessary to pay such obligations. All amounts sold will be properly accounted for, and equal opportunity to acquire such assets for the aforementioned currencies will be granted to all member countries of the Far Eastern Commission. Circular No. 9 establishes various safeguards for preserving the values of the gold and silver. Paragraph 4 b provides, for example, that the export proceeds of products manufactured from materials, the importation of which are financed by the fund, will be paid into the fund. In addition, the net return from the export of textiles manufactured from raw cotton imports which have heretofore been financed by the U.S. Government, will also form a portion of the fund’s assets. 3 For extract from SCAP circular No. 9, August 15, see p. 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] . 4 July 24; for text, see The Far Eastern Commission , p. 31. 5 Robert W. Barnett, Acting Adviser, Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs; Roswell H. Whitman, Acting Associate Chief of the Division; and Orville J. McDiarmid, Chief of the Finance Section of the Division. Memorandum by Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, to the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee 894.5018/12–1847 [Document 282] Memorandum by Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, to the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee confidential [ Washington , December 18, 1947.] There is enclosed a draft directive 6 prepared on the basis of a policy decision approved at the eighty-third meeting of the Far Eastern Commission on December 11, 1947, 7 under the provisions of paragraph II, A, 1, of its terms of reference. It is requested that the enclosed directive be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for transmission to General MacArthur for his guidance in accordance with paragraph III, 1, of the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission. It is assumed that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff have any question regarding the draft directive they will refer the matter to the Department of State for clarification before transmitting a directive on the subject. It is also requested that the statement of the U.S. representative on November 20, 1947, 6 and the statements of the U.S., Chinese, and New Zealand representatives at the time of the adoption of the policy decision, December 11, 1947, be transmitted to the Supreme Commander for his information. The Secretary-General of the Far Eastern Commission has requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in transmitting the enclosed draft directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, inform him that in adopting the policy decision regarding the supply of food for civilian consumption in Japan the Commission agreed that it should be released to the press after being received by the Supreme Commander. Therefore, in accordance with normal procedure, acknowledgment of the receipt of the directive is requested. Frank G. Wisner [Annex 1] Statements by the United States and Chinese Representatives, Far Eastern Commission, December 11, 1947 The United States representative asked that the following statement be recorded in the minutes of the Commission at the time of adoption of this policy. “The United States approves the policy statement on food contained in FEC 248/4 on the understanding that: 1. As a first step in implementation of paragraph 3 of this policy the Supreme Commander will present his requirements for food imports to the United States Government as requested by current directives classified separately as to: a . Requirements essential to the safety of the occupation forces. b . Additional requirements necessary to meet the objectives of the occupation. 2. In order to make it possible for the United States Government to ‘take all steps within its power to assist this policy to be carried into effect’ the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will forward to the United States Government all necessary data as to Japanese indigenous resources, measures being taken to increase production and provide equitable distribution of such resources, dietary standards necessary to prevent disease and unrest such as would endanger the safety of the occupation forces and other required information. 3. The United States Government will determine, on the basis of information submitted by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and other information available to it, and after consultation with appropriate international bodies, the imports other than those needed for the safety of the occupation forces which would not have the effect of giving preferential treatment to the Japanese. 4. The United States Government will then inform the Supreme Commander of its views as to the maximum imports which would not provide preferential treatment for the Japanese.” The Chinese representative made the following statement of understanding which he asked be recorded in the minutes. “It is the understanding of the Chinese Delegation that paragraph 2 a should not be interpreted to prevent removal as reparations of Japanese fertilizer plants and facilities, or to predetermine the ultimate capacity of such industry to be retained in Japan.” In reference to the above Chinese statement, the United States representative asked that the following statement of understanding also be recorded in the minutes. “The United States Government does not acquiesce in any statement which implies that fertilizer plants may be used for reparations.” [Annex 2] Statement by the New Zealand Representative, Far Eastern Commission, December 11, 1947 “Mr. Chairman, may I be permitted to make some statements on the general aspect of this paper now that it is going to be passed? This is not the first occasion on which the Far Eastern Commission has been called upon to consider the question of food supplies for Japan. The Commission will recall the very keen interest which my Government, and particularly my Minister, Sir Carl Berendsen, has taken in the matter in its earlier stages, and I don’t have any desire at all to recapitulate any part of the difficult and prolonged discussions which we have had on this paper extending almost for over a year—well over a year. “I am instructed by my Government to support the present paper as being the best obtainable under the circumstances, but I should like to comment on one or two of the general aspects involved. “Of course, we realize that it is entirely natural and understandable that an occupying power holding such a predominant place in Japan as does the United States should earnestly desire to avoid any unnecessary complication of its difficult and delicate task. It is also true that it is difficult to build a democratic country out of a hungry people. These things are plain and undeniable. “But there is another principle involved. If there is to be hardship, and if at a time like this when there is not food enough to go around, anyone has to go short, then clearly, as we see it, the shortage and the suffering should fall upon the aggressors and not upon their victims. There does not seem to be any reason whatever, in logic or in equity, why, for example, the people of China, or Malaya or the Philippines or India or Burma, or, indeed, any of the peoples of the world who are suffering from hunger as a direct result of Japanese aggression, should be allowed to go short of food in a time of desperate need while the Japanese, the substantial cause of their miseries, are supplied with food in greater proportion. The paper before us acknowledges this general principle, the validity of which, of course, is unquestionable, but the paper provides an important exception, in that the Japanese may be permitted to receive more food than their former victims if such extra food is necessary to prevent such starvation and widespread disease and civil unrest as will endanger the safety of the occupation forces. This is an exception, sir, which may become both unjust and dangerous. “It may become unjust because it can lead to a violation of that general principle I have referred to, and it may become dangerous because it leaves the way open for the Japanese, by deliberately fomenting internal disorder, to induce SCAP and the United States Government to allow more food. But, of course, in the proper discharge of the Commission’s responsibilities, it is clear to all of us that such an exception must be inserted in the policy paper. In the circumstances we couldn’t possibly do otherwise, but I do suggest that we should act with our eyes open. It is, therefore, obviously the duty of all concerned to minimize both the possibility of injustice and of danger, and to take all necessary steps to insure that the amount of actual food required by this exception is as small as possible. The Japanese food problem is only one part of a world-wide problem, as is recognized in the statement of the United States Member in the document recently filed, FEC 248/4, and the more the Japanese can be got to see it in this light, and together with their own part in the history of its development, the less is there likely to be unrest and the more cooperative will the Japanese become and the lower will the level of food required to prevent danger to the occupation forces also be. In a previous food paper before the Commission, that is, FEC 026/12, there was a very significant paragraph which doesn’t appear in the present paper, and I should like, with your permission, sir, to quote that paragraph. The paragraph reads as follows: ‘The Supreme Commander should make it clear to the Japanese people that: ‘(1) Many countries are suffering from a dire shortage of foodstuffs largely due to Japanese aggression and in many of the countries devastated by the Japanese the diet of the people is inferior to that of the Japanese. ‘(2) The Supreme Commander assumes no obligations to maintain, or to have maintained, any particular standard of living in Japan, and ‘(3) The Supreme Commander assumes no responsibility to the Japanese people to import foodstuffs to meet any deficit arising from the failure of the Japanese Government and people to assure the just and impartial distribution of their indigenous foodstuffs. ‘(4) The standard of living will depend upon the thoroughness with which Japan rids itself of all militaristic ambitions, redirects the use of its human and natural resources wholly and solely for purposes of peaceful living, administers adequate economic and financial controls and cooperates with the occupying forces and the governments they represent.’ “Now, sir, in the course of the food discussions, which, of course, were very prolonged in the Commission and in the committee, the New Zealand Delegation fully understood the reasons for most of the arguments which were adduced by the United States, although, of course, on occasions we contested their validity, but we never did understand the reason for the flat United States rejection of subparagraph (1) in the abstract of the paragraph which I have just read. That is the subparagraph which suggests that the Supreme Commander should make it clear to the Japanese people that many countries are suffering from shortage of food stuffs largely due to Japanese aggression. The remainder of the paragraph that I quoted was fully accepted by the United States Delegation. Now my Government attaches great importance to this matter being understood in its correct perspective, and being so understood by the Japanese, and it has at times felt doubtful whether this was the situation or even whether SCAP was doing what could be done in this respect. And the attitude of the United States upon that subparagraph (1)1 have referred to didn’t help very much to remove the doubts. But it does not appear that comparatively recently something has been done to put the matter to the Japanese in the proper light. I refer to the two papers that have been filed in the Commission—FEC 248/5 and 248/6—and I refer also to a press report to the effect that the Japanese miners have been informed that they were getting twice as much food as the European miners but that they were only producing one-fourth as much coal. Now that is the sort of thing which ought to be told to the Japanese, but here again in the statements that were made by SCAP officers at their press conference, the two statements that are filed as of record in the Commission, I note that the SCAP officers gave a reasonably good picture of the world food situation but there was no significant mention of the one big fact which must be brought home to the Japanese—that their own carrier [career?] of wanton aggression throughout the food-producing lands of Southeast Asia has been and still is a major cause of the world shortage of rice. We should like to see this fact hammered home to the Japanese until every man, woman and child in Japan had at least some appreciation of the grave extent of Japan’s own responsibility in this matter. I repeat that the information at our disposal may not be complete, but in any case I would suggest to the United States Representative that possibly his Government might profitably look again at the whole paragraph that I have referred to, that is, the paragraph that was in the previous document, and carefully consider the advisability of implementing it so as to attain the two objectives: a . The maximum possible cooperation from the Japanese, and b . The reduction in the amount food required to keep safe the occupation forces.” 6 Not printed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the directive as War 92777 on December 19, Serial No. 88. 7 FEC–248/9, printed in The Far Eastern Commission , p. 41. 6 Not printed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the directive as War 92777 on December 19, Serial No. 88. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 894.602/12–1947 [Document 283] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State No. 1469 Tokyo , December 19, 1947. The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose five copies of a press release dated December 12, 1947 8 in which it is announced that the General Contractors’ Association, formerly utilized by the Japanese Government as a control association, will be designated as a closed institution by March 1, 1948. The press release contains a statement by Mr. Edward C. Welsh, Chief of the Anti-Trust and Cartels Division of the Economic and Scientific Section of this Headquarters, in which he states that closure and dissolution of the Association will permit the rise of democratic trade organizations which will be encouraged to raise the ethical standards of the construction industry, perform useful research and investigation and represent the industry before the public. 8 Not printed. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 894.5151/12–2347 [Document 284] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State confidential for use of department only No. 1473 Tokyo , December 23, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to enclose 9 copy of a summary of the recommendations on exchange problems prepared by the Exchange Committee of the Japanese Government and approved by the Conference of Economic Ministers on December 15, 1947, and subsequently submitted to the Foreign Exchange Rate Committee of the Economic and Scientific Section of this Headquarters. A list of the members of the Exchange Committee of the Japanese Government, a committee of experts, the Chairman of which is Tsuru Shigeto, Vice Chairman of the Coordinating Committee of the Economic Stabilization Board, is also enclosed. The Conference of Economic Ministers is a conference of ministers of cabinet rank holding economic portfolios and is comprised of the following members: Wada Hiroo, Director General of the Economic Stabilization Board; Kurusu Takeo, Minister of Finance; Mizutani Chozaburo, Minister of Commerce and Industry; Hatano Kanae, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry; Kitamura Tokutaro, Minister of Transportation; Miki Takeo, Minister of Communications; and Yonekubo Mitsusuke, Minister of Labor. The position is taken by the Japanese Government that a general rate of exchange, to be determined by reference to price indexes, should be established as soon as possible. Further, that where commodity transactions cannot be carried on at the general rate, a special rate, either above or below the general rate, will be established for each such specific commodity. For the most part, it is anticipated that commodity imports, invisible exports, capital imports and other capital transfers will be conducted at the general rate. On the other hand a multiple exchange rate or factor system would be established for commodity exports with the approval of a Yen Committee to be set up by the Japanese Government. It is believed that the decision by the Japanese Government to establish a multiple system of exchange rates or factors for commodity exports rather than a single rate has been predicated in large measure upon the recognition of, and belief in the probable continued existence of, the present wide disparity in the ratios of dollar and yen prices of the various goods represented in Japanese foreign trade, by commodity groups as well as by individual items within these groups, as indicated in the tables transmitted in this Mission’s despatch No. 1437 of December 6, 1947 on the subject of Transmission of Tables Concerning Yen/Dollar Relationship Represented in Japan’s Foreign Trade. 10 As was pointed out in that despatch, dollar prices placed upon exportable items are not controlled by the yen cost of those items. Furthermore, exports from Japan have been sold on a competitive basis in most instances, whereas imports into Japan have been set at an artificially low yen price in order to support price stabilization policies of the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government has apparently decided, in view of the above, that the establishment of a single yen-dollar rate would not only compel sellers of those commodities in which prices are currently at a yen-dollar ratio above this rate to reduce the yen price and presumably sell at a loss or stop production, but also would enable sellers of commodities at a ratio below the general rate to raise their yen prices and contribute to the inflation, or permit purchasers to buy for less and thereby realize a “windfall profit” at the expense of the Japanese foreign currency position. It is understood that consideration was given by Japanese Government officials concerned to the desirability of establishing a single rate of exchange and utilizing a governmental subsidization program (within the scope of the subsidy provisions embodied in the draft Charter for an International Trade Organization) to meet the needs of those industries whose costs of production would not permit them to continue at the established rate, as well as the imposition of a type of export fee to reduce large profits derived by those industries whose costs of production would permit substantial price increases. However, the belief was expressed that a system of multiple exchange rates would provide a more suitable frame of reference for the conduct of private trade than a single rate, and that a subsidization program on the other hand would present opportunities for corruption of officials and businessmen. In this connection, it is to be noted that no consideration has apparently been given in the enclosed statement to the problem of administration of a multiple system of exchange rates, which would involve, it is believed, in addition to the problem of rate determination, continual pressures to raise individual commodity rates as well as manifold opportunities for corruption of officials and businessmen. Although the general rate, once established, is to be maintained at that level as long as possible, the plan as outlined envisages a periodic revision of the general rate in accordance with a “balancing formula” (as set forth in Enclosure No. 1), which is intended eventually to effect a balance between the general rate and the ratio of all yen-dollar ratios of commodity transactions carried on above and below the general rate in Japanese foreign trade transactions. In this connection, it is to be noted that unanimity of opinion does not exist within the Exchange Committee of the Japanese Government concerning the mathematical accuracy of the “balancing formula”. Apart from the question of mathematical accuracy, however, the Japanese Government officials concerned anticipate that through periodic revision of the general rate in the light of some “balancing formula” and through realistic adjustment of the rates above and below the general rate, a balance will be reached resulting in the use of a single factor or rate for all types of transactions. Information available to this Mission through contacts established with Japanese officials concerned would indicate that the views expressed by the Japanese Government in regard to exchange matters conform for the most part to the tentative views expressed thus far by the Foreign Exchange Rate Committee of this Headquarters. Although the enclosed statement does not treat the problem of currency conversion after the establishment of a rate or rates of exchange, it is assumed that at least for the near future the Japanese would not be permitted to receive foreign currency and non-Japanese would be permitted to convert only limited quantities of foreign currency for yen. Respectfully yours, W. J. Sebald 9 Enclosures not printed. 10 Not printed. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 761.94114/12–2447 [Document 285] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 1475 Tokyo , December 24, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to refer to this Mission’s despatch 1263 of October 4, 1947, 11 with which were transmitted the corrected verbatim minutes of the 44th meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, at which the subject of delays in Japanese repatriation from Soviet territory was discussed. On December 2, 1947, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers was notified by Major General Kislenko, Acting Member from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Allied Council for Japan, that repatriation of Japanese war prisoners from the Port of Nahodka and of Japanese citizens from the Port of Maoka would be temporarily suspended because of climatic and icing conditions from December 1, 1947, until the opening of navigation in April 1948. A copy of this letter is attached hereto as enclosure 1. 12 With the approval of the Chief of Staff, a letter was sent to Major General Kislenko on December 10, 1947 requesting that the decision to suspend repatriation be reconsidered in view of the fact that 21,723 repatriates had been returned to Japan from the ports in question last winter during the period December 1, 1946 to January 3, 1947. A copy is attached as enclosure 2. An offer was made in this communication to despatch ice breakers with repatriation vessels to overcome icing conditions in the ports, and a previous offer of August 30 to send repatriation vessels to any other port designated by Soviet authorities was reiterated. The concern of the Japanese Foreign Office in this matter was indicated in an item in the Jiji Press Home News Service of December 16, a copy of which is attached as enclosure 3, in which it was stated that sources close to the Foreign Office declare that the holding up of repatriation until April 1 is a blow to the Japanese who are eagerly awaiting the return of fathers, sons, relatives and friends before winter. This article followed press releases of General Headquarters dated December 13 and 16, 1947, copies of which are attached as enclosures 4 and 5. In the former it was stated that 496,349 Japanese remained to be repatriated from Siberia, 201,968 from Karafuto and the Kurile Islands, and 3000 from Dairen. * In the latter release it was disclosed that, in accordance with the Soviet decision to cease repatriation until April 1, the Japanese Government had been directed on December 16 to suspend operations at the Maizuru and Hakodate reception centers. The Japanese communist newspaper Akahata on December 9, 1947, before issuance of these press releases, printed an interview with a repatriate from Siberia who allegedly stated that lack of smooth progress in the repatriation program was due to the negligence of the Japanese Government and that “rumors” that the Soviet Union had no intention of returning Japanese from its territories were “absurd propaganda”. A copy of this article is forwarded as enclosure 6. This article recalls what the Chairman said at the 44th Meeting of the Allied Council concerning propaganda organs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which had “attempted to place direct blame for the small rate of repatriation from the Soviet-controlled areas upon the Occupation authorities”. The dissemination given the type of Soviet propaganda printed in the Akahata is indicated by an interview with a repatriate from the Maoka Repatriation Center, which is reported in a military letter from a branch office of G–2, IX Corps, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, IX Corps, at Sendai, a copy of which is forwarded herewith as enclosure 7. According to this document, repatriates in Maoka were told by a Soviet lieutenant colonel that the Japanese Government and the United States Occupation authorities are causing Russians great hardships by not sending ships on schedule and thereby upsetting the carefully planned repatriation program. It was also alleged that prisoners of war from Okha were told during their internment that the Japanese Government together with the Occupation authorities had requested that repatriation be stopped due to acute shortage of food and housing in Japan. Although the repatriation agreement of December 19, 1946, between SCAP and General Derevyanko stipulated that shipping would be furnished within fourteen days of the receipt of a Soviet request therefor, recent Soviet practice has been to request shipping to arrive at Soviet ports on as little as four or five days notice. At no time has SCAP failed to comply with the stipulated fourteen-day period, and on only one occasion did a vessel dispatched by SCAP fail to arrive on the exact date requested. Soviet authorities had asked on October 31 that a vessel be available at Maoka on November 5. This ship was dispatched in such time as to arrive in Maoka on November 8. The Chairman of the Allied Council for Japan stated at the forty-fourth meeting † that General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers had, since May 1947, consistently provided shipping space ten per cent in excess of requests made by the Soviet authorities. The most recent report of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, concerning the status of Japanese repatriation, dated December 19, 1946, contains a recapitulation of repatriation from Soviet and Soviet-controlled areas for the first year of the program. It is forwarded herewith as enclosure No. 8. According to this report the excess of shipping space furnished from December 3, 1946, through December 4, 1947 averages thirteen percent. The total number of shipping spaces provided during the year which Soviet authorities failed to fill is 69,527. It should be pointed out that the repatriation agreement of December 19, 1946, specified Genzan and Kanko in North Korea and Dairen, in addition to Nahodka and Maoka, as ports for repatriation from Soviet-controlled areas. Genzan and Kanko are free of all but light surface ice the year round, and the harbor of Dairen is essentially free of ice although temperatures below freezing are common. ‡ The Soviet authorities would appear to have unilaterally limited repatriation from Siberia, Karafuto and the Kuriles to the ports of Maoka and Nahodka although, if a positive desire existed on their part to discharge their obligation in the shortest possible time, no reason is apparent why repatriates from Siberia, in any case, could not be routed through the North Korean ports. § Maoka and Nahodka are generally icebound during the first months of the year. ║ Information now available in General Headquarters ¶ indicates the strong likelihood that these ports were actually frozen over during the first part of December this year, as Major General Kislenko’s letter of December 2 appears to state. On the other hand, the Soviet representative at a conference on repatriation held in General Headquarters on January 14, 1947, stated his reason for declining the proffered loan of icebreakers, then made for the first time orally, to be the difficulties of overland transportation in winter. In a staff study made by G–3 Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, preparatory to answering Major General Kislenko’s letter of December 2, 1947 the possible validity of climatic conditions as the reason for the Soviets’ early suspension of repatriation from Maoka and Nahodka is recognized. However, the possibility is asserted that barracks and camps in and around the ports could have been filled to capacity during the autumn months, and that a certain flow of repatriates could have been maintained during December and early January as was done last winter. If the difficulty does lie in overland transportation, it might indeed be impossible to reroute repatriates from Siberia through the North Korean ports, although the continuance for two consecutive winters of the same conditions could hardly be classified as “unforseen circumstances” under paragraph 4, Section II, of the repatriation agreement, cited by Major General Kislenko in his letter. Respectfully yours, W. J. Sebald 11 Not printed. 12 Enclosures to this despatch not printed. * The most recent status of Repatriation Report, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated December 19, 1947, gives revised estimates for Siberia, Karafuto and the Kuriles: 494,226 for the former and 198,292 for the latter two areas. [Footnote in the original.] † Minutes, page 5, last line. [Footnote in the original.] ‡ Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (Janis):—No. 74 for Dairen and No. 75 for Kanko and Genzan. [Footnote in the original.] § Except for an estimated 506 persons repatriation of Japanese from the North Korean area was completed with the last lift, November 6, 1947, from Kanko. In December 1946, January, March, July and November 1947, 27,296 Japanese were returned to Japan from Kanko and Genzan. The latter port was not used during 1947. The North Korean ports were originally intended to be used chiefly or only for repatriation of Japanese in North Korea. [Footnote in the original.] ║ According to United States Hydrographic Office publication No. 133, “Sailing Directions for Chosen and Siberia”, the port of Nahodka is frozen and closed to shipping several months of the year. Number 79 of the Janis series states the following regarding Maoka: “The harbor is reported to be frozen over from December to mid-March, but the ice is never more than one foot thick. Occasionally drift ice from the north combine’s with the field ice to completely block the port but never for more than a day or two.” [Footnote in the original.] ¶ The Weather Station of the 15–9th Army Air Forces at Haneda Airfield, Tokyo, which is the central clearing house of the Far East Command for weather information, has orally reported that there is a strong supposition, on the basis of available information, that Maoka and Nahodka harbors were frozen during the first half of December 1947 and that Hokkaido and Karafuto (Saghalin) were colder than during the same period in 1946. [Footnote in the original.] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 694.0031/12–2947 [Document 286] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State No. 1481 Tokyo , December 29, 1947. The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to enclose copies of this Headquarters’ Circular No. 15 of December 11, 1947 13 rescinding Circular No. 9 of August 15, 1947 regarding the establishment of an Occupied Japan Export-Import Revolving Fund for financing Japanese imports and exports of commodities and services. By the terms of Circular 15 additional authorization has been granted to the Controller of the Fund to borrow money on the credit of the Fund (par. 3, b ); to treat such money as a part of the Fund assets (par. 4, 9[ d ]); and to use the Fund for the payment of monies so borrowed (par. 5, e ). Furthermore, Circular 15 places a time limitation upon the Controller’s power to use the Fund for payment of imported materials to be utilized in export production. He may make such purchases only if, in his judgment, the materials will “have an anticipated value in excess of the cost of such materials realizable within one year after the date of arrival in Japan of such materials” (par. 5, b ). Circular 9 provided that no special lien or preference would be given the supplier of commodities for which the Fund is obligated or expended, whereas Circular 15 provides that those to whom the Fund is so obligated shall have a first claim against the Fund’s assets (par. 6, a ). Paragraph 6, c of Circular 15 provides that in the event the Controller decides to sell Fund assets to meet Fund obligations, the Controller must offer “to sell such assets to member nations of the Far Eastern Commission for currencies required to discharge such obligations of the Fund.” The percentage requirement of Circular 9 that the net worth of the Fund exceed fifty per cent of the total liabilities before the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may make withdrawals in any amount from the Fund provided that such withdrawals do not reduce the net worth of the Fund to less than fifty per cent of the total liabilities, has been changed in Circular 15 to forty per cent. 13 Not printed. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 894.50/12–3047 [Document 287] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State secret for use of the department only No. 1486 Tokyo , December 30, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to enclose copy of memorandum of a conversation, 14 which is summarized below, between Mr. Shigeto Tsuru, Deputy Director-General of the Economic Stabilization Board and Mr. W. Henry Lawrence, Jr., Second Secretary of this Mission on the subjects of imbalance of exports and imports, balanced budget, note issue, possibilities of economic collapse, controls versus autonomy of local government, tax collection, and ownership of facilities used by the Occupation. Summary , Mr. Tsuru stated that during 1947 imports exceeded exports by about $300,000,000, mostly covered by American appropriations. The imports have been sold at a lesser cost, thereby subsidizing the populace. Occupation costs are said by Tsuru to be about 70 billion yen for the fiscal year of 1947 with prospects of being slightly less next year. During 1948, aid valued at $400,000,000 is essential, according to Tsuru. Imported goods will be sold at prices closer to reality in an effort to acquire a surplus in the Foreign Trade Budget. Tsuru is of opinion that the danger point in the Japanese economy is the next six months. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has ordered the budget balanced. Supplementary budgets have been balanced, but mainly on paper. Note issue was estimated by Tsuru during the conversation on December 15 at between 200 and 210 billion yen by the end of December. (Official figures from Bank of Japan report the note issue to be nearly 221,000,000,000 as of December 29, 1947). He stated that there are signs that indicate the whole Japanese economy may collapse; one, an allowance of 2.8 months salary has been given government workers; two, the government has succumbed to deficit loans; and three, the Central Labor Relations Commission is to allow a sliding scale wage index for electrical workers already paid far above average wages. Unforeseen requirements of the Occupation, such as the new airfield in Aomori, may also prevent balancing the budget and cause a vicious cycle of shortages, black market activities and demands for increased wages. General Headquarters on one hand desires increased economic controls, but decreased governmental controls. Tsuru cited this as indication of a need for some group to be concerned with the over-all policy for the Occupation. He also expressed concern at the involvement of General Headquarters in operating details rather than supervision. Tsuru indicated that in the first eight months of the fiscal year of 1947 only about one-third of taxes due have been collected. This, he stated, has been caused by the lack of personnel, the loss of experienced tax collectors due to low pay, the influence of communists in tax collectors unions, and the new system of individuals making out their own returns. (Kurusu, Minister of Finance, has said only 45,000 out of 80,000 positions authorized are filled). Tsuru believes that the Japanese Government is missing an opportunity for revenue because it cannot put the customary excise tax on sugar being imported in large quantities. According to Tsuru, titles to homes and buildings used by the Occupation remain with the original owner and titles to housing developments belong to the Japanese Government. End of Summary. Respectfully yours, W. J. Sebald 14 Not printed. War claims: reparations, restitution, levels of industry and of production War claims: reparations, restitution, levels of industry and of production 15 15 For previous documentation on war claims and reparations, see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , pp. 471 ff. [288] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) [Washington,] January 8, 1947. 740.00119–P.W./1–847 [289] Editorial Note [290] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs (Martin) to Mr. Ernest A. Gross, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) [Washington,] January 9, 1947. 740.00119 PW/1–947 [291] Memorandum by Mr. Rufus Burr Smith of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs to the Chief of the Division (Martin) [Washington,] January 13, 1947. 740.00119 PW/1–1347 [292] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, February 3, 1947. 740.00119 P.W./2–347 [293] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Washington, February 11, 1947—5 p.m. 894.60/2–1147: Telegram [294] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) Washington, February 11, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/2–1147: Telegram [295] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo [Washington,] 12 February 1947. Department of Defense files [296] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State London, February 13, 1947. 740.00119 PW/2–1347: Telegram [297] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Washington, February 13, 1947—6 p.m. 740.00119 PW/2–1347: Telegram [298] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, February 13, 1947. 740.00119 Control(Japan)/2–1347: Telegram [299] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) [Washington,] February 19, 1947. 740.00119 PW/1–3147 [300] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) Washington, February 19, 1947—6 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC(Info)/2–1947: Telegram [301] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo [Washington,] 19 February 1947. Department of Defense files [302] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Novikov) Washington, February 24, 1947. 894.30/2–2447 [303] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Novikov) Washington, February 24, 1947. 894.30/2–2447 [304] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to Mr. Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce and Director of the Office of International Trade Washington, February 28, 1947. 740.00119 PW/2–2847 [305] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) Washington, February 28, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC(Info)/2–2847: Telegram [306] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) Washington, March 3, 1947—4 p.m. 894.50/3–347: Telegram [307] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Washington, March 4, 1947. 894.60/2–2047 [308] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) [Washington,] March 4, 1947. 740.00119 P.W./3–447 [309] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Tokyo, 10 March 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1247 [310] The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State Washington, 10 March, 1947. 894.30/3–1047 [311] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) Washington, March 11, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/3–1147: Telegram [312] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) Washington, March 24, 1947. 894.60/3–1947 [313] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee Washington, March 24, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1247 [314] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) [Washington,] April 3, 1947. 894.50/3–1747 [315] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur , at Tokyo [Washington,] 4 April, 1947. Department of Defense files [316] Mr. Robert W. Baker, Secretary to Mr. Edwin W. Pauley, to the Acting Secretary of State Los Angeles, April 4, 1947. 740.00119 PW/4–447 [317] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) Washington, April 7, 1947. 740.00119 PW/4–747 [318] Memorandum by the Army Member of State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee [Washington,] 7 April 1947. 894.60/4–847 [319] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, April 9, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/4–947: Telegram [320] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, April 16, 1947—6 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/4–1647: Telegram [321] The Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department (Noce) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) Washington, 18 April 1947. 740.00119 PW/4–1847 [322] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, April 24, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/4–2447: Telegram [323] The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé (Tsarapkin) Washington, April 25, 1947. 894.30/3–1047 [324] The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State Rangoon, April 29, 1947—8 a.m. 740.00119 PW/4–2947: Telegram [325] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, April 30, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/4–3047: Telegram [326] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon Washington, May 5, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 PW/4–2947: Telegram [327] The Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) Washington, May 12, 1947. 740.00119 Control Japan/5–1247 [328] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] May 13, 1947. 894.30/5–1347 [329] Memorandum by the Department of State to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) [Washington, May 13, 1947.] 740.00119 Control Japan/5–1247 [330] Memorandum by Mr. John K. Emmerson , Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton), to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) [Washington,] May 15, 1947. 740.00119 PW/5–1547 [331] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel) Washington, May 15, 1947. 894.30/5–547 [332] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo [Washington,] 15 May 1947. Department of Defense files [333] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, May 16, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/5–1647: Telegram [334] Memorandum by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs (Snow) to Mr. Rufus Burr Smith of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs [Washington,] May 22, 1947. 740.00119 PW/5–2247 [335] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Noce) Washington, May 22, 1947. 740.00119 PW/4–1847 [336] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, May 23, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/5–2347: Telegram [337] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, May 27, 1947. 740.00119 PW/5–2747 [338] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) Washington, May 29, 1947. 740.00119 (Control Japan)/5–1247 [339] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, June 2, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/6–247: Telegram [340] Memorandum by Mr. John K. Emmerson, Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) [Washington,] June 11, 1947. 894.30/6–1147 [341] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) Washington, June 12, 1947. 894.30/4–2447 [342] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] June 30, 1947. 740.00119 PW/6–3047 [343] The British Embassy to the Department of State [Washington], June 30, 1947. 740.00119 PW/6–3047 [344] The French Embassy to the Department of State Washington, July 10, 1947. 894.24/7–1047 [345] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) Washington, July 15, 1947. 894.60/6–1947 [346] The Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) Washington, 22 July 1947. 894.60/7–2247 [347] Memorandum by Mr. Cleon O. Swayzee of the Division of International Labor, Social, and Health Affairs [Washington,] July 23, 1947. 740.00119 P.W./7–2347 [348] The Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) Washington, 24 July 1947. 894.60/7–2447 [349] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) Washington, July 28, 1947. 894.60/7–2447 [350] The Legal Adviser (Fahy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) [Washington,] July 29, 1947. 740.00119 PW/7–2947 [351] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, July 31, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/7–3147: Telegram [352] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, August 5, 1947—6 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC/8–547: Telegram [353] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) Washington, August 20, 1947—6 p.m. 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/8–2047: Telegram [354] The United States Reparations Delegate in Japan (Hodge) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 3, 1947. 740.00119 P.W./9–347: Telegram [355] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) and the Acting Adviser of the Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs (Barnett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) [Washington,] 25 September 1947. 740.00119 P.W./9–2547 [356] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Reparations Delegate in Japan (Hodge) Washington, September 29, 1947. 740.00119 PW/9–2947: Airgram [357] The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang) to the Secretary of State New York, October 9, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [358] The Department of State to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang) Washington, October 19, 1947. 740.00119 PW/10–1947 [359] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Saltzman) [Washington,] October 29, 1947. 894.60/10–2947 [360] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Washington, November 12, 1947—3 a.m. 740.00119 PW/11–1247: Circular telegram [361] The Assistant Secretary of State (Saltzman) to the Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) Washington, November 13, 1947. 894.60/11–1347 [362] The Assistant Secretary of State (Saltzman) to the Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) Washington, November 14, 1947. 740.00119 PW/11–1447 [363] The Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) Washington, 20 November 1947. 894.60/11–2047 [364] Memorandum by Mr. John A. Bailey, Administrative Officer of the Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs [Washington,] November 26, 1947. 740.00119 PW/11–2647 [365] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, December 10, 1947—3 p.m. 740.00119 PW/12–1047: Telegram Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) 740.00119–P.W./1–847 [Document 288] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfield ) [ Washington ,] January 8, 1947. Mr. Graves 16 called this morning at his request and handed me the attached memorandum. 17 By way of explanation he said that yesterday he had been approached by Dr. Blakeslee, 18 who stated that, in view of the long delay in British reply to our approach of November 6 on reparations, there seemed to be some feeling within the Department to interpret silence as assent and asked whether this impression was correct. Mr. Graves said that this emphatically was not the case and that the purpose of the attached memorandum was to make this position clear. He went on to explain that the subject of Japanese reparations is considered of great importance and has been put up to the British Cabinet Committee, from which a decision is now awaited momentarily. He intimated that much of the delay has been due to an endeavor to reach agreement with the Australians, who are “dead set against” our proposal. 19 Mr. Graves stated that the Embassy had received a copy of the memorandum sent to the Cabinet Committee and went on to say that in his “personal opinion” the British reply might be expected to agree in principle to our proposal, but urged that agreement first be reached on reparation shares. He felt this very important because the initial removals, even if they amounted to only 20% of the contemplated total removals, would constitute the cream of the available equipment and the countries which received this 20% would in effect be receiving a very large proportion of the total worthwhile assets available for reparations. The British are anxious, he said, to see that their dependencies in Asia such as Borneo, Malaya, Hong Kong, et cetera, receive a fair proportional share of reparations in compensation for the devastation they have suffered. I made no comments to Mr. Graves other than to remark that we were apparently all agreed as to the urgency of the problem and hoped that an official British reply would be forthcoming in the very near future. 16 Hubert A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy. 17 Not printed; it promised a British reply in due course to the American proposal to compile interim directives on reparations by Japan (740.00119 PW/1–847). 18 Member of the U.S. delegation to the Far Eastern Commission. 19 The Australian Embassy on January 6 stated that the Australian Government could not “agree at this stage to the proposals” by the United States and hoped that alternative measures could be devised which would not by-pass the jurisdiction of the Far Eastern Commission and depart from the Moscow Agreement of December 1945 (740.00119 PW/1–647). For Soviet concern regarding the U.S. proposal, see telegram 12 (FEC 4), January 13, to Tokyo, p. 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] . Editorial Note [Document 289] Editorial Note In a memorandum of January 9, not printed, the Chinese Embassy informed the Department of State that the Chinese Government welcomed the proposal of the United States to expedite deliveries of reparations from Japan by issuing interim directives to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces in Japan, and it called attention to certain special requirements for China’s reconstruction. (740.00119 PW/1–947) Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs (Martin) to Mr. Ernest A. Gross, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) 740.00119 PW/1–947 [Document 290] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs ( Martin ) to Mr. Ernest A. Gross, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Hilldring ) [ Washington ,] January 9, 1947. Subject: Reparations Program for Japan. Now that the way has been cleared, subject to approval by the Secretary, for employing the interim directive procedure for handling the advance transfer paper and its essential concomitant, the procedures paper, JK has been reconsidering next steps. I should like to propose a program somewhat along the following lines. I may say that this program attempts to reconcile, as best we can, the need for speed of action with the attainment of responsible international support and agreement from all the FEC countries for what we do. I need not remind you how concerned we have been on this point since the interim directive proposal was first broached by General McCoy. 24 It has seemed to us that in particular the interim directive procedure would tend to focus on the U.S. all possible objections to reparations decisions embodied in the U.S. directives. 1) The FEC has been for some weeks engaged in final level of industry discussions in the sub-committee of the Economic Committee on recommendations regarding a number of industries. They may be presented this week. It is awkward, to say the least, to have no U.S. position on these recommendations. The recent radio from SCAP commenting on and in general concurring in SFE 162/15 makes it possible to proceed to secure SWNCC approval without serious further delay. At present this paper is on the shelf at our request pending completion of our review of the reparations from current production problem. I should like to recommend, now, that SFE 162/15 be put back on the agenda. I want, moreover, to reverse its emphasis so as to make the level of industry figures contained therein represent “assured retention levels” rather than levels down to which reparations removals should be made. In effect, we would be saying that the FEC must assure Japan that it will be allowed to keep at least this much. On this basis reconciliation of what differences we have with SCAP should be easy and on this basis there is no danger of conflict between this paper and any conclusions we may ultimately reach with respect to reparations from current production. The only effect of reparations from current production would be to increase the industrial capacity to be left in Japan for this purpose. On the other hand, action on this paper will get U.S. position established on an important issue promptly and permit us to satisfy the FEC desire to make level of industry decisions to the fullest extent possible, and, if approved by the FEC, will facilitate the task of SCAP in rehabilitating Japanese industry, with the resultant reduction of U.S. Treasury financial liability. 2) I further recommend that as the next step in the interim directive program the U.S., as soon as State Department approves the proposed national percentage distribution of reparations shares, initiate negotiations on national percentage shares in preparation for its issuance as an interim directive, if immediate FEC ratification seems unlikely. These negotiations should be on a bi-lateral basis. I think that we could secure considerable support for going ahead with an interim directive on this subject, if FEC ratification did not materialize at once, because of the pressing desire which the seven countries not authorized to secure reparations under the advance transfer directive will have to get a percentage distribution established which can be promptly applied to the remainder of the facilities made available under the interim removals program. I propose that the consultations be bi-lateral for two reasons. In the first place, on a bi-lateral basis it may be possible to avoid, or at least minimize, discussions of the justifications for the recommended percentage distribution of assets from Japan. Such discussions would be embarrassing to the Soviet Union, and fear of such discussion might cause the Soviets to refuse to participate in multilateral negotiation. Our own relations have been friendly and I think that on the bi-lateral basis we could perhaps secure their cooperation. The second reason is to permit, when desirable, the use of higher level personnel where we expect serious difficulties such as with the Soviets. Such personnel cannot be expected to conduct the negotiations as a whole. For example, the discussion on the Soviet share should, I think, be handled at Acheson’s 25 level, perhaps at Marshall’s. 26 I recognize the serious disadvantage in this procedure in that it focuses all complaints against the U.S. representative and leaves us no chance to play oft effectively the claims of one country against the other. However, I think the gains that could be secured in terms of possible Soviet collaboration are worth this additional burden. 3) On the completion of these consultations I recommend that the U.S. submit its recommendations to FEC for ratification. If ratification is delayed an interim directive on the percentage distribution of Japanese assets from within Japan should be issued. This percentage distribution should apply immediately to all or part of the facilities made available under the interim program and not allocated under the advance transfer program. 4) I recommend that before the first of February the U.S. representative in the FEC be authorized to say to the FEC that in view of the reluctance shared by all, including the U.S., to see important decisions affecting Japan made without the full participation and endorsement of the members of the FEC and in view of the expressions made personally by many members of the FEC, in which we agree, that level of industry for Japan was a vital decision of that sort, the U.S. proposes that the FEC, as a matter of urgency, make special arrangements for reaching a prompt agreement within the FEC as to the level of industry in Japan, a decision which will, of necessity, determine the Japanese assets to be made available for reparations removal. It is assumed that this decision will also govern the question of reparations from current production. This proposal should also be accompanied with a statement that the urgency of having a decision reached on this point increases with each week and therefore the U.S. will feel itself obliged to resort to the interim directive procedure if agreement has not been reached in the FEC on a program by April first. 5) There are a number of peripheral problems such as Japanese assets in neutral countries, Japanese diplomatic property and what action is necessary to permit title to Japanese assets in Allied countries which need further consideration, but with respect to which I would recommend that the burden of proof must be on those who propose interim directives immediately rather than including these problems in the issues on which the FEC is to be given until April 1st to reach a decision. 6) I would assume that the question of priority claims and the basis for distributing merchant shipping and any other special categories of assets would be handled as a part of the percentage distribution in interim directives. On the other hand, I would assume what categories of assets were available if such special distributions would be among the matters on which the FEC would be permitted a limited time to reach agreement. This will be awkward, but the general advantages of the scheme seem to me to outweigh the disadvantages. I think it highly important that the State Department lay out for itself a program along these lines. This proposal may need to be modified but we need to know promptly where we are going. 24 Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy (ret.), U.S. Member of the Far Eastern Commission, and its Chairman. 25 Dean G. Acheson, Under Secretary of State. 26 General of the Army George C. Marshall, appointed Secretary of State; his nomination was confirmed by the Senate on January 8, 1947, and he took the oath of office on January 21. Memorandum by Mr. Rufus Burr Smith of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs to the Chief of the Division (Martin) 740.00119 PW/1–1347 [Document 291] Memorandum by Mr. Rufus Burr Smith of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs to the Chief of the Division ( Martin ) [ Washington ,] January 13, 1947. Subject: Nations to be invited to submit reparations claims. The attached list contains the names of all nations to whom invitations should be submitted and the date on which their belligerency began. The following general principles underlie the above list: ( a ) Belligerents (including those countries actually at war with Japan and those which had declared a state of belligerency) to submit claims only for their period of actual belligerency. ( b ) No invitation to be submitted to neutrals to be reimbursed for any damages from Japanese assets located within their borders prior to the transferring of such assets to Allied countries (settlement identical to that in Germany). ( c ) Nations which severed diplomatic relations but did not declare war, or where a state of belligerency did not exist, are not to receive invitations. This excludes Denmark and Colombia. The following specific problems have been considered: ( a ) France: The high points of French relations with Japan for purposes of determining a date of actual belligerency appear to be as follows: 1. 2/8/41—Declaration of war by the Free French. 2. 4/21/44—Statement by de Gaulle that the French were participating in the Pacific War. 3. October 1944—Recognition of the French Provisional Government by the U.S. Since U.S. did not recognize the de Gaulle government as a government of France in control of French Indo-China prior to October 1944, no legal basis exists considering France to be at war with Japan prior to that time. It is therefore suggested that October 1944 be taken as a legal date of actual French belligerency with Japan. ( b ) It is suggested that Italian claims to Japanese reparations be given the same treatment as in the German war; namely, that Italy be permitted to retain Japanese assets within her own borders but that no additional claims be considered. This date [ sic ] places Italy on the same basis as Siam. ( c ) Outer Mongolia: Since the U.S. recognizes neither the independence nor the government of Outer Mongolia, no invitation should be issued to it. ( d ) Ukrainian SSR and Byelo-Russia: The Soviet grant of authority to these countries in the field of foreign relations was limited to negotiations with “neighboring states”. Therefore it does not appear that an invitation should be given to these countries. [Annex] List of States Declaring Belligerence Against Japan Argentina 3/27/45 Australia 12/8/41 Belgium 12/20/41 Bolivia 4/7/43 Brazil 6/6/45 Canada 12/7/41 Chile 2/12/45 Bel. China 12/9/41 Costa Rica 12/8/41 Cuba 12/9/41 Czechoslovakia 12/9/41 Dominican Republic 12/8/41 Ecuador 2/2/45 Egypt 2/26/45 El Salvador 12/8/41 Ethiopia 12/1/42 France Oct. ‘44 Greece 12/8/41 Guatemala 12/9/41 Haiti 12/8/41 Honduras 12/8/41 India 12/7/41 Iran 2/28/45 Iraq 1/16/43 Italy 7/15/45 Lebanon 2/27/45 Liberia 1/27/44 Luxembourg 9/8/42 Mexico 5/22/42 Netherlands 12/8/41 New Zealand 12/8/41 Nicaragua 12/8/41 Norway 12/7/41 Panama 12/7/41 Paraguay 2/8/45 Peru 2/11/45 Bel. Philippines 12/7/41 Poland 12/11/41 Saudi Arabia 3/1/45 Syria 2/26/45 Turkey 2/23/45 U. of South Africa 12/8/41 U.K. 12/7/41 Uruguay 2/22/45 Venezuela 2/14/45 Bel. Yugoslavia 12/7/41 U.S.S.R. Mongolian Peoples Republic 8/10/45 U.S.A. 27 27 The last three countries were added to the list in handwriting. No dates were given for the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 740.00119 P.W./2–347 [Document 292] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) No. 50 Washington , February 3, 1947. The Secretary of State encloses for reply, a letter from Mr. Soon Ju Chey 28 concerning the treatment of former Japanese industrial facilities in Korea under the reparations program. The Secretary of State transmits herewith the following information for use in replying to Mr. Chey’s letter: The negotiations for a settlement of Japanese reparations issues will be carried out on a governmental level by the countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission. As part of its responsibility for Southern Korea, the United States Government is prepared, as it has previously announced, to use a portion of such allocation of Japanese industrial assets as may be made to it through inter-Allied agreement, to secure industrial equipment from Japan for installation in Southern Korea. In addition, it is the United States position that all industrial facilities in Korea which were formerly owned by the Japanese shall be excluded from the Japanese reparations settlement and shall remain the property of the Korean people. The United States Government will adopt and will endeavor to obtain agreement by the other nations participating in the Far Eastern Commission to any recommendations contained in the report of Ambassador Pauley 29 which will contribute to the well being of the Korean people. 28 Not printed. 29 Edwin W. Pauley, Personal Representative of President Truman on Reparations, with rank of Ambassador; for text of report, see Department of State. Far Eastern Series No. 25: Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States, November 1945 to April 1946 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948). The report was submitted to President Truman on November 12, 1946, with a letter dated April 1, 1946. The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 894.60/2–1147: Telegram [Document 293] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo confidential priority Washington , February 11, 1947—5 p.m. 43. Personal for MacArthur from George Atcheson. 30 1. Yesterday American Delegation FEC invited me to sit with them preparatory to full FEC meeting Feb 13. Principal topic was paper on retention Jap industrial plants. Delegation fully realizes importance of getting this paper through FEC soonest and has been making strenuous efforts to do so. Matter has now come to point where Soviet member is agreeable, providing authorization to you to undertake retention of plants contains some reference to consultation with Allied Council. Specific Soviet proposal is to use words “after consultation with Allied Council”. One alternate American suggestion was “after such consultation as may be called for under the Council’s terms of reference”. My views were requested and I pointed out strong objections to any reference to consultation with Council on various grounds as such reference would open way for Derevyanko to demand some system of plant inspection with his staff participating and also as non-compliance with recommendation of Council would expose SCAP to public Soviet and possibly other criticism as well as providing Soviet press with further anti-American propaganda material. However, in the light of importance of achieving early FEC approval of the paper, American delegation still feels it will have to make some language concession to Soviet along the lines of that suggested. While this will undoubtedly bring about difficulties envisaged there will be no impairment of your authority and it might be possible to handle matter with a minimum of trouble by asking Council members by letter for their recommendations and at the same time exercising your full authority by going forward with the program. 2. Other subject was publication of Constitutional review decision. My views and delegation’s were as widely divergent as before and discussion was inconclusive. Marshall 30 The Political Adviser in Japan was in Washington for consultation. The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/2–1147: Telegram [Document 294] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) confidential Washington , February 11, 1947—7 p.m. 44. FEC 7. Obligations to Consult Allied Council . Soviet representative has proposed, as sine qua non for approval, insertion in Assured Production Capacity Levels policy paper of clause “upon consultation with the Allied Council”. Soviet representative stated proposal has no hidden motive but arises from desire to call attention to existing obligation of SCAP under terms of reference of Council to consult with Council on matters of substance. Proposal he said does not contemplate going beyond existing terms of reference. Some members questioned authority of FEC to require such consultation. U.S. representative reserved position pending consultation with his government. Marshall The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Department of Defense files [Document 295] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 31 confidential War 91906 [ Washington ,] 12 February 1947. The following directive, 31a prepared by the State Department to implement the policy adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on 23 January 1947 32 under the provisions of paragraph II, A, 1, of its terms of reference, 33 has been received from the State, War and Navy Departments for transmission to you for your guidance in accordance with paragraph III, 1, of those terms of reference: Directive begins: “ Directive Regarding Interim Objectives of the Far Eastern Commission Toward the Determination of the Peaceful Needs of Japan “1. The Far Eastern Commission determines as a matter of policy that the peaceful needs of the Japanese people should be defined as being substantially the standard of living prevailing in Japan during the period of 1930–1934. “2. Data about the standard of living during 1930–1934 should for present purposes be used to make an estimate of Japan’s peaceful needs in 1950. In estimating the nature and size of the industrial structure within that level, account should be taken of such factors as technological developments, the balance of payments and employment. “3. Acceptance of the above policy should not be interpreted to mean acceptance in advance of a specific level for any particular industry.” Directive ends. The Far Eastern Commission requests that you be informed: a . That the Commission recognizes the necessity for establishing a broad principle for the guidance of the Commission and SCAP, prior to the establishment of particular levels of industry in various categories. b . Since this policy is primarily for the guidance of the Commission release to the press is not recommended at the present time. However, since future publication may be regarded here as desirable your views on publication of the directive are requested. 31 Copy transmitted to the Department of State by SWNCC in SWN–5152, February 17, and by General Hilldring to the Far Eastern Commission on February 19. On February 21 the Department sent the Commission General MacArthur’s reply of February 14 as follows: “The advisability of publication of this and of any directive affecting the occupation, as a matter of basic principle, should depend upon the internal conditions existing in Japan at the time publication is proposed.” (740.00119 Control (Japan)/2–1747) 31a The directive was identified in other copies as Serial No. 68. 32 Telegram 26 (FEC 5), January 27, 7 p.m., to Tokyo, reported the unanimous adoption of this policy (740.00119 FEAC/1–2747). 33 See communiqué of the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers, Foreign Relations , 1945, vol. ii , p. 815 . The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/2–1347: Telegram [Document 296] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Gallman ) to the Secretary of State London , February 13, 1947. 991. In response question in Commons 12th whether His Majesty’s Government has been consulted by US Government on desirability early Inter-allied Jap Reparations Conference on basis Pauley recommendations, Foreign Secretary 34 made following statement: “The US Government have invited all Governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission to take part in early consultations on Japanese reparations. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have accepted this invitation but it is not yet known when the discussions will begin or what form they will take. Mr. Edwin Pauley’s recommendations to President Truman on Japanese reparations have not been specifically put forward as the basis for these discussions.” In response further inquiry, Foreign Secretary gave assurances he would bear in mind British reparation claims for goods removed by Japs from Malaya and Hong Kong to Japan and some of which reportedly sent US. Repeated USPolAd, Tokyo, 1. Gallman 34 Ernest Bevin. The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 740.00119 PW/2–1347: Telegram [Document 297] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo secret Washington , February 13, 1947—6 p.m. 48. Personal for General MacArthur from Ambassador Atcheson. Understand that advanced transfer paper introduced today in FEC against background of US Govt decision to issue interim directive if Commission does not act favorably on paper in question within approximately 2 weeks. 35 [Atcheson.] Marshall 35 For report on action taken, see telegram 54 (FEC 8), February 19, to Tokyo, p. 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] . The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control(Japan)/2–1347: Telegram [Document 298] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , February 13, 1947. 36. Reference Department’s telegrams 43 and 44, February 11. Following observations are offered regarding proposed obligations to consult Allied Council: Soviet proposal for insertion of clause “upon consultation with Allied Council” would, if accepted, amount to unwarranted assumption by Far Eastern Commission of executive authority over Supreme Commander requiring him to consult Allied Council on details of administration. Consultation with Allied Council is governed solely by terms of reference and strict compliance therewith has been practiced. The Soviet proposal appears to disregard completely paragraph B, section 2, “functions” of terms of reference for Far Eastern Commission, in which it is stated “… the Commission in its activities will proceed from the fact that there has been formed an Allied Council for Japan and will respect existing control machinery in Japan including the chain of command …”. It also appears to be an entering wedge in an attempt to establish direct relationship between Allied Council and Far Eastern Commission and marks but yet another attempt by Soviets to derogate from SCAP authority and to weaken American control of the occupation. It seems to us of utmost importance that such moves should be firmly resisted. There have already occurred attempts by Japanese to circumvent SCAP and appeal through Allied Council to Far Eastern Commission. Such efforts have been completely rejected. As required by terms of reference the Supreme Commander will consult with Allied Council on any matters of substance that might arise in implementation of this program. The individual plants to be retained can hardly be considered matters of substance. On the other hand, the minimum levels for the broad industries concerned are to be determined by Far Eastern Commission and not by SCAP decision and therefore are not subject to consultation between the Supreme Commander and Allied Council. United States policy, as determined by SWNCC in 239/19, designates SCAP as the deciding authority for individual plants. Acceptance of Soviet proposal would violate this vital aspect of United States policy. Its value and effectiveness require, as stated in reference paper, speedy execution which is impossible of accomplishment without administrative flexibility. The Soviet proposal would effectively prevent “speedy execution”. It is therefore believed that the issue should be faced squarely and that the United States should decline to accept Soviet proposal. If no solution can be found in Far Eastern Commission, United States Government presumably could issue an interim directive based upon United States policy. Bishop Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 740.00119 PW/1–3147 [Document 299] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) secret [ Washington ,] February 19, 1947. In accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of State of February 13, 1947, there is enclosed a statement of United States policy regarding the Principles Under Which Advance Transfers of Japanese Reparations May Be Accomplished, comprising the conclusions of SWNCC 236/24 which was approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on January 30, 1947. 36 The United States Member is requested to introduce this United States policy into the Reparations Committee of the Far Eastern Commission as a matter of the highest urgency with a view of obtaining from the Commission a policy decision on the subject. The Secretary of State takes the view that the Far Eastern Commission’s consideration of this policy will take place in lieu of the diplomatic consultations which hitherto have been regarded as necessary preceding its issuance as an interim directive. It is suggested that the United States Member, Far Eastern Commission, may wish to urge the Reparations Committee to remain in continuous session after a reasonable time has been allowed for Governments to provide their representatives in the Far Eastern Commission with instructions. It is hoped that the Far Eastern Commission will reach agreement on this matter by Friday, March 7. In as much as the issuance of a directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on this subject is regarded as a matter of urgency, the United States will consider itself in a position to issue an interim directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the event that agreement has not been reached in the Far Eastern Commission by that date. In that event, due consideration will be given to views which have been expressed in the course of Far Eastern Commission deliberations. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has stipulated that SWNCC 236/24 should not be issued unless accompanied by SWNCC 236/35 regarding Procedures for the Allocation of Japanese Reparations Assets. Upon approval by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, SWNCC 236/35 will be submitted for consideration by the Far Eastern Commission, but the United States Government considers itself in a position to issue it as an interim directive at the same time that SWNCC 236/24 is issued. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has also stipulated that SWNCC 236/24 should not be issued unless accompanied by SWNCC 236/19 regarding Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan. SWNCC 236/19 has been under Far Eastern Commission consideration since August 12, 1946. No other papers are considered relevant to accomplishment of the advance transfer program. Hence, it is not anticipated any delays will be occasioned by consideration of any other papers dealing with reparations problems. J. H. Hilldring [Annex] secret Statement of United States Policy Regarding Principles Under Which Advance Transfers of Japanese Reparations May Be Accomplished It is the position of the United States Government that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should effect immediate delivery of assets within Japan in accordance with the provisions of SWNCC 236/27 [FEC–094/2] 37 as advance payment on account of ultimate reparations shares providing: (1) That such assets fall within categories of Japanese facilities and equipment which have been properly declared as available for reparations transfer by the FEC and designated for removal by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. (2) That such assets should be declared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to China, the Philippines, the Netherlands (for NEI) and the United Kingdom (for Malaya and Burma) only; (3) That such assets should be delivered to a recipient country only after it has supplied evidence acceptable to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or to some other agent or agency hereafter designated to evaluate and pass judgment on such evidence, that the (i) immediate and useful employment of such assets is practicable, and (ii) Employment of rehabilitated, repaired or reconstructed facilities can contribute, directly, to immediate relief and rehabilitation requirements of the war devastated economy of the claimant country or, indirectly, to the relief needs of other parts of Asia devastated by Japanese armed forces; (4) That no country listed in paragraph (2) should receive delivery of more than 5 percent, excepting China which may receive 15 percent, in quantity or value of any single category of assets available as determined in paragraph (1) above, and authorized for transfer under the provisions of paragraph (3) above. (5) That assets specified for delivery should represent in their total quantity or value, not more than 30 percent of any single category of available assets as determined in paragraph (1) above. The SCAP should designate for delivery on advance transfer account such a balanced selection of plants and facilities as will not represent disproportional reduction of value or quality of over-all residual industrial capacities available for later transfer as reparations. The SCAP should maintain such records as necessary to enable offset for any such advance transfers to be made against ultimate fulfillment of approved and recognized over-all national reparations shares. 36 A copy of SWNCC 236/24, as amended January 22, was sent in instruction 419, February 10, to Tokyo. 37 Brackets appear in the original. The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) 740.00119 FEAC(Info)/2–1947: Telegram [Document 300] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) confidential Washington , February 19, 1947—6 p.m. 54. FEC 8. Obligation to Consult Allied Council . In view of firm Soviet position and pressing need of passing papers through Commission, U.S. Representative with approval of U.S. Government on Feb. 13 proposed following phrase in lieu of Soviet amendment: “upon such consultation with the Allied Council as is required by the Council’s terms of reference”. 38 This will not place additional burdens upon SCAP. Soviet representative has referred matter to his government. Advance Transfers of Reparations . Secretary Marshall Feb. 13 authorized placing before FEC for possible approval U.S. policy on advance transfers covering delivery to China, Philippines, Britain and Netherlands for relief and reconstruction purposes in Far East of 30 percent of Japanese internal assets declared available for reparations. FEC will have period until U.S. policy regarding reparations procedures has been determined to reach decision on advance transfers, so no delay will be caused by placing matter before FEC. Reparations Committee of FEC held two meetings Feb. 14 to consider policy. France and India insist must have share of advance transfers but their demands can be over-ruled if necessary. More serious is Soviet proposal that percentage to be delivered as advance transfers be raised to 50 or even 70 and that deliveries be made to all 11 nations represented on FEC with Soviet receiving 5 or more percent. Whether or not this is Soviet firm position not certain at present. Marshall 38 Telegram 49, February 15, 1 p.m., to Tokyo, noted that the British delegate would have preferred no reference to the Allied Council (894.60/2–1547). The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Department of Defense files [Document 301] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 39 restricted War 92372 [ Washington ,] 19 February 1947. The following directive, 39a prepared by the State Department to implement the policy adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on 13 February, 1947 under the provisions of paragraph II, A, 1, of its terms of reference, has been received from the State, War and Navy Departments for transmission to you for your guidance in accordance with paragraph III, 1, of those terms of reference: Directive begins: Directive Regarding Delivery of Reparations Goods in Japan [Here follows text of FEC policy decision of February 13 printed in Department of State, Far Eastern Series No. 24: Activities of the Far Eastern Commission, Report by the Secretary General, February 26, 1946—July 10, 1947 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), page 79.] 39 Copy of directive transmitted by SWNCC in its SWN–5170, February 25, to the Department and forwarded by the Department to the Far Eastern Commission on February 27. 39a The directive is identified in other copies as Serial No. 69. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Novikov) 894.30/2–2447 [Document 302] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union ( Novikov ) confidential The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the proposal of the Soviet Government made in Mr. Lozovski’s letter to the United States Embassy in Moscow on June 1, 1946, 40 that a commission be formed by representatives of the Soviet, Great Britain, China and the United States to draw up lists of the vessels subject to division. The Soviet Government is informed that complete information regarding the number, condition, and location of former Japanese naval vessels within the Japanese Empire classified as “combatant and of destroyer tonnage or less” is now in the possession of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Consequently, the United States Government is in a separate communication to the Soviet Government transmitting this information and stating that it is now possible to proceed to the immediate division of certain combatant vessels of the Japanese Navy. The Governments of Great Britain and the Republic of China are being similarly informed. It is recalled that the establishment of a commission was not provided for in the original exchange of communications between Mr. Molotov and Mr. Byrnes 41 on the subject of division of the Japanese naval vessels. In view of these facts, it is the view of the United States Government that the establishment of a four power commission to draw up lists of the vessels to be divided is not now necessary. With reference to the desire of the Soviet Command that certain Japanese vessels be allocated to it to fulfill tasks relating to the accomplishment of the capitulation of Japan in areas occupied by troops of the Red Army, communicated by Lt. General Derevyanko 42 to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo and referred to in the Soviet Embassy’s note of July 13, 1946, 43 the United States Government is of the opinion that the vessels to be delivered in accordance with the plan referred to above, will in part fulfill the immediate needs of the Soviet Command. With reference to the problem of the division of the Japanese merchant fleet, mentioned in Mr. Lozovski’s letter of June 1, 1946, the United States Government is still of the opinion that the final disposition of the Japanese merchant fleet involves the broader problems of reparations and the future economy of Japan, and must depend upon further policy decisions by the Far Eastern Commission. This communication is transmitted to the Soviet Ambassador for his confidential information. Washington , February 24, 1947. 40 See telegram 1759, June 5, 1946, from Moscow, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 526 . Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky was Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. 41 V. M. Molotov, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the then Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. 42 Lt. Gen. Kuzma Nikolaevich Derevyanko, Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan. 43 Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 555 . The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Novikov) 894.30/2–2447 [Document 303] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union ( Novikov ) 44 confidential The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the previous agreement that all Japanese submarines and all Japanese combatant vessels larger than destroyers should be destroyed but that destroyers and surface combatant vessels of lesser tonnage should be divided equally among Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China and the United States. The United States Government has been informed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that certain vessels of the Japanese fleet are now available for division among the four powers mentioned above. 45 The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is therefore informed, as are the Governments of Great Britain and China in identic notes, of the following procedure: (1) Certain ex-Japanese navy ships within the Japanese Empire and classified as “combatant and of destroyer tonnage or less,” are either wrecked, sunk or require, with means available to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and without interfering with the utilization of those means for projects assigned a higher priority by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, more than 60 days to place in operable condition. Such remaining inoperable vessels will be scrapped. A tentative list of these vessels is enclosed, as Enclosure “A”. 46 (2) It is intended that arrangements be made immediately for the delivery with Japanese crews of those vessels now declared available and in good material and operating condition by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, at such times and at such ports outside of Japan as the receiving Governments may designate. In order to facilitate the delivery, it is requested that no port west of Singapore be designated and that each Government designate no more than one port. An accompanying vessel can be sent with each lot to repatriate Japanese crews if the receiving nation does not desire to assume responsibility for returning the crews. The receiving Government should reimburse the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in dollars or in kind for all expenses involving expenditures of United States supplies, such as fuel oil furnished these vessels on the outward voyage, as well as for fuel oil consumed on the round trip of repatriation vessels used to return the crews. The details of such arrangements should be worked out between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the representatives in Japan of the Governments concerned. (3) It is requested that your Government designate its representative in Japan to participate in the drawing of lots to determine which of the four equivalent lots of ships into which all allocable ships have been divided will become the property of each of the respective countries. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will facilitate the inspection by representatives of claimant nations of vessels prior to their delivery. The Soviet Government is informed that all ships have been demilitarized and items of military equipment destroyed and that these ships cannot be remilitarized in Japan. A tentative list of the vessels to be delivered is enclosed as Enclosure “B”. (4) Delivery of additional vessels will be made as soon as they become available. A tentative list of the remaining vessels to be delivered is enclosed as Enclosure “C”. (5) It should be noted that since each of the tentative lists mentioned in the preceding paragraphs was prepared on 15 June 1946 the status of some of those ships may in the meantime have been changed or may be changed in the future due to damage or other exigencies. (6) It will be noted from Enclosure “B” that some sixty-four ships are now ready for delivery to the four Governments concerned. It would therefore be appreciated if the Soviet Government would inform the United States Government promptly of the port in the Far East to which it wishes its share of the ships to be delivered. Upon receipt of this information, and when the Soviet representative in Tokyo shall have been empowered to act on behalf of his Government, detailed plans for delivery will be carried out. 47 This communication is transmitted to the Soviet Ambassador for his confidential information. Washington , February 24, 1947. 44 Identic notes were sent to the British and Chinese Ambassadors. 45 On January 29 SCAP had telegraphed that all vessels then available for release had been completely demilitarized; on February 11 SCAP requested that the three other powers be informed that all ships had been demilitarized and items of military equipment destroyed and that the ships could not be remititarized in Japan (894.30/5–847). 46 Enclosures not printed. 47 Revised lists were sent on April 1, with the comment that they might be further revised on receipt of additional information (894.30/3–2147). During 1947, four drawings of Japanese vessels took place (894.30/11–2847). The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to Mr. Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce and Director of the Office of International Trade 740.00119 PW/2–2847 [Document 304] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to Mr. Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce and Director of the Office of International Trade Washington , February 28, 1947. My Dear Mr. Blaisdell : The Department of State is undertaking the formation of a mission to Japan responsible for representing United States interests on problems of reparations, restitution of looted property, and the protection, preservation and reporting upon United States owned property prior to restoration. The official mission is to be composed of five members, assisted by a limited number of technical and clerical aides. At this time, this Department is primarily interested in the formation of that part of the mission which will be concerned with United States owned property in Japan. SCAP has requested assistance and guidance on this problem, and numerous inquiries have been addressed to the State Department by private owners as to the condition of their property. Current plans, therefore, call for sending to Japan at an early date the chief of the mission, who will be a State Department representative; the mission member primarily responsible for protection and rehabilitation, and a group of five to ten technical experts with clerical staff. As stated in preliminary meetings with members of your staff, it is our opinion that the mission member responsible for United States property should be from the Department of Commerce, while the technical experts should represent United States businesses with property holdings in Japan, serving, if necessary, on a rotating basis to insure fair coverage of all interests and employed on a dollar-a-year basis. The functions to be performed by this group in representing United States property interests are as follows: ( a ) To inspect United States owned property and to advise the Civil Property Custodian, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as to measures necessary to protect and maintain its value. ( b ) Appraise damage and deterioration resulting from the war and from Japanese negligence in the administration and control of the property during the period of seizure and custodianship, and to prepare information which may be used as a basis for claims by the owners against the Japanese Government. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has issued a directive to the Japanese Government to protect and maintain United States property. However, personnel is lacking to inspect adequately these properties, nor can government personnel speak officially on behalf of the property interests and claims of private concerns. It is not the function of representatives to submit claims for or accept custody or control of United States property, resume plant operations, revive marketing outlets, and enter into contracts with Japanese for agency or other services. Such activities must await the establishment of restoration procedure, and the reopening of Japan to foreign private business operations. Considerable concern has been expressed as to possible charges of discrimination among private owners resulting from the necessity of limiting the number of representatives who can be permitted in Japan at this time. Preliminary discussions have resulted in a recommendation that the Department of Commerce issue an invitation to United States owners having a substantial property interest in Japan to attend a conference to select jointly those persons to represent their interests. To avoid all possible charges of discrimination, the list invited should be as inclusive as practicable. The State Department is preparing and will shortly send the Commerce Department, a listing of firms with substantial interests in Japan. Assuming that the conference can select five to ten representatives, the persons selected will form the initial staff operating under the direction of the Department of Commerce mission member. If, however, the conference cannot agree, in whole or in part, the Department of State and the Department of Commerce can then select representatives, either private or government, without being open to charges of discrimination. The individuals selected will, of course, be subject to normal State and War Department clearance. If the Department of Commerce approves of the procedure outlined above, I suggest the immediate appointment of representatives to confer on the detailed procedures at as early a date as is possible. Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) 740.00119 FEAC(Info)/2–2847: Telegram [Document 305] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) confidential Washington , February 28, 1947—7 p.m. 69. FEC 9. Obligation to Consult Allied Council . Soviet Government rejected U.S. alternate phrase quoted in FEC 8. At Commission meeting Feb. 20 following compromise phrase agreed upon with consent of U.S. Government: “upon consultation with Allied Council in accordance with terms of reference of Allied Council” U.S. Government would prefer no reference to consultation but formula agreed upon will adequately protect SCAP. Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan . This policy paper approved by FEC Feb. 20 with insertion in two places of consultation phrase referred to above. Policy will permit SCAP immediately to designate, up to certain limits, production facilities which will in no circumstances be subject to removal. Advance Transfers of Reparations . U.S. policy paper has so far received unqualified approval only from Canadian and Chinese Governments. Australian government objects to relief as basis for any delivery of reparations but if policy is adopted wishes to put in claim based on occupation by Japanese of New Guinea, Papua and Nauru. French Government would prefer program applicable to all 11 countries but if relief is adopted as basis must insist upon share for use in French Indo-China. Indian Government states cannot agree to omission of India from any program based on relief. Claim based on war-caused famine in India and Japanese occupation and devastation of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, USSR and U.K. representatives have not yet received instructions. Netherlands representative however supported U.S. policy and opposed suggestion that advance transfers be applied to all 11 countries. New Zealand representative advanced theory that U.S. would not be legally justified in unilaterally allocating reparations by means of interim directives. U.K. representative supported this view and questioned urgency of matter. Marshall The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) 894.50/3–347: Telegram [Document 306] The Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) confidential Washington , March 3, 1947—4 p.m. 70. FEC 10. Short period controls over Japanese economy to relieve world shortages . FEC Feb. 27 adopted above policy paper, 48 requiring encouragement of Japanese production consumption goods needed by victims Japanese aggression and further requiring restriction consumption of such goods, particularly textiles, by Japanese to minimum requirements. Paper originally introduced into FEC by British who urgently need consumption goods for their Asiatic dependencies. Advance Transfers of Reparations . During past week U.S. policy officially supported by Netherlands, Philippines and New Zealand (latter subject to Cabinet confirmation). Philippines approved policy provided no substantial amendments are made. New Zealand stated policy should be approved roughly as stands and no other countries should be added as beneficiaries. Now have six countries approving policy and three opposed. USSR and UK governments yet to be heard from. Several approving countries have emphasized need for some Allied body in Japan to watch interests of claimant countries which are not beneficiaries under advance transfers program. Marshall 48 For text, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 90. The directive was sent as serial 70, March 5, to SCAP by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Far Eastern Commission on March 19 by General Hilldring. The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 894.60/2–2047 [Document 307] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee confidential Washington , March 4, 1947. Subject: Draft Directive Regarding Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan. There is enclosed a draft directive prepared on the basis of a policy decision unanimously approved at the forty-sixth meeting of the Far Eastern Commission on February 20, 1947, under the provisions of paragraph II, A, 1, of its terms of reference. It will be noted that this policy decision is quoted verbatim in the enclosed draft directive. It is requested that the enclosed directive be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for transmission to General MacArthur 49 for his guidance in accordance with paragraph III, 1, of the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission. It is assumed that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff have any question regarding the draft directive they will refer the matter to the State Department for clarification before transmitting a directive on the subject. It is also requested that the enclosed statement of the Chinese representative to the Far Eastern Commission made before the policy decision relative to Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan was formally approved by the Commission, and setting forth the position of his Government with regard to paragraph 5, Iron and Steel Industry, of the policy decision, be transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for his information. The French representative expressed his concurrence in the Chinese statement. The Secretary General of the Far Eastern Commission has requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in transmitting the enclosed draft directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, inform him that in adopting the policy decision relative to Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan the Commission accepted the recommendation of the Supreme Commander that the decision not be released to the press until specific plants had been designated by the Supreme Commander, pursuant to the terms of the policy decision. The Commission would appreciate it if the Supreme Commander could inform them when in his opinion the release of this policy decision to the press would be appropriate. It is also requested that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers be informed that the Australian representative pointed out that consultation with the Allied Council, as provided by the policy decision, might involve public disclosure of its contents and desired that it be understood that a Power would not be violating the Commission’s decision on publication if it raised any question connected with the policy at a meeting of the Allied Council. J. H. Hilldring [Annex 1] Draft Directive Regarding Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan confidential The following directive, prepared by the State Department to implement the policy adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on February 20, 1947, under the provisions of paragraph II, A, 1, of its terms of reference has been received from the State, War and Navy Departments for transmission to you for your guidance in accordance with paragraph III, 1, of those terms of reference: “1. Interim assured production capacity levels are hereby established for each of the eight categories of Japanese industry listed below. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan, may designate for retention specific plants and establishments, associated with each category, whose aggregate production capacity does not exceed the level established for that category. Such designation should be interpreted to mean that: a . The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with, the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan, decides that operation of these plants and establishments, individually and collectively, is practical in terms of current needs for their products, and in terms of such conditioning factors as availability of raw materials, power, and labor; b . Owners and management are assured that the particular facility will not be subject to removal under the Interim Program or subsequent disarmament or reparations programs. “2. Machine Tool Industry The assured production capacity level for Japan’s machine tool industry should be placed at a balanced type-size aggregate of 7,500 units annually. “3. Arsenals, Army and Navy No assured production capacity level should be assigned to Army and Navy arsenals. “4. Aircraft Industry ( including aircraft engines ) No assured production capacity level should be assigned to the aircraft industry. “5. Iron and Steel Industry The assured production capacity level for Japan’s iron and steel industry should be placed at an aggregate of 2.0 million metric tons of steel ingot, and an aggregate of 800,000 metric tons of pig iron annually. “6. Light Metals Industry No assured production capacity for Japan’s light metals industry should be given. “7. Thermal Electric Power Industry The assured production capacity level for Japan’s thermal electric power industry should be placed at an aggregate installed public utility capacity of 1.0 million kilowatts. “8. Soda Ash, Chlorine, and Caustic Soda Industry The assured production capacity level for Japan’s soda ash, chlorine, and caustic soda industry should be placed at 207,000 metric tons of soda ash, of which 72,000 are required to produce caustic soda, 28,000 metric tons of chlorine, and 80,000 metric tons of caustic soda annually. “9. Sulphuric Acid Industry The assured production capacity level for the Japanese sulphuric acid industry should be placed at 3,000,000 metric tons annually.” [Annex 2] Item 3— Assured Production Capacity Level for Japan (FEC–083/2, FEC–083/3, FEC–083/4) (Statement by the Chinese Member) Dr. Koo presented the following formal statement: [In his statement, not printed, Dr. Koo declared that the Chinese Government would accept the proposed directive only conditionally.] Mr. Naggiar (French Representative) said that he desired to record his Government’s approval of the position just expressed by Dr. Koo. General Hilldring said that he had no objection to the record containing this statement of understanding on the part of the Chinese representative. He desired to point out, however, that the subject of reparations from current production had not previously been considered by the Commission and he wanted to make it clear that the United States Government could not at this time commit itself on any proposal involving reparations from current production. Dr. Koo said that the understanding he had just recorded naturally applied only to the Chinese Government and that he simply wishes to reserve the right of the Chinese Government to raise the question at the appropriate time. 49 This was done in serial 71, March 7; the Par Eastern Commission was informed by General Hilldring on March 19. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs (Martin) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 740.00119 P.W./3–447 [Document 308] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs ( Martin ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) secret [ Washington ,] March 4, 1947. As indicated in the accompanying memorandum to the SWNCC Secretariat, 50 the amendments to SWNCC 236/35 “US Policy on Reparations Allocations Procedures for Industrial Facilities in Japan”, proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 236/40, are generally acceptable with the notable exception of the changes with respect to the formation and functions of the proposed inter-Allied Reparations Technical Advisory Committee. In view of the nature of the Japanese occupation and of the proposed directive on the advanced transfer of reparations goods in Japan, it is considered of paramount importance to establish promptly such inter-Allied Advisory Committee in Japan. Such a committee would provide a procedure for international assistance in the settlement of disputes over reparations between claimant countries, disputes which otherwise would tend to degenerate in every case into a bi-lateral fight between SCAP and another country. In operation such a committee would serve to remove some of the onus of unilateral action inherent in the present situation with regard to Japanese reparations. Further, the presence of the Committee would afford an orderly procedure for the presentation of questions and problems to SCAP by other countries, which in itself would tend to reduce disputes, since such problems would be initially presented for the scrutiny of an inter-Allied group. In an exchange of cables, SCAP has expressed strong opposition to the formation of such an Advisory Committee on the grounds that it would infringe on his authority. On the basis of the SCAP objection, the JCS has recommended that the formation of such a committee by SCAP, and the referral of disputes between SCAP and a majority of the Committee to the US Government for action, be made optional rather than mandatory. It is believed that the formation of such a Committee is of such importance to US foreign relations that the State Department cannot concur in the JCS recommendation, and that the strongest argument should be made for the original State Department provisions of SWNCC 236/35 in the SWNCC meeting. However, if it becomes evident that the War Department will not accept the State Department’s recommendations in toto, it may be necessary in order to pass this paper to compromise by permitting the submission of disputes between SCAP and a majority of the Committee to the US Government to be optional with SCAP, but providing that the formation of the Reparations Technical Advisory Committee be mandatory on SCAP. 51 50 Not printed. 51 A copy of SWNCC 236/45, “Interim Directive regarding advance transfers of Japanese reparations and reparations allocation procedures for industrial facilities in Japan”, was transmitted to Nanking in instruction 317, April 18. For statement on April 3 by General McCoy to the Far Eastern Commission on the U. S. decision to send an interim directive to SCAP, see Department of State Bulletin , April 13, 1947, p. 674. For the directive to SCAP, serial 75, April 4, see p. 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] . General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1247 [Document 309] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 52 confidential Tokyo , 10 March 1947. C 50730. Reurad W 93518 dated 9th [ 7th ] March. 53 Those provisions of the policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission which require consultation between the Supreme Commander and the Allied Council for Japan are violative of the terms of reference of the Moscow agreement and consequently entirely lacking in validity. They attempt to prescribe the detailed action of the Supreme Commander and the Allied Council, both of which are agencies independent of the Far Eastern Commission, in carrying out the provisions of their inherent responsibilities. They would arrogate to the Far Eastern Commission an authority which by the Moscow Agreement lies within the exclusive functions of other bodies. The Far Eastern Commission in itself cannot thus change the terms of reference of the Moscow Agreement which can only be altered by the formal agreement of the 4 governments concerned—not by the representatives appointed by them to serve on the Far Eastern Commission for the purpose of exercising its legitimate and prescribed functions. Even if valid there would be imposed upon the Supreme Commander and the Allied Council for Japan an unrealistic burden rendering impossible the orderly implementation by the Supreme Commander of the policy decision in reference, in that it would impose upon the Supreme Commander the obligation to seek, and upon the Allied Council for Japan the obligation to give, technical advice concerning thousands of industrial plants for which neither individually nor collectively is there available to the Allied Council for Japan or its members the large technical staff essential to an intelligent approach to this vast problem; and even were the contrary true, many months of study would be required to make such technical advice possible—causing a delay in implementation which would defeat entirely the purpose of the directive. On the other hand, to require the Supreme Commander to seek and act upon the Allied Council’s non-technical advice upon so highly technical a subject, would be to make a mockery of his executive and the Allied Council’s consultative responsibility in the occupation of Japan. [ MacArthur ] 52 Copy transmitted to the Department by SWNCC with its SWN–5218, March 12, not printed. 53 Not printed; it reported FEC–083, February 20, annex 1 to General Hilldring’s memorandum of March 4, p. 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] . The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State 894.30/3–1047 [Document 310] The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State [Translation] No. 14 The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. presents its compliments to the Department of State of the U.S.A. and in connection with the Department’s notes of February 24 of this year concerning the division of ships of the Japanese Navy of the tonnage of destroyers and below has the honor to state the following: The Soviet Government accepts the proposal of the Government of the U.S.A. to the effect that the division of these ships should be entered upon without delay and to such end will send to Japan in the near future its representative with a group of six people accompanying him. 54 In connection with the distribution of the Japanese ships of the tonnage of destroyers and below according to groups, and also the details of the organization of the division of the ships and the technicalities of their delivery, in the opinion of the Soviet Government all of these questions could be determined and agreed upon on the spot by representatives of the four Governments—the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., Great Britain, and China in collaboration with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan. The ships to be delivered to the Soviet Union in accordance with the division must be sent to the port of Nakhodka. With reference to the fact that the Soviet Government does not possess information concerning the old warships of the Japanese fleet of a tonnage higher than that of destroyers, it would be grateful to the Government of the U.S.A. for the transmission to it of such information. 55 Washington , 10 March, 1947. 54 The Soviet Embassy informed the Department in its note 83, May 17, that this group, led by Rear Admiral A. M. Stetsenko, had left for Japan (894.30/5–1747). 55 For Mr. Acheson’s statement of April 11 on Japanese vessels available for delivery to the four Powers, see Department of State Bulletin , April 20, 1947, p. 717. The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Bishop) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/3–1147: Telegram [Document 311] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Bishop ) confidential Washington , March 11, 1947—7 p.m. 84. FEC 11. Interim Principles for Restitution of Identifiable Property Confiscated in Japan from Allied Nationals . Policy paper of above title approved by FEC March 6. 56 Permits SCAP to restore to nationals of members United Nations identifiable property tangible and intangible owned by them prior to outbreak of hostilities, provided owners are present in Japan or are religious or charitable institutions properly represented in Japan. For present, restoration of commercial and industrial enterprises limited to small-scale enterprises. China interprets “outbreak of hostilities” as July 7, 1937 and France as September 22, 1940. For other countries date is December 7, 1941. Advance Transfers of Reparations . No progress made during past week due to non-arrival of instructions from USSR and UK. 57 Supply of Food for Civilian Relief in Japan . For some months majority of members of FEC have been pressing for policy decision to be sent to SCAP as directive on supply of food for Japan. U.S. government willing to go only so far as to restate in composite form policies re food already sent to SCAP. Economic Committee of FEC insisted on inserting following paragraph “Supreme Commander should make it clear to Japanese people that many countries are suffering from dire shortage of foodstuffs largely due to Japanese aggression and in many countries devastated by Japanese diet of people is inferior to that of Japanese”. This has been unacceptable to U.S. government largely because of effect latter part of paragraph might have on efforts to obtain adequate appropriations from Congress for costs of occupation. U.S. government, however, consented to insertion of following clause in another part of paper “many of which (Allied Powers and liberated areas) suffer shortages of food largely due to Japanese aggression”. This compromise disliked by most members of FEC because contains no reference to inferior diet of some Asiatic countries to that of Japanese. However, it may be accepted as U.S. representative has thus far indicated that U.S. not disposed to go further in endeavoring to meet wishes of Commission in this matter. Representatives have referred matter to their governments. Acheson 56 For text, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 83. This was FEC–011/28, received from General McCoy with his letter of March 6 (740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–647). It was sent to SCAP as a directive in serial 73, March 22. 57 For next report, see telegram 94 (FEC 12), March 18, 7 p.m., to Tokyo, p. 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] . Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 894.60/3–1947 [Document 312] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) secret Washington , March 24, 1947. In accordance with a memorandum dated March 19, 1947, from the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, there is enclosed a copy of SWNCC 236/35 regarding United States Policy on Reparations Allocations Procedures for Industrial Facilities in Japan which was approved by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee on March 11, 1947. 58 The United States Member, Far Eastern Commission, is requested to submit this statement of United States policy, as set forth in the conclusions of SWNCC 236/35, to the Far Eastern Commission as a matter of the highest urgency with a view to obtaining from the Commission a policy decision on the subject. If the Far Eastern Commission has not agreed to the adoption of a policy decision on this subject within a brief but reasonable period of time, the United States Government will, after giving due consideration to views which have been expressed in the course of Far Eastern Commission deliberations, issue this policy as an interim directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 59 J. H. Hilldring 58 Not attached to file copy of memorandum. 59 For interim directive, see serial 75, April 4, to SCAP, p. 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] . Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 740.00119 Control (Japan)/3–1247 [Document 313] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee confidential Washington , March 24, 1947. Subject: Draft Directive Regarding Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan. With reference to the memorandum of March 12, 1947 from the Secretary of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 60 stating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested that the enclosed message dated March 10, 1947 from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers be transmitted to the Far Eastern Commission, it is recommended that this message be referred to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee and that it not be transmitted to the Far Eastern Commission, for the following reasons: 1) The message is extremely critical of a policy decision duly passed by the Far Eastern Commission with the necessary affirmative vote of the United States Government. It is unlikely that the FEC would reconsider its action even if the United States Government were to reverse its own position by supporting General MacArthur’s views. Reference of the message to the FEC would serve only to create ill will within the Commission and harm relations between SCAP and FEC. 2) The points made in the SCAP message were thoroughly considered by the United States Government before decision to support the proposal was taken. The following conclusions were reached: a ) The reference in the policy decision to consultation with the Allied Council is worded in such a way as to prevent any alteration in the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council. The phrase as it now stands: “upon consultation with the Allied Council for Japan in accordance with the Terms of Reference of the Allied Council for Japan”, does no more than recognize a fact, without broadening the Terms of Reference or permitting any consultation which is not already provided for. b ) The Terms of Reference of the Allied Council provide that “He (SCAP) will consult and advise with the Council in advance of the issuance of orders on matters of substance, the exigencies of the situation permitting. His decisions upon these matters shall be controlling.” It is not believed that the wording of the FEC policy decision would as indicated in SCAP’s telegram, “impose upon the Supreme Commander the obligation to seek, and upon the Allied Council for Japan the obligation to give, technical advice concerning thousands of industrial plants ….” SCAP will still decide in each particular instance whether the matter is one of substance, and whether the exigencies of the situation permit. Only if his decision on both points is affirmative, is he obligated to consult the Council, and in any case, his decision is controlling. 3) The SWNCC has already approved the establishment of an Allied Technical Advisory Committee whose functions will be to advise SCAP on technical matters concerned with reparations. Thus the Allied Council will not be called upon for technical advice and its terms of reference will not be affected since even in the case of the Technical Advisory Committee, SCAP’s decisions will be controlling. It is further believed that no reply to SCAP’s message is required for the following reasons: 1) General MacArthur’s message does not specifically request any action by the United States Government, 2) by now SCAP must have access to the minutes of the FEC meetings at which this subject was discussed, and 3) Ambassador Atcheson, who is thoroughly informed of the considerations which led to the U.S. Government decision, is now in Tokyo. I therefore recommend that 1) the message not be transmitted to the Far Eastern Commission, 2) the Joint Chiefs of Staff be informed of the foregoing considerations, and 3) no reply be made to the SCAP message. J. H. Hilldring 60 See footnote 52, p. 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] . Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 894.50/3–1747 [Document 314] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) confidential [ Washington ,] April 3, 1947. With reference to the directive of March 5, 1947, Serial No. 70, to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 61 regarding Short Period Controls over the Japanese Economy to Relieve World Shortages, the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission is informed that the following message, dated March 13, 1947, has been received from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers: “Receipt is acknowledged of directive to implement Far Eastern Commission policy adopted 27 February 1947. All features of this policy have been anticipated and are in effect at the present time. Although in the instant case figures quoted are within the limitations of accomplishment it is believed that quantitative limitations expressed in Far Eastern policy should be (1) avoided in policy covering overall operation, or (2) carefully verified with SCAP to evaluate ability to meet the figures set and the probable effects upon Japan.” J. H. Hilldring 61 See footnote 48, p. 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] . The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur , at Tokyo Department of Defense files [Document 315] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur , 62 at Tokyo confidential War 95604 [ Washington ,] 4 April, 1947. “ Interim Directive Regarding Advance Transfers of Japanese Reparations and Reparations Allocation Procedures for Industrial Facilities in Japan “The following Interim Directive, Serial Number 75, received from the State, War, and Navy Departments, issued under the provisions of paragraph III, 3, of the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission, is furnished for your guidance. Part A “1. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should effect immediate delivery of assets within Japan in accordance with the provisions of the Directive, Serial Number 69, February 19, 1947, regarding the delivery of reparations goods in Japan, as advance payment on account of ultimate reparations shares providing: a . That such assets fall within categories of Japanese facilities and equipment which have been properly declared as available for reparations transfer by the Far Eastern Commission and designated for removal by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; b . That such assets should be declared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to China, the Philippines, the Netherlands (for Netherlands East Indies) and the United Kingdom for Malaya, Burma and its colonial possessions in the Far East; c . That such assets should be delivered to a recipient country only after it has supplied evidence acceptable to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or to some other agent or agency hereafter designated to evaluate and pass judgment on such evidence, that the (1) Immediate and useful employment of such assets is practicable, and (2) Employment of rehabilitated, repaired or reconstructed facilities can contribute, directly, to immediate relief and rehabilitation requirements of the war-devastated economy of the claimant country or, indirectly, to the relief needs of other parts of Asia devastated by Japanese armed forces; d . That no country listed in subparagraph b should receive delivery of more than 5%, excepting China which may receive 15%, in quantity or value of any single category of assets available as determined in subparagraph a above, and authorized for transfer under the provisions of subparagraph c above. e . That assets specified for delivery should represent in their total quantity or value, not more than 30% of any single category of available assets as determined in subparagraph a above. “2. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should designate for delivery on advance transfer account such a balanced selection of plants and facilities as will not represent disproportional reduction of value or quality of over-all residual industrial capacities available for later transfer as reparations. “3. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should maintain such records as necessary to enable offset for any such advance transfers to be made against ultimate fulfillment of approved and recognized over-all national reparations shares. Part B “1. The following procedures should govern SCAP implementation of those aspects of the Japanese reparations program providing for the removal from Japan of industrial facilities and equipment. a . In accordance with provisions of directives to SCAP regarding availability for reparations transfer of categories of Japanese industry, SCAP should be responsible for final selection of those particular industrial facilities and equipment to be made available for removal from Japan as reparations. b . SCAP should be responsible for preparing an inventory of individual Japanese industrial facilities selected under a above. This inventory shall include any available information which would aid a prospective claimant in determining the utility of the individual facility, such as technical specifications, make, age and condition. c . SCAP should be responsible for assigning monetary valuation to industrial facilities selected and listed under a and b . Procedures for uniform monetary valuation should be determined by SCAP. Valuations should be in sufficient detail to permit charges to be made for parts of plants which may be allocated separately. Values assigned to reparations assets referred to in a and b above need have no relation to any other values as long as these values are consistent among the reparations assets comprised of industrial facilities and equipment. d . SCAP should submit to representatives of countries, members of the FEC the inventory provided in b , and the valuation provided in c. e . Upon receipt of the inventories and valuations mentioned herein, a country, member of the FEC may lodge with SCAP claims for the allocation to it of particular industrial facilities. f . Upon receipt of directives indicating the over-all shares assigned to each country, SCAP should set up appropriate reparations accounts for recipient countries. The value of the facilities received by any one country should not exceed its percentage share of the total value of the industrial facilities selected and valued by SCAP for removal as reparations. As provided in the Directive, Serial Number 69, February 19, 1947, regarding the delivery of reparations goods in Japan, a recipient country will make a commitment to accept a specific facility at the time allocation is made. SCAP should likewise agree to reserve the accepted facility for the claimant country. At such time SCAP will make an initial charge of the monetary value assigned to the facility (in accordance with 1 c ) to the reparations account of the recipient country. When the final title is taken by a recipient country to an individual facility aboard ship, a final charge shall be made against the reparations account of the recipient country, taking into account, if necessary, any unforeseen loss of value. g . From those items of industrial facilities and equipment declared available for reparations removals SCAP should allocate particular industrial facilities to each country on the basis of claims submitted by that country. To the extent that claims of two or more countries are In conflict, he will work out what seems to him the most reasonable allocation, taking into primary consideration the proportion of each country’s allocation still unfilled. After taking into account this primary consideration, consideration should be given the following four items in stated order of priority: (1) Claims for whole plants and related facilities, as opposed to claims for portions thereof. (2) Claims for parts of plants or related groups of items which can be integrated with the existing industrial pattern of the claimant country. (3) The extent to which the claimed item or items would replace property which was destroyed, damaged or looted in the war, or requires replacement because of excessive wear incident to prosecuting the war against Japan. (4) The extent to which the claimant country depended in prewar years on imports from Japan of the item or items (or products thereof) claimed. h . In making allocations as provided by subparagraph g , SCAP should, to the extent practicable, give consideration to striking a fair and equitable balance as between all claimant countries of items: (1) In integrated or consolidated units. (2) Of modern and efficient design and manufacture. (3) In good working condition. i . Each country represented on the FEC should be permitted to have a Reparations Technical Mission in Japan. These missions should be afforded full opportunity for inspection of plants declared available, and should be kept fully informed by SCAP of all designations and allocations. They should be authorized by their governments to receive inventories, valuations and other communications from SCAP relating to reparations, to lodge claims, to make commitments to accept title to plants selected, to accept final title to industrial facilities on reparations account, and to make all necessary arrangements with SCAP including scheduling the required shipping for the actual removal of allocated facilities in accordance with the principles laid down in the Directive, Serial Number 69. j . SCAP should organize a Reparations Technical Advising Committee (RTAC) composed of the heads of the above Reparations Technical Missions located in Japan and chaired by a representative of SCAP appointed by SCAP. The function of this committee should be to assist SCAP, in an advisory capacity, in the development of technical and administrative procedures to assure an orderly removal of reparations goods from Japan, and in the settlement of conflicts between claimant countries arising over claims for particular facilities. In the event of disagreement between SCAP and a member country concerning the allocation of a particular facility by SCAP, if a formal protest is made to SCAP by two-thirds of members of RTAC, SCAP, who has final authority in such matters, may, in his discretion, refer the dispute to the U.S. Government. k . Claims for individual facilities must be filled [ filed? ] with SCAP by a claimant country within 6 months after the fixing of a claimant country’s final reparations percentage share, or receipt from SCAP of a final inventory and valuation of the facility, whichever is the later date. l . Each claimant will arrange for transportation for its reparations goods at the port and will be prepared to accept transfer of title no later than 2 years after the designation of the goods for application to that country’s reparations account, providing that such goods have been delivered to the loading point at the port within a reasonable time before the end of that period. m . Industrial facilities, machinery or equipment (other than specialized war-making equipment) declared available for reparations, but either (1) unclaimed for application against recognized reparations claims on Japanese assets from within Japan, or (2) unaccepted as prescribed by 1 l above, should not be destroyed or otherwise disposed of by SCAP pending receipt of further directives. n . The provisions of this paper shall apply to any country not a member of the FEC which may be declared eligible to receive reparations from Japan in industrial facilities, except that no country not a member of the FEC shall be a member of the RTAC. “2. The provisions of paragraph 1 c and d requiring a monetary valuation for industrial facilities shall not operate to delay delivery of goods under the provisions of Part A of this directive. As soon as recognized and approved national reparations shares have been determined and announced by directive to SCAP all of the provisions of Part B of this directive will govern and provisions of Part A of this directive will be rendered inoperative.” 62 Copy received by the Department of State from SWNCC with its memorandum of April 9, and forwarded to the Far Eastern Commission on April 11. The draft had been sent to SWNCC on April 3 by General Hilldring who referred to his memorandum of March 24 (p. 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] ), which provided that if the Far Eastern Commission had not agreed within a brief but reasonable period of time to the adoption of policy decisions on the subject, an interim directive would be sent to SCAP (894.60/4–347). Mr. Robert W. Baker, Secretary to Mr. Edwin W. Pauley, to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/4–447 [Document 316] Mr. Robert W. Baker, Secretary to Mr. Edwin W. Pauley, to the Acting Secretary of State Los Angeles , April 4, 1947. Dear Mr. Acheson : Mr. Pauley has asked me to ascertain whether you approve his making the attached statement; and, if you do approve, whether you would care to issue it through the Department of State. 63 As you know, while Mr. Pauley has resigned as the United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations, and as the President’s Personal Representative on reparations matters, he has, at the request of the President and Department of State, agreed to remain as advisor on reparations, subject to the call of the Secretary. Sincerely yours, Robert W. Baker [Enclosure] Proposed Statement by Mr. Edwin W. Pauley The following statement was made today by Edwin W. Pauley, formerly United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations and Personal Representative of the President in reparations matters: “The order of the State–War–and–Navy Coordinating Committee, authorizing General MacArthur to begin the removal of industrial equipment from Japan as reparations, 64 will be beneficial both to the countries which will receive it and to the Japanese, themselves. “The receiving countries: China, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and the British colonies of Malaya, Burma and others will benefit because they need this equipment desperately to rebuild their economies, shattered by Japanese aggression. “The Japanese will benefit because they will at last be on the way to learning definitely what plants are to be removed. Thus, a start is made toward removing the uncertainty which has hindered the Japanese in planning for their future. “The only regret is that this action has been so long delayed. I believe it appropriate to note that, in my Interim Report to the President on December 18, 1945, more than fifteen months ago, I emphasized: “‘A program of interim removals should be announced to other claimant nations immediately, and the successive actions of seizure, inventory, packing, and shipment should follow in the shortest possible time in order to make both the framework of policy and the course of action uncompromisingly clear. … The sooner the interim removal program is made clear to the Japanese, the sooner they will see that they cannot rely definitely on certain things … the better it will be for them as well as for us.’” Although Mr. Pauley has resigned as reparations Ambassador, he has, at the request of the President and the Department of State, agreed to remain as advisor on reparations, subject to the call of the Secretary. 63 Mr. Acheson replied to Mr. Pauley on April 12: “The Department has no objection to the statement which you propose; but I would suggest, however, that you issue it personally.” (740.00119 PW/4–447) 64 Sent to SCAP as serial 75, April 4, supra. The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) 740.00119 PW/4–747 [Document 317] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) Washington , April 7, 1947. My Dear Mr. Petersen : In conformity with a recent State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee decision, the United States Government is now forming a U.S. Reparations, Restitution, and Restoration Mission for Japan, which will have as its primary function the representation of United States interests in the foregoing matters. In addition, members of the official mission may act in an advisory capacity to the Supreme Commander in interpreting the various policy directives on reparations and restitution matters which have been issued from Washington. In considering the composition of the official mission the State Department believes it desirable that the War Department be represented because of its close and intimate relationship both with the formation of policy and the direction of administrative matters pertaining to these problems. I am, therefore, inviting you to consider the appointment of a War Department representative as an official member of the five-men U.S. mission. In view of the issuance of the directive on Advance Transfers of reparations goods in Japan the State Department hopes that it will be possible for the State and War Department members of the mission to leave for Tokyo in the very near future, so that they may be present at the time when the actual beginning of reparations removals is made. 65 Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring 65 In telegram 149, April 25, to Tokyo, the Department reported that the initial group of the mission, consisting of a chief, an administrative officer, and a secretary, was leaving about May 1 for Japan, while other members of an official 5–man mission, plus staff, would follow (124.945). Rufus Burr Smith was chairman of the mission. On May 8 the Department asked Seoul to recommend an American member representing USAFIK to join the mission in Tokyo (740.00119 PW/5–847). In telegram 235, June 25, 7 p.m., to Tokyo, the Department reported Commerce Department plans to send four businessmen as advisers for their firms in Japan (740.00119 PW/6–2547). Memorandum by the Army Member of State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 894.60/4–847 [Document 318] Memorandum by the Army Member of State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee 66 secret [SWNCC 236/43] [ Washington ,] 7 April 1947. Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping From Japan 1. As a result of the outcome of recent discussions between representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments and representatives of the Pauley and Strike reparations groups, 67 agreement, subject to SWNCC approval, has been reached on a U.S. position for a comprehensive Japanese reparations removals program. 2. These discussions culminating months of effort on the part of the U.S., both unilaterally between Washington and General MacArthur, and on a governmental level in the FEC, have resulted in agreed conclusions which should be set into motion as soon as practical. 3. Although an effort should be made to secure FEC agreement, indications are that agreement is improbable within a reasonable period of time and that final agreement will only come with the signing of the peace treaty. Inasmuch as the prompt handling of the Japanese reparations problem is essential in the attainment of U.S. occupational objectives and in alleviating Japanese economic and industrial inertia, thereby reducing U.S. costs, it is believed that prompt unilateral U.S. action will be necessary. 4. A second paper on the implementation of removals of industrial facilities and merchant shipping from Japan has been drafted and will be presented to SWNCC in the near future. 5. A third paper on the control of the economic war potential of Japan has also been drafted and will be presented to SWNCC in the near future. This paper will be a substitute proposal for SWNCC–302, now under consideration in the FEC (FEC–084 Series). 6. It is requested that the enclosure be approved by SWNCC as a matter of urgency. 68 66 This memorandum was circulated as SWNCC 236/43, April 7, in SWNCC and approved informally April 8; the enclosure, not printed, was forwarded on April 8 to General McCoy for consideration by the Far Eastern Commission. 67 Edwin W. Pauley and Clifford S. Strike headed reparations groups to Japan in January 1947. Mr. Strike was head of F. H. McGraw & Co., and of Overseas Consultants, Inc., both of New York. 68 See Department’s memorandum of May 13 to General McCoy, p. 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/4–947: Telegram [Document 319] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , April 9, 1947—8 p.m. 125. FEC 14. Advance Transfers of Reparations . At meeting FEC Apr 3 General McCoy in prepared statement 69 announced that US Government would issue paper on Advance Transfers of Japanese Reparations as interim directive to SCAP 70 as FEC has been unable to reach agreement on subject. As justification for issuance McCoy referred to urgent need of war-devastated countries for equipment for reconstruction, to deterioration of unused equipment in Japan, and to fact that failure to get reparations program started is impeding progress of SCAP’s occupation objectives. Step which had been anticipated by most members aroused little rancor. Representatives reiterated their countries’ position as conveyed to you in previous telegrams. UK representative presented his country’s views which had just arrived. These were in brief that UK share should apply also to Hong Kong and Borneo; that some extension should be made to cover Australian New Guinea, Papua and Nauru; that allotment of five percent is too small to cover relief needs in all British East Asiatic dependencies; and that Japanese external assets in possession of recipient countries should have been taken into account, in which case China’s share of 15 percent might have been reduced to ten percent pending consideration of information on external assets in China. USSR representative in restating case asserted that US action in issuing interim directive is premature and undesirable and will have negative effect upon international cooperation; that all possibilities in FEC had not been exhausted; and that because Soviets had not been invaded by Japanese does not mean that Soviets do not need reparations. Reparations Allocations Procedures . This paper of which SCAP has been informed will be issued with Advance Transfers as interim directive. 71 Paper was placed before FEC only about 2 weeks ago and representatives have not had time to ascertain opinions of governments. However, acting in personal capacity representatives made various amendments which were acceptable to US Government and have been incorporated in paper. Paragraph requiring reparations receiving countries to obligate themselves not to sell or barter reparations except under certain conditions encountered considerable opposition in FEC and has been deleted because (1) SCAP could not enforce this provision, and (2) this condition must be agreed to by governments concerned and cannot be imposed by unilateral action of US Government. Supply of Food for Civilian Relief in Japan . UK representative has served notice that he will reopen subject in FEC by introducing new paper designed as compromise between former FEC and US papers. Acheson 69 For text, see Department of State Bulletin April 13, 1947, p. 674. 70 Serial 75, April 4, p. 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] . 71 Serial 75, April 4, p. 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/4–1647: Telegram [Document 320] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , April 16, 1947—6 p.m. 136. FEC 15. Advance Transfers of Reparations . At FEC meeting April 10 USSR representative apparently in order to clear his record with Moscow demanded vote on various proposed amendments to Advance Transfer paper still before Commission. These amendments included (1) inclusion of all 11 countries with allocation of 5 per cent to USSR and increase of removals to 40 or 50 per cent and (2) suspension of action on Advance Transfers pending final decision on total shares of reparations. Motions failed to receive seconds. USSR representative then demanded vote on Advance Transfers paper apparently so that he could veto and then claim interim directive invalid because of defeat of paper in Commission. General McCoy ruled proposal out of order and consequently this maneuver failed. Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan . U.S. Government has introduced into FEC paper 72 of above title compiled after discussion between State War and Navy representatives and Pauley and Strike technicians. Paper designed to fix final levels above which industrial facilities and merchant shipping will be available for removal as reparations. This will also fix industrial levels to be retained in Japan. With some exceptions levels are those of interim removals decisions of FEC. No reactions yet from countries members of FEC. Acheson 72 SWNCC 236/43, April 7, p. 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] . The Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department (Noce) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 740.00119 PW/4–1847 [Document 321] The Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department ( Noce ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) secret WDSCA 387.6 Washington , 18 April 1947. Dear General Hilldring : There is attached hereto as inclosure 1 a letter from Mr. Clifford Strike to the Assistant Secretary of War 73 which offers interpretative comments regarding the statement contained in SWNCC 236/43, “Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan,” 74 which was recently submitted to the Far Eastern Commission. It is the desire of the War Department to forward the above letter to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for his information and guidance. It is believed that the contents thereof will prove most helpful in achieving a complete understanding between the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and interested U.S. government agencies regarding an acceptable interpretation of a statement on reparations removals from Japan when such statement is submitted to him formally as approved policy. The War Department’s forwarding letter should, however, clarify further some of the comments offered, and indicate a resolution of differences of opinion which are reflected in other comments. Your comments or concurrence are therefore requested on the proposed draft of a letter from the War Department to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, which forwards the above referenced letter, and which is attached hereto as inclosure 2. 75 Sincerely yours, Daniel Noce Major General, GSC [Enclosure] Draft Letter, for General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo secret My Dear General MacArthur : There is attached hereto a letter from Mr. Clifford Strike which gives the results of a conference held recently 76 in Washington between his group, representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments, and members of your staff. The purpose of this conference was to effect delineations of the terms of definition and limitation contained in the conclusions of approved SWNCC 236/43. These conclusions outlined the United States position on “Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan” and have been submitted to the Far Eastern Commission for consideration. It is the belief of the War Department that the conference has achieved a mutual accord and understanding between members of your staff and interested U.S. Government agencies regarding interpretation of the above-mentioned reparations statement, and therefore, may prove of material assistance to you in establishing appropriate criteria when the statement is transmitted formally to you. For your information, subsequent discussion with General Hilldring has further clarified certain of the comments offered in the original letter. Thus, the current United States position is: a . With regard to Sulphuric Acid, it was agreed that no contact type plants would be removed as reparations where they are serving as integral and essential functional units in any other manufacturing plants not made available for claim. If necessary, revisions will be made in the language now constituting paragraph 1 a (2) ( c ) 1 of the inclosed statement in order that the substance may clearly indicate this intent. b . With regard to the Light Metals Industry, it is highly probable that the language of paragraphs 1 a (7), and 1 a (7) ( a ), will be revised as recommended in the letter in order to provide for the intent indicated by the comments therein. c . With regards Merchant Shipping, it was agreed that no fishing or whaling vessels, per se, will be made available for claim. However, whether or not it will be necessary to revise the language of paragraph 1 a (9) ( a ) 1 has yet to be determined. d . With regard to the recommendation that a provision be included in the ultimate statement which will enable you to retain facilities for the needs of the occupation, you may be assured that such provision will be incorporated in subsequent instructions through proper channels. e . With regard to amendment of the title of the basic statement to read “final,” this matter has yet to be determined. I commend to you the members of your staff whose wholehearted cooperation and enthusiasm during their visit contributed greatly to the successful accomplishment of the conference. Both General Hilldring and myself extend our warmest regards. Sincerely yours, 73 Not printed. 74 See memorandum of April 7, by the Army member of SWNCC, p. 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] . 75 Infra; for General Hilldring’s reply of May 22, see p. 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] . 76 April 14. The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/4–2447: Telegram [Document 322] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , April 24, 1947—8 p.m. 144. FEC 16. Advance Transfers of Reparations . USSR rep at FEC meeting Apr 17 continued attacks on Advance Transfers paper, this time on procedural grounds, but received no support from other members of Commission. He also made highly emotional statement to Commission, claiming USSR Govt deeply hurt because, although USSR supported claims of France, India and Australia to share of advance transfers, no one except himself even mentioned USSR as possible recipient; also because rec’d no seconds to his proposed amendments. This new Soviet line has Commission somewhat puzzled. Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping . Some members of Economics Committee claim cannot discuss U.S. proposal until are furnished with paper explaining why U.S. has in some cases departed from principles and standards previously agreed upon (for example, proposing production in Japan of 25,000 tons of primary aluminum per annum, whereas interim removals decision permits only working of secondary aluminum). Otherwise no specific objections yet interposed. Release of Unpublished Decisions . Commission Apr 17 decided release for publication all hitherto unpublished decisions of FEC except Red Cross decision and Assured Production Capacity Levels decision. Latter being held pending notification from SCAP that plants have been designated for retention. Release of other decisions noon Apr 18. Acheson The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé (Tsarapkin) 894.30/3–1047 [Document 323] The Acting Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé ( Tsarapkin ) 77 The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and acknowledges the receipt of the Embassy’s note of March 10, 1947, accepting this Government’s proposal that the division of certain Japanese combat vessels take place without delay and that a representative of the Soviet Government be designated to participate in carrying out the arrangements for the division of these ships as proposed in the Department’s notes of February 24, 1947. Reference is made to the Embassy’s statement that the Soviet Government does not possess information concerning those warships of the Japanese fleet of a tonnage higher than that of destroyers. In accordance with the agreement of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain and China regarding the destruction of certain Japanese naval vessels, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers issued a directive to the Imperial Japanese Government on April 30, 1946, (Scapin 910), providing that all former Japanese surface combatant vessels within the Japanese Empire, readily towable, larger than destroyers, and not employed by the occupation forces or in the repatriation services, were to be destroyed by scrapping or other approved manner. A supplementary directive on this subject was issued to the Japanese Government on June 6, 1946, (Scapin 1002). The Soviet Chargé d’Affaires is informed that, in accordance with these directives, former naval vessels of the Japanese Navy falling within this category have been or are in the process of being scrapped. As stated in a letter addressed on May 5, 1946, to Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko by Major General Paul J. Mueller, Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, further detailed information on this subject may, if desired, be obtained by the Soviet Representative in Tokyo from SCAP Headquarters. Washington , April 25, 1947. 77 Draft text was informally approved by representatives of the War and Navy Departments. The Consul General at Rangoon (Packer) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/4–2947: Telegram [Document 324] The Consul General at Rangoon ( Packer ) to the Secretary of State confidential immediate Rangoon , April 29, 1947—8 a.m. 337. Shwe Baw has requested me inform Dept Governor 78 today telegraphed Secretary of State for Burma 79 that Burma desires be represented proposed Far Eastern Commission Tokyo in May on Jap reparations. He said Executive Council disappointed it had had no opportunity present its views before decision reached (Dept Wireless Bulletin April 4 80 ) alloting only 5% for UK, Burma, Malaya, et cetera, and was inclined blame HMG; it felt Burma’s share of these 3% insufficient and inequitable. British group of four members, he said, was due leave London for Tokyo April 21 but had no information whether it had actually departed from UK. I promised inform Dept. In this connection see Rangoon press clippings series No. 3, April 12 80 items g 5 and 6. Relay London as 68. 81 Packer 78 Maj. Gen. Sir Hubert E. Rance. 79 Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India and Burma. 80 Not printed. 80 Not printed. 81 This was done on April 29 at 9 a.m. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/4–3047: Telegram [Document 325] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , April 30, 1947—8 p.m. 153. FEC 17. FEC April 24 passed a policy decision entitled “Destruction or Removal of United Nations Property in Japan” 82 which lays down principles governing treatment of property of nationals of members of United Nations when such property is subject to destruction or removal under other FEC policy decisions and providing for compensation therefor. In Reparations Committee Soviet member with support of most other members is demanding that U.S. member obtain from SCAP explanation of reasons why SCAP deleted some 150 plants from list of plants designated for removal as reparations. Special reference was made to certain plants of Nakajima Aircraft Company. U.S. member explained that plants had probably been converted to peacetime uses but this explanation considered unsatisfactory in light of FEC policy decisions re interim removals of aircraft plants and re Zaibatsu plants. U.S. member therefore stated will endeavor to obtain explanation desired. Marshall 82 For text, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 107. It was embodied in a directive, serial 76, May 2, sent to SCAP and, in accordance with SWNCC memorandum SWN–5366, May 7, was sent to the Far Eastern Commission on May 13. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 740.00119 PW/4–2947: Telegram [Document 326] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Rangoon 83 confidential Washington , May 5, 1947—8 p.m. 169. Reurtel 337, Apr 29. Have no knowledge proposed FEC Tokyo in May on Japanese reparations. All policy deliberations taking place Washington. May refer missions being established in Tokyo to implement reparations decisions by making claims for particular facilities and arranging taking title and shipping. This operation necessarily under UK control unless or until steps taken for establishing independent Burmese allocation. State Dept prepared support any proposal made by UK for separate reparations allocation by Far Eastern Commission to Burma and for invitation to Burma present its claim for reparations independently to FEC in Washington in accordance with general procedures which may be adopted for presentation of claims for reparations from Japan by countries not members of FEC. For your info present discussions in FEC dealing with questions of volume of industrial equipment to be made available as reparations from Japan and percentage basis for distributing this equipment among FEC countries. Separate allocation for Burma not prejudiced by these discussions since always possible amend UK share as made necessary by segregation Burma claim from overall UK claim. Otherwise US proposes kitty of about 2 percent for non-FEC claimants. Marshall 83 Repeated to London as telegram 1964. The Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 740.00119 Control Japan/5–1247 [Document 327] The Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) secret Washington , May 12, 1947. Dear John : As you are undoubtedly aware, there are several outstanding questions on the subject of Japanese Reparations which could and should be settled in the immediate future. The answers to these questions appear to be mainly within the realm of the State Department. This letter is a request for information as to the status of the problems enumerated below: 1. On 9 April, the State Department sent to the Far Eastern Commission a paper entitled “Reparations Removals from Japan” (SWNCC 236/43). It was our agreement that this paper was to be acted upon by the Far Eastern Commission within a period of 21 days, or the United States was to take unilateral action and issue the provisions of the paper to General MacArthur as a directive. You stated, however, that your agreement to this effect was subject to General Marshall’s approval. Has General Marshall’s approval been given to carrying out such a plan? Has McCoy been so informed? If so, on what date will we be able to proceed unilaterally and issue a U.S. directive to General MacArthur in the absence of agreement by the Far Eastern Commission? 2. On 14 April, a conference was held in the Pentagon between the Strike group, representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments and of SCAP to interpret the definitions and limitations contained in SWNCC 236/43. The results of this meeting were contained in a letter which was sent to you on 18 April for your approval prior to the time it was sent to SCAP. When may we expect a reply to this letter? 3. At the SWNCC meeting on 29 April, it was agreed that SWNCC 236/44 would be withdrawn from current consideration by SWNCC, but that it would be used as a directive to General MacArthur after all provisions therein had been approved by FEC, or the U.S. had decided to take unilateral action on those provisions not approved by FEC. It was further agreed to delete the reference pertaining to percentage shares of reparations for the eleven nations comprising FEC. When will unilateral action be taken by the U.S. Government in the absence of FEC agreement? Will such action be simultaneous with action taken on SWNCC 236/43? Could you also give me an estimate as to when all provisions contained in SWNCC 236/44 will be finally submitted to the Far Eastern Commission? 4. On Thursday, May 1, the Committee of Three agreed that SWNCC 302/6 would not be submitted to the Far Eastern Commission at this time, but they did not consider or approve the substance of the paper in its entirety. It is believed by the War Department that this paper should be considered by SWNCC and that formal approval of the paper by SWNCC is desirable. In light of the current consideration of the control of economic war potential in Japan by the Far Eastern Commission, it is requested that the War Department be informed as to how the State Department proposes to use the provisions contained in SWNCC 302/6, i.e., whether they will be issued to SCAP as a unilateral directive, whether they will later be submitted to FEC after its action on FEC 084/9, or whether they will be retained for ultimate introduction into, and consideration by, a Japanese Peace Conference. 5. There are indications in the Far Eastern Commission that certain nations are willing to raise the levels established by the U.S. Government in SWNCC 236/43 for the retention in Japan of certain levels of industry. The War Department position has consistently been that the levels established for the ultimate retention of industrial capacities in Japan are minimum levels and therefore the War Department has no objection to any action taken by the Far Eastern Commission which would raise the levels of industries which are allowed to remain in Japan under the terms of SWNCC 236/43. Accordingly, it is recommended that the U.S. member of the Far Eastern Commission be advised that the United States Government has no objection to the raising of any levels of industrial capacity for Japan above those which are contained in SWNCC 236/43. Due to the lack of progress on this subject during the past year and the pressing need in Japan for a final reparations program, both of which are well known to you, it is earnestly hoped that early action will be taken on the above points and that the U.S. Government will be able to furnish General MacArthur with instructions which will permit him to carry out the reparations program for Japan at an early date. 84 Sincerely yours, Howard C. Petersen 84 For reply by General Hilldring, see his letter of May 29, p. 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 894.30/5–1347 [Document 328] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State confidential [ Washington ,] May 13, 1947. Participants: Mr. Makin, the Australian Ambassador Mr. Stirling, the Australian Minister The Secretary Mr. Vincent, FE 85 Ambassador Makin called at his request. He stated that he was calling under instructions from his Government to bring to my attention the feeling of his Government with regard to partition of the Japanese fleet. He referred to recent information received from the Dominions Office in London to the effect that steps were now being taken by General MacArthur to divide the Japanese fleet among the Chinese, Russians, British and Americans. He dwelt upon the part played in the Pacific war by Australia and asserted that Australia had a right to be counted in on the division of the Japanese fleet. He said that his Government felt that any division of the Japanese fleet should be deferred for consideration at a conference on a Japanese peace treaty. In connection with the treaty he commented with evident satisfaction on an article in this morning’s Washington Post which contained speculation that the United States Government would be opposed to a five-power conference on a Japanese treaty and would favor an eleven-power conference composed of the nations now represented in the Far Eastern Commission. I told the Ambassador that as to the subject of the partition of the Japanese fleet, I would look into the matter. Mr. Vincent reminded the Ambassador that agreement among the four powers regarding the Japanese fleet had been reached in the autumn of 1945; that submarines and all naval vessels above the size of destroyers were to be scrapped; and that destroyers and surface vessels of lesser tonnage would be divided equally among the four powers mentioned. He said that he had assumed that the Australian Government had been informed of this agreement, presumably by the Government of the United Kingdom. The Ambassador said that his Government had been informed but that it had not realized until it received the information from the Dominions Office that steps were now being taken to turn over the vessels. He repeated his previously expressed views, and the Secretary again assured him that he would look into the matter. There followed an unrelated casual conversation with regard to methods of assuring security over the telephone; development in the United States during the war of the atomic bomb; the serious decisions that confronted us at times during the war in Europe; and the problem of eliminating the Japanese from the war without having to drive them out of every bit of territory in the Far East and Pacific which they occupied. The call began at 11: 30 and ended at 12 noon, May 13, 1947. 85 John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. Memorandum by the Department of State to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 740.00119 Control Japan/5–1247 [Document 329] Memorandum by the Department of State to the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) [ Washington , May 13, 1947.] In accordance with paragraph 86 of the Memorandum of April 8, 1947, forwarding to the U.S. Member of the Far Eastern Commission SWNCC 236/43, 87 the negotiating instructions referred to in that paragraph are hereby transmitted. The United States Member is requested to expedite the negotiation of this United States policy in the Far Eastern Commission as a matter of the utmost urgency. In view of the length of time which the Commission has already devoted to the Level of Industry and the detailed discussions thereon which have taken place, it is hoped that every effort will now be made to complete this matter by obtaining a policy decision on this paper within three weeks. Three amendments to this paper have now been agreed to in SWNCC. You are requested to introduce these in the FEC as U.S. amendments to FEC 218. They are as follows: 1. Substitute for para. 1 g of the enclosure to FEC 218 the following: “ Aluminum and Magnesium (Definition: “Plants and establishments primarily engaged in the production of alumina, primary or secondary aluminum and magnesium and in the rolling, extruding, drawing, forging and casting of aluminum and magnesium and their alloys.”) (1) All facilities for the production of magnesium should be made available for claim. (2) All facilities in excess of 25,000 metric tons per year aluminum reducing capacity should be made available for claim. (3) All facilities primarily engaged in the rolling, extruding, drawing, forging, and casting of aluminum and magnesium and their alloys should be made available for claim.” 2. a ) At the end of the first sentence of para. b .(1) add the following words: “including the Ryukyus”; b ) After the first sentence insert the following: “During the period of the occupation SCAP may also retain additional fertilizer capacity necessary to meet essential fertilizer imports for Southern Korea.” 3. As a new paragraph 3. to the Enclosure of FEC 218, add the following: “In addition to the facilities to remain in Japan, as provided in this paper, SCAP may retain temporarily any items deemed essential to the needs of the occupation.” In order to secure prompt agreement by the Commission, the U.S. Member is authorized to accept such limited and minor changes as would not materially affect the over-all level of retention as provided in the Conclusions of SWNCC 236/43. Only two additional matters require immediate FEC action in connection with SWNCC 236/43 (FEC 218). These are the Selections paper, SC–041/7, and the Industrial Disarmament paper, FEC 084/11. Instructions on this latter document have been recently transmitted to you. In order to clarify the procedures whereby Japanese facilities will be selected for reparations it is necessary that FEC approval be obtained to SC–041/7, “The Selection of Plants for Reparations Removals, Destruction or Retention in Japan”. Existing instructions to you on this paper appear adequate for purposes of final negotiation. 86 Number of paragraph not inserted in file copy. 87 Ante , p. 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] . Memorandum by Mr. John K. Emmerson , Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton), to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) 740.00119 PW/5–1547 [Document 330] Memorandum by Mr. John K. Emmerson , 88 Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ), to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) confidential [ Washington ,] May 15, 1947. The knottiest problem now facing the Far Eastern Commission is the determination of national percentage shares of reparations to be obtained from Japan. After months of discussion it was finally decided that on Monday, May 12, each member of the Reparations Committee would present the percentage which his country claimed from the total reparations approved. Accordingly, at the meeting on Monday each member of the Committee made a statement explaining his country’s contribution to the war against Japan and supporting his claim for a share of reparations. The Australian representative stated that in view of his Government’s statements made at the previous Commission meeting that the determination of percentage shares of reparations lay outside the competence of the Far Eastern Commission, he was not in a position to present a percentage for Australia. The percentages presented were as follows: Australia * Canada 1½ China 40 France 12 India 18 Netherlands 15 New Zealand 2 Philippines 15 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 14 United Kingdom 25 United States   34 176½ While the total of 176½% means that the problem is still far from solution, the percentages actually were more modest than most members had expected. On May 12, following the regular meeting of the American Delegation of the FEC, General McCoy, Dr. Blakeslee, Mr. Martin, Mr. Dickover, Mr. Barnett 89 and I discussed the next step to be taken towards solving the percentage problem. It was agreed that there was little prospect of more than a majority of the Far Eastern Commission countries presenting schedules of the 11 national percentages. Various alternatives were discussed, including the proposal made by Sir George Sansom 90 approximately a year ago that General McCoy should present a list of percentages in his capacity of Chairman of the Commission. Mr. Barnett suggested that as this procedure presented certain disadvantages, another method would be for him, Mr. Barnett, to present a list of 11 percentages to the Reparations Committee purely in his personal capacity. These percentages would not be the official United States list but would be near enough to make the list a responsible one. Dr. Blakeslee said that we should avoid any action which might be construed to be the “spearhead” of an attack on the USSR. It is clear, however, that Mr. Barnett’s list was not aimed particularly at the USSR since percentages of several other countries were just as drastically reduced. General McCoy finally agreed to Mr. Barnett’s proposal. At the meeting on Wednesday, May 14, considerable discussion was held as to ways and means of reducing the lists of percentages to 100%. After numerous suggestions had been presented and rejected, including one by Mr. Graves 91 that General McCoy present a “Chairman list”, Mr. Collins, the Canadian representative, suggested that the U.S. representative might contribute much to the progress of discussions if he presented a list purely in his personal capacity. This suggestion was greeted with enthusiasm by most of the members. Only the Soviet representative objected to it. A vote was taken and 10 members voted to invite Mr. Barnett to present his list with the Soviet member voting against the motion. Before presenting his list, Mr. Barnett emphasized that his schedule differed from the U.S. position and that he was presenting it solely with a view to expediting Committee action. He did say, however, that he had taken into consideration extensive statistical work which had been done within the U.S. Government as well as the political factors, as he had come to know them during 15 months of conversations. The list of percentages presented by Mr. Barnett follows: Australia 9 Canada 2 China 25 92 France 2 India 5 Netherlands 5 New Zealand 2 Philippines 9 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 3 United Kingdom 9 United States  29 100 There was no discussion of Mr. Barnett’s list and the Committee decided to postpone consideration of percentages until its meeting on Wednesday, May 21st. It was apparent that there was general approval of the action of the U.S. member in presenting a list which added up to 100% and in thus deflating a number of percentages which were out of all reason. 88 Mr. Emmerson had been appointed First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union on May 1. He was a member of the U. S. delegation to the Far Eastern Commission. * Australia submitted a percentage of 28% at the meeting on May 14th. [Footnote in the original.] 89 Erie R. Dickover and Robert W. Barnett were also members of the U.S. delegation to the Far Eastern Commission. 90 British Minister and representative on the Far Eastern Commission until his retirement May 22. 91 Hubert A. Graves was British alternate representative on the Far Eastern Commission. 92 On May 22 the Chinese Minister stated that this figure was not acceptable to China (740.00119 PW/5–2247). The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel) 894.30/5–547 [Document 331] The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador ( Inverchapel ) confidential The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer to his note of March 6, 1947, 93 with regard to the disposition of certain combatant vessels of the Japanese Navy. In reply to the question regarding the disposition of Japanese naval tugs, harbor craft and salvage vessels, it may be stated that these vessels are not regarded as combatant vessels and have therefore not been included in the list of combatant vessels of destroyer tonnage or less, to be divided among the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and the United States. It is the intention of the United States Government that Japanese ex-naval tugs, harbor craft and salvage vessels be used in the economic rehabilitation of Japan in fulfillment of the objectives of the occupation. Since the vast majority of these vessels are of less than 100 gross tons, it is the position of the United States Government that they are not subject to classification as merchant vessels and hence are not available for reparations. With regard to the request for certain technical information concerning transports, minesweepers, and auxiliary subchasers, it is understood that complete information of this nature is already in the hands of the British Admiralty. Should additional data be required, it is suggested that inquiry be made of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Tokyo by the appropriate representatives of the British Government accredited in Japan. This communication is transmitted to the Ambassador for his confidential information. Washington , May 15, 1947. 93 Not printed. In a later note, G77/–/47, April 22, the British Ambassador replied to a note from the Department of February 24 (not printed), by stating objection to restriction to one port for delivery of combatant vessels allocated to Great Britain, and asked to reserve Hong Kong in addition (894.30/4–2247). The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Department of Defense files [Document 332] The Joint Chiefs of Staff to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 94 restricted War 98167 [ Washington ,] 15 May 1947. The following directive, serial number 79, prepared by the State Department to implement the policy adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on May 8, 1947 95 under the provisions of paragraph II, A, 1, of its terms of reference has been received from the State, War and Navy Departments for transmission to you for your guidance in accordance with paragraph III, 1 of those terms of reference: “ Directive Regarding Division of Reparation Shares [Here follows text of the Far Eastern Commission’s decision of May 8.] The Commission advises that in approving the policy decision, the Australian representative on the Far Eastern Commission abstained from voting on this policy because in the opinion of the Australian Government the question of division of reparation shares should be dealt with in the Peace Conference. The Commission has agreed to release the foregoing directive to the press after its receipt in Tokyo, therefore acknowledgment of receipt is requested.” 94 Copy transmitted by the Department of State to the Far Eastern Commission on June 2. 95 For text of FEC decision, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 80. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/5–1647: Telegram [Document 333] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , May 16, 1947—8 p.m. 175. FEC 18. Reparations . At meeting FEC May 5 Australian Ambassador 96 read statement giving his government’s opinion that FEC has no jurisdiction over division and allocation of reparations although does have authority to determine total amount of reparations to be exacted from Japan. Australia therefore proposes establishment of impartial three-person tribunal to investigate facts and formulate recommendations to peace conference which alone would have authority to determine reparations shares. Australian statement threw Commission into confusion but after numerous bilateral conversations during next 3 days all members except Australian decided to proceed with work on division of reparations despite Australian position. Consequently on May 8 Commission passed policy decision on “Division of Reparations Shares” which is in fact reparations section of FEC paper on Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan not yet approved in toto. Policy decision adopted by 10 votes with Australia abstaining. This decision establishes principle that reparations shares shall be determined on “broad political basis” and defines meaning of that phrase, and for first time lays down principle that defraying of occupation costs and maintenance of minimum standard of living for Japanese shall not be prejudiced by reparations removals. Passage of policy decision will also serve to reassert jurisdiction of FEC over all phases of reparations problems. Verbatim text of decision follows. [Here follows text of policy decision of May 8.] Sources of Japanese Imports and Destination of Japanese Exports . These two papers which establish principles under which sources of imports and destinations of exports should be determined have been held up for months because UK desired that “pre-war pattern of trade” be a primary factor in determining sources and destinations while USSR desired that pre-war pattern play very minor role. Compromise reached May 8 and both papers approved unanimously. 97 Marshall 96 Norman J. O. Makin. 97 See Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , pp. 87 and 88. Memorandum by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs (Snow) to Mr. Rufus Burr Smith of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs 740.00119 PW/5–2247 [Document 334] Memorandum by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs ( Snow ) to Mr. Rufus Burr Smith of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs 98 [ Washington ,] May 22, 1947. 1. A legal opinion is requested on the problem of the transfer from Japan of assets available as reparations, the reparations properties to be transferred to the United States Military Government in Korea on behalf of the Korean people. 2. It has been stated by the State, War and Navy Departments in SWNCC 310/1, 12 July 1946, 99 that Japanese external assets in Korea are to be retained in Korea and “held in trust for the benefit of the Korean people” (par. 2 b ). The United States reported to FEC, in FEC 061/3, 23 Oct. 1946, a Soviet comment on an American proposal, to the effect that Japanese assets in Korea should be retained in Korea and excluded from the reparations fund [par. 4(3)], 1 and a statement by the United States that it welcomed the Soviet endorsement of the American proposal that Japanese assets in Korea should be retained “for the benefit of the Korean people” [par. 5(3)]. The United States proposed to FEC, in FEC 211/3, 2 April, 1947, that in so far as fulfillment of claims for industrial equipment is in excess of the ability or desire of the claimant country to utilize it, the country should have the right to allocate or otherwise dispose of its claim, to Korea, on a political basis (par. 1 K ). 3. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, in virtue of the military occupation, is in possession of the Japanese assets in Japan determined to be available for reparations. SCAP can allocate part of the United States share of such assets to the United State Military Government in Southern Korea, “for the benefit of the Korean people”, and cause the assets so allocated to be transferred to Korea, into the possession of the United States Military Government in Southern Korea. Property so transferred can then be held by the United States Military Government in Southern Korea “in trust for the Korean people”, precisely on the same terms as Military Government is now holding Japanese external assets in Korea, as appears from paragraph 2 above. 4. Such allocation and transfer of Japanese reparations property to the United States Military Government in Korea need not involve any transfer of title to property while both Korea and Japan remain under Allied, control; transfer of title could be postponed until a Korean government is in being and capable of holding property, or until the Japanese peace settlement. On the other hand, it may be desired to transfer title at an earlier date from the Japanese owners of property. Such transfers could be effected through the Japanese Government on instructions of SCAP. Title to property so transferred would be vested in the United States. Later, the property would be transferred to the Government of Korea for disposition in the interest of the Korean people. It is not believed that Article IV, Section 3, of the United States Constitution would govern the disposition of Japanese reparation property transferred to USAMGIK, so that only Congress could authorize a subsequent transfer from Military Government to the national Korean administration. While title to the reparations property allocated to Korea would be in the United States, the United States would not be the beneficial owner, but rather a trustee holding legal title only. When the transfer is made from the Japanese owners it would at that time be clearly understood that the United States was taking title “for the benefit of the Korean people”. Because of the trust thus declared, the property would not be such as to fall within the Constitutional provision for exclusive Congressional disposition of Federal Government property. Judicial precedents bearing on this problem are unavailable, since the settlement after World War II presents the first occasion on which the United States has sought reparations from defeated enemy states. No sufficiently close analogies in which there are judicial decisions have been found. But a number of precedents in practice exist in Europe and the Far East, in the aftermath of the war. In Germany, for example, the United States, together with the other occupying powers, vested in themselves the title to German external assets. Law No. 5 of the Allied Control Council, Germany, October 31, 1945. In the absence of any Congressional authorising action, the United States has taken steps together with other of the Allied Powers disposing of title to certain German assets in some of the neutral countries. Similarly, the United States Military Government in Korea vested in the Government title to all Japanese assets in Korea. Pursuant to directives approved by SWNCC (i.e., SWNCC 265/1, September 27, 1946) USAMGIK has been authorized, in the absence of Congressional action, to sell certain of these assets in Korea. In both of these cases the vesting took place for the purpose of exerting plenary control over the enemy assets in question. While the United States Government took legal title to property, it did not purport to acquire the property in beneficial ownership. Rather, it took title as a trustee or custodian, implying that final disposition of the enemy property involved would be determined by the peace settlements, or by other inter-Allied agreement. Similarly, if Japanese reparations property were now transferred to the United States, the Government would hold the property virtually in trust, to inure to the benefit of whatever authority or persons should be decided on subsequently in international agreement. The transfer from the Government could at that time be effected under the authority of the President without Congressional authorization. 5. The legal opinion expressed above does not take into account considerations of policy which might make it advisable and desirable for the Executive branch of the Government to secure Congressional approval for, or at least keep Congress informed of, plans to allocate some of the United States share of Japanese reparations to Korea. Such allocations would of course be closely bound up with the program of American relief and rehabilitation of the Korean economy. 98 Mr. Smith was head of the reparations mission to Japan. 99 See annex to SWN–4541, July 12, 1946, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 546 . 1 Brackets in this paragraph indicated in the original. The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Noce) 740.00119 PW/4–1847 [Document 335] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department ( Noce ) secret Washington , May 22, 1947. Dear General Noce : I concur for the Department of State in the draft letter to General MacArthur sent to me with your letter of April 18, 1947, with three qualifications. 1. With respect to sulfuric acid there is no change in the views of the Department as indicated in the Strike memorandum. 2 The 3,500,000 figure was reached as representing an adequate capacity, and no information is available to the Department to indicate that the removal of integrated contact plants in order to bring capacity down to this figure would so vitally affect the Japanese economy as to call for a change in the New York agreement and the SWNCC decision. The following is suggested for inclusion in the letter to General MacArthur on this point: “You will note that the memorandum does not reflect full agreement with respect to sulfuric acid, and we cannot therefore assure you that no integrated contact plants will be subject to removal. If in your judgment the proposed provision allowing you to retain facilities for the needs of the occupation is inadequate to prevent serious damage to the Japanese economy at the agreed level, on this account, you may wish to furnish detailed information on the basis of which the question can be reopened.” 2. With respect to the light metals industry, there is, I think, complete agreement about aluminum and magnesium capacity. I cannot, however, accept the parenthetical comment under 1 a (7) ( a ) that at no future time will any of the nonferrous metal rolling capacity be made available for claim, except in accordance with paragraph 1 b, and I doubt if that is a legitimate interpretation of paragraph 1 b . It is true, of course, that the inclusion of copper or other non-ferrous metals would require amendment of SWNCC 236/43, but there is a decided interest in the matter in the FEC, and the Department of State may have to recommend amendment on this score. It is fully agreed that rolling capacity in the non-ferrous industries should be used to process aluminum produced in Japan. If an amendment to SWNCC 236/43 is offered to make rolling capacity of copper or other non-ferrous metals available for claim, the Department of State agrees that insofar as possible such capacity as is needed to roll aluminum must be retained. The following is suggested for inclusion in the letter to General MacArthur on this point: “With regard to the light metals industry, the intent is that capacity to roll aluminum produced in Japan shall be retained in the other nonferrous industries. The statement in the parenthetical comment under 1 a (7) ( a ) is too broad, however. It is possible that it will be necessary, as a result of the interest of the FEC countries, to make available some metal rolling capacity in the copper and other non-ferrous industries. That would require amendment of SWNCC 236/43; if that is done, capacity to process aluminum will be safeguarded.” 3. With respect to fishing and whaling vessels, the Department is sympathetic to the retention for this purpose of some shipping over the limitation of 3000 light displacement tons or with a speed of over 15 knots. The agreed amendment to SWNCC 236/43 to permit SCAP to retain whatever industrial facilities or ships are deemed necessary to meet the needs of the occupation would clearly protect SCAP in retaining essential whaling vessels. To propose a specific exemption for whaling vessels would be obnoxious to the FEC countries who have strong sentiments on this subject; would add no real protection to SCAP beyond that already provided in the general retention exemption; and would in fact materially weaken the U.S. case for FEC approval of the general retention exemption. Moreover, the character of and areas in which Japanese fishing and whaling operations are to be permitted is a matter for eventual settlement in the peace treaty. A specific exemption for Japanese whaling vessels at this time would be regarded by the FEC as an attempt by the U.S. Government to prejudge this aspect of the peace treaty. For these reasons, the Department is unable to agree with the proposed specific exemption for whalers and suggests the following for inclusion in the letter to SCAP on this point: “With regard to merchant shipping, the comment under 1 a (9) ( a ) 1, that no fishing or whaling vessels will be made available for claim, is too sweeping. The sentiment of the FEC countries on this subject is so strong that it is considered preferable not to discuss it there or to amend the SWNCC paper. You will be able in any event to retain vessels for the needs of the occupation. The United States will press for recognition in the Peace Treaty of Japan’s whaling and fishing interests and the right to retain vessels for that purpose.” Yours sincerely, J. H. Hilldring 2 Not printed; for a description of the memorandum by Mr. Strike, see General Noce’s letter of April 18, p. 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] . The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/5–2347: Telegram [Document 336] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , May 23, 1947—7 p.m. 188. FEC 19. Reparations . Pursuant to Soviet proposal adopted by Reparations Committee April 14, 1947, on May 12 each nation represented on FEC (except Australia) laid before Reparations Committee percentage share of reparations, determined on broad political lines, which it desires to receive from industrial assets within Japan declared available for reparations. On May 14 Australian member of Committee stated that Australia, while adhering to opinion that division of reparations should be determined at peace conference, did not wish to obstruct work of Commission and consequently tabled share desired by Australia. 3 As expected eleven shares total over 200 percent. It would be inequitable to reduce each requested share proportionately to make total 100 percent as some nations put in shares which they honestly hoped to receive while others put in inflated shares in expectation of reduction. Consequently it is not believed that this approach to problem will be fruitful. Meantime U.S. member of Committee has been working consistently to induce as many members as are able and willing to do so to table schedules setting forth ideas of their governments or delegations as to percentages which each FEC country should receive. It was hoped that such schedules could be merged into composite table which would form basis for discussion. His attempts being unsuccessful American member was authorized to lay before Committee schedule for 11 countries embodying his own personal views, if urgently invited to do so and if commitment given to discuss matter seriously. U.S. Government assumes no responsibility for schedule which in fact follows broad outline of U.S. policy re division of reparations but differs in detail. Schedule laid before Committee May 14 for discussion following week. Marshall 3 On May 28 the Australian Minister (Stirling) was informed that, whereas the Department was sympathetic toward the principle that Australia deserved equal consideration in matters pertaining to war settlements in the Pacific, it could not accede to the Australian Ambassador’s request that division of the Japanese Fleet be postponed and considered at a conference on a Japanese peace treaty (740.00116 PW/5–2947). The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/5–2747 [Document 337] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 1067 Tokyo , May 27, 1947. The United States Political Adviser has the honor to enclose copy of General Order No. 9, May 21, 1947, issued by this Headquarters, creating a “Reparations Technical Advisory Committee”. 4 The body was established as a consultative committee to assist the Supreme Commander in an advisory capacity in developing technical and administrative procedures for the orderly removal of reparations goods from Japan and in the settlement of conflicts between claimant countries arising over claims for particular facilities. The order was issued pursuant to instructions contained in interim directive No. 75 received in this Headquaters from the State, War and Navy Departments, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 in War Department telegram No. War 95604, dated April 6 [ 4 ], 1947. Chairman of the newly created committee is Brigadier General W. K. Harrison, Jr., concurrently Chief of the Reparations Section of this Headquarters. In his absence or at his discretion, Mr. Norman J. Meiklejohn, Deputy Chief of Section, will serve as Committee Chairman. 4 Not printed. 5 April 4, p. 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] . The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) 740.00119 (Control Japan)/5–1247 [Document 338] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) secret Washington , May 29, 1947. Dear Pete : I have delayed replying to your letter of May 12 inquiring about the status of five steps to be taken in connection with the settlement of the Japanese reparations problem because several of the matters were in a state of considerable uncertainty. As of today the situation is as follows: 1. The State Department cannot fix a time limit on FEC action on “Reparations Removals from Japan” (SWNCC 236/43) until all U.S. amendments have been put into General McCoy’s hands. As you know, the War Department has proposed certain amendments which were discussed at the SWNCC meeting of May 20. When a decision has been reached on these proposals an instruction will be given to General McCoy to seek action on the original paper, as amended by the instruction, within twenty-one days. At the conclusion of that period the question of issuance of an interim directive will be decided by the Secretary of State in the light of the situation at that time. 2. A reply to General Noce’s letter of April 18 on certain interpretations and amendments of SWNCC 236/43 was discussed at the SWNCC meeting on May 20, and sent him on May 22. 3. The State Department proposes to take action on a directive supplanting SWNCC 236/44 when action is taken on SWNCC 236/43, either by the FEC or by the issuance of an interim directive. All the provisions of SWNCC 236/44 will be before the FEC when General McCoy has received his final instructions for processing and amending SWNCC 236/43. 4. The State Department proposes to consider the provisions of SWNCC 302/6 in connection with the drafting of the disarmament provisions of the Japanese peace treaty. 5. The recommendation contained in your paragraph 5 is noted and appreciated. The State Department has informally agreed that the U.S. Delegation on the FEC should for the present concentrate on securing agreement on the provisions of SWNCC 236/43, but be prepared at an early date to present as a unit proposals for amendment which, in the light of the discussion, will facilitate FEC approval of the document without affecting the ability of the Japanese to maintain, from the standpoint of industrial capacity, the prescribed level of living. These recommendations must, of course, include changes that may be required to maintain not only an adequate capacity level but one which is in balance as between related industries. A single level cannot be changed without giving consideration to the effects in terms of both requirements and supply factors on many others. There can be no disagreement between us as to the urgency of an early settlement of the Japanese reparations question, and a settlement which, by being really final and not open to challenge, can form a sound basis for planning the future economic development of Japan. Sincerely, J. H. Hilldring The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/6–247: Telegram [Document 339] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , June 2, 1947—7 p.m. 195. FEC 20. 1. Selection of Plants for Reparations Removals, Destruction or Retention in Japan . FEC May 22 unanimously approved policy decision of above title. Text follows: [Here follows text printed in Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , page 77. A directive, serial 80, June 3, was sent to General MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; a copy was sent by the Department on June 12 to the Far Eastern Commission.] Only criticism of policy in Commission came from several members who objected to inclusion of paragraph 1 d (3) on ground that Commission probably had no jurisdiction over property of neutrals in Japan. However as matter is largely if not entirely academic objectors decided not to vote against policy. 2. Sir George Sansom left FEC May 22 having retired from British Foreign Service. Marshall Memorandum by Mr. John K. Emmerson, Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) 894.30/6–1147 [Document 340] Memorandum by Mr. John K. Emmerson, Special Assistant to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) [ Washington ,] June 11, 1947. With the receipt from the Chinese Embassy of their note 6 delivered June 9 designating representatives to participate in the drawing of lots in Tokyo and specifying Shanghai as the port of delivery, it is presumed that SCAP will proceed with the division of the ships. The Chinese note was telegraphed to Tokyo on June 9 (Deptel 206, June 9). 7 SWNCC 186/27 is awaiting approval of SFE. State and Navy have both approved this paper with the revisions attached to the documents herewith. War Department has wired SCAP for further information regarding a provision contained in a SCAP telegram and incorporated into the revisions of SWNCC 186/27 that ships of low speed hull form which can be profitably employed in the Japanese fishing and coastal trade be declared surplus to OFLC. War Department is expected to approve the paper upon receipt of clarification of this point from SCAP. It is noted that our suggested new paragraph 16 c specifies the action which the State Department is to take with regard to the transfer of certain of these vessels to the French and Chinese Governments. I am informed that an opinion from the Attorney General 8 is expected shortly. Mr. Paul A. Wolkin in Le is informed regarding the action awaited by the Attorney General and should be consulted if you wish to make inquiry concerning this phase of the problem. Mr. Wallner of WE and Mr. Ringwalt of CA are informed regarding the French and Chinese aspects of the problem. Representatives of the War and Navy Departments who have been actively working on this paper are Major Miller, CAD, War Department Extension 5013, and for the Navy, Colonel Metz, Navy Department Extension 61293. 6 June 5, not printed. 7 Not printed. On June 19 a note from the Chinese Ambassador indicated his Government’s acceptance of the U.S. proposal (894.30/6–1947). 8 Tom C. Clark. The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission (McCoy) 894.30/4–2447 [Document 341] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission ( McCoy ) Washington , June 12, 1947. My Dear General McCoy : Reference is made to your letter of April 24, 1947, 9 enclosing an extract from the verbatim minutes of the meeting on that day of the Far Eastern Commission which related to a query made by the French Representative, Ambassador Naggiar, with regard to the division of Japanese combatant vessels among the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the U.S.S.R. 10 Ambassador Naggiar pointed out that the problem of the disarmament of Japan had been under consideration by the Far Eastern Commission, particularly by Committee No. 7, and requested information on this matter, particularly as to the basis on which the division of the vessels was to be made. Should Ambassador Naggiar again raise this question in the Commission, you may wish to reply that the division of Japanese combatant vessels of destroyer tonnage or less was the subject of agreement among the four Powers mentioned above shortly after the surrender of Japan. You will recall that the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, China, and the U.S.S.R., declared at Moscow on October 30, 1943, “that those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of the enemy”. Consequently, in accordance with this agreement, the disposition of the Japanese fleet was decided upon by the four Powers. All submarines and large surface vessels, above destroyer size, were to be destroyed and all destroyers and surface combatant vessels of lesser tonnage were to be divided equally among the four Powers. The four Governments concerned have appointed their representatives in Japan and it is expected that the division will proceed shortly. For your confidential information, the United States Government has for some time been in correspondence with the French Government with regard to handing over to the French a portion of the United States share of these ships and is prepared to consider favorably a French request for certain of these vessels. In view of these considerations, it is not believed that the division of Japanese combatant vessels is a subject for useful discussion by the Far Eastern Commission. It would therefore appear to be unnecessary for the United States Representative to raise this question in the Commission, and it is suggested that the information contained in this letter be used in your discretion only if the French Representative chooses again to introduce this subject at a meeting of the Far Eastern Commission. Sincerely yours, Ernest A. Gross for J. H. Hilldring 9 Not printed. 10 For Acting Secretary of State Aeheson’s announcement on April 11, see Department of State Bulletin , April 20, 1947, p. 717. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 740.00119 PW/6–3047 [Document 342] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] June 30, 1947. Participants: Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador The Secretary of State Mr. Matthews 11 Lord Inverchapel called on me this morning at his request to say goodbye. He is returning to England for a two-months’ vacation which he hoped would give him the opportunity to catch up on conditions and thought in England. [The first part of this conversation dealt with the Marshall Plan. For documentation on the Marshall Plan, see volume III .] Japanese Whaling I said that I had wished to speak to him last week on the subject of whales but I had since learned that Mr. Clayton 12 had taken up the matter in London and hence would not bother him. I did want him to know, however, how I felt about the question. I presumed that his Government was largely just backing up Australia, but we did feel that at a time when we were being asked to put up considerable sums of money for aid to Europe to be asked to add to our costs of occupation in Japan was not sound. The question of Japanese whaling might not be so important in itself but I wanted him to know that we did feel strongly about the principle involved and that serious efforts should be made to assist the economic reconstruction of Japan. The Ambassador said he was glad to hear that Mr. Clayton had already taken up this question and that he consequently would not do so on his arrival home. Japanese Reparations He said he also had a different type of “wail” to talk about, namely, the question of Japanese reparations. He handed over the attached memorandum. 13 His only comment was that his Government felt that the Chinese had done pretty well in the way of reparations through the holding of Japanese external assets and that his Government should receive a relatively higher share of Japanese reparations. Specifically, he said his Government had felt entitled to some 20% and had been awarded 8%. I remarked that judging by the experience of the Soviets with German reparations in the form of industrial plants, I thought their value was somewhat illusory. I wished the Ambassador a pleasant vacation. He said he expected to return about the first of September. 11 H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs. 12 William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. 13 Infra. The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.00119 PW/6–3047 [Document 343] The British Embassy to the Department of State 14 Japanese Reparations In the course of discussions in the Reparations Committee of the Far Eastern Commission of the shares of reparations from Japan in the form of industrial equipment, the United States member of the Committee has put forward two lists of percentages. The first of these, which was presented on 12th May, 1947, represented the personal views of the United States member and proposed that the United Kingdom should receive 9%. The second, which was presented on 29th May, represented the official views of the United States Government and proposed an even smaller percentage for the United Kingdom, viz. 8%. 15 His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom are very much disappointed at the ungenerous treatment which the United States representative has proposed for the United Kingdom. On general grounds of policy His Majesty’s Government agreed in July, 1945, that the United States should have priority with the United Kingdom in the allocation of German reparations, although there was an excellent case for a higher percentage for the United Kingdom. His Majesty’s Government feel therefore that there are strong grounds for asking for reciprocal treatment in the allocation of reparations from Japan. Nevertheless, in recognition of the preponderant part which the United States played in the Pacific war, His Majesty’s Government will support a higher percentage for the United States than for the United Kingdom. His Majesty’s Government feel that in return they are entitled to ask for just treatment for the United Kingdom and a proper consideration of the grounds for the United Kingdom claim. The United Kingdom has a major claim on any of the three main grounds on which claims to internal assets in Japan can be based, viz. ( a ) extent of devastation, ( b ) war effort, and ( c ) paucity of holding of Japanese external assets. With regard to the first of these, the extent of the devastation of British territories in the Far East appears to have been insufficiently recognised. Burma, for example, twice suffered serious devastation in the war against Japan, first from a scorched earth policy and then from bombing and a military campaign which traversed the whole country. Similar considerations apply to Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo, where an immense task of reconstruction and rehabilitation has been left for His Majesty’s Government to deal with. With regard to war effort, His Majesty’s Government wish to mention that British forces fought a major land campaign, with the result that the whole Japanese military and administrative machine in Southeast Asia was destroyed. On the sea, His Majesty’s Navies drove the Japanese naval forces from the Indian Ocean and neighbouring waters, contained capital forces in the South-east Asia zone, took part in the naval advance to the shores of Japan and mounted a full scale operation for the recapture of Singapore. It is difficult to believe that, in proposing the figure of 8% for the United Kingdom, the United States Government have given full weight to all the relevant factors. For instance, the United States Government propose to give China more than three and a half times the share of the United Kingdom, which cannot be consistent with any just appraisal of relative deserts in relation to war effort and holding of Japanese external assets. Nor does it appear that the United States Government have properly appreciated that the share of the United Kingdom is intended to cover Burma and the Colonies as well. It would be difficult to maintain that, taking Burma as a single unit, she should be less generously treated than the Philippines, to which the United States Government propose to give as great a share as to the United Kingdom, Burma and the Colonies taken together. His Majesty’s Government wish also to comment on the proposal submitted to the Far Eastern Commission by the United States Government that “in so far as fulfilment of the claim for industrial equipment is in excess of the ability or desire of the claimant country to utilise it, that country shall have the right to allocate or otherwise dispose of its claim, to other claimants and to Korea, on a political basis.” Such a principle would be contrary to that unanimously agreed upon in respect of reparations from Germany, when it was laid down in the final act of the Paris Conference that “if any signatory Government renounces its share or part of its share in German reparations, the shares or part thereof thus renounced or remaining shall be distributed pro rata among the other signatory Powers.” The view of His Majesty’s Government is that the foregoing principle should apply also in the case of Japanese reparations. They would regard it as a misuse of reparations receipts if the latter were transferred by the recipient to other countries for political purposes. It is the earnest hope of His Majesty’s Government that the United States Government will re-examine the basis of their proposals for shares of reparations from internal assets in Japan and will be able to support a percentage for the United Kingdom, Burma and the Colonies which takes proper account of the devastation suffered, the war effort exerted and the insignificant amount of external assets held. 16 [ Washington ], June 30, 1947. 14 Handed to the Secretary of State on June 30 by the British Ambassador (Inverchapel). 15 Neither list found in Department files, but see memorandum of May 15, p. 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] . 16 In reply, the Department on July 25 stated that the subject of Japanese reparations was still under study, the points raised by the British Embassy would be fully taken into account, and some modification in initial views of all FEC members would be required if a final decision were to be reached (740.00119 PW/6–3047). The French Embassy to the Department of State 894.24/7–1047 [Document 344] The French Embassy to the Department of State [Translation] No. 245 Washington , July 10, 1947. The Embassy of France in the United States presents its compliments to the Department of State and, referring to its notes dated January 8 and 22, 1946 17 relating to the distribution of the Japanese fleet, has the honor to inform it of the following: Although the French Government has always attached the greatest importance to the allocations of equipment which might result from the distribution of Japanese reparations, it finds that the Nipponese warships which might be allocated to France would be utilizable only after extensive and costly alterations. The French Government, under these conditions, deems it preferable, to relinquish all requests concerning warships, in order to receive equipment from Japanese navy yards or naval bases, Thus, it would like to obtain, more particularly, the following: Floating docks, repair ships, and elements which may be used in the establishment of a mobile base. A shipyard for the construction and repair of naval equipment. The French Government would, moreover, greatly appreciate receiving this equipment as soon as feasible. 18 The Embassy avails itself [etc.]. 17 See Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 471 and footnote 64, p. 472 , respectively. 18 The Department explained to the French Embassy, orally, that French refusal by August 8 to accept four former Japanese destroyers would not entitle them to other equipment (894.30/8–447). The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) 894.60/6–1947 [Document 345] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) secret Washington , July 15, 1947. Subject: Program of Strike Corporation in Japan On 19 June you sent a message to SCAP on this subject which contained the following paragraph: “Part 5. WD intends to make every effort to secure full US govtal auth to proceed with final reparations program on same unilateral basis as advance delivery directive. Matter to be discussed with Secy State tomorrow. Consider independent certified report on Japanese industry is needed to provide maximum unbiased factual support for US unilateral action respecting not only Japanese reparations and economic recovery programs but also for peace treaty provisions favorable to our avowed intention to assist in world economic stabilization and prevention of political unrest. State Dept fully shares this view.” It is not clear to me what is meant by the statement that the report of the Strike Corporation will provide additional factual support for a Japanese economic recovery program and for the Japanese peace treaty provisions. It had been the understanding of the Department that the Strike Corporation was authorized to check the specific plant selections made by SCAP within the framework of FEC policy decisions with specific regard to the reparations program and the retention of essential facilities in Japan. It would be appreciated if you would clarify what further functions the Strike Corporation report is expected to serve. I understand, of course, that a clear definition of reparations removals will facilitate Japanese economic recovery and the determination of the United States policy in the formulation of a peace treaty with Japan. Nevertheless, I should like to know whether you envision the Strike Corporation report as extending to any subject other than reparations removals and permanent plant retentions. The State Department, of course, feels that we should not wait for the Strike Corporation to report before proceeding forthwith with both the Japanese recovery program and the preparation of the United States position on a peace treaty. I am, thus, disturbed by the concluding sentence of the above-quoted portion of your message to SCAP indicating full State Department endorsement of the program outlined by you. The Department could make no such commitment until it more fully understands the implications of the language used. The message in question further implies that the State Department would support unilateral action by the United States on (1) Japanese reparations, (2) Japanese economic recovery, and (3) peace treaty provisions. Such a position is obviously inconsistent with our engagements to participate fully in the operations of the Far Eastern Commission. The State Department does not, in any sense, contemplate unilateral action by this Government in these broad fields. I would strongly suggest that SCAP be informed that the State Department had not seen or approved this program. As a preferable alternative, I would urge that you and I meet to discuss this matter and agree on a more precise description of the assignment of the Strike Engineering Corporation for communication to General MacArthur as a corrected version of Part 5 of your message. Such an amended version could then bear, without qualification, the endorsements of both the State and War Departments. In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you would send me, at your earliest convenience, a copy of the contract with the Strike Engineering Corporation so that we might be informed as to its specific terms. J. H. Hilldring The Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 894.60/7–2247 [Document 346] The Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) Washington , 22 July 1947. Dear General Hilldring : In acknowledgment of your memorandum of 15 July 1947, on the above subject, I am forced to express surprise at some of the questions you raise. From our previous conversations on this subject, I was under the impression that we had reached substantial agreement as to what we both desire to have accomplished and the reasons therefor. Since your memorandum reopens matters I had considered closed, I feel it necessary to refer in some detail to previous discussions and matters of record. You will recall, I am sure, our agreement that we should comply with General MacArthur’s request that an “audit” be made of the plant selections his headquarters has made for reparations purposes and agree to his suggestion that he make no statement of “assured capacity levels” for Japan until the audit of plant selections had been completed, since the former is so closely related to the decisions regarding plant removals. Accordingly, since Mr. Clifford S. Strike had headed a mission to Japan in January of this year, I asked him to consult with me about the possibility of obtaining the services of competent engineers to go to Japan to perform the services requested. In discussion with the Secretary of War and myself, Mr. Strike and Colonel Cheseldine, CAD, pointed out the fact that no “audit” of plant selections already made could be certified by independent engineers unless and until the engineers were satisfied with the basis upon which the selections had been made. This, accordingly, would require a review of the industrial surveys made by SCAP and the Japanese technicians plus such independent surveys as the engineers might deem necessary to enable them to render independent opinions. Obviously, such review and survey must go to the basic questions of the level of industry to remain in Japan under policies of the U.S. government. The Secretary of War agreed to the value of independent analysis to support any action taken by the United States. He further stated his belief that independent conclusions should be of value to U.S. representatives at a peace conference. He then requested Mr. Strike and Colonel Cheseldine to discuss the matter with you before proceeding further. Mr. Strike and Colonel Cheseldine did confer with you and I am informed they discussed in some detail the method of procedure advocated by Mr. Strike. The question of possible unilateral action in the interest of prompt results and decisions was explored and, I am told, you agreed that there were occasions when such action was necessary pointing to the proposed whaling expedition as an example. Mr. Strike reported to me your agreement with the War Department’s desire to secure as much independent factual data as possible both for the purpose of expediting the reparations program and to strengthen the position of the U. S. delegation to the peace conference. Acting upon the assumption that you were thoroughly acquainted with what was proposed, a contract was signed with Overseas Consultants, Inc., copies of which have been furnished your office, and the cable mentioned in your memorandum was sent to General MacArthur. I am somewhat surprised that you read into that cable the need for the alarm mentioned in your memorandum and that you take exception to its statements. I have been under the impression that you have agreed that, unless prompt action was taken by FEC upon the State-War agreed paper on the final level of industry for Japan, the United States would issue a unilateral directive to General MacArthur to proceed to carry out its provisions. We had agreed to a twenty-one day FEC consultation period (see my letter to you dated 12 May 1947) and on 29 May 1947 you wrote to me that “when a decision had been reached on these proposals (amendments to the paper on ‘Reparations Removals from Japan’) an instruction will be given General McCoy to seek action on the original paper, as amended by the instructions, within twenty-one days. At the conclusion of that period the question of the issuance of a unilateral directive will be decided by the Secretary of State in the light of the situation at that time.” The amendments referred to were accepted by the War Department and communicated to General MacArthur in a letter from the Secretary of War dated 27 June 1947. A copy of this letter was furnished your office and receipted for by the State Department on 1 July. It has seemed to me, therefore, that you and I have been in substantial agreement on the question of unilateral action on reparations for sometime and I am therefore at a loss to account for the objection you now raise to the statement in the quoted cable that the State Departmen shares the War Department view. I had assumed that the twenty-one day period had begun. It is also difficult for me to understand how you can refuse to indorse the program outlined in the quoted cable. Assuming, as I did, your approval of possible need for unilateral action on reparations following FEC failure to act, the economic recovery program would follow as a natural corollary. If these were put in motion, it would naturally follow that the United States would have begun to establish its position on these matters which it would support at the peace conference. This is the only possible construction which can be placed upon the statements in the quoted cable. I fail to see wherein such a plan is in any way “obviously inconsistent with our engagement to participate fully in the operations of the Far Eastern Commission.” The work of Overseas Consultants, Inc., under the terms of the contract is to provide factual data, conclusions and recommendations. It is obviously not a policy-making organization. Such data as it produces for the reparations and retention programs will be of value in consideration of an economic recovery program, if properly used. Such use, therefore, could be of assistance in the preparation of the United States position on a peace treaty. This is the only manner in which the corporation report could be considered “as extending to any subject other than reparations removals and permanent plant retentions.” The report will be made available to the State Department. It is hoped that the State Department will find it of some value. The War Department does not recommend that the State Department should wait for the Corporation’s report before proceeding with a recovery program and preparation of a position on a peace treaty. We do feel, however, that the report will supply data to assist in those activities. It had been hoped that much of the data to be supplied could be available before final conclusions are reached and, since the State Department has indicated a desire to convene a preliminary conference in August, every effort will be made to expedite the flow of information from Japan for whatever use may be made of it. Since the War Department still has the obligation of implementation in Japan of any policies established by either the FEC or the United States government, it has a deep interest in any proposals for an economic recovery program as well as the reparations program and, consequently, hopes by the use of this independent engineering group to be able to make vital contribution to such joint studies and conclusions as may be undertaken by the State and War Departments. In addition to the reasons for this contract as stated in the introduction thereto, I am attaching a copy of a press release 19 relating to the contract. I have gone into considerable detail herein to explain the War Department’s position in this matter in anticipation of the conference you proposed in your memorandum. I will be most happy to discuss these questions at any time which suits your convenience. In this connection, an early conference is believed important because I have already received inquiries about the possible effect of the proposed peace conference 20 upon the completion of our contract. The publicity already given to your retirement and mine, the retirement of Judge Patterson, 21 and the sudden impact of the proposal for a peace conference have caused some people to assume that there may be a change in policies and decisions. So acute has this matter become that member firms of Overseas Consultants, Inc., are speculating as to the possibility of cancellation of their contract. I desire to assure them at the earliest possible date that such action is not contemplated either now or in the future. Sincerely yours, Howard C. Petersen 19 July 5, not printed. 20 Proposed on July 11; for documentation, see pp. 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] ff. 21 Kenneth C. Royall succeeded Robert P. Patterson on July 24 as Secretary of War. Memorandum by Mr. Cleon O. Swayzee of the Division of International Labor, Social, and Health Affairs 740.00119 P.W./7–2347 [Document 347] Memorandum by Mr. Cleon O. Swayzee of the Division of International Labor, Social, and Health Affairs 22 secret [ Washington ,] July 23, 1947. Subject: Comments Respecting the Draft SWNCC Paper which Deals with the Problems of the Utilization of Japanese Technical Personnel by Claimant Countries in the Installation and Operation of Industrial Facilities Removed from Japan on Reparations Account. The proposed U.S. policy in dealing with the above-named problem, as laid out in the draft SWNCC paper, would permit the recruiting of a “reasonable” number of Japanese technicians by reparation claimant countries under a number of safeguards to be set up by SCAP designed to protect them from involuntary employment. The reparation claimant countries would be responsible only for transportation and “subsistence” during the period of the contract, while the Japanese government would be responsible for the workers’ remuneration “in excess of subsistence”. The latter payments would be made in yen to the account (or the dependents) of the individual Japanese so employed and would be debited to the reparations accounts of the reparation claimant countries. This Division has two general comments regarding the proposals embodied in this paper: I. While we recognize the validity of the various arguments put forward in support of this program, such as the necessity for the industrially undeveloped claimant countries to secure the use of skilled technicians, and that the amount of reparations that these countries will receive from Japan is likely to be relatively little at the best; we still believe that certain aspects of the program as outlined has serious disadvantages from the U.S. point of view: a . We believe as a matter of principle that it is undesirable to recruit labor for service abroad as reparation because we believe such arrangements considerably increase the risks that are always present in recruiting labor for service abroad, namely those of involuntary servitude and the exploitation of labor. Largely because of this danger American labor has gone on record as opposing the use of manpower as reparations, and would undoubtedly protest if our Government agreed to a plan calling for the same. Moreover, if we give assent to a labor reparations program, however carefully we might attempt to safeguard the rights of labor, our action would be subject to misrepresentation and distortion abroad, and consequently our future position in dealing with international issues involving moral considerations would be weakened. b . This policy differs radically from the one that we have been following in Europe. Thus on March 19, 1947 an outgoing telegram for the Political Adviser in Berlin (No. 603) 23 which cleared through A–H, GA, CE, EUR and ILH stated: “We have considered proposal stated in urtel 482 Feb 27 24 relative to recruitment of labor in Germany for work abroad for purposes of reerecting plants allocated member countries IARA as reparation. “We are opposed in principle to use of German labor abroad as form of reparation. … “However we are agreed in principle that recruitment of German technicians be permitted for purpose assisting in reerection of plants removed as reparation. Such recruitment should be conditioned upon following requirements in addition those you listed: First, recruitment be on voluntary basis. Second, that technicians be permitted leave Germany only on temporary assignments limited to period necessary to accomplish reerection of the plants, and that arrangements be made to ensure their return. Third, arrangements for remittances of earnings to Germany be accomplished. …” In view of the foregoing considerations we recommend that this Government: (1) oppose any proposal that Japanese workers be recruited for labor abroad on reparation account; and (2) support, as a substitute, the idea of voluntary recruitment in keeping with the general provisions of the third paragraph of the Department’s telegram to Berlin. II. We are considerably concerned over the possibility that Japanese workers recruited for service abroad at this time and for the purpose indicated, whether on reparations account or by voluntary recruitment, might in fact become subject to involuntary labor. However carefully the work contract required by SCAP might be drawn up, once the workers were in the reparations claimant country, unless some special safeguarding plan were adopted, they would be entirely subject to control of the authorities of that country. This would follow because they would have no Consul to appeal to in case the terms of their contracts were not lived up to, and would be unable in all probability to finance a return trip to their own country (certainly unable if “subsistence” only is paid directly to them as under the payments for reparation account plan) or to secure the needed travel permits or tickets. Therefore, we believe that the safeguards set out in the draft SWNCC paper should be altered to include the following provisions: a . The contract be drawn for a fixed period, not to exceed one year, but subject to renewal in case both parties agree. b . Either party should be permitted to terminate the contract at any time by giving one month’s notice. In order to protect the employing country from capricious actions by Japanese employees, we would favor including in the contract a wage-withholding plan which would place at least some portion of the cost of the repatriation of workers who wished to return home before their contracts expired upon the workers themselves. c . The setting-up of some system of inspection to ensure that the Japanese workers are given the treatment called for in their contracts; and especially that they are not being detained against their wills. Possibly we should insist that SCAP, until such time as the Japanese Government resumes control of her foreign relations, be given authority to send or delegate representatives periodically to inspect the conditions of the men so recruited. In practice this should not prove too difficult as it could be done by the regular U.S. diplomatic corps in the countries in question. Another possible method of protection might be that of arranging periodic inspection by International Labor Office representatives who would report to SCAP directly. In order to expedite action on this problem we are drawing up specific suggestions for the amendment of the draft SWNCC paper and will forward these to you for consideration by the China Committee 25 at an early meeting. Cleon O. Swayzee 22 Addressed to General Hilldring; Arthur R. Ringwalt, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs; Edwin M. Martin, Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs; Hugh Borton, Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs; and Melville H. Walker, Assistant Chief of the Division of Investment and Economic Development. 23 Vol. ii , p. 1105 . 24 Ibid. , p. 1104 . 25 Mr. Ringwalt was Chairman of the Committee. The Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 894.60/7–2447 [Document 348] The Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) Washington , 24 July 1947. Dear John : In connection with our discussion of the scope of activity of Overseas Consultants, Inc., under the terms of the contract with the War Department, Article 1 e of that contract requires the personnel of Overseas Consultants, Inc., to operate under instructions of the Secretary of War or his authorized representative. Because of the difficulties attendant upon a formal amendment of the existing contract, the War Department will include the following in the instructions to be given to Overseas Consultants, Inc., by the Secretary of War: A. Article 1 a ( 2 ) and the last clause of ( 4 ). Overseas Consultants, Inc., is not engaged to set up or question the level of industry in Japan as contained in SWNCC 236/43 but, if during the course of the work done in Japan by the Overseas Consultants, Inc., they determine that a specific level of industry as contained in SWNCC 236/43, in their opinion is in error, they should include that opinion in their report. B. Article 1 b ( c ). SWNCC 236/43 is specifically mentioned in this Article of the contract and Overseas Consultants, Inc., will be instructed to be guided by that document. C. Article 1e . Overseas Consultants, Inc., will be guided by pertinent approved U.S. or FEC policy decisions. If you agree to the above, a copy of this letter will be officially furnished the President of Overseas Consultants, Inc., as part of his instructions under para 1 e of the contract, and copies will be supplied to General MacArthur for his information. I anticipate an early reply from you to the effect that the State Department is in full agreement with the purpose and the terms of the contract between the War Department and the Overseas Consultants, Inc., as further amplified by the above agreed instructions. Sincerely yours, Howard C. Petersen The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) 894.60/7–2447 [Document 349] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) Washington , July 28, 1947. Dear Pete : Your letter of 24 July in conjunction with our oral discussions of the Strike Corporation Mission to Japan is a satisfactory settlement of the differences which had apparently existed between the viewpoints of the Departments on this matter. I am very happy that the misapprehensions have been disposed of and that the necessary modifications in the contract arrangements will be made in the manner that you suggest in your letter. If the instructions outlined in your letter are given to Overseas Consultants, Inc., the State Department will be wholly satisfied on these points. I, personally, am most gratified by this resolution of the apparent differences. You suggested in one of your communications to me that the interim reports of the Corporation will be made available to the War and State Departments in order to facilitate our consideration of the level of industry and allied matters in the period prior to the submission of the final report of the Corporation. The State Department is most anxious that these reports be made available on the same basis as they are made available to SCAP, and as regularly as possible, in order to assist in the formation of our official position in FEC and for the guidance of our general consideration of Japanese economic matters including reparations. Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring The Legal Adviser (Fahy) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 740.00119 PW/7–2947 [Document 350] The Legal Adviser ( Fahy ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) [ Washington ,] July 29, 1947. Use by Occupying Powers, of Japanese Goods Designated for Reparations, To Defray Occupation Costs 1. A legal opinion is requested on the effect of the adoption by the FEC of FEC–032/25, July 23, 1947, Interim Import-Export Policies for Japan, 26 on the availability of Japanese stocks of gold, silver, other precious metals, precious stones and jewels, for application to occupation costs. 2. The general policy of the FEC regarding the relationship between reparations and costs of occupation was laid down in FEC–014/9, June 20, 1947, Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, 27 and in FEC–219/7, May 9, 1947, Division of Reparations Shares. 28 The two policy decisions are identical, and establish that reparations shall be exacted from Japan through the transfer of “such existing Japanese capital equipment and facilities or such Japanese goods as exist or may in future be produced and which under policies set forth by the Far Eastern Commission or pursuant to the Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission should be, made available for this purpose.” The same policy decisions also establish the additional proposition that the reparations shall be in such a form “which would not prejudice the defraying of the cost of occupation and the maintenance of a minimum civilian standard of living”. The net result of the two provisions would seem to give to the occupying powers a prior right to apply to cost of occupation such Japanese capital equipment, facilities or goods as may be made available for reparations. 3. FEC–032/25 (par. 16.0) designates Japanese stocks of gold, silver, other precious metals, precious stones and jewels, or the value thereof after their liquidation for the purpose of acquiring foreign exchange, for ultimate disposal as reparations. It is believed that the intent of the paragraph is to add Japanese stocks of precious metals and stones to the categories of Japanese property referred to in FEC–014/9 as available for reparations under policies of the Far Eastern Commission. This, without more, would seem to subject this new category to the accompanying provision that reparations shall be in such form as not to prejudice the defraying of the cost of occupation. 4. The difficulty with this interpretation lies in the fact that the paper in question, as originally drafted (FEC–032/24), contained an express reservation: “provided this would not prejudice the defraying of the costs of occupation and the maintenance of a minimum standard of living, in accordance with the principles of FEC–219/7”. This provision, on objection of the United Kingdom, was struck out in the Steering Committee, and the United States reserved its position on the amended paragraph. On consideration before the FEC General McCoy withdrew his reservation, stating the understanding of the United States that “the disposition as reparations of stocks of gold, silver, et cetera, referred to in paragraph 16. c should be in accordance with “the quoted provision of FEC–014/9” This would probably have served to clarify the issue had not Mr. Graves of the United Kingdom then stated that “in view of the United States interpretation just recorded by General McCoy” he would point out that it was the understanding by his Government “that FEC–032/25 would provide for the ultimate disposition of stocks of gold as reparations, and that while being preserved for this ultimate disposition, they would not be available for a trading account”. Although he later stated that “his only desire had been for assurance that stocks of gold or their equivalent would not be dissipated by trading operations”, he left standing his position that the stocks of gold or their equivalent in acceptable currency would be “ultimately disposed of as reparations”. This raises serious doubt as to whether the United States and the United Kingdom agree in their interpretation of FEC–032/25. 5. If it is seriously expected that the occupying powers may need to use the Japanese stocks of gold et cetera, or their value after conversion into currency, for application to occupation costs, it would seem to Le highly desirable at this time, if possible, to secure a clear admission by the representative of the United Kingdom that he did not intend to dispute its applicability to occupation costs, or at least for the United States to state more clearly and unequivocally its understanding that FEC–032/25 would not prevent the application to occupation costs of the Japanese stocks of precious metals and stones, or their value after liquidation. Charles Fahy 26 For FEO policy decision of July 24, see Department of State, Far Eastern Series No. 29: The Far Eastern Commission, Second Report by the Secretary General, July 10, 1947–December 23, 1948 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 31. 27 June 19, Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 49. 28 May 8; ibid. , p. 80. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/7–3147: Telegram [Document 351] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , July 31, 1947—8 p.m. 296. FEC 24. Reparations Shares . Reparations Committee of FEC has been working intensively for past several months in effort to obtain precise views of each country on FEC regarding percentage shares of Japanese industrial assets available for reparations to be allotted claimant countries. So far Committee has before it four complete official schedules submitted by USSR, US, UK and Netherlands; one official schedule by groups of countries submitted by China; one tentative official schedule by groups submitted by Canada; and four complete schedules submitted by New Zealand, Indian, Philippine, and French members, either as personal or delegation views. Australian only member who has submitted no views. Problem now is to find equitable method of reconciling conflicting views of various countries, who place differing weights on various factors governing determination of reparations shares. However general pattern for shares of small countries has emerged and such shares could probably be approved with little difficulty. Principal differences of opinion are encountered in determination of shares of Big Four, but it is still hoped that solution to problem can be found. Marshall The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.00119 FEAC/8–547: Telegram [Document 352] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) confidential Washington , August 5, 1947—6 p.m. 305. FEC 25. Interim Import-Export Policies for Japan 29 (FEC–032/24 which should now be at GHQ SCAP 30 ). At Steering Committee July 22 UK member moved deletion of clause in paragraph 16 c “provided this would not prejudice the defraying of the costs of occupation and the maintenance of a minimum civilian standard of living, in accordance with the principles of FEC–219/7. 31 ” Motion carried by 8 to 1 (US opposed) and amended paper sent to Commission. Following discussion during next two days US Government consented to deletion provided US position made clear to effect “first charge” principle in paragraph 4 of Basic Post-Surrender Policy 32 should apply to stocks of precious metals and stones. Paper with deletion therefore approved by Commission on July 24 and General McCoy made statement for record that understanding of US Government was that disposition as reparations of stocks of gold, silver, etc. is covered by provisions of controlling document, Basic Post-Surrender Policy, as follows: “The reparations shall be in such a form as would not endanger the fulfillment of the program of demilitarization of Japan and would not prejudice the defraying of the cost of the occupation and the maintenance of a minimum civilian standard of living.” In view of US statement, UK member then stated that understanding his government was that paragraph 16 c as amended would provide for ultimate disposition of stocks of gold as reparations and that while being preserved for this ultimate disposition they would not be available for transfer to trading account. Later he amplified this by giving as his understanding that 16 c provided that stocks of gold or equivalent in acceptable currency would be preserved for ultimate disposition as reparations and would not be dissipated in trading operations. In private talks with UK member it developed that British fear that fund established on basis of stocks of gold would gradually be dissipated by unprofitable trading transactions, leaving little or nothing for eventual disposition as reparations. It appears, therefore, that without bringing up question of defraying of costs of occupation, UK took this method of serving notice that they expect that fund will be used only for sound transactions which can be expected to return to fund amount equivalent to that taken out, thereby preserving value of fund. In view of fact that FEC decision makes available to SCAP badly needed revolving fund for revival of Japanese economy and in view of fact that it probably will not be necessary in any event to utilize Japanese gold stocks for defrayment of occupation costs until end of 1948, State and War Departments with concurrence of General McCoy agreed that it would be inadvisable at present time to endeavor to reach meeting of minds with UK in regard to ultimate disposition of gold stocks or their equivalent. In meantime SCAP will be advised not to utilize gold stocks to defray costs of occupation pending receipt of further instructions. Temporary Retention of Electric Steel Furnaces . FEC July 24 approved policy 33 of retaining 300,000 tons additional electric steel furnace capacity with integrated rolling mills until June 30, 1948. Marshall 29 Approved July 24 by the FEC, The Far Eastern Commission , p. 31. 30 See bracketed note, p. 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 246 ] . 31 May 8, Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 80. 32 June 19, ibid. , pp. 49, 54. 33 For text, see The Far Eastern Commission , p. 41. The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) 740.00119 FEAC (Info)/8–2047: Telegram [Document 353] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) confidential Washington , August 20, 1947—6 p.m. 333. FEC 26. Reduction of Japanese Industrial War Potential (FEC–084 series). Policy paper of above title with long and tortuous history adopted by FEC Aug 14. 34 Original paper introduced in FEC by US member one year ago. After various amendments in Economic and Steering Committees and in Commission paper was almost ready for final approval in April 1947. At this juncture War Dept, which feared that phrase “during the period of the occupation” in para 9 b might be interpreted in future to cover any period when Japan is under any form of control, with approval of State Dept had US member introduce amendment to para 9 as follows: “The provisions of this policy decision will apply until Jan 1, 1949, or until the end of the present phase of the occupation, whichever is the earlier.” This amendment not acceptable to majority of FEC countries which suspected that US working toward removal of all economic controls over Japan in near future. Meanwhile US Govt adamant in insisting on insertion in para 9 of some sort of limiting clause. Chinese representative on July 8 submitted list of 10 questions in effort to ferret out US reasons for insisting upon limiting clause and upon date of Jan 1, 1949. US replies indicated clearly that purpose was “to forestall and prevent the possibility of a situation arising in which any X part of the Japanese economy might inadvertently be kept within a straitjacket” and that date was selected to make it clear that provisions of 9 b would apply only to short period. Explanation not entirely satisfactory to several members of Commission who still suspected hidden motive in US amendment and who opposed approval of paper with amendment. Chinese member then received instructions from his Govt to endeavor have date changed to 1950 but on own responsibility compromised on Oct 1, 1949. This date accepted by US Govt and paper finally approved with several members expressing for the record dissatisfaction with inclusion of any date. Chinese and Filipino members also read into record statements to effect that any rehabilitation of Japanese industry after Oct 1, 1949 should not interfere with previously planned reparations removals. Soviet and UK members had no comment. Reparations Shares . With submission August 13 of official Philippine schedule of percentage shares of industrial assets available for reparations, FEC now has nine official schedules, New Zealand and Australia being only countries not submitting some sort of official schedule. USSR also submitted revised schedule to bring it more in line with general trend of thought in Commission. Lovett 34 See ibid. , p. 25. The decision was embodied in a directive, serial 87, August 23, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SCAP, sent as War 84940 on August 23, and a copy of the directive was sent to the Far Eastern Commission on September 4 by the Department. The United States Reparations Delegate in Japan (Hodge) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 P.W./9–347: Telegram [Document 354] The United States Reparations Delegate in Japan ( Hodge ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Tokyo , September 3, 1947. OE No. 19. From US Reparations and Restitution Delegation to US Department of State—For Martin and Barnett: ( a ) SCAP chairman of RTAC submitted to RTAC for consideration and advice following document entitled “Interpretation of Provision for Economic Justification of Claims in Interim Directive Regarding Advance Transfers”. ( b ) Document reads as follows: “1. The directive puts basis of allocation on the rehabilitation, repair or reconstruction of facilities which can contribute directly to the immediate relief and rehabilitation requirements of the war damaged claimant or indirectly to the relief needs of other parts of Asia devastated by Japanese Armed Forces. 2. The words used preclude the allocation of facilities whose purpose is to start a new industry not essential to rehabilitation, repair or reconstruction of facilities. The facilities thus rehabilitated, repaired or reconstructed must have existed in claimant country prior to Japanese occupation. 3. Restoration of certain industries to satisfactory operating condition may require items not available in the claimant country and formerly imported, but which can be provided by allocation of certain facilities from Japanese reparations. Such allocation would in effect form the basis of a new industry in the claimant country, but its primary purpose would be restoration of pre-existing industry. It is therefore justified under the provisions of the directive. Any narrower interpretation of the directive would to a considerable extent defeat the obvious purpose of the advance transfer directive. The statements of Major Plimsoll (Australia, Chairman of FEC Reparations Committee) and Mr. Burr Smith (then US member of RTAC) in the fourth RTAC meeting indicate that the interpretation advanced above is that intended by the US Government and so understood by the FEC. 4. Therefore claimants for advance transfer must admit evidence that a claimed facility will either serve to rehabilitate, repair or reconstruct a previously existing facility which can contribute to relief as described in the advance transfer directive”. ( c ) Please advise if US member RTAC should support or seek modification above interpretation. Personally favor broadest possible interpretation consistent with FEC intent, particularly since countries entitled only 5 percent would otherwise get practically nothing but few machine tools under present SCAP procedure of making only 30 percent of limited segments each category of industry available rather than 30 percent of all surplus above interim levels. For your information, unofficial personal conversations with French and Australian delegations indicate no strong feeling or interpretation quoted above. New Zealand representative thinks interpretation not broad enough. Those entitled to advance transfers of course favor broadest possible interpretation. Hodge Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) and the Acting Adviser of the Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs (Barnett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) 740.00119 P.W./9–2547 [Document 355] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfield ) and the Acting Adviser of the Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs ( Barnett ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Saltzman ) 35 [ Washington ,] 25 September 1947. Subject: Japanese Reparations Shares 1. FE, EUR, OE and General McCoy have reconsidered our earlier proposal for attempting to achieve FEC agreement on the division of Japanese reparations shares and have revised it, with the help of Mr. Bohlen, 36 in the light of views expressed by you and General Hilldring. 2. You will note that in the U.S. schedule the award to the U.S.S.R. has been reduced to 4% as compared to the 6% contained in our last proposal to you, and the awards to Canada and New Zealand have been reduced from 1%½ to 1%. The awards to the U.S. and China have been raised respectively to 28% and 30%. 3. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that the 6% award to the U.S.S.R. previously contemplated was too high and, in any case, would not be regarded by the Soviets as final. He preferred to allow General McCoy discretion to bargain upwards from a starting 3% in bilateral talks with the Soviets to obtain their vote. Both EUR and General McCoy disliked that suggestion. Thus, since Mr. Bohlen did not share EUR’s fears that Soviet participation in the redistribution of a U.S. surplus would present serious political difficulties and since he agreed in the desirability in disposing, if possible, of the whole reparations shares problem outside of the framework of the Japanese Peace Conference, the attached proposal is being supported by the interested offices of the Department. 4. The attached proposal is the result of prolonged “political calculations” which have led us to believe that, though far from ideal, it is the most likely method for obtaining an FEC decision on the shares problem. The U.S. Government committed itself to a division of Japanese reparations along “broad political” lines only because protracted discussion in the FEC made it plain that the statistical approach which the U.S. had advocated would be wholly unacceptable to the three other veto powers, U.K., China, as well as the U.S.S.R. We agreed in the “broad political” approach since the U.S. had little, if any, interest in the actual values of Japanese surplus industrial facilities. Therefore, we could attach primary importance to adopting any reasonable method for securing a decision in the FEC which would enable SCAP to proceed with his reparations program. 5. The Policy Planning Staff and Mr. Bohlen agree with FE, EUR, OE and General McCoy that the problem of reparations shares should be disposed of, if possible, outside of the framework of the Japanese Peace Conference. We feel that the attached proposal, whatever its defects, provides the best method for attempting to attain a practical solution of the problem in the FEC. [Annex] Memorandum Prepared for the Secretary of State 37 Washington , 25 September, 1947. 1. I recommend that the United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission make the announcement in paragraph 2 as a next step in our attempt to dispose of the long-standing problem of Japanese reparations shares. 2. “The United States Member of the Far Eastern Commission has been authorized by his government to announce that if the Far Eastern Commission will adopt as a matter of policy the schedule herebelow, as embodying authorized percentage awards to be applicable to Japanese industrial facilities available for reparations, Australia 8% Canada 1 China 30 France 2 India 4 Netherlands 4 New Zealand 1 Philippines 8 U.S.S.R. 4 United Kingdom 10 United States 28 the United States Government, on its part, will hold 19 of its own 28% authorized share of industrial facilities for redistribution among the Far Eastern Commission countries which desire increments to amounts of industrial facilities they are entitled to receive under their authorized shares. It would be equally satisfactory to the United States Government if those countries decided, among themselves, to divide the 19% in accordance with their respective authorized percentages adjusted to 100%, or in accordance with some other principle such as need. The United States Government would not participate in that decision, but would redistribute its 19% upon the basis or any agreement reached by the interested countries. Meanwhile, the Far Eastern Commission adoption of the U.S. percentage schedule would enable the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to make available to all eleven FEC countries their authorized shares of Japanese reparations in the form of industrial facilities. The United States Government has been guided by broad political considerations in formulating this proposal now put before the Far Eastern Commission. If unacceptable to the Far Eastern Commission, the United States Government will, of course, consider itself at liberty to withdraw it.” 3. All of the Far Eastern Commission countries desire more than this U.S. schedule awards them. However, in the light of a desperate frustration which exists as a result of past FEC discussions on the subject of shares, they may approve the above proposal because it is a prompt and practical method to reach agreement and because each of them would hope for increments later out of the U.S. surplus. All of the FEC countries, including the U.S.S.R., would be eligible to benefit from the proposed plan for sharing the U.S. surplus if the Far Eastern Commission could accept the U.S. schedule of percentage awards. To permit the Soviets to share in the U.S. 19% surplus is hard to reconcile with present tendencies of U.S. economic policy towards the U.S.S.R. in Europe. However, the disadvantage of that inconsistency has been weighed against the following considerations. The redistribution to the U.S.S.R. from the U.S. surplus would be made by the ten other FEC countries without direct U.S. participation. Soviet approval is needed for a formal FEC decision and the Soviets might concur in our proposal because of the hope of obtaining a substantial increment to their authorized share. We believe that hope to be unfounded, but whatever industrial facilities the Soviets might receive would be of inconsequential importance either economically or from a security point of view. There is a better prospect for securing ten-country support (i.e. the FEC less the U.S.S.R.) for the U.S. schedule if the door is left open at this stage to Soviet sharing in our surplus than if that door is closed. If the Soviets alone opposed our proposal and its contents were sent as an interim directive on the basis of ten-country agreement, the Soviets would be, of course, excluded from sharing in our 19% surplus. Hence, this offer, which the Soviets might seriously consider accepting, would not be an exorbitant price for achieving a formal FEC decision which can remove an important factor of uncertainty embarrassing SCAP’s handling of Japan’s economic recovery and which can remove the problem of reparations shares from the agenda of the forthcoming Peace Conference. Since the U.S. proposal is a quid pro quo , unfavorable reaction by a number of FEC countries would leave the U.S. at liberty to withdraw its offer with no commitment for the future. 4. This memorandum is concurred in by EUR, FE, OE, and General McCoy, U.S. Member of the Far Eastern Commission. We stress the importance of settling, if possible, the Japanese reparations shares problem outside of the framework of the Japanese Peace Conference. 38 35 Brig. Gen. Charles E. Saltzman had succeeded General Hilldring on September 2. 36 Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department. 37 A memorandum dated October 6 to Mr. Saltzman from a member of his staff stated that the memorandum from Edwin W. Pauley in regard to the proposal for division of reparations shares in the Far Eastern Commission had reached Under Secretary of State Lovett and added: “I think Mr. Pauley would be very pleased to have his recommendation on this forwarded to Mr. Lovett. In essence it is a concurrence with reservations which, I understand, probably is equivalent to your own viewpoint.” (740.00119 PW/9–2547) 38 For further discussion of the reparations shares proposal, see memorandum, of October 29 by Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, p. 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Reparations Delegate in Japan (Hodge) 740.00119 PW/9–2947: Airgram [Document 356] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Reparations Delegate in Japan ( Hodge ) secret Washington , September 29, 1947. A–92. Re urad No. 19, 39 paragraph C, U.S. representative FEC has interpreted criteria broadly in FEC discussion since original introduction paper in accordance with Department’s policy. U.S. member RTAC in July gave similar interpretation that body. Department now seeking War Department concurrence in communication to SCAP clarifying matter accordance Department’s interpretation. Therefore you should continue oppose narrow interpretation Chairman RTAC, quoted urad, effect of which would nullify in large part relief intended advanced transfer directive, and contradict long standing interpretation officially presented to FEC by U.S. Only limitation to broad interpretation is necessity protect special interests small claimants in individual cases under final settlement. Lovett 39 September 3, p. 427 [ Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] . The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [Document 357] The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Wang ) to the Secretary of State 40 strictly confidential Aide-Mémoire on the Restitution of Japanese Looted Property The Far Eastern Commission in Washington is about to adopt a policy statement entitled “Restitution of Looted Property”. This decision of the Commission would authorize the proceeds from the sale of unidentified looted property of a “secured fund” to be used to finance self-liquidating imports into Japan for a period ending on a specified date, probably October 1, 1949. On that date, the total amount of the fund will be divided among the seven recipient countries, including China, the territories of which, one and all, were occupied in part or in toto and looted by Japan in the course of her aggression against them. It is understood that the total proceeds from the sale of unidentified looted property will amount to a considerable sum and, on the basis of the percentages of reparations shares which the Far Eastern Commission will shortly decide to assign to the eleven countries represented thereon, China’s share in these proceeds should be a substantial one. The Chinese Government had urged the distribution to the countries entitled to receive a share of the proceeds immediately upon the liquidation of the unidentified looted property, and, in a spirit of compromise, accepted the United States proposal to use these proceeds as a “secured fund” for financing self-liquidating imports into Japan. China desires, however, to make use of her share, which will be paid to her about two years from now as a security for a loan to be arranged with a governmental or commercial bank, so that her share in the above-mentioned “secured fund” could be made available for the use of the Chinese Government before the actual date of distribution. It is hoped that the American Government would facilitate arrangements for such a loan, and extend, through its appropriate agency, all necessary co-operation by assuring the bank or banks with which such arrangements may be made, of the approximate amount of China’s share and the date of its availability to her. While the exact value of the Japanese looted property and China’s share in it remain to be determined, the Chinese Government hopes that the amount of loan would, in any case, not be less than U.S. $150,000,000. The Chinese Government would undertake to repay the loan in full from its national treasury, in case the value of her share in the looted property should not be able to cover the full amount of the loan. New York , October 9, 1947. 40 Handed by Dr. Wang to the Secretary in New York, October 9. The Department of State to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang) 740.00119 PW/10–1947 [Document 358] The Department of State to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Wang ) 41 Aide-Mémoire The Department of State has studied the aide-mémoire on the Restitution of Japanese Looted Property presented by the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Republic on October 9, 1947. The Department is pleased to be informed that the Chinese Government wishes to accept, in a spirit of compromise, the provision in the pending revision of Far Eastern Commission policy on restitution which calls for establishment of a “secured fund.” The Department wishes to observe that China’s hope to base a loan, so large as $150 million, upon China’s ultimate share in the contemplated “secured fund” seems to reflect some misunderstanding of the nature and probable size of that fund. To assist in clarifying the position, the following observations are offered. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is now acting upon a directive regarding restitution of looted property which was issued to him in July 1946. That directive embodied a policy decision which had been approved unanimously in the Far Eastern Commission. 42 The United States Government was and continues to be satisfied with that policy. When it became apparent, however that a majority of the other FEC countries desired to enlarge the scope of existing restitution policy, the United States Government stated that in the interests of accomplishing a just, comprehensive and prompt agreement on what seemed to be the principal restitution problems, it could agree to the following: Property eligible for restitution from Japan as loot should include not only that property found in Japan which could be identified as having existed in Allied countries prior to their occupation by the Japanese (as the Far Eastern Commission policy now provides), but also property which could be identified as having been produced in Allied territories occupied by the Japanese during periods of such occupation. For example, if identified as to origin or ownership, such commodities as tin or rubber could be restored to an Allied country as loot even if that tin and rubber had been produced during the period of Japanese occupation. Further, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should apply relaxed standards of identification in determining whether or not property should be considered to be loot. In cases of doubt, his presumption should be in favor of the claimant country whenever permitted by the broadest application of law, equity and common sense. Finally, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should set up, inform and seek the assistance of an inter-Allied technical advisory agency when there arose any conflict between claimant countries for property known to have been looted but not clearly identifiable as to particular origin or ownership. However, the United States Government stated that it could approve these modifications in the existing Far Eastern Commission policy only if the Far Eastern Commission would accept a formula providing for establishment of a “secured fund” made up from the liquidation of that property which could be defined as having been looted but could not be identified as to any particular ownership or origin. The “secured fund” would be distributed in dollars or some other acceptable currency to the seven Japanese-occupied Allied countries prior to a specified date but, in the meanwhile, would be available for use by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as collateral or as payment for imports required for self-liquidating production programs in Japan. The United States Government believes that the effects of this pattern of proposals would be to expand greatly the quantity and value of property moving to claimant countries on restitution account, to establish a simple and fair procedure for administrative handling of property known to have been looted but ineligible for restitution because unidentifiable as to a particular origin or ownership, and to require a small Allied contribution, over a short period of time, to the accomplishment of the economic objectives of the occupation. By the terms of the directive upon which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is currently acting, he is not authorized to define as loot property to which clear title cannot be established, to effect restitution, or to dispose of it except as Japanese property. If the proposed changes in the restitution policy are approved and a “secured fund” established, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers would have to apply, over some period of time, the relaxed standards for identifying property as having been looted before the amount of “unidentified loot” could be determined. The United States Government cannot foresee at this time what the value of the “secured fund” will be. Nor can it estimate China’s share in the fund, whatever its size, since that share depends upon the award which China will receive in the Far Eastern Commission’s pending decision on authorized reparations percentages of industrial reparations from Japan. Accordingly, it follows that it would be premature to discuss, except in principle, the question of a Chinese loan for which China’s equity in the “secured fund” could serve as security. However, in principle it would be the Department’s desire that full consideration be given at the appropriate time to the suggested loan referred to in the Chinese aide-mémoire . Washington , October 19, 1947. 41 Handed under instructions of the Secretary of State to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs at New York on October 19 by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth). 42 For policy decision FEC–011/12, July 18, 1946, see Activities of the Far Eastern Commission , p. 80; for amended text, FEC–011/18, October 10, 1946, see ibid. , p. 83. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State (Saltzman) 894.60/10–2947 [Document 359] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State ( Saltzman ) secret [ Washington ,] October 29, 1947. Participants: A–S Mr. Saltzman Mr. Claxton Mr. Hemmendinger FE Mr. Penfield OE Mr. Martin 44 Department of the Army: Mr. Draper 43 Mr. Fahey Lt. Col. Pixton Col. Westover Mr. Saltzman stated that he desired if possible to have Department of the Army approval of the reparations shares proposal. The issue seemed to be principally with respect to whether approval of reparations shares should await report by Overseas Consultants Inc. Mr. Saltzman and Mr. Martin pointed out that the levels of industry for interim reparations removals had been worked out by State, War and SCAP more than a year ago and approved by FEC. The levels under consideration in FEC 218 would make slightly more reparations available. FEC 218 was approved by State, War and the Strike Group, which in conferences held at that time withdrew recommendations inconsistent with the paper as finally approved. There should not be any prospect of reconsidering the levels of the interim program since FEC 218 was the frame of reference against which Overseas Consultants had been instructed to report. Mr. Martin stated that a reconsideration of the levels involved economic judgments which were outside the province of engineers. General Draper referred to the experience in Germany, where levels which he and others approved as proper were soon found to be entirely inadequate. He said he had the feeling and others in Tokyo had the feeling that the same situation might easily exist in Japan, particularly with respect to power. Two members of Overseas Consultants were economists who were intended to deal with the overall economic judgments involved. He conceded that the main purpose of Overseas Consultants was to examine the listings, pursuant to the agreed levels, but stated that it was their secondary mission to make any other recommendations which their experience led them to think appropriate. Martin suggested that Overseas Consultants had been indoctrinated to reach certain conclusions and had gone out with preconceived ideas. This was rejected by General Draper, Col. Pixton and Mr. Fahey. General Draper said that various people in Tokyo believed that some reparations would be appropriate. Mr. Fahey observed that so far as reparations shares were concerned, the work in Japan made certain that in any case deliveries would not be made until there was opportunity to consider the report of the Overseas Consultants. Mr. Saltzman stated that the State Department was also of that opinion, and considered it a sufficient reason why the Army Dept need not oppose a decision on reparations shares at this time. General Draper agreed, but observed that while most of Overseas Consultants expected to finish their work by about December 1, the two economists referred to above might not finish until after the first of the year. Mr. Saltzman read the proposed statement by General McCoy. General Draper withdrew his objection to its being made at this time provided the next to the last paragraph be omitted. Mr. Saltzman agreed. General Draper urged, but not as a condition of the withdrawal of his objection, that a statement be made at the same time that the U. S. did not intend to use any of its remaining shares for its own benefit. State members agreed that a statement along those lines ought probably to be made at the same time. General Draper also suggested that a definite period be set for the FEC adoption, at the end of which the proposal would be withdrawn. Mr. Saltzman agreed to consider it. New Subject: General Draper read a proposed draft cable to SCAP on the subject of the issuance of an interim directive to SCAP based on SWNCC 236/43. 45 The cable stated that the paper was making slow progress in FEC and that the Army Dept considered it undesirable to press for an interim directive in the circumstances. It further stated that it was the “view here” that approval of paper on levels of reparations available should not be sought until after the report of Overseas Consultants. Mr. Saltzman said that he could not concur in that without serious consideration in the Department. General Draper referred to a conversation had by him with Mr. Lovett at which Mr. Lovett had indicated general approval of the idea. Mr. Saltzman said that he would discuss the matter in the Department, and would advise General Draper further. General Draper asked whether the Department of State really would be prepared to go ahead with substantial deliveries before considering the report of Overseas Consultants. Mr. Martin replied that he thought the question could not arise because of the time schedule involved in listing and allocating plants. 44 Edwin M. Martin, Acting Chief, Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs. 43 Gen. William H. Draper, Jr., Under Secretary of the Army. 45 April 7; see Army memorandum of April 7, p. 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] . The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers 740.00119 PW/11–1247: Circular telegram [Document 360] The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers 46 secret Washington , November 12, 1947—3 a.m. For your secret info only, following proposed policy statement has been sent by Dept to Amer Representative on Far Eastern Commission for submission to that body for adoption: “1. Assets in the neutral countries (Afghanistan, Eire, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland including for present purposes Liechtenstein) should be marshaled by the Japanese Gov pursuant to appropriate SCAP directives. Compensation of Japanese nationals should be afforded by credits against taxes owing the Japanese Gov. 2. SCAP should request the governments of the Four Powers (China, the UK, the USSR, and the US, or such of them as maintain diplomatic relations with the respective neutral countries) to consult on Japan’s behalf with the neutral countries and to conclude on behalf of Japan arrangements pertaining to the assets. Such arrangements should include provision for the liquidation of the assets. In the process of such liquidation secured claims against a specific asset and unsecured claims (including those of the governments of the neutral countries) having a direct relationship to a specific asset should be satisfied in accordance with the law of the neutral country (except that the Four Powers should attempt to preclude the assertion of unsecured claims by any government other than that of the neutral country on its own behalf, even though such claims have a direct relationship to a specific asset). No other claims should be satisfied out of such assets. Where appropriate, settlement of valid claims may be effected by the transfer to the neutrals of such assets in Japan as may be designated for reparation delivery and are not accepted by the countries entitled to reparations. 3. In the course of such consultations due regard should be had to any agreements, undertakings, or understandings already existing between any of the Four Powers and any of the neutrals relevant to such assets. 4. The local currency and credit accruing from the liquidation should remain in the respective neutrals and be used in such manner us SCAP deems necessary. The initial value of the proceeds should be used for payment for accrued and current costs of disease and unrest imports in Japan.” It will be further proposed that the Four Powers may refrain or desist from acting in regard to assets in any of neutral countries where value of the assets considered in conjunction with the claims likely to be held valid does not warrant action. Marshall 46 At Bern, Dublin, Kabul, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Moscow, Nanking, and Stockholm. The Assistant Secretary of State (Saltzman) to the Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) 894.60/11–1347 [Document 361] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Saltzman ) to the Under Secretary of the Army ( Draper ) restricted Washington , November 13, 1947. My Dear Mr. Draper : You will recall that at the conference of October 28 on Japanese reparations Mr. Martin referred to the desirability that the Departments of the Army and of State should receive the Interim Reports of Overseas Consultants, Inc. As was stated in General Hilldring’s letter of July 28, 1947, to Mr. Petersen, the Department of State is most anxious that these reports be made available on the same basis as they are made available to SCAP, and as regularly as possible, in order to assist in the formulation of our official position in the FEC and for our general guidance on Japanese economic matters. I would appreciate it if you could have dispatched to SCAP a cable along the lines of the attached proposed draft on this subject. 47 You will also recall that mention was made in the course of the conference of the question whether population increase had been taken into account in the determination of levels of industry by the FEC. There appears to be a serious misapprehension on this point in Tokyo, which is revealed by the quotation attributed to Sebald in the FEC Weekly Summary of Information on Japanese Economic and Financial Affairs C2–026/42 15 October 1947. Sebald was quoted as stating before the Allied Council for Japan that the FEC decision to set Japanese post-war industrial level at 1930–34 was too low because of failure to allow for population increase. I would appreciate it if the substance of the attached draft cable on that subject could be dispatched to SCAP. Sincerely yours, Charles E. Saltzman [Enclosure] restricted Draft Cable to SCAP FEC Weekly Summary of Information on Japanese Economic and Financial Affairs C2–026/42 15 October 1947 contains quote attributed to Sebald 30 September 1947 before Allied Council for Japan that FEC decision to set Japan’s post-war industrial level at 1930–34 too low because of alleged failure to allow for population increase. This is based upon misapprehension. FEC policy decision as well as levels of industry now under FEC consideration take into account population increase. Request that correction be made upon suitable opportunity. 47 Not printed. The Assistant Secretary of State (Saltzman) to the Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) 740.00119 PW/11–1447 [Document 362] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Saltzman ) to the Under Secretary of the Army ( Draper ) secret Washington , November 14, 1947. Dear Mr. Draper : It would be appreciated if the attached draft cable could be sent to SCAP to correct an apparent misapprehension with respect to the intent of the Advance Transfers Directive on Japanese reparations. 48 By letter of August 18, 1947 from General Eberle, 49 copy of which is attached, 50 the Department of the Army declined to send a cable along similar lines. The matter was not then pressed by the Department of State pending receipt of the actual minutes of the RTAC meeting and discussion between you and myself on the overall reparations problem. The answers to the objections previously raised are as follows: 1. Although the Advance Transfers Directive is a unilateral directive and the United States cannot be charged on its account with failure to implement a FEC decision, it was communicated to the FEC and described by the United States Government in FEC 216 and in statements in the Reparation Committee of the FEC as a measure designed to give immediate relief to the four recipients. Failure to carry it out will reflect on the sincerity of this Government. 2. The 30% of assets is based upon 100% of the facilities and equipment declared available by the FEC and transmitted to SCAP in directives governing interim reparations removals. Accordingly it is feasible to designate facilities as Advance Transfers without awaiting the determination of final levels for reparation removals by the FEC. 3. By the terms of its contract, Overseas Consultants Inc. takes into consideration the Advance Transfers Directive, which is based on the FEC policies for interim reparations removals. The Department is aware that Overseas Consultants Inc. may not be able in the immediate future to conclude its survey of all industrial categories in the interim program. It is believed, however, that it can proceed in such a manner that 100% listings can be expedited for a number of categories, thus permitting smooth scheduling of reparation allocations and removals before its final report is completed. Since the point was not raised in the letter of August 18, it is assumed that the Department of the Army accepts the interpretation of the Advance Transfers Directive set forth in the draft cable. Since no more than 30% of any category can be made available as Advance Transfers, it is necessary to apply the directive as nearly as possible across the board in order to give the immediate relief intended by the Directive. Sincerely yours, Charles E. Saltzman [Enclosure] Draft Cable for SCAP confidential In view certain statements made by SCAP representative in RTAC meeting re interpretation Advance Transfers Directive (ourad War 95604 Apr, JCS Serial No. 75) 50a following clarification offered re intent this Directive: In reply to Australian question 2 (minutes, 3rd RTAC meeting), SCAP representative stated that it is “within the discretion of SCAP to designate such categories as he may desire or may find proper.” Interpretation by U.S. representatives in FEC has uniformly been in terms of advance transfers pool aggregating 30 per cent of assets declared available under interim reparations program. Since paragraph 1 d limits advance transfers from any single category to 30 per cent, program covering full 30 per cent from all categories required except where impracticable under terms of paragraph 2 of Directive. In paragraph 10, JCS Directive 87 51 (ourad War 84940) SCAP has full authorization retain temporarily facilities required meet needs of occupation, but such retained facilities not exempt from designation for removal. Since differences between interpretations offered in FEC and RTAC may leave question in minds of representatives other countries as to U.S. sincerity and intentions, we suggest SCAP consider further clarifying in RTAC statement quoted above. Re Australian question 3 same meeting, we agree with SCAP comment that 100 per cent listing required to protect interests countries not sharing 30 per cent advance transfers. 48 Serial 75, April 4, p. 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] . 49 Brig. Gen. George L. Eberle, then Acting Chief, Civil Affairs Division, War Department. 50 Not printed. 50a Ante , p. 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] . 51 August 23; see footnote 34, p. 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] . For paragraph 10 of FEC policy decision FEC–084, August 14, see The Far Eastern Commission , pp. 25, 30. The Under Secretary of the Army (Draper) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 894.60/11–2047 [Document 363] The Under Secretary of the Army ( Draper ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) secret Washington , 20 November 1947. Dear Mr. Lovett : Some weeks ago you, Secretary Royall 52 and I discussed at lunch the reparations studies that are being made in Japan by the Overseas Consultants Inc. Overseas Consultants Inc. as their first priority assignment are determining the capacities of the several reparations industries, and in addition were asked to point out any errors in the contemplated levels of industry which they consider should be modified. I mentioned to you that General Saltzman and I had had lunch with General McCoy a few days before and had discussed the desirability of no action being taken by the Far Eastern Commission on reparations levels until after the Overseas Consultants’ report and its recommendations were available for study here. My recollection is that you agreed with this suggestion and also you did not think it necessary to withdraw the present SWNCC paper now before FEC, inasmuch as action would be unlikely anyway and General McCoy could appropriately delay action if necessary. On the 25th of August an agreement was reached between the State and Army Departments that after the lapse of 60 days a decision would be made as to whether or not a unilateral directive based on SWNCC 236/43 would be issued to General MacArthur. General MacArthur was informed of this agreement. On 25 October when no final decision on this subject had been made, the following cable for General MacArthur was drafted and was sent to the State Department for concurrence: 53 “CinCFE “1. Re ourad W–85285 (Aug) policy decision by FEC on content of SWNCC 236/43 has not been possible by 25 Oct and there is little prospect for substantive reparations agreements in near future. “2. In view of present OCI expert study now being made we will not press further for final policy decision on reparations levels until after the OCI report and its recommendations are available, the view here being that a final U.S. position would be unwise until OCI recommendations can be given consideration.” This draft cable was sent to the State Department shortly after our conversation. I have since been informed that the State Department does not wish to send this cable and that the State Department would not oppose FEC finalizing the reparations levels pending receipt of the report in question. The Department of the Army considers that such action would be contrary to the best interests of the United States, since there is a real question whether the proposed levels could result in a self-supporting Japanese economy and that, in any case, no final action should be taken or even considered until the report and its recommendations are available. I had thought your views were in accordance with ours in this matter and would appreciate your comment on it. We still believe that some such cable should be dispatched. 54 Sincerely yours, William H. Draper, Jr . 52 Secretary of War Kenneth C. Royall became Secretary of the Army on September 19. 53 See Mr. Hemmendinger’s memorandum, October 29, p. 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] . 54 Mr. Lovett replied to this letter on January 13, 1948. Memorandum by Mr. John A. Bailey, Administrative Officer of the Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs 740.00119 PW/11–2647 [Document 364] Memorandum by Mr. John A. Bailey, Administrative Officer of the Division of Occupied-Area Economic Affairs 55 [ Washington ,] November 26, 1947. Subject: Review of U.S. Reparations, Restitution and Restoration Delegation to date. The function of the U.S. Reparations, Restitution and Restoration Delegation to Japan is to represent the interests of the U.S. Government in the following major fields: ( a ) the distribution of reparations from Japan, ( b ) the restitution to claimants of property looted from their territory by Japan, and ( c ) the restoration of property owned by U.S. citizens to its rightful owner. A separate U.S. mission to accomplish these purposes is necessary because the American forces under General MacArthur are in Japan as an Allied Occupation Force, representing the interests of all allied powers, and not the direct interest of the U.S. Government as such. As a consequence, General MacArthur has invited the United Nations with paramount Far Eastern interests, who compose the Far Eastern Commission, namely, Australia, China, France, India, The Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, The Philippines, UK, USSR, and the U.S. to appoint official missions to perform the above mentioned general functions in Japan. All eleven countries have accepted the invitation and now have missions actively operating in Japan. These missions act both as spokesman and claimant for their respective governments and as advisors to SCAP in the development of mutually acceptable procedures for the solution of these problems. Jointly the eleven missions form the Reparations Technical Advisory Commission to SCAP and will shortly be organized into a similar agency concerned with problems of restitution and restoration. Accomplishments: The accomplishments of the first 6 months of the operation of the mission may be summarized under the following heads: ( a ) Reparations . The U.S. mission has participated actively in the organization of the Reparations Technical Advisory Committee in Tokyo. This eleven nation inter-allied body, in consultation with SCAP, has been responsible for the development of specific procedures which will govern the selection and distribution of reparations facilities in Japan. The U.S. member, both because of the position of the U.S. in the administration of Japan and because of his personal acquaintance with the activities of the Far Eastern Commission and its basic policies governing Japan, has exerted a considerable influence upon the policies of the RTAC. In addition, the U.S. member, for the foregoing reasons, has frequently been able to negotiate points of conflict between other nations and SCAP with mutual benefit to both parties and considerable benefit to U.S. foreign relations in this field. During this period basic procedures have been adopted, the first allocation of reparations under the advance transfer reparations program of the U.S. has been made and additional removals of facilities will begin in the near future. The first actual reparations from Japan, consisting of some 20 thousand machine tools, have recently been allocated and are now being packaged for removal. While the U.S. is not a recipient of any of these advance reparations, the prompt receipt and use of them by such nations as the Philippines, China, N.E.I. and Malay–Burma, is of direct concern to the basic policies of the U.S. Government in assisting in the rapid post-war recovery of these areas and in lessening consequent requirements for U.S. dollar assistance. ( b ) Restitution . The direct concern of the U.S. in the restoration of looted property has been minor, since very little American territory has been actually occupied by the Japanese. The principal activities of the U.S. delegation in this field has been concerned with the revision of existing policies and procedures, in consultation with SCAP and the Department of State, in order to expedite the restitution of property owned by other countries. An example of the work of the mission in this field has been the success of the Chief of the Delegation in obtaining SCAP approval of a broad revision of basic policy under consideration by the Far Eastern Commission. ( c ) Restoration . The most direct U.S. interest of the activities of the delegation is in the prompt restoration of U.S. owned property in Japan to its rightful owners. The U.S. delegation has invited all major U.S. interests with property in Japan to send representatives, as technical aides to the delegation, for the purpose of inspecting their properties, recommending steps necessary for their adequate protection while under the custodianship of SCAP, and formulating a decision as to the time and conditions under which they desire a return of that property. To date, some 15 representatives of such American concerns as I.T. & T., Ford Motor Company, Singer Sewing Machine, Otis Elevator, Libby Owens Ford, and Socony Vacuum Oil Company have availed themselves of this opportunity. The U.S. delegation has also been actively concerned in developing, with SCAP, detailed policies and procedures for the actual restoration of this property, for its exemption from Japanese war-time tax burdens, and its treatment under Japanese corporate re-organization policies. In addition to the foregoing official functions, it should be recognized that the U.S. delegation is the only fully independent representative of the State Department in Tokyo and as such it has been of great service to the Department in consulting with SCAP on various proposed U.S. economic policies requiring SCAP approval and also in reporting to the Department developments within Japan which would effect basic policies under consideration in the Department, or in the Far Eastern Commission. Future Activities: The activities of the past six months have been largely preparatory to a greatly increased flow of reparations, of restituted looted property and the actual restoration of U.S. property in Japan, all of which, it is anticipated, will reach a peak with the next 6 months. The best estimate of the Department of the duration of the activities of the mission, with regard to these matters, is that it will require a further period of 2 years for completion. This estimate is based upon the policies adopted by the Far Eastern Commission for the removals of restorations work and identification of looted property. The foregoing discussion of the functions of the delegation indicates clearly the technical nature of the problems involved. It has also been the experience of the delegation during the past 6 months that the technical competence of its personnel and their intimate acquaintance with the policies of the Far Eastern Commission has been of major significance in their negotiations with other delegations in Tokyo. When the delegation was originally formed, it was staffed by personnel temporarily detailed to it from their regular assignments dealing with these same matters in the Department in Washington. At that time it was hoped that it would be possible to employ an eminently qualified person, either in or out of the government, to become permanent Chief of the Delegation. However, over a period of 6 months it has not been found possible to obtain a person from outside sources with the requisite technical knowledge and experience. It has, therefore, been necessary to ask Mr. Charles L. Hodge, who has been serving as Chief of the delegation on a detail basis from OE, if he would be willing to serve as permanent Chief of the Delegation. He has agreed to accept the position providing the Department would grant him reemployment rights, allow him to maintain his Civil Service Status, and provided his family could join him for the duration of his stay. He also expressed the need for a qualified technical assistant if he was to do the job expected of him by the Department. 56 55 Addressed to Dr. Warren Kelchner, of the Division of International Conferences. The memorandum was drafted by Rufus Burr Smith who had originally headed the reparations mission in Japan. 56 In despatch 1482, December 29, the Acting Political Adviser in Japan reported on the operations of the Reparations and Restitution delegations in Japan and submitted a list of the personnel of 11 delegations. The Reparations Technical Advisory Committee had held 16 meetings since June 2, and a Restitution Advisory Committee was being planned. (800.515/12–2947) The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 740.00119 PW/12–1047: Telegram [Document 365] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom secret us urgent Washington , December 10, 1947—3 p.m. TelMar 63. For Martin 57 from Barnett OE: Discussed with Plimsoll prospects for US-Australian proposals on Japanese reparation shares. It is hoped you can take steps to facilitate UK support. December 4 meeting FEC Soviets stated US proposal unacceptable because Soviet minimum demand 12 percent. Chinese stated they could accept US proposal as “point of departure and basis of discussion”. FEC considered Chinese statement as rejection of our proposal. Graves in BritEmb has advised FonOff to consider US-Australian proposals dead. Subsequent December 4 meeting, McCoy obtained from Amb Koo informal commitment that China will change position and will indicate clearly acceptance US schedule. Suggest you and Drumright 58 see Dening 59 and explain Dept’s desire obtain 10–country approval and belief this possible if UK can support. 60 [Barnett.] Lovett 57 Edwin M. Martin, Acting Chief of the Division of Occupied-Areas Economic Affairs. 58 Everett F. Drumright, First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (and appointed December 9 to the mission in Tokyo). 59 Maberly E. Dening, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 60 Mr. Drumright in a letter on December 12 and Secretary Marshall in telegram Martel 89, December 18, reported conversations with British Foreign Office members who promised to review the situation in the light of the discussion; however, the feeling was strong that British colonies in the Far East, Burma, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom should receive substantially equal amounts from Japan (740.00119 PW/12–1247 and/12–1847). The efforts of the United States in behalf of a peace treaty with Japan The efforts of the United States in behalf of a peace treaty with Japan [366] The Ambassador in Australia (Butler) to the Secretary of State Canberra, January 28, 1947. 740.0011 PW(Peace)/1–2847 [367] Mr. George Atcheson, Jr ., to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Washington, 12 February 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/2–1247 [368] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) [Washington,] March 20, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2047 [369] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, March 20, 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/3–2047 [370] Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Tokyo, 20 March 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2047 [371] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokoyo, March 21, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2147: Telegram [372] Memorandum by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur [Tokyo,] 21 March 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2147 [373] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) [Washington,] March 24, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2447 [374] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) [Washington,] May 14, 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/5–1447 [375] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) [Washington,] May 20, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/5–2047 [376] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, June 9, 1947. 740.0011 PW Peace/6–947 [377] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia Washington, June 10, 1947—3 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/6–247: Telegram [378] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs (Braden) [Washington,] June 17, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/6–1747 [379] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Washington, June 26, 1947—3 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/6–2647: Telegram [380] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, July 7, 1947—7 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–747: Telegram [381] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) [Washington,] July 8, 1947—11:30 a.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–847 [382] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) [Washington,] July 1, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1147 [383] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State Moscow, July 11, 1947—6 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1147: Telegram [384] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) [Washington,] July 16, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1547 [385] The British Embassy to the Department of State July 15, 1947 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1547 [386] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, July 17, 1947—6 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1747: Telegram [387] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State Moscow, July 23, 1947—2 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–2347: Telegram [388] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) [Washington,] July 23, 1947—2:30 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–2247 [389] The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 28, 1947. 740.0011 P.W.(Peace)/7–2847: Telegram [390] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfleld) [Washington,] August 2, 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–247 [391] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) [Washington,] August 6, 1947. 740.0011–P.W. (Peace)/8–647 [392] Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Fahy) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] August 7, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–747 [393] Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Kennan) [Washington,] August 11, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1147 [394] Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] August 12, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1147 [395] Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] August 12, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1247 [396] The Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé (Tsarapkin) Washington, August 12, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–2347 [397] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, August 13, 1947—2 p.m. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–1347: Telegram [398] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) [Washington,] August 13, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1347 [399] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) Washington, August 13, 1947—3 p.m. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–1347: Telegram [400] Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Bishop of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) [Washington,] August 14, 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–1447 [401] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Clark) to the Secretary of State London, August 14, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1447: Airgram [402] Memorandum by Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) Washington, 18 August 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–1847 [403] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, August 22, 1947—noon. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2247: Telegram [404] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia Washington, August 22, 1947—6 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2047: Telegram [405] Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] August 25, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–747 [406] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) Washington, August 25, 1947—6 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2547: Telegram [407] Memorandum by Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) Washington, 25 August 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–2547 [408] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Petropolis Washington, August 26, 1947—7 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2447: Telegram [409] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Petropolis Washington, August 26, 1947—7 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2647: Telegram [410] The Chief of the Planning Branch, Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Fahey) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) Washington, 29 August 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2947 [411] The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State Washington, August 29, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2947 [412] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 29, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2947: Telegram [413] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State Tokyo, September 1, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–147: Telegram [414] Editorial Note [415] The Australian Ambassador (Makin) to the Acting Secretary of State Washington, 2 September, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–247 [416] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, September 11, 1947—noon. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2947: Telegram [417] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [New York,] September 14, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–1447 [418] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [New York,] September 14, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–1447 [419] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) [New York,] September 17, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–1747 [420] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] September 22, 1947. 740.0011 PW Peace/9–2247 [421] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) [Washington,] October 6, 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/10–647 [422] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [New York,] October 9, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [423] The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang) to the Secretary of State New York, October 9, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [424] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) [Washington,] October 9, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [425] The British Embassy to the Department of State undated 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [426] The British Embassy to the Department of State [Washington], October, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [427] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) [Washington,] October 10, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [428] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) Washington, October 13, 1947—6 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–1347: Telegram [429] Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) [Washington,] October 14, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2947 [430] The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to the Secretary of State New York, 16 October, 1947. 740.00116 PW/10–1647 [431] The Secretary of State to the Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) New York, October 22, 1947. 740.00116 PW/10–1647 [432] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) [Tokyo,] October 26, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2747 [433] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [New York,] October 28, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2847 [434] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) Tokyo, October 28, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2847 [435] Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs [Washington,] October 29, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2947 [436] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 4, 1947—2 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–447: Telegram [437] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in China Washington, November 7, 1947—5 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–447: Telegram [438] The Secretary of State to the Pakistani Ambassador (Ispahani) Washington, November 10, 1947. 740.0011 PW(Peace)/9–3047 [439] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) [Washington,] November 14, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–1447 [440] The Chinese Ambassador (Koo) to the Secretary of State Washington, November 17, 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/11–1747 [441] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) [Washington,] November 18, 1947. 740.00119 PW (Peace) [442] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, November 20, 1947—2 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2047: Telegram [443] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) [Washington,] November 20, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2047 [444] The British Embassy to the Department of State undated 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2047 [445] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) Washington, November 21, 1947—7 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2147: Telegram [446] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London Washington, November 21, 1947—7 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2147: Telegram [447] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London Washington, November 27, 1947—1 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2447: Telegram [448] The Soviet Chargé (Tarassenko) to the Secretary of State Washington, November 27, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2747 [449] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, December 2, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–247: Telegram [450] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State Moscow, December 2, 1947—9 p.m. 740.0011 P.W.(Peace)/12–247: Telegram [451] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, December 5, 1947—6 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–547: Telegram [452] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London Washington, December 5, 1947—8 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–547: Telegram [453] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London Washington, December 6, 1947—3 p.m. 740.0011PW (Peace)/12–647: Telegram [454] The Chinese Ambassador (Koo) to the Acting Secretary of State Washington, December 6, 1947. 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/12–647 [455] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 8, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–847: Telegram [456] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State London, December 11, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–1147: Telegram [457] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London Washington, December 15, 1947—5 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–1547: Telegram [458] Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Drumright) to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London [London,] December 16, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–1647 [459] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 16, 1947. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–1647: Airgram [460] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, December 22, 1947—10 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–247: Telegram [461] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State Moscow, December 27, 1947—3 p.m. 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–2747: Telegram The Ambassador in Australia (Butler) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW(Peace)/1–2847 [Document 366] The Ambassador in Australia ( Butler ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 99 Canberra , January 28, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram no. 279 of December 13, 1946, 7 p.m., 61 wherein I was instructed to advise Dr. Evatt 62 informally and confidentially that the United States hoped and desired that Australia would participate on a full and equal basis in the formulation of the peace treaty with Japan, and to my telegraphic reply, no. 36 of January 28, 1947, 9 a.m., 61 summarizing the content of a letter addressed to me on January 17, 1947 by Dr. Evatt, expressing appreciation of the message referred to above and outlining his Government’s thoughts with respect to Japanese peace treaty negotiations. I am forwarding herewith a copy of the text of Dr. Evatt’s letter. Respectfully yours, Robert L. Butler [Enclosure] The Australian Minister for External Affairs ( Evatt ) to the American Ambassador in Australia ( Butler ) secret Canberra , 17th January 1947. My Dear Ambassador : Would you kindly convey to the Secretary of State my thanks for the message of 13th December in connection with the Japanese peace treaty negotiations which you communicated to me personally? The expression of your Government’s desire for Australia’s full and equal participation in these negotiations is warmly welcomed and we would attach very great importance to an assurance of the United States Government’s full support for Australia’s claim to participate as a principal party in all discussions of the settlement with Japan including any preliminary or preparatory discussions. It will be recalled that our Ambassador in the United States of America, 63 in conversation with the Secretary of State on December 9th, stressed Australia’s vital interest in the future arrangements regarding the ex-Japanese Mandated Islands, and informed him that in any consultations regarding these or other Japanese island territories Australia would claim a right to participate as a party principal. 64 We have recently been giving preliminary study to the vast and complex range of questions involved in the settlement with Japan and are ready at any time to enter into exploratory discussions with your Government. We would be glad to take up at once, for example, the question whether the Far Eastern Commission would be the appropriate body to undertake the drafting and negotiation of the treaty and if not what would be the most appropriate method for handling the work. In our view, the work of drafting and negotiating the settlement with Japan should be done by those nations who were effective belligerents in the Japanese war and whose geographical position gives them paramount interests in the future of the Pacific Area. Although it is appreciated that it will be some considerable time before the actual treaty can be concluded and the occupation forces withdrawn from Japan, I think the time is near when thought should be given to the formulation and interchange of views on the form the treaty should take. I would therefore welcome any suggestions your Government might wish to make in order to initiate an exchange of views between representatives of our two Governments. We would of course wish the New Zealand Government to be kept fully in touch with any such preliminary discussions. In view of the fact that Australia is in a sense the representative of the British Commonwealth of Nations chiefly concerned in the Pacific we are advising the United Kingdom Government of the purport of the present communication. Yours sincerely, H. V. Evatt 61 Not printed. 62 Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs. 61 Not printed. 63 Norman J. O. Makin. 64 For documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. i , pp. 544 ff, and 1947, volume i . Mr. George Atcheson, Jr ., to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/2–1247 [Document 367] Mr. George Atcheson, Jr ., 65 to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 66 eyes alone Washington , 12 February 1947. My Dear General : In my talk with General Hilldring 67 this morning he gave me assurances that no inter-governmental discussion of the details of a treaty with Japan will be entered into without full and prior coordination with you. There is a draft treaty, which I am to see, now in preparation in the Department of State but I am told that it has not progressed very far and has remained within a State Department committee without yet even having been discussed with any other Department of the Government. General Hilldring states it is probable that at the Moscow Conference 68 the Secretary will issue some statement to the general effect that the United States Government is willing at some future Foreign Ministers’ Conference to discuss the question of what machinery should be set up to prepare a treaty with Japan. This, however, has not yet been finally decided. General Hilldring feels, and I concur, that as a matter of procedure it would be far preferable when the time comes to undertake discussion of a peace treaty in the Foreign Ministers’ Conference and to keep it out of the Far Eastern Commission whose terms of reference make no provision for such discussion and whose character in general is such that there is little likelihood that discussion in that body would be productive of anything but delay and other difficulty. 69 Very sincerely yours, George Atcheson, Jr. 65 Political Adviser in Japan, and Chief of the Diplomatic Section, GHQ, SCAP, on consultation in Washington. 66 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Japan. 67 Gen. John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas. 68 For documentation on the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Moscow March 10–April 24, see vol. ii , p. 139 ff. 69 In telegram 85, March 11, 7 p.m., to Tokyo, the Acting Secretary of State informed Mr. Atcheson that the Secretary was expected to make a statement during the Moscow Conference along the following general lines: “The Government of the United States suggests that it would be desirable for the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss at a meeting in the near future questions of procedure with regard to the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.” (740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–1147) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2047 [Document 368] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Allison ) confidential [ Washington ,] March 20, 1947. Mr. Stirling 70 called this afternoon at his request. He said news stories had been carried in the Australian press to the effect that Acting Secretary Acheson had stated the Department had been working on a draft treaty of peace with Japan for some time and that the press stories implied that there was in existence an American draft treaty. As a result, the Australian Embassy here had been instructed to ascertain whether or not such a draft treaty did exist and if so whether it would be possible for a copy to be made available to the Australian Government. Mr. Stirling said he had been instructed to refer to previous communications from the American Embassy in Canberra to the Australian Government to the effect that the United States would support Australian participation in the consideration of a peace treaty with Japan. He also referred to Mr. Evatt’s letter of January 17 to the American Ambassador in Canberra, in which Mr. Evatt said that the Australian Government has been giving preliminary study to considerations involved in a settlement with Japan and is ready at any time to enter into exploratory discussions with the United States. I told Mr. Stirling that Mr. Acheson’s statement had been in response to a question based on General MacArthur’s recent interview in Tokyo, 71 and that while I did not have before me the exact text of what Mr. Acheson had said, I knew that it was to the effect that interested offices of the Department had been conducting preparatory and exploratory studies for some time on the question of a peace treaty with Japan. I pointed out that this was only natural and that I presumed the same sort of work was going on in other foreign offices. I stated definitely that there was no accepted U.S. draft treaty as yet which could be shown to anyone else. In reply to a specific question I stated that the State Department had had no conversations with the United Kingdom Government or anyone else regarding the treaty with Japan. I assured Mr. Stirling that we were well aware of the deep interest of Australia in this matter and I reaffirmed our previous statement that the United States hopes and desires Australia will participate on a full and equal basis in the formulation of a peace treaty with Japan. Mr. Stirling thanked me and said he had assumed the situation was as I described it and that he would so report to his Government. 70 Alfred Stirling, Minister, Australian Embassy. 71 The press interview in Tokyo on March 17 was reported by the Associated Press; for transcript, see SCAP, Report of Government Section: Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 765. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/3–2047 [Document 369] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 66 London , March 20, 1947. Subject: Foreign Office Comment on General Mac Arthur’s Advocacy of Treaty with Japan. Sir : I have the honor to enclose a copy of a self-explanatory memorandum of a conversation held between a Foreign Office official and an officer of the Embassy on the above-cited subject on March 19, 1947. I also enclose a copy of the text of an item which appeared in the March 19, 1947 issue of the Manchester Guardian (independent) on the subject of General Mac Arthur’s pronouncement. 72 There is very good reason to believe that that item was written after its author had canvassed the situation at the Foreign Office, and that it correctly reflects Foreign Office thought on the subject of Japan. Respectfully yours, For the Ambassador: Everett F. Drumright First Secretary of Embassy [Enclosure] Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Drumright ) confidential [ London ,] March 19, 1947. Subject: Foreign Office Comment on General MacArthur’s Advocacy of Treaty with Japan. In the course of an informal conversation this afternoon at the Foreign Office, Mr. Drumright inquired what views were held in the Foreign Office on the statement made by General MacArthur to foreign correspondents at Tokyo on March 17, 1947. Mr. MacDermot 73 said that General MacArthur’s views on the future of Japan had not come as a surprise to the Foreign Office, since about a week prior to his interview with the press General MacArthur had imparted them in a general way to Mr. Gascoigne, the chief British diplomatic representative in Tokyo. Mr. MacDermot said that the Foreign Office shared General MacArthur’s views that an early settlement of issues about Japan is desirable. He went on to say that the Foreign Office is in favor of the conclusion of a general treaty with Japan, but that before such a treaty is arranged the Foreign Office considers that a disarmament and demilitarization treaty along the lines suggested by Mr. Byrnes in 1946 74 should be concluded among the interested powers. Though generally approving of General MacArthur’s statement, Mr. MacDermot said that the Foreign Office was “piqued” over his remark that “Japan was still blockaded by the allied powers.” Mr. MacDermot went on to say that Great Britain was not responsible for the economic blockade of Japan and had never wanted it. For several months, as a matter of fact, Britain had been calling for the opening of Japan to private trade, and he (Mr. MacDermot) was glad to see that more and more steps were being taken to open Japan to private trade. Mr. Drumright inquired whether the Foreign Office had issued or contemplated issuing a statement in regard to General MacArthur’s pronouncement. Mr. MacDermot replied that the Foreign Office had not issued a formal statement but that after consultation the news department of the Foreign Office had “briefed” certain correspondents on its thoughts on the matter. Before closing the conversation, Mr. Drumright referred to the currecent clamor in Britain for the demobilization of British troops and asked in this relation whether there might be further withdrawal of British troops from Japan. While Mr. MacDermot did return a categorical reply to this question, it appeared from the tenor of his remarks that the British Government may now have under consideration the withdrawal of further British contingents from Japan. In this connection, Mr. MacDermot referred to a recent pronouncement of the Indian Government on the return of all Indian troops to India and remarked that this undoubtedly presaged the recall of Indian troops from Japan. Everett F. Drumright 72 Not reprinted; it indicated approval of General MacArthur’s call for an early peace settlement and his proposal to end the economic blockade and to restore free trading with Japan (740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2047). 73 D. F. MacDermot, Head of the Japan and Pacific Department of the British Foreign Office. 74 For draft released by the Department on June 21, 1946, see Department of State Bulletin , June 30, 1946, p. 1113. Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2047 [Document 370] Memorandum by the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur top secret eyes alone Tokyo , 20 March 1947. Subject: Outline and Various Sections of Draft Treaty. Subjoined are preliminary State Department “committee” drafts as follows: 75 (1) Outline of the Peace Treaty with Japan. (2) Preamble to the Treaty. (3) Chapter I—Territorial Clauses. (4) Chapter II—Clauses Relating to Ceded Territories. Chapter V, Interim Controls, was recently communicated to you. As stated in the covering memorandum addressed to me 76 these drafts are tentative and have not as yet been approved by the State Department committee working on the drafts or elsewhere in the State Department. The other sections of the draft treaty as indicated in the outline have not yet been drafted. With reference to Chapter I, Territorial Clauses, article A, 1, I understand that discussion is still continuing between JCS and SWNCC in regard to the future of Okinawa and the most southern part of the Kuriles. Any comment you might wish to make in regard to any portion of the draft would, of course, be most welcome. George Atcheson, Jr . 75 Drafts not printed. 76 Not printed; it was dated March 19 and initialed by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton), who was temporarily in Tokyo. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2147: Telegram [Document 371] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokoyo , March 21, 1947. 65. Press despatches from Washington cite officials of the State Department as saying that during my recent visit to Washington I was informed of preparatory steps being taken for a Japanese Treaty; that upon my return to Tokyo I had “undoubtedly” informed General MacArthur thereof; and that as a result General MacArthur issued his “statement” of March 17. 77 The last assertion is without any basis in fact. The General’s interview with correspondents at a luncheon at the Press Club on March 17 occurred the day before he saw the “committee draft” of Chapter 5 and alternate drafts which we are proposing. In fact he issued no “statement” and his answers to inquiries by correspondents were unpremeditated. He attended the luncheon on the prior understanding that no questions would be asked but on arrival was persuaded to be interviewed. We were all surprised at the emphasis given by the press to his replies because they were either repetitions or paraphrases of remarks made and published previously. His opinion concerning the post-war United Nations relationship with Japan was published in Washington during my visit there in a press article by the Christian Science Monitor editor. The opinion that we should have an early treaty with Japan was expressed in his published message to the Congress regarding appropriations for occupation purposes and was regarded as in line with the prior statement by the President that early treaties with Germany and Japan were desirable. Other remarks in reply to the correspondents inquiries had been included in various press releases published here and in the United States. This seems to be one of those instances in which the handling of the matter by the sensational press has created public issues which otherwise were nonexistent. While General MacArthur’s remarks were not intended to pose any immediate problems to the Government, I believe with him that a basic decision on the entire matter should if possible be reached at an early date. It is hoped that General MacArthur’s detailed views as to the most practicable post-occupation arrangement for Japan will be available soon. I understand that the Australian Government sometime ago formed a “committee” composed of Evatt, the Foreign Under Secretary, Eggleston, Makin and Ball 78 to prepare a draft peace treaty, and that both the British and Chinese Governments are thinking concretely about the matter. Atcheson 77 See footnote 71, p. 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 368 ] . 78 Sir Frederic W. Eggleston had been Ambassador to the United States and was succeeded by Norman J. O. Makin in 1946; W. MacMahon Ball was head of the Australian Mission in Japan and joint representative of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and India on the Allied Council for Japan. Memorandum by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2147 [Document 372] Memorandum by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur [ Tokyo ,] 21 March 1947. Memorandum Concerning Drafts of Chapter V ( Interim Controls ) and Chapter VI ( Disarmament and Demilitarization ) of a Treaty of Peace With Japan in Process of Preparation by the State Department, and Draft of Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan 79 These drafts embody the concepts that, following the signing of a Treaty of Peace, a military occupation of Japan should continue, as should existing control machinery in slightly modified form; that all directives theretofore issued in furtherance of occupational objectives, not inconsistent with the treaty terms, should remain in force until altered or revoked by the control council proposed to be established to replace the Far Eastern Commission; and that following the complete withdrawal of all Allied Forces from Japan a four power control be established. Such proposals could not fail to be challenged as imperialistic in concept, in purpose, and in form. They are furthermore unrealistic in that, should a military occupation continue after a treaty is signed, it would merely substitute newly designed control machinery for that now existing—machinery which would relegate to virtual impotency the executive authority over Japan, through a complete subordination to a control body sitting in Washington and the rights of appeal therein established against all local executive action. The proposals would fail to take into account inherent weaknesses which experience has disclosed, and immeasurably add to the confusion which heretofore already has resulted from the operation of the present system established by the Moscow Conference of 1945. The proposal for a later four power control, to the exclusion of other nations actively engaged in the war against Japan, would be highly offensive to the latter nations and most unwarranted. As I have previously stated, it is my considered view that the Japanese nation and people are now ready for the initiation of negotiations leading to a Treaty of Peace—ready in the sense that Japan’s warmaking power and potential is destroyed, the framework to democratic government has been erected, reforms essential to the reshaping of Japanese lives and institutions to conform to democratic ideals have been instituted, and the people have been accorded the fundamentals of human liberty. And ready in the sense that there is a “peacefully inclined and responsible government” which can pledge Japan to the undertakings incident to such a treaty. Such a treaty, however, must be designed effectively to restore peace—not merely to extend in modified form the foreign military controls now existing. For it is a truism that democracy is a thing of the spirit which can neither be purchased nor imposed by the threat or application of force. For it is only under conditions of peace, with a maximum of freedom to seek its own economic salvation, that Japan may have any hope to revive its internal economy to the point that will reasonably permit of its self-sufficiency. Until this is done, the responsibility to cover the deficit to the economic level necessary to sustain Japanese life must continue to rest upon the American taxpayer. Until it is done, the absorption of the ideals of democracy, however firmly the seeds are sown, will proceed slowly, as the shadow of foreign bayonets is not conducive to rapid democratic growth. As I have previously pointed out, Japanese economy has always been geared to the necessity for the importation of food resources to sustain life. Such necessity was never more real than now with the resources of Manchuria, Korea and Formosa withdrawn, fishing rights on the high seas curtailed, and with the home islands under the strangulation of an economic blockade which must continue to exist, in varying degrees of intensity, until Japan is rendered completely free to chart its own course toward economic revival. In my opinion, this revival to a point of self-sufficiency, with a consequent release of our responsibility to cover any deficit in the bare essentials of life, is dependent upon the effectuation of such a treaty. A realistic approach to this problem requires that such a treaty should provide: for the complete withdrawal of all direct military controls; for an undertaking by the Japanese Government and people to respect and faithfully comply with all of the basic mandates incident to Japan’s surrender, and vigorously to advance the fundamental political, social and economic reforms already instituted, with the right reserved to every Japanese citizen to appeal to the United Nations, through its appropriate instrumentality, the deprivation of any fundamental right or the emasculation of any basic reform, granted or instituted during the period of occupation; and for such minimum future inspection and control, for at least a generation, by the United Nations as may prove necessary to insure that such treaty commitments are fully and faithfully complied with. The means of inspection and control by the United Nations should, of course, be left to that body to determine initially, and to modify as experience dictates, rather than be limited to any prescription established by treaty with Japan, as only in that manner may the United Nations freely reorient its course as circumstances from time to time may require. Sight should not be lost of the fact that the situation here presented involves more than an unilateral undertaking alone, as Japan, by the terms of its new Constitution, has taken an advanced position in the evolution of civilization through its renunciation of war, of the future maintenance of armed force, and of all sovereign rights of belligerency. It has thus rendered its future security subject to the justice and good faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. There is here a challenge which all other nations must accept if they would foster and preserve the peace—a challenge to the moral strength of all men and nations of good-will, which must firmly be met if physical force is ever to yield to moral force in the settlement of disputes involving men and nations and continents. It is therefore incumbent that the Allied Nations for their part, in the spirit of this constitutional provision, undertake to guarantee the neutrality of Japan, with the view to the transfer of such undertaking to the stewardship of the United Nations, where the responsibility properly should rest. The Treaty of Peace with Japan, within the broad limitations of the surrender terms, should be negotiated with representatives of the Japanese people—not imposed upon them. All eleven of the Allied Powers directly concerned should participate. Devoid of vengeful purposes, it should be so composed as realistically to provide for the emergence here of a social system dedicated to peace, with full economic, social and political opportunity for the advancement of the dignity and welfare of the individual. It should constitute within itself a charter of human liberty to which the Japanese citizen will cling for guidance and protection, rather than shun with the revulsion of shame. Without yielding firmness in its essential mandates, it should avoid punitive or arbitrary and complex provisions, and by its terms set the pattern for future peace among the peoples of the world. It should emphasize in natural sequence the full dignity of the organization of the United Nations as the final arbiter among the nations of the world to preserve the peace. It should in full reality mark the restoration of a peace based upon justice, good-will and human advancement, if the costly victory is to become the cornerstone to enduring peace. Without going into detail, I recommend that these drafts be amended in accordance with the above concepts. Douglas MacArthur 79 In a memorandum of March 26, Mr. Borton and Miss Ruth E. Bacon, who were on a visit to Tokyo, commented on General MacArthur’s memorandum and pointed out that it applied “primarily to only one of the three alternative drafts which have been prepared.” (FE Files) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/3–2447 [Document 373] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Allison ) confidential [ Washington ,] March 24, 1947. While calling on another matter Mr. Graves 80 referred to General MacArthur’s recent interview and the statements of Mr. Acheson at his press conference on March 18th. He then said his Government would be interested in knowing how far along we were in preparation for a Japanese treaty and whether or not the time had come when profitable formal discussions between our two Governments could take place. I told him that as Mr. Acheson had stated in his press conference, the interested divisions in the Department had been working for some time on the preparatory work necessary prior to consideration of the peace treaty with Japan, but that at the present time there was no accepted U.S. draft treaty which could profitably be discussed with anyone. Mr. Graves said he assumed that was the case but expressed personal hope that it would not be too long before at least informal discussions could take place. He referred to Drew Pearson’s prediction on the radio the night of March 23rd that the Japanese peace conference would be held in San Francisco in October and that General MacArthur would be a delegate and said he presumed that was merely an intelligent guess on Mr. Pearson’s part. I stated that as far as I knew no thought had been given in the Department as to locale of a Japanese peace conference or to the composition of the American delegation. 80 Hubert A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/5–1447 [Document 374] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) confidential [ Washington ,] May 14, 1947. Memo for the Record Recommendation hereunder agreed to by Secretary on May 14, 1947, in conference with General Hilldring and Mr. Vincent with following modification: We are prepared to agree to four-power unanimity as stated in the attached memorandum but are not prepared to agree to six-power unanimity as stated therein. The Secretary believes that the inclusion of France, in view of its negative record in the Pacific during the war, among the “principally interested” powers would inevitably raise embarrassing issues with other Pacific nations, such as New Zealand, the Netherlands, India and the Philippines. [Annex] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Secretary of State confidential [ Washington ,] May 12, 1947. Preparatory Conference on a Japanese Peace Treaty Officers of the Department have discussed methods for initiating action on the above subject. There is complete agreement that a preparatory conference should not be confined to the representatives of only four nations (US, UK, USSR and China) or of the CFM powers (France in addition to the four powers named). A majority of the officers felt certain that the USSR would not join in a conference of eleven nations which did not provide for large-power unanimity (for a Soviet veto). Some officers felt that Russia would, faced with a definite decision to hold an eleven-power conference based on a two-thirds voting procedure, choose participation as less disadvantageous than abstention. There were some officers who felt that the US itself should retain some kind of veto. Discussion produced general agreement to proceed as follows: Ambassador Smith upon his return to Moscow would consult with Molotov. Simultaneously, Department officers would consult with the Ambassadors in Washington of the other nine powers. An eleven-power preparatory conference to meet in Washington at an early convenient date would be suggested, and the views of the various governments would be solicited. In response to the inevitable question as to voting procedure, we would express a preference for a two-thirds majority system and request the views of the various governments as to what nations might be considered as “principally interested” if large-power unanimity were desired. It is recommended that we make the approaches to the representatives of the various governments as indicated above; that we be prepared to reject flatly any suggestion of a conference limited to only four, five or six powers; that we stand firm on our desire for a conference composed of eleven powers; and that we be prepared to accept the principle of large-power unanimity on a basis of four powers (US, UK or Australia, USSR and China) or six powers (US, UK, USSR, China, Australia and France). Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/5–2047 [Document 375] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Hilldring ) 81 top secret [ Washington ,] May 20, 1947. As you are aware, a small group, under the leadership of Mr. Penfield, 82 was designated several months ago to begin work on drafting a Japanese peace treaty. Other members of this group were Miss Bacon (FE), Martin (JK), Hunsberger (OIR), Emmerson (NA) and myself. 83 During the absence of Miss Bacon and myself in the Orient no work was undertaken by the group, but Miss Bacon and I prepared three alternative drafts for the chapters on interim controls and on the disarmament treaty, one of these drafts being based on General MacArthur’s opinion concerning the treaty. In view of recent developments, Mr. Vincent asked me to take charge of the group during Mr. Penfield’s absence. At a meeting May 9, the group decided that guidance was needed on certain fundamental questions before it could carry on its work effectively. Consequently, the group would appreciate an opportunity to discuss with you, Mr. Thorp and Mr. Vincent at your earliest convenience, your views on the following: 1. Should the four-power disarmament treaty for Japan still be considered as basic U.S. policy? It is recommended that, in view of the new approach proposed for the procedural conference for the peace treaty and of the suggestions already made by General MacArthur in reference to United Nations control, a broader basis be adopted for the disarmament treaty and consideration be given to tieing the treaty with the Security Council. 2. Is the possibility of a peace conference being called in the near future sufficiently great to require the group to meet in continuous session until a draft treaty is completed? Prior to Miss Bacon’s and my going to Japan, the group met once a week. If it continues to meet at this rate it probably will not have a draft ready until September 1st. It is recommended, therefore, that the Committee be given instructions to consider the preparation of a draft treaty as a matter of priority, to utilize a limited number of personnel within the divisions concerned for preparation of drafts, and to meet daily if necessary in order ‘to complete a draft by July 1. 3. What relations, if any, should the group have with other divisions of (the Department and other agencies of the Government? Thus far only the persons listed above have been working on the project. I understand, however, that after General MacArthur’s reference to United Nations control of Japan, SPA has set up a committee to work on the treaty and has asked that their representative, Mr. Wainhouse, 84 meet with us. It is recommended that: 1) SPA be asked to send their representative to meetings when chapters on intrim control and on the disarmament treaty are discussed; 2) drafts of the treaty should not be discussed formally by the Committee with any of the other divisions in the Department or other agencies until after a completed draft has been prepared and received further consideration. 4. What relationship, if any, should the group have with SCAP? Ambassador Atcheson informed me that the Secretary had told him that General MacArthur would be kept informed of all stages in drafting of the treaty. It is recommended that upon the approval by the Committee of drafts of the chapters in the treaty, these drafts be transmitted to Tokyo for information. After the draft treaty has been informally approved in the Department, including approval by the Under Secretary, the Committee should meet with representatives of SCAP to allow for an exchange of views. 5. What provisions of the treaty, if any, have such military or strategic significance as to require clearance with the War and Navy Departments through SWNCC or the Committee of Three? It is recommended that only the provisions of the treaty on interim control, disarmament treaty, and territorial disposition require such clearance and that the Department of State prepare its recommendations on these provisions for consideration by SWNCC. Special reports should be prepared for the Ryukyu Islands and for the southern Kuriles. 85 81 Addressed also to Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and John Carter Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. 82 James K. Penfield, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. 83 Ruth E. Bacon, Special Assistant to Mr. Vincent; Edwin M. Martin, Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs; Warren S. Hunsberger, Division of Research for Far East; and John K. Emmerson, Special Assistant to Mr. Borton. 84 David W. Wainhouse, Assistant Chief of the Division of International Organization Affairs. 85 Ernest A. Gross, Deputy to General Hilldring, stated on May 21: “Gen. Hilldring agrees to all recommendations except the last. He points out that consultation with SCAP will have to be through War or JCS, hence it will not do to confine service participation.” (740.0011 PW (Peace) 5–2047) The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.0011 PW Peace/6–947 [Document 376] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) 86 [Extracts] personal and confidential Washington , June 9, 1947. Dear George : … . . . . . . . After careful study of all the papers you have submitted, I am unable to find any fundamental difference of thinking between Tokyo and Washington. After listening to all concepts on this subject from a large variety of sources both in the U.S. and among our Allies, I find I can roughly divide all views into two general categories, punitive and constructive. Those who advocate the punitive approach are invariably violent in denouncing those who take the opposite view as anti-Russian, if not Fascist. This has caused and is causing some Americans to shy away from advocacy of a constructive treaty, but their numbers are diminishing and so far as I know there are now none of these any more in any responsible position in our Government. I feel, therefore, that in the matter of the treaty, Tokyo and Washington can henceforth devote themselves to discussion and decisions as to how the constructive philosophy shall be devised and described. We need not any longer, I am sure, concern ourselves with whether or not we shall advocate a punitive treaty. That is a closed issue. I shall not in this letter treat with any of the details of the treaty except to say that our differences appear to me to be minor and susceptible of easy and early reconciliation. [Here follows a paragraph mentioning General MacArthur’s two statements of February 20 and March 17, printed in Political Reorientation of Japan , pages 763–766.] As to the substance of General MacArthur’s recommendation, we feel: ( a ) That he is a hundred percent right as to an early Japanese treaty and ( b ) That placing the external responsibility for Japanese economic recovery in the UN is theoretically sound, but we seriously question the ability of UN to get ready in time to do this job. We believe that some other arrangement is necessary on the simple grounds of competence, either today or in the foreseeable future. The Secretary and I have received General MacArthur’s most recent views on treaty making procedures, and I expect that your Geneeral will hear directly from my General before very long on the proposals that Borton brought back to Washington with him. You may assure the General that we will readjust our present plans to the greatest extent we can in order to incorporate his ideas. The major changes will involve the elimination of a procedural conference and the designation of Tokyo as the site of the peace conference. . . . . . . . With respect to Japan, we are actively supporting General MacArthur—every day. Last week we disregarded the unanimous opinion of the other FEC countries in approving the SCAP whaling expedition for 1947. … Hardly a day goes by that I do not straighten out the thinking of some domestic writer about matters in Japan. I spend many hours a week at this. It isn’t a difficult case to present. General MacArthur has done a magnificent job, and there is a plethora of evidence to prove it. But the point I wish to make is that, so far as the State Department is concerned, no effort is spared at this end to give the General and his operation a good press, and certainly this is the case. No activity of our Government is so well supported in the press and the radio as is SCAP’s administration of Japan. As I said earlier, if we fail to rise to the occasion it is inadvertent. Our heart is in the right place. I enjoyed your letters very much. Please write again whenever you have the urge. Sincerely, John 86 A notation on the original by Mr. Atcheson reads: “Reed June 17 ‘47. Shown to MacA. GA”. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia 740.0011 PW (Peace)/6–247: Telegram [Document 377] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia secret Washington , June 10, 1947—3 p.m. 148. Dept would appreciate whatever info you have on Australian views as to Japanese peace treaty but you should not initiate discussions on the subject and should make it clear to the Australian Govt that we are not yet prepared to enter into bilateral discussions with other nations. Furthermore Dept does not feel that any useful purpose would be served by implementing the proposal that Evatt and you visit Japan (urtel 176 June 2 87 ). You may point out to the Australian Govt that in the near future we will hope to be in a position to exchange views with the Australian Govt in regard to a Japanese peace treaty and to discuss the matter with other interested govts. With regard to General MacArthur you may say that we are of course in close consultation with him on the subject. 88 Marshall 87 Not printed. 88 In telegram 151, June 12, 7 p.m., to Canberra, the Department stated that a Commonwealth conference and a visit to SCAP might arouse misgivings unfavorable to peace negotiations (740.0011 PW(Peace)/6–247). Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs (Braden) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/6–1747 [Document 378] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs ( Braden ) 89 confidential [ Washington ,] June 17, 1947. Procedure for Making Peace With Japan (A) Participation of Other American Republics Generally (B) Participation of Mexico in Particular (A) All the American republics, except Argentina, are at war with Japan and have signed the Declaration by United Nations. Argentina is at war with Japan but has not signed the Declaration. The United States has an obligation to support participation by the Latin American republics, except Argentina, in the making of the peace with Japan. This obligation has the following basis: (1) While the participation of the other American republics in the war effort was generally limited to active political and economic cooperation, the United States did not encourage them to participate with military contingents and allowed them to believe that they would not suffer discrimination in the postwar settlements on that account. (2) The Declaration by United Nations contains a pledge that none of the signatories will make a separate peace. The United States policy in dealing with a like situation as it bears on the making of a peace for Germany, has been to express support for the principle that all states at war with Germany should be invited to participate in a peace conference to consider the draft of the peace settlement as soon as its preparation is sufficiently advanced. While this Government rightly expected that the Soviet Union would oppose such broad participation in the making of this treaty, it gave its support with a view to discharging its obligation and vindicating its good faith, while placing the blame for any failure to invite the states where it belongs. For like reasons, it would appear in order for this Government to support the principle that all the American republics which are at war with Japan and signatories to the Declaration by United Nations have a right to participate in the making of the Japanese peace. Cuba and Mexico have both asserted, in communications to this Government, their claim to such participation. (B) The position of Mexico differs from that of the other Latin American States in that she participated with military contingents in the war against Japan. Thus Mexico’s position with respect to Japan is like that of Brazil with respect to Germany and Italy, since Brazil was the only American republic to participate with military contingents in the war in Europe. Brazil, it will be recalled, was invited to participate in the peace conference on Italy. This Government has formally committed itself to support Mexico’s claim to participation in making the Japanese peace. In instruction no. 867 of February 27, 1947, 90 the American Ambassador in Mexico City was instructed to inform the Mexican Government “that this Government’s position with respect to Mexican participation in the making of a peace with Japan is identical in principle with its position with respect to Mexican participation in the settlements for Germany and Austria”. Our Ambassador in Mexico was instructed to state to the Mexican Foreign Office that this Government’s position with respect to the Mexican participation in the settlements for Germany and Austria was as follows: (1) “The Government of the United States agrees that Mexico should be allowed to participate in the making of the treaties for Germany and Austria.” (2) “The United States will make its position in this respect known to the other powers represented on the Council of Foreign Ministers.” Consequently, as I see it, we have a general obligation to support the participation of all Latin American republics except Argentina, and we have a particular obligation to support the participation of Mexico in making the peace with Japan. Spruille Braden 89 Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) and the Counselor (Cohen). 90 Not printed. The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 740.0011 PW (Peace)/6–2647: Telegram [Document 379] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo secret Washington , June 26, 1947—3 p.m. 237. From the Secretary for General MacArthur: There follows for your info and such comment as you may care to make the text of instruction which has received careful consideration here in Dept and which we expect to dispatch to Moscow in near future: 91 “1. As suggested in your conversations with General Hilldring in Dept please take up personally with Mr. Molotov at earliest possible occasion question of conference on peace treaty for Japan and give Dept as much advance notice as possible of date of your engagement with Molotov in order that similar conversations may be held in Washington with nine other interested powers. “2. You should endeavor obtain USSR views on our desire to hold 11 power conference soon as practicable. You may inform him similar confidential conversations are being held with other nine interested powers in order to obtain such positive ideas as they may have on questions relating to drafting of peace treaty with Japan and that we would appreciate expression of Soviet views on question soon as possible. It is our idea also that other states at war with Japan should be given opportunity to present their views at drafting stage and that after draft has been sufficiently advanced it should be considered by conference of all states at war with Japan. “3. In reply to questions which Mr. Molotov may ask as to voting procedure, you may state that this Govt is disposed to favor decision by simple two thirds majority but wishes to have benefit of views of other powers. “4. For your info and for communication to Molotov at your discretion Dept is prepared to reject any suggestion of a conference limited to only four, five or six powers and to stand firm on our desire for a conference composed of 11 powers, namely those of the members of the FEC. An 11-power conference is considered preferable to a conference composed of nations represented on the Council of Foreign Ministers because: 1) such a conference would broaden the representative basis of participation to include all nations with a primary interest in Japan; 2) the thorny problem of Australian representation would be solved; and 3) the problem of arranging for consultation with directly interested powers in the course of drafting would be greatly simplified. “5. For your info but not for discussion with Molotov at this time, although Dept prefers a voting procedure requiring only two thirds majority of the 11 powers, it would be prepared to consider provision for unanimity among interested powers if the suggestion came from a substantial number of the powers consulted and if the provision for unanimity could be limited to four powers—the US, USSR, China and UK or Australia. Dept believes that the extension of unanimity provision to include greater number of powers would be highly impracticable. In foregoing connection, there have been intimations from British officials here that British Govt would oppose substitution of Australia for UK as one of the vetoing powers but would be prepared to accept straight two thirds majority plan. In December we informed Dr. Evatt of our hope and desire that Australia participate on a full and equal basis in the formulation of a peace treaty with Japan but that it seemed natural to expect the Russians would insist upon a more limited group than the Far Eastern Commission for treaty negotiations and that it was therefore impossible for us to predict what final arrangements would be made for negotiating the treaty.” Marshall 91 General MacArthur replied in telegram C 53694, June 29: “I am in full accord with suggested instructions.” (740.0011 PW (Peace)/6–2947) Text as quoted was sent as telegram 1422, July 7, noon, to Moscow for Ambassador W. Bedell Smith. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–747: Telegram [Document 380] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) secret Washington , July 7, 1947—7 p.m. 259. For your info the fol transmitted to Smith, Moscow, July 7 as Dept’s 1425 (see Deptel 237, June 26): “When you discuss the matter of a peace treaty for Japan with Molotov (Deptel 1422, July 7 92 ) please state that we are anxious to hold a conference on the subject as soon as practicable and suggest tentatively Aug 19 as a date for convening a conference. In view of the Secretary’s commitment to attend conference at Rio on Aug 15 it is not practicable to propose a conference on the Foreign Minister level and we therefore envisage that it would initially be composed of deputies and experts. You should also add that we should be pleased to be host for such a conference in or near Washington or at San Francisco if preferred by the other interested powers. For your info similar suggestions will be made when matter of peace treaty discussed with other nine powers.” Marshall 92 See footnote 91, p. 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 379 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–847 [Document 381] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) [ Washington ,] July 8, 1947—11:30 a.m. Participants: Norman J. O. Makin, Ambassador of Australia Alfred Stirling, Minister of Australia Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State Hugh Borton, Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs Ambassador Makin called at his request. He stated that aside from wishing to make a courtesy call on the Under Secretary 93 and expressing the hope that the cordial relations which had existed between Mr. Acheson and himself would continue in the future, he wished to raise the question of possible action by this Government in reference to discussions with other interested governments on the matter of procedures connected with the Japanese peace treaty. Ambassador Makin added that his Government hoped that no action would be taken by this Government until after the conclusion of the Commonwealth conference in Canberra which is called for August 26, and that he understood statements had been made to the effect that this Government would meet the Australian wishes in this matter. Mr. Lovett interrupted to say that he knew of no such statements. Mr. Borton also stated he was at a loss to know just what the Ambassador was referring to and that our Ambassador in Canberra conveyed to the Australian Government early in June our views that we are not yet prepared to enter into bilateral discussions with other nations on procedural or any other questions relating to the Japanese peace treaty, but that we hoped to be in a position to exchange views with other interested governments on the matter in the near future. Mr. Lovett further stated that this whole matter was under active consideration by this Government and that such matters as the attitude of Congress and possible publicity that might result from Dr. Evatt’s visit to General MacArthur made it impossible for us to say that we would postpone action until any specific date. In answer to a specific question from Ambassador Makin as to whether such assurances could be given, Mr. Lovett again emphasized that we could assure them no separate bilateral discussions would be carried on but that we are not prepared to wait until the end of August to take any specific action. H[ ugh ] B[ orton ] 93 Mr. Lovett had succeeded Dean Acheson on July 1. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1147 [Document 382] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) [ Washington ,] July 1, 1947. Subject: Conversation on Japanese Peace Conference. Participants: General John H. Hilldring, A–H Mr. John Carter Vincent, FE Mr. Hugh Borton, NA Mr. Alfred Stirling, Australian Embassy Mr. Ralph E. Collins, Canadian Embassy Mr. Wellington Koo; Dr. Shao-Hwa Tan, Chinese Embassy Mr. Henri Bonnet, French Embassy Mr. B. R. Sen, Indian Embassy Jonkheer O. Reuchlin, Netherlands Embassy Sir Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Legation Mr. Joaquin M. Elizalde, Philippine Embassy Mr. H. A. Graves, British Embassy General Hilldring opened the discussion by stating that the Soviet Ambassador 94 had been invited and was unable to attend but a copy of the oral statement which was to be made was being forwarded to him immediately. General Hilldring also stated we preferred no publicity on the matter, at least until after the governments concerned had had a chance to express their views and, consequently, were making the statement to them in confidence. General Hilldring then read the oral statement, a copy of which is attached. The discussion which followed General Hilldring’s reading of the oral statement brought out the following points: 1) Our proposal that the conference suggested for August 19 should be a formal conference but that it would have two stages, namely, that in which the deputy and technical experts would attempt to attain agreement on as many problems as possible, and a second stage in which the Foreign Ministers would participate and reach final decisions on the contents of the treaty. 2) A general peace conference would then be held of representatives from those states at war with Japan. 3) The problems to be discussed at the peace conference would have to be coordinated with decision taken at the Far Eastern Commission but, as indicated in the oral statement, the conference would be outside the Far Eastern Commission and its terms of reference would not apply to the conference. 4) As many procedural problems as possible should be solved prior to the August conference. 5) This Government proposed an August date for the conference in view of its desire for a treaty for Japan as soon as possible and the hope that the final phase of the conference in which the Foreign Ministers would participate would be as short as possible. 6) The position of the other belligerents in relation to the drafting of the treaty is a question which would have to be settled prior to the August meeting. [Annex] Record of Oral Statement on Peace Treaty for Japan 95 The Government of the United States desires to hold a Japanese peace conference as soon as practicable composed of representatives from the 11 states members of the Far Eastern Commission, but such a conference to be outside the Far Eastern Commission. Such an 11-power conference is advocated because it would provide a broad representative basis of participation to include all of those nations with a primary interest in Japan. It is the view of this Government that other states at war with Japan should be given an opportunity to present their views while the treaty is being drafted and that after the draft has reached a sufficiently advanced stage, it should be considered by a general conference of all the states at war with Japan. This Government further suggests a tentative date of August 19, 1947 for the convening of a Japanese peace conference. In view of the various commitments of the Foreign Ministers of the Governments concerned, it does not appear practicable to the Government of the United States to propose that such a conference be on the Foreign Minister level, so that it is envisaged that it would initially be composed of deputies and experts. The Government of the United States should be pleased to be host for such a conference in or near Washington or at San Francisco if preferred by other interested powers. With regard to voting procedure to be adopted at such a conference, this Government is disposed to favor decision by a simple two-thirds majority. The present conversations are being held with representatives of states members of the Far Eastern Commission in order to obtain such positive views as they may have on the various questions relating to the drafting of the peace treaty with Japan. This Government would appreciate an expression of the views of your Government on the points raised above and on any other questions concerning a Japanese peace conference. It is anticipated that your Government will wish to consider these matters prior to expressing its views, and, consequently, officers of this Government will be ready to discuss these matters individually with representatives of your Government as soon as it is convenient for you to express your views. 94 Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov. 95 Text of this statement was sent by telegram to the 10 missions concerned and also to Tokyo, July 11, 8 p.m. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1147: Telegram [Document 383] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Smith ) to the Secretary of State secret Moscow , July 11, 1947—6 p.m. 2411. I saw Molotov at 4 p.m. today and gave him substance of Dept’s 1422 96 and 1425 97 on Jap treaty conference. At conclusion of my presentation he asked if it were not the view of the US that treaty should be prepared by CFM. I replied that our views, as already indicated, were that conference should be composed of the 11 primarily interested powers constituting FEC, and again gave our reasons therefor. Molotov then said he was unable to comment at this time and that matter would have to be considered. I asked for a reply at earliest possible moment, and left an aide-mémoire containing substance of Dept’s views. I then asked Molotov for his informal expression of opinion with regard to ratification date for satellite treaties, referring to memorandum from British Govt suggesting July first date. His reply was that neither France nor Britain had as yet ratified the treaties. He then asked if US had ratified the treaties, stating that “it was difficult to determine from press reports what the status of this matter was in the US”, and if US did not agree with Soviet Union that simultaneous ratification was desirable. I replied that the first and most important step, ratification by Senate, had been completed, that this frequently took some time, and that while I did not believe my Govt considered simultaneous ratification essential, we did consider that conclusion of formalities, i.e., deposit of ratification, should be done at earliest possible date consistent with legal processes for treaty ratification in the various countries concerned. I then asked Molotov categorically if he visualized any serious obstacle to prompt ratification by Soviet Union. He replied that Soviet Union was of opinion that ratification should be accomplished promptly and simultaneously by four powers concerned. My comment on all of above is that Soviet Govt will make an issue of the preparation of Jap peace treaty by CFM as against 11-power conference, and that in matter of treaty ratification Kremlin may delay. Smith 96 July 7, noon: see footnote 91, p. 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 379 ] . 97 July 7; see telegram 259 to Tokyo, p. 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1547 [Document 384] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfield ) [ Washington ,] July 16, 1947. Participants: Sir John Balfour, Minister, British Embassy Mr. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy Mr. Armour, A–A 98 Mr. Penfield, FE Sir John and Mr. Graves called to deliver the attached reply 99 to our proposal for a meeting to discuss the Japanese peace settlement. In reply to an inquiry they expressed the opinion that the statement that “questions of policy and principle should be determined first on the Ministerial level before deputies and experts proceed to the task of examining the Japanese peace treaty in detail” should be interpreted as meaning that the British Government feels that the first meeting to discuss the Japanese peace treaty should be on a Ministerial level. They promised, however, to obtain clarification on this point. After some general discussion of the subject, Mr. Armour and Sir John departed for the Under Secretary’s office. Later, Mr. Graves expressed his personal opinion to Mr. Penfield that a meeting between the end of the Canberra conference and the opening of the UN General Assembly Session on September 15 would be practicable and that the suggestion for a preliminary meeting of deputies “has merit”. 98 Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs. 99 Infra . The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1547 [Document 385] The British Embassy to the Department of State July 15, 1947 Substance of a Message From the Foreign Office to His Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires Dated 15th July , 1947 His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom having accepted, together with other members of the Commonwealth, an invitation from the Australian Government to proceed to Canberra for a meeting on 26th August for a preliminary exchange of views about a Japanese Peace Settlement, would find difficulty in attending a meeting in the United States as proposed on 19th August. It has long been the practice for members of the British Commonwealth to exchange views on questions of mutual interest in advance on international conferences and in this case His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom feel that such an exchange of views would facilitate procedure when the International Conference is summoned to discuss a Japanese Peace Treaty. While it would thus be difficult for His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to be represented at a meeting on 19th August, they are in no way opposed in principle to the suggestion for an early meeting to discuss the Japanese Peace Settlement and would welcome any suggestion the United States Government may be willing to make for a date which would not conflict with the meeting at Canberra (bearing in mind of course the other international engagements to which Ministers of the Powers concerned are likely to be committed). On the remainder of the proposals made by the United States Government, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would wish to defer their comments for the present except to say that they are of the opinion that questions of policy and principle should be determined first on a ministerial level before deputies and experts proceed to the task of examining the Japanese Peace Treaty in detail. 1 1 Australian and New Zealand views of a similar nature were also expressed on July 16 in visits to the Department. The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–1747: Telegram [Document 386] The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State confidential Nanking , July 17, 1947—6 p.m. 1544. Yesterday afternoon I called upon the Foreign Minister. 2 in response to his request. He stated that he wished to discuss the preliminary conference for drafting the Japanese peace treaty; that his information was that this would be held in Washington or San Francisco on August 19 on a confidential basis; that there would be no veto by a single member but that all decisions would be by a two-third’s majority vote and that the draft would be submitted later to a formal conference in which all nations which had declared war against Japan would be represented (Department’s telegram 861, July 11 3 ). He stated that China would not wish to see her special share in the war against Japan completely ignored; that the draft of the German peace treaty was limited to four countries; that this analogy need not be stressed too far; but that he had prepared the following proposed voting formula to apply both to the preliminary and the formal conference: “All decisions shall be made by a two-third’s majority of the members of the conference present and voting, including a majority of the members of the Allied Council for Japan present and voting.” He thought it possible that the USSR would not take part if the single veto were not permitted, in which case the United States, Great Britain and China could doubtless reach conclusions without serious disagreement. He stated that his views had already been communicated to the Chinese Ambassador in Washington. 4 Stuart 2 Dr. Wang Shih-chieh. 3 See footnote 95, p. 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 382 ] . 4 The Chinese Ambassador called on General Hilldring on July 24 to state the Chinese position and added the desire for the conference to meet in China during its session (740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–2447). The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–2347: Telegram [Document 387] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Smith ) to the Secretary of State 5 restricted urgent Moscow , July 23, 1947—2 p.m. 2486. Following is Embassy translation Soviet aide-mémoire dated July 22 regarding Jap peace treaty: “On July 11, 1947, the Ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. Smith, informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, that the Government of the USA proposed to convene on August 19, 1947, for the purpose of drawing up peace treaty with Japan, conference of 11 powers who are members of Far Eastern Commission. At the same time Government of the US unilaterally initiated conversations on this question with the governments of other powers who have representatives on the Far Eastern Commission. In this fashion Government of the US began preparation of a conference for drawing up of peace treaty with Japan, having done this upon a unilateral decision and without consultation with Governments of the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain. Whereas it is known that the Four Powers—the USA, Soviet Union, China and Great Britain—secured victory over aggressor Japan with their armed forces and still during course of war with Japan reached specific agreements among themselves both on questions of conduct of war as well as on questions of post-war settlement. It is sufficient to refer to such documents as the Cairo Declaration, the decisions of the Yalta Conference, and the Potsdam Declaration. And furthermore after the war with Japan, US, Great Britain and Soviet Union, joined by China, determined in agreement of December 1945 at Moscow that those four countries would participate in Allied Council for Japan and that Far Eastern Commission in Washington would take its decisions subject to requirement of agreement of representatives of four named Powers, whereby there was recognized special interest of these Governments in questions of post-war situation in Japan. In view of these circumstances Soviet Government cannot agree that question of convening of a conference for drawing up a peace treaty with Japan should be decided by the Government of the US unilaterally without preliminary consultation with the Governments of the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain. All the more since the Council of Foreign Ministers, organized on the initiative of the USA, was organized particularly for preparatory work of drawing up peace treaties and therefore it cannot be ignored in preparation of peace treaty with Japan. In accordance with aforementioned considerations Soviet Government considers it necessary that question of convening of a conference for drawing up a peace treaty with Japan be provisionally examined by Council of Foreign Ministers composed of representatives of abovementioned Four Powers. As concerns date for convening Council of Foreign Ministers regarding question of drawing up a treaty with Japan, Soviet Government declares itself in favor of having Ambassadors of USSR, China and Great Britain who are in Washington examine together with a representative of USA what early date would be acceptable for all interested governments, keeping in view desirability of accelerating convening of Council.” Smith 5 Repeated to Tokyo by the Department as No. 288, July 28, 3 p.m. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–2247 [Document 388] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) [ Washington ,] July 23, 1947—2:30 p.m. Participants: Norman J. O. Makin, Ambassador, Australian Embassy General John H. Hilldring, A–H General Charles E. Saltzman, A–H Mr. John K. Waller, First Secretary, Australian Embassy Mr. Hugh Borton, NA Ambassador Makin called at his own request to present the attached aide-mémoire . 6 Ambassador Makin emphasized that he wished to consider the discussions on the treaty informal but had been instructed by his Government to point out that the Australian Government could not accept an invitation to the conference unless Australia were to be represented by the Minister of External Affairs. He also emphasized the appreciation of his Government of assurances from the United States that it recognized Australia as a party principal in any negotiations regarding the Japanese peace treaty. General Hilldring stated that on the matter of Dr. Evatt’s attending the initial stages of the conference, we had no objections to Foreign Ministers appearing at the conference whenever they wished. Our problem is a logistic one, namely, of desiring to have a peace conference begin as soon as possible and yet having the Secretary of State committed to attend conferences from the middle of August until after the meeting of the CFM. Consequently, we had suggested a meeting of deputies. In answer to a question as to how long the Australians contemplate an initial conference of Foreign Ministers would last, Ambassador Makin said he guessed it might be called just the week prior to the General Assembly and in such case would not last over a week. General Hilldring replied that he thought an agreeable compromise could be reached on this question. General Saltzman referred to the statement in the Australian aide-mémoire that “the Australian Government understands that the United States Government will not in any stage compromise in the application of the principle for voting procedure”. General Hilldring commented that our proposal for a two-thirds voting procedure was made with the utmost sincerity and that in spite of the reported rejection by the Soviets he knew of no change in U.S. policy on this point. 6 Dated July 22, not printed. The Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 P.W.(Peace)/7–2847: Telegram [Document 389] The Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) to the Secretary of State top secret Tokyo , July 28, 1947. 202. C–54398. For the eyes only of Secretary and Assistant Secretary Hilldring. In separate conversations with General MacArthur and with me, Evatt has outlined his general ideas in regard to peace settlement as follows: 1. ( a ). The matter should be pushed as rapidly as possible. ( b ) It should be an 11-power settlement, and if the Soviets will not join at the beginning they will come in later because they will not wish to be without a voice in the interim regime of control. ( c ) There is no connection between the German settlement and a Japanese settlement, and no reason why a Japanese settlement should be delayed on account of the German question. ( d ) Preliminary conference should not be one of deputies and experts, but should be one of governmental representatives capable of making decisions and moving forward with practical results. ( e ) He himself wished to attend such conference and believes that, in general, the conferees should be Foreign Ministers rather than deputies because Foreign Ministers have their jobs to get back to and thus are forced by circumstance to progress with the conference work and achieve results. 2. In broad outline the interim controls should consist of a working group of perhaps [not?] more than four Allied representatives, possibly along the lines of the interim commission of control in the projected 25-year four-power pact (but the pact, if made the basis, should not be limited to the four) reporting to a council of Ambassadors of the 11 Allies which would ordinarily meet say, once in 3 months. The council of Ambassadors would report to their governments which would consult together under a regional security pact for the Far East consonant with the Charter of the United Nations. The council of Ambassadors should be headed by an American chairman. In contemplation that the high contracting parties to the peace settlement would commit themselves under appropriate conditions to support Japan’s application for membership in the United Nations, it should also be contemplated that eventually Japan would become a member of the regional security arrangement. The regional security arrangement should not be directed against Japan or any one nation. 3. He felt therefore nations such as France which [ sic ] do not deserve full participation in the peace settlement and the interim controls, et cetera, but appeared reconciled to their inclusion for the sake of moving forward with and effecting the settlement. As regards voting procedure, he indicated doubt that a two-thirds system would be workable, mentioned the desirability of unanimity and, speaking very generally, said the main thing was to work out a wholly democratic procedure. 4. He indicated he felt there should be no collective trusteeship over the Ryukyus (Okinawa), but that the United States should be sole trustee. 5. His attitude has been cordial and friendly in every way. He expressed himself emphatically in regard to Japanese Antarctic whaling question, but indicated he felt that the question of the future of whaling had not been prejudiced, and that the second expedition was a closed matter and he intended to say nothing further about it. He expressed himself as completely optimistic that basic American and British Commonwealth policies were identical, and that agreement as to the essentials of a peace settlement would not be difficult. Atcheson Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfleld) 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–247 [Document 390] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfleld ) 7 secret [ Washington ,] August 2, 1947. We have now received replies from all the ten Governments we approached on July 11 regarding a conference on the Japanese Peace Treaty. We should make our next move without delay. It will be noted from attached summary of views received (Tab A) 8 that there are differences regarding date of the conference, voting procedure, and whether it should be Foreign Minister or Deputy level. However, all Governments except the USSR have agreed to an eleven power conference. The Soviets have not definitely refused to participate in such a conference but it is unlikely that they will show up. We may therefore in the final analysis be faced with the necessity of deciding whether we consider ourselves released from our “separate peace” commitment, in view of Soviet refusal to participate in the drafting or signing of a treaty. In this situation we should make every possible gesture to the Soviets which does not compromise our basic position, and we should be careful at all stages in the procedure to avoid slamming the door in their face. With these considerations in mind it is recommended that: 9 1) We immediately attempt to obtain from the Chinese Ambassador and the British Chargé d’Affaires assurances that their Governments will support us in refusing to consider that the Council of Foreign Ministers has jurisdiction over the Japanese Peace Treaty and in refusing to refer this matter to the Council. 2) Permission be obtained informally from the local diplomatic missions of the nine Governments concerned to circulate their views on our proposals of July 11, in an agreed summary form. 3) The attached note be dispatched to the Soviet Embassy (Tab B). 10 4) Identic notes (Tab C) be dispatched to the other nine Governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission, enclosing copies of the Soviet Aide-Mémoire of July 22, 10a our reply thereto, 11 and a summary of the views of the Governments on our proposals of July 11 (Tab A). 5) In the event that the Soviets do not reply within two weeks, the Secretary should then consider whether formal invitations should be dispatched at once to the ten Governments inviting them to attend a Japanese Peace Conference on the following conditions: Place: Washington Date: September 8, 1947 Level of representation: Each country to be represented by its Foreign Minister or a Deputy as it chooses. Procedure: The conference to determine its own procedure after it convenes. 7 Addressed to Under Secretary of State Lovett and General Hilldring. 8 For summary, see telegram 318, August 13, 2 p.m., to Tokyo, p. 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] . 9 The recommendations made in this memorandum were approved by the Office of European Affairs and the Division of Eastern European Affairs. A memorandum of August 5 by the Executive Secretariat stated that General Hilldring had approved the recommendations, the first four for immediate action, the fifth conditionally. (740.0011 P.W.(Peace)/8–747) 10 Note dated August 12, p. 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] . 10a See telegram 2486, July 23, from Moscow, p. 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 387 ] . 11 For U.S. reply to the aide-mémoire of July 22, see post , p. 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] . Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) 740.0011–P.W. (Peace)/8–647 [Document 391] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) to the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ) 12 secret [ Washington ,] August 6, 1947. Subject: Draft Treaty of Peace for Japan. In view of our desire to call a peace conference for Japan as soon as possible and of the probability that such a conference may be held during the second week of September, it is imperative that the Department’s views on the treaty be determined as quickly as possible. There is attached for your consideration a copy of a draft treaty of peace for Japan, 13 together with the most important annexes and a copy of a draft disarmament and demilitarization treaty for Japan prepared by a drafting committee composed of representatives of FE, NA, DRF, OE, Le and SPA. In reference to the attached, special attention should be given to Chapter I, Territorial Clauses; Chapter IV, Interim Supervision and Assistance; Chapter V, Disarmament and Demilitarization; and Chapter VIII, Other Economic Clauses as none of these items appear in any of the satellite treaties or the Treaty for Austria. Chapter V is based on a revision of the draft Disarmament and Demilitarization Treaty circulated to the Governments of China, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on June 21, 1946. 14 The Territorial Clauses (Chapter I) are based on what is believed to be firm United States policy with the exception of the provision concerning the Ryukyu Islands which is under discussion in the Government. Chapters IV and V are based on a conception that continued control is necessary over the Japanese war potential and supervision must continue for the development of democratic processes. They also provide for the establishment of a Council of Ambassadors with two subordinate groups, namely, an Executive Staff and a Commission of Inspection, which it is anticipated will have only a small percentage of the number of persons now connected with SCAP Headquarters. Other Chapters in the treaty follow in general the principles laid down in the satellite and Austrian Treaties. In view of the urgency of the matter, it is requested that you notify Mr. Borton, FE, Room 3162 by August 12 of any comments you may have on the attached. 12 Copies were sent to General Hilldring, Mr. Saltzman, the, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp), the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk), W. Walton Butterworth, of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, the Legal Adviser (Fahy), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), Rear Adm. E. T. Wooldridge (Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department), Maj. Gen. Daniel Noce (Chief, Civil Affairs Division, War Department), Brig. Gen. C. V. R. Schuyler (Plans and Policy Group, Plans and Operations Division, War Department), and Warren S. Hunsberger, of the Division of Research for Far East. 13 Dated August 5, not printed. 14 Department of State Bulletin , June 30, 1946, p. 1113. Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Fahy) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–747 [Document 392] Memorandum by the Legal Adviser ( Fahy ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) top secret [ Washington ,] August 7, 1947. Subject: Manner of Preparation of the Treaty of Peace With Japan. Introductory The note delivered by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy on July 22, 1947, in response to the United States invitation to attend an eleven-power conference beginning August 19, 1947, has accentuated the following questions concerning the manner of preparation of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: 1. Do existing international agreements require that the Treaty of Peace with Japan be drawn by the Council of Foreign Ministers? 2. In the event that the Soviet Government insists that the Japanese peace settlement be prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers, are other states which participated in the war against Japan at liberty to prepare a Japanese peace settlement in some other body without the participation or assent of the U.S.S.R.? These questions will now be considered in order. The Forum At the end of a war between two belligerents the victorious state fixes the time and manner of making peace with the vanquished enemy, unless arrangements to the contrary have been agreed upon between the two belligerents, by armistice or otherwise. When a coalition of states has defeated a common enemy, the victorious powers similarly control the making of peace, either acting together pursuant to agreement or acting separately in the absence of agreement. See Oppenheim, International Law (6th ed., 1944) 470, note 1 (conclusion of peace with Germany following World War I). The Council of Foreign Ministers was established pursuant to a decision of the heads of the Governments of the Soviet Union, United States, and United Kingdom in the tripartite conference of Berlin in July and August 1945. The conference protocol, issued on August 2, 1945, 15 stated: “The conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, representing the five principal Powers, to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the Council by agreement of the Governments participating in the Council.” The five principal Powers were stated to be the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, China, France, and the United States. Paragraph 3 of the agreement for the establishment of the Council read: “3. (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorised to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany, to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established, (ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks, the Council will be composed of the members representing those states which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purpose of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion, (iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the member Governments.” China and France, which were not represented at the Berlin conference, were invited to adopt the text of the agreement on the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers and to join in establishing the Council. They did so subsequently, and the Council was established. It is to be noted that the Berlin statement introducing the text of the agreement for the Council referred to “a Council of Foreign Ministers, representing the five principal Powers, to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements”. This plural reference to peace settlements, while not in terms confined to Europe, might be interpreted as so confined since paragraph 3(i) of the agreed text refers specifically to the several European peace settlements, and since the Berlin conference was convened to deal with European problems. The Soviet Union was then still at peace with Japan. Paragraph 3(iii) provided that other matters could be referred to the Council by agreement among the member governments. It could not, however, be inferred from these circumstances that work by the Council on a peace treaty with Japan was definitely not contemplated. Work on the “peace settlements” was to be done by a Council “representing the five principal Powers”, including China; China would not be among the members of the Council preparing the European satellite treaties under the terms of paragraph 3(ii). Therefore, the inclusion of China must have been for a purpose other than the specific purposes enumerated in paragraph 3(i), and might well have included the purpose of preparing later a Japanese peace treaty. The omission to mention specifically a Japanese peace treaty for work by the Council should, for a further reason, not be regarded as foreclosing that intention: such a mention would have been inappropriate before a Soviet declaration of war on Japan. Yet the very fact that the Soviet Union was not then at war with Japan seems to preclude construing the language of the Berlin protocol as a definite commitment that the Council would work on the Japanese treaty. It should be noted, however, that the question of Soviet entry into the Pacific war was in the minds of the participants at the Berlin conference. See, e.g., minutes, meeting of the Heads of Government, July 19, 1945 and July 29, 1945 (discussion of use of German navy and merchant fleet); minutes, meeting of the Heads of Government, July 29, 1945 (discussion of manner of entry of USSR into Far Eastern War). And the record of the discussions at the Berlin conference shows that the question of procedure for making a Japanese peace treaty was even then under consideration by the heads of the three Governments. Those discussions provide the background of the decision to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers, and show what was contemplated with respect to the Council and Japanese peacemaking. On the first day of the conference, the heads of the three Governments took up the United States proposal for a Council of Foreign Ministers. Mr. Stalin said he was not clear about the inclusion of China in the Council, as he supposed it was contemplated the Council would discuss European problems; for this reason, he wished to question the inclusion of China. Mr. Truman stated that China was a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Mr. Churchill opposed the participation of China in the European settlement. Mr. Truman “observed that he had no objection to China being excluded from the Council”. Minutes of July 17, 1945. The proposal for the Council was then referred to the three Foreign Ministers. They began discussion of it on July 18, and Mr. Molotov “again raised the question of China but said that if the Council was to deal with other than exclusively European affairs the objections to China’s participation would drop”. Mr. Byrnes “suggested that the Council be composed of five powers but that participation of China be limited to problems concerning the Far East or problems of world-wide significance. He explained that if the war with Japan should end soon they would in this manner have established the organization to deal with the problem of peace in the Far East. The other reason for including China was that China is one of the permanent members of the Security Council.” Mr. Eden then agreed that “if the Council’s sphere were to be the world, China should be included”. “Mr. Molotov proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers be established to deal with both European and non-European affairs and should be composed of five members.” Minutes, meeting of the Foreign Ministers, July 18, 1945. Basic agreement was reached on this proposal, and the preparation of final text was remitted to a drafting committee. * The text of the agreement establishing the Council was approved by the heads of the three Governments on July 20, 1945. From the foregoing it is my opinion that the protocol of the Berlin conference, containing the text of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers, does not contain a specific commitment concerning preparation of a Japanese peace treaty by the Council—as it does concerning the German and other European peace treaties—notwithstanding that the agreement to include China as a member of the Council was reached in part on the basis of Mr. Byrnes’ argument † that the Council would be the agency for preparing a peace settlement in the Far East. It may therefore be concluded at most that there was a political understanding or intention but not an international agreement at Potsdam to the effect that the Council of Foreign Ministers would be the body for preparing the Japanese peace treaty. No more can be said. It is impossible from the minutes to be precise as to how far there was a meeting of minds even on such a political understanding. Mr. Molotov’s final statement was very general, that the Council “deal with both European and non-European affairs” and should therefore include China. Cf. Oppenheim, International Law (5th ed. 1937) 685, § 482; No. 6, Status of Eastern Carelia , I World Court Reports 190 (1923) (League Council’s request for an advisory opinion declined by the Court in a dispute where USSR maintained that a Declaration concerning autonomy of Eastern Carelia did not constitute a binding obligation toward Finland but was furnished merely by way of information in conjunction with negotiations for the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Dorpat). This situation, coupled with the altered political circumstances, two years after Potsdam, would warrant the United States in feeling that it is not bound by such a doubtful political understanding, not incorporated in the agreement arrived at, if it is deemed that, in the light of subsequent political experience, the Council is not an effective or proper agency for concluding the Japanese peace settlement, and if political considerations now necessitate the adoption of a different procedure. Separate Peace without the Soviet Union If the Soviet Government insists that the treaty of peace with Japan be prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and if the other ten Governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission are not willing that the Council should do so, the question is then raised whether those other ten are at liberty to prepare a treaty among themselves and present it for signature to Japan and to the other members of the United Nations at war with Japan. At the outset it may be stated that no rules of international law prevent in general the employment of separate peace-procedure by a number less than all of the victorious belligerents in a war. It is necessary then to inquire what obligations those belligerents have undertaken in that regard. There is contained in the joint Declaration by United Nations, of January 1, 1942, 16 to which 26 states were signatory, the following undertaking: “2. Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.” Probably the terms “separate armistice or peace” should be read together, and in the sense that none of the United Nations would withdraw from the war and make any separate arrangement with an enemy before victory was achieved. The emphasis here was on continuing the war, together, to a successful conclusion. Thus the obligation not to make a separate peace did not include the obligation, after the war had been won, not to conclude a separate treaty of peace regardless of the impossibility of concluding a joint United Nations peace with each enemy. Subsequent conferences among the great powers resulted in further statements that have some bearing upon the question now under consideration. The communiqué of the Moscow conference of October 1943 17 began: “The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China: united in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis Powers with which they respectively are at war until such Powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender; conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the people allied to them from the menace of aggression; recognizing the necessity of ensuring rapid and orderly transit from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of this [ the ] world’s human and economic resources for armaments; jointly declare: 1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security;” And the Teheran Declaration of December 1, 1943 18 stated: “We, The President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet Union have met these four days past in this the capital of our ally Iran and have shaped and confirmed our common policy. “We expressed our determination that our Nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow. . . . . . . . “And as to peace we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.” These statements of a general character expressed a determination on the part of the participating powers to work together in organizing peace after the war. There was no specific commitment to make treaties of peace only by joint action if friendly cooperation to that end should not prove possible or be conducive to a just peace. In fact the statements could be interpreted as meaning only that the participating governments would cooperate in establishing a world system or organisation for maintaining peace after the war. However, paragraph 5 of the Teheran Declaration, quoted above, referred to “the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace …”, suggesting that the unity of action promised earlier should obtain inter alia in the negotiation of peace treaties. An even stronger statement along the same lines appeared in part IX of the Crimea Conference report, February 11, 1945: 19 “IX. Unity for Peace as for War . Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.” These statements, made in declarations by the great powers at international conferences, comprise political undertakings by those powers to act in concert after the war, with respect to the negotiation of peace treaties as well as other matters in the organisation of peace. But direct commitments regardless of circumstances to make treaties of peace only jointly are not found in the statements. If it is the view of this Government that the accord of purpose represented by earlier statements has been breached, it is clear that there is no international agreement which holds the United States to a course of conduct it is convinced has become an ineffective and impracticable method of settlement of post-war problems. Legal Consequences of Separate Peace A separate memorandum will be submitted at an early date 20 concerning the legal situation that would result from the making of a peace settlement with Japan in the absence of participation by the Soviet Government. Charles Fahy 15 See Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin, August 2, 1945, Foreign Relations , The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii , p. 1499 . * It is apparent from the Foreign Ministers’ discussion on July 18 that paragraph 3 (iii) of the agreement establishing the Council was included for the purpose of making clear that the Council might deal with matters other than peace-making; the language of 3(iii), however, left decision on additional Council agenda up to agreement of the member Governments so that the Council would not necessarily supersede the meetings of the three foreign secretaries agreed on at Yalta (at first the British, and later the Russians, opposed dropping the three-power consultation agreed at Yalta.) [Footnote in the original.] † China was included because also of consideration for her world position recognized in permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council. In this connection it is to be noted that at the Second Moscow Conference (December 1945) it was agreed that the peace conference for the satellite treaties would “consist of the five members of the Council of Foreign Ministers”, including China, together with the other United Nations that waged war actively against European enemy states. [Footnote in the original.] 16 Foreign Relations , 1942, vol. i , p. 25 . 17 Quoted here is the introduction to the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed October 30, 1943, at Moscow. For text see Foreign Relations 1943, vol. i , p. 755 . 18 Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 640 . 19 Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 968 , 975 . 20 August 25, p. 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 405 ] . Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Kennan) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1147 [Document 393] Memorandum by Mr. John P. Davies, Jr., of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff ( Kennan ) secret [ Washington ,] August 11, 1947. Subject: Draft Peace Treaty for Japan It would seem that a peace settlement for Japan proposed by the American Government should further American aims in Japan and the Pacific area. The central American objective in this respect is taken to be a stable Japan, integrated into the Pacific economy, friendly to the U.S. and, in case of need, a ready and dependable Ally of the U.S. Rather than assuring a furtherance of our central objective, the Draft Treaty of Peace for Japan appears to be preoccupied with drastic disarmament and democratization under continuing international supervision, including the U.S.S.R. But demilitarization is no longer a serious problem in the case of Japan. Even if it so desired, Japan could not in the foreseeable future resurrect itself as a first-class military power. It can only gravitate into the orbit of one or the other of the super powers. As for democratization, it is questionable whether the presence of the U.S.S.R. on an international supervisory body would contribute to democratic advances. It is likely that the U.S.S.R. in this position would be a disruptive influence in Japan, placing the onus for continued supervision on the U.S. and conspiring to bring about sovietized totalitarianism. The ease with which a coup could be engineered under the proposed treaty is manifest on cursory examination of Chapter V. Occupation forces having been withdrawn, the Japanese Government would have at its disposal for the maintenance of security and order only a civil police force equipped with small arms. There are other secondary questions and objections which need not be brought up here. It is recommended that the Draft Treaty be discussed in conference with FE and that the discussion be on the basic issues of harmonizing the treaty with fundamental American objectives in Japan and the Pacific. John Davies, Jr . Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1147 [Document 394] Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff ( Kennan ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) 21 [ Washington ,] August 12, 1947. We have examined informally in the Planning Staff the draft treaty for Japan. This draft causes us some concern. I enclose a memo by Davies 22 which explains some of the reasons why this is so. So far as I know, we have not yet formulated with any degree of concreteness our objectives with respect to Japan and the Pacific area. This draft does not seem to be related to any realistic pattern of such objectives that we can conceive of here. It would be highly dangerous, it seems to me, for us to enter in on discussions of peace terms until we know precisely what it is that we are trying to achieve. It is my view that we should try to delay the opening of these discussions until this matter can be systematically thrashed out, United States objectives agreed upon at a high level, and our peace treaty draft related strictly to those objectives. G. F. Kennan 21 Mr. Lovett wrote a notation as follows: “GK: I have sent the ‘treaty’ back as being wholly inadequate in present form. Your views are being passed along. L”. 22 August 11, supra . Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1247 [Document 395] Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) [ Washington ,] August 12, 1947. Subject: Reply to Soviet Note on Japanese Peace Settlement. A careful study of the Soviet note objecting to the idea of a conference and Soviet radio comment makes it apparent that the underlying reason for the Soviet attitude is their fear that the Yalta Agreement giving them the Kuriles and the southern part of Sakhalin may be upset. They probably fear that at an eleven-power conference they might be outvoted and this Agreement abrogated. Since I understand that it is our preference to have Russia attend this conference and we do not intend to go back on the Yalta Agreement, it would seem to me wise when you hand this note to the Soviet Chargé to inform him orally that the U.S., of course, intends to honor its commitments as set forth in the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreement on the Far East, and the Potsdam Declaration, and that you are confident that the other countries, namely, China and Great Britain, who were parties in one way or another to these various declarations, will likewise honor their word. In the circumstances since the four nations, namely, the U.S., the U.K., the Soviet Union, and China, will support at this conference the war-time agreements, there is no possibility of a conference of eleven, even operating under the two-thirds rule, voting to override the commitments contained in these agreements. It would be well not to go beyond this statement to Mr. Tsarapkin 23 and to avoid any implication that the U.S. is assuming any responsibility for the actions of the other participating countries in respect to commitments to which they were not a party. 23 S. K. Tsarapkin, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy and Chargé. The Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé (Tsarapkin) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/7–2347 [Document 396] The Secretary of State to the Soviet Chargé ( Tsarapkin ) 24 Aide-Mémoire The Secretary of State has the honor to refer to the Soviet Government’s aide-mémoire of July 22, 1947, transmitted to the American Embassy at Moscow, in which it is stated that “the Soviet Government considers it necessary that the question of convening of a conference for the drawing up of a peace treaty with Japan be provisionally examined by the Council of Foreign Ministers, composed of the representatives of” the Governments of the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain and the United States. The United States Government considers that such discussions as occurred at Potsdam regarding problems of peace in the Far East, in connection with the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers, do not require enlarging the agreement on the Council set forth in the Potsdam protocol so as to make mandatory reference to the Council of matters relating to the peace settlement with Japan. Although the CFM was constituted on a basis which would have permitted its use for the preparation of a Treaty of Peace with Japan, provided the members of the Council subsequently agreed, this Government does not believe it appropriate for this matter to be referred to the Council for the reasons mentioned below. In reference to the Cairo Declaration, the decisions of the Yalta Conference, or the Potsdam declaration on Japan, they contain no provisions which give the Council of Foreign Ministers any authority in connection with a Japanese peace settlement. In Moscow in December 1945, four of the Governments represented on the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to the setting up of a Far Eastern Commission composed of representatives of eleven powers “to formulate the policies, principles, and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished.” It is the view of the United States Government that this action constituted a recognition of the primary interests of these powers in post-surrender policy matters for Japan and hence in the peace settlement. Accordingly, the special interest of other Pacific powers in the Japanese settlement requires the governments which compose the Council of Foreign Ministers to recognize that a conference now to consider that settlement even provisionally should be larger in composition than the Council. Therefore, it is the view of the United States Government that neither the Council of Foreign Ministers, as established at Potsdam, nor a council composed of the representatives of the four powers mentioned by the Soviet Government is the appropriate body to consider the question of a Japanese peace treaty. The approach made by the United States Government on July 11 to the other ten Governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission was based on this view. Since this approach to the Governments concerned was merely to ascertain their views on a conference for a Japanese peace settlement, such action cannot be interpreted as unilateral. Although, for the reasons given above, the United States Government does not consider that reference of this matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers is appropriate, it is transmitting the views of the Soviet Government to the Governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission which includes those represented on the Council of Foreign Ministers. The United States Government wishes to point out that in the replies received from the other nine Governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission to the suggestions of the United States Government of July 11, all of these Governments indicated their agreement to an eleven-power conference on the Japanese peace settlement, as set forth in the attached summary 25 of the views of these Governments. The conference would, of course, be free to decide its own procedure. It is hoped, therefore, that the Soviet Government will also indicate its willingness to attend a conference for the purpose of considering the Japanese peace settlement to be held in the near future and to be composed of the eleven states members of the Far Eastern Commission. Washington , August 12, 1947. 24 Handed to Chargé Tsarapkin by the Counselor (Bohlen) on Wednesday afternoon, August 13. Text sent to Moscow in telegram 1593, August 13, 3 p.m. 25 For summary released to the press on August 21, see Department of State Bulletin , August 31, 1947, p. 435. The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–1347: Telegram [Document 397] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) 26 top secret urgent Washington , August 13, 1947—2 p.m. 318. Eyes only Atcheson and MacArthur. For your info, the status of Japanese peace treaty discussions is currently as follows: 1. A. Replies to our July 11 suggestion of a conference of deputies and experts on August 19 have been received from the 10 Govts approached, which offered the following views on leading questions involved: a . Composition: All states consulted except Soviets indicated willingness attend an 11-power peace conference. Soviets took position Far Eastern Big Four possessed special interests postwar treatment of Japan, Council of Foreign Ministers had been organized particularly for preparatory work of drawing up peace treaties, and question of convening a conference to draw up Japanese treaty should therefore be provisionally examined by CFM. b . Date: France, Netherlands, and Philippines considered August 19 satisfactory date. Brit, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and India supported suggestion for an early conference but stated it would be difficult or impossible to attend on August 19. Soviets emphasized desirability of haste in convening CFM. c . Level of Representation: US proposal that conference initially be composed of deputies and experts accepted by France, Netherlands and Philippines. Canada reserved position. Chinese, Indian and New Zealand positions not clarified. Brit expressed view questions of policy and principle would have to be determined first at ministerial level before deputies and experts could usefully begin to operate. Australia also took this position and stated Australian Minister of External Affairs must represent Australia at any peace conference on Japan. Soviets proposed whole question of Japanese treaty be first considered by CFM. d . Place: No Govt expressed clear preference regarding site of suggested conference but several representatives have expressed preference for Washington because of presence here of Far Eastern experts attached to FEC. Chinese Ambassador urged preliminary or formal conference be held in China. e . Voting: Australia, Canada and Philippines expressly accepted American proposal voting at conference be by simple two-thirds majority. France accepted for initial conference with understanding voting procedures at a subsequent meeting of 11 Foreign Ministers to pass on draft would be determined at the time. New Zealand and India approved suggested abandonment FEC veto rights. Brit and Netherlands did not question US proposal for two-thirds voting system. China proposed decision by two-thirds majority including majority Far Eastern Big Four. Soviets gave no indication voting preferences beside proposal treaty be considered by CFM. 2. Soviet answer viewed as counter-proposal rather than refusal, with some possibility Soviets may still accept 11-nation conference on which US Govt firmly determined, possibly in return for FEC voting procedure. It is therefore planned to dispatch note Soviet Embassy pointing out Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam agreements did not establish Four Power jurisdiction Japanese treaty; establishment of FEC constituted recognition primary interests 11 powers Japanese post-war treatment and peace settlement; US proposal for 11-nation conference accepted by other nine FEC nations; and it is therefore hoped Soviet Govt will indicate willingness attend 11 nation conference near future, conference to decide its own procedure; and dispatch identic notes other nine Govts enclosing copies Soviet reply of July 22, our reply thereto, and summary of views of ten Govts to our July 11 proposals. 27 3. Text of reply being sent to Soviets today follows: [Here follows text of aide-mémoire of August 12 printed supra .] 4. If Soviets do not reply within 2 weeks Secy will consider whether to despatch formal invitations 10 Govts inviting them to attend Japanese Peace Conference at Washington on September 8, each country to be represented by its Foreign Minister or a Deputy as it chooses and with conference to determine its own procedure. Lovett 26 Introductory paragraph and paragraphs numbered 1, 2, and 4 repeated to Chiefs of Mission (eyes only) at 10 capitals of Far Eastern Commission members (1592 to Moscow, 3471 to London, 3007 to Paris, 408 to The Hague, 139 to Ottawa, 189 to Canberra, 124 to Wellington, 503 to New Delhi, 908 to Manila, and 1010 to Nanking). 27 The other nine FEC members were circularized by note dated August 14. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1347 [Document 398] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ) confidential [ Washington ,] August 13, 1947. Participants: Mr. Semen K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Chargé d’Affaires ad interim; Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Chief, Eastern European Affairs; and Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor. I handed Mr. Tsarapkin, Soviet Chargé d’Affaires, the aide-mémoire 28 in answer to the Soviet aide-mémoire of July 22 28a regarding the preparation of a Japanese peace treaty. I outlined the contents to him and asked if he had any questions. Mr. Tsarapkin repeated the arguments contained in the Soviet aide-mémoire of July 22 emphasizing particularly that the Moscow Agreement of 1945 setting up the Far Eastern Commission provided for a special position in regard to voting for the U.S., the U.K., the Soviet Union and China. I told him that the present subject was the procedure for the drawing up of the peace treaty with Japan and, therefore, dealt with the future whereas the Far Eastern Commission was set up to deal with questions and policies arising in connection with the military occupation of Japan. I told him that we had been somewhat puzzled as to the reference to the Cairo Declaration, Yalta decisions, and the Potsdam declarations since these documents did not deal with the manner of drawing up the Japanese peace treaty which had been the purpose of our original approach. However, as to these agreements and declarations in question, they of course remained valid as far as this Government was concerned and I had no reason to doubt the other countries who had signed them. Mr. Tsarapkin replied that the reference to the declarations of Cairo, Potsdam, and the Yalta decisions were merely to indicate the responsibility of the four Governments in question in the matter of winning the war with Japan and, therefore, by analogy for the peace treaty. He said he would transmit our aide-mémoire to his Government and inform us of his reply. 28 August 12, p. 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] . 28a See telegram 2486, July 23 from Moscow, p. 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 387 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan (Atcheson) 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–1347: Telegram [Document 399] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Japan ( Atcheson ) top secret us urgent Washington , August 13, 1947—3 p.m. 319. For Atcheson. As Dept is undertaking basic review of overall factors involved in Jap peace settlement hope you can have detailed discussion with Supreme Commander before your departure in order that we may have benefit of his views on both short and long range objectives for Japan and its place in overall Far East and world picture. Lovett Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Bishop of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–1447 [Document 400] Memorandum by Mr. Max W. Bishop of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfield ) 29 confidential [ Washington ,] August 14, 1947. Urgency of a Peace Settlement With Japan The following are offered as being among the important factors making urgent a peace settlement with Japan: It is impractical to attempt measures to revive the economies of the Far East until the existence of a state of war has been resolved. It should be obvious that the interdependence of economic well-being requires simultaneous up-swing of economic activity in China, Japan, and other closely associated areas. It would not promote the interests of the United States to attempt to stimulate artificially with political state-to-state loans such an economic up-swing unless that revival were to be based solidly upon the resurgence of private enterprise and the active and increasing participation of private business of all countries and nationalities. This solid foundaton of private business activity is not possible of realization so long as a state of war continues. In other words a sound national move toward economic revival, which must be started at the earliest possible moment, requires as its first step a peace settlement with Japan. Any delay in proceeding to a settlement with Japan would have serious psychological repercussions, highly detrimental to United States interest. The stage has been set, the audience assembled and the overture played. Failure to raise the curtain now could destroy the possibility of the United States’ taking the leading role and might well allow another actor to steal the show. Reference to editorial comment in this country and to recent statements by such Allied leaders as President Roxas of the Philippines should furnish ample evidence to support the psychological urgency of a settlement with Japan. In view of the stand which we have taken vis-à-vis Soviet Russia’s attitude toward settlement with Japan and more especially the interpretation which has been placed by the press on our position, any hesitancy, postponement, or delay on our part would in all likelihood be subject to serious and detrimental misinterpretation. It is probable that the Soviets themselves would misinterpret any delay or postponement with possible serious repercussions on our position and adverse effect upon other Allies. While many may argue that the last factor to be taken into consideration is that of the effect of delay on Japan and the Japanese, it should be borne in mind that to the degree that we plan to use Japan and the Japanese we must give consideration to assuring that the timing of the settlement not be allowed to impair effective utilization of Japan’s ability promptly to contribute to economic revival and political stability. Delay in the settlement would have a disheartening effect on Japan, would lead to confusion because of inability to determine the cause of the delay, and would, at the least, seriously diminish the immediate usefulness of Japan for our purposes. The Occupation has accomplished its purpose and the point of diminishing returns has now been reached. The obvious and only logical change is that of settlement of the state of war. The present situation can be continued only with the expectation that if we delay or postpone peace settlement we shall gradually lose ground or at best make more difficult the gathering of momentum in our eventual peace program for the Pacific. The crying need of the moment is believed to be the assertion of leadership by the United States in the Pacific. The peace settlement with Japan is the ideal springboard for such a program and failure to use or delay in using this springboard could well threaten, and would at least be an important obstacle to, any program of leadership. 29 Mr. Penfield forwarded the memorandum on the same day to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), with copies to Mr. Bohlen and General Saltzman. Mr. Penfield stated the importance of not allowing long delays to occur in the peace-making process. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Clark) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–1447: Airgram [Document 401] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Clark ) to the Secretary of State confidential London , August 14, 1947. A–1778. 1. During an informal conversation with MacDermot, Head, Japan and Pacific Department, Foreign Office, on August 12, 1947, an Embassy officer inquired whether the Foreign Office had made any study of the Soviet contention that consideration of the Japanese peace treaty should come within the purview of the Council of Foreign Ministers (in this instance, the US, UK, China and the Soviet Union). 2. MacDermot responded that following the Soviet reply to the US proposal for an 11-power conference on the Japanese peace treaty, the Foreign Office had engaged in some research on the question. He said that the Foreign Office had been unable to find any provision or understanding in the decisions or minutes of the Potsdam Conference conferring on the Council of Foreign Ministers the specific right to consider the Japanese peace treaty. MacDermot went on to say that although the question had been raised at the Conference of the Foreign Ministers held in London in September 1945, no agreement had been reached on the subject. As for the Moscow Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in December 1945, the Foreign Office had found nothing in the Soviet-Anglo-American Communiqué and Report relating specifically to the subject. In any event, MacDermot continued, the Foreign Office regarded the Moscow Meeting as an ad hoc affair at best. 3. Based on its examination of the relevant papers and decisions, the position of the Foreign Office was, MacDermot said, that there is no written agreement or understanding which requires that the Council of Foreign Ministers shall confer on the Japanese peace treaty. 4. MacDermot said that, as far as he was aware, the UK would be willing to proceed with the US proposed multi-power conference on the Japanese peace treaty irrespective of the Soviet attitude toward such a conference. Clark Memorandum by Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–1847 [Document 402] Memorandum by Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) secret Ser. 00496P35 Washington , 18 August 1947. Subject: Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan. 1. In accordance with your request the following informal comments are submitted after preliminary examination of the subject paper. These comments are intended to cover only the highlights in the Draft Treaty. The paper is under continuing study and further comments will be forthcoming. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff … have indicated 30 the need for retention of the Nansei Shoto 31 south of latitude 29° North, Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan, and Marcus Island under United Nations strategic trusteeship administered by the U.S. The Joint-Strategic Survey Committee is now reviewing the matter of control needed by the U.S. over these islands. Therefore, the territorial limits of Japan, as specified in Chapter I paragraph 1, do not coincide with the views of the JCS as indicated above. 3. The Navy Department desires base rights at Yokosuka and necessary air fields to provide protection for the base. 4. ( a ) It is noted that, under the provisions of Chapter V, the demilitarization and disarmament of Japan is to be complete except for the formation and employment of such detachments of Japanese civil police, including coast guard, and their equipment with such types and quantities of imported small arms as may be essential to the maintenance of public security. ( b ) Chapter IV Article 23, stipulates withdrawal of Allied military forces from Japan beginning immediately upon the coming into force of the Treaty and to be completed within six months. ( c ) Should action be taken in accordance with 4( a ) and ( b ) above, Japan will be completely unable to defend herself against outside aggression. ( d ) It would seem advisable therefore, under existing world conditions, to provide means of protecting Japanese territory by continuing the military occupation until such time as the United Nations has adequate forces for performing this function. 5. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that the subject paper be submitted to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to its submission to the Committee of Three. 32 E. T. Wooldridge 30 In a memorandum to President Truman, dated October 19, 1946; with the President’s approval, copies were sent two days later to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy; not printed. 31 Ryukyu Islands. 32 The Department on August 21 asked SWNCC to consider the question of disposition of Japanese outlying islands as a matter of priority (740.0011 PW(Peace)/8–1847). The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2247: Telegram [Document 403] The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State 33 secret Nanking , August 22, 1947—noon. 1770. I was summoned by the Foreign Minister yesterday evening (August 21) and handed a letter addressed by him to you which he asked to have transmitted through our facilities, indicating that he did not wish to rely on the security of the Chinese Embassy in Washington. The Foreign Minister made it plain that he was much concerned over the attitude of the Soviets and the consequences of Soviet refusal to go along with the American peace proposal. He said that the Chinese Government wished to avoid offending the Soviets, especially because of the bearing of the matter on the problem of Dairen. 34 He said that he felt sure that the Soviets would use a peace treaty negotiated without their participation as an excuse for intrenching themselves even deeper and for refusing any form of cooperation with China with respect to Dairen. Following is text of letter: “Dear General Marshall: I would not write to you personally were it not for the fact that the matter I am going to discuss in this letter is particularly important and merits your immediate attention. Shortly after the contents of the verbal statement made by General Hilldring on July 11 were received, the Chinese Government informed the State Department through its Ambassador in Washington of its views regarding the proposed conference on peace with Japan. It will be recalled that in that reply the Chinese Government stated, among other things, that it would have to re-examine the matter in the event of Soviet Russia refusing to participate in the conference on the terms suggested by the United States and that the Chinese Government would like to know what further steps the American Government would take in case such a contingency arose. Since then the Soviet Government has made its reply, from which it is clear that the stand taken by the Soviet Government in the matter is radically different from that of the American Government and that unless some modification of the original American proposal is conceded, it is scarcely possible to expect her attendance at the proposed conference. It is the opinion of my Government that the purpose of this conference being to seek the creation of greater stability in the Far East and thus to reap the fruit of real peace, no effort should be spared in securing the Soviet Government’s participation, so as to prevent her from pursuing independent lines of action. The policy of my Government in this matter will be based primarily on this consideration. With a view to reconciling the divergent views and seeking a formula under which participation by all the interested powers would be possible, the Chinese Government thinks that the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China should get together at the time of the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations and engage in an exchange of views on the organization and procedure of the conference on peace with Japan in the hope that some agreement may be reached and an all-inclusive conference brought about. I shall appreciate it very much if you will give your careful consideration to this suggestion and let me have the favor of an early reply. I am looking forward to the pleasure of meeting you again in September when the General Assembly of the United Nations meets. With kindest personal regards, yours very sincerely, (Signed) Wang Shih-chieh.” Stuart 33 Repeated in telegram 105, August 26, 7 p.m., to Petropolis, Brazil, for the U.S. delegation, headed by the Secretary of State, to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security, held August 15–September 2, 1947. 34 For documentation on the status of Dairen, see volume vii . The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2047: Telegram [Document 404] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia secret Washington , August 22, 1947—6 p.m. 199. Urtel 247, Aug 20. 35 No definite date for calling peace conference been set in view of fact impossible to predict nature or date of Soviet reply to US aide-mémoire of Aug 12. You may tell External Affairs that in view of shortness of time it seems unlikely conference can convene by Sept 10. 36 Lovett 35 Not printed. 36 Telegram 250, August 25, 1 p.m., from Canberra, reported Dr. Evatt’s opinion that it was urgently necessary to hold the peace conference before the UNGA meeting, even if only a few days beforehand, and that the meeting should take place even if the Soviet Government refused to attend (740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2547). Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–747 [Document 405] Memorandum by the Legal Adviser ( Gross ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) secret [ Washington ,] August 25, 1947. Legal Situation Resulting From a Separate Peace The present memorandum is submitted in accordance with Mr. Fahy’s memorandum to you dated August 7, 1947. General Considerations A peace settlement with Japan in which less than all of the states at war with Japan participated would leave the non-participating states still at war with Japan; such a settlement would result in peace only between Japan and the members of the United Nations which participated in the settlement. A non-participating state would not be bound by the provisions of the peace and would be at liberty to make international arrangements disregarding the peace provisions. In March 1918 the Russian Soviet Government concluded a separate peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk. In Articles 116 and 292 of the Treaty of Versailles the Allied and Associated Powers provided acceptance and recognition by Germany that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was abrogated. Thus the Allied and Associated Powers of World War I considered themselves in no way bound by that Treaty, * and felt free in framing their own settlement to disregard entirely Russia’s separate peace with Germany. Similarly, the United States which, although a signatory, did not by ratification become a party to the Treaty of Versailles, did not consider itself bound by provisions of that Treaty, such as those contained in Articles 1 through 26 establishing the League of Nations, † In the case of a peace with Japan in which the Soviet Union did not participate, the Soviet Government would not be bound by the settlement provisions, regarding vital matters such as the territorial limits of Japan, an interim system of Allied controls over Japan, or reparations. The Soviet Government would not of necessity recognize the Japanese Government with which other members of the United Nations concluded peace; it might prefer to withhold recognition and make international arrangements with a later Japanese regime. The USSR and Other United Nations If it is concluded, then, that the USSR would not be bound by a peace with Japan made by other members of the United Nations without Soviet participation, it remains to be considered what rights and duties under international law would then govern the relations between the USSR and other members of the United Nations with respect to Japan. In the absence of a treaty of peace, when war terminates through the simple cessation of hostilities, it is generally held that the status quo post bellum becomes silently recognized by the former belligerents, and is the basis of future relations between them. See II Oppenheim, International Law (6th ed. 1944) pp. 465–466. If this were the case between Japan and the United States, for example, it could be inferred that other states would be bound to recognize this status quo post bellum , between Japan and the United States, in the absence of some inter-Allied agreement to the contrary. Since the USSR would not be bound by a Japanese peace treaty to which it was not a party, it could be argued by analogy that the USSR would be required to recognize the status quo post bellum , between Japan and the United States, unless this status conflicted with the results provided for in existing inter-Allied agreements. A state that has been under military occupation must under international law recognize the legitimate acts, connected with the occupied territory and with individuals and property there, which have been done by the former occupant. See II Oppenheim, op. cit. supra , pp. 482–483. Similarly, it could be argued that the USSR, in the event of a separate peace with Japan, would be required to recognize the validity of the military occupation of Japan, and of all legitimate acts done in that period, though the Soviet Union should not be a party to the treaty of peace. In any discussion of the relations between the USSR and other members of the United Nations, in the event of a separate peace with Japan, account must be taken of the post-peace status of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, of the Allied Council for Japan, and of the Far Eastern Commission. SCAP was designated, and his powers fixed, by agreement among the United States, China, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom. The designation of General MacArthur to this office and the grant of powers to him in his capacity as SCAP were without a specified time limit. ‡ It might therefore appear that the designation and grant could not be formally revoked or terminated except by agreement among at least the four great Far Eastern powers which established SCAP. However, General MacArthur is an officer in the American Army, and the chain of command from the Allies to SCAP is through the United States Government. Thus, in the event of refusal of one of the four powers to agree to a termination of SCAP, the United States would appear to be able, as a practical matter, unilaterally to end the operations and authority of SCAP at any time through the issuance of orders to General MacArthur. In this connection, however, it should be noted that the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission (Article III–3) provide that the United States shall not issue “any directives dealing with fundamental changes … in the regime of control”, without an affirmative decision of the FEC on the question. Issuance of any orders to General MacArthur which would have the effect of ending the operations of SCAP would appear to fall within the scope of this provision. Accordingly, if, in the event the USSR vetoed the termination of SCAP and his operations, the United States acted unilaterally to terminate SCAP, the United States might be thought to breach the Moscow agreement. An argument may be made, however, that the regime of control embodied in the Moscow agreement of December 1945 was not to last indefinitely and to continue to bind the Allies into the remote future. Clearly this regime was devised and intended to last only until peace. If, after exhaustive but futile efforts to make a just peace with the collaboration and consent of all the United Nations at war with Japan, the United States and other powers were justified in concluding a Japanese peace settlement without participation by the USSR, it might be argued that the agreements on control machinery for Japan during the occupation period would lapse with the conclusion of such a peace. This argument would warrant the United States, in such circumstances,—acting alone or with other of the Allies—in terminating the now-existing regime of control in Japan without the assent of the USSR. The Allied Council for Japan is part of the regime of control, and therefore under the terms of the second Moscow agreement could be formally terminated only by affirmative agreement in the Far Eastern Commission. But the Council acts solely as an adviser to SCAP. Absent SCAP, the Council would have no function to perform. Soviet disagreement on the abolition of the Council would not be of practical importance, since the Council’s continuing existence would be nugatory. The Council would even be without a chairman following the withdrawal of SCAP from Japan. The Far Eastern Commission, by Article VII of its terms of reference, shall provide for its own dissolution on the vote of a majority including the representatives of the Far Eastern Big Four. So far as the express provisions of the terms of reference control, this is the only way in which the Commission could be formally terminated. The USSR could by veto block such a resolution to terminate. If in this manner the FEC remained in existence following the conclusion of a separate peace, clearly the United States alone or with other powers could prevent the taking of any further action by the Commission. By analogy to the argument made with respect to SCAP, however, the agreement on the FEC might also be held to lapse with the conclusion of peace. Clearly the policies, principles, and standards formulated by the FEC to enable the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender cannot have been expected to survive the conclusion of a treaty of peace, except insofar as incorporated therein. If the authority of SCAP be considered to terminate with the conclusion of peace, by the same token the authority of the FEC, which was to be enforced through directives issued to SCAP, would also lapse. The USSR and Japan If the USSR were not a party to the Japanese treaty, and did not make an international arrangement of its own with Japan to end the state of war between the two countries, the question would arise of the relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. A state of war may terminate following a simple cessation of hostilities, without a peace treaty, without subjugation, and without any formal declaration of either state. See II Oppenheim, op. cit. supra , p. 465; Hyde International Law (1945) p. 2385; Hall, International Law (8th ed. 1924) p. 679. New relations stem from such a termination, even though it is extremely difficult to ascertain exactly when the war ended. See Hyde, op. cit. supra , pp. 2386–87, note 2; VI Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1943) pp. 428–36. The Soviet Union would be entitled to preserve the status quo post helium vis-à-vis Japan, so far as consistent with existing inter-Allied agreements. For example, the USSR could retain possession of the Kuril Islands and of Karafuto (southern Sakhalin). The Soviet Union would not, however, be entitled to any reparations from Japan, apart from the limited class provided for in Article 3 of Hague Convention IV (1907) cf. Oppenheim, International Law (6th ed. 1944) pp. 462–463, 476–477. Other questions present more difficulty and cannot be clearly answered. Among these are: the question of repatriation of enemy prisoners of war held by the USSR following termination of war through simple cessation of hostilities; the question of the revival or extinguishment of bilateral treaties between Japan and the Soviet Union. Whether or not the USSR could derive any rights under a peace treaty with Japan if the Soviet Government did not become a party would be governed by the treaty’s own provisions. The draft treaty prepared in the Department and circulated early in August contains a provision excluding from the treaty’s benefits any state entitled to sign or adhere which does not ratify the treaty. Ernest A. Gross * It is to be noted that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was concluded while hostilities continued between Germany and the Allies in the West, and that the Russian Soviet Government denounced the Treaty two days after the Armistice of November 11, 1918. See II Oppenheim, International Law (6th ed., 1944) p. 474, note 1. [Footnote in the original.] † The United States Congress, however, in passing the joint resolution of July 2, 1921, declaring the war with Germany ended, stipulated a reservation in favor of the United States of all rights to which it could become entitled under the Treaty of Versailles. [Footnote in the original.] ‡ The nature of the designation of General MacArthur individually to be Supreme Commander, with certain powers, implied of necessity a termination of the designation and grant in the event of the death, resignation, or permanent incapacity of MacArthur. [Footnote in the original.] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2547: Telegram [Document 406] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) secret Washington , August 25, 1947—6 p.m. 344. Dept contemplated extensive use of Atcheson’s advice as well as any comments he was bringing from Supreme Commander in its consideration of treaty in relation to our immediate and future objectives for Japan and place of Japan in Far East and the world. We are anxious to obtain Supreme Commander’s views as soon as possible (Deptel 319, Aug 19 [ 13 ]). In view of tragic accident to Atcheson 37 which removes possibility of obtaining results of his personal discussions with Supreme Commander we hope it may be possible for Supreme Commander to set forth his views adequately by radio. If considered this method inadequate we would, if Supreme Commander feels he can be spared, welcome despatch of member of his staff to present his views here. Treaty draft prepared by working group in Dept has only recently been completed and is now receiving consideration by higher officers of Dept who feel that it will need considerable revision. In order to expedite consideration and enable other interested Departments and officials to develop their views on problem copies of this working paper have been informally handed to War and Navy Depts and copy was given Kades 38 just prior to his departure. As this working paper may be of interest to Supreme Commander in this connection please obtain Kades copy and make it available to Supreme Commander emphasizing its preliminary and tentative nature and need of considerable revision. Lovett 37 See Acting Secretary Lovett’s statement on August 20 following the loss at sea of Mr. Atcheson while flying to Honolulu from Japan, Department of State Bulletin , August 31, 1947, p. 437. 38 Col. Charles L. Kades, Deputy Chief of Executive Group, Government Section, GHQ, SCAP. Memorandum by Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Borton) 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/8–2547 [Document 407] Memorandum by Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Borton ) secret Ser. 00498P35 Washington , 25 August 1947. Subject: Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan. Reference: ( a ) Navy Dept. letter, Ser. 00496P35 of 18 Aug. 1947. In accordance with paragraph 1 of reference ( a ) the following additional informal comments are submitted: 1. Preamble page 2. It is indicated that the Allied and Associated Powers will support, in due course, Japan’s application to become a member of the United Nations. 2. Article 26, Chapter IV indicates “in due course” to mean as soon after the coming into effect of the Treaty as the Council of Ambassadors is satisfied that Japan has sufficiently fulfilled its obligations under the Treaty to warrant application for membership. 3. Article IX of the Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan stipulates that the Contracting Parties agree to consult together on the need for revising the present Treaty, at the time of Japan’s admission to membership in the United Nations. 4. At the time of admission to membership in the United Nations, Japanese armed forces will be completely disarmed, demobilized and disbanded. Japan, therefore, will be unable to fulfill her commitments to the United Nations relative to furnishing prescribed armed forces. It is, therefore, recommended that provision be made for revising the Treaty well in advance of Japan’s admission to membership in the U.N. 5. Article 18, Chapter III requires that requests for the handing over of War Criminals shall be made within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. In view of the tremendous amount of documentary evidence to be reviewed in the determination of persons involved in War Crimes it appears that six months’ time is insufficient. It is conceivable that, unless a longer period is allowed, many guilty persons will remain unapprehended. This would result in loss of prestige by the Allied or Associated Power concerned. 6. Article 22, Chapter IV abolishes FEC, SCAP, ACC and their effective directives upon the coming into force of the Treaty. Such a sudden disruption of the functioning of these policy, implementing, and advisory agencies might well defeat the aim of the Interim Supervision and Inspection program. For this reason I suggest that the FEC be abolished as provided (each nation now represented in the FEC will be represented in the Council of Ambassadors), but that SCAP and ACC continue to function until such time as the Chairman of the Council of Ambassadors sees fit to terminate their offices. This provides for more freedom of action on the part of the Council. 7. Article 23, Chapter IV stipulates that during the course of withdrawal of Allied military forces from Japan, these forces shall be under the control of an American commander designated by the President of the U.S. and that this commander shall be under the authority of the Chairman of the Council of Ambassadors for Japan. Inasmuch as it is not considered sound practice, from a military point of view, to have military forces under the authority of other than normal military commanders it is suggested that this clause be modified to provide for the control of military forces under the prescribed nation’s military commander and the functions of the Council be limited to formulation of policy for implementation by the said commander. 8. Paragraph 13, Article 53, Chapter IX provides that the language in which the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be conducted shall, unless otherwise agreed, be English, French, Russian or Chinese. Because Japan will always be a party to the disputes it is suggested that this paragraph may be too restrictive and may work a hardship on the Tribunal. Therefore, it is suggested that Japanese be added to the other four languages allowed. 9. Page 7, Article 1 of the Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan includes the following statement: “All military forces brought into or operating against Japan … shall be under the general control of the Council.” This statement is subject to the same suggestion as offered in paragraph 7 above. 10. The following minor changes are suggested: [Here follow 17 suggestions for minor changes.] E. T. Wooldridge The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Petropolis 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2447: Telegram [Document 408] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Petropolis top secret Washington , August 26, 1947—7 p.m. 100. For the Secretary: We suggest following reply to Nanking’s 1770 Aug 22, which is being repeated to you separately. 39 We do not completely rule out the possibility of a meeting such as that suggested by Dr. Wang but have rejected his suggestion in proposed reply on basis that (1) we should do our best to stiffen Chinese backbone, (2) we should maintain a firm position with Soviets and (3) in any event decision should be made in light of situation existing at time of GA. “Please deliver following to FonMin in reply to his letter quoted in urtel 1770 Aug 22: ‘Dear Dr. Wang: I fully share the concern expressed in your letter to me of Aug 21 over the possibility of Soviet refusal to participate in the proposed Japanese peace settlement conference. We are very conscious of the dangers of such a development and I assure you that the United States Govt, for its part, will spare no effort in securing the Soviet Govts participation. At the same time I am firmly convinced, as are apparently all the other powers concerned, that the future peace and stability of the Far East demand an early start on a Japanese peace settlement. I am also firmly convinced, for reasons set forth in our communication to the Soviet Govt of Aug 12, that this settlement should be considered ab initio by the 11 powers directly concerned. I am, of course, in complete agreement with the purpose of your suggestion that the FonMins of China, the US, UK and USSR should meet at the time of the GA for an exchange of views on the organization and procedure of the Japanese peace settlement conference. It is clear, however, that such a meeting would compromise the principle of 11-power participation, and I feel, therefore, that its purpose could be better achieved by the Chinese and other interested govts individually taking such action as they feel may be helpful in obtaining Soviet acceptance of the principles upon which we are agreed. I am looking forward to seeing you and discussing this matter further when we meet next month in New York. With best wishes, Faithfully yours, G. C. Marshall.’ When you hand Dr. Wang above letter please inform him of my opinion that the Chinese Govt is overly concerned regarding the effect on the Soviet attitude toward Dairen of peace treaty discussions without Soviet participation. That port is now effectively denied to the Chinese and I see no reason to hope that peace settlement discussions, even with Soviet participation, would per se result in an early change in this situation. Please point out to Dr. Wang in a friendly but positive manner the obvious advantages to China of participation and the serious disadvantages to her of refusal to participate in any Jap peace settlement conference to which a majority of the powers concerned may agree. You may also inform him that our present feeling is that it will be impracticable for a conference to convene before the opening of the GA.” 40 Lovett 39 Telegram 105, August 26, 7 p.m.; see footnote 33, p. 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] . 40 The Secretary indicated approval of the proposed message to Nanking in telegram 94, August 27, 9 p.m. (740.0011 PW(Peace)/8–2747), and it was sent to Nanking in telegram 1081, August 28, 4 p.m., as from the Secretary. The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Petropolis 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2647: Telegram [Document 409] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Petropolis confidential Washington , August 26, 1947—7 p.m. 104. For the Secretary. Minister-Counselor of Australian Emb left at Dept Aug 26 following personal message for you from Evatt: “The Canberra Conference on the Japanese Settlement began today and I believe I am interpreting the views of all the members of the British Commonwealth correctly in saying that we consider every endeavour should be made to press forward to achieve preliminary discussions on the terms of the Japanese Settlement between representatives at the governmental level not later than September. There is also strong support for the United States proposals on voting.” Minister-Counselor was told that while we agree that every effort should be made to press forward on Japanese peace settlement we did not see at the present time how it would be possible to have any meeting on this subject prior to the opening of the General Assembly. Minister-Counselor expressed hope that you would make at least brief acknowledgment of Evatt’s message. 41 Lovett 41 In an aide-mémoire dated August 28, handed to the Australian Embassy by the Department on August 29, a reply from the Secretary of State was transmitted for Dr. Evatt. In it the Secretary said: “I agree with urgency of Japanese peace settlement but cannot possibly arrange meeting before opening of General Assembly. Your support of our voting proposal is most gratifying. Warm regards.” (740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2747) The Chief of the Planning Branch, Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Fahey) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2947 [Document 410] The Chief of the Planning Branch, Civil Affairs Division, War Department ( Fahey ) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfield ) top secret Washington , 29 August 1947. Dear Jim : Reference is made to your memorandum of 11 August to General Noce forwarding a copy of a preliminary draft peace treaty for Japan. 42 Our analysis has been confined to a consideration of basic criteria—desirable from the Civil Affairs/Military Government point of view—rather than to any recasting of your draft. This approach has been made in the light of my understanding that governmental discussions on a Japanese treaty will probably be delayed until after the CFM meeting this November. The attached draft of CA/MG criteria may be useful in developing discussions on the subject at a planning level prior to a more formal resolution of U. S. views, through SWNCC. In addition to the draft criteria, I feel that the U. S. cannot be a party to a Japanese Peace Treaty unless the treaty is fully definitive and comprehensive in character—and not an interim control arrangement. The existing arrangements for Japan permit considerable U. S. control and leadership. Until this government may deal with Japan on a nation to nation basis, diffused authority and multi-lateral control must be avoided. Subject to your, or Hugh Borton’s convenience, I should be glad to participate in further discussions on the subject. Consultation with P&O here in the War Department develops that they are following a similar course of action in their reply to you and are confining their discussion to the purely security aspects of a treaty. 43 Sincerely yours, Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr . [Enclosure] Draft Prepared in the War Department top secret Washington , 29 August 1947. Draft Basic Civil Affairs/Military Government Criteria Among Those To Be Encompassed in a Japanese Peace Treaty 1. That the treaty be so designed as to encourage and continue a Japan aligned with U.S. interests. 2. That during any interim period between now and the exercise of full sovereignty of the Japanese themselves, no existing authority now reposing with U.S. be relinquished. Comment —Existing control measures for Japan including the authority of SCAP, the FEC and the Allied Council permit U.S. domination of the Japanese occupation. Without relinquishing our dominant position nor our authority, the U.S. can and should progressively diminish the degree of control as Japanese political and economic self-sufficiency progresses. 3. That the treaty fully recognize and be so designed as to confirm: ( a ) Allied agreements re Japan thus far. ( b ) SCAP accomplishments thus far under U.S. directives. ( c ) The prestige of the U.S. and the significant position occupied by General MacArthur. Comment —Accomplishments thus far in Japan are almost without exception attributable to U.S. leadership. If the U.S. does not insist upon confirmation of the things thus far accomplished we are necessarily throwing away our leadership and recommitting for further review that which is and should remain as a fait accompli . As a practical matter we should avoid any provision which would create a hiatus between standing decrees and the exercise of full sovereignty by the Japanese Government. 4. That the treaty be so designed as to encourage and permit Japanese economic self-sufficiency. Comment —The Japanese must stand on their own feet. The use of U.S. dollars to bolster the Japanese economy cannot be continued indefinitely. 5. That if controls of Japan’s war potential are necessary in a treaty, they be limited to production potentialities and the level of supply of the few basic commodities upon which a revitalized Japanese war potential would be dependent. Comment —The above contemplates possible controls over such basic commodities as steel, coal and petroleum. 6. That the treaty should permit full Japanese participation in international trade subject only to international conventions. 7. That the treaty should provide for the settlement of reparations claims subject only to occupation costs and without prejudicing the retention of sufficient productive capabilities essential to permit Japan’s reasonable economic self-sufficiency. 8. That the treaty should insure the restitution of all items in Japan which may be reasonably identified as having been improperly removed from other countries. Comment —It appears that restitution may well be completed before a treaty is consummated. If so, this criteria is unnecessary. In the event restitution is covered in the treaty, a cutoff date for the filing of claims would be necessary. 9. That the treaty should encourage the continuation of educational methods and standards along democratic lines established during the occupation. 10. That the treaty be so designed as to nullify previous treaties and conventions which do not respect the rights of the U.S. and its nationals in the publications field. Comment —The Bi-lateral Convention of 10 November 1905 between Japan and the U. S. is the type convention referred to. This convention, which should be nullified, permits citizens of either country to translate without authorization written material of all sorts into either English or Japanese. SCAP’s administrative decisions have provided that U. S. authors and publishers must be afforded copyright protection equal to that granted nationals of other countries having more favorable treaties with Japan. Thus, the convention has been inoperative under the present occupation. 11. That the treaty be so designed as to insure known war criminals, under Japanese jurisdiction, be surrendered for trial, and that those incarcerated in Japan serve the full term of their sentence, unless clemency is granted by the committing authority, with the U. S. having a final voice in clemency proceedings involving offences against U. S. nationals and a dominant voice in clemency proceedings involving international tribunals. Comment —The objective of the War Crimes program in both Europe and in the Far East is that those guilty shall be apprehended, tried and punished as a deterrent against future war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity. It appears probable that the Japanese War Crimes’ trials will be substantially completed prior to the effective date of a peace treaty. Unless the sentences as a result of the trials, are enforced, there exists the probability that our war crimes program, at a great expense of effort and money, may be converted into a mockery and a farce. There is already considerable indication among both Japanese and Germans on trial for war crimes that if they escape the death sentence, the most they must endure, is imprisonment not beyond the period of occupation. The ultimate place of confinement of convicted war criminals is now undetermined. Probably a determination will be required before a treaty, insofar as it pertains to war crimes, may be given final form. 42 See footnote 12, p. 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] . 43 In a reply dated September 4, Brig. Gen. C. V. R. Schuyler, Chief of the Plans and Policy Group, Plans and Operations Division, War Department, said that formal comments on the draft treaty did not seem necessary in writing, as informal discussions were taking place directly with State Department representatives (740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–447). The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2947 [Document 411] The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State 44 [Translation] Aide-Mémoire In reply to the aide-mémoire of the Secretary of State of the United States of America of August 13 [ 12 ], 1947 concerning the convening of an 11-Power Conference to draw up a peace treaty with Japan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. communicates that on the following grounds the Soviet Government considers as unfounded the reasons advanced by the Government of the United States against a preliminary consideration of the question of convening a conference to draw up a peace treaty with Japan by the Council of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Four Powers, the Soviet Union, United States of America, Great Britain, and China. It is known that the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs was established by the Potsdam Decision to carry on the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlement. This decision does not in the least envisage the restriction of this work only to a peace settlement in relation to the countries of Europe. The composition of the Council of Foreign Ministers itself points to the contrary. The inclusion in it of a representative of China is evidence that questions of a peace settlement in relation to Japan are also within the competence of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. This circumstance is also recognized by the Government of the United States of America, in as much as in its aide-mémoire of August 13, 1947 it is pointed out that the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs was constituted on a basis which would have permitted its use for the preparation of a treaty of peace with Japan. However, this recognition in the aide-mémoire of the United States of America is accompanied by a stipulation of an arbitrary character to the effect that the use of the Council for the preparation of a treaty of peace with Japan could take place only on the condition that the members of the Council subsequently agreed to this. At the same time, as an acquaintance with the text of the Potsdam Decision shows, such a stipulation is not included in this text. The Soviet Government cannot accept this stipulation since, as is evident from the text of Section A of the Potsdam Decision for the establishment of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, there is only one stipulation in the Decision according to which it is necessary to reach a supplementary agreement between the Governments participating in the Council only in connection with the consideration of other questions apart from question in the peace settlement. * The special interest of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain, and China in questions concerning the postwar situation in Japan was recognized by the fact that at the Moscow Conference in 1945 the United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union reached an agreement, to which China subsequently adhered, that these four countries would participate in the Allied Council for Japan and that the Far Eastern Commission in Washington would adopt its decisions with the mandatory concurrence of the representatives of the four above-mentioned powers. The reference to this decision of the Moscow Conference which was made in the previous note of the Soviet Government was not answered in the note of the United States of August 13. Nevertheless, the sense of this decision of the Moscow Conference cannot be subject to misinterpretation. † In view of the above, the Soviet Government continues to maintain the point of view set forth in its reply of July 22, 1947 and insists that the question of convening a conference to draw up a treaty of peace with Japan be preliminarily considered at the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs composed of representatives of the Soviet Union, United States of America, Great Britain, and China. Washington , August 29, 1947. 44 The text was published in Moscow on August 31, 1947. * Translator’s note: “The reference is apparently to the first paragraph of Section II of the Potsdam Communiqué reading: ‘The Conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers representing the five principal powers to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the Council by agreement of the Governments participating in the Council.’ ” † Translator’s note: “The reference is apparently to paragraph 2, Article V, part II, of the Communiqué of the Moscow Conference in 1945 reading as follows: ‘The Commission may take action by less than unanimous vote provided that action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all representatives including the representatives of the four following Powers: the United States, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China.’ ” The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2947: Telegram [Document 412] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , August 29, 1947. 306. ZPOL 1084. 1. Dr. Kimm Kiusic has asked that message quoted below signed by him as chairman and by all other members of the interim Legislative Assembly of South Korea be transmitted to President Truman. They also ask that identic message be sent to Prime Minister Attlee and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Message is as follows: “We hereby express our desire that Korea be allowed to participate in the coming peace conference with Japan. The direct participation of Korea for her own interest is justified by the fact that relationship between Korea and Japan had been very complicated for a long period. Accept, Sir, our highest consideration and greatest respects and we hope you will continue to offer your best efforts for world peace.” 2. Dr. Kimm has been informed that the message has been forwarded to Department of State as the appropriate agency for handling communications of this kind from South Korean authorities to higher American and other non-Korean authorities. 3. We feel here that some representative of the South Korea Government might well be permitted to attend the peace conference with Japan if only in the capacity of an observer. We realize however that granting such permission to a representative of South Korea will probably move the USSR, if it attends the conference, to request that a representative from North Korea be present. To permit representatives from both North and South Korea to attend an international gathering such as the Japanese peace conference might be objectionable from the viewpoint of emphasizing the division of Korea into two separate political entities. Accordingly, as Dr. Kimm has been informed of the foregoing disposition of the Assembly’s message, no further reply need be given him unless it is desired that we inform him that the State Department is giving consideration to the matter. 4. The question of some American representation (State or War) from Korea at the conference was raised in Seoul PolAd No. 226, July 22, to which the Department replied in Department’s telegram 158, July 31. 45 Regardless of action taken with respect to Korean representatives, we feel that these American representatives should attend. Jacobs 45 Neither printed. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–147: Telegram [Document 413] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , September 1, 1947. C55205. I have carefully read the suggested draft of a treaty of peace with Japan brought here by Colonel Kades. I fully agree that this draft requires major revision before being acceptable for presentation as the considered view of the United States Government. As it is apparent from the message in reference that the paper is still under study in Washington from which marked revision in both form and context [ content? ] may be expected, I shall limit myself here to comment only upon the following features which instantly appear to me as highly questionable: 1. The draft provides for the retention of the Ryukyu Islands by Japan. Control over this group must be vested in the United States as absolutely essential to the defense of our Western Pacific Frontier. It is not indigenous to Japan ethnologically, does not contribute to Japan’s economic welfare, nor do the Japanese people expect to be permitted to retain it. It is basically strategic, and in my opinion, failure to secure it for control by the United States might prove militarily disastrous; 2. Provision that the forces of occupation should pass under the authority of the American Ambassador, a civil functionaire, upon the effectuation of the treaty is professionally unsound and follows a concept fraught with the danger of grave consequences. At such stage the entire military operation under the terms of the draft would have become one of evacuation which should be conducted, as any other military operation, under the control of the War rather than State Department with respect to American forces and the other governments concerned with respect to foreign forces. Should it become necessary in an emergency to use the force remaining for other military operations during the withdrawal period arrangements therefor should be effected on the highest governmental levels; 3. Provision for the post-treaty utilization of Allied force in Japan after the withdrawal of the occupation forces would provide a possible stepping stone for Russia or some other objectionable foreign power later to acquire a military foothold upon Japanese soil, an eventuality which would not only threaten all gains made during the occupation but our strategic position in the Western Pacific as well. Should the application of Allied military force be so required, we would be confronted with a situation in which the treaty had broken down and reestablishment of the occupation rendered mandatory; 4. It is believed a faulty concept which would provide for Allied executive authority over Japan in the post-treaty period, exercised through the proposed Council of Ambassadors. It would but continue the existing SCAP control organization under a new name and defeat the primary treaty aim of seeing Japan emerge from occupation control as a self-respecting, autonomous and democratic nation. The principal functions of the Council of Ambassadors should embrace the close observation of the manner of compliance with the treaty terms (which should provide for the full and faithful implementation of SCAP directives issued in furtherance of Allied policy, except where expressly modified by treaty provisions) and the reporting to the member governments or the United Nations, as appropriate within its terms of reference, of serious violations thereof; 5. Provision for a separate 25-year treaty among the 11 powers to insure the demilitarization and disarmament of Japan fails realistically to recognize Japan’s present situation and its potential for rearmament during that period of time. It would bring US into doubtful military alignments, unjustified by the circumstances existing, which might well later prove politically embarrassing and militarily disadvantageous. Apart from the fact that, from a physical and material standpoint, Japan is utterly incapable of rearming herself for modern war within the 25-year period prescribed, any possible will or attempt toward such end, in disregard of treaty commitments, can better be controlled by the power and prestige of the member governments and the moral force of world opinion, than by the overhanging threat of Allied forces; 6. The proposal to establish a commission of inspection, arbitral tribunals, et cetera, would appear cumbersome and unnecessary and would invite the establishment in Japan of unwarranted numbers of foreign officials for many years and create the basis for the spread of internal ideological conflict through widespread abuse of official status and misuse of power and authority, and inevitably would subject Japan to an unprecedented carpet-bagging invasion. The proposed Council of Ambassadors would possess inherently the authority to organize such technical and other assistance as might prove essential to the proper discharge of its functions, without the rigidity of treaty mandate; 7. The proposed staging of post-treaty supervision from the Council of Ambassadors to one or more successor organizations follows a seeming faulty concept and would prove uncertain, unwieldy and confusing in its failure to provide a positive solution to the problem; 8. The unilateral right vesting in the Allied Powers, in their sole discretion, to alter the treaty terms after ratification by all powers, including Japan, is highly questionable. Such indefinitive treatment of the problem would not prove the freedom of action inherent in the change from war to peace, would suggest indecision and vacillation on the part of the Allied Powers, and could not fail to foster confusion and unrest among the Japanese, with a chaotic situation resulting where confidence and stability would be the pressing need. Sufficient information which guided Allied policy in the past is now at hand to boldly and explicitly set forth the conditions prerequisite to the restoration of peace. Such conditions should be stated in simple and unmistakable language with every effort made to avoid arbitrary, oppressive, and unnecessary controls which would tend to stultify the evolutionary development of a democratic, peaceful, and economically self-sustaining Japan; 9. Nothing could be fraught with greater danger to the composed and stable situation which now exists in Japan than to abrogate all orders and directives, issued both by and to SCAP during the occupation, upon the effectuation of the peace treaty. Such procedure would have the effect of nullifying all of the considered action taken by the Far Eastern Commission and SCAP during this post-surrender period and would thoroughly discredit both international entities and threaten all gains made through the exercise of their respective spheres of authority. The whole framework to political, economic and social reform rests upon these policies and directives, many of which may only be fully implemented in the course of a long period of time, and all of which automatically will, in any event, cease to have force and effect as implementation is completed; 10. It is highly objectionable to commit the United States by treaty provision to post-treaty credits of hundreds of millions of dollars to support the Japanese economy. With the restoration of peace, such matters should be left to negotiation by the Japanese under the normal methods of international finance. Furthermore, such action by treaty provision would commit future Congresses of the United States to the appropriation of funds without the opportunity for legislative consideration; 11. The economic levels fixed in the treaty are highly speculative and may well prove unrealistic and opposed to our basic purpose in the restoration of peace, as may also features of the reparations solution. Economic levels consistent with stability are dependent upon too many variables impossible now to assay, to permit arbitrary ceilings by treaty mandate without threat to the achievement of a self-sustaining Japanese economy, and a resultant possibility of burdensome expense to the American taxpayer. As stated, the foregoing is comment upon only those features of the draft which appear to me at first glance to be most doubtful. I should be very glad, when revision of the paper as now contemplated has been completed, to give my views thereon in greater detail, or at any time my comment on any specific point involved. It is possibly needless to point out that discussion of this matter has been predicated upon the concept that the treaty of peace will be ratified by all nations involved in the war against Japan. Should any nation, such as Russia, abstain from the peace negotiations or fail to ratify the peace pact, the situation thereby created would necessitate consideration of aspects of the problem, especially those involving withdrawal of the occupation forces, from an entirely different point of view, with markedly different conclusions resulting. MacArthur Editorial Note [Document 414] Editorial Note The Secretary of State replied in telegram 361, September 10, 6 p.m., to General MacArthur: “Greatly appreciate your comments on treaty draft (your C–55205 Sept 1), which are being carefully considered in connection current high level examination draft’s underlying assumptions and basic provisions.” (740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–147) The Australian Ambassador (Makin) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–247 [Document 415] The Australian Ambassador ( Makin ) to the Acting Secretary of State No. 328/47 Washington , 2 September, 1947. The Australian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Acting Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him that he has been instructed by the Minister of State for External Affairs, Dr. H. V. Evatt, to convey the following message to the Secretary, Mr. Marshall:— “A short meeting at a governmental level during the early part of the Assembly would in my view be suitable providing matter is then pressed forward. I am sending to Ambassador Butler confidential report concerning present British Commonwealth discussions on Japanese settlement so that he may communicate it to yourself. I am happy to advise you that discussions have revealed not only that all governments are approaching the subject along parallel lines but also in the way in which I believe your Government would fully approve in principle. I am leaving Australia for the United States on Thursday next. I am looking forward to seeing you in New York where I can give you a full report and I hope to have the honor of working with you to achieve a speedy just and stable settlement. Personal Regards.” 46 46 In a memorandum of September 3, the Secretary of State was informed that the report of the Canberra Conference was encouraging from the American point of view. The Australian Embassy was orally informed that the Secretary looked forward to seeing Dr. Evatt in New York. Telegram 212, September 9, 6 p.m., to Canberra, informed the Ministry of External Affairs that Dr. Evatt’s report of the conference had been most helpful to the United States with regard to the peace settlement for Japan (740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–247). The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/8–2947: Telegram [Document 416] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) confidential Washington , September 11, 1947—noon. 191. Inf CinCFE. Urtel 306, Aug 29. Inform Kimm Kiusic message being transmitted Pres Truman and Dept giving consideration means by which Korean interests connection Japanese peace settlement can best be given expression. Not clear from urtel whether intended message also to be sent to Dept to Prime Minister Attlee Generalissimo CKS. Dept has taken no action this matter but raises question whether messages might not be transmitted by Legislature or by USAFIK acting for Legislature through Chinese and British Consuls Seoul. Your comment requested. 47 Marshall 47 Telegram 344, September 13, from Seoul, stated that the messages had already been transmitted through the Consuls and that this procedure would be followed in future cases (740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–1347). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–1447 [Document 417] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 48 secret [ New York ,] September 14, 1947. My interview with Dr. Evatt 49 was most informal and was almost entirely confined to discussions by him. I did not find it necessary to make any important statements. Dr. Evatt devoted most of the time to the question of the Pacific Peace Treaty. He was strongly of the opinion that we should decide very shortly, that is, during our early meetings here in New York, to have a preliminary procedural meeting, preferably at Pearl Harbor because of psychological reasons. Whether or not the Soviets attended he did not think at this time was of great importance because he felt that later they would feel compelled to attend in order to safeguard commitments which had already been made in their favor regarding the southern half of Sakhalin, the Kuriles, et cetera. Dr. Evatt thought that the meeting in Hawaii should be restricted to a very limited period and suggested three or four days. During that time he thought that the ordinary questions of procedure could be settled and that the committees could be determined upon, and the date and place for the formal conference settled. Dr. Evatt was of the opinion that the formal meeting should occur within two or three months and he expressed the view that a peace treaty could be completed within three months after the meeting in Hawaii. He thought it very important that we conclude matters in the Pacific at as early a date as possible, and he felt that the issues were not difficult of solution, that is, comparable to the extreme difficulties in connection with the peace treaty regarding Germany. Dr. Evatt talked at some length regarding his visit to Tokyo and his discussions with General MacArthur. He disagreed with MacArthur regarding the holding of the formal conference in Tokyo. He thought that it was not advisable. In other matters he seemed to be in pretty general agreement with General MacArthur. He stated several times there was a full disposition on the part of the British Empire troops to go along with the United States and accept United States leadership. He foresaw no complications in this regard. Regarding the present meeting of the General Assembly he made almost no comments. He was very critical of Mr. Bevin’s Fort Knox gold utterances. He had nothing to say about the veto nor about the chairmanship of the Assembly and I made no reference to these matters. Dr. Evatt asked me to please keep him advised of the American desires and indicated a desire on his part to go along with us. 48 The Secretary of State was in New York attending the Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 6–November 29, 1947. 49 Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs, who was attending the UN General Assembly. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–1447 [Document 418] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ New York ,] September 14, 1947. I had an informal conversation with Dr. Wang 50 during and after a dinner with only the two of us present. Dr. Wang talked to me at length about the arrangements for the Pacific Peace Treaty. He expressed deep concern over any suggestion that the veto power be eliminated and gave these reasons: The Far Eastern Commission had proceeded on the basis of the veto, that is, a two-third’s vote of the eleven powers represented, but the privilege of the veto to any one of the four great powers concerned. He felt that a departure from that would place China in a very critical situation regarding the Soviets. He explained that the Chinese had a treaty with the Soviets 51 and they had their deep concern regarding Manchuria. Now if the veto were eliminated with the Chinese subscribing to the elimination he very much feared that the Soviets would interpret this, for their own convenience, as virtually canceling the Sino-Soviet Treaty. In expressing his concern he emphasized the fact that the Chinese had no desire to exercise the veto nor thought of any occasion which might persuade them to do so. He was solely concerned over the reaction on the part of the Soviets as it would relate to the situation of China. He begged that I give this very careful consideration and said that he would delay talking to Vyshinsky 52 until he had had another conversation with me. I briefly discussed my reasons for sending General Wedemeyer 53 to China, explaining to Dr. Wang that while I was at Moscow I had called on a number of officials and individuals in China for suggestions as to what we might do to be of assistance to China, and that none of the replies had offered any practical solution. In fact, almost all of them offered no solution at that time. Finally, I determined that something further must be done and I had selected Wedemeyer because of his known pronounced anti-Chinese Communist bias and his devotion to the Generalissimo, and also because of the Generalissimo’s expressed confidence in Wedemeyer. I felt that under these conditions and balanced by the fact that Wedemeyer’s high integrity would override any personal prejudice or leanings, he was the best person to send on the mission. I explained that I was merely endeavoring to find some practical means that could be taken by the United States Government to assist the Chinese Government. Dr. Wang made no comment in reply. I further explained that Wedemeyer would reach Washington Tuesday or Wednesday and that after the State Department had had an opportunity to analyze his report, which I had not yet seen, I would get the papers here in New York and probably have General Wedemeyer up here or would see him down there. Then I might wish to talk to Dr. Wang. I stated that I was unaware of what the contents of the report would be and its recommendations; that Wedemeyer had given me a brief letter with a description of his experiences in Formosa. Beyond that I had no details other than were implied in his public statement. I did say that the comments regarding Formosa were tragic in the description of what the civil government had done and what the military leaders had done in the misrule of that country and the complete antagonism of the inhabitants. Dr. Wang stated that there were two things I did which the Generalissimo would never forget nor would China throughout the years to come. One was the removal from China and Manchuria of three million Japanese and the other was not only the transportation of troops to Manchuria, but the preparation of these troops for service there, their equipment, their clothing and supplies, which I had energetically directed and arranged immediately upon my arrival in China. Beyond that he made no comment regarding my services in an effort to mediate. 50 Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, attending the UN General Assembly. 51 Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945. 52 Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and Soviet representative at the United Nations. 53 Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Special Representative of President Truman in China and Korea, July–September, 1947. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/9–1747 [Document 419] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ) secret [ New York ,] September 17, 1947. Participants: Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh, Chinese Foreign Minister Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. Mr. Charles E. Bohlen In continuance of the conversation which the Secretary had with Dr. Wang 54 concerning the procedures for the Japanese peace settlement, I had dinner last night with Dr. Wang and Wellington Koo. Dr. Wang developed the point of view of the Chinese Government concerning procedures for the Japanese peace conference which he had briefly outlined to the Secretary previously. The Chinese Government believes that the most practicable and wisest method of handling the preparation for the Japanese peace treaty would be to adopt the membership and voting procedures of the Far Eastern Commission. The Chinese Government considers this preferable to their original idea to having an informal Four-power meeting in New York for an exchange of views on this subject. Dr. Wang explained that the attitudes of his Government were based on the following two factors which he was giving in frankness and in confidence: 1. Chinese national sensibility would be wounded and there would be an adverse public reaction if China, having been excluded from the purely great power formulation of the peace terms for the European countries, particularly Germany should then be placed on the same footing as all of the eleven countries directly concerned with the peace settlement with Japan. He said that Chinese public opinion had always resented the fact that China had been excluded from the making of the European peace, but since the principle of special great power responsibility had been adopted in regard to Europe it would be very difficult for the Chinese Government to support before the people any procedures for the making of the Japanese peace which did not accord China some privileged position in view of the vital interest of China in the terms of the Japanese peace settlement. 2. The Chinese Government was apprehensive lest the Soviet Union would seize, from the fact that China had proceeded to negotiate and conclude a peace treaty with Japan without the participation of the Soviet Union, as grounds for abrogating the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1945. He said that while this treaty with the Soviet Union had not fully led to the results hoped for by the Chinese Government, nevertheless it had, he believed, operated as a restraining factor in the Soviet attitude towards the Chinese Communists. If a pretext was offered the Soviet Union through the conclusion by China of a separate peace with Japan the Russians might have grounds then for openly supporting the Chinese Communists even possibly to the extent of recognizing a Communist regime in Manchuria and North China. He said these apprehensions might be groundless, but nevertheless his Government felt that they were a real possibility and in view of the geographic proximity of the Soviet Union his Government felt it would be unwise for them to take the risk. I explained first of all to Dr. Wang that when we had made the suggestion for the composition and procedure of the Japanese peace conference we expressly stated that the conference itself would determine its own voting procedure and that our proposal for the two-thirds majority was, therefore, not definite but subject to consideration by the proposed members. I said we had been led to make the suggestion regarding the two-thirds majority because of the experience which we had had at every international conference and in the United Nations with the Russian abuse of the veto. I outlined to him the difficulties we had run into in the making of the European peace and in particularly in regard to Germany and Austria because of the previous adoption of the rule of unanimity. In the case of Germany we had finally been forced by the pressure of absolute necessity in connection with our zone to proceed with its development in conjunction with the British over Russian objection. Because of this experience we had felt that it might be wise to explore the possibility in connection with the Japanese settlement of doing away with the veto through the medium of a two-thirds majority. I pointed out that, of course, this meant that the U.S. was suggesting giving up its right of the veto but that we were fearful of a prolonged stalemate in the Japanese peace negotiations if the principle of unanimity which had so frustrated the establishment of conditions of peace in Europe were adopted for the Far Eastern settlement. I said that I fully understood the difficulties for China in this matter for the reasons mentioned by Dr. Wang, but that I wondered if those same difficulties would not be if anything enhanced should the four-power veto be adopted in the peace conference and then as a result of long obstruction by the Soviet representative it became absolutely necessary to proceed without the Soviet Union. I inquired whether under those circumstances if it would not be even more dangerous for China to proceed with the making of the Japanese peace excluding Russia if such should prove absolutely necessary in violation of the agreed upon procedure. I said it had been my experience that it was infinitely harder to move out of an existing organization than to establish it on a sound basis and let the Soviet Union as it were exclude itself from the beginning. Dr. Wang said he recognized the validity of that point but it was one which would have to have consideration if and when the question arose. He said he did not feel that in the Japanese peace settlement the Russians would be as likely to obstruct as they had in Europe. In the case of Japan with the U.S. in sole occupation the Russians would undoubtedly be desirous of seeing the U.S. withdraw and, therefore, would be in favor of the early conclusion of a peace treaty. This was not true in regard to Germany where the Russians were in occupation of the Eastern zones. He cited, for example, the fact that in the Far Eastern Commission the Russians had not attempted to obstruct in anything like the same manner as they had in Europe. I then raised the point as to whether Dr. Wang had any indication that an eleven power conference with the same voting procedure as the Far Eastern Commission would be acceptable to the Russians; in their replies to us they had proposed only that the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of the U.S.S.R., China, the U.K., and the U.S. should draft the peace treaty following the same procedure which had been set up for the European treaties. Consideration, therefore, should be given as to whether the Russians would not refuse the suggestion of Dr. Wang and that we would, therefore, be exactly where we were now with the exception that the position of a two-thirds majority had been abandoned without profit. Dr. Wang replied that he had no indication from the Russians on this point as he had specifically refrained from talking with them until he had discussed this matter with Secretary Marshall. Ambassador Koo said that in any case he thought that there should be no abandonment of the two-thirds majority principle until it was quite clear that the Russians were prepared to accept the Far Eastern Commission membership and voting procedures for the conference. He suggested that it might be wise if Dr. Wang on his own initiative would sound out the Russians and the British on this point before any change were made in existing positions. If the Russians were willing to accept, the conference could be convened and could then adopt the Far Eastern Commission voting procedures. Dr. Wang pointed out that the American suggestion of two-thirds was in effect a modification of the Far Eastern Commission procedure and if it were not adopted it would then be easy for the conference to almost automatically retain the Far Eastern Commission procedures. Dr. Wang said that there would obviously be difficulty with the British Dominions, particularly Australia, although in a brief talk he had had with Dr. Evatt in San Francisco on his way here Dr. Evatt had suggested that the four powers should have informal discussions in an endeavor to iron out any differences they might have on the substance of the treaty before the conference convened. Dr. Wang said he had pointed out to Dr. Evatt that this in effect would mean the establishment of the same procedures which had been so difficult in Europe, namely, that the four powers would in effect draft the treaty and even under the two-thirds rule there would be no chance in a conference of eleven of effecting any changes in a draft they had agreed on. I agreed to communicate the views of Dr. Wang to the Secretary and, I was sure that they would receive the most serious consideration and would communicate with him further regarding the position of the United States Government. Charles E. Bohlen 54 Supra . Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW Peace/9–2247 [Document 420] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth ) to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] September 22, 1947. Background: 1. The Policy Planning Staff has, in collaboration with FE, reviewed the position in regard to the Japanese peace settlement. Final recommendations by the Staff will be forthcoming shortly but it has definitely decided that we should not unduly delay initiation of discussions on a peace treaty for Japan. 2. There are, on the other hand, doubts as to the advisability of hastening negotiations until our basic position is firm, until we can better estimate the amount of support we can count on for this position and until the Soviets take a final stand on Germany, presumably in the CFM meeting in November. 3. All of the Powers we approached on July 11 regarding initiation of Japanese peace treaty discussions indicated general agreement with our proposals except: a . The USSR, which stated, and reiterated in a note of August 29 in reply to our rebuttal, that “the question of convening a conference to draw up a treaty of peace with Japan should be preliminarily considered at the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and China.” b . China, whose doubts were most clearly set forth in a letter to you from the Chinese Foreign Minister of August 21 55 in which he proposed an informal meeting in the near future of the Foreign Ministers of the UK, China, US and USSR. In your reply to Dr. Wang of August 28 (Tab A) 56 you rejected this proposal on the grounds that it would prejudice this principle of eleven-Power participation and expressed the hope that China would participate in any conference to which the majority of the Powers directly concerned might agree. In his conversation with you on September 14 he advocated adoption of a voting procedure similar to the FEC, in which the rule of unanimity would apply to the Big Four (See Tab B). In his conversation with Mr. Bohlen on September 17, he reiterated this position (See Tab C). It is questionable whether the USSR will participate in an eleven-Power conference, even if assured of a veto. It is felt, however, that we should make every effort to obtain Soviet participation. In the conversation between Mr. Bohlen and Dr. Wang, it was suggested that it might be advisable to sound out the Soviets to determine whether the Russians were prepared to accept the Far Eastern Commission membership and voting procedure for the conference. In a memorandum of August 25, 1947 to Mr. Lovett the Legal Adviser stated: “In the event of a separate peace, concluded following exhaustive but futile efforts to make a just peace settlement with the participation of all the United Nations at war with Japan, the regime of control for Japan comprising SCAP, the Allied Council, and the FEC could be terminated without the assent of the USSR.” This position suggests that further efforts should be made to endeavor to obtain Soviet participation in the conference. Without taking such a step, the United States and the other Allies would face serious legal obstacles in making a separate peace or in terminating SCAP or the FEC without Soviet consent. 4. Dr. Evatt has been constantly pressing for early consideration of the Japanese peace settlement. He has strongly argued against a veto and discussion at Canberra on voting procedure was on the assumption that we would not change our original position of two-thirds vote. In his conversation with you on September 14, Dr. Evatt again advocated an early preliminary procedural meeting on the peace treaty and suggested Pearl Harbor as a preferable place (See Tab D). His statement that Soviet attendance at this stage was unimportant, as they would come in later to safeguard territorial commitments made to them, seems unrealistic as the Soviets are already in occupation of these territories and can continue to hold them in virtue of their rights as victors in the war against Japan. On September 2 we were informed by the British Embassy that the general feeling expressed at the Canberra conference was that Japanese peace treaty discussions should begin not later than the end of September. The Philippines and the French, particularly the former, are anxious for an early start on discussions. The Netherlands appears to have no strong convictions. China, as indicated above, would doubtless prefer postponement to a meeting which the Soviets refused to attend. 5. The British have raised the question of Pakistan participation in the treaty drafting. This is undesirable because it would ( a ) increase the “British bloc” representation to 6 or 50 percent of the participants, ( b ) open the door to applications from Burma and Outer Mongolia, and ( c ) represent a departure from our criterion for determining the participants, namely, membership in the Far Eastern Commission. On the other hand, areas in India directly involved in the war are included in Pakistan and it is likely that if we actively opposed her participation we would find ourselves in a minority and would incur considerable resentment. On balance, it is believed to be not in our interest to block such participation but that the question should be settled at the conference. Recommendations: It is recommended that: 1. Our basic position on security and other vital issues involved in the Japanese peace settlement be decided, at the Secretarial level if necessary, not later than October 6. 2. In view of the suggestion made by Ambassador Koo during the conversation with Mr. Bohlen on September 17 that Dr. Wang sound out the Russians and British as to whether they were prepared to accept the Far Eastern Commission membership and voting procedure for the conference, you inform Dr. Wang that we have no objection to his undertaking exploratory talks with the Soviets and British and others especially interested, such as the Australians, and that we should be glad to have at as early a date as possible his findings. 57 3. The decision on the next step which the United States should take might await the result of Dr. Wang’s conversations. Even though we may be prepared to agree to some form of four-Power unanimity rule, if it is clear that a majority of the other powers would accept such a procedure, we should give Dr. Wang no indication now of our willingness to adopt such a procedure. If we find it necessary to accept a four-Power unanimity rule, it is important that we do so reluctantly and with expressed skepticism as to the suitability of such a procedure to produce a satisfactory treaty. This position towards the veto is necessary in the event that a peace conference in which the veto is used develops in such a way that we may be called upon to break it up and adopt some other procedure which will produce an arrangement more satisfactory to us. 55 See telegram 1770, August 22, noon, from Nanking, p. 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] . 56 See telegram 100, August 26, 7 p.m., to Petropolis, and footnote 40, p. 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 408 ] . 57 Mr. Butterworth in a memorandum of October 2 reported a conversation with Dr. Wang who indicated that “he had proposed to Mr. Vishinsky as a possible compromise the same voting procedure as pertains to the Far Eastern Commission; that at his request Mr. Vishinsky had telegraphed Moscow for an official expression of his Government’s views.” (740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–247) Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/10–647 [Document 421] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth ) secret [ Washington ,] October 6, 1947. Subject: Canberra Conference on Japanese Peace Treaty. Mr. Graves 58 called at his own request to leave the attached folder containing: 1) An oral statement concerning the attached documents 2) Memorandum by the UK Delegation on the Economic and Financial Provisions of the Japanese Peace Settlement 3) Appendix on Long-Term Security Controls Over Japan 4) Appendix on Reparations 5) Appendix on Disposal of Japanese-Owned Property in Neutral Countries 6) Appendix on Economic Questions Relative to the Cession of Territories by Japan 7) Annex on the Review of the Japanese Constitution 8) Memorandum on Territorial, Political and General Clauses 9) Memorandum on UK Views on Measures for Control of Japan Mr. Graves stated that he was delivering this material 59 on instruction from his Government and wished to point out that the documents are a purely provisional expression of the views of his Government and should be considered as such. Mr. Graves added, however, that the enclosed memoranda contained ideas which were logical developments of the position already taken by the United Kingdom in the Far Eastern Commission. It was his view that while the United Kingdom might change on certain minor points raised in the attached, they would adhere, in general, to the policies set forth in the documents. Mr. Graves further added that whenever the phrase “consensus of opinion” or “general agreement” was used in the oral communication, it indicated that no formal decisions had been made at the Canberra Conference as such was the usual procedure of Commonwealth meetings. Mr. Graves concluded by saying that as they had consulted on the treaty problems and as they did not wish to give the impression of forming a Commanwealth bloc among the countries to participate in the peace conference, they felt it advisable to inform us of their views at the Conference. I thanked Mr. Graves for the information and the documents which he left with us and told him that I was sure they would be of great value to us and hoped he would communicate our appreciation to the British Government. [A memorandum analyzing the contents of the documents will be circulated shortly.] 60 H[ ugh ] B[ orton ] 58 Hubert A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy. 59 Not printed. 60 Brackets appear in the original. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [Document 422] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ New York ,] October 9, 1947. Participants: Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh, Chinese Foreign Minister; Secretary of State Marshall; Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor, Department of State. Dr. Wang called and brought up with me this morning the following subjects regarding the Japanese peace conference: Japanese Peace Conference: Dr. Wang informed me that he had mentioned to Mr. Vyshinsky the Chinese suggestion that the Japanese peace conference should follow as to membership and voting procedure the precedent of the Far Eastern Commission. Mr. Vyshinsky had expressed doubt as to this suggestion, reaffirming the Soviet position that the treaty should be drafted in the first instance by the four powers sitting on the Council of Foreign Ministers and the draft when completed should be submitted to a conference of eleven. Mr. Vyshinsky had, however, promised to refer Dr. Wang’s suggestion to Moscow but although this had been some time ago the Russians according to Chinese information had not yet received Moscow’s reply. In this connection Dr. Wang outlined the reasons for China’s suggestion and concern over the consequences of proceeding without Russia which he had already stated to me and subsequently in greater detail to Mr. Bohlen. Dr. Wang said that his Government while determined to adopt a completely firm attitude in regard to the Chinese Communists was nevertheless being very careful to avoid any action which might provoke the Soviet Union. He said also that the Chinese Government was very careful not to request anything of the U.S. in connection with Chinese matters which might heighten the tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He said that should, however, the Soviet Union begin overt assistance to the Chinese Communists or other actions designed to frustrate the re-establishment of the Chinese Government over Manchuria, the Chinese Government would face squarely up to that fact and would not back away from it. He said one of the central aims of Chinese foreign policy at this time was to re-establish the central Government’s control over Manchuria, that without Manchuria, China would be in an impossible economic and political state. He said for this reason that he personally had not considered the Yalta arrangement made by President Roosevelt as bad as others had in that it involved an official recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria. He also stated that he felt my efforts in China had been directed towards the same end. I told Dr. Wang that I was continually turning over in my mind the problem of how best the U.S. could help China in her present difficulties without complicating the situation in relation to the Soviet Union. I said I was fully conscious of the concern which the Chinese Government felt over possible Russian action in this area and that I myself had been trying to analyze the real motives of the Soviet Union in staying out of the proposed Japanese peace conference and what this attitude might mean in relation to Soviet policy towards China and the Far East in general. Dr. Wang said that he was returning to China next week and that following his return he proposed to address a formal note to the U.S., the U.K., and the Soviet Union setting forth officially the Chinese suggestion that the Far Eastern Commission voting procedure should be followed at the Japanese peace conference. He said he hoped thereby to obtain a definite answer from the Soviet Government. He said he realized that the U.S. had made a definite proposal on that subject and could hardly be expected to reconsider its position until it was known whether the Soviet Union would participate on the basis of the Chinese suggestion. He said that if the Soviet Government refused while England and America had indicated a willingness to go along with the Chinese suggestion, he would have to present to the National Council the question of whether China in the circumstances should proceed without Russia. He said frankly he did not know what the decision of the National Council would be but he felt that the question of proceeding without the Soviet Union was so important for China because of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 that it would have to be placed before the Council. [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Wang) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [Document 423] The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Wang ) to the Secretary of State 61 strictly confidential Aide-Mémoire on the Calling of a Peace Conference Regarding Japan The Chinese Government deems it of great importance in the general effort to promote stability and expedite recovery in the Far East that the peace conference regarding Japan should ensure the participation of all Powers with a primary interest in the matter. In the case of the Soviet Union, China has a particular reason for desiring to secure its co-operation in such a conference. Apart from the fact of geographical propinquity, Article II of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945, provides: “The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiation with Japan and not to conclude, without mutual consent, any armistice or peace treaty either with the present Japanese Government or with any other government or authority set up in Japan which do not renounce all aggressive intentions.” The non-participation of the Soviet Union in the said conference might give occasion to the Soviet Government to raise the question to the Chinese Government under the foregoing provision as to the propriety of China’s own participation and it is the consistent policy of the Chinese Government to abide by the Treaty and to give Soviet Russia no ground whatever for such deviation from it on her part as might seriously endanger the security of China and the Far East. For this reason and also in the general interest of promoting international understanding and co-operation, the Chinese Government believes that every effort consistent with the primary purpose of convoking the peace conference regarding Japan should be made to secure the participation and co-operation of all the major Powers in the conference. The Chinese Government considers that for the drafting of a peace treaty regarding Japan, the existing organization of the Far Eastern Commission and its procedure may be utilized or a conference with similar organization and procedure shall be called. New York , October 9, 1947. 61 Handed to the Secretary by Dr. Wang in New York on October 9. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [Document 424] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth ) secret [ Washington ,] October 9, 1947. Mr. Graves called at his request to leave some informal notes 62 on thinking in the British Government in reference to a Japanese Peace Conference. Mr. Graves stated that he had been called home for two weeks’ consultation on Peace Treaty discussions and they would appreciate the reaction of the State Department to the views which they set forth. Following these discussions, it is likely that the British Government will present something formally to us on the subject. As Mr. Graves leaves early Friday afternoon, October 10, any comments which we may wish to make will have to be prepared immediately. Mr. Graves stated that in their view there were two reasons which made it particularly important to go ahead with a Peace Conference now. The first of these is the fact that it may be extremely difficult six months or a year hence to develop the same interest in convening a Peace Conference which exists at present and if such is the case the Western powers could be accused of having acted in bad faith. The second point is that Mr. Graves doubts whether it would be possible to convene a Conference just prior to an election. They have concluded, therefore, that we should be prepared to go ahead without the Soviets, and that if we decide to do so the Chinese would find it to their interest to go along with us. In discussing Article 2 of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, I told Mr. Graves that I had personally interpreted this article as not preventing the Chinese from making a separate peace as the present Japanese Government had already renounced aggressive intentions. I added, however, that officers in Le had pointed out that the clause “the high contracting parties undertake not to enter into separate negotiations with Japan”, was separate and distinct from the second part of the article and that hence the Chinese Government may feel they cannot enter into negotiations unless the Soviets participate. Mr. Graves pointed out, however, that if the Chinese participated in negotiation to which the Soviets had been invited but had refused to participate, the Chinese would be in a different legal position from a position wherein they alone entered into negotiations with Japan. In answer to a question as to their reaction to Dr. Evatt’s opinion that the Soviets would probably wish to join the Conference later to confirm their claims for the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin, Mr. Graves answered that they did not think that would affect Soviet participation but that our position on Korea would have a direct bearing on Soviet participation. In other words, if it were clear to the Soviets that we intended to stay in Korea and prevent the Sovietization of Korea, they would be more likely to join the peace discussions. I told Mr. Graves that I did not wish to comment at the moment on the points raised by him, but that I would try to have something available for him tomorrow. 62 Infra . The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [Document 425] The British Embassy to the Department of State 63 undated We should be interested to learn whether the State Department has reached any conclusion on the course to be followed in the light of the Soviet and Chinese attitude over the opening of Japanese Peace Treaty negotiations. We see an advantage in pressing ahead with plans for making peace with Japan with, or without, Russian participation because, in the interests of the whole of Asia, we wish to avoid the same state of continued uncertainty as exists in Europe and the blame which will attach to Western powers if they are responsible for delay. We also have in mind that 1948 will be a very busy year and one in which the Presidential election takes place. It seems unlikely that the Russians will participate in a conference of eleven or in the Peace settlement except on their own terms. But we do not consider that the Russians are justified in insisting on the exclusive competence of the Council of Foreign Ministers. They are, however, likely to stick to their principle of demanding “Great Power unanimity”, and it may be that the least that would satisfy them at a conference of eleven would be a Steering Committee of some sort. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government would undoubtedly try to use this for obstructive purposes and we have little confidence that they would be less obstructive in the Far East than in Europe. In our view it would be possible to conclude the Peace Treaty with Japan without Russian participation. The situation resulting from such a treaty would be influenced largely by United States plans for the withdrawal of their troops from Japan and the degree to which Communist penetration of Japan could be prevented. Control machinery might not be effective in this respect, although we are inclined to think that the Japanese themselves might take active steps against it if political conditions were suitable. If the United States, Great Britain and the other countries concerned were to show determination to go ahead without Russia we very much doubt whether China would consider it in her interests to stand out. Nevertheless, we have to take account of the effect for many years to come of concluding a Japanese settlement in which Russia is not included, and which she will undoubtedly attack in Japan as an imperialist diktat , and in China as an attempt to build up Japan against China. For both the United States and Great Britain it would probably be valuable in the future to be able to demonstrate irrefutably that Russia stayed out of her own free will. In order to make this clear, we consider that if Russia persists in her refusal to participate, and a conference is convened in her absence, the door should be left open for her to join the conference at any time. Furthermore, that the Treaty should be drafted so as to meet her legitimate claims, and that the conference should keep her informed of progress made, and that the draft should even perhaps be submitted to her for comment and amendment at some stage, though in so doing we should have to devise means to prevent the Russians from obstructing the progress of the Conference. For the same reason it might even be desirable, if the Russians do not bring the matter up themselves, to initiate further discussions of procedure with them either during the United Nations Assembly Meeting or the November Conference. It would also be necessary, in our opinion, to make it clear that the procedure adumbrated is not aimed at Russia’s large and legitimate interests in the Far East. The foregoing represents merely the lines on which we have been thinking and the intention of this conversation is to ascertain whether our views are in general accord with those of the State Department. 63 Presented to Mr. Borton by Mr. Graves on October 9. The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [Document 426] The British Embassy to the Department of State 64 Communicated Orally The Foreign Office have sent us the following account of the Canberra meeting of representatives of the British Dominions. They make it clear that this is in no way a final report and does not purport to be exhaustive. The Conference was an exchange of views on the broad issues, and detailed discussion of technical matters, for which in any case there would have been insufficient time, was never contemplated, so that no statements of agreed policy were formulated and the Conference entailed no kind of commitment on any government represented at it. 2. The consensus of opinion was that all countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission should be entitled to representation in the framing of the peace settlement and that in addition Pakistan’s claims for separate representation were incontestable. Decisions at the conference should be by two-thirds majority on matters of substance but by a simple majority on drafting and procedural matters; the use of the veto should be avoided. Washington was generally favoured as the venue of the conference. It was generally hoped that the conference would begin with a short initial meeting at a Governmental level as soon as possible. 3. There was general agreement that the treaty could hardly do other than endorse the territorial agreements made at Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam. In view of the uncertain future of Korea it was suggested for consideration that it might be advisable to leave Quelpart Island under Japanese sovereignty in spite of the fact that its population is Korean. The question was raised (but left unanswered) as to how the advantages of civil aviation bases in the Southern Kuriles could be obtained. It was generally contemplated that the Ryukyus and the Bonins should continue under United States administration presumably under some form of strategic trusteeship. 4. The conference agreed that Japan should remain completely disarmed and demilitarised, that armament manufacture and naval shipbuilding should be prohibited and that there should be careful supervision to ensure the observance of these sections of the treaty. 5. The majority of Delegations favoured the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft in Japan; internal operation by Japan should be confined to a limited number of imported civil aircraft for specified purposes and under strict control. 6. The consensus of opinion was that the democratic principles broadly outlined in the Potsdam declaration and already included in the Japanese constitution should be written into the treaty but that the constitution itself should not be so written. 7. There was general support for the view that provision should be made in the treaty for the protection of civil rights of alien residents in Japan who should be accorded treatment at least no worse than that enjoyed by Japanese nationals in their own countries and in accordance with generally approved international standards. 8. On economic matters the majority of the Delegates were agreed that— ( a ) The manufacture of synthetic oil and rubber should be completely prohibited; ( b ) Although it would be impracticable to include detailed provisions in the treaty referring to the freedom of trades unions, the general principle of freedom of association should be included leaving the Japanese to work out the details for themselves; ( c ) It would be a mistake to incorporate any scheme of land reform in the treaty; ( d ) The process of dissolving the Zaibatsu should be completed by the Japanese Government as soon as possible; ( e ) The treaty should not attempt to lay down details regarding such subjects as economic equality, maintenance of full employment, fiscal policy; ( f ) Japanese external assets should be taken into account in assessing total reparations and their percentage distribution (Delegates did not discuss the division of shares of reparations in general): ( g ) Japanese shipping should be limited to vessels not exceeding 5000 gross registered tons. The construction of vessels should be limited to those not exceeding a stipulated speed. Japan’s total merchant shipping tonnage should be limited to a maximum sufficient for the conduct of such trade as the Allies deem necessary. 9. With regard to post-treaty control the general feeling of the conference was that all the countries who share in the initial drafting of the treaty (i.e. the eleven Far Eastern Commission Powers plus any agreed additions) should be represented on whatever supervisory body may be set up. It was not thought that any military occupation force in Japan would be necessary after the treaty but it was considered that forces outside Japan should be available for enforcing the treaty if necessary. It was recognised that special regard should be paid to the views of the United States Government on this subject in view of the special responsibilties already undertaken by the United States. Voting in the supervisory body should be by simple majority. The conference gave consideration to the United Kingdom view that it might be desirable to conclude an agreement between the controlling powers separate from the treaty of peace. In order to minimise possible delays the treaty should come into force upon ratification by two-thirds of the the treaty-making powers. 10. The conference recognised that provision should be made for the acceptance of the treaty by belligerents who did not participate in the drafting. 11. The conference agreed that Japan should be compelled to observe the international whaling conventions if it were agreed that Japan should be allowed to participate in whaling at all. 12. Amongst other aspects of the settlement discussed in general terms by the conference were atomic research, education, emigration, Japanese membership of international bodies. 13. Copies of four documents submitted to the Conference by the U.K. delegation as a purely provisional expression of their views and in no way binding on His Majesty’s Government are enclosed. With reference to that relating to the territorial, political and general clauses, we attach some importance to a careful wording of the preamble of the treaty which might have useful and long-term political and propaganda effects both on the Japanese people and on the countries which were overrun and devastated by Japan. [ Washington ], October, 1947. 64 Presented to Mr. Borton by Mr. Graves on October 9. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–947 [Document 427] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth ) secret [ Washington ,] October 10, 1947. Participants: Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy Mr. F. C. Everson, First Secretary, British Embassy Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director, FE Mr. Graves and Mr. Everson called at my request in order that a reply could be given orally to the informal notes on thinking in the British Government which Mr. Graves had left on October 9. I reported that there had been informal discussions in New York between the Secretary of State and the Chinese Foreign Minister on the Chinese position in reference to the question of voting procedure. I stated that the Chinese Foreign Minister had made it patently clear that the Chinese were anxious to go along with us on Japanese Peace Treaty matters but that he had emphasized the fact that they considered themselves to be in a difficult position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in such areas as Sinkiang, Manchuria and North China, and that they did not wish to be placed in a position which would give the Soviets an excuse to abrogate the Sino-Soviet Treaty. I reported that Dr. Wang had offered on his own iniative to sound out informally Mr. Vyshinsky and possibly others in New York on the Chinese attitude toward some sort of a compromise proposal. We supposed that such a proposal might include a voting procedure similar to that in the Far Eastern Commission. I further stated that Dr. Wang was informed that we had no objection to such an approacch but that at the same time it was made abundantly clear to him that our agreeing to his making such an approach in no way implied that we had changed our position on the voting question, or that we had given serious consideration to changing our position. I added that Dr. Wang had already seen Mr. Vyshinsky but that he was awaiting a further reply from him. Mr. Graves commented that one reason for their suggestion was to find out whether there was any possibility of an early decision on our position in reference to going ahead without the Soviets, but that in view of the complications raised by the Chinese position he assumed that no decision would be made in reference to our attitude toward Soviet participation until after the Chinese situation had been clarified. I told Mr. Graves that such was essentially the case. Mr. Graves further stated that Mr. Everson would be taking over his duties on the Treaty while he was away, and I stated we would keep them informed of significant developments. In answer to a question by Mr. Everson as to whether we felt the Chinese were sincere in placing their emphasis on the Sino-Soviet Treaty, I replied that we had no reason to believe otherwise. In reply to a further question as to whether I had any information on the contents of Dr. Evatt’s conversation with the President, I said I knew nothing more about it than had appeared in the press. The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–1347: Telegram [Document 428] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) secret Washington , October 13, 1947—6 p.m. 403. For your info status of Jap peace treaty discussions currently as follows: [Here follows summary of developments since July 11.] Dept will examine the situation in the light of Dr. Wang’s findings in the matter of the attitude of Soviet and other govts. 4. Dept will be course keep you informed of significant developments. Lovett Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2947 [Document 429] Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff ( Kennan ) 65 top secret [ Washington ,] October 14, 1947. The Planning Staff has spent considerable time during the past eight weeks in a study of the problems connected with the Japanese peace treaty. In the course of this study, we have consulted not only with the officials of our own Far Eastern Office, including Mr. Penfield and Mr. Butterworth; but also with representatives of the Army and Navy; and with leading outside experts, including Mr. Grew. 66 As a result of this study, I am convinced that in regard to several of the most important issues involved we do not have before us here in Washington the facts which would enable us to make firm and sound judgments on some of the most important points at issue. The remaining information we require can be obtained, for the most part, only in Tokyo, and in consultation with SCAP. Furthermore, I think it important to make sure in advance that General MacArthur is in accord with any position we may take. I have therefore decided not to submit a final paper on this problem at this time. Before we attempt to do this, I think it essential that some high official of this Department proceed to Japan and discuss in detail with General MacArthur and his assistants the issues involved. In the attached memorandum, I set forth briefly the results we have been able to come to on the basis of the incomplete factual matter we have before us. In accordance with what has been stated above, I am not recommending to you that these be accepted now as a Department position; but I think they should serve as points of departure for discussion with SCAP at the earliest possible date. If you approve of this general procedure, I recommend that orders be issued for a high official of the Department concerned with policy matters to proceed at once to Japan to discuss with General MacArthur all essential points of the problem at hand. 67 George F. Kennan [Annex] Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff ( Kennan ) top secret PPS/10 [ Washington , October 14, 1947.] Results Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement 1. Timing of Settlement . The Staff sees great risks in an early relinquishment of Allied control over Japan. It has no satisfactory evidence that Japanese society would be politically or economically stable if turned loose and left to its own devices at this stage. If Japan is not politically and economically stable when the peace treaty is signed, it will be difficult to prevent communist penetration. Nevertheless, we recognize that the occupation is in many ways entering on a period of diminishing returns. Furthermore, we are already committed to proceed with peace discussions by the invitations we have issued to other governments. The Staff considers, therefore, that we cannot very well refuse to proceed with the negotiations at this time. On the other hand, we should not force the pace in any way but should keep the talks exploratory and non-binding and hold open some possibility of further postponement of final decisions, until we can arrive at a firm judgment on certain of the basic issues involved. Accordingly, discussions of substance should not be begun until after January first at the earliest, and we should not plan on completing them before about next June. 2. Voting Procedure . If possible, the U.S.S.R. should be included in the negotiations. If it is to exclude itself, it would be better that this occur on a substantive issue damaging to the U.S.S.R. in Japanese eyes rather than on a procedural question such as voting arrangements. If the other drafting powers will agree to a veto, on the FEC rules or otherwise, the U.S. should concur reluctantly. Otherwise, assuming that there is no agreement on a two-thirds rule, we should permit the whole question to carry over to next spring before proceeding with the talks at all. 3. Tactics . It is highly questionable whether we will be able to get agreement at this time on a treaty which would satisfy our minimum requirements. Should we not be able to get such agreement, we always have the possibility of unilaterally introducing a virtual peace-time status in Japan by gradual modification of our occupational regime. In other words, we might achieve something approaching a normal peace-time status without any treaty at all. This alternative is our main bargaining weapon in these discussions. If it is to be fully effective, we should begin in the near future to shape the trend of our occupational policy in this direction. In this way, we will be better prepared for whatever may come; and others will be able to convince themselves of the reality of our alternative. 4. Territory . The final status for which we should press, with respect to the territorial limits of Japan, would be that shown on the attached map (Appendix A). Under this arrangement: A. The southern-most islands of the Kurile archipelago would be retained by Japan. B. The Bonins, Volcano Islands and Marcus would be detached from Japan, with a view to their being placed under U.S. strategic trusteeship. appendix A C. A decision on the disposition of the Ryukyu islands south of 29° would be held in abeyance pending the receipt from SWNCC of information regarding the relative desirability of ( a ) a U.S. strategic trusteeship over those islands and ( b ) a long-term lease of base areas, nominal sovereignty over the islands being retained by Japan. 5. United States Security . As stated above, we would insist on U.S. strategic trusteeship of the Bonins, Volcano and Marcus Islands. In addition to this, we should proceed in the negotiations on the assumption that we will require military facilities in Okinawa. As to the general disposition of the Ryukyus south of Latitude 29 and the framework in which the U.S. should retain the right to strategic facilities on Okinawa, the Staff feels that this should be made the subject of a special study by SWNCC which should include appraisal of the prospective cost and burden to the U.S. of civil administration of those islands in the event that this Government takes responsibility for them. (A special recommendation on this subject is being submitted to Mr. Lovett.) As to whether American base facilities would be required on the Japanese main islands, the Staff does not have the basis for an adequate judgment at this time. We have no evidence that facilities for land forces or for air forces alone on this territory would serve any useful purpose. The question narrows down to whether facilities should be sought for the U.S. Navy, presumably at Yokosuka, with air support facilities. A decision on this score involves far-reaching political considerations, both internal Japanese and international. From the standpoint of U.S. security, the Staff does not consider this moment propitious for a final decision on this subject. It would prefer to see this postponed, if possible until next spring. 6. Military Defense of Japan . This brings up the whole question of the future defense of the Japanese home islands. We are already committed to the demilitarization of Japan. The Staff considers that the idea of a four-power agreement on Japanese demilitarization should be abandoned but that the Treaty should provide for complete Japanese disarmament, with the reservation that Japan should be permitted to maintain a civil police force, including a constabulary and coast guard, at a strength to be defined initially by SCAP. A Council of Ambassadors should be charged with the continued supervision of demilitarization and disarmament. Admittedly, this leaves the Japanese without means of self-defense against foreign aggression. The Staff sees no means of avoiding this. It feels that in the coming period Japanese military security must rest primarily on the proximity (or in extreme event, the presence in Japan) of adequate U.S. forces, and that it should be accepted as a principle of American defense policy to retain in the Pacific areas sufficient armed strength to make plain our will and determination to prevent any other military power from establishing itself in the Japanese home islands. 7. Political and Economic Defense of Japan . The Staff does not consider that there should be any formal allied control or supervision of Japan’s political life following entrance into force of a peace treaty. One of the greatest values of a peace treaty, from our standpoint, is its psychological effect on the Japanese. This would be lost if formal political controls were to be retained. If we must retain controls, it would be better to have no treaty. This means that when American occupation forces leave, Japan will be politically on its own. There can be no doubt that Moscow-controlled communists will then make an intensive effort to penetrate and dominate Japanese political life. Japan’s fortunes will then depend primarily on the stability of its internal political structure. This in turn will be partly a matter of the political institutions inherited from the occupational regime and the extent to which Japanese political psychology is adjusted to them and finds normal expression in them. But it will be also in large part a question of whether tolerable economic conditions exist and whether hope for a better economic future can be maintained. If economic distress and insecurity prevail, this will provide greatly added incentive and assistance to communist efforts. It is clear that with the loss of a certain portion of its economic substance, with the loss of its markets and raw material sources in Soviet-dominated portions of the mainland, with highly unstable conditions prevailing in China, in Indonesia, in Indochina, and in India, and with no certainty as to the resumption of certain traditional exports to the dollar area, Japan faces, even in the best of circumstances, an economic problem of extremely serious dimensions. It is impossible to undertake any reliable appraisal of the dimensions of this problem on the basis of information now available. This can be remedied in some part by further study in the Department, and the Staff understands that this is already being given further attention in the competent operating divisions. But it is clear that complete certainty will never be achieved. Some degree of calculated risk will be present in any solution. As things stand today, the information we have does not satisfy us that Japanese society, if turned loose on its own now or in the near future, would be able to survive successfully the resultant strain on its political structure. If, on the basis of further study and discussions with SCAP, we can see no real likelihood that Japan, even after an initial “tiding-over” period of U.S. aid, will be able to stand on its own feet economically, then we may have to revise our basic approach to this whole problem, even at the possible cost of abandoning the idea of concluding a peace settlement at this time. If, however, we conclude that Japan does have a fair chance of a satisfactory economic future, then the best we can do is to see that Japan is placed, before the occupation is terminated, in as favorable a position as possible to orient itself in a new and unfavorable environment and to carry on independently. In either case, we shall have to determine whether the directives under which SCAP is now operating are such as to make the maximum contribution to Japan’s eventual ability to meet the strain of renewed economic independence. On this, the Staff has heard and considered directly contrary opinions from highly competent and serious sources. The negative view holds that our present purge and de-cartelization policies, in particular, run counter to the requirements of future stability and economic vigor in Japan. This view is categorically rejected by SCAP. In the light of the limited facts available to it, the Staff is unable to find any satisfactory reconciliation of these conflicting views, and considers that further discussion with SCAP is in order. 8. Reparations . The reparations program should be wound up at the earliest possible date. Minimum reparations, consistent with existing commitments, should be exacted, and none out of current production. The Council of Ambassadors should be charged with the administrative supervision of reparations in the post-war period. 9. Industrial Disarmament . Japan’s industrial disarmament should be limited to the prohibition of the manufacture of weapons of war and aircraft and the minimum of restrictions on industrial production which can be advocated in the light of commitments already made by the U.S. regarding the reduction of industrial war potential. Japan’s economic war potential should be controlled by restrictions on allowable stockpiling of designated strategic raw materials within Japan. Japan should be permitted to operate at least domestic civil air transport and a merchant marine, although she should not be permitted to manufacture aircraft. In defining our position on the limitations on merchant shipping, primary consideration should be given to the views of the Navy. 10. Provision in Treaty for Future Revision . It is absolutely essential that a peace treaty contain adequate provision for revision. A peace treaty imposing servitudes of indefinite duration rests on the inexcusable assumption of a static world and constitutes an infallible invitation to eventual unilateral violation. 65 Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State. 66 Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador in Japan and Under Secretary of State. 67 In a memorandum of October 29, Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine, Director of the Executive Secretariat of the office of Secretary of State, informed Messrs. Thorp, Armour, Saltzman, Kennan, and Butterworth that the Secretary had approved the attached study of problems of the Japanese peace treaty in principle and that the question of who would be sent to Japan should be worked out by Messrs. Lovett, Armour, and Kennan. In a memorandum to Mr. Armour of the same date, Mr. Humelsine suggested that he talk with Mr. Kennan about the individual to assume this assignment. (740.0011 PW(Peace)/10–2947). The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to the Secretary of State 740.00116 PW/10–1647 [Document 430] The Australian Minister for External Affairs ( Evatt ) to the Secretary of State My Dear General Marshall : I refer you to the communications from me about Japan made after my visit to Japan and my talks with General MacArthur. I beg to bring formally to your notice also the subject of my conversations, first with you in the middle of September, and later with President Truman and Mr. Lovett last week, on the subject of convening the conference on the Japanese peace settlement. As you will remember, action was taken by the United States Government last July to issue invitations to the eleven Governments which are members of the Far Eastern Commission to attend preliminary talks on the Japanese settlement on 19th August. These talks were subsequently postponed, because the Canberra Conference of 26th August made it impossible for members of the British Commonwealth to be present at a conference in America at that time. Under the United States proposal, decisions of the conference were to be made by two-thirds majorities, a proposal which the Australian Government supported. In the opinion of the Australian Government, the question is one of great urgency. The situation may well deteriorate unless definitive action is taken quickly to bring about an early settlement. The Korean situation 68 is an essential and integral part of the Japanese peace settlement. But, instead of it being handled as such, steps have been taken to bring it before the General Assembly of the United Nations, which includes many nations which are not directly concerned in the Pacific settlement and even nations which were not at war with Japan. It is the view of the Australian Government that, if it has been found impossible to carry out the agreement on Korea formulated by the Moscow Conference of December 1945, 69 the matter should be referred, in the first instance at least, to the States directly concerned in the war with Japan, and not to the General Assembly. As far as Australia is concerned, you will know that on two separate occasions the United States Government has given assurances that Australia will be regarded as a party principal in connexion with all matters relating to the Japanese peace settlement. Australia has steadfastly objected to any discussions of the Japanese settlement by the Council of Foreign Ministers, taking the view that, except for the United States, no other country made so vital a contribution to the Pacific victory as Australia and that Australia has supplied the main portion of the British Commonwealth occupation forces in Japan. Australia also has a special interest in the Korean situation because, as you are aware, the United Kingdom has agreed that Australia should occupy the place of the United Kingdom on the four-Power trusteeship for Korea if one is established in accordance with the Moscow decision of December 1945. For these reasons it is submitted that definitive action should be taken to fix the time and place of the conference which only a few weeks ago you regarded as possible to be convened for preliminary work during the present Assembly. The date should be chosen after consultation with the interested Powers. It is also submitted that no discussions should take place in the absence of Australia in regard to any part of the Pacific settlement, including Korea. Yours sincerely, H. V. Evatt New York , 16 October, 1947. 68 For documentation on the Korean problems, see pp. 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] ff. 69 See the communiqué on the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers, Foreign Relations , 1945, vol. ii , pp. 815 , 820 . The Secretary of State to the Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) 740.00116 PW/10–1647 [Document 431] The Secretary of State to the Australian Minister for External Affairs ( Evatt ) 70 confidential New York , October 22, 1947. My Dear Dr. Evatt : In reference to your letter of October 16, 1947, in which you bring formally to my notice the subject of your conversations with me in the middle of September and later with the President and Mr. Lovett on the question of convening a conference on the Japanese peace settlement, I appreciate this further indication of your views on the matter. In reference to your statement that on two separate occasions the United States Government has given assurances that Australia will be regarded as a party principal in connection with all matters relating to the Japanese peace settlement, I assume you are referring to the note presented to the Australian Government on December 13, 1946, in which it was stated that the United States hopes and desires that in the formulation of the peace treaty with Japan, Australia will participate on a full and equal basis and that negotiations and drafting will take place outside the Far Eastern Commission. The note further stated that the United States Government expects that the Soviet Government will insist upon a much more limited group for these negotiations and that it is of course impossible to predict what final arrangements will be made for negotiating the Japanese treaty. You will realize from the developments which have taken place why it was believed to be impossible to predict the final form which any negotiations would take. I am not aware of any further specific assurances on this matter. With a view to the early convening of a conference on the Japanese settlement, on July 11, 1947, this Government informally approached the eleven governments which are members of the Far Eastern Commission concerning the holding of preliminary talks on the Japanese settlement on August 19. Certain developments, however, have made necessary the temporary postponement of any conference on the Japanese peace settlement. As you are aware, favorable replies to the proposals of the United States have been received from eight of the governments on the Far Eastern Commission. The Soviet Government, however, has insisted on two separate occasions in aides-mémoire of July 22 and August 29 that the question of convening of a conference for drawing up a peace treaty for Japan should be provisionally examined by the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of the representatives of the governments of the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain and the United States. Furthermore, the Chinese Foreign Minister in an aide-mémoire of October 9, 1947, stated that the Chinese Government believes that every effort consistent with the primary purpose of promoting the peace conference regarding Japan should be made to secure the participation and cooperation of all the major powers in the conference. The Chinese Government considers that for the drafting of the peace treaty regarding Japan, the existing organization of the Far Eastern Commission and its procedure may be utilized or a conference with similar organization and procedure should be called. While I wish it were possible to fix the time and place of a conference on the Japanese peace settlement, it appears clear from the position of both the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government that they would not be prepared to attend a conference at this time composed of the eleven states members of the Far Eastern Commission whose decisions would be made by a voting procedure of a two-thirds majority. I am sure you will agree with me that it would be inadvisable to call a conference which both of these governments would not attend. I should like to take this opportunity to assure you that in view of these circumstances my Government is giving serious consideration to the next step which it should take. Your statement that the Korean situation is an essential and integral part of the Japanese peace settlement and that if it had been found impossible to carry out the Moscow Agreement on Korea of December, 1945, the matter should be referred, in the first instance at least, to the states directly concerned in the war with Japan instead of the General Assembly of the United Nations has been noted. As you are aware the actions of this Government in connection with the situation in Korea have all been taken in light of its obligations under the Moscow Agreement, to which the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China are parties. After the Joint U.S.–U.S.S.R. Commission on Korea, set up by the terms of the Moscow Agreement, had reached a stalemate, the United States Government proposed that the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement have discussions concerning how the purposes of that agreement might speedily be accomplished. The Soviet Government refused to participate in such discussions. It was thus only after every reasonable effort had been made, through bilateral negotiations under the Moscow Agreement, and after it had proved impossible to have discussions with the powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement, that the United States Government presented the problem of Korean independence for the consideration of the General Assembly. Inasmuch as Korea does not fall within the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission there would appear to be no recognized international body other than the General Assembly to which the Korean problem could be presented. In view of the historic development of international agreements regarding Korea at Cairo, Potsdam and Moscow, the question of the reestablishment of Korean independence as distinct from the separation of Korea from Japan has been considered apart from the Japanese peace settlement and in the opinion of the United States Government there is no necessity of altering this procedure. Consideration of the Korean situation, as it is today, in connection with the Japanese peace settlement could only confuse matters and further delay the establishment of an independent, united Korea. The legitimate interests of Australia in the Korean situation will not, it is believed, be prejudiced through consideration of this problem, by the General Assembly, in which consideration Australia will be able to play an important role. Faithfully yours, G. C. Marshall 70 In a note dated October 23, the Secretary wrote Dr. Evatt that he had delayed sending his formal reply in the hope that a personal meeting might occur at which some factors he did not wish to put on paper could be discussed. He promised to get in touch with Dr. Evatt on returning from Washington. (740.00116 PW/10–1647) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2747 [Document 432] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) 71 secret [ Tokyo ,] October 26, 1947. Mr. Sebald called upon Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh by appointment at 9:00 p.m., October 26, 1947 at the residence of Lt. General Shang, Chief of the Chinese Mission in Japan. The interview lasted approximately two hours, and despite several attempts on the part of Mr. Sebald to leave, Dr. Wang was insistent upon further discussion. The participants were alone throughout the interview. Mr. Sebald asked whether, as a result of Dr. Wang’s visit in Japan, he had been able to form conclusions which might be of interest. Dr. Wang replied that in his opinion the present Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Katayama is sincere and honest in its efforts to spread democracy among the Japanese and that he is glad to learn that new elements are in control in Japan. He stated that Mr. Katayama and Dr. Ashida 72 (who came uninvited) had called at the Chinese Mission at his request yesterday morning, as he was most anxious to determine by a straightforward answer whether, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, once the Occupation forces are removed, the Japanese Government would be able to withstand pressure from rightist and leftist groups. Mr. Katayama was unable to answer this question directly but asked Dr. Ashida to reply. In Dr. Wang’s opinion, Dr. Ashida’s reply was not convincing nor was it straightforward. Dr. Wang is of the opinion that this question is one of great importance, it is one that must be answered soon, and that the answer will largely determine the type of post-treaty control for Japan. Asked concerning the underlying reasons for criticism of the Occupation, and specifically the United States’ elements thereof, in the Chinese press and by Chinese Government officials, Dr. Wang stated that this is natural in view of the lack of understanding of Occupation problems and American objectives in Japan. He said that by and large the Chinese people are in full sympathy with the United States but that they are unclear concerning the Japanese picture. There were distorted reports of what is going on in Japan and, in contrast to the chaos in China, they naturally feel that the United States is building up Japan at the expense of China. As an example, he raised the question of the so-called “gold pot”, comprised of looted gold and precious metals. He said that he could not understand why the United States has taken unilateral action in placing this gold at the sole disposal of Japan with a view to building up Japan’s trade. He said that as the gold pot is eventually to be divided among the four Allies, he could not understand why it would not be possible at this time to allow China also to take advantage of the “gold pot” as a credit base upon which to encourage Chinese trade. He said China is also in dire straits for raw materials, but that the United States apparently overlooks this factor. He hoped that something could be worked out along these lines. With regard to the apparent alignment of China with Russia on the question of the peace conference, Dr. Wang stated that there is no such alignment and that China’s position is predicated upon the realities of the situation. He said that the proposal made by the United States is impractical in that it, in fact, prevents Russia from joining the peace conference. When chided with the remark that Russia was not being kept out but rather that Russia refuses to come in, he said that this argument is fallacious for the following reason: a two-thirds majority could be obtained by the five British Commonwealths and the United States; Russia would have one vote, as would China; the other countries would not count. It would therefore be possible for Britain and the United States (plus the Philippines) to out-vote Russia and China on all matters which these countries might consider of major importance and vital to their respective interests. For example, it might be possible to take away all territorial concessions which have been made to Soviet Russia; it would be possible to establish a post-treaty regime of control which might be entirely unacceptable to China; the question of war loot could easily be settled in such manner as to be detrimental to both China and Russia; the question of external assets might be resolved in favor of Japan; a reparations settlement might be made which would be unacceptable to China, though entirely acceptable to wealthier countries. In Dr. Wang’s opinion, the realities of the situation make it impossible for Russia to join under the conference proposal advanced by the United States. On the other hand, Dr. Wang continued, his suggestion that the FEC set-up and procedure be adopted in drafting the treaty—with the appointment of more “high-powered” representatives if desirable—appears to be the only practical compromise which might be acceptable both to Russia and to the United States. As the proposer, it would of course be acceptable to China. He said that the FEC has functioned satisfactorily since its inception, much work has been done, major policies have already been agreed upon (including the post-war overall policy for Japan), and above all else, Soviet Russia had not once used its veto in the FEC. He explained that the situation in the Pacific is entirely different from that in Europe where Russia’s interests are predominant. In any event, in so far as Japan is concerned, the United States is the principal occupying power and its weight of opinion is strong enough to carry along the majority of the other FEC countries. Dr. Wang also stated that in his opinion, even if Soviet Russia should refuse to accede to his (China’s) compromise proposal, he felt that the United States could safely go along with the Soviet proposal that a treaty be drafted by the CFM as was done in the case of the European treaties. He said that these treaties were drafted (admittedly with difficulty) and have become acceptable, even though it did take a long time. In the event that this method of drafting the treaty should bog down by reason of Soviet obstructionism, the United States could always review its position, go to the American people and say that a fair trial has been given to the Soviet method but has failed. This would be the time for an alternative procedure, even if unacceptable to Russia, to be adopted. All in all, however, Dr. Wang feels strongly that his own proposal is the most practical one. He said that as yet no reply has been received from the Soviets on his proposal and that as soon as he returns to Nanking, he intends to press for an answer. He felt that Mr. Vishinsky is so busy in New York with his vituperation and invective that he does not have time to devote to Japanese peace treaty matters. Dr. Wang believes, however, that eventually the Russians will accept this compromise arrangement. Dr. Wang stressed again and again his belief that the FEC procedure is the only realistic one which could be employed—he said that this statement is made not because it is his own plan, but because the United States’ proposal is unrealistic and unworkable for the reasons previously stated. Dr. Wang stated that most of the basic principles of the treaty are already agreed upon by all FEC nations. The most difficult problem, which can only be determined when the conference takes place, is the question of post-treaty control. He is not convinced that a sudden withdrawal of all troops from Japan is the proper answer although he said he does not at this time feel strongly one way or the other. In any event, it appears reasonable to him that Soviet Russia, in any post-treaty control which is set up, is bound to gain something which, she does not now have. It is therefore in her interest to make a treaty of peace with Japan. The problem is to find a formula which is acceptable to Russia. When asked whether China would join the conference in the event that Soviet Russia should turn down the Chinese proposal, Dr. Wang stated that he does not presently know what China would do, and that it would be necessary for him to submit the problem for decision to the Political Council. He expressed considerable fear that unilateral action on the part of China would give the Soviets a free hand in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria and that they would use the Chinese “violation” of the Sino-Soviet treaty as an excuse for such action. He said it is obvious that China can now ill-afford to have Soviet Russia take the offensive in this respect. Dr. Wang was strongly of the opinion that any peace treaty without Soviet Russia would be a failure and could not possibly work. He counselled a United States’ policy of firmness and patience, stating that the United States is firm but not patient. Finally, he wondered whether the time is ripe for a peace treaty with Japan and whether it would not be wiser to await the outcome of the present discussions in the UN. The results of these discussions will, in his opinion, be largely determinative of the Soviet’s approach to and attitude towards the Japanese peace treaty. Dr. Wang then commented upon the 25-year, Four-Power Security Treaty which had been proposed by the United States. He said that this proposal is still resting in the Foreign Offices of China and Russia, and that, in effect, it amounts to a commitment by the United States. He failed to see how it could be withdrawn, unless it is overridden by a peace treaty to which China and Russia subscribe. He posed the question: “What if Russia were now to accept the proposed security treaty?” He saw only a gain on the part of the Soviets in the Occupation of Japan, and wondered whether the United States would, under present conditions, welcome the arrival of a Soviet contingent of troops in Japan. With regard to American policy vis-à-vis China, Dr. Wang said that the United States is being very cautious, not necessarily for its own good but rather because of fear that anything which is done might make matters worse in so far as Russia is concerned. He said this cautiousness is misunderstood in many quarters in China but that he fully understands. In any event, however, he hopes that some aid will eventually be forthcoming from the United States and that China will not be forgotten as she was during the war. W. J. Sebald 71 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 1353, October 27, from Tokyo; received October 31. 72 Dr. Hitoshi Ashida, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2847 [Document 433] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ New York ,] October 28, 1947. Participants: The Secretary Dr. H. V. Evatt, Australian Delegation Mr. John F. Dulles 73 Mr. Charles Bohlen Dr. Evatt repeated his views which he had outlined in his letter to me of October 16, 1947, on the question of the Japanese peace treaty. He said this was an urgent matter and Australia very much hoped that the calling of the Conference to consider the Japanese peace settlement could be expedited. He repeated the vital interest of Australia in the Japanese settlement on the ground of its participation in the war which he said was second only to that of the United States, and neither Great Britain or even China. He said from my reply of October 22nd to his letter he had had the impression that the United States was not as firm as it had been in the past on the understanding which he said had been conveyed to him by my predecessor, Mr. Byrnes, that Australia would have a position second to none in the making of the Japanese peace treaty. I explained to Dr. Evatt the difficulty we had encountered in our efforts to call a Japanese peace conference. I said that in addition to the Soviet Union, which had refused to attend, the Chinese Government, as he knew, was reluctant to participate in a Japanese peace conference without the Soviet Union. I said from my conversation with Dr. Wang here that it had been clear that the Chinese Government were concerned lest the Soviet Government utilize Chinese participation in such a conference without the Soviet Union as grounds for abrogating the agreements concluded in 1945 between China and the Soviet Union. I told Dr. Evatt that our objectives in the matter of the peace conference, I felt, were identical. The difficulty was how to work out some formula which would make at least Chinese participation possible, and preferably that of the Soviet Union. I said that the whole Japanese peace conference without the Soviet and China was manifestly meaningless. Dr. Evatt said that he would like to suggest the fixing of the date for what he called a preliminary informal conference of the eleven powers to consider preparations for the peace conference. I told Dr. Evatt that in my understanding that was exactly what we had proposed last summer but that for the reasons I had indicated above neither the Russians or the Chinese would attend such a preliminary meeting until the question of the voting was decided. Dr. Evatt’s suggestion, therefore, would not in effect advance matters at all as I believed the same replies would be received from the Soviet and Chinese Governments. I mentioned that Dr. Wang had suggested to Vyshinsky the adoption of the Far Eastern Commission’s voting procedure but had had a negative reaction from Vyshinsky himself and no further word from Moscow. Dr. Evatt expressed the view that the Russians would eventually jump at the adoption of the Far Eastern Commission’s voting rules as that would give them the veto. He said it would be “intolerable” for Australia to be in an inferior position at the Japanese peace conference since they had made the second largest contribution to the War and certainly more than the Soviet Union. I told him we were considering how best to get around the present difficulty and it was possible that after all the heat and controversy of the General Assembly was over that the possibilities of so doing might be increased. Korea —Dr. Evatt said that, as he had stated in his letter, he felt that the question of Korea should not be brought before the General Assembly; that it was a question for decision by the countries directly concerned and who had fought in the war. He felt, as he had said in his letter of October 16th, that if the Moscow mechanism was stalled, the question should be referred to the Japanese peace conference. He again emphasized the role of Australia in Far Eastern matters. In reply I told Dr. Evatt that in our view the Korean question which arose out of pledges made during the War on the restoration of Korean independence did not properly belong in the Japanese peace discussions since all that would be required there was the simple statement that Japan would renounce all claims upon Korea. I added that, developing out of the Cairo and Potsdam Conferences, a mechanism had been set up in Moscow in December 1945 which placed the responsibility for the implementation of the pledge of Korean independence upon four powers and more directly on the United States and USSR. I said that this machinery, despite all our efforts, had been stalled and that the situation in Korea was going from bad to worse. I said that the Koreans were very difficult to deal with and their Representative here in New York and the leaders of Southern Korea had been exchanging messages which showed a complete absence of any reality in their approach to the whole problem. In the circumstance, we have merely sought the assistance of the United Nations in breaking the deadlock. The United States wished to see it become possible for the United States, with decency and in fulfillment of its pledges, to withdraw from Southern Korea, but not on the basis of scuttling out which was what the Russians desired to bring about. I asked Mr. Dulles if he had any comment on our Korean resolution. 74 Mr. Dulles said that we had placed this question on the agenda since we believe that the United Nations was the only organization which could be of any help. Already the simple act of putting it on the agenda had caused the Soviets to make a proposal which, although inacceptable as made, nevertheless was the first break in the log jam. He went on to explain that the United States was merely suggesting a UN Commission which would be an international eye backed by the prestige of the UN on the execution by the powers directly responsible of their obligations in this matter. Dr. Evatt said that his chief concern was the position of Australia should be safeguarded in this matter and he intended, therefore, to suggest that the UN Commission to go to Korea should be confined only to those powers having such a direct interest and who have fought in the war against Japan. Warmongering —In discussing yesterday’s resolution on warmongering, Dr. Evatt said that there was considerable feeling that he shared that the American press, particularly the tabloids, and certain radio commentators were indeed attempting to provoke a war with the Soviet Union. He felt that the reports in the American press, even including the New York Times , had not been giving dependable and accurate account of what happened. He felt that they had put the Russians in a distorted light. He then, however, went on to say that his rebuttal of Vyshinsky in Committee 1 on the subject had not been given adequate coverage. 75 (It was not entirely clear from Dr. Evatt’s remarks exactly what he was complaining about in the New York Times reporting.) I remarked to Dr. Evatt that this whole question of propaganda was an extremely tricky and dangerous one, that no one had yet discovered the proper way of dealing with it whether by meeting fire with fire or avoiding being drawn into vituperative debate. I then told Dr. Evatt that in my opinion, the Russians, in two years, had undone all the good will that had been built up during the War in the United States by its consistently hostile attitude towards this country. I said that I felt that that was the cause of certain intemperate press and radio comments on the Soviet Union. I added that what I was continually endeavoring to find out in my own mind was why the Russians were pursuing this course of action which could only have the inevitable result of angering the American people and producing the hostile comments to which he referred, and I was still trying to find out what the Russians were after. 73 Member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. 74 For text of the American resolution transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations on October 17, see p. 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 638 ] . 75 For discussion on October 27 in the 87th meeting of the First Committee, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, First Committee , pp. 248 ff. For amendments to warmongering resolution, see ibid ., pp. 578–579. For further documentation on the subject, see volume i . The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2847 [Document 434] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfield ) 76 secret Tokyo , October 28, 1947. Dear Jim : General MacArthur told me that he had a two-hour talk with Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh on October 24 and gave me the highlights of his conversation as set forth below. He said that the discussion centered about three points, namely, the apparent Sino-Soviet alignment, reparations out of current production, and the necessity for mutual trade between China and Japan. The first and third items were raised by General MacArthur; the matter of reparations was raised by Dr. Wang. General MacArthur told Dr. Wang that world opinion today takes it for granted that the Chinese Government has now aligned itself with the Soviets and that by doing so, the Chinese are flirting with danger not only because they are thereby making it difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to go ahead with the Japanese peace treaty discussions, but also because in the long run, the Soviets will take advantage of China and bring about the Sovietization of China proper. He pointed out to Wang that the Chinese attitude, as indicated by numerous editorials, etc., in the Chinese press, is as inexplicable as it is unrealistic. He said that by aligning herself with the Soviets, China is more and more forcing Japan either into the American sphere, or possibly by force of necessity into that of the Soviets. This would have the result that instead of a peaceful and sympathetic Japan on its doorstep, China might find that Japan has turned its back on China and entirely integrated its economy with the United States or with Russia. He continued, that it would be more to China’s advantage to create a triangular arrangement, whereby Japan would be enabled to assist China economically, as well as politically, in the struggle which lies ahead with Communism and perhaps the Soviet Union. He said that sooner or later Japan will again get on its feet and that by continually criticizing what is being done in Japan, the Chinese are only harming themselves. As to the second point: Dr. Wang stated that the Chinese are most desirous of obtaining a larger share of reparations out of current production. In rebuttal of this statement, General MacArthur drew two parallel horizontal lines, the lower line representing Japan’s present 45% production and the upper line a theoretical 100% production. He said the space between the two lines could be reached only at the expense of the United States and that the Chinese must consider us very stupid if they believe that we would fill in the gap only to have production turned over to the Chinese in the form of reparations. He further stated that even the 45% production had been achieved only as a result of considerable assistance from the United States which is now $300 million behind on this venture. He pointed out that China has already received a tremendous share of Japan’s external assets in the shape of capital goods in China, Manchuria, and Formosa, and that Japan has lost huge sums in its investments in Korea and elsewhere. He asked Dr. Wang how the Chinese could possibly expect Japan to produce sufficient goods and turn over a substantial amount thereof, out of current production, when Japan itself is just about keeping alive with American assistance. The General stated that in his opinion, the current Chinese press campaign is perpetrating a huge fraud upon the Chinese people who expect to receive an endless amount of goods, etc., from Japan, when in fact, there is practically nothing to be given or taken. He asked Dr. Wang why the Chinese Government does not do something to stop the present press campaign; if a change of attitude is not brought about, the Chinese Government in the final analysis will be blamed for having fooled the people. With respect to trade: General MacArthur pointed out that Japan and China must engage in mutually beneficial trade or economic chaos in the two countries will result. He felt that it is unrealistic to restrict Chinese trade with Japan particularly as the economies of the two countries can be so closely correlated. He said that China should not hope to buy for itself needed capital goods in the United States; the prices in America are too high in relation to what could be produced in Japan, were adequate raw materials (from Chinese sources) available here. Without a mutually beneficial trade between China and Japan, General MacArthur sees no hope for either country. In the General’s opinion, Dr. Wang left the interview greatly subdued and to some extent disappointed. The General said that he does not known to what extent his remarks may have affected Dr. Wang’s viewpoint, but nothing was spared in an attempt to point out the fallaciousness of China’s arguments and the unrealism of present Chinese tactics. The General feels, and attempted to persuade Dr. Wang accordingly, that China must eventually join the Peace Conference even without Russia; he agrees that a treaty of peace to which Russia is not a partner can not amount to much but that at least we should go ahead, even if Russia does not join. The chair should be left vacant for Russia to take its seat at any stage of the proceedings. In this connection, the General feels strongly that at some time, Russia will join; if she does not, the United States could, when the final draft is ready, reexamine its position and determine whether we should sign the treaty without Russia. The Sino-Soviet Treaty, and specifically Article 2 thereof, was not mentioned in the conversation. In General MacArthur’s opinion, if China wishes to “get around” Article 2, it can easily find a way to justify its action. He feels that China has taken a position, for reasons not entirely clear to the Chinese themselves, and now relies upon Article 2 to maintain that position. Please show this letter to Butterworth and Hugh Borton. I specifically request that it go no farther, as it would be most embarrassing to have the above filter back. I feel however, that the General’s views are interesting and undoubtedly important. (It might be well to read this letter in conjunction with my despatch no. 1353, October 27, 1947, 77 on the subject of my interview with Dr. Wang.) Sincerely, Bill 76 Initials on this document indicate that it was seen by the Secretary of State. 77 See footnote 71, p. 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] . Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10–2947 [Document 435] Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs 78 secret [ Washington ,] October 29, 1947. Subject: Timing of the Japanese Treaty. The following thoughts are offered as of possible interest on the present situation regarding the Japanese treaty. It is over a month since Mr. Vishinsky referred Dr. Wang’s proposal for an eleven-nation conference utilizing the FEC voting system to Moscow. The length of time which has elapsed, and the unlikelihood that the Soviets will commit themselves on the question without first knowing whether the United States supports and is prepared to act on the proposal, makes it highly doubtful that they will ever reply. Even if Dr. Wang makes good his stated intention to put the question to the Soviets and British in formal notes on his return to China, the Soviets are likely to return a vague answer or a refusal as long as they do not know how we stand on the proposal. The possibilities open to us in the circumstances thus appear to be either (1) to defer further action for a time and see what develops; (2) to decide, and publicly announce the decision, to postpone the calling of a peace conference for a definite minimum period, say one year or eighteen months; or (3) to submit a new proposal for the convening of a conference in the near future so drawn that there would be a reasonable prospect that the Soviets and Chinese would accept. These three courses will be considered in turn, followed by a statement of conclusions and recommendations. I. A Policy of “ Wait and See ” The first alternative, to defer further action for a period, would afford time ( a ) to await Moscow’s reply to Dr. Wang’s proposal if a reply should be forthcoming, ( b ) to form a better estimate of the probable future course of events in Korea, and ( c ) to await any changes in China’s attitude on the treaty question resulting from our “new China policy” if such a policy should be developed, before deciding on our next step respecting the treaty. On the other hand this course, which could not unfairly be described as a policy of drift, has definite disadvantages. First, as a result both of General MacArthur’s statements and action here in Washington, the Japanese have come to expect and count on a treaty to an extent, according to persons recently returned from Tokyo, not appreciated in Washington. Failure to follow up on our treaty proposals would cause a letdown and feeling of disillusionment in Japan which might have definitely undesirable consequences for our program there. Second, some SCAP Staff Sections are handicapped by uncertainty regarding the timing of the treaty and the length of time they will have to complete their respective programs. A progressive lessening of enthusiasm and effectiveness in these Sections must be expected as a price of a policy of drift. Third, some of the British Commonwealth countries, or at least their leaders, have come to expect and count on a treaty, and there is risk of their wishing to withdraw more of their occupation forces and adopting a less cooperative attitude in the FEC if we do not follow through in the matter. Fourth, General MacArthur has banked on an early treaty and from the point of view of his own personal plans if nothing else will probably request a definite statement of intention by Washington on the subject in the near future. Finally, America’s primary responsibility in Japan is recognized the world over, and our failure to follow up in some definite fashion on our July 11 treaty proposals would create an unfortunate impression everywhere as to the strength and forcefulness of American leadership. II. Postponement The second alternative, to postpone calling of a peace conference for a set minimum period, and to announce publicly our decision to postpone the conference and the period of such postponement, has been supported in some quarters within the Department during the past month. The arguments in favor of this course are summarized below, followed in each case by the pertinent counter-considerations to permit a balanced appraisal: (1) We need two more years to complete our major reform programs and this can be better done under a predominantly American control structure than under a post-treaty Allied control structure:— One counter-consideration here is that there would probably be up to a year’s grace for completion of our reform programs under SCAP supervision even if immediate action were taken for the convening of a conference. Further, the recently drafted economic reform annex (Annex H) in the treaty would definitely and specifically bind Japan to complete the reforms on the pattern already set. Although the Council of Ambassadors’ advisory and supervisory powers to ensure their completion would be less than SCAP’s, it can be argued that they would be entirely adequate for the purpose, considering the relatively advanced stage which the reforms would have reached a year hence. Our sanctioning powers, exercised through the Council and through our control over imports, would be almost as effective after the treaty as before. (2) We can better supervise cranking-up under the present control structure than under the post-treaty structure:— It is true that the United States has a freer hand in Japan today than it is likely to have after the treaty. Under present plans, however, cranking-up will be provided for by a separate US-Japanese economic agreement, and with the United States putting up all or the bulk of the funds we should be in a strong position to insist on the supervisory powers within Japan which we require. There is of course the added probability that the Japanese would implement cranking-up more wholeheartedly and effectively after a treaty, when they are more on their own, than under SCAP. While the proportion of civilian employees in SCAP will doubtless increase, and while General MacArthur has assented in principle to the assignment of limited numbers of State personnel to the SCAP Sections, we cannot be certain that the military command structure (civilians responsible to military officers instead of to civilians in the performance of political, economic and social functions) which reportedly has seriously obstructed efficient and imaginative implementation of our policies, particularly our economic policies, in Japan will be modified prior to the conclusion of a treaty. That such modification would be possible, however, is shown by the fact that it has been carried out in our zone in Germany. (3) Cranking-up funds can be more easily obtained from Congress for expenditure prior to than after the treaty:— This is probably true, but if cranking-up is provided for by a separate US-Japanese agreement, and if we retain effective powers of supervision over the program, possibilities that Congress will appropriate the necessary funds should not be materially lessened. Congress will be asked under the Marshall Plan 79 to provide funds for the rehabilitation of many countries not under American occupation, and, it may not be too much to hope, would be able to perceive that our stake in Japan was as great after the treaty under the Council of Ambassadors as under SCAP and the FEC. (4) A definite decision for postponement would open the way for a general program of civilianization of the SCAP organization to increase the effectiveness of that organization:— It seems clear in the light of recent high level decisions on the subject that a State takeover of the Japanese occupation is not to occur. At the moment the Department of the Army is questioning even the present role of State in the occupation. While thoroughgoing civilianization could, as stated in (2) above, be effected without a State takeover, as in the American zone of Germany, it is questionable whether General MacArthur would give his consent to this as long as he remains in control. If General MacArthur were to resign his post fairly soon after a decision for postponement, as is probable, this opposition would be removed, but General MacArthur’s own loss would have to be set against the gain. (5) It would be desirable for the U.S. to maintain its predominant control and its armed forces in Japan at least for the next two years in the present state of world tensions:— Regarding the strategic advantages deriving from our predominant position in Japan, it is significant that General MacArthur and high Army Department officials, who, respectively, have actively sponsored or interposed no objections to an early treaty calling for withdrawal of our forces and a greater sharing of our occupation responsibilities with our Allies, do not share this concern, * provided we retain control of the Ryukyus. It seems unlikely even if the treaty is postponed that the present number of U.S. forces would be retained. Although our present predominant position in Japan, irrespective of exactly how many troops we have there, does afford certain security safeguards most of these would be preserved under the presently contemplated post-treaty control structure. (6) The economic benefits which a treaty might be expected to confer on Japan (reduction of occupation costs, travel of Japanese businessmen abroad, etc.) can be as well achieved without a treaty:— While this is generally true, there may be much truth in the thesis that the Japanese will only take hold of their economic problems with their customary energy and singleness of purpose after conclusion of a treaty putting them essentially on their own. (7) The Soviet Union and China might prevent the United States from achieving several of its principal desiderata in a veto-type conference, which it appears is the only type of conference we could convene at this time. These desiderata include ( a ) satisfactory solution of reparation issues, ( b ) absence of restrictions on war-supporting industries, ( c ) acceptance of the principle of cranking-up, ( d ) a Ryukyus base, and ( e ) a simple two-thirds voting system in the Council of Ambassadors:— Without going into detail there seems little doubt but that the Soviets and Chinese would oppose us on some of our basic desiderata at a peace conference and, possessed of a veto, could prevent us from achieving those desiderata in the treaty. It is pertinent to consider, however, whether we would be any better able to obtain these desiderata (most of which we must endeavor to obtain in the next year or eighteen months at most) without a treaty, or if we did obtain them without a treaty over the objections of the Soviets and Chinese, whether the cost in ill will and dissension would be worth it. The reparation and industrial disarmament issues, for example, would, in large measure, have to be resolved in the FEC, where the veto of course obtains, if not at a peace conference. As for cranking-up, if we could not obtain acceptance of the principle of cranking-up at a conference there is no good reason why we would be better able to obtain it by independent negotiation. A Ryukyus base will be achieved only over the categorical objections of the Soviets, and possibly the Chinese, no matter how the matter is approached. The question of the voting procedure in the Council of Ambassadors would not arise in the absence of a treaty, of course, but the importance of avoiding the veto in the Council may in any case have been exaggerated. Other powers, particularly the Soviets, are likely to be even stricter than we in ensuring that Japan abides by its reform commitments and other obligations in the treaty, so that Big Four veto rights in the Council should be no handicap and perhaps even a convenience to us. The fact that every nation possesses an effective veto in peacemaking in its decision to ratify or not to ratify the treaty produced by the peace conference is of course another reason why we should not necessarily be deterred by the Soviet and Chinese positions on the voting question from continuing our efforts for a treaty. A non-veto conference at which we won our points by two-thirds majorities but the results of which were not ratified by the Soviet Union and China would be no better than no conference or treaty at all. Because of this factor, and because we might have been expected to anticipate, and indeed did anticipate, that the Soviets and Chinese might want a veto voting system, these countries’ attitudes on the voting issue may not provide as convincing an excuse for our postponing the conference as has been imagined. III. An Early Peace The above arguments and counter-arguments do not permit easy decision on the question of whether an early peace or postponement of the peace conference for a prescribed minimum period up to two years, is more in United States interest. However, the following positive arguments for an early peace, some already advanced negatively as counter-arguments to postponement or a policy of drift, can be adduced: (1) Failure to convene a peace conference at an early date would ( a ) cause a feeling of letdown in Japan which might impair Japanese initiative for recovery and otherwise militate against the success of our occupation program. ( b ) Cause dissatisfaction among those of our Allies who have favored an early peace, possibly reflected in a less cooperative attitude in FEC. ( c ) Probably result in General MacArthur’s resignation before termination of the occupation, necessitating the finding of a competent successor. (2) If the peace is postponed the momentum which the treaty project has achieved will be lost, interest will decline, and the specialized personnel now available in the Department and in the various delegations of the FEC for use at a conference will disperse. (3) There is danger, evidenced particularly by General Draper’s views 80 and the views of some American business and financial interests, that determination within the American Government and among the American people to see our economic reform programs in Japan through may lessen over the next year or so, especially if a Republican Congress should begin to question them, as it well may, in connection with cranking-up. The possibility of the programs being carried to completion, therefore, might actually be greater if they were embodied at an early date in the treaty (as set forth in the newly drafted economic reform annex) than if another year or two were afforded for their completion under the occupation. (4) Possibly the strongest argument of all for an early peace is that the Japanese are only likely to exert their best efforts for economic recovery after a treaty, provided that treaty succeeds in imparting to them the feeling that they are again in a real sense the masters of their own fate. (5) It can also be strongly argued that the chances of our obtaining those of our basic objectives in and with regard to Japan which it is important that we should obtain during the next year or eighteen months will be greater at a peace conference, even with the veto, than by the other means which would be available to us if a conference were not held during that time. With the representatives of all concerned nations gathered around a table it may be possible to iron out differences and reach agreement on leading issues more quickly and more amicably than if we do not convene a conference but set out to obtain our objectives unilaterally or through bilateral deals. Moreover, the greater share which our Allies would obtain in the control of Japan as a result of a treaty of the type prepared by the Working Group would serve as an inducement for their acceptance of the other features of our program, an inducement which would not exist if a conference were not held and we sought our ends by unilateral action or bilateral negotiation. IV. Recommendations A. About the only recommendation which I would be prepared to offer in unequivocal terms on the basis of the above considerations is that the United States adopt some definite course as soon as possible regarding the calling of a Japanese peace conference, and that it not pursue a policy of drift. The advantages of deferring action until the Soviets answer Dr. Wang’s proposal or until the Chinese and Korean situations are further clarified would seem to be far outweighed by the disadvantages of this course. B. As for the question of what course we should take, to postpone the conference for a prescribed minimum period or to submit new proposals for a conference which we could reasonably expect the Soviets and Chinese to accept, my thinking since my memorandum of September 22 81 on this subject has moved more in favor of the latter. During the last five weeks the economic reform annex has been prepared and, if adopted and accepted by Japan as a part of the treaty, would appear to constitute an effective guarantee, under the Council’s supervision, of the completion of these reforms after the treaty. At the same time, opposition to the reforms in the Army Department and elsewhere has increased the danger that they may not be fully implemented if they are not soon embodied in a treaty. Further, several persons recently returned from Japan have reported that the Japanese expect and count on a treaty to an extent I had not previously appreciated and that postponement would have definitely unfortunate psychological consequences. Finally, further reflection on the voting issue has led me to doubt whether Big Four veto rights at a conference would be the handicap I had imagined, and whether we could not better hope to accomplish our objectives at a peace conference, even a veto conference, than by the means open to us in the absence of a conference. While I would not be prepared without further thought and discussion to recommend positively that we make important concessions to the Soviets and Chinese on the voting question and other outstanding issues to induce them to attend an early conference, I do now incline to that view. C. If the Department should decide to renew its efforts for an early treaty, it would have to decide, on the one hand, how far we would have to retreat from our original, preferred position expressed in our July 11 notes to be reasonably certain of Soviet and Chinese acceptance of our new proposals and, on the other, of how far we can go in modifying our original position without jeopardizing basic principles or sacrificing fundamental aims. It seems clear on the first score that the Soviets, and hence probably the Chinese, will not participate at any stage without a veto. While the Soviets might be willing to participate in an eleven-nation conference with a veto this is not “reasonably certain” (in fact the chances of it are considerably less than even), and there is little doubt but that to be “reasonably certain” we would have to offer more. Without going into detail on the exact steps which might be taken, which is not the purpose of this memorandum, it seems clear that the least we could do with confidence that we would not be turned down again would be to address notes to the Soviets, Chinese and British, with information copies to the other seven FEC nations, raising with them the question of how to proceed. Our proposal to the three might, as suggested by Mr. Hamilton a while ago, be to convene an eleven-nation conference with Big Four veto rights to consider the treaty preliminarily and to report to the CFM after a predetermined period what they had been able to agree on and what not. The CFM nations, which collectively and individually would retain effective control of the proceedings from beginning to end, would then, if they so determined, attempt to reach agreement on the remaining issues. If they succeeded, they would produce a treaty for consideration and signing by all the nations at war with Japan, and if they failed they would drop the matter temporarily or consider some further means of reaching agreement. This procedure would seem to be both the maximum we should be prepared to offer and the minimum the Soviets and Chinese are likely to accept. D. If the Department decides to postpone the calling of a conference, or if it makes renewed efforts for an early conference and those efforts fail, it is believed that we should immediately inform the other concerned governments and the public at large of our intention not to undertake again to convene a conference for at least a year, two years, or whatever period may be decided. With that decision made, fundamental reorganization of the SCAP structure should be undertaken to make it the most efficient organization possible for the execution of Allied policy during the prescribed remaining period of the occupation. 78 Addressed to Maxwell M. Hamilton and Hugh Borton; Mr. Hamilton noted: “Very good. MMH”. 79 For documentation on this subject, see volume iii . * Admiral Wooldridge in a preliminary comment on the August 5 treaty draft did, however, express concern on this point. [Footnote in the original. The reference is presumably to his memorandum of August 18, p. 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] .] 80 Gen. William H. Draper, Jr., Under Secretary of the Army, had visited Japan in September and issued a favorable report on the success of the occupation. 81 Not printed. The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–447: Telegram [Document 436] The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State secret urgent Nanking , November 4, 1947—2 p.m. 2189. On afternoon November 3 FonMin informed me that Soviet Government had not delivered any formal reminder to Chinese Government of clause in Sino-Soviet treaty to effect that neither Government should conclude separate peace with Japan without consent of the other. This point had come out, however, in verbal discussion Fon-Min had had with Vishinsky in United States. FonMin informed me that he was considering (reDeptel 1323, October 31, 2 p.m. 82 ) the advisability of sending a formal proposal to the Foreign Ministers Conference convening on November 25 in London containing the Chinese plan of having a majority of the 11 nations pass on the Japanese Peace Treaty with the right of veto reserved to any of the four principal countries. He requested that I inquire of the Department for an expression of its views on this question. FonMin inquired whether the tension between the American and Soviet Governments was such that it would be expedient to make such a proposal after adjournment of the United Nations and before the Foreign Ministers Conference. The FonMin thought that otherwise it might be desirable to have such a proposal presented early in the FonMins Conference in the hope that either the United States or China, together with the United Kingdom, would put the matter up to Molotov and ask for reply. FonMin states that in conferences with him Vishinsky had expressed his personal opinion that the Peace Treaty ought to be dealt with entirely by the four principal powers but that he would refer the question to Moscow. The FonMin asked repeatedly if a reply from Moscow had been received but up to the present he has had no word on the matter. Stuart [In despatch 2557, November 12, from London, the Embassy reported a conversation with the British Foreign Office concerning the Chinese position as explained to the British Ambassador in China (Stevenson) by the Chinese Foreign Minister. In addition, the Chinese Foreign Minister had stated his disagreement with General MacArthur about the advisability of immediate withdrawal of occupation forces from Japan when a peace treaty became effective. (740.0011 PW(Peace)/11–1247)] 82 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in China 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–447: Telegram [Document 437] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in China secret Washington , November 7, 1947—5 p.m. 1360. Urtel 2189, Nov. 4. Emb requested to inform FonMin: 1. Dept has no objection China addressing identic notes Brit, Soviet and US FonMins setting forth Chinese proposal for voting procedure in a Jap peace conference as outlined by Chinese FonMin in conversation with SecState Oct 9 nor does it object such notes being dispatched, as suggested by Dr. Wang to you, before CFM meeting. 2. Dept does not consider this subject appropriate for discussion forthcoming CFM meeting in London. It is not on agenda. 3. In conveying above to Dr. Wang, please indicate to him this expression Dept’s views does not constitute any change in US position. Marshall The Secretary of State to the Pakistani Ambassador (Ispahani) 740.0011 PW(Peace)/9–3047 [Document 438] The Secretary of State to the Pakistani Ambassador ( Ispahani ) The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Pakistan and has the honor to refer to his Embassy’s note of September 30, 1947 83 inviting attention to Pakistan’s claims to participate in the initial, and any other, Japanese peace discussions that may be held. In reference to the statement that the United States Government has already issued invitations to the Member States of the Far Eastern Commission to participate in such initial discussions, the Secretary of State informs the Ambassador that this Government has not as yet issued invitations for participation in the peace conference but has offered suggestions on procedural questions to the States members of the Far Eastern Commission. While the Government of the United States agrees that Pakistan would have been a member of the Far Eastern Commission if it had existed as a separate State at the time the Commission was formed, it considers that it is not in a position to decide alone on the validity of the claims of Pakistan to participate initially in the Japanese peace discussions and that the matter is one calling for consideration also by the other Governments concerned. The Government of the United States will be glad, at the opening of Japanese peace discussions, to bring the contents of the Embassy’s note of September 30 to the attention of the meeting. Washington , November 10, 1947. 83 Not printed. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–1447 [Document 439] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Hugh Borton, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth ) confidential [ Washington ,] November 14, 1947. Subject: Japanese Peace Conference. Participants: Mr. Everson, British Embassy Mr. Butterworth, Director of Far Eastern Affairs Mr. Borton, Special Assistant to the Director, FE Mr. Everson called at his request to convey to the Department the following: 1. The British Embassy in Nanking reported that their Ambassador had inquired of Dr. Wang whether the Chinese had received a formal note from the Soviets reminding them of their commitments under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. The Ambassador had been told by Dr. Wang that no such note had been received. 2. Mr. Everson then read a telegram from the Foreign Office to effect that the Foreign Office had given further consideration to the Chinese proposal that the voting procedure at the Japanese Peace Conference be similar to that in the Far Eastern Commission. The telegram continued that the Foreign Office found this procedure, or any procedure which included a provision for a veto, “unpalatable” and assumed that the United States would likewise find any such procedure unpalatable. In view of the fact that it was not impossible that the Chinese proposal would be acceptable to the Soviet Union, the British Government proposed that the British and American Ambassadors in Nanking approach the Chinese Foreign Minister and suggest that the Chinese Government refrain from pushing further their proposed voting procedure. The telegram concluded that, unless the United States perceived objections to this procedure, the Foreign Office intended to instruct their Ambassador in Nanking to make such an approach to the Chinese Foreign Minister. Mr. Butterworth replied that far as this Government is concerned he thought that it would be inadvisable for us to take such a step in view of the fact that the Secretary had told Dr. Wang in New York on two occasions that we had no objection to his approaching Mr. Vishinsky informally to obtain the Soviet views on the Chinese voting procedure. Mr. Butterworth pointed out that we had made it clear to the Chinese that our consent to their making such an approach in no way indicated a change in attitude on our part in reference to the voting nor did it imply we had reconsidered our position. Mr. Everson inquired as to whether our consent to have Dr. Wang talk with Mr. Vishinsky indicated that we favored the Chinese voting procedure. Mr. Butterworth replied that, in the first place, we could not prevent the Chinese from talking to anyone they want; and, in the second place, no decision had been reached on the question. Furthermore, it was logical for the Chinese to wish to raise this question before they would be willing to accept a two-thirds voting procedure. Mr. Everson then asked whether we would consider it inadvisable for the British to take the step contemplated. Mr. Butterworth stated that he would not be able to give an answer until after he had taken the matter up with his superiors. In answer to a question as to whether the British Government desired Soviet participation in the Peace Conference, Mr. Everson said that his Government preferred Soviet participation but was prepared, at an earlier stage, to proceed with a peace conference without the Soviet if the way was left open for Soviet participation at any time. Mr. Butterworth then asked whether the Foreign Office expected the Soviets to accept the Chinese formula. Mr. Everson replied that he thought the FEC voting procedure was tantamount to acceptance of the Soviet proposal that the treaty be considered by the Four Powers as the other states would be forced to comply with the desires of the Four. Mr. Butterworth then pointed out that while he was not arguing for the FEC voting procedure he did not agree with this analysis. Mr. Butterworth noted that it was significant that the Foreign Office had stated that the FEC voting procedure was “unpalatable” rather than “unacceptable” to it. Mr. Everson answered that he had assumed that in this case the two words were synonymous. Mr. Everson then inquired whether there was any indication that the question of the Japanese Peace Conference would be discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers. In reply it was pointed out that the subject was not on the agenda, that if the matter was raised by the Soviets the Secretary would doubtless take the same attitude that had been taken in Moscow, namely, that matters not on the agenda should not be discussed formally in the Conference itself. 3. Mr. Everson concluded the discussion by reading from a telegram from Nanking in which the British Ambassador set forth Dr. Wang’s views on the treaty as follows: a . It was desirable to have a peace treaty with Japan as soon as possible. b . The Soviet Union would support an early peace treaty as it is anxious to have American troops withdrawn from Japan. c . Voting procedure in the Peace Conference should be by a two-thirds majority, including the Big Four. It was noted that this was the first time the Chinese had suggested this form of voting. [In a conversation on Nov. 14, the member of the Australian delegation to the United Nations, Maj. James Plimsoll, informed Mr. Borton of his Government’s anxiety lest a Japanese peace treaty be drafted without Australian participation. He also stated Dr. Evatt’s desire for a preliminary conference in January or February to lay down basic principles and directives under which deputies would operate in drafting a treaty. This would go beyond the American idea of a brief meeting on procedure. (740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–1447) On returning from London, the British Counselor of Embassy (Graves) had a conversation with Mr. Borton on November 17, reviewing the situation, and stated the British preference for a preliminary conference to settle only procedural matters, not matters of substance (740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–1747).] The Chinese Ambassador (Koo) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/11–1747 [Document 440] The Chinese Ambassador ( Koo ) to the Secretary of State Washington , November 17, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to transmit to you the following note dated November 17, 1947, from Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh, Minister of Foreign Affairs: “On July 11th, 1947, the United States Government made a proposal for the calling of a preliminary peace conference dealing with Japan. The terms of the proposal did not, however, meet with the concurrence of all the powers consulted. “Bearing in mind the necessity of an early reestablishment of peace and normal conditions in the Far East and having due regard to the difference of opinion that has arisen on this matter, the Chinese Government holds the view that the preliminary peace conference should not deviate from the principles which govern the composition and procedure of the Far Eastern Commission and which had the approval of all the eleven members of the Commission. The Chinese Government therefore submits the following proposals regarding the composition and procedure of a preliminary peace conference for Japan: “( a ) A preliminary conference composed of all the members of the Far Eastern Commission shall be convened at an early date to be agreed upon by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States and China, to proceed with the drafting of the peace treaty and to determine matters pertaining to the calling of the final peace conference. “( b ) Decisions of the conference should be taken by a majority of the member states composing the conference, including the concurring votes of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States and China. “Identical notes containing these suggestions are being sent to the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is further suggested, should the United States Government and the other two governments concerned agree to the aforesaid proposals, that after the fixing of a date for the preliminary conference, the United States Government be requested to issue invitations in the names of the four powers, namely, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States and China to the other members of the Far Eastern Commission. The Chinese Government would appreciate an early reply from the United States Government.” Accept [etc.] V. K. Wellington Koo Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) 740.00119 PW (Peace) [Document 441] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth ) 84 [ Washington ,] November 18, 1947. The attached memorandum has been prepared for the Secretary’s use at the CFM meeting in London on the question of the Japanese Peace Conference. You will note that the memorandum proposes, on page 2, that we propose circularizing the Chinese note of November 17 to the other FEC countries, stating that while the United States still favors a two-thirds voting procedure, in order to facilitate with the calling of the Japanese Peace Conference, the United States would, though reluctantly, be willing to accept the Chinese proposal if agreement could be obtained for calling a conference on that basis. You may wish to raise this question with the Secretary if you think such procedure is not acceptable to him. W. W[ alton ] B[ utterworth ] [Annex] Memorandum on Japanese Peace Conference secret Problem: To determine the United States position on action to be taken in reference to the Japanese Peace Conference. Action Taken: On July 11 the United States suggested to the eleven countries members of the Far Eastern Commission that a peace conference be called on August 19 composed initially of deputies of the FEC countries, that voting be by a two-thirds majority, that other states at war with Japan be consulted and that a final conference be held of the states at war with Japan to give final approval to the draft of the treaty. All of the countries except the Soviet Union agreed with the proposal for an 11-power conference and 8 of them agreed with our proposed voting procedure. The Soviet Union, in a reply of July 22, maintained that the question of convening a conference for the drawing up of a peace treaty for Japan should be provisionally examined by the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, China and the United Kingdom. On August 12, the United States rejected this proposal and stated that it was hoped the Soviet Union would be willing to attend a conference of FEC countries, such a conference being free to decide its own procedure. On August 29 the Soviets reiterated their former position. On October 9 the Chinese Foreign Minister left an aide-mémoire with the Secretary in which it was proposed that the peace conference adopt a voting procedure similar to that in the Far Eastern Commission whereby decisions should be taken by a majority vote including the concurrence of the Big Four. The Chinese Foreign Minister explained that he feared that if the Chinese participated in a peace conference which the Soviets refused to attend, such action would have serious consequences upon Soviet-Chinese relations because of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. Dr. Wang approached Mr. Vyshinsky to obtain the Soviet reaction to his proposal for voting but received no reply from the Soviets prior to his return to China. The Embassy in Nanking reported that Dr. Wang was considering the advisability of formally proposing the Chinese plan of voting to the Foreign Ministers Conference in London. He has requested the views of the Department on his suggestion and inquired whether it would be expedient to make such a proposal after the adjournment of the United Nations and before the Foreign Ministers Conference in London. Dr. Wang further stated that no reply has yet been received from Moscow to his approach to Mr. Vyshinsky. The Department answered Dr. Wang that it has no objection to his sending notes to the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, USSR and United States proposing his voting procedure, but that the Department does not consider it appropriate for the question of the Japanese peace conference to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, pointing out that it is not on the agenda. The Chinese Government delivered a note on November 17, 1947, to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union proposing that a preliminary Japanese peace conference be called, at a date to be agreed upon by the Four Powers, of the states members of the Far Eastern Commission, decisions of the conference to be taken by a majority of the member states composing the conference, including the concurring votes of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States and China. The United States proposes to circularize the Chinese note to the other countries on the Far Eastern Commission together with a note from this Government. The United States note would contain a statement of the position which the various countries had taken to date and would emphasize the fact that this Government’s endeavors to obtain agreement on a two-thirds voting procedure had failed. The note would further state that while the United States still favored a two-thirds voting procedure, as a contribution to facilitating the calling of a Japanese peace conference, the United States would, though reluctantly, be willing to accept the Chinese proposals if agreement could be obtained for calling a conference on that basis. The United States would request the views of the other countries concerned. The Australians have been constantly pressing for an early Japanese peace settlement. On October 16 Dr. Evatt wrote the Secretary that “definite action should be taken to fix the time and place of the conference”. Dr. Evatt was told by the Secretary on October 28th that the difficulty was how to work out some formula which will make at least Chinese participation possible and preferably that of the Soviet Union, as it would be manifestly meaningless to have a Japanese peace conference without the Soviet Union and China. It is proposed to inform Dr. Evatt personally of the contents of the Chinese note, of our intention to circularize it to the states members of the Far Eastern Commission for their views and of our willingness to accept the Chinese proposals if agreement can be reached for a conference on that basis. In a note from the Chinese Foreign Minister dated November 5, 1947, 84a the Chinese Government stated that while the drawing up of the peace treaty for Germany “may be entrusted to France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Powers signatories to the terms of surrender for Germany, China is entitled to participate in discussions to determine the time and place for the German Peace Conference, its composition, agenda and other related matters. It also follows that China has the right to be one of the inviting Powers.” Identic notes have been sent to the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The United States has replied that, as on previous occasions, this Government favors the inclusion of China as a sponsoring power for the conference to consider the peace settlement for Germany. Recommendations: 1) The United States should refuse to discuss at the Council of Foreign Ministers the question of the Japanese peace settlement since it is not on the agenda. It should hold firm to its position that formal discussion on this question should not be restricted to China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States. 2) Before the United States note summarized above is circulated to the other members of the Far Eastern Commission, a copy will be telegraphed to London so that it can be handed informally to Mr. Molotov in an attempt to determine whether the Soviet Union will be prepared to enter a peace conference on the basis of the Chinese proposals. If it is not possible to obtain agreement for a conference, the United States must publish the record indicating that it has taken all reasonable steps to bring about a peace conference. It is important that the United States be thus placed in a position to proceed with the requisite changes in the character of the occupation of Japan to achieve so far as possible those conditions which a peace treaty would otherwise have produced. 84 Addressed to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) and the Counselor (Bohlen). 84a Vol. ii , p. 700 . The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2047: Telegram [Document 442] The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State 85 secret urgent Nanking , November 20, 1947—2 p.m. 2266. Foreign Minister on the morning of November 19 handed to the Ambassador copy of a note dated November 17, regarding the Japanese Treaty, which was delivered to the Secretary of State by the Chinese Ambassador in Washington. In handing this document to the Ambassador the Foreign Minister said he had told the Soviets he felt they should compromise by accepting the enlarged preliminary conference and that he hoped the US would compromise by accepting retention of the veto. He said he had asked Soviets for a definite yes or no answer in the early future. From a Chinese standpoint Foreign Minister said he felt retention of veto might be necessary to assure protection of vital Chinese interests. At the same time Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in conversation with Embassy officer elaborated on Chinese position. Vice Minister expressed doubts that the Soviets would agree to the Chinese proposal in which case China would be forced to reconsider its position, although he added it would be premature to express any opinion, personal or otherwise, as to what that position might be. Vice Minister then added that the question of Japanese Treaty places China in an extremely difficult and relatively impotent position: It would, in the first instance, be a mockery to have a peace treaty without Chinese participation; on the other hand, a peace treaty without Soviet participation would place China in the impossible situation of having made commitments which it would be incapable of carrying out simply because the Soviet Union has already obtained most of its primary and major objectives in China. It is therefore in a position to exploit and develop what it has, while at the same time simply refusing compromise on grounds that in not being a participant to the treaty it would be under no obligation to carry out its provisions. Vice Minister indicated that referred particularly to Manchuria and Korea as well as certain provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. Vice Minister then expressed doubts that the Russians have any intention, for the time being at least, of participating in any kind of Japanese Peace Treaty, preferring to rely on the Yalta Agreement, Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and the advantages obtained following its entry into war against Japan. Vice Minister then referred to veto question and said that although the Foreign Office does not believe retention of the veto to be necessarily essential, this question is periodically discussed in the State Council and the various Yuan where the consensus is that at Yalta, the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union without previous approval by China made commitments which will seriously damage Chinese interests for years to come. What assurance is there, they ask, that circumstances in the future will not again dictate decisions by the same three powers and again without the consent and at the expense of China. The Foreign Office professes to have no answer to this question. With reference to numbered paragraph 3 of London’s 5880, November 5 to the Department 86 which states that the British Foreign Office considers the Chinese are merely quibbling over Sino-Soviet Treaty terms while seeking clarification of American policy toward China, the Embassy believes Chinese attitude stems from more basic causes. In the opinion of the Embassy, so-called quibbling is in reality genuine fear of the consequences to China should a treaty be concluded without Soviet participation. Large and vital areas of China are presently under the explicit or implicit domination of Soviet Union. The Chinese well realize that a peace treaty without Soviet participation would give Moscow the pretext for retaining and increasing its control of these areas. To this situation should be added the threat of expanding Communist influence in China proper to say nothing of areas such as Manchuria, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. China must also realize full well its own incapacity under present circumstances of single-handedly regaining control of all Chinese territory. Furthermore, Nanking does not see, or at least professes not to see, where it will get that kind of external aid which will enable it to do the job it cannot do alone. Hence Nanking, in groping for some solution, is reluctant to take that kind of action which it believes would probably evoke counter-action that might irrevocably damage its vital interests and alienate its sovereignty over Chinese territory. Stuart 85 Repeated to London by the Department as telegram 4954, November 24, 1 p.m. 86 Not printed. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Penfield) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2047 [Document 443] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Penfield ) confidential [ Washington ,] November 20, 1947. Mr. Graves called at his request and handed me the attached document. 87 which he characterized as preliminary working level Foreign Office reactions to the Chinese note of November 17. Mr. Graves asked whether our reactions were similar. I told him that the Secretary himself was considering the matter and that I assumed he would discuss it with Mr. Bevin upon his arrival in London. I thanked Mr. Graves for giving us the benefit of British views, but told him that in as much as consideration had progressed beyond the working level stage I could not appropriately discuss the Chinese note in any detail. Mr. Graves said he appreciated the situation and would simply inform the Foreign Office that the Secretary was personally concerning himself with the Japanese peace settlement and that it might therefore be desirable for Mr. Bevin and the Secretary to consult sometime after the latter’s arrival in London. 87 Infra. The British Embassy to the Department of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2047 [Document 444] The British Embassy to the Department of State 88 undated Japanese Peace Treaty On the 17th November the Chinese Ambassador left a formal note at the Foreign Office proposing that a preliminary conference of all member states of the Far Eastern Commission be convened at an early date, to be agreed upon by the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., United States and China, to proceed with the drafting of the Japanese Peace Treaty and to determine matters pertaining to the calling of a final Peace Conference. The note went on to propose that all decisions of the conference should be taken by a majority of the member states, including the concurring votes of the Big Four. It is understood that identic notes were to be delivered to the Governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R. The Chinese Embassy in London asked the Foreign Office on the 18th November what were the preliminary reactions of the Department. The Chinese Minister was told that the note was being studied and that it was not possible to say when a formal reply would be given since, as the Embassy would be aware, His Majesty’s Government had only recently taken part in a British Commonwealth Conference at Canberra where the general view was that the decisions of the Japanese Peace Settlement should be reached by simple majority vote of the member states of the Far Eastern Commission, bearing in mind that Pakistan and Burma would wish to be added to the number of participating states. The Chinese Minister was asked what he presumed would happen if the Chinese proposal were acceptable to the Soviet Union and to all the other states concerned. Assuming that the Peace Conference assembled in these circumstances and assuming that it were possible to reach general agreement on a number of questions, would it not be likely that precisely on those questions most closely affecting China (such as external Japanese assets in Manchuria) the Big Four would find themselves in disagreement? Where, the Minister was asked, would China then stand? It would only need one veto to ensure that no treaty would be made. His Majesty’s Government did not want a treaty without the Soviet Union: on the contrary it was desired that the Soviet Union should participate. But the Foreign Office did not perceive that the Chinese proposal would necessarily produce the desired result. The Chinese Minister was not prepared to answer these questions. He said that China was between two fires and that her proposal was in the nature of a compromise. In his personal view—and this he mentioned confidentially—it would be a good idea to try to get rid of the veto, since it did not work. He went on to say that China was anxious to have an early peace with Japan but there were Chinese fears of the Soviet interpretation of Article 2 of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. In regard to this point the Foreign Office official commented that we were, after all, all of us parties to the original United Nations Declaration of 1942 which bound us not to negotiate or to conclude separate armistices or peace treaties, and that although China might be in a slightly different position by virtue of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, it was the view of the Foreign Office that the provisions about separate peace making had little application to present circumstances or to a peace (hostilities being over), in the negotiation or conclusion of which Russia would be given every opportunity to participate and to which she could still adhere even if she refused to participate. On the interpretation of Article 2 of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the Foreign Office considered that there was a clear let-out for China in the phrase “or with any other government or authority set up in Japan which does not clearly renounce all aggressive intentions.” The Foreign Office official also remarked that if the Soviet Union used Article 2 of the Treaty to justify their action in Manchuria then it would be open to China to raise the question before the Security Council and to suggest, if she so desired, a reference to the International Court of Justice (though there was of course no way in which Russia could be forced to agree to such reference). Alternatively China could bring Russia’s action in Manchuria to the attention of the Security Council, though this might well prove to be much the most serious matter with which the Council had yet had to deal and might even lead to its undoing. The Chinese Minister showed interest in these arguments and appeared to be relieved that such views were held. The Chinese Minister’s attention was drawn to an article in the Ta Kung Pao which appeared to show that credence was given to the view that the United States was building up Japan instead of helping to build up China. The Soviet Union seemed to be making use of this line of propaganda. It was suggested to the Minister that the best way to ensure that Japan was not in a position once more to become an aggressive state was to thresh out all these points at the peace table. As far as the Foreign Office were aware no one dissented from the view that security must be the first consideration in framing the Japanese Peace Treaty. It was made clear to the Chinese Minister that the foregoing were only the preliminary reactions of the Foreign Office, but he was left in no doubt that the Chinese proposal, even if it proved acceptable to all, was, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, unlikely to provide a solution for China’s difficulties. 88 Handed to Mr. Penfield by Mr. Graves on November 20. The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen) 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2147: Telegram [Document 445] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ) 89 secret us urgent Washington , November 21, 1947—7 p.m. 4943. Secdel 1500. For Bohlen. As instructed, Butterworth this afternoon informed Evatt of Chinese note on Jap peace settlement and of action Dept intends to take in premises. Evatt referred to our previous assurances which he characterized as a commitment in spirit if not in letter that Aus would be treated as a principal power in connection Jap peace settlement and he stated it was absolutely essential for him to obtain such role for Aus. His genl reaction however was reasonable and he said he appreciated the situation and desired to do his utmost to cooperate with us. He proposed that we approach the Brit with a view to obtaining their cooperation in either 1) securing inclusion of Aus as a fifth power exercising veto or 2) securing appointment of Aus to exercise a veto on behalf of Brit Commonwealth (composition of Allied Council in Tokyo in some respects provides precedent for this procedure). Evatt stated that if one of these procedures could not be arranged he would have no alternative but to “blow it up”. In view Evatt’s attitude the Secy may wish to discuss matter with Bevin in near future. 90 Unless you indicate some other preferred date Dept proposes to deliver notes to Embs here on Nov 25. Assume agreed approach to Molotov will be made same date. Next following tel contains suggested text of note. Lovett 89 Mr. Bohlen was in London as Adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held November 25–December 15, 1947. 90 In telegram Martel 11, November 28, from London, the Secretary reported that he had read the draft note to Mr. Bevin on November 25 and advised him of Dr. Evatt’s attitude. Mr. Bevin “brushed off apparently any idea of Great Britain placing in hands of Australians British veto power” and said that he would take the matter up at once, presumably with the Cabinet. The Secretary had heard nothing since. (740.0011 P.W.(Peace)/11–2847) The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2147: Telegram [Document 446] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ), at London restricted Washington , November 21, 1947—7 p.m. 4944. Secdel 1501. For Bohlen. Following is suggested draft note on Jap peace treaty conference: “The ActSecState presents his compliments to His Excellency the Amb of blank and has the honor to refer to this Govt’s note of Aug 14, 1947, re a Jap peace settlement. Since the dispatch of this note formal views on this matter have been received from two interested Govts. On Aug 29, 1947, the Dept of State received an aide-mémoire from the Sov Emb at Wash reiterating the Sov position as set forth in the Emb’s aide-mémoire of Jul 22, 1947, a copy of which was enclosed with the ActSec’s note referred to above. On Nov 17, 1947, the Sec-State received a note from the ChiMin of FonAff in which are advanced certain proposals regarding the composition and procedure of a preliminary peace conference for Japan. A copy of this note is enclosed. Although the suggestions for a conference on a Jap peace settlement made by the US Govt on Jul 11, 1947, were approved in genl by 8 of the 10 Powers approached, it would appear that they are not acceptable to the Chi and Sov Govts. On the other hand, there seems to be no support for the Sov contention that the Jap peace settlement should ‘be preliminarily considered at the Council of Mins for FonAff composed of reps of the Sov Union, the US of A, Great Britain and China’. However, all 11 Govts represented on the FEC have indicated that they consider it important that Jap peace settlement negotiations be initiated promptly. The US Govt is loath to agree to a modification of the suggested procedure of an 11-Power conference taking decisions on the basis of a simple two-thirds majority vote, which it regards as preferable and which has found such wide acceptance. However, sharing as it does the genl concern over delay in initiation of negotiations, it is prepared, for its part, to accommodate its views, in so far as possible, to those of the other interested Govts in order to expedite the convening of a conference on a basis acceptable to all Powers concerned. Therefore, in the interests of achieving genl agreement on this important matter, the Govt of the US stands ready to accept the proposals of the Chi FonMin relating to the voting procedure, as set forth in his note of Nov 17, providing these proposals are agreeable to the other interested Powers. With reference to the date of the proposed conference and issuance of the invitations, the US Govt would be willing to issue invitations, but, in line with its position that this matter should be considered ab initio by the 11 Govts represented on the Far Eastern Commission, would prefer to make no distinction between sponsoring and non-sponsoring Powers and to specify a date agreeable to all. This Govt would welcome an expression of the views of the blank Govt on this matter. The views of the other Govts represented on the Far Eastern Commission are being similarly solicited.” In note to Sov Emb following is suggested substitute for first para above draft: “The ActSecState presents his compliments to His Excellency the Amb of the Union of Sov Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Sov Emb’s aide-mémoire of Aug 29, 1947, reiterating the Sov position re the question of convening a conference to draw up a Jap peace treaty. The SecState has now received a note dated Nov 17, 1947, from the ChiMin of FonAff in which are advanced certain proposals regarding the composition and procedure of a preliminary peace conference for Japan and in which it is stated that an identical note containing these suggestions was being sent to the Govt of the Union of Sov Socialist Republics.” Lovett The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2447: Telegram [Document 447] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ), at London secret Washington , November 27, 1947—1 p.m. TelMar 12. For Bohlen. Mr. James Plimsoll called at Dept today and stated Dr. Evatt had delayed sending message to Secy in London and now asked that it be thus transmitted to him: “Mr. Butterworth of the State Department has discussed confidentially with me the Chinese proposal for the Japanese peace conference, including the Far Eastern Commission method of voting. I have been in touch with my Government who are greatly concerned with the matter, feeling that Australia’s status as a Pacific belligerent is not at all recognized in the Chinese proposal and that we are entitled to rely on being treated as a party principal in all matters relating to the settlement of the Japanese war, in which our contribution was second only to the U.S.A. Australia fills one of the four positions on the Allied Council for Japan and has been working in the closest cooperation with General MacArthur. Throughout the work of the Far Eastern Commission during the past 2 years, Australia has given the utmost assistance to the U.S.A. Government in meeting the problems of the occupation and in developing a sound policy towards Japan. Australia has joined with the U.S.A. in the offer made two weeks ago to return a substantial portion of our own reparations from Japan back to the pool for distribution among other claimants, as a means of securing a settlement acceptable to other countries and relieving economic problems in the rest of the Far East. Certain alternatives for the Peace conference are possibly open, and I am asking Mr. Plimsoll of the Australian Department of External Affairs to discuss the whole position with Mr. Butterworth. In the meantime I would request that no commitment of any kind be given.” The fact is that Plimsoll had no suggestions to offer. It is fair guess from Plimsoll’s rather vague remarks that Dr. Evatt has had a second thought about his proposal to act in UK stead and that his last hope is that the Secy can persuade the Russians to agree to Australia’s inclusion as fifth Power. Dept would appreciate indication when exploratory talks in London will take place. It assumes you have in mind undesirability of losing through undue delay opportunity offered by Chinese note. (See London’s 6171 Nov 24, 6 p.m. 91 ) Lovett 91 Not printed. The Soviet Chargé (Tarassenko) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11–2747 [Document 448] The Soviet Chargé ( Tarassenko ) to the Secretary of State [Translation] No. 233 Washington , November 27, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China Mr. Wang Shih-Chieh to his note of November 17, 1947 concerning a peace settlement for Japan. 92 Accept [etc.] V. Tarassenko [Enclosure—Translation] The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union ( Molotov ) to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Wang ) Mr. Minister : In reply to your note of November 17 of this year concerning the preparation of a peace settlement for Japan I have the honor on instructions from the Soviet Government to communicate the following. It is known that the four powers—China, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, which bore the principal burden of the war and assured through their armed forces victory over Japan, reached among themselves during the course of the war specific agreements concerning the postwar peace settlement. This found its expression in the Cairo Declaration, in the decisions of the Yalta Conference and in the Potsdam Declaration. According to the decisions of the Potsdam Conference the conduct of the necessary preparatory work for a peace settlement was placed on the Council of Foreign Ministers, the participation in which of China had in view precisely the questions of a peace settlement in the Far East. After the end of the war with Japan the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and also China which adhered thereto, determined in the December 1945 agreement in Moscow that precisely these four countries would participate in the Allied Council for Japan and that the Far Eastern Commission in Washington would adopt its decisions with the obligatory concurrence of the representatives of the four above-mentioned powers, thereby confirming the special interest of these states in questions of the postwar position of Japan. On the basis of these decisions, the Soviet Government in its notes of July 22 and August 29 of this year already expressed itself concerning the necessity for consideration in the nearest future of the question of a peace settlement for Japan in the Council of Foreign Ministers composed of representatives of China, the USA, the USSR and Great Britain. The proposal set forth in your note concerning the procedure for a peace settlement for Japan also takes as its point of departure the recognition of the special interest of the four above-mentioned powers inasmuch as it envisages the adoption of all decisions on questions of a peace settlement for Japan with the obligatory concurrence of representatives of China, the USA, the USSR and Great Britain, although in your note it is proposed to convene for this purpose a special preliminary conference which, however, did not envisage any previous decisions of the above-mentioned powers and which is in contradiction to the Potsdam decision for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers and can only delay the restoration of peace in the Far East. Therefore, in the interests of the earliest establishment of peace in the Far East and of providing to Japan and its people appropriate conditions for peaceful development the Soviet Government proposes that there be convened in January 1948 a special session of the Council of Foreign Ministers comprising the representatives of China, the USA, the USSR and Great Britain for the consideration of the question of the preparation of a peace settlement for Japan. It is proposed that this session of the Council of Foreign Ministers be convened in China if the Chinese Government deems this desirable. I would be grateful to you for an early reply from the Government of China on this question in order that in the event of the agreement of the Chinese Government and of the two other interested governments with the proposal set forth above the necessary preparatory measures may be taken as rapidly as possible. I have also sent a similar proposal to the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain. Please accept [etc.] V. Molotov 92 The texts of the Chinese and Soviet exchange of notes of November 17 and 27 were published in Moscow on November 28. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–247: Telegram [Document 449] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent London , December 2, 1947. Martel 23. Relative to the Japanese treaty: 1. Sargent, 93 Foreign Office, says that His Majesty’s Government has so far received no representations from Evatt of Australia to the effect that either Australia act as a substitute for His Majesty’s Government or alternatively that Australia be added to the four powers with veto. Should proposals along these lines be received by His Majesty’s Government from Australia, they will be declined. 2. Sargent suggests that since there is danger that the Chinese Government may accept the Soviet proposal we both instruct our respective heads of mission in Nanking strenuously to urge that the Chinese Government decline the Soviet proposal. 3. Sargent also suggests that our respective Heads of Mission in Nanking attempt to persuade the Chinese Government to accept our original proposal. 4. We should, of course, reject the Soviet proposal for the same reasons that it was originally rejected when first made. 5. As to a reply to the Chinese note it would appear preferable to await the outcome of discussions at Nanking before making any formal answer to the Chinese proposal which in view of the Soviet attitude has failed of its purpose. Douglas 93 Sir Orme G. Sargent, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 P.W.(Peace)/12–247: Telegram [Document 450] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Durbrow ) to the Secretary of State 94 secret Moscow , December 2, 1947—9 p.m. 3310. Following is Embassy’s estimate based on Soviet actions and press comment Far East for Dept’s consideration connection Soviet proposal for CFM meeting consider Jap peace settlement. 1. Primary Soviet objectives Far East: ( a ) Communist domination Korea, Manchuria, secondary objectives: Communist control “democratic” regimes Indo-China and Indonesia, and of India. Tertiary objective: Communist dominated Japan. 2. Soviets believe: ( a ) North Korea regime now consolidated to extent that taking advantage confused situation South Korea after troop withdrawal Communist control whole country can be quickly achieved. ( b ) Progress Chinese Communists Manchuria satisfactory; “democratic people’s” regime will be set up in due course, probably even without necessity direct Soviet aid. ( c ) General chaotic conditions China portend eventual Communist victory over entire country. Civil war is on Soviet side. American aid can never do more than delay inevitable. ( d ) Unrest in Southeast Asia, fully exploited, particularly through Chinese Communist organization, will grow continuously and eventually result in Communist dominated regimes. ( e ) Japan may not easily and quickly be swung into Communist orbit. However, with consolidation of Communist strength Manchuria, Korea, and possibly Southeast Asia, Jap party will inevitably be strengthened and after withdrawal occupation forces, its opportunities for activity greatly increased. 3. Given such favorable conditions in Asia, peace with Japan is of little importance to Soviet strategic and diplomatic policy. Deeply apprehensive of American military power based Japan and Okinawa, Soviets will attempt build counter power in Korea, Manchuria and on newly acquired former Jap territories. 4. Any peace settlement will inevitably be regarded as onerous by defeated peoples; by remaining outside Soviets gain propaganda advantages, incur no responsibilities, and win new opportunities for sabotage, infiltration, and boring from within. They count on early withdrawal occupation forces and ineffective weak post-treaty control regime. Taken into account this presumptive Soviet view of Far East, US should be in no hurry to sign a peace and withdraw from Japan. In fact US should recognize advantages prolonging in some form present occupation activities and at same time be aware possible dangerous consequences hastily proceeding to peace settlement boycotted by USSR. In any case break over Japan should not occur before final break over Germany, even though both should prove to be eventually inevitable. Therefore, we suggest following general principles should be borne in mind in determining US position toward Soviet proposal: 1. Early treaty “for treaty’s sake” is not necessarily advantageous to us. 2. We should be sure that UK, China, and majority FEC powers agree with US before rejecting Soviet proposal CFM meeting and even in such case, should exhaust efforts to get Soviets join 11–power conference before finally proceeding without them. 3. If peace conference is convoked without USSR, post treaty controls should be devised which will maximize stability Jap Govt and minimize Soviet influence. 4. In long run success or failure US policy in Korea and China may have more bearing on finality Jap peace settlement than what we do about the peace conference itself. Sent Dept 3310; repeated to London 363. Durbrow 94 Repeated by the Department to Nanking as 1462 and to Tokyo as 466, December 3, 6 p.m. The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–547: Telegram [Document 451] The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State 95 secret Nanking , December 5, 1947—6 p.m. 2342. Vice Minister Foreign Affairs has furnished following information re Sino-Soviet negotiation Japanese peace treaty. Foreign Office has received Soviet note dated November 27 (in reply to Chinese note of November 17 proposing that peace conference consist of the 11 nations concerned with two-thirds majority decision but with unanimity among four principal powers). The Soviet note rejected the Chinese formula and reiterated Soviet demand for preliminary conference of Four Powers. Vice Minister stated that he understood text of note had been supplied to Department by Soviet Embassy. Foreign Office has decided to reply to Soviets, maintaining original Chinese position because Chinese see no reason why work of preparing peace treaty for Japan should be limited to Four Powers. Chinese will reiterate their view that composition and procedure of the Far Eastern Commission should be adopted inasmuch as principles governing the composition and procedure were agreed upon by all 11 powers including USSR. As to time and place which Soviet note proposed for conference, i.e. in China in January, the Chinese have no objections provided that British and US Governments agree, but failing such agreement Chinese wanted revert to their original insistence of having conference held in Washington. Foreign Office expects that this note will be delivered in Moscow tomorrow so urged caution against premature disclosure. Copy will be made available to US Government in due course. Vice Minister stated that he was particularly anxious that this information reach Department in order to counteract certain mistaken and misleading views expressed by US press re Chinese position in Japanese peace treaty negotiations, to effect that China has been playing both ends against the middle in effort to secure favorable position for herself. This he said was not true, nor had China any intention of “Climbing on the Soviet lap”. He expressed the hope that two factors in situation would be fully appreciated in Washington: 1. The pressure of public opinion in China, as exemplified by the influential Ta Rung Pao , which fears a resurgence of Japanese power under American protection and agitates against abridgment of Chinese veto powers and 2. The unremitting pressure of the Soviets. Vice Minister stated that extent and force of this pressure was not generally appreciated abroad but that some day the record would show that Chinese Government has not been lacking in courage in dealing with Soviets. He added that Chinese Government has been giving close study to the provision of the Sino-Soviet Treaty relating to conclusion of treaty with Japan and that there was no doubt that the Chinese were not bound to await Soviet approval to a peace treaty. However, he stated that the Chinese were not now in position to press this interpretation on Soviets. Embassy feels that Chinese are haunted by fear of Russia because of geographical propinquity plus rampant Chinese communism. They do not dare therefore to offend Russia or to expose themselves to the charge of violating treaties if they join in a peace conference in which Russia is not a participant. They have had some slight hope that Russia would prefer their suggestions and conclude a peace which would end American predominance in Japan but this hope would seem now to have been unfounded. They are obviously afraid to make any other move until they know more about our policy. Stuart 95 Repeated by the Department to London for Mr. Bohlen as telegram TelMar 44, December 6, 3 p.m. The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–547: Telegram [Document 452] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ), at London secret Washington , December 5, 1947—8 p.m. TelMar 40. For Bohlen from Butterworth. Graves Brit Emb called today and read two tels from London recounting interchange there and one from Nanking reporting confidential conversation between Brit Min-Counselor and Chinese Vice Min in which latter stated that on Dec 6 Chinese would reply to latest Russian note re Jap peace treaty making following three points: a . China could not agree to preparatory consideration by the four powers only. b . China stood by FEC representation and its voting procedure proposal. c . China was agreeable to time and location suggested by Sovs for meeting provided UK and USA were agreeable; otherwise would favor Washington. Graves seemed hopeful that there might still be time for joint representations in Nanking with view to persuading China to accept two-thirds voting proposal. He was informed that Dept had sent no new instructions to American Amb in Nanking. I expressed personal view that even aside from Chinese view of their own self-interest it was quite impractical to expect Chinese thus to reverse the position they had so recently embodied in formal communications and published to the world. Furthermore I indicated that in my opinion the stage had now been reached when careful consideration would have to be given as to whether we were prepared in present circumstances to proceed with negotiations for Jap peace treaty without Russian participation and that various elements of this Govt would have to be consulted in reaching decision. Obviously it would be unwise for us to embark on a course of attempting to persuade the Chinese to reverse their stand if it might transpire that we would be unwilling to join with them and the other powers concerned in effecting a peace settlement without the Sovs. For your info Dept has received no similar tel from AmEmbassy Nanking. 96 For my part I welcome the timing and content of Chinese note and hope it will be despatched as apparently scheduled. [Butterworth.] Lovett 96 Nanking’s telegram 2342, supra , arrived after this text was drafted. The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London 740.0011PW (Peace)/12–647: Telegram [Document 453] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ), at London secret u.s. urgent Washington , December 6, 1947—3 p.m. TelMar 45. For Bohlen from Butterworth. Graves telephoned me at my house last evening stating that BritishAmb. Nanking was being instructed to represent to Chinese Gov undesirability of sending note in form indicated in TelMar 40 Dec 5, 8 p.m., and urging that it should be modified to embody two-thirds proposal. FornOff instructions were apparently that BritishEmb. Washington was to attempt to obtain instructions for Dr. Stuart to act similarly, failing this BritishEmb. Nanking was to act alone unless BritishEmb. Washington indicated this Government’s objection. I replied State Dep unwilling to instruct AmAmb. Nanking in this sense at this time; whereas I could not speak for the Acting SecState or SecState in my view such representations at Nanking were undesirable and would prove ineffective and I expressed the personal hope that the British Gov would do nothing to delay the dispatch of a Chinese note rejecting the Russian proposal. Nanking’s 2342 December 5, 6 p.m. available this morning and being repeated to you. Repeated to Nanking No. 1480. [Butterworth.] Lovett The Chinese Ambassador (Koo) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/12–647 [Document 454] The Chinese Ambassador ( Koo ) to the Acting Secretary of State 97 Washington , December 6, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to transmit to you the following note dated December 6, 1947, from Dr. Wang Shih-Chieh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed to the Secretary of State: “Sir: I have the honor to refer to my note of November 17, 1947, on the proposed preliminary peace conference dealing with Japan and the reply thereto from the Soviet Foreign Minister, of which I understand an identical copy was sent to you on November 27, 1947. I have today addressed another note to the Soviet Foreign Minister. The following is its full text: ‘I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note in reply to my Note of November 17, 1947, which was transmitted by the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Nanking on November 27, 1947. ‘The Chinese Government has given your reply its most careful consideration and is glad to note that the Soviet Government is as desirous as the Chinese Government of effecting an early peace with Japan. The Chinese Government is, however, unable to share the view that the task of preparing a peace settlement for Japan must needs be confined to the four major Powers. While the Potsdam Agreement of July 26, 1945, constitutes the basis for the formation of the Council of Foreign Ministers, it does not contain any express provision investing the Council with the function of preparing a peace treaty on Japan. On the other hand, the Far Eastern Commission, which was created under the terms of the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, was explicitly charged with the work of formulating policies, principles and standards in relation to the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender. The composition and voting procedure of the Commission were agreed upon by all its members. ‘It is the view of the Chinese Government that the function of the Commission as stated above is no less vital than, in fact bears close relation to, that of the preliminary peace conference now under consideration. The Chinese Government sees no necessity for such a conference to deviate from the principles governing either the composition or the voting procedure of the Far Eastern Commission. Insistence on such deviation may only cause further delay in the calling of such a conference. It is therefore earnestly hoped that after further consideration the Soviet Government will see its way to accept the views of the Chinese Government. ‘As to the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the proposed preliminary conference be convened in January, 1948, in China, the Chinese Government is prepared to give it its acceptance, should the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom also find the proposal agreeable. Failing such agreement, the Chinese Government will maintain its original proposal in regard to the site of the proposed conference as set forth in my note of November 17, 1947. ‘Separate notes containing identical observations are being communicated to the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom.’ “I avail myself of this occasion to renew to you, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. Wang Shih-Chieh” Accept [etc.] V. K. Wellington Koo 97 On December 12 the Department sent copies of the Soviet Union’s notes of August 29 and November 27, and the Chinese notes of November 17 and December 6 to the other seven members of the Far Eastern Commission who had not hitherto received them; the British and Chinese Embassies were orally informed on December 12 and 15, respectively. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–847: Telegram [Document 455] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State secret Tokyo , December 8, 1947. 308. CX 57183. With reference to Moscow’s 3310, December 2 (Dept serial 466), suggest consideration of following factors, estimates, and comments concerning Japanese situation and the occupation in determination of policies regarding convocation peace conference: 1. With exception of relatively few as yet not finalized directives, basic policies of occupation have largely been implemented and firm ground-work laid for effective growth of democratic principles in Japan. 2. Political stability has been achieved, although continuation thereof will largely depend upon economic rehabilitation which in turn depends upon many factors beyond control of SCAP and which we believe cannot be achieved in adequate measure until private capital and enterprise (including foreign) can be given free play in Japan’s industry and foreign trade. Under present conditions, with continued scarcities raw materials and most vital necessities, attainment of economic stability appears difficult in immediate future. 3. We feel it is doubtful whether occupation of Japan can be continued for indefinite period without eventually, in part, defeating its own ends and perhaps at some stage hastening an unhealthy reaction detrimental to US prestige in Japan and elsewhere, particularly if it should become apparent that peace treaty is to be unduly delayed. 4. Considering such intangible factors as Japanese psychology, proneness to follow new leadership, and habits of discipline, the possibility should not be dismissed that continued presence large numbers aliens in Japan may eventually revive xenophobia which could result in loss of much that has been gained and of which Communists would take full advantage. 5. We believe that with conclusion of treaty of peace within a reasonable time and given strong internal police powers and moderate economic stability, duly constituted Japanese government can successfully resist encroachments of Communist Party, especially as overwhelming majority Japanese people would support any duly elected government making honest effort. A careful consideration of the above factors leads us to believe that the US has much to gain from an early peace as the Japanese people would thereby be enabled to practice the precepts of democracy and be given an opportunity to put their economic house in order by their own efforts rather than by continued reliance upon the resources and active assistance of the United States. We furthermore believe that an early peace will result in firm establishment of much closer ties, politically, economically, and culturally, between the US and Japan than would a peace deferred for lengthy period under any pretext, especially as later circumstance would give Soviets and other countries additional time to take advantage of Japan’s present inferior position. In any event, if it should transpire that Soviets refuse to join in peace conference as proposed by US, we feel that entire concept of post-treaty control would have to be reshaped to afford adequate protection to Japan against undue internal influence and encroachment by Soviets in the post-treaty period. In such case, we believe the Japanese government and people would welcome the security afforded by close political and economic ties with the US which such arrangement would presumably envisage. We also share view that posttreaty control must envisage preponderant US role. But we believe also in the essentiality of a US policy of readiness, if necessary, to support duly constituted Japanese government in event internal or external threat should seriously undermine constitutional government, if Japan is to become a battle-ground of opposing ideologies in the future. General MacArthur concurs in my sending this message. Sebald The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–1147: Telegram [Document 456] The Secretary of State 98 to the Acting Secretary of State secret us urgent London , December 11, 1947. Martel 64. Butterworth from Bohlen. Deptel 5136, December 6. 99 The principal reason for considering the Chinese proposal favorably was that it might have provided the basis for a complete agreement, but now it appears that approval of the Chinese proposal by US, while it would line us up with China, it would, on the other hand, probably have the effect of developing disagreements almost certainly with Australia, accompanied by difficulties with the British and possibly one or two other of the eight countries who have accepted our proposals. Accordingly, while it may be difficult, if not impossible, particularly in view of Chinese reply of December 6 to the Soviet note of November 27, to persuade the Chinese Government to shift its position and support the original US proposals in regard to the Japanese Peace Conference, I see no objection to instructing our Chief of Mission in Nanking to explore the matter with Chinese Government. (TelMar 40, December 5; TelMar 45, December 6; Embtel 6354, December 6. 1 ) If Chinese Government insists upon its own proposal, we can then officially reply in the light of this information. If Chinese Government indicates willingness to reconsider its position, we can then reply accordingly. In any event, it seems to me that nothing will be lost by the oral conversations which I suggest. If you agree, it might be prudent to advise our Chief of Mission in Nanking the line of persuasion which he is to take; namely, ( a ) That the veto, which is implicit in the Chinese proposal, would, as a matter of fact, be ineffective for the reason that it could not, in practice, be invoked against the concurrence of two-thirds of any proposition; ( b ) That it is most unlikely on any matter of substance the US would not be sympathetic with any Chinese proposition; and ( c ) That if the Soviet refused to attend the conference, we could then consider what course would be the wisest to follow, and that should the Soviet take this position, it might well be to our mutual advantage were no peace conference to be called in the immediate future. Sargent of Foreign Office informed me today that British Government has instructed the British Embassy at Nanking to inform the Chinese Government that British Government continues to favor the original American proposals on procedure for the Japanese peace conference. 2 [Bohlen.] Marshall 98 The Secretary of State was attending the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at London November 25–Deeember 15, 1947. 99 Not printed; it reported the Chinese note of December 6, p. 587 [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] . 1 Telegram 6354 not printed. 2 British replies to the Chinese and Soviet communications were sent the night of December 12; copies were transmitted by the British Embassy to the Department on December 13, and texts were made public in London on December 14. The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–1547: Telegram [Document 457] The Acting Secretary of State to the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ), at London secret us urgent Washington , December 15, 1947—5 p.m. TelMar 81. For Bohlen from Butterworth. Martel 64, Dec 11. Your tel been considered together with previous interchanges by those in Dept who have had continuing interest in problem of convoking a Jap peace conference and the following constitute our recommendations: We feel that before US makes any further diplomatic moves of importance we need to establish basic pattern our policy and answer fundamental questions whether it would be in interest US to have peace treaty with Japan without Soviet participation and whether in the light of indicated Soviet and Chinese positions regarding procedures any attempt now to negotiate peace treaty with Jap is in US interest. It seems to us we should not attempt persuade Chinese to support original US proposals on voting procedure until we answer those fundamental questions. We are convinced such questions can be answered adequately only after a better understanding has been achieved through consultations between Dept officials and SCAP as proposed Kennan and approved Sec. If conclusion should be that it is not to US interest to have treaty now, we feel it would be preferable to base our position on disagreement caused by three different voting procedures than for us to persuade Chinese support our original proposal and then not proceed with peace treaty. Approach to Chinese at this time implies to them and British our willingness to proceed as soon as practicable with treaty negotiations and would make it more difficult to postpone such negotiations than would be the case if no further diplomatic moves have been taken. We therefore favor deferring reply to Chinese note and any other action until first-hand consultation with Sec and you. Dept now preparing memo for consideration upon See’s return on two fundamental questions raised in first sentence. Recommend, in meantime, we let Chinese know informally we shall probably not wish to reply to their note until sometime after CFM meeting ends. [Butterworth.] Lovett Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Drumright) to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen), at London 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–1647 [Document 458] Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Drumright ) to the Counselor of the Department ( Bohlen ), at London 3 secret [ London ,] December 16, 1947. Subject: Japanese Peace Settlement. 1. Pursuant to your suggestion, I have obtained and read a copy of Butterworth’s telegram to you. 4 2. In the light of Butterworth’s telegram, I should like to offer a few personal observations:— 3. First of all, I have been acting on the assumption that the United States Government desired an early treaty with Japan. It seems to me that such a desideratum was implicit in our original proposals. I am almost certain that the UK Government has been acting on that assumption. 4. Secondly, if the US Government is now uncertain as to the desirability of an early treaty, as Butterworth seems to suggest, then I think he is correct in advising postponement of further action until the US Government does take a decision on that question. Obviously that question is one for settlement between Washington and SCAP in Tokyo. In this connection, the UK Government and the Commonwealth Governments, at their meeting in Canberra, came out strongly for an early treaty. However, if the US Government desires to postpone the treaty-making for a few months, I personally feel that the British will not make too much of a row. The British are in a weak position in the Far East, and they cannot conceivably adopt a really independent position. Essentially, they must fall in line with our position on Japan, as two or three responsible Foreign Office officials have indicated to me on various occasions. One of the main UK worries, if the treaty-making is deferred, will be the placating of Evatt, who can be a thorn in the side. 5. As regards the Chinese, my own feeling has been and is that they can be persuaded to participate in the treaty-making even though the Soviets are absent. But to obtain Chinese agreement, I think we shall have to give them two major commitments: 1) that we will support them against Soviet (i.e. Chinese Communist) aggression; and 2) that adequate safeguards will be incorporated in the Japanese treaty to checkmate potential Japanese aggression against China. In my view, the Chinese cannot but regard the Soviets as their mortal enemies. Moreover, they must be disillusioned by the Soviet rejection of their proposals for the Japanese peace negotiations, and they can now no doubt perceive from the CFM London conference that a similar CFM conference on Japan (or even an eleven-Power conference with the veto) is not likely to have any greater success. In my opinion, the Chinese would probably not be averse to having the Japanese peace treaty talks deferred for a period. 6. Unlike the UK Foreign Office, I have not felt that we are under obligation to make a speedy reply to the Chinese note of November 17th. If we want further time to consider the overall question of the timing for a peace settlement, I see no objection to Butterworth’s recommendation that we tell the Chinese informally that we do not wish to reply to their note pending further consideration of the whole question. 7. I wish I were qualified to comment on the question of the timing for a Japanese peace treaty. However, I have not sufficient first-hand knowledge of the subject to venture an opinion. 8. If we do determine to defer the treaty-making for any appreciable length of time, I think we shall be obliged to adduce some sound reasons therefor to our Allies and to the Japanese people. The latter have been led, I think, to expect a fairly early settlement, and there may be some serious repercussions if they are disappointed in that hope. 9. If you so desire, I shall be glad to discuss the issue with you at your convenience. Everett F. Drumright 3 Copy transmitted to Mr. Allison by Mr. Drumright on the same date. In his covering letter Mr. Drumright mentioned that the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London had ended. 4 Supra. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–1647: Airgram [Document 459] The Acting Political Adviser in Japan ( Sebald ) to the Secretary of State secret for use of department only Tokyo , December 16, 1947. A–132. In an informal discussion which I had with General MacArthur concerning the prospects of the convocation of a conference for negotiating the Japanese peace treaty, General MacArthur stated that Ambassador Gascoigne, Head of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Tokyo, had recently called upon him with a view to determining his attitude regarding an early summoning of the conference. General MacArthur stated that he had told Mr. Gascoigne that, in his opinion, it would be a mistake to allow the Soviets, like Canute, “to stop the flow of the tide”. He felt that the time has come when the United States must decide to go ahead with the peace conference even without the Soviets, as in his opinion, the Soviets wish to obstruct an early peace for their own ends and to the detriment of the United States. In General MacArthur’s opinion, it will, in any event, take some 6 to 8 months to negotiate the treaty. When a treaty has been drafted to the satisfaction of the Powers attending the conference, he feels that the various Powers should then make a concerted effort to obtain Soviet Russia’s concurrence to the treaty which has been drafted, and that the United States could then decide whether to sign and ratify the treaty without USSR participation. General MacArthur said that Mr. Gascoigne was in full agreement with his ideas regarding the necessity for convoking a peace conference at the earliest possible date, even without Soviet participation. Sebald The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–247: Telegram [Document 460] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union secret Washington , December 22, 1947—10 p.m. 2051. Your 3310, December 2. In estimating that a communist Japan was a tertiary Soviet objective in Far East, Dept assumes you did not mean to imply Japan was of less strategic importance to U.S.S.R. than South Asia and that you were indicating sequence of opportunities becoming ripe for Soviet exploitation. It is assumed you proceeded on basis of U.S. occupation being smoothly succeeded by continuing, if modified, allied control and American assistance in rehabilitating Japan. Obviously in such circumstances, opportunities for Soviet conspiracy to bring about communist Japan would probably be less than opportunities to bring about “democratic” regimes in parts of South Asia. Department would appreciate your estimate of Soviet intentions given a different set of basic assumptions with regard to Japan. If occupation were to be terminated by, say, end of 1948 and it were assumed that U.S. would be unwilling or unable to exercise firm control or provide large scale economic aid, would Embassy still describe Japan as a tertiary Soviet objective? Lovett The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State 740.0011 PW (Peace)/12–2747: Telegram [Document 461] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Smith ) to the Secretary of State secret Moscow , December 27, 1947—3 p.m. 3444. Deptel 2051, December 22. Department’s assumption correct that Embassy sought indicate sequence opportunities ripening for Soviet exploitation and did not intend imply Japan was of less strategic importance to USSR than South Asia. On contrary, Kremlin, fully comprehending Japan’s strategic importance, must see continuation strong American influence there as exasperating obstacle Communist expansion. Since realistic assessment “soft” and “hard” spots dictates timing Soviet pressure, Embassy estimated Japan as tertiary objective in belief Soviets themselves assume continuation for at least temporary period of important American influence. If occupation of Japan terminates end 1948 and US exerts no control nor provides aid to Japan after that date, Soviets could be expected revise emphasis their objectives in order take advantage such favorable turn of events. Pressure on Japan would be stepped up to greatest degree possible. Even in such case, however, Embassy believes Soviets would still consider Japan harder nut to crack than other Far Eastern areas and would therefore need more time achieve and consolidate control. Consequently, objectives might still remain in same time sequence Embassy indicated. Additional evidence that Soviet thinking is as suggested by Embassy contained in recent significant article Bolshevik December 15 (to be summarized in separate message) which reveals Kremlin’s particular and immediate concern in four countries: China, Korea, Indonesia, and Viet-Nam. Only mention of Japan in lengthy article is single statement that American imperialists are endeavoring convert Japan into colony. Embassy believes all above considerations serve only to emphasize imperative necessity maintaining strong US influence in Japan following signature peace treaty. Smith Korea Korea Contents General political policies of the United States toward Korea and appeal to the United Nations General Assembly (Documents 462-689) General political policies of the United States toward Korea and appeal to the United Nations General Assembly General political policies of the United States toward Korea 1 and appeal to the United Nations General Assembly 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1946, Vol. viii , pp. 605 – 786 . [462] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, January [4?], 1947. [Received January 5—1:36 p.m.] 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–547: Telegram [463] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, January 17, 1947—7 a.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–1747: Telegram [464] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, January 24, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–1947: Telegram [465] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] January 27, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2747 [466] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) [Washington,] January 27, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2747 [467] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, February 3, 1947. 740.00119 P. W./2–347 [468] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Washington, February 7, 1947—3 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/2–747: Telegram [469] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Noce) Washington, February 11, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2047) [470] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, February 20, 1947. 895.00/2–2047 [471] Memorandum by the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea Washington, February 25, 1947. 895.01/2–2547 [472] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) and the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] February 28, 1947. 895–01/2–2847 [473] Major General Albert E. Brown to the Department of State and the War Department Seoul, [February 28, 1947.] 740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–147: Telegram [474] Dr. Syngman Rhee to President Truman [Washington,] March 13, 1947. 895.00/3–1347 [475] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, March 21, 1947. 895.01/3–2147: Telegram [476] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson) Washington, March 28, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–2847 [477] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State Moscow, April 2, 1947—4 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–247: Telegram [478] The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Acting Secretary of State Washington, April 4, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–447 [479] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow Washington, April 5, 1947—noon. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–247: Telegram [480] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) [Washington,] April 11, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–1147 [481] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow Washington, April 11, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–1147: Telegram [482] The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State Nanking, April 15, 1947—10 a.m. 895.00/4–1547: Telegram [483] The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State, at Moscow Moscow, April 19, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–2347 [484] The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) Washington, April 24, 1947. 695.0031/4–2447 [485] Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Drumright) London, April 24, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–2547 [486] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, April 30, 1947—11 a.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–3047: Telegram [487] Draft Message To Be Transmitted to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo undated 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–747 [488] The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State Moscow, May 7, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–847 [489] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 11, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1147: Telegram [490] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, May 12, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–847: Telegram [491] The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State Moscow, May 17, 1947—noon. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1747: Telegram [492] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 17, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1747: Telegram [493] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 18, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1847: Telegram [494] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 21, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2147: Telegram [495] The Secretary of State to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul Washington, May 21, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2147: Telegram [496] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, May 23, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2347: Telegram [497] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson) Washington, May 23, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2347 [498] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 23, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2347: Telegram [499] Dr. Robert T. Oliver to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) Washington, May 23, 1947. 895.00/5–2347 [500] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 24, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2447: Telegram [501] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 26, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2647: Telegram [502] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 27, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2747: Telegram [503] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 30, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–3047: Telegram [504] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, May 30, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–3047: Telegram [505] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 1, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–147: Telegram [506] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Seoul, June 2, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–247: Telegram [507] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 4, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–447: Telegram [508] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, June 4, 1947. 695.0031/4–947 [509] Memorandum of Conversation, by Commander Allen B. Moreland of the Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas [Washington,] June 6, 1947. 805.01/6–647 [510] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 6, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–647: Telegram [511] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 7, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–747: Telegram [512] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, June 9, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–947: Telegram [513] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, June 9, 1947—7 p.m. 895.50/6–947: Telegram [514] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 9, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–947: Telegram [515] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June [11?], 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1247: Telegram [516] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 11, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1147: Telegram [517] The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 13, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1347: Telegram [518] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 19, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1947: Telegram [519] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, June 19, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1247: Telegram [520] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 20, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2047: Telegram [521] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 20, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2047: Telegram [522] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 20, 1947. 895.01/6–2047: Telegram [523] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 26, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2647: Telegram [524] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 26, 1947. 895.00/6–2647: Telegram [525] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, June 27, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2047: Telegram [526] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, June 28, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2847: Telegram [527] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, July 2, 1947—noon. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2847: Telegram [528] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July 2, 1947. 895.00/7–247: Telegram [529] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 2, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–247: Telegram [530] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 3, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–347: Telegram [531] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 3, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–347: Telegram [532] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 4, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–447: Telegram [533] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo Washington, July 7, 1947—4 p.m. 121.893/7–747: Telegram [534] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 7, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–747: Telegram [535] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 7, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–747: Telegram [536] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 8, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–847: Telegram [537] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 8, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–847: Telegram [538] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State Tokyo, July [9?], 1947. 895.00/7–1047: Telegram [539] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 9, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–947: Telegram [540] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 10, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1047: Telegram [541] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 14, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1447: Telegram [542] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, July 14, 1947—5 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1447: Telegram [543] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 16, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1647: Telegram [544] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 16, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1647: Telegram [545] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 17, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1747: Telegram [546] Editorial Note [547] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 17, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1747: Telegram [548] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 19, 1947. 895.00/7–1947: Telegram [549] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 21, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2147: Telegram [550] The Secretary of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers Washington, July 22, 1947—8:40 a.m. 695.0031/7–2247: Circular airgram [551] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) undated FE Files, Lot 244, Box 7946 [552] Interim Directive to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo, for Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul [Washington, July 24, 1947.] 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2547 [553] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 25, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2547: Telegram [554] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 25, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2547: Telegram [555] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, July 25, 1947—8 p.m. 40.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2547: Telegram [556] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) [Washington,] July 29, 1947. IO Files [557] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, July [30,] 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–3047: Telegram [558] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, July 31, 1947. 740.0019 Control (Korea)/7–3147: Telegram [559] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 2, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–247: Telegram [560] Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Korea [Washington,] 4 August 1947. SWNCC 176/30 [561] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] August 6, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–647 [562] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 5 [6], 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–547: Telegram [563] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 7, 1947. 895.51/8–747: Telegram [564] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 7, 1947. 895.00B/8–747 [565] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 9 [10?], 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–947: Telegram [566] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 11, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1147: Telegram [567] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, August 11, 1947—6 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1147: Telegram [568] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 12, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1247: Telegram [569] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 12, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1247: Telegram [570] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 14, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1447: Telegram [571] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 14, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1447: Telegram [572] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, August 15, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1547: Telegram [573] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 17, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1747: Telegram [574] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August [17,] 1947. 895.00/8–1747: Telegram [575] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, August 18, 1947—10 p.m. 895.00/8–1747: Telegram [576] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 19, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1947: Telegram [577] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 20, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2047: Telegram [578] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 20, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2047: Telegram [579] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 21, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2147: Telegram [580] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, August 22, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1947: Telegram [581] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 22, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2247: Telegram [582] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 23, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2347: Telegram [583] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, August 23, 1947—5 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2347: Telegram [584] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, August 24, 1947—11 a.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2447: Telegram [585] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 25, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2547: Telegram [586] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 25, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2547: Telegram [587] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 26, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2647: Telegram [588] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, August 26, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2647: Telegram [589] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, August 26, 1947—8 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2647: Telegram [590] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, August 27, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2647: Telegram [591] The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Clark) to the Secretary of State London, August 28, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2847: Telegram [592] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State Moscow, August 28, 1947—9 p.m. 895.01/8–2847: Telegram [593] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, September 2, 1947—8 p.m. 895.01/9–247: Telegram [594] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 3, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–347: Telegram [595] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 3, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–347: Telegram [596] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, September 4, 1947—6 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2947: Telegram [597] The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State [Moscow,] September 4, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–547 [598] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 5, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–547: Telegram [599] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 5, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–547: Telegram [600] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 8, 1947. 895.01/9–847: Telegram [601] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Stevens) [Washington,] September 9, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–947 [602] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 10 [9], 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1047: Telegram [603] Editorial Note [604] The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to Mr. Ben C. Limb, of Washington Washington, September 10, 1947. 895.51/8–1347 [605] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 12, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1247: Telegram [606] The Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) to the Secretary of State Seoul, 12 September 1947. [Received September 23.] 125.8536/9–1247 [607] Memorandum by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff [Washington,] 15 September 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2647 [608] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, September 16, 1947—8 p.m. 501.BB/9–1647: Telegram [609] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 16, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1647: Telegram [610] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 17, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1747: Telegram [611] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, September 18, 1947—6 p.m. 501.BB/9–1847: Telegram [612] Report to the President on China–Korea, September 1947, Submitted by Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer September 1947 120.293/4–1050 [613] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 19, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1947: Telegram [614] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 19, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1947: Telegram [615] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 20, 1947. 895.00/9–2047: Telegram [616] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 22, 1947. 895.01/9–2247: Telegram [617] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) [Washington,] September 23, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2347 [618] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, September 23, 1947—4 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1247: Telegram [619] Conclusions of SWNCC 376, “Treatment of Korean Workers Organizations” Approved September 23, 1947 September 23, 1947 895.5043/9–2447 [620] Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) [Washington,] September 24, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2447 [621] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 24, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2447: Telegram [622] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, September 25, 1947—9 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1747: Telegram [623] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 26, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2647: Telegram [624] Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State Washington, 26 [29] September, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2647 [625] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, September 30, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–3047: Telegram [626] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] October 1, 1947. 501.BB Korea/10–147 [627] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State Moscow, October 1, 1947—3 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–147: Telegram [628] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 2, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–247: Telegram [629] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, October 4, 1947—5 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–447: Telegram [630] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 8, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–847: Telegram [631] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 8, 1947. 895.00/10–847: Telegram [632] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 8, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–847: Telegram [633] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 9, 1947. 895.00/10–947: Telegram [634] The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State Moscow, October 9, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–1047 [635] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, October 10, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–247: Telegram [636] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 10, 1947. 895.01/10–1047 [637] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State [New York,] October 14, 1947. 501.BB Korea/10–1447 [638] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary General of the United Nations (Lie) October 17, 1947 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–2147 [639] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 17, 1947. 40.00119 Control (Korea)/10–1747: Telegram [640] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, October 17, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–1747: Telegram [641] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 18, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–1847: Telegram [642] Dr. Syngman Rhee to the Korean Commission at Washington Seoul, October 18, 1947—8:37 a.m. 501.BB Korea/10–2047 [643] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 18, 1947. 895.00/10–1847 [644] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 20, 1947. 895.00/10–2047: Telegram [645] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 20, 1947. 407.00119 Control (Korea)/10–2047: Telegram [646] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 22, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–2247: Telegram [647] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union Washington, October 24, 1947—7 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–147: Telegram [648] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, October 28, 1947—3 p.m. 895.00/10–2847: Telegram [649] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, October 29, 1947. 895.00/10–2947: Telegram [650] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, October 29, 1947—10:30 p.m. 501.BB/10–2947 [651] Editorial Note [652] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, November 1, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–147: Telegram [653] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, November 3, 1947—3 p.m. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–147: Telegram [654] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Department of the Army for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Seoul, November [3?], 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–347: Telegram [655] Editorial Note [656] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, November 5, 1947—noon. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–547: Telegram [657] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, November 10, 1947. 895.00/11–1047: Telegram [658] Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo, and Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul Washington, November 10, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–1047: Telegram [659] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, November 12, 1947. 894.00/11–1247: Telegram [660] Resolution Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 14 at its 112th Plenary Meeting November 14, 1947 501.BB Korea/11–2647 [661] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, November 17, 1947. 895.00/11–1747: Telegram [662] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) Washington, November 17, 1947—noon. 501.BB Korea/11–1747: Telegram [663] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, November 19, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–1947: Telegram [664] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, November 19, 1947. 501.BB Korea/11–1947: Telegram [665] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State Seoul, November 19, 1947. 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–1947: Telegram [666] The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Monnett B. Davis, Chief of the United States Delegation to the ECAFE Meeting at Baguio, Philippines Washington, November 26, 1947—5 p.m. 501.BD Asia/11–2447: Telegram [667] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, November 29, 1947. 895.00/11–2947: Telegram [668] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State Seoul, December 2, 1947. 501.BB Korea/12–247: Telegram [669] The Chief of Staff (Eisenhower) to the Secretary of State, at London Washington, December 3, 1947—2:36 p.m. 740.00119 PW/12–447: Telegram [670] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, December 3, 1947—6 p.m. 501.BB Korea/12–347: Telegram [671] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to the Secretary of State, at London [London,] December 4, 1947. 740.00119 PW/12–447 [672] The Secretary of State to the Chief of Staff (Eisenhower) [London,] December 4, 1947. 740.00119 PW/12–447: Telegram [673] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, December 6, 1947. 895.00/12–647: Telegram [674] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, December 7, 1947. [Received December 31—12:38 p.m.] 501.BB Korea/12–747: Telegram [675] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, December 9, 1947. 501.BB Korea/11–2647 [676] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, December 9, 1947—6 p.m. 501.BB Korea/12–347: Telegram [677] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, December 10, 1947. 895.011/12–1047 [678] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, December 11, 1947—3 p.m. 895.00/12–1147: Telegram [679] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, December 13, 1947. 895.00/12–1347: Telegram [680] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, December 15, 1947—8 p.m. 895.00/12–647: Telegram [681] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State Seoul, December 22, 1947. 501.BB Korea/12–2247: Telegram [682] The Acting Secretary of State to the Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) Washington, December 22, 1947—6 p.m. 895.51/12–347: Telegram [683] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, December 23, 1947—6 p.m. 501.BB Korea/12–2347: Telegram [684] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Canada (Atherton) Ottawa, December 27, 1947. 501.BB Korea/12–2747 [685] The Acting Secretary of State to the Canadian Prime Minister (MacKenzie King) December 30, 1947, 9:15 a.m. 501.BB Korea/12–2947 [686] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber) [Washington,] December 30, 1947. 501.BB Korea/12–3047 [687] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) Washington, December 30, 1947—5 p.m. 501.BB Korea/12–3047: Telegram [688] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in El Salvador Washington, December 31, 1947—1 p.m. 501.BB Korea/12–3147: Telegram [689] The Canadian Prime Minister (MacKenzie King) to the American Ambassador in Canada (Atherton) [Ottawa,] December 31, 1947. 501.BB–Korea/12–3147 The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–547: Telegram [Document 462] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , January [4?], 1947. [Received January 5—1:36 p.m.] 1. Because of the: ( a ) Prevalent unrest following the first and fruitless anniversary of the Moscow decision, 2 ( b ) the recrudescent suspicion here and perhaps in North Korea that we are setting up a separate government in our zone, ( c ) the exaggerated ideas of itself and its functions held by the Interim Legislative Assembly, ( d ) the confusion being created in the minds of some Koreans by Dr. Rhee’s 3 campaign and publicity for immediate independence under an undefined South Korean aegis, General Hodge 4 is releasing following statement 4 January. 5 “In Cairo in December 1943 and again at Potsdam in July 1945, the President of the US approved for his country a formal declaration of the Allied Powers that Korea should in due course become free and independent. Realizing the insecurity of Korea, a small defenseless nation in a troubled postwar world, the US at the Moscow Conference in December 1945 bound itself in an agreement with other major powers as to the general procedure by which Korean freedom and independence would be achieved. This agreement, known as the Moscow Decision, provides for the development of a democratic, unified government for all Korea with the initial assistance by the US, USSR, England, and China. Through this agreement, the Allied Powers assured the world that blood, lives and resources expended by them in making possible that liberation of Korea, would bear fruit and not be wasted, and that Korea would be independent. The Secretary of State of the US, speaking for his Government, has recently publicly reaffirmed the unchanging intention of the US in the following words: ‘The (State) Dept and the Government’s policy is the same as it always has been and as I have stated several times our policy is to bring about the unification of a free and democratic Korea. We intend to stay there until we have been successful in doing it’ In order to fulfill its commitments to Korea and to the Allied Powers, the US Government placed forces in Korea and has designated the CG of these forces to act as its agent with broad powers. Included in his directives, in addition to his responsibility for commanding of US forces in Korea, is the requirement that he exercise executive power for governing the American Occupied Zone, until the provisional government of all Korea is established or as the executive head of the government within this area, the CG USAFIK, has designated a principal assistant as military governor to act as his deputy in handling the details of the civil government. Either through lack of knowledge of facts or though malicious intent to deceive the Korean people, certain elements are creating the impression that the US now favors and is actively working toward a separate government in Southern Korea; and that the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly is a completely independent body designed as the forerunner of that government. Both of the above assumptions are incorrect and dangerous conclusions, entirely without justification, and contrary to the announced basic policies of the US and the other great Allied Powers who liberated Korea from the Japanese. In furtherance of the US policy and in order to prepare South Koreans for democratic self-government, the CG, through his deputy for military government, has been progressively drawing Koreans into governmental activities in order that they may, to the maximum extent possible, gain experience and take over governmental responsibility pending establishment of their unified government. This does not mean that he intends to or that he can under his directives shirk his responsibility as executive, or completely transfer his executive power to any other agency until the provisional government of unified Korea is formed. At the same time it is the repeatedly announced and continuing intention of the American Commander to give to Koreans the maximum possible freedom in operation of the agencies of government assisted as required by American advisors and to further all legitimate and proper aspirations of the people of Southern Korea for independence. The Legislative Assembly is a body established with extensive powers under order No. 118 designed to give Koreans greater influence and voice in the affairs of Southern Korea. It is a great step forward and offers a great opportunity for the Korean people to develop their nation. It may draft legislation lead[ing] into [ to ] important political, economic, and social reforms pending the establishment of the provisional governmment. However, it must remain clear to all that the legislature is not a government within itself, nor is it the governing body of South Korea. It is exactly what its name implies: An Interim Legislative Assembly with legislative powers to make laws and [for?] enforcement by the executive branch of government, and to assist the executive branch in carrying out government of South Korean according to the will of the Korean people pending the establishment of Korean provisional government under the Moscow Decision. As previously stated, I and my assistants, in accordance with the policy of the US Government, will continue to work for a united Korea, governed by a democratic provisional government created in accordance with recognized international agreements and with the expressed will of the Korean people which will lead to the independence of Korea as a nation united North and South into one. The desire of the Korean people to achieve unity, dependence and democracy can best be realized by full knowledge of and adherence to the foregoing policies. Efforts to undermine or oppose these policies for selfish political or personal gains can only bring harmful results, and delay the progress of your nation. The Korean people must know and recognize facts as they exist and should not follow the will-of-the-wisp of purely wishful thinking. Those who support and aid in the development of the Korean Government within the framework of the policies will make the greatest possible contribution to the cause of early Korean independence.[”] The 7th: General Hodge is also releasing the general contents of General Chistiakov’s letter of November 26 and his reply thereto of December 24. 6 This is considered advisable in order that the South Korean people may be acquainted with the exchange of letters and any doubts that may exist in their minds about our loyalty to the Moscow decision dispelled. Langdon 2 For section on Korea in communiqué issued at Moscow, see telegram 4284, December 27, 1945, 3 a.m., from Moscow, ibid. , 1945, Vol. ii , pp. 815 , 820 . 3 Dr. Syngman Rhee, veteran Korean nationalist leader, then on a visit to the United States. 4 Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in Korea, with headquarters at Seoul. 5 In telegram 2, January 7, 7 p.m., to Seoul, the Department said that “Gen. Hodge’s excellent statement” was being released to the press on that day (740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–747). 6 For exchange of letters between General Hodge and Guard Col. Gen. Ivan Mikhailovich Chistiakov, Commanding General, Soviet Forces in Korea, see Department of State Far Eastern Series No. 18: Korea’s Independence (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 28–31. For communiqué issued at Seoul on April 18, 1946, by the U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission for Korea, see ibid. , p. 19, Department of State Bulletin , January 26, 1947, p. 173. The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–1747: Telegram [Document 463] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , January 17, 1947—7 a.m. 10. As indicated in our Tfgcg 560, December 31 to CINCAFPAC, 7 General Brown 8 on same day conferred with [Mrs. Rhee], Kim Koo 9 and two others at Rhee’s house and pointed out that certain parts of Rhee’s message were inflammatory and unsuitable for release, that it was the duty of Korean leaders to restrain and not incite the people, and that Rhee’s pretensions that the President, Secretary of State and General MacArthur 10 supported his views could not be published as they were untrue, such views being quite a[t] variance with the fixed policy of the US. The Korean conferees made it plain that if disturbances occurred in the south, it would bring the conditions of Korea to the world’s attention and hasten Korean independence. General Brown reached the conclusion that although those Koreans did not want open revolt which might get beyond their control, they did not mind uprisings that would keep Korea in the international spotlight and were not averse to the sacrifice of some life in the process. The publication on January 11 of our reply to Chistiakov, which extreme rightists say sells them down the river, seems to have been one precipitant of Rhee’s plans, an account of which talk given by General Hodge in paragraph 10 of his ZGCG 40 to General MacArthur of January 13. On the 15th, following a meeting of representatives of Rhee’s and Kim Koo’s henchmen, some 30 rightist organizations issued a manifesto complaining about the delay of the Allies in settling the Korean questions and calling on them to cancel the trusteeship provisions of the Moscow agreement and set up a provisional government immediately as the “only way to save Koreans from the conditions of slavery under military government”. In addition a joint message along the same lines addressed to the Allied Board was drawn up. The message referred to Rhee as “our trustworthy representative” to the UN Assembly. In the LNG [ Legislative ] Assembly 40 rightist members (a majority at the moment) on the 14th introduced a motion to oppose trusteeship but action was averted by adjourning the session for the 20th. 11 Also Kim Koo and two of his main supporters called on General Hodge about trusteeship this week and remained obdurate in the face of arguments against anti-trusteeship agitation. From underground we have seized inflammatory anti-trusteeship and anti-military government handbills in course of printing by Rightist Youth Alliance, and have intercepted a message to Rhee from his headquarters here that demonstrations would begin on the 18th. We have been reliably informed that defections from military government and the policy [ police? ] may occur at the same time. According to the same source Kim Koo and Cho So Ang, his Under “Foreign Minister”, will assume responsibility for the demonstrations and seek martyrdom. In the last few days we have intercepted messages from Rhee to his headquarters indicating he is uneasy about possible repercussions to the developments from the demonstrations. His concern seems to be lest they assume the form of or be construed as an anti-foreign campaign. Measures have been taken by the leaders in Seoul to meet a threat to American personnel, since the neutrality or loyalty to military government of the police cannot be absolutely relied upon. Also on the 16th General Hodge issued a special statement on the anti-trusteeship covenant (this will be repeated in my ensuing telegram), 12 while steps are being taken through General Brown to dissuade passage of an anti-trusteeship resolution in the assembly. It is thought here that the position of the American authorities could be eased by some action in Washington. The Department for example might consider a discussion by the Acting Secretary at an early press conference of the current anti-trusteeship agitation in Seoul, laying it on the line, so to speak. It might be pointed out that the agitation cannot have the slightest effect on the international program for Korean independence laid down in the Moscow decision, of which the US played a major role in formulating and to which it loyally adheres, that the agitators offer no practicable plan for independence in the light of actualities, and that agitating elements by their actions only prejudice their opportunities for participation in the forthcoming provisional government. Langdon 7 Foreign Relations , 1946, Vol. viii , p. 785 . 8 Maj. Gen. Albert E. Brown, chief U.S. representative on the U.S.–Soviet Joint Commission, then recessed. 9 Head of the so-called Chungking exile group of Koreans, of the Korean Representative Democratic Council, and of the Korean Independence Party (Hankook Dok Lib Dang). 10 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan. 11 At the meeting on the 20th, the resolution was passed, despite explanations by Generals Hodge and Lerch at a private meeting with members of the Legislative Assembly. The vote was regarded as a defeat for the middle-ground group. The situation was reported in telegram 15, January 27, from Seoul, which emphasized the unpopularity in South Korea of the idea of trusteeship (740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2747). Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch was Military Governor of the U.S. Zone (South Korea). 12 Telegram 11, not printed; for statement, see Department of State Bulletin , February 2, 1947, p. 210. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–1947: Telegram [Document 464] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) Washington , January 24, 1947. 12. Dept in issuing General Hodge’s statement (urtel 11 13 ) to press Jan 23 prefaced it with the following: “In making available the following text of a recent public statement by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the United States forces in Korea, the Department desires to emphasize this Government’s concern in regard to the activities of dissident Korean groups which cannot but militate against the efforts of those Koreans who are earnestly desirous of attaining a united and independent government for their country. As General Hodge says in his statement ‘(Para 7 of Gen Hodge’s statement).’” Full text followed Marshall 13 Telegram 11 not printed; for statement by General Hodge on January 16, see Department of State Bulletin , February 2, 1947, p. 210. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2747 [Document 465] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Secretary of State secret [ Washington ,] January 27, 1947. General Hodge, in his telegram Jgcg 98, 14 outlines the present serious situation in Korea and concludes that unless the US–USSR Joint Commission reconvenes or positive action is taken on a national (government to government) level within the next two months, the U.S. may lose the opportunity of accomplishing its mission in Korea and lose the confidence of the Korean people with consequent increased danger of outbreaks of violence. General MacArthur, in a separate telegram CX69369, 15 expresses serious concern over the problem and makes the following four recommendations: 16 1. Submission of entire Korean problem to UN; 2. Request by U.S. Government for formation of commission which might include disinterested nations for purpose of making thorough survey of existing Korean problem and making recommendations for solution of matter; 3. A further meeting between Governments of U.S., U.K., China and U.S.S.R. with a view to clarifying Chapter III of Moscow Agreement insofar as it relates to Korea in the hope of coming to a workable solution; 4. A highest level meeting between representatives of U.S. and U.S.S.R. in effort to resolve all the issues now preventing successful development of Korea as political and economic unit with its planned emergence as an independent state. Progress toward establishment of administrative machinery on a national basis to prepare Korea for independence is dependent upon understanding between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. There can be no question but that the first three recommendations by General MacArthur are sound in principle and would be desirable in practice if circumstances did not strongly militate against their success. A broadening of the scope for consideration of the problem to include other powers, either in the Security Council or in a commission or conference of more limited membership, would, it is believed, be highly desirable but, in the absence of US–USSR understanding, bringing other powers into the picture would not, it is feared, produce the progress desired. The only useful result might be to focus world interest on the problem without any reasonable promise of concrete results. The procedure described under General MacArthur’s recommendation 4 has, in the past months, been considered frequently and with great care in the Department, not only by the officers directly concerned but by Secretary Byrnes himself. The conclusion has been reached, at least for the time being, that the initiation of a further approach to the Russians on a government to government level would not produce the results desired. General Hodge has, during the past half year, initiated a number of attempts to get the Joint Commission back into session. His efforts have so far proved unavailing. With the Russians in their present frame of mind we do not see that initiation of an approach by us on a government to government level would have any greater promise of success and might quite likely be misinterpreted and taken advantage of by the Russians as an indication of over-anxiety to get forward with a liquidation of our responsibilities in Korea. Our position in this matter, however, does not preclude our being open to the initiation by the Russians on a government to government level of a new approach on the Korean problem. It is felt that we should be prepared to consider seriously any reasonable suggestions made by the Russians, either within or outside the framework of the Moscow Agreement, which held promise of getting on with plans for a unified, democratic and independent Korea. Should the Russians initiate discussions we might be prepared to offer for discussion a plan, now under consideration in the Department, which provides for the immediate setting up of a 4-power trusteeship, without going through the machinery of the Joint Commission providing for prior agreement on the establishment of a Korean provisional government. The plan we have in mind makes provision for setting up a provisional Korean government and the formation of a Korean constitution after the trusteeship has been established. While awaiting initiation of an approach from the Russians we should give not only all our assistance but encouragement as well to the War Department to obtain from Congress the funds requested in their next annual budget for relief and rehabilitation purposes in Korea. We should if possible secure an increase in those funds as approved by the Budget Bureau. After the present budget has been approved by the Congress we believe that consideration should be given to special legislation establishing a “Grant in Aid” for Korea of, say, $50,000,000 to enable us to carry out a program more extended than that contemplated by the War Department. To date we have been unable to obtain the services of a really high level Political Adviser for General Hodge, although he has indicated clearly his desire for such assistance.… What is needed is a man of well-known ability and judgment whom General Hodge could feel assured came to him with the full backing and confidence of the President and the Secretary of State. It is felt that positive measures such as those recommended above to get along with our own program would have a sobering effect upon the Koreans and a healthy effect on the Russians. Faced with evidence that we are prepared to carry out a long-term program in Korea, it is not at all improbable that the Russians would become less obdurate in the matter of reaching an understanding for the unification of Korean administration. There is attached a telegram to General MacArthur for your signature, if you approve. 17 J[ ohn ] C[ arter ] V[ incent ] 14 Received via Tokyo on January 22, 8:01, a.m., not printed. 15 Received January 22, 1:56 p.m., not printed. 16 As choices for consideration. 17 Telegram 28, January 28, 6 p.m., to Tokyo, stated that the Secretary was giving his personal attention to the telegrams from Generals Hodge and MacArthur and added: “We are all fully alive to the seriousness of situation and to the need for positive action to carry forward our program and objectives in Korea.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2847) On January 29 the Secretary requested Mr. Vincent to “have plan drafted of policy to organize a definite government of Southern Korea and connecting up its economy with that of Japan.” He informed the War Department that the State Department would support the “Grant in Aid” appropriation for Korea. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2747) Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Hilldring) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2747 [Document 466] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Hilldring ) [ Washington ,] January 27, 1947. Mr. Oliver, who I understand is a paid advisor to Syngman Rhee, called on me this afternoon and left the attached paper entitled “A Solution of the Korean Problem”. 18 There ensued a half-hour’s conversation in which Mr. Oliver endeavored to explain to me what Dr. Rhee had in mind in the various points in the memorandum. In conclusion, Oliver asked that I make the proposed solution available to you. I told him I would do so. He also said that he would be asking to call upon you next week when he returns to Washington. I gave Oliver no indication as to what I thought of the proposed solution beyond saying that I felt that the objectives of all of us were identical (that is, to bring into being at the earliest possible moment a united democratic Korea) and that where differences existed they were in regard to method. With this thought in mind I told him that the various points raised in the proposed solution seemed to me to be worthy of consideration. Oliver, and Rhee, are anxious to obtain some kind of indication of the Department’s views on the proposed solution. I told him that I was quite sure that he would be unable to obtain any such indication and he seemed to take this in good grace.… . . . . . . . J[ ohn ] C[ arter ] V[ incent ] [Annex] A Solution of the Korean Problem by Syngman Rhee Russian and American forces now occupy Korea, according to a secret agreement, the nature of which has never been fully revealed. Since Korea lies in the heart of the vital strategic triangle of north Asia, bordered by the Siberian Maritime Province, China and Japan, Korea should not be controlled by any one or combination of them, or by any other outside power, without grave danger to the others and to the peace of the Orient. For this reason, as well as for justice to Korea, negotiations must be renewed between Russia and the United States to get their armies out of Korea and to live up to the Cairo Declaration promising Korean independence. We Koreans do not wish to do anything to impede these essential negotiations. We should like to speed them in every way possible. At the same time there are inalienable and basic rights that we as a people must have. We present the following program for immediate implementation by the United States in southern Korea. This program represents the indispensible minimum steps by which we can commence the rehabilitation of our nation, and build a sound democratic basis for the future: 1. An interim government should be elected for southern Korea, to serve until the two halves of Korea can be re-united and a general election held immediately thereafter; 2. Without disturbing direct Russian-American consultations on Korea, this interim government should be allowed to negotiate directly with Russia and the United States concerning the occupation of Korea, and on other outstanding questions; 3. Korean claims for reparations from Japan should be given early consideration, to aid in the rehabilitation for Korean economy; 4. Full commercial rights should be granted to Korea, on a basis of equality with other nations, and with no favoritism extended to any nation; 5. Korean currency should be stabilized and established on the international exchange. 6. United States troops should remain in southern Korea until the two foreign armies of occupation simultaneously withdraw. 18 Dr. Rhee sent the same paper on February 19 to the Secretary of State and stated in part: “This program is, I believe, substantially in accord with the program already initiated by Major General Archer L. Lerch.” The Department acknowledged receipt of Dr. Rhee’s letter on March 4. (895.01/2–1947) Dr. Robert T. Oliver, on leave of absence from Syracuse University, was registered as Adviser and Representative of Dr. Syngman Rhee in the United States. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 740.00119 P. W./2–347 [Document 467] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) No. 50 Washington , February 3, 1947. The Secretary of State encloses for reply, a letter from Mr. Soon Ju Chey concerning the treatment of former Japanese industrial facilities in Korea under the reparations program. 19 The Secretary of State transmits herewith the following information for use in replying to Mr. Chey’s letter: The negotiations for a settlement of Japanese reparations issues will be carried out on a governmental level by the countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission. As part of its responsibility for Southern Korea, the United States Government is prepared, as it has previously announced, to use a portion of such allocation of Japanese industrial assets as may be made to it through inter-Allied agreement, to secure industrial equipment from Japan for installation in Southern Korea. In addition, it is the United States position that all industrial facilities in Korea which were formerly owned by the Japanese shall be excluded from the Japanese reparations settlement and shall remain the property of the Korean people. The United States Government will adopt and will endeavor to obtain agreement by the other nations participating in the Far Eastern Commission to any recommendations contained in the report of Ambassador Pauley 20 which will contribute to the well-being of the Korean people. 19 Letter dated November 27, 1946, not printed. 20 Department of State, Far Eastern Series No. 25: Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States, November 1945 to April 1946, by Edwin W. Pauley, Personal Representative of the President on Reparations (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948). The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 740.00119 Control (Korea)/2–747: Telegram [Document 468] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo top secret Washington , February 7, 1947—3 p.m. 37. For MacArthur from Marshall. This is a further report on Korea. Secretary Patterson and I have decided to convene a high level State Department and War Department Committee to make recommendations on future policy in Korea. Patterson and I believe that it would be highly desirable to have General Hodge confer with and advise this committee and to discuss the conclusions of the committee with Patterson and me. If this suggestion meets with your approval, will you please arrange to have General Hodge proceed to Washington as soon as convenient to you and him. If you feel the necessity of additional assistance in Korea during absence of Hodge, War Department can make General Gillem, now in China, available to you as temporary substitute for Hodge with possibility of taking over permanently. 21 Though please treat this last as most confidential pending your reaction and ours to Hodge’s report here. Marshall 21 General MacArthur replied in telegram CX 69933 (received February 10) that General Hodge would reach Washington February 18 and added: “Hodge is thoroughly satisfactory commander but if for any reason he drops out I would be delighted to have Gillem.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/2–1047) Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., was Commanding General, Peiping Headquarters, and American Commissioner, Executive Headquarters at Peiping. The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department (Noce) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1–2047) [Document 469] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department ( Noce ) Washington , February 11, 1947. Dear General : I have given careful consideration to the draft of a proposed bill “To Provide for Government, Relief, Economic Rehabilitation, Reorientation and Reeducation in Occupied Areas in Foreign Countries, and for Other Purposes” transmitted with your letter of January 20, 1947. 22 The Department of State approves and will support the bill proposed by the War Department. However, while supporting the War Department’s efforts to obtain enabling legislation to carry on activities in the occupied countries beyond those permitted by the disease and unrest formula, I should like to add this parenthetical thought. Large scale rehabilitation and reconstruction programs are not contemplated from funds appropriated to the War Department. As you know, the State Department is sponsoring a bill to provide relief funds for Austria and is planning to introduce a separate bill to obtain funds for relief and rehabilitation in Korea. It is not now contemplated that funds appropriated to the War Department will be used for reconstruction programs in Germany and Japan. I should like to have the opportunity to examine any revisions that may be made in the draft of the bill, and would appreciate it if you would keep me advised of developments in this regard. Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring 22 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 895.00/2–2047 [Document 470] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State confidential No. 94 Seoul , February 20, 1947. Sir : There is transmitted herewith for the information of the Department copy of a paper, “Development of a Political Program,” prepared February 4, 1947 for the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, by Major General Albert E. Brown, Chief Commissioner of the American delegation U.S.–U.S.S.R. Joint Commission for Korea. The paper recapitulates policies for south Korea prescribed by the United States Government, presents in clear outline the main elements and recent developments in internal politics in our zone, discusses the problems raised by these facts in the execution of United States policies, and makes recommendations for action. In a letter dated February 10, addressed to this Office, General Hodge stated: “The recommendations contained in Section III of Memorandum dated 4 February 1947 from Joint Commission to CG XXIV Corps, Subject: Development of a Political Program, are approved as a statement of policy of this headquarters for political development. “Paragraph 4 of approved recommendations is not construed as intending that replacements will be made from leftists whose aims are inimical to American and Korean interests.” It is believed that the Department will find the paper not only concisely but yet comprehensively informative and a useful reference background of the changing political scene in southern Korea as it is reported to the Department. Respectfully yours, Wm. R. Langdon [Enclosure—Extract] Paper Prepared by Major General Albert E. Brown, February 4, 1947 Development of a Political Program . . . . . . . II. Conclusions. . . . . . . . 4. The intensive organized efforts of the extreme rightist bloc together with the much publicized activities of Dr. Rhee, Syngman in the United States, has brought the trusteeship issue so sharply into focus in southern Korea that it eclipses and probably will overshadow for some time all other political issues. Certain political leaders will continue to keep anti-trusteeship and allied political matters to the forefront as a sure-fire issue with powerful, even potentially explosive, political appeal. The return of Dr. Rhee will intensify this campaign. III. Action Recommended. 1. That efforts be continued to develop representative democratic government in southern Korea. 2. That the Interim Legislative Assembly be encouraged to reconvene under the leadership of Dr. Kimm, Kiusic as chairman and that the legislature be guided and persuaded into consideration of a constructive legislative program in order to convince the people of its usefulness. 3. That effort be made to strengthen and extend the prestige of the Coalition Committee in order to encourage, to the maximum extent, the formation of a real “middle of the road” political party. 4. That the power in government of the extreme rightist bloc be gradually reduced by replacement of the members of the bloc. 5. That the Coalition Committee be persuaded to enlarge and revise its “seven principles” to secure more general acceptance of its program for political unification. 6. That a vigorous educational campaign be instituted at once to inculcate among Koreans more realistic consideration and acceptance of the Moscow Agreement. 7. That in the furtherance of political objectives economic assistance from the United States, such as locomotives, fertilizers, food, etc., be given wider publicity. 8. That “Koreanization” of the government be played up in such a way as to reflect more of the “credit” for its consummation on the Assembly. Memorandum by the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea 895.01/2–2547 [Document 471] Memorandum by the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea 23 secret Washington , February 25, 1947. The Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea, established to prepare policy recommendations for the Secretaries with regard to Korea, has reached general agreement with regard to a U.S. course of action in Korea. It will be a few days, however, before the detailed report and recommendations of the committee have been prepared and have been discussed with Mr. Grew. 24 In view of the early departure of the Secretary of State for Moscow, and the opinion of this committee that he should discuss the question of Korea in Moscow, it appears desirable that certain pertinent aspects of the committee’s proposed report should be considered by the two Secretaries prior to the departure of the Secretary of State. Enclosed is an initial draft of the general discussion and recommendations to be contained in the committee’s final report. It is the view of the committee that two measures are essential to obtaining a satisfactory solution of the difficult Korean problem. These measures, discussed in Section IV of the enclosed initial draft report are: a . An approach to the Soviet Government prior to the close of the forthcoming Moscow Conference, and b . Special legislation by the Congress to authorize and appropriate funds for a positive program for economic rehabilitation, educational and governmental improvement, and political guidance for Korea. A governmental approach at this time might be considered by the Soviets as a sign of U.S. weakness in Korea. A properly planned, aggressive approach, however, will minimize such an appearance of weakness. It is felt, furthermore, that such an approach would be of inestimable assistance to General Hodge in alleviating the situation in Korea, would clarify the U.S. position with regard to its intentions in Korea, and would prove to Congress that all possible efforts had been made to achieve a Korean settlement. A positive political, cultural and economic program will be necessary, not only to improve the present unsatisfactory conditions in Korea, but in order to strengthen our hand for any future negotiations with the Soviets. It will be necessary to convince Congress that a strong affirmation of U.S. purposes in Korea, expressed by Congressional approval of a three year program and separate appropriations for Korea for fiscal year 1948, is absolutely essential in order to enable us to approach the Soviets on a sufficiently strong basis to give hope of securing a settlement satisfactory to the U.S. It is now anticipated that such a program will amount to approximately $600,000,000 for the three years, of which approximately $250,000,000 would be spent during the fiscal year 1948, an increase of $113,000,000 over the $137,000,000 now allocated to Korea in the proposed 1948 War Department budget. Without such a program, and the necessary legislation, the committee feels that the Korean situation will so deteriorate as to seriously impair the U.S. world position. In order to assure the maximum possibility of success in the governmental approach to the USSR, the committee believes it desirable to coordinate the timing of the approach with Presidential submission to Congress of the proposed special Korean legislation, since it is believed that this will not delay the approach. The committee recommends that the course of action proposed above be approved in principle by the Secretaries of State and War. J. Weldon Jones 25 J. K. Penfield 26 A. V. Arnold 27 [Annex—Extracts] Draft Report of Special Interdepartmental Committee on Korea secret [ Washington , February 25, 1947.] . . . . . . . II. Present Situation in Korea A. General 1. U.S. policy towards Korea is based on the following basic objectives: (1) To establish a self-governing sovereign Korea as soon as possible, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations; (2) to insure that the national government so established shall be fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korea people; and (3) to assist the Koreans in establishing a sound economy and adequate educational system as essential bases of an independent, democratic state. 2. For the purpose of taking the Japanese surrender Korea was divided into two zones of military occupation, the United States occupying that part south of 38°, and the U.S.S.R. occupying the northern part of the country. This division persists. However, through the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China are committed to the eventual independence of all of Korea. In its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, the U.S.S.R. joined in the Potsdam Declaration. 3. In the early days of the occupation the U.S. Commander, General Hodge, was unable to establish satisfactory liaison with the Soviet Commander in the north. Political and economic problems created by the artificial division of the country into two zones became acute. In December 1945, at the Moscow Conference, these serious consequences of the bi-zonal occupation were discussed and an agreement between the U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. was reached regarding Korea. This agreement, to which China subsequently subscribed, provided that: [Here follow provisions of agreement.] . . . . . . . IV. Possible Courses of Action A. Without Agreement with U.S.S.R. 1. Continuation of Present Policies and Programs The present U.S. program in south Korea (which provides for the use of Koreans in political, administrative and technical positions under military government supervision, and for limited imports of food and other essentials to prevent disease and unrest) was based on the assumption that the provisions of the Moscow Decision would soon be carried out. Consequently this program was intended to be only an interim one. The successful operation of even this limited program has been hampered by insufficient funds and lack of Korean cooperation. Consequently, present conditions in Korea are deteriorating rather than improving. If this trend continues, it is apparent that our position in Korea will soon weaken to a point where it may become untenable. The Korean people are daily growing more antagonistic in their attitude toward military government, toward U.S. objectives in Korea, and even toward the U.S. itself. These antagonisms have already caused riots and disorders involving loss of life. There is every reason to expect an increase in the use of tactical troops to suppress disorders with all the attendant complications in world public opinion. It is therefore obviously extremely unwise to rely solely on present ineffective programs. 2. Recognition of Independent Government in South Korea . Both in the U.S. and in Korea there is some pressure, inspired principally by the Syngman Rhee group, for the recognition by the U.S. of the independence of south Korea. Many Koreans, anxious for independence, angered by the proposed trusteeship, and thoroughly discouraged by the failure of the U.S. and the Soviets to get started even at that, are clamoring for independence. Superficially this might appear to be a step which would enable the U.S. to shed some, at least, of the burdens which are proving so onerous. However, it is questionable if this single act will solve any of the present problems, either of the U.S. or the Koreans. It seems certain, on the other hand, that whether or not accompanied by withdrawal of U.S. forces, to grant immediate independence to south Korea would create new difficulties. Recognition of her political independence will not solve the economic problem of southern Korea. Only unification, and a program of outside aid in rehabilitation can do that. The U.S., the only practicable source for such aid, will be more likely to make grants to a people for which it has direct responsibility than to an independent country. No loaning agency could consider south Korea an acceptable risk. From the standpoint of the U.S., of course, an independent south Korea might provide an excuse for ending our financial assistance, but it would mean starvation and economic chaos in south Korea, a development for which the U.S. could not, in good conscience, allow itself to be responsible. Moreover, it would represent a direct breach of our commitments, both to our allies and to the Koreans, to establish a united and truly independent Korea. These commitments are Important as a pledge to a liberated people whose treatment by the great powers is watched with concern by all small powers and dependent peoples throughout the world. This fulfilment is important as evidence that U.S. foreign policy is based upon fundamental principles which will not be abandoned. And again, regardless of whether we withdraw our forces or not, our recognition of the independence of southern Korea would inevitably be the signal for a concerted effort to bring all of Korea under the political control of groups more interested in cooperating with the U.S.S.R. than in promoting the welfare of Korea. Our ability to counter such a campaign, not an easy thing to do under the best of circumstances, would be greatly hampered in an independent south Korea. Of course, if our recognition were accompanied by a withdrawal of U.S. forces, it would be obvious to the world that the U.S. had suffered a complete political defeat in a test of strength with the Soviet Union in the only area where we and the Soviets stand face to face alone. It is improbable that the U.S. could unilaterally establish safeguards which would assure that an independent southern Korea would not fall under Soviet domination. The effect on world power relations, however, would almost certainly far transcend the mere transfer of southern Korea from the U.S. to Soviet control. The loss of U.S. prestige and influence, and the consequent increase in Soviet influence and power, would have prejudicial repercussions not only on U.S. interests in the Far East but on the entire U.S. world position. If, on the other hand, we should make our recognition conditional on permission for our troops to remain, we could hardly hope to avoid reaping the antagonism and ill-will which seem the inevitable lot of foreign troops quartered in a proud and independent nation. Not only the Koreans, but many other nations would condemn the U.S. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the presence of U.S. troops could effectively offset any of the disadvantages described above which would result from a recognition by the U.S. of the independence of south Korea. 3. Reference of problem to Foreign Ministers or UN . Unilateral action by the U.S. to refer the Korean problem to the Foreign Ministers who participated in the Moscow Agreement or to the United Nations (presumably the Security Council) 28 would be unsatisfactory because (1) it would in effect be an admission by the U.S. of failure in Korea and would thus have a most damaging effect on U.S. prestige; (2) it would undoubtedly be countered by the Soviets with the assertion that the U.S. is committed to an international agreement regarding Korea which it refuses to implement, thus putting us in a most disadvantageous position; and (3) it is hardly likely that a unilateral attempt by us to bring additional protagonists into the Korean situation would result in hastening a solution to the problem. The various factors involved in possible prior agreement with the Soviets for reference of the problem to an international body are discussed below in IV–B–4. If, however, all other attempts to solve the Korean problem should fail, it might eventually become desirable to refer it to the United Nations. This cannot be done until it is conclusively demonstrable that the Soviet Union is deliberately preventing a solution of the Korean problem. Such action, of course, should not be taken without carefully weighing the importance of a Korean solution against the possible repercussions resulting form another open U.S.-Soviet dispute in the United Nations. 4. Adoption of an aggressive positive program for south Korea. As pointed out in IV–A–1 above, a continuation of our present essentially interim and ineffective program is unsatisfactory. As discussed in IV–B–1 below, any attempt to approach the Russians regarding a solution of the Korean impasse, while we appear to be so halfhearted in carrying out our responsibilities in our zone, would in all probability be rebuffed. It therefore appears necessary, if we are to remain in Korea and to achieve any success in solving the Korean problem, to initiate an aggressive, positive, long-term program. Even though basic agreement on the Korean problem may be reached with the Soviets in the future, the U.S. cannot postpone positive action in southern Korea pending such agreement. Such a program would have the following advantages: (i) It would show the Russians that we have no intention of allowing Korea to fall into their hands by default. (ii) It would strengthen our position in any future negotiations with the Soviets. For example, if it is obvious that we are determined to expend money and effort during the next few years to insure Korean independence, the Soviets will realize that if they are to retain their present position in Korea they will either have to expend funds and effort of their own, which they would be reluctant to do, or be willing to retreat from their present position. (iii) It would provide a sound basis for the development of a country which will be able to maintain its independence after U.S. and Soviet withdrawal. (iv) Any new program which provided for adequate civilian relief and rehabilitation in Korea would make the Koreans more cooperative and thus strengthen our position in that country under any circumstances. In order to succeed, such a program must be supported by sufficient funds in the form of Congressional appropriations to finance the substantial political, economic and cultural measures required to bring about the economic rehabilitation of southern Korea and to prepare the country for early and complete independence. Lacking such funds, we will fail to meet our international commitments in Korea. The essentials of such a plan are outlined in Appendix “A”. 29 This plan calls for the appropriation of $250,000,000 for fiscal 1948. In view of the present temper of Congress the outlook for approval of this sum is not encouraging. It should, however, be possible to obtain Congressional action which would greatly strengthen our position in Korea. Passage of the authorizing legislation alone would have a great psychological effect. The above $250,000,000 involves an increase in the budget of only $113,000,000 as the War Department occupied areas budget—which it is hoped will be approved—includes an allocation of $137,000,000 for Korea. Deletion of this item and its approval as a special sum implementing the Korean “grant-in-aid” legislation would be a further psychological boost without increasing the presently proposed budget. If, in addition, Congress could be persuaded to authorize even $50,000,000 it would at least be possible to undertake some railway rehabilitation and other absolutely vital and urgent projects. B. Collaboration With the USSR 1. Local level negotiations in Korea General Hodge is, as pointed out in II. A. 6. above, corresponding with the Soviet Commander with a view to reaching agreement on a formula for reconvening the Joint Commission. It is improbable that agreement will be reached under present conditions, as the Soviets are apparently unwilling to change their position and the U.S. is unable to make further concessions from the position taken in General Hodge’s letter of December 24, 1946, 30 without compromising our basic belief in freedom of expression and risking Soviet domination of all of Korea. Thus, under present circumstances, we cannot anticipate progress toward solution of the Korean problem through negotiations on a local level in Korea. There is, however, nothing to be gained by formally breaking off these negotiations. By allowing the situation to drag on along its present lines, the door remains open for Soviet concessions if and when the operation of our positive program and other developments in Korea convince the Russians that it is to their interest to retreat from their present intransigeant position. Any further negotiations in Korea should be kept strictly within the terms of the Moscow Agreement and any contemplated modification thereof should be discussed on a governmental level. 2. Governmental negotiations a . Desirability of governmental approach An approach to the Soviets on a governmental level under present circumstances has certain disadvantages: (i) Without any evidence of a firm U.S. determination completely to fulfill our Korean responsibilities, such an approach would undoubtedly be regarded by the USSR as a “lead from weakness” and could therefore not be expected to result in progress towards a solution of the Korean problem. The Russians, anticipating U.S. concessions if they continue their intransigeance , could be expected to reject our approach or, more probably, give a procrastinating reply or no reply at all. The impression of weakness engendered by such an approach might persist to some extent even after the initiation of a positive program in our zone, and thus prejudice future attempts to reach an agreement. (ii) An approach now, or in the near future, might prejudice our overall position vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. The committee is not in a position to evaluate this factor. It is noted, however, that governmental approaches have been made to the USSR on other matters where, even though the approach appeared foredoomed to failure, it was felt important to make clear to the Soviets and to the world that the U.S. would adhere to its international commitments. A governmental approach would also have advantages: (i) Most important it should greatly ease the position of the occupation authorities. Lack of any substantial action by the U.S. Government has apparently given many Koreans the impression, which may be shared by the Soviets, that the U.S. has no great interest in the Korean problem and has more or less abandoned General Hodge to his own devices. An early governmental approach would provide positive evidence to the Koreans of our desire for early Korean independence. Until such evidence is forthcoming it will undoubtedly become increasingly difficult to maintain our position in the face of constantly growing Korean impatience. (ii) Congress will not approve special Korean legislation without a careful analysis of the record of our Korean negotiations with the U.S.S.R., and will wish to be assured that every possible step has been taken to reach agreement before it approves special legislation. The fact that a governmental level approach had been made would be added evidence of the extent of our attempts to implement the Moscow Agreement. Absence of such evidence might lead Congress to question the need for the desired legislation or at least to defer approval pending results of a governmental approach. On the other hand, it might be possible to persuade the Congress that a strong affirmation of U.S. purposes in Korea, expressed by Congressional approval of a three-year program, is needed in order to enable us to approach the Soviets on a sufficiently aggressive basis to give hope of securing a settlement satisfactory to us. Evidence of further Soviet procrastination, even if only for a month or two, will clearly indicate to Congress the necessity for special legislation if we are ever to achieve a solution in Korea. It is believed that on balance the advantages of making a governmental level approach to the U.S.S.R. in the near future outweigh the disadvantages. b . Timing of approach It is unlikely that discussions with the Russians would result in substantial progress toward a settlement if made before a positive program is actually in operation in south Korea. However, they would have much greater chance of being substantially effective if accompanied by some evidence of our determination to carry through in Korea, such as a strong Presidential statement submitting Korean legislation to Congress. It is suggested, therefore, that the timing should be thus coordinated if this can be done without unduly delaying the approach. In order to be effective for its purposes (in Korea and vis-à-vis Congress), it should in any event be made before the conclusion of the coming Moscow Foreign Ministers’ meeting. c . Substance and manner of approach The Soviets invariably view with horror any alteration of the wording of an existing agreement and a direct proposal involving modification of the Moscow Agreement would therefore in all probability be brusquely rejected and would result in vigorous Soviet accusations that we were failing to live up to our agreements. The U.S. approach should be aggressive in order to minimize any impression of weakness. Any U.S. proposals should be so worded as to come within the letter of the Moscow Agreement although they might, in effect, represent a considerable modification thereof. For example: (i) It might be possible to fulfill the consultation provisions of the agreement by avoiding a definition of “democratic organization” and having the Commission divide into two sections, a northern (Soviet) section which would consult with organizations in north Korea and a southern (U.S.) section which would consult with organizations in south Korea, each section establishing its own rules of procedure. Other possible variations which might be developed during the course of negotiations are discussed in succeeding sections. The details of proposals and counter-proposals would, of course, have to be worked out in the light of day-to-day developments. (ii) It might be possible, during the course of discussions, to work out a formula nominally within the framework of the Moscow Agreement, but which would in effect bring about early trusteeship through the elimination or simplification of the steps of consultation and establishment of a provisional government. For use in the event such an opportunity arises, there is attached, as Appendix “C”, 31 a draft trusteeship agreement which it is believed would be acceptable to us and to which it might be possible to attain Russian agreement. In this regard consideration must be given to possible Korean resentment if a trusteeship is established without consultation with Koreans. (iii) It might further be possible to refer the Korean problem, in agreement with the U.S.S.R., to the Security Council of the United Nations. An attempt to obtain Soviet agreement to such action would have the same disadvantages, in reduced measure, as United States unilateral action along the lines discussed in paragraph IV–A–3 above, and is therefore undesirable unless no more promising courses are available to us. It is believed that any governmental action approach made in the near future should in essence consist of a statement of concern over U.S.S.R. delaying tactics and an expression of our desire to expedite implementation of the Moscow Agreement. At the discretion of the Secretary of State this approach should be made either by note from the Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Office or informally by Secretary Marshall to Molotov. 32 As discussions progress, the alternatives mentioned above should be useful in the development of specific U.S. proposals. V. Recommendations It is recommended that: A. The program outlined in Appendix “A” 33 be implemented, action to include: 1. Request to the President to forward to the Congress draft legislation for a “grant-in-aid” to Korea and implementing appropriation of $250,000,000 for fiscal 1948. 2. Allocation of $ . . . . . of the War Department deficiency appropriation for the remainder of fiscal 1947 to Korea. 3. Gradual civilianizing of Military Government in Korea, appointment of a High Commissioner and cooperation by State and War Departments in providing him with appropriate staff. 4. Termination of CINCFE’s political responsibilities in Korea. 5. Issuance of new directive to CG USAFIK. 6. Intensification of present policies regarding participation of Koreans in government. 7. Institution of a publicity campaign in the U.S., including a statement by the President to be issued upon General Hodge’s return to Korea. 8. Despatch of a high level business and industrial group to Korea to make recommendations on economic and financial rehabilitation. 9. Despatch of a high level education group to make recommendations regarding Korean educational problems; intensification of public information and education program in Korea. B. The door be left open to a continuation of current U.S.–U.S.S.R. negotiations in Korea. C. An early governmental level approach be made to the U.S.S.R. expressing our concern over Soviet obstruction to implementation of the Moscow Agreement. D. A Soviet proposal for mutual withdrawal of forces from Korea should be approved in principle, subject to the establishment of adequate safeguards assuring the political and territorial integrity of Korea. 34 23 Addressed to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War (Patterson). 24 Joseph C. Grew, former Under Secretary of State and former Ambassador to Japan. 25 Assistant Director in charge of the Fiscal Division, Bureau of the Budget. 26 Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. 27 Major General and former chief representative on the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission for Korea. 28 In an undated memorandum “Outline of Program for Korea” by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Allison), prepared about February 12, a possible action for the United States, independent of the Soviet Union, was suggested as “Presentation of Problem to United Nations (Security Council).” (Lot 244, Box 7946, Office of Chief, JA, February 1947) 29 Entitled “Positive Program”, not printed. 30 See footnote 6, p. 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] . 31 Entitled “Draft Trusteeship Agreement”, not printed. 32 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs. 33 Not printed. 34 At this point the following was added in handwriting: “after establishment of some gov’t.” Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) and the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State 895–01/2–2847 [Document 472] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) and the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] February 28, 1947. Assistant Secretary of War Petersen, Mr. Weldon Jones of the Budget, General Hodge, General Hilldring, and Mr. Vincent met with Ambassador Grew this morning to discuss the preliminary report of the Special State-War Committee on Korea. There is attached memorandum signed by the three principal members of the Special Committee 35 which contains a brief summary of its conclusions and recommendations. There is also attached the preliminary report. 36 Ambassador Grew expressed himself as being in full accord with the argument and conclusions of the Committee. He was, of course, aware of the difficulties of getting the Congress to appropriate the amount desired ($250,000,000 the first year, $200,000,000 the second year, and $150,000,000 the third year). All others present also approved the report with the possible exception of Mr. Petersen, who raised general questions with regard to the practicability of the program but did not disapprove it. We (General Hilldring and Mr. Vincent) approve the recommendation that you approach the Soviet Government prior to the close of the Moscow Conference, but we continue to be of the opinion that it would be good tactics to allow the Soviet Government ample opportunity to take the initiative in discussing Korea and to come forward with concrete suggestions for administrative unification; and we believe that there is better than a 50–50 chance that they will at least initiate discussions. With regard to the idea of coordinating the timing of an approach to the Russians with Presidential submission to Congress of proposed special legislation for a grant to Korea, we can see the advantages of such action but are not as impressed as the Committee seems to be with its vital importance. We say this because of our feeling that, whereas Congress is going to require a lot of convincing in order for us to get the grant we want, they will not require additional evidence that “all possible efforts” have been made “to achieve a Korean settlement”. We recommend a meeting with you on this subject before your departure. Secretary Patterson and Mr. Petersen desire to attend the meeting. 35 Ante , p. 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] . 36 Supra. Major General Albert E. Brown to the Department of State and the War Department 740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–147: Telegram [Document 473] Major General Albert E. Brown to the Department of State and the War Department secret urgent Seoul , [February 28, 1947.] Pass to Hodge. Cite Zgcg 268. Reply dated 28 February from Chistiakov 37 to General Hodge’s December 24 letter has been received. Text will be transmitted today. In general reply has a friendly tone. Hodge’s proposals have apparently been accepted with what appears from hasty reading as a possible effort to exclude from consultation certain individuals who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to Moscow decision. An analysis of these changes with recommendations will be transmitted in few days. No publicity will be given locally. 38 [ Brown ] [For text of address by Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring before the Economic Club of Detroit on March 10 on the subject “Korea—House Divided”, see Department of State Bulletin , March 23, 1947, pages 544–547. After reviewing the situation in Korea, General Hilldring said: “I feel certain that before too long we can arrive at a formula for the waiting period that lies ahead that will be tolerable to the Koreans and the Korean leaders. In any case we are not leaving. We have an important job to do, and we are going to stay until the job is done.”] 37 For text of letter, see Far Eastern Series No. 18: Korea’s Independence , p. 31. 38 In telegram 528, March 15, noon, to Moscow, the Department stated: “We do not feel Chistiakov’s reply of Feb 28 to Hodge’s letter of Dec 24 provides sound basis for reconvening Joint Commission. It has been given no publicity here or in Korea and will not be answered for time being.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–1347) Dr. Syngman Rhee to President Truman 895.00/3–1347 [Document 474] Dr. Syngman Rhee to President Truman 39 [ Washington ,] March 13, 1947. Sir : Permit me to congratulate you on your historic message to Congress yesterday. 40 You have given a new hope to the liberty-loving people all over the world. In taking this courageous stand against communism, please instruct the American military authorities in Korea to follow your policy and abandon their efforts to bring about coalition and cooperation between nationalists and communists. Korea is located in a strategic situation similar to that of Greece and the Korean patriots are greatly encouraged in their fight for freedom by your inspiring message. The immediate establishment of an interim independent government in the American zone will set up a bulwark against advancing communism and bring the unification of North and South Korea. 41 Respectfully, Syngman Rhee 39 Copy transmitted to the Department by the White House on March 14. A notation by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (Allison) on March 28 read: “It is recommended that this letter remain unanswered. JMA”. 40 Department of State Bulletin , March 23, 1947, p. 534. 41 On March 27 Dr. Rhee wrote President Truman again to submit a message from Kim Koo, “Chairman, Anti-Trusteeship Committee for National Independence.” This was likewise referred to the Department’s attention. (895.01/3–2747) The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 895.01/3–2147: Telegram [Document 475] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) Washington , March 21, 1947. 43. With reference to Rhee statement which will be carried by Press services, 42 Department’s press officer today made following remarks in press conference: “These are simply suppositions put forward by Dr. Rhee. As the Acting Secretary stated yesterday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the interested departments of the Government are considering plans for a more effective implementation of our policy and program in Korea. It is hoped that a public announcement with regard to these plans can be made within a matter of weeks. As Mr. Acheson indicated, it is the intention of this Government now, as in the past, to strengthen Korean economy and also to bring Koreans more and more into positions of administrative responsibility in preparation for carrying out our commitment that Korea shall become a united self-governing independent nation. Then there were other stories in the press this morning that we had given up all hope of further negotiations with the Russians and were going ahead on our own. I would like to correct that. As we have said repeatedly, we are willing to go ahead with negotiations with the Russians at any time on the unification of Korea under the terms of the Moscow Agreement. Q. Then you have not given up all hope, is that it? A. No.” 43 Acheson 42 Dr. Rhee predicted an interim independent government in Korea to replace the American military government within 30 to 60 days; this was reported in the New York Times , March 22, 1947, p. 4, col. 6. 43 In telegram 120, April 4, 8 p.m., to Tokyo, the Department reported that Syngman Rhee was due to reach Tokyo by special plane on April 10 en route to China and was traveling in private capacity. This telegram was repeated to Nanking, Shanghai, and Seoul. (895.01/4–447) Dr. Rhee returned to Seoul by Chinese plane on April 21. The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/3–2847 [Document 476] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Patterson ) secret Washington , March 28, 1947. My Dear Mr. Secretary : With regard to our future program in Korea, I am told that General Hilldring and Mr. Vincent discussed the matter with you and Mr. Petersen yesterday along the lines of the discussion which took place with Secretary Marshall on March 4. We are of the opinion that decision and action on the following matters are urgently required in connection with our program which has as its objective the more effective implementation of policy in Korea: (1) Congressional authorization by legislative act should be requested for expenditures in Korea over the period of the next three years not to exceed $540,000,000. (2) Congressional appropriation of $215,000,000 for the fiscal year 1948 should be requested. Detailed justifications are being prepared but no formal action is necessary until the authorizing legislation has been passed. (3) Our administration in Korea should be reorganized: ( a ) A directive should be issued terminating General MacArthur’s political—but not his military—responsibilities in Korea. ( b ) A political adviser of ambassadorial rank should be appointed. He should be capable of taking charge at some future time of all US civil administration operations in Korea as well as assuming responsibility for possible future negotiation with the Soviets in Korea. ( c ) There should be a gradual replacement of military personnel in Military Government by civilians, civilianization to be substantially completed within the next two or three months. ( d ) Military Government is now endeavoring to obtain passage by the Interim Legislative Assembly of a general election law. These efforts should be continued and as soon as a law is passed a new legislative assembly should be elected. As soon as this has occurred Military Government should move as rapidly as possible toward setting up a Korean provisional government with substantial autonomy in domestic affairs. It is anticipated that the Political Adviser, acting as “Civil Commissioner”, would replace the Military Governor by the time a civil administration has been set up. ( e ) The Political Adviser should operate within the War Department chain of command as at present. When he assumes the position of Civil Commissioner he should have over-all direction of civil affairs, CG USAFIK retaining only his strictly military responsibilities. With this change-over, the Civil Commissioner would report directly to and come under the direction of the State Department. This assumption of responsibility by the State Department is conditioned upon approval by Secretary Marshall. ( f ) The inauguration of the above changes will necessitate the issuance of a new “Interim Directive to the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, for Military Government in Those Areas of Korea Occupied by U.S. Forces”. Processing of such a directive through SWNCC and JCS channels is now in progress. (4) A high level business and industrial group should be dispatched to Korea to take an industrial census and make recommendations on economic, financial and industrial rehabilitation. A representative of Military Government in Korea is now in Washington in regard to this matter, which is being handled by the War Department (CAD) in consultation with JK. (5) The public information and education program of Korea should be intensified. This is being handled by the War Department (CAD) in consultation with OIC. General Marshall has indicated his intention to discuss the Korean problem with Molotov (or Stalin) sometime before the end of the present Moscow Conference. It is anticipated that the General will tell Mr. Molotov plainly and firmly of our disappointment over the Soviet Government’s attitude toward implementation of the Moscow agreement regarding Korea of December 1945 and will inform Molotov that, while we are not closing the door to a reasonable Soviet initiative on reconvening the Joint Commission, we plan to proceed energetically with carrying out the objectives of the Moscow Agreement in so far as it is feasible for us to do so in the absence of a unified administration for the country. A Russian proffer to reconvene the Joint Commission and go forward with implementing the Moscow decision on terms acceptable to us would call for a reassessment of the program outlined above but not for its abandonment. Without doubt a unified administration would make possible a reduction in the amount required for rehabilitation and reconstruction in southern Korea. But a considerable sum still would be required and machinery for expenditure of these funds under American control would be necessary. Therefore, whether the Civil Commissioner mentioned above would function independently in southern Korea or whether he would function jointly for a time with a Russian of similar status, expenditure of appropriated funds would remain under his supervision. Furthermore, should there be a joint withdrawal of American and Soviet troops from Korea, the need and means for achieving our objectives with regard to the economy and political evolution of Korea would remain substantially the same, although some modification in method might be necessary. It could be hoped, but with little confidence, that the Russians might be induced to make a proportionate expenditure of funds, but Soviet failure to make proportionate expenditures in Korea would not alter our problem or our objective, and therefore a need for expenditure of American funds under American control would continue to exist. It is our objective to bring about in as short a time as possible a united democratic Korea and in order to do so the economy of Korea requires our support. We estimate that the amount for which authorization is requested ($540,000,000) would bring into being at the end of three years a viable, self-supporting Korean economy. Sincerely yours, Dean Acheson The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–247: Telegram [Document 477] The Secretary of State 44 to the Acting Secretary of State secret Moscow , April 2, 1947—4 p.m. 1149. Kosmos 20. For Acheson from Marshall. If we are to approach Soviets regarding Korea, I believe this should be done before I leave Moscow. I am considering relative advantages my sending letters to Molotov as against delivery, before I depart, of formal communication by Department to Soviet Embassy, Washington or by Smith 45 here to Foreign Office. Give me Department’s recommendation as to making approach now and method. War and Navy should be consulted. I have had drafted here a possible letter to Molotov from me, text of which follows. This should be examined by Department as to tone, factual accuracy, scope of action it proposes to Soviets, and propriety of last paragraph which contains idea that might better be subject of later communication. I am not firm regarding letter of this character but am anxious to settle on a course of action within the week. Draft letter follows: “I wish to call to your attention the situation in Korea. The representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States on the joint US–USSR Commission in Korea have been unable to make progress towards the establishment of a Korean provisional government. It has been 19 months since the Japanese surrender, yet Korea has profited little. The country is divided into two zones. The Soviet Commander in northern Korea has refused to permit freedom of movement and free economic exchange between these zones. This has precluded freely chosen political amalgamation of the Korean people and has resulted in grave economic distress. The policy of the United States toward Korea has the following basic objectives: 1. To assist in the establishment as soon as practicable of a self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations; 2. To insure that the National Government so established shall be representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people. 3. To aid the Koreans in building a sound economy as an essential basis for their independent and democratic state. The United States, in the Cairo Declaration of 1 December, 1943, 46 declared its determination that in due course, Korea should become free and independent. The United Kingdom and the Republic of China were parties to the same declaration. The Cairo Declaration was specifically reaffirmed by the Three Powers in the Potsdam Declaration which defined terms for the Japanese surrender. The USSR in its declaration of war on Japan on August 8, 1945, declared its adherence to these declarations. Upon the surrender of Japan, United States and Soviet forces accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea in the areas respectively south and north of a line arbitrarily assigned for this purpose, the thirty-eighth degree parallel. This line of demarcation became in effect a boundary between zones of occupation. At the conference of the Foreign Ministers of the US, UK and USSR in Moscow in December, 1945, the serious consequences of the bi-zonal division of Korea were discussed and an agreement regarding Korea was reached and published in part III of the Communiqué of the Conference. The Republic of China subsequently subscribed to this agreement. On March 20, 1946, the Joint US–USSR Commission appointed under the terms of the Moscow Agreement met and began its task, as outlined in the agreement, of assisting in the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government as a first step in assuring the establishment of an independent and sovereign Korean nation. It was the hope of the Government of the United States that speedy action would be taken by the Joint Commission, a provisional Korean government would rapidly be established, the unfortunate results of the line of demarcation between the United States and the Soviet forces would be overcome and Korea could be started on the way to attaining an independent and democratic government. Unfortunately the work of the Joint Commission became stalemated after a short time through failure to agree on the definition of the word ‘democratic’ as it pertained to the representatives of the parties and social organizations mentioned in the Moscow Agreement to be consulted by the Joint Commission in its task of assisting in the formation of a provisional government. As it became evident that no agreement could be reached at the time, the Joint Commission adjourned sine die on May 8, 1946. The United States representatives on the Joint Commission has several times suggested to the Soviet representative that the Commission reconvene and get on with its work. Now, in April, 1947, 16 months since the agreement pertaining to Korea was reached in Moscow, there has still been no real progress made towards the implementation of that agreement. In fulfillment of the intent of the Agreement and Declaration made at Moscow in December, 1945, the Government of the United States desires to further the work of establishing a free and independent Korea without additional delay. To this end I ask that you recommend to your Government to agree with the United States to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible for discussions and agreements which will advance the purpose of the Moscow Agreement, and to fix with the United States Government a mutually acceptable date during the summer of 1947 for a review on the governmental level of the progress made to that date by the Joint Commission. If, in the view of your Government, there seems little hope that the Joint Commission in its new meetings can achieve the results expected of it in the Moscow Agreement, I will be pleased to discuss reconsideration of the Moscow Agreement in the effort to find better way to bring about the establishment of Korea as a genuinely free, independent and stable nation.” [ Marshall ] 44 The Secretary of State was attending the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held at Moscow March 10–April 12, 1947. 45 Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Ambassador in the Soviet Union. 46 Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448 . The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Acting Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–447 [Document 478] The Secretary of War ( Patterson ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret Washington , April 4, 1947. Dear Mr. Secretary : I have received your letter of 28 March as regards our policy in Korea. I am pleased that the Secretary of State has indicated his intentions of discussing the Korean problem with the Soviets before the end of the present Moscow Conference and hope he will achieve a definitive solution of the current stalemate. The current situation in Korea is potentially explosive. There exists always the danger of the development of an internal situation which would force our precipitate withdrawal under conditions gravely detrimental to our position in the Far East and in the world. I feel that this danger will remain to a certain degree so long as we continue to occupy Korea because I do not believe that any program, no matter how enlightened, will satisfy the intense Korean desire for independence. On the basis of equivalent strengths of occupation forces, 47 Korea is the most difficult occupation area to maintain. From the standpoint of U.S. security the probabilities of long-term remunerative results are low, particularly if some solution is not achieved with the Soviets which unites the country in the near future. I am convinced that the United States should pursue forcefully a course of action whereby we get out of Korea at an early date and believe all our measures should have early withdrawal as their overriding objective. In urging this course of action, I appreciate the view that it is important to attain a solution of the Korean problem in some form other than abandoning Korea to the Soviets. I recognize that the apparent inability of the U.S. to carry out its policies in Korea may have some impact on the Japanese people and on U.S. security interests in the Far East. It is also apparent that, from the standpoint of U.S. security, our policy in the Far East cannot be considered on a piecemeal basis, and logically the policy concerning Korea must be viewed as part of an integrated whole which includes Manchuria and China. The War Department has striven in every way in its power to support our foreign policy. A high proportion of the Army’s available means are now directly so engaged. This support is definitely limited by the resources of men and money made available by the Congress. It is to be expected that decreasing funds and manpower will, in the near future, result in a material reduction in the Army’s capability to continue present programs of support. This decreasing capability will exist in non War Department programs with which the Army is associated in supporting our foreign policy. Hence it is now essential that we review critically all programs with the realization that non-availability of means will force us to drop the least remunerative of them in the near future. As to the specific proposals in your letter, I agree that General MacArthur’s political—but not his military—responsibilities should be terminated and that a political advisor of ambassadorial rank should be appointed. This, I feel, is a necessary preliminary to undertaking the civilianization of our government in Korea, an objective with which I am in agreement. This cannot be done, however, within the next two or three months. When examined from the practical standpoint, it is apparent that it will take a much longer time. I agree with your subparagraphs d, e and f , which envisage setting up a provisional Korean government in south Korea and appointing a civil commissioner directly responsible to the State Department for direction of civil affairs. At the time the change is made from military to civilian control, funds appropriated for civil affairs in Korea, and the responsibility for administering these funds, should be transferred to the State Department. It seems essential that such action be preceded by public and forceful action which proves to the U.S. people that we have done our best to make Korea one nation and that the U.S.S.R. is responsible for the current unsatisfactory situation. I agree with your proposals in paragraphs (4) and (5) concerning dispatch of a business and industrial group to Korea and for intensifying the information and education program, on the assumption that the expenditures envisaged by these proposals would be met from funds to be made available to the State Department, rather than those now being requested by the War Department for the prevention of disease and unrest. As to the proposal to request Congress to authorize $540,000,000 for the next three years and an appropriation of $215,000,000 for the fiscal year of 1948, I question seriously that Congress will be willing to agree to such action. I fear that the request will occasion an adverse reaction resulting in a net reduction of the funds provided to the War Department and other agencies for support of U.S. policy throughout the world. Such an adverse reaction seems certain if the ground for the request is not prepared by measures which will convince the U.S. people and the Congress: a . That every effort has been made on the international level to solve those economic ills of Korea arising from the division on the 38° parallel; b . That the U.S. has determined upon a program and taken a decision which will assure reduction of the cost of the Korean commitment at an early date; and c . That, in the event we cannot reach agreement with the Soviets regarding Korea, this program envisages carefully considered alternatives, such as referral of the problem to the United Nations or the establishment of an independent government of south Korea, or both, whereby we can still achieve our objectives; as I have indicated above, we cannot resort to such alternatives until our forceful action has gained public recognition of the fact that the Soviets have abrogated the Moscow Agreement. The whole tenor of the hearings on the Greek-Turkish matter 48 indicates that such expositions and assurances will be required in public hearings. Further, I believe that a critical analysis of the funds proposed to be authorized should be made to determine what reductions; would result in case a sensible solution were worked out with the Soviets, and also to determine what portions, if any, of the program beyond the minimum required to prevent disease and unrest can actually be expended remuneratively in Korea. Even though the funds were made available, there is some question in my mind that the entire proposed rehabilitation program is feasible or remunerative. It is recognized that an authorization by Congress along the line that you suggest will greatly strengthen the hands of our negotiators in dealing with the U.S.S.R. If a plan is worked out, as indicated in the preceding paragraphs, which offers some chance of acceptance of the program by the Congress and appears to assure at least a very substantial reduction at an early date of our commitments in Korea, I agree that a program of the nature you envisage in your paragraphs; (1) and (2) should be undertaken and the War Department will support it. 49 Sincerely yours, Robert P. Patterson 47 In a memorandum to Mr. Acheson on April 8, Mr. Vincent, discussing this phrase, remarked: “… it is my understanding that it has never been our intention to match forces in Korea with the Russians. I believe that General Eisenhower made this point clear at a meeting of the three Secretaries about six weeks ago.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–847) General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was Chief of Staff; the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy met at intervals to consider matters of interest. 48 See vol. v , pp. 1 ff. 49 In the memorandum to Mr. Acheson dated April 8, Mr. Vincent advised Mr. Acheson that “we can, in large measure, go along with the suggestions he [Mr. Patterson] makes and, with regard to reduction of our commitments, we can point out that our program seems to us to be the only feasible way of accomplishing this end once we rule out the alternative of abandonment of Korea to USSR domination.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–847) The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–247: Telegram [Document 479] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow secret Washington , April 5, 1947—noon. 825. Moskco 44. For the Secretary from Acheson. Kosmos 20 Apr. 2. We offer following comments, with which War and Navy agree, on approach to Soviets re Korea. We feel recommendation of Special State-War Committee on Korea 50 that early approach be made to Soviets (copy handed to Cohen 51 prior to departure) is sound and agree that it should be done before you leave Moscow. We believe approach would be most effective, both vis-à-vis Soviets and in strengthening Hodge’s position in our zone, if made in form of letter from you to Molotov. Letter appears to be drafted with view to making public, which we agree is desirable. In any event we suggest copies be given to British and Chinese. General tone seems appropriate except that it might be desirable to go further toward placing blame on Soviets. Detailed comments on draft follow. Antepenultimate paragraph contains a factual error. In addition we feel it might be desirable to include in that paragraph reference to reasons for failure to reach agreement. Following redraft of that paragraph is suggested. “The United States Commander in Korea has several times suggested to the Soviet Commander that the Commission reconvene and get on with its work. However, the Soviet Commander has insisted on a formula which would result in eliminating the majority of representative Korean leaders from consultation as representatives of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and has reiterated this position in a letter to the American Commander as recently as Feb. 28, 1947. It has therefore been impossible to agree upon a basis for reconvening the Commission. Now in April 1947, almost 16 months since the agreement pertaining to Korea was reached in Moscow, there has still been no real progress made towards the implementation of that agreement.” We see little use in reconvening the Commission without some basis to enable it to progress and therefore suggest second sentence of penultimate paragraph be redrafted along following lines: “To this end I ask that our Govts agree to instruct our respective Commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission as soon as possible and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion. I further suggest that a mutually acceptable date during the summer of 1947 be fixed for a review by the two Govts of the progress made to that date by the Joint Commission. In the meantime, the United States, mindful of its obligations under the Moscow Agreement, sees no alternative to taking without further delay such steps in its zone as will advance the purposes of that Agreement,” We do not feel that the last paragraph, which opens the door to a reconsideration of the Moscow Agreement, is likely to serve any useful purpose at this time. On the contrary it gives the Soviets an opportunity either to charge us with attempting to evade our commitments or to make procrastinating or embarrassing counterproposals, and it might give rise to false hopes and disturbing speculation in Korea, We therefore suggest that it be deleted and that following paragraph be added to end of letter. “I am furnishing copies of this letter to the Brit and Chinese Govts.” 52 Acheson 50 February 25, p. 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] . 51 Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department. 52 Telegram 1269, April 9, 5 p.m., from Moscow (Kosmos 25), reported dispatch of the letter (as amended) of April 8 to Foreign Minister Molotov; the Secretary was releasing the text to the press on April 11(740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–947). The text was transmitted to the Department in despatch 103, April 10, from Moscow, and by the Department in telegram 58, April 9, 7 p.m., to Seoul. It is printed in Department of State Bulletin , April 20, 1947, p. 716. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–1147 [Document 480] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) secret [ Washington ,] April 11, 1947. The phrase of which we spoke this morning occurs on page 5 of Appendix “D” of the State-War Special Korea Committee report 53 and has been suggested for inclusion in the revised directive which is now before the JCS. It reads as follows: “… for all appointive posts, selecting Koreans in so far as possible from all political groups having due regard to their proportionate strength, but avoiding extremists of either right or left …” I suggest deletion rather than amendment of the underlined phrase. 54 J[ ohn ] C[ arter ] V[ incent ] 53 February 25, p. 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] ; appendix not printed. 54 Notation by General Hilldring: “I concur JHH”. The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–1147: Telegram [Document 481] The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Moscow secret Washington , April 11, 1947—7 p.m. 900. Moskco 56. From Acheson for the Secretary. In recent exchange of letters between SecWar and myself agreement was reached re Korea along lines approved by you before your departure. Contemplated action includes (1) Presidential request for Congressional authorization for expenditures in Korea for the next 3 fiscal years not to exceed 540 million dollars to be followed by request for appropriation of 215 million dollars for fiscal 1948 55 and (2) reorganization of our admin in Korea along following lines: ( a ) termination of Gen MacArthur’s political—but not his military—responsibilities in Korea; ( b ) gradual replacement of military personnel in Military Govt by civilians; ( c ) passage by Interim Legislative Assembly of a general election law to be followed by election of a new legislative assembly and rapid progress toward setting up a Korean provisional govt with substantial autonomy in domestic affairs; ( d ) appointment of a Political Adviser of ambassadorial rank who would operate within the War Dept chain of command as at present but would in few months assume position of “Civil Commissioner” and have over-all direction of civil affairs, CG USAFIK retaining only his strictly military responsibilities. Sec Patterson’s approval of assumption of civil affairs responsibility by a Civil Commissioner is contingent upon your willingness to have this commissioner report directly to and come under the direction of State Dept which would also take over Korean military govt functions now being performed by CAD. We realize this raises general question of admin of occupied areas. We feel however that there are substantial reasons for regarding Korea as a special case, due to its status as a liberated area, the nature of our commitments re Korea, the delicacy of our relations with, the Soviets there, the volatile internal political situation and the relatively minor administrative problems involved. We have not yet been able to make a detailed study of the administrative problem but a preliminary estimate indicates that present War Dept occupation responsibilities in Korea could be carried by State without major administrative readjustment. It is probable that a gradual takeover could be worked out which would be completed be before end of fiscal 1948. In view of above factors I recommend that you authorize me to inform Sec Patterson that you approve this proposal subject to the working out of mutually satisfactory detailed arrangements. Acheson 55 In a letter to the Bureau of the Budget on May 15, the Department stated that Congress would be asked only for the one-year program for fiscal 1948 and that the War Department would support this (740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1547). The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State 895.00/4–1547: Telegram [Document 482] The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State confidential Nanking , April 15, 1947—10 a.m. 814. Chinese Ambassador in Moscow 56 has been instructed to hand Secretary of State following letter which Foreign Minister intends to release to the press here upon notification from Chinese Ambassador that it has been delivered: “Dear Gen. Marshall: I am in receipt of a copy of your note addressed to Mr. Molotov dated April 8 on the situation in Korea, for which I thank you. On behalf of my Govt I have the honor to state the following views on the subject of Korea: The future of Korea is a matter of deep concern and vital interest to China. The Chinese people and Govt have always held that the Korean people should be given independence at the earliest possible date. We regret to observe, however, that in spite of the long lapse of time since the defeat of Japan no govt of the Korean people has yet been set up. We strongly urge, therefore, that there should be no further delay in bringing into existence and operation of such a govt. In order not to delay further the realization of the aspirations of the Korean people in their long struggle for freedom and independence, it is our view that full consultation should take place among USA, USSR, Great Britain and China, who are parties to the Moscow agreement of Dec 2[ 27 ], 1945 on Korea, if the occupying powers cannot reach an agreement soon on this matter. I am instructing the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow to furnish copies of this note to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin. 57 Wang Shih-chieh”. Sent Dept 814, Dept please repeat Moscow as 15 for General Marshall. 58 Stuart 56 Foo Ping-sheung. 57 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at Moscow. 58 Sent as telegram 950 (Secdel 1466) April 16, 6 p.m., to Moscow and repeated as 134 to Tokyo and 67 to Seoul. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State, at Moscow 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–2347 [Document 483] The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Molotov ) to the Secretary of State, at Moscow 59 [Translation] Moscow , April 19, 1947. Dear Mr. Marshall : In reply to your letter of April 8 on the question of Korea, I am communicating the following: At the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom in December 1945, an agreement was reached which determined the policy of the three powers with respect to Korea. A basis for this agreement were the proposals of the Soviet Government, to which the Government of the U.S.A. also agreed, having consequently abandoned its first intention not to establish a National Korean Government in Korea. The Moscow agreement held the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government which could take all the necessary measures for the development of Korean industry, transport, agriculture and the national culture of the Korean people, to be a problem of primary importance. Having made these proposals, the Soviet Government deemed that the unification of Korea under the leadership of the Korean National Government was the most important prerequisite for the restoration of Korea as an independent state and the establishment of bases for the development of the country on democratic principles. The Soviet Government continues to adhere to this point of view and insists on a steadfast implementation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, being certain that, on the basis of the execution of this agreement, Korea would be successfully developed along Democratic principles, would become an independent and prosperous state and an equal member of the United Nations. However, the legislative program provided for Korea by the Moscow Agreement has not yet been carried out. A Provisional Democratic Korean Government has not been established. The work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, established for the purpose of collaborating in the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government was suspended as a result of the fact that the American Delegation on this Commission took a stand contrary to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Furthermore, the American Command in Southern Korea did not agree to a serious consideration of the proposals by the Soviet Command in Northern Korea on the question of an economic exchange between the two zones, which made it impossible to reach an agreement on this question. In the course of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission during the period from March to May 1946, the Soviet Delegation made every effort to effect the execution of the aforementioned Agreement on Korea and, first of all, provide for a prompt establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government and for the unification of Korea under its leadership. However, the Soviet Delegation met not only with difficulties in this connection, but also with direct counteraction on the part of the American Delegation. Basing itself on the Agreement on Korea, which provides that the Joint Commission, in formulating its proposals, should consult Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the Soviet Delegation insisted on a wide-scale attraction of such parties and organizations to consultation with the Commission. The American Delegation excluded participation by a whole series of large democratic organizations in Southern Korea and insisted on consultation with groups which had taken a stand in opposition to the Moscow Agreement, consultation with which, naturally, could not facilitate the execution of this Agreement. The American Delegation included in the list of parties and organizations submitted by it for consultation with the Joint Commission, seventeen political parties and social groups of Southern Korea which took a stand against the Moscow Agreement, and only three democratic parties which supported the Agreement. The American Delegation excluded such large democratic parties and social organizations as the All-Korean Labor Confederation, the All-Korean Peasant Union, the Korean National-Revolutionary Party, the All-Korean Youth Union, etc., from participation in consultation. Deeming it impossible to agree to this position of the American Delegation, the Soviet Delegation nevertheless did its utmost to find a way to reach an agreed decision. This, however, appeared impossible and the work of the commission, on the suggestion of the American Delegation, was curtailed. The intolerance of the resulting situation is evident. As a result of this, as you know, it was necessary to take new measures in endeavoring to find a way out of such a situation. The Soviet Commander in his relations with the American Commander endeavored to find a basis for the renewal of the work of the Joint Commission. As a result of an exchange of letters, there has been a considerable rapprochement of the points of view of both sides, which fact was noted by both Commanders. It was expected that an agreement would soon be reached and the Joint Commission would begin its work very shortly. However, no reply has been received to date from the American Commander to the last letter of February 28 from the Soviet Commander and the proposed agreement was not reached. Disagreement of action was a serious obstacle for the opportune fulfillment of the program of measures proposed in the Moscow Agreement on Korea as a whole. In connection with Northern Korea, during the period beginning with the capitulation of Japan, considerable progress was made in the field of democratization, and also with respect to the restoration of national economy and culture. Wide democratic reforms have been made which guarantee political freedom and raise the standard of living of the population. I have in mind, first of all, the introduction of an over-all electoral right; a law on equal rights for women; the establishment of local authority agencies and the People’s Committee of Northern Korea on the basis of free democratic elections; land reform, as a result of which 725 thousand landless peasant farmers and those having little land received more than 1 million hectares of free land, which formerly belonged to Japanese colonists and their accomplices in Korea; the nationalization of former Japanese industries, the 8-hour work-day, safeguarding of labor and social insurance; public educational reform, as a result of which the Korean language has been reestablished, the network of schools was increased and the number of students was increased, etc. However, such wide democratic reforms have been carried out only in Northern Korea, where there is only two-fifths of the population of Korea. The Soviet Government, closely adhering in their policy toward Korea to the program planned in the Moscow Agreement, believes the following to be points of primary importance: 1. The establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government on the basis of a wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations, in order to expedite the political and economic unification of Korea as a self-supporting state independent of foreign interference, which would do away with the division of the country into two zones. 2. The establishment of democratic authority agencies throughout Korean by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right. 3. The aiding of Korean people in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture. In conformity with the steadfast aspiration on the part of the Soviet Government for the prompt restoration of Korea as a united sovereign state and elimination of difficulties arising from the fact that Korea to date has not been unified and does not have a national government, I propose that the Joint Soviet-American Commission resume its work on May 20 of the current year in the city of Seoul, on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, and that the Commission present the result of its work on the elaboration of recommendations with respect to the establishment of a Provisional Democratic Korean Government for consideration by the two Governments in July and August 1947. I am sending copies of the present letter to Mr. Bevin and to the Chinese Ambassador in Moscow. I beg [etc.] V. Molotov 59 Copy transmitted to the Department with memorandum by Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary, on April 23 from Moscow; text was sent in telegram 1517 (Kosmos 59), April 23, from Moscow and repeated by the Department as telegram 75, April 30, 8 p.m., to Seoul. The Moscow press on April 22 printed the exchange of letters of April 8 and 19 between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister. The Soviet reply was printed in Department of State Bulletin , May 4, 1947, p. 812. The Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) 695.0031/4–2447 [Document 484] The Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Assistant Secretary of War ( Petersen ) Washington , April 24, 1947. My Dear Mr. Petersen : In our recent conversations regarding the stimulation of exports from the areas under U.S. occupation we have discussed the appointment in the War Department at a high level of some aggressive person who can devote his full time to expediting the development of such exports. It was our thought that this officer would engage in the active promotion of trade with these areas and would be the person in the government with whom business men having proposals for financing and developing such trade would deal. The Advisory Committee on Occupied Areas Affairs is deeply interested in aiding any program undertaken by the War Department for the rapid increase of exports from our occupied areas. In order to give the most effective aid to solving the problems involved, the Committee has agreed to establish two subcommittees on trade development, one for Germany and Austria, the other for Japan and Korea. Each Department will assign an officer to these subcommittees who, to the extent that they are needed, will be available for the work of the subcommittees. It is the thought of the OAC that the subcommittees on trade development can work in the very closest coordination with the War Department’s expediter, who is invited to sit on each subcommittee. Through this close coordination the suggestions of all interested departments will be made available to him at once. Through the operation of the subcommittees and with their advice the Department of State may rapidly furnish him with necessary policy decisions. Through the members of the subcommittees he will be able to have clearly defined and responsible contacts in each of several departments and agencies with which he will have frequent dealings in his work. The OAC contemplates that the USCC will also have a representative on each subcommittee and that other interested agencies, such as the Export-Import Bank, will be invited to sit on the subcommittees when matters in which they are concerned are under discussion. In behalf of OAC, I should appreciate having your views on the possibility of an early appointment of a trade development officer in the War Department and on his participation with the OAC subcommittees in an active effort to bring the foreign trade of our occupied areas into an early balance. Sincerely yours, J. H. Hilldring Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Drumright) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–2547 [Document 485] Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom ( Drumright ) 60 confidential London , April 24, 1947. 1. In the course of a call at the Foreign Office today, Mr. Drumright had an informal conversation with Mr. MacDermot 61 on the subject of Korea. 2. In connection with the U.S.-Soviet impasse over the future of Korea and the recent Marshall–Molotov exchange of notes, Mr. MacDermot remarked that the Foreign Office had suggested to Mr. Bevin that he endeavor to keep clear of the Korean imbroglio. (In other words, Mr. MacDermot was intimating that Korea is a “hot potato” and that it would be preferable from the British point of view to let the two countries directly concerned—the United States and the Soviet Union—settle their differences between themselves.) 3. Mr. MacDermot confirmed that the Foreign Office had received an official note from the Chinese Government suggesting a four-power conference on the Korean question. Mr. MacDermot said that the British Government had not replied to the Chinese note, and indicated that Britain was not particularly receptive to the Chinese suggestion for the reason set forth in paragraph numbered 2 above. 4. Mr. MacDermot said that reports received in the Foreign Office from its representative in Seoul were on the whole of a “gloomy” character. The latter had particularly stressed the political immaturity of the Korean politicians and their inability to cooperate for the good of Korea. Instead of promoting the interests of Korea, these politicians seemed to be intent on seeking personal power and aggrandizement. Mr. MacDermot said that the Foreign Office representative in Seoul had reported very little on developments in the Soviet zone of Korea. That little had suggested, however, that the Soviets had set up a typical “stooge regime” in the north, and that, generally speaking, the Soviets and their regime enjoyed slight popularity among the Korean population. 5. Mr. MacDermot indicated that the Foreign Office would welcome the projected American grant-in-aid to Korea. At the same time, however, he said that the British Government doubted the advisability of allocating Japanese reparations to Korea. In support of this position, he pointed out that Korea had in many ways benefitted from Japanese occupation, that Korea had suffered little war devastation, and that Korea had not fought on the allied side during the war. The British view was, he said, that Japanese reparations should go to areas that had contributed to the war and had suffered such as China, the Philippines, Malaya and Burma. 6. Mr. MacDermot said further that a recent report from the British representative in Tokyo had occasioned some misgivings in the Foreign Office. The report was to the effect that an account had appeared in the Japanese press of an alleged interview between General MacArthur and a Korean correspondent in which General MacArthur was cited as having told the correspondent that Korea should be “represented” at the Japanese peace conference. Mr. MacDermot continued that the word “represented” could be construed in a number of ways, but if formal Korean representation was meant, the Foreign Office was at a loss to understand how this could be legitimately arranged. In defense of this contention, Mr. MacDermot asserted that Korea could not properly be “represented” at the peace conference unless her independence were consummated and a recognized Korean Government established, adding that there appeared to be little hope that these developments would eventuate in the foreseeable future. Everett F. Drumright 60 Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 696, April 25, from London; received May 9. 61 D. F. MacDermot, Head of the Japan and Pacific Department, British Foreign Office. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4–3047: Telegram [Document 486] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 62 restricted Washington , April 30, 1947—11 a.m. 1094. Please deliver to the Foreign Minister following note in reply to Mr. Molotov’s letter of Apr 19 re Korea: “Dear Mr. Molotov: I have considered your letter of Apr 19, 1947 in which you accept our proposal to reconvene the US–USSR Joint Commission and suggest that the Commission resume its work on May 20 of this year. I have also noted your statement that resumption of the Commission’s work shall be ‘on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea’. In order to avoid any future misunderstanding with respect to the phrase ‘exact execution’ I wish to make clear my interpretation of the phrase. In my letter to you of Apr 8 I stated that the Joint Commission should be charged with expediting ‘its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement on a basis of respect for the democratic right of freedom of opinion.’ In making this statement I had and have in mind the well-known position of the Govt of the United States that Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean govt because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future govt of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission. You mention three points which the Soviet Govt believes to be of primary importance in its policy towards Korea. Your statement concerning the importance of establishing a provisional democratic Korean Govt on the basis of wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations has from the beginning been accepted by the United States Govt as basic to its policy of assisting in the establishment of a self-governing sovereign Korea, independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the United Nations. I interpret your second point with respect to the establishment of ‘democratic authority agencies’ throughout Korea as referring to local, provincial and national govt agencies chosen, as you state, by means of free elections on the basis of a general and equal electoral right. I welcome the assurance contained in your third point with regard to the importance you attach to aiding in the restoration of Korea as an independent democratic state and in the development of its national economy and national culture. The United States Government has under consideration a constructive program for the rehabilitation of the economy of Korea and for its educational and political development. In order that I may direct the United States Commander in Korea to make preparations for opening the sessions of the Joint Commission in Seoul on May 20, 1947, may I receive an early confirmation that we are mutually agreed as to the basis on which the Commission shall resume its important work? I am furnishing copies of this letter to the Govts of China and the United Kingdom. Please accept, Mr. Minister, assurance of my highest esteem.” In order that Dept can release note to press at proper time, inform when delivered. 63 Marshall 62 Repeated as telegram 509 to Nanking and 1862 to London, with the additional sentence: “Please give copy of above note to the Foreign Office”; repeated as telegram 74 to Seoul “for information”. 63 The note, delayed in transit, was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office at 12:50 p.m., May 2 (740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–247). Draft Message To Be Transmitted to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–747 [Document 487] Draft Message To Be Transmitted to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 64 undated secret General Hodge’s conclusion is correct that Molotov in his reply 65 (text delayed in transmission from Moscow sent to you as State series 75 April 30) did not concede basic principle of freedom of expression for Koreans. Secretary Marshall’s reply to Molotov 66 expressly calls for recognition of this principle (text transmitted to you as State series 74, April 30). Molotov has not yet responded, but text will be transmitted to you when received. Reference possibility complete withdrawal Soviet forces opening way for demand for American withdrawal, U.S. would agree to such withdrawal, provided satisfactory assurances of implementation of Moscow decision are given, and only after ( a ) establishment Provisional Korean Government and ( b ) establishment of such Government’s authority over all armed forces, which would require demobilization Korean Native Army in North. In event of development of threatened or actual Korean native Army operations across zonal border, General Hodge should make clear he is prepared to take action necessary to protect his authority or general internal order within his zone. Please report developments indicating likelihood such action by northern armed groups. 64 Cleared at Staff meeting on May 7 and transmitted to SWNCC for despatch by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A message substantially to this effect, but taking account of further diplomatic developments and providing fuller military instructions, was dispatched to General MacArthur on May 27, with Department of State concurrence, as War 98911. 65 April 19, p. 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] . 66 Supra . The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–847 [Document 488] The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Molotov ) to the Secretary of State 67 [Translation] Dear Mr. Marshall : I acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 2 68 concerning the resumption of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea. Your proposal, as I understand it, is to the effect that before the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission an agreement should be reached concerning the conditions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations. This question was the subject of an exchange of correspondence between the Soviet and American Commanders in Korea as a result of which, as I already answered in my previous letter, the points of view of the two sides were brought considerably closer. The Soviet Commander in his letter of November 26, 1946 advanced the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission: “1. The Joint Commission must consult those democratic parties and organizations which uphold fully the Moscow decision on Korea. “2. Parties or social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission must not nominate for consultation those representatives who have compromised themselves by actively voicing opposition to the Moscow decision. “3. Parties and social organizations invited for consultation with Joint Commission must not and will not voice opposition nor will they incite others to voice opposition to Moscow decision and the work of the Joint Commission. If such be the case such parties and social organizations by mutual agreement of both delegations will be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission.” The American Commander in his letter of December 24, 1946 agreed to accept these proposals of the Soviet Commander with the following changes as the basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission: “Proposal number one to be interpreted as follows: signing the decalaration in communiqué number five 69 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation. “Proposal number two, I consider it the right of a declarant party or organization to appoint the representative which it believes will best present to the Joint Commission its views on the implementation of the Moscow decision. “However, should such representative for good reason be believed to be antagonistic to the implementation of the Moscow decision or to either of the Allied powers, the Joint Commission may, after mutual agreement, require the declarant party to name a substitute spokesman. “Proposal number three, it is suggested that it be reworded as follows: individuals, parties and social organizations invited for consultation with the Joint Commission should not after signing the declaration contained in communiqué number five foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision. “Those individuals, parties and social organizations which after signing the declaration contained in communiqué number five do foment or instigate active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission or to either of the Allied powers or to the fulfillment of the Moscow decision shall be excluded from further consultation with the Joint Commission. “The decision excluding such individuals, parties and social organizations shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission.” With a view to expediting the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission and the creation of a temporary Korean democratic government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander. I hope that there will thus exist no further reasons for postponing the convocation of the Joint Commission. In your letter you state that the Government of the United States is at the present time considering a constructive program for the reconstruction of Korean economy and its cultural and political development. I presume that the Joint Commission, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement on Korea, after the completion of the work connected with the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government should consider with the participation of this government proposals from the American and Soviet sides concerning measures of aid and assistance for the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic autonomy, and the establishment of the state independence of Korea and present agreed recommendations on these questions. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China. Please accept [etc.] V. Molotov Moscow , May 7, 1947. 67 Note transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Soviet Ambassador (Novikov) May 8; published with the American reply of May 2 in the Soviet press on May 10. Text printed in Department of State Bulletin , May 18, 1947, p. 995. 68 See footnote 63, p. 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] . 69 Adopted by the Joint Commission on April 17, 1946; for text of declaration released April 18, 1946, see Department of State Bulletin , January 26, 1947, p. 173. The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1147: Telegram [Document 489] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , May 11, 1947. 100. Cite Zpol 625. “Reference Radio Moscow report transmitted by United Press under London dateline May 11 indicating Molotov has accepted proposals contained in General Hodge’s letter to General Chistiakov of December 24 as basis for reconvening Joint Commission. In his reply of February 28, 1947 to General Hodge’s letter of December 24, 1946, General Chistiakov repudiated his apparent prior partial acceptance of the principle of freedom of expression as contained in his letter to General Hodge of November 26, 1946, and as commented on in the third paragraph of General Hodge’s letter to General Chistiakov of December 24 by insisting in his proposal number 2 that those be accepted for consultation ‘who has not compromised himself by actively voicing opposition to that decision’. There may be other points to give rise to possible confusion. Unless and until a simple, clear, definite and specific agreement can be reached with the Russians to accord freedom of expression of opinion to Koreans regardless of their vocal expression of nonagreement with certain principles of the Moscow decision no concrete results can be expected by reconvening the Commission. Should the Joint Commission be reconvened without a definite and specific guarantee of freedom of expression local conditions indicate a large exclusion of rightist leaders and political parties which will result in largely leftist consultation and may interfere with the work of the Commission by creating local disturbances. In view of the differences in viewpoint contained in the several letters exchanged with the Russians and the necessity to avoid further opportunity for misunderstanding, recommend that the basis of reconvening Joint Commission be as stated in paragraph 2 of reply by Secretary Marshall to Molotov’s letter of April 19 and that the agreement reached be specifically worked and transmitted by both Governments for guidance of the Joint Commission thus avoiding polemic references to previous correspondence. Hodge and Brown concur.[”] Langdon The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–847: Telegram [Document 490] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union confidential Washington , May 12, 1947—8 p.m. 1155. Please deliver following to FonOff. 70 “My dear Mr. Molotov: I have received your letter of May 7, 1947 and am pleased to note the agreement of your Government to the reconvening of a Joint Commission on the basis of the proposals made in the American Commander’s letter of Dec 24, 1946 to the Soviet Commander in Korea. Those proposals were authorized by this Government and are identical in purpose to the statement contained in the second paragraph of my letter of May 2, 1947. I am instructing the American Commander in Korea to make immediate preparations for reconvening the Commission in Seoul. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China. I convey renewed assurances of my highest consideration.” Sent Moscow. Repeated Seoul. 71 Sent London and Nanking for info FonOff. 72 Marshall 70 The letter was delivered the morning of May 13. 71 As telegram 80. 72 As telegrams 2070 and 566, respectively. In telegram 1044, May 14, the Ambassador in China reported that the Chinese Foreign Minister had remarked that the Soviet idea of compromise was to force acceptance of their own view (740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1447). The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1747: Telegram [Document 491] The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Durbrow ) to the Secretary of State confidential niact Moscow , May 17, 1947—noon. 1807. ReDeptel 1155, May 12 to Moscow, repeated Seoul 80, London 2070, Nanking 56 [ 566 ]. Following Embassy’s translation text Molotov letter to Secretary dated May 16 just received: “Dear Mr. Marshall: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of reply dated May 13, 1947. “Your statement that you are instructing the American Commander in Korea to make immediate preparations for reconvening the Commission in Seoul I regard as your agreement to my proposal to resume the work of the commission on May 20, 1947. “For my part, I inform you that the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission is prepared to arrive in Seoul by that date. “I am sending copy of this letter to the Govts of UK and the Chinese Republic. “Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my highest consideration. V. M. Molotov”. Sent London as 214. Dept please repeat Nanking as 8 and Seoul as 2. Durbrow The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1747: Telegram [Document 492] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , May 17, 1947. 104. Cite Zgbi 658. This headquarters yesterday, 15 May, released long message from Representative Democratic Council to Secretary closing with a demand for immediate withdrawal of occupation forces to make way for interim government in process of being created by Koreans themselves. Department will recall RDC has lost its former quasi-official character and become the tool of the most extreme and intransigent rightist element whose fate is bound up in the status quo . As for the message it is understood that Dr. Rhee is aware of it and may have had a hand in drafting it. To us this is an indication that the Rhee–Kim Koo “diehards” are preparing a last desperate effort to embarrass, if not sabotage, the work of the Joint Commission by resurrecting the trusteeship issue and exciting the people. Recommend that the message be ignored. Our impression is that the vast majority of Korean people and most newspapers are jubilant over the news of the reconvening of the Joint Commission and prospect of national provisional government. Langdon The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1847: Telegram [Document 493] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , May 18, 1947. 109. Cite 671. Russian delegation of Joint Commission expected to arrive Seoul 20th. Advance member states delegation will have only 3 Commissioners this time, General Shtikov 73 chairman, General Lebedeff 74 who was subcommissioner on government structure last year and Minister Tumkin 75 of Moscow Foreign Office who has China Service background. Balasanov 76 will act as delegation’s advisor. Sub [ U.S. ] commissioners will be General Brown chairman, General Weckerling subcommissioner on government and Bunce subcommissioner on consultation with parties and Government personnel. If Soviet delegation is enlarged Calvin Joyner of Military Government will be economic subcommissioner and Colonel Lincoln executive officer, with Clyde B. Sargent of War Department as alternate commissioner in order that I may work with Commission and report its proceedings to Department. Penfield will attend proceedings as American delegation’s advisor until he leaves 3 weeks hence. Opening ceremonial meeting tentatively fixed for 21st. On eve of reconvening all Koreans but Rhee, Kim Koo, anti-trusteeship, anti-Soviet elements are exulting and expectant. In desperation Rhee, Kim Koo crowd have been trying to stage anti-trusteeship demonstrations, which we have blocked by blanket municipal order forbidding mass political meetings at this time. Concurrently these elements are trying to bulldose all rightist parties and groups into their movement so that the latter might automatically excommunicate themselves from consultation under the Commission’s new rules. Their reasoning seems to be that by boycotting the Commission the American delegation will have no alternative but to set up any extreme leftist if not a Communist provisional government, since the only representatives from the south in such cases would be leftists and all representatives from the north Communists. This we would not do they believe in view of our Government’s declaration of war on communism. General Hodge and his spokesmen have been reasoning and plain talking with Rhee and Kim Koo on the one hand and, on the other hand, working to dissuade the conservative but politically essential Democratic and Independence Parties from suicide. There are no indications that Rhee and Kim will bend their stiff necks, and they may cause us difficulties. The two major rightist parties named seem to be vacillating between their desire to being represented before the Commission and their fear of going against Syngman Rhee and anti-trusteeship. Langdon 73 Col. Gen. Terenty Fomich Shtikov. 74 Maj. Gen. N. Lebedeff. 75 Gregori Ivanovich Tounkin, Chief, 1st Far Eastern Division, Soviet Foreign Office. 76 G. M. Balasanov, Political Adviser in North Korea. The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2147: Telegram [Document 494] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Seoul , May 21, 1947. 115. General Brown held a 3-hour conference with rightist leaders on 18th May followed by a similar conference held by General Hodge 19th May with reference to the threatened rightist boycott of consultation with the Joint Commission because of objective of “trusteeship”. Under leadership of Syngman Rhee they are now labeling General Hodge as Communist and pro-Communist and saying he intends to sell them into communism through the operation of the Joint Commission. “Joint Commission,[”] “Communism” and “trusteeship” appear to be synonymous in the rightist mind. In conferences they requested definitions be given of “democratic” and “trusteeship” and demanded that General Hodge send message along following lines to State Department: “Word trusteeship is misused in the Moscow decision and conflicts with the main objective of the Joint Commission which is to make Korea independent. The word trusteeship stands in the way of millions of Korean people who would otherwise support the Moscow decision. In order to get the support of all Koreans, the word trusteeship should be omitted and only ‘help and assistance’ be used therefore. Democracy means one thing to United States and another to Russia. An agreed definition should be presented to the Koreans.” Conferences with this group are strongly reminiscent of conferences with same group following announcement of Moscow decision in December 1945 during the “trusteeship revolt”. General Hodge sees little hope of getting needed cooperation of rightist groups with Joint Commission, and feels they will continue efforts to force the proceedings to break down in order that a separate government for South Korea may become an alternative. There is no doubt that this group has real fear of the Russians. There is also no question but that they could muster large and vociferious following here if they start again on an all-out campaign against “trusteeship”. On the other hand their request to General Hodge described above may be face-saving gesture and if they get indication of high level indirect cognizance thereof they may give at least some degree of cooperation. With this in view, it is suggested that the Department may wish to issue a statement for news and radio services to effect that reports from Korea indicate there is still a lack of understanding among some democratic and patriotic Koreans as to the nature of the aid and assistance (trusteeship) provisions of the Moscow decision, and apprehension that four powers intend to impose some burdensome tutelage on Korean people; that the purpose stabilization for the Korean Government during its early stages; to provide necessary aid and assistance to Korea in development of economic, cultural and political stability, to insure orderly transition from a provisional government to a permanent Korean Government according to the expressed will of the Korean people and to insure that during the early stages of the redevelopment of the Korean nation it does not become a mere puppet state, but will move to genuine independence. It is believed that issuance of a reassuring statement at this critical moment is a strategic necessity. However, if Department thinks it inadvisable that it should itself acknowledge rightist apprehension, the same result might be achieved if Department authorized General Hodge to state publicly that he has received assurances from Secretary Marshall along above lines. If Department has strong objections to issuing of statements now, in Washington or here, designed to afford the rightists a chance to modify or reverse their present uncompromising stand, we will take it to be the Department’s attitude that rightist non-cooperation or active opposition is a calculated risk we must accept. Penfield concurs. Langdon The Secretary of State to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2147: Telegram [Document 495] The Secretary of State to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul secret Washington , May 21, 1947—7 p.m. 92. For Hodge from Hilldring. Dept in full accord with your efforts to prevent Rhee and Kim Koo from embarrassing U.S. position on Commission. Secy Marshall is personally anxious that no Korean group engage in any activity obstructing the work of Joint Commission mtg (ref Seoul’s Zgcg 662, 77 104 78 109 79 ). You may feel free to show Rhee a paraphrase of this message and inform him that there never has been any question in my mind but that the policy of the United States is based on Moscow Decision and that “establishing and developing a provisional govt, for a united Korea, through U.S. representatives on the Joint Commission, is the policy of the U.S.” (see Seoul’s Zgcg 662, May 17). Such a procedure seems preferable to my cabling him directly. Any reference Syngman Rhee may have made to alleged promises from me that we would form a southern Korean Govt probably result of Rhee’s misinterpretation of discussions in Dept based on possibility that the Joint Commission would not again convene. In the eventuality that the Commission did not meet again, the Dept realized para 1 of Moscow made it incumbent upon U.S. Govt to take such steps as it could toward the formation of a provisional Korean Govt. This Govt has repeatedly insisted that its basic policy in ref to Korea was based on the Moscow Agreement and hence has cont’d to press the Soviets for the reconvening of the Joint Commission. This Govt welcomed, therefore, Molotov’s acceptance of the reconvening of the Commission and as already indicated to you by formal instructions from the JCS, 79a you are carrying out the expressed wishes and consistent policy of the U.S. Govt by reconvening the Joint Commission on May 20. For your personal info, the Secy is prepared to make a statement here emphasizing need for cooperation of Koreans during session of Joint Commission and referring personally to recalcitrant attitude of Syngman Rhee. If you think such action advisable, please notify. Dept is anxious to assist you in any way possible. [Hilldring.] Marshall 77 May 17 for General Hilldring, not printed. 78 May 17, p. 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] . 79 May 18, p. 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] . 79a Department of State guidance was sent to MacArthur to pass to Hodge in War 98003, May 13, 1947. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2347: Telegram [Document 496] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) secret Washington , May 23, 1947—7 p.m. 97. 1. Urad No. 115 dated May 21 apparently crossed Deptel 92 same date for Hodge from Hilldring. Note particularly last para Deptel 92 and advise whether action desired. 2. Rhee’s message, read in context urad indicates to us his objective is not to obtain clarification trusteeship issue but rather to obtain unilateral statement from us modifying our position on trusteeship as stated in Moscow Declaration which would probably force open debate between ourselves and Russians to detriment of work of Commission. Statement along lines suggested by you seems to be simply a reaffirmation of Moscow Declaration concept and hence would not be likely to have any effect on Korean public opinion. On the other hand, any public statement involving departure from the Moscow concept would endanger work of the Commission. 3. However, if from your close observation of the situation at Seoul you feel that issuance of a statement by you along the lines suggested in your telegram is strategic necessity Department would interpose no objection and would appreciate opportunity to see a draft of the statement before its issuance. 4. Dept. suggests that Hodge take into account timing and manner of issuance of such a public statement, particularly from the point of view of not obstructing the orderly progress of the work of the Joint Commission. Specifically, Dept feels that publicly raising the trusteeship issue now might prejudice the immediate and pressing problem before the Commission of establishing provisional govt. 5. If Hodge nevertheless perceives value in making public statement on trusteeship, Dept. suggests he consider whether or not there would be advantages in doing so at a Joint Commission meeting with a view to release to the press. Marshall The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2347 [Document 497] The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War ( Patterson ) Washington , May 23, 1947. Dear Patterson : I know that you will agree with me that it is important for the War and State Departments to concert plans and arrangements for the transfer from the War Department to the State Department of administrative responsibility for the non-military aspects of the occupation of Korea, Japan and Germany. In the case of Korea, it is, I think, particularly important that we develop as soon as possible a mutually satisfactory plan for administrative transfer in the light of our agreement that the Department of State would assume administrative responsibility at the time the civil Commissioner takes office. For the purpose of expediting planning and in order to reach an agreement on procedures as soon as possible, I should like to suggest that we each designate an official responsible to carry this project forward and to make recommendations to us. I have instructed Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring to act in this capacity on my behalf and I should appreciate advice from you concerning the War Department representative with whom General Hilldring should deal on this matter. 80 Faithfully yours, G. C. Marshall 80 On May 26 the Assistant Secretary of War (Petersen) was designated by Secretary Patterson to represent him. The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2347: Telegram [Document 498] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , May 23, 1947. 119. Cite Zpol 698. Herewith summary of 25th meeting Joint Commission 22 May, General Brown presiding, follows: Text of decision No. 1 of last year’s proceedings 81 dealing with Commission’s operating procedure was adopted with one additional provision for holding of open meetings by mutual agreement. Next item was our proposal to revise last year’s decision No. 3 “joint agreement on program of work”. We wished to delete items 3 and 4 of section 2 relating respectively to elaboration of a political platform and to recommendations for the personnel of the provisional government, substituting therefore a revised item reading as follows: “Study of existing governments North-South Korea with the view to the transfer to and assumption by the provisional government of the responsibility exercised by these existing governments and recommendations for the method of procurement of personnel for the provisional government”. Soviets insisted on necessity of a political platform, wondering why we wanted to set it aside since it had been agreed upon last year. We stated that conditions had changed, that our idea was to incorporate essential features of political platform questionnaire in our questionnaire relating to structure and principles of organization of government, and that the questionnaires were not final decisions in themselves since they were intended to be annexes to the decision in consultation with parties which was never reached. As the point seemed unimportant we accepted the original text with the reservation that we would be free to revise the questionnaire when the time came to consider it. Likewise we accepted original item 4 reading “elaboration of recommendations for the personnel of the provisional government”. To meet the purpose of our proposed item No. 3 cited above, Soviets offered a fifth point in the program of work reading “the method of assumption of power by the provisional government and the method of selecting personnel for the provisional government”. We accepted with understanding placed on record that no particular methods are envisioned at this time and that the final choice of methods would follow study and recommendations of the Joint Subcommission concerned. Commission then appointed Joint Subcommissioners as follows: Subcommission No. 1—conditions for and order of consultation with parties, Tounkin and Bunce; Subcommission No. 2—structure and principles of organization and political platform of Provisional Government, Generals Lebedeff and Weckerling; Subcommission No. 3—personnel and methods of assumption of power and selection of personnel, Balasanov and Joyner. Atmosphere of first reconvened session was easy, and informal. Department no doubt noted in Shtikov’s bland address at opening ceremonies 82 absence of fulminations against reactionaries or other name-calling characteristics of last year’s address, as well as emphasis on urgency of formation of provisional government. Insistence of Soviets on a political platform is a possible indication of later attempts to bind the provisional government to policies adopted in North Korea. [ Langdon ] 81 Texts of procedural decisions not printed; they were sent to the Department with despatches 10 and 11, March 28 and April 11, 1946, from Seoul, not printed. 82 Telegram 117, May 21, not printed. Dr. Robert T. Oliver to the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) 895.00/5–2347 [Document 499] Dr. Robert T. Oliver to the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) Washington , May 23, 1947. Dear General Hilldring : The United Press carries a story that the State Department has “announced emphatically” that it has no secret agreements with anybody about Korea. The purpose of the announcement was to deny an alleged claim by Dr. Rhee that he has a “secret agreement” with the State Department for establishment of a Korean government. For your information I am enclosing a copy of a press release by Colonel B. C. Limb, which I believe is self-explanatory. 83 In connection with this matter I believe that two points are of the gravest importance. First, Dr. Rhee must, of course, be very careful not to make any statements which can be misinterpreted or lifted out of context so that they seem to mean something he does not mean. As you know, it is very difficult for any public man to protect himself against this form of misinterpretation. Second, it appears to me equally important that great care should be exercised by officials of the United State government in commenting adversely upon alleged statements attributed to Dr. Rhee. We know that there are many who are eagerly desirous of misrepresenting him when they can. Sometimes this is because of bias, and sometimes it is simply the method of irresponsible newsmen to create a sensational story. I believe we both know that if Dr. Rhee’s influence with the Korean people should be undermined by official declarations, or in any other way, the best interests of both the United States and Korea would suffer. Dr. Rhee is the one stabilizing and unifying figure in Korean public life whose influence is extensive enough to hold the people together. He has used his influence to hold the more ardent nationalists in check, while the United States has time to work out a Korean solution. He has prevented the re-establishment of the old Provisional Government. He has assured the Korean people that if they will only wait a little longer, this time something satisfactory will surely emerge. He has done this when by far the easiest course would be for him to join in the demand for immediate independence at all costs. I can assure you most positively that Dr. Rhee has the strongest determination to cooperate wholeheartedly in every way to assure the success of the program for Korea as we understand it. He has been steadfast in his policies for half a century, and you may rest assured that he is not wavering now. Random comments by radio and news reporters should not be allowed to create a contrary impression. I am sure you agree with me in this, and I hope that further incidents will not again embarrass and complicate the situation. Sincerely yours, Robert T. Oliver 83 Not printed; Ben C. Limb was chairman of the Korean Commission, a private group in Washington. The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2447: Telegram [Document 500] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , May 24, 1947. 122. Cite Zpol 704. Summary of 26th meeting Joint Commission May 23 follows: Meeting opened with our proposal to rewrite last year’s decision number 2 governing joint press releases as follows: “1. The attention of the world is focused on the proceedings of the US–USSR Joint Commission. The Korean people are vitally interested in the efforts of the Joint Commission to assist in the formation of a Korean government. Recognizing these facts, the Commission resolved to publish detailed joint communiqués regarding the work of the Commission after the settlement of each major question or at other times decided by the Commissioners. Each Chief Commissioner at his discretion may meet with the press and inform them on matters not of a secret nature. 2. The proceedings of the closed sessions of the Joint Commission and of its committees, subcommittees and other subordinate agencies shall be considered secret and any matter pertaining to them will be divulged only as specified in paragraph 1 above.” Soviets rejected our proposal and argued for adoption of text of old decision on ground it worked satisfactorily. We pointed out that old arrangement for a joint communiqué after each decision was too restrictive to meet current local and world interest in Commission’s work and demands for information of numerous American and European correspondents who have come to Seoul especially to cover the Commission’s progress. Against further Soviet obduracy, we proposed to proceed without any rules concerning publicity, allowing each Chief Commissioner to use his own discretion as to how to keep the press informed without at the same time injuring the Commission’s work. The Soviets seemed taken aback and implied it might be an intention to use the press to force the hand of the other side. General Brown gave assurances that this was not his intent in seeking freedom to issue unilateral news bulletins. Debate followed for a considerable time with each side attempting, by revision of or additions to old and proposed text, to obtain agreement to its wishes. Finally General Brown proposed that last year’s decision be adopted with a minute placed on the record as follows: “Each Chief Commissioner shall have the right to meet the press at his discretion to inform it about the work of the Joint Commission not of a secret nature.” The Soviets accepted this motion, whereupon the meeting adjourned having lasted some 2½ hours. Informality and good humor continued to characterize the atmosphere of this meeting. Langdon Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2647: Telegram [Document 501] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , May 26, 1947. Zgcg 705. For Hilldring. Your State serial 92 84 appreciated. Events here and statements from Washington appear to be pushing Rhee into at least a passive position where he will not openly attempt sabotage of Joint Commission at least for the present. His extravagant claims and promises to the Koreans concerning his “complete diplomatic success” in Washington and China have put him in a bad spot at home. Contends that “trusteeship” is worse than death to his nation and preaches to all who will listen. Has never given up the idea of a “separate independent govt” for South Korea and has never properly combined in his mind the factors entering into our planning for an “iterim govt” in any case [if] the Russians do not carry out the Moscow Decision. While general trend of Koreans is a wish that Joint Commission can and will solve their problems, there is still a strong antagonism to “trusteeship” and though this is, [ sic ] Rhee has the ability to stir up real trouble. Unless he makes new moves, do not believe he should be dignified by direct personal mention by the Secretary of State. American correspondents here appear determined to discredit his views, and may give leads for official or unofficial Dept releases. Local impact of statements in Washington is heavy. Will inform you additionally if need special announcement other than those dictated by news dispatches. [ Hodge ] 84 May 21, 7 p.m., p. 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–2747: Telegram [Document 502] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , May 27, 1947. 128. Cite Zpol 714. General Hodge’s ZGCG 705 to State Dept for Hilldring 85 evidently crossed Department’s 97 of May 23 and disposed for the time being of the question of a special statement in Washington or here designed to obtained general rightist support of the Joint Commission’s work. Also such a statement may be too late to do any good as “National Unification Headquarters,” Doctor Rhee’s super pool of 26 rightist parties, yesterday memorialized the Commission directly along lines of message quoted in my telegram 115, May 21, including a particularly provocative reference to Soviet “democracy”. As and if strategic need arises for a statement, the proposed text thereof will be submitted to the Department for prior approval. Meanwhile, at General Hodge’s suggestion I passed on to Rhee in an amiable letter a paraphrase of Deptel 92, Hilldring to Hodge. 86 The following telegram from Rhee to his Washington office, just released by censorship today, suggests his evident reaction to it and probably to Department’s May 22 denial that it had any secret agreements with anybody about the future of Korea: “Released statement denying secret agreement story as smearing campaign. Hope you received my wire. One pressman sent that story. Some people here and Washington trying to discredit me but truth will indicate they trying to blur issue. You and many other Americans heard the spokesman say our six-point program was workable and US would support in forming a government for whole nation when legislature passes election laws. You heard General Hodge say our program is what he was working for and that Rhee should help pass legislation. They cannot deny it now. The best they may say is that this plan was accepted when there was no hope of reconvening Joint Commission. Regarding proposed government, General Hodge now says it will be interim and not independent. How can we without independence deal with other powers as stated in six points. They are trying to silence me here and misrepresent me abroad, but many Americans here know the facts. Legislature cannot adopt election bills. Coalition groups backed by authorities and supported by Communists hailed as moderate leftists. Some as moderate rightists are making a quorum impossible.” The purpose of the message is not clear but the last two sentences suggest that noncooperating rightists may be losing control of the situation. Langdon 85 Supra . 86 May 21, 7 p.m., p. 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–3047: Telegram [Document 503] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , May 30, 1947. 132. Cite Zpol 735. Summary of 27th meeting Joint Commission May 29, General Shtikov presiding, follows: Shtikov opened meeting by taking exception to AP article from Seoul in Stars and Stripes 25th entitled “Americans Have Gained Partial Victory”, which related to minute approved last session that each Chief Commissioner would have the right to meet with press to discuss no [ non- ] secret material. Claiming it gave wrong impression of the case, Shtikov proposed a revision of decision number 2 (concerning press releases) which would narrow the scope of what the Chief Commissioners might tell the press. We agreed to study the proposal. Next item was approval of questionnaire of structure and principles of organization of provisional govt. We had originally intended to make some revisions but, to avoid an issue over a relatively unimportant matter, yielded in Subcommission to wish of Soviet’s that the old questionnaire be adopted. Soviets then proposed like adoption of the old questionnaire on a political platform, but we indicated we desired some changes. Accordingly the Subcommission was told to examine differences and report at next Commission meeting. Shtikov then went on to what he alluded to humorously as our number one problem, that is, order of consultation with parties, which had reached an impasse in Subcommission. In latter the Soviets wanted the old decision to consult orally only 30 parties from North and South Korea to stand, and to announce beforehand the three conditions for consultation laid down in General Hodge’s letter of December 24. In view of the Marshall–Molotov agreement on wide participation of Korean parties in consultation, our policy is to place no initial numerical limitation on parties to be orally consulted provided they have membership of over 1000 and branches in two or more provinces. Determination of parties to be orally consulted, under our proposal, is to be made after all parties as just mentioned have filed their applications to be heard. Since we anticipate northern parties to be solidly Communist dictated and as the strong Communist dominated leftist political body of South Korea will have to be given a fair representation, the result of orally consulting only 30 parties would be negotiation with a predominant, if not overwhelming, Communist dictated group. Also if the three Hodge rules for consultation and exclusion therefrom are announced beforehand, we insist they should be accompanied by a reference to freedom of opinion. In view of wide disagreement, Shtikov proposed that the question be bypassed for the time being and that in meantime a joint announcement be made publishing joint communiqué number 5 together with approved questionnaires and inviting all interested parties to sign the declaration therein and make their recommendations on the questionnaires by June 20. After recess to consider the proposal, we rejected it on ground no announcement should be made until there is agreement on decision number 4 (order of consultation). Following this General Brown read a paper quoting passages in Hodge–Chistiakov and Marshall–Molotov exchanges which specifically conflicted with the idea of restrictive consultation and reiterating the American position that expressions of opinion regarding the Moscow agreement would not affect eligibility for consultation. Shtikov claimed that his proposal for an announcement now had in mind expediting the work of the Commission, that it would not influence the order of consultation, that it would start the Koreans studying their answers and that it would show them we were on the job. General Brown agreed that Shtikov’s views had much merit but declared it would be useless and cause confusion if a general invitation were extended to parties and the latter qualified themselves for consultation only to be later excluded therefrom. Meeting adjourned after agreement that at the next meeting each delegation would prepare a draft joint communiqué indicating agreement was reached on the text of communiqué number 5 with annexed questionnaires but not on methods of consultation. Shtikov also stated he would present the Soviet position on order of consultation at next meeting on 31st. Langdon The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–3047: Telegram [Document 504] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , May 30, 1947. 133. Cite Zpol 736. An off-the-record meeting of Bunce and Tounkin of Subcommission 1 on May 28 failed to resolve wide differences in point of view between US and USSR regarding consultation. USSR refused to accept American proposal to consult parties and organizations on wide basis which would include approximately 100 parties and organizations and would make eligible for consultation those who signed the agreement contained in communiqué number 5. USSR position as indicated this meeting is that tentative agreements reached year ago to consult 30 parties and organizations and to send questionnaires to other parties and organizations not orally consulted is still pending. USSR also insists on including in the decision the three points in Hodge’s December 24 letter, thus apparently accomplishing the provision contained in paragraph 2 of Chistiakov’s letter to Hodge of February 28 in reference to informing beforehand those parties and organizations selected for consultation was basis on which they would be excluded from consultations. US proposed that in addition to these three points Marshall’s statement in paragraph 2 of his letter May 2 regarding freedom of opinion be included in the text. The US proposal was entirely unacceptable to Tounkin who would not consider modifying his original position outlined above. Acceptance of USSR position would inevitably lead to conflict as to the specific parties to be orally consulted unless American delegation accepts disproportionate Communist representation. During the discussion it became quite clear that public statements of opinion by Koreans opposing the Moscow agreement in whole or in part would be interpreted by the Soviet delegation as fomenting and instigating active opposition. Further the discussion indicated that the Soviets would not consult with parties and organizations which have already publicly opposed trusteeship, although such groups would be eligible to submit their views in written form. Tounkin strongly implied that Marshall’s statement regarding freedom of opinion was not a valid part of the agreement between the Foreign Ministers in spite of the fact that the Secretary referred to it in his letter of May 13. Because of inability to reach a compromise in Subcommission, General Brown requested a formal meeting of Commission, which was held 29th. Soviet delegation stated they were not prepared to discuss the disagreement out on the matter of consultation at this meeting but would discuss it at the later meeting. General Brown read into the record our point of view, including wide consultation with all political parties and social organizations with membership over 1000. He requested reconvention on May 30 to continue discussion of the matter but Soviet delegation asked reconvention May 31 which was approved. The matters mentioned above and other trends indicate a possible Soviet policy of limiting those consulted to leftist organizations insofar as practicable and utilizing these organizations consulted as sources of procurement of personnel for the provisional government. An intimation has also been made but their ideas of this govt is a govt by Ministers appointed not elected. Langdon The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–147: Telegram [Document 505] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , June 1, 1947. 136. Cite ZPOL 749. Summary of 28th meeting Joint Commission May 31, General Shtikov presiding, follows: Meeting opened with Soviet proposal to rewrite decision number 2 relating to press relations on ground of alleged unfair press coverage of preceding sessions. This would add second article to the decision to read “each Chief Commissioner in his discretion may meet the press to inform them of the work of the Commission within the limits of the agreements reached in the Commission in order not to divulge material of a secret nature.” General Brown explained he was not responsible for speculative press reports and could not remedy them unless allowed some latitude to give correspondents an idea of what was going on. Debate followed until Brown suggested that all meetings be opened to the press or that an official Commission spokesman be designated. As this was new question, Shtikov said, he was not prepared to discuss it, but was merely seeking to prevent publication of open questions. Finally agreement was reached to rewrite pertinent passage of decision to read “the Joint Commission issues joint bulletins after each session and publishes detailed joint communiqués after the settlement of each major question or at other times decided by the Commission. The heads of the corresponding delegations at their discretion may conduct press conferences to inform the representatives of the press of the work of the Joint Commission within the limits of the joint bulletins and communiqués agreed upon and on other matters not of secret nature”. Shtikov next read statement of the Soviet position concerning consultation, gist of which follows: The Moscow agreement aims to attract Koreans to consultation so that Commission’s recommendations will interpret Korean aspirations. The order of consultation therefore is all-important in the right solution of the Commission’s task, which is the creation of the provisional govt. The current American position is not in accord with that of last year when, in opposition to the Soviet desire for broad consultation, it insisted on limiting oral consultation to 30 parties from north and south with written recommendations only from parties with inconsiderable membership. Soviets in Subcommission have defended last year’s agreement in the interest of time saving, not for any other purpose. Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction American purpose to broaden consultation, but does not understand reason for new criteria for consultation, namely that parties must have membership of over 1,000 and branches in two or more provinces as delegation does not realize perhaps the work this would involve. For example, in the north the Democratic Party has 245,000 members and the Protestant Association 6,000 members. On the American basis of one representative per thousand, 251 representatives would have to be consulted. How could the Commission handle this huge volume of work? The Soviet delegation has given thought to the question of how to attract widest consultation and thinks a party’s influence in society ought to be the ruling factor. Membership from 10,000 to 20,000 would omit many parties. As for inclusion of three conditions of consultation stipulated in Hodge letter of December 24, General Brown considers that they are not complete in themselves but must be supplemented by passages in Marshall–Molotov exchanges. Why does the American delegation now object to inclusion in the order of consultation of these three conditions? Does it disagree with them or with the Foreign Ministers’ acceptance thereof. American delegation constantly alludes to freedom of opinion. Why throw this at the Soviet delegation which itself likewise defends freedom of opinion? Soviet delegation thinks three points do not impinge on this freedom but uphold it, and therefore insists on making the three points part of the decision on order of consultation. It has no objection to the American idea of publishing the whole Foreign Ministers’ correspondence. Concluding this position Shtikov moved (1) to charge Subcommission to determine number of parties to be consulted and principles of consultation; (2) to announce three Hodge conditions for consultation; (3) to publish forthwith invitation to Korean parties to sign declaration contained in communiqué number 5 and annexed questionnaires on structure and principles of organization of provisional govt and on political platform thereof. Shtikov then read draft of his press communiqué embodying item (3) above, with June 10 as deadline for parties to sign declaration. General Brown stated the Soviet paper required study but in general provided considerable basis for solution of the question. Thereupon Shtikov pressed for publication of his communiqué, but Brown declined to publish anything on consultation until agreement had been reached on the number of parties to be consulted. Shtikov then pleaded for earliest publication solely in the interest of speed, since Molotov in his April 19 letter had charged the Commission with preparing recommendations by July or August, and argued publication now would have excellent results on Commission’s work. Brown said he appreciated need of speed and therefore best way to go about it was to reach basic agreement on number of parties to be consulted and method of consultation. At this point Shtikov asked how many parties Brown had in mind. Brown replied the Moscow agreement required all parties to be consulted but, bearing in mind there were parties with membership as low as 25, it was necessary to set certain practical standards for consultation, which was the basis for our present proposed criteria. He was willing, however, to consider any other criteria the Soviets might have in mind and was only interested in coming to an agreement on criteria. After implying once more that we were seeking to disengage ourselves from last year’s agreement, Shtikov again averred that his proposal was not to limit the number of parties to be consulted. He added (this was quite new) that after all the signed declarations were received we would have the opportunity to decide which signees to consult orally. Brown then stated categorically we did not feel bound by last year’s proceedings on this question, as there had been no conclusive agreement on it, and that unless we could come to an agreement on consultation there could never be any consultation. Brown added that Shtikov was wrong in saying that those who signed would be consulted as our later decision might well bar some signatories. Shtikov defended last year’s work, denies the Commission was [apparent omission] 20 and repeated some of his arguments. As to the idea that there might never be consultation if no agreement was reached, it must be put aside, as the Foreign Ministers had decided the Commission must submit its recommendations and therefore agreement must be reached and the Koreans consulted. Shtikov disputed the charge he was wrong in saying those who signed would be consulted, since the text of the Marshall–Molotov correspondence said signing would be considered, [apparent omission] (Hodge point number 1). Thereupon Brown asked if he would agree to consult all parties which signed. Shtikov thought this was elaborating on the conditions fixed by the Foreign Ministers. Brown then said the discussion was without any point as if Soviets were willing to consult all parties why set 30 as the limit? Shtikov then chuckled and said the limit of 30 was our last year’s brain child and not his and if we no longer liked it he agreed not to name limited number. But he pleaded for publication now of the invitation in communiqué number 5 and of the two questionnaires. Brown accordingly proposed, in view of Soviet willingness to eliminate the 30 limitation of parties to be orally consulted, that Subcommission iron out remaining differences and complete the agreement on order of consultation (decision number 4) for approval at next meeting June 2. Shtikov agreed and meeting adjourned. I have reported this meeting in some detail in order to reflect the progressive collapse of the stubborn defense in Subcommission of restrictive oral consultation and the complete surrender, in the record at least, to our insistence on leaving the question open. What the future Soviet tactics will be remains to be seen, but yesterday’s meeting gives the definite impression that the Soviet delegation is under some driving compulsion to complete something concrete in the way of plans for provisional govt within the next 2 months. Langdon Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–247: Telegram [Document 506] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 87 secret Seoul , June 2, 1947. Zgcg 754. For Gen. MacArthur. Info War Department and State Department. Subject is status of rightist parties re Joint Commission. Reopening of Joint Commission was greatest disappointment to date for Syngman Rhee and his close followers of extreme right. Rhee has for past year been making many rash promises to Koreans concerning their ability gain immediate independence and set up their own government. His activities have ranged all the way from promises of a separate government of South Korea by Korean effort alone to a planned revolt to seize governmental power from United States occupation forces during his absence from Korea December to April. His power here is centered in the old revolutionary exile group with their legendary heroic patriotism. Their battle cry since October 1945 has been “Anti-Trusteeship” based on their unilateral interpretation of the meaning of trusteeship. This slogan is a powerful weapon in Korea because the nation is so untutored in international affairs. When it was announced that the Joint Commission was to reopen, Rhee started a fire-eating campaign to be led off by extensive anti-trusteeship demonstration. A flat ban on mass political demonstrations gave him a cooling off period, during which we brought all guns to bear in an effort to get rightist consultation and cooperation with the Joint Commission. At the present there seems to be an even chance we may get results. Although I do not believe Rhee, Kim Koo and other principal exile figures will participate in consultation, it appears now that many or most rightist groups may pull away from them and will cooperate. There is no way accurately to forecast their actions until consultations get underway. Although denunciations of Rhee in the States have been effective in reducing the Rhee group clamor, I have made every attempt personally to keep from denouncing him, hoping to use his local influence and following if and when needed in future. Suggest information be passed to War and State. [ Hodge ] 87 Forwarded from Tokyo and received by the Department on June 7, 4:50 a.m. The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–447: Telegram [Document 507] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , June 4, 1947. 138. Cite Zpol 765. “Summary of 29th session Joint Commission June 2, General Brown presiding, follows: “Session opened with consideration of revision of last year’s questionnaire on political platform of provisional government, which had become deadlocked in Subcommission 2. Soviets had agreed to some minor revisions desired by US but did not yield on rewriting paragraphs 2 and 3 reading ‘2, elimination of Japanese influence—what measures should be undertaken for the elimination of the evil consequences of the prolonged Japanese domination in Korea and of the pro-Japanese elements; 3, how should excessive private concentration of the economic or political power, and the activity of reactionary antidemocratic elements and elements attempting to undermine the provisional Korean government, be prevented.’ “In paragraph 2 we wished to delete ‘and of the pro-Japanese elements’ and in 3 ‘and the activities of reactionary antidemocratic elements and elements attempting to undermine the provisional Korean government’. Our stated reasons were that the Moscow agreement charged US with the elimination of Japanese influence and not of pro-Japanese elements, which was an internal Korean question in process of solution by the Koreans themselves in South Korea, and that in any case we had completely eliminated, or were in the final stages of eliminating, in South Korea every physical or psychological trace of Japanese rule. In number 3 we thought ‘antidemocratic elements’ sufficiently descriptive for the Commission’s purposes. Actually the wording of the controversial passages in the old questionnaire is pure South Korea Labor Party (Communist) lingo, and it would at the outset align us on the Communist side. “After considerable debate we yielded over not altering the original wording of number 3 but stood pat on the question of pro-Japanese elements, to the great vexation of Shtikov who again stressed the pressure of time on the Commission’s work. Being unable to meet on this issue we passed on to the question of order of consultation with Korean parties, likewise an impasse in Subcommission over criteria for oral consultation and over the publication of Hodge’s 3 conditions for consultation without the related background and later references. Shtikov repeatedly urged publication of the invitation to consultation and of the 2 questionnaires, reiterating his assurances that after all replies from parties had been received we could agree on which parties on a wide basis as wished to consult orally. General Brown stuck to our position in the preceding meeting that there would be no formal invitation to Korean parties until the Commission had determined the standards for eligibility for oral consultation, mentioning in the course of his remarks the hypothetical figure of 108 parties which might qualify. “Debate continued inconclusively until adjournment, with question referred back to Subcommission for composing difference of view by next meeting June 4.[”] Langdon The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 695.0031/4–947 [Document 508] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) confidential No. 75 Washington , June 4, 1947. The Secretary of State transmits herewith for such action as may be deemed appropriate a copy of a letter of April 9, 1947 from the Trade Association of Korea to the Secretary of State 88 regarding the development of Korea’s foreign trade and the relationship of the U.S. Commercial Company to that trade. With respect to Korea’s foreign trade, this Government has taken the position that Korean traders should handle the shipment of Korean products to world markets to the greatest possible extent. It is not contemplated that U.S. Commercial Company assistance to Military Government in Korea in selling those Korean products abroad which cannot be handled by private traders at the present time should in any way impede the participation of Korean merchants in foreign trade. Instructions with respect to the restoration of private trade with Korea are to be published by the War Department within the immediate future, 89 and it is believed that the public announcement accompanying the issuance of such instructions should afford a satisfactory basis for reply to the Trade Association’s letter. 88 Not printed. 89 The decision on opening Korea trade was forwarded on May 29 to Seoul. Memorandum of Conversation, by Commander Allen B. Moreland of the Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas 805.01/6–647 [Document 509] Memorandum of Conversation, by Commander Allen B. Moreland of the Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas [ Washington ,] June 6, 1947. Subject: Formation of Korean Government. At his request, Dr. Robert T. Oliver of the Korean Commission, was received by General Hilldring at 4:10 P.M. on Wednesday, June 4, 1947. Dr. Oliver requested General Hilldring to give him assurances on the following points so that they could be transmitted to Dr. Rhee: 1. That the composition of the Provisional Government of Korea would be a result of free elections instead of being an appointed “Coalition Government”. 2. That the Trusteeship Plan is in fact nothing more than “Aid and Assistance”. 3. That the democratic government to be provided for Korea should be a democracy measured by the standards of the U.S. interpretation of this term. General Hilldring indicated that he could not make a statement on these points as he was a public official and statements made by him during the present proceedings of the Joint Commission would be subject to misinterpretation. General Hilldring emphasized the fact that the best way to realize the objectives of Dr. Rhee would be for him to enter into the fullest consultation with the Commission. It was pointed out that if a central government could be established for all Korea on the basis of free and fair elections, the other difficulties facing that country could be met and in due course satisfactory solution could be found for them. General Hilldring further stated that there seems to be a little question as to whether this Government wanted one Korea or two Koreas. He emphasized that it had always been the desire of the United States Government to turn one Korea over to the Koreans. Dr. Oliver requested permission to send the following cable to Dr. Rhee: “Have conferred with General Hilldring. Assures you that Korean provisional government will be established only on the basis of fair and free election. Assures that you need not now worry about trusteeship issue. He feels highly desirable that you enter into consultation with the Commission”. Authorization was not given for the transmission of this message on the ground that it would be interpreted as a statement from Washington which might have an effect on the present negotiations of the Joint Commission. The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–647: Telegram [Document 510] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , June 6, 1947. 141. Summary of 30th session Joint Commission June 4, General Brown presiding, follows: As Subcommission 1 had been unable to compose different points of view on order of consultation, the Commission as a whole took up the question but was unable to reach agreement and once again sent it back to Subcommission. Differences are on two heads: 1. Soviet insistence on incorporating Hodge’s three conditions for consultation (December 24) in the published rules of consultation, and 2. Inviting parties immediately to consultation, with publication of questionnaires, before agreement is reached on standards for oral consultation. Our position is with respect to (1) that Hodge’s three points do not stand alone, but are amendments to Chistiakov’s three points of November 26, and therefore that Molotov letter of May 10, 90 which cites both Chistiakov letter and acceptance of Hodge’s amendments thereto is the minimum which should be put in the rules if it is at all necessary to incorporate the well publicized basis of reconvention in the rules. As for the Soviet idea of a general invitation to parties to sign up for consultation, we suspect its purpose is to see first which parties will respond and then to fix the standards for oral consultation to fit parties favorable to them. Along with this line, they now propose that each consulted party be represented not by one spokesman but by several in a ration [ ratio ] to their relative membership, and that all representatives form a permanent consultative body for the Commission. We suspect that these maneuvers are aimed at securing a majority in a body that will not only dictate the writing of the charter but also supply the personnel of the provisional government. We are trying to secure advance agreement on standards for oral consultation, as the materials we have for North and South Korea indicates that in the overall picture non-Communist parties would tip the scales in any scheme for consultation of general application. Next item on the agenda was our proposal of the previous session to eliminate references to pro-Japanese elements and to activities of reactionary anti-democratic elements and elements attempting to undermine the provisional government. As the Soviets showed no disposition to yield on this point, it was put on the agenda for the next meeting on the 6th. It may be necessary for us to withdraw this proposal in order to expedite our work and for the sake of consistency with our position a year ago. Langdon 90 With regard to Molotov’s letter, see footnote 67, p. 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–747: Telegram [Document 511] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Seoul , June 7, 1947. 144. Summary of 31st meeting Joint Commission, June 6, General Brown presiding, follows: Order of consultation with parties was only question taken up. Subcommission reported progress made in resolving differences between two sides, including Soviet’s acceptance of the American position that published conditions of consultation would include Chistiakov’s proposals of November 26 as well as Hodge’s amendments of December 24. It also reported inability to reconcile positions on broad general consultation notwithstanding earlier Soviet agreement to that principle. Soviets in Subcommission had been refusing to put this principle in specific language, avoiding mandatory terms with respect to oral consultation of general application. After some opposition to our proposal to set criteria for oral consultation (tentative membership of 5,000), Soviets agreed to our alternate proposal that all parties signing the declaration in communiqué number 5 would be invited for oral consultation with Joint Commission Committees. The meeting adjourned with instructions to Subcommission to draw up the final agreement on consultation for the Commission’s approval June 7. Text will be quoted to the Department when approved. Langdon The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–947: Telegram [Document 512] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) secret us urgent Washington , June 9, 1947—7 p.m. 112. Please pass following message to General Hodge: “Owen T. Jones 91 will by now have given you details Dept plan to request Congressional authorization and appropriation $78 million grant-in-aid to Korea for FY 48, supplementing 137 million for Korea in War Dept request for relief in Occupied Areas. In anticipation presentation grant-in-aid bill to Congress, explanatory discussions now being held with Congressional leaders. In this connection and for possible use in Congressional hearings following formal presentation, your estimate effect such legislation on Joint Commission negotiations requested.” Marshall 91 Captain Jones had been with the Korean Economic Mission since September 1946. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 895.50/6–947: Telegram [Document 513] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) confidential Washington , June 9, 1947—7 p.m. 115. (Inform Bunce) Subject is first meeting of United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 92 to convene in Shanghai June 16 to plan immediate ECAFE study tasks. Instructions being sent by State Dept to Monnett Davis, 93 US rep on Commission, specify inter alia US desire that studies be undertaken which would “be of a kind to assist in the carrying out of US policies vis-à-vis Japan and Korea in relation to other territories in the Far East”. Believe it would be useful in this connection for Commission to study availability in Far East of critical raw materials and foodstuffs needed by Korea to expand her industrial production. Also useful, though perhaps less immediate, would be study of Far Eastern markets for possible Korean exports. Suggest that, if you wish to promote those studies, Hodge might wish to send staff member familiar with the problems and data involved, for brief visit to Shanghai prior to June 16 to advise Monnett Davis. Such a visit would have to be informal and outside of the ECAFE, since terms of reference of ECAFE will have to be revised at July 7 meeting in New York before USAMGIK consultation with ECAFE can take place on official basis. Suggest you contact Davis direct if interested. Request CINCFE pass to CG USAFIK ourad 167 May 9 and urad 126 May 17. 94 Sent to Seoul 95 repeated to Shanghai as 942. Marshall 92 For creation of the Commission, see Department of State Bulletin , April 13, 1947, p. 655, and June 22, 1947, p. 1198. 93 Monnett B. Davis, Consul General at Shanghai with rank of Minister. 94 Neither printed. 95 Seoul replied in telegram 152, June 12, that telegram 115 had just arrived, too late to send a representative to the Shanghai meeting, but that a complete study of Korean economic potential by the Bunce Mission was being sent by courier to Mr. Davis (895.50/6–1247). The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–947: Telegram [Document 514] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , June 9, 1947. 146. Zpol 780. Summary of 32d session Joint Commission June 7, General Brown presiding, follows: “Subcommission number 1 reported agreement reached on order of consultation with parties. This agreement examined by Commission and approved. Text which is appended hereto represents broad acceptance of our principles of unlimited oral consultation and of publication of full facts of Hodge’s three conditions for consultation. Translation and printing of invitation to consultation and of questionnaires as well as other arrangements for execution by stipulated deadlines of consultation procedures indicated in agreement are now going forward. Following approval of agreement on consultation, we moved to delete references to a ‘pro-Japanese’ and ‘reactionary’ elements in questionnaire on political platform. Specifically we proposed to rewrite article A–2 of last year’s paper as follows: ‘Elimination of Japanese influence. (1) What measures should be undertaken for the elimination of Japanese influence? (2) What measures should be taken by the Korean provisional government to classify and punish the Koreans who collaborated with the Japanese to the detriment of the Korean people?’ As for article A–3, we wanted the word ‘reactionary’ stricken out. After a recess to consider the motions, Soviet agreed to our rewording of A–2 but insisted on retention of the word ‘reactionary’ in A–3. Not to hold up our substantive work, General Brown stated, he reluctantly yielded to the Soviets and thus the questionnaire decision number 6 was approved as amended above. In committing itself to unrestricted oral consultation, the Commission is exposing itself to an immense load of work, but procedures are being devised to handle expeditiously the processing and analyzing of a maximum foreseeable volume of Korean written and oral recommendations. Attention is invited to article IX of the new agreement, providing in substance for a consultative body. This article was more or less written by the Soviets (see summary of June 4 meeting) and was accepted because of the soundness of the principle it represents. As the body may be looked upon by the Soviets as the chief source of key personnel for the provisional government, we expect a battle to develop when the questions of its compositions come up. Shtikov showed satisfaction over the prospect of concrete work, confirming our impression that he may be under instructions to produce concrete results by July or August. Text of decision number 4 on the order of consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organization[s] in northern and southern Korea follows: 1. In consulting with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, the Joint Commission shall be guided by the conditions stated in the letter of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, of May 7, 1947, and accepted by the Secretary of State of the USA, George Marshall, in his letter of May 13, 1947. 96 The appropriate quotation from the letter of Foreign Minister Molotov is given below: ‘The Soviet Commander in his letter of November 26, 1946, advanced the following proposals as a basis for the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission: (Here follows the passage of the letter citing Chistiakov’s three points and Hodge’s three proposals for amendment thereof.) With a view to expediting the resumption of the work of the Joint Commission and the creation of a temporary Korean democratic government, I am prepared to accept the amendments set forth above proposed by the American Commander.’ 2. The Joint Commission will consult with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aims and methods and which will subscribe to the following declarations: ‘We declare that we will uphold the aims of the Moscow decision on Korea as stated in paragraph 1 of this decision, namely: The reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles, and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea. Further we will abide by the decision of the Joint Commission in its fulfillment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow decision in the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government. Further we will cooperate with the Joint Commission in working out by it, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government, of proposals concerning measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the Moscow decision. Signed by . . . . . . . . . . . . representing the . . . . . . . party or organization.’ 3. Democratic parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea are hereby invited to submit their applications for participation in consultation with the Joint Commission. Every party and organization must submit only one application through its central zonal organ. The application should be accompanied by a copy of the declaration given in paragraph 2 above, duly signed and sealed with the seal of its central organ and also signed by the designated representative. The application shall contain the following information: ( a ) The full name of the party or organization, the address of its central office, the date of establishment, the membership number and location of branches, and total membership. ( b ) The full name of a designated representative given in Chinese characters and, where possible, in English and Russian translation, the place and home address. Applications for participation in consultation shall be submitted to the Joint Commission at address in Seoul or address in Pyongyang by June 23, 1947. 4. Democratic parties and social organizations of northern and southern Korea which have signed the declaration contained in paragraph 2 may submit to the Joint Commission in written form their considerations regarding the structure and principles of organization of the provisional Korean democratic government and local organs of authority (provisional charter) and also the political platform for this government may be in accordance with a questionnaire approved by the Commission. This questionnaire shall be published in the press and printed copies will be available to the Joint Commission headquarters in Duksoo Palace, Seoul, and (address) Pyongyang. The applications for considerations shall be submitted to the Joint Commission by July 1, 1947. 5. Subcommission number 1, upon receiving the applications for consultation, shall compile a list of all democratic parties and social organizations and their designated representatives of North and South Korea which have signed the declaration in paragraph 2. 6. Following the approval by the Joint Commission of the list of democratic parties and social organizations and their representatives, mentioned in paragraph 5, the Joint Commission shall convene in Seoul on June 25, 1947 a joint meeting to which it shall invite the above-mentioned representatives of parties and social organizations in South Korea. A similar meeting of representatives of parties and social organizations in North Korea shall take place in Pyongyang on June 30, 1947. The Chief Commissioner of the Soviet delegation shall preside over the meeting in Seoul, and the Chief Commissioner of the American delegation shall preside at the meeting at Pyongyang. In such meetings the chief of the delegation in whose zone the Assembly is being held will present a statement elaborated by the Joint Commission. 7. Representatives of parties and social organizations of both northern and southern Korea which are included in the list referred to in paragraph 5 above will be invited to individual oral consultation regarding the structure and principles of organization of the Korean provisional democratic government and loyal [ local ] organs of authority (provisional charter) and also regarding the political platform for this government. For this purpose the Joint Commission will appoint the necessary numbers of subcommittees and shall notify each representative of the time and place he is to appear for consultation. Oral consultation shall commence on July 5, 1947 and take place in Seoul and Pyongyang. 8. The Joint Commission will present the considerations and proposals received from the Korean democratic parties and social organizations of North as well as South Korea for study and elaboration of coordinated proposals to the corresponding subcommissions which will create, for this purpose, the necessary members of subcommittees. Advisors, experts and technical personnel for the work in the joint subcommissions and subcommittees will be appointed by the heads of the corresponding delegations. 9. For the purpose of consultation and aiding the Joint Commission in elaboration by it of recommendations regarding the structure and principles of organization of the Korean provisional democratic government or the local organs of authority (provisional charter) and also the political platform for his government, representatives of parties and social organizations shall be invited from among parties and organizations included in the list mentioned in paragraph 5. The number of such representatives of various parties and organizations shall be determined by the Joint Commission in accordance with their membership and, as far as possible, taking into account their influence. The Joint Commission shall convene joint meeting with such representatives and may also call upon them to take part in the elaboration of recommendations by subcommissions and subcommittees. The time and the agenda of the joint sessions of the Joint Commission with such representatives will be appointed by the Chief Commissioners. 10. Democratic parties and social organizations of both northern and southern Korea shall have equal rights and opportunities in consultation with the Joint Commission. 11. The coordinated proposals elaborated by the subcommissions shall be submitted for consideration to the Joint Commission which shall examine such proposals and shall grant its provisional approval. Following this the Joint Commission shall appoint a Drafting Commission to which it shall give the necessary instructions regarding the compilation of the final text of the recommendations concerning the structure and principles for organization of the Korean provisional democratic government and local organs of authority (provisional charter) and also the political platform for his government. The texts of recommendations elaborated by the Drafting Commission shall be approved by the Joint Commission. 12. Following the approval of the texts of recommendations submitted by the Drafting Commission, the Joint Commission shall proceed with elaboration of recommendation regarding the personnel of the Korean provisional democratic government.” Langdon 96 See telegram 1155, May 12, 8 p.m., to Moscow, p. 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1247: Telegram [Document 515] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , June [11?], 1947. Cite Zpol 792. State serial 45 (29 March 1946) 97 requested suggestion in revising par 4 b SWNCC 176/18. 98 Following are combined views as presently held of Political Adviser and Joint Commission in which Hodge concurs: 4 b (SWNCC 176/18) assigns Joint Commission most pressing political task, establishment of provisional Korean government. Present position of American delegation in general is that provisional government embodying basic democratic concepts will be government of united Korea, capable of: (1) Maintaining unimpaired efficiency and useful services of government. (2) Integrating under supervision of Joint Commission zonal laws and ordinances paragraph 3. Providing satisfactory vehicle for bridging interim period prior to inauguration of permanent government utilizing present South Korean Government expanded as framework and pattern. Solution of fundamental problems vital to welfare of all or most Koreans, such as land reform, definition of pro-Japanese collaborationism, ownership and operation of industry, etc., while regarded by American delegation extremely important are visualized as largely functions of a permanent government for final solution, preferably after mature discussion by a nationally elected legislature. American delegation will urge in Joint Commission forming of provisional Korean government by electoral processes including free elections by secret ballot and freely chosen multi-party slates of candidates. However, it is almost a foregone conclusion that Russians will disagree with this basis. Already General Lebedeff has informed a member of American delegation that Soviets favor appointment of members of Korean provisional democratic government. Soviet tactics both during this and last year’s meetings further belief that Soviets will maintain this stand. However, Lebedeff stated that USSR favored election of national legislature during life of provisional Korean democratic government which probably is indicative of Soviet optimism in gaining control of provisional government. Two other feasible methods of forming the provisional government besides electoral approach described above are: (1) fusion of two existing zonal legislatures which would elect provisional government and (2) appointment of provisional government by Joint Commission followed by general election to select legislature and provisional and lower officials. In all three methods described legislatures generally representative of the will of the Korean people will probably be in existence. Although any calculations at this time concerning system of permanent government is frankly a leap in the dark, it appears reasonable to suppose that permanent government will grow out of legislative appointment. As to type and structure of both provisional and permanent governments, general form should not differ radically from present interim South Korean Government, with ministers or directors of departments as there is some doubt whether USSR delegation will accept our proposal for a president or chief of state particularly if rightist or center (or coalition of both) control is in sight. Indications were that Soviets favored last year a Council of Ministers with senior minister acting as a sort of premier. Soviets are expected to press for a highly centralized government with intention of communizing Korea. US position favors greatest possible decentralization and autonomy for provincial governments. Politically immature Koreans probably will be strongly influenced along oriental lines and despite their experience with a tyrannical dynasty and domination by Japanese will in the end gravitate toward a highly centralized government while giving lip service to “democracy” which they understand in practical effect only vaguely. Views of American delegation of the Joint Commission concerning these questions will hardly crystallize prior to consideration of questionnaires submitted by Koreans on the provisional charter and political platform of provisional government and plans for integration, and probably not until the political color of provisional government is decided and reaction of Koreans to this government is learned. Therefore, appreciation of these factors is essential in consideration of this discussion. Measures for helping and assisting political, economic and social progress of Korean people presumably will be taken by both US and USSR in event Joint Commission is successful and permanent Korean government is established under paragraph 3 of Moscow decision. It is impossible at this time to estimate with any accuracy extent of aid and assistance in face of so many variables. Our national policy will probably insist on minimum allocation of US resources for an independent Korean government. Russians will probably press for equal participation in any aid and assistance granted permanent Korean government until basis is worked out. They then can be expected to offer only token aid. They may conceivably also have withdrawn most of their forces by that time. In any event, US policy for Four Power trusteeship, viewed in light of our present knowledge of events, should be barest minimum impingement on the sovereignty of Korea, with only such necessary nominal supervision as should be exercised by Joint Commission, or similar body, associated with a strong United States Embassy Mission which will naturally evolve in sequence of events. [ Langdon ] 97 Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 654 . 98 January 28, 1946, ibid. , p. 623 . The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1147: Telegram [Document 516] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , June 11, 1947. 149. Zpol 793. “Summary of 33rd meeting of Joint Commission June 11th General Shtikov presiding, follows: “Agreement was reached on manner of distribution and handling in North and South Korea of questionnaires and of declaration set forth in joint communiqué number 5, and on simultaneous release June 12th in North and South Korea of joint communiqué number 11 reciting decision number 4 reached June 7th on order of consultation with parties and social organizations. “Agreement was also reached on as [ an ] accord, proposed in Subcommission number 3, between American and Soviet delegations to exchange detailed written data on the structure, functions and directing personnel of the executive, legislative and judiciary organs of authority of North and South Korea. A short questionnaire accompanied the accord for the guidance of each delegation in preparing this data. The information obtained in this way is to be used as a basis for studying the integration of the two administrations. “At a dinner party given last night by the Soviet delegation in honor of General Hodge and the American delegation, marked by exceptional informality and apparent cordiality, General Shtikov in the course of a toast intimated he expected proposals for the provisional government to be completed by the end of August. While it is possible his expectation may be premised on success of his own plans for the provisional government, his toast is another indication of his seeming earnest desire that the reconvened Joint Commission produce something concrete in the next few weeks.” Langdon The Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1347: Telegram [Document 517] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , June 13, 1947. 151. Zpol 801. Feeling of General Hodge and Joint Commission is that any local effect of Korean Grant-Aid legislation would probably be favorable and believe it should be pushed. They believe, however, that provision should be made for adoption of program to whole of Korea in line with later Joint Commission recommendations or for suspension pending adjustment to Four Power Agreement on measure of aid and assistance. Penfield concurs. 99 [ Langdon ] 99 The Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs was on a visit to Korea. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1947: Telegram [Document 518] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , June 19, 1947. 160. Cite Zurc 518. 34th meeting of Joint Commission held p.m. 18 June, General Brown, Chairman. Jacobs 1 was introduced as succeeding Langdon and Jones as succeeding Joyner. 2 Detailed agenda and arrangements approved for formal meeting on 25 June. Provision made for maximum of 300 invited delegates and 200 guest spectators in addition to press. Program entirely formal and will include music by US Army band and address by General Brown. Text of address not yet completely agreed in Subcommission 1. Anticipated that General Shtikov will give address in Pyongyang on 30 June identical to address of General Brown in Seoul on 25 June. General Brown stated that about 260 organizations had picked up questionnaires in South Korea. 3 Soviet had no information from North Korea on this matter, but expect it on June 19 when Lebedeff is due to return from Pyongyang to Seoul. Joint bulletin was agreed. Text will be sent in separate radio. 4 [ Hodge ] 1 For appointment of Joseph E. Jacobs as Political Adviser in Korea, see Department press release of May 29, Department of State Bulletin , June 15, 1947, p. 1178. For Department press release on Joint Commission’s procedure to consult Koreans, issued June 12, see ibid. , June 22, 1947, p. 1247. 2 Calvin N. Joyner had been assisting with economic matters. 3 In telegram 168, June 24, from Seoul, the number who filed applications was given as 423, “predominantly rightist although one large rightist group, the Rapid Realization Youth Party, did not file an application” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2447) 4 Telegram 161 not printed. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–1247: Telegram [Document 519] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret Washington , June 19, 1947—8 p.m. 123. Urtel 5 giving combined advice on selection of Korean provisional Govt of great interest and value to Dept. We agree that selection of provisional Govt by electoral processes is desirable particularly from a policy viewpoint and therefore approve your taking initial position as indicated. Because of Soviet opposition and because Korean lack of experience in participation democratic elections presents obvious practical difficulties we realize you may have to recede from your initial position. In that event you should press for agreement to your first alternative providing for election of the provisional Govt by the joint action of the two existing zonal legislatures, due weight being given to the fact that the southern legislature speaks for over ⅔ of the Korean population. It is appreciated that the Russians may argue that the Moscow Agreement makes no provisions for the election of the provisional Govt and that you may finally be compelled to agree to appointment by the Joint Commission of the provisional Govt. In such case you should insist upon the system mentioned in your alternative 2 for a general election as soon as possible following the appointment of the Govt. Following is for your background information. If no agreement for a general election of a provisional Govt is reached in the Joint Commission at the time its recommendations are referred to the four Govts for approval this Govt will insist upon agreement among the Four Powers, as a condition precedent to our approval, that definite provision be made for holding a general election at the earliest practicable date, such election to be either for a legislature which in turn will select a Govt or for direct election of the personnel of the Govt. In taking the foregoing position Dept is fully aware of the validity of your estimate regarding political immaturity of Koreans and danger of their gravitation towards highly centralized Govt. We appreciate that sounder progress is made in implanting democracy in countries previously inexperienced in democratic methods by confining elections at first to selection of provisional and local legislative bodies and officials but it is feared that political exigencies will not permit of a long-term program at this time. In case it becomes necessary that provisional Govt be appointed by Joint Commission personnel should be selected from among Korean leaders on a representative basis. At the time the Joint Commission makes such appointments it would be our intention to announce publicly that such Govt is in fact provisional and is to remain in office only until a Govt is selected by electoral processes. Possibility might then be considered of forming interim national legislature by fusion of two existing zonal legislatures. Such interim legislature to be charged with preparing regulations for elections as soon as possible of provincial legislatures and provincial and lower officials. At same time interim legislature should prepare for election of national legislature to be held as soon as practicable after elections of local bodies and officials. In all elections, local provincial and national, it should be made absolutely certain that they be carried out by secret ballot from freely chosen multi-party slates of candidates. In order that no charge can later be made of undue pressure from the outside such elections might well be supervised by a commission of the UN which would not include any nationals of the Four Powers signatory to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. Dept would appreciate your comments on above suggestions in light of local conditions. Marshall 5 Zpol 792, June 11, p. 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2047: Telegram [Document 520] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret urgent Seoul , June 20, 1947. 163. Cite Zpol 821. On June 18 paid courtesy calls on the President of the Assembly Kimm Kiusik and Civil Administrator Ahn Chai Hong. Kimm told me (what he had already told General Hodge the day before) that the Russians would soon request release of all political prisoners in South Korea and then went on to say that he was much concerned about the elections, first, because he did not like the Russian election system prescribed in North Korea and, second, he feared results of an election in the south under existing police control and collaborators with Japanese. Understand that for some time Kimm has expressed dissatisfaction with the present police system in the south. Ahn Chai Hong revealed more serious struggle going on in the minds of Korean leaders who are afraid of the Russians and worried about Dr. Rhee’s attitude. He referred first to the situation in Hungary and inquired whether the US after having reached what might appear to be satisfactory agreement with the Soviet with respect to Korea would do anything if the Soviet began to support Korean Communists in their efforts to gain control. Tried to point out that the situations in Hungary and Korea were not the same but he could not be reassured because he feels that Soviet influence and power are on the up and up while ours are on the downgrade. As he is friendly towards the US, his misgivings are serious since they indicate that friendly group of Korean leaders are falling for Soviet propaganda to the effect that Soviet influence and power is increasing while that of the US is on the wane. Ahn then referred to Dr. Rhee’s statement (see Seoul PolAd No. 162, June 20 6 ) that differences existed between the State and War Departments with respect to Korea. He wanted to know whether there was any truth in that statement and inquired whether US would continue through Joint Commission to set up provisional government if rightists refused to cooperate. Assured Ahn that knew of no disagreement between State and War with respect to the policy of the US toward Korea and stated that insofar as I was aware the US through Joint Commission would continue its efforts, of [ in? ] keeping with Moscow agreement with respect to Korea, to set up provisional government and otherwise carry out the directives of that agreement regardless of the attitude of the rightists even though their noncooperation would make our task more difficult. If Department has any observations to make in the premises both General Hodge and [Brown] would appreciate receiving same. Jacobs 6 Not printed; Dr. Rhee was reported by a Korean newspaper to have advised rightists not to split in regard to cooperating with the Joint Commission, as this would play into the hands of leftists (895.01/8–2047). The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2047: Telegram [Document 521] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , June 20, 1947. 164. Cite Zpol 822. Few days ago General Brown by letter asked General Shtikov to appoint group from his delegation to confer with corresponding group from our side to discuss problems which must necessarily arise when North and South Korea are united, such as problems relating to unified transportation, communications, finance, food collection and distribution, currency, et cetera. In his reply, General Shtikov declined stating that while such problems are important, they are not sufficiently important for discussion at this time as such discussion would delay our efforts to submit to our governments recommendations in accord with point 2 of the Moscow Agreement, and only month and half remain in which to select personnel and to submit such recommendations. This last observation with respect to time seems to indicate that in his mind Joint Commission is expected to submit by August 1 general recommendations with respect to setting up of provisional government, leaving many details to be settled later. Jacobs The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.01/6–2047: Telegram [Document 522] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State restricted Seoul , June 20, 1947. 165. Cite Zpol 5219. Reurtel 119, June 17. 7 Following is text of ordinance 141, May 17: (title) “Designation of South Korean Interim Government”. (Body of ordinance). “Pending action on the subject matters hereof by the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and the enactment of legislation pursuant thereto, the following shall govern: Section 1. Designation of element of government. The Korean elements of United States Army Military Government in Korea concerned with governing Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude including the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches, are hereby designated as South Korean Interim Government. Section 2. Effective date. This ordinance shall be effective on the date appearing hereon. Recommended: Ahn Chai Hong Civil Administrator. Approved: Archer L. Lerch, etc.” Jacobs 7 Not printed; it inquired about the change of name of USAMGIK (895.01/6–1747). The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2647: Telegram [Document 523] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , June 26, 1947. 170. Number Zurc 834. Thirty-fifth meeting of Joint Commission held afternoon 25 June at the Capitol Building, Seoul. General Shtikov chairman. In attendance were about 425 designated representatives of the political parties and social organizations of South Korea plus about 200 invited guests and the press. Appropriate music was furnished by the Seoul Symphony Orchestra. General Brown made speech informing representatives of the purpose and procedure of consultation. 8 Following the speech the delegation shook hands with all representatives. Much cordiality between the Soviets and a large number of the Korean representatives was evident. Copies of speech being airmailed to Plans and Operations Division War Department with request copy be furnished State Dept. Deadline for submission of answers to questionnaires has been changed to 5 July and beginning of oral consultation 7 July. Soviet delegation depart for North Korea today leaving Mr. Tounkin to continue work in Subcommission No. One on final list of organizations to participate in consultation. US delegation will depart for North Korea 29 June. Results of analysis of political orientation of organizations and effect on US position will be sent in later radio. 9 Jacobs 8 For text of statement by General Brown on June 25 and by General Shtikov on June 30, see Korea’s Independence , p. 45. 9 Infra . Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 895.00/6–2647: Telegram [Document 524] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , June 26, 1947. 171. Nr. Zgcg 835. Reference PolAd ’s 168, June 24. 10 Three political parties and 35 social organizations all leftists filed applications in North Korea with declared membership about 13,000,000. Final tabulation for South Korea now increased by two additional parties to total of 425 with declared membership of 62,000,000. Last estimated population all Korea is only about 30,000,000; the declared membership in both North and South Korea of approximately 75,000,000 obviously indicated duplication and padding. While our experts are attempting to prepare careful breakdown of both groups and declared membership, tentative estimate for all Korea indicates that declared membership is roughly 55 per cent rightist and 45 per cent leftist but this slight advantage of the rightists is apparent only because leftists, due to Soviet pressure especially in North Korea, constitute a well integrated bloc with definite program whereas rightists are seriously divided as to regards both leaders and policies with some rightist leaders, for instance Doctor Rhee, completely out for purposes of joint consultation. 11 This division and corresponding discord among rightist[s] seems due partly to congenital inability of Koreans to integrate themselves into large political groups except under all powerful pressure such as exerted by the Russians in North Korea and partly, especially recently, to growing fear among rightist leaders that the United States might not be willing or even able to assist in stemming the Communist tide. While we endeavor to combat the situation as best we can, this statement of the problem focuses attention on one of the difficulties facing the American members of the Joint Commission. [ Hodge ] 10 See footnote 3, p. 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] . 11 In telegram 175, June 27, from Seoul, Mr. Jacobs reported that the groups led by Rhee and Kim Koo totaled about 5,500,000, although some of these might be represented in other groups which had filed applications (895.00/6–2747). The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2047: Telegram [Document 525] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret Washington , June 27, 1947—7 p.m. 127. Urtel 163 June 20. Your assurances to Ahn relative agreement between State and War on US policy toward Korea well founded. Appropriate portions of Deptel 92 May 21 may be used in whatever manner you see best as a basis for assurances to Koreans that Gen. Hodge is carrying out policy of this Govt and as refutation of statements to effect Command is operating on basis of policy at variance with that of Dept. (urtel 162 June 20 12 ) It should be made clear to Koreans that US policy toward Korea will not change so long as there is evidence USSR adheres to principles Moscow Agreement and is taking constructive steps with us in accomplishing purposes and aims of Moscow Agreement. Marshall 12 See footnote 6, p. 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 520 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2847: Telegram [Document 526] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Seoul , June 28, 1947. 176. Cite Zur[c] 839. During discussions on June 27 in Subcommission of arrangements for consultation with representatives of parties and organizations, which hitherto had been proceeding smoothly, Tounkin, in connection with preparation of list of those to be consulted, announced that Soviet delegation would insist on exclusion of all parties opposing trusteeship and named eight parties specifically, all rightists or with rightist leanings with declared membership totalling about 3,000,000, which would cut deeply into rightists’ availability for consultation and might drive all rightists to boycott the Joint Commission. He went on to say that his delegation also reserved the right to insist on the exclusion of other organizations later if it appeared that such were opposing trusteeship or the Moscow agreement. Bunce pointed out that under the terms of the Marshall–Molotov exchange of notes only the Joint Commission could exclude organizations from consultation and then only for cause stated, and asked for an adjournment. American delegates discussed matter and decided the Subcommission first should meet following day June 28 to get an approved list (even with Soviet reservations) for submission to Joint Commission, and second, to attempt to persuade Soviets to drop insistence upon their viewpoint, or failing that to get a clearer statement of their position for consideration by the Joint Commission in Pyongyang next week. Subcommission met today and in quite lengthy discussion Soviet delegates admitted that anti-trusteeship activities prior to signing declaration prescribed in communiqué Five did not constitute bar to consultation but they insisted that all parties and organizations, approximately 35 and all rightists, which formed an anti-trusteeship committee last January be refused consultation unless they declare that they are no longer members of that committee. They also refuse to approve a list and arrangements for consultation until this matter is settled. Matter will be discussed again next week in Pyongyang first by Subcommission and then if necessary by Joint Commission. Matter is serious because if Soviet position prevails most participating rightists, who are at best lukewarm to cooperation under Moscow agreement, will probably refuse to make public statements required and withdraw leaving only leftists with whom to consult. That is what Soviet delegates wish. Position of American members is that mere membership in an anti-trusteeship committee organized months ago does not constitute per se active opposition to Moscow agreement by organizations signing declaration prescribed in communiqué 5, and that Joint Committee should proceed with consultation, taking up individual cases on their merits as they arise. Soviet proof of instigation and fomentation of opposition can then be considered with each case and referred if necessary to Joint Commission as provided. If Soviet delegates continue to insist, this new development has in it the makings of a deadlock as they cannot be permitted to impose new conditions not agreed upon. Jacobs The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6–2847: Telegram [Document 527] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret u.s. urgent Washington , July 2, 1947—noon. 135. Urtel 176, June 28. Dept fully agrees your view as to seriousness of Soviet position in Subcommission on June 27 that all parties opposing trusteeship should be excluded from consultation. Dept believes there can be no compromise on this issue. As stated in Secretary’s letter to Molotov of May 2 the US Govt holds that representatives of Korean parties and social organizations “shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean government because of opinion they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future government of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission.” Dept concurs in position of American members reported last para urtel and authorizes you to stand firm on this point. Marshall General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State 895.00/7–247: Telegram [Document 528] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State secret priority Tokyo , July 2, 1947. C 53768. The following message from General Hodge, ComGen USAFIK. Message in two parts: “Subject is conditions in Korea. Part I. Political. In my opinion the Korean situation is more precarious today than at any time since the occupation began. During the year that the Joint Commission was recessed, the Russians have worked diligently in developing a stronger Comintern fifth-column in South Korea and strengthening the Soviet hold in North Korea. During last summer and winter they apparently helped reorganize and re-equip the Chinese Communist army in Manchuria and trained a North Korean Communist army of at least 150,000 most of which is now being battle-seasoned in Manchuria. The ill-timed attempt at Communist revolution last September–October in South Korea showed a lack of strength in the cell organization. This weakness has now been in considerable degree overcome by eliminating the name ‘Communist Party’ and the extension of its control to include wider and more powerful front organizations and in unceasing and increasing propaganda to discredit the United States efforts and win the following of all malcontents and refugees in South Korea. This effort has been reinforced by well trained and well indoctrinated assistance infiltrating from North Korea plus considerable funds and some weapons and munitions smuggled in. Large amounts of printed Marxist doctrine in Korean have been imported and distributed with telling effect. Abortive efforts by Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo and followers to put the old provisional government group in power, plus their continued and senseless anti-trusteeship agitation, have driven large numbers of Liberals into the Communist controlled (leftist) camp and have thus strengthened Communist propaganda aimed at destruction of all the rightist groups. The reconvening of the Joint Commission was the signal for intensely renewed political activity, chicanery and scramble for power. The great desire in the minds of the masses for a united country and their own government, makes most Koreans anxious to see the work of the Joint Commission succeed. The Syngman Rhee propaganda against trusteeship makes the word synonymous with communism and Russian control and greatly confuses a politically infantile people. They are made to feel that if they cooperate with the Joint Commission they are joining the leftist camp and favoring communism. There is strong indication that several rightist groups who signified intention to cooperate with the Joint Commission are doing so to ‘fight the trusteeship’ rather than in an effort to help the negotiators implement the Moscow decision. The result is that the Communist controlled left wing is being greatly strengthened by middle of the road and former rightist followers. With the ‘extremist psychology’ of the Koreans it appears impossible to develop any truly moderate political strength. The rightists offer nothing except ‘anti-trusteeship’. The Communists offer history’s finest civil liberties and ‘democratic’ window dressing to an uninitiated people through thousands of ardent and well trained salesmen. The Korean has no knowledge of where Communist leadership will take him. He does, however, reach for the fulfillment of the rainbow promises of free land and share the wealth. This increase in the leftist strength creates a situation more and more hostile to the American type of democracy, making the task of the American delegation on the Joint Commission more difficult. It is also bringing the rightists into a frustration complex as they watch their sworn enemies grow stronger and watch the advent of Communistic control in Korea grow closer. The situation becomes more explosive each day. If the Joint Commission fails, I expect to see terrorism by both factions begin on a scale that may approach an oriental style civil war and an early attempt by the Communists to carry out their much talked of ‘spontaneous uprising of the masses’. The Soviets have already laid the groundwork for extensive physical activity by their fifth-column and may be expected to reinforce it heavily. The Communist controlled groups have full confidence that the Joint Commission will result in a full-fledged Communist government for Korea. The rightist groups have no confidence in anything except the belief that they are going to have to fight for democratic independence either now or later. ‘Trusteeship’ is still the most dangerous word in all the Korean language. The work of the Joint Commission has not developed far enough to estimate chances of its full success, but it can safely be said that the Russians have not changed their goal which is to hold Korea as a Communist satellite loyal to the Soviet and to insure Soviet use of Wonsan and Chinnampo [as] Soviet ports. Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, with die-hard memories of the extreme right, are reportedly planning widespread disturbance in hope that they can cause break-up of the Joint Commission and get me removed from Korea, particularly the latter. The Communists will welcome such activity in hope that United States will get disgusted and remove all troops from Korea. Part II. Economics. Economically, general improvement has been slow. Koreans are hungry but not starving, they are clothed but not well-dressed, their housing and employment are reaching a serious condition due to great increases in population. Economic recovery is delayed by division of the nation, by political turmoil and slow arrival of vital civilian supplies. Inflation is again progressing after a few months hold-the-line reprieve early this year. Some type of grant-in-aid over and above current concept of GARIOA funds is essential for any real progress toward economic stability. Thievery against Americans, both federal and personal property, by Koreans is increasing so rapidly as to be a major concern. This, as well as many other problems including feeding, housing and employment of Koreans, is aggravated by the constant and heavy flow of indigent refugees from Soviet zone.” Hodge [ MacArthur ] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–247: Telegram [Document 529] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , July 2, 1947. Zgcg 851. American delegation of Joint Commission arrived in Pyongyang station at 0800, 30 June. It was welcomed by General Shtikov, a Russian band and escort of honor. No Koreans were present or visible in the near vicinity of the station which was heavily guarded. General Brown and the American Commissioners were conducted to a house which had been prepared for their use and the remainder of the American delegation to a hotel. General Brown called on General Korotkov 13 at 1000, interview was without incident and lasted 30 minutes. Korotkov informed General Brown he could go wherever he wished and see whomever he pleased. Joint Commission met at 1400 with General Korotkov presiding. Present were members of both delegations, the Soviet staff, Korean officials of North Korea and the Soviet and Korean press of North Korea. Speeches by Korotkov, Brown and Shtikov. American press was not present due to absence of authority from Soviet Command. At 1630 American and Soviet delegation with Korean notables including Kim Il Sung 14 reviewed a crowd of demonstrators estimated at 50,000. These demonstrators carried streamers and banners with party legends, numerous Russian and Korean flags, and pictures of Stalin and Kim Il Sung. No US flags were visible. Speeches by the Korean notables to the crowd were received with loud acclamation. They were political in nature and followed the current Communist Party line in Korea in every respect. As far as could be determined from translation, not a single kind word was spoken concerning the Americans. After the speeches the demonstrators passed the reviewing stand in a parade which lasted over 2 hours. The entire ceremony was well organized, well conducted and without disorder. Most of the demonstrators were youthful and included many females. The enthusiasm seemed genuine. At 2030 the American delegation was entertained at the Soviet Officers’ Club by a chorus of about 30 voices and an orchestra, all of the Red Army. Present also were Russian officers and dependents, no Koreans. The performance was excellent and was thoroughly enjoyed. The 36th meeting of the Joint Commission is being held at 1400 July 1 in Pyongyang. This is the counterpart to the meeting which was held Seoul on 25 June. The Joint Commission will meet the representatives of the parties and social organizations of North Korea. Hodge 13 Lt. Gen. G. P. Korotkov had replaced Col. Gen. Chistiakov in March as Commanding General of Soviet Forces in North Korea. 14 Head of North Korean regime and former officer in Soviet Army. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–347: Telegram [Document 530] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , July 3, 1947. 179. Cite Zpol 853. For Jacobs. Thirty-sixth meeting of Joint Commission held at Pyongyang P.M. July 1, General Brown chairman. In addition to the Commissioners present were approximately 60 Russians, 15 members of the American delegation, 150 Korean spectators including the North Korean Press. This was the formal meeting with the representatives of the northern political parties and social organizations, 38 in number. Kim Doo Bong 15 although not a representative was seated with the representatives in a most prominent location. Total attendance about 265. The program followed faithfully the corresponding meeting in Seoul which was held on P.M. 25th June (35th meeting). General Shtikov gave the address of the day identical in text to that given by General Brown in Seoul. Meeting was well managed and impressive although due to the smaller attendance and less elaborate surroundings it was not so impressive as the June 25th meeting in Seoul. Practically all of the Korean representatives were youthful. A successful effort was made to feature Kim Il Sung shaking hands with General Brown in the pictures which were taken at the close of the meeting. Tentatively, schedule for second July is a business meeting to discuss the list of parties and organizations and schedule to be approved for oral consultation. Ends Jacobs’ message. Hodge adds: Report from Pyongyang as of 1530, 2nd July, 1947, states Soviets are trying to eliminate Chamber of Commerce and all such similar organizations from consulting and that they make charges that all rightist groups who have in the past been identified with a so-called “anti-trusteeship association” are guilty of instigating and fomenting active opposition in connection with the anti-trusteeship demonstration of 23rd June. Report says Soviet attitude “firm”. It is becoming more apparent that the Russians are aware that all rightist and most middle of the road groups oppose “trusteeship” and that they will use this “opposition to the Moscow decision” to the fullest to eliminate all opponents of Soviet democracy from consultation. I am certain that no rightist group has changed its basic opposition to “trusteeship”. All who agreed to cooperate in the Joint Commission did so to help get provisional government that will oppose “trusteeship” as Koreans understand it or get “helping and assisting” trusteeship as the Moscow decision indicates it could be. The word is as obnoxious today as it ever was and I feel sure that many if not most rightist groups will bolt consultation the minute they feel that “freedom of expression” is endangered. Clarification of the concept of “trusteeship” by State or by Joint Commission would help situation. Reports from our delegation in North Korea and the liaison officers there, combined with an interview by General Brown with Cho Man Sik, the great Korean leader held in protective custody by Soviets, indicate that so far as consultation on the North Koreans is concerned we will get nothing except the arrest of Communist demands for the form, operation and personnel of the provisional government. 16 It is my personal belief that the Joint Commission has little chance of success on any basis acceptable to the United States except possibly through the formation of provisional government by free and supervised universal suffrage which there is no indication the Russians will accept. There is growing trend of information from North Korea to the effect that the Russians do not expect or intend the Joint Commission to succeed, although I have little doubt they will cooperate fully so long as they have their way. [ Hodge ] 15 Head of North Korean Party and Vice Chairman of regime. 16 Apparently garbled. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–347: Telegram [Document 531] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , July 3, 1947. 180. Zurc 857. Thirty-seventh meeting of Joint Commission held 1400 July 2 at Joint Commission offices Pyongyang, General Brown Chairman. This was a business meeting to attempt to reach agreement on the final list of organizations to be invited for consultation scheduled to begin on 7 July. Subcommission No. 1 had failed to reach agreement after several meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang. At this meeting Mr. Tounkin, the Soviet chairman of Subcommission No. 1, outlined the Soviet position, which was fully supported by General Shtikov throughout the Joint Commission meeting. The Soviet position is briefly as follows: First, organizations not political or social in nature such as Chambers of Commerce cannot be consulted; second, all organizations of a local nature which do not have a central zonal headquarters, specifically district organizations, cannot be consulted; third, organizations expressly organized to oppose the Moscow decision or affiliates of such an organization cannot be consulted. In this connection the anti-trusteeship committee including about 15 rightist political parties which have applied for consultation was cited by name. The US position had been made in Subcommission No. 1 and continued in the Joint Commission meeting is as follows: The criteria as expressed in joint decision No. 12 and published to the Korean people for inclusion in the lists for consultation required only signature to the declaration of communiqué 5. The present Soviet proposals are an unwarranted attempt to amend and pervert not only Joint Commission decision 12, but also the agreement between Marshall and Molotov. The Soviet position obviously has the objective of eliminating the non-Communist predominance in South Korean representation. It is fundamental and basically the same issue on which the Commission broke up 1946. Soviet proposed consultation begin 7 July with those parties who are not barred from consultation under the principle enunciated by them as quoted above. This proposal was rejected by the American delegation. General Brown met General Shtikov at 1000 July 3 at his request. Brief discussion only was had of the issue. No progress was made. Commission meets at 1330 July 3 to continue discussion. Irrespective of result, American delegation plans to depart for Seoul 1800, July 3. General Shtikov stated that Soviet delegation would depart for Seoul so as to arrive about 0800 July 7. Jacobs The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–447: Telegram [Document 532] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , July 4, 1947. 181. Zurc 859. Thirty-eighth meeting of Joint Commission held 1330, 3 July, at Pyongyang. Discussion of 37th meeting on final list of organizations to be invited for consultation was continued. In discussion General Brown made a comprehensive statement of the US position on board [ broad ] consultation and freedom of expression. Statement included pertinent extracts from the Hodge–Chistiakov and Marshall–Molotov correspondence, and concluded that all parties and social organizations who sign the declaration in communiqué 5 are eligible for consultation; furthermore, their eligibility cannot subsequently be compromised except by proof of an overt act of fomenting or instigating active opposition against the Moscow decision or one of the Allied Powers. The Soviet delegation requested time to study the text of General Brown’s statement and recommended it be further discussed at the next meeting. General Brown then pointed out that it is well known that the political alignment in Korea is divided between right and left in about 3 to 2 ratio, and that the Soviet proposals generally have the effect of eliminating the right. 17 General Brown added that he did not contend that such an effect was intended by the Soviets; however, it would be contrary to the intent of the Moscow decision and would make impossible the task of the Joint Commission which must consult with representatives of all shades of opinion. Soviet replied that its yardstick was not the rightist or leftist complexion of the parties, but that they were only trying to guard the Moscow decision. Soviet avoided answering query as to whether they thought the Moscow decision limited freedom of expression. US delegation then stated that it was the US position that Korea should have the type of democracy the Korean people want and not necessarily either the US or Soviet type. Soviet were requested that if they desired to restrict consultation to state their position without equivocation. Soviet agreed that the Moscow decision did not predetermine the type of government but did state it should be “democratic”, that is, “peoples”. They denied equivocation. In order to avoid delay of consultation scheduled for July 7, the US delegation then proposed that all applicant organizations of over 10,000 members be approved for consultation, and decision on those of lesser membership be made later. Soviet seemed on verge of accepting this offer, but demanded that groups who are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee be warned they would have to repudiate any affiliation with that organization. US would not agree to such a provision and meeting adjourned. Throughout meeting Soviet pressed for initiation of consultation with organizations not under suspicion. US would not agree as 15 rightist groups including the more important organizations would have been eliminated. Throughout all the meeting there was a marked absence of politics considering the nature of the discussion. The farewell at the station in Pyongyang at 1900, 3 July, seemed genuinely cordial. General Shtikov stated that sufficient time did not exist while the Americans were in Pyongyang to reach an agreement. He informed General Brown that the Soviet delegation would arrive in Seoul at 0800, 7 July and agreed to a meeting on the afternoon of 7 July, exact time to be set later by him as chairman. Consultation will be delayed from its scheduled starting date of 7 July. Effort to agree on joint communiqué failed. General Brown will issue a statement to the press which will mention lack of agreement but not emphasize it. Text will be transmitted in clear. 18 It is believed that there is a fair chance for workable agreement on this matter. American delegation arrived in Seoul early morning July 4. Jacobs 17 In telegram 193, July 9, from Seoul, Mr. Jacobs reported details in regard to answers received to questionnaires and concluded: “As all parties and organizations in the north are leftists, the breakdown by parties for all Korea is: 64% right or moderate; 31% left or moderate left; 5% unknown. Based on claimed membership, the breakdown for all Korea is as follows: 51% right or moderate; 48% left or moderate left; and 1% unknown.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–947) 18 General Brawn’s statement was issued to the press on July 4 and is quoted in telegram 182, July 4, from Seoul, not printed. It reported the American delegation’s visit to Pyongyang and noted Soviet courtesies there. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–447) The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo 121.893/7–747: Telegram [Document 533] The Secretary of State to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo top secret us urgent Washington , July 7, 1947—4 p.m. 256. Personal and eyes only for General MacArthur from Secretary Marshall. Wedemeyer will probably proceed to China on a fact-finding mission within a few days. 19 It is estimated that he and a small group of experts and assistants will be in China not longer than 6 weeks. I should like to have your comment on suggestion that he return via Korea for a brief survey of current conditions there. 20 Marshall 19 For White House press release on July 11 about Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer’s mission, see Department of State Bulletin , July 20, 1947, p. 149. For General Wedemeyer’s mission to China, see volume vii . 20 In telegram 265, July 11, 5 p.m., to Tokyo, Secretary Marshall informed General MacArthur of the plan to have the Wedemeyer Mission visit Korea, after completing its visit to China, for the purpose of making a brief survey of Korean conditions, especially with reference to their relation to plans for an economic aid program for Korea (121.893/7–1147). The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–747: Telegram [Document 534] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , July 7, 1947. 184. Zgcg. In light of experience with Soviet technique in Albania, conclusion, after 4-day visit to Pyongyang, capital of North Korea, is that Soviet has established there Korean Communist state with all its trappings (although not yet as well organized as Balkan satellites), viz.: Korean stooges installed and maintained by Soviet advisers chiefly military and Soviet trained Korean army and security police; fear rampant; liquidation of opposition; photos of Stalin and Korean stooge Kim II Sung everywhere; Soviet and Korean flags everywhere; book stores full of Communist literature in Korean language; purging of non-Communist from government agencies; youths sent away for training and indoctrination (some say to Moscow and others say to special school for Koreans at Voroshilov near Vladivostok); preponderance of youth in all walks of official life (among 50,000 who paraded for Commission, at least one half were under 20 and two-thirds under 25); distribution of land under conditions which peasants did not expect; nationalization of large industries and businesses; suppression of all except National Front groups; favoritism toward army and officials in rationing; and so on. For economic highlights, see Bunce’s message in my 183, July 5. 21 Even if Joint Commission ultimately succeeds in implementing Moscow agreement, foregoing situation will present difficult problem in the integration of North and South Korea. Organized Communists in the north linking up with fellow travelers in the south and backed up by Soviet trained Korean army and security police will endeavor to carry out their program which is of definite nature. They are certain to clash with rightists in the south who are divided into dissident groups with no fixed plans and little force to support them. Large numbers of these rightists are not supporting Joint Commission’s efforts to solve the problem and many of them are publicly expressing hope that Joint Commission will fail so that United States (so they think) will remain to protect them from Korean Communists and from Soviet encroachment. In submitting foregoing I do not wish my approach to the Korean problem to be interpreted as that of a pessimist but rather that of a cynic not yet devoid of hope. 22 Jacobs 21 Not printed. 22 Mr. Jacobs sent further details in his despatch 27, July 31, from Seoul, not printed. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–747: Telegram [Document 535] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State confidential priority Seoul , July 7, 1947. Zgcg 865. For Hilldring. Following is public statement made by Syngman Rhee on 3rd July: “We have been supporting General Hodge’s policy that the Korean-American cooperation would set up a government and solve the Korean problem. General Hodge tried to obtain our cooperation 5 or 6 times but they always failed because he could not get the cooperation of the Communist leaders. “If we were to get the cooperation of the Communist leaders all plans will be reduced into nothing. But General Hodge’s only policy is to obtain the Communist leaders’ cooperation, which is impossible. But we cooperated with General Hodge hoping that he would learn that getting any cooperation from the Communist leaders is something impossible, and that he would devise some new plans. “At last, last winter I realized that it was hopeless to expect anything new of General Hodge and we could not support him any longer. I told him the reasons and Mr. Kim Koo and I said that we would take our own free actions. “While in the States, General Hodge told me that he would pass a general election law in the Legislative Assembly and that he would conduct a general election so that a Korea Interim Government could be set up according to the will of the Korean people. He made this statement in public too. Ever since that time I have been hoping that he would fulfill his statement that he made in Washington and that by doing so I thought there would be some cooperation between General Hodge and myself. General Hilldring of the State Dept. and General MacArthur of Tokyo gave me the hope that this plan (general election) would take place and that they wanted me to support that plan. As we see the thing as it stands the Legislative Assembly members whom General Hodge appointed have pursued an obstructionist policy in passing this general election law and they even dreamed of destroying the Legislative Assembly itself. By the concessions on the part of the rightist camp at last the enfranchisement bill was passed. In making this concession the rightist did not want to give the world an unpleasant impression and a wrong impression that the Koreans are running their own affairs. General Hodge is expecting something of the Joint Commission; when the general election will take place is something indefinite. Therefore, we are compelled to set up our own plans and go ahead with them. Our fellow countrymen must realize this and all the political parties and social organizations must have one heart and go forward with one spirit. “The reason why we fail to have cooperation with General Hodge is something inevitable—it has nothing to do with our personal friendship. The only thing is that our political policy is something different. If he changes his policy it is a different thing. If not, we have to stick to the policy we have been supporting all this while. General Hodge’s policy is against that of the American Government. We want to advocate the American policy and we want to carry it out along with the Americans. All our fellow countrymen must realize this either in action or speech. All the ill feelings should not be expressed. In politics we have to maintain what is right and we have to push it to realize this policy.” This public statement is in line with his propaganda line of “secret understandings, promises by the State Dept., etc.” for past several months and is being accompanied by personal propaganda attacks on and reported plans of assassination of General Brown by extreme rightist groups. Rhee apparently being encouraged in his attitude by Oliver, Staggers 23 and Jerome Williams 24 in Washington. His actions are a part of his campaign to break up the Joint Commission and establish a separate government in South Korea which he hopes to head. He confuses many ignorant Koreans and builds up hostility to the US forces. Local statements in refuting have no counteracting effect. To allow such statements to go unchallenged leads ignorant Korean and military youth groups to believe they are true. 25 [ Hodge ] 23 John W. Staggers, Washington lawyer and president of the American World Trade Export-Import Company, Inc. 24 Jay Jerome Williams, vice president of the same company. 25 In telegram 186, July 7, from Seoul, Mr. Jacobs quoted an exchange of messages between General Hodge and Dr. Rhee which the latter made public. Dr. Rhee denied accusations against him and demanded an investigation to determine the truth. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–747) The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–847: Telegram [Document 536] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Seoul , July 8, 1947. 191. Cite Zurc 870. Thirty-ninth meeting Joint Commission met from 1:30 to 4:15 p.m. July 8. General Shtikov presided and after approval minutes of 34th, 35th, and 36th meetings proceeded to read statement of Soviet position with respect to parties and social organizations to be consulted in which following are highpoints: 1. Soviet delegation shall be guided by Marshall–Molotov exchange of notes, Moscow decision and Joint Commission decision 12 but not other correspondence (thus ruling out Hodge–Chistiakov letters); 2. Denied that Soviet delegation is attempting unilateral exclusion of parties and organizations as Subcommission 1 under joint decision 16 has not agreed on a list; 3. Accused American delegation by various publicity means of attracting as large a number of parties and organizations as possible; 4. Ridiculed possibility of there being 70 million members of parties and organization[s] as alleged and said this membership must be checked; 5. Alleged that some organizations aren’t social and should be eliminated; 6. Insisted that parties and organizations which have applied for consultation and still belong to the anti-trusteeship should be excluded (as such membership is incompatible with declaration to cooperate) until they withdraw from the anti-trusteeship society; 7. Cited call on June 23 of demonstrators upon General Brown as proof of anti-trusteeship agitation; 8. Stated willingness of Soviet delegation to hear small organizations, if, after hearing head offices of such organizations, the small units have anything to add; 9. Denied that Soviet delegation opposed freedom of expression; 10. Denied that Soviet delegation favors leftists any more than US delegation favors rightists; 11. Proposed that consultation start at once by consulting parties and organizations above suspicion for which purpose Subcommission should prepare list at once. In reply General Brown stated that US delegation would study Soviet statement and reply later but he went on to comment as follows: 1. Proposal of Soviet delegation mentioned in 11 above was not acceptable; 2. His purpose in quoting Hodge–Chistiakov correspondence was to review consistent American position concerning freedom of expression; 3. Admitted US authorities had encouraged parties and organizations to apply for consultation; 4. Stated allegation against anti-trusteeship society cannot be proven by newspaper reports; 5. Read his report on the demonstration group which indicated that they were affiliated with Rhee and Kim Koo and not organizations which had filed applications for consultation; 6. Stated that if Joint Commission had gone on with broad consultation as planned instead of wasting time on debate, matter would be well on road to conclusion. Commission then recessed for 15 minutes after which Shtikov stated: 1. Soviet delegation cannot agree to consult with local branch organizations, only with zonal or head offices. 2. General Brown should refute statements of the three demonstrators; 3. Public opinion in South Korea is created largely through the press which reports activities of anti-trusteeship society; 4. Unable to produce minutes of anti-trusteeship society to prove case but press carried report; 5. Soviet delegation will not include members of anti-trusteeship society until they publicly in the press withdraw from this society, sincerely cooperate with Joint Commission and cease opposing Moscow decision. He again proposed going ahead with consultation with selected group, but Brown proposed adjournment until 1:30 tomorrow which was approved. General Brown proposes to prepare and read tomorrow brief statement of US delegation’s position which substantially is: 1. That no organization can be eliminated except upon presentation of acceptable evidence or specific cause such as fraud or serious misrepresentation of facts in its application for consultation (exaggeration of membership not to be acceptable for this purpose); 2. That only upon presentation of adequate acceptable evidence to Joint Commission that, since signing the declaration, party or organization has fomented or instigated active opposition to the Moscow decision shall be excluded from further consultation by mutual agreement of the Joint Commission. As the position of the Soviet delegation has not materially changed since this issue was joined 3 weeks ago in Subcommission 1, it seems apparent that the Soviets are either stalling for time or wish to reach a deadlock. Most of us believe that it is the former. Some evidence to support this view may be deducted from rumors from leftist side that deadlock is expected in late July and from fact that Soviet delegation brought with them large quantities of supplies which would seem to indicate expectation of protracted stay here. Jacobs The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–847: Telegram [Document 537] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Seoul , July 8, 1947. Cite Zgbi 866. In addition to seclusion of the railroad station during the arrival and departure of the American delegation to the Joint Commission in Pyongyang, other preparations were made for their stay. The liaison officer reports that searches for weapons were made of passengers on streetcars, and that all pedestrians who happened to come in contact with members of the American party were subject to arrest or close interrogation. The Department of Education is reported to have issued instructions that no school child would ride in any American vehicle, accept any candy or other presents from military or civilian members of the party, nor would greet them in any way, and that they would not display the American flag. Further, with the arrival of the delegation, it was directed that a program involving this propaganda be initiated in the schools. During the parade held to welcome the Americans several arrests were made for allegedly cheering the American-Russian Commission rather than reversing the title. The members of the Korean staff of the liaison section, and the interpreter of General Brown were both molested by police, apparently for their association with Americans. Additional steps taken were banning all gatherings of more than three persons during the sessions, ordering all persons to arrange for new prosperous looking white clothes, and the release of large quantities of polished rice to the market for the first time in over 7 months. This rice, released the day before arrival, was reported to be the first available on the market in 2 months and resulted in a large price drop. It disappeared with the departure of the delegation. Consensus of opinion indicates Soviet soldiers appeared less neat and soldierly than did natives in People’s Army. Our soldiers were superior in dress, neatness and courtesy. School children in Catholic school were divided into groups and searched by police to insure they had not been issued “reactionary” pamphlets to take home to their parents. While courtesy was the general rule, all members of the delegation were subject to constant (and obvious) surveillance. Jacobs General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State 895.00/7–1047: Telegram [Document 538] General of the Army Douglas MacArthur to the Secretary of State secret priority Tokyo , July [9?], 1947. Cite C–53942. The following is message from General Hodge dated 9 July 1947 on subject of political turmoil in Korea which supplements ourad C–53768. 26 “Political unrest in Korea is growing and becoming more violent as the meeting of the Joint Commission goes on. The anti-trusteeship groups were caught off balance when the Joint Commission opened soon after the cheering Marshall–Molotov letter exchange ceased. As a result, they did not get their campaign under way in time to stop several rightist groups from agreeing to consult with the Joint Commission, after considerable persuasion by Americans here. As their anti-trusteeship (now becoming anti-Joint Commission, anti-Russian, and gradually anti-United States) campaign gets under way and the work of the Joint Commission drags because the Russians do not want to consult rightist groups and look for ways to avoid it, these anti groups are rapidly regaining some of their appeal among wild-eyed rightist youth groups, extreme rightists and refugees from North Korea. Threats and bold terroism on the part of rightest groups are on the increase and the voice of anti-trusteeship grows bolder and more blatant under the leadership of the still powerful Syngman Rhee. This activity may be expected to increase and there is evidence that it may go into an attempt to set up an unrecognized government. As news gets out concerning the activities of the Russians here and in North Korea, their delaying tactics and their manner of handling the recent consultations in North Korea, more Koreans tend to lose hope for the success of the parleys. There are indications that some of the more fainthearted rightist organizations who have signed up may withdraw from consultations with the Commission under renewed pressure from the extreme rightists. Such direction is almost sure to take place if and when it becomes apparent in consultations that the Russians do not tolerate any freedom of expression that includes objections to the Moscow decision. One tangible and bad result of machinations of the extreme rightists is that through growing propaganda to effect that the Americans are trying to force the Koreans into the hated trusteeship and communism, American prestige is definitely on the decline with the rightists who have heretofore been our bulwark of support. I reiterate that there is no known education or hocus pocus that will explain away the word ‘trusteeship’ to where we can ever get any real cooperation by the majority of Koreans in South Korea with the work of the Joint Commission. The current political terrorism and intensified hatred are spilling over into the Korean personnel in military government and the police. It appears impossible to keep any Koreans out of political factionism and skullduggery. As to getting Koreans, except Communists and their followers, to give any real support to or cooperation with the work of the Joint Commission, we have led part of the horses to water, but will not be able to make them drink so long as ‘trusteeship’ is in the picture. (Signed) Hodge.” [ MacArthur ] 26 Dated July 2, p. 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–947: Telegram [Document 539] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret urgent Seoul , July 9, 1947. 195. Zpol 877. According to further information which General Hodge is receiving from published statements and intelligence sources (similar to that already reported in several recent telegrams) of Syngman Rhee’s continuing efforts to spread rumors that General Hodge is not carrying out US policy with respect to Korea and in view not only of his refusal to cooperate with Joint Commission but also his agitation against its work, General Hodge and I feel that the time has come for the Secretary to issue very strong statement such as suggested in last two paragraphs of Deptel No. 92, May 21, deprecating reports which are being received from Korea that General Hodge is not following US policy. Issuance of such a statement here will not have the desired and necessary effect. Jacobs Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1047: Telegram [Document 540] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , July 10, 1947. 196. Zurc 887. Fortieth meeting of the Joint Commission was held p.m. 9th July, General Shtikov chairman. Present as guest was Lieutenant General Charles H. Gairdner, personal representative of Prime Minister Attlee in Japan. Discussion of the list to be approved for consultation continued as in previous meetings. No progress was achieved except to clarify the Soviet position as indicated below. An analysis of the developments in the Joint Commission indicates that it has reached an impasse over the question of consultation after lengthy discussion throughout the 37th, 38th, 39th and 40th meetings. Disagreement on the issue of broad consultation has continued without material change for over 3 weeks, except for minor concessions in which the Soviet has paid lip service to the principle of broad consultation. Resolution appears doubtful. The conflict between the American and Soviet delegation is now clearly discernible in the position taken by the Soviet delegation in regard to the list of applicant parties and social organizations with which the Joint Commission will consult. This position is that applicant parties and social organizations may be included on the list only through mutual agreement. Thus the Soviets could block the inclusion on the list of certain rightist parties and in effect create a Soviet veto of consultation. The American position is that an applicant party of [ or ] social organization will be included on the list unless it is specifically excluded by mutual agreement. The American position is based on the Marshall–Molotov letters, which specifically assert that exclusion shall be by mutual agreement only. This position has been consistently held by the US in all subcommission meetings and was written into Joint Commission decision number 12 as paragraph 5. The Soviets insist on application of their unilateral exclusion principle by eliminating from the 463 applicant parties: 1. Those organizations which are not in fact social as covered by their definition of a social organization under the Moscow decision. The Soviet has not however specifically stated their definition. 2. Those organizations which are purely local in nature such as district and other narrow organizations. In this Soviet base their contention on the fact that decision number 12 required organizations to submit application through central zonal offices. A district organization not having such an office is by implication not eligible for consultation. 3. Those parties and social organizations specifically organized to fight the Moscow decision (primarily those parties which according to delegation are members of anti-trusteeship committee). Their contention is that membership in such a committee is prima facie evidence of the fact that signature on the application for consultation which pledges the signer to fully uphold the Moscow decision is worthless because [of?] membership in the committee mentioned. The Soviet delegation consistently refuses to proceed for exclusion of such parties and organizations as provided under the third agreed proposal adopted for the reconvention of the Joint Commission, but insists on their exclusion from the list for initial consultation unless such parties and organizations publicly renounce their membership in the anti-trusteeship committee and again affirm their intention to fully support the Moscow decision. The position of the American delegation is: 1. That the Moscow decision fails to define a social organization, and the Soviet delegation failed prior to preparation of the Joint Commission decision number 12 to agree on a definition of this term as proposed by the American delegation. The American delegation warned the Soviet delegation that after Joint Commission decision number 12 was approved it would not agree to amendments, and has since stated that definition of social organization must be sought in definitions implied in dictionaries throughout the world. The American delegation is willing to exclude those organizations which do not fall within such a definition. 2. The American delegation has renewed a proposal made to the Soviets several weeks ago, that all organizations with membership less than a thousand or any other reasonable figure acceptable to the Soviet delegation be denied oral consultation. The American delegation cannot accept the contention of the Soviet that organizations without its own central office are under the terms of agreements reached not eligible for consultation. 3. The American delegation’s position is that under Joint Commission decision number 12 all parties and organizations signing the application for consultation (including the declaration contained in joint communiqué number 5) are, under the terms of the Marshall–Molotov agreement, eligible for initial consultation and must be placed on the list. Further, that under the agreements of the 2 Ministers, exclusion from the list can only be had by joint agreement and for fomenting or instigating active opposition to the Moscow decision or to either of the Allied Powers. It is believed that the basic points of difference are: 1st, the principle of unilateral exclusion from the list, 2nd, specifically exclusion of parties which are members of the anti-trusteeship committee. Although the Soviets have carried out exhaustive discussion on the undesirability of admitting non-social organizations and local organizations to consultation, it is believed that agreement could easily be achieved on such organizations if the basic issues were resolved. The American delegation has repeatedly expressed a willingness to consider the Soviet’s desires and has in fact made a specific offer to consult initially with all parties and organizations with 10,000 or more members, which would arbitrarily exclude most organizations in the district or social categories in question. The Soviet however have not demonstrated any attempts to establish the unilateral exclusion principle and attack of anti-trusteeship committee. The Anti-Trusteeship Committee has been investigated by the Joint Commission and has been found to be in a dormant state since its members submitted their applications for consultation. The Soviet attack on these 15 member parties is based on the most flimsy of Korean press evidence and the press statements are in fact untrue. In addition, the US has definite positive evidence of the good faith of these 15 parties based on the agreement of some of their leaders to members of the Joint Commission. It is intended in the 41st meeting to state such facts to the Soviet delegation, not in the sense of defending the 15 parties, but in the sense of providing [ proving ] to them the absurdity of the Soviet position. 27 To accept the Soviet demand that members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee must publicly state their withdrawal prior to acceptance for consultation is clearly a leftist ruse to drive the rightist parties completely away from consultation. Were the 15 rightist parties, which are presently involved and which include the large and important Democratic Party under the leadership of Kim Koo, required to publicly state their withdrawal from the Anti-Trusteeship Committee, they would undoubtedly bolt the Joint Commission because under the principle of freedom of expression they wish to reserve right to discuss freely all angles of future trusteeship. They would carry with them practically all rightist support and the Joint Commission would thus be left with only leftists with which to consult. This would undoubtedly be what the Soviets desire and they are apparently being encouraged in their efforts to eliminate the rightist parties by the current unstable political situation and the activities of Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo. It is the intention of the American delegation to stand firm on this issue even to the extent of risking a break in the discussions. Confirmation of this intention is required. Hodge 27 Telegram 197, July 10, from Seoul, reported no substantial progress at this meeting. Agreement was made only to issue a press release, although a text had not yet been prepared. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1047) The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1447: Telegram [Document 541] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , July 14, 1947. 206. Zurc 903. Forty-second meeting of Joint Commission held on 14 July for almost 4 hours. General Brown chairman. Soviet and US had exchanged proposed text of joint communiqué prior to meeting. Purpose of the communiqué to explain the issues and cause of deadlock in the Commission. Discussion disclosed the attitude of Soviet has not changed from that given in our previous radios. They continuously argued and often without reference to the communiqué itself. However, they did object to a specific statement in the US communiqué to the effect that the US has frequently offered to examine the list and exclude such organizations as both delegations mutually agree should be excluded. US quoted from record to prove truth of this statement. Soviet insisted on a joint communiqué; however, US delegation informed Soviet it would issue release and transmit copy to Soviet inasmuch as it would be impossible to agree on a communiqué. US has no objection to Soviet issuing their draft. Not known whether Soviet will issue statement. If issued, US release will be sent Washington in clear. 28 Commission adjourned until date to be set by General Brown. Jacobs 28 The release was given the press in Seoul on July 15 at 4 p.m. and sent the Department in telegram 208, July 15; the next meeting of the Commission was set for July 16 at 1:30 p.m. For text of the press release, see Department of State Bulletin , August 10, 1947, p. 294. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1447: Telegram [Document 542] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret u.s. urgent Washington , July 14, 1947—5 p.m. 142. Urad Zgcg 865 29 and PolAd ’s 186, July 7. 30 For General Hodge from Hilldring: 1. Rhee’s statement and letters exchanged not carried by U.S. press, and while appreciating your situation it is believed statement here by Secretary would unnecessarily call attention to and dignify Rhee’s activities. We also feel any statement at this time directed primarily against Rhee would only emphasize unstable political situation among South Korean groups and play into hands of Soviets along lines mentioned last sentence penultimate para urad Zurc 887. 31 Dept confirms intention American delegation as outlined that message, but believes possibility success scant unless Soviets are convinced Korean parties in south are cooperating with Americans. 2. Should Rhee’s recent activities receive publicity here Secretary is prepared to issue following statement: “Statements coming out of Korea alleging that the American commander there, General Hodge, has been following a policy in Korea contrary to that of the United States Government as laid down in Washington have absolutely no foundation in fact. There is but one American policy which is to assure that, in accordance with our international commitments, Korea shall become a free, united and sovereign nation with a government representative of the will of its people. I am sure all loyal, patriotic Koreans will set aside personal differences and work together with us toward accomplishing our common objectives.” 3. In meantime suggest that you or Jacobs see Rhee and make statement to him from the Secretary of State along lines para 4 and 5 below. 4. The Secretary wishes to make clear that any implication that General Hodge is following a policy in Korea contrary to that of the U.S. Govt is [ as? ] laid down in Washington has absolutely no foundation in fact. There is only one American policy which is to assure that, in accordance with our international commitments, Korea shall become an independent and united nation. The American Govt and people are just as anxious as the Korean people are for the early fulfillment of this policy. The chief obstacle at present to achieving this end is the existence of the artificial barrier at the 38th parallel. The best information in the possession of the U.S. Govt is that the Soviets will not agree to any relaxation of this barrier until a Provisional Govt for all of Korea has been established. The present negotiations with the Soviets in the Joint Commission are for the purpose of obtaining agreement to the setting up of a Korean Provisional Govt. Without such a government of a unified Korea there can be no hope in the near future of breaking down the 38th parallel barrier. If such a government can be formed there is real hope of a unified Korea which will be an economic, political and administrative whole. This Provisional Korean Govt would then be able to discuss with the Joint Commission methods for giving help and assistance to the Korean people in establishing their government on a firm foundation. The officials of the Provisional Govt and the Korean people will be given full opportunity to express their views and make recommendations as to the form this assistance shall take and their views and recommendations will receive the most sympathetic consideration of the U.S. Govt. The fact that four powers are responsible under the Moscow Agreement for agreeing on a method of giving this help and assistance should be an assurance to the Korean people of impartial and constructive consideration. 5. As long as there is any possibility that a Provisional Govt for all Korea can be set up which will result in doing away with the 38th parallel barrier and which will have the benefit of international help and assistance the U.S. Govt feels it must make every effort to achieve such a desirable goal. Consequently, the US Govt cannot consider the establishment of a separate Govt, provisional or otherwise, in southern Korea so long as there is possibility of agreement in the Joint Commission in accord with the Moscow Agreement. Failure of the work of the Joint Commission would mean the perpetuation of the 38th parallel barrier and the indefinite postponement of any hopes for a unified, completely independent Korea. The U.S. Govt feels that its position will be greatly strengthened on the Commission and the possibility of success enhanced if all groups in South Korea cooperate with the Commission. The U.S. Govt feels certain that Mr. Rhee, when he fully realizes the great importance to the Korean people of a successful outcome of the Joint Commission negotiations, will wish to cooperate in bringing about that success. The U.S. Govt has stated that no Koreans should be prohibited from consultation with the Joint Commission merely because of opinions they hold about the government of their country provided they agree to cooperate with the Commission. There will be no infringement of the rights of freedom of opinion and speech. On this basic position the United States will not compromise. The best way for Mr. Rhee and his followers to contribute to the early establishment of a united and independent Korea will be for them to join with all the other democratic parties and social organizations in southern Korea in cooperating with the Joint Commission. Marshall 29 Dated July 7, p. 691 [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] . 30 See footnote 25, p. 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] . 31 Dated July 10, p. 967 [ Pg. 967 includes portions of Doc. 767 and Doc. 768 ] . Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1647: Telegram [Document 543] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret urgent Seoul , July 16, 1947. Zgcg 907. To Hilldring. State serial 142 32 indicates Korea political picture not clearly visualized in Washington. Rhee and his gang are engaged in all-out opposition to the Russians, the Joint Commission, General Hodge and military government using the war cry of “anti-trusteeship” and alleged high level promises to Rhee of a separate government for South Korea. His Washington lobby has recently tried to bog him down to no avail. Russians well aware that if they can in any way scare or discredit those rightists who broke away from Rhee’s control to sign to cooperate with the Joint Commission that they will bolt their pledges and return to the “reactionary” camp, thus leaving the right without consultees. Rhee has been engaged for several days in activities appearing to be leading up to the announcement of provisional government of Korea using the old Chungking group as a basis. American press has carried no stories of his activities because they have not so far crystallized. American press has also refused to aggrandize Rhee by reporting his activities to US. However, Rhee and followers are making a great splash here among Koreans and will not listen to reason on a local level. Jacobs will talk to him again on the line of State serial 142, but this has been hashed over many times with Rhee in all phases and embellishments by all Americans here from Hodge to American newspapermen. He is so far out on the limb that he will not listen to reason. Wedemeyer should be well briefed on Korea before he leaves. Rhee may listen to him, if he is still out of jail when Wedemeyer arrives. Still believe statement along line suggested by Lerch 33 is needed, not only for Rhee but to clarify the situation and put a calming influence on the entire populace. Rhee’s name need not be mentioned. [ Hodge ] 32 July 14, p. 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] . 33 In telegram Zgcg 897, July 14, from Seoul, General Lerch reported Syngman Rhee’s attitude and added: “The one thing he fears is unfavorable US press and denouncements of unfavorable statements by high government officials.… Because no high government official has taken notice of his repeated open denouncements of the American command here, he is growing bolder each day, Koreans do not understand, and many believe him.” (895.00/7–1447) The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1647: Telegram [Document 544] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , July 16, 1947. 209. Cite Zurc 283. Following is an attempt to analyze briefly present Joint Commission deadlock and its implications: Soviet delegation is clearly seeking to take advantage whenever and wherever possible of a narrow, technical interpretation, in some cases equivalent to distortion, of any agreement, decision, communiqué or minute for the purpose of elimination from consultation parties and organizations (chiefly rightists or moderate rightists) which oppose the establishment in a united Korea of a predominately Peoples Democratic Front (Communist) Government, provisional or permanent. An indication of the nature and stubbornness of this technique will be found in statements of the positions of the American and Soviet delegations set forth in parallel columns in the press release contained Seoul PolAd No. 208, July 15. 34 The effect of Soviet position is that the Soviet delegation will not even agree to the preparation of a list of parties and organizations to be invited (Soviet delegation does not consider that eligibility carries with it the assurance of an invitation) for consultation unless the American delegation agrees to a selection procedure in Subcommission 1 which would enable the Soviet representatives on that Subcommission unilaterally to exclude (by refusing to include) any part[y] or organization unacceptable to them. In giving reasons for exclusion, the Soviet representatives will say that the excluded party or organization is not a “social” organization or that it is “non-zonal” organization or that it has not, because of its membership in an anti-trusteeship organization, signed an additional public statement that it has withdrawn from such an association and will support Moscow decision in every respect to the extent presumably (although we have not yet discussed that point) of not even being able to voice during the consultations objection to anything which in the eyes of the Soviet delegation contravenes what it understands and interprets to be the meaning of the Moscow decision. In other words, the Soviet delegation is attempting to prevent any Korean party or organization (and by implication their representatives) from exercising freedom of expression in presenting their views. The group of rightist parties which the Soviets are attempting to eliminate are grouped under the leadership of Kim Sung Soo, chairman of the Democratic Party. The American delegation is thus defending a segment of the right which while for the moment apparently separated from the leadership of Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo is in fact still sympathetic if not subservient to their policies and leadership. With Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo openly opposing the Joint Commission, the position of the American delegation is somewhat insecure as the Democratic Party and its satellites eventually may have to be eliminated for fomenting and inciting active opposition. If we yield to the Soviet delegation, we shall find ourselves in a situation where there will be a few rightist parties and organizations (none of importance) to consult. We should then, having most [ lost ] rightest support, find the Soviet delegation insisting, with much to support its contention, upon a leftist dominated consultative group (see paragraph 9, joint decision 12) and as a next step thereafter, the appointment of a provisional government with members picked from the leftist dominated consultative body. The United States delegation would thus be put in the position of accepting a provisional government dominated by the Peoples Front and headed by Kim Il Sung or refusing to accept the advice of a body which it had helped establish as representing the Korean people. These facts are well known to all thoughtful leaders in South Korea and our yielding to Soviet pressure on present issues would be interpreted by such leaders as evidence of our desire to abandon the Korean people to communism and Soviet domination. Some such talk is now current, probably inspired by the leftists. The American delegation will resist to the limit the Soviet delegation’s efforts to establish its position as approved by Department in Department’s telegrams 135, July 2 and 142, July 14. While it is anyone’s guess as to Soviet overall strategic motives, a summary of our thinking is somewhat as follows. During sessions at Pyongyang, we felt, due to veiled references to Moscow, that the Soviet delegation was fighting for time while waiting for directives from Moscow in the light of developments resulting from Molotov’s recent visit to and hurried departure from Paris. More recently, there has been some feeling that Soviet delegation is merely stalling for time so that the Commission may continue its work beyond the adjournment of Congress in the hope that Congress will take no action on the grant-in-aid program (Seoul PolAd No. 205, July 12 35 ). Whatever may be the immediate motives of the Soviet delegation, all here concerned are pretty much unanimous in the view that the Soviet delegation and Moscow really do not want an agreement unless they are able to set up a provisional government in Korea and establish other arrangements which will ensure the ultimate control of a united Korea by a Peoples Democratic Front (Communist) party and thus establish another Soviet satellite state. How long the Soviet delegation will be authorized to continue to negotiate with the American delegation, we do not know and can hardly hazard a guess. They may permit the present impasse to drag along, attempting to put the blame on the American delegation for the delay, or they may break off any time. There are several courses of action which the American delegation has in mind to prolong the present impasse for some weeks and these courses will be followed (not necessarily in the order indicated) as future developments may dictate. First, we shall continue the fight for some days along present lines of argument. Second, failing as above indicated, we might propose that the Soviet delegation carry on consultations south of 38th parallel; or probably (this would be preferable), we consult jointly both in the north and in the south with those parties acceptable to the Soviet delegation (note that the American delegation is prepared to consult with all) and the American delegation unilaterally consult with those which are unacceptable to the Soviet delegation. Third, we might suggest that oral consultations be dispensed with entirely and that consultation with respect to the nature provisional government and charter be confined to a joint American-Soviet study of the written replies to the questionnaires filed by parties and organizations (the Soviet delegation would probably in this event refuse to consider replies of the rightists and the same struggle between positions of the two delegations would continue). Fourth, as a final effort, the American delegation might propose to drop consultations altogether and go into the question of discussing the topic, composition and creation of the proposed provisional government. Failure of all of the above efforts seems certain to result in a breakdown. We must all, therefore, be prepared at any time for the eventuality and the various courses of action that might be followed thereafter. This message has concurrence of General Hodge and General Brown. Jacobs 34 See footnote 28, p. 701 [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] . 35 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1747: Telegram [Document 545] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret operational priority Seoul , July 17, 1947. 211. Zpol 916. At yesterday’s meeting (43rd session) of the Joint Commission, two interesting developments took place. Refer to Seoul Pol Ad number 210, July 16. 36 1. General Shtikov at one point in rather heated manner stated that the Korean people would ultimately get truly democratic government based on the Moscow decision whether the present American delegation wishes or not. He emphasized the word “present” to convey the impression that the American delegation as at present constituted opposition to the carrying out of the Moscow decision. 2. At another stage when General Brown was pressing General Shtikov for more positive proof than had been produced of anti-trusteeship activities of parties and organizations which have already signed declaration, Shtikov suddenly said in heated manner that we “felt it on our skins” referring to incidents on June 23 when mud and sticks were thrown at cars of the Soviet delegation in which some members of that delegation were riding. When General Brown attempted to get General Shtikov to say what proof he had that the members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee had instigated such mud slinging, General Shtikov suddenly became angry and said that the Soviet delegation had been insulted and he would have to report to his Commanding General for instructions. General Brown replied that he had not intended to insult the Soviet delegation; that he was merely pointing out that the Soviet chairman had produced no proof that the members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee were responsible for the incident. This did not seem to satisfy Shtikov and, as the Commission had already been in sessions for more than 4 hours, adjournment was taken to study the record on both sides to determine whether there had been any misunderstanding or misinterpretation. Jacobs 36 Not printed; it pointed out that the “Soviet are demonstrating extreme sensitivity toward ‘exact fulfillment of the Moscow decision’ and those who ‘struggle against any word or any period in it’.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1647) Editorial Note [Document 546] Editorial Note No progress was made in the next three meetings on July 18, 22, and 24; telegram 231, July 24, from Seoul, reported that the Soviets were recommending a list that omitted 24 rightist parties which claimed a membership of over 15,000,000. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2447) Meanwhile, on July 21, the Soviet delegation issued a lengthy statement to the press in which they argued that a more rapid and successful solution was possible if the two delegations would strictly abide by the Moscow decision and the agreement between the two Foreign Ministers; text of statement was quoted in telegram 225, July 22, from Seoul. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2247) Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–1747: Telegram [Document 547] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , July 17, 1947. 212. To Hilldring. Jacobs and I talked with Rhee last night (July 16) for almost 2 hours along the lines indicated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of State 142, July 14. 37 At times Rhee conversed in rational manner but at other times he burst into irrational tirades, speaking rapidly and almost unintelligibly. He denied that he was responsible for various rumors appearing in rightist papers, saying that he did not even read them. However, he repeatedly referred to other news appearing in the same papers he claims not to read. At one stage, he revealed that he had recently discovered that Kim Koo was not acting in the best interests of Korea and that he might have to sever all connections with him and his group. In this connection intelligence sources reveal that about 15th July Rhee underwent a change of heart in working with Kim Koo in setting up unilaterally a provisional government. How far he has come to his senses on this remains to be seen. Rhee made it completely clear that he and his party would not participate in the work of the Joint Commission and would not accept anything that the Commission did unless satisfactory to him and his party. He spoke heatedly against the Moscow decision, saying that neither the United States nor Russia had any right to prescribe trusteeship for Korea and that he and his party would oppose to the death any form of trusteeship that restricted the complete sovereignty of Korea. He indicated that he expected a provisional government would be set up as a result of free elections and said that his party was now preparing to enter candidates in that election in an effort to secure control of the government which would then oppose trusteeship. While Rhee may now cease to spread rumors that there is a disagreement of the question of policy between me and various US Government agencies in Washington, he made it clear that neither he nor his party as long as he is the leader thereof will cooperate in implementing the Moscow decision. 38 Hodge 37 In telegram Zgcg 934, July 21, from Seoul, General Hodge reviewed his relations with Syngman Rhee. He concluded that he still felt a statement issued in Washington would have been helpful some time ago though he feared that it might then be too late; he stated that “Koreans in the street now believe Rhee is right because Washington has shown no public support to Hodge and is sending Wedemeyer to find out what is wrong.” (895.00/7–2147) 38 Telegrams 213, July 17, and 221, July 21, from Seoul, reported further on Syngman Rhee’s opinions; in the latter telegram he was quoted as saying: “We stand now as always have for Korean-American cooperation in ending division of Korea and establishment of elected government.” (895.00/7–2147) The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/7–1947: Telegram [Document 548] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State confidential urgent Seoul , July 19, 1947. 217. Zpol 924. Lyuh Woon Hyung, chairman Laboring Peoples Party, was shot to death about 1 o’clock this afternoon while riding in his motor car. Assassin escaped. This may be the first of several political assassinations by rightists which have been rumored recently but Lyuh himself had recently spoken of difficulties in his party which he claimed had become infiltrated with Communists and which he was convening in conference this coming week to have a showdown. Hence, it is also plausible to assume that his assassin may have been a Communist. 39 [ Jacobs ] 39 Papers found in brief case of Lyuh Woon Hyung showed his contacts with leaders in North Korea and “shed some light on interplay between various parties in which Lyuh was engaged”. (895.00/7–2547, 8–747) The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2147: Telegram [Document 549] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret urgent Seoul , July 21, 1947. 219. Cite Zpol 935. Recent exchange of telegrams regarding proposed issuance of statements by the Secretary (several messages were General Hodge’s without Pol Ad numbers), following are my comments, some of which have bearing on other aspects of present situation here: 1. It was not contemplated here that statement would refer to Dr. Rhee or any other Korean leader by name. Our thought was that statement would be of broad general nature reaffirming United States policy and proclaiming that General Hodge and other United States officials here are doing everything possible to carry out that policy (somewhat as set forth in Deptel 142, July 14th). In other words, we felt there should be a general statement from the highest authorities to scotch rumors that American officials in Washington and here are working at cross purposes. 2. Although have not hitherto so stated, I have felt that if a statement is issued the Secretary of War should also issue similar statement simultaneously. 3. It seems almost certain that Joint Commission will soon be deadlocked a second time, which will require major reorientation of United States policy with respect to Korea. Mere fact that the President has announced that General Wedemeyer will come to Korea can only be interpreted here (and has so been interpreted) that the highest authorities in Washington feel that our past policies have failed and therefore require revision. Announcement of Wedemeyer’s mission has encouraged rightist leaders, especially Doctor Rhee, to tell their followers “I told you so” and given renewed impetus to Rhee campaign for South Korea state which he will head, so he thinks, with United States furnishing both protection and money. He thus continues, as he has been doing, to compromise our effort to find some solution with the Soviets and to oppose General Hodge against whom he nurses violent and unreasoning hatred. General Wedemeyer’s telegram to Rhee quoted PolAd ’s 220, July 21, 40 will if delivered add fuel to Rhee’s fire. 4. Present situation is having unfortunate effects upon moderates who have hitherto supported us and who deserve our support. Their effectiveness is becoming impaired and they themselves, sensing that they are likely to be crushed between Communists on one hand and reactionary rightists under Rhee and Kim Koo on the other hand, are beginning to become lukewarm and are deserting some to leftist and some to rightist camps. 5. It is unfortunate that events are forcing us into a position where we may be compelled for reasons of expediency (opposition to the Soviets) to support extreme rightist leaders such as Rhee and Kim Koo, who continue to hold to concepts and practices, which, while suited to their positions as messiahs when the Japanese occupied their homeland, are not suited to the situation today, I have a feeling that in dealing with the rightist group we shall eventually be compelled to arrange somehow that they select other leaders. 6. I feel, therefore, that, because of these developments, the timeliness of the proposed statement have been lost although if issued now by State and War, it would counteract further adverse and unfair criticism of General Hodge which is certain to arise if and when the State and War Departments do actually change policy as a result of a breakdown in the Joint Commission negotiations and General Wedemeyer’s report. Jacobs 40 Not printed. The Secretary of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers 695.0031/7–2247: Circular airgram [Document 550] The Secretary of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers Washington , July 22, 1947—8:40 a.m. Opening of Limited Private Trade in Korea:—Entry of traders into south Korea in limited numbers will be permitted beginning July 15. Traders will be furnished food and lodging accommodations, and transportation facilities within south Korea, by the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), at commercial rates payable in dollars. Facilities will be provided only in the capital city of Seoul and in the port city of Pusan. Special arrangements for trips to other cities in south Korea may be made if trade possibilities exist. Applications from U.S. nationals abroad representing U.S. firms are made by firm in U.S. to Dept of Commerce. If U.S. applicant abroad does not represent U.S. firm he applies through American Consul to Dept of Commerce. Non-U.S. nationals or U.S. nationals not in U.S. representing foreign firms should have firm apply through its government to USAMGIK through U.S. Consul General at Seoul. Then U.S. national if approved by USAMGIK may apply to nearest consulate for U.S. passport. At outset, applications to visit south Korea will be considered only for following purposes: ( a ) To purchase goods available for export, or to make arrangements for future purchases of potential exports, or to sell raw materials which Korea requires. ( b ) To provide commercial services, such as insurance and shipping, to facilitate movement of exports and imports ketween Korea and other countries. When making application, applicant should furnish detailed statement of the purpose of the visit, explaining whether it is to purchase goods, develop future markets, or to make arrangements for furnishing raw materials. Applicants should also furnish information indicating financial responsibility, a record of experience in handling the type of commodities which will be available for export from South Korea, or in the absence of such experience, the applicant should be prepared to provide reasonable proof that his visit will contribute to the restoration of Korean trade (and the Korean economy). Applicants receiving final approval by USAMGIK will then apply for passports in the usual manner. Representatives of insurance, shipping, and banking companies should file their applications directly with State Dept. Due to the fact that all foreign exchange assets must be very carefully controlled and expended only for south Korea’s most essential imports, trade will be carried on only in dollars or other currencies usable for procurement of essential imports for south Korea. All imports and exports of south Korea will be controlled through the issuance by USAMGIK of import and export licenses. The negotiation of price and the consummation of transactions will be between the buyer and seller, subject to confirmation by USAMGIK. For the time being no commercial exchange rate will be established. Foreign exchange receipts of Korean exporters will be held in special accounts by USAMGIK and will be available to Korean importers for the procurement of essential imports. USAMGIK will permit the exporter 180 days to use his earned foreign exchange for imports; if he does not do so, he will receive payment in Korean currency for his exports and the foreign exchange will be made available to other importers. The arrangement also includes provisions whereby an exporter may transfer his interest in earned foreign exchange to others under USAMGIK regulations. Stocks and production from plants under direct USAMGIK control will continue to be sold through a government agency. Insurance on export shipments may be obtained either through insurance companies operating in south Korea or by coverage obtained in the United States by the consignee. Preliminary advice from USAMGIK indicates availability of the following general classes of Korean products: wicker baskets fish creels graphite tungsten fluorite mica ginseng lead zinc porcelain clay fish and other marine products (including lavar, agar agar, shark fin) leaf tobacco raw silk handicraft goods, such as lacquerware molybdenum Transactional communications, involving actual purchase and sales contracts, and also the exchange of samples, are now permissible under regulations administered by USAMGIK. Marshall Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) FE Files, Lot 244, Box 7946 [Document 551] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Allison ) 41 undated As an aid to the discussion this morning regarding Korea I have listed below the various questions to be considered as I see them. They divide into immediate and long-term problems. By long-term problems I do not mean those which we can delay coming to a decision on, but those which affect future policy. Short-Term Problems [Here follows brief section on short-term problems.] Long-Term Problems 1. Stalemate in the Joint Commission—What do we do about it? It has been suggested that we address a letter to Molotov referring to his statement that the Joint Commission should report in July or August, calling attention to the present stalemate, reiterating U.S. previously expressed policy regarding freedom of expression and basis for Korean consultation, and finally suggesting that if no substantial progress is made by a given date, say August 10, that the two delegations be requested to report to their Governments and that the Governments then consider what further steps can usefully be taken to bring about a united, independent Korea. Consideration might also be given to the possibility of presenting the Korean problem to the United Nations. The letter mentioned above to Mr. Molotov would have the effect of giving this Government freedom of action so that it might take any steps deemed necessary, including public recognition that the Moscow Agreement is unworkable and that therefore the matter should be presented to the United Nations. 2. If, as is likely, the Joint Commission breaks down we will have to come to some definite decision with regard to what we should do about; ( a ) Rhee and his group, ( b ) elections in south Korea, and ( c ), a provisional or interim government for south Korea. 41 Mr. Allison was designated steering member of an ad hoc committee to study and report on Korea as a result of the 59th meeting of SWNCC on July 23. The other two members were Lt. Col. T. N. Dupuy, War Department, and Capt. H. R. Hummer, Navy Department. Mr. Allison’s memorandum was undated but written probably on July 23. Interim Directive to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo, for Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2547 [Document 552] Interim Directive to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo, for Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul 42 secret [SWNCC 176/29] [ Washington , July 24, 1947.] Interim Directive to the Commander-in-Chief , US Army Forces, Far East, and Commander General , US Army Forces in Korea, for Military Government in Those Areas of Korea Occupied by US Forces 1. The Purpose and Scope of this Directive a . This directive, which supersedes the basic initial directive under which you have been operating, defines the authority which you will possess and the policies which will guide you in your conduct of military government in those areas of Korea occupied by U.S. forces during the period prior to the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government as envisaged in the Moscow Agreement. b . This directive is divided into Part I: General and Political; Part II: Cultural; Part III: Economic and Civilian Supply; and Part IV: Financial. c . This directive is based upon policies agreed upon by the State, War and Navy Departments and approved by the President. It is recognized that the financial requirements of this directive may be greater than under preceding directives and that U.S. funds may not now be allocated or otherwise made available to you in sufficient amounts to implement certain features of the directive. To the extent that essential imports and other necessary expenditures contemplated by this directive exceed your budgetary limitations, you will, as soon as practicable, report fully on the nature and extent to which additional U.S. funds will be required, including complete justification for such additional funds so that the War Department may request additional appropriations by Congress. Pending such appropriations or arrangements you will expend funds in implementing this directive only to the extent and for the purposes for which currently such funds are available. Part I General and Political 2. The Basis and Scope of Military Authority a . By virtue of your military occupation of southern Korea, you are vested with the conventional powers of a military occupant of former enemy territory. In addition, and in order to effectuate the Surrender Instrument executed by command of the Emperor of Japan, The Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and the Moscow Agreement, you are authorized to exercise all power necessary to give effect to those instruments. b . While reporting to the Commander in Chief, Far East, 43 for all military matters, you will report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the War Department acting as the executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff) for all non-military aspects of the occupation, including political, economic, cultural, social and non-military operational matters. c . Your administration of military government will be based upon the treatment of Korea as a liberated country. In all your activities you will bear in mind the policy of the United States in regard to Korea which, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, contemplates a progressive development involving the following successive steps: (1) The present period of zonal administration by the United States and the USSR; (2) The establishment of a Provisional Korean Government which will assist the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission in preparing Korea for self-government; (3) The creation of some form of trusteeship for Korea under the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the USSR for a period of up to five years, unless there is general agreement among the four powers that conditions make this unnecessary; and (4) The complete independence of Korea at the earliest possible date, with subsequent membership in the United Nations. 3. Basic Objectives of Military Occupation a . The basic objectives of the United States with regard to Korea are: (1) To establish an independent and sovereign Korea, free from all foreign domination and eligible for membership in the United Nations; (2) To insure that the national government so established shall be a democratic government fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people; and (3) To assist the Koreans in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system necessary for an independent, democratic state. b . It is the intention of the United States Government to achieve its objectives in Korea within the framework of the Moscow Agreement and to this end to do all in its power to achieve the fulfillment of the terms of the Agreement and in particular the attainment of Korean independence at the earliest possible date. c . The United States occupation of southern Korea is for the purpose of facilitating the attainment of basic United States objectives, in Korea and shall continue as long as it contributes to this end. d . You will continue to replace military personnel in Military Government with Korean personnel and U.S. civilian personnel with a view to the complete elimination of U.S. military personnel as soon as practicable. e . A political adviser of ambassadorial status will be appointed to advise you on matters concerning the administration of civilian affairs in southern Korea and relations with representatives in Korea of the Soviet Union. At such time as you and the political adviser agree that civilian personnel have effectively replaced military personnel in the administration of civilian affairs and so report to the Joint Chiefs, you will be relieved of your responsibilities for civilian administration and the political adviser will assume them. At such time as this transfer of responsibility takes place, the term “Military Government” will be abolished and a term such as “Interim Civilian Administration in Korea” will be substituted therefor. Until such time as this transfer of authority takes place, and a new directive is issued, you will retain final responsibility for all military and non-military aspects of the occupation. You will, however, gradually delegate to the political adviser the operational exercise of the political authority and functions now exercised by you or by the Military Governor, both with respect to internal civil administration and with respect to relations with the Soviets. The political adviser will report to you, and his reports will be transmitted to the Joint Chiefs through you as prescribed in subparagraph 2 b above. You will assure that there will be appropriate distribution of all communications to and from the political adviser 4. General Administrative Measures a . You will continue to take all actions necessary to assure the maintenance of law and order. b . You will continue to utilize local, regional and national agencies of governmental administration subject to the necessary changes implicit in this directive. You will continue to give these agencies maximum responsibility for the administration of government and will, insofar as practicable, charge them with the execution of your policies and directives. At all times, however, and in all circumstances you are empowered yourself to take direct action where required to carry out the objectives of the occupation. c . Pending the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government, you will continue to strive for the coordination of economic and administrative matters between the U.S. command in southern Korea and the Soviet Command in northern Korea, insofar as this can be done without prejudicing the attainment of basic U.S. objectives. 5. Political Reorganization a . You will broaden the basis for Korean participation in the administration of southern Korea, pending the establishment of a nationwide Provisional Korean Government. Insofar as the following can be accomplished without impairing the maintenance of the necessary military control, you will: (1) Utilize qualified Koreans in as many posts of responsibility as possible in the local and provincial administrations and in the administration of the United States zone as a whole by: ( a ) Using popular electoral processes wherever appropriate for the selection of Koreans to occupy key posts, and, ( b ) For all appointive posts, selecting Koreans insofar as possible from all political groups, having due regard to their proportionate strength; and (2) You will continue to utilize the Interim Legislative Assembly which shall have the duty of formulating and presenting to you draft laws to be used as a basis for political, economic and social reforms in the southern zone, pending the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government. You shall put into effect such draft laws except when they are inconsistent with basic United States objectives or the Moscow Agreement. In the implementation of paragraphs (1) ( a ) and (2) above, you will make every effort to insure that all major political groups participate in elections. b . You will take steps to institute a broad program of constructive economic and educational reforms for southern Korea looking towards the creation of conditions favorable to the development of a strong and lasting democratic system in Korea. The Interim Legislative Assembly shall be encouraged to assist in formulating this program and to take the lead in initiating draft legislation for its implementation. All major reforms shall, if practicable, be initiated by the advisory legislative body, and normally no major reform should be undertaken without consultation with this body and, preferably, after obtaining its support. c . In implementing paragraphs a and b above, you will, insofar as consistent with paragraph 7 d below, continue to permit full freedom of expression to all political groups and shall seek the cooperation of representatives of all groups in the administration of southern Korea. No Korean shall be barred from an appointive or elective post because of his political affiliations, except as hereinafter provided. However, as a general policy, you should encourage the selection of leaders who remained in Korea throughout the period of Japanese rule and should in no way oppose the voluntary retirement from politics of Korean leaders who have returned to Korea since the Japanese capitulation. d . While implementing paragraphs a and b above, you should not lose sight of the intention of this government to establish, as soon as possible, a nationwide Provisional Korean Government, in accordance with the terms of the Moscow Agreement. To this end, while standing firm on the principle that freedom of expression must be safeguarded throughout Korea, you will be prepared to instruct the U.S. representatives on the Joint Commission to resume negotiations with the Soviet representatives at any time and will propose the resumption of negotiations whenever there is reason to believe that there may be a basis for agreement within the Commission without compromising United States principles. In particular, you will be ready to exploit any favorable reaction on the part of the Korean people or the Soviet representatives on the Joint Commission to conditions resulting from the implementation of paragraphs a and b above as the basis for agreement regarding the establishment of a nationwide Provisional Korean Government. When negotiations are resumed, the United States representatives will look to SWNCC 176/18 44 for guidance and should also consider the following additional suggestions as possible means of resolving the present impasse in the Joint Commission: (1) To hold nationwide elections of a type consistent with United States concepts of democracy in order to select the group of representative democratic Korean leaders called for in paragraph 4 d (1) of SWNCC 176/18; (2) To hold nationwide elections of a type consistent with United States concepts of democracy in order to select the key members of a nationwide Provisional Korean Government; (3) To accept for consultative purposes the advisory legislative body called for in paragraph a (2) above as representative of all democratic parties and social organizations in southern Korea; and (4) To use members of such an advisory legislative body for key positions in a nationwide Provisional Korean Government. 6. Legal and Police Organization a . You will continue the substantive and procedural law now existing in Korea only in so far as it is consistent with the objectives of the occupation. You will encourage the Interim Legislative Assembly to initiate and pass laws, subject to your veto, and you will impose laws by decree or ordinance only in so far as other legislation is necessary to achieve the objectives of the occupation. You will take action necessary to annul any laws and practices promulgated or followed by the Japanese authorities which discriminate for or against any person because of race, nationality, creed or political opinion. b . Ordinary criminal and civil courts in Korea will be permitted to continue to function subject to such regulations, supervision and control as you, or the legislative body with your approval, may provide. Personnel of the courts who are found to be incompetent or objectionable because of Japanese influence will be removed and will be replaced with acceptable and qualified successors. Full power of review will be retained by you over all courts which are allowed to function but will be ordinarily used only to set aside decisions which are inconsistent with the purposes of your mission. You will continue to take all necessary measures to cause the release of persons unjustly held in custody. c . You will continue or appoint such military courts as may be necessary with jurisdiction over offenses involving U.S. personnel or property and over such other acts as you may declare to be offenses against your military occupation. You will, however, except as otherwise deemed necessary by you, assure that Korean courts exercise an effective jurisdiction over cases not of direct or predominant concern to your military occupation. d . You will retain appropriate existing police agencies and establish such others as may be necessary. All police agencies will be kept free of undependable and undesirable elements. e . Existing policies will be continued relative to (1) arrest and internment of war criminals, (2) prisoners of war, United Nations nationals, neutrals, and displaced persons, and (3) personnel objectionable because of Japanese influence. 7. Political Activity a . The dissemination of Japanese propaganda in any form will be prohibited and completely suppressed, and no revival of Japanese or pro-Japanese nationalistic societies will be allowed. b . Subject to the necessity of maintaining the security of the occupying forces, the formation and activities of democratic political parties with rights of assembly and public discussion will be encouraged. You will continue your supervision over all political parties and those organizations and societies which participate in political activities. c . Encouragement will be given to the development of democratic labor organizations in commerce, industry and agriculture. d . To the extent that the security of your military occupation and the attainment of its objectives are not clearly prejudiced, you will continue to insure freedom of opinion, speech, press and assembly. e . Freedom of religious worship shall be maintained. f . You will not extend official recognition to, nor utilize for political purposes, any self-styled “Korean Provisional Government” or similar political organizations. 8. Other Administrative Measures a . United States military and civilian personnel in Korea should make special efforts to treat the Korean population in such a manner as to develop confidence in and increase the prestige of the United States and the United Nations. You will continue to provide your forces with information concerning the customs of the Korean people in order to contribute to a better understanding between your forces and the Korean people and to avoid friction and undesirable incidents. b . You will continue, with appropriate publicity, your efforts to ensure the recruiting and training of suitable Koreans to replace at the earliest possible moment Japanese or non-desirable Koreans who have been retained in positions of responsibility by reason of their technical qualifications. c . You will continue such minimum control and censorship of civilian communications including the mails, wireless, radio, telephone, telegraph and cables, films and press as may be necessary in the interests of military security and the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation. d . You will assist and cooperate with civilian agencies of the U.S. Government or of other United Nations Governments functioning in southern Korea in accordance with decisions communicated to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The activities of such agencies will be subject to your control and authority. e . For the purpose of attracting the well qualified civilian personnel essential to the effective operation of the U.S. occupation of southern Korea, and for properly maintaining the occupation forces, you will initiate a program to provide acceptable living accommodations for United States personnel and their families. While immediately taking all practicable steps to provide living accommodations by utilizing and remodeling former Japanese and foreign-owned property, you will initiate plans to undertake such new construction as is necessary, submitting estimated requirements to finance such new construction in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 c above. f . In view of the limited facilities and services existing in Korea, the provisions of War Department policy contained in War 80429 (12 March 1946) will not apply to War Department civilian employees or to other civilian personnel, employed by other agencies of the U.S. Government, who are operating under your command in connection with military government in Korea. While not committing U.S. funds beyond budgetary limitations, you will take all practicable steps to make available to U.S. personnel and their families facilities such as schools, hospitals, and household supplies and to assist them in maintaining a suitable community. Part II Cultural 9. Objectives The basic cultural objectives of the United States with regard to Korea are: a . To further the attainment of the over-all objectives of the occupation, b . To encourage and assist the Koreans in freeing their cultural institutions, and the educational system in particular, from all Japanese nationalistic influences which have been forced upon the country in the past, in establishing a free and revitalized educational system and media of information, and in preserving and developing their own traditional national culture along liberal and democratic lines, and c . To encourage and assist the Korean people through an education and information program to rehabilitate their economy, and develop scientific research and technological skills, d . To encourage and assist the Koreans to prepare for and, to the extent that conditions permit, to participate in international cultural organizations and in international cultural exchange, so long as these are consistent with the purposes and objectives of the United Nations. e . To foster among the Korean people a knowledge and understanding of the history, institutions, culture and accomplishments of the United States to the end that U.S. occupation policy may achieve its objective. 10. Education a . You will permit all bona fide educational institutions including libraries, museums and art galleries, to remain open or to reopen as soon as possible. In order that the educational processes may continue with the least possible interruption, you will undertake to preserve the use of these institutions for educational purposes. Where temporary use for other purposes is deemed imperative, they shall be returned to their normal uses as soon as possible and in as nearly their original condition as practicable. b . In order that Koreans may eventually achieve the level of literacy and educational standards necessary for the people of a democratic and independent state, you will permit, encourage, and assist in: (1) the expansion of existing educational facilities, including facilities for technical and in-plant training, (2) the opening of appropriate new educational institutions, and (3) the expansion of existing adult education programs, making use of schools, lectures, displays and mobile educational units. To the extent that such assistance involves the expenditure of U.S. funds, you will be limited by the amounts of U.S. funds available to you. c . You will continue to insure that all teachers who have been exponents of Japanese militant nationalism and aggression and those who actively oppose the purposes of the military occupation are removed, and, wherever possible, replaced by acceptable and qualified successors. d . Proper training will be provided to insure that qualified Koreans are available for governmental, educational, and other essential positions. e . You will permit, encourage, and within the means at your disposal assist the Koreans in programs for: (1) the organization and administration of a democratic educational system; (2) the general training of an adequate number of teachers at all levels; (3) inservice training of teachers for an educational system consistent with democratic, independent statehood; (4) the reorientation and retraining of teachers who have been deprived of an adequate knowledge of their own culture, language and institutions; (5) The development of the vocational and technical training of the Koreans through in-plant training and adult education techniques; (6) The training of farmers through an agricultural extension system. f . You will continue to remove and prohibit the use of text books and curricula containing Japanese nationalistic propaganda and see that new text books and curricula of a liberal and democratic character suitable to the Korean people are provided as soon as practicable. g . So far as consistent with the purposes and objectives of the occupation and the security of the occupying forces: (1) You will permit and wherever feasible assist suitable Koreans to travel abroad for purposes of study and observation in all fields of knowledge and in all skills; (2) You will permit and encourage suitable citizens of Allied countries to teach and aid in educational, scientific, technical and related institutions; to carry out activities of a philanthropic and eleemosynary character; and to engage in religious instruction; (3) You will permit, and within the means at your disposal, assist the flow into Korea of suitable educational materials including books and other publications, aural and visual aids, technical and scientific supplies, specimens and other educational aids essential to the development of education and training; and, wherever conditions permit, you will also make available other suitable material from local sources at your disposal, including confiscated Japanese material. h . In order that the progress of the Korean people in matters relating to the appreciation, protection and development of their traditional and historical national culture may proceed in an orderly fashion, you will permit and encourage the Koreans in the creation of societies and organizations for these purposes and for the general advancement of learning. i . You should encourage the Koreans to make appropriate use of the museums, libraries, monuments, and related institutions for educational purposes. j . You may request the services of competent educational, scientific and technical advisers whenever desirable. k . In the event that the funds and other collective resources at your disposal or at the disposal of the Koreans are not adequate to insure the carrying out of programs based upon the above paragraphs, you should, under the provisions of paragraph 18 below, submit such requests and justifications for additional resources as you deem necessary for their fulfillment. 11. Media of Information a . You will encourage the Korean people to develop all media of information and to enjoy freedom of speech and of the press, subject to the necessity of maintaining such minimum control and censorship as may be necessary for military security. b . All available media of public information will be utilized for the guidance of the Korean people in the attainment of the objectives set forth in paragraph 3 a through the dissemination of American ideals and principles of democracy. c . You will develop and maintain organizations and facilities for the operation of media of information designed to further the objectives of your government. 12. Arts and Archives a . You will continue to take adequate measures for the protection and preservation of all historical, cultural and religious monuments and objects, and archaeological sites against deterioration and depredation. b . You will maintain jurisdiction over designated national treasures, monuments and archaeological antiquities and prohibit their sale and export. c . You will prohibit archaeological excavations and the undertaking of any extensive restoration, repairs or remodeling of monuments or other cultural objects except as may be necessary for their preservation, and then only under the guidance of competent experts. d . You will take such measures as appear appropriate to encourage and, within the means at your disposal, to assist the training of competent Korean scholars and experts so that they may be prepared to assume full responsibility for the administration, technical care, and utilization of their historical and cultural property. e . You will cause to be preserved the records and reports prepared during the period of Japanese control, (including those of the Government General, government departments and bureaus and all government-administered institutions and organizations), the records of important Japanese or Japanese-controlled private, financial, industrial, manufacturing, and business concerns, the archives of the former kingdom of Korea and all other historical archives. f . You will prepare reports, as necessary, on the overall status of Korean art collections, museums, historic monuments and archeological sites. Part III Economic 13. Objectives The basic economic objectives of the United States with regard to Korea are: a . To further the attainment of the over-all objectives of the occupation. b . To establish a strong independent Korean economy free from domination by Japan or any foreign power as a necessary foundation for political independence. c . To assist the Koreans in developing an economy which will provide them with as high a standard of living and as great economic security as their resources and technological development will permit. d . To assist the Koreans in initiating a broad program of domestic economic reforms which will encourage stable democratic institutions. e . To assist the Koreans in encouraging and developing scientific research and technology adaptable to their country. 14. General Policy for Attainment of Objectives While at all times and in all circumstances you are empowered to take such direct action as necessary, insofar as possible, you will accomplish these objectives as follows: a . By encouraging maximum local production and equitable distribution of needed goods. b . By encouraging Korean participation in world trade particularly with a view to stimulating exports, procuring imports essential to the attainment of the objectives of the occupation and keeping to a minimum the quantity of imports which must be financed by the U.S. c . By encouraging in the United States zone Korean responsibility, initiative and participation in economic activities in all ways which are not inconsistent with the maintenance of necessary military control, by (1) utilizing for this purpose the advisory legislative body as provided for in paragraph 5 d (2) above, and (2) encouraging Koreans to assume responsibility insofar as possible for administration of economic programs, with participation of U.S. personnel directed primarily to high level advice, guidance, technical assistance and training in fields where skilled Korean personnel is limited. d . U.S. occupation costs in Korea, including both won and non-won expenditures for purposes of the occupation, will be covered by separate directive. 15. Reintegration of Economy of Northern Korea with that of Southern Korea Early reintegration of the economy of northern Korea with that of southern Korea continues to be an important aim of U.S. policy. You will be prepared to instruct the U.S. representatives on the Joint Commission to resume negotiations with the Soviet representatives to effect economic reintegration at any time. Meanwhile, you will continue your efforts to arrange with the Soviet Commander of Northern Korea for the exchange of goods between the northern and southern zones. 16. Domestic Economic Program a . In order to control inflation, maximize production of needed goods, ensure equitable distribution of such supplies are are available, and introduce greater stability into the economy of southern Korea, you will establish such measures for rationing, price control, allocation of materials, production control, and such other appropriate fiscal and administrative measures as you deem necessary. You will encourage Korean participation in the formulation and administration of these measures. You will guide the establishment of such controls so that, insofar as possible, they will be developed only as temporary measures to revive the economy following a period of disruption caused by war and will be administered to bring about such balance and stability as would permit their elimination as soon as possible. b . Safeguards should be taken to assure to the Koreans adequate opportunity to determine for themselves the ultimate character of economic institutions and activities within Korea. You will assist them in every way possible to develop an economy so organized as to facilitate the growth of peaceful and democratic, political, social and economic institutions. Such an economy in Korea might well be of the “mixed” type including various arrangements for industrial organization such as public, private and cooperative ownership, and an agriculture based firmly on a large number of small farmer proprietors. You will encourage popular discussion of economic reforms such as redistribution of land ownership or development of credit cooperatives and promote active Korean participation in the formulation and administration of measures to accomplish these reforms along the lines indicated in paragraph 14 c . 17. Foreign Trade Subject to your control, participation of Koreans in world trade will be encouraged. You will establish measures to stimulate exports from Korea, to limit imports and other expenditures requiring foreign exchange to items essential for the achievement of all the objectives of the occupation, and to establish control over all Korean foreign exchange in order to pay for a maximum proportion of such necessary imports and reduce U.S. commitments for this purpose to a minimum. As in the case of domestic economic controls, such measures should be of temporary duration for the purpose of dealing with the present abnormal situation. 18. Civilian Supply a . You will assure that all practicable measures are taken to achieve the maximum utilization of Korean resources in order to limit U.S. responsibility for imports into Korea. Such measures will include the controls discussed in paragraph 16 a above. b . Insofar as essential goods necessary to accomplish the objectives set forth in paragraph 13 cannot be furnished through local Korean production or through imports financed by relief and charitable agencies such as UNRRA, it is the policy of the United States Government to provide such imports, subject to the following procedures and to budgetary limitations: (1) You will submit periodically to the Joint Chiefs of Staff statements of over-all import requirements essential to attain these objectives, setting forth specific justifications of items and quantities. (2) You will indicate proposed sources of supply and methods of financing for these import programs according to the following categories: ( a ) Surplus or Excess U.S. Government Stocks in Asia and the Pacific As high a proportion of your import requirements as possible should be obtained from excess U.S. government stocks. Additional goods, suitable in type and cost to Korea’s economy and available in surplus property stocks, should be obtained within the limits of Foreign Liquidation Commission credits made available to you. ( b ) Imports from Japan Such essential imports as Korea can most easily and economically obtain from Japan should, during the period of rehabilitation, be supplied from that country to the extent that they are available. Imports into Korea from Japan will provisionally be considered as deductions from Japanese obligations to the United States for repayment of Japanese imports. ( c ) Imports Financed by Korean Foreign Exchange and Exports . Other essential imports should be financed to the maximum extent through Korean foreign exchange or exports. ( d ) Imports Financed by U.S. All other sources should be fully exploited before establishing import requirements which must be financed by the U.S. Government. 19. Resumption of Foreign Business Operations U.S. policy calls for the resumption of normal foreign business operations in Korea as soon as possible. You may, subject to the controls established in implementing paragraph 17 above, authorize travel of Allied businessmen to southern Korea and of Korean businessmen to Allied countries when you consider such travel desirable. When authorizing such travel you will consider the needs of the Korean economy for industrial development and technical assistance, the necessity of preventing foreign enterprises from obtaining control over any part of the Korean economy, the availability of living facilities and any other relevant considerations. Opportunities for such travel will be open on equal terms to businessmen of all Allied countries which practice no discrimination against U.S. interests. The detailed terms and limitations under which Allied businessmen will be permitted to enter southern Korea will be determined by the United States Government upon receiving your recommendations. To the extent that such a program will improve the Korean economy, you will enlist the aid of U.S. and other Allied technicians and experts in training Koreans to carry out necessary economic activities. Part IV Financial 20. In the administration of financial matters, you will continue to use Korean personnel and existing agencies and financial institutions in Korea to the maximum extent consistent with the objectives of the occupation. You should establish new agencies, or reorganize existing ones, to the extent necessary to assure the effective execution of the policies and programs of this directive. You will continue to remove and exclude from positions of responsibility or influence all personnel objectionable because of Japanese influence. You may establish administrative machinery not dependent upon Korean authorities and agencies to the extent necessary to execute or assure the effective execution of the policies and programs in this directive. Such machinery will be integrated with other Korean agencies as early as practicable to insure maximum efficient and economical administration of Korean financial affairs. 21. You will continue to take all steps necessary to terminate Japanese influence over financial institutions in Korea. You will not permit communication or other contact involving business, commercial, or financial matters between Japanese nationals in Japan and persons within Korea. 22. The legal tender in Korea will be Bank of Chosen notes. Until further directed you will not permit any other currency to circulate except as follows: a . United States Military Payment Certificates will be a medium of exchange for authorized personnel under regulations approved by you. b . As a temporary measure, Japanese currency now in circulation of less than one yen denomination may be continued in use. You will not announce, establish or permit the use or publication of any general rate of exchange between Bank of Chosen notes and the United States dollar and/or other currencies, except for a military conversion rate to be governed by separate directives. 23. a . The Bank of Chosen will continue to perform central banking functions under your direction. The central banking functions of the institution will, for the purposes of accurate accounting and the training of specialized personnel, be segregated from its commercial banking activities and handled by a separate department of the bank. You may if you deem appropriate change the English translation of the name of the bank to “Bank of Korea”. b . Adequate funds in Korean legal tender may be made available to financial and business institutions in Korea to finance activities which you consider essential to the Korean economy. You will receive a separate directive dealing with revised procedures regarding the financing of local currency expenditures (see paragraph 14 d ). c . Your Military Government in Korea, either directly or through the central banking department of the Bank of Chosen, should maintain strict control of bank credit in Korea, regulate rates of interest, conduct periodic bank examinations, require banks to maintain reserves against deposits, and take such other measures as may be required to assure adequate supervision and control of the Korean financial and credit structure. 24. You will continue to maintain such accounts and records as may be necessary to reflect the financial operations of your military occupation and you will provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff with such information as they may require. Separate accounts will be kept of all receipts and expenditures in United States dollars and all receipts and expenditures in Korean legal tender currency arising from (1) the normal functions of government in Korea and (2) the military occupation of Korea. 25. You will continue to take action necessary to ensure that all laws and practices promulgated by the Japanese authorities relating to taxation or other fields of finance in Korea which discriminate for or against any person because of race, nationality, creed or political opinion, will be amended, suspended or abrogated to the extent necessary to eliminate such discrimination. The military government in Korea should take all steps necessary to revise the tax structure and to take such other measures as may be required to assure the adequate inflow of revenues, and should exercise control and supervision over the expenditures of public funds to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes of the occupation. Funds in excess of normal government revenues necessary to finance essential government activities and programs necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation may be borrowed by the military government from the Bank of Chosen in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 23 of this directive; however, such expenditures in excess of revenues should be kept to a minimum. Furthermore, you will operate on the assumption that any such loans or expenditures authorized by Military Government will be honored by the Provisional Korean Government or other Korean Government when established. You will make no commitment beyond the purview of Congressional appropriations for approved War Department civil affairs/military government operations that might be construed as an obligation of the dollar funds of the United States Government. 26. No transaction with respect to any impounded or blocked assets will be effected except pursuant to licenses or other authorizations issued by your Military Government in Korea. You will impound or block all gold, silver, platinum, currencies, securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers, and all other property falling within the following categories: a . Property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by any of the following: (1) The governments, nationals or residents of Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary; (2) Any persons specified by Military Government by inclusion in lists or otherwise. b . Property in Korea which is, or has been since 6 December 1941, owned or controlled directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by any person outside Korea or Japan. c . Identifiable looted property. Identifiable looted property in Korea and property of Allied nationals which was vested by the Japanese Government should be restored as promptly as possible. 27. All transactions in foreign exchange and foreign exchange assets, including those arising out of exports and imports, shall be controlled for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the occupation. To effectuate such objectives you will: a . prohibit, except as specifically authorized by your Military Government in Korea, all dealings in foreign exchange assets and all foreign exchange transactions. b . establish effective controls over the import and export of (1) gold, silver, whether in coin or bullion form, platinum and other precious metals; (2) currency; (3) securities; (4) checks, drafts, bills of exchange, promissory notes, payment instructions, transfer orders and other financial instruments; (5) powers of attorney or other authorizations or instructions to effect financial or property transactions; and (6) other evidences of indebtedness or ownership of property. c . make available any foreign exchange only for the payment of imports necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of the occupation. No other outlay of foreign exchange assets will be made without specific approval by your government through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. d . As used herein, the term “foreign exchange asset” shall include, but not by way of limitation, gold, silver, whether in coin or bullion form, platinum; any foreign currency, property physically situated outside of Korea; claims, demands, bank deposits, credits, securities, checks, drafts, insurance policies, or other evidences of ownership or indebtedness issued by or which are obligations of any person outside of Korea; copyrights, patents or trade-marks, issued by any country other than Japan, and any contracts or licenses relating thereto. e . As used herein the term “transactions in foreign exchange” shall include, but not by way of limitation, any transaction involving any foreign currency, any payment or transfer to or from any foreign country, any transfer of credit, or payment of an obligation, expressed in terms of a foreign currency, any purchase sale, transfer or other dealing in any foreign currency; any financial or property transaction between a person in Korea and a person outside Korea, whether or not expressed in terms of any foreign currency, and any transaction involving any obligation owed by any person in Korea to any person outside of Korea or owed by any person outside of Korea to any person in Korea. 28. You should seek out, reduce to actual possession and, when title is a matter of record, effect transfer of record title to Military Government of all Japanese public and private property interests title to which was vested in the Military Government of Korea by its Ordinance No. 33 of 6 December 1945. In the case of juridical persons chartered in Korea steps may be taken to make the ordinance applicable only to the Japanese interests of such juridical persons. The Military Government in Korea will hold vested property for ultimate disposition in accordance with instructions to be forwarded to you. 42 Copy transmitted to the Department by SWNCC with its SWN–5583, July 25; approved by SWNCC on July 23 after revision of SWNCC 176/23, August 14, 1946, and sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to forward. The JCS did so in telegram War 82886, July 26 (SWNCC 176 series). A copy was sent by the Department in instruction 84, July 30, to Seoul for the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs). 43 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 44 January 28, 1946, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 623 . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2547: Telegram [Document 553] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , July 25, 1947. 234. Cite Zurc 945. From Hodge, Brown and Jacobs. Reference is made to the Joint Commission deadlock described in Seoul Pol Ad 209, July 16. It is confirmed opinion of American delegation that Soviet delegation stalling, that present lines of argument are virtually exhausted and that new lines must be adopted. American delegation is continuing to press Soviet delegation to submit proposals for overcoming present difficulties. It will also propose that matter of consultation be referred back to Subcommission number 1 with directive to prepare lists of all parties and organizations requesting consultation and those unacceptable to either delegation with reasons therefor. If accepted, it is estimated that this will require one week. If above proposals fail or are not acceptable, the American delegation will offer proposals outlined in afore-mentioned radio in following order: (1) Soviet delegation carry on consultation north of 38th parallel and American delegation south of 38th parallel; (2) Both delegations consult jointly in North and South Korea with those parties acceptable to both delegations, and American delegation consult unilaterally with those which are unacceptable to Soviet delegation. This proposal would carry necessary safeguards against future elimination of parties from the consultative body provided for in paragraph 9, Joint Commission decision 12, and from the provisional government; (3) Oral consultation to be dispensed with entirely and consultation with respect to future provisional government be confined to written replies to questionnaires already filed. If none of above proposals is acceptable to Soviet delegation, then American delegation will consider proposing that Joint Commission drop for time being the question of consultation, and paragraph 1. Proceed under paragraph 9 of Joint Commission decision number 12 to discuss the creation of the consultative body, and paragraph 2. Discuss type, composition and method of creation of the provisional government. It is estimated that these proposals will have been presented within the next 2 weeks. The probability of acceptance or rejection by the Soviet delegation is dependent upon their instructions and good faith. When the above approaches have been exhausted, it would appear useless to proceed further with discussions except in pursuance of the course of action proposed below: (1) Review of the progress of the Joint Commission (upon Marshall’s initiative), by the Foreign Ministers, for which purpose and prior to their meeting the two delegations would prepare joint or separate statements reporting progress to date and setting forth points of difference between the two delegations. (See reference to July and August review, from last paragraph Molotov letter April 19 to Marshall). (2) Prior to the meeting for review by the Ministers, the US Government instruct the American delegation to propose a recess until instructions are issued by the two Ministers following their joint review. American delegation is pessimistic over possibility of reaching satisfactory agreement with respect to consultation and is convinced that Soviet delegation is waging systematic campaign in South Korea assisted by leftist parties, directed first against American delegation to force acceptance of Soviet views, and second against Korean rightist parties, hoping to eliminate them by goading them into overt acts which would constitute fomenting and inciting active opposition within the meaning of the Marshall–Molotov agreement, and thereby eliminate themselves. In latter event American delegation would be forced to acquiesce in elimination of rightist parties from consultation and probably from participation of their representatives in provisional government. There are indications that the present condition of disagreement is causing loss of confidence among Koreans in the ability of the Joint Commission to reach any agreement under the Moscow decision. Soviet delegation here with about 90 members and Soviet radio station at Pyongyang are taking full advantage of situation to breed unrest. Our intelligence officers report increasing stream of visitors to residence of that delegation and visits of members of the delegation on Koreans at late hours of the night. Their presence and activity in Seoul increases probability of disorders and difficulties of the American commander. Would appreciate receiving as soon as possible any instructions that State and War may wish to give. Jacobs Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2547: Telegram [Document 554] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , July 25, 1947. 236. Cite Zurc 947. 46th [ 47th ] meeting of Joint Commission held 25 July for 1½ hours, General Shtikov Chairman. Soviet delegation failed to put forward any new proposals. US Chairman then read prepared statement covering attitude of political groups in North and South Korea, suggested that some new proposal should be made, and specifically proposing that lists be prepared by Subcommission No. 1 which would show in terms of parties and organizations the position of each delegation. Soviet delegation, however, insisted on consideration of its list described in report of 45th [ 46th ] meeting rather than list of all applicants. Soviet delegation asked adjournment for study of US proposal find also proposed that a joint communiqué be drafted giving reasons for delay, stating that if US delegation would not agree to Soviet draft [apparent omission] Soviet delegation tried to fix next meeting for July 29. US delegation suggested July 28. Matter not decided. [ Hodge ] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 40.00119 Control (Korea)/7–2547: Telegram [Document 555] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) confidential u.s. urgent Washington , July 25, 1947—8 p.m. 153. Giving urgent study to US course of action for Korea in case of breakdown or indefinite prolongation present stalemate in Joint Commission. It is hoped to inform you of approved course during next week. You should use all appropriate measures to insure continuance of negotiations. Marshall Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) IO Files 45 [Document 556] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Allison ) [ Washington ,] July 29, 1947. The following rough outline is presented for consideration in the ad hoc committee on Korea 46 as a possible basis for discussion. It is believed that in general it presents a series of steps which need to be taken and which are designed (1) to prove to the discouraged and explosive Korean people that the United States Government is making every possible effort to speed their independence, and (2) to prove to American and world public opinion that the United States Government is acting in accordance with its international commitments, particularly under the Charter of the United Nations. A. If Soviets Break Off Joint Commission Negotiations Prior to Aug. 5. 1. Immediate letter to Molotov with copies to the United Kingdom and China calling urgent conference to discuss further steps—(letter to be along lines of draft telegram to Hodge—not sent, and to include as an enclosure proposals in 2 below.) Letter to be made public. 2. Presentation to 4 Powers of specific plan. a . early elections by secret, multi-party ballot in both zones to choose provisional legislatures, b . wholly elective legislatures to pick provisional executives, c . provisional legislatures in cooperation with provisional executives to choose representatives to meet with representatives from other zone to discuss formation of a provisional government for a united Korea on a basis bearing in mind the proportional population in each zone, d . this provisional Korean Government to meet with representatives of 4 Powers to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to put Korea on a firm economic foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given, e . that upon agreement by the Korean Provisional Government with 4 Powers on aid and assistance all occupation forces shall be withdrawn unless specific agreements are entered into by the Korean Provisional Government and the Powers concerned. Such agreements would naturally provide that as long as armed forces remained their commander and his government would naturally have final say as to their use, although acting as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the Korean Provisional Government, f . during stages a, b and c , the United Nations will be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative character of the provisional legislatures and executives. 3. In presenting the above plan to the 4 Powers they should be informed that, in justice to the Korean people, no undue delay can be permitted and that, if speedy agreements cannot be reached, the United States Government intends to present the whole problem of Korea at the earliest possible date to the United Nations. They should also be informed that in the meantime, in order that there may be no delay in making preparations for a united Korea, the United States Government in the zone of its responsibility intends to take the steps outlined in 2 a and 2 b above along with a positive program of political, educational and economic help and assistance. That in carrying out this program, including steps in 2 a and 2 b , the United States Government will welcome United Nations observers. This statement should be made on the first day of the Conference in public session. B. If Soviets Drag Out Joint Commission Negotiations . 1. Letter should be sent to Molotov on August 6 calling attention to his original suggestion that Joint Commission should report in July or August; that United States Government deplores present lack of progress made by Commission; that United States Government requests a report by August 10 from Commission of such progress as has been made so that consideration can be immediately given as to what further steps can be taken to hasten the establishment of a united, independent Korea. 2. On August 12, after receipt of report from Joint Commission, United States should present a letter to 4 Powers adhering to Moscow Agreement along lines in A 1 and A 2 above. 3. Public statement provided for in A 3 above should be made on opening day of 4-Power Conference, which should meet in Washington on August 25. If no progress is made by September 10, United States should announce its intention of submitting matter to next session of General Assembly of United Nations. C. In Case of Soviet Refusal to Meet . 1. Should Soviet Government refuse to meet as requested or endeavor to delay meeting unreasonably, United States Government should announce that after informing other adherents to Moscow Agreement on Korea it intended to submit whole problem of Korea to next session of General Assembly of United Nations and that in meantime it would take steps outlined in A 2 a and A 2 b above, welcoming at same time United Nations observers should United Nations so desire. D. Preparation of Case for United Nations . A State Department working team should immediately be formed to prepare case for submission to United Nations. E. Grant-in-aid Program and State Department Takeover . It is believed present report should stress urgency of continuing with efforts to obtain approval for grant-in-aid program and the necessity for setting a definite date for takeover of civil functions in United States zone of Korea, by the State Department. The urgency should also be pointed out of designating a Civil Commissioner who could begin at once preparations for this takeover. 45 Master Files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 46 See footnote 41, p. 713 [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7–3047: Telegram [Document 557] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State restricted Seoul , July [30,] 1947. [245.] Zurc 970. Forty-eighth meeting of Joint Commission held 1330, 29 July for 4½ hours. General Brown chairman. Soviet delegation read long detailed statement extolling many alleged successful reforms in North Korea and alleging contrasting unfavorable conditions in South Korea. Soviet made no new proposal. American delegation then proposed Soviet delegation consult with organizations in North Korea and US delegation consult with those in south Korea. Soviet delegation rejected this proposal as not worthy of serious consideration. Next meeting July 31. [ Jacobs ] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.0019 Control (Korea)/7–3147: Telegram [Document 558] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , July 31, 1947. 246. Zurc 978. 49th meeting of Joint Commission held p.m. 31 July for about 3½ hours. General Brown chairman. Soviet delegation, when invited to introduce new proposal, reintroduced previous proposals. US delegation restated reasons why these were unacceptable. US delegation then read a letter from certain organizations who are members of Anti-Trusteeship Committees, reaffirming intent to cooperate with the Joint Commission. In modified form, US delegation then renewed its proposal of 47th meeting that Subcommission No. 1 make systematic listing of all applicant organizations showing position of each delegation with respect to each party. Soviet delegation said it would study letter, consider US proposal and reply tomorrow. No change of attitude or progress achieved. Next meeting 1330, August 1. Press statement issued by US delegation will be transmitted in clear. 47 [ Hodge ] 47 Telegram 247, August 1, not printed; for text of statement dated July 31, see Department of State Bulletin , August 10, 1947, p. 296. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–247: Telegram [Document 559] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , August 2, 1947. 253. Zurc 984. The American delegation has now presented to the Soviet delegation without apparent success in breaking present stalemate other than promise by Soviet delegation to consider letter of Anti-Trusteeship Committee mentioned Seoul 246, July 31 and to submit reply thereto, the first two proposals 48 mentioned in Seoul PolAd No. 234, July 25. While barring unexpected developments there remains sufficient number of other proposals to spin out negotiations over 2 more weeks, instructions from State and War requested in last sentence Seoul PolAd No. 234, July 25 needed soonest. General Shtikov held press conference afternoon August 2 and handed out five-page release which is being translated. Apparently nothing new in it but will telegraph anything of importance when translation is available. 49 Jacobs 48 The second proposal was rejected at the 50th meeting on August 1. 49 Telegram 259, August 5, from Seoul, stated that the Soviet release again tried to place blame on the Americans. In despatch 36, August 5, from Seoul, Mr. Jacobs submitted texts of recent press statements and stated: “The whole problem is that the Soviet Delegation is trying to exclude a large group of rightists from consultation which, for all Korea, would give a slightly more than 50% participation both by parties and alleged membership.… To this the American Delegation will not and cannot agree.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–547) Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Korea SWNCC 176/30 [Document 560] Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Korea 50 secret [ Washington ,] 4 August 1947. United States Policy in Korea the problem 1. To formulate as a matter of urgency a proposed course of action to be adopted by the United States Government to prevent further serious deterioration of the unsettled political situation in Korea. facts bearing on the problem 2. See Appendix “A”. 51 discussion 3. See Appendix “B”. 51 conclusions 4. It is concluded that: a . The U.S. cannot at this time withdraw from Korea under circumstances which would inevitably lead to Communist domination of the entire country. The resulting political repercussions would seriously damage U.S. prestige in the Far East and throughout the world, and would discourage those small nations now relying upon the U.S. to support them in resisting internal or external Communist pressure. Every effort should be made, however, to liquidate or reduce the U.S. commitment of men and money in Korea as soon as possible without abandoning Korea to Soviet domination. b . The present unsatisfactory state of affairs in south Korea will not improve until definite action is taken giving the Koreans reassurance that the United States is doing and will continue to do its utmost to carry out its commitment to bring independence to Korea. c . In the event of early failure of Joint Commission negotiations there is the possibility that the Korean people, discouraged by lack of progress toward their independence, will be led by extremists of either Eight or Left, into such serious internal disorders that U.S. public opinion might require the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea under such circumstances would almost certainly result in the complete domination of Korea by the Soviet Union, with grave consequences to U.S. prestige and world-wide political objectives. d . The United States must immediately adopt a course of action to expedite a satisfactory solution to the Korean problem. This course of action must be designed (1) to prove to the discouraged and explosive Korean people that the U.S. Government is making every possible effort to speed their independence, and (2) to prove to American and world public opinion that the U.S. Government is acting in accordance with its international commitments, particularly the Moscow Agreement and the Charter of the United Nations. e . In the event that the present impasse in the Joint Commission continues until August 7, a letter (Appendix “C”) 52 should be dispatched to the Foreign Minister of the USSR informing him of the desire of the U.S. Government to receive from the Joint Commission a report by August 17 of such progress as it has made so that immediate consideration can be given as to what further steps should be taken to expedite the establishment of a united, independent Korea. If the Joint Commission is unable to agree on a joint report, the U.S. delegation should be instructed to submit its unilateral report to the U.S. Government. On August 18, after receipt of a report either from the Joint Commission or the U.S. delegation, the U.S. Government should forward a note (Appendix “D”) 53 to the other three powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement, informing them of the lack of progress by the Joint Commission, and proposing definite steps for early achievement of the aims of the Moscow Agreement. These proposals should provide (1) for the establishment of a Provisional Government by the Koreans themselves through recognized democratic procedures, (2) for United Nations observation of elections and the other procedures involved in establishing the Provisional Government, and (3) for such aid and assistance, (not termed “trusteeship”) as is agreed between the Provisional Government and the Four Powers. This letter to the other three powers should request the early comments and views of the other three powers, and invite informal consultation in Washington through their Ambassadors. It should be made clear at the beginning of these consultations that if no agreement is reached regarding these or substitute proposals, the United States feels that, in view of the already untoward delay in achieving Korean independence, it must submit the matter to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The letters in Appendices “C” and “D” should be made public upon receipt of notification of their delivery. f . In the event that the Soviet Delegation on the Joint Commission should precipitate a breakdown in the negotiations prior to August 7, the U.S. Government should immediately dispatch to the other three Powers concerned the note contained in Appendix “D” with appropriate modification of the first paragraph. Under such circumstances the United States should follow the courses outlined above with reference to publicity. g . Should the Soviet Government refuse to consider the U.S. proposals, the United States Government should inform the other adherents to Moscow Agreement on Korea that it is submitting the whole problem of Korea to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and that in the meantime it proposes to take the initial steps outlined in the Annex to Appendix “D”, welcoming at the same time United Nations observers. Immediate steps should then be taken to place the case on the agenda of the General Assembly. h . Should the Soviet Government propose the immediate simultaneous withdrawal of occupation forces, the U.S. Government should agree in principle subject to the limitations set forth in Section IV, B, 4 of the Interdepartmental Committee Report on Korea which are designed to safeguard Korean political freedom and national independence. i . In the unlikely event that the Soviet delegation begins to cooperate on the Joint Commission, reference to the United Nations must be delayed at least temporarily. The United States should still make a public announcement of the actions being taken in the southern zone to expedite Korean self-government and full independence. A new impasse in negotiations should be met by immediate initiation of the course outlined in subparagraph e above. j . A State Department working group should immediately be formed to prepare the Korean case for submission to the United Nations. This working group should consult as appropriate with representatives of the War and Navy Departments. k . In view of the possibility of failure of solution in the United Nations, the U.S. Government must be prepared for the possible necessity of granting independence to south Korea, and must make a continuing study of the political and economic considerations involved in taking such a step. l . There is a continuing need for a Grant-in-Aid to Korea by the U.S. Government, whether or not it becomes necessary to submit the Korean problem to the United Nations. Plans should be made therefore to submit Grant-in-Aid legislation to the next session of Congress. m . Immediate steps should be taken by the Foreign Policy Information Subcommittee of SWNCC to revise appropriately the public information policy on Korea. recommendations 5. It is recommended that: a . In the event that present impasse in the Joint Commission continues until 7 August, the letter in Appendix “C” be dispatched to the Foreign Minister of the USSR, and on 18 August the letter in Appendix “D” be dispatched to the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, United Kingdom, and China; these letters to be made public upon notification of their delivery. b . In the event of breakdown in Joint Commission negotiations in Korea prior to 7 August, that the letter in Appendix “D” be immediately dispatched with appropriate publicity, to the governments of the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and China. c . If no agreement can be reached between the four powers regarding the proposals contained in the Annex to Appendix “D”, on 10 September the United States publicly announce its intention of submitting the whole Korean problem to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations beginning 16 September. d . In the event the Soviet Union refuses to consider the U.S. proposals on Korea, or otherwise delays progress, the United States inform with appropriate publicity, the other three powers of its intention to submit the whole problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations. e . A State Department working group immediately be formed to prepare the Korean case for submission to the United Nations, consulting as appropriate with representatives of the War and Navy Departments. f . The Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC, after the receipt of General Wedemeyer’s report, prepare a study of the political and economic considerations which will be involved should it become desirable or necessary to grant independence to South Korea. g . Grant-in-Aid legislation for South Korea be prepared for submission to the next session of Congress. h . The information policy on Korea be appropriately revised by the Foreign Policy Information Subcommittee of SWNCC. 50 Submitted to SWNCC on August 4. 51 Not printed. 51 Not printed. 52 Not printed, but see note quoted in telegram 1582, August 11, 6 p.m., to Moscow, p. 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] . 53 See document quoted as enclosure to note in telegram 1646, August 26, 8 p.m., to Moscow, p. 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] . Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Hilldring) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–647 [Document 561] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Hilldring ) to the Secretary of State 54 secret [ Washington ,] August 6, 1947. Discussion: The attached report by an ad hoc committee of SWNCC 55 recommends a course of action to be taken by the US Government in regard to the Korean situation in the event of (1) an abrupt breakdown of the Joint US–USSR Commission negotiations as a result of Soviet initiative or (2) the indefinite prolongation of the present stalemate in the Joint Commission negotiations as a result of Soviet procrastination. General Hodge and Minister Jacobs report that the political situation in Korea is becoming increasingly explosive due to the stalemate in the Joint Commission and the resulting delay in setting up an independent Korea. The matter was placed before SWNCC for urgent consideration in SWNCC 176/27 of July 24, which quoted a telegram from General Hodge and a statement by the War Department of US policy towards Korea. 56 The report of the ad hoc committee concludes that the US cannot at this time withdraw from Korea under circumstances which would almost certainly result in the complete domination of that country by the Soviet Union with grave consequences to US prestige and world-wide political objectives. The action recommended in the attached paper is designed (1) to prove to the discouraged and explosive Korean people that the US Government is making every possible effort to speed their independence and (2) to prove to American and world public opinion that the US Government is acting in accordance with its international commitments, particularly the Moscow Agreement on Korea and the Charter of the United Nations. If the Soviets break off Joint Commission negotiations prior to August 7, an immediate letter should be sent to Molotov with copies to the UK and China, requesting early consultation in Washington to discuss further steps, such letter to include proposals as stated below and such letter to be made public. The letter to the Powers concerned should include as an enclosure a specific US plan providing (1) for the establishment of a Provisional Government by the Koreans themselves through recognized democratic procedures, (2) for UN observation of elections and the other procedures involved in establishing the Provisional Government, and (3) for such aid and assistance (not termed “trusteeship”) as is agreed between the Provisional Government and the Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea. In presenting this plan to the Powers concerned during discussions in Washington to begin on August 25, they should be informed that, in justice to the Korean people, no undue delay can be permitted and that, if speedy agreement cannot be reached, the US Government intends to present the whole problem of Korea at the earliest possible date to the UN. They should also be informed that in the meantime, in order that there may be no delay in making preparations for a united Korea, the US Government, in the zone of its responsibility, intends to follow a positive program of political, educational and economic help and assistance, and that in carrying out this program the US Government will welcome UN observers. If the Soviets drag out Joint Commission negotiations, a letter should be sent to Molotov on August 7, calling attention to his original suggestion that the Joint Commission should report in July or August; that the US Government deplores the present lack of progress made by the Commission; that the US Government requests a report by August 17 from the Commission of such progress as has been made so that consideration can be immediately given as to what further steps can be taken to hasten the establishment of a united, independent Korea. On August 18, after receipt of the report from the Joint Commission, the US should present a letter to the Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement along the lines indicated in paragraph 2 above. Subsidiary recommendations in the report are ( a ) that, should the Soviet Government refuse to discuss the matter or should it unreasonably delay discussions, the US Government should inform the other adherents to the Moscow Agreement that it intends to submit the whole problem of Korea to the next session of the UN General Assembly; [ b ] that a State Department working team should immediately be formed to prepare a case for possible submission to the UN; and ( c ) that a Grant-in-Aid program should be prepared for submission at the next session of Congress. Recommendation: It is recommended that the recommendations in this paper (Tab 1) be approved. Concurrences: Concurrences from the following offices have been given on the report itself: NA, FE, EE, SPA, A-H. War and Navy Departments have also concurred. 54 Notation by General Hilldring: “The Sec State approved this in my presence. J H H”. 55 SWNCC 176/30, August 4, supra . 56 None printed. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–547: Telegram [Document 562] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , August 5 [ 6 ], 1947. 262. Zurc 992. 51st meeting of Joint Commission held 5th August for 4 hours, General Shtikov chairman. Soviet delegation in response to letter from organizations presented in 49th meeting proposed to call in signatory organizations for questioning. Soviet delegation stated purpose of questions to clarify organization attitude toward Moscow decision and its relation to Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Soviet delegation however would not inform on specific questions to be asked. US delegation rejected Soviet proposal on basis that these signatory organizations had clearly and unmistakably made themselves eligible for consultation under joint agreements and that their recent letter was in fact unnecessary. However, the letter had specifically reaffirmed their intention to support and cooperate with the Joint Commission. US delegation stated that it had no objection to questioning of organizations on such matters but it should be done at the time they appear for consultation. Soviet delegation declined this and then read prepared proposal in substance as follows: First, begin working out proposals on the charter, platform, personnel and composition of the provisional government; second; to entrust chiefs of the 2 delegations and Subcommission number 1 with task of working out list for consultation. Soviet delegation continues attacking American delegation by making polemic accusations that it causes delays and violates Marshall–Molotov agreement and joint decisions. Refutation of these accusations only serves to intensify Soviet attack. Next meeting Thursday, August 7th. [ Hodge ] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 895.51/8–747: Telegram [Document 563] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , August 7, 1947. 264. [Zurc?] 1000. Fifty-second meeting of Joint Commission held August 7 for 3 hours. General Shtikov chairman. Soviet continued attack on parties which are members of Anti-Trusteeship Committee and insistence that Subcommissions 2 and 3 begin work. No change in situation except that further discussion in Joint Commission along present lines has become absurd. Next meeting to be set by American chairman next week. American delegation is releasing unilaterally letter signed members of United Council presented in 49th meeting. Text thereof will be transmitted in clear. 57 [Hodge] 57 Telegram 265, August 7, not printed; for text of letter, dated July 28, see statement by General Brown on August 7, Department of State Bulletin , August 24, 1947, p. 399. Text of the letter is also printed in Korea’s Independence p. 49. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00B/8–747 [Document 564] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret No. 39 Seoul , August 7, 1947. Sir : While looking up Soviet-Communist activities in Korea, I came across the enclosed G–2 memorandum, dated June 29, 1946, on Soviet-Communist master plan for Korea, together with a related memorandum of communist activities dated May 25, 1946, a copy of which is also enclosed. 58 The following comment is made on the main points of strategy referred to in the master plan (the paragraphs below are set forth in the same order as the paragraphs appear in the memorandum): a . While it is impossible to estimate accurately how many Koreans in North Korea have been given military training, there is ample evidence from G–2 sources (Intelligence Summaries of North Korea, prepared by G–2) that the youth of North Korea is being given military training in large numbers. It is also known from discoveries made in South Korea that a goodly number of these trainees have already infiltrated into South Korea and some of them have actually gotten into the police force and constabulary of South Korea. b . While there is little evidence of a concentrated drive to increase the membership of the Communist Party, there is ample evidence of efforts to increase the membership of the People’s Democratic Front and the various front organizations such as youth, women and labor groups, the principal leaders of which are either known or believed to be Communists. c . In view of the observation in item b above it seems that the Communists as such are in a sense “going underground” inasmuch as they are working through organizations other than the strictly-speaking “Communist Party”. There is also some evidence that they are trying to compromise with rightist groups. From remarks made by Dr. Syngman Rhee, leader of the largest rightist group, and Kim Sung Soo, leader of the Hankook Democratic Party, also rightist, these leaders seem to feel that the time may soon come when they can work with the leftists. By these remarks, I am led to believe that the leftists have probably already made some approaches to them for a compromise arrangement which has as its purpose the apparent “burying of the hatchet” between the two groups until a unified provisional government consisting of both groups has been established and the American and Russian troops have left the country. After that, the Communist group will maneuver to obtain the most strategic positions in the government and at an appropriate time seize the reins of government as they have done in the Balkans and some European states and establish a Communist-satellite state. I should not be at all surprised to see the leftists even go so far as to offer the presidency of this temporary provisional state to Dr. Rhee in order to win him and his group over to such a compromise. He is a vain man, loves flattery, and would sell his soul to be the Chief of State of a United Korea or even over South Korea if there is no United Korea. I am following this phase of Communist strategy because I believe it is the line of compromise which the Communists will shortly attempt to press with increasing vigor. Respectfully yours, Joseph E. Jacobs 58 Neither printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–947: Telegram [Document 565] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret urgent Seoul , August 9 [ 10? ], 1947. 268 [ 269 ], Cite Zurc 1010. This telegram is from Hodge, Brown and Jacobs: With reference to SWNCC proposals 59 contained War 83671 (081300Z) the first phase of which we assume has been put into effect, we offer the following comments for consideration with respect to the proposals in appendix “D”: 1. Paragraph 1 of the proposals as submitted will lead to the election of a solid Communist controlled bloc from North Korea. When Peoples from [ Front ] representatives of South Korea are added, the combined legislative group will in all probability be dominated by Communists under Russian direction. This result is what Russia has been working in Joint Commission to achieve. The only way by which Communist control may be avoided is through secret, multi-party ballot, properly supervised and controlled throughout all Korea (not by zones) and conducted under common regulations to be drafted by the Four Powers. Even this will be most difficult if not impossible in North Korea. 2. While paragraph 3 implies the establishment of a four-power body to discharge the responsibility placed upon the Joint Commission by the Moscow Agreement, no adequate replacement agency is specifically provided. It is suggested therefore that a new paragraph number 8 be added to read: “During all the above stages the Four Powers concerned shall be represented in Korea for purposes of direction, advice and approval, by a four-power body of equal representation. The decisions of this body shall be by majority vote.” Jacobs 59 SWNCC 176/30, August 4, p. 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 560 ] . Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1147: Telegram [Document 566] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret urgent Seoul , August 11, 1947. Zgcg 1013. Pass to Hilldring. Reference is made to various requests from me and Jacobs for a simple statement on high level that the American Commander in Korea and his assistants are carrying out the policies of their Government, to radios from Lerch to Hodge on the subject and their answers, and to State serial 92, 21 May and 142, 14 July, which indicated public statements on high level when needed. It may appear that the time has passed when such a statement will be of any great value for the present phase of events here but the fact remains that the Rhee charges are continuing and are growing in effect in creating anti-American feeling. Moreover, if I am to remain in command in Korea after we are forced by Soviet noncooperation to change tactics here, I consider it to be essential that there must be something said to the effect that the command here has faithfully carried out and is still carrying out United States policies in Korea. Rhee’s crowd is still active in public and whispered propaganda that “General Hodge has not and is not now carrying out his directives and the policies of his Government”. They are using the Wedemeyer mission to indicate that the President and the Secretary of State feel that United States policy is not being followed in Korea and have sent Wedemeyer to find out why not, intimating strongly that Wedemeyer is a personal envoy to the “great leader” Syngman Rhee. Since no one above General Hodge refutes the statement that he is not carrying out US policies, the “line” gets a lot of credence, and Rhee will gracefully accept full credit for “exposing” General Hodge and for changes in the local unpopular American “policies of General Hodge” in trying to make the hated Moscow decision work, in his dealings with the Russians in the Joint Commission and in his attempting to establish middle of the road political leadership. Unchallenged, this line, coupled with the Wedemeyer visit which Rhee will make every effort to capitalize, will serve effectively to discredit me for future value in dealing with those Koreans we normally expect to be of assistance. This will result in added local difficulties with respect to leading the Koreans in future efforts and in getting the backing we will require for the success of any future moves. I realize that US press has carried little of this, the principal reason being that I have been able to persuade the American press representatives here generally to keep it out of US news since it would only confuse Americans who do not know local conditions. Statement need not mention Rhee by name or point to the “extreme right” as a group. [ Hodge ] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1147: Telegram [Document 567] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 60 restricted us urgent Washington , August 11, 1947—6 p.m. 1582. Please deliver following letter to Mr. Molotov and inform Dept time of delivery: 61 “Dear Mr. Molotov: In your letter of Apr 19, 1947, you suggested that the Joint Soviet-American Commission on Korea resume its work on May 20 in Seoul ‘on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement on Korea” and that the Commission should present the result of its work for the consideration of the Soviet and US Govts in Jul and Aug, 1947. According to all reports received from the American delegation to the Joint Commission, it has been impossible for the two delegations to agree on the issue of broad consultation with Korean political parties and social organizations. This situation has continued without material change for more than one month and is a matter of great concern to the govt of the US. You will recall that in my letter to you of May 2, 62 I referred to your statement that the work of the Commission should be ‘on the basis of an exact execution of the Moscow Agreement’ and that in order to avoid future misunderstanding I made clear my interpretation of that phrase. I pointed out that it had been the consistent and well-known position of the US Govt that ‘Korean representatives of democratic parties and social organizations shall not be excluded from consultation with the Commission on the formation of a provisional Korean govt because of opinions they might hold or may have expressed in the past concerning the future govt of their country, provided they are prepared to cooperate with the Commission.’ In your reply of May 7 you did not take exception to this position. You accepted as a basis for reconvening the Commission the suggestion outlined by Gen Hodge in his letter to Gen Chistiakov of Dec 24, 1946, 63 which was in accordance with the US position described above. In furtherance of this policy the American delegation to the Joint Commission has maintained that there should be the widest possible participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations and that in such participation there shall be no restriction on freedom of expression and opinion by all Koreans. In an effort to expedite matters the US delegation has several times offered to limit oral consultation to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1000, or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet delegation. This proposal, however, has not been accepted by the Soviet delegation. The US Govt believes that, in justice to the Korean people whose hopes of independence have been so long postponed, there cannot be further delay. It is the desire therefore of this Govt that by Aug 21, 1947, the Joint Commission report the status of its deliberations so that each govt may immediately consider what further steps may usefully be taken to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement, namely the establishment of an independent, united Korea which can take its proper place among the United Nations. I am providing copies of this message to the Govts of China and the United Kingdom. I have the honor to be, etc.” Marshall 60 Repeated as No. 3437 to London and as No. 1000 to Nanking, substituting following for first paragraph: “Please give copy of following letter to FonOff with statement that it has been dispatched today.” Notation at end of telegram reads: “Above telegram is implementation of SWNCC 176/30, which has been cleared by NA, FE, EE, SPA, A–H, and War and Navy Departments.” For SWNCC 176/30, see p. 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 560 ] . 61 Text delivered on August 12 to Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, in the absence of Mr. Molotov who was on leave. 62 See telegram 1094, April 30, 11 a.m., p. 638 [ Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 485 and Doc. 486 ] . 63 Department of State Bulletin , January 26, 1947, p. 170. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1247: Telegram [Document 568] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , August 12, 1947. 270. Cite Zpol 1019. I concur in telegram which General Hodge sent to Assistant Secretary Hilldring (Zgcg 1013) yesterday. Since I came here 2 months ago (the records show same thing for several months prior to my arrival) the leaders of certain rightist groups, particularly Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, have carried on in the press and through underground channels a campaign which has as its objective the undermining of the prestige of General Hodge, and to a less extent that of Military Government. The General and Military Government have become the symbols of frustration of these rightist leaders over their failure to be anointed as the sole leaders in South Korea and supported in their campaign to circumvent the Trusteeship provisions of the Moscow decision. The central theme of this campaign is that General Hodge and his aides are not carrying out the policy of the United States Government with respect to Korea as laid down in Washington. To allow such a situation to go unchallenged would be bad in any country but in an oriental country, especially such as Korea which was for so many years completely under the domination of dictatorial Japan, such villification of the highest officials of the American Government can only lead to an undermining of the prestige and authority of those officials. In the days of the Japanese occupation such lese majesty would have been punished by death. Today, in North Korea, it is punished by death or slavery. A general statement by the higher authorities in Washington is needed for dissemination here to combat the campaign. Without that, statements of officials here are useless. The only other alternative would be for General Hodge to suppress rightist papers and possibly incarcerate Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, but this he cannot do, not only because of the uproar which would be created here but also that in the United States by misguided liberals like Baldwin of the Civil Liberties Society [ sic ]. Thus, while we delay, the Soviet stooges continue to take advantage of the situation and make hay while the sun shines. If we change our policy here, as there are indications that we may do, there is all the more reason for a statement from Washington or otherwise General Hodge’s position will be most difficult as he points out in his telegram. The following are some recent evidences of the campaign referred to above. In a memorandum dated July 15 to General Wedemeyer signed by Messrs. Oliver, Limb, Staggers and Williams of Washington, which is in Rhee’s possession here and being circulated by him among his followers, there occurs following statement: “General Hodge and his State Department advisers in Korea (the memorandum mentions Bunce and Bertsh 64 ) should be replaced. General Hodge has lost the confidence of the Korean people in his ability to accomplish the announced objective, namely, the establishment of a free and independent Korean Government”. I have a belief that there is some law under which these American citizens might be prosecuted for such interference in our foreign relations. Although there is a constant stream of such articles, the following, translated from the July 30th issue of rightist newspaper in Seoul Dae Han Ilbo , a mouthpiece of Rhee, is a typical example: “On September 6 the year before last when the United States Army occupied Korea, how enthusiastically we Korean people welcomed them. Whenever we heard their footsteps, everyone, young and old, men and women, welcomed them with cheers of banzai. “Two years have elapsed. Our gratitude toward the American Army has been changed to disillusionment and grudges. Our yearnings to foster friendly relations with Americans have been turned into anti-American feelings. This is a serious matter. We cannot help asserting that the responsibility for it lies with Lt. General Hodge, the commanding general. “While General Hodge is not the direct cause of all the people’s suffering, he becomes an indirect cause and gets the blame because he is the top of the statesmen who watch the leftists who obstruct Korean independence. The following important illustrations testify that he is indirectly responsible: (1) “General Hodge has stuck to the Moscow Agreement, Russia’s chief instrument to communize Korea by trusteeship, so literally that he cannot grasp the life between the lines of the agreement. The result is that he can not make use of the anti-Communist policy of the State Department. In other words, by suppressing the anti-trusteeship group he stirred up the morale of the leftist Red mob. (2) “He released 6,999 devils from prison. Since then terroristic activities in South Korea have increased and Koreans capable of self-government have been disgraced in the eyes of the world. (3) “In Seoul alone there are 32 daily newspapers to which only 5 or 6 belong to the rightist[s] while the rest are mouth organs of the leftists and their kinsmen, the middle of the roaders. The Government authorities have no way of controlling these papers and let the Reds carry on their heaven and earth sweeping propaganda. General Hodge trusts and employs the leaders of the middle of the road group and this policy becomes a hotbed of cultivating leftist strength in South Korea. “Because of one American statesman, the ill feelings of the Koreans towards Americans have reached a point that they begin to call them names. As time goes by the ill feelings may become worse than that toward Japan. Before it reaches there we request General Hodge to reflect very deeply”. 65 Jacobs 64 Lt. Leonard M. Bertsch. 65 Further instances of anti-American propaganda were reported in telegram 274, August 14 and in despatch 87, September 15, neither printed. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1247: Telegram [Document 569] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , August 12, 1947. 271. Zurc 1018. Fifty-third meeting of Joint Commission held on 12th August. General Brown chairman. Soviet delegation had no proposals. US delegation then made modification of proposal outlined in Zurc 945, Seoul PolAd 234 of July 25. Text of this new proposal is as follows: “The American delegation, mindful of the solemn obligations of its Government under the Moscow agreement and conscious of its duty to the Korean people to establish as early as possible provisional Korean democratic government, makes the following proposals to overcome the present impasse regarding consultations: (1) Individual oral consultation as specified in paragraph 7 Joint Commission decision number 12 will be dispensed with and the questionnaires submitted by Korean political parties and social organizations shall be accepted as consultation under the Moscow agreement. (2) Directive to be issued to Subcommission number 2 to complete and present to the Joint Commission a provisional charter and political platform for the provisional Korean democratic government. This charter to specify which offices are appointive and which are elective. (3) The Joint Commission shall in the charter proposed to the Four Powers include a provision for an immediate general election to elect a national legislature and such other individuals of the government the charter may specify, which election shall be held with free electioneering, secret and multi-party ballots, under international supervision. That Subcommission number 2 be directed to prepare detailed plans for such a general election in North and South Korea to be presented to the Four Powers with the proposed charter. (4) That Subcommission number 3 be directed to prepare a plan for the selection of appointive personnel for the integration of the existing governmental functions of North and South Korea.” Soviet delegation expressed interest and asked many questions, some possibly designed to precommit American delegation on implementation of its terms. Soviet delegation will express views in next meeting which it will call when ready. This apparently indicates reference to Moscow for instructions. [ Hodge ] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1447: Telegram [Document 570] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Seoul , August 14, 1947. 273. Cite Zpol 1022. Reuters report referred to in Deptel 166, August 12th, 66 flatly denied here. Headquarters USAFIK had numerous reports and intercepted documents indicating August 15th as day for organized rioting, strikes, sabotage, assassinations and other acts of terrorism by Communists which would have involved rightist reprisals. National police were requested to conduct routine raids in Seoul on 5 Communist dominated headquarters for documentary evidence and to arrest a list of 20 high powered Communist leaders and agitators. Raids were extended locally to known headquarters of contacts with Communists of North Korea and to one known propaganda mill. Lower headquarters were raided by CIC in 4 southern provinces simultaneously. Raids were conducted on August 12th. Indications are that parties were tipped off and raids led to arrest of only 7 on list of 20. Although much documentary evidence along ordinary Communist “line” was captured only a few references to organized terrorism on August 15th were found higher headquarters in Seoul. National police on follow-up and for purpose of maintaining law and order have subsequently arrested total reported of 200 known Communist agitators. These arrests are civil affair conducted entirely by civil police. Early reports from provinces indicate considerable evidence of planned disorders for August 15th, showing that orders were passed from high echelons. Our authorities state raids and arrests are not “witch hunt” and are believed will have salutary effect in limiting terrorism on Korean liberation day since other leaders and agitators are underground. Jacobs 66 Not printed; it stated that “milit govt has ordered arrest of all extreme left wing leaders and that two thousand have already been rounded up.” (895.00/8–1247) The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1447: Telegram [Document 571] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , August 14, 1947. 275. Zurc 1025. Reference War 83983 (122230Z). 67 On morning August 14 General Brown released to foreign and Korean press text of Marshall’s letter August 12 to Molotov. He called meeting of Joint Commission for afternoon August 14 to discuss preparation of joint report, but General Shtikov replied by letter to effect that although he knew of letter he had received no instructions from his Government and deemed it inexpedient to hold such meeting. General Brown then sent letter to General Shtikov suggesting a meeting of Joint Commission at 1330 tomorrow to discuss preparation of joint report. No reply yet received. This afternoon at 1500 hours General Shtikov released to press a statement in reply to statement on freedom of expression recently released by Chief Commissioner of American delegation. This statement repeated defense of Soviet position of exclusion of parties members of Anti-Trusteeship Committee. Text will be mailed. 68 Jacobs 67 Text quoted in telegram 1582, August 11, 6 p.m., to Moscow, p. 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] . 68 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1547: Telegram [Document 572] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) us urgent Washington , August 15, 1947. 168. Following statement being issued to press by Dept today: “Reports have reached the Department of State from Korea, alleging that the American Commander there, General Hodge, has been following a policy in Korea contrary to that of the United States Government as laid down in Washington. The projected visit to Korea of General Wedemeyer and the recent letter addressed by Secretary Marshall to Mr. Molotov are cited as evidence of a coming change in United States policy as it has been carried out in Korea by General Hodge. Such allegations have absolutely no foundation in fact. “The policy of the United States Government towards Korea has been and still is to assure that Korea shall become a free, united and sovereign nation with a democratic government representative of the will of its people. In addition to the funds for Korea appropriated to the War Department by the Congress, Governmental agencies in Washington, in close collaboration with General Hodge, are completing studies on the requirements of the Korean people for further aid. These studies will be supplemented by the report of General Wedemeyer, who heads a fact-finding mission of Government experts to Korea and China. Any program of further aid developed from these studies will be closely coordinated with the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, as existing programs and policies have been. “The Department of State therefore wishes to state categorically that there is but one American policy toward Korea and that General Hodge has faithfully and consistently acted in conformance therewith under difficult and complex circumstances.” Lovett The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1747: Telegram [Document 573] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , August 17, 1947. 278. Zpol 1035. Reference mytel 277, August 15. 69 Liberation Day celebrations on 15th in the provinces passed off without any serious outbreaks. Two persons reported killed with minor clashes in six places which reveals less disturbance than usual. Comparatively peaceful character of celebrations believed due to arrests several days prior to 15th which made it clear that authorities would not stand for violence. Also knowledge of American Government’s refusal to acquiesce in Soviet efforts to have their way in the Joint Commission may have had soothing effect as rightists have become jubiliant and leftists less bold over this development. Civil administrator Ahn Jai Hong accompanied by Mayor Kim and police chief Cho attempted to call on General Shtikov on morning 16th August to apologize for booing which he received at celebration in Seoul on 15th but Shtikov refused to see them. Members of the Northwest Young Men’s Association which led booing against Shtikov are composed largely of youths who escaped from North Korea and are, as result of their experience, very bitter against the Russians. Jacobs 69 Not printed; it gave details of the celebration on August 15 at Seoul (740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1547). The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/8–1747: Telegram [Document 574] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , August [17,] 1947. 279. Zpol 1034. Reference Deptel 167, August 14. 70 Translation of election law airmailed to Dept August 15 with dispatch No. 52 dated August 14. 71 Present Assembly declined to adopt Military Governor’s recommendation that age limit be reduced from 23 to 20 and the literacy requirement be eliminated. General Lerch plans to accept Assembly’s wishes and to sign law after which he will proceed to arrange for holding of elections there-under in South Korea. It is believed essential here that such action be taken regardless of developments in Joint Commission. The apathy of present Assembly and growing demands for an election among all groups supports this belief. Jacobs 70 Not printed; it asked for information. 71 Neither printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 895.00/8–1747: Telegram [Document 575] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret us urgent Washington , August 18, 1947—10 p.m. 171. State Dept working group, formed to prepare Korean case for submission to UN, in implementing annex to Appendix D, SWNCC 176/30 is considering procedure whereby Four Powers, under Article 10 of UN Charter will request GA to provide UN observers of elections in Korea. It is believed observers should arrive in Korea well in advance of first elections and it is contemplated that US will provide transportation and housing to group in its zone. Your recommendations as to approximate number needed and comments as to best methods of operation will be appreciated. While Dept agrees that preparation for election in US zone in near future should be continued (PolAd ’s 279 72 ) in view steps outlined annex to Appendix D SWNCC 176/30, it is believed no date for such election should be decided upon or announced until receipt further instructions. Lovett 72 Supra . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1947: Telegram [Document 576] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , August 19, 1947. 284. Zpol 1042. General Shtikov asked to see General Brown the afternoon of August 18 and asked what General Brown had in mind by twice requesting that he call meeting of the Joint Commission. General Brown replied that he desired this meeting in order to comply with the letter from Secretary of State George C. Marshall to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov, which requested that the Joint Commission submit to their respective governments a report by August 21. General Shtikov stated that he still had no instructions from his Government concerning the Marshall letter. General Brown then informed Shtikov that American delegation would continue preparation of report and submit it on August 21 subject to such changes in this plan as might be required if Shtikov should receive instructions from Moscow before that date. Shtikov then said the Soviet delegation is still working on proposal made by American delegation at 53rd meeting, August 12, quoted in Seoul PcdAd 271, August 12. General Brown stated American delegation would meet with Soviet delegation when Soviet Chief Commissioner, chairman for this week, called a meeting. The future Soviet strategy cannot be predicted. It is possible that Soviet delegation may submit counter proposal to recent American proposal so drawn as to keep the Joint Commission alive and to prevent further pressure from US on governmental level until after UN meeting in September in order to keep Korean problem out of UN for another year. It is believed here that SWNCC plan (War 83671, 081300) 73 should be aggressively pushed to completion. In the meantime, in the absence of instructions to the contrary, the American delegation will proceed in accordance with the program outlined in Seoul Polad 234, July 25. It is not believed that favorable result is to be expected unless Moscow directs Soviet delegation to change present tactics and adopt broad-minded and cooperative attitude. Such result may arise from SWNCC plan if aggressively pushed. If Soviet delegation continues dilatory tactics, request authority for American delegation to propose recess pending results of effort on ministerial and four-power level. This telegram has approval of General Hodge and General Brown. Jacobs 73 See telegram 269, August 10, from Seoul, p. 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] . Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2047: Telegram [Document 577] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , August 20, 1947. 288. Zurc 1044. Reference Department’s telegram 172, August 18. 74 In compliance radiogram War 83983, August 12, full unilateral report of US Delegation, US–USSR Joint Commission, being dispatched by courier today. Report covers agreements initiating commission, first session (1946), interim correspondence, current session (1947) and conclusions of US Delegation. Condensation of last two follows: From May 21, 1947 until August 21, 1947, 31 meetings were held. Early indications of divergent positions were apparent in Subcommission No. 1, when Soviet delegate (1) proposed narrowing consultation to 30 organizations, (2) refused to arrive at definitions of “social organizations” and “political party”, (3) refused to establish criteria as basis for elimination of local and small organizations from consultation, and (4) contended that in order to be consulted organizations must fully uphold Moscow agreement, including every paragraph. US delegate rejected all, and on May 27 pointed out there could be no unilateral exclusion under terms on which Joint Commission reconvened. In Joint Commission meetings positions were amplified. Then in agreeing to principles in Joint Decision No. 12 Soviets on June 6 unexpectedly receded from position of narrow consultation, and by specific statement agreed to broad consultation. Large registration of South Korean parties under provisions of Joint Decision No. 12 (copies of which are in your hands and also are attached as appendix to full report) resulted in Soviet concern and retreat from principle of broad consultation. Soviet position was (1) fact that organization is eligible for consultation under Marshall–Molotov agreements as published in Joint Decision No. 12 does not mean it must be admitted for consultation, (2) in order to be consulted, organization must be acceptable to both delegations: in short, Soviet can use veto, (3) following would not be consulted: non-social organizations, purely local organizations, and organizations not intending to fully uphold Moscow agreement, particularly members of anti-Trusteeship Committee, and (4) signatures of latter on applications (Joint Communiqué 5) not in good faith and members must publicly withdraw from membership. US position was (1) Under Marshall–Molotov agreement signing declaration in Communiqué No. 5 acceptable as good faith, (2) organizations signing declaration are automatically eligible and cannot be excluded except by agreement of both delegations, (3) US willing to exclude non-social organizations on basis of “social” as used in dictionaries throughout world, (4) US submitted proposals which, if accepted, would have eliminated large number of purely local organizations, (5) US willing to exclude organizations for fraud, provided that only fraud was not exaggeration of membership, and (6) whereas nothing in any agreements authorizes exclusion by unilateral veto, two specific agreements provide for exclusion from consultation by mutual agreement. Results of Soviet and US positions evident after consideration of following: (1) Extreme rightists under Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee with total claimed membership of 11.25 million failed to apply for consultation. (2) North Korea applicant parties totaled 38, all Democratic People’s Front, while South Korea parties totaled 422, representing all shades of political views. (3) Soviet list of 147 North and South Korea parties of membership in excess of 10,000 whose eligibility for consultation Soviets willing to discuss, omitted 24 parties with claimed membership of 15.2 million, which Soviets say are members of Anti-Trusteeship Committee. (4) US acceptance of proposal would have driven majority of 71 rightist and moderate groups from further support of Joint Commission. (5) Although Soviets deny their purpose is to eliminate rightists, US acceptance of Soviet proposals would make Commission entirely or almost entirely dependent on Communist-dominated Democratic People’s Front for formation of provisional government. It is the opinion of the US delegation that the objectives of the Soviet delegation’s position were: (1) To insure Democratic People’s Front control of provisional Korean democratic government similar to that established in North Korea, and (2) To establish a Communist-controlled satellite state on the border of USSR which, in the words of the Soviet Chief Commissioner at the opening meeting in March 1946, “will not become a base for attack on the Soviet Union” and which will outflank a hoped for Communist Manchuria. To effect realization of objectives, Soviet relied on (1) suppression of all but Democratic People’s Front in North Korea, (2) exclusion from consultation of non-Democratic People’s Front organizations in South Korea and (3) strategic aid to Communist-dominated groups in South Korea (fifth column activities). Failing to obtain agreement on consultation, US delegation successively submitted three proposals as per radios Zurc 970, Seoul PolAd 245, July 30; Zurc 982, Seoul PolAd 250, August 1; 75 Zurc 1018, Seoul PolAd 271, August 12. Soviets rejected first two and have not replied to third. US delegation concludes: (1) The Soviet objective was announced by the Soviet Chief Commissioner to the Joint Commission in March 1946. This objective is: ( a ) To create the provisional Korean democratic government by a wide unification of all “democratic parties and organizations supporting the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs”; ( b ) through such a government, to eliminate “reactionary, pro-Japanese, anti-democratic elements” and “to carry out radical measures of economic and political reform”; ( c ) to establish a Korea “friendly to the Soviet Union so that in the future it will not become a base for an attack on the Soviet Union”. (2) The Soviet Government and its agents have followed the Soviet objective as above announced during: ( a ) The 1946 sessions of the Joint Commission; ( b ) the exchange of correspondence between the commanders; ( c ) the 1947 session of the Joint Commission; (3) The Moscow agreement, the Marshall–Molotov correspondence, and Joint Commission Decision No. 12 constitute adequate and detailed terms for conducting consultation and for the implementation of the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government. (4) The Soviet delegation to 1947 session of the Joint Commission shows no intention of divergence from the objectives announced by the then and present Chief Commissioner of the Soviet Delegation at the opening session of the Joint Commission in 1946. (5) Unless and until the Soviet Government directs the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission to follow policies other than those announced by the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet delegation in 1946 as the Soviet objective, it will be impossible to draft any agreement with the Soviet Government which will lead to successful evolvement of Korean independence through the medium of the Joint Commission. [ Hodge ] 74 Not printed; it asked for a report by the Joint Commission or by the U.S. delegation by August 21 (740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1747). 75 Latter not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2047: Telegram [Document 578] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , August 20, 1947. 289. Zurc 1045. Fifty-fourth session of Joint Commission held afternoon 20 August for 1½ hours with Shtikov as chairman. Soviet delegation wished to make some changes in minutes of 43rd and 49th sessions, but decision postponed to enable American delegation to study proposed changes. Soviet chairman Shtikov then read statement (being translated) complaining that recent arrests of leaders and members of parties and organizations which support Moscow agreement creates unfavorable atmosphere which should be corrected so as to restore proper working conditions for democratic parties and Joint Commission. General Brown replied that American delegation would study statement when translated but he felt that such matters affecting the Government of South Korea were not the concern of the Joint Commission. Reference report contemplated by Secretary’s letter of August 12 to Molotov, Shtikov said he still had no instructions. General Brown then advised that American delegation was submitting a report unilaterally. General Shtikov stated in reply to General Brown’s inquiry that Soviet delegation was still considering last proposal of American delegation and would submit answer at a subsequent meeting. Meeting then adjourned subject to call of chairman. [ Jacobs ] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2147: Telegram [Document 579] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , August 21, 1947. 76 292. Zpol 1080. For Penfield, Office Far Eastern Affairs: Group on American delegation of Joint Commission including myself sent to Dept in Seoul PolAd 269, August 10, two comments on appendix D of SWNCC’s proposal contained in War 83671 (081300Z). In addition I have another observation which some of the others here handling this matter do not seem to consider important. After more than 2 years of effort to reunite Korea and set up a government therein, I feel that it is high time to get away from the “provisional” concept of the govt to be established. If possible a govt of permanent character should be established with permanent constitution which can only be changed in accordance with normal procedures laid down therein, subject to possible veto over such changes by those powers who accord aid and assistance [apparent omission] are adversely affected. My reasoning is based on belief that Soviets prefer “provisional” type of government as it gives them and their stooges breathing spell during which they can carry on friendly relations with the rightist groups until they have wheedled themselves into key positions. When that time comes, they point out that the system is only provisional and that new elections must be held to establish permanent people’s democratic govt. When that govt is established “à la Soviet”, the stage is all set for the kill and the rightists discover too late they are in for liquidation. I realize that Soviet intrigue and duplicity may attain same results under a “permanent” governmental set-up but it will be more difficult because in order to accomplish their purposes Soviet stooges will not have breathing spell to establish themselves before they strike and if they have to strike quickly their chances of success are less. In drafting new proposals, therefore, consideration should be given to the idea of establishing a “permanent” govt in Korea rather than of perpetuating a “provisional” state. Jacobs 76 Received August 22. Printed from corrected copy received August 30. The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–1947: Telegram [Document 580] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret Washington , August 22, 1947—7 p.m. 176. Urtel 284 Aug 19. Dept does not believe USdel should propose recess of Joint Commission pending reply from Soviet Govt to our proposal being sent Aug 25 to London, Nanking and Moscow for Four Power conversations on Korea. Text of this proposal (Appendix D SWNCC 176/30) has been slightly revised and will be forwarded separately to you. You should not initiate further discussions. If Soviet Delegation makes proposals of entirely new character you should refer them to Washington for instructions with your recommendations. If Soviets suddenly accept your proposals made at 53rd meeting Joint Commission or submit counter proposals along those lines you should state that in view of fact these counter proposals received after Aug 21 deadline they must be referred to Washington for instructions. In referring these proposals your recommendations should be included. Lovett The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2247: Telegram [Document 581] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , August 22, 1947. 296. Zurc 1054. Chief Soviet delegate Shtikov called press conference 1500 hours 22 August and released statement made at 54th session 77 as mentioned second paragraph Seoul PolAd No. 289, August 20. Complete translation of that statement reveals that Soviet delegation is charging that arrests complained of are creating conditions in South Korea which impede fulfillment of the Moscow decision on Korea and the agreement reached between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister Molotov, and that this situation is being created for purpose of undermining the work of Joint Commission. When press representatives called on General Brown regarding release he read to them what he had replied to General Shtikov at the 54th session as follows: “The American delegation will need time to have this document translated and prepare reply. Listening to the document, it is the opinion of the Chief Commissioner of the American delegation that the Soviet delegation is attempting to interfere in the conduct of the Government of South Korea. It is not the function of the Joint Commission to govern Korea but to prepare plans which will establish a government which in the future will govern Korea. There are others who have present responsibility for governing Korea. The American delegation will reply to the statement at a later date.” We consider it highly improper for the chief Soviet delegate to release statement of this kind criticizing the authorities of South Korea. Such action on his part is in keeping with other propaganda activities of the Soviet delegation in Seoul as reported in Seoul PolAd No. 234, July 25. The question is now posed as to how far the Commanding General can permit the Soviet delegation to abuse the privileged position which it occupies to criticize publicly the authorities of South Korea. We are, however, somewhat restrained in deciding upon what should be done because we have feeling that the Soviet delegation may be seeking to provoke the Commanding General to some action which will enable that delegation to blame the US for a break up of the Joint Commission. We seem to sense they realize they are out on a limb over the consultation question and that if a long recess or break occurs for that reason, they will bear the responsibility. The American delegation is considering its reply which will be made to the Soviet delegation at the next meeting, probably next week, with a view to release to the press immediately thereafter. Jacobs 77 Text of statement was transmitted to the Department in despatch 59, August 23, from Seoul, not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2347: Telegram [Document 582] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , August 23, 1947. 297. Zpol 1056. In reply to Department’s telegram 171, August 18, election law for United States zone has been passed by Legislative Assembly which has adjourned to reconvene September 1st. Announcement of election date cannot be postponed much beyond that date as the Koreans are enthusiastic over prospect of election and long delay would subject us to widespread criticism. However, at least 80 days must elapse between announcement of date and actual election which will allow sufficient time for completing arrangements for any UN observers desired or to call off election if some new election arrangement is made as result of recent letter of Secretary to Molotov or of contemplated approach to General Assembly. Officials of Military Government state that ideal method would be to have observers at each polling place but they feel this is manifestly impossible. They would concentrate on populous places where partisan interference might determine election results. On this basis their estimate of approximate requirement for South Korea is 45 observers and for North Korea if nation-wide election is to be held an additional 25 or total of 70. They feel larger number of observers undesirable because of housing shortage and lack of other facilities. American members of Joint Commission are also considering this problem on basis of draft of an election law prepared by American members of Subcommission 2 for general election in both North and South Korea to be held in connection with formation of proposed provisional government by Joint Commission under Moscow agreement. This draft election law and comment thereon may be more valuable to group now studying problem in Washington. Therefore comments will be telegraphed 78 and text of law mailed soonest possible. Jacobs 78 See telegram 352, September 16, p. 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2347: Telegram [Document 583] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) restricted Washington , August 23, 1947—5 p.m. 177. Text Soviet note dated Moscow Aug 23 received by Dept today follows: “Dear Mr. Marshall: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 12, 1947 on the question of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission. As is known, the work of the Joint Commission was resumed on the basis of the three conditions for consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations which were textually set forth in my letter of May 7, 1947 and accepted by you in a letter of May 13. The Soviet delegation was instructed to be guided in questions of consultation specifically by these conditions. In accordance with these conditions the Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea. However, applications to participate in the consultations were also submitted by parties and organizations belonging to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The Soviet Government considers that the admittance of such parties and organizations to the consultations could take place only in the event that these parties and organizations officially break with the above-mentioned Committee and announce their withdrawal from the Committee, without which consultations with them should not be carried on. The Soviet Government, standing on the position of wide consultation with Korean democratic parties and organizations, does not consider that the Joint Commission should consult with such organizations as have in their ranks only tens or hundreds of persons. Such organizations exist in large number and consultation with them would not be effective in view of their lack of authority. Furthermore, consultation with such small groups would drag out the work of the Joint Commission for many months, and would lead to the postponement of the creation of a Government of Korea for a long time. The Soviet Government considers that consultation can be conducted with parties and organizations whose members number more than 10,000 persons. With reference to your observation that in conducting consultations there should be no restriction on freedom of speech and opinion, this should be extended in the first place to parties and organizations which are assisting in carrying out the Moscow Decision. Furthermore, recently the parties and organizations of Southern Korea which support the Moscow Decision are being subjected on the part of the American authorities in Southern Korea to the severest restrictions and cruelest persecutions, which contradicts democratic principles and is entirely out of accord with the decision of the Moscow Conference. The premises of such parties and organizations are being seized by the police authorities; their leaders and members are being arrested; their press organs are being closed. The Soviet Government considers such a situation abnormal and inadmissible, excluding the possibility of the correct fulfillment of the decision of the Moscow Conference of the three Ministers on Korea, provided these persecutions of democratic organizations and individuals in Southern Korea do not immediately and completely cease. The Soviet Government considers it necessary that the American Delegation in the Joint Commission receive appropriate instructions for the fulfillment of the agreement reached between the Governments of the USA and the USSR in April of this year, and does not object to your proposal that the Joint Commission report on the status of its work in order that each Government may immediately consider what steps could be usefully undertaken for the fulfillment of the objectives of the Moscow Decision. The Soviet Delegation has been instructed in the above sense. Copies of this letter are being sent by me simultaneously to the Governments of Great Britain and China. Accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the assurances of my highest consideration. (Signed) V. Molotov” Dept’s instructions re above following shortly. In meantime give matter no publicity. Lovett The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2447: Telegram [Document 584] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret u.s. urgent Washington , August 24, 1947—11 a.m. 178. Deptel 177 Aug 23. In view Soviet reply authorizing Soviet Delegation participate in report on work of Joint Commission you should endeavor secure agreement to early submission such report. Believed here only agreed report possible will be brief factual statement of inability two delegations to agree on basis of consulting with Koreans. In meantime we are considering proceeding with implementation SWNCC 176/30 modified to take cognizance Soviet note. You will be informed soon as decision reached. For possible use in this connection your immediate comments requested re Soviet desire consult only organizations of more than 10,000 membership. Also any further comments you may wish to make re recent arrests U.S. zone. Lovett The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2547: Telegram [Document 585] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State 79 secret us urgent Seoul , August 25, 1947. 300. Zurc 1064. Joint Commission held 55th session for 2 hours on afternoon August 25th with General Brown as chairman. First matter discussed was correction of certain minutes desired by Soviet delegation which was settled by Soviet delegation agreeing to let minutes stand after having read into today’s record their interpretation of what they intended to say. General Brown then read his reply to General Shtikov’s complaint against arrest of leftists in South Korea made at 54th session and released by him to press on August 23rd. Text of General Brown’s statement is being released to press this afternoon and text transmitted in separate telegram. 80 General Shtikov stated he would reply when General Brown’s statement was translated and attempted briefly to justify his attack by repeating arguments in his original statement, Shtikov then mentioned that part of Molotov’s reply to Marshall’s letter of August 12th which referred to a joint status report and suggested that Subcommission number 1 prepare such report in 3 days. General Brown replied that as Soviet delegation had already been informed, American delegation’s report was submitted to Washington on August 20th. As General Shtikov again asked that Subcommission draft a report, General Brown agreed that it should first draft an outline. In view of difficulties which have led up to present deadlock no joint report will be possible. Accordingly, as American delegation has submitted unilateral report, request that it be authorized to inform Soviet delegation that joint report is no longer required. Next meeting set for tomorrow August 26th to hear Soviet delegation’s reply to American proposals made at 53rd meeting on August 12th, and to American delegation’s reply today concerning arrests. American delegation has in mind State serial 176, August 22nd, 7 p.m., received August 25th. Jacobs 79 Marginal notation by Mr. Allison: “Noted—answered by Deptel 178 Aug 24 which crossed.” For telegram 178, see supra . 80 Infra . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2547: Telegram [Document 586] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State priority Seoul , August 25, 1947. 301. Cite Zurc 7545. Following is text of General Brown’s statement released to press afternoon August 25 in reply to General Shtikov’s complaint against arrests in South Korea. “At the 54th meeting of the Joint Commission, 20th August 1947, the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet delegation read a statement concerning the arrest of certain leftist leaders of South Korea. In this statement he requested the American delegation to join with the Soviet delegation in initiating certain action. The Chief Commissioner of the American delegation informed the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet delegation that before the American delegation could comment on his statement it would be necessary to have it translated, that comment would be made at a later meeting. He also informed the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet delegation that in listening to the Soviet statement it appeared to the Chief Commissioner of the American delegation as though the Soviet delegation was attempting to interfere with the Government of South Korea, that the Joint Commission had no responsibility at this time for governing Korea, but did have responsibility for preparing plans for the formation of a government which would later govern Korea. On August 22 the Chief Commissioner of the Soviet delegation released to the American and Korean press the above mentioned statement. By informing the people of the world of a complaint against an outside third party—the South Korean Government—prior to agreement by the American delegation, which was not even given a chance to reply, the Soviet delegation is in fact attempting to usurp the functions of the Joint Commission and to take upon itself action which the Joint Commission could only take by mutual agreement of both delegations. The Soviet delegation overlooks the fact that while in South Korea it is actually a guest of the South Korean Government and of the United States which this government represents, and that it should follow the normal dictates of comon courtesy in conducting its business. The statement that fulfillment of the Moscow decision is being impeded by the arrest of the few individuals reported in the Soviet statement is absurd. There remain tens of thousands of individuals left in the political parties and organizations represented by those arrested who can substitute for them if necessary as representative of their parties and organization. Moreover, for reasons totally unrelated the arrests, the Joint Commission has had no prospect of holding oral consultation since the meeting of 2nd July. The arrests, therefore, have no bearing whatsoever on the conduct of oral consultation. Furthermore, the Soviet delegation does not know whether, if oral consultation should commence tomorrow, the individuals of whose arrests it complains would or would not be made available for consultation. I can assure the Soviet delegation that the American delegation will join with it in requesting that any individual with whom the Joint Commission desires to consult be made [available?] to the Joint Commission for the purpose. The American delegation also expects that the Soviet organization will join with it in producing certain individuals now held under arrest in North Korea with whom the American delegation is most anxious to consult. The statement of the Soviet delegation that these arrests seem to be made for the purpose of creating conditions which would undermine the work of the Joint Commission is pure fantasy. The Soviet delegation is bringing the charges for purposes of pure propaganda and of creating a smoke-screen to obscure certain strategic blunders of the Soviet delegation. These blunders have placed the Soviet delegation, through its inexcusable refusal to consult broadly with Korean parties and social organizations, in the position of repudiating the Marshall–Molotov agreement and holding up the work of the Joint Commission, the fulfillment of the Moscow decision on Korea and the final establishment of Korean independence. While the American delegation did not and would not have raised the issue, since the Soviet delegation [it-]self raised it, the American delegation desires to make the following comments on the activities of the parties and organizations in South Korea which the Soviet delegation is attempting to defend. The South Korea Labor Party and other parties and organizations, members of the Democratic Peoples’ Front of South Korea, have since their inception been disloyal to the government of South Korea and hostile to the United States. They have used illegal means, including subversive action, to embarrass and undermine the governmental functions in the United States zone. They have been aided and abetted in such action by the Democratic Peoples’ Front of North Korea. Agents from without South Korea have been sent into South Korea to organize disorders against the government and to lead these organizations, members of the Democratic Peoples’ Front, in such disorder (unless and until the parties and organizations holding membership in the Democratic Peoples’ Front cease their present policy of intrigue and disloyalty to the existing government,) their leaders must accept the responsibility for the illegal acts of the parties which they lead and which they presumably plan and direct. Such responsibility includes the ever present possibility of arrest, file [ fine ] and/or imprisonment. The Government of South Korea has authority to take such action as is necessary to protect itself. The American delegation once again advises the Soviet delegation to avoid entanglement in Korea politics, particularly in support of parties and organizations hostile to the United States.” Jacobs The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2647: Telegram [Document 587] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , August 26, 1947. 303. Zurc 1068. From Hodge, Brown and Jacobs. Reference Department’s 178, August 24. 1. American delegation will proceed to prepare a brief joint report. 2. American delegation willing to consult all applicant parties and organizations, all with membership of 10,000 or over provided the list specifically includes those applicant parties and organizations claimed by Soviet delegation to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee or similar organizations, and to exclude only those applicant parties and organizations to be removed subsequently for specific cause by mutual agreement of the two delegations. Written questionnaires of applicant parties and organizations with membership under 10,000 submitted to Joint Commission should also be considered in lieu of oral consultation with exclusion only by mutual agreement of both delegations. American delegation has since July 2 several times offered the above proposal. Soviet delegation has consistently accepted such a list as a basis of consideration subject to arbitrary removal of parties and organizations claimed by them to be members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee and further removals upon challenge of either delegation. Soviet position would assure majority to parties and organizations members of Democratic People’s Front (extreme left) which is their overall objective (see paragraphs 42 and 43, pages 24 and 25, report United States delegation, Joint Commission, 20 August 1947 81 ). The American delegation has therefore consistently rejected Soviet proposal for amendment. 3. Re arrests, see General Brown’s statement transmitted Seoul PolAd 301, August 25, and General Hodge Zgcg 1066, August 25 to Joint Chiefs Staff. 82 4. Reference statement in Department’s telegram 178 “in meantime we are considering proceeding with implementation SWNCC 176/30 modified”. Note conclusions in paragraph 45, report United States delegation, Joint Commission, August 20, and uncompromising, untenable and intransigent attitude expressed in Molotov letter of 22 August. Recommend original plans be carried to final conclusion. Jacobs 81 See telegram 288, August 20, p. 757 [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] . 82 Latter not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2647: Telegram [Document 588] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , August 26, 1947. 304. Cite Zurc 1071. From Hodge, Brown and Jacobs. Fifty-sixth session of Joint Commission held for 2 hours August 26 with General Brown as chairman. Soviet delegation replied to US delegation’s proposals made at 53rd session on August 12 (Seoul PolAd 271, that date) to the effect that those proposals were unsatisfactory and counter-proposed: (1) That oral consultations be dispensed with and Sub-commission number 2 study written replies to questionnaires while Sub-commission number 3 drafts recommendations regarding personnel; (2) that a provisional assembly be created from among democratic parties and organizations of 10,000 or more which fully support the Moscow agreement (would exclude anti-trusteeship parties and organizations and possibly others), half from North and half from South Korea (an important revelation of Soviet desires) on proportionate basis as to membership and influence; (3) that provisional charter prescribe how elections shall be held and (4) that the provisional assembly participate in working out charter, in forming government and conducting elections on free, equal and secret basis with equal right of all parties and organizations to nominate and electioneer. 83 There followed some fruitless discussion on correct interpretation of Marshall–Molotov letters on question of parties and organizations to be consulted, that is, what is meant by upholding Moscow agreement. The Soviet delegation consistently held to its view that mere signing of declaration required by joint Communiqué number 5 did not overcome presumption of bad faith on part of parties and organizations which remain members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The Soviet proposal as anticipated limits membership in the consultative body to parties and organizations coming within their yet undefined definition of a democratic party. It specifically excludes all those which struggle against the Moscow decision, including those which they claim are members of the Anti-Trusteeship Committee. The American delegation will reject this proposal at their next meeting, August 28 or 29. 84 Commission then discussed outline of joint report in accordance with which each delegation will draft its ideas and attempt on Friday morning, August 29, to combine the two drafts into one joint report. Soviet delegation will not, however, include anything in the report relating to incidents prior to reconvening of Joint Commission on May 20, 1947. Reference last sentence, Deptel 177, August 23, Soviet delegation has released here Molotov’s letter of August 22[ 23? ]. The Soviet rejection of our last proposal and the monotonous constant rehashing of the Soviet views along the line given in Molotov’s letter of 22 August, leaves few, if any, issues to discuss in the Joint Commission. On our part, the record is complete. The only unfinished task is the preparation of a joint status report which is almost impossible of agreement. Even the outline of this report is in dispute; it will be difficult to keep the Joint Commission in session after September 1. Effort to continue can only be justified by strategic reasons not known locally. [ Jacobs ] 83 Copy of translation of Soviet statement was transmitted to the Department in despatch 65, August 30, from Seoul, not printed. 84 In telegram 305, August 27, from Seoul, Mr. Jacobs reported that General Brown had refrained from calling a meeting, while Subcommission 1 was trying to draft a joint report (740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2947). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2647: Telegram [Document 589] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 85 restricted us urgent Washington , August 26, 1947—8 p.m. 1646. Please deliver following letter to FonOff. You may orally inform FonOff it is expected Asst. Secy Saltzman 86 will open conversations but will delegate day to day negotiations to a deputy. After receipt notification of delivery letter will be released to press. “Dear Mr. Molotov: In your letter of August 23, 1947 to Secy Marshall the position of the Soviet Delegation to the Joint Commission has been set forth in terms which corroborate a recent report received by this Govt from the US Delegation to the Joint Commission. The report of the United States delegation was in compliance with the desire of Secretary Marshall as set forth in his letter to you of Aug 12 that a report from the Joint Commission should be submitted by August 21 in order that our governments might immediately consider what further steps may be useful to achieve the long-delayed unification and independence of Korea. The report of the United States Delegation makes it clear that the Joint Commission has been unable to reach agreement regarding the basis on which representatives of democratic Korean parties and social organizations shall be consulted by the Joint Commission. The United States delegation also reports that it has been unable to obtain the agreement of the Soviet delegation to any alternative method of completing the task of the Joint Commission. As pointed out in your letter it was agreed in the interchange of correspondence in May of this year that ‘the Joint Commission should consult with those democratic parties and social organizations which fully support the Moscow Decision on Korea’. You will, however, recall that in your letter of May 7 you expressly agreed to the interpretation of the above phrase as proposed by the United States Commander in Korea that ‘signing the declaration in Communiqué No. 5 will be accepted as declaration of good faith with respect to upholding fully the Moscow Decision and will make the signatory party or organization eligible for initial consultation’. The parties and organizations mentioned by you as belonging to the Anti-Trusteeship Committee did sign Communiqué No. 5 and are, in the opinion of the United States Government, eligible for initial consultation. Your letter of May 7 also provided that any decision excluding individuals, parties and social organizations for active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission ‘shall be by agreement of the Joint Commission’. Accordingly, the United States delegation has repeatedly, but without success, attempted to obtain from the Soviet delegation agreement to criteria for consultation with Korean parties and social organizations applying for such consultation in accordance with the terms embodied in your letter. The Soviet delegation has insisted on the unilateral right to exclude parties which have expressed distaste for ‘trusteeship’, even though such parties have declared and reiterated their intention fully to support the Joint Commission and have in fact, since signing the declaration, not instigated active opposition to the work of the Commission. The Soviet position is not only contrary to the specific terms of the agreement between you and Secretary Marshall, it is also contrary to the democratic principle of freedom of opinion. In Secretary Marshall’s letter to you of August 11, 1947 reference was made to the fact that the United States Delegation has several times offered to limit oral consultations to parties and organizations with membership in excess of 1,000, or any other reasonable figure proposed by the Soviet delegation. The United States delegation reports, however, that when the Soviet delegation proposed limiting consultation to parties of 10,000 or more, the Soviet Delegation submitted a list which omitted 24 such parties which claimed total membership of 15,200,000 and refused to consider any other list or alternative proposal. The United States Government denies categorically that there has been oppression or persecution of Korean parties or individuals in the United States zone as charged in your letter. The arrests which you mention have been necessary to control subversive activities aimed at the destruction of constituted government and law and order in the American zone. United States forces are charged with the responsibility for maintaining law and order in south Korea without interference with democratic rights. That they have done so successfully is amply proven by the freedom with which all shades of political opinion are expressed and respected in the United States Zone. It is noted that you have no objection to the proposal that the Joint Commission furnish an agreed report to our two governments. The United States delegation has accordingly been instructed to take immediate steps to reach agreement on a joint report of the status of the deliberations of the Joint Commission. In view of the position set forth in your letter and the report already rendered by the United States delegation, however, it is apparent that a joint report can accomplish little other than a formal delineation of the issues which have prevented the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement. For almost 2 years the Government of the United States has devoted its utmost efforts to carrying out the terms of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The present stalemate in the Joint Commission negotiations and the failure of that Commission to accomplish even the first task of its mission have made it abundantly clear to all that bilateral negotiations on the subject of consultation with Korean political parties and organizations will only serve to delay the implementation of this agreement and defeat its announced purpose of bringing about early independence for Korea. The United States Government cannot in good conscience be a party to any such delay in the fulfillment of its commitment to Korean independence and proposes that the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out. The United States Government therefore submits for the consideration of your government the enclosed outline of proposals designed to achieve the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea. The United States Government proposes that these suggestions be considered at an early date by the powers adhering to that Agreement. It is therefore hoped that the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires at Washington or an authorized deputy may be designated to participate in four power conversations on this problem at Washington beginning on September 8, 1947. It is believed that the Joint Commission’s report on the status of its deliberations might be helpful in consideration of the United States proposals during these four power conversations. The United States delegation has accordingly been instructed to endeavor to reach agreement with the Soviet delegation on a joint report to be submitted not later than September 5, 1947. Copies of this letter are being transmitted to the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and China together with invitations to participate in the four power conversations referred to above. 87 Please accept, etc.” Signed Robert A. Lovett Enclosure to above: “United States Proposals Regarding Korea 1. In both the USSR and US zones of Korea there shall be held early elections to choose wholly representative provisional legislatures for each zone. Voting shall be by secret, multi-party ballot on a basis of universal suffrage and elections shall be held in accordance with the laws adopted by the present Korean legislatures in each zone. 2. These provisional zonal legislatures shall choose representatives in numbers which reflect the proportion between the populations of the two zones, these representatives to constitute a national provisional legislature. This legislature shall meet at Seoul to establish a provisional government for a united Korea. 3. The resulting Provisional Government of a united Korea shall meet in Korea with representatives of the four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea to discuss with them what aid and assistance is needed in order to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation and on what terms this aid and assistance is to be given. 4. During all the above stages the United Nations shall be invited to have observers present so that the world and the Korean people may be assured of the wholly representative and completely independent character of the actions taken. 5. The Korean Provisional Government and the Powers concerned shall agree upon a date by which all occupation forces in Korea will be withdrawn. 6. The provisional legislatures in each zone shall be encouraged to draft provisional constitutions which can later be used as a basis for the adoption by the national provisional legislature of a constitution for all of Korea. 7. Until such time as a united, independent Korea is established, public and private Korean agencies in each zone shall be brought into contact with international agencies established by or under the United Nations and the presence of Korean observers at official international conferences shall be encouraged in appropriate cases.” Lovett 85 Repeated as No. 3705 to London, as No. 1071 to Nanking, and as No. 181 to Seoul, substituting following for first paragraph: “Following is text letter being sent Molotov today. This contains revision of Appendix D to SWNCC 176/30.” Text of letter was repeated in telegram 347, August 28, noon, to Tokyo. 86 Brig. Gen. Charles E. Saltzman succeeded General Hilldring on September 2 as Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas. 87 Text of invitation was sent in telegrams 3704 to London and 1070 to Nanking, with instruction to inform the Foreign Office orally of the Department’s intention to have Mr. Saltzman open conversations and to delegate day-to-day negotiations to a deputy (740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2647). The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2647: Telegram [Document 590] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret us urgent Washington , August 27, 1947—7 p.m. 183. Urtel 304 Aug 26. Dept still of opinion expressed in its 176 Aug 22 that USDel should not propose recess of Joint Commission pending reply from Sov Govt to our latest proposals dispatched Aug 26. Should Sovs call further meetings Joint Commission USDel should attend but should refer to Washington any proposals that run counter to plans for implementation SWNCC 176/30. USDel should not call meeting of Joint Commission for purpose other than preparation Joint Report unless requested by Sovs. Upon receipt Sov reply to latest US letter further instructions will be forwarded. Lovett The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Clark) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2847: Telegram [Document 591] The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Clark ) to the Secretary of State confidential London , August 28, 1947—7 p.m. 4682. 1. Note and letter contained Department’s telegrams 3704 and 3705 August 26 88 delivered Foreign Office this morning. Foreign Office assured us Foreign Secretary who out of London will be apprised of contents at once. 2. When delivering note we were orally informed Foreign Office had learned from British Embassy Washington general terms of Department’s proposals. Further on August 18 Foreign Office had cabled British Embassy to inform Department United Kingdom Government willing participate in proposed Four Power talks on Korea. Foreign Office this morning orally confirmed willingness to participate and said formal acceptance will be forthcoming soon. 3. Foreign Office also told us that at Moscow 1945 conference United Kingdom had informed Byrnes and Molotov that if trusteeship established Korea, Australia would replace United Kingdom as Commonweath member. While Foreign Office considers it impracticable for Australia to represent Commonweath at proposed Washington conference, Foreign Office states United Kingdom feels obliged to keep Australia informed of all developments pertaining to conference. 89 4. Foreign Office expressed view orally to us this morning that while it not sanguine over outcome proposed Washington conference, it feels Department’s proposals are logical step in development Korean problem, and that if nothing else conference talks will serve to clarify Korean problem to world. Clark 88 See footnotes 87 and 85, pp. 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 589 ] and 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , respectively. 89 The British acceptance, dated September 5, followed lines indicated in this telegram and was transmitted to the Department in telegram 4850, September 8, 1 p.m., from London, not printed. In the meantime, the Chinese Ambassador (Koo) on September 4 accepted for his Government. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/0–847, 9–447). The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State 895.01/8–2847: Telegram [Document 592] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Smith ) to the Secretary of State secret Moscow , August 28, 1947—9 p.m. 2728. Deptel 1646, August 26. Note to Foreign Office on Korea was delivered tonight since it is understood it was being transmitted to UK and China. Must point out, however, that while I think it unlikely Soviet Govt will accept our proposal, Kremlin may be cleverer than we think. Therefore we should be prepared for possibility of agreement by USSR to form such a coalition govt and should have no illusions as to ultimate result of such acceptance. Experience in other areas and evidence of consistency of Soviet methods convinces me that any provisional govt set up in a united Korea according to Dept’s plan would eventually inevitably be Communist-dominated. Only question is length of time it would take for militant, disciplined, highly organized minority to secure power. Activities of disunited right wing and non-Communist groups in Southern Korea might delay this domination temporarily but could hardly alter final result. In such case, US will face Soviet control of a vital strategic area of Far East. I believe strategic importance of Korea to Soviet Union is such that Kremlin would not relinquish control except under most drastic circumstances. Should USSR agree participate Four Power conversations and accept general plan for establishment of coalition govt this may be taken as clear indication of their confidence in achieving control of Korea. However, as previously stated, I consider this agreement unlikely. Smith The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 895.01/9–247: Telegram [Document 593] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret u.s. urgent Washington , September 2, 1947—8 p.m. 187. Reurtel 309, Sept 2. 90 For your confidential information, Dept believes extremely unlikely Soviets will consent to take part in Four Power conversations as suggested in our letter to Molotov. In such case Dept will proceed as directed under SWNCC 176/30 and present whole Korean problem to next session General Assembly UN. Should Four Power discussions be held, however, Korean representation believed inappropriate as such discussions are merely for obtaining agreement that Koreans may proceed to form their own Govt after which that Korean body will be the proper medium for any discussion with the Four Powers about future of Korean political and economic status. This is based on assumption that such contacts as are to be had with Koreans will be during next stage and in Korea. In light of above believed here Rhee should be discouraged from coming to US. Statement along above lines, with exception of first para, will be made to Limb who is being received by an officer of the Dept tomorrow. Suggest use same line of argument in addition that in your 309 in dissuading Rhee. Lovett 90 Not printed; it reported the desire of Koreans for representation at any conference concerning Korea (895.01/9–247). The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–347: Telegram [Document 594] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Seoul , September 3, 1947. 312. Zurc 1101. Fifty-seventh session of Joint Commission afternoon September 3 lasted 3½ hours with Shtikov as chairman. General Brown rejected Soviet counterproposals of August 26 in prepared statement, text of which is being telegraphed separately. (See Seoul’s 304, August 26 and Seoul’s 313, September 3). Shtikov said he would study statement when completely translated but on basis of oral translation he made three-quarter hour’s recital of hackneyed arguments in support of Soviet position to which General Brown did not reply. Matter of joint report was then discussed but got nowhere in resolving difficulties which had arisen in Subcommission 1 because of Soviet contention that statements of American position with which they do not agree cannot be included in the joint report. It was finally agreed that Subcommission 1 would again attempt tomorrow to agree on a joint report. Jacobs The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–347: Telegram [Document 595] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State priority Seoul , September 3, 1947. 313. Following is text of statement which General Brown read at 57th session of Joint Commission rejecting Soviet counter-proposals made at 56th session to American delegation’s proposals made at 53rd session on August 12: “The American delegation has carefully studied the counterproposals submitted by the Soviet delegation on 26 August 1947 in reply to the American delegation proposals of 12 August 1947. The Soviet counterproposals contain the same objectionable features which have characterized almost every proposal which the Soviet delegation has made since the Joint Commission first met on 20 March 1946 and reconvened on 21 May 1947. The Soviet counterproposals maintain the position of ‘exclusion’ and the right to the veto power as insisted upon by them throughout the recent discussion of consultation. More specifically, they exclude from membership in the consultative body representatives of parties stated by them to be nondemocratic, representatives of all parties and organizations with membership less than 10,000, those who do not fully support the Moscow decision and those who struggle against the Joint Commission and the Allied Powers. Paragraph 2 of the Soviet counterproposals visualizes the creation of a ‘provisional all Korean peoples’ assembly’, which resembles a consultative body. The creation of a consultative group on a fair and liberal basis and the methods by which it is to be established were already agreed to by the American and Soviet delegations and included in Joint Commission decision number 12. The counterproposal presently submitted by the Soviet delegation would, therefore, in fact create a consultative body of a type and in a manner different from that agreed upon by the Soviet and American delegations, as promulgated in Joint Commission decision number 12. Acceptance of the Soviet counterproposals would create a consultative body from which would be excluded representatives of 24 major rightist groups of South Korea, with a claimed membership in excess of 15½ million. Should the American delegation be foolish enough to accept these counterproposals, it would change the normally substantial rightist-moderate majority throughout North and South Korea to an overwhelming and unrealistic leftist majority. It thus reverses the actual political situation. The Soviet delegation offers what is ostensibly a fair proposal—‘the creation of a legislative body, elections for which should be conducted throughout all Korea on the basis of general, direct, equal suffrage, by secret ballot’. However, closer study indicates that the ‘election’ would without doubt only be conducted after the leftist dominated consultative body and the government created by it had organized and prepared Korea for the type of election recently conducted in North Korea under which 99% of the people, as the Soviets said, ‘willingly and voluntarily dropped their ballots into the white box’—an election typical of those being held in other Soviet satellite countries. What have the Soviets to be afraid of in forming a government by free participation of all political groups? They have a deep and serious fear, otherwise they would be content to proceed to form a government which would assure to all of the political groups in Korea an equal opportunity for consultation and at the polls. The position of the Soviet delegation has been made crystal clear, more so than ever before, by the statement in the latest Soviet proposals that ‘the number of representatives in a provisional all Korean peoples’ assembly for North and South Korea must be equal’, when as a matter of fact everyone will admit that the population of South Korea is more than double that of North Korea. There is nothing in the Moscow agreement with respect to Korea which justifies or supports the Soviet position as indicated above. That agreement is a brief, simple document, the clear purpose of which was the setting up of an independent government for all Korea of a democratic nature through consultations with Korean democratic parties and organizations and by the rendering of such aid and assistance as might later be determined, with the participation of the Korean provisional democratic government, to develop and maintain democratic self-government in Korea. The American delegation cannot, therefore, agree to these counterproposals presented by the Soviet delegation.” [ Jacobs ] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8–2947: Telegram [Document 596] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union secret Washington , September 4, 1947—6 p.m. 1684. Urtel 2736. 91 Copy of SWNCC 176/30 (US Policy in Korea) and material relating to Korea and work of Joint Commission being forwarded air mail. Next step as follows: Should USSR refuse to consider proposals of US (Deptel 1646 92 ), US will inform UK, China and USSR that it is submitting Korean problem to next session of General Assembly and that in meantime it will carry out positive program in US zone such as holding elections with presence of UN observers. In view possibility failure UN solution, US is studying possible necessity granting independence south Korea and implications such action. Lovett 91 August 29, not printed. 92 August 26, p. 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] . The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–547 [Document 597] The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Molotov ) to the Secretary of State 93 [Translation] Dear Mr. Marshall : In acknowledging receipt of Mr. Lovett’s letter of August 26, 1947, I consider it necessary to draw to your attention that the preliminary elaboration of measures to assist the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government, in accordance with the decision of the Moscow Conference of the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs, is to be carried out by the Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the Soviet Command in northern Korea and of the United States Command in southern Korea. For the consideration of the four Governments, including the British and Chinese Governments, according to the Moscow decision, there should be submitted the recommendations worked out by the Joint Commission prior to adoption of a final decision. Furthermore, the Governments of Great Britain and China will take part, together with the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., in the consideration of the proposals worked out by the Joint Soviet-American Commission concerning measures for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic, and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government, and the establishment of the national independence of Korea, in order to work out an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship with relation to Korea. The task of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, as is known, is to render assistance in the formation of a single provisional democratic government for all Korea. The Joint Commission has still, in fact, done little in this direction, but this situation is primarily the result of the position adopted by the American delegation on the question of consultation of the Commission with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, as was pointed out in my last letter to you. If the American delegation had shown the necessary desire to render assistance in the creation of a really democratic government in Korea, the work of the Joint Commission would have been more successful, the task laid upon it would have been fulfilled, and there would not be that stagnant situation in the work of the Joint Commission which in Mr. Lovett’s letter is called an impasse. As you know, the Soviet delegation, wishing to resolve the situation which had been created in the Joint Commission and seeking to expedite the work of creating a provisional Korean democratic government, agreed with the proposal of the American delegation not to carry on oral consultations with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, and on August 26, 1947 introduced a new proposal for the establishment of a consultative organ—the provisional general Korean peoples’ assembly of representatives of democratic parties and social organizations of all Korea. This proposal in our opinion should meet no objection on the part of the American delegation in as much as it might remove the difficulties which the Joint Commission has encountered. I consider it necessary to add to the above that the successful realization of the measure set forth in the proposal of the Soviet delegation is possible only on the basis of free and unfettered activity of the democratic parties and organizations, representatives of which at the present time in southern Korea are subjected to arrests and other repressions, which is incompatible with the principles of democracy and legality and also with the obligations which the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. took upon themselves with respect to Korea. In connection with the assertions contained in Mr. Lovett’s letter concerning the position of the Soviet delegation to the Joint Commission, the sense of which is that the Soviet delegation does not display sufficient understanding of the proposals of the American delegation, I see no necessity for stopping on these assertions in view of their obvious unsoundness. At the same time I cannot fail to express regret concerning unilateral acts undertaken by you such as the despatch of an invitation to the Governments of Great Britain and China to take part in the discussion of this question, fixing the place and date for the conference. The Soviet Government considers inexpedient your proposal to submit the question of the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government to the consideration of the Governments of the four countries in as much as the Joint Commission is still far from exhausting all its possibilities for working out agreed recommendations, which is entirely possible. The “United States proposals concerning Korea” set forth in Mr. Lovett’s letter are also unacceptable. These proposals cannot fail to entail the further division of Korea in as much as they envisage the establishment of separate provisional legislative assemblies in the south and in the north of Korea (in the Soviet and American zones) whereas the vital task is to achieve as rapidly as possible the establishment of a single, even though provisional, organ of authority—the General Korean Provisional Democratic Government. The American proposal does not correct the situation now existing in Korea—the division of the country into two zones, to the liquidation of which all efforts should be directed,—but on the contrary consolidates this abnormal situation. Having in mind that the proposal for the consideration of the question of Korea in a joint conference of the representatives of the four powers does not stem from the Moscow decision of the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs concerning Korea, and taking into consideration the views set forth above, the Soviet Government sees no possibility of accepting the proposals advanced in Mr. Lovett’s letter. Copies of this letter are being sent by me to the Governments of Great Britain and China. Please accept [etc.], V. M. Molotov [ Moscow ,] September 4, 1947. 93 Transmitted to the Department by the Soviet Chargé (Tsarapkin) in his note 175, September 5, not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–547: Telegram [Document 598] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret urgent Seoul , September 5, 1947. 315. Cite Zurc 1106. Joint Commission with Shtikov as chairman held 58th meeting September 4th to consider difficulties encountered by Subcommission in trying to reach agreement on joint report. First half of meeting began 1530 hours and lasted 1¾ hours. At that session American delegation stated its willingness to accept statement of Soviet position as drafted by that delegation but Soviet delegation consistently sought to revise American delegation’s statement of its position. As such revision would have emasculated the American statement of its most essential facts, the American delegation obviously could not agree. Soviet delegation then refused to have both statements of position transmitted by covering letter signed by the two Chief Commissioners. The only part of draft report that could be agreed upon was factual list of 12 joint decisions which had been reached during present session (numbers 7 through 18). That portion of the report is of little value as texts of these decisions are well known and are in both Moscow and Washington. At second session of 58th meeting which began at 1930 hours September 4th, the Commission took up the draft of both delegations paragraph by paragraph, each side commenting and recording its approval or objections. This procedure continued for 6 hours when adjournment was taken until 1030 hours September 5th. At that time same procedure will be continued until both drafts have been completed. Believe that it will be impossible to arrive at joint report unless Soviet delegation is willing to accept our proposal that each delegation’s statement of its own position be forwarded as such by covering letter signed by Chief Commissioners of both delegations. Jacobs The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–547: Telegram [Document 599] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , September 5, 1947. 316. Z[urc?] 1111. Joint Commission held 59th meeting September 5 with Shtikov as chairman to continue reading of drafts of joint report as reported Seoul PolAd 315, September 5. First session lasted 2 hours and second session 1¼ hours. After completing paragraph by paragraph study for discussion of both drafts, ways and means of resolving difficulty were discussed. General Brown suggested first transmitting each delegation’s full report with covering letter, stating that each delegation had prepared its own report and did not fully concur in the report of the other delegation; and second, that the part of each report containing each delegation’s summary of its position be similarly transmitted. Shtikov, who had no other suggestion, declined these proposed solutions. Thereupon, General Brown proposed that same [ each? ] delegation report to its government that no agreement on a joint report could be reached. To this Shtikov agreed. Hence our report herein that there will be no joint report. Commission then adjourned until next week. General Brown will be chairman. Separate telegram will give more details. 94 [ Jacobs ] 94 Telegram 317, September 5, not printed. In its last paragraph, Mr. Jacobs reported that the “Soviet Chief Commissioner in agreeing to a report to our Governments that no joint report was possible petulantly remarked that the stubborn attitude of the American delegation during the discussion of the joint report indicated that they really did not want one.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–547) For General Brown’s statement issued on September 8 in regard to the matter, see Department of State Bulletin , September 28, 1947, p. 625. The text was sent to the Department in telegram 327, September 9, not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.01/9–847: Telegram [Document 600] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State [Extracts] secret Seoul , September 8, 1947. 320. Zpol 1121. The subject matter of Department’s telegram 167 [ 187 ], September 2.… . . . . . . . Finally, all groups except the leftists want American money, aid and assistance and armed protection (some are so impudent as to assume we owe it to them) but they want no control or supervision. Sooner or later the American people and Congress will discover that aside from the leftist groups wanting us out of Korea, even rightists are making our task most difficult, if not impossible. When that time comes, which may not be long with so many members of the press and Congress visiting here and beginning to report facts, Ave may have to abandon the country willy nilly. The picture is dismal and if our new approach to the problem through the Four Powers or United Nations produces a new plan, I feel we shall have to take a more firm stand vis-à-vis this crowd of South Korean politicians and compel them under stern control measures either to cooperate in implementing that plan or suffer elimination from the political arena. If we do not take such steps we shall more and more find ourselves in the unenviable position of being shot at by both the leftists and rightists. The only other safe alternative would be to arrange with the Soviet Union for mutual withdrawal of troops and let nature take its course which will eventually mean another Soviet satellite state in Korea. Jacobs Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Stevens) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–947 [Document 601] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs ( Stevens ) 95 secret [ Washington ,] September 9, 1947. United States Policy on Korea I have pondered at some length the discussion yesterday concerning our policy regarding Korea and am increasingly concerned as to whether what seemed to be a fairly unanimous agreement to abandon the Koreans to their fate may not be a rather short-sighted policy from the standpoint of our long-range interests. Accepting the military opinion that Southern Korea is without strategic value to us, is, in fact, a strategic liability, and the more debatable judgment that there are likewise no political reasons (in the short-term sense) which impel us to remain in Korea, I am nevertheless of the opinion that there are important ideological imponderables which should not be overlooked in reaching a final decision on our Korean policy. Ever since the zonal occupation of Korea began it has been evident that the Soviet objective has been control of the entire country. There is a reasonable chance of Soviet military withdrawal from Northern Korea if by such action American forces are withdrawn from the south. The Soviets, I am convinced, are not interested in permanent military occupation of Korea but consider control of the country vital to them, and would expect to effect such control after military withdrawal through the various infiltration devices which they have used with such success in the Balkans. Having achieved control without direct responsibility, they could maintain that the pledge of independence to the Korean people had been fulfilled while still utilizing the country for their own purposes, as they do, for example, in Outer Mongolia. In the ideological struggle between East and West, between communism and Western political concepts, individual political acts may have an importance far beyond their immediate local consequences. Korea is the one country in the world where Soviet and American forces are in direct contact and share between them the administration of the country. The United States is pledged to establish Korea as an independent nation. Korea consequently is a symbol to the watching world both of the East-West struggle for influence and power and of American sincerity in sponsoring the nationalistic aims of Asiatic peoples. If we allow Korea to go by default and to fall within the Soviet orbit, the world will feel that we have lost another round in our match with the Soviet Union, and our prestige and the hopes of those who place their faith in us will suffer accordingly. In the Far East the reliance of national movements on American support would be seriously shaken, and the consequences might be far-reaching. It seems to me important that these factors receive serious consideration before a hasty decision is taken to withdraw entirely from Korea. Francis B. Stevens 95 Addressed to George F. Kennan, Director, Policy Planning Staff, and John M. Allison, Assistant Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1047: Telegram [Document 602] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , September 10 [ 9 ], 1947. 324. Zpol 1122. 1. The South Korea Interim Legislative [Assembly] on September 4th [passed?] resolution that Korea should be represented by either unofficial delegates or by observers at proposed Four Power conference to reconsider new plan for establishing an independent Korea. 2. When the Acting Military Governor General Helmick brought this resolution to my attention for comment, I suggested he convey to the chairman of the Assembly the substance of the Department’s views as stated in Deptel 187, September 2nd. I also intend to discuss matter shortly with Kimm Kiusic, chairman of the Assembly, in order to allay his fears, and through him the fears of the other members of the Assembly, that Korean leaders will [not?] have an opportunity at a later date to be heard here. 3. As Syngman Rhee is also agitating strongly for representation in Washington or New York, if the Korea problem is reconsidered there, the Department must envisage increasing pressure on the part of Koreans to be heard. It would be helpful, therefore, to us here in our efforts to assuage and control this desire, if the Department would issue a statement to the effect that hearing of Korea representatives in the United States is not necessary inasmuch as Korean leaders will later be given an opportunity in Korea to present their views. Even with such a statement I am doubtful whether they will be satisfied but our position here will be stronger because all Korean leaders have a tendency to feel that unless Washington speaks, American representatives here are merely speaking on their own without authority from above. Jacobs Editorial Note [Document 603] Editorial Note In telegram 325, September 9, from Seoul, Mr. Jacobs reported that Syngman Rhee had appointed two of his adherents in the United States (Ben C. Limb and Louisa Yim) “as alternate delegates to represent Korea at the proposed Four Power conference or any other conference”, and was working for a general election of a national legislature to adopt a constitution and establish a government for Korea (895.01/9–947). In telegram 337, September 11, from Seoul, Mr. Jacobs further reported that Rhee was stressing a Korea without foreign interference and had stated that the general election law had been signed by the Acting Military Governor (895.01/9–1147). The Military Governor, General Lerch, died on September 11 and the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly next day adopted a resolution mourning his loss. President Truman on September 13, aboard the U.S.S. Missouri , acknowledged receipt of a message from Koreans on the death of General Lerch. The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to Mr. Ben C. Limb, of Washington 895.51/8–1347 [Document 604] The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Saltzman ) to Mr. Ben C. Limb, of Washington Washington , September 10, 1947. My Dear Mr. Limb : I refer to your letter of August 13, 1947 to General Hilldring 96 in which you request information on what Koreans may do to obtain additional economic assistance from the United States. The United States, as you know, has already extended to Korea a sizeable amount of economic assistance. From May 1946 to March 1947 alone, the United States Government gave Korea $91,000,000 under the Civilian Supply Program. Approximately $10,000,000 of additional civilian supplies are now on their way to Korea. For the fiscal year 1948, the Congress of the United States has appropriated $600,000,000 for government and relief in Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea. Korea will receive its proportionate share of these funds. In addition, approximately $18,000,000 of the $25,000,000 extended to Korea by the Foreign Liquidation Commission, Department of State, has been expended for army surpluses needed in Korea. There is, however, little likelihood of any additional economic assistance in the immediate future. The United States Government recognizes that Korea, as a liberated area, should, whenever possible, receive preferential treatment over ex-enemy countries. Sincerely yours, Charles E. Saltzman 96 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1247: Telegram [Document 605] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , September 12, 1947. 339. Cite Zpol 1133. There is another phase of the situation here which gives us cause for worry and which Department may wish in some way to refer in possible press release along with subject referred to in last paragraph Seoul PolAd No. 324, September 9. The Koreans who work with us in Military Government and in the Interim Legislative Assembly, men like Ahn Chai Hong and Kimm Kiusic, complain that they do not receive adequate recognition and assistance from us and that therefore their prestige suffers. Their complaint is not entirely unjustified. After recent recess of the Legislature Kimm Kiusic almost refused to resume his duties and Ahn Chai Hong is none too happy. These men deserve our fullest support because without them our position might become precarious. 97 They naturally are discouraged when the Korean people read of apparently favorably received activities of Rhee’s and other unofficial agents in the United States claiming to represent the Korean people. Some of these agents even agitate against us but the point is that all of them are unofficial, representing only segments of the Korean people, and some almost no Koreans at all. It would be most helpful, therefore, especially at this time when various alleged Korean groups are propagandizing in the US, styling themselves as “delegations”, “plenipotentiaries of the Korean people” and “representatives of a Korean Assembly” et cetera, and appealing to the UN, if the Department could issue a statement to the effect that the only official Korean agencies authorized to speak officially for the Korean people under the military government which the United States has established in South Korea are (1) the civil administrator and (2) the South Korea Interim Legislative Assembly. This statement would boost morale of Koreans here who support and work with us, and not against us, and would also serve notice on other governments and international agencies (we have in mind China and the United Nations especially) that the official Korean agencies authorized to represent South Korea under our administration are the two agencies mentioned above. Jacobs 97 In telegram 193, September 12, 6 p.m., to Seoul, which apparently crossed telegram 339, the Department stated that it was considering the advisability of having Dr. Kimm Kiusic or other qualified representatives of the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (Skila) visit Washington for consultation (740. 00119 Control (Korea)/9–1047). The Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) to the Secretary of State 125.8536/9–1247 [Document 606] The Economic Adviser in Korea ( Bunce ) to the Secretary of State No. 82 Seoul , 12 September 1947. [Received September 23.] Sir : I have the honor to forward four complete folders of the economic materials presented to the Wedemeyer Mission during its recent visit to Korea. 98 At the request of the Military Governor, Mr. Owen T. Jones and other members of my staff coordinated, prepared and presented most of this material in cooperation with representatives of the Military Government. The presentation included oral and written reports on major economic problems by American specialists, discussions on long range economic planning, and field trips to Pusan, Kwangju, and Inchon. Twenty copies of the report on “The Present Economic Status of South Korea,” which is included in the compilation of the Wedemeyer presentation, were forwarded on 2 September 1947 as Seoul PolAd Despatch No. 66. 99 Because only four completed folders are available, eight additional copies of the following two reports included in the folders are enclosed for wider distribution: 1. Revised Statement of Rehabilitation Program for South Korea . This report represents a re-thinking of the proposed three-year rehabilitation program for South Korea in the light of the possibility that the present division of the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel may continue indefininitely. The conclusions of this report indicate the American occupation zone in Korea may be brought to within $10,000,000 per year of being self-sustaining by 1953 if a net total of about $420,000,000 becomes available to finance a program of economic recovery and rehabilitation during the five years beginning 1 July 1948. These conclusions are somewhat more optimistic than those of the spring of 1947, and are based upon the growing conviction that the revival of Korean agriculture, fisheries, mining, and foreign trade may progress more rapidly than previously indicated and upon the belief that capital expenditures need not be as heavy as originally contemplated. A despatch fully developing present thinking regarding the requirements for a long-range rehabilitation program for South Korea is now being prepared by the staff of the Department’s Economic Mission. 2. Statistics on Civilian Supply Import Program and Foreign Trade . This series of tables was prepared by The National Economic Board. The data on imports and exports to and from South Korea indicates that total imports from all sources into the area were valued at $144,900,000 for the period September 1945 through July 1947, and that exports were valued at $8,210,000, resulting in an excess of imports over exports of approximately $136,690,000. Imports by value included $95,470,000 from GARIOA funds, more than half of which was expended for foodstuffs; $25,000,000 from surplus military stocks, under the Foreign Liquidation Commission credit; $500,000 from UNRRA; $21,590,000 from Japan (mainly bituminous coal), and $2,340,000 from private trade. Respectfully yours, Arthur C. Bunce Minister 98 Enclosures not printed. 99 Not printed. Memorandum by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2647 [Document 607] Memorandum by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee to the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff secret SWN–5694 [ Washington ,] 15 September 1947. The following has been received from the State Member, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee: 1 “In view of the continuing stalemate in the Joint Commission in Korea and in view of the recent Soviet refusal to participate in Four Power Consultations in Washington on proposals for the early achievement of the aims of the Moscow Agreement, the State Department is currently considering what further steps should be taken to implement U. S. policy in Korea. In order that such consideration may include the basic elements, the State Department requests, as a matter of urgency, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the interest of the U. S. in military occupation of South Korea from the point of view of the military security of the United States.” It is requested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above be obtained as a matter of urgency and forwarded to the Secretary, State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee. 1 Charles E. Saltzman. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 501.BB/9–1647: Telegram [Document 608] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 2 restricted niact us urgent Washington , September 16, 1947—8 p.m. 1738. Please deliver following letter to FonOff immediately and inform Dept of time of delivery. 3 Copy being given Soviet Chargé, New York. “Dear Mr. Molotov: The decision of the Soviet Govt as conveyed in your letter of September 4, not to participate in Four Power discussions of proposals of the US Govt designed to achieve the speedy realization of the aims of the Moscow Agreement on Korea is regretted. For almost 2 years the US Govt has been faithfully endeavoring to reach agreement with, the Soviet Govt to carry out the terms of the Moscow Agreement but with no appreciable success. It has even proved impossible for the Soviet and US Dels on the Joint Commission in Korea to agree upon a joint report of the status of their deliberations up to the present. There is no sign of the early setting up of a Korean Provisional Govt. Korea remains divided and her promised independence unrealized. The US Govt believes that this situation must not be permitted to continue indefinitely. In view of the fact that bilateral negotiations have not advanced Korean independence and that the Soviet Govt does not agree to discussions among the powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement, there is but one course remaining. It is the intention, therefore, of my Govt to refer the problem of Korean independence to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the UN. It is suggested that the members of the Joint Commission hold themselves in readiness to give such aid and assistance to the General Assembly as may be required during the Assembly’s consideration of this problem. It is the hope of my Govt that consideration of this problem by the General Assembly may result in bringing about the early restoration of freedom and independence to the long suffering people of Korea. Copies of this letter have been furnished to the Govts of the UK and China. Accept, Sir … etc. Robert A. Lovett” Lovett 2 Repeated as telegram 195 to Seoul, substituting the following for first paragraph: “Following note despatched today to AmEmbassy Moscow for immediate delivery. Secretary will announce in speech before UN tomorrow that Korean case being submitted to General Assembly.” 3 It was delivered to the Foreign Office at 12:30, September 17, Moscow time. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1647: Telegram [Document 609] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , September 16, 1947. 352. Zpol 1152. In reference to Seoul PolAd No. 279, August 17. 1. American delegation of Joint Commission has completed study of a national election plan and procedure for all Korea under UN or Four-Power supervision. Will forward 10 copies to Joint Chiefs of Staff and I shall send 3 to State Department. 4 Preparing its study American delegation has assumed that United States wants carefully supervised election to ensure to people of Korea an opportunity to express their wishes without fear or intimidation. The plan is, therefore, more detailed and bold than contemplated in election law recently passed by South Korea Interim Legislature. Essential features follow below. 2. In view of difficult terrain and lack of communications, plan contemplates holding elections by stages (three or four provinces at a time) so that adequate supervision can be provided by smaller supervisory groups than otherwise would be required. Under this arrangement all Korea would be divided into four groups. After election is held in one group’s area, the control and supervisory groups would move to next area. Lack of communications would prevent any appreciable double voting by voters moving from one area to another. [Here follows summary of proposed national election plan.] 6. One important feature of American delegation’s proposed plan as compared with recent law passed by legislature is the “run-off” feature. Under delegation plan, if any candidate does not obtain 51% majority, there would be run-off between two candidates receiving highest number of votes. This would make it difficult for leftists (or any other small, well-organized group) to obtain largest number of successful candidates, especially in South Korea. Otherwise, because rightists are divided into about five main groups as against only one left candidate for all leftist groups, latter are almost certain to win in most areas. Lack of this feature is most serious objection to election law passed by South Korea Interim Legislature. 7. If election is held in South Korea only, Commanding General and Military Government feel we should proceed with elections under recent law passed by Skila (see my despatch No. 52, August 14 5 ) as South Koreans are pressing for such election. To delay much longer even in starting plans for that election would cause repercussions. There is insufficient time, therefore, for elections under Joint Commission plan unless that plan should be adopted by UN or the Four Powers in which event South Korea election could be halted since 80 days must elapse after initial announcement date before that election can be held. Rightist groups and members of Skila are considering ways and means of taking adequate safeguards against the danger referred to in paragraph 6 above either by an amendment providing for run-off election or by rightists agreeing upon one candidate in each district. The Commanding General, of course, would exert maximum supervision with means at his command. 8. Commanding General desires to know whether restriction on his freedom of action contained in Deptel 171, August 18, can now be removed. We realize that decision in this matter depends partially at least upon plans of Department and SWNCC for future handling of Korean problem by the Four Powers and UN concerning which we have little information especially as regards timing of next moves. [ Jacobs ] [On September 17 the United States Representative at the United Nations, Senator Warren R. Austin, wrote the United Nations Secretary General, Trygve Lie, requesting that “The Problem of the Independence of Korea” be added to the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly; United Nations, Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, General Committee (hereinafter cited as GA (II), General Committee ), page 36. On the same day, in an address before the General Assembly, the Secretary of State, as Chief of the United States Mission at the United Nations, presented a program for a more effective United Nations and discussed, among other matters, the question of the independence of Korea; Department of State Bulletin , September 28, 1947, pages 618–622, or United Nations, Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings (hereinafter cited as GA (II)), volume I, pages 19, 21–22. The remarks on Korea were sent to Seoul in telegram 198, September 17, not printed. For proceedings in the General Assembly, including discussion of the question of Korea introduced by the Secretary, see United Nations, GA (II), volume I, pages 22 ff. For objections by the Soviet Representative at the United Nations, Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, on September 18 and 23, see ibid. , pages 91–92, 275–276. On September 21 the General Committee of the General Assembly took up the matter of Korea’s being included in the agenda and voted 12–2 to recommend this to the General Assembly; United Nations, GA (II), General Committee , pages 19–20. The Soviet Union and Poland voted in the minority. On September 23 the General Assembly took up the matter and, following discussion, voted 41–6, with 6 abstentions, to include Korea in the agenda and to refer the matter to the First Committee for consideration and report; United Nations GA (II), volume I, pages 275–299.] 4 Despatch 90, September 19, from Seoul, not printed. 5 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1747: Telegram [Document 610] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , September 17, 1947. 359. Cite Zpol 1182. Sixtieth meeting of Joint Commission held afternoon September 17 for about 45 minutes at call of General Shtikov, chairman for the week. General Shtikov read a statement 6 accusing US delegation of deliberately complicating and delaying the work of the Commission. Then after summarizing, as he has done before, various proposals which have been made by the Soviet delegation and rejected by the; US delegation, the statement proposed as follows: “1. Sub-commission Number 3 immediately to initiate a study of the written answers to the questionnaires distributed by the Joint Commission which had been submitted to the Joint Commission in written form by the democratic parties and social organization[s], and to submit to the Joint Commission projects for the structure of the provisional Korean democratic government and the local bodies of authority (provisional charter) and the political platform. 2. Sub-commission Number 3 to submit to the Joint Commission proposals regarding the personnel composition of the provisional government and regarding the order of assumption of authority by that govt. 3. As regards the problem of the formation of the provisional all Korean peoples assembly, the Soviet delegation considers that the objections regarding that question advanced by the American delegation in its statement of 3 September not to be well founded and proposed that it is necessary to continue the discussion of this problem for the purpose of reaching agreement.” These proposals were conditioned, however, on the cessation of oppression “of leftists in South Korea and the release of leftists now under arrest with assurance of free and unimpeded activity on their dirt box”. [ sic ] General Brown expressed disappointment that Soviet statement contained no indication of willingness on part of Soviet delegation to concede the right of all Korean political parties and social organizations to equality of consideration in the formation of their government. He said statement would be translated, studied and reply made at later date. American delegation will reply to Soviet statement to the effect that unless and until Soviet delegation is willing to accept the principle of equality of consideration for participation in the formation of the provisional government of all parties and organization[s] which are not barred for specific cause by mutual agreement, the American delegation perceives no object in the further discussion of the formation of the provisional all-Korean peoples assembly as suggested by the Soviet delegation. Urgently request confirmation of this proposed action. Jacobs 6 The statement was released to the press the same afternoon. The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 501.BB/9–1847: Telegram [Document 611] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) confidential Washington , September 18, 1947—6 p.m. 406. Following draft resolution on Korea, for introduction in GA, cleared in Dept. Your comments requested. “I. The General Assembly, Recognizing that a continuation of the existing situation with respect to Korea is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations; Having in mind that it is one of the purposes of the UN to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; Having noted the international obligations undertaken with respect to Korea, including the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, 7 in which China, the United Kingdom and the US stated the determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, 8 in which China, the UK, and the US reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration and to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered upon entering the war in the Pacific, and the Moscow Agreement of Dec. 27, 1945, 9 in which the UK, the USSR and the US, with the adherence of China, provided that there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government with a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state; Recommends that the national independence of Korea should be reestablished at the earliest possible date in order that Korea may become eligible for membership in the United Nations and that a situation likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations will cease to exist; Recommends that as a first step in the achievement of this objective a national election be held in Korea within six months under the observation of the United Nations, and in accordance with the procedure set out hereinafter, for the purpose of choosing representatives to a National Constituent Assembly to form a national provisional Government and draft a constitution for Korea; II. The General Assembly, Desirous of making the resources of the UN available to the fullest extent in order to expedite the carrying out of the above recommendations; Resolves that: 1. A Commission on Korea shall be created consisting of the representatives of [11 states]. 10 2. The Commission shall establish regulations governing the conduct of the elections to be held for the purpose of choosing the National Constituent Assembly of Korea. In formulating such regulations the Commission shall take account of the election laws at present applicable respectively in the northern and southern zones of Korea, but shall in any event provide for voting by secret, multi-party ballot on the basis of universal suffrage. Special care shall be taken to formulate safeguards against the use of fraud, force or intimidation. 3. The Commission shall establish a body of impartial election observers consisting of nationals of states other than those adhering to the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945. These observers shall be stationed at such places throughout all Korea as the Commission may determine and shall report to the Commission on the extent of compliance with the election regulations. 4. The Commission shall be available to furnish the National Constituent Assembly such advice and assistance as the latter may desire in perfecting its organization and in forming a provisional government. 5. The Commission shall, in consultation with the Korean provisional government, consider and investigate such other questions relating to the re-establishment of Korean independence as it deems appropriate, including the establishment of a permanent govt for a united Korea, the withdrawal of the armed forces at present in occupation of Korea, the admission of Korea to the UN, and the aid and assistance to Korea needed to place Korean independence on a firm economic and political foundation. 6. The Commission shall submit to the Secy-Genl for transmittal to the Members of the UN an interim report on the result of the elections and on the formation of a provisional govt, and shall submit a comprehensive report and recommendations covering the matters referred to in paragraph 5 above to the next session of the GA. 7. The Commission shall have the widest powers required to enable it to carry out the functions specified above, including the authority to investigate, and to conclude appropriate arrangements with the proper authorities in Korea. Decisions of the Commission shall be taken by majority vote. In other respects the Commission shall determine its own procedure. III. The General Assembly, Directs the Secretary-General to provide the necessary facilities for and assign appropriate staff to the Commission; Authorizes the Secretary-General to defray the cost of the Commission and the body of observers from the Working Capital Fund, including the cost of reimbursing travel and subsistence expenses of a representative and an alternate representative from each government represented on the Commission on such basis as he may determine most appropriate; Calls upon the Member States concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfillment of its task.” Repeated Seoul as 201. Lovett 7 Foreign Relations , The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448 . 8 Foreign Relations , The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii , p. 1474 . 9 The Communiqué on the Moscow Conference of the Three Foreign Ministers, Foreign Relations , 1945, vol. ii , p. 815 . 10 Brackets appear in the original telegram. Report to the President on China–Korea, September 1947, Submitted by Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer 120.293/4–1050 [Document 612] Report to the President on China–Korea, September 1947, Submitted by Lieutenant General A. C. Wedemeyer 11 September 1947 top secret Appendix “E” to Part III— Korea, Political 12 résumé of united states policy toward korea The first treaty between the United States and Korea, signed in 1882, provided that if other powers dealt unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other would exert its good offices to bring about an “amicable agreement.” During the early period of United States-Korean relations the United States considered Korea as an independent state for the purposes of fulfilling treaty obligations, although that nation was actually under Chinese suzerainty. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, when efforts were made to gain the support of the United States to avert war, the United States took the position that, while it stood for peace, it would do nothing which might cause it to assume responsibility for settlement of the dispute. Under the treaty ending the war, China relinquished suzerainty over Korea, which was in turn assumed by Japan. Therefore, the United States continued its policy of non-interference in Korean internal affairs and in 1899 denied a Korean request for American initiative in obtaining from the powers an agreement guaranteeing Korea’s integrity. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05, President Theodore Roosevelt stated that the United States could not intervene to preserve Korean integrity since the Koreans were unable “to strike one blow in their own defense.” When Japan forced the Korean Emperor to agree to Japanese control of the administration of Korean affairs, the Emperor appealed to the United States, under the good offices clause of the United States-Korean Treaty of 1882 but his appeal was denied. Nor did the United States protest Japanese formal annexation of Korea in 1910. Thus, with little or no effort on the part of the United States to oppose such a development, Korea passed from the suzerainty of China to that of Japan and thence to the status of a Japanese colony. Efforts of Korean exiles to introduce Korea’s case at the Paris Peace Conference and at the Washington Conference of 1921–22 were rebuffed, but these exiles continued their efforts to further the cause of Korean independence, some of them in the United States. With the outbreak of World War II, the question of Korean independence was revived and Korean exiles in the United States and China began to agitate for Korean independence and official recognition. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, agreement was reached by the participating powers, later adhered to by the Soviet Union, that Korea would become independent “in due course.” This phrase caused great resentment among the Koreans who felt that they should be given immediate independence upon the defeat of Japan. This resentment was increased when the decision was reached at the Moscow Conference in December 1945 that Korea would be placed under a Four-Power Trusteeship (the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China) for a period of up to five years. A tentative agreement in this regard had previously been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, and when the end of the war was imminent agreement was reached between the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China that Soviet forces accept the Japanese surrender in Korea north of the 38° North parallel, while the American forces would accept such surrender south of that line. This arbitrary line, originally serving as a marker of military responsibility, soon became a complete barrier to free movement between North and South Korea. It has resulted in separation of the country into two parts, an economically unstable division which has seriously blocked efforts to establish a unified Korea. current political situation The major political problem in Korea is that of carrying out the Moscow Agreement of December 1945 for the formation of a Provisional Korean Government. The United States-Soviet Joint Commission, established in accordance with that Agreement, held its first meeting in [ on ] March 8 [ 20 ], 1946, but finally adjourned on May 28, 1946, without having reached an agreement looking toward the implementation of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. The failure of the Joint Commission arose from the unwillingness of the Soviet Delegation to agree to consultation with the Commission of all Korean groups, as provided for in the Moscow Agreement, to assist in the formation of the Provisional Korean Government. Soviet motives have been to eliminate the majority of the rightist groups in the American-occupied zone of Korea from consultation and subsequently from participation in the new government. Had the Soviet Delegation been successful the result would have been a Communist-dominated government in Korea. Soviet objections to consultation with these rightist groups have been based on the latter’s openly expressed opposition to trusteeship. The American Delegation has taken the stand that criticism of trusteeship did not disqualify Korean groups from participation in consultation, since to do so would deprive a considerable section of the Korean people of an opportunity to be heard in regard to the formation of the Provisional Korean Government. An exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign Minister in April and May 1947 resulted in a resumption of the meetings of the Joint Commission on May 21, 1947, under a formula which provided for consultation by all Korean groups which were prepared to sign a declaration that they would not, after such signing, “foment or instigate active opposition” to the work of the Joint Commission or to the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement. After repeated sessions of the Joint Commission a deadlock was again reached in July, the Soviet Delegation returning to its position of the previous year and the American Delegation insisting upon the implementation of the formula set forth in the Marshall–Molotov letters, which guaranteed wide-scale participation of Korean democratic parties and social organizations in consultation and freedom of expression of opinion by all Koreans. Further meetings of the Commission having produced no results, Secretary Marshall addressed another note to Foreign Minister Molotov on August 12 requesting that the Commission submit by August 21, 1947, a joint status report or that each Delegation submit separate reports. No reply having been received to this note and the Soviet Delegation refusing to participate in a joint report, the American Delegation on August 20 transmitted a unilateral report to Washington. Since the receipt of this report, the Secretary of State has addressed identical notes to China, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union proposing a Four Power Conference for a settlement of the Korean situation. China and the United Kingdom have indicated their willingness to participate in such a conference. The Soviet Union has declined. Internally, the Korean problem has been complicated by the Soviet establishment of a Communist state in North Korea and by its encouragement of the activities of Communist and Communist-dominated organizations in South Korea hostile to the United States. The activities of extreme rightist groups in South Korea, under Doctor Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo, who have openly declared their hostility to the trusteeship provisions of the Moscow Agreement, have served further to embarrass the American authorities. The rightist groups are probably the best organized parties in South Korea. They command a majority of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and, if elections were held under present conditions, would gain control of any government established in South Korea by such elections. The American authorities in South Korea are endeavoring to turn over to the Koreans as rapidly as possible administrative responsibility in the various departments of the United States Military Government, have organized a half-elected and half-appointed Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, and in general are striving to carry out a policy of “Koreanization” of government in South Korea. military government directive and steps taken to implement same The Directive under which the United States Military Government now operates in Korea sets forth three basic United States objectives: (1) To establish an independent and sovereign Korea, free from all foreign domination and eligible for membership in the United Nations (2) to insure that the National Government so established shall be a democratic government fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people; and (3) to assist the Koreans in establishing the sound economy and adequate educational system necessary for an independent democratic state. The Directive points out that the policy of the United States in regard to Korea, in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, contemplates the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government to assist the United States-Soviet Joint Commission in preparing Korea for self-government, the creation of some form of trusteeship for Korea under the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union for a period of up to five years and the complete independence of Korea at the earliest possible moment, with subsequent membership in the United Nations. The Directive goes on to state that the American occupation of South Korea is for the purpose of facilitating the attainment of the basic American objectives in Korea and shall continue as long as it contributes to that end. As a result of Soviet obstruction and tactics designed to eliminate the majority of the rightist groups from participation in the new government to be established for all of Korea, the American military authorities in South Korea have been unable to proceed with the initial steps required for the establishment of a Provisional Korean Government. As required by the Directive, the American authorities have made considerable progress in utilizing qualified Koreans in posts in local and provincial administration and in the administration of the United States zone as a whole. American personnel remains in the provincial administrations only in an advisory capacity and all administrative posts are filled by Koreans. In the over-all administration of South Korea, all Government departments are now headed by Korean officials and Americans are utilized only in an advisory capacity, although important controversial matters may be referred either to the United States Military Governor or the Commanding General of the United States Occupation Forces for final decision. American military personnel in the Military Government are being replaced as rapidly as possible by American civilians. A Korean Interim Legislative Assembly was established in December 1946, half of its membership being selected by the United States Commanding General from a list of Koreans recommended by Korean groups and half being elected as representatives of the various provinces and municipalities. Presently under consideration by this Assembly is a program for land reform in South Korea and the Assembly has recently adopted a general election law providing for election of officials to an Interim South Korean Government according to certain stipulated rules and regulations. In accordance with the Directive, the United States military authorities have permitted full freedom of expression to all political groups, except in those cases when the activities of certain Communist-dominated groups were clearly prejudicial to the security of American military occupation. Korean rightist youth corps organizations and the Korean National Police have in some cases employed intimidation and violence to prevent full freedom of expression and of legal political activity. In seeking to attain the cultural objectives set forth in the Directive, the United States occupational authorities have caused funds to be set aside for training courses in industry and agriculture, have encouraged the establishment of teacher training schools and of summer and winter institutes for the re-education of teachers and have in general devoted their efforts to the restoration of schools, the enforcement of new system of education and expansion of school facilities. They have also encouraged the formation of various committees for the purpose of democratizing the Korean educational administration. The implementation of these programs has been handicapped by lack of funds. Culturally, as well as politically, efforts have been made to carry out a process of “Koreanization” looking toward a free and independent Korea. It should be pointed out that the Directive itself necessarily allows latitude of interpretation and execution and that the American authorities in Korea have functioned within the framework of that Directive. For example, failure of the American authorities to remove Korean collaborators, and thus Japanese influence and methods, from the Korean National Police can be justified, in part, by the lack of qualified Korean personnel and by the necessity of maintaining law and order vital to the American occupation. Also, the failure to implement the badly needed land reform program has been due to the desire to await the unification of North and South Korea, at which time a Provisional Korean Government would be in a position to carry out a uniform program of this kind for the entire nation. Now that unification appears to be a matter for the indefinite future, plans are being made to carry out such a program at the earliest possible moment. obstructions to realization of united states objectives The chief obstructions to the realization of United States objectives in Korea have been the division of that country by the 38° North parallel barrier and the lack of Soviet cooperation in carrying out the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. Behind the 38° North parallel the Soviet Union has established a Democratic Front Government modelled along Soviet lines and has eliminated all political parties of a non-Communist character. North Korean Communist groups have thus been able to encourage and assist the activities of the Democratic Front and other Communist-dominated leftist groups in South Korea hostile to the United States by the infiltration of agents from North Korea into the American zone of occupation. The Soviet refusal in the United States-Soviet Joint Commission to consult with all Korean political and social organizations, as the first step in the formation of a Provisional Korean Government, has so far made it impossible to realize American objectives in Korea—the establishment of a self-governing, sovereign Korea independent of foreign control and fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people. Other obstructions to the realization of American objectives in Korea have come from sources within the United States zone of occupation: 1. Extreme rightist groups under Dr. Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo have done much to block American efforts to implement the Moscow Agreement by adopting not only a non-cooperative but even an obstructive attitude. These groups, aided by their youth corps organizations employing terroristic tactics, have used methods of intimidation to restrict the political activity of middle-of-the-road and non-Communist leftist groups; they have acted to prevent the participation in governmental administration of moderate Koreans of influence and ability who might otherwise have made a contribution to the development of Korea. 2. Similarly, extreme leftist groups have endeavored to foment hostility to the United States and opposition to the attainment of American objectives in Korea. Such groups have been particularly active among Korean peasants in opposing the rice collection program instituted by the United States Military Government for the purpose of ensuring sufficient food for the urban areas. 3. Another obstacle to the attainment of American objectives has been the activities of the Korean National Police, which have been the chief object of criticism by all Koreans except the extreme rightists. The latter and their youth corps work closely with the Police. Criticism has been directed chiefly at the presence in positions of influence and control in the National Police of Koreans formerly employed in the Japanese police system and at the fact that approximately 80 percent of the officers in the present police organization were former Japanese police employees. Korean resentment arises from the feeling that liberation has not removed from the scene this hated symbol of Japanese oppression, from the continued employment of Japanese methods of brutality and torture, and from the arbitrary arrests of innocent Koreans frequently accompanied by extortion. This resentment is often transferred to the United States Military Government and American prestige suffers as a result. So long as there is no reform of the present police system and police brutality and partisanship continue, there seems to be little hope that a government can be established fully representative of the freely expressed will of the Korean people in South Korea. The American military authorities are handicapped in their efforts to take effective steps in this direction by the necessity of maintaining a Korean police force which will deal effectively with subversive elements hostile to the United States, as a measure vital to the security of the United States occupation, and by the lack of trained Korean personnel to replace former Japanese-employed Korean police officers. The present activities of the Korean National Police, however, are believed to be increasing the shift of Korean political thinking to the left and this situation has an important effect both on the attainment of American objectives in Korea and on the prestige of the United States. implication of withdrawal of all united states assistance or continuing present united states policy The American occupation forces in Korea could not remain in that country if all assistance to South Korea were stopped, since the cessation of all aid would lead to an early economic breakdown and to the outbreak of riots and disorder throughout the United States zone of occupation. The withdrawal of American military forces from Korea would, in turn, result in the occupation of South Korea either by Soviet troops, or, as seems more likely, by the Korean military units trained under Soviet auspices in North Korea. The end result would be the creation of a Soviet satellite Communist regime in all of Korea. A withdrawal of all American assistance with these results would cost the United States an immense loss in moral prestige among the peoples of Asia; it would probably have serious repercussions in Japan and would more easily permit the infiltration of Communist agents into that country; and it would gain for the Soviet Union prestige in Asia which would be particularly important in the peripheral areas bordering the Soviet Union, thus creating opportunities for further Soviet expansion among nations in close proximity to the Soviet Union. Present American policy provides that, in view of the failure of the United States-Soviet Joint Commission to succeed in implementing the provisions of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea, the matter be referred to the Four Powers for solution. It also provides that the matter be referred to the General Assembly of the United Nations in the event of the failure of the Four Powers to solve the Korean problem. This indicates that the United States will continue to seek, by consultation with the powers concerned, a solution of the problem, but a failure to reach an agreement on Korea in the United Nations will require that the United States make a decision regarding its future course in Korea: whether it shall withdraw or whether it shall organize a South Korean Government and under what conditions and whether it shall give economic and military aid to such a government. A continuation of present American policies will serve to give notice to the Soviet Union and to other nations in the Far East that the United States will not abandon Korea in the face of Soviet intransigence and that the United States will continue to insist upon the fulfillment of the Moscow Agreement regarding Korea. A continuation of present American policies will serve to deny to the Soviet Union direct or indirect control of all of Korea and prevent her free use of the entire nation as a military base of operations, including the ice-free ports in South Korea. 11 Dated September 19; for text, except sections on Korea, see Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 764–814. This includes General Wedemeyer’s memorandum of September 19 to President Truman and the President’s directive, of July 9, pp. 764 and 774. For sections on Korea, except for certain deletions, see Committee Print entitled “Report to the President Submitted by Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, September 1947: Korea” (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951), printed for the Committee on Armed Services of the U. S. Senate at the time of the 1951 hearings. The deletions in this text (except in Appendix “E”, here printed) are as follows: Part III (Korea, political): “The terrorist activities of extreme rightists, who have strongly opposed trusteeship, have continually obstructed the efforts of United States authorities.” Part IV (conclusions, Korea): “The terrorist and obstructive activities of extreme rightist groups are further aggravating this situation.” Appendix “H” to Part III (Korea, military): “The Japanese influence remaining in this [National Police] force is a constant thorn in the side of the Korean people.” 12 Printed without deletions. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1947: Telegram [Document 613] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , September 19, 1947. 361. Zpol 1162. 1. The present transition period in our policy with respect to Korea and consideration on higher level of new plans, moves me to submit following comment, especially as the Department and SWNCC may soon be giving consideration to General Wedemeyer’s report. 13 In submitting this comment, I realize that the points raised have probably been mulled over many times in War Department. 2. The Joint Commission stalemate affords opportunity to take stock of obligations and commitments with view to reorienting our Korea policy in light of present world situation. The failure of the Joint Commission after two efforts, extending over 18 months, to implement the Moscow Agreements with respect to Korea affords ample logical grounds for seeking some other solution which Department had sought in its effort to have problem considered by Four Powers concerned. The Soviets have, however, rejected that proposal and Department, in keeping with SWNCC directive No. 176/30, 13a has taken the matter to the General Assembly of UN. As regards the probability of success of this new approach, I am in agreement with conclusion reached in paragraph 13 of the “discussion” in the aforementioned SWNCC directive that, due to Soviet intransigence, the result may be inconclusive. 3. In view of foregoing prognosis, SWNCC in 176/30 argues that US should proceed with positive program of establishing more or less permanent government in South Korea with grant-in-aid program, appointment of civil commissioner, et cetera. While that plan seems sound, I cannot give full concurrence without knowing answers to two questions posed in paragraph 6 below. 4. The Soviets have made it abundantly clear in the positions which they have taken in Joint Commission that they do not propose to agree to the establishment of any all-Korea Government unless it is leftist dominated and so constituted that the leftists can take over control in due course. It can be inferred therefore that they are determined to establish in Korea another satellite state. If, therefore, the United States proceeds with an all-South Korea program (assuming approach to UN fails), we must visualize the establishment of another undeclared battlefront along the 38th parallel similar to that now existing along Greek frontier and Yugoslav-Venezia-Giulia boundary. It would be foolish, wishful thinking to believe that Soviets will not avail themselves of opportunity to establish such a front. In order to control situation the United States would probably be compelled to increase its armed forces in Korea and to station along the 38th parallel more or less permanently at least 1 division of well-trained American troops, not recruits, and we should have to train and equip a South Korean Army of some considerable size. 5. And the foregoing does not exhaust all unfavorable factors under which we would have to function and operate. Our position in South Korea would be none too secure. The Korean masses have been subjected to semi-slavery for so long that their one cry, to be expected of a semi-emancipated people, is “independence and freedom”. Even under our mild rule they feel that our presence here keeps them from realizing all the good things they have dreamed of and do not possess and never will for many years. Also, according to our best deductions from Joint Commission and other data at least 30 per cent of the people of South Korea are leftists, following Comintern Communist leaders who would support the Soviets behind United States lines. In addition the rightists and middle-of-the-roaders are divided into at least 4 groups with numerous minor factions, fighting and quarreling among themselves with all (except few intelligent leaders who have spent most of their lives abroad) desiring that we turn the country over to them, simple-mindedly believing or hoping that the United States will continue to pour in aid and assistance without control and somehow magically protect them from the Russians with few American troops. A better milieu for Communist propaganda could not be devised. And last but not least is the economic drain upon the United States for aid and assistance which our economists estimate under most favorable circumstances (they describe it as an “intelligent estimate”) would require total of at least half billion dollars over 5-year period and that figure does not include troop maintenance. Thus our proposed South Korea program is wrought [ fraught ] with dangerous and costly possibilities. 6. In my opinion the most important criterion by which decision should be made whether the US should enter upon heavy undertakings in South Korea would be the carefully studied answer of United States military and political strategists, who are considering overall strategy and tactics around the Soviet perimeter from Japan and Korea to Norway and Sweden, to the question: is Korea of sufficiently vital importance [to] the United States in its relations with the Soviet Union within the foreseeable future (for the next 5 years) for the United States to undertake the risk and expense of holding South Korea? There is also a corollary question which must be answered, viz.: if it is impossible for the United States to enter into all the undertakings around the Soviet perimeter which the strategists consider vital, is South Korea one that might as safely be abandoned in favor, say, of other safeguarding measures which could be undertaken in Japan or elsewhere nearby? 7. If the answer of the strategists is that South Korea is so vital to our over-all policy of containment of the USSR that it must be held as one of our bastions of defense (or offense), then we should liquidate the Moscow Agreement with respect to Korea as quickly and gracefully as possible and begin [work?] upon our plans for the development of South Korea with the utmost vigor. The questions of cost, personnel, Congressional support, etc., will all have to be faced and met. There is no other safe alternative. 8. If, on the other hand, the strategists feel either that South Korea is not so vital to our defense (or offense) and other appropriate safeguarding measures can be taken or that the US should not or cannot hold South Korea as against other more important bastions that must be held, then we should “make peace with the Soviets” on this problem and get out of Korea as quickly and as gracefully as possible. This might be done by adopting with respect to Korea less firm stand against the Soviets here and on higher levels and at UN, and, by compromise bargaining in other fields, work out some arrangement whereby an all-Korean Government is created, which, when established, will be followed by simultaneous withdrawal of both US and Soviet troops. Under such arrangements, we may agree to give some aid and assistance under minimum supervision but I am certain that shortly after US and Soviet troops are withdrawn there will ensue here a state of anarchy and bloodletting, as has recently taken place in India or at least as is taking place between Communist[s] and non-Communists in China, which will give rise to a situation under which little or no aid and assistance can be given. 9. I know that there are those who will criticize this plan because the United States may lose “prestige” among Far Eastern peoples but I doubt whether that danger will arise since any plan devised for uniting Korea and for withdrawal of troops will be readily accepted by the Koreans who seem to be willing to take the risks involved. And besides, the decision of the strategists should carry much weight as an offset against the danger of loss of prestige. In any event we cannot give democracy, as we know it, to any people or cram it down their throats. History cries loudly that the fruits of democracy come forth only after long evolutionary and revolutionary processes involving the expenditure of treasure, blood and tears. Money cannot buy it; outside force and presure cannot nurture it. 10. If by chance the expert strategists disagree on the answers to the questions raised above (and that may well be the case), then we really “have a bear by the tail”. In that event, the only courses of action: ( a ) to press strongly and expeditiously at UN for the most favorable solution possible and, ( b ) failing success of that effort, decide whether to remain or get out of South Korea and proceed vigorously to implement whichever decision is reached. 11. My final observation is that whatever policy and plan are decided upon, the decision that they are “the policy and the plan” should be made soon and we should immediately move swiftly to implement them (as we have been doing during the past 6 weeks). Time is the essence. Two years have been lost. The Koreans are becoming restless. Communist borers are boring. Further uncertainty regarding what we do here can easily lead to bloodshed. Whatever we do will be difficult but further uncertainty is worse. 14 Jacobs 13 Supra . 13a August 4, p. 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 560 ] . 14 In telegram 219, September 25, 7 p.m., to Seoul, the Department informed Mr. Jacobs that his “excellent analysis” would be of “great assistance in consideration of Korean problem here.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1947) For Mr. Kennan’s comment on September 24, see p. 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1947: Telegram [Document 614] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , September 19, 1947. 363. Zpol 1165. 1. The problem posed by General Hodge in his Zgcg 1150, 160835Z to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 15 concerning the continued presence in Seoul of the Soviet delegation on the Joint Commission is a real serious one. The size [of] that delegation is approximately 100 persons, consisting of 2 generals, 3 colonels, 4 lieutenant colonels, 3 majors, 7 captains, 49 other ranks, and 38 civilians, of whom 22 are men and 16 women. A list of this personnel was transmitted to the Department with my dispatch number 48 of August 11. 15 2. As the Department is aware, the Joint Commission’s activities are practically in abeyance pending the results of the steps which the Dept has taken in Washington and at UN. Accordingly, insofar as its essential duties are concerned, the Soviet delegation is idling here in Seoul. There is ample evidence, however, from the Commanding General’s intelligence sources, that members of that delegation are leaving no stone unturned to restore the democratic front parties and organizations in South Korea which suffered a serious setback through the arrests made just prior to liberation day, August 15, although most of those arrested [have been released?] Mister A. I. Shabshin and Mister and Mrs. A. S. Maslov were formerly members of the Consulate General in Seoul during the war. They are familiar with Korean leaders and speak Korean. There is evidence that Shabshin is contacting various leftist leaders in secret meetings. Balasanov, a member of the delegation, was some years in Japan and speaks Japanese well so that he can converse easily with most Korean leaders. He and Tounkin, another member, have been conferring with leftist leaders at the Soviet Mission and they have even, on Soviet invitation, discussed possible compromises with two friends of Kimm Kiusik. 3. The democratic front groups in South Korea are now compiling long list of alleged cases of ill treatment and terrorism against leftists in South Korea which they undoubtedly are doing under Soviet direction for the purpose of presenting it to the United Nations or to a United Nations commission should one be sent to Korea. The form of this list has all the earmarks of similar lists of alleged grievances which I saw in Albania charging the Greeks with mistreatment and terrorism. Their common inspiration and source is clearly evident. Also this preparation of lists ties up with radio broadcasts from Pyongyang alleging terrorism in South Korea and attempts of South Korean rightists to stir up trouble in North Korea, as reported in Seoul PolAd number 355, September 17. 16 4. While I can well understand the Department’s reluctance to have the American delegation become responsible for proposing a recess of the Joint Commission and thus give the Soviet delegation an excuse to charge the US with breaking up the Commission, we cannot continue to allow the Soviet delegation to remain much longer in Seoul without creating a situation which may become exceedingly dangerous for the Commanding General to handle. We feel that once the Soviets reach the conclusion that we are definitely not going to agree with them on the kind of united Korea which they desire, they will definitely throw down the gauntlet and the leftists in South Korea whose following, according to best estimates, constitute at least one-third of the population of South Korea, will begin a campaign of unrest and terrorism which will give the Commanding General no end of trouble. 5. Also, the continued presence of the Soviet delegation here and occasional meetings on the request of the Chief Soviet Commissioner such as the 60th meeting reported in Seoul PolAd number 359, September 17, can only lend color to the declaration of the Soviet representative at UN that the Joint Commission has not exhausted all possibility of carrying out the plan contemplated by the Moscow Agreement. These occasional meetings may also become dangerous, as the discussions on Korea at UN proceed, by the sudden introduction on the part of the Soviet delegation of some apparently feasible plan which it would only introduce to becloud the issue at UN and later renege upon when it had served their purpose. 6. Accordingly, unless we can be given some directive as to what the Joint Commission can do at this transition interval, it is strongly recommended that the American delegation be authorized to propose a recess until the adjournment of the present session of the General Assembly or sooner if a decision by the UN with respect to Korea should require. Jacobs 15 Not printed. 15 Not printed. 16 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/9–2047: Telegram [Document 615] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , September 20, 1947. 365. Zpol 1171. 1. There is quoted in the next paragraph of this telegram an intercepted message dated September 19 (which is being banned) from Doctor Rhee to his Washington office. Please note that he wants a completely Rhee government with no rightists, leftists, or middle roaders because when Rhee speaks of an election he is cocksure that his crowd will have a large majority. Also note his renewed attack against General Hodge especially the malicious and false charge that he ordered the arrest of leftists to make an impression upon General Wedemeyer and his accusation that Hodge is now ordering release of those arrested. The truth with respect to the last point is that the police in true oriental style have been holding many minor leftists against whom they cannot bring substantial charge of wrongdoing and Hodge has ordered that all such be released. The reason for this new outburst on Rhee’s part is believed to be jealousy over our efforts to give prestige to those who are working with us, for instance his reference to Kimm Kiusic. [Here follows text of message.] Jacobs The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.01/9–2247: Telegram [Document 616] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , September 22, 1947. 369. Zurc 1175. 1. Have conferred with General Hodge and American delegation, and following represents our comments on draft resolution quoted in Deptel No. 201, Sept 18. 17 2. We feel that the draft resolution is defective because it does not clearly indicate whether the provisional government is to be an operating government or merely an advisory government pending the submission by the UN Commission of its interim report provided for in paragraph 6 of II. 3. If the provisional government is to be merely “advisory” pending approval of the Commission’s interim report, then we suggest that it be not styled a “provisional government” but rather “consultative body” until it is ready to assume the functions of government. 4. It is our opinion that a provisional government over a united Korea should be established at the earliest practicable moment; that the first task of the National Constituent Assembly should be to determine the type, composition and organization of that provisional government, to create that government and to bring it into being; and that the second task of the National Constituent Assembly should be the drafting of a constitution for Korea which will govern the permanent government which is to replace the Provisional Government. 5. If, as recommended above, the Provisional Government is in fact, when formed, to assume the functions of government, then the draft proposal should be modified to include provisions with respect to the following: a , relationship of the provisional government to the existing zonal governments of North and South Korea and occupying powers now in authority, and b , relationships of the UN Commission with the aforementioned authorities and the provisional government. Due to the political and economic immaturity of the Korean and his inclination to go his own way without foreign interference, if it is intended that the provisional government shall supersede the existing governments of North and South Korea, it is essential that the UN Commission be given sufficient authority over the provisional government to assure successful execution of the tasks assigned to the UN Commission. 6. There is no provision regarding the transfer of authority from the zonal and military governments to the new provisional government. Possibly the authors of the draft resolution feel that the clause “to conclude appropriate arrangements with the proper authorities in Korea” in paragraph 7 of Part II covers this point, but our experience here with both Russians and Koreans leads us to feel that the provision quoted is too vague on this point and will lead to difficulty. If, therefore, it is contemplated that the provisional government, when declared such by the UN Commission, is to become an operating government, then more definite provisions regarding the transfer of authority must be inserted in the resolution. Jacobs 17 Same as telegram 406, September 18, 6 p.m., to New York, p. 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2347 [Document 617] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Saltzman ) [ Washington ,] September 23, 1947. Participants: Col. B. C. Limb, Chairman of the “Korean Commission” Mr. Robert T. Oliver Mr. Saltzman, Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Penfield, FE Colonel Limb and Mr. Oliver called on Mr. Saltzman by appointment. They expressed great pleasure over the reference of Korea to the General Assembly and conveyed to Mr. Saltzman the gratitude of the “Korean people”. They then proceeded to raise the following matters: (1) They referred to the passage of an election law by the Interim Legislature some months ago, said they could not understand why General Hodge has delayed appointing an election commission (which would be the first step toward holding elections), and strongly urged that no time be lost in expediting the holding of an election in South Korea. I was noncommittal in my comments on this subject. (2) As an argument for early elections, Messrs. Limb and Oliver described at some length the undesirable situation affecting former Japanese-owned property, which they said constitutes 90% of the productive facilities of South Korea. All of this property is held in trust by the military government which operates it as trustee for a future Korean Government. As a result, no one is willing to make basic policy decisions on the conduct and operation of the property and due to this cause alone, they intimated, Korean production is but a fraction of its pre-war volume. I asked Messrs. Limb and Oliver one or two questions on this matter and promised to look into it further. (3) Messrs. Limb and Oliver next asked whether an exchange rate could not be fixed for Korean won . They said that various Korean groups wished to send representatives abroad and that many Korean students wanted to study in American universities but that these very desirable activities were greatly restricted because it is impossible to change Korean currency into US dollars. They suggested that it might be possible to arrange some remittance procedure through the military government, even if the fixing of a general commercial exchange rate was impractical. It was agreed that Mr. Oliver would discuss this matter further with Mr. Hilliard. 18 (4) Finally, Colonel Limb explained that he and Miss Louisa Yim had been appointed representatives of the Korean people by the National Representative Assembly which, although unofficial, is representative of all Korean political factions except the Communists. He asked my assistance in arranging for some sort of official or semiofficial status in the UN for him and Miss Yim. I explained that in as much as their credentials came from an unofficial body, it would be very difficult to try to give them an official status and that, furthermore, it was our feeling that the problem now being in the hands of the UN, it would be inappropriate for the US to take the initiative in attempting to arrange for the hearing of Korean witnesses. I added that the UN would undoubtedly want to take Korean views into consideration but that it might, for instance, wish to send a committee out to Korea to get its information on the spot. Messrs. Limb and Oliver appeared to appreciate our position in this matter. Charles E. Saltzman 18 Charles C. Hilliard, assistant for financial policy in General Saltzman’s office. The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1247: Telegram [Document 618] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) restricted Washington , September 23, 1947—4 p.m. 211. Following draft of letter being despatched in accordance recommendations contained urtel 339 Sept 12: “Secretary General of UN: Sir: The attention of the United States Government has been drawn to the fact that various private Korean individuals in this country have issued from time to time statements regarding the Korean question and the presentation of that question to the United Nations. Such statements may have sometimes given the impression that these Korean individuals had some official status or represented official bodies in Korea recognized by this government. I have the honor to advise that it is requested that the various delegations to the GA of the United Nations be informed that the only official Korean agencies authorized to speak officially for the Korean people under the military government which the United States has established in south Korea are (1) the civil administrator and (2) the South Korea Interim Legislative Assembly. There is of course no objection so far as the US is concerned to the expression by individual Koreans or others of their personal views regarding any problem which is before the United Nations. However, to avoid misunderstanding it should be made clear that such persons are in no sense representative of any official body recognized by the United States Government. Accept etc. Warren Austin US Representative” Lovett Conclusions of SWNCC 376, “Treatment of Korean Workers Organizations” Approved September 23, 1947 895.5043/9–2447 [Document 619] Conclusions of SWNCC 376, “Treatment of Korean Workers Organizations” Approved September 23, 1947 19 September 23, 1947 secret Appendix “C” 1. Encouragement will be given to the development of democratic labor organizations in all fields of economic activity. ( a ) The right of workers to organize and join labor unions or similar organizations of their own choosing will be recognized and labor unions and workers will be safeguarded in their efforts to improve wages, hours and working conditions, and to promote their mutual protection and economic status generally. You will not permit employers to interfere with, restrain, coerce or discriminate against employees or prospective employees because of union membership or activities. You will protect the right of union organizations to influence legislation through orderly means, and otherwise to represent publicly their members in matters affecting their economic and social status. Administrative machinery adequate to secure these rights and safeguards, based upon appropriate legislation, will be established. ( b ) In the adjustment of labor relations and labor disputes, the practice of collective bargaining will be encouraged, assisted, where necessary, by agencies of conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration. ( c ) Strikes or other work stoppages should be prohibited only when the Military Governor considers that such stoppage is harmful to the objectives or security of the occupation. ( d ) The military security forces and the constabulary or police forces will not participate in or intervene in labor disputes except to prevent public disorder and to safeguard life and property. ( e ) You will facilitate and protect the right of labor unions and workers to hold meetings, print and distribute handbills, posters and newspapers, engage in peaceful picketing and to utilize peaceful means in recruiting members or obtaining public support for their activities. ( f ) Workers should be free to choose the form of organization of their unions, whether on a craft, plant, industry or territorial basis. Unions should be allowed to form federations or similar groupings. ( g ) You will encourage the use of secret balloting and democratic methods in the election of trade union officials and standing committees. 2. Encouragement will be given to the improvement of working conditions and the development of protective legislation. ( a ) You will develop legislation to eliminate abuses in working conditions and to promote industrial health and safety and will establish agencies competent to enforce and administer such legislation. ( b ) You will pursue employment policies designed to relieve unemployment and make maximum use of the manpower resources of Korea. ( c ) You will encourage the establishment of a wage and salary structure designed to promote industrial efficiency and stable labor relations. ( d ) You will encourage the development of appropriate social insurance and public assistance legislation and the establishment of agencies competent to implement such legislation. 19 Originally dated June 27 and revised July 2 prior to approval by SWNCC. Copy transmitted to the Department in SWN–5703, September 24, with the statement that the conclusions were to be telegraphed to Seoul by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for implementation. The JCS sent the conclusions as WARX 87117 on September 25, and a copy of the entire paper was also sent. Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2447 [Document 620] Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff ( Kennan ) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth ) secret [ Washington ,] September 24, 1947. Walt : With regard to this telegram from Korea, 20 I should like to make clear to you the position of the Planning Staff with regard to policy in Korea. This field, as you know, was covered by a SWNCC directive which carried our policy up through the present period. We had assumed that the military aspects of the Korean question had been fully taken into account by SWNCC in preparing its program. We are not sure, however, that the SWNCC program represents a logical elaboration of the answers to the questions contained in paragraph 6 of Seoul’s telegram. From the discussions we have had with members of the armed services on this question, we do not get the impression that Korea is regarded as militarily essential to us. If this is correct, we feel that our policy should be to cut our losses and get out of there as gracefully but promptly as possible. This matter at present is highly operational, and I think no useful purpose would be served by the preparation of a Staff paper on it. If at any time you think we could do anything useful along this line, please let me know. George F. Kennan 20 No. 361, September 19, p. 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2447: Telegram [Document 621] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , September 24, 1947. 376. Cite Zurc 1186. Chief Soviet Commissioner has thrice requested by letter Chief American Commissioner who is chairman this week to call meeting, the third letter stating that “without regard to whether the American delegation is ready with an answer (to the Soviet’s proposal at 60th meeting as set forth Seoul PolAd 359, September 17) Soviet delegation insists on meeting for purpose of discussing further steps in the work of the Joint Commission”. General Brown has replied that as result of Soviet’s insistence he will call meeting for 1330, September 26. Any instructions Department may have are urgently requested before that date. General Brown will answer last Soviet proposal mentioned above substantially along lines mentioned Seoul PolAd 359, September 17. 21 Jacobs 21 In telegram 217, September 25, 7 p.m., to Seoul, the Department approved the proposed American reply and suggested that it specifically refer to the fact that the American delegation’s position “is in exact accordance with agreement reached in Marshall–Molotov exchange of letters on basis of which Joint Commission resumed discussions”. (740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1747) The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–1747: Telegram [Document 622] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret Washington , September 25, 1947—9 p.m. 220. Urtels 356, 366. 22 Dept has given further serious consideration advisability having Korean observers at UN and has consulted USDel New York. Consensus is that unless there is overpowering pressure for such observers they should be discouraged for following reasons: (1) presence observers from south Korea would necessitate same from north Korea with consequent confusion of issue and possible real detriment to UN consideration Korean case; (2) whole problem observers at UN from non-member states or affiliated organizations delicate due pressure from WFTU, Moroccans and others who wish to use UN as propaganda forum. Believe Koreans could be assured action in New York is primarily for purpose obtaining agreement among UN members on action to expedite Korean independence and setting up of Provisional Govt and that definite provision will be made for consultation with Korean Provisional Govt on future of Korea including any agreements on aid and assistance necessary to put Korea on firm economic and political foundation. Even should Dept decide Korean appearance at UN desirable, final decision on matter is by GA itself and not US alone. On other hand, presence in US of Koreans who could be relied on to give some support to our policies would doubtless have beneficial effect in counteracting efforts of Rhee group. In addition you may feel that trip to US by three Skila members, including if possible Kimm Kiusic, would have salutary effect in Korea even if they did not officially appear before UN. If in light of above considerations you believe such trip important Dept prepared defray incidental travel and living expenses in US. Air transportation to and from US will be provided for by War Dept under separate authorization. Your recommendations desired soonest. If Koreans come US it should be made clear they are coming for consultation Dept and every effort should be made to prevent false hopes regarding appearance before UN. Lovett 22 Neither printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2647: Telegram [Document 623] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , September 26, 1947. 381. Zurc 1194. See Seoul PolAd 376, September 24. Sixty-first meeting of Joint Commission called by American chairman upon insistence of Chief Commissioner of Soviet delegation lasted for about 2 hours on afternoon of September 26. General Brown read his reply to Soviet statement made at 60th meeting, as stated he would do in Seoul PolAd 359, September 17 and 376, September 24, with additional paragraph contained in Deptel 217, September 26[ 25 ]. 23 Full text being telegraphed separately. 24 Then General Shtikov read statement in which he blamed American delegation for failure to reach an agreement under the Moscow decision with respect to Korea, which concluded with the following proposal: “The Soviet Government has always regarded small peoples with respect and still so regards them. It has struggled and it shall continue to struggle for their independence and sovereignty. Therefore, the Soviet delegation considers that it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea. The Soviet delegation declares that if the American delegation would agree with a proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops during the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops will be ready to evacuate Korea simultaneously with the American troops.” General Brown inquired whether Soviet delegation was speaking with authority of its Government in making its proposal. To this General Shtikov replied that the Soviet delegation was responsible to its Government for any statement it makes and that therefore it was not necessary for American delegation to know whether its proposal was made in its name or in the name of its government. General Brown then said that American delegation was not authorized to discuss such a matter which was beyond scope of the Moscow Agreement with respect to Korea and proposed adjournment which was accepted. Next week is the Soviet chairman’s turn to call meetings. Department’s instructions urgently requested if the American delegation will be expected to take any action here. As soon as translated, full text of Soviet delegation’s statement will be telegraphed, probably this evening. 25 After meeting Soviet delegation released statement to press. Jacobs 23 See footnote 21, p. 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] . 24 Telegram 382, not printed. 25 Telegram 383, not printed. Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2647 [Document 624] Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense ( Forrestal ) to the Secretary of State top secret Washington , 26 [ 29 ] September, 1947. Subject: The interest of the United States in military occupation of South Korea from the point of view of the military security of the United States. Pursuant to the request in SWN–5694 (copy attached), 26 initiated by the State Member of the Committee, the following views have been received: The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, from the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic interest in maintaining the present troops and bases in Korea for the reasons hereafter stated. In the event of hostilities in the Far East, our present forces in Korea would be a military liability and could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. Moreover, any offensive operation the United States might wish to conduct on the Asiatic continent most probably would by-pass the Korean peninsula. If, on the other hand, an enemy were able to establish and maintain strong air and naval bases in the Korean peninsula, he might be able to interfere with United States communications and operations in East China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan and adjacent islands. Such interference would require an enemy to maintain substantial air and naval forces in an area where they would be subject to neutralization by air action. Neutralization by air action would be more feasible and less costly than large scale ground operations. In light of the present severe shortage of military manpower, the corps of two divisions, totaling some 45,000 men, now maintained in south Korea, could well be used elsewhere, the withdrawal of these forces from Korea would not impair the military position of the Far East Command unless, in consequence, the Soviets establish military strength in south Korea capable of mounting an assault in Japan. At the present time, the occupation of Korea is requiring very large expenditures for the primary purpose of preventing disease and disorder which might endanger our occupation forces with little, if any, lasting benefit to the security of the United States. Authoritative reports from Korea indicate that continued lack of progress toward a free and independent Korea, unless offset by an elaborate program of economic, political and cultural rehabilitation, in all probability will result in such conditions, including violent disorder, as to make the position of United States occupation forces untenable. A precipitate withdrawal of our forces under such circumstances would lower the military prestige of the United States, quite possibly to the extent of adversely affecting cooperation in other areas more vital to the security of the United States. 27 James Forrestal 26 September 15, p. 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] . 27 Copy of this memorandum was referred by Mr. Lovett to Messrs. Kennan, Saltzman, Armour, Bohlen, and Butterworth on September 29. On the same day the Secretary of State discussed the matter with Messrs. Lovett and Kennan. On October 1 Mr. Kennan wrote down his understanding of the conclusions of this discussion as follows: “That we will not turn down the Soviet proposal for evacuation of armed forces but will pass it on to the UN together with our recommendations as to what should be done to prepare the Koreans for national independence before troops are withdrawn. Copy of this memorandum was referred by Mr. Lovett to Messrs. Kennan, Saltzman, Armour, Bohlen, and Butterworth on September 29. On the same day the Secretary of State discussed the matter with Messrs. Lovett and Kennan. On October 1 Mr. Kennan wrote down his understanding of the conclusions of this discussion as follows: “That we will not turn down the Soviet proposal for evacuation of armed forces but will pass it on to the UN together with our recommendations as to what should be done to prepare the Koreans for national independence before troops are withdrawn. “In doing this, however, we shall be careful not to commit ourselves too firmly to this program of preliminary steps, our aim being to get the best bargain we can but not to tie our own hands unnecessarily.” (740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–2647) The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9–3047: Telegram [Document 625] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State restricted Seoul , September 30, 1947. 393. Cite Zpol 8818. Doctor Syngman Rhee issued a lengthy press release on afternoon September 30, full text of which will be submitted by airmail. As already indicated in previous telegrams, he is opposed to mutual withdrawal of armed forces until “Red Korean Army in north” has been disbanded under joint supervision and a South Korea Army is constituted in South Korea with respect to which he foolishly states “we can complete with the organization of our national defense army within 6 weeks”. His comment on Soviet attitude is stated as follows: “The Soviet proposal to jointly withdraw both forces came not as surprise to us. We know the motive behind the proposal. We knew also that even the Soviet Union cannot afford to ignore the moral force of world opinion in favor of law and justice when it was sufficiently aroused.” The statement, in the usual Rhee style, contains, however, more criticism of the United States than of the Soviets. The following are some examples: “I humbly warn the Americans not to let history repeat itself.” Speaking of the division of Korea after the war he states: “The United States agreed with the Soviet Union to divide and occupy Korea and to establish a trusteeship for Korea without even consulting the Korean people. This was a grave injustice.” With regard to elections he states: “Koreans are at last determined to hold a general election and form a government even in the American zone, either with or without the cooperation of American Military Government.” With regard to continued retention of American troops in Korea he states: “As we hold the US partly responsible for the division of our country, the US must not and cannot pull out until we have had time to evolve order and peace caused by foreign co-occupation. “We demand that the US maintain a small force of security in South Korea without interference in our sovereign rights until we organize our government according to the will of the people.” Please note that Rhee continues to speak as if he were the duly constituted head of all Koreans, and that he continues to operate as a lone wolf crying loudly, “A plague on both your houses”. During this new development he has made no effort to contact any of us to inquire how and what he and his followers can do to assist in obtaining what he so loudly proclaims as his objective, namely the unfettered independence of all Korea. Jacobs Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 501.BB Korea/10–147 [Document 626] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) secret [ Washington ,] October 1, 1947. Subject: Presentation of Korean Problem to the United Nations. Problem To determine, in view of the Soviet proposal in the Joint Commission in Korea for the simultaneous withdrawal of US and Soviet occupation forces from Korea, what steps this Government should take in furtherance of its announced intention to present the problem of Korea for the consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Discussion On September 29, 1947, at a meeting in the Secretary’s office attended by the Secretary, the Under Secretary, Mr. Kennan S/P, Mr. Butterworth FE, Mr. Rusk SPA, and Mr. Allison NA, the Korean problem was discussed. It was agreed that ( a ) ultimately the US position in Korea is untenable even with expenditure of considerable US money and effort; ( b ) the US, however, cannot “scuttle” and run from Korea without considerable loss of prestige and political standing in the Far East and in the world at large; ( c ) that it should be the effort of the Government through all proper means to effect a settlement of the Korean problem which would enable the US to withdraw from Korea as soon as possible with the minimum of bad effects; ( d ) the latest Soviet proposal offers an opportunity if properly exploited to increase the probability of the US’ being able to withdraw gracefully from Korea; ( e ) therefore, nothing should be done which would make it impossible for the Soviets to agree with the US on a solution of the Korean problem; ( f ) the US resolution for UN consideration should be drawn up with the above factors in mind and should be forwarded to the Secretary-General of the UN as soon as possible under cover of a letter referring to the Soviet proposals and bringing them as well as the US proposals to the attention of the UN; ( g ) the US proposals should be presented tentatively and not in a take-it-or-leave-it manner. Recommendations 1. The letter in Tab 1 and its enclosure (Tab 2) be forwarded to the US Delegation in New York for transmission to the Secretary-General of the UN by Senator Austin. 28 2. The letter and its enclosure be given to the press after dispatch to the Secretary-General. 3. The letter and its enclosure in Tabs 1 and 2 be forwarded to the US Delegation on the Joint Commission in Korea with instructions ( a ) to read them into the record of the Joint Commission, and ( b ) to propose that pending consideration of the problem of Korea by the UN the Joint Commission be recessed and the two Delegations hold themselves in readiness at their respective headquarters for such assistance and consultation with the UN as may be desired by that body. Concurrence The following Offices have concurred in the above recommendations: C, A–S, FE, EE, NA, SPA, OA, Le. W. W[ alton ] B[ utterworth ] 28 For text of Senator Warren R. Austin’s letter of October 17 to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, with enclosure, see p. 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] . The texts were given to the press the same day. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–147: Telegram [Document 627] The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Smith ) to the Secretary of State restricted Moscow , October 1, 1947—3 p.m. 2960. Following substance Foreign Office note dated September 30, delivered last night: 29 “1. On September 6, 1947 in Seoul, in building where joint Soviet-American Commission for Korea works, attempt was made by American sentries to search an employee of Soviet delegation, Pak Tyaseb. Head of Soviet delegation, General. Shtikov, sent protest to head American delegation General Brown, in regard to this illegal act of the American sentries. In reply this protest, completely unsatisfactory explanation was presented to effect Pak Tyaseb was mistakenly taken by sentries for Korean char woman of building, who was subject to search upon exit from building. Such error could not have happened since all American sentries guarding aforesaid building know by sight Pak Tyaseb as permanent employee of Soviet delegation. 2. On September 21 at 15 hours local time, interpreters of Soviet delegation, Gerasim Pak and Lyan Kehen, while returning home, were arrested on street by officials of American military police who invited interpreters to enter police car and go to police station. In spite of fact that interpreters Gerasim Pak and Lyan Kehen presented their cards of identity issued by American Secretariat of Joint Commission and signed by chief of American military police, one of police struck Lyan Kehen, after which both interpreters, under threat of arms, were made to sit in car and were taken to American police station. At the station, where the interpreters of Soviet delegation were detained for 3 hours, they were photographed, interrogated, and subjected to an insulting search. At same time, request of interpreters to communicate by telephone with Secretariat Soviet delegation re incident was categorically refused. Government of USSR considers such action of American military authorities in South Korea as crude breach of existing norms of international law. On behalf of Soviet Government, Ministry Foreign Affairs protests with regard to above-mentioned intolerable actions of American military authorities in South Korea in connection with employees of Soviet delegation to Joint Commission, and insists that the guilty persons be prosecuted and that measures be taken to prevent similar occurrences in the future.” Repeat to Seoul. Smith 29 For Department’s reply, see telegram 1883, October 24, 7 p.m., p. 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–247: Telegram [Document 628] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , October 2, 1947. 399. Zpol 1207. 1. Department will note that Rhee’s message quoted in Seoul PolAd No. 397, October 1 30 is another unwarranted attack on General Hodge and through him United States policy and plans with respect to Korea. The conference called by Rhee for October 2 will not as stated by him be representative of “all parties and organizations” although it will be fully representative of rightist groups supporting Rhee. 2. This agitation by Rhee to bring about a situation calculated to compel US to permit him to appear before UN officially or otherwise is characteristic of his tactics. In view of this “thorn in our flesh”, we agree more than ever with the Department’s view, as expressed in Deptel 220, September 25, that there should be no Korean representation at UN for the forthcoming discussion of the Korean problem. We feel therefore that some restraining influence might be brought to bear upon Rhee if the Department would explain to his henchmen in Washington the reasons set forth in numbered paragraph 1 and first two sentences of numbered paragraph 2 of Deptel 220, September 25, with reference to an additional reason that continued agitation and Rhee’s noncooperation may cause Korea to lose the opportunity to have Korea’s case considered favorably in UN by focussing attention upon Korean intransigeance due to divided Korean political leadership in South Korea which has already made our task in South Korea well nigh impossible and which plays in [to] Soviet hands. 3. We shall follow same line here but without much hope of making any impression upon Rhee and his wife (who is equally as important a factor as Rhee himself). He never contacts any ranking State or War officers here and to reach him we must either deal with go-betweens or practically summon him to appear. Jacobs 30 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–447: Telegram [Document 629] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) top secret Washington , October 4, 1947—5 p.m. 231. Having in mind considerations mentioned General Hodge’s Zgcg 1201, Sept 28, Zgcg 1178 Sept 22, 31 and PolAd’s 369 Sept 22, Dept has redrafted resolution for submission to UN and hopes to have final form of resolution ready for transmission Seoul shortly. Should Soviets insist on meeting of Joint Commission prior this time and should they insist on statement regarding US answer to Soviet proposal US delegation should state that Soviet proposal is under consideration by United States Govt which will answer in due course in appropriate manner. Lovett 31 Neither printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–847: Telegram [Document 630] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , October 8, 1947. 409. Cite Zpol 1234. There is a plan afoot, which is reported to have General Shtikov’s support, to bring together prominent Korean leaders of both North and South Korea. The South Korean leaders mentioned are Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo, Kimm Kiusic, Ahn Chai Hong, plus two leftists and one other rightist whose names have not been revealed. The North Korean group would consist of Kim II Sung, Kim Doo Bong, Oho Man Sik, and one other unnamed person. It will be noted that the conference is to consist of 11 leaders, 7 from South and 4 from North Korea, which follows closely the population ratio between the two areas. It should also be noted that 5 persons are unquestionably leftist, 2 so-called middle of the readers who have at various times been accused of vacillating between right and left while the remaining 4 are rightists. The general political complexion, therefore, of the committee would be predominately leftist. The avowed purpose of the plan is to get these leaders to confer together to work out a plan for uniting Korea which would be submitted to the Joint Commission and transmitted by it to the governments of the Four Powers for approval. The promoters of the plan are three little known Koreans: Chung Yun Taik, Lee Chung Suk, Son Hung Woon who are being investigated. Chung calls himself “Doctor” and considered somewhat of a “crackpot” but may not be so crazy as he seems. He and Son are definitely known to have had a conference on October 2 with Maslov of the Soviet delegation and, it is understood, to have received Soviet “blessing”. At least Chung is talking of making a visit to Pyongyang. “We also know that Rhee and Doctor Kimm Kiusic have been consulted. According to our informer, Rhee has refused to participate on the ground that the promoters wish to use him and then kick him out later. Kimm Kiusic is understood to have considered the plan more favorably as he some months ago declared himself in favor of some such plan. This plan has all the earmarks of Soviet origin and we believe that it is being pressed at the present time on the hope that enough may come of it to enable the Soviets to declare at UN that Korean leaders could work out their destiny if all troops are withdrawn and they are left to themselves. The matter is being watched and any future developments of importance will be reported. 32 Jacobs 32 General Hodge’s telegram Zgbi 1281, October 17, from Seoul, gave further details and said the so-called plan was receiving popular attention (895.00/10–1747). The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/10–847: Telegram [Document 631] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State Seoul , October 8, 1947. 413. Cite Zpol 9088. Following is statement issued by General Hodge October 8 regarding South Korea election and Korean representation at U.N.: 33 [“]When queried with reference to the subjects of selection of Korea’s representatives to go to the United Nations, and of a date for a general election in South Korea, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge stated as follows: ‘All Koreans are fully aware that because of the deadlock in the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, the United States has requested the General Assembly of the United Nations to take up the problem of early establishment of Korean independence of a united Korea. They are also aware that most of the independent nations of the world fully approved this action by placing the Korean problem on the agenda of the General Assembly discussions by a vote 41 to 6. The wide local general approval of this action, as expressed by prominent Koreans and Korean political parties other than the Communist-dominated groups, indicates that most Koreans welcome the solution of their problem by the United Nations.’ Concerning representatives to United Nations General Assembly, General Hodge said that he has received no request or authorization from the United States Government or from the United Nations for Korea representatives to attend any discussions of the General Assembly, and until request has been received, it is not within his power either to select or to dispatch representatives from Korea for that purpose. As to the matter of designating a specific date for a general election in South Korea, he pointed out that since the United Nations has decided to act on the Korean problem at the request of the United States Government, the local commander of the United States forces is not empowered to set a date for a unilateral general election within this zone until directed to do so, either by his Government or by a proper directive from the United Nations. He urged the Korean people to grasp the full significance of the Korean problem being placed in United Nations General Assembly and to understand that precipitant unilateral action in South Korea at this time will endanger the future of a united Korean nation. In conclusion he said: ‘My advice to all Koreans at this critical time in the development of their nation is to put faith in the wisdom and ability of the United Nations General Assembly to find a means of solving the Korean problem, and to give their full and wholehearted support to the decision of the General Assembly of peace loving independent nations of the world. Calm and patience are essential.’” 34 Jacobs 33 In telegram 412, October 8, from Seoul, it was explained that General Hodge issued his statement following agitation by rightist groups and police prevention of a “sit-down protest” on October 7 (740.00119 Control(Korea)/10–847). 34 A further paragraph to the statement was sent in telegram 415, October 9, as follows: “In this connection, General Helmick, Acting Military Governor, states that pending decision by the United Nations, the interim government of South Korea, assisted by the United States Military Government, is pushing the preparations for a general election.” (895.00/10–947) The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–847: Telegram [Document 632] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , October 8, 1947. 414. Zpol 1238. In view of recent Soviet proposal for mutual troop withdrawal we have been giving renewed consideration to reports and other information concerning the situation in North Korea. Weighing our information, it seems that the number of Soviet troops in North Korea has been reduced to two divisions which according to conservative estimates could easily be withdrawn within 30 days. There is considerable information regarding activity of the North Korean Army with renewed recruiting. Units of this army, known to be well-equipped with infantry weapons, have now appeared in the provinces of North Korea bordering on the 38 parallel where they have never previously known to have been in numbers. Estimate of this situation is that the Soviets are getting ready for withdrawal of their own troops and are preparing and possibly are redeploying the North Korean Army for its future role. We even go so far as to believe that, if the Soviet proposal for mutual withdrawal is not accepted soon, we may next be confronted by a declaration on the part of the Soviets that they are withdrawing their troops regardless of whether we do or not. This they can safely do, in view of the North Korean Army which they leave behind and the continued proximity of their own armed forces to Korea. In that event, we shall be left in the unenviable position both at UN and here of continuing our military occupancy of South Korea. At UN the representatives of many states, ignorant of the realities of the Korea problem, may take sides against us. Here in South Korea we are likely to be confronted with demand for our withdrawal by a large segment of Koreans consisting of all leftists plus many well-meaning but ignorant rightists. While most rightist leaders understand the implications of the Soviet withdrawal proposal, the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops will have an immense popular appeal among Koreans. The effects of a similar appeal to the American public should also not be ignored. In connection with this message, please see Seoul PolAd number 409, October 8. Jacobs The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/10–947: Telegram [Document 633] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , October 9, 1947. 416. Cite Zpol 1239. Adopted four resolutions which were released to press by Rhee on October 7th. 35 Text follows in Seoul PolAd No. 417, October 9th. 36 Department will note threats contained in these resolutions which may mean that Rhee is determined to force US to hold an election before decision is reached at UN or to compel US to take action against him so that he can appear in the light of a martyr. He and his group are alone in agitating for a South Korean election before Korea question is considered by UN. Even Kim Koo and his group are not supporting Rhee in this. It may also be observed that since subsidence of leftist activities about middle of August, the chief cause of disorder in South Korea has been the strong armed methods of Rhee’s rightist groups especially by his youth corps. Jacobs 35 Adopted by Rhee’s “Korean National Association” on October 6. 36 Not printed. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (Molotov) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–1047 [Document 634] The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs ( Molotov ) to the Secretary of State 37 [Translation] Dear Mr. Marshall : The position taken by the US delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission at Seoul provides evidence that the USA Delegation does not wish to continue the work of the Joint Commission with a view to reaching, on the basis of an exact observance of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, agreed decisions on questions connected with the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government. In violation of the Moscow Agreement on Korea and the understanding reached between the Governments of the USSR and the USA in May 1947 concerning the conditions for resuming the work of the Joint Commission, the USA Delegation insists that not only democratic parties and groups in northern and southern Korea which have signed the declaration of support for the aims of the Moscow Agreement and are loyally carrying out the conditions of this declaration, but also such reactionary groups which, having signed this agreement, are carrying on a struggle against the Moscow Agreement and are continuing to comprise the so-called “Anti-trusteeship Committee”, which contradicts the above-mentioned understanding between the Governments of the USSR and the USA, shall take part in the formation of the Korean Government. The Soviet Delegation, consistently defending the principles of the Moscow Agreement, obviously cannot agree with this. The position of the USA Delegation has made impossible the formation of a provisional Korean democratic government in accordance with the Moscow Agreement, which hinders the re-establishment of Korea as a united democratic state. In view of the situation which had been created the Government of the USSR instructed the Soviet Delegation to introduce in the Joint Commission at Seoul a new proposal, namely: To give to the Koreans the possibility of forming a government themselves, without aid and participation on the part of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, on condition that American and Soviet troops be withdrawn from Korea. If the Government of the USA should agree to the proposal for the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign troops at the beginning of 1948, the Soviet troops would be ready to leave Korea simultaneously with the American troops. Notwithstanding the fact that this proposal was introduced by the Soviet Delegation at the session of the Joint Commission on September 26, the USA Delegation has unfortunately not replied to date, which cannot fail to delay the solution of the Korean question. With reference to the consideration of the Korean question at the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, which was proposed in Mr. Lovett’s letter of September 17, the position of the Soviet Government on this question, as you know, has already been set forth by the Soviet Delegation to the General Assembly. 38 Copies of this letter are being sent by me to the Governments of Great Britain and China. Please accept [etc.] V. Molotov Moscow , October 9, 1947. 37 Transmitted to the Acting Secretary of State by the Soviet Chargé (Tarassenko) in his note 210, October 10. The text was published in Moscow on October 12. 38 See citations in bracketed note, p. 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 609 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–247: Telegram [Document 635] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) confidential Washington , October 10, 1947—7 p.m. 240. Urtel 399 Oct 2. In reply to letter in which Limb transmitted copy Rhee’s telegram quoted urtel 397 39 Asst Secy Saltzman stressed fact that Korean representation is matter for decision by GA rather than US but regardless Korean representation action in UN is to expedite Korean independence and that provision for consultation with Koreans in Korea will doubtless be made. Letter concludes as follows. “The above comments are offered in response to the substance of Dr. Rhee’s radiogram, but I feel that I must also call your attention to the inappropriateness of some of the statements in Dr. Rhee’s radiogram. As you know, General Hodge is the representative of this Government in Korea and is carrying out in that country United States policies directed to the development of a free, united and sovereign Korea with a democratic government representative of the will of the people. This Government must therefore take exception to statements by Koreans residing in the United States zone of Korea which refer to General Hodge ‘sending only his personal representatives to UN’ and assert that they do not ‘recognize’ the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly which was established in accordance with instructions of this Government as a step in the development of a fully representative body of Koreans to aid in achieving a democratic, independent and united Korea.” Lovett 39 Not printed, but see telegram 399, October 2, p. 822 [ Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] . The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.01/10–1047 [Document 636] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State restricted No. 109 Seoul , October 10, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to enclose a policy outline, dated September 25, 1947, 40 for the guidance of the South Korea Interim Government, which was, as stated at the beginning of the outline, “Unanimously adopted by the Korean Interim Government, and also unanimously adopted by the Joint Conference of Directors and Governors.” The memorandum was presented to Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge on October 1, 1947 by Mr. Ahn Chai Hong, Civil Administrator, and Mr. Cho Pyung Ok (known as P.O. Chough), who is Director of the National Police Force and a prominent member of the Hankook Democratic Party, as well as a political associate of Dr. Syngman Rhee. In presenting the memorandum to General Hodge, Mr. Ahn and Mr. Cho expressed the hope that General Hodge would select a small group of top-ranking American officers and advisers now in Seoul to serve with a corresponding group on the Korean side as a “Policy Advisory Group”, to study the policy outline and seek ways and means of implementing its practical and proper features. General Hodge and Brigadier-General Charles Helmick, the Acting Military Governor, favor the idea and, in due course, some such advisory group may be constituted if developments with respect to the problem of Korea at the United Nations do not take a turn which will render such action unnecessary. It is understood that the preparation of this memorandum was largely the work of the Director of the National Police, Mr. Cho. The motive behind this development, which, although dated September 25, 1947, refers to the Soviet proposal for mutual withdrawal of troops, made on September 26, 1947, is self-protection against the threat of engulfment by radical forces of conservative Korean elements in the event of precipitate United States acceptance of the Soviet proposal. Mr. Ahn Chai Hong no doubt signed the memorandum in his capacity as presiding officer of the Korean Directorate (Cabinet) of SKIG rather than is [ in ] his personal capacity of “Number Two Man” (Dr. Kimm Kiu Sic is “Number One”) of the Coalition Committee, whose jealousy of the Hankook Democratic Party’s paramountcy in SKIG is well-known to the Department. Nevertheless, it can readily be seen that the Coalition Committee would approve in principle of the constructive, patriotic, pro-American, nonpartisan aspects of the paper. Since signing the policy memorandum, Mr. Ahn has handed another memorandum to General Hodge in which he shows his distrust of the rightists by suggesting ( a ) that the Civil Administrator be given broader powers than he now possesses, ( b ) that rightist excesses be curbed, and ( c ) that the police force take in more nonrightist members and be subjected to greater control by higher administrative authorities. The essence of the memorandum seems to be contained in Section III, “The Urgency of Strengthening South Korea”, the recommendations in which coincide closely with the philosophy of Dr. Rhee, namely: (1) a separate South Korean Government in which the American commander “holds the sovereign power in South Korea” (see I–B of the memorandum, viz., an American quasi-protectorate), and which would be “the moving power for the unification of North and South Korea”; (2) arming of South Korea, including military training of students and all youth. Section IV also deals with concrete political measures: a purge of all anti-national, anti-American (this smacks of oriental toadying to might and is discounted) and anti-Communist [ destructive? ] elements; state propaganda and control of the press; suppression of terrorism. Many of the foregoing measures could hardly be supported by the United States, especially those conflicting with basic democratic principles and with the spirit of part I, paragraph 5 a of SWNCC directive No. 176/29, July 23,1947, 41 providing that, in broadening the basis for Korean participation in the administration of Southern Korea, qualified Koreans must be utilized by electoral processes wherever appropriate, and for appointive posts by selection from all political groups, having due regard to their proportionate strength. 42 However, if nothing comes of the discussions at the UN, and the United States must perforce remain in occupancy of South Korea, it may be necessary to adopt some of those measures. For example, careful screening of Korean employees in government and public enterprises may have to be necessary, as members of component parties of the Communist dictated Democratic Peoples’ Front are frequently saboteurs of our efforts. To give an instance: it has recently been found that it was impossible to keep the street cars in Seoul operating until the South Korea Labor Party members had been removed from among the Company’s employees. As soon as they were removed, the number of street cars operating quickly rose from the 30’s to more than 100. The same improvement is now being worked out in the railway system. Respectfully yours, Joseph E. Jacobs 40 Not printed. 41 July 24, p. 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] . 42 In despatch 174, December 18, from “Seoul, the Skila’s ultimate disapproval of the “outline” on December 15 was reported to the Department (895.01/12–1847). Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Secretary of State 501.BB Korea/10–1447 [Document 637] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs ( Allison ) to the Secretary of State secret [ New York ,] October 14, 1947. Subject: Chinese Position on United States Korean Resolution. When Dr. Wang, the Chinese Foreign Minister, was handed a copy of the United States Korean Resolution on October 10, he raised two questions: (1) What effect the United States resolution had on the special responsibilities and position with regard to Korea of the Four Powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement; and (2) what action would the United States take should the Soviet Government decline to be guided by any United Nations resolution on Korea. Dr. Wang stated that he would be prepared to make further detailed comments on our resolution by the evening of October 14. At a meeting in Assistant Secretary Saltzman’s office in the Department the afternoon of October 13, it was agreed that the points raised by Dr. Wang should be met as follows: 1. The United States Resolution is a method of accomplishing the first step in the carrying out of the Moscow Agreement on Korea, namely the setting up of a Korean government, plus a provision for the mutual withdrawal of troops. The achievement of this objective as a result of recommendations in a United Nations resolution would not affect the responsibilities or special position of the Four Powers under the Moscow Agreement. These would remain the same, and after the setting up of a Korean Government it would still be for the Four Powers to decide how to exercise their continuing responsibilities under the Moscow Agreement in the light of all circumstances then obtaining. 2. With regard to the action the United States might take in the event of a Soviet refusal to carry out the terms of a United Nations resolution, it was agreed that no final decision could be made until we know the manner of the Soviet refusal and that this question must be left open. However, it was agreed that the Chinese might be assured that the United States had no intention of carrying out a precipitous withdrawal of troops, leaving a vacuum behind. It is recommended that should Dr. Wang raise the above points again in his conversation with you this evening, that you reply along the above lines. J[ ohn ] M. A[ llison ] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary General of the United Nations (Lie) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–2147 [Document 638] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary General of the United Nations ( Lie ) 43 October 17, 1947 Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the facts that on September 17, 1947, the United States Secretary of State announced that the United States was placing the problem of Korean Independence before the General Assembly and on September 23, 1947, the General Assembly voted to place that problem upon its agenda. On September 26, 1947, the Chief Soviet Delegate on the Joint United States U.S.S.R. Commission meeting in Seoul, Korea, made the following statement, in translation: “Therefore, the Soviet Delegation considers that it is possible to afford the Koreans an opportunity to form a government by themselves without the aid and participation of the Allies under the condition of withdrawing the American and Soviet troops from Korea.” The United States Government desires to take any practicable step which will further the speedy establishment of a truly independent Korea. The only concern of this Government is to make certain that its responsibilities to the Korean people and to the United Nations are properly carried out. It will be recalled that after negotiations in the Joint Commission had reached a stalemate the United States Government proposed that the question of forming a government for Korea be discussed in Washington by representatives of all powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea, China, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the United States. China and the United Kingdom accepted this suggestion but the U.S.S.R. did not. It was only after this that the matter was presented to the United Nations. It is believed that inasmuch as the General Assembly has already voted to consider the problem of Korean independence, its attention should be called to the most recent Soviet proposal, referred to above, as well as the suggestions for a solution of the problem which the Secretary of State said the United States Government would be prepared to advance. With these proposals before it the General Assembly will, it is hoped, be able to recommend measures for an orderly transition from the present systems of government in north and south Korea to an independent, united Korean government and the consequent speedy withdrawal of all occupying forces. There is therefore transmitted herewith a Resolution which contains the suggestions the United States Delegation will submit for the consideration of Committee 1 of the General Assembly when the problem of Korean independence comes before that body. It is considered that an arrangement of the nature indicated in this Resolution should make possible the early establishment by the Korean people themselves of their own government and the withdrawal of all Soviet and United States armed forces from Korea. It is requested that copies of this letter together with its enclosure be circulated to the various delegations to the General Assembly for their information. Accept [etc.], Warren R. Austin [Enclosure] Resolution The General Assembly Recognizing the urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea; Having in mind that it is one of the purposes of the United Nations to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; Having noted the international obligations undertaken with respect to Korea, including the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, in which China, the United Kingdom and the United States stated their determination that in due course Korea shall become free and independent, the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26,1945, in which China, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration and to which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics adhered upon entering the war in the Pacific, and the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945, in which the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States, with the adherence of China, provided that there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government with a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state; Believing that the national independence of Korea should be reestablished and all occupying forces should be withdrawn from Korea at the earliest practicable date; To this end, Recommends that the occupying powers hold elections in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, under the observation of the United Nations, as the initial step leading to the creation of a National Assembly and the establishment of a National Government of Korea in conformity with the procedure set out in the Annex to this Resolution; Further Recommends that immediately upon the establishment of the National Government of Korea referred to above, that government will constitute its own national security forces and will arrange with the occupying powers for the early and complete withdrawal from Korea of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. and the United States; Resolves, that the responsibilities assumed by the United Nations under this resolution should be discharged by a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, consisting of the representatives of (names of states). This United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shall (1) be present in Korea during the elections in each zone with the right of freedom of travel and observation throughout all of Korea, (2) be available for such consultation as may be appropriate in connection with the elections, the organization of the national assembly, the formation of the national government and the conclusion of agreements for the withdrawal of the occupying forces, (3) report to the General Assembly or if in its judgment developments so require to any competent agency of the Assembly with respect to its activities under the terms of this resolution, and make any recommendations that it may wish concerning further UN action in maintaining the independence of Korea; Calls upon the member states concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea in the fulfillment of these responsibilities. Annex Recommended Procedure for the Holding of Elections and the Establishment of a National Government of Korea (1) The elections to be held by the occupying powers in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, shall be for the purpose of choosing representatives to a National Assembly. The number of representatives elected to the National Assembly from each zone shall bear the same proportion to the total membership of the National Assembly as the population of that zone bears to the total population of Korea. Subject to this principle, the number of representatives to be elected from each zone shall be determined by the United Nations Commission on Korea in consultation with the occupying powers. (2) As soon as possible after the elections the National Assembly of Korea shall meet and form a Government and shall notify the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea of the formation of this Government. (3) Upon notification to the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea of the formation of a National Government of Korea, that Government shall take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian authorities of North and South Korea, respectively, in accordance with arrangements to be agreed upon under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on Korea between the Government of Korea and the respective occupying authorities. (4) The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea shall be available for such consultation and assistance as may be requested and appropriate in connection with the decisions and actions contemplated in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above. 43 Delivered on October 17 to the Secretary General of UN and released to the press the same day; text transmitted to Moscow in airgram A–360, October 21, and copies sent to London and Nanking. Printed as U.N. doc. A/C.1/218, October 17; Department of State Bulletin , October 26, 1947, p. 820. Texts were sent on October 10 and 15 to Seoul, with instructions to read them to the Joint Commission. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 40.00119 Control (Korea)/10–1747: Telegram [Document 639] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State restricted Seoul , October 17, 1947. 429. Zpol 9431. General Shtikov called on General Hodge this morning by appointment and after brief conversation read protest of which following is our translation: “On 14 October, 1947, the Seoul newspapers published a declaration by the Chief of Seoul City Police of 13 October, 1947 in which the latter permitted himself to engage in inimical attacks against the Soviet delegation to the Joint Soviet-American Commission, and attempted to advance ludicrous and slanderous accusations regarding one of the collaborators of the Soviet delegation. Such a declaration by the Chief of Seoul Police, whose actions are controlled by the American military authorities, could have taken place only with the permission of the latter, because of which I place full responsibility for the declaration upon the American military command in South Korea. I register a protest regarding the matter, and demand immediate removal of the Chief of Seoul Police from his duties, and that measures be taken which would guarantee the impossibility of repetition in the future of slanderous and provoking attacks against the Soviet delegation in Seoul and against its collaborators.” General Hodge replied that he would read statement of Chief of Police Chang and give consideration to the matter. He has released text of protest to press along with brief factual statement as follows: “General Shtikov, Chief Commissioner of the Soviet delegation of the US-USSR, Joint Commission, called upon General Hodge this morning by appointment and read the following statement (already quoted above). General Hodge replied that he would study Police Chief Chang’s statement complained of and give consideration to the matter.” Some comment will follow in separate telegram 44 on Police Chief Chang’s statement which was based upon statements of leftists arrested during week prior to August 15, some of whom have already been tried and others of whom are now on trial. Jacobs 44 Telegram 430, October 18, from Seoul, not printed, but see telegram 433, October 20, p. 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , for General Hodge’s reply to the protest. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–1747: Telegram [Document 640] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union restricted us urgent Washington , October 17, 1947—7 p.m. 1855. Please deliver following letter to FonOff immediately and inform Dept of time of delivery: “Dear Mr. Molotov: In your letter of October 9, 1947, you state that the position taken by the United States Delegation in the Joint Soviet-American Commission at Seoul has delayed a decision on the Korean question and you refer to the proposal made by the Soviet Delegation in Seoul on September 26, 1947, for the immediate simultaneous withdrawal of United States-Soviet occupation forces to which you state no reply has been received. The Secretary of State announced on September 17 that the problem of setting up an independent Government for a unified Korea would be presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations and on September 23 the General Assembly voted to place this question on its agenda. In the opinion of the United States Government the question of withdrawal of occupation forces from Korea must be considered an integral part of the solution of that problem. The United States Delegation to the General Assembly meeting in New York City has now had circulated to the various delegations for their consideration a proposed resolution which is designed to bring about the early establishment of an independent Korean Government representative of the will of the Korean people, and the consequent speedy withdrawal of all occupation forces. In submitting this proposal to the Secretary General, 45 specific attention was called to the Soviet proposal for the simultaneous withdrawal of troops with the statement of the United States’ hope that having both proposals before it the General Assembly would be able to recommend a solution of the problem. A copy of the United States proposals was delivered to the Soviet Delegation in New York prior to its being communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the other delegations. In view of the continued inability of the Soviet and United States Delegations in the Joint Commission to agree on how to proceed with their work and the refusal of the Soviet Government to participate in discussions on this problem with the other Governments adhering to the Moscow Agreement on Korea, the United States Government considers it is obligated to seek the assistance of the United Nations in order that, as the Secretary of State said on September 17, ‘the inability of two powers to reach agreement’ should not further delay the early establishment of an independent, united Korea. Copies of this letter have been furnished to the Governments of the United Kingdom and China. Accept, Sir, … etc. Signed Lovett” Text today’s note to SYGUN and accompanying UN resolution on Korea being transmitted by airgram. 46 Sent Moscow, repeated Nanking, London and Seoul. 47 Lovett 45 See letter of October 17 from the U.S. Representative at the United Nations to the UN Secretary General, p. 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] . 46 See footnote 43, p. 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] . 47 As Nos. 1282, 4489, and 247, respectively; also sent as No. 484 to the U.S. delegation at the UN. Slight changes were made in the first sentence. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–1847: Telegram [Document 641] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , October 18, 1947. 431. Cite Zurc 1283. Sixty-second meeting of Joint Commission convened 1000 hours, October 18, with Shtikov as chairman, lasted for 45 minutes. General Brown read texts of documents 48 communicated in Deptel No. 239, October 10, and Deptel No. 244, October 15, 49 and proposed recess with each delegation holding themselves in readiness at the headquarters of the respective occupation forces for such assistance as may be requested by the United Nations. General Shtikov after 19 minutes’ recess replied that whereas the US proposal suggests interrupting work of Joint Commission, Soviet delegation will report to its Government for necessary instructions and will advise when these received. Jacobs 48 See letter of October 17 from the U.S. Representative at the United Nations to the UN Secretary General, p. 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] . 49 Neither printed. Dr. Syngman Rhee to the Korean Commission at Washington 501.BB Korea/10–2047 [Document 642] Dr. Syngman Rhee to the Korean Commission at Washington 50 Seoul , October 18, 1947—8:37 a.m. Radiogram from General Saltzman to General Hodge said in substance: “This government takes exception to Dr. Rhee’s telegram accusing General Hodge of sending only his personal representatives to UN and asserting that Koreans don’t recognize South Korea Interim Legislature.” 51 Please submit to Assistant Secretary following explanation: If my telegram appeared as accusation am exceedingly sorry but it was only for information. On September 24th Civil Administrator Ahn Chai Hong, Chief of Police Department Dr. Cho Pyungok, and head of SKIG Public Relations Dr. Chulwon Ryee came and informed me that directorate of SKIG and USAMGIK had chosen Dr Kiusic Kimm Moderate and myself Rightist as UN Delegates. I replied that I will not go with any Coalitionist; first, because that would encourage Communists in South; second, delegation representing Rightist and Leftist would work cross purposes. When people later learned about directorate choice of delegates they openly denounced choosing of Coalitionist. Then came State Department’s statement by Mr. Austin, published Seoul Press, that Korean delegates should be chosen by Interim Legislature and Civil Administrator. Dr. Kimm and Mr. Ahn are both Coalitionists. People vigorously opposed it through press and public meetings. General Hodge told inquirers that UN and State Department would decide. This has created great excitement throughout country. Four hundred delegates representing seven million members of National Federation met Seoul October 4th to 7th and adopted four resolutions, one of which requested General Hodge to dissolve Coalition Committee which had been originated by him last year for purpose of inducing Soviets to resume discussions. Now that Joint Commission failed again, people believe General Hodge should dissolve it, for its continuation only tends to revive Communism. But General Hodge refused to comply. People are extremely restless because in past two years Communist terrorists, under AMG neutral policy, have repeatedly burned and destroyed many homes, institutions, and lives, and now another loophole is left open for them. To set up a free independent Korean Government is the objective of USA and UN. Korean people should be consulted, not AMG, which the Korean people don’t regard as their representative government. People don’t understand why USA and UN should choose Korean Delegates to UN or any other conference. That is the prerogative of the Korean people. Korea is not an enemy nation. AMG ordinances declared that Legislature’s first duty was to pass election law. They don’t regard Interim Legislature as their true representative body because half of its members were appointed by General Hodge. 52 In short it is the wisest and best policy to let people have promised and long overdue general election in South to set up government of their choice, with understanding that whenever UN settles problem satisfactorily they will drop present plan in order to accept UN settlement, instead of waiting indefinitely. Syngman Rhee 50 Copy of telegram transmitted to the Department by Chairman Limb of the Korean Commission on October 20. 51 See telegram 240, October 10, 7 p.m., to Seoul, p. 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] . 52 Telegram 441, October 23, from Seoul, reported the Assembly on October 20 had passed a resolution referring the matter of Korean representation at UN to the Civil Administration and the Military Government (895.00/10–2347). The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/10–1847 [Document 643] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State restricted No. 121 Seoul , October 18, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith the text of a message broadcast in Korean from Pyongyang, North Korea, on October 9, 1947, 7 a.m. EST, 53 which it is alleged that the Central Committee of the North Korea Democratic People’s Coalition Front resolved to send to President Truman and Premier Stalin and which is said to have been actually forwarded on September 22, 1947. The letter is essentially a protest against the alleged suppression of leftist activities in South Korea and against terroristic activities on the part of South Korean police and reactionary rightist groups. The letter also goes on to criticize the American Commanding General, Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge, for approving mass arrests and for stating that such arrests were justified because of the seditious plans of the South Korean Democratic People’s Front, which the broadcast denies. Some comment is required on the six demands found at the end of this letter. 1. With regard to the demand that arrests of patriots fighting for the freedom of the Korean people be discontinued, it may be stated that the general arrest of leftist leaders suspected of seditious activity, which took place during the week preceding August 15, ceased on or about that date. Our military authorities are aware of the fact that the Korean police, who conducted the arrests and who are largely rightists, were overly zealous in arresting the leftists and that, as a result, there may have been some arrests after that date but all such arrests have long since been discontinued. The only arrests now being made are, as indicated in the daily and weekly G–2 reports, those of both rightists and leftists who continue to carry on terroristic activities against each other. In view of the hatred between the rightists and leftists and the exuberance of the rightist youth groups in South Korea, it is very difficult to control all terroristic activities. 2. With regard to the demand that the suppression of the South Korean democratic political parties and social organizations be discontinued, there never was any suppression of these parties as such. During the general arrests prior to August 15 some leaders of these parties were arrested but no ban on the parties themselves was issued. 3. With regard to the demand that all democratic leaders be released from prison, many of these so-called leaders have already been released for lack of evidence upon which to prosecute them. A few such leaders are still under arrest and their trials will begin shortly. What the leftists are really talking about are some of their high-ranking leaders, such as Ho Hun, who remain in hiding, afraid to come forth even though no warrant exists for his arrest. 4. With regard to the demand that buildings and properties seized from democratic organizations be returned, there never was any seizure of such properties except possibly in some isolated cases in the provinces where proper supervision could not be exercised over the zealousness of the police and youth organizations. What happened was that during the arrests all leftists became frightened and deserted their properties to which they are now gradually returning. 5. With regard to the demand for free publication of leftist newspapers, none was banned during the arrests prior to August 15 or since. The failure of these papers to resume publication is due largely to the fear of their publishers to return to their premises, while some have discontinued publication voluntarily, probably through fear and some for financial reasons. 6. With regard to the demand that reactionary elements and terrorists, who have committed massacres and atrocities, be severely punished, the Commanding General has taken steps to instruct the police to put a stop to terroristic activities among all groups including the rightists and the police have taken steps to curb these activities, although it is most difficult to get the rightist police, especially in the provinces, to exercise to the fullest extent their obvious duties in this respect. It can also be denied that there have been any “massacres” and “atrocities” either by police or rightist groups. The latter may have badly beaten up some leftists in some instances but such instances cannot be classified as “massacres” or “atrocities”, and as an offset the leftist group has similarly beaten up rightists. In a situation such as exists in South Korea where it is the policy of the United States Government to give all parties and organizations freedom to carry on their activities as long as they are not subversive, it is obvious that the leftists, who are Communist-dominated, will from time to time reach a point in their activities where the Commanding General and the police must take a hand to prevent disorders against the peace and order of the area. It is the avowed purpose of the Communist leaders of these leftists to stir up trouble in South Korea and the inevitable result is that from time to time there must be certain steps taken to suppress their evergrowing boldness. If the American authorities are to remain for a long time in South Korea, it will eventually become necessary to place a ban on activity by these leftist groups in order adequately to maintain law and order. As has already been indicated in other despatches and telegrams, the removal of these leftists from the employ of the tramway and railway companies immediately resulted in much greater efficiency of the operation of these transportation systems. It has also been necessary to eliminate some of the more objectionable leftist characters from among the school teachers. It is not known here whether the enclosed letter ever reached President Truman and, if so, through what channels. Respectfully yours, Joseph E. Jacobs 53 Not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/10–2047: Telegram [Document 644] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State Seoul , October 20, 1947. 433. Cite Pol 9519. Following is text of General Hodge’s memorandum reply, dated October 20th to General Shtikov’s protest against Police Chief Chang, which is being handed to General Shtikov and released to press that date: “The protest made by you in a personal interview with General Hodge on the morning of October 17th, has been carefully studied and all pertinent facts available regarding a recent statement made by Chief Chang of the metropolitan police have been checked. An investigation reveals that Chief Chang’s statement was an informative report submitted by a reliable Korean Government official, giving the facts available to him and the logical conclusions based on those facts. These conclusions follow an exhaustive and prolonged investigation by the law enforcement agencies in the zone of American responsibility, of several ringleaders of seditious planning and activity aimed at destruction of orderly government and fomenting extensive and violent disturbances in South Korea. His statement was presented to the free press of South Korea in response to continuous public demand for a report to the people of the zone concerning activities inimical to their best interest and general welfare. It is permissible in the American occupied zone of Korea for responsible Korean Government officials to make such reports to the people on their own initiative, without interference or direction from American officials. It is also permissible for the press to make its own interpretation and comment. No words or indication in Mister Chang’s report appear to bear out your accusation that he made ‘inimical attacks’ or advanced any ‘ludicrous and slanderous accusations’ against the Soviet delegation to the US–USSR Joint Commission. The only references found concerning the Soviet delegation, or anyone connected therewith, are statements pertaining to political activities beyond the nature of work of the Joint Commission, at times and places when the Commission was not in session, on the part of one Soviet citizen attached to the Soviet delegation. The character of these activities is nothing new to the American command. Other than that, Chief Chang’s report presents the activities of the South Korea Labor Party and its members, together with its established relationships with allied North Korean organizations and personalities. Much of the information he reported as having gained through the investigations is borne out by facts long since established by American investigators. His entire report is based upon evidence supplied by a large number of competent witnesses whose statements are recorded. The close tie-in of the North Korea Labor Party and of the North Korean People’s Committees with the leadership and activities of the South Korean Labor Party and its satellites in continuing efforts to disturb the peace in South Korea is so well established as to no longer require surmise on the part of South Koreans or the American command. In view of the continuing and recently greatly increased flood of vitriolic propaganda and vicious perversions of fact released through radio Pyongyang (including party line propaganda directives) directed against the United States command in Korea, against the American delegation to the Joint Commission, and against the United States Government, it is difficult to understand the extreme sensitiveness displayed by you and the head of the Soviet delegation, when a well founded report is made by a Korean official indicating Communist connections with past and planned subversive activities within the American occupied zone of Korea. As a result of careful examination of the statement of Chief of Metropolitan Police Chang, and of full investigation of all information available in connection therewith, no action will be taken with respect to the removal of Mister Chang. On the contrary, the South Korean police will be requested to continue their vigilance against the subversive and terroristic activities on the part of any and all individuals and organizations directed against the interest of the Korean people and the peace and security of the American occupied zone.” Jacobs The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 407.00119 Control (Korea)/10–2047: Telegram [Document 645] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State Seoul , October 20, 1947. 434. Cite Pol 9525. Following is text of General Shtikov’s reply dated October 20, 1947, to American proposal for recess of Joint Commission: 54 ‘Dear General Brown: In regard to your proposal at the meeting of the Joint Commission on 18 October 1947 I have the honor to communicate to you the following: “During the period of the work of the Joint Soviet-American Commission, the Soviet delegation has exerted all its efforts toward the speediest fulfillment of the Moscow agreement on Korea and, on the basis of that decision, toward the creation of a united independent Korea under the guidance of a provisional Korean democratic government. In view of the position of American delegation, which made impossible the realization of the Moscow decision of a united Independent Korea, on 26 September 1947 [the Soviet delegation] introduced, at the direction of its Government, a proposal to withdraw simultaneously the American and Soviet troops from Korea during the beginning of 1948 and to afford Koreans themselves the opportunity of forming the government of Korea. The American delegation refused to discuss this proposal and at the Joint Commission meeting of 18 October 1947, referring to the direction of its Government, proposed to interrupt the work of the Joint Commission. In connection with the above stated, the Soviet delegation has received from its government, a direction to depart for Pyong Yang.’ 55 Colonel General Shtikov, chief of the Soviet delegation in the Joint-So-Ko-American Commission”. Shtikov has released text foregoing letter to press stating in substance that it was answer to American delegation proposal of October 18. Jacobs 54 Read and handed to General Brown on October 20. 55 The Soviet delegation departed on October 23, leaving five persons as caretakers and liaison. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–2247: Telegram [Document 646] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , October 22, 1947. 438. Cite Zpol 1296. The following is substance of certain information concerning the plans of Soviet authorities in North Korea with respect to the Korean problem which have recently come to attention from what is believed a highly reliable source and which check with certain other information already in possession of our military authorities. Details have already been sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Commanding General in his Zgbi 129 about the middle of June, the Soviet authorities, apparently believing that the American delegation of the Joint Commission would agree to Soviet plans for consultation of only democratic parties and social organizations which fully supported the Moscow decision arranged through their stooges in North Korea for the convening of an indoctrination conference of Army, security police and Coast Guard representatives at Pyongyang on June 24. At that time the Soviet delegation for some reason felt assured that none of the rightist groups in South Korea would participate as they had refused to do the previous year because of their aversion to the trusteeship. Shortly thereafter the Soviets found they were mistaken in their belief. At the aforementioned conference the chairman who was the head of the Interior Section of the North Korea Government stated that it was expected that the Joint Commission would shortly agree to the setting up of an all Korea government and that the members of all the agencies concerned must prepare themselves to be ready at the proper time to take over South Korea and eliminate the reactionaries and rightists in order to establish for Korea a “progressive democracy” which would ultimately lead to the establishment of a truly democratic state along Soviet lines within the Soviet orbit. The members present were cautioned against adhering too strictly to nationalistic Korean concepts as it was necessary that all peoples go through the “progressive democratic” stage leading up to the ultimate ideal of becoming a member of the USSR and through it of the brotherhood of all the nations of the world. The representatives were told to go back, indoctrinate their men and prepare for coming events. On September 6, a larger conference of the same groups was called at which time the representatives were told that General Shtikov would propose the mutual withdrawal of troops, which he actually did, 20 days later on September 26. The same line of indoctrination given on June 24 was repeated with greater emphasis. The United States was condemned as being in the hands of reactionaries who were working with reactionaries in Korea. An attempt was made, however, to give the impression that all Americans were not reactionary; that ultimately the United States would go through the “progressive democratic” stage and evolve into an ideal Communist state; and that there were not enough atomic bombs in the world to kill all the truly democratic leaders. The representatives were told to go back to their posts and prepare for eventual invasion of South Korea the moment the signal was given which would be when the United Nations, to which the United States had referred the question, decided that the North Korean army must be disbanded. The tactical plan to be followed was somewhat as follows: A special initial group of saboteurs would enter South Korea and through sabotage and assassinations create terror and chaos. At the moment of their entry into South Korea, the electric power from North Korea would be cut off so that most cities would be in darkness which would assist these saboteurs who had definite instructions to kill without mercy all police, constabulary and South Korean officials. The second phase would follow shortly after which the North Korean army would move into South Korea and occupy the principal centers. The third phase to be handled by what might be called the “liquidation squads” who would follow the army, take charge of security control and police and liquidate the remaining South Korean leaders and reactionaries, mentioning by name Syngman Rhee, his foreign wife and Kim Koo. The plan seems to have been based on the assumption that the United States and Soviet troops would have previously been withdrawn from the country and the proposed uprising would take place when the United Nations attempted to disarm the North Korean army. There does not seem to be any plan to have the Soviet troops assist in this uprising. However, the information [ informant ] believes that the North Korean leaders are fanatical enough to attempt to carry out the plan even with US soldiers present in South Korea. He stated that the representatives were told to be cruel not only with respect to Korean reactionaries but also “our foreign enemies”, presumably Americans in South Korea. One interesting comment of the informant was to the effect that when the chairman of the meeting on September 6 called for helpful suggestions from those present, nobody said anything, which seemed to irritate him and the other leaders who curtly stated that they would draw up the plans which would be carried out faithfully. The informant on September 28 fled to South Korea with several others all of whom were disillusioned because they discovered that the Soviet plan contemplated not an independent Korea but a satellite of the USSR. The informant also stated that another meeting would be called for October 20 in order that all those who were to participate in this enterprise would be given further indoctrination as well as passwords and proper identification documents. All old identification documents and signs were to be called in and new ones supplied. We have learned from other sources that the identification documents of some North Korean army units and of some of the security police have been called in but that new badges or documents have not yet been issued. 56 These plans reveal rather clearly what was really behind the Soviet proposal for the mutual withdrawal of troops, namely, the taking over of South Korea by the North Korean army and security police for the purpose of setting up a democratic front, Communist-dominated government in all Korea. Pending the outcome of our efforts to find a solution of the Korean problem at UN we have no other comments and no suggestions except to state that our Army forces will need to be more alert than ever before for an increase in subversive activities instigated from North Korea, The meeting planned for October 20 forebodes evil days ahead if the Soviets do not go along with the proposed UN resolution. Please see in connection with this message the so-called Soviet master plan for Korea transmitted with my despatch number 39, August 7. Jacobs 56 Further details were given in General Hodge’s telegram Zgbi 1294, from Seoul, received October 22, 8:35 p.m., not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union 740.00119 Control (Korea)/10–147: Telegram [Document 647] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union restricted Washington , October 24, 1947—7 p.m. 1883. ReEmbtel 2960 Oct 1. Following reply should be made to Soviet note dated Sept 30: [“] Reference Min FonOff’s note dated Sept 30, investigation has been completed by appropriate US authorities re two specific incidents which were subject of Ministry’s protest. Ministry’s note refers to incident on Sept 6, 1947 in Seoul, Korea in building where Joint Soviet-American Commission for Korea works when, it was stated, attempt was made by Am sentries to search employee of Sov Del, Pak Tsi Seb. Facts regarding this incident as revealed by Am investigation are as follows: The Am soldier on guard at entrance of building where both Am and Sov Dels have their offices, had instructions to search, if necessary, Korean laborers leaving building. On this occasion the Am guard observed a Korean leaving building with number of papers under his coat. The Am soldier stopped Korean, turned back his coat and found that papers were in either Korean or Russian language. Upon being refused permission to leave premises, Korean immediately returned to building where he found Capt. Phillips of Am Del, who recognized Korean as Pak Tsi Seb of Sov Del and who, in company with interpreter, accompanied Pak Tsi Seb back to guard at entrance where he learned what had happened and where he explained to Pak Tsi Seb through interpreter why guard had stopped him. Pak Tsi Seb appeared satisfied by this explanation and was immediately permitted to depart. Second incident mentioned in Min’s note refers to arrest of two interpreters of Sov Del, Geracim Lee Pak and Ki Hyun Yang, on Sept 21, at 3 pm. It is alleged in Sov note that in spite of fact that two interpreters, Geracim Lee Pak and Ki Hyun Yang, presented their cards of identity issued by Am Secretariat of Joint Commission and signed by Chief of Am Mil police, one of police struck Ki Hyun Yang after which both interpreters, under threat of arms, were made to sit in Am Mil Police car and were taken to Am Police station where they were detained for 3 hours and were photographed, interrogated and subjected to insulting search. Facts of this incident as developed through investigation by appropriate Am authorities reveal that on Sept 21 two Koreans, who had been acting in suspicious manner, were stopped on street in Seoul for questioning by Am Mil police. They refused to be questioned and presented no identification documents. They were then induced to enter Am jeep during course of which one of Koreans, who later turned out to be Ki Hyun Yang, bumped his nose on jeep top frame which later led to a claim that he had been beaten. At Am headquarters two Koreans were searched. There was found on Geracim Lee Pak identification card issued by Am Provost Marshal to V. I. Petonov, Russian adviser to Sov Del. There were found on Ki Hyun Yang two passes in Russian language, one issued by Mr. Maslov of Sov Del stating that Ki Hyun Yang was member of that Del, and a second stating that Ki Hyun Yang was member of Sov Mil Service employed as interpreter to Chief of Mil Censorship. Neither had pass issued by Am Provost Marshal as is required and as was admitted by General Shtikov in his exchange of letters with General Hodge. The two men were detained approx 45 minutes and not 3 hours as stated in Min’s note. In view of facts cited above from which it is apparent that Am Mil police acted only in the performance of their routine duty and since in case of Geracim Lee Pak and Ki Hyun Yang they were without required identification passes issued by Am Provost Marshal, my Gov is unable to accept contention of Sov Gov that actions of Am authorities in South Korea were in any way a violation of existing standards of international law.[”] Repeated to Seoul as 251. Lovett The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 895.00/10–2847: Telegram [Document 648] The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret Washington , October 28, 1947—3 p.m. 253. Story by Johnston NY Times Oct 27 states in part “a highly placed US milit authority here said today that the report of the north Korean Communist plans to attack south Korea in force after withdrawal of the Soviet and US Army was correct”. UN Del informs Dept stories such as this may prejudice UN consideration Korean question now scheduled begin this week. Washington exercising special caution during next 2 or 3 weeks avoid action likely to react unfavorably in New York and would appreciate your following similar course. Lovett The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/10–2947: Telegram [Document 649] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret priority Seoul , October 29, 1947. 451. Cite Zpol 1322. In addition to subversive activities of leftists the command is now faced with what might be termed subversive activities of rightists under Dr. Rhee. After having gotten most of the leftist agitators out of the transportation system we find that the rightists, apparently under orders from Rhee, are staging “go slow” tactics. Last night it was necessary for our military authorities to threaten force to compel a switch engine crew to move cars in order that a train taking our liaison officer back to Pyongyang could proceed. Also, yesterday, a train with recently arrived dependents was stoned while being delayed as result of aforementioned tactics. As yet, we do not know whether stoning was done by rightists or leftists. On October 27, an American officer in conversation with Rhee was told by Rhee that “during the coming 2 months he is going to cause General Hodge a great deal of trouble”. This officer said that he thought Rhee was not mentally well-balanced with which opinion I agree. Dr. Rhee gave this officer to understand that he, Rhee, controlled the police force; that Cho Pough [ Pyung ] Ok, Chief of the National Police, is afraid of Rhee; that Chang Taik Song, Chief of Seoul Police, is Rhee’s errand boy; that Rhee controls the Northwest Youth Organization; and that Kim Koo takes orders from Rhee. (Our command does not believe that Rhee dominates the police as he claims.) Rhee also indicated that when Kim Koo dined with General Rowt some nights ago, he, Rhee, gave him permission to do so. At a dinner which this same officer attended, Mrs. Rhee, who is as important a person in the Rhee outfit as Rhee himself, said: “Many people speak of Dr. Rhee as the future President of Korea. He is now the President of South Korea.” There is also evidence from several sources that Richards, the Hearst correspondent now here, acting under instructions from his paper, is procuring material for a personal attack on General Hodge. Richards himself has indicated that the policy of the Hearst papers is to place the extreme right in power and that he had been sent to Korea to work with Syngman Rhee. Unless I am very much wrong, I think we are headed for troublesome waters here shortly. I have reason to doubt whether Rhee and his crowd will accept any United Nations proposal, with or without the possibility of a united Korea as he is still pressing for elections now because he does not want an election with United Nations observers since with such observation he might not win. What he and his gang want, as I have stated before, is a South Korea government headed and controlled by him and supported and protected by the United States. In other words, Rhee wants full authority with the United States carrying all of the responsibility. In this plan, he is being egged on by certain Americans in the United States, known to the Department, who are seeking personal interest as alleged even by the Soviets. Jacobs The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 501.BB/10–2947 [Document 650] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State restricted priority New York , October 29, 1947—10:30 p.m. 1113. Following is text of Soviet resolution on withdrawal of troops from Korea: 57 “Having considered the resolution of the delegation of USSR on the simultaneous withdrawal of American and Soviet troops from Korea at the beginning of 1948; “Bearing in mind that the aim of that resolution is to accelerate the transformation of Korea into an independent democratic state and to afford the Korean people the possibility of establishing its own national government of Korea; “Recommends to the Government of the United States and to the Government of the USSR the simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from Southern and Northern Korea, respectively, at the beginning of 1948, thereby leaving to the Korean people itself the establishment of a national government of Korea.” Austin 57 UN document A/C.1/232, submitted on October 28 to the First Committee, which began discussion of the U. S. resolution on Korea that day; for proceedings, see United Nations, Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, First Committee (hereafter cited as GA (II), First Committee ), pp. 248–307. The U.S. resolution is printed ibid ., p. 602; the Soviet resolution, p. 607. For Soviet resolution on inviting Korean representatives to take part in discussion of Korea (document A/C.1/229), see ibid ., p. 606. Editorial Note [Document 651] Editorial Note On October 29 the second Soviet proposal, to invite Korean representatives to take part in discussion of Korea, was taken up first, as a matter of procedure, in the First Committee on political and security questions, and the United States offered an amendment providing for a temporary commission of the United Nations to expedite Korean elections (document A/C.1/230; United Nations, GA (II), First Committee , page 606). The Soviet bloc opposed the amendment as not being procedural, and China proposed an amendment of the American text (document A/C.1/231; ibid. , page 607); this was accepted by the United States ( ibid. , page 279). On October 30 a Byelorussian amendment of the American text was submitted (document A/C.1/234; ibid. , page 608), and then the Ukraine submitted a draft resolution (document A/C.1/233; ibid. , page 607) to take up the American amendment together with the substance of the Korean question. At Venezuela’s suggestion, the American amendment was voted as part of the second Soviet proposal by 43–6 (4 abstaining); ibid. , page 278. The Ukrainian resolution was then rejected by 40–6 (5 abstaining); ibid. , page 279. The Byelorussian amendment of the American text was thereupon rejected by 36–6 (9 abstaining), and the Soviet bloc announced it would be unable to vote on the American amendment; ibid. , page 279. The second Soviet proposal as amended was voted by 41–0 (7 abstaining); ibid. , page 281. Finally, the original Soviet proposal was rejected by 35–6 (10 abstaining); ibid. , page 281. For text of resolution as adopted, see telegram 256, November 3, to Seoul, page 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] . The Soviet position was stated as one of not participating in a UN temporary commission unless Korean representatives were first consulted, and a draft resolution to postpone the Korean question was submitted (document A/C.1/235; ibid. , page 608); this was rejected by 33–6 (12 abstaining), ibid. , page 282. Debate on the main American and Soviet resolutions was resumed. Egypt stated its preference for troop withdrawal from Korea; India favored a compromise, including elections on a national, not a zonal, basis with UN temporary commission control, followed by formation of a national government and troop withdrawal; ibid. , page 282. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–147: Telegram [Document 652] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , November 1, 1947. 454. Cite Zpol 1331. In view of conflicting and contradictory press accounts received here concerning action actually taken on Korea by UN Political Committee on October 30, would appreciate receiving official statement from Department as to nature of decision reached. Press accounts indicate that some sort of preliminary UN committee is to be sent here at once to supervise election of Korean representatives for consultation purposes. If true, this merely foreshadows the same sort of deadlock countered by the Joint Commission. What is sorely needed and necessary after 2 years’ delay is not consultation but an immediate election by the Korean people of representatives to an assembly which will form a government for all Korea if possible and, if not, then for South Korea. Whatever consultation may be necessary can take place after the government formed by the people’s representatives begins to function. Jacobs The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–147: Telegram [Document 653] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) confidential urgent Washington , November 3, 1947—3 p.m. 256. Urtel 445 [ 454 ] Nov 1. Text resolution adopted by Committee No. 1 Oct 30 follows: “Inasmuch as the Korean question which is before the General Assembly is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself and concerns its freedom and independence, and recognizing that this question cannot be correctly and fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population. The first committee recommends that elected representatives of the Korean people be invited to take part in the consideration of the question. Further recommends that in order to facilitate and expedite such participation and to observe that the Korean representatives are in fact duly elected by the Korean people and not mere appointees from military authorities in Korea, there be forthwith established a United Nations temporary commission on Korea, to be present in Korea with right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea.” Inconclusive nature resolution recognized but it was supported as tactical move in order counter original Soviet proposal for immediate dispatch Korean representatives to UN. Committee No. 1 discussion continues and US will press for and is optimistic re passage in GA substance original US resolution amended to take account Oct 30 resolution. Purpose UN Commission thereby being to observe elections Korean representatives to National Assembly which in turn to set up National Government. Marshall Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Department of the Army for the Joint Chiefs of Staff 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–347: Telegram [Document 654] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Department of the Army for the Joint Chiefs of Staff secret priority Seoul , November [3?], 1947. Zgcg 1337. To Dept of the Army for JCS info CINCFE. 58 Subject is Korean attitude on troop withdrawal. The immediate purpose and intent behind the Soviet proposal for immediate mutual withdrawal of both US and Soviet forces and allowing Koreans to form their own government without any aid or guidance from outside powers is apparently well understood by all Koreans. The Communists and their followers including several rated as “moderate leftists” and the “middle of the road” parties favor the Soviet proposal in toto as the surest early means of obtaining “the people’s” power, and are working hard at propagandizing its popularity. Soon after the Soviet proposal was made there was an outspoken, demand on the part of many Korean groups that US forces stay indefinitely to protect Korea. However, today that early trend has changed to where no Korean would dare make such a statement publicly to demand that US forces remain one day longer than required to establish a Korean representative government and start moving out. Koreans generally are watching our moves in UN with tongues in cheek to see if Russians will stymie us again. It must be kept in mind that the general idea of eliminating foreign armed forces and occupation has a growing appeal to all Koreans, which will increase each day that there is no progress toward independence. They are becoming more and more impatient for some settlement that will relieve Korea of the burden and stigma of occupation. Some non-Communist leaders are now beginning to say that it would be better to take troops out now as per Soviet proposal and let the Koreans fight it out among themselves than to continue the occupation and the division of Korea. Syngman Rhee, who has greatest following of any Korean individual, tells me that he is convinced that Koreans can handle their own affairs if the great powers withdraw troops. It is. possible that in this self hypnotism, he may soon go on a campaign to get troops out willy nilly, thus in effect joining the Communist demands. He is becoming more anti-American every day. From what I read and hear in news dispatches and radio on UN political committee proceedings, it appears that a willingness for further delay in a Korean solution is creeping into UN thinking in spite of the initial US statements and aims in presenting the case. No one here believes the Russians will agree to any settlement other than complete Soviet control of Korea, and I feel our delegation should continue its drive to get UN backing for the fastest possible settlement here so that we can move immediately toward establishment of a representative govt at least in South Korea. The Communist strength in our zone is currently at its lowest ebb since our arrival in Korea, but any further international stalemates that prevent taking positive action in our zone with or without UN supervision will result in a. strong upsurge of feeling against the US. It will build up Communist influence through a growing popularity of the Soviet proposal to withdraw and will probably bring on an all-out demand by all Koreans to get all forces out of Korea without qualification. Again I urge that in our thinking on the Korean problem, we consider the borders of Korea and its effect on our position here. We have lost well over a year in gains of political stability in our zone and in institution of popular basic reforms through our honest adherence to international agreements and our hope of some agreement with the Russians. I urgently recommend that if UN does not agree to the original American resolution and/or if the Russians do not indicate a willingness to participate, we proceed immediately with an election for a. South Korean legislature with or without UN observers, and establish at earliest possible date a representative interim govt of South Korea. If we do not act along this line at early date we will be in a worse position than ever to meet future Soviet moves and propaganda in this area. If press indications are correct, and the current proposal that UN will send a delegation here only to observe selection of representatives for further consultation with UN, we have gained nothing in local authority. On the other hand, if we go ahead now with our election of a legislature, I know of no better means for final selection of representatives needed for consultation than through having them selected by an all-elected legislature. The sooner we can announce the date of a general election in South Korea, the better our local position will be, and the less trouble we may expect in local administration during this critical period. Jacobs concurs and requests pass to State Dept. [ Hodge ] 58 Notation: “action taken by War [ Army ] Dept tel”. See telegram Warx 90136, November 10, p. 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] . Editorial Note [Document 655] Editorial Note On November 4 a revised draft of the American resolution (document A/C.1/218/Rev. 1; United Nations, GA (II), First Committee , page 605) was introduced; ibid. , page 286. An Indian amendment to it (document A/C.1/237; ibid. , page 609) was submitted, followed by a Philippine amendment (document A/C.1/236; ibid. , page 608), providing that the General Assembly urge noninterference in the internal affairs of Korea; next, a Chinese amendment (document A/C.1/238; ibid. , page 609), providing for troop withdrawal after the Four Powers of the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945, had consulted. On November 5 the main Soviet resolution was rejected by a vote of 20–6 (7 abstaining); ibid. , pages 304–305. The amendments offered by India and the Philippines were voted by 34–0 (4 abstaining) and by 34–0 (3 abstaining). China thereupon withdrew its amendment, substituting two new ones which were accepted by the United States; these were voted by 32–0 (7 abstaining) and by 44–0 (4 abstaining) after being modified by France; ibid. , page 306. The United States then proposed 9 members for the UN temporary commission on Korea; the Ukraine stated it would not participate as one of the 9 members because Koreans had not been invited to take part in UN debate. The American resolution, as amended, was voted by 46–0 (4 abstaining), with the Soviet bloc of 6 not participating as Koreans were not present; ibid. , page 307. The text of this document was presented by the First Committee to the General Assembly with a report (document A/447, November 6) on the proceedings; United Nations, GA (II), volume II, pages 1554–1557. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–547: Telegram [Document 656] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State secret London , November 5, 1947—noon. 5876. In conversation with Embassy officer yesterday, MacDermot, head Japanese Department, FonOff, and Graves, Counselor UK Embassy Washington, expressed view there good possibility next important Soviet move re Korea will involve unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from Korea. They feel Soviets reason that once Soviet troops withdrawn US will find it difficult on moral and practical grounds to retain its forces in Korea, and that if US follows Soviets in withdrawing forces, well-knit political and military machine in Soviet zone will be in splendid position to move in and take over effective control all Korea in behalf its Soviet masters. Sent Department, repeated Moscow 311; Department pass Tokyo, Seoul. 59 Douglas 59 Repeated to Tokyo and Seoul at 2 p.m., November 5. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/11–1047: Telegram [Document 657] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , November 10, 1947. 467. Cite Zpol 1364. See Seoul PolAd No. 450, October 28. 60 Our liaison officers at Pyongyang have recently been restricted in their movements and kept under more strict surveillance. By way of explanation our officers have been told that Major Kormishev, Soviet liaison officer in Seoul, is constantly followed in Seoul and his movements restricted to the city. There is reason to believe that the Soviets are moving heavy material such as trucks, weapon carriers, jeeps and gasoline tank trucks northward from Pyongyang although there is little evidence of the departure of personnel. It seems therefore that the Soviet military establishment in North Korea is stripping down to bare essentials in preparation for rapid evacuation of personnel if that course should be decided upon. During the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the October revolution on November 6 and 11, in which Generals Korotkov and Lebedev took the leading parts, definite effort was made to elicit information from our officers as to whether or not the American Army is leaving South Korea. At these celebrations, Kim Il Sung was conspicuous by his absence. It was explained that he had been recently operated upon and was in the hospital. The honor seat was given to Kim Doo Bong. It was also noticed that Mister Shabshin had returned to Pyongyang. However, General Shtikov and Mister Tounkin were not observed at any of these celebrations and the belief is that they have gone to Moscow. Jacobs 60 Not printed. Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo, and Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–1047: Telegram [Document 658] Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, at Tokyo, and Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, at Seoul 61 top secret Washington , November 10, 1947. Warx 90136. From CSGPO. 62 Part 1. To assist the Far East Subcommittee of SANACC in determination future Korea policy specifically study recommended in paragraph 5 F of SWNCC 176/30, 63 the detailed views and comments of ComGen USAFIK and such additional comments as you desire to make on the development of a future course of action would be appreciated in light of following consideration. Part 2. Two major alternatives contemplated: ( a ) Most probable being Soviet refusal to cooperate with United Nations decision passing resolution 64 transmitted by State tel 258 dated 5 November. 65 In this case most likely United States will decide implement resolution insofar as possible in South Korea, or ( b ) Soviet cooperation in implementation of United Nations decision. In such case United States will follow action outlined in resolution and appropriate directives will be issued taking due consideration of your outline plan for an orderly withdrawal referred to in part 3. Part 3. Either alternative will include possibility United States withdrawal soon after establishment South Korean or United Korean Government, perhaps third quarter 1948. Actual determination time of such withdrawal obviously will depend on developments including Soviet action, outlook as affected by presence North Korean Army and temper South Koreans (ComGen USAFIK’s Zgcg 1337 66 ). In light of these considerations, and to properly evaluate and correlate time factors, would greatly appreciate outline plan for an orderly withdrawal by air mail with telegraphic summary. Part 4. As aid in planning, comments and info requested on ( a ) Projects or programs desirable be completed before withdrawal such as land reform, disposition of vested property, irrigation projects, et cetera. ( b ) Time, personnel and materials required to complete, before withdrawal, such projects and programs. Part 5. With regard to the establishment South Korean Armed Forces, we are giving full consideration your views CX 56266 67 and awaiting further info requested our Warx 89253 and 89254. Part 6. State concurs this message. [ Wedemeyer ] 61 Received by the Department on November 23. 62 General Wedemeyer was Director, Plans and Operations, General Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army Department. 63 August 4, p. 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 560 ] ; this paragraph recommended a study of political and economic considerations “should it become desirable or necessary to grant independence to South Korea”. 64 Resolution adopted by the 1st Committee (Political and Security) of the UNGA on November 5; for final text, see p. 857 [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , and Department of State Bulletin , November 30, 1947, p. 1031. 65 Not printed. 66 November 3, p. 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 654 ] . 67 October 22, not found in Department of State files. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 894.00/11–1247: Telegram [Document 659] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State [Extract] confidential Seoul , November 12, 1947. 470. Cite Zpol 1369. In connection with election problem as referred to in Seoul PolAd No. 468, November 11, 68 there is quoted below intercepted telegram sent November 12 by Rhee to Louise Yim in New York in which he makes clear that he is pressing for immediate election in order that [ sic ] (as he hopes and probably would if an election is held now) to get rid of present interim government and establish another interim government which he would dominate prior to main election under UN observation. By this means, he would hope to dominate the future government of South Korea which he might not be able to do if the present interim government with our assistance and under UN observation handled the preparations for main election and that election is carefully observed by UN representatives. . . . . . . Jacobs 68 Not printed. Resolution Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 14 at its 112th Plenary Meeting 501.BB Korea/11–2647 [Document 660] Resolution Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 14 at its 112th Plenary Meeting 69 November 14, 1947 The Problem of the Independence of Korea I Inasmuch as the Korean question which is before the General Assembly is primarily a matter for the Korean people itself and concerns its freedom and independence; and Recognizing that this question cannot be correctly and fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population: The General Assembly 1. Resolves that elected representatives of the Korean people be invited to take part in the consideration of the question; 2. Further resolves that in order to facilitate and expedite such participation and to observe that the Korean representatives are in fact duly elected by the Korean people and not mere appointees by military authorities in Korea, there be forthwith established a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, to be present in Korea, with right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea. II The General Assembly , Recognizing the urgent and rightful claims to independence of the people of Korea; Believing that the national independence of Korea should be reestablished and all occupying forces then withdrawn at the earliest practicable date; Recalling its previous conclusion that the freedom and independence of the Korean people cannot be correctly or fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the Korean people, and its decision to establish a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (hereinafter called the “Commission”) for the purpose of facilitating and expediting such participation by elected representatives of the Korean people: 1. Decides that the Commission shall consist of representatives of Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; 2. Recommends that the elections be held not later than 31 March 1948 on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot to choose representatives with whom the Commission may consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people and which representatives, constituting a National Assembly, may establish a National Government of Korea. The number of representatives from each voting area or zone should be proportionate to the population, and the elections should be under the observation of the Commission; 3. Further recommends that as soon as possible after the election, the National Assembly should convene and form a National Government and notify the Commission of its formation; 4. Further recommends that immediately upon the establishment of a National Government, that Government should, in consultation with the Commission: ( a ) constitute its own national security forces and dissolve all military or semi-military formations not included therein; ( b ) take over the functions of government from the military commands and civilian authorities of north and south Korea, and ( c ) arrange with the occupying Powers for the complete withdrawal from Korea of their armed forces as early as practicable and if possible within ninety days; 5. Resolves that the Commission shall facilitate and expedite the fulfilment of the foregoing programme for the attainment of the national independence of Korea and withdrawal of occupying forces, taking into account its observations and consultations in Korea. The Commission shall report with its conclusions, to the General Assembly and may consult with the Interim Committee (if one be established) with respect to the application of this resolution in the light of developments; 6. Calls upon the Member States concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfilment of its responsibilities; 7. Calls upon all Members of the United Nations to refrain from interfering in the affairs of the Korean people during the interim period preparatory to the establishment of Korean independence, except in pursuance of the decisions of the General Assembly; and thereafter, to refrain completely from any and all acts derogatory to the independence and sovereignty of Korea. 69 Transmitted to the Department by the UN Secretary General in covering letter of November 24; the latter drew attention to paragraph 6 of the substantive part of section II. The two sections consisted originally of two separate resolutions. The vote was 43–0–6. For proceedings in the General Assembly, November 13–14, see United Nations, GA (II), vol. ii , pp. 822–858. The Soviet Union made another attempt to get troop withdrawal acted upon (document A/477; ibid ., p. 1557). The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 895.00/11–1747: Telegram [Document 661] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , November 17, 1947. 475. Cite Zpol 1384. At conclusion of city of Seoul official (purely Korean) celebration in Seoul stadium on November 15 of the 4280 anniversary of the founding of Korea, which was attended by about 25,000 people, some of Rhee’s followers took advantage of occasion to read and adopted [ adopt? ] “resolutions”. About midway of the reading of the resolutions the small Soviet flag (among flags of five other Allied Powers on the speakers’ stand) was kicked over while the crowd cheered. The nature of the resolutions was as follows: 1. One resolution condemned members of the interim government who participated in the preparation of the “policy outline” (transmitted to Department with Seoul despatch No. 109, October 10) by which they sought to consolidate their political power. 2. Another resolution praised the new military governor, General Dean, 70 who was stated to favor a policy of turning over the government to Koreans as desired by the rightist followers of Rhee. The nature of the resolution is such as to constitute a backhanded slap at General Hodge who by implication is indicated as opposing that policy. 3. A third resolution condemns 12 centrist or middle-of-the-road parties as being the agencies through which the “Communist traitors” are now working. 4. The other two resolutions relate to the future election and are thus the most important. One of these states that “we are now in the process of carrying out this election and we hope that there will be no misunderstanding about it”. The other states that preparations for an election (promised by the State Department and General Hodge) have been going on for many months and “our election committees (Dr. Rhee’s) are in every province, country and district”. It demands that General Hodge set the date for the election before the end of this year and “announce it immediately” and threatens that if he does not, “we shall be compelled to go ahead with our program”. We need some definite news soonest regarding the election so that we can officially advise the Korean people by radio, press, and pamphlets what the future election schedule is going to be even if the information so broadcast is merely to the effect that the election plans will be announced after the arrival of the UN Commission. Such action will help to clear the atmosphere for the Korean masses who, in the absence of any official statement from the American authorities, are becoming more and more bewildered by the aggressive tactics of Rhee’s followers. Such action will also help curb the political capital which Rhee is now making over this election issue. In considering the foregoing, especially paragraph 4, please see Seoul PolAd No. 468, November 11, 71 and comment in first paragraph of Seoul PolAd No. 470, November 12. [ Jacobs ] 70 Maj. Gen. William F. Dean assumed his new post on October 31. 71 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) 501.BB Korea/11–1747: Telegram [Document 662] The Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) secret us urgent Washington , November 17, 1947—noon. 262. UN resolution on Korea as finally passed by GA plenary Nov 14 combines and conforms to texts transmitted Deptels 256 72 and 258 73 except reference “First Committee recommends” changed to “GA resolves”. Should pressure for elections referred urtel 468 74 warrant such action, it is suggested Gen. Hodge or an appropriate authority his command may wish state publicly US feels bound conform in every respect to UN resolutions on Korea, including holding of elections under observation UN Commission. Meanwhile Dept considers it advisable Victor Hoo, Asst. Sec. Gen. UN in charge Trusteeship Affairs who has been named Head Secretariat UN Commission on Korea, be furnished info relative pressure US zone for early elections and need for immediate steps to be taken in preparation elections (such as promulgation election law registration, election polling districts, election officials, etc.) in order to meet Mar 31 deadline. This should also provide opportunity make available UN Commission data relative proposed election law and details plan to be used conducting elections. It is hoped thereby elicit request USAMGIK immediately undertake preparations for elections to be held after arrival Commission which, it is anticipated, cannot be expected before middle January. Final Soviet attitude toward UN Commission also may be determined by similar request addressed Soviet Command. In order these highly important matters may be presented in light most recent developments Korea and providing General Hodge agrees, Jacobs should proceed immediately first available air transportation Dept for consultation. TO 8—4964 Nov 17, 1947 authorizes transportation Washington and return and consultation approximately 8 or 10 weeks. Marshall 72 November 3, p. 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] . 73 November 5, not printed. 74 November 11, not printed. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–1947: Telegram [Document 663] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , November 19, 1947. 481. Cite Zpol 1391. Reference Deptel 262, November 17. 1. General Hodge will issue statement (text will be forwarded separately) which, in order to reach the maximum number of Koreans, will be given to the Korean press, broadcast over the South Korean radio network, and dropped in leaflet form on isolated regions. 2. I am collecting all information possible pertinent to the subject matter of the telegram under reference (also subject matter of Warx 90136, 75 111834/Z) and plan to proceed to Washington via Northwest Airlines departing Seoul November 21 or 23. Will advise later exact date. 76 3. Before arrival, Department officers concerned may wish to take under consideration a suggestion that UN, instead of asking USAMGIK to undertake preparations for elections, ask the Commanding General in South Korea and the Commanding General in North Korea to instruct their respective delegations on the Joint Commission to act as a liaison group, each operating in its own separate zone, to confer with local Korean officials appointed under the laws of the respective zone to begin preparations for an election pending the arrival of the Commission. There are several advantages in this approach to the election problem. First, it will constitute another effort to perpetuate the agencies established under the Moscow decision and may thus constitute an incentive for the Soviets, if they should have a change of heart, to cooperate with the UN Commission. Second, it would utilize the best qualified and experienced group of American and Soviet nationals anywhere for the difficult task of organizing election preparations. Third, insofar as South Korea is concerned (on the assumption that we shall proceed in South Korea regardless of whether the Soviets cooperate) the members of the American delegation are far more qualified for the duties contemplated than USAMGIK which is an operating agency already overburdened and likely soon to be required to undertake greater burdens involved in withdrawal. Fourth, USAMGIK with its Korean coalition officials is viewed with a certain degree of distrust by the rightists (especially Rhee’s group) so that election preparations carried on as indicated above might be more acceptable to all concerned than election preparations under supervision of USAMGIK. [ Jacobs ] 75 November 10, p. 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] . 76 Mr. Jacobs departed from Korea November 23, leaving William R. Langdon in charge of the office. The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 501.BB Korea/11–1947: Telegram [Document 664] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State restricted Seoul , November 19, 1947. 482. Cite Zpol 10699. Following is text of statement, as referred to in a previous telegram, which General Hodge proposes to release shortly on the UN Commission and the holding of a general election: “It was with much pleasure that I received the news that the General Assembly of the UN had adopted by an overwhelming majority a resolution establishing a UN Commission which will come to Korea soon to observe the holding of an election and otherwise to facilitate and expedite the setting up of an all Korean Government and the attainment of the national independence of Korea. This Commission will consist of the representatives of nine nations, four of which are Pacific and Far Eastern countries, namely, China, the Philippines, India and Australia. I am authorized by my Government to inform the Korean people and their leaders that the United States Government feels bound to conform in every respect to the UN resolution on Korea, including the holding of an election under observation of the UN Commission. As the representative of the United States, I assure the peoples of Korea that I shall do my utmost to assist in the successful accomplishment of the purpose for which the UN Commission was created. One of the first steps under the new plan will be the holding of a general election which under the resolution must be held not later than March 31, 1948. Koreans will have the widest possible participation in that election consistent with the directive of the UN Commission. I am now in communication with the authorities in Washington on this subject and hope to be able to announce soon the steps to be taken to prepare for this election. Until such announcement is made, all Koreans should await further official news on this subject. Above all they should not fall prey to propaganda and should not allow themselves to be misled by unauthorized and unofficial news concerning an election. I am fully aware that the Korean people have endured nearly 2 years of discouragement and disappointment. This delay has occurred despite the tireless efforts of the United States and its representatives to bring about Korean independence—first through two sessions of the Joint Commission in 1946 and 1947, and then through a proposed conference of the Four Powers which subscribed to the Moscow Agreement, and finally through the recent UN action which was initiated by the United States. I hope with you that this new approach to your problem under the auspices of UN will bring to realization your long cherished dreams fully supported by the great majority of the world’s independent nations. In order that you may read the text and study the contents of the UN resolution on Korea, it is quoted below for your information.” [ Jacobs ] The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State 740.00119 Control (Korea)/11–1947: Telegram [Document 665] The Political Adviser in Korea ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , November 19, 1947. 483. Cite Zpol 1392. 1. With reference to city of Seoul anniversary celebration mentioned Seoul PolAd No. 475, November 17, Dr. Rhee is dispatching today to his office in Washington following telegram which is being delayed 24 hours in order to enable this telegram to reach Dept first: “Please transmit to Secretary Marshall and chairman United Nations Assembly following resolutions: “‘Well over 100,000 assembled in mass meeting Saturday 15th at Seoul stadium unanimously resolved to express sincere appreciation for your concerted efforts to solve our difficult problem. As first step toward proper solution, South Korea election for congress promised by United States State Dept and AMG nearly a year ago should be held without further delay. This interim election will set up interim govt which will consult and cooperate with United Nations Commission when here, for otherwise there will be no official body truly representative of people work with Commission and consequently many difficulties follow. Election will take only few weeks as we are well prepared for it if General Hodge cooperates. Please advise him to set election date to complete this year.’” 2. In connection with foregoing, following untruths, characteristic of Rhee’s tactics, should be noted: first, although he states “100,000 attended meeting on Nov 15th,[”] the estimates of our own agents who attended meeting and who are usually generous in their estimates were that only 25,000 attended. Second, Rhee’s message makes it appear that multitude assembled at a mass meeting for purpose of passing resolutions when as matter of fact they assembled to attend official celebration sponsored by mayor of Seoul. What Rhee’s minions did was to muscle in at end of this meeting to read prepared resolutions while crowd was leaving stadium. The only approval of resolutions was given by these minions themselves. Mayor himself was angry at intrusion, especially angry over insult to Soviet flag. Third, statement that election will take only few weeks “as we are well prepared for it” merely means that Rhee and his minions are ready for a rigged election with no supervision in which his minions through intimidation and terrorism will control all votes. This last point is one of the best indices of Rhee’s concept of “democracy” which so readily lends itself to Soviet charges that Rhee is reactionary, pro-Japanese and Fascist. 3. We believe we sense some opposition to Rhee’s tactics and since we now know our immediate and ultimate election objectives under UN resolution, we can better control the situation by advising Korean public of new program such as General Hodge is doing in his initial statement communicated to Department in Seoul PolAd No. 482, November 19. 4. As present instance is such a glaring case of misrepresentation, Dept, when Ben Limb presents Rhee’s message, might tell him some of unvarnished truths about message which he delivers. Jacobs The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Monnett B. Davis, Chief of the United States Delegation to the ECAFE Meeting at Baguio, Philippines 501.BD Asia/11–2447: Telegram [Document 666] The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Monnett B. Davis, Chief of the United States Delegation to the ECAFE Meeting at Baguio, Philippines 77 confidential priority Washington , November 26, 1947—5 p.m. This is Ecafe 1. Unable comment on doc E/CN.11/33 as not available here. ECAFE terms ref expanded since first meeting now provide consultation control authorities Japan and Korea, and contemplate same status for USAMGIK as for SCAP. Northern Korea and southern Korea should have received invitations identical to that sent SCAP. In view general Korean situation and impending visit Commission just appointed by GA Dept considers important assert principle that individuals representing control authority in either zone of liberated Korea have status no less independent than individual from conquered Japan. Hence USRep should establish that Sturm 78 attends ECAFE in capacity of consultant to the Commission, not as member of or adviser to USDel. Lovett 77 Repeated to Seoul as No. 268. 78 Dr. Paul J. Sturm, of the Staff of the Adviser to the Commanding General, USAFIK, Seoul. The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 895.00/11–2947: Telegram [Document 667] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State confidential priority Seoul , November 29, 1947. 495. Cite Zpol 1420. On November 21, 18 main groups owing allegiance to Rhee memorialized General Dean stating they had passed resolution on 19th to hold election (under Skila law) this year and that Military Governor will be asked to announce election date within one week. Indications are that Rhee intends to try to hold an election since he has called his provincial lieutenants to meeting in Seoul 1st, 2nd and 3rd December for receiving instructions. Letter delivered on 24th and on 25th four spokesmen of bloc called on Dean to obtain answer to memorial, presenting generally specious arguments for their election. Said SKIG was created arbitrarily without election, therefore their election would set up SKIG in fact as well as in name. Insisted their election would not conflict with UN election but would establish Korean representative body to cooperate and consult with UN, thereby preventing recurrence of conditions heretofore existing when special missions like Wedemeyer’s consulted only SKIG and US officials. Also if UN plans for national election failed, as they probably would, their electees could constitute truly representative popular government to meet Korean problems ahead. Their election organization was all ready and election would be speedy and easy. Delay in Skila law enforcement and substitution UN election therefore were violations of State Department’s, Hodge’s and Lerch’s promises. In no other conquered or liberated country have people been denied election. People may get out of hand. Dean replied their arrangements for election would result in party not people’s election; that UN Commission not coming here to find out wishes of political parties but to conduct election for all Koreans to take part in. Said decision had been made by Commanding General that there will be no election until UN Commission gets here and itself specifies date. In answer to direct question whether Dean would support or cooperate with their election, Dean replied that he would do neither and would not permit election. Refuting accusation that US used UN resolution on Korea as pretext to put off their election, Dean said UN election was UN undertaking and we would not show them how to do it. One spokesman then said that they would conduct election themselves and thereby absolve US of embarrassment vis-à-vis UN. Dean countered “And it will be clear to UN that there are two governments in Korea, SKIG and your party, and we will not allow it”. On 27th, obviously in defiance of Dean’s clear-cut rejection of memorial, Rhee issued to press a bitter statement on matter including personal attack on General Hodge ending with a call to “patriotic” men and women to establish “our government through the enforcement of the general election”. Translation of statement will be given in my next telegram. 79 It is believed Rhee camp fears time is playing against them since Kim Koo and his strong Independence Party on 19th publicly came out in favor of a national election. Neutrals and moderate leftists will be furnished castle in the air (probably Communist inspired) of meeting and negotiation with northern leaders under UN auspices also is gaining adherents and undermining Rhee’s immediate election plan. Hodge requests copy this message be furnished Jacobs and that Jacobs be consulted regarding appropriate action. Langdon 79 Telegram 496 not printed. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State 501.BB Korea/12–247: Telegram [Document 668] Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , December 2, 1947. Cite Zgcg 1427. Instigated by Syngman Rhee and his followers are many embarrassing questions arising among heretofore reasonable Korean rightist political groups as to the future of the UN commission and of the general election in South Korea in case the Soviets refuse to cooperate with the UN Commission. Also, news dispatches from US are pessimistic about any success of UN Commission in Korea and tend to discourage the Koreans. Careful perusal of the General Assembly resolution gives no answer to these queries and no indication of UN attitude toward or probable action in South Korea alone in case Soviets do not cooperate, being so worded as to relate only to all of Korea. The unanswered questions pertaining to the fate of South Korea are adding to the fuel of Syngman Rhee’s demands for an announcement of a general election in South Korea now, without waiting for the UN Commission to announce its plans. It is believed that except for Syngman Rhee and his close followers that most Koreans (except Communists) are willing to cooperate with UN Commission and US authorities but they would like to have some assurance that the general election will go on in South Korea, even if Soviets do not cooperate. It is not known here whether or not the US can make any predictions or promises of action for South Korea alone. At present I am forced to remain quiet in face of growing criticism and demands by rightist groups for answers, which situation gives Rhee and now growing following a chance to criticize and to work up demonstrations demanding announcement of date for an early Korean election. Some statement or indication that South Korea will have an election in any eventuality would take away their initiative to a great extent. The Koreans are becoming more and more restive as days pass and no announcements are made as to the when, what, how, etc., of the UN Commission. The failure of past panaceas and promises of action to produce results toward their independence makes Korean patience grow thin, and makes them subject to fast agitation by demagogues. If possible at this time a firm announcement, either by the UN Commission or by the US Government, giving the Koreans something to tie to would be of considerable assistance in combatting heavy pressure and controlling a difficult political situation. Even the public announcement of the plans of the UN Commission would help. 80 [ Hodge ] 80 In telegram 499, December 3, from Seoul, Mr. Langdon reported further political developments, including the assassination of Chang Duk Soo, leader of the Hankook Democratic Party, and urged the Department to send news about UN developments to help combat “drift away from reality” in Korea (895.00/12–347). The Chief of Staff (Eisenhower) to the Secretary of State, at London 740.00119 PW/12–447: Telegram [Document 669] The Chief of Staff ( Eisenhower ) to the Secretary of State, at London 81 eyes only top secret and urgent Washington , December 3, 1947—2:36 p.m. W–91489. To General Marshall by hand, eyes only for General Marshall from Eisenhower. Inasmuch as the decision has been reached by UNO to hold general elections in Korea March 1948, and also information from the State Department indicates that the withdrawal of American forces presently in South Korea will be initiated July 1948, I discussed the relief of the American Commander, General Hodge, with Mr. Lovett in order to ascertain your particular desires in the premises. Mr. Lovett suggested that I communicate direct with you and express my view that it might be advantageous to continue General Hodge as Commander in Korea for the limited duration of American occupation. In the light of his long experience and knowledge in the area, I feel that Hodge would fulfill our mutual requirements more effectively than any replacement, no matter how highly qualified. However if you are apprehensive about Hodge’s ability to cope with problems which will be presented during the remaining period of American occupation, I will take prompt steps to effect his relief, submitting a list of nominees for your consideration. Eisenhower 81 The Secretary of State was in London attending the Fifth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25–December 15, 1947. The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 501.BB Korea/12–347: Telegram [Document 670] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) secret us urgent Washington , December 3, 1947—6 p.m. 274. Jacobs will confer Dec 5 and 6 with Victor Hoo 82 and other responsible UN offiicals. Hausner, Adm. Asst. UN Secretariat (Deptel 272 Dec 2 83 ) indicates, however, no countries have yet named delegates and although Victor Hoo (Deptel 262 Nov 17) expects call first meeting Commission before middle December, anticipated this meeting cannot be more than organizational in character and material decision (such as request that USAFIK proceed with preparation for election or fixing of date for election) may not develop. If Jacobs finds that the foregoing estimate of the situation is correct, he will then suggest the desirability of the issuance by some responsible UN official of a public statement of a character which would lend itself to dissemination in Korea in support of USAFIK preparations for an election before the arrival of the Commission (PolAd’s 495, 496, Nov 29 84 ). In seeking such a statement, Jacobs will point out that, if issued, the CG USAFIK would be instructed to: 1. Undertake immediate administrative preparations for an election, and 2. Put Skila law into effect contingent upon final ratification and possible modification after consultation with the UN Commission upon its arrival in Korea. It is felt principal purposes to be served by putting Skila election law into provisional effect are: (1) recognition of Skila work and (2) establishing date for election 80 days subsequent to effective date of approval and within time limit set by UN. These factors, combined with reiteration US determination to conform to provisions UN resolution on Korea, should be used to (1) concentrate energies of Koreans on preparations for elections and (2) form the basis for discouraging followers of Rhee and others from precipitate contrary action. In order to overcome objectionable features Skila law listed in Exhibit C of the “Plan for National Elections in Korea”, which Jacobs will point out to UN officials, and which may be the basis for Commission’s recommendations for changes in Skila law, CG USAFIK should take all appropriate measures to encourage Korean authorities to make as many of those changes as possible, without however bringing about a deadlock or raising a public issue. This telegram is purely informative and requires no action unless CG USAFIK may wish to renew efforts along lines indicated in the preceding paragraph. Lovett 82 UN Assistant Secretary General in charge of Department of Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. 83 Not printed. 84 Telegram 496 not printed. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to the Secretary of State, at London 740.00119 PW/12–447 [Document 671] Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas ( Saltzman ) to the Secretary of State, at London top secret [ London ,] December 4, 1947. Regarding the attached message to you from General Eisenhower (W–91489), 85 I should recommend that, on the assumption that our time schedule for withdrawal is approximately the one indicated by General Eisenhower, it would be preferable for General Hodge to remain in Korea, since, in the normal course of events, he would be withdrawn by August or September of 1948 in any case. I believe that General Hodge’s replacement at this time, no matter how favorably represented by us, would be considered a victory by extremist political elements in Korea, notably Syngman Rhee and his followers, who have been attacking General Hodge continuously. Although it has been generally felt for other reasons that General Hodge could be advantageously replaced, the situation can be expected to be reasonably satisfactory if he remains for another eight or nine months. The disadvantages of withdrawal under current conditions would outweigh the advantages. In view of General Hodge’s two year tenure, and the limited period remaining, there is insufficient justification for a change in command at this time. The foregoing is based on the assumption that the time schedule indicated by General Eisenhower is the one presently visualized by the State Department. If you have serious doubt that our withdrawal will take place as scheduled, I believe it might be desirable to replace General Hodge despite the local disadvantages to which I have referred. I have discussed this question with Colonel Byroade 86 and Colonel Dupuy 87 who concur in the views expressed above. Charles E. Saltzman 85 December 3, p. 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 614 ] . 86 Col. Henry A. Byroade, U.S.A., General Staff, Department of Defense, adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting at London. 87 Lt. Col. Trevor N. Dupuy, formerly member of the U.S. delegation to the Far Eastern Commission. The Secretary of State to the Chief of Staff (Eisenhower) 740.00119 PW/12–447: Telegram [Document 672] The Secretary of State to the Chief of Staff ( Eisenhower ) top secret eyes only [ London ,] December 4, 1947. From Secretary Marshall for Eisenhower. Re your W–91489 I concur in your proposal for continuation of Hodge in command for present presumably June ‘48 if troop withdrawal is to be made then. If withdrawal is to be further and seriously delayed then I would reconsider matter. Marshall The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 895.00/12–647: Telegram [Document 673] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State confidential Seoul , December 6, 1947. 505. Cite Zpol 1443. Reftel 506 88 today will give translation of Rhee’s statement to press 5th. Statement sets Korean people against American authorities and administration by deliberately misrepresenting facts, US aims, and relief operations, represents American commander as an absolute monarch or war lord (reflecting no doubt his own philosophy of government) rather than as constituted United States executive for Korea; questions our governing authority; and attributes postponement of his general election to Hodge’s personal perverseness rather than to UN resolution which has time and again been publicly explained to people. Also he implies that Hodge had a hand in or knew in advance or approved SKIG cabinet’s “outline”. 89 He totally ignores UN plan and preparations being made for temporary commission’s work. Department representatives may wish to show statement to Limb or Oliver with appropriate comment on its dangerous, destructive and unfriendly implications both to the United Nations and to the United States. Suggestion is also made that it be brought to attention and explained to proper UN or temporary commission authorities and that it perhaps be given a press playback damaging to Rhee. Please consult Jacobs. [ Langdon ] 88 December 6, not printed. 89 For disapproval by Skila, see footnote 42, p. 830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 636 ] . The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 501.BB Korea/12–747: Telegram [Document 674] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State Seoul , December 7, 1947. [Received December 31—12:38 p.m.] 507. Following is statement issued to press today by General Hodge: “There appears to be considerable misunderstanding among certain groups of Koreans as to the purpose and operation of the United Nations Commission that is scheduled to arrive in Korea in the next few weeks. Let me state a few conditions pertaining thereto that may help to clear away fog surrounding the subject. These are based on study of the resolution adopted by the United Nation [ Nations ] re [ sic ] General Assembly and upon careful perusal of the full verbatim discussion of the Korean question in the General Assembly. 1. The UN Commission is not coming to Korea to consult with preselected representatives of the Korean people—that question was thoroughly threshed out in the UN political committee discussions which decided that those accepted to represent the Korean people would be those elected under observation of the UN Commission in Korea. Hence, the UN Commission is coming to Korea to observe the election of the representatives of the Korean people with them [ whom ] they will then consult. These representatives, in turn, are to form a Korean national government and report it to the UN Commission for acceptance. Only one election is contemplated and that will be under the observation of the United Nations. 2. There is much propaganda that the American Command will attempt to influence or to dictate to the UN Commission as to whom they will consult. This is pure fiction handed out solely to confuse the Korean people. The American Command has no control over and will make no effort to influence the UN Commission which will carry its holy mission of observing a fair election in which those elected as representatives will, in fact, truly represent the Korean people. 3. The United States Command is charged under the UN resolution with giving all possible help and support to the UN resolution with [apparent garble] after UN Commission in the accomplishment of its internationally assigned mission. I can assure you that this will be carried out to the best of our ability. 4. The UN resolution specifically provided that during the interim period preparatory to the establishment of Korean independence, steps to be taken in that direction of the United Nations General Assembly. The decision under which we are operating at present is the same resolution of which I speak in this statement, and which provides for a general election and formation of a Korean National Government followed by withdrawal of occupying troops as early as practicable and if possible within 90 days. 5. I quote paragraph 4 the United Nations resolution as approved. (Quotes text of cited paragraph.) This provides for the end of any form, kind or shape of Military Government control of the Korean National Government by the occupying powers; as soon as the UN Commission completes its work.” Langdon The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 501.BB Korea/11–2647 [Document 675] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) No. 272 Washington , December 9, 1947. The Acting Secretary of State acknowledges the receipt of despatch No. 5034 of November 26, 1947, from the United States Representative to the United Nations 90 enclosing a note from the Secretary-General of the United Nations dated November 24, 1947, 91 which draws particular attention to paragraph 6 of the substantive part of the General Assembly’s Second Resolution on Korea which was adopted on November 14, 1947, and requests the United States Representative to address the following note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations: “Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of November 24, 1947 enclosing the texts of the two resolutions concerning the problem of the independence of Korea which were adopted by the General Assembly at its one hundred and twelfth plenary meeting on November 14, 1947. “My Government has noted your emphasis on paragraph 6 of the substantive part of the second resolution and has instructed me to state that, as you are no doubt aware, the United States Government has been very happy to afford the fullest assistance and facilities to members of the Secretariat who are now preparing for the work of the Korean Commission. It is a pleasure to add that United States authorities both here and in South Korea will continue to give the fullest assistance to the Korean Commission in an endeavor to assist in the fulfillment of the terms of the Assembly’s resolution.” 90 Not printed. 91 See footnote 69, p. 857 [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 501.BB Korea/12–347: Telegram [Document 676] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) secret us urgent Washington , December 9, 1947—6 p.m. 281. Jacobs’ conversations with Victor Hoo and other UN officials developed following info which reveals impossibility of obtaining UN approval of the proposals mentioned in Deptel 274, Dec 3: (1) Full meeting UN Commissioners cannot be expected before their arrival Seoul. Secretariat will leave for Korea first week Jan. Commissioners already appointed include Jean Paul-Boncour for France (now Minister in Bucharest), S. H. Jackson for Australia (now in Tokyo), Dr. Liu Yu Wan for China (now en route Seoul). Victor Hoo believes that other Commissioners (except Ukrainian and Syrian who probably will not participate) will be appointed soon and be able meet in Seoul soon after arrival Secretariat. 92 (2) While Hoo and others consulted appreciate problems arising from continued delay in arriving at decisions regarding election law and date for election thereunder (Reference Zgcg 1427, Dec 2), they are not Commissioners and therefore without authority to make decisions. In addition they expressed belief that precipitate action by either the Commission or Secretariat before arrival in Seoul would prejudice position of the Commission and its future usefulness by giving color to existing propaganda stories that the Commission is merely a tool of the US. (3) It is hoped (Dept now making efforts along this line) that within short time responsible UN official (possibly UN Sec Gen) will issue factual statement regarding organization Secretariat, Commissioners named and schedule probable arrivals Korea, and calling upon all Koreans to await arrival of Commission and give it their fullest cooperation and assistance. Such statement will be useful for publicity purposes in Korea. (4) In circumstances it is felt no action should be taken putting Skila law into effect prior arrival Commission. In the absence of any other law it is anticipated, however, that shortly following arrival Commission, it will raise no objection to the implementation of this law with amendments to overcome objectional features listed in Exhibit C of “Plan for National Elections in Korea”. Accordingly, USAFIK should continue with its informal preparations for an election thereunder stating, if it becomes necessary to make any statement, that such preparations are informal, undertaken solely in an effort to expedite matters and to be helpful to the UN Commission, and that they are subject to review and ratification by that Commission after its arrival. (5) Mr. Graham Lucas, one of the Asst. Secretaries of the Secretariat mentioned in Deptel 272, Dec 2, 93 will be departing for Seoul by Northwest Airlines about Dec 29 as an advance representative to assist in preparations for housing, reception, etc. This fact may be given publicity in Seoul along with information concerning names of Commissioners mentioned in para 1 above. The text of a note dated Nov 26[ 24 ] from SYG together with Dept’s reply is being transmitted separately. 94 This exchange of notes should be given publicity in Seoul. Dept will continue to keep you fully informed of all developments here in connection with the Commission for publicity purposes in Korea with the thought that the continual release of information about the Commission will, by keeping the Korean public posted, tend to ween [ wean? ] their thoughts from Rhee’s propaganda. If Rhee continues to agitate, his agitation should be counteracted by further statements similar to those made by Gen Hodge (urtel 482, Nov 19), Gen Dean (urtel 495, Nov 29), and Langdon to NY Times correspondent as published here under Seoul date line Dec 6. While Dept recognizes difficult problem referred to Zgcg 1427, Dec 2, namely possible failure UN efforts if Soviets continue to refuse to cooperate, and agrees that resolution does not provide all answers to queries raised as result of that contingency, this difficulty cannot be resolved definitively until Commission arrives and makes necessary decisions “in the light of developments” as provided in paragraph 5 of the UN Resolution. However, Dept believes that full publicity of the fact that the UN Commission is actually coming to Seoul shortly should give considerable assurance to Koreans that Commission expects to carry out its assigned tasks even if restricted to south Korea. As it is manifestly impossible to anticipate developments upon arrival Commission, CG USAFIK should endeavor to concentrate efforts of Koreans on constructive measures which might be of assistance to Commission when it arrives and to discourage them from discussion or speculation concerning possibility elections resulting in the establishment of a south Korean government only. Lovett 92 Senator Melecio Arranz was appointed Philippine member of the Commission, according to telegram 293, December 18, to Seoul (501.BB Korea/12–1847). 93 Not printed. 94 Neither printed. The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 895.011/12–1047 [Document 677] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State restricted No. 165 Seoul , December 10, 1947. Subject: Temporary Constitution of Korea. Sir : Reference is made to this Office’Sir despatch No. 70 of September 3, 1947, 95 on the above captioned law passed August 6, 1947 by the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. On November 20, 1947, the Deputy Military Governor addressed a letter to the Assembly withholding approval of the bill and stating that a legislature composed of members, one-half of whom were appointed, could hardly be said to have a mandate from the people to enact so fundamental a document as a constitution. He further stated that the constitution could apply to South Korea only and that such a document actually should be approved by representatives of a united Korea and should be written for a united Korea. The letter pointed out that the constitution would require the reorganization of the present government of South Korea, a step deemed unwise under present conditions, and added that the adoption of the constitution at the present time might make more difficult the task of the ultimate unification of Korea. The substantive provisions of the proposed constitution were not discussed. The letter of disapproval was read at the same time as the letter disapproving the law on pro-Japanese, National Traitors and Profiteers, and the virtual veto of the two bills caused visible resentment in KILA. The Assembly addressed a written list of questions to General Helmick on December 2, 1947, most of which applied to the Anti-Collaborationist bill and have been discussed in this Office’s despatch No. 163 of December 9, 1947. 95a Apparently the disapproval of the temporary constitution did not arouse as much resentment as the Anti-Collaborationist bill failure. However, in point VI of questions raised by the Assembly, the disapproval of the temporary constitution was discussed. The same basic argument was raised as to the right of KILA to pass fundamental legislation, with Assembly members seeming to feel that if the two bills in question were beyond the scope of the Assembly, then any bill passed by the Assembly would be equally illegal for the same reason. The Assembly pointed out that the temporary constitution was actually only for South Korea and that the word “Provisional” should be emphasized. The Assembly asked why, if it was difficult to reorganize the government due to present unstable conditions, the present government is proceeding to reform its own structure. The paper addressed to General Helmick by the Assembly stated the belief that a provisional constitution was necessary for the transfer of administrative power to the Koreans as outlined by U.S. military authorities in the past. General Helmick’s letter of December 5, 1947 postponed an immediate answer to the questions raised by the Assembly. In all probability the Assembly will accept a compromise measure on the “Anti-Collaborationist” bill and the temporary constitution will remain tabled for the time being. 96 General Helmick’s answers to the Assembly will be submitted to the Department when they are prepared. Respectfully yours, William R. Langdon 95 Not printed. 95a Not printed. 96 General Helmick appeared before the Assembly on December 9, and his report was accepted, thereby settling the matter. As Mr. Langdon stated in despatch 169, December 15, the temporary constitution “is a dead issue.” (895.011/12–1547) The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 895.00/12–1147: Telegram [Document 678] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) confidential us urgent Washington , December 11, 1947—3 p.m. 285. Urtel 499, Dec 3. 97 The second assassination of an important Korean political leader in less than 6 months gives excuse for critics to question the ability of the US to maintain law and order and thus to afford political leaders not [ now? ] engaged in subversive activities an opportunity to express themselves publicly and solicit support for their political beliefs. Accordingly, this second political crime would seem to warrant any vigorous action that CG USAFIK may feel can be taken to discover the instigators and to forestall further terroristic acts. CG USAFIK may wish to consider the desirability of impressing upon influential Koreans in private of the need and his intention, particularly in view imminent arrival UN Commission, to assert his authority in fixing responsibility for any further political crimes of this character. Should it appear desirable, CG USAFIK may also wish to inform the Korean public to this effect. In the event that Korean police or other law enforcement authorities operating under USAMGIK are found delinquent in the performance of their duties or abusing their position, with respect to political crimes, CG USAFIK might consider it desirable to have US authorities participate with them in investigations. The foregoing is in no way a criticism of CG USAFIK but merely an expression of concern here, which we feel is shared by him, over repercussions from political crimes of this nature. This message has been coordinated with Army. 98 Lovett 97 See footnote 80, p. 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 668 ] . 98 Telegram 531, December 29, from Seoul, quoted a statement issued by General Hodge on December 27 deploring the assassination of December 2 and promising in this and future cases of terrorism that “all those responsible, including all accomplices and instigators, irrespective of political party affiliation or station in life, will be summarily ordered before military courts for prompt and complete trial and given the severest punishment according to the extent of their guilt.” (895.00/12–2947) The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 895.00/12–1347: Telegram [Document 679] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , December 13, 1947. 514. Cite Zpol 1473. Fourth paragraph of mytel 511, December 11, 99 recites great drop in terrorism and special police measures to suppress it as well as to correct irregularities in police force. Paragraph 3 also mentions Command’s transfer from Korean judiciary to provost court of defendents in Dai Han Youth League case, in face of uproar in judiciary and rightist circles, to ensure proper punishment of leaders of that now dissolved terrorist organization (Deptel 285 1 ). As for Chang Duk Soo case, American authorities took it over from Korean police several days ago and two actual assailants and seven accomplices, members of a murder organization, are presently in army’s custody. Confessions obtained by police indicate Kim Koo personally ordered assailants to murder Chang; as truth of confessions exacted by Korean police are open to question, General Hodge is using CID and CIC investigators and intends to establish facts according to American procedure in a military commission and, if guilt is determined, to recommend death or maximum penalties for all concerned, including Kim Koo. Kim Koo’s responsibility is widely suspected and as police, political leaders and assembly men are indicating uneasiness over his sources of terrorism, Command proposes to make example of this case to reassure public. Langdon 99 Not printed. 1 Supra . The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 895.00/12–647: Telegram [Document 680] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) confidential us urgent Washington , December 15, 1947—8 p.m. 290. Urtels 505 and 506, Dec 6. 2 Rhee’s attitude and position have been explained to Victor Hoo of UN Commission who understands problem. Felt however that little can be done through UN to remedy situation. Situation will be discussed with Limb and Oliver but little can be expected of that approach because Oliver wrote Rhee in Nov that his agitation for elections before arrival of UN Commission was ill-advised. Felt that press playback here would not serve any useful purpose in view of little time remaining before UN Commission arrives Korea. Also Dept prefers not to dignify Rhee’s statement with press playback. Felt here that best course is for responsible US officials in Seoul to continue to maintain firm stand against Rhee’s election plans as suggested in Deptel 281, Dec 9, 6 pm. Lovett 2 Latter not printed. The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State 501.BB Korea/12–2247: Telegram [Document 681] The Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) to the Secretary of State secret Seoul , December 22, 1947. 525. Cite Zpol 1495. Paragraph 4, Deptel 281, December 9, gave opinion no action should be taken to put Skila election law into effect prior arrival UN Commission but that informal preparations for an election thereunder should be continued. In this connection USAMGIK proposes immediately to issue executive order requiring registration with provisional election committees under Skila law of all prospective voters in UN observed election of representatives to National Assembly. Order has set 20 or 21 years as minimum registrant’s age with proviso that determination of adult voting age (that is “adult suffrage” in paragraph 2 of UN resolution) will be announced later. This physical preparation essential if election to be completed before March 31. General Hodge asks if Department knows of any contrary commitments or of any serious objection to this proposed measure. We can see no objection here but only advantage, as responsibility of administering UN observed election is USAMGIK’s and as USAMGIK must therefore make all administrative preparations of mechanical nature. Registration also will have important psychological value at this time. Langdon The Acting Secretary of State to the Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) 895.51/12–347: Telegram [Document 682] The Acting Secretary of State to the Economic Adviser in Korea ( Bunce ) top secret Washington , December 22, 1947—6 p.m. 295. No new directive planned at this time on disposal large vested industries reurtel 498, 3 Dec 47. 3 Present wording SANACC directive now under consideration is “The present program for the disposition of small vested Japanese commercial enterprises and urban residences should be continued in such a manner as to be susceptible of eventual completion by a new Korean Govt. Public announcement should be made at an appropriate time that title large vested industrial properties will be transferred such govt.” Foregoing for your info. Believed wording conforms recommendations urtel. Lovett 3 Not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 501.BB Korea/12–2347: Telegram [Document 683] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) secret us urgent Washington , December 23, 1947—6 p.m. 297. As discussion with members of Secretariat of UN Commission which led to drafting of para 4 Deptel 281 4 revealed clearly strong feeling that no formal action should be taken to put into effect Skila law or any part thereof prior to arrival and first meeting of the Commission in Seoul, felt here that registration of voters under executive order suggested urtel 525, Dec 22 is not desirable. As members of Commission and Secretariat are scheduled to arrive Seoul about Jan 7 the intervening delay (about 2 weeks) seems too short to make any material difference in the situation. While realized here unfortunate repercussions which might ensue if following information came to attention of those Korean factions urging haste in holding of elections, it may be added for your secret information and that of CG USAFIK that Dr. Victor Hoo has stated that in his opinion if Commission found after its arrival that insufficient time remained between date decision is reached on election procedure and date of Mar 31 to prepare for an election, it would still be possible within the terms of the Resolution to postpone the election for a month or such reasonable time as might appear necessary. Jacobs agrees with foregoing and wishes to add that he has talked with Oliver who stated that he had written Dr. Rhee afterwards urging him to cooperate fully with UN Commission and transmitted with that letter text of address of welcome which Rhee might wish to deliver on Commission’s arrival. Lovett 4 December 9, p. 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Canada (Atherton) 501.BB Korea/12–2747 [Document 684] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Canada ( Atherton ) secret Ottawa , December 27, 1947. On Saturday afternoon, December 27, I received an instruction from the Department of State asking me to deliver the following message to the Prime Minister 5 from the President: “I have just learned that the Canadian Government is contemplating withdrawal from the United Nations Korean Commission. In General Marshall’s absence I have asked the Acting Secretary of State to prepare and send you a personal message fully setting forth our views in this respect and explaining our deep concern regarding the possibility of such withdrawal. I earnestly hope you will find it possible not to make any final decision until you have had an opportunity to consider this message. Please accept my very best wishes for the new year. Harry S. Truman” I called on the Prime Minister by appointment in the evening about seven o’clock and presented him with the message, and he then said he would like to go to his study and talk the situation over. The following is a résumé of the views he gave me: The Prime Minister began by saying that he had but recently returned from Europe and a survey of conditions on the Continent which exceeded any of his most pessimistic anticipations. He said the basis for world recovery, particularly in which Canada could play an effective role, lay in Western Europe and he felt the outstanding effort of this country had begun there and must continue there without wasting her strength ineffectually in other areas of the world. He said from his trip through Western Europe he could realize the ever-widening gulf between the United States and Soviet Russia and the world ideologies these two nations represented. He did not feel the United Nations was as yet effectively able to deal with this basic conflict of East and West. He had talked with many statesmen in Europe including Bevin and Attlee (to whom he made particular reference) and he continued he could not but feel the handling of the Palestine situation 6 was inept, hasty and not well-considered, and he implied English opinion was critical of Lake Success decisions having been influenced by the world of political Jewry. He said in his time as Prime Minister of Canada he had used his weight in the formation of British Government policy to avoid what he considered potential mistakes and he could not now accept for Canada a role in the Korean Commission which he felt would be a mistake for his own country and the role it played in the Commonwealth of Nations. Palestine was a fundamental issue in the world and the nations most interested in its solution should have been the ones to resolve it. The Korean question he felt was another such problem, as he saw it. It was a field of conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Korea might well present a front between the two nations such as existed in Berlin today which ill-considered action might ignite, and yet to meet this the United Nations in unhappy, ill-advised haste and without chance for his own Government even to consider the issues in Ottawa had pressed forward with the naming of the committee and with urgent pleadings due to shortness of time had committed the Canadian delegation to decisions that had not been referred to the Cabinet or himself. Had this been the case, he certainly would never have agreed that Canada should serve on the Korean Commission. He felt that … Canada had been included in an attempt to balance the situation. The suggestion now that a counselor of the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo should lend whatever weight he was able to an already underweighted commission especially for such an important task, which might in an ill-conceived procedure precipitate a crisis, was inconsistent with the role Canada had undertaken in working for the success of the United Nations. He said he could not possibly defend before Parliament Canada’s participation on such a commission and he was unwilling to do it. If against his advice Canada did participate on this commission, it[ he? ] would leave it to the Minister for External Affairs or some other Cabinet officer to defend this action on the floor of the House of Commons. He said the United Nations had no force, although that was one of the fundamental conceptions in its origin, and he was more and more apprehensive of its dissipating its early and already badly strained strength until shortly it would not amount to much more than the League of Nations. He said his country had made every effort to make the greatest contribution and was anxious to continue to do so, but in the issue between east and west it was an issue for the nations chiefly concerned in the first instance, and if they would not take part in such discussions it was idle to put off the responsibility on such a weak commission as this one that had been named. The Prime Minister continued that he had no objection to my making very clear to my Government his strong views on this and said he hoped any message that came to them would not be of such a nature that he would appear for the first time to be giving his views in contradiction thereto, since the conversation he had with me for informal and confidential repetition to Washington with his permission clearly enumerated his objections. The conversation lasted almost an hour. I could see a great deal of what was in the Prime Minister’s mind, particularly as to the United Nations, had grown out of his conversations with Attlee and Bevin. He indicated to me that there were elements in the Canadian scene that did not agree with him in his point of view as set forth above, but he felt he himself was fairly adamant in his resistance. I put forth very clearly yet tactfully the American views, on which I felt I had a good understanding especially after my oral conversations on the telephone with the Department of State. The most assurance I could get from the Prime Minister was that he would make no final decision until he had received the message in question outlined in the President’s message above referred to. Ray Atherton 5 W. L. MacKenzie King. 6 For documentation, see vol. v , pp. 999 ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Canadian Prime Minister (MacKenzie King) 501.BB Korea/12–2947 [Document 685] The Acting Secretary of State to the Canadian Prime Minister ( MacKenzie King ) 7 December 30, 1947, 9:15 a.m. secret Mr. Prime Minister : The President has asked me to present to you in some detail the considerations which led to our grave concern over the possibility that Canada might decline participation in the work of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. The question of Korea was placed before the General Assembly of the United Nations by the United States in the sincere hope that the United Nations might find ways and means of resolving the impasse which had developed over the past year and a half between the United States and the USSR with respect to the creation of a free and independent Korea. In his opening statement to the General Assembly, Secretary of State Marshall indicated that we were unwilling to let the failure of ourselves and the Soviets to reach agreement deprive the Koreans any longer of their independence under a government of their own choice. When the matter was taken up by the First Committee of the Assembly, the United States Representative presented our suggestions in the form of a draft resolution, not because we were convinced that we had a single right answer, but because we considered it incumbent upon us to indicate to our fellow members the main lines of a solution which we ourselves thought might most speedily result in the emergence of an independent and democratic Korea. This was necessary because our position in Korea laid upon us the responsibility to furnish information and to put forward such suggestions as we might have. We were anxious, however, to obtain the views of others, and objected to the Soviet proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of occupation forces at the beginning of 1948 only because we were convinced that such a proposal if accepted would lead to the early establishment of a dictatorship in Korea. No suggestions substantially different from those we presented were put forward from any other source and the Assembly, as you will recall, accepted the United States proposal by a vote of 46 to 0, with 6 abstentions. The First Committee adopted the United States draft resolution as amended on November 5, 1947, with Canada included as a member of the proposed Commission. The Assembly action on Korea took place on November 14, and the Assembly itself did not adjourn until November 29. Thus there was a period of 24 days within which the matter might have been raised for reconsideration or arrangements made for substituting membership on the Commission. The General Assembly Resolution in brief calls for: a . the election by March 31, 1948 of representatives of the Korean people with whom the UN Temporary Commission on Korea may consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people; b . the formation of a National Assembly by the elected representatives; c . the establishment by the National Assembly of a National Government and the constitution by that Government of its own security forces and the dissolving of other military or semi-military forces not included therein; d . the taking over by the National Korean Government of the functions of government from the present governments in south and north Korea, and then; e . the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Korea within 90 days, if possible; f . the Commission to facilitate and expedite the fulfillment of the foregoing program for the attainment of the national independence of Korea, taking into account its observations and consultations in Korea; g . a report by the Commission, with its conclusions, to the General Assembly or to the interim committee with respect to the application of the resolution in the light of developments; h . the member states concerned to afford every assistance and facility to the Commission in the fulfillment of its responsibilities. In pursuance of the foregoing provisions, the Secretary General of the United Nations has formulated plans which envisage the arrival of the Commission in Korea on or about 7 January 1948. Nothing has yet occurred which has obstructed the implementation of the recommendations of the General Assembly regarding Korea. It is true that the Ukraine stated from the outset that it would not be able to serve on the Commission. It is also true that such indications as we have suggest that the Soviet Union will not cooperate with the Commission with respect to north Korea or the formation of a national Korean government, but it would be premature to conclude that such obstruction will inevitably materialize. In any event, Mr. Prime Minister, would you not agree that the responsibility for the failure of the policy approved by the General Assembly with respect to Korea should not be allowed to rest upon the Assembly itself or the governments members of the Commission named by the Assembly, but rather upon those governments which in fact bar the path to Korean independence? It is equally clear that the General Assembly has not given the Commission precise instructions as to its course of action if it is impeded in its work. The Assembly provided, however, that the Commission might consult with the Interim Committee in such a contingency. It is the view of the United States that, as a minimum, the Korean Commission should survey the situation in Korea, consult with Korean leaders and with the present military governments of the two zones, make the facts and its conclusions available to the General Assembly, and consult with the Interim Committee as to whether there is any course of action which, in the circumstances, might seem likely to advance the cause of Korean independence. Thus, the Commission has a free hand to use its best judgment in the light of the situation. I do assure you that the United States would greatly appreciate and strive in every possible way to meet the views of the Commission. We have no purpose in Korea but to give effect to the pledges made by the Allied governments during and after the war. We think it a matter of the greatest importance that the United Nations do what it can in behalf of the Korean people themselves in this situation. At the same time a great deal will have been accomplished if this point of irritation among the great powers can be alleviated by the work of the Commission. In all sincerity, I assure you that in the view of the Department of State, in which the President concurs, it will be difficult indeed for others to understand the basis for Canada’s withdrawal from the work of the Commission at this stage. Although there is a generally recognized shortage everywhere of men of great experience and competence in international affairs, we are confident that Canada could produce an entirely suitable representative, particularly in light of the fact that Canada has repeatedly demonstrated that it can make one of its greatest contributions to the United Nations in the high qualities of leadership and competence of its representatives on United Nations bodies. Canada’s prestige in international affairs and recognized interests in the peace of the Pacific would enhance the standing of the Commission. The United States views the participation of the Canadian representative in the work of the Commission as essential to such success as the Commission might achieve. The reluctance of Canada to participate in the work of the Commission is especially difficult to understand in the light of the fact that Canada is one of those nations which, as evidenced by its membership in the Far Eastern Commission, have a direct and urgent interest in the restoration of peace and stability in East Asia. Even were this not the case, Canada’s nonparticipation under existing circumstances would be difficult to understand in the light of its assumption of the responsibilities of membership in the Security Council, involving a willingness to contribute to international peace everywhere and not merely in regions of special interest. I may add, Mr. Prime Minister, that, although the United States is not a member of the Korean Commission, it is apparent that we on our part are carrying a very heavy share of the responsibility for the future of Korea. We are also concerned lest those unfriendly both to the United States and to Canada should find, if Canada does not see her way clear to participate in the work of the Commission, grounds for propaganda to the effect that Canada’s action reflected irritation and difference of view with the policies of the United States. While we ourselves are confident that no such element would in fact be present, we recognize that speculation along this line would inevitably ensue. There remains the question as to whether your Government’s abstention would denote the view that the course of action determined upon by the General Assembly is the wrong course or that in some fashion a new situation has arisen which makes that course now inappropriate. I venture to indicate again that the Commission itself is in no way bound by its terms of reference to follow any particular course of action if it is unable to follow through with the program outlined by the General Assembly. If there is doubt that the original course of action itself should not be followed, the means for giving effect to that view might be either action in the Commission itself or action to convene a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the Korean question. In the light of the foregoing, which I venture to present to you with the utmost of frankness, I trust that it may be possible for your government to review the situation having in mind particularly the effect upon the United Nations itself of Canada’s withdrawal from the work of the Korean Commission in its most important initial stage. I feel certain that you, as well as we, are gravely concerned lest the calculated policy of boycott on the part of those who may be trying to destroy the United Nations will succeed in seriously crippling the work of the Organization, and we are confident that you share with us the belief that those of us who support the United Nations and strive for its success must exert extra effort during this crucial phase. 7 Telephoned to Ambassador Atherton at 9:15 a.m., December 30. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber) 501.BB Korea/12–3047 [Document 686] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Reber ) secret [ Washington ,] December 30, 1947. Mr. Atherton telephoned from Ottawa this afternoon to inform us of developments following his presentation to the Canadian Prime Minister of the U.S. views respecting Canada’s proposed withdrawal from the United Nations Korean Commission. He confirmed information already received from the Canadian Embassy that Mr. Pearson, Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs, would bring the formal answer of his government to Washington on January 2 and has asked to be received by the Acting Secretary and by the President upon his arrival. Mr. Atherton said that Mackenzie King’s present position with respect to non-participation was adamant and that in his present mood the Prime Minister was apparently prepared to take this issue to the country even if it entailed a division in the Cabinet and to fight Canada’s participation in the Korean Commission on the ground that it had already overextended its activities in the United Nations and was being called upon to do more than its share. The Prime Minister apparently goes back in his mind to the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations in 1933 and 1935 when there was much talking with respect to the Far East but little achieved. Mr. Atherton also felt that Mackenzie King had been very largely influenced by his visit to London and by Bevin’s feeling that Canada, under the influence of Lake Success, had not been helpful in the settlement of the Palestine issue about which Bevin apparently feels very bitterly. There seemed also to be a feeling in London that Canada was more inclined to “take orders” from Washington. Mr. Atherton got the impression that Mackenzie King was making this issue a declaration of independence to show that Canada reached its decisions independently of the United States. Mr. Atherton therefore thought that we should not press the Canadians too hard as he did not see any way in which the Prime Minister’s decision could be reversed without forcing a Cabinet crisis during which Canada’s relations with the United States might become the issue before the Canadian people. Mackenzie King also has reached the end of his career and therefore is less easily influenced by the feelings of his Cabinet. The Ambassador thought it would be preferable to seek to find some solution which would ease the Prime Minister’s position and not force the issue between Canada and the United States. He suggested as a possibility that we endeavor to persuade Pearson that Canada should not withdraw formally from the Commission but merely not appoint a representative. I repeated that Canada’s boycott of the Commission would in our opinion have serious consequences with respect to the future of the United Nations. We would regard such action with very real concern and would no doubt have to express our views in this sense to Pearson upon his arrival. S. Reber The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) 501.BB Korea/12–3047: Telegram [Document 687] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser in Korea ( Langdon ) confidential Washington , December 30, 1947—5 p.m. 303. Reference Johnson’s report to NY Times from Seoul dated Dec 29 that Soviet broadcasts have raised “race question”, Dept suggests that CG USAFIK or you with his approval might wish to make statement to Korean press pointing out, without mentioning “race question”, that inclusion of China, India, and the Philippines on UN Commission affords unique opportunity for Koreans, in attaining international status, to avail themselves of assistance of an international body with three fellow Oriental peoples represented thereon. Such statement might also tend to counteract Soviet propaganda belittling UN Commission. It would be helpful to Dept to receive telegraphic summary of Korean reaction to date to UN Commission to be followed up by subsequent reports. Constructive comment by Koreans might be used here for dissemination to press in U.S. and possible playbacks over VOUSA. Lovett The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in El Salvador 501.BB Korea/12–3147: Telegram [Document 688] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in El Salvador confidential us urgent Washington , December 31, 1947—1 p.m. 162. Seek early interview with FonMin to express high importance attached by US Govt to Salvadoran participation in work of United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea. Failure of El Salvador to participate in work of Commission would be severe blow to functioning United Nations and would be subject to misinterpretation and misleading propaganda by elements not interested in early peaceful settlement Korean situation. For your information Salvadoran Amb 8 in Washington is communicating with his Govt along same lines. Telegraph urgently decision Salvadoran Govt re participation Korean Commission. Lovett 8 Dr. Héctor David Castro. The Canadian Prime Minister (MacKenzie King) to the American Ambassador in Canada (Atherton) 501.BB–Korea/12–3147 [Document 689] The Canadian Prime Minister ( MacKenzie King ) to the American Ambassador in Canada ( Atherton ) 9 [ Ottawa ,] December 31, 1947. My Dear Ambassador : I duly received your letter of yesterday to which was attached the text of the communication from the Acting Secretary of State 10 referred to in the message you brought to me from the President on Saturday night. 11 On receipt of your letter I immediately read the text of this communication to Mr. Saint Laurent, the Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. Pearson, the Under Secretary, was present with us at the time. Mr. Saint Laurent and I were both of the opinion that the subject matter was one which, for many reasons, it would be preferable to have considered in personal conference. We have, therefore, asked Mr. Pearson to proceed to Washington to have informal conversations with the Under Secretary of State and if thought desirable, with the President. If, thereafter, it should be found necessary to a complete understanding of our position to have the matter further dealt with by a member of our Government, on hearing from Mr. Pearson to this effect, Mr. Saint Laurent, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, will leave for Washington. Immediately following the consideration given the matter yesterday morning by Mr. Saint Laurent and myself Mr. Pearson, I understand, informed you of this intended action by way of reply to your letter and acknowledgment of its enclosure. I have felt, however, that I should make in writing this further reply. Having understood from you that in view of our conversation together at the time, a reply in writing from myself would not be expected to the message you brought me from the President, I have governed myself accordingly. W. L. MacKenzie King 9 Notation by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Wailes): “The following letter from the Canadian Prime Minister was dictated to us by Ambassador Atherton at 1:00 p.m., December 31, 1947.” 10 For text of latter, dated December 30, see p. 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] . 11 See memorandum of December 27, p. 880 [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] . Netherlands East Indies Netherlands East Indies Contents The interest of the United States in nationalist opposition to the restoration of Netherlands rule in the East Indies and consideration by the United Nations Security Council of the Indonesian case (Documents 690-889) The interest of the United States in nationalist opposition to the restoration of Netherlands rule in the East Indies and consideration by the United Nations Security Council of the Indonesian case The interest of the United States in nationalist opposition to the restoration of Netherlands rule in the East Indies 1 and consideration by the United Nations Security Council of the Indonesian case 1 Continued from Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , pp. 787 – 860 . [690] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, January 6, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.01/1–647: Telegram [691] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, January 8, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.00/1–847: Telegram [692] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, January 9, 1947—10 p.m. 856E.01/1–947: Telegram [693] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, January 10, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.00/1–1047: Telegram [694] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, January 13, 1947—10 p.m. 856E.00/1–1347: Telegram [695] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, January 23, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.01/1–2347: Telegram [696] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, January 23, 1947—10 p.m. 856E.01/1–2347: Telegram [697] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, February 5, 1947. 656D.006/2–547: Telegram [698] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, February 6, 1947—3 p.m. 656D.006/2–647: Telegram [699] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State The Hague, February 10, 1947—5 p.m. 856E.00/2–1047: Telegram [700] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, February 11, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.00/2–1147: Telegram [701] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, March 3, 1947—7 p.m. 656D.006/3–147: Telegram [702] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, March 8, 1947—5 p.m. 656D.006/3–847: Telegram [703] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, March 9, 1947—4 p.m. 656D.006/3–947: Telegram [704] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeastern Asian Affairs (Lacy) [Washington,] March 12, 1947. 856E.00/3–1247 [705] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, March 12, 1947. 656.56D31/3–1247: Airgram [706] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, March 13, 1947—4 p.m. 656D.006/3–1047: Telegram [707] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, March 17, 1947—4 p.m. 656.56D31/3–1747: Telegram [708] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) [Washington,] March 20, 1947. 656D.006/3–2047 [709] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) [Washington,] March 21, 1947. 656D.006/3–2147 [710] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Benton) to the Secretary of State The Hague, March 22, 1947. 656D.006/3–2247: Telegram [711] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Benton) to the Secretary of State The Hague, March 26, 1947—6 p.m. 856E.01/3–2647: Telegram [712] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, April 1, 1947—7 p.m. 656D.006/3–2247: Telegram [713] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, April 3, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.01/4–347: Telegram [714] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Benton) to the Secretary of State The Hague, April 4, 1947. 856E.01/4–447: Telegram [715] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, April 4, 1947—8 p.m. 656D.006/4–247: Telegram [716] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Benton) to the Secretary of State The Hague, April 5, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.01/4–547: Telegram [717] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Moscow,] April 7, 1947. 856E.01/4–1747 [718] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, April 9, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.01/4–547: Telegram [719] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming) and the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat) [Washington,] April 17, 1947. 856E.00/4–1747 [720] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, April 18, 1947—6 p.m. 656D.006/4–1847: Telegram [721] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, April 18, 1947—10 p.m. 856E.00/4–1847: Telegram [722] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, April 24, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.01/4–1847: Telegram [723] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, May 2, 1947—6 p.m. 856E.01/4–2547: Telegram [724] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, May 7, 1947—6 p.m. 656D.006/5–747: Telegram [725] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, May 10, 1947—noon. 856E.00/5–1047: Telegram [726] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, May 13, 1947—6 p.m. 856E.01/5–1347: Telegram [727] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, May 15, 1947—6 p.m. 656D.006/5–1547: Telegram [728] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, May 16, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.51/5–247: Telegram [729] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, May 17, 1947—10 a.m. 856D.50/5–1747: Telegram [730] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, May 21, 1947—6 p.m. 856E.00/5–2147: Telegram [731] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, May 23, 1947—11 p.m. 856E.00/5–2347: Telegram [732] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, May 28, 1947—10 p.m. 856E.00/5–2847: Telegram [733] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, May 29, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.01/5–2947: Telegram [734] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Schnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs [Washington,] May 29, 1947. 856E.00/5–2947 [735] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Sehnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs [Washington,] May 29, 1947. 856E.01/5–2947 [736] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, May 29, 1947—8 p.m. 856E.01/5–2947: Telegram [737] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, June 2, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.01/6–247: Telegram [738] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, June 3, 1947—8 p.m. 856E.01/6–347: Telegram [739] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, June 3, 1947—9 p.m. 856E.01/6–347: Telegram [740] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, June 4, 1947—2 a.m. 856E.01/6–447: Telegram [741] The British Embassy to the Department of State June 4, 1947 856E.01/6–447 [742] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, June 5, 1947—8 p.m. 856E.01/6–547: Telegram [743] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Sehnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs [Washington,] June 6, 1947. 856E.01/6–647 [744] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, June 9, 1947—8 p.m. 856E.00/6–947: Telegram [745] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, June 10, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.01/6–1047: Telegram [746] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, June 10, 1947—6 p.m. 856E.01/6–1047: Telegram [747] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, June 13, 1947—10 p.m. 856E.01/6–1347: Telegram [748] Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Washington,] June 16, 1947. 856E.00/6–1647 [749] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] June 17, 1947. 856E.01/6–1647 [750] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, June 17, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.01/6–1747: Telegram [751] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, June 17, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.01/6–1747: Telegram [752] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, June 18, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.01/6–1847: Telegram [753] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, June 19, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.01/6–1947: Telegram [754] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, June 19, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.01/6–1947: Telegram [755] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of South-east Asian Affairs (Moffat) [Washington,] June 20, 1947. 856E.01/6–2047 [756] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, June 20, 1947—10 p.m. 856E.01/6–2047: Telegram [757] The Department of State to the British Embassy Washington, June 23, 1947. 856E.01/6–1647 [758] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, June 23, 1947. 656D.006/6–347 [759] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, June 25, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.01/6–2547: Telegram [760] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, June 25, 1947 June 25, 1947 856E.01/6–2547 [761] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, June 26, 1947—8 p.m. 856E.01/6–2647: Telegram [762] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, June 26, 1947—8 p.m. 856E.01/6–2347: Telegram [763] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State London, June 27, 1947—1 p.m. 856E.01/6–2747: Telegram [764] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, June 28, 1947—4 p.m. 356E.115/6–2847: Telegram [765] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, June 28, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.01/6–2847: Telegram [766] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, June 29, 1947—8 p.m. 856E.01/6–2947: Telegram [767] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, June 29, 1947—8 p.m. 856E.01/6–2947: Telegram [768] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, June 30, 1947—10 a.m. [p.m.] 856E.01/6–3047: Telegram [769] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 2, 1947—5 p.m. 856D.00/7–247: Telegram [770] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, July 3, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.01/7–147: Telegram [771] Editorial Note [772] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 4, 1947—3 p.m. 356E.115/7–447: Telegram [773] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 7, 1947—5 p.m. 856E.01/7–747: Telegram [774] Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) [Washington,] July 8, 1947. 856D.00/7–847 [775] Editorial Note [776] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon) [Washington,] July 9, 1947. 856E.00/7–947 [777] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 9, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.01/7–947: Telegram [778] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 10, 1947—4 p.m. 356E.115/7–1047: Telegram [779] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State The Hague, July 10, 1947—5 p.m. 856E.01/7–1047: Telegram [780] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 15, 1947—11 p.m. 856E.00/7–1547: Telegram [781] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, July 17, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.01/7–1547: Telegram [782] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 17, 1947—10 p.m. 856E.00/7–1747: Telegram [783] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, July 18, 1947—10 p.m. 856E.00/7–1847: Telegram [784] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour) [Washington,] July 20, 1947. 856E.00/7–2047 [785] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, July 20, 1947—5 p.m. 856E.00/7–2047: Telegram [786] The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State New York, July 22, 1947—2 p.m. 501.BC/7–2247: Telegram [787] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 22, 1947—11 p.m. 856E.00/7–2247: Telegram [788] The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, July 23, 1947—10 a.m. 856E.00/7–2347: Telegram [789] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) [Washington,] July 24, 1947. 501.BC Indonesia/7–2447 [790] The British Embassy to the Department of State Washington, 24 July, 1947. 856E.01/7–2447 [791] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 25, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.00/7–2547: Telegram [792] The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State New Delhi, July 26, 1947—10 a.m. 856E.00/7–2647: Telegram [793] Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) [Washington,] July 28, 1947. 856D.00/7–2847 [794] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] July 29, 1947. 501.BC/7–2947 [795] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Villard) to the Counselor (Bohlen) [Washington,] July 29, 1947. 501.BC/7–2947 [796] Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State [Washington,] July 29, 1947. 501.BC/7–2947 [797] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman Washington, July 30, 1947. 501.BC/7–3047 [798] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Armour) [Washington,] July 30, 1947. 856E.00/7–3047 [799] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, July 30, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.00/7–3047: Telegram [800] The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State Cairo, July 30, 1947—6 p.m. 856E.00/7–3047: Telegram [801] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, July 31, 1947—3 a.m. 501.BC/7–3147: Telegram [802] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] July 31, 1947. 501.BC Indonesia/7–3147 [803] Editorial Note [804] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India Washington, July 31, 1947—8 p.m. 501.BC/7–3147: Telegram [805] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, August 1, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.00/8–147: Telegram [806] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 1, 1947—11 p.m. 856E.00/8–147: Telegram [807] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] August 2, 1947. 856E.00/8–247 [808] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, August 3, 1947—1 a.m. 856E.00/8–347: Telegram [809] The Netherlands Ambassador (Van Kleffens) to the President of the United Nations Security Council (Faris El Khoury), at New York Washington, August 3, 1947. 501.BC/8–347 [810] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] August 4, 1947. 856E.00/8–447 [811] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, August 4, 1947—3 p.m. 856D.00/8–447: Telegram [812] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, August 4, 1947—5 p.m. 856E.01/8–447: Telegram [813] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, August 4, 1947—6 p.m. 856E.00/8–447: Telegram [814] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 5, 1947—11 a.m. 856E.00/8–547: Telegram [815] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) [Washington,] August 5, 1947. 856E.00/8–547 [816] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 6, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.00/8–647: Telegram [817] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 7, 1947—noon. 856E.00/8–747: Telegram [818] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 8, 1947—11 a.m. 856E.00/8–847: Telegram [819] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, August 8, 1947—2 p.m. 856E.00/8–847: Telegram [820] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Batavia (Foote) Washington, August 8, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.00/8–447: Telegram [821] The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) Washington, August 8, 1947—7 p.m. 501.BC/8–847: Telegram [822] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, August 9, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.01/8–947: Telegram [823] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 12, 1947—3 p.m. 856E.00/8–1247: Telegram [824] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 12, 1947—4 p.m. 856E.00/8–1247: Telegram [825] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State The Hague, August 12, 1947. 856E.01/8–1247: Telegram [826] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 12, 1947—5 p.m. 856E.00/8–1247: Telegram [827] The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) Washington, August 12, 1947—5 p.m. 501.BC/8–1247: Telegram [828] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 12, 1947—6 p.m. 501.BC/8–1247: Telegram [829] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) Washington, August 13, 1947—6 p.m. 856E.00/8–1347: Telegram [830] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Batavia (Foote) Washington, August 14, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.00/8–1247: Telegram [831] Memorandum by Mr. Ben Hill Brown, Jr., of the Office of the Legal Adviser, to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk) [Washington,] August 15, 1947. 856D.00/8–1547 [832] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) Washington, August 16, 1947—1 p.m. 501.BC/8–1647: Telegram [833] The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State New York, August 16, 1947—2:40 p.m. 501.BC/8–1647: Telegram [834] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 17, 1947—11 p.m. 856E.00/8–1747: Telegram [835] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] August 18, 1947. 501.BC Indonesia/8–1847 [836] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, August 19, 1947—11 a.m. 856E.00/8–1947: Telegram [837] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, August 19, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.00/8–1947: Telegram [838] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon) [Washington,] August 20, 1947. 856E.00/8–2047 [839] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom Washington, August 20, 1947—6 p.m. 856E.00/8–1847: Telegram [840] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, August 21, 1947—6 p.m. 501.BC/8–2047: Telegram [841] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands Washington, August 21, 1947—7 p.m. 501.BC/8–2147: Telegram [842] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) Washington, August 25, 1947—4 p.m. 501.BC/8–2547: Telegram [843] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, August 27, 1947—10 a.m. 501.BC/8–2747: Telegram [844] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [Washington,] August 28, 1947. 856E.00/8–2847 [845] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, September 3, 1947—11 a.m. 501.BC/9–347: Telegram [846] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, September 4, 1947—5 p.m. 501.BC/8–3047: Telegram [847] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) Washington, September 6, 1947—1 p.m. 501.BC/9–647: Telegram [848] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [Washington,] September 8, 1947. 856E.00/9–847 [849] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State Batavia, September 22, 1947—11 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/9–2247: Telegram [850] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, September 27, 1947—4 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/9–2247: Telegram [851] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, October 10, 1947—11 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/10–1047: Telegram [852] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, October 11, 1947—10 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/10–1147: Telegram [853] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State New York, October 15, 1947—12:07 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/10–1547: Telegram [854] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State New York, October 15, 1947—5:13 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/10–1547: Telegram [855] Memorandum of Conversations by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Lacy) [Washington,] October 16, 1947. 501.BC Indonesia/10–1647 [856] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State New York, October 21, 1947—12:40 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/10–2147: Telegram [857] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State New York, October 25, 1947—12:10 p.m. 501.BC–Indonesia/10–2547: Telegram [858] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State New York, October 25, 1947—12:05 p.m. 501.BC–Indonesia/10–2547: Telegram [859] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, October 29, 1947—11 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/10–2947: Telegram [860] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Washington, October 30, 1947—7 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/10–2947: Telegram [861] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, October 31, 1947—4 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/10–3147: Telegram [862] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, November 1, 1947—11 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/11–147: Telegram [863] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, November 3, 1947—7 p.m. 856E.00/10–3047: Telegram [864] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, November 3, 1947. 501.BC–Indonesia/11–347: Telegram [865] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, November 7, 1947. 501.BC Indonesia/11–747: Telegram [866] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, November 13, 1947—3 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/11–1347: Telegram [867] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, November 17, 1947—9 a.m. 856E.00/11–1747: Telegram [868] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, November 18, 1947—noon. 501.BC Indonesia/11–1847: Telegram [869] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 1, 1947—2 p.m. 501.BC–Indonesia/12–147: Telegram [870] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 1, 1947—3 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–147: Telegram [871] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 4, 1947—10 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–447: Telegram [872] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 4, 1947—11 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–447: Telegram [873] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 6, 1947—10 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–647: Telegram [874] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 6, 1947—11 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–647: Telegram [875] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, December 11, 1947—7 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–647: Telegram [876] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 13, 1947—9 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–1347: Telegram [877] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, December 18, 1947—10 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/11–1347: Telegram [878] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, December 19, 1947—8 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–1947: Telegram [879] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 20, 1947—10 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–2047: Telegram [880] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 20, 1947—11 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–2047: Telegram [881] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 20, 1947—noon. 501.BC Indonesia/12–2047: Telegram [882] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, December 20, 1947—2 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–1247: Telegram [883] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 22, 1947—5 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–2247: Telegram [884] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 23, 1947—11 a.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–2347: Telegram [885] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 27, 1947—1 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–2747: Telegram [886] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 30, 1947—noon. 501.BC Indonesia/12–3047: Telegram [887] The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State Batavia, December 31, 1947—4 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–3147: Telegram [888] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia Washington, December 31, 1947—6 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–1947: Telegram [889] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia Washington, December 31, 1947—7 p.m. 501.BC Indonesia/12–3147: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.01/1–647: Telegram [Document 690] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia confidential Washington , January 6, 1947—7 p.m. 3. Unless you perceive objection, Dept desires you discreetly seek out individual views of Republican leaders on following: 1. Probability Central National Committee approval Cheribon Agreement. 2 2. When decisive vote may be expected. 3. How enlargement Central National Committee reported Aneta Dec 31 may affect probability of approval. 4. Willingness of those within Central National Committee opposed to Agreement to abide by majority decision in democratic spirit. In seeking above info you might keep in mind Dept’s Press Release of Dec 17 3 (RCA No. 181045 sent Batavia Dec 18). In this connection Dept would be interested in knowing whether Press Release understood by Indonesian leaders as indicating this Govt’s interest in prompt and responsible fulfillment of Agreement by both sides. Byrnes 2 Known also as the Linggadjati Agreement, initialed November 15, 1946; see ibid. , p. 852 , footnote 27. 3 For Department’s statement of December 17, 1946, see Department of State Bulletin , December 29, 1946, p. 1188. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/1–847: Telegram [Document 691] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State restricted Batavia , January 8, 1947—4 p.m. 9. Conference at Den Pasar, Bali, which began talks December 7, formally opened December 18 and adjourned December 24, signed agreement establishing state of “East Indonesia” which will be first of United States of Indonesia. Van Mook, Acting Governor General, today published decree that East Indonesia became legal state on December 24, headed by Soekawati, President; Nadjamoeddin, Prime Minister; and Tadjoeddin, head of House of Representatives. New state includes all of former Great East except Netherlands New Guinea. Agreement of Den Pasar is far too long to cable but copy and English translation being sent by courier tomorrow. 4 Foote 4 Despatch 190, January 7, not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/1–947: Telegram [Document 692] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , January 9, 1947—10 p.m. 10. Deptel 3, January 6. Have spent 10 days trying obtain views of Republican leaders on Cheribon Agreement but this had to be done with great caution since nearly every act or word liable be misunderstood or purposely distorted. Indo leaders from Soekarno 5 down say they positive Cheribon Agreement will be approved by Indo National Committee. Indo National Committee due convene January 27 and Sjahrir 6 told me last night decisive vote expected January 28. Enlargement Central National Committee by Soekarno was done to ensure approval Cheribon Agreement and obtain representation thereon for Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Moluccas, agriculturalists, industrial labor and other formerly unrepresented groups. Committee was increased from 230 to 413 members. While Masjoemi, 7 Indo Nationalist Party and some small groups had voted against approval, Indo leaders say that merely expression opinion in nature debates to air the subject and that same opponents will support Govt by voting approval. There will be some opposition during convention debates but Soekarno and other leaders expect good majority for approval. Indo leaders know some persons will oppose agreement even after approval but such opposition will probably lead to stronger efforts by Soekarno’s govt to eliminate die-hards, such as General Soedirman. 8 Soekarno felt it not advisable drop undesirables until after General [ Central ] National Committee approved agreement. This would enable him state Govt supported by farmers, laborers, Moslems and natives of outer possessions as well as Java. Dept’s press release, December 17, apparently well understood and published in full by Indo and Dutch press. Indo press in addition commented editorially to effect USA desirous see peace and prosperity in Far East and trade developed along healthy lines. In informal talks with Indo leaders and editors I emphasized desire of USA to see peace established over entire world, rehabilitation begun, trade resumed, living standards increased and cultural relations established to spread better education and friendlier feelings among men. My remarks were likewise published by Indo press and created good reactions. Foote 5 “President of the Republic of Indonesia”. 6 Sutan Sjahrir, “Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia”. 7 Council of Indonesian Moslem Organizations. 8 Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/1–1047: Telegram [Document 693] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , January 10, 1947—4 p.m. 12. Mytel 9, January 8. So-called constitution of East Indonesia which approved at Den Pasar now en route Dept by courier. 9 Doctor Koets, Political Adviser and Chef de Cabinet to Van Mook, told Browne 10 as follows: Constitution of East Indonesia will be model for Borneo but not for United States of Indonesia. On other hand that for USI must be in agreement with others. Powers listed in constitution for East Indonesia as reserved for state will be exercised by NEI Govt until distributed between state and USI. Indo Republic not sovereign and will not have international status but will be analogous to a state of USA. The USI will be sovereign state. Difference between Indo Republic on one hand and Borneo and East Indonesia on other will lie in fact that Republic will have constitution of own choosing achieved through revolution rather than by legal means. With establishment of USI, Netherlands will recognize de jure authority of Republic, thus legalizing present illegal situation. At Malino, NEI Govt guaranteed form of independence for those areas not desiring be part of Republic. Initialing Cheribon agreement Republic delegates recognized Malino principles and renounced claim to authority over Malino area. Den Pasar constitution is first putting into effect of Malino plan. If Republic rejects Cheribon Agreement, NEI Govt will continue build East Indonesia and Borneo while trying meantime reach other agreement with Republic. NEI Govt will not permit Republic gain ascendency or establish control over other two states unless such be will of people thereof. Koets also said Soekarno’s increasing size of Republic Central National Committee political maneuver obtain approval Cheribon Agreement. My comments follow in later telegram. Foote 9 Despatch 19, January 8, not printed. 10 Sidney H. Browne, Consul at Batavia. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/1–1347: Telegram [Document 694] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential urgent Batavia , January 13, 1947—10 p.m. 13. Comments on my telegram 12, January 10: Indo press and leaders belittle results Den Pasar Conference, calling it comic opera. At same time more conservative Indos feel Republic is falling behind as East Indonesia is preparing for peace and reconstruction. Whatever outcome may be, there will be much agitation by more extreme Indo leaders against Republic becoming state similar to East Indonesia. For this reason, Dutch policy, if Koets is right, may be dangerous and give rise further agitation, fighting, chaos and more delay in establishing peace and beginning reconstruction of industries and economic life in general. Ambitious young Indos are looking forward to heading diplomatic missions to foreign countries and failure do so may increase friction. Indos expect receive Ministers from other countries but Van Mook said Netherlands Government probably will ask other nations accredit Ministers to United States of India [ Indonesia ] instead of Republic. If and when all these matters become known to Indos such may support actions of extremists in opposing agreement with Dutch. Unless situation changes radically or unless Soekarno can eliminate obstructionists I see little hope for peace or any form of reconstruction probably for many months. If situation deteriorates or if moderate leaders lose what little control they have, I fear further fighting, more chaos and delay in reconstruction efforts. Foote The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/1–2347: Telegram [Document 695] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State top secret Batavia , January 23, 1947—3 p.m. 30. De Boar, member Commission General, sent for me and said he felt he ought decline sign Cheribon Agreement despite having initialled it since he believed it doomed to failure. Gave as reason his conviction Republicans had no intention honoring it and would violate it as flagrantly as it did truce agreement. He gave no indication of views of Schermerhorn and Van Poll 11 beyond saying Van Mook alone was optimistic. In explaining conviction reply would not carry out agreement he referred to rejection by PJSTI, 12 Soekarno’s political party; Masjoemi, union of Moslem parties; Working Committee of National Assembly and other groups, pointing out that even leaders favoring agreement such as Soekarno, Hatta 13 and Sjarifoeddin 14 had made it plain they did not regard it as basis of solution but only as step advantageous to success of revolution and eventual domination all Indonesia by Republicans. He said he believed influence Soekarno and moderates like Sjahrir had greatly declined and referred to recent ten to one vote of Working Committee of KNIP 14a declaring illegal Soekarno’s decree enlarging National Committee by addition of members favoring agreement. Said he understood approval by KNIP would be only on condition further concessions from Dutch which they cannot afford to give. He added that Republicans disregard of truce and increasing attacks on Dutch military positions indicated rising influence of irreconcilable militarists who oppose all agreements. Concluded by saying he reluctant approve arrangement certain to be sabotaged by Indonesians and believed more honest and effective measure restore order and prosperity would be swift military action and capture Djocja, 15 an opinion he said shared by increasing number Dutch here and in Netherlands. I remarked Cheribon Agreement warmly applauded by democratic world and that even if subsequent hostilities unavoidable because of Republicans bad faith Dutch would lose much favorable world opinion by failure sign. He replied Dutch now steadily losing respect for world opinion of events in Indonesia. My comments follow next telegram. Foote 11 Professor Willem Schermerhorn, former Netherlands Prime Minister, and J. M. Van Poll, of the Netherlands Second Chamber, were both members of the Commission General to the East Indies. 12 Partai Nasional Indonesia. 13 Dr. Muhammad Hatta, “Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia”. 14 Indonesian Minister of Defense. 14a Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, Central Indonesian National Committee. 15 Jogjakarta is the accepted spelling of the name of the Indonesian capital. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/1–2347: Telegram [Document 696] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State top secret Batavia , January 23, 1947—10 p.m. 31. Following my comments on subject my telegram 30, January 23. De Boar is non-political businessman with strong principles and thus less likely than politically trained colleagues on ComGen to compromise with convictions. If he signs he probably will issue statement explaining why he felt he must and reiterating objections. He may refuse to sign in which case I presume one dissenting voice will not impair agreement’s validity. 16 It is of course possible further Republican action will cause other members ComGen share De Boer’s view. While I think KNIP will approve agreement, I concur with De Boer that cannot be carried out unless present attitude Republican leaders reversed and militarists controlled. Loss influence by Soekarno and many former moderates reflected in their urging mere political expediency as reason for approval. Leadership now appears passing to extremists over whom moderates have little control. Significant that Soedirman essentially a nonentity can flout truce rulings made on highest civil level. Sjarifoeddin, Hatta and other former cooperators clearly leaning more and more toward extremist position. Having aroused people’s support by assuring them Republic was sovereign state, they unwilling tell them now this [ap]parently not so under agreements terms and their altered attitude probably due to political impasse of their own making. Republican press now occasionally critical of alleged weakness Sjahrir’s diplomacy. While Dutch not blameless violation truce, it obvious any impartial observer here guilt lies almost entirely with Republican militarists led by Soedirman. Dutch statements of fact draw violent, often hysterical, denials by Republic press and spokesman in which note of desperation discernible. Dutch forces here now number about 120,000 and their effectiveness increasing. Republican forces about 151,000 of which maximum 20% armed while they largely lacking ordnance, tanks, planes, etc. In recent fighting their leadership and spirit generally poor, they plainly far less formidable than Indochinese. 17 Dutch victory would be easy but inevitable aftermath bitterness would be hard to overcome even by energetic sincere implementation Cheribon Agreement. While some Dutch military favor all-out attack now they in minority and well under control. I sure Dutch would not attack until after signature agreement and then only as last resort. Other restraining considerations would be fear world opinion such as now directed at French, fear foreign or international intervention and fact that at least 190,000 internees still in Republican hands. I feel American press poorly informed of present nature of Republic due to ignorance, bias or false glamorizing by many correspondents. I feel recent implication Republican officials in brutal murder Australians last April and in later murder Indo Red Cross doctor, subsequent mock trials by Republican courts (details in later tel) probable partnership Gani 18 in Chinese smuggling ring, neglect starving people Madoera and elsewhere while shipping rice to India for political purposes, increased shooting, kidnapping peasants by Republican forces, numberless acts bad faith Republican military leaders, ineradicable taint of Jap influence, continued use large number Jap soldiers, technicians, selfish British support and Australian Communist assistance, all indicative that authoritarian misnamed Republic no longer worthy exponent honest healthy Indo nationalism. If Jap [ I feel? ] further weakening European position Java and Sumatra would precipitate ruthless Chinese economics domination and that Indo reaction there now might have repercussions dangerous to American interests and security in southeast Asia. In short I feel time now ripe for reexamination our attitude toward situation here. Because of above am sure Indos will hasten to sign agreement and Ghentry [ sic ] force approval by National Committee. Browne concurs these. Foote 16 Telegram 199, March 22, noon, from The Hague, reported the resignation of Commissioner de Boar (856E.01/3–2247). 17 For situation in French Indochina, see pp. 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 58 ] ff. 18 Dr. Adnan Kapan Gani, Indonesian Minister of Welfare and third Vice Premier. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 656D.006/2–547: Telegram [Document 697] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia us urgent Washington , February 5, 1947. 32. New York representative Isbrandtsen SS Co advised Feb 5: “Further reference Deptel Jan 28, Dept advised Feb 4 by Zimmerman, 19 representing Neth Emb, that NEI authorities will strictly enforce new import-export regulations decreed Jan 29 in Batavia. Text these new regulations not yet received by Dept. Understand Zimmerman has telegraphed you his interpretation effect new regulations upon your proposed commercial transaction with Perseroan Bank. Dept hereby reemphasizes to you that NEI Govt is authority recognized by US Govt in entire Neth Indies.” Dept further informed Isbrandtsen, New York, Feb 5: Dept informed 20 Sjahrir received cable Jan 29 from Isbrandtsen Co, New York, that ship Martin Behrman would call at Cheribon for cargo and that transaction had been approved by State Dept. Any statement that your proposed transaction has official approval is misleading. You will note from Deptel Jan 28 to you that on basis assurances given you and Dept by Neth Indies Govt representative Wash concerning that Govt’s trade regulations, Dept registered no objection your proceeding with transaction at your own risk and responsibility.” Forward text new regulations air pouch. Marshall 19 E. C. Zimmerman, Trade Commissioner for the Netherlands East Indies in the United States. 20 Telegram 38, January 31, 10 p.m., from Batavia, not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 656D.006/2–647: Telegram [Document 698] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State restricted Batavia , February 6, 1947—3 p.m. 40. Netherlands Indies Government issued a number of decrees on January 28 effective January 29 confirming import and export trade through ports of Republican de facto area. The decrees and their accompanying regulations are far too voluminous to telegraph but the following are the most important and urgent provisions thereof: Ships bound for Republican ports must first stop at Dutch port for cargo inspection and clearance. If there is no contraband on board ship will be permitted to proceed. Contraband includes everything suitable for military purposes; all machinery and goods suitable for the manufacture of military equipment or munitions; all means of transport by sea, land, air; radio telegraph and telephone equipment; gold, silver and all currencies. The only goods which may be exported freely from Republican ports are so-called native produce distinguished from European plantation or estate products. All exports of estate products from Republican ports are prohibited and ships carrying such cargo may be taken into Dutch ports, unloaded and cargos confiscated. Cinchona and derivatives, tea and palm oil are classified as estate products in all areas of the Netherland Indies. In addition, estate products in Java and Madoera also include coffee, rubber, cane sugar, tobacco and fibers. North of the line Bengkalis–Sibolga in Sumatra, Gambier, rubber, tobacco and fibers are classed as estate products and are not subject to legal exportation from Republican ports. Native pepper, tea, tapioca in Java; and native coffee, rubber, tobacco, copra, gums and rattan in south Sumatra presumably may be exported. Dutch Navy is expected to be very strict in the application and enforcement of the regulations. It is suggested that the Isthmian Steamship Company, Isbrandtsen Steamship Company, American Lines and any other companies interested in the ocean carrying trade be informed of the contents of this telegram. Full texts of the decrees and accompanying regulations have been forwarded by air pouch via Legation at Cairo. Foote The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/2–1047: Telegram [Document 699] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Hornbeck ) to the Secretary of State confidential The Hague , February 10, 1947—5 p.m. 99. Rejection [of] Dutch Government interpretation Linggadjati Agreement by Indonesian Cabinet, which declares such interpretation as violation original agreement, viewed with concern by Foreign Office official charged with Indies matter, who says “critical situation” thus created. Informant added Government awaiting official views Republican Government and report from Commission General before deciding its future policy. Hornbeck The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/2–1147: Telegram [Document 700] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , February 11, 1947—4 p.m. 45. Political situation is highly confused, reached impasse and pessimism growing. In spite all promises Indos have not yet issued cease-fire order, 21 with result Dutch lost more troops since truce agreement of October 14 than prior thereto. Dutch patience, which being tried sorely, taken by Indos as sign of weakness. Republican Cabinet at Djocja stated last Saturday that Indo delegates authorized sign Cheribon Agreement on basis its wording minutes of meetings and correspond[ence] between the two delegations and that statements made by Jonkman 22 or others at Hague not to be considered. General Soedirman has issued orders to prepare for destruction bridges, factories, et cetera, on “Bandoeng front”. From February 4 to 8 Soekarno and Soedirman conferred with commanders of the seven Indo divisions in Java re “present critical situation”. Feeling is growing that Soekarno either does not want truce and general agreement or is unable enforce his desires on Soedirman. Opinion prevails at palace and business circles that even if Cheribon Agreement is signed such will only be the beginning of the real troubles. No one believes that Indos will carry out article 14 of agreement with result that gloom is all pervading. Commission General asked Indos what points of Jonkman’s statement they objected to. They could not or would not name them, merely maintaining that they did not like it and would not take it into consideration. Indo Cabinet not yet returned from Djocja but I shall have personal talk with Sjahrir when he returns to obtain information. Foote 21 On February 15 the Indonesians officially informed the Dutch that the ceasefire order had been issued effective that midnight, but later reports indicated that fighting continued in various places (856E.00/2–1547). 22 Jan A. Jonkman, Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 656D.006/3–147: Telegram [Document 701] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential u.s. urgent Washington , March 3, 1947—7 p.m. 103. Deptel 57 Jan 31 and urtel 135 Mar 1. 23 Please inform FonOff orally as follows: Amer ship Martin Behrman sailed from Philippines to Cheribon, Java, on express assurance of Neth Embassy Wash that voyage and proposed purchases agreeable Neth Indies Govt. Subsequent to this assurance Neth Indies Govt promulgated new regulations Jan 29 in effect abrogating approval given by Neth Embassy. Ship’s Captain and owners advised of new regulations while ship en route Cheribon and Dept on several occasions advised them of possible consequences to them of failure to comply with NEI regulations. Nevertheless Neth Govt must realize Amer public opinion will not understand or condone any injury to Amer personnel on board Martin Behrman . Dept deprecates tone statement, copy of which given AmConsul Batavia Feb 27 by NEI authorities with regard possible arbitrary action against vessel and crew 24 (Deptel 102 Mar 1 25 ). US Govt reserves all rights in regard to any injury to ship or personnel. US Govt considers amicable adjustment Martin Behrman imperative. Case of Martin Behrman is direct effect Jan 29 regulations. While avowed purpose regulations is to prevent export stolen property and assure compensation lawful owners, practical effect is to paralyze trade with NEI, and to prolong and intensify economic disturbances already resulting from world shortages commodities covered by these regulations. Moreover, regulations are so inclusive as to prohibit importation to NEI of many articles urgently required for civilian needs. The Linggadjati Agreement requires Indonesian Govt restore all foreign property to its owners. US Govt earnestly urges that, pending ratification agreement, some procedures be effected by means of which commodities covered in regulations can promptly reach channels of world trade subject protection rights of lawful owners whatever nationality. We consider that early restoration of normal exchange of goods between Indies and rest of world is one of most necessary and practical means of bringing about stability in Indies and South East Asia as a whole in which US cannot but have an abiding interest. US Govt urges, therefore, early reconsideration by Neth Govt of import-export regulations which have been adopted by NEI Govt. In your approach Neth authorities, endeavor focus their attention broader consequences which their policies in NEI may have in relation to early political and economic world stabilization. Sent to The Hague as 103 for action and to London 1005 for information citing 1308 from London, Feb 27, 26 and to Batavia for information citing 64 from Batavia, Feb 28. Marshall 23 Neither printed. 24 Reported in telegram 64, February 28, 11 p.m., from Batavia, not printed. 25 This repeated telegram 64 from Batavia. 26 Not printed; it reported a British protest over Dutch seizure or restraint of British vessels on the high seas (856E.00/2–2747). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 656D.006/3–847: Telegram [Document 702] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential us urgent Washington , March 8, 1947—5 p.m. 114. Urtels 147, 150 Mar 6. 27 Dept considers oral observations Chief, Political Section 28 as well as Neth press release unsatisfactory in tone and substance. Pls deliver following by hand to FonMin 29 immediately. “Excellency: I am instructed by my Govt to inform you as follows: The Dept of State regards the oral observations made to this Emb, as well as the press release of the Neth Govt of Mar 6, on the subject of representations made by the US Govt to the Neth Govt in regard to the NEI import-export regulations and in regard to the Martin Behrman as unresponsive and in certain other respects unsatisfactory. The Neth Govt is aware that the US Govt has borne in the past, and continues to bear, a large part of the burden of relieving world food shortages. Accordingly, the interest of the US in the situation now existing in the Neth Indies goes far deeper than its own need to acquire commodities available in the Neth Indies for its own purposes. The US Govt is interested in the immediate export of commodities which are needed throughout the world for the relief of world shortages which are prolonging widespread economic disturbances. Therefore, in view of the US Govt’s immediate and compelling responsibilities in respect to the relief of such shortages, it can not be satisfied with the statement of the Neth Govt that ‘the new export and import regulations have in view the promotion of legal export’. The principal interest of the US Govt in the export-import regulations of Jan 29 is not in their intent but in their effect. It was to an immediate and salutary modification of the effect of the regulations that the Dept’s representations of Mar 3 were directed. The Dept remains unconvinced that the regulations will ‘divert exports to regular channels’. In the view of the Dept the effect of the regulations is to place upon the ordinary course of trade with the Neth Indies such uncertainties and complex procedures as to make it improbable that the commodities known to be available will in fact be forthcoming. The Dept of State considers that any measures taken by the Neth Govt which tend to retard the economic rehabilitation of the Indies seriously and adversely affect world political and economic stabilization. Accordingly, in view of the FonOff statement that the regulations are not designed to hamper export trade, the attention of the Neth Govt is invited to the absolute prohibition of the importation into territory within the de facto jurisdiction of the Indonesian Republic of producer and consumer goods without which commercial relations can not be resumed and economic rehabilitation of the Neth Indies can not take place. For example, the great need for the rehabilitation of the transportation system of the NEI is well known. The regulations of Jan 29 absolutely prohibit the importation into Java, Sumatra or Madura of motor vehicles or railroad equipment of any sort. The Dept of State therefore urgently requests that prompt consideration be given to the revision of the export-import regulations of Jan 29 in a manner which will make possible the movement of the commodities covered by them into the normal channels of world trade.” Pls point out to FonMin orally the following: A. With regard to SS Martin Behrman , 30 continued widespread publicity, both press and radio, caused by this incident is having a harmful effect upon traditionally favorable attitude of American public toward Neth which may well outweigh in importance financial considerations involved. Fact Isbrandtsen Company sought and obtained before undertaking transaction specific assurances from Neth Emb, Wash that purchase rubber, sugar, other commodities at Cheribon through agency Perseroan Bank not in conflict existing NEI regulations gives slant to publicity favorable to Company and unfavorable to Dutch while recent press reports of physical constraint in moving vessel at Batavia are arousing unfavorable public reaction. Dept therefore earnestly requests prompt remedial action case Martin Behrman. B. With regard to trade regulations, situation somewhat analagous to that which exists in the NEI developed in Siam in 1946 in connection with export tin metal and tin concentrates which had been mined from foreign-owned concessions during war. It was proposed during early stage of discussions to restrict export all tin from Siam until bona fides its ownership could be established. It became obvious proposal require proof non-foreign origin as condition to exportation tin would act as practical prohibition upon any substantial export this metal, would impose prohibitive burden on exporters who had clear title, and would seriously and adversely affect economy Siam. Agreement was therefore reached between Siam and Govts concerned upon a stated amount of tin as amount derived from foreign-owned concessions and upon method of paying compensation which made full allowance for expenditures incurred in production such tin by others than concessions holders. The effect of this agreement has been to afford fair protection to lawful concession holder, to remove cloud on title to tin in Siam, allowing it freely enter world market, and to permit Siam promptly to realize benefit foreign exchange made available to her through its sale. While recognizing greater complexity problem in NEI, this Govt believes similar arrangements could be made with de facto Indonesian Republic especially in light of Article XIV of Linggadjati Agreement. Acheson 27 Neither printed. 28 Jonkheer Van Vredenburch. 29 Dr. Carel Godfried W. H. Baron Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout. 30 Telegram 68, March 3, 10 p.m., from Batavia reported that the ship reached Batavia on March 2 “voluntarily and under own steam”, thus avoiding an “unhappy incident which certainly would have occurred if ship had attempted illegal sailing.” (656 D.00613–347) The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 656D.006/3–947: Telegram [Document 703] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State Batavia , March 9, 1947—4 p.m. 77. Master of Martin Behrman today made an affidavit as quoted below: “Rudy Gray, being of lawful age and being duly sworn, deposes and says: That at 1 p.m. March 7, 1947, one Dutch civilian, one Dutch Army officer and two armed enlisted men came aboard the steamship Martin Behrman , of which he is the Master, and informed him that they had a court order to seize the cargo of the ship; That he asked them where the court order was; to which he pointed to a brief case and said ‘I have it here’; that the civilian then said ‘First I have come here to ask whether you will cooperate in discharging the cargo’; that he replied ‘No, not only will I not cooperate but if you send any stevedores aboard without armed guards, I will have my crew throw them overboard’; that the civilian then left the ship immediately and has not been seen by him again; that he ordered the Chief Mate to take up the gangway; that four armed Dutch marines, who came aboard while he was talking to the above-mentioned civilian, forcibly prevented the Chief Mate from taking up the gangway as had been ordered by him; that at about 1:15 p.m. the same day, 22 armed Dutch soldiers and marines came aboard and took up stations all around the deck; that at about 1:30 the same day, 20 armed Dutch secret police came aboard to supplement 2 armed secret police who were already aboard; that at about 2 p.m. the same day, a Dutch Naval Lieutenant and a pilot came aboard and asked if they could have any assistance in moving the ship; that he said ‘No’; that the Dutch Naval Lieutenant then placed 16 Naval Blue Jackets armed with rifles near the gangway; that the pilot then asked him if he could have steam on deck, to which he replied ‘No’; that the 16 armed Blue Jackets were then called aboard ship; that he then informed the Naval Lieutenant as follows: ‘The ship is yours. I am no longer in command’; that the Naval Lieutenant then said: ‘I have orders to seize this ship and take it to another dock’; that he then said to the Dutch Naval Lieutenant, ‘Where is your order?’, to which he replied, ‘I have orders not to show anyone who signed my orders’; that he then said ‘You then have the ship). I am leaving’; that the Naval Lieutenant then called aboard 20 additional armed Dutch marines; that there were then 87 armed Dutch personnel aboard the ship; that at 2:20 p.m. the same day, he left the ship, refusing to remain aboard while the ship was out of his control.” Foote Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeastern Asian Affairs (Lacy) 856E.00/3–1247 [Document 704] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeastern Asian Affairs ( Lacy ) confidential [ Washington ,] March 12, 1947. Participants: Mr. Alfred Stirling, Minister, Australian Embassy; Mr. John H. Morgan, 31 NOE; Mr. W. S. B. Lacy, SEA. Subject: Australian Proposal to Raise Indonesian Situation in Security Council. Mr. Stirling called yesterday at his request and handed Mr. Lacy the attached copy of a telegram from the Australian Prime Minister to the Australian Ambassador in Washington. 32 Mr. Lacy agreed on that occasion to communicate the Department’s views as soon as possible. Accordingly Mr. Stirling called at Mr. Lacy’s request March 12, at 2:30 p.m., and was advised by Mr. Morgan and Mr. Lacy that in view of the very recent approval of the Cheribon Agreement by the Indonesian Central National Committee and in view of the Department’s understanding that the Dutch Government at present takes an optimistic view of the possibility of early ratification of the Agreement, as well as of the situation in Indonesia as a whole, the Department was disinclined to adopt a new course of action in respect of the Indonesian situation at the present time. Mr. Stirling was advised that the Department would receive with interest any information which the Australian Government might possess indicating that the Indonesian situation was further deteriorating and that should new developments occur in Indonesia foreshadowing a further deterioration in the relations between the Dutch and the Indonesians, the Department would be happy to consider any proposals suggested by the Australian Government for a peaceful solution of the problem. W[ illiam ] S. B. L[ acy ] 31 Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs. 32 Norman J. O. Makin was Australian Ambassador; and Joseph B. Chifley, Prime Minister; telegram not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 656.56D31/3–1247: Airgram [Document 705] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential Washington , March 12, 1947. A–55. For your information: Professors Weyer and de Kat Angelino, Dutch representatives, 33 have informed Department that Neth Govt proposes to supplement Linggadjati Agreement by economic agreement with each of three states of projected United States of Indonesia. Even if Republic refuses, Dutch hope to negotiate such agreement with East Indonesia and Borneo. Purpose of proposed agreement is to attract foreign capital as essential to rehabilitation of N.E.I. Main points proposed agreement are: 1. Sound currency system under control autonomous central bank of issue similar Java Bank to be chartered first by states and then by U.S.I. for specified period of time. 2. Sound control of foreign exchange by autonomous body with right of foreign investors to remit at least income and amortization. 3. Sound governmental financial policies. 4. Agreed rates of duty on exports produced by foreign capital and imports essential to foreign capital enterprise, to remain in force, say, twenty-five years but subject to change by agreement between Neth and Indonesian Govts. 5. A guarantee of all prewar rights and obligations of foreign capital for a specified period, say twenty-five years, which would inter alia prevent nationalization of foreign holdings. Dutch representatives stated that they were not here to request U.S. Govt loan but, believing rehabilitation of N.E.I. would require private capital, Dutch Govt hoped their proposals could have moral support this Govt; that they might so inform Indonesians; and that, if necessary, U.S. would so inform Indonesians. Dept has informed Dutch representatives that it is unwilling to give any assurance that this Govt would urge on, or suggest to, Indonesians acceptance of the proposed economic agreement; that it cannot subscribe to proposal which would involve presentation to Indonesians by Neth Govt of proposed economic agreement as embodying views U.S. Govt. Dept stated this Govt is deeply interested in prompt economic rehabilitation N.E.I. and recognizes that foreign capital must play important part in such reconstruction and that stable government and currency and reasonable foreign exchange controls will facilitate such reconstruction; that it considers that immediate free and unhampered trade and commerce between N.E.I. and rest of world is one of most essential steps to world rehabilitation as well as to economic rehabilitation of the N.E.I.; that it believes that “open door” policy is an essential predicate of such free and unhampered commerce. Dept expressed hope that whatever plans may be proposed will complement and not restrict economic development of Indies by Indonesians, and that care will be taken not to give foreign capital position of special privilege, which might result in developing antagonism to capitalism and ideologies of Western democracy and which might, if such antagonism became strong enough, result in liquidation of such foreign capital and undoing of economic rehabilitation of area. Informal conversations on technical level continuing. Sent to The Hague. Repeated to London and Batavia. Acheson 33 On the Far Eastern Commission, Washington. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 656D.006/3–1047: Telegram [Document 706] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 34 confidential Washington , March 13, 1947—4 p.m. 125. Urtels 147, Mar 6, 35 and 166, Mar 10. 36 It seems possible from various oral observations made to you by FonMin and Director Political Affairs that FonOff may not have been properly informed by Neth Emb Wash and may in good faith believe that Isbrandtsen reed no assurances from Emb or NEI authorities in regard his transaction with Perseroan Bank. There may be some danger therefore that FonOff may base its eventual reply on incorrect appreciation of facts. Following are facts re Neth Emb assurances: James W. Ryan, representing Isbrandtsen Co, on or about Jan 21 asked Dept’s advice concerning proposed commercial transaction his Co and Perseroan Bank involving lifting cargo rubber, sugar, other commodities, Cheribon. Ryan advised at that time that owing uncertainty political conditions and owing Dept’s info that NEI anthorities opposed purchase commodities Indonesian ports on grounds uncertainty title, Dept considered proposed transaction premature, financially risky, and politically inexpedient. On Jan 27 meeting was called in Dept to consider question with Ryan present. Dept’s views previously expressed to Ryan were reiterated. Dept’s approval of transaction, sought by Ryan, was not granted. Ryan then stated that in informal conversations with Van Kleffens, 37 and Loudon, 38 and Janssen, he was given to understand that Neth Govt had no objection to proposed transaction. On basis these statements, Dept agreed reconsider question and send Ryan telegraphic reply New York. On same day (Jan 27) E. C. Zimmerman, Neth Indies Trade Commissioner, requested appointment to discuss matter and, in presence two Dept officials, stated that Neth Govt not only did not oppose proposed transaction, but favored it as implementation Linggadjati Agreement. Zimmerman suggested Dept interpose no objections to proposed transaction. When asked whether he represented Neth Emb in this matter, Zimmerman replied that he did. He reiterated to Dept assurances previously given Ryan, namely, that proposed transaction would not violate any existing NEI trade regulations. After Zimmerman’s departure, Dept officer telephoned Neth Emb to make sure that Zimmerman spoke with authority Amb. Dept officer was advised by a First Secretary that Zimmerman had previously discussed whole matter thoroughly with Loudon and that he was presumably authorized speak for Emb on question. Accordingly, on Jan 28 Dept advised Isbrandtsen as reported Deptel 57 Jan 31. 39 Dept desires you, without awaiting FonOff’s written reply Deptel 114 Mar 8, inform Boetzelaer or Vredenburch orally of above, pointing out that, in view Emb assurances to Isbrandtsen and in view NEI Govt’s intention ship cargo to USA in Amer vessel (Deptel 122 Mar 12 39 ), Dept considers discrimination against Isbrandtsen in favor member Batavia Conference would be unjust, unfair & inadvisable. For your info, National Maritime Union, in tel to Dept, has formally protested alleged actions NEI authorities against members Behrman’s crew. Tel intimates possible reprisal action NMU against Dutch shipping. Acheson 34 Repeated to Batavia as No. 65. 35 Not printed. 36 Not printed; it reported oral observations in reply to the American note, to which a written reply was promised, and concluded that the apparent purpose of the Dutch authorities in the Indies was “to force Indonesian signature Linggadjati Agreement as price of aid to economic rehabilitation Indonesian controlled areas”. (656D.006/3–1047) 37 Dr. Eelco N. Van Kleffens, former Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs. 38 Dr. Alexander Loudon, Netherlands Ambassador to the United States. 39 Not printed. 39 Not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 656.56D31/3–1747: Telegram [Document 707] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret rush Batavia , March 17, 1947—4 p.m. 87. Boon, political adviser to Van Mook, just came to me to say Netherlands Government authorized signing of Cheribon Agreement with Jonkman’s statement merely “Dutch interpretation”. Yesterday Sjahrir wrote letter to Van Mook accepting this provided Jonkman’s statement merely “interpretation of Dutch viewpoint”. Sjahrir reserved right discuss matter after signing agreement. Van Mook and Commission General have sent urgent telegram to Hague recommending signing agreement at once. 40 It understood another agreement regulating traffic of goods between Dutch and Indo territories will become effective at same time. Further details unavailable now. Have asked Ryan of Isbrandtsen please cease agitation and remain quiet to give both sides chance reach agreement. Foote 40 According to telegram 89, March 18, 4 p.m., from Batavia, on March 18 announcement was made that the agreement would be signed (856E.01/3–1847). Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) 656D.006/3–2047 [Document 708] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs ( Morgan ) [ Washington ,] March 20, 1947. I called Mr. J. Webb Benton, Counselor of our Embassy at The Hague today in regard to the Martin Behrman case. I told him that I was speaking for myself as Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs in the absence of Hugh Cumming and for Jack Hickerson as Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs. I requested Mr. Benton to get in touch urgently and on a personal basis with Mr. Vredenburch in regard to this case. I told Mr. Benton that since Mr. Vredenburch had served in this country and knows Jack Hickerson and me he should be able to estimate the seriousness of a situation which required us to telephone in this manner. I stated the telephone in NOE rings constantly with a new Congressman inquiring about the case. Members of the Congressional Committee on the Maritime and Fisheries Committee are thinking seriously of asking for an investigation of the State Department’s handling of the case. Isbrandtsen is busily putting over his own story. Resultant public reaction is very hostile to the Dutch. Hostility is increased by reports that Japanese POW’s are being used for unloading the Martin Behrman , reports that part of the cargo, the cinchona, has already been put on a British ship bound for Liverpool and that other parts of the cargo have been put on Dutch vessels and shipped to Rotterdam. All the notes and comments, et cetera by the Foreign Office and by Vredenburch so far received are based on legal considerations and the question of Dutch prestige in the NEI as regards the Indonesians and the Chinese. What the Dutch should think of is the prestige that they are losing and the ill-will they are creating in a much more important quarter, the US. (At this point Mr. Benton asked about the telegram 41 of yesterday about the cargo shipped to effect Dutch substituting another cargo to be shipped on Isthmian Line boat.) I told Mr. Benton that we had received the aforementioned telegram but it was not regarded as satisfactory—not in any degree. I told him that the Dutch are going to run into much more serious sanctions in this country if they continue to look at this question as an isolated, small legal incident. I told him that the cargo should be put back on the Martin Behrman and the Martin Behrman sent out with that cargo to the US as promptly as possible; that is the only thing that will satisfy public opinion here. Unless the Dutch can get that through their heads they will find all kinds of difficulties in the future. He should tell Vredenburch of this call at once and point out the urgency with which this case is regarded here. I pointed out that we keep getting telegrams saying that we will get an answer on the 17th, then the 18th, 19th and so on, but we have received no definite word as yet. Pressure is building up. These replies represent a legalistic point of view and sound as though they are dealing with this case as a minor one purely on its legal merits. We have followed an entirely correct attitude towards the legal questions, but this is not the point. The thing is out of our hands now, however, as far as public opinion is concerned. It is entirely a question of common sense now. I told him that he could say that everything he says is solidly backed up by the State Department. Get the cargo on the ship and get it moving! Mr. Benton said that he would get in touch with Vredenburch right away and try to give me an answer by tomorrow. John H. Morgan 41 No. 195, March 19, 8 p.m., from The Hague, not printed. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) 656D.006/3–2147 [Document 709] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs ( Morgan ) [ Washington ,] March 21, 1947. Counselor Benton telephoned from The Hague the following oral reply by Mr. Vredenburch to the representations made by him at the Department’s instruction last night: (1) NEI Government prepared to provide Martin Behrman with another and similar cargo so that Isbrandtsen Line will not be deprived freight. Give full compensation for costs resulting from voyage Cheribon to Tandjong Priok and costs resulting from unloading. This compensation procedure can be settled by eventual arbitration. (2) However, the NEI Government can only give these compensations if the Isbrandtsen Line is prepared to declare that they will not take any measures against this cargo in the US. (This means that the owners of this cargo will be free to sell such cargo in the US.) If Isbrandtsen is not prepared to do this, Martin Behrman can only be given cargo for European ports. (3) It will be seen that case of Martin Behrman does not constitute impediment to shipments for the US in as much as the NEI Government is willing to ship on her a cargo the same as the one that the Martin Behrman carried. Nine hundred tons of rubber are all ready for shipment. (4) Measures will be taken in cooperation between NEI and Indonesian officials to expedite export trade as soon as Linggadjati Agreement has been signed. Serious consequences would result if the Martin Behrman is allowed to ship its original cargo to US. One hundred and fifty Chinese smugglers from Singapore are ready to proceed to NEI port with view forwarding goods from Indies far below market prices. Detrimental consequences NEI economy would result. (5) If Martin Behrman allowed to ship the original cargo, Chinese boycott would automatically result in Singapore and the danger that this boycott would spread to other harbors from which goods are being exported to the NEI, in which case serious famine in the NEI would result. John H. Morgan The Chargé in the Netherlands (Benton) to the Secretary of State 656D.006/3–2247: Telegram [Document 710] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Benton ) to the Secretary of State us urgent The Hague , March 22, 1947. 200. Netherlands Government has released to press statement translation of which follows: “Continued friendly contact between the Netherlands and American Governments has led to agreement as to the solving of the difficulties attendant upon the voyage of the Martin Behrman to Indonesian waters. The Netherlands Government have informed the American Government that they deplore not only these difficulties, but also the disturbance created thereby in the public opinion of the Netherlands and the United States. In the view of the Netherlands Government those difficulties have to a large extent resulted from the refusal of the Isbrandtsen Line to comply with the Netherlands Indies regulations and with the advice and direction given to the company by both the Netherlands and the American Government. It has been repeatedly pointed out both to the Isbrandtsen Line and to the Martin Behrman what consequences could ensue if the existing regulations in the Netherlands Indies were not observed. This is clearly apparent from the joint statement issued today by the Netherlands Ministries for Overseas Territories and Foreign Affairs. To remove the difficulties and taking into consideration the fact that the Martin Behrman was already en route to Cheribon before the new Netherlands Indies import and export regulations were announced, the Netherlands Indies Government has agreed to give the Martin Behrman a legal cargo, thus enabling the ship to earn the same freight charges. Furthermore, the Netherlands Indies Government has agreed to refund to the ship’s owners the cost of proceeding from Cheribon to Tandjong Priok, which costs may be fixed by arbitration. The Netherlands Indies Government, however, can only follow this course, provided the Isbrandtsen Steamship Company declares for her part that she will not take action in the United States against the cargo that now will be carried as otherwise only cargo consigned to European ports could be provided. As follows from yesterday’s statement by the State Dept, 42 the American Government consider the matter closed. The Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Government rejoice with the American Government that it has been found possible to reach agreement promptly as soon as all the necessary data had become available.” 43 Benton 42 For Department press release of March 21 and editorial note on the Martin Behrman case, see Department of State Bulletin , April 20, 1947, p. 720. 43 Telegram 201, March 22, 4 p.m., from The Hague quoted the Netherlands Government’s reply of March 21 to the American note (656D.006/3–2247). Telegrams 146, March 25, to The Hague and 219, March 29, from The Hague, indicated that a difference of interpretation ensued between Washington and The Hague (656D.006/3–2247, 3–2947). The Chargé in the Netherlands (Benton) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/3–2647: Telegram [Document 711] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Benton ) to the Secretary of State secret The Hague , March 26, 1947—6 p.m. 212. In course conversation with me today Foreign Minister said, referring to recent signing Linggadjati Agreement, 44 that he now feels Western Powers, including US, Great Britain, France and Netherlands, should “get together” and cooperate closely on economic, financial and other problems in Far East. He did not elaborate but added that Dutch Ambassador Moscow might be expected approach Chief US delegation Moscow 45 with view ascertaining his views this matter. Repeated Moscow as 2. Benton 44 The Linggadjati (or Cheribon) Agreement was signed at Rijswijk Palace, Batavia, March 25. Despatch 225, April 16, from Batavia, received May 8, gave a full account of the signing, with texts of documents (856E.01/4–1647). 45 The Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held at Moscow, March 10–April 12, 1947. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 656D.006/3–2247: Telegram [Document 712] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential Washington , April 1, 1947—7 p.m. 155. Inform FonOff that proposals relative Martin Behrman set forth Note (urtel 201, Mar 22 46 ) appeared fair in view special considerations affecting undertaking of voyage, would have liquidated aspects giving rise to diplomatic discussions and, on official information presently available Dept, relegated further determinations to regular judicial proceedings if desired by Isbrandtsen. As stated Deptel 146 Mar 25 46 Isbrandtsen Counsel informed offer including statement no waiver legal rights except points specifically set forth Neth Note. In anticipation meeting Isbrandtsen query raised here whether Neth Note in fact expressed Neth intentions. Inquiry this point therefore made. Dept unwilling urge US citizen waive such legal rights he may have in order settle awkward diplomatic situation. Dept has therefore communicated new proposals to Isbrandtsen without recommendation 47 and will forward reply when received. Believe Isbrandtsen reply will wait on Ryan’s return and probably be negative. Ryan leaving Batavia Apr 2. Acheson 46 See footnote 43, p. 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 710 ] . 46 See footnote 43, p. 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 710 ] . 47 Letter dated March 31, not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.01/4–347: Telegram [Document 713] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia restricted us urgent Washington , April 3, 1947—7 p.m. 89. 1. You are requested to express to Van Mook and Sjahrir gratification this Govt at signing Linggadjati Agreement. 2. You are further requested to inform Van Mook and Sjahrir in writing that the US recognizes de facto jurisdiction of Republic of Indonesia in Sumatra, Java and Madoera and consequently that you are authorized to deal with Republican Govt on matters within competence of that Govt on a de facto basis on behalf of this Govt. 48 3. At your early convenience you should, if possible, proceed to Djockja and express to Soekarno this Govt’s gratification at signing Linggadjati Pact. 4. You should also inform Van Mook, Sjahrir and Soekarno of earnest hope this Govt that further negotiations implement Linggadjati Pact will be approached by both Neth and Republican Govts with resolution to achieve objectives outlined in Pact and with mutual understanding and respect for views of the other Govt and peoples it represents. AmEmbassy, Hague being requested notify FonOfE in similar vein. 49 Acheson 48 In telegram 119, April 8, 3 p.m., from Batavia, Consul General Foote reported the absence in India of Premier Sjahrir and added: “My sincere opinion is that de facto recognition of republic now will either torpedo Linggadjati Pact or greatly delay its implementation. It appears Indo extremists are seeking every possible way to delay or destroy the pact. Recognition now, plus case of ship Martin Behrman , will go long way to delay fulfillment.” (856E.01/4–847) 49 Telegram 159, April 3, 7 p.m., to The Hague, not printed. The Chargé in the Netherlands (Benton) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/4–447: Telegram [Document 714] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Benton ) to the Secretary of State The Hague , April 4, 1947. 233. By note dated April 3 circulated all Missions here, FonOff advises by reference articles 12 and 13 Linggadjati Agreement which provide respectively for establishment US of Indonesia and union before January 1, 1949 and for admission US Indonesia as member UN after formation of union, that after union shall have been established “cooperation in field of foreign relations shall inter alia be considered as being of joint interest to the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the Netherlands, Surinam and Curaçao), and the US of Indonesia (article 7 of the Linggadjati Agreement)”. FonOff note adds that until US Indonesia and union are constituted Netherlands Government remains solely responsible for foreign relations Netherlands Kingdom (Netherlands, NEI, Surinam and Curaçao). Finally note states that in order adjust international position Netherlands Kingdom to situation created by signing Linggadjati Agreement as rapidly as possible and in conformity article 15 of agreement Netherlands Government is prepared “to admit a suitable number of Indonesian officials to be selected in mutual consultation with Government of Indonesian Republic into the foreign service of the Netherlands”. FonOff explains verbally that note designed to clarify certain misconceptions regarding agreement appearing in foreign press and that while not intended for immediate publication in Netherlands context note may be used abroad for any useful purpose. Copy of note together with “unofficial” English translation agreement attached to note forwarded by next air mail pouch. 50 Benton 50 A similar communication was made to the Department by the Netherlands Embassy on April 12 (856E.01/4–1247). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 656D.006/4–247: Telegram [Document 715] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential Washington , April 4, 1947—8 p.m. 163. Urtel 201, Mar 22. 51 Inform FonOff Isbrandtsen by letter Apr 2 rejected Neth proposals Martin Behrman , stating Neth requirement Isbrandtsen waive legal rights old cargo (Dept’s 146, Mar 25, Embtel 219, Mar 29 51 ) “completely ignores our interests as factors and merchants of which position Dutch well aware when arrangements made originally. In view our attitude previously expressed and now more especially because of this condition, since added by Dutch, requiring waiver by us of all our rights, we are compelled to reject this latest proposal as unfair, unjust and in direct violation of the Agreement we had with Netherlands Indies Govt before Martin Behrman set sail for Netherlands East Indies.” 52 Acheson 51 See footnote 43, p. 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 710 ] . 51 See footnote 43, p. 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 710 ] . 52 The ship sailed for Singapore on April 3 without cargo (656D.006/4–547). On April 21 the Department wrote Mr. Isbrandtsen that he “should take appropriate measures to exhaust all legal remedies available” in Netherlands courts before being entitled to diplomatic interposition in support of claims against the Netherlands (656D.006/4–347). On April 22 Consul General Foote was informed by the district judge at Batavia that the ship’s case would be reviewed August 25 when the master should appear or be represented by local attorney, as otherwise the case would be decided against him (656D.006/4–2247). The Chargé in the Netherlands (Benton) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/4–547: Telegram [Document 716] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Benton ) to the Secretary of State restricted The Hague , April 5, 1947—4 p.m. 235. Deptel 159, April 3. 53 Foreign Office informed as directed. This morning Vredenburch handed me note dated April 5 which reads as follows: “I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of April 4 in which you inform me that the United States of America recognizes the de facto jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia. I assume that it is the intention of the United States Govt to recognize the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Linggadjati Agreement, as signed by the Netherlands and Indonesian delegations on March 25 in Batavia. In accordance with this agreement, the Royal Netherlands Govt remain solely and exclusively responsible for all foreign relations of the Kingdom of the Netherlands until the United States of Indonesia and the Netherland-Indonesian Union will have been constituted. I had already the honour to bring this to your attention in my note of April 3. “Therefore, all matters concerning the Netherlands Indies, whether re territories being under the de facto authority of the Republic of Indonesia, or other component parts of the future United States of Indonesia, as for example the state East Indonesia, or other territories, whose status remains to be established, should be dealt with by the consular officers of foreign powers through the intermediacy of the Far Eastern Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Batavia.” For note April 3, please see Embtel 233, April 4. Vredenburch expressed regret that we had brought up question recognition at this time, adding that it could only tend make more difficult Dutch relations with Indonesians. He also expressed strong hope that, if Dept makes public statement to effect that AmConsul General Batavia being authorized deal with Republican Govt on matters within competence that Govt on a de facto basis on behalf American Govt, such statement should make it clear that dealings envisaged should be through, or at least have sanction of, Netherlands Foreign Office representative Batavia. Benton 53 See last paragraph of telegram 89, April 3, to Batavia, and footnote 49, p. 912. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 856E.01/4–1747 [Document 717] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State secret [ Moscow ,] April 7, 1947. The Dutch Ambassador called on me at noon today and left at 1:15. The subject of his discussion was the view of the Dutch Government that “Up till now there is little indication of a common policy of the Great Western Powers towards China, Japan and India. This is even more fatal where it concerns the weak Asiatic countries such as Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indo-China, the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines.” The attached paper is a concise statement of the views expressed by him on the general subject. 54 When questioned concerning the possible formalization of procedure in the matter, he presented no definite proposition, stating that the Dutch Government first wished to get my personal reaction on the general proposition. When questioned regarding specific procedure of such cooperation, he was lead into a discussion of the economic factors which included a statement by him to the effect that it was desired that the various business enterprises upon which the prosperity of the Far East and these small countries in particular depended, should be secured against disruption and against gradual deterioration through the inability of the natives themselves to operate and maintain them. I understood him to mean specifically that the Netherlands Government had in mind a procedure between the democratic governments immediately concerned which would protect these business enterprises, I presume largely foreign if not entirely foreign owned, against the disorganization and deterioration which it was felt would inevitably follow, if, for example, these businesses were nationalized or ex-appropriated [ expropriated ] and taken over by native technical management. The Ambassador also discussed the necessity of agreed interchange of goods which would give a balanced economy and prosperity to the regions concerned. I told the Ambassador that as far as I was concerned personally, and I was reasonably certain that it was the view of my Government, that we regarded some degree of cooperation among the democratic powers concerned in the Far East was necessary, both for the peace and prosperty of that region and also to offset the subversive activities which were in progress and which could easily excite destructive reactions. Other than that, I could not commit myself and that even that statement had no implication of agreement to the necessity for formalizing the procedure. 54 Not printed, but see memorandum of April 17, p. 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 856E.01/4–547: Telegram [Document 718] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential Washington , April 9, 1947—7 p.m. 168. Para 2 Deptel 159, Apr 3. 55 Late Apr 8 Neth Emb informed Dept that FoMin by telephone had requested US not have AmConGen Batavia deliver message Sjahrir. FoMin suggested message be delivered through Far Eastern Office FonOff Batavia opened Apr 1. Inform FonOff that Dept anxious avoid creation any difficulties or confusion in successful implementing Linggadjati, wired immediately ConGen Batavia withhold delivery Sjahrir message pending further instructions. 56 Accordingly, you are instructed request FonOff convey Indo Republic substance message, para 2 159, Apr 3 through its own channels. 57 This procedure discussed with Neth Emb Wash which agrees it most satisfactory in circumstances. Explain to FonOff that message drawn in consonance Linggadjati Agreement and in no way intended derogation Neth sovereignty NEI. Matters pertaining to foreign relations will, in accordance with that Agreement, be taken up with Neth authorities. Dept expects ConGen deal with de facto Indo authorities on local matters within competence those authorities. Dept would, of course, expect any of its consular officers in the territory under the de facto authority of the Republic to follow usual practice of dealing directly with local authorities on local matters within their competence such as protection U.S. nationals, property, shipping and commerce. Dept contemplates no issuance public statement foregoing. For your information our request that FonOff convey substance US position to Indo Republic rather than using Far Eastern Office Neth FonOff Batavia determined after consultation Neth Emb first because FonOff should now fully understand US position and second Dept not clear functions, powers or procedures FonOff branch Batavia. Dept has requested Neth Emb secure clarification and any info will be appreciated you can secure on relationship branch office to FonOff, and to NEI Govt, Republic and other component parts projected USI. 58 Repeated Batavia as no. 97. Acheson 55 See telegram 89, April 3, to Batavia, and footnote 49, p. 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 126 ] . 56 Telegram 92, April 8, 6 p.m., not printed. Telegram 120, April 9, 4 p.m., from Batavia, stated that the messages had not been delivered and further instructions were awaited. (856E.01/4–847, 4–947) 57 Telegram 247, April 10, 7 p.m., from The Hague, reported that the Netherlands Foreign Office had promised to convey the message to the Indonesian Republic (856E.01/4–1047). 58 Telegram 258, April 16, 11 a.m., from The Hague, reported the Foreign Office’s explanation of its branch at Batavia as a liaison and coordinating office directly responsible to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs (856E.01/4–1647). Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming) and the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat) 856E.00/4–1747 [Document 719] Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs ( Cumming ) and the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs ( Moffat ) 59 secret [ Washington ,] April 17, 1947. The Netherlands Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. Lovink, called on Secretary Marshall in Moscow to discuss the Netherlands Government’s views regarding the desirability of cooperation between the Western Democracies on problems affecting the Near, the Middle, and the Far East. 60 Ambassador Lovink’s proposals were of a general nature and no specific procedure for cooperation was suggested. Ambassador Lovink left two memoranda with the Secretary. In the first, emphasis is placed upon the need for Western Power cooperation “in the Social, Economic, and Cultural fields with the accent on the necessary work of reconstruction”. The memorandum stresses the vulnerability of the weaker countries of Southeast Asia (Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indo-China, the NEI, and the Philippines) to a Pan-Asiatic alliance under the aegis of India or China, and proposes that some form of joint Western Power cooperation is necessary to prevent such a development. The second memorandum depicts the growing influence of Communism in the Netherlands East Indies; emphasizes the ties existing between Indonesian Communists and Communist organizations in Singapore and China; and states that “the strategic stake for Moscow is high—a Communist stronghold situated between Singapore, the Philippines and Australia.” In reply, Secretary Marshall expressed himself as being in favor of “some degree of cooperation among the Democratic Powers concerned in the Far East”, but made no commitment regarding the necessity for formalizing the procedure. Our views regarding the Dutch proposals are as follows: 1. With respect to the Netherlands East Indies, we feel that a stabilization of the present Indonesian Republican Government within the framework of the basic political accord (Linggadjati Agreement) is desirable and can best be achieved by assisting promptly in the economic rehabilitation of the area, via US Government credits, private investments, and trade. While we are favorably inclined towards discussions leading to this end between a Dutch-Indonesian delegation on the one hand and US representatives on the other, we are not convinced at this time that joint Western Power discussions, including Great Britain and France, are desirable. If, however, the Netherlands Government wishes to make specific proposals concerning a procedure for cooperation, such proposals will be given careful consideration. We further think that such economic aid as this Government may extend, either alone or jointly, should be safeguarded so as not to prejudice a fair implementation of the Linggadjati Pact. 2. With respect to the danger of Communist domination of the Netherlands East Indies, we feel that Communist influence at the present is neither widespread nor effective. It is our hope that prompt measures to consolidate and strengthen the present Indonesian leadership (which we believe to be Socialist and not Communist, Nationalist and not Soviet-controlled) will eliminate those conditions which may make Communist infiltration effective. 3. In general, the US Government is in frequent contact with the Netherlands Government on matters concerning the Netherlands East Indies; our views and those of the British are substantially parallel; we feel that care should be taken lest a joint Western Power approach be interpreted by the Indonesians as a threat to their national aspirations and thus result in defeating our purpose of stabilizing the present Indonesian regime. For the present, therefore, we think that no followup of the Dutch proposals is necessary, but that specific proposals along these lines which the Dutch may present should be considered in the light of conditions then existing. We do not think it necessary for Mr. Acheson to see the attached file. 59 Addressed to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) and the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent), both of whom indicated concurrence. 60 See memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 7, p. 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 717 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 656D.006/4–1847: Telegram [Document 720] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential Washington , April 18, 1947—6 p.m. 179. Recent report from Batavia indicating progress in implementation Linggadjati Agreement and mentioning specifically import-export discussions is encouraging. At your discretion you may reiterate FonOff US view (Deptel 114 Mar 8 re Jan 29 regulations) importance agreement soonest possible to permit world trade on non-discriminatory basis with entire area, stressing our view that such trade will prove important factor in restoring economic stability NEI. Sent The Hague. Repeated Batavia. 61 Acheson 61 As telegram 101. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/4–1847: Telegram [Document 721] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , April 18, 1947—10 p.m. 137. Have learned from Gani, Indonesian Minister of Economic Affairs, that he and Van Hoogstraten 62 in virtual basic agreement re return to estates and other enterprises of private owners or their personnel. Indonesian proposals are: 1. Conditions under which they may return to be worked out by joint committee composed equal number Dutch and Republicans. If they fail agree, matter to be submitted Dutch and Indonesian delegations. Private owners to be represented on technical subcommittees. 2. This does not apply to private enterprises to be nationalized by Republic such as public works and utilities. 3. Owners to be permitted visit their estates and enterprises. This to be arranged in agreement with Republic which to facilitate contact between owners and laborers. 4. Goods produced before Japanese invasion to be recognized as property of owners of enterprises who will be allowed sell them according rules to be made but part thereof to go to Republic in payment of expenses of storing and caring for them. 5. Part of production during Japanese occupation to be handed to owners by Republic as payment for use of installations minus expenses for caring for that part in question. 6. Similar action to be taken re stocks produced after August 17, 1945. Mutual claims to be considered by committees of experts. Gani and Sjahrir have gone Djocja to obtain Indonesian Cabinet’s approval of above six points. If approved, subcommittees of experts expected proceed at once putting details into effect. Foote 62 Netherlands East Indies Director of Economic Affairs. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 856E.01/4–1847: Telegram [Document 722] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential Washington , April 24, 1947—3 p.m. 187. Urtel 266, Apr 18. 63 Dept issued no statement de facto recognition. When queried by several news agencies on stories not originating Dept, officials stated following: a ) U.S. had requested Neth FonOff inform Indonesian Republic that it accorded Republic same de facto recognition accorded by Neth Govt under Lingga Djati Agreement. b ) U.S. Govt recognizes sovereignty Neth in NEI. c ) U.S. will continue to be represented in NEI by Consul General, Batavia. However, U.S. desired Consul General Batavia to deal directly with Indonesian authorities in matters determined to be within their competence. Acheson 63 Not printed; it inquired about an AP despatch of April 17 from Washington concerning U.S. recognition of de facto jurisdiction of Indonesian Republic (856E.01/4–1847). In reporting the same to the Legation in Egypt in telegram 676, April 29, 4 p.m., the Department noted that “US Govt recognizes continuance Neth sovereignty over entire NEI pending establishment sovereign United States of Indonesia as contemplated Lingga Djati.” (856E.00/4–2647) The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.01/4–2547: Telegram [Document 723] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 64 confidential Washington , May 2, 1947—6 p.m. 119. Reurtel 150, April 25. 65 Pls inform Far Eastern Division FonOff as follows: During month since signing Linggadjati Agreement US Govt has awaited announcement that provision of agreement which would affect restoration American rights and property within Republican territory has been put into effect. This Govt considers prompt action to reach agreement on economic and financial matters including implementation Article 14 essential, not only as legal obligation, but also as prerequisite to rehabilitation NEI economy. US Govt therefore urges upon joint committee responsible for implementing economic and financial provisions Linggadjati Agreement effective and prompt action. Marshall 64 Repeated to The Hague as telegram 207. 65 Not printed; it reported that Indonesian “delaying tactics may retard return of estates and rehabilitation of industries for many weary chaotic months.” (856E.01/4–2547) The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 656D.006/5–747: Telegram [Document 724] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 66 restricted u.s. urgent Washington , May 7, 1947—6 p.m. 123. In response to repeated inquiries Dept has urged U.S. shipping companies not to send ships Republican ports pending anticipated early agreement joint economic committee because one major U.S. objective is development Netherlands-Indonesian cooperation in accordance spirit Linggadjati Agreement. Delay in reaching agreement causing Dept embarrassment as Dept cannot prevent privately owned American vessels going Republican ports. In order that Dept may deal with present situation prompt replies desired following inquiries which you should transmit through FEO Batavia to both Netherlands and Republican authorities: 1. With what legal requirements must American vessel comply since Linggadjati Agreement to enter and depart Republican port? 2. Is joint committee for economic affairs now functioning with respect to import-export controls? 3. Will joint committee appoint inspectors to check cargo during loading? 4. Will their approval of cargo assure issuance necessary export license? 5. If agreement reached between Netherlands and Republican authorities regarding export estate products, what are its terms? 6. If no final agreement reached, can ad hoc arrangement be effected to deposit in bank in joint account value such items of cargo so that these funds may be substituted for estate products, with understanding they shall be distributed in accordance with general policy decided later? Explanatory telegram follows. 67 Marshall 66 Repeated to The Hague for information only as No. 214. 67 No. 124, not printed. The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/5–1047: Telegram [Document 725] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State secret The Hague , May 10, 1947—noon. 314. Chief Political Section FonOff last night made following observations to Counselor re Indonesian situation: 1. Various joint commissions, including Joint Economic Commission, had been set up but as yet had produced nothing concrete. So far no agreement on export-import, foreign exchange and military problems; Dutch insist these problems be put in hands joint commissions which alone would have power make decisions, while Indonesians demand unilateral action; obviously these problems must be handled by central authorities as otherwise chaos would result. 2. Informant said his impression Indonesians, in spite efforts Dutch to hasten implementation Linggadjati Agreement, stalling for time in hope Dutch eventually would either withdraw from Indies or else initiate military action which they (Indonesians) convinced would be most unpopular US and UK. 3. Informant observed that in connection with high Netherlands authorities he now studying possible plans of action in event it is found impossible implement Linggadjati Agreement, but he stressed that no decision would be taken until after return early June Beel 68 and Jonkman from their fact-finding visit to Indies; possible plans include: ( a ) military action in order bring Indonesians into line; ( b ) withdrawal from Java, Sumatra and Madura after lapse certain period. He observed that, in his opinion, plan ( a ) impracticable inasmuch as public opinion US and UK might be expected strongly oppose coercion Indonesians by force (he said Dutch now have about 100,000 troops Indies and that this number tending decrease inasmuch as more troops now returning home from Indies than going out), and that consequently eventual decision, in event found impossible implement Linggadjati Agreement might be for Dutch announce withdrawal from Indies effective certain date and at same time refer whole matter UN. 4. Informant concluded with expression personal opinion that time might conceivably come when US could assist in exerting pressure, either officially or otherwise, on Indonesians to cooperate with Dutch with view implementation Linggadjati Agreement. However, he stressed that no US action should be taken until after Beel and Jonkman have returned and made their report substance of which, he added, would immediately be communicated Dept. 69 Baruch 68 Netherlands Prime Minister. 69 In telegrams 243 and 136, May 22, the Department asked The Hague and Batavia for the latest estimate on the situation with special reference to the danger of the Dutch resorting to military operations. At the same time paragraphs 2–4 of telegram 314 were repeated to Batavia. (856E.00/5–1047) The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/5–1347: Telegram [Document 726] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , May 13, 1947—6 p.m. 175. Deptel 119, May 2. Dept’s message conveyed to FEB Foreign Office on May 5. Matter then emphasized to both Dutch and Sjahrir. British, Dutch and Americans all anxious return at once to rehabilitate their properties. Sjahrir agrees with every point in Deptel but he having mounting trouble with Communists and radical labor organizations. For example, British personnel of one British textile factory in east Java returned as technical advisers, leaving management in hands Indo labor union. Sjahrir hopeful can avoid such unfortunate actions in future and promises try speed up implementation article 14. Dutch ready sign now but Indos unable agree among themselves. Sjahrir promised advise me in near future. Foote The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 656D.006/5–1547: Telegram [Document 727] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia confidential Washington , May 15, 1947—6 p.m. 131. Deptel 124, May 7. 70 Pursuant request that Isbrandtsen not send Richard Randle Rep port pending Dept inquiries situation, Isbrandtsen has informed Dept ship ordered wait Singapore. Dept appreciates urtels 174 and 175, May 13, 71 and requests you reiterate its urgent view necessity Dutch-Rep agreement practical interim arrangements which will permit US ships trade Rep ports. Presumably this might include joint approval import and export permits for proposed cargoes individual ships, joint inspection, and, as to estate products determined such inspection, placing proceeds sale escrow pending agreed distribution. Reasons: ( a ) World need commodities short supply and strengthening NEI economy hence moderate Rep Govt; ( b ) agreement on interim arrangements might facilitate agreement major policies; ( c ) some US ship may attempt trade Rep ports before policy agreements reached. US possibly has no legal power to stop such ship. If ship in fact enters Rep port and is seized by Dutch there might be most serious consequences here among labor unions, Congress and public opinion. If US accepted technical legality Dutch action US would be construed everywhere as backing colonial powers against independence movements. If US supported ship there might be serious strain US-Neth relations. Dutch view here Jan 29 regulations continue full force and Neth have right unilaterally promulgate any desired decrees notwithstanding Linggadjati but desire prompt agreement Rep regarding imports and exports including joint inspection, joint body for issue permits, and joint body control foreign exchange. AP story May 11 refers official NEI statement claiming Rep noncooperation on ground Rep economic counter-proposals covered all Indonesia and failed provide unconditional return non-Indonesian property within Rep. Dutch here, however, pointed out May 9 that import-export regulations and foreign exchange controls must apply all Indonesia in order insure fair distribution Rep and non-Rep territories. Hague’s 314, May 10 (Deptel 127, May 12 72 ) reports Dutch view that Rep desire unilateral Rep action on export-imports, etc. Please report urgently on what points economic policies Dutch and Rep appear approximate agreement and on what basic issues there is disagreement. For Dept info endeavor ascertain discreetly Rep interpretation Linggadjati as applied pertinent issues. Also report your opinion on both Dutch and Rep desire cooperate in reaching agreements and willingness effect real give and take that end. 73 Sent Batavia 131. Repeated Hague 230 info only. 74 Marshall 70 Not printed. 71 No. 174 not printed. 72 Telegram 127 not printed. 73 Telegram 197, May 29, 5 p.m., from Batavia, reported that the Indonesians had not agreed to implement any phase of the agreement before all its articles were simultaneously implemented (656D.006/5–2947). 74 Also repeated to London as No. 2268, May 26, 7 p.m. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 856E.51/5–247: Telegram [Document 728] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential Washington , May 16, 1947—3 p.m. 231. AmConGen Batavia reports probability Van Mook and Lieftinck 75 coming US shortly for purpose discussing Exim Bank loan to NEI. One hundred million dollar loan considered 1945 and money earmarked by Exim Bank but agreement not concluded at request Dept view uncertainties political situation. At early appropriate opportunity please informally indicate to FonOff with reference reported Van Mook–Lieftinck plan that although Exim Bank credit for purposes NEI rehabilitation agreed in principle 1945 agreement never finalized, new negotiations necessary and in view political developments US would wish representatives Rep and also other constituent parts USI participate such negotiations. You should indicate also that nature of any Neth-Rep economic and financial agreements would naturally be one important factor in such negotiations. In this connection you should point out as follows, leaving aide-mémoire: US has given serious consideration to situation Southeast Asia. Strong nationalist movements throughout area are not isolated phenomena of concern to few colonial powers only. Outcome will have profound effect on future world. Area strategically located athwart Southwest Pacific and of greatest economic importance. US, therefore, has special concern future Southeast Asia. This Govt believes there is danger that nationalist movements Southeast Asia may tend toward pan-Asiatic or totalitarian philosophy. As either trend would be contrary interests Western democracies, it believes every effort should be made persuade peoples Southeast Asia voluntarily seek association with Western democratic powers. It convinced such voluntary association essential world political and economic stability. Moderate leaders among nationalist groups Southeast Asia recognize such associations with countries with whose mores, laws and languages they familiar would be advantageous their peoples. Such associations furthermore would give component parts political, economic and strategic strength which neither would possess alone. Accordingly, it has been consistent hope this Govt that Neth Govt would be able peaceably to work out with Indonesians an arrangement which would meet natural aspirations of Indonesians and which would, at same time, establish voluntary association of Indonesian and Dutch peoples. This Govt learned therefore with profound pleasure of signing of Lingga Djati [ Linggadjati ] Agreement. While obviously difficulties will be encountered in implementing political aspects of Lingga Djati this Govt is confident that good sense and mutual respect displayed by both Neth Govt and Rep Govt will resolve these difficulties. Problem of resolving conflicting economic interests may, however, present even greater difficulties and resolution of those difficulties will be no less important than resolution of political problems. Following views this Govt are offered not in spirit of interference but with hope they may be of assistance in bringing about solutions helpful to objectives which it believes all are seeking. US believes that immediate opening trade and commerce throughout NEI non-discriminatory basis is first and most imperative step in stabilizing political and economic conditions and in rehabilitating Indonesian economy. This essential as means of strengthening moderate elements of Rep Govt which secured signing Lingga Djati. It is also basic to attraction foreign capital investment in area which would appear essential to rehabilitation Indies. Dept considered with much interest views of Neth Govt, as communicated to it by Professors Weyer and de Kat-Angelino, on basic principles which Neth Govt believes should be included in an agreement between Neth and Rep Govt for purpose assuring that potential investors will have such confidence. While not disagreeing with basic objective of creating conditions conducive to foreign capital investment, Dept fears lest proposed manner of achieving objective will in fact defeat purpose sought. Basis of any confidence by foreign investors must be attitude and policies adopted by Rep. Dept queries whether unless Rep itself is convinced of need of attracting investment foreign capital and recognizes that in order attract such capital it must deal fairly and reasonably with such capital, any agreement which would specifically limit powers of Rep in certain respects with relation foreign invested capital would have substantive value; and whether if there is such conviction and recognition by Rep any such formal detailed agreement would be required. Dept believes moreover there is serious danger that any agreement which appeared to give foreign capital a privileged position in NEI might, when economic conditions improve, become focal point for communist as well as nationalist agitation. Very existence such an agreement might, indeed, tend defeat objectives which agreement designed achieve and political reaction to it might destroy voluntary partnership contemplated Lingga Djati and cause Indonesia incline to pan-Asiatic or communist influence. Dept recognizes that to urge immediate opening trade and commerce throughout NEI and to offer only critical comments economic plans outlined Weyer and de Kat is scarcely sufficient. It desires therefore express willingness consult with representatives Neth and NEI Govt and with Indonesian representatives looking to economic rehabilitation Indonesia on foundations which will strengthen mutual respect and voluntary association of Neth and Indonesian peoples. 76 This entire tel sent Hague as 231 and repeated Batavia as 132. 77 Following for Batavia action only. You should informally communicate substance foregoing Van Mook at early appropriate opportunity (urtel 159, May 2 78 ). If Van Mook indicates approval participation Rep and other Indonesian representatives on loan negotiations and US consultation both Neth and Rep on economic policies affecting rehabilitation Indies please report promptly and indicate your view when similar informal communication should be made Sjahrir. In connection Van Mook’s plans Dept desires soonest informal general indication nature and scope loan sought, purposes, and areas funds would be applied. Marshall 75 Pieter Lieftinck, Netherlands Minister of Finance. 76 Telegram 251, May 23, 2 p.m., to The Hague, directed that the substance of the first two paragraphs of this telegram should not be included in the aide-mémoire to the Netherlands Foreign Office, but that the substance of the second paragraph should be communicated informally and orally for the information of the Netherlands delegation coming to the United States (856E.51/5–2347). 77 Also repeated to London in telegram 2269, May 26, 7 p.m. 78 Not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856D.50/5–1747: Telegram [Document 729] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State top secret Batavia , May 17, 1947—10 a.m. 183. In re following report please refer my telegram 128, April 14; 137, April 18; 138, April 19; 141, April 22; 146, April 25; and 152, April 28. 79 Joint Dutch-Indo Economic Committee were near agreement and Gani came to me personally to give data contained in above references. When Dutch agreed virtually to every Indo proposal, Gani went Djocja to submit matter to Indo cabinet. When he returned it appeared every proposal rejected by Djocja or made contingent upon acceptance other proposals which unacceptable to Dutch. NEI Director Economic Affairs and committee then had meeting with Gani and advisers at which Dutch asked if Indos willing cooperate formation joint board for distribution food within areas of coming USI if they willing cooperate formation regulations govern imports, exports and financial matters in NEI and if willing cooperate implementing article 14 Linggadjati. Gani’s replies all in negative and said in Java, Sumatra and Madura this business Repub and not Dutch. Re implementation article 14 Gani said foreign and other owners must apply direct to Repub and obey such rules as Repub may prescribe re wages taxation, working conditions, and not to Dutch. Matter then brought to meeting Beel, Jonkman and advisers and Van Mook advisers and Department heads. Some severe criticism of Van Mook by Beel and Jonkman and two of Van Mook’s closest advisers, Van Hoogstraten and Idenburg, said present policy leading nowhere and should be changed. Van Mook then called in representative entrepreneurs and said there might be change of policy but decision thereon would be made after Beel and Jonkman return Hague and submit reports on fact find[ing] visit. American, British, and Dutch businessmen agree problem will never be solved as now proceeding because when Dutch agree one point Indos reject it and demand two more. No doubt Indos stalling for time hoping Dutch be refused loan USA and become helpless financially. Communists growing stronger and while formerly quiet are becoming bolder. Bothani [ Both Gani? ] and Masjoemi appear taking sides against Soekarno, Sjahrir, Sjarifoeddin and others for seeking Communist support and their representatives visited Van Mook and said they not opposed Linggadjati but rather action Communists supporting it and to growth Communism in all branches Republic Govt (long despatch on growth and tendencies communism being typed). In meantime Van Mook receiving increasing number pleas from Indos in Republic areas take military action to relieve them from terrorism of Communists and irregulars. If Indos refuse cooperate re article 14 and Dutch fail enforce Linggadjati by military action, Department may be assured foreign industrial interests including USA will be lost either to Communism or their return greatly delayed. Whatever happens present situation cannot continue much longer. Foote 79 None printed except No. 137, April 18 (p. 918). The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/5–2147: Telegram [Document 730] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State 80 confidential London , May 21, 1947—6 p.m. 2861. 1. Further to ourtel 2837, May 20, 81 Foreign Office today showed us another message just received from Batavia stating there still no indication of break in Dutch-Indos deadlock. According this message, Hirschfeld 82 had told British Consul General 83 on 18th Indos still playing for time which Dutch with heavy military expenditures, loss of trade and dollar exchange could ill afford to sustain for any length of time. Hirschfeld, apparently with eye to Indochina example, advanced thought it perhaps best if Dutch launched military operations to destroy Republican opposition. He argued that although there would be outcry in US and UK they would be placated by consequent resumption of trade. Only alternative, Hirschfeld continued, was for Dutch to withdraw (at least from Java), thus leaving Indos in chaos and open to Communist infiltration. 2. Dening 84 returned London this morning from The Hague where he had long conversations with Vredenburch on Dutch-Indos situation. Dening tells us he urged patience, pointing out Dutch in Indos no more than British in India and Burma could go on ruling native peoples by force. He expressed thought that Indonesians have absorbed large measure Dutch culture and thought, as Indians and Burmese have British culture and thought, and that if patience and tact exercised in all three areas peoples thereof can doubtless work in cooperation with Dutch and British. Dening says Vredenburch did not dissent from this view, but he made it clear Dutch could not go on indefinitely in face Indos’ intransigence and stalling tactics. He said to Dening Dutch had three alternatives: (1) Use of force; (2) withdrawal from Indos; (3) resort to US as mediator. In latter connection, Vredenburch expressed view US “ham-fisted” probably unable arrange satisfactory solution. 3. Dening states Vredenburch emphasized it not Dutch policy to use force in reaching solution. Dening observes it his view this true statement of Dutch policy, but he thinks there is a possibility Dutch extremists (particularly the military) might take the initiative, in which event moderate elements might be powerless to rectify situation. 4. Dening discussed situation with Sir Orme Sargent 85 (who is in charge of Foreign Office during absence of Bevin on holiday) this afternoon. Later this afternoon Dening is to lay situation before Prime Minister 86 with a view perhaps to calling in Dutch Ambassador to suggest that Dutch Government refrain from use of force on Indos and exercise patience in negotiations. 5. Foreign Office has not instructed British Embassy Washington to discuss situation with Department but may do so in near future. 87 Sent Department 2861; repeated The Hague 21. Douglas 80 Repeated by the Department to Batavia as No. 137, May 22, 5 p.m. 81 Not printed. 82 Economic Adviser to Netherlands Prime Minister Beel. 83 Gilbert MacKereth. 84 Maberly E. Dening; British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 85 British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 86 Clement R. Attlee. 87 In telegram 189, May 27, 5 p.m., from Batavia, Mr. Foote commented that “any interference by British Foreign Office or USA may wreck all efforts and may lead to fighting which Dutch trying avoid”. (856E.00/5–2747) The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/5–2347: Telegram [Document 731] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , May 23, 1947—11 p.m. 186. Beel and Jonkman left by air for Hague via Singapore late today. Schermerhorn and Van Poll, members Commission General, leaving for Hague May 25 by air. My talks today with the four men lead to conclusion they feel further negotiations will be fruitless. For Dept’s information, events and statements by Indonesians last few days convinced me further negotiations will lead nowhere. Sjahrir very unhappy but has no authority conclude any agreement. Each little decision must be submitted Djocja Karta 87a for confirmation and in nearly every case Sjahrir’s recommendations are rejected by Djocja. My opinion is Dutch wish implement Linggadjati Agreement and establish sovereign United States of Indonesia but efforts do so always rejected by Indonesians. Any decisions reached at Hague after return of Beel and Jonkman and two members Commission General will probably be to implement Linggadjati and proceed with formation United States of Indonesia with all speed possible. If this not done I reluctantly reach conclusion this country will decline into further chaos retarding all attempts at rehabilitation. My report on communism which completed and awaiting next courier leads to conclusion communism is real and immediate danger. General situation which is tense and at crisis being watched closely as possible. Foote 87a Variant spelling of Jogjakarta. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/5–2847: Telegram [Document 732] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Batavia , May 28, 1947—10 p.m. 190. Department’s telegram[s] 136 and 137, May 22, and circular telegram May 23, 1 p.m. 88 Following is summary Van Mook’s statements to me last night: Indos stalling for time, making no effort reach agreement which Dutch still trying implement. New Dutch proposals handed Indos yesterday and they asked reply earliest possible to prevent further chaos and deterioration of industries. Van Mook promised me copy thereof today. When received will translate and telegraph full summary. Regarding London’s telegram 2837, May 20, 89 it difficult understand distorted or exaggerated ideas from British Foreign Office unless due fact that British Consul General MacKereth, who left Batavia very recently and who violently anti-Dutch and pro-Indo, is expressing himself very freely. Truth is area mutual distrust not enlarged; Dutch have not told Sjahrir they prepared use force as last resort and Sjahrir has not said “Indos would not be intimidated”; army and naval elements not gaining in influence and Van Mook’s trip to USA put off for entirely different reason which will be reported later. If left alone Dutch and Indos will probably reach agreement but if again interfered with country will decay further and fall completely in hands of Communists and/or terrorists. Van Mook emphasized several times Indos not threatened that force would be used but were told that Linggadjati Agreement would be carried out with or without republic’s cooperation. In brief, situation is as follows: Present chaotic conditions cannot continue much longer; Dutch still trying negotiate settlement; army and navy not threatening elements but obedient and well under Van Mook’s control; new proposals made to Indos; Dutch Mission went Djokjakarta today to meet Soekarno and Cabinet to discuss entire question; Dutch will establish liaison office at Dioca [ Djokjakarta ] at once to be able discuss matters with Soekarno at any time; military action not wanted by Dutch who realize its danger and who do not want create hatred among Indos and Dutch say they determined implement Linggadjati and create sovereign United States of Indonesia. Van Mook today gave me aide-mémoire his statements to me last night. It will be telegraphed as my telegram 192, May 28. 90 Foote 88 None printed, but telegram 137 repeated telegram 2861, May 21, from London, p. 927. 89 Not printed, but see telegram 2861, May 21, from London, p. 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] . 90 Not printed. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/5–2947: Telegram [Document 733] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State 91 confidential us urgent London , May 29, 1947—4 p.m. 2962. 1. Further to our telegram 2943, May 28 92 on Indonesia, we had extended discussion at FonOff today with Allen 93 who read to us text of several informative messages received from Singapore, Batavia and Hague. Allen states all these messages repeated British Embassy Washington which will be instructed in very near future to make contents known to Dept. Suffice it to say here Dutch have proposed to Republicans early establishment of interim regime in which both sides will participate in governing of NEI pending establishment of US of Indonesia. Allen says text of proposals not yet received, but according to word from Hague they likely to be published today. 2. Allen states Dutch have intimated that if Republicans evince reluctance to accept new proposals, Dutch will ask British and perhaps US to exercise persuasion on Republicans to accept. If Republicans flatly reject new proposals, Dutch considering seeking joint Anglo-American arbitration of issues. In this connection Dutch have told British they do not wish Indo’s issue to come before UN. 3. A telegram from Batavia which Allen read to us is to effect there a definite “détente” Java since departure Beel, Jonkman and Commissioner General and that Republicans now seem more amenable to peaceful settlement. 4. Allen, on basis of information at hand, expresses view new Dutch proposals seem reasonable and offer promising approach to resumption of negotiations. If hitch develops he says FonOff likely to instruct British Consul General at Batavia 94 to urge Sjahrir informally to accept Dutch proposals. 95 5. On other hand, if new Dutch proposals plainly unacceptable to Republicans, Allen says he thinks FonOff will favorably entertain request for joint US-British arbitration if that acceptable to US. We may say here that Allen, who appears to have an excellent insight into problem, is definitely of personal view that a “blow” in Indonesia is highly improbable at this stage. On the contrary, he feels that a peaceful solution may yet be achieved. He says that new Dutch proposals and report of “détente” at Batavia fortify him in this view. On the basis of information contained in telegrams read to us, particularly those from Singapore citing Beel and Jonkman, we are inclined to feel there some basis for Allen’s optimism—at least from short-term point of view. 6. In course of talk we took occasion to query Allen as to his views on communism in NEI. Although he admits there some communism in NEI, he feels its strength and influence are by no means as great as Dutch would like to have British and Americans believe. He feels neither Sjahrir nor Soekarno tainted with communism. 7. Allen also states he has received no information which would lead him to believe Republican regime on verge of collapse. Repeated Hague 26. Douglas 91 Repeated by the Department to Batavia in telegram 145, June 3, 1 p.m. 92 Not printed. 93 Head of Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office. 94 John L. M. Mitcheson, British Deputy Consul General at Batavia. 95 In telegram 2985, May 31, 5 p.m., from London, the Embassy reported that in a preliminary British study the new Dutch proposals were considered as reasonable, and the British Embassy in Washington was being instructed to propose application of joint U.S.–U.K. persuasion on the Indonesian Republicans to accept. (856E.00/5–3147) Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Schnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs 856E.00/5–2947 [Document 734] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Schnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] May 29, 1947. Participants: Mr. F. C. Everson, First Secretary of the British Embassy; Mr. Frederick Nolting, NOE; Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA; Mr. Alexander Schnee, SEA Mr. Everson handed us a British version of the summary of the Dutch note of May 27 and stated that his Government viewed the note favorably. Since his last discussions with the Department (about May 19), the danger of the Dutch resorting to force appears to have been lessened as indicated by the fact that the Dutch, including the Prime Minister, recently explicitly denied any intent to resort to force. Conversations between his Government and the Netherlands Government indicate that the latter consider this a favorable time for the United States and the United Kingdom to exert their influence on the situation by persuading the Indonesians to accept the Dutch proposals. Should the United States and the United Kingdom adopt this procedure, the Dutch would prefer that the initiative appear to come from the United States and the United Kingdom and not from the Netherlands. If the Indonesians reject the Dutch proposals the latter would then favor arbitration by the United States and the United Kingdom, such arbitration not to take place without prior approval of the Netherlands Government. Mr. Everson was instructed to inform the Department that his Government was proposing that the United States and the United Kingdom adopt a similar course of action and endeavor to persuade the Indonesians to accept the Dutch proposals. Mr. Everson expressed the opinion that the Dutch proposals were designed to “smoke out” the Republicans and to make them face the issues. He also expressed the opinion that Sjahrir’s position is very difficult in that his support stems from the left non-cooperative faction of the Republican Government. As regards the views of the Dutch in Indonesia, Van Mook in a conversation with the British Consul General described the note as an ultimatum and said that there are only two courses of action open to the Dutch ( a ) limited military action and ( b ) abandonment of the Netherlands East Indies. Mr. Everson finds that whereas the Dutch in The Hague are now unanimously against the use of force, the Dutch in Batavia appear to be unanimously in favor of resorting to force. In conclusion, he stated that he would like to know whether this Government is willing to pursue a parallel course of action with the British to exert pressure on the Indonesians to accept the recent Dutch proposals. He said that he would leave an aide-mémoire with the Department tomorrow. Mr. Landon replied that the Department would consider the British proposal. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Sehnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs 856E.01/5–2947 [Document 735] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Sehnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] May 29, 1947. Participants: Mr. Helb of the Dutch Embassy; Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA; and Mr. Alexander Schnee, SEA. Mr. Helb called to discuss two subjects, (1) the aide-mémoire which Ambassador Baruch delivered to the Netherlands Foreign Office and (2) the note of May 27 which the Netherlands Government addressed to the Republic of Indonesia. Mr. Helb mentioned the fact that Ambassador Baruch had delivered an aide-mémoire to the Dutch and said he was calling to learn the sense of the document. (The aide-mémoire followed the line of the Department’s telegram No. 231, May 16 to The Hague referring to considerations which would govern a loan to the Netherlands East Indies and stated our willingness to assist in the establishment of an interim arrangement which would foster trade with that area.) Mr. Schnee read to Mr. Helb contents of Department’s telegram 231 which contained the sense of the note delivered by the Ambassador. Mr. Helb then referred to the Dutch note of May 27 and informed us of the contents thereof. He had not received a complete text himself. After referring to the history of the Lingga Djati Agreement and the failure of the Dutch to secure the cooperation of the Indonesians, he stated that the Dutch Government was of the opinion that the only hope for a prompt and peaceful solution of the Indonesian problem lay in United Kingdom and United States pressure on the Indonesians to accept the recent Dutch proposals. Mr. Helb was unable to clarify the reference in the preamble to the note to the cancellation of the truce of October 1946. 96 He had no information to the effect that such a reference was included in the preamble. 96 Telegram 371, June 6, from The Hague, gave the text of this reference as follows: “The Commission General further considers the reasons for a truce, as was concluded on 14 October, 1946, de facto lapsed through the signing of the agreement which has the cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia and in particular between the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic as a starting point, because the conclusion of such an agreement cannot be brought into line with the situation whereby hostilities are merely suspended.” This correction was taken from the Foreign Office text given to the Embassy on June 6. (856E.01/6–647) The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/5–2947: Telegram [Document 736] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential The Hague , May 29, 1947—8 p.m. 345. Foreign Minister this afternoon handed me a note which Government of The Netherlands is addressing to the Republic of Indonesia containing demands which require an answer within 2 weeks. A summary of translation of note, which has two annexes which will be made public today, follows shortly. 97 Minister restated the fact that when Beel and Jonkman arrived they found atmosphere in Republican circles entirely adverse to possibility conclusion of any agreement in implementation of Linggadjati and after repeated futile effort they determined to return, as Department already informed. The note lays down basis which Netherlands Government deems irreducible minimum for cooperation but Dutch Government seems convinced public [ republic? ] not interested in federation or formation of United States of Indonesia but only desires promote selfish interest of republic but as government here desires make one more effort this note has been addressed to Republican Government. It is my opinion very little result is anticipated here. They state they must formulate such action as may be necessary when either an answer or lack of answer is made to this note and its two annexes. Sent Department as 345, repeated London as 23. Baruch 97 A summary of the translation of the note as released to the press on May 29 was reported in telegram 348, May 29, from The Hague, and repeated by the Department in its telegram 146, June 3, to Batavia, neither printed. On June 2 Batavia reported on the note (which consisted of a covering memorandum and five annexes) in telegrams 202–205, none printed. The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–247: Telegram [Document 737] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State secret The Hague , June 2, 1947—3 p.m. 354. Over the week end general sentiment seems much calmer and more confident that ultimate implementation Linggadjati Agreement possible either with present Indonesian authorities or some replacement. Confidence in Sjahrir as moderate untainted Indonesian statesman seems unabated but Soekarno is looked on almost universally as unreliable, unstable, self-seeking and selfish agitator whose constant efforts to remain on right side of all questions are disastrous. Steps to start export business on some fair basis from the Netherlands Indies are continuous and most ardently sought, and I believe personally this is of first importance and would help immediately to restore political stability. Someone close to Van Mook told me his one ambition was to remain in the East and put all his efforts behind this latter problem, and though he had been tempted by offer of Washington Embassy post he has been permitted to remain Batavia and devote all his efforts to solving present impasse. There remains, however, large element of opinion here which is unalterably opposed to Van Mook and would like to see him removed. I feel strongly that if Dutch Government’s present efforts fail we will be asked to mediate forthwith unless resort to force is precipitated by ever-present hotheaded minority. Re London’s 2962, May 29 on Indonesia. In Embassy’s judgment, Dutch note containing proposals for various forms of cooperation to expedite implementation of Linggadjati Agreement seems sound and may well test good faith of Republicans. Considering all aspects of US interests in Indonesia, Embassy believes nothing can be lost and possibly much may be gained by application joint US-UK persuasion on Republicans to accept terms latest Dutch proposals. Baruch The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–347: Telegram [Document 738] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent The Hague , June 3, 1947—8 p.m. 361. Foreign Minister summoned me to his office and reported the following: Vredenburch, as already reported our telegram 355, June 2, 98 had been in London all day conferring with British Foreign Office substantially as communicated in this reference; he would be instructed to proceed to Washington in the absence of any unfavorable reaction from our State Department; and he explained further the contents of memo handed me which will be summarized in later message. Reported that finally Dutch officials had reached Djokjakarata, Republican capital, with not entirely unfavorable impressions. He appears more hopeful but not sanguine that results will follow. He expressed the strong hope that if our Government could see eye to eye with Dutch Government on reasonableness of offers now already transmitted to Republican Government on May 27 our Government might be inclined to express to Republican Government the idea that Dutch proposals were reasonable, in good faith, and contain suggestions which if carried out would be equitable and fair to both sides and much facilitate resumption trade and feeding of Indonesian population by their own resources. He even suggested that our Consul General Foote, if our Government saw fit so to do, could produce most favorable results by a visit to Republican Government capital and suggest such thoughts to the Indonesian leaders as might produce some reasonable results in breaking up the now existing impasse. Vredenburch will probably arrive either Wednesday or Thursday under instruction to speak frankly and fully and explain this and matter of memo and note of May 27 in complete detail. While Foreign Minister did not say so, I believe he had similar conversation with British Embassy yesterday. Sent Department as 361; repeated London as 31. Baruch 98 Not printed. The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–347: Telegram [Document 739] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State 99 confidential us urgent The Hague , June 3, 1947—9 p.m. 362. Embassy’s telegram 361, June 3, repeated London as 31. Following is summary of memo handed Ambassador by Foreign Minister this p.m. based on report after visit by Dr. Idenburg to Djokjakarta received at Foreign Office yesterday: Distrust in motives of Netherlands Government are reported based on evidence of separatist movements and alleged increase of Netherland troops in Java and Sumatra. Idenburg comments on ignorance at Republic capital of information regarding essential points negotiations between Commanding [ Commission ] General and Indonesian delegation, with result this mission first met in atmosphere of formal politeness. Gradually indication was shown to discuss broad political aspects and opportunity afforded mission to explain Netherlands concern to Soekarno, Sjahrir and Sjarifoeddin and others, on prevailing situation together with Indonesian objections since signing Linggadajati. Indonesian distrust further accentuated by reputedly biased selection in Republic newspapers of Netherlands news, particularly from right wing press. Other groups coming into discussion with Idenburg mission included several Cabinet Ministers not previously contacted in Batavia as well as representatives of Socialist Party and important group of youths (Penoeda’s) [ Pemudas? ] which had previously shown reluctance to enter into direct contact with Netherlands delegation. Only group still remaining aloof were the “Masjoemi” (Moslem opposition party) whose motive is suggested in report as based on strong opposition to Communistic leaning of which they suspect Republic Government. Indications noted that Moslem party demanding general election with hope majority victory at polls. Report states one practical result of Idenburg visit was Republic willingness receive permanent Netherlands liaison office at Djokjakarta. Report indicates Japanese indoctrination still manifest in striking uniformity of political thinking and expressions of recrimination against Dutch manifest in all groups. It is suggested this may explain exaggerated confidence placed in youth movements and military forces, both of which indicated wielding great influence. Mission reports being struck by lack of insight by Indonesians in financial and economic matters and undue emphasis on political and psychological factors. Insight into economic future of Republic described as vague, with no firm intention to tackle existing complex problems. Suggestion is made that Republic suffering from inferiority complex as shown by passionate desire to exhibit only good results of Republic Government and elimination all criticism, particularly self-criticism. Idenburg’s mission described as greeted by certain apathy on part of representatives. Proposals of May 27 note not discussed with him awaiting meeting of the Republic Cabinet; nevertheless general impression exists that proposals stand fair chance being accepted. This based on “certain utterances” of advisors close to Soekarno with a majority of Indo officials seen as convinced of necessity—although some reluctantly—to cooperate with Netherlands. Conclusion of mission as reported to Foreign Office is that peaceful solution remains possible despite strong resistance within Republic. This could be overcome by objective information and cooperation with Republic authorities. View is expressed that in order solve most pressing problems at short notice “it will be necessary to bring to bear unrelating [ unrelenting? ] pressure on the Indonesians”. At same time report expresses doubt as to ability of Republic Government to make clear-cut decisions owing to high[ly] complex political organization of Republic and handicap caused by constant deterioration of economic structure, particularly in transport facilities and production. Report points out that findings submitted apply only to political circles at Djokjakarta and that situation may vary in other parts of interior where consequences of maladministration are felt even more strongly without benefit of compensation from new ideals of freedom and independence. Repeated London as 32. Baruch 99 Repeated by the Department to Batavia in telegram 152, June 6, 3 p.m. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–447: Telegram [Document 740] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State 1 confidential us urgent London , June 4, 1947—2 a.m. 3037. 1. As stated our 3015, June 3, 2 we met Dening and Vredenburch that evening. In response latter’s request, Foreign Office has sent telegraphic instruction British Consul General Batavia to consult Van Mook after which he to proceed Jogjakarta to urge Republic authorities to accept new Dutch proposals. 2. In course conversation Vredenburch stressed desperate situation in which Dutch now find themselves, saying Dutch now have four alternative courses action: 1) continue negotiations (which he emphasized could not be continued indefinitely); 2) withdraw from Indonesia (which he thought would be disservice to Holland, Indonesia and to United States and United Kingdom); 3) resort to UN (which he said Dutch would reject for obvious reasons); and 4) resort to “limited” military action (which he thought was unlikely unless all possibilities peaceful settlement exhausted). Vredenburch categorically stated Dutch not contemplating all-out military action. He also denied Dutch seek “arbitration” as contrasted to good offices or mediation. 3. Vredenburch expressed hope United States, like United Kingdom, will use its influence to prevail upon Republicans to accept new Dutch proposals. He stated in event Republicans reject new proposals he unable state probable Dutch action. We gathered from way he talked Dutch would either withdraw from Java and Sumatra or would resort limited military action with probability latter course would be followed. Dening strongly advised against latter course. 4. Vredenburch stated he willing proceed Washington to discuss situation if so desired by Department. His present intention is to return Hague June 4th, noon, by air. 5. It obvious from conversation with Vredenburch that Dutch hopes now pinned on British efforts to induce Republicans to meet latest Dutch proposals. It equally obvious Dutch hope United States will follow same course, in which event they feel Republicans may likely accept proposals. Sent Department 3037; repeated Hague 31. Douglas 1 Repeated by the Department to Batavia in telegram 152, June 6, 3 p.m. 2 Not printed. The British Embassy to the Department of State 856E.01/6–447 [Document 741] The British Embassy to the Department of State 3 June 4, 1947 Aide-Mémoire 135/129/47 His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have been perturbed by reports which have reached them from their representatives in the Netherlands East Indies to the effect that there is a serious danger of armed clashes if the Republican Government of Indonesia fails to accept the proposals contained in a note which was presented to Indonesian representatives by the Dutch on the 27th May. A summary of the proposals contained in that note, furnished by His Majesty’s Consul General at Batavia, has already been given to the State Department. His Majesty’s Government have made it abundantly clear to the Dutch Government that they would deeply deplore the use of force in Java and that they would not expect its use to lead to a solution of the problems with which the Dutch Government is faced. 2. His Majesty’s Government are also anxious for the Dutch and Indonesians to reach agreement on those clauses of the Linggadjati Agreement which require further elaboration so that the trade of the territory may resume its former volume. Under settled conditions the Island of Java is a valuable source of oils and fats of which the British people and indeed most of the peoples of Europe stand in urgent need. 3. The Dutch Commission General and certain Dutch officials have informally put forward two suggestions. They are:— (1) that if the proposals communicated by the Dutch to the Indonesians on the 27th May are considered to be sound, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom should bring their influence to bear on the Indonesians to respond favourably to them, and (2) that if the proposals are rejected, joint Anglo-American arbitration might be acceptable to the Dutch. 4. These proposals have not received the official backing of the Dutch Government. 5. So far as the first point is concerned, His Majesty’s Government understand that they are not likely to receive any official request from the Netherlands Government to use their influence with the Indonesians but that the Dutch would nevertheless be glad if it were used informally, as on various occasions in the past. On the other hand, His Majesty’s Government have been given to understand that the Dutch would prefer to make the second proposal themselves rather than have it made to them by the United States or the United Kingdom Government. 6. On the basis of the information available to them, His Majesty’s Government consider the Dutch proposals to be on the whole sound and sensible and they think that an approach to the Indonesians recommending their acceptance, with a view to avoiding further bloodshed and disorder, seems desirable. They would be glad to learn whether the United States Government would be disposed to act in a similar manner if they themselves made such an approach. 7. If the Indonesians refuse the Dutch proposals, a critical situation will have arisen and the Dutch authorities may then sound the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom about a solution by arbitration. Should they fail to do so, His Majesty’s Government might consider taking the initiative in proposing it. Washington , 4 June, 1947. 3 Notation by Alexander Schnee: “Handed to Mr. Landon, SEA, by Mr. Everson of the British Embassy on June 4, 1947. Reply made by Mr. Landon orally on June 5”. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.01/6–547: Telegram [Document 742] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia secret u.s. urgent Washington , June 5, 1947—8 p.m. 151. Dutch proposals May 27 impress Department as presenting timely and valuable opportunity achieve essential step forward towards attaining objectives contemplated Linggadjati. Dept believes that interests of US, as well as those of Indonesians, Dutch and rest of world require US exert influence in direction achieving utmost consideration these proposals and maximum efforts both sides towards breaking deadlock. Although Dept sympathetic general objectives Dutch proposals which appear reasonable in most respects, it is concerned over suggestion of ultimatum accompanied by sanctions which it detects in Dutch note. Based on summary information available, Dept interprets proposals as threat of sanctions in that ( a ) preamble refers to termination of truce of Oct 1946 ( b ) Dutch insist on satisfactory reply prior to June 11 ( c ) essential alterations to the proposals are not admissible and ( d ) Dutch intend discontinue negotiations if their proposals are not accepted within the 14-day period. Points ( a ) through ( d ) imply that if Indonesians do not make satisfactory reply prior June 11 negotiations will cease, Linggadjati Agreement will be terminated and situation will revert to that existing prior to truce of Oct 1946. Dept will discuss these and other aspects Dutch proposals with Vredenburch who arrives Washington June 5. Foregoing for your info and use in discussing with Dutch significance proposals, but not to be divulged Indonesians at this time. You are instructed proceed immediately Djocja and deliver verbally to appropriate Republican authorities following message: 1. US Govt views with concern total lack of progress to date in implementation Linggadjati Agreement. 2. US Govt believes that further deadlock or dilatory tactics either side can only worsen situation all peoples concerned. 3. US Govt considers that Dutch proposals May 27 have been offered in good faith in effort implement Linggadjati, that proposals appear to offer reasonable basis effective interim govt, pending formation sovereign USI and Neth-Indonesian Union and that Indonesian Republic would be well advised to respond promptly in spirit of good faith and compromise, thus demonstrating sincerity pledges undertaken Linggadjati. 4. US Govt believes that if effective interim govt thus promptly established, attainment of ultimate objectives Linggadjati Agreement will thereby be facilitated. US Govt will watch with close interest attainment these long-range objectives, as well as immediate measures for restoration orderly govt throughout Indonesia. In carrying out above instructions avoid giving publicity purposes of your visit to Djocja. You may at your discretion inform Van Mook substance of your message to Indonesians. You should time your trip Djocja so as not correspond with visit British Consul General. 4 Sent Batavia as 151; repeated Hague as 271 and London as 2419. Hague and London inform respective FonOffs substance foregoing. Acheson 4 As telegram 151 did not reach Batavia until nearly midnight June 8, after dispersal of the Indonesian Cabinet and after its counter-proposals to the Netherlands note had been handed to Mr. Van Mook, the Department instructed Mr. Foote in telegram 154, June 10, 5 p.m. not to take action (856E.01/6–947). Telegram 234, June 13, 10 a.m., from Batavia, reported that only discussions with the Dutch had taken place (856E.01/6–1347). Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Sehnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs 856E.01/6–647 [Document 743] Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Alexander Sehnee of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs confidential [ Washington ,] June 6, 1947. Participants: Ambassador Loudon, Netherlands Embassy; Mr. Vredenburch, Chief of the Political Department, Netherlands Foreign Office; Dr. Hirschfeld, Economic Adviser, Netherlands Foreign Office; Mr. Helb, Netherlands Embassy; Under Secretary of State; Mr. Vincent, FE; Mr. Hickerson, EUR; Mr. Cumming, NOE; Mr. Nolting, NOE; Mr. Landon, SEA and Mr. Schnee, SEA. Mr. Vredenburch began his statement with respect to the Dutch position by reference to the recent visit to Batavia of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign [ Overseas ] Affairs. Messrs. Beel and Jonkman found the Commissioner General and Lieutenant Governor convinced that further negotiations with the Indonesians would be futile and that the Dutch had to choose between two alternatives: ( a ) evacuation of the area and ( b ) military action. In an effort to avoid either of these possibilities, both of which are considered extremely undesirable by the Dutch, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs worked out the proposals which were transmitted to the Indonesians on May 27 and which were subsequently approved by the Council of Ministers at The Hague. Mr. Vredenburch stated that reports from the Dutch Mission which went to Djocjakarta subsequent to the delivery of the note indicate that there was a good chance that the Indonesians will find the terms generally acceptable. Because of the division of opinion among Indonesian leaders, the Netherlands Government believes that effective action by the Indonesian Republic in implementing the terms of the Lingga Djati [ Linggadjati ] Agreement could only be achieved if continuous pressure were exerted upon the leaders. Mr. Vredenburch then requested that the United States provide this pressure by instructing its Consul General in Batavia to go to the Indonesian Capital and to urge upon the Indonesian leaders acceptance of the proposals outlined in the Dutch note of May 27. Alternative courses of future Dutch action and the Dutch Government’s views with respect to these alternatives were set forth as follows: (1) Continued negotiations . Mr. Vredenburch said that continued and drawn-out negotiations with the Indonesians were not acceptable to the Dutch for the reason that they could not afford to bear the cost of the continued loss of foreign exchange resulting from a disruption of trade in Indonesia caused by the present stalemate. While the Dutch were not “flat broke”, they nevertheless had a very serious foreign exchange problem and they were approaching the danger point. (2) Reference to the United Nations as an alternative course of action would probably result in the sending of a mission to the Netherlands East Indies which would require a couple of months to complete its investigation and as it was probable that at least two months more would be required for consideration of the Mission’s report by the United Nations, this procedure was unacceptable to the Dutch for the reason that they could not afford to carry the financial burden for the length of time UN procedure would require. From a political point of view the submission of the Indonesian problem to the United Nations was also objectionable because of the danger that Indonesia would become a political football and that the ultimate decision would not be based upon the issues involved but upon conflicting political interests. (3) Withdrawal to the outer islands . While Mr. Vredenburch personally has kept in mind the possibility that the Dutch might eventually arrive at the point where they would choose to withdraw to the outer islands, this alternative is unacceptable at this time. Execution of a withdrawal would be difficult because of the large numbers of people who would have to be evacuated. This alternative was unacceptable not only because of the Dutch responsibility in the area but also because it would be costly and would require at least one year to evacuate 500,000 people, including 100,000 military, 100,000 civilians, 200,000 natives and 100,000 Chinese who would also want to leave if the Dutch withdrew. (4) Limited military action . Mr. Vredenburch wished to make clear at the outset that in considering the alternative of military action, the Dutch did not contemplate occupying the Indonesian Republic’s Capital of Djogjakarta and did not contemplate military reprisals against the political leaders. In considering this alternative, the Dutch contemplate such limited military action as will permit them to enlarge the area of their foothold in Java in order to bring under Dutch control stocks which would be available for export and those areas in which the Dutch could plant crops for later export. With respect to the latter, the Dutch estimate that if they can occupy these areas in order to plant sugar cane seeds by August they will by 1949 have an export surplus of sugar valued at approximately $ (U.S.) 500,000,000. In response to a question by Mr. Vincent, Dr. Hirschfeld and Mr. Vredenburch stated that limited military action would relieve the Dutch financial position because of the fact that the small scale military effort required could be completed within a month and that the Dutch would thus secure control of stocks which could be sold abroad and could commence planting of the sugar crop. With the stabilization of the situation under Dutch control they could then make the investments in Indonesia required to increase the exchange producing resources in that region. Mr. Vredenburch agreed that Mr. Vincent was correct in his understanding that the Dutch had eliminated alternatives (1) (2) and (3) above and that alternative (4) calling for limited military action will remain. A fifth alternative, arbitration, was discussed when Mr. Landon inquired whether the Dutch had decided to discard the alternative of arbitration as provided in Article 17 of the Lingga Djati Agreement. Mr. Vredenburch said that while his Government might be willing to arbitrate the interpretation of various points in the Lingga Djati Agreement, it was not willing to submit the problem to arbitration in a manner which would require a fresh review of the entire situation. Arbitration along such lines would be drawn out and would be objectionable to the Dutch because of the fact that their financial position requires a more prompt solution of their differences with the Indonesians. Upon the conclusion of Mr. Vredenburch’s presentation, the Under Secretary informed him that the Department also thought that the proposals were reasonable and that Mr. Vredenburch’s remarks had clarified two of the three points on which the Department had not been clear. These points pertained to (1) the significance of the reference in the preamble to the expiration of the truce of October 1946 and (2) the Dutch position that the proposals are not subject to any essential change. Mr. Vredenburch stated that the reference to the termination of the truce was based on a Dutch interpretation to the effect that a truce implies two forces lined up opposite each other and that with the signing of the Lingga Djati, the Dutch and Indonesians should eliminate battle lines and form a joint military force which could be reduced as developments in Indonesia progressed. The Dutch insist any future discussions with the Indonesians be based upon the proposals of May 27. They are willing to discuss with the Indonesians the details of these proposals but not any change in substance. (3) The third point on which the Department sought clarification concerned the establishment of an interim government. Mr. Vredenburch replied that the Dutch hoped that the interim government could be supplanted by the permanent government envisaged in the Lingga Djati Agreement as quickly as developments permit. From the Dutch point of view, the sooner the permanent government was established the better. Mr. Acheson then informed Mr. Vredenburch that our Consul General in Batavia had received instructions to proceed to the Capital of the Indonesian Republic and there to urge upon the Indonesians the prompt acceptance of the Dutch proposals as a basis for arriving at a solution of their problems. The Under Secretary asked if the Dutch would like us to take further action, and in reply Mr. Vredenburch thanked him for the action which the United States had already taken. The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/6–947: Telegram [Document 744] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential The Hague , June 9, 1947—8 p.m. 378. Republican reply approximating 5,000 words handed Van Mook Batavia yesterday has been received The Hague. Text has been released and will appear evening papers. Acting Chief Political Section Foreign Office in off record comment stated initial impression official circles The Hague is that Republican note is “more or less disappointing and not very satisfactory”. First reading alleged text reply impresses me as Republicans accepting freely all rights offered but endeavoring once more to shirk responsibilities accompanying such rights. Summary follows and further attempt interpretation will be submitted when official text available. 5 Sent Department as 378, repeated to London as 38. Baruch 5 Telegram 382, June 10, 1 p.m., from The Hague, reported that the text was being sent by air to Washington, as it was understood that the reply had been forwarded there on June 8. (856E.01/6–1047) The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–1047: Telegram [Document 745] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , June 10, 1947—4 p.m. 223. Yesterday evening discussed contents Deptel 151, June 5, with Van Mook. He appeared most appreciative of Dept’s position and statements but offered following suggestions re points ( a ) to ( d ). ( a ) Termination of truce does not mean termination of spirit thereof. Military truce should be unnecessary. There should be joint action or cooperation instead of armies facing each other and exchanging fire. Linggadjati should be beginning of peace. ( b ) Reply prior June 11 necessary to prevent further deterioration resulting from interminable discussion. Conditions so bad that action needed without delay. This to mend tempers and save people from starvation, disease and death from other causes. It is not meant as threat and Indonesians so informed but to emphasize emergency and need for action. ( c ) Every proposal been examined and discussed but Indonesians desiring peace too often thwarted by those who constantly bring up unacceptable issues. ( d ) 14-day period meant that Commanding General could go no further and other action to be directed from Vozt at Hague. Commanding General may receive new instructions. Indonesians understand this and reason therefor. Above four points do not imply terminations of Linggadjati and [apparent garble] Contrary is true and agreement will be carried out and USI formed regardless of whether Republic helps. Van Mook said he received Indonesian reply but not studied it enough to draw conclusions. He said from first reading he feared reply not satisfactory. Copy promised as soon as translated and copied. When received will summarize 6 and telegraph as did Dutch note May 27 unless Department obtains copy from Hague. Foote 6 A summary of the Indonesian text was sent in telegrams 225–231, June 10–12, none printed. The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–1047: Telegram [Document 746] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential The Hague , June 10, 1947—6 p.m. 388. Foreign Minister considers note unsatisfactory in many respects after further study. States official answer will await arrival tomorrow Commissioners Schermerhorn and Van Poll, Batavia when Van Mook and Commissioners will give full consideration and wire their determination for discussion Cabinet here. His personal reaction is that answer again totally disregards importance of federation and approach to United States of Indonesia and over-emphasizes Republicans’ position and exaggerates its importance in total Indonesian situation. Says Van Mook has already wired State Department through Foote that his visit would not be helpful now and had best be deferred. Thinks Saturday or Sunday 7 would be earliest date reply from Commissioners could be expected here. I think his personal views coincide closely with those of other Cabinet members. Sent Department as 388, repeated London as 41. Baruch 7 June 14–15. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–1347: Telegram [Document 747] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , June 13, 1947—10 p.m. 232. Following are comments on Indo reply to Dutch note of May 27: Preamble contains inaccuracies, evasions and insinuations alleging illegal actions by Dutch and demands Netherlands Government countermand “measures taken contrary to spirit Lingga Agreement” [but in no place?] refers to or admits similar acts by Indos. It states Dutch constantly crossed demarcation lines and permitted separatist movements to go unchecked but makes no mention of violations of truce by Indos. Fact is while Dutch did not interfere with separatist movement in Buitenzorg they protected Indo authorities against possible acts by Indonese [ Ambonese? ] and prevented similar movement in Batavia. Note also says Dutch have arrested leaders, detained people on inadequate grounds, searched journalists and prohibited flying Indo Red White flag and singing Indo national anthem. Facts are Indo leaders permitted visit Batavia freely where they not detained, journalists do not criticize Republic authorities for fear internment or far worse. Close analysis note shows it is bid by Republic for control of proposed Interim Government in all NEI. It proposes at least one-half Interim Government be republic officials and decisions of Interim Government be by majority of votes. This impossible if Republic controls 50% of government unless decisions favor Republic. Note proposes that position of Governor General be abolished in favor of High Commissioner but gives no authority to him except where Netherlands interests are concerned. It states decisions Dutch-Indo delegations be executed by Interim Government. This apt cause deadlocks and gives no method to break them. Re military matters, note provides both Dutch and Indo armies leave demarcation areas and retire to garrisons. Such would leave these areas at mercy of private armed groups. Also says formation army forces in states not part of Republic be done by Republic and other states on one hand and Netherlands on other. Foreign Exchange Board to be responsible to Interim Government which cannot have majority since 50% to be Republic. Board of Management for Foreign Exchange to consist of five from Republic and five from other states in Dutch, [ sic ] again making majority impossible. Foreign exchange fund to satisfy principal wants of people but 50 millions of these in Java. This would leave little or nothing to meet want peoples other states. Purchasing goods abroad to satisfy needs of all Indonesia to be under Republic supervision. Re exportation European estate products, Board of Management according Indo note to be composed of four Republics and three for all other states. Re Central Foodstuff Board, three to come from Republic, two from East Indonesia and one from Borneo, again making decision impossible except when favors Republic. In case deadlock, Interim Government to decide ban Interim Government for all Indonesia would be at least 50% Republic, again making majority impossible. In brief, note is carefully prepared attempt to seek power and control over all Indonesia. Too early obtain Dutch reactions. Foote Memorandum by the Secretary of State 856E.00/6–1647 [Document 748] Memorandum by the Secretary of State 8 secret [ Washington ,] June 16, 1947. After his meeting with the President today the Secretary dictated the following: “I discussed with the President the request of the British Ambassador 9 to see me today or tomorrow (appointment set for 11 a.m. tomorrow) in regard to a request the British Government is making to join with it in offering to the Indonesian Republic our good offices in solving their present difficulties. The President, like myself, was hesitant regarding the joint action phase of the matter. He is entirely in accord with our Government’s communicating to the Dutch and Indonesians our hope that they will continue in their efforts peacefully to settle their differences.” 8 Drafted and initialed by Carlisle H. Humelsine, of the Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary, and addressed to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) and the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent). 9 Lord Inverchapel. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–1647 [Document 749] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 10 confidential [ Washington ,] June 17, 1947. Lord Inverchapel called at 11 o’clock by appointment. He handed me an aide-mémoire and two other papers, 11 one reporting the contents of a telegram from the British Ambassador at The Hague to the British Foreign Office and the other reporting the contents of a telegram from the British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador at Washington. I read the aide-mémoire , which reviewed recent developments in regard to Indonesia and inquired “whether the United States Government would be prepared to make a joint offer with His Majesty’s Government of their good offices to bring the Dutch and Indonesians together again to seek agreement by peaceful means”. I told Inverchapel that we were prepared to make representations to the Dutch Government and to the authorities of the Indonesian Republic, strongly urging them to refrain from any use of force and advising them to get together in a further attempt to reconcile their differences. We were not, I told the Ambassador, prepared to join with the British Government in an offer of good offices. There followed in general conversation with regard to the Indonesian problem during which Inverchapel said that the Indonesians had some suspicion that the Dutch were not playing fair with them and that he felt the Indonesians’ suspicions were justified. He referred to the attitude of the Commanding General of the Dutch forces as a man who was anxious to use force to settle the problem and to the attitude of the “die-hards” in Indonesia who were sticking out for full retention of Dutch rights in the Indies. I mentioned some experiences I had had with British “die-hards” in China back in 1926–27. Inverchapel stated that he would inform Mr. Bevin 12 of his conversation with me and in order to be sure there was no mistake he summarized what I had told him as to what we were prepared to do. He did not say whether the British alone would go ahead with their idea of making an offer of good offices, but he did express the fear that advice to the Dutch and Indonesians, unaccompanied by an offer of good offices, would probably not be effectual. Questioned by Mr. Vincent, he expressed the opinion that the British Government did not intend to make simultaneous offer of good offices and agreed that it would be appropriate to sound the Dutch out first. I told Inverchapel that our telegrams to The Hague and Batavia would go out today. He then brought several matters unconnected with Indonesia to my attention. 10 Drafted by John Carter Vincent who was present. 11 None printed. 12 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 856E.01/6–1747: Telegram [Document 750] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 13 secret us urgent Washington , June 17, 1947—4 p.m. 292. You are requested immediately to make representations to Neth FonOff as set forth in numbered paras below. 1. US Govt is increasingly concerned over indications that military force may be resorted to in an effort to break deadlock in Indonesia. This Govt wishes again to express the view that the use of military force would not be regarded favorably by this Govt, would arouse serious adverse reaction US public opinion, and would be self-defeating in purpose. The foregoing applies as well to the “limited military operations” mentioned by Vredenburch on his recent mission to Wash as to a military campaign aimed at larger objectives. 2. This Govt feels that the interests and agreed objectives of the Neth Govt and of the Indo Republic provide a basis for continued negotiations with the possibility of achieving a prompt and workable agreement. We therefore feel very strongly that the door should not be closed to further negotiation, but that persistent efforts should be made to find a meeting ground between the two positions which were recently more clearly defined. Repeated to London for info as 2592. Marshall 13 Repeated in telegram 162, June 20, noon, to Batavia. Copies of this telegram and of telegram 160, infra , were transmitted on June 18 to President Truman with the statement “that an offer of ‘good offices’ is not being made”. (856E.01/6–1847) The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.01/6–1747: Telegram [Document 751] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia secret us urgent Washington , June 17, 1947—4 p.m. 160. You are requested immediately make representations to Indo Republican authorities as follows: Dutch proposals May 27 impress Dept as presenting timely and valuable opportunity achieve essential step forward towards obtaining objectives Linggadjati. This Govt feels that the interests and agreed objectives of both parties provide a basis for continued negotiations with the possibility of achieving a prompt and workable agreement. We therefore urge strongly that persistent efforts should be made to find a meeting ground between the two positions which were recently more clearly defined. US Govt believes that prompt establishment interim government essential attainment of ultimate objectives Linggadjati Agreement. Repeated to London for info as 2593 and to the Hague as 293. Marshall The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–1847: Telegram [Document 752] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State secret The Hague , June 18, 1947—7 p.m. 413. Presented today contents Deptel 292, June 17. Van Boetzelaer stated that he had been informed by Loudon of instructions sent to Foote in Batavia, and was duly cognizant and grateful for our interests and efforts. With reference to paragraph 1, he stated that his Government had prepared a final analysis of the last reply from the Indo-Republican Government (Embtel 412, June 18, 6 p.m. 14 ) and that generally they found it most unsatisfactory; that they could continue their efforts to reach a peaceful settlement but that there always remained the unhappy possibility of the limited military operations mentioned by Vredenburch to you in Washington as a last resort. They are duly mindful of the importance of our suggestions and deeply respected the same, but felt that time was of the essence, and they thought they would not retire from the general position taken by them as stated in their note of May 27. He stated that they would not close the door on further negotiations but they felt that they had already made many concessions and that the Indo-Republicans instead of approaching their position had receded constantly, seeming to persistently and continuously make new and more divergent demands. Foreign Minister restated his belief that the Indo-Republican Government were avoiding the issue of federation and the Linggadjati goal of the US of Indonesia; that the Dutch Government had already received repercussions from east Borneo and eastern Indonesian sections expressing their absolute objection to being dominated by the Indonesian Republican Government. The impression I received from the interview with the Minister was that he had a quiet determination to do what his Government thought was necessary in the situation, but he has a sincere desire to avoid armed conflict; that he would do everything possible up to a certain point to bring about an early and peaceful solution, but did not think the situation would brook prolonged and unproductive negotiations in the eastern manner. Sent Department 413; repeated London 47. Baruch 14 Not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–1947: Telegram [Document 753] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Batavia , June 19, 1947—3 p.m. 238. Deptel 160, June 17. Representations to Indo Republic authorities will be carried out soonest. Sjahrir returned last night from Linggadjati at request British Consul General. I have requested appointment and expect see him within few hours. Following suggestions offered as of possible interest to Department: Deptel mentions continued negotiations and urges persistent efforts find meeting ground between two positions. This exactly what Indos want, knowing time on their side, since enables them improve their armed forces and same time weakens Dutch. On other hand Indos have no intention finding meeting ground between two positions. Soekarno and Sjahrir may have such intention but they helpless against Communist Alimin, Indo Generals Soedirman and Soetomo who trying sabotage Linggadjati Agreement. Gani, Indo Minister Welfare and Economic Affairs, told me Indos will not give ground one millimetre. Gani also said while he not Communist he favors them; that he does not favor return of Dutch estates et cetera to private owner. Military intercept received here today contains orders from Djokjakarta to Republican agents Java, Sumatra and other islands that Indo note is rejection Dutch note and that Indos will not agree formation interim government or government of USI unless Republic predominates in both. Representations contained in Deptel 160 will give moral support to extremist factions and if they accomplish anything it apt be only further delay. In meantime Chiese [ Achinese? ] and Batak armies now facing each other in north Sumatra and unrest growing in Java and other parts of Sumatra. Further delay in restoration law and order, which Republic unable to accomplish, may lead to bloodshed among Indos themselves and misery untold among poorer classes of Indos who form 95 percent of population who apathetic towards politics and desire only right to return to work in peace. My opinion is representations should be stronger. Appeal for continued negotiations may be dangerous and efforts find middle ground useless except as matter of record. Representations should give forceful picture of results of failure to agree at once and then build sovereign USI along constitutional lines with USA and other countries watching and guiding where possible. Weak representations will lead only to increased dilatory or obstructive tactics. This country can not stand much more of this. Foote The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–1947: Telegram [Document 754] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State top secret us urgent Batavia , June 19, 1947—4 p.m. 239. Saw Sjahrir today and made representations as per Deptel 160, June 17. In addition I told him of misery which might follow failure to agree, stressing this as my personal opinion based on many years duty here and on my personal admiration Indo people. He promised call meeting Indo delegation at once to acquaint them of Dept’s views and asked me call on him tomorrow morning for amendments to Indo reply to Dutch note of May 27. Sjahrir certainly knows danger of present situation and admitted Indo reply was drafted by Indo War Council. He hopes overcome at least some of Indo extreme views. Situation may have been eased somewhat. Will report result tomorrow’s meeting. Please regard Sjahrir’s remarks as Top Secret for Department only. Foote Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of South-east Asian Affairs (Moffat) 856E.01/6–2047 [Document 755] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of South-east Asian Affairs ( Moffat ) confidential [ Washington ,] June 20, 1947. Participants: Mr. O. Reuchlin, Minister, Netherlands Embassy; Mr. Abbot Low Moffat, SEA; Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA. Mr. Reuchlin called by appointment to inform the Department of the next steps contemplated by his Government relative to Indonesia. It was proposed, he stated, that the Commission General would inform the Republican delegation that it considered the Republican reply to the Dutch proposals of May 27 as unsatisfactory and offering no further basis for negotiation between the Commission General and the Republican delegation; that the whole matter was therefore being referred to the Netherlands Government. The Netherlands Government expected thereupon to send the Republican Government a friendly letter requesting cooperation in carrying out the Dutch proposals of May 27. I expressed the personal view that this would not advance a settlement of the situation; that actually I thought the Republican reply had made many important concessions and that, stripped of details, the two sides were not so very far apart; that each side appeared to be magnifying the differences instead of emphasizing how close together they were. It seemed to me, I explained, that the Dutch were wrong in overemphasizing Dutch control in the interim period (and confusing the interim form in this respect with the final form of the United States of Indonesia) and in trying to give undue weight to the two “paper” states of East Indonesia and Borneo; that, on the other hand, the Republicans were wrong in trying to eliminate the Dutch from the interim government as the Dutch obviously continued as the de jure authority. I expressed the view that the Republic with eighty percent of the population and perhaps ninety percent of the wealth and resources of Indonesia was perfectly right in asking fifty percent membership on any federal body but that the Dutch should during the interim period have the presiding officer with at least a casting vote in case of a tie. I thought if this problem could be solved, which I believed quite possible, the details on other matters would fall quickly into place with little difficulty. On the matter of gendarmerie , I thought that the Republicans were wrong but that if the other matters were resolved outside pressure could, if need be, bring agreement on some form of joint and integrated policing. I also expressed the view that the Republic was wrong in asking immediate admission in U.N. of the interim states, as the U.S.I. could not become a formal state until the Dutch constitution is amended. Mr. Reuchlin showed us an Aneta report which had just been received stating that the Republican delegation had sent the Commission General a further letter accepting many of the Dutch proposals in accordance with a conciliatory radio speech made the preceding night by Sjahrir. Mr. Reuchlin observed that if this were true the whole situation might be resolved quickly. A[ bbot ] L[ ow ] M[ offat ] The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–2047: Telegram [Document 756] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , June 20, 1947—10 p.m. 241. My telegram 239, June 19. Called on Sjahrir today for amendments Indo reply Dutch note May 27. Instead amendments to Indo reply, received only copy radio address by Sjahrir last night. Highlights thereof follow: Following signing Linggadjati, feelings distrust increased and any step or move of either party added to distrust by other. After Dutch note May 27 and Republican’s reply clouded sky became dark. People now discussing possibility of war. Some see Indo reply as rejection in concealed manner designed force Dutch surrender, accepting even force if necessary as consequence of Republican policy. Spirit of Republican reply is sincere desire achieve quick practical solution. Wording of Republican reply could perhaps be better so that increasing suspicion be prevented but Indo reply clearly stated there no hidden meanings concealing malice or desire for disaster. Republican note is reflection feelings views Republican Government. No new discussions yet occurred so cannot be said what solution can be accepted by all parties but mutual suspicions constantly increasing and atmosphere deteriorating. Real object of Republicans is avoid being forced into degrading situation where have to choose between war and straight out surrender by Republicans. We propose materialize forthwith cooperation meant at Linggadjati and we agree with establishment interim government. What we suggest re composition interim government and position of Crown does not exclude that during first period of interim government representative of Crown may occupy position de jure . We expect interim government approach nearer what we picture in counter note and interim government finally be dissolved in sovereign government of USI. Negotiations reformation interim government to be held with representatives of east Indo and Borneo and this should be done quickly and interim government established by middle July. This ends Sjahrir’s statement. Two points should be emphasized: This statement is personal one by Sjahrir and not made in consultation with government at Djocja and, from talks with Sjahrir yesterday and today, Republic has no intention to recede from its bid to dominate all NEI and future USI. British Consulate General had separate talk with Sjahrir and appears optimistic re situation but regret I do not share his optimism. Talks today with head FEO Netherlands Minister Foreign Affairs show Dutch attach little or no importance to Sjahrir’s statement. Atmosphere is tense awaiting decision from Cabinet at Hague. In meantime heads of Governments West Borneo and East Indonesia have stated publicly after conversations with Sjahrir and other Indo officials their opposition to plans outlined in Republican’s note. Foote The Department of State to the British Embassy 856E.01/6–1647 [Document 757] The Department of State to the British Embassy Aide-Mémoire Reference is made to the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of June 16, 1947, 16 which recounts recent developments with regard to Dutch-Indonesian relations and inquiries whether the United States Government would be prepared to make a joint offer with His Majesty’s Government of their good offices to bring the Dutch and Indonesians together again to seek agreement by peaceful means. The Government of the United States has dispatched telegrams to the American Ambassador at The Hague and to the American Consul General at Batavia, instructing them to make representations to the Dutch Government and to the authorities of the Indonesian Republic respectively. The United States Government is not prepared to join with the British Government in an offer of good offices. The United States Government sincerely hopes, however, that its representations at The Hague and in Indonesia will have the effect of bringing the Dutch and Indonesians together again to discuss and seek a solution of the problem confronting them. Washington , June 23, 1947. 16 Not printed. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 656D.006/6–347 [Document 758] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia confidential Washington , June 23, 1947. The Secretary of State has received the Consul’s despatch No. 221 dated April 10, 1947, 16 with enclosures, regarding the case of the American steamship Martin Behrman . The information contained in this report has been read with much interest, and the report has been of considerable assistance in dealing with the problems involved. The Secretary of State transmits herewith a copy of a letter dated June 3, 1947, with enclosures, received from W. Everett Smith, Vice President of Isbrandtsen Company, Inc., 16 relating to a summons that was addressed to Captain R. Gray, c/o Isbrandtsen Line, 26 Broadway, New York, under date of May 23, 1947, by the Acting Consul General of the Netherlands in New York. The Secretary of State has requested Mr. Smith to advise the Department concerning the action that Captain Gray takes with respect to this matter. The Secretary of State desires to receive from the Consular Officer a report regarding the present status of the legal proceedings which constitute the subject matter of this summons and copies of all papers relating thereto which have not previously been forwarded to the Department. Information is desired as to whether the cargo of the Martin Behrman is still in a warehouse, as a report has been received indicating that the warehouses in which it was stored were burned. A full report with regard to these matters is desired at an early date. 17 16 Not printed. 16 Not printed. 17 Telegrams 338, August 23, and 448, November 26, from Batavia, indicated that the case of the Martin Behrman was first postponed to November 28 and again to February 27, 1948. The Department, in telegram 72, February 19, 1948, 3 p.m., to Batavia, requested a further postponement pending the possible opening of negotiations looking to a settlement of the claim. (656D.006/8–2347, 11–2647) In despatches 309, September 24, and 372, November 24, from Batavia, reports were made regarding the cargo of the ship (656D.006/9–2447, 11–2447). The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–2547: Telegram [Document 759] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , June 25, 1947—3 p.m. 248. Deptel 160, June 17. Since making representations, have followed through by making two appeals personally both Sjahrir and Gani. Also discussed matter fully with Van Mook in same vein. Sjahrir realizes fully danger present situation and apparently anxious conclude agreement largely on basis Dutch note May 27. After my last visit to Sjahrir he called meeting Indonesian Delegation and some members Indonesian Cabinet after which he delivered new note to Commanding [ Commission ] General which little more polite and conciliatory but still failing agree with Dutch note of May 27 or make any changes in Indonesian note of June 7. At noon June 23, Van Mook visited Sjahrir and delivered note on behalf of Netherlands Govt text of which is urgent appeal to Indonesians accept Dutch proposals. In addition to appeal, note contains seven points in effort prove Dutch note in no way contradicts principles of Linggadjati Agreement. These points are: 1. Indonesian nationalism must obtain full liberty to organize itself and develop itself in Indonesian federal state. 2. Netherlands and Indonesia should retain common organization in interests both countries and international community of nations. 3. In order achieve future political structure, both existing legal position and factual relations must be taken into consideration. 4. Importance of East Indonesia, Borneo and Republic as component parts must be recognized in order give them place in real federation to which they entitled and which they desire. 5. Fundamental rights and liberties must be guaranteed to all races, groups and individual citizens in Indonesia. 6. Preparation of new political organizations in all Indonesia must be supported by adequate force, strength of which must be adapted to the measure in which guarantees of law and order are realized. 7. Economic rehabilitation of Indonesia as whole must be taken in hand at once on foundation of freedom, security and in interest both parties. Late yesterday Sjahrir, Gani and other members Indonesian Cabinet went Djocja where full Cabinet meeting held today during which it likely Indonesian final decision be made re Dutch note May 27. Many people fear there no solution to apparently hopeless situation. These opinions based on following: Sjahrir and other moderates favor agreement but are opposed by other elements such as Communist Alimin, Indonesian General Soedirman and others. They fear if Sjahrir agrees to Dutch proposals his Cabinet may fall or Indonesians would torpedo any attempts to implement agreement; if Indonesians accept, opinion is general they will have no power to restore law and order in Sumatra; in event Indonesian Cabinet falls, Alimin or Soedirman or both may try overthrow Soekarno and seize Indonesian Govt by staging coup d’état; in such event it feared East Java, West Java and Sumatra will fall away from Republic, feeling also general that military operations, probably limited in extent, would become unavoidable. It believed likely that Indonesian final reply will reach Van Mook by June 27. Foote Press Release Issued by the Department of State, June 25, 1947 856E.01/6–2547 [Document 760] Press Release Issued by the Department of State, June 25, 1947 18 June 25, 1947 Statement on Indonesia The United States Government is encouraged by preliminary reports that renewed negotiations between the Dutch and the Indonesians have shown the way towards overcoming the major obstacles to the establishment of an interim government in Indonesia along federal lines. The area of agreement reported thus far demonstrates the fact that even the most difficult problems can be solved by the exercise of a spirit of good faith and compromise. This Government feels that the Netherlands’ proposals of May 27 were made in good faith, and that they represent a reasonable approach to securing agreement on an effective federal government for all of Indonesia during the interim period pending the constitutional development of the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. The recent radio address of Premier Sjahrir revealed a high quality of statesmanship and has increased the expectation of this Government that a mutually beneficial settlement will be promptly achieved. 18 Text was sent to The Hague in telegram 311, June 26, and repeated to London as No. 2743 and to Batavia as No. 170. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.01/6–2647: Telegram [Document 761] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia confidential us urgent Washington , June 26, 1947—8 p.m. 172. You are requested immediately make following representations appropriate Indonesian Republic authorities, leaving aide-mémoire: 19 1. US Govt is gratified by preliminary reports that Indo Republic and Neth Govt representatives have made substantial progress towards agreement for the prompt formation of an interim federal govt for all Indonesia. This Govt has viewed with increasing alarm the danger inherent in failure to implement the Linggadjati Agreement. The US must necessarily be concerned with developments in Indonesia because of the importance of Indonesia as a factor in the world’s stability, both economic and political. We wish, therefore, to stress to the Indonesian Republic the suffering likely to result from further deadlock. We wish also to point out the benefits which will flow from a prompt agreement and a cooperative endeavor to overcome the problems with which Indonesia is confronted. 2. This Govt believes that the immediate formation of an interim central govt for Indonesia, established upon the principle of federation, as proposed by the Neth Govt and as accepted in principle by the Indonesian Republic is urgently necessary. In our reading of Linggadjati Agreement, it is clear a transition period was envisaged (between now and Jan 1949) during which Neth retains sovereignty and ultimate authority in Indonesia. We therefore urge Indo-Republic cooperate without delay in immediate formation of an interim federal govt. We are confident when agreement thereon achieved, remaining issues can be resolved in spirit of good will. 3. It is this Govt’s expectation that establishment interim Govt on basis mutually beneficial both sides will provide political stability essential to development positive program of economic rehabilitation. This Govt is prepared therefore after interim Govt is established and mutual cooperation along constructive path assured to discuss if desired with representatives of Neth and of interim Govt (including representatives of the Republic and other constituent areas) financial aid (Deptel 132, May 16 20 ) to assist in the economic rehabilitation of Indo. Advise Van Mook content foregoing. 21 Sent Batavia 172; repeated The Hague as 315; and London as 2760. Marshall 19 The Consul General reported in telegram 251, June 28, 3 p.m., that the aide-mémoire was delivered to an Indonesian representative in Batavia on June 28, and the Department informed Batavia the same day in telegram 176 that it had no objection to publication of the document (856E.01/6–2847). 20 Same as telegram 231 to The Hague, p. 924. 21 Telegram 446, June 30, 3 p.m., from The Hague, reported the reaction of the Netherlands Foreign Office as follows: “The Netherlands Government believe that the interest shown by the American Government may as yet prove most helpful in solving the deadlock which at present exists in Indonesia. It is therefore that Her Majesty’s Government may express the earnest hope that the American Government will continue to urge the Indonesian authorities concerned to cooperate without delay in reaching a fair and reasonable solution to the serious difficulties that are being encountered.” (856E.01/6–3047) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 856E.01/6–2347: Telegram [Document 762] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential us urgent Washington , June 26, 1947—8 p.m. 316. Embtel 423, June 23. 22 On basis incomplete info received from several sources, including Neth and Brit Embs here, it appears Republican Dels have accepted most May 27 proposals but not provisions for joint police force. You should inform FonOff as follows: (1) This Govt encouraged by reports that current negotiations Dutch-Indos have made substantial progress overcoming major obstacles establishment interim Govt Indo. (2) As mutual tolerance essential to success of agreement, this Govt hopes Dutch will not insist on Republican acceptance provisions which will obviously provoke future disagreements and thus impede successful functioning of federation (Embtel 423, para 2). We believe it important also that Dutch not push for acceptance their position to point likely to strengthen extremists who feel Republic has already made too many concessions and to weaken moderates among Republican Del who seek agreement. (3) It is this Govt’s expectation that establishment interim Govt on basis mutually beneficial both sides will provide political stability essential to development positive program of economic rehabilitation. This Govt is prepared therefore after interim Govt is established and mutual cooperation along constructive path assured to discuss if desired with representatives of Neth and of interim Govt (including representations of the Republic and other constituent areas) financial aid (Deptel 231, May 16) to assist in the economic rehabilitation of Indo. For your guidance should any of following become pertinent in your conversations with FonOff, it is Dept’s opinion: (1) The Dutch should not insist upon unanimity in voting procedure of interim Govt and its federal bodies since majority principle [with Dutch as sovereign power casting deciding vote in case of tie] 23 important element development successful functioning of a federal government. (2) In view preponderant population Republic allocation to it of 50 percent membership interim council and federal bodies reasonable with Dutch as sovereign presiding and retaining power cast deciding vote in case of tie. (3) Dept apprehensive lest use Dutch troops in joint gendarmerie in peaceful areas under Indo Republic control may in fact engender local difficulties. Agreement that joint gendarmerie would be used only if Republic unable maintain law and order as pledged would seem preferable. (4) Immediate reduction armed forces would constitute timely contribution to establishing mutual good faith. Sent Hague as 316. Repeated Batavia as 173 for info and similar representations Van Mook. Repeated London as 2762. Marshall 22 Not printed. 23 Brackets appear in the original. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–2747: Telegram [Document 763] The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the Secretary of State confidential u.s. urgent London , June 27, 1947—1 p.m. 3526. 1. Foreign Office this morning showed us text of three urgent telegrams from Batavia, two of which despatched 26th and one 27th (all repeated British Embassy, Washington). 2. Important points were: ( a ) Van Mook had told Mitcheson night of 25th he thought Sjahrir unable bring back satisfactory reply and even if Republican response satisfactory he confident Republicans would not implement agreement; ( b ) Van Mook expressed view conditions in interior deteriorating, people disgusted with Republican regime and Republican Government unable control disparate elements, especially semi-independent military; ( c ) Van Mook told Mitcheson he authorized by The Hague to take military action if he found Republican reply unsatisfactory and he implied he ready take such action forthwith; ( d ) Republican reply due Batavia 27th, 2 p.m. Batavia time, to be signed by Soekarno and not Sjahrir who being retained as “Presidential Counsellor”; 24 ( e ) Mitcheson recommended Foreign Office urgently request Dutch Government to withdraw authority to Van Mook to resort military action without previously consulting The Hague. 3. Foreign Office informs us it not following Mitcheson’s recommendation but awaiting information re nature Republican reply before considering what further action it may wish to take in matter. Sent Department, repeated The Hague 42; Department pass Batavia. Douglas 24 Telegram 434, June 27, 5 p.m., from The Hague, reported pessimism of the Foreign Office over the resignation of the Indonesian Prime Minister, regarded as a defeat for constructive elements in the Republican Government (856E.00/6–2747). The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 356E.115/6–2847: Telegram [Document 764] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential Washington , June 28, 1947—4 p.m. 320. View apparent deterioration situation Indonesia with possibility Dutch military action and retaliatory scorched earth policy by Indos emphasize to FonOff grave concern this Govt lest action be taken endangering American lives and threatening destruction American property. In particular sabotage Standard-Vacuum oil northwest of Palembang field would because of high pressure charactertics that field result its permanent and total loss, ruining American investment and depriving Dutch Indos and world of needed oil and valuable resource. U.S. fears that, even though Indos might give assurances of protection, action by irresponsible elements in face of threat of Dutch military move might result in irreparable damage to wells. Breaking of one cap on wells might result in uncontrollable fire. AmConGen Batavia requested make similar representations Van “Mook and point out emphatically and clearly to Indos technical danger complete loss of fields in event of sabotage, and that US in view de facto Indonesian control looks to them to see field not harmed and that this to their interest as well as interest US and world. 25 Sent Hague No. 320. Repeated Batavia as No. 175 Marshall 25 Telegram 445, June 29, 9 p.m., from The Hague, reported Foreign Office promise to send appropriate instructions to Batavia (856E.01/6–2947). The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–2847: Telegram [Document 765] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent The Hague , June 28, 1947—4 p.m. 441. Text Republicans’ reply has been received here but only copies available are in hands Prime Minister and Minister for Overseas Territories. Vredenburch states that summaries now appearing in press somewhat off mark but repeats that general tenor of reply “most unsatisfactory”. Govt’s position and decision as to next move is subject to Cabinet meeting tentatively set for this afternoon. Embassy trying obtain copy soonest possible and will communicate context to Department. 26 Vredenburch added that from brief opportunity to read text of reply it appears to him contain much “double talk” and certain passages not at all clear which presumably will necessitate further clarification. Vredenburch denies that Van Mook authorized to take military action contingent on nature reply of Republican Govt. (London 42, June 27, sent Dept as 3526). He point out, however, that Governor General has power at all times as Commander-in-Chief to take military action in case of emergency. Position of US Government towards military action as stated in Deptel 292, June 17 was again repeated to Minister in substance. He reaffirmed previous assurances that resort to force is not present Government’s policy although Govt confronted with dilemma how to resolve the problem in face of lack good faith on part of Republic on one hand and in face of fact on the other that Netherlands Govt is “broke”. Sent Dept as 441, repeated London as 56. Dept pass to Batavia. Baruch 26 An unofficial summary by the Netherlands Press Agency was reported in telegram 442, June 28, from The Hague (856E.01/6–2847). The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–2947: Telegram [Document 766] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential The Hague , June 29, 1947—8 p.m. 443. Deptel 318[ 316 ], June 26. Under instructions from Foreign Ministry, Vredenburch today advised Embassy that while realizing message transmitted by Embassy June 27 was drafted before Sjahrir’s resignation and that passing events had somewhat superseded terms message Netherlands Govt still considered it desirable make some comments on message. With reference to passage in paragraph 2 reading “provisions which will obviously provoke future disagreement and thus impede successful functioning of federation”, Vredenburch stated that Netherlands Govt wished to emphasize that it is unaware that tolerance has not been persistently shown by them. On other hand he makes point that notwithstanding signing Linggadjati Agreement the Indo Republic has so far shown no willingness practice tolerance in sense suggested by Dept as essential to the success of the agreement. As examples of lack such tolerance on part Republic he cited following points: 1. Continued military and subversive activities have been and are being carried out by Republic in Malino-territories. 2. Nearly 2 years after the defeat of Japan many thousands who were interned during the Jap occupation have as yet not been freed. 3. Altho an agreement was concluded some time ago with regard to demilitarization of Modjokerto-region Republic attacks in that area still continue. 4. It is a well-known fact that Indos who loyally cooperate with the Netherlands are threatened with retaliation by the Republic authorities. 5. Economic assets both Dutch and foreign-owned which are indispensable for rehabilitation of country are wantonly destroyed on ever increasing scale. He went on to say that it was not clear to Netherlands Govt as to which provisions US Govt had in mind when stating “will obviously provoke future disagreements”. He said that Netherlands Govt desired point out this connection that it has requested Republic Govt accept essence proposals submitted Indo delegation May 27 which were considered “fair and reasonable” by Under Secretary State Acheson on June 6 (Vredenburch visit). He added that it was Netherlands Govt understanding that US Govt at that time considered Dutch proposals offered in good faith, as effort implement Linggadjati Agreement and as providing reasonable basis for effective interim govt pending formation of sovereignty United States Indonesia and Union. He also recalled opinion expressed by US Govt that Republican Govt would be well advised respond promptly in spirit good faith and compromise as demonstration its sincerity of pledges undertaken at Linggadjati. Vredenburch, in considering Dept’s view that Dutch should not push for acceptance their position to point likely to strengthen extremists, said that it could be shown that policy of appeasing extremists had only lead to resignation of Sjahrir and apparent rejection Netherlands proposals by Soekarno. He said that Netherlands Govt moreover wished to stress that their proposals had been drafted with view make all possible concessions concomitant with fact that they retain sovereignty ultimate authority and consequent ultimate responsibility in NEI until US Indo and Union have been established. He added that the Netherlands Govt hardly could be expected to accept an agreement which placed them in position where such ultimate responsibility could not be put in effect. He added that the answer received from Indo Republic indicated that US expectation regarding establishment interim govt with Netherlands maintaining authority in transition period had apparently failed of fulfillment. With reference to the proffer of financial aid to assist economic rehabilitation of Indo, Vredenburch made following statement: “The Netherlands Govt wishes to express their sincere appreciation for this renewed demonstration of American willingness to assist in rehabilitation of distressed areas.” He went on say that in view dilatory tactics continuously pursued by Republic authorities that Netherlands Govt fear long period time may elapse before mutual cooperation along constructive path is assured. This, Vredenburch said, was point which he had particularly stressed while in Washington, adding that financial position of Netherlands Govt had reached stage where further protracted negotiations or discussions with Republic cannot be considered. Reverting to oral discussion of other points reflecting Dept’s opinion (Deptel 316, June 2[ 26 ]) as they became subject of conversation, he indicated some modification from earlier position reported Embtel 435, June 27, 27 in that he stated Dutch would not insist on unanimity voting procedure provided Dutch retain ultimate authority. Under such understanding Netherlands Govt could accept majority principle. This also applied, he said, to question 50 percent Republic membership interim council but with added proviso this case that East Indo and Borneo concurred. Insofar as joint military force was concerned, Vredenburch stated that Netherlands Govt would wish to retain discretion to decide when considerations called for maintenance of law order. Regarding recruiting armed forces, he pointed to recent Republic authorities announcement that number their troops to be increased and that especially the Heihos (Indos in Jap military service during occupation) had been remobilized. He also stated that it probably would not have escaped Dept’s attention that in his reply June 27, Soekarno makes allegations that Republic troops have in fact been reduced. The conclusion could only be drawn, Vredenburch said, and [apparent garble] at Washington is Govt’s view that official Republic utterances destined for foreign consumption were at variance with facts, these being admitted by Republic military authorities. Sent Dept 443, repeated London 57. Dept pass Batavia. Baruch 27 Not printed. The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–2947: Telegram [Document 767] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent The Hague , June 29, 1947—8 p.m. 444. Vredenburch appears to have receded somewhat from earlier interpretation as unsatisfactory Soekarno’s reply and have modified personal views which are reflected in Netherlands Govt comments contained Embtel 443. He sees divergence between Sjahrir and Soekarno position considerably narrowed if verbal purported conciliatory interpretation in reply given Van Mook can be confirmed by Indo Republic on paper. In order achieve this end, he stated it has been suggested Van Mook put following questions to Republic: 1. Does it recognize authority of Crown in interim Govt? 2. Does it agree it is US Indo which is sovereign and not Republic and that it is US Indo which will send diplomatic representatives abroad? 3. Does it agree to organization of federal bodies (centralized food, foreign exchange, etc.) under interim Govt as proposed by Netherlands Govt May 27? 4. Does it agree that estates of non-Indo owners be returned as proposed May 27? 5. Does it accept joint responsibility of maintenance law and order in territories which are under Republic’s de facto authority? 28 In above connection Vredenburch states that occasion submitting above questionnaire may be another opportunity for US action as we stressed the view that main influence rests with US as Indo recognize British has little to offer situation besides moral persuasion. He again referred to time element, stating that his estimate gives outside limit 2 weeks when matter must be received particularly interims of Dutch deteriorating financial position. Another consideration heard was approach and observance Ramadan beginning mid-July, that after fasting had begun it would be almost impossible to carry on effective negotiations. Again terms of time he stated that morale of troops who were constantly being sniped at must be considered. He said that he believed that restraint of military had to date been exemplary in face of constant provocation and should be commended; the sooner pressure was taken off troops possibility for incidents would be reduced. In this connection, he inquired if Foote could not urgently press Republican authorities to desist not only from sniping but from continued destruction of property. It appears that Van Mook has requested instructions to tell Foote that it will be impossible maintain morale of troops much longer if Dutch must keep purely defensive position. I feel that the tolerance of the Dutch is reaching a critical point and I respectfully suggest that in urging the Dutch to refrain from use of force we may have assumed high responsibility in settlement of Indonesian problem. By so doing we have unquestionably aided bargaining position of Republican authorities in removing use of force as alternative in any event up to present. Consequently, I feel that in next few days we should exert greatest possible measure of our influence to urge Republic to be reasonable and give Dutch reason to believe their good faith and cooperation may be counted upon; and that they in turn will be held to strictest accountability for sabotage and destruction of American interests and property in Republican controlled area, and more especially as outlined your (Deptel 320, June 28). Sent Dept as 444, repeated London as 58. Dept pass to Batavia. Baruch 28 Telegram 450, June 30, 8 p.m., from The Hague, reported that a communication based on these points was addressed to the Indonesians on June 29 (856E.01/6–3047). The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/6–3047: Telegram [Document 768] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Batavia , June 30, 1947—10 a.m. [ p.m. ] 252. Deptel 172, June 26. In personal letter Soekarno acknowledged receipt aide-mémoire stating “We now studying various points raised in your aide-mémoire and I sincerely hope that the relations between Government of US and our Government will grow more cordial every day.” This, of course, says nothing but messenger who brought special personal message said verbally that Soekarno hoping obtain control over his opponents, such as Alimin and others, to enable him comply with Dutch note May 27 and our aide-mémoire . Moderate Indonesians and Dutch deeply gratified with aide-mémoire and hope will avoid military action and help restore law order and rehabilitation industries. One of first reactions our aide-mémoire was from left-wing groups at Djocja which on June 28 retracted resolution which opposed policy Sjahrir. Government and political circles at Djocja referred to leftwing action against Sjahrir as “irresponsible procedure by unschooled politicians”. Soekawati of East Indonesia and Sultan Hamid of West Borneo came Batavia especially to thank me for our aide-mémoire . Yesterday many Dutch, British, American, Indonesians and others came my home to offer thanks for averting bloodshed. It remains be seen, however, whether this true. It appears there only two factors preventing complete agreement: Communist Alimin and Indonesian General Soedirman. Special messenger believes Soekarno will win over his opponents and Sjahrir will resume duties as Prime Minister. When it appeared Communists and Indonesian military had control, Sjahrir was forced resign but Soekarno, who has strong personality, assumed complete control of Republican Government, without name of dictator. I have much faith Soekarno’s ability and desire reach quick agreement and if he has control of left wing, agreement may be expected. If not, no one knows answer. Regardless opinion British Foreign Office or any of its personnel, Van Mook trying every possible way avoid all military action. Any recommendations British Consul General Batavia to remove Van Mook’s authority are merely stupid efforts. Van Mook is best friend Indonesians have and they admit that fact. Unfortunately Mitcheson, British Consul General, been here only few weeks and cannot know peculiarities this situation. I warn Department that news correspondents and some foreign consuls here may spread many types false rumors of unconfirmed reports. Please be assured that I am in close touch with both Dutch and Indonesians and that facts will be reported promptly. It is certainty your aide-mémoire prevented unfortunate incidents over past weekend. Sent my personal greetings today to Soekarno verbally by one his Ministers in which he urged to decide and act without delay since sand is running out of glass. Van Mook today sent new note to Indonesians in which he again pleads for implementation Linggadjati on basis of our aide-mémoire . Expect receive copy this note late tonight. If received, will cable tomorrow. 29 Foote 29 Text of note, dated June 29, was sent to the Department in telegram 253, July 1, 3 p.m., from Batavia (not printed). The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856D.00/7–247: Telegram [Document 769] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State top secret Batavia , July 2, 1947—5 p.m. 255. Have seen copy telegram from United States Military Attaché, Singapore, to Director Intelligence, Washington, reporting Lord Killearn’s 30 remarks to him, essence thereof being that British Government policy is favor and assist Indos, that British Consul General Batavia is advising Indos in present situation, that Sjahrir has depended on British advice in handling crisis and Killearn fears military action in NEI would have unfavorable effect on nationalist movements in India, Burma and Malaya. I am and have been convinced beyond doubt long time that Dutch-Indo problem would have been solved last year except for British encouragement to Indos; present deadlock caused by British who all-out pro-Indo and desire see Dutch evacuate NEI; British do not wish Dutch-Indo agreement and encourage Indos stall for time. British Consul General here writes Soekarno but does not do so always through FEO Netherlands Foreign Office. It is fact, and generally known locally, that British have been and now trying cause local Chinese become anti-Dutch and favor Indo cause. On June 30 in my presence British Consulate [ Consul ] General asked Van Mook “does Your Excellency have full authority declare war on Indos when time deemed appropriate?” Van Mook did not lose temper but answered abruptly that he in constant communication with Hague. He advised plantations and other enterprises have advocated and now doing so that Sumatra and Malaya should go together—thus eliminating Dutch and taking Sumatra from Republic. Such remarks made to me many times over many years. Killearn’s statement he feared repercussions India, Burma, Malaya does not impress me. Fact is British want own or control Sumatra. They anti-Dutch because think can obtain more favors from Indos than from Dutch. There appears be no British neutrality in this situation. If Dutch and Indos fail to agree and if military action results, considerable responsibility therefor will rest on British because of almost constant interference. Commenting more fully by despatch. 31 Foote 30 British Special Commissioner in Southeast Asia at Singapore. 31 No. 268, July 3, from Batavia, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.01/7–147: Telegram [Document 770] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia confidential us urgent Washington , July 3, 1947—7 p.m. 181. Urtel 253 July 1. 32 View uncertainty personalities new Republican Govt and time limit included Van Mook communication, you are requested if in your judgment such action beneficial reiterate appropriate Republican authorities that US Govt earnestly stresses urgency establishment interim Govt and implementation Linggadjati. We understand Neth Govt has requested Republican Govt to state its position on five specific points. We strongly urge that Republican Govt reply in specific terms Dutch communication as promptly as possible, not only as means of eliminating misunderstanding, but also as further evidence Republic’s willingness to act promptly and responsively towards achieving common goal of workable interim Govt, thereby eliminating grave dangers inherent in present situation, and making possible progress toward economic rehabilitation Indonesia. Sent Batavia as 181; repeated Hague as 337 and London as 2880. Marshall 32 Not printed, but see footnote 29, p. 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 768 ] . Editorial Note [Document 771] Editorial Note In telegram 259, July 7, 3 p.m., from Batavia, Mr. Foote reported formation of a new Indonesian Cabinet on July 3, with the Defense Minister, Dr. Sjarifoeddin, also as Prime Minister; and with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hadji Agoes Salim, as Foreign Minister. The latter would head the delegation to negotiate with the Dutch. (856E.00/7–747) The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 356E.115/7–447: Telegram [Document 772] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret us urgent Batavia , July 4, 1947—3 p.m. 258. Deptel 175, June 28. 33 In view urgency situation, Dept’s attention invited to following points: 1. By July 6 we may know whether Dutch-Indo agreement possible. My opinion Indo reply will be unsatisfactory since it known they been stalling for time with no intention reaching any agreement except on own terms. In such event some military action may occur. 2. If presume Indos agree 100%, must be remembered they unable restore law and order or perform any other duties of government in Sumatra and most of Java where feelings mostly anti-Javanese. If Republican Govt wishes agree, they must use some Dutch forces to restore law and order and protect lives and property, especially in Sumatra and parts of Java. Whether or not agreement made, cold fact is some military action (more in nature of police action) completely necessary, especially in Sumatra where American property located. Irresponsible elements there are in control and in nature of private armies or gangs who obey no one but local leaders. Republic means nothing to such elements. Regardless of whether Dutch and Indos agree, there many areas Sumatra and Java where quick surprise steps must be taken if will protect property. 3. Even police action will be exaggerated by correspondents into fullblown war in efforts make headlines. This will be done chiefly by British and Australian correspondents but I fear some Americans may possibly follow suit and again glamorize where such may be unjust. If military or police action becomes necessary anywhere, both Van Mook and General Spoor 35 have promised keep me advised every possible detail. Foote 33 Same as telegram 320, June 28, to The Hague, p. 962. 35 Commander in Chief, Netherlands East Indies Army (Land Forces). The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/7–747: Telegram [Document 773] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , July 7, 1947—5 p.m. 260. Deptel 172, June 26. Following note signed personally by Soekarno received by me last night from hands of Dr. Tamzil, Indonesian Vice Minister Foreign Affairs: “The aide-mémoire of the US Govt dated June 28, 1947, which the Govt of the Republic of Indonesia has studied with keen interest, justifies the opinion of the Republic of Indonesia, that the Indonesian problem is not only concerning Indonesia and the Netherlands themselves, but also concerning the whole world. From the note of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, dated June 27, 1947 to the Netherlands Govt can be proved that the Govt of the Republic of Indonesia is prepared to establish immediately an interim central govt for Indonesia on the principles of federation, as proposed by the Netherlands Govt and accepted in principle by the Indonesian Republic. The Indonesian Govt recognizes that during the transition period (between now and ultimately on January 1, 1949) the Netherlands is to retain sovereignty and ultimate authority in Indonesia. According to the Linggadjati Agreement, this recognition, however, may not endanger the de facto authority of the Republic of Indonesia, which has been recognized. Therefore, the Republic of Indonesia always shows her spirit of good-will to cooperate without delay on immediate formation of an interim federal govt. The sending of more Dutch troops to Indonesia, however, endangers the possibility to solve the problem peacefully. To guarantee cooperation for establishing an interim govt on the basis of mutual benefits, the withdrawal of the reinforcements of the Netherlands troops is of much importance. The Indonesian Govt never doubts that the establishment of the interim govt will benefit both sides and will give to the country the political stability essential to the development of a positive program of economic rehabilitation. We are very glad to know that the US Govt is willing to give to the Indonesian people all possible financial aid to assist in the economic rehabilitation of Indonesia.” Republic reply handed Van Mook yesterday. Have not seen text thereof but it been described as unacceptable. Van Mook says it can be divided into three categories of replies to his questions: evasions, rejections, and acceptances conditional on Dutch acceptance of other unacceptable points. Indonesian note referred Hague for further instructions. 36 In meantime, Indonesian Minister who brought note borrowed Dutch airplane and returned Djocja today in effort have Indonesian Cabinet write new more acceptable note. 37 Expect receive text Indonesian note tonight. Foote 36 Telegram 472, July 8, 9 a.m., from The Hague, reported that the British Embassy there had advised that the Dutch position was regarded as reasonable and that the Indonesians should not delay longer implementing the Linggadjati Agreement (856E.01/7–847). 37 In telegram 261, July 8, noon, Mr. Foote reported having stressed the contents of telegram 181, July 3, p.m. He had just been informed that Indonesian instructions had been sent to say a new note acceptable to the Dutch had been drafted. Mr. Foote added: “I feel hopeful that we have averted war but must wait for contents new Indo note.” (856E.01/7–847) Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) 856D.00/7–847 [Document 774] Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs ( Morgan ) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Matthews ) [ Washington ,] July 8, 1947. Subject: Proposed Course of Action With Regard to the Dutch-Indonesian Controversy. From scanty reporting from Foote in Batavia and from press sources, it appears that the range of issues between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic has been narrowed to a single issue—the Dutch demand that a joint Dutch-Indonesian police force be established to maintain law and order throughout the entire area. The Indonesian Republic has officially agreed to the immediate formation of an interim federal government under Dutch determining control, but has balked at the acceptance of the proposal for a joint gendarmerie to police Republican territory on the grounds that such action would nullify the recognition of the Republic’s de facto authority granted by the Dutch under the Linggadjati Agreement. Van Mook in Batavia has demanded acceptance by the Indonesians of the joint police force. He has referred the matter back to The Hague for final decision. It appears from press reports that conservative and right wing elements in Holland consider Indonesian acceptance of a joint gendarmerie a sine qua non of agreement with the Republic. Labor circles generally in Holland appear to favor a compromise on this issue, and are not reconciled to making this issue a cause for war. A cabinet crisis at The Hague would thus seem to be in the making. A press report of today quotes informed Dutch officials as predicting hostilities within four days unless the issue is reconciled. If the situation in the Indies is allowed to deteriorate into open warfare (as is likely to be the case in the absence of further U.S. intervention), I believe that a valuable opportunity will be lost to consolidate that area under a regime which will remain oriented to the Western Democracies. It is therefore recommended that the Dutch and Indonesians be urged to compromise this remaining issue, or to submit the question to arbitration as specifically provided for in Article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement. If we urge the Dutch to compromise this issue, it is likely that the suggestion informally advanced by Helb of the Netherlands Embassy some days ago, to the effect that this issue might be resolved by inviting a neutral American Mission to head a constabulary for all Indonesia, will be officially proposed to this Government. I understand that this idea was brought forward at the meeting last week with Under Secretary Lovett 38 and was rejected. I believe it deserves, nevertheless, careful consideration as a means of preventing an outbreak of hostilities which would wreck all possibility of a voluntary association between the Dutch and the Indonesians and would in addition endanger U.S. property and commercial opportunities. 38 Robert A. Lovett, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, replaced Dean Acheson on July 1 as Under Secretary of State. Editorial Note [Document 775] Editorial Note In a memorandum of July 8, the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Moffat) stated: “It is understood that the Dutch anticipate the possibility of agreement on all points except the gendarmerie . In an effort to conclude an agreement and knowing Indonesian confidence in the United States, they may propose that the gendarmerie be placed under neutral American administration for the interim period. If such a request is made by both sides to the United States and the terms are acceptable to both sides and to this Government, it is believed the United States should accede to the request if satisfied that by so doing a peaceful settlement can be achieved along the lines of the Lingga Djati [ Linnggadjati ] Agreement and so accomplish the American objective in Indonesia,” This memorandum was transmitted by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs on July 9. (856E.00/7–847) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon) 856E.00/7–947 [Document 776] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs ( Landon ) confidential [ Washington ,] July 9, 1947. The Indian Ambassador, Mr. Asaf Ali, called on the Under Secretary to express the concern of his Government for the deteriorating situation in Indonesia stating that the Dutch were moving a fresh division of troops into Java; that this appeared to his Government as a deliberate act of aggression by a European power to force an agreement on an Asiatic people; that such an act of aggression would have a very bad effect among all Asiatic peoples and particularly in India which had intimate relations with the peoples of Indonesia from whom they received important rice shipments; that Article 17 of the Lingga Djati Agreement provided for arbitration of points of disagreement; and that it was hoped by his Government that the United States would remind the Dutch of this fact and indeed would use its good offices in an attempt to bring about a peaceful solution. 39 It was pointed out to Mr. Ali that our most recent information seemed to indicate that the Indonesian and Dutch positions were almost reconciled if not entirely so; that there was less danger than before of an attempt to settle the issue by force; and that therefore it was hoped that our information was more recent than the information of the Indian Ambassador. Mr. Ali was informed that the information which he had given us would be passed on to the Secretary of State. 39 Telegram 509, July 9, 1 p.m., from New Delhi, reported a similar move the previous night when it was explained that the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States might take this line (856E.01/7–947). The gist of telegram 265, July 9, 3 p.m., infra , was reported in 389, July 10, 7 p.m., to New Delhi and orally to the Indian Ambassador on July 11. (856E.01/7–947, 856E.00/7–1147) The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/7–947: Telegram [Document 777] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State restricted Batavia , July 9, 1947—3 p.m. 265. Van Mook informed me that Dutch and Indos are in 95 percent agreement and that he and Indos can arrange other 5 percent at conference table. Only point at issue is gendarmerie which not now regarded as real problem. Van Mook called me to palace to thank us for assistance in reaching agreement. Indo Deputy Prime Minister, Gani, and Indo Acting Minister Foreign Affairs, Tamzil, called this morning thank us for assistance reaching agreement. Both Dutch and Indos stated they will push for immediate formation interim government and full implementation Linggadjati. Above due largely my convincing British Consul General take action parallel mine which based on Department’s telegrams 172, 40 175 41 and 181. 42 British Foreign Office instructed British Consul General accordingly yesterday. Text [of] Indo reply being encoded. 43 Foote 40 June 26, p. 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 760 and Doc. 761 ] . 41 Same as telegram 320, June 28, p. 962 [ Pg. 962 includes portions of Doc. 763 and Doc. 764 ] . 42 July 3, p. 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , and Doc. 772 ] . 43 Telegram 264, July 10, 3 p.m., from Batavia, reported the text of a document handed to the Dutch on July 8 with a note dated July 5 (856E.01/7–1047). The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 356E.115/7–1047: Telegram [Document 778] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State 44 secret Batavia , July 10, 1947—4 p.m. 267. Indo Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Gani, and Vice Minister Foreign Affairs, Dr. Tamzil, called personally last evening and left following aide-mémoire with me in reply my verbal representations as per Department’s telegram 175, June 28: 41 “1. Government of the Republic with all the power and the implements at their disposal will safeguard the lives and property of American nationals present in the de facto territory of the Republic. 2. On account of oil being vital for necessities of life to the community in this country, renewed instructions have been issued in order that the oil wells and refineries remain constantly in good care, no matter what events may occur in the future. 3. The Government of the Republic are fully aware that oil wells with high pressure such as oil wells situated northwest of Palembang are difficult to fix up again once having been damaged and that such a situation will result in loss for all parties concerned. 4. However, in case the Dutch conduct large scale operations in the vicinity of the oil wells and refineries by employing artillery and bombs, then the Dutch should be held responsible.” Foote 44 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 350, July 11, 8 p.m. 41 Same as telegram 320, June 28, p. 962 [ Pg. 962 includes portions of Doc. 763 and Doc. 764 ] . The Chargé in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/7–1047: Telegram [Document 779] The Chargé in the Netherlands ( Chapin ) to the Secretary of State confidential The Hague , July 10, 1947—5 p.m. 488. Vredenburch said today that he had instructions to tell me officially that the Netherlands Government was appreciative of timely assistance of US Consul General Batavia, adding that Government considered his efforts had played important part in helping resolve present phase of Indo situation. Reference is also made in Government statements issued this afternoon of “friendly advice” rendered by US Government. This statement being released to press late today. Vredenburch describes it as long historical review which discloses no new information. (Summary of concluding paragraphs follows in another telegram.) He said that it had been drafted by Cabinet Ministers and that tenor of statement reflects the not inconsiderable controversy which arose in Cabinet discussion just prior its release. Vredenburch again expressed anxiety lest further period of procrastination would materialize before Republicans showed disposition to activate Linggadjati, and added that Netherlands Government couldn’t consider program for withdrawal Dutch troops from Indo until such time as Indos themselves had shown unmistakable measure good will towards implementation. The statement issued by Evatt 46 has been “source of annoyance” to Netherlands Government and Netherlands Minister in Canberra has been instructed to tell Evatt that Netherlands Government does not consider the moment chosen by him proffer good offices either timely or helpful. Sent Department 488; repeated London 68; Department pass Batavia. Chapin 46 Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–1547: Telegram [Document 780] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , July 15, 1947—11 p.m. 271. Situation yesterday looked hopeless and Dutch and Indonesians looked equally grim. Last night I met Van Mook and later Sjarifoeddin, Setiadjit, Gani and Leimena. 47 We again discussed situation in general. Today the four Indonesians met Dutch at Koning Klein Palace and capitulated to Van Mook’s demands. He thereupon loaned them airplane to enable them visit Djocjakarta to obtain full Cabinet approval. They will proceed Djocjakarta early tomorrow morning. Their agreement with Van Mook includes following points: 1. Joint constabulary accepted. Each state to have own police with Dutch furnishing instructors, et cetera. Dutch units may be used restore law and order where states unable do so. 2. Indonesian military to be demobilized or returned to their garrisons. 3. Perimeters to be guarded by mixed police force during first few days or weeks. 4. Indonesian military and other authorities to give orders to commanders all sectors and perimeters to cease fire by midnight July 16. 5. Nature of Indonesian propaganda to change by July 17. 6. Military withdrawals from perimeters to be completed by 6 p.m., July 19. 7. Plans for demolition and scorched earth to be cancelled and explosive charges everywhere to be withdrawn by July 21. 8. When above all completed Dutch will begin changing from military to police force. Indonesian reply expected tomorrow night. If Indonesian Cabinet agrees, situation appears solved with possible exception of police action in certain areas to remove irregular or private fighting clubs. I hope to be able report full agreement tomorrow. Department pass London and Hague. Foote 47 Setiadjit was Fourth Deputy Prime Minister; Dr. Johannes Leimena was Minister of Public Health. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 856E.01/7–1547: Telegram [Document 781] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential us urgent Washington , July 17, 1947—3 p.m. 358. Dept has consistently endeavored assist Dutch in peaceful establishment new arrangements accordance realities situation in which there will be voluntary association Neth and Indos believing such association essential future Dutch economic and political strength Europe as well as political and economic benefit Indos and maintenance Western democratic influence Southeast Asia. Accordingly it welcomed Linggadjati and recently urged Indo cooperation immediate formation interim Govt. Referring recent Neth demands (Batavia tel 271, July 15), press this morning reports Republicans have rejected requirement unilateral Indo cease-fire order requesting mutual cease-fire orders and Dutch unequivocally predicting war. Inform FonOff all foregoing and that in view major Indo concessions following US Aide-Mémoire and apparent major agreement these recent demands, Dept confident Dutch will achieve peaceful solution present crisis recognizing insistence details adversely affecting face present moderate Republican Govt likely result strengthening extremists and rendering impossible achievement agreement in cooperative spirit essential successful development Neth-Indo Union. AmConGen Batavia requested inform Van Mook foregoing and also if in his judgment advisable to stress again to both Van Mook and Republicans urgent need prompt formation interim Govt and agreement policing problem. However, in talk with Republicans ConGen to avoid suggestion US supports details recent demands and to indicate to Van Mook Dept perturbed their extreme unilateral nature. Sent Hague as 358. Repeated to Batavia for action as 194. Repeated to London as 3055. Marshall The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–1747: Telegram [Document 782] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Batavia , July 17, 1947—10 p.m. 272. While Sjarifoeddin, Setiadjit, Gani and Leimena accepted Van Mook’s proposals as reported my telegram 271, July 15, while they publicly expressed satisfaction and while it known Soekarno likewise pleased, Van Mook informed me today he just received word from Djocjakarta that Indo Cabinet had rejected proposed settlement—thus leaving nothing accomplished. Van Mook today cabled contents Indo answer to Netherlands Government at Hague. Hague’s possible decision thereon not known here. It understood difficulty is Indo Government at Djocja unable issue orders mentioned point 4 my telegram 271. Indo Generals Soedirman and Soetomo, both rabid extremists, refuse obey orders. Cold facts are that either with or without agreement the Republic is powerless to enforce anything not approved by Indo military leaders; if complete agreement reached, some military or police action will still be needed to eliminate roving bands of private armies or fighting clubs which have been and are now terrorizing natives inland; if agreement not reached, same bands must still be eliminated if peace and reconstruction desired; Indonesian educated and progressive leaders know this and are anxious for some action to eliminate looters and irregulars from east Java to north Sumatra. Medan, Sumatra and many other areas are scenes of fighting every day. This fighting increases with each day’s delay and leads to further chaos and destruction. Unless police action taken soon to restore peace, law and order, there will soon be nothing to save. Texts will be telegraphed when available. 48 Department pass London and Hague. Foote 48 The Indonesian reply to the Dutch proposal of a joint constabulary or gendarmerie was quoted in telegram 273, July 18, 10 p.m., from Batavia. Mr. Foote concluded that this would prevent the use of any Dutch army or police units anywhere within the Republic’s area. (856E.00/7–1847) The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–1847: Telegram [Document 783] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent The Hague , July 18, 1947—10 p.m. 516. Following is résumé situation sent last night by Foreign Office [to] Netherlands Embassy Washington without instructions transmit Department. Foreign Office stated similar procedure followed towards Netherlands Embassy London. 1. On July 15 Sjarifoeddin stated to Van Mook that Republic representatives considered our (Dutch) demands and proposals reasonable. They furthermore expected that these demands and proposals would prove acceptable Djocja. 2. However, it was proved in Djocja that no majority could be found agree Netherlands desiderata. Sjarifoeddin then did not follow Sjahrir’s example by resigning as Prime Minister. Events past few days once more prove incapacity existing in Djocja to take necessary decisions. Important fact in this situation is also that Republic Government know that orders issued by them and which are contrary to negative and dilatory tactics pursued until now, will not be obeyed by many Republic authorities, civilian and military who presently have acquired more power or greater financial benefits than they deserve. 3. Last Republic answer is highly unsatisfactory. Refusal accept Dutch assistance for special police forces (according Netherlands proposal Indo units would accept Dutch assistance for instruction and leadership these police forces, whilst Dutch units would be attached to Indo police in certain special circumstances only) means, in view situation existing in Republic territory, that the essential conditions reestablish law and order have not been accepted by Republic. 4. Republic proposal regarding end hostilities and withdrawal of troops to a distance of two kilometers of the demarcation lines cannot be taken seriously as this two kilometer zone is already in force (in theory) since October 14, 1946 when truce was established. 5. Number times Republic forces have violated truce exceeds one thousand. Dutch infractions do not exceed several dozen. It may furthermore be pointed out every time Republic complained about infraction of truce by Dutch troops an enquiry took place and extensive reply was sent competent Indo authorities, Republic on other hand has up until now not once replied to complaints about Indo violation truce. 6. Netherlands Government now consulting Van Mook regarding road to be followed to bring end to present untenable situation. Foreign Office informed today contents Department’s telegram 358, July 17 as instructed, which elicited following comments from Vredenburch: 1. Present “Netherlands demands” should be more properly regarded as “concessions” when earlier Netherlands position as presented by Van Mook taken into consideration. 2. Cease fire order is already established on mutual basis. Vredenburch claims that Republic insistence for current Dutch declaration cease fire would be tantamount to admission October 14, 1946 declaration at time truce concluded (see paragraphs above) had been violated by Dutch which admission Republic desire for propaganda purposes. 3. While Sjarifoeddin gave evidence acceptance last Dutch “demands”, he unable swing Djocja in line and then unwilling resign as case Sjahrir fearing lest Sjahrir return to office which according Vredenburch Sjarifoeddin wishes prevent at all costs. This comment made with reference to “present moderate Republic Government”. Vredenburch states that Batavia advises Sjarifoeddin wanted return Batavia discuss situation with Van Mook night 16th but was prevented by and yielded to Djocja opposition. He also states before reply was made to Van Mook “demands” as disclosed by intercept messages from Djocja all Republic military commanders instructed continue military preparation in anticipation Dutch military action. He added that in face continued bad faith on part Indos, Dutch cannot further recede from present position until some evidence given cessation (1) food blockade from interior, (2) attacks, (3) Republic propaganda. He said he realized that all these could not be put into effect at once but if any one were undertaken this could be regarded as beginning show good faith on part Indos. As far as Dutch withdrawal on any perimeters to distance 10 kilometers Vredenburch pointed out that in some instances e.g. Surabaya this would push Dutch troops into sea; furthermore withdrawal would only open up more territory for Republic propaganda giving appearance to presently friendly population that Dutch were withdrawing and that instinct self-preservation would cause some elements to join over with Republic forces. Foreign Office states no Government statement expected for time being. Sent Department 516, repeated London 73. Department pass Batavia. Baruch Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour) 856E.00/7–2047 [Document 784] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs ( Armour ) secret [ Washington ,] July 20, 1947. Ambassador Baruch called me by telephone from The Hague today. He said that the Dutch Government had reached a decision to embark on police measures in certain areas in the Indies, and that operations will begin at 8:00 a.m. (Dutch time) on July 21, and this decision would be communicated to the press at 9:00 a.m. (Dutch time). The Dutch Government, he said, claimed that this was the only alternative they have in view of the threat presented to the Islands by continuance of the present disorders. Mr. Baruch made the suggestion that possibly the appearance of an American warship—as he put it, the friendly display of our flag—in the vicinity might have a salutary effect. At this point the communications were interrupted. While they were trying to restore the circuit, I called Mr. Vincent and reported the situation to him. Mr. Vincent said that we had made our position clear time and time again, the last occasion only three days ago, cautioned against hasty action, and said he did not feel that there was anything further we could do or that we might do which would have any effect on the Dutch Government; nor could he see that the appearance of an American warship at this time would contribute anything, certainly at Batavia although it might be advisable to consider having one of our vessels, if available, proceed to Palambang where American oil interests are centered. When the circuit was restored, I spoke again to Mr. Baruch along these lines. He agreed, however, to make another attempt to dissuade the Government from taking precipitate action, while I told him we were planning to do the same with the Netherlands Embassy here. Mr. Baruch explained that a telegram was going forward giving a full report on the situation. This has since come in. (Niact 522, July 20, 5 p.m. 49 ) Norman Armour 49 Infra . The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–2047: Telegram [Document 785] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State top secret niact The Hague , July 20, 1947—5 p.m. 522. Boetzelaer handed me memo this afternoon to be released publication Hague 9 a.m., 21st, stating Netherlands Government decision to embark on “police measures of a strictly limited character” in certain Republican areas beginning immediately. Last paragraph memo reads follows: “The Netherlands Government has no designs on the integrity of the Republic. It remains prepared as before to come to terms with the Republic, assuming that the Republic is supported by the majority of the population and by the ethnical elements composing it. They have, however, no choice but to resort to police measures of a strictly limited character, designed to create conditions in the Republic under which the common man can once again hope to follow in freedom his lawful pursuits for his own benefit and for the good of the world at large, creating at the same time the conditions which must enable the principles embodied in the Linggadjati Agreement to come to full fruition.” In answer my query to interpret police action, Foreign Minister said for this purpose it meant full military action. In handing me memo, Foreign Minister emphasized following points: (1) Netherlands Government determined to adhere to Linggadjati and will put it into force in Java and Sumatra as soon Netherlands authority reestablished. (2) Netherlands financial position affords no other alternative and that all areas must be restored to law and order and specially that 1949 sugar crop may be initiated. Any further delay would jeopardize crop. (3) Van Mook has expressed view to Foreign Minister that limited action may have profound effect on Republican authorities and may afford moderates opportunity to return to Government showing Djocja elements in minority. (4) Publication of memo addressed primarily to US and UK Governments, 9 a.m. Monday. Prime Minister making broadcast statement 20 o’clock tonight. Embassy also informed that Government including Labor Party endorses action and Foreign Office does not expect any trouble locally although anticipates communistic demonstration. I consider the situation most grave and the use of all forces at Netherlands command may begin at any moment. Am trying to reach Department by telephone 50 but communication to States from Hague out of order. Have requested Embassy London to notify you immediately by teletype. Baruch 50 See memorandum supra . Telegram 523, July 21, 3 p.m., from The Hague, reported the Ambassador’s conversation with the Foreign Minister the previous evening when he pointed out the probability of the Netherlands-Indonesian matter being brought before the United Nations, with the danger of entry into discussion by the Soviet Union, etc. (856E.00/7–2147) The Netherlands statement was given six members of the Consular Corps at Batavia on July 20 and made public after midnight. The British Foreign Office early on July 21 issued a statement in regard to the situation, and the Department of State issued a statement of regret at the breakdown of negotiations on July 21; Department of State Bulletin , August 3, 1947, p. 230. The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 501.BC/7–2247: Telegram [Document 786] The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State New York , July 22, 1947—2 p.m. 669. Following letter received by SYG’s office from Jonkheer Snouek Hurgronje, permanent representative of the Netherlands to UN: “In pursuance to the letter addressed to you by Mr. E. N. Van Kleffens, then representative of the Netherlands to the UN, on 26 March 1947, No. 174/51, I have the honor, under instructions from my Government, to communicate the following to you: From the discussions which have been carried on with the Indonesian Republic since the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement on March 25, it has become clear that the present Government of the Republic is either not prepared or not able to implement that agreement. Furthermore the truce concluded on October 14, 1946 has in reality never been complied with by the Republican forces; the Government of the Republic themselves have not denied that hostilities were committed by their forces. During the last few months acts of violence both on demarcation lines in Java and Sumatra and against East Indonesia and Western Borneo have rather increased than decreased. They were accompanied by a senseless destruction of valuable economic assets. By maintaining the food blockade a part of the population of Indonesia was brought to the verge of starvation. Hostages are still being imprisoned and held in Republican territory and a hostile and inflammatory propaganda was maintained. The Netherlands as the state with whom the sovereignty of this territory rests and which consequently is ultimately responsible for maintaining law and order cannot allow these inimical actions to continue. It has become patently clear that the present Republican Government is incapable of maintaining security, law and order in their territory whilst refusing cooperation with the Netherlands Government to create the necessary conditions thereto. In these circumstances Her Majesty’s Government have with the utmost reluctance been compelled to authorize the Lieut. Governor General to resort to police measures of a strictly limited character. The Netherlands Government wishes to stress that it maintains its unalterable decision to carry out the political program based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement. The Netherlands Government confidently hopes that circumstances will soon permit to resume constructive cooperation with the Republic as desired by innumerable Indonesians in Republican territory, which cooperation already successfully exists with the states of East Indonesia and Borneo.” Johnson The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–2247: Telegram [Document 787] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , July 22, 1947—11 p.m. 278. Deptel July 19, 9 p.m., relayed from Hague. 51 There appears some misunderstanding because [ re cause? ] decision leading present operations. Facts obtained by me from both Dutch and Indonesians are: Van Mook and his staff on one hand and Sjarifoeddin, Setyadjit, Gani and Leimena on other held conference at Batavia and mutually agreed that Dutch proposals were fair and sincere. Sjarifoeddin then addressed meeting Republican intellectuals at Batavia and asked them support Dutch in order end chaos and speed rehabilitation. Indonesians then requested Van Mook furnish airplane take them Djocjakarta to put matter through Cabinet. When they arrived Djocjakarta, Cabinet rejected plan re joint constabulary and even those who made agreement with Van Mook voted against it. On other hand, break not caused by matter of constabulary but by fact that Cabinet voted as Soedirman and Soetomo wished. Fact is, according Van Mook, Indonesian Cabinet or civil authorities may promise anything but can implement or carry out nothing. For example, Sjarifoeddin ordered lifting food blockade at Medan where 40,000 Chinese starving but Indonesian military around Medan refused obey orders. Indonesian authorities ordered cease fire many times but firing only increased. Van Mook said not one promise made by Indonesians had been carried out probably because Indonesian military leader disregarded orders. He said it therefore impossible for Republic to implement Linggadjati or to carry out any promises. Van Mook, Schermerhorn, Van Poll and General Spoor informed me they will not destroy Republic but will establish it in hands decent sincere men who have interests people at heart; that they determined form sovereign United States Indonesia and Netherlands-Indonesian Union at earliest possible moment so rehabilitation can begin. Am assured that when agreement recently seemed achieved, Indonesian Army was busiest destroying bridges, factories, et cetera, thus indicating their intention that there would be no agreement. It appears definite fact that most intellectuals of Republic are disgusted and desire assistance to eliminate certain element among themselves. General Spoor estimates that the limited “police” operations which to be carried on in certain areas only will be completed within 14 days and there will then be excellent chance to establish Republic on firmer basis and implement Linggadjati in way which cannot be done now. Abdullah Dirwidjojoat Modjo, 52 well-known Nationalist and who is known to Department, appointed Chief Administrator of West Java by Van Mook. Foote 51 Not printed. 52 Abdul Kadir Widjojoatmodjo. The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–2347: Telegram [Document 788] The Ambassador in India ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State secret New Delhi , July 23, 1947—10 a.m. 561. Bajpai 53 expressed to me last night his Government’s grave concern over hostilities Indonesia. He expressed fear these hostilities would have adverse influence on troubled areas of Indochina and Burma and he wishes USA to take active steps to prevent spread of conflagration. Bajpai is communicating with Department through me rather than through Asaf Ali in whom he says GOI has very little confidence. Bajpai expressed wish our Government would answer his appeal through this Embassy. I made no commitment and pointed out USA had for some time past taken active interest in obtaining peaceful settlement Indonesian problem. He gave me text of telegram sent yesterday by Nehru 54 to Indian High Commissioner London which reads as follows: [This telegram, not printed, expressed concern at developments in Indonesia and referred to possible action by the United Nations.] Department please repeat London, The Hague, Batavia as staff at Delhi inadequate. Grady 53 Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary General of the External Affairs Department, Indian Interim Government. 54 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Deputy President of the Executive Council and Councilor for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Indian Interim Government. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) 501.BC Indonesia/7–2447 [Document 789] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs ( Morgan ) 55 confidential [ Washington ,] July 24, 1947. Participants: The Secretary The newly appointed Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. Eelco van Kleffens The Netherlands Chargé d’Affaires, Jonkheer O. Reuchlin Mr. H. Charles Spruks, S/S–PR Mr. John H. Morgan, NOE After the usual remarks of protocol and a general conversation on economic conditions in the Netherlands and in Europe, the Secretary inquired whether the Netherlands in submitting a note to the Secretary General of the United Nations concerning its action in Indonesia had meant to acknowledge that the dispute was not an internal matter but within the competence of the United Nations. The Ambassador replied that when the question of the presence of British troops in Indonesia was brought before the Security Council by the Ukraine in February 1946, 56 the Netherlands Government had maintained that the situation in Indonesia was a purely internal matter and it had been supported in this view by a vote of 9–2 in the Security Council. The Netherlands Government had nevertheless recognized the general interest in the question of the eventual status of the Indonesian people and had stated that it would inform the Security Council of the agreement finally reached. It had, therefore, later informed the Council of the conclusion of the Linggadjati Agreement and had now in the same spirit informed the Security Council of the failure of efforts to implement that Agreement. The Secretary inquired whether the Netherlands Government proposed to reopen negotiations. The Ambassador replied that he did not think the present was an appropriate moment for negotiation but that the Netherlands Government intended in all sincerity to carry out the obligations which it had assumed under the Linggadjati Agreement as soon as there had established itself a group of Indonesians truly representative of the Indonesian people with whom negotiations on a responsible basis could be resumed. The Ambassador stated that the Netherlands had no desire to reimpose a colonial system upon the Indonesians but that it felt that the present Indonesian Government was dominated by a minority group of extremists unrepresentative of the real sentiments of the Indonesian people. The Ambassador having stated and restated this thesis at great length, there remained no time in which the Secretary could inquire what the attitude of the Netherlands Government might be toward the possibility of the Indonesian dispute being brought before the Security Council by a friendly state in order to forestall such action by one of the Soviet or Asiatic states unfriendly to the Netherlands. In escorting the Ambassador from the Secretary’s office, Mr. Morgan, however, took the occasion to put this question to the Ambassador who stated that from his considerable experience in United Nations affairs, he felt that there would be no advantage in having the question raised by one of the Western democracies; that if the question were raised by the Soviets, India or the Philippines, the Netherlands would simply stand upon its record as it had done heretofore. He was confident that it would be impossible to show that international peace was threatened by the Netherlands military action in Indonesia which continued to be a purely internal matter. He felt sure that he expressed his Government’s view in saying that he saw no advantage in having the matter raised first by a friendly power. He felt that however well meant such action might be, it would be in practice quite impossible to prevent a Soviet or Asiatic state from pursuing its own point of view regardless of the basis on which the question had been originally introduced. 55 Initialed by the Secretary of State. 56 See memorandum of February 7, 1946, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and footnote 41, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 804 . The British Embassy to the Department of State 856E.01/7–2447 [Document 790] The British Embassy to the Department of State 57 Aide-Mémoire From statements issued by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom the United States Government will have realised how greatly distressed His Majesty’s Government have been by the turn of events in the Netherlands East Indies; Dutch action there represents a breakdown of the constant efforts made by His Majesty’s Government, with the concurrence and support of the United States Government, during the past two years to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem with which His Majesty’s Government were faced on taking over the responsibility for those territories at the time of the Japanese surrender. It may be that militarily the Dutch will gain an initial success; but the resulting situation in South East Asia will make the position of the western powers very difficult indeed. His Majesty’s Government are of course fully aware of the juridical arguments which may be advanced by the Netherlands Government; but it cannot be overlooked that these events in the Netherlands East Indies will cause dislocation in the whole of the area and must therefore be considered on a practical and realistic basis. 2. On the 21st July His Majesty’s Government made a public offer of good offices to both parties, with the knowledge and approval of the United States Government. The Netherlands Government replied on the same day that they were grateful to the United States Government and to His Majesty’s Government for the help that they had offered, that they had taken note of the offer of His Majesty’s Government to lend their good offices in the future and that it would depend on developments whether, and if so when, it would be considered opportune to make another appeal to the friendly governments of the United States and the United Kingdom. No reply has been received from the Indonesian Republican Government. 3. It is significant that in their statement the Netherlands Government have been at pains to stress their friendly relations with, and help received from both our Governments (although in fact no offer of help has been made by the United States Government to the Netherlands Government since the latest crisis occurred) rather than to respond to the offer of good offices made by His Majesty’s Government alone. 4. Mr. Bevin is accordingly convinced that the only hope of arresting the present tragic course of events is for the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government to induce the Netherlands Government to accept some form of arbitral solution which would first have to be agreed between our two Governments. It seems fairly certain that the Dutch will dislike and perhaps resent this though the Indonesian Republican Government is likely to agree readily to any reasonable solution which will put an end to the fighting. 5. A factor which in Mr. Bevin’s view renders it extremely urgent to try to solve the matter on these lines is the likelihood of an appeal being made to the Security Council in the near future by some other power. It has already been proposed in Parliament that His Majesty’s Government should take this action and it is believed that other governments are considering it too. His Majesty’s Government are anxious to anticipate what may otherwise become an inevitable development. 6. His Majesty’s Government are not at present in a position to suggest the concrete terms of any solution which it might be possible to urge upon the Dutch. This would require further careful consideration by the United States and United Kingdom Governments. But His Majesty’s Government consider that to have any chance of success the solution must aim at finality and must provide that the Dutch and the Indonesians bind themselves in advance to accept whatever recommendation the British and United States arbitrators propound after conferring with both sides. 7. His Majesty’s Government hope most earnestly that the United States Government will feel able to act with them, and along the same lines, in striving to put an early end to a conflict of which the consequences—quite apart from humanitarian considerations—may be incalculably damaging to the peace and stability of Asia and to the revival of economic prosperity in that and other parts of the world. Washington , 24 July, 1947. 57 This communication was left with Under Secretary of State Lovett the afternoon of July 24 by the British Minister, Sir John Balfour, who discussed the matter with Mr. Lovett. The matter was reported to London in telegram 3210, July 26, 1 p.m. (856E.00/7–2547) and, more briefly, to New Delhi in telegram 448, July 26, 3 p.m. (856E.00/7–2347). In telegram 3210, after reviewing the discussion, the Department stated that Mr. Lovett informed Sir John that “we felt we must be realistic and face fact that Dutch would not accept arbitration at this time.” In telegram 448, the Department said that the “British note and entire situation receiving urgent consideration at highest level.” The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–2547: Telegram [Document 791] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , July 25, 1947—3 p.m. 286. Van Mook called British ConGen and me to Palace yesterday to inform us of situation and said in effect as follows: 1. Operations so far about 2 days ahead of schedule and will probably end about July 28 (General Spoor says objectives will be reached and operations ended about August 1). There no intention of taking Djocjakarta. 2. There practically no casualties on either side. Dutch lost less than 40 men on all fronts both Sumatra and Java, and Indo losses not much more. Reason is Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) completely demoralized or uninterested and have scattered panic-stricken wherever contacted. Highly fortified area south of Semarang not defended by Indonesians. Roads on lines of advance littered with Indo uniforms and Jap Army boots which soldiers threw away in efforts escape. General Soedirman has lost face in Djocja. 3. Speed of Dutch advance on all fronts prevented sabotage or demolitions which Indonesians had planned; retreating Indonesians devoted time at their disposal to looting and burning Chinese property; natives in all areas showed Dutch troops where land mines, booby traps and demolition charges were placed; Dutch advanced more in nature of parade than military operation; natives of all classes from intellectual to coolie obviously pleased and relieved that looting and commandeering their products which began with Jap invasion now ended; natives inside Republic greeted Dutch with enthusiasm and offered cooperation; there no panic anywhere among people who flocking to fields, offices, et cetera, to carry on daily pursuits. 4. It appears certain both west and east Java will secede from Republic since people of both dislike Javanese and tired their domination and Communistic influence which so apparent. If this occurs, Sumatra will probably secede and form separate state. 5. Dutch hope speed formation Interim Govt and United States Indonesia in order stop terrorism and speed rehabilitation industries. This end digest Van Mook’s remarks. 6. Mitcheson, British ConGen, then said he had telegram from Singapore quoting Sjahrir, who went there in Indian airplane, to effect Republic Cabinet will probably fall soon; that Soekarno will again take charge; that Soekarno will endeavor eliminate Communist and extremist elements and that Sjahrir may join Soekarno in his efforts. Department pass London and Hague. Foote The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–2647: Telegram [Document 792] The Ambassador in India ( Grady ) to the Secretary of State confidential New Delhi , July 26, 1947—10 a.m. 583. Bajpai has given me exact text Nehru’s telegram to Indian High Commissioner, London, sent yesterday. “I have not so far heard anything from you re steps His Majesty’s Government may have decided take re conflict now raging Indonesia. I have received today from Listowel 58 telegram (repeated next telegram) which says that in reply to offer of good offices made to Netherlands Government by His Majesty’s Government July 22, Netherlands Government have taken note of offer and added it would depend on developments whether, and if so when Dutch would consider it opportune make another appeal to friendly United States and British Governments. “Shariar [ Sjahrir ] arrived as representative of President of Indonesian Republic and brought me letters both from President and Premier. According these communications Dutch air forces, without warning and while Republican delegates were still at Djakarta [from?] Batavia, bombed Republican airfields, causing wanton destruction and hardship. My conversation with Shariar confirms impressions which we formed from press and other reports that so-called police action by Dutch is carefully and long prepared military campaign whose real purpose is inflict complete military defeat on Republic and prepare way for political settlement entirely favorable to Dutch. While offer of His Majesty’s Government to mediate may have been satisfactory at one time, in view Dutch reply and in particular progress of Dutch forces, it is impossible for us to be satisfied with it. No one in India or anywhere in Asia will believe that if Governments of United Kingdom and United States of America really desired bring this conflict to end they could not do it immediately without military intervention. Holland’s economic as well as political dependence on these two countries is such that its Government could not afford forfeit their goodwill and support by refusal to end hostilities and reach settlement with Indonesians by peaceful means. In our view, time for formal offers of mediation is past. I would add in parenthesis that Bevin’s refusal commit himself on subject of supply of equipment and facilities to Dutch is hardly calculated to persuade Dutch to take offer of mediation by His Majesty’s Government seriously. “It is for His Majesty’s Government to determine what positive action they can take to bring about immediate end this conflict. But if His Majesty’s Government unable take effective action end hostilities and restore consideration of dispute to peaceful plane we shall have no option but take matter before UN Security Council. In our view if His Majesty’s Government wish avoid what they consider the inconveniences of this course, it is up to them to devise means which would render recourse to Security Council unnecessary. We should have thought in view of tactics adopted by Dutch, His Majesty’s Government would spontaneously have invoked aid of UN. That organization obviously exists to exert itself in cause of peace if other methods to preserve peace fail. Would be impossible us (India) induce public opinion in India accept view our efforts persuade His Majesty’s Government induce Dutch resort to arbitration having failed we could do nothing but watch Dutch prosecute military campaign to successful end. “United States Ambassador to whom representations on lines of your instructions were made day before yesterday, has not yet had reply from his Government. We propose approach him again in order emphasize urgency of situation and consequent need immediate and more effective action. I hope you will impress upon His Majesty’s Government what we propose impress on United States Ambassador, namely, that failure for whatever reason of these two great powers intervene effectively in cause of peace and on side of people struggling for freedom cannot but create most unfortunate impression in India and all Asian countries. “If case should go to Security Council it is our intention you present it our behalf. You may wish make provisional passage arrangements meet this contingency.” While at my home yesterday evening Bajpai said Shariar wanted to see me. I told Bajpai I would be pleased to see Shariar who arrived a few minutes later. Shariar said nothing regarding Indonesian situation which is not in Nehru’s telegram. I carefully avoided any commitments. I asked Bajpai if, apart from other issues involved, India’s action re Indonesia was not a bid for political leadership in Asia, to which he said yes. Feeling aroused here, however, should not be underestimated. Please repeat London, The Hague, Batavia. Grady 58 The Earl of Listowel, British Secretary of State for Burma. Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Morgan) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) 856D.00/7–2847 [Document 793] Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs ( Morgan ) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs ( Matthews ) [ Washington ,] July 28, 1947. Reuchlin, the Netherlands’ Chargé, came to see me this morning apparently chiefly for the purpose of reading a series of news and propaganda telegrams received by the Embassy. He confirmed his previous telephone call to the effect that in reply to Van Kleffens’ report of his talks in the Department the Foreign Office had telegraphed that the Netherlands Government did not desire the United States or other friendly power to introduce the NEI question in the Security Council but should some other state bring the question before the Security Council on the basis of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter the Netherlands Government would greatly appreciate action by the United States to have the Security Council take up the matter on the basis of Chapter 6. The propaganda material had mainly to do with Chinese protests against “wanton destruction” of Chinese property by the Indonesians. One telegram, however, stated that it was not the intention of the Dutch to remove all officials of the Indonesian Republic in the areas occupied by the Dutch; that on the contrary wherever these officials refrained from action against the Dutch military they would be permitted to continue in office and perform their normal administrative functions undisturbed. I took the occasion to tell Reuchlin that of the various items he had read me this seemed to me the most important and warned him against the unfavorable effect on public opinion which might result if the Dutch appeared to be setting up merely a government of stooges on the Russian model. Reuchlin remarked that the officials the Dutch had in mind would be Indonesians. I pointed out that this in itself might be discounted by public opinion since the Russian stooges in the Balkans were for the most part natives of their respective countries. In departing Reuchlin stated that he would mention my point to the Ambassador. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 501.BC/7–2947 [Document 794] Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) [ Washington ,] July 29, 1947. Subject: Possible action in connection with the situation in Indonesia. I understand that you are going to have a conversation with Mr. van Kleffens, the Netherlands Ambassador, on the afternoon of July 29. The following suggestive material may be of use to you in that conversation: It seems clear that the Indian Government proposes to take action promptly to bring the Indonesian situation before the United Nations Security Council. In such an event it would be difficult for the United States Government to take a completely neutral and disinterested position. American public opinion as reflected in the press has been strongly adverse to the military action taken by the Netherlands Government. If there is no indication that the differences between the Netherlands and Indonesia are in process of settlement at the time the question is raised before the Security Council, it would probably be difficult for the United States to oppose the establishment of a United Nations Commission for investigation or settlement. It may, therefore, be desirable for the Netherlands Government to take prompt action either before or after the Indonesian situation is brought before the United Nations Security Council to request mediation of either the United Kingdom or the United States or both in harmony with Article 33 of chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. The United States Government has followed closely the development of events not only in Indonesia but in Indochina which latter situation is similar in some respects to the situation in Indonesia. It is believed that military operations of the sort now going on in both Indochina and Indonesia seldom result in a clear cut decision and that long guerrilla operations may weaken the sovereign European powers not only in Asia but in Europe. In this connection it is necessary to point out that if events should develop adversely, the Netherlands Government cannot look to the United States for military or financial aid to support the military efforts in Indonesia. In the past the Netherlands Government has taken the position that the Indonesian situation is an internal matter not subject to the Security Council. The same view was put forward by the Netherlands Ambassador in a recent conversation with the Secretary. It is improbable, however, that the United States Government could support such a viewpoint should the Indonesian question be brought before the Security Council under the present circumstances. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Villard) to the Counselor (Bohlen) 501.BC/7–2947 [Document 795] Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs ( Villard ) to the Counselor ( Bohlen ) secret [ Washington ,] July 29, 1947. Problem: To determine what action the U.S. Government might take in view of the Indian intention to present the Indonesian case to the UN Security Council, as a means of avoiding further alienation of friendly relations with India and other Asian countries. The Indian Government repeatedly requested the US and UK to take action to bring hostilities in Indonesia to an end. In view of US and UK failure to act, the Indian Government intends today to submit the issue to the UN Security Council. Discussion: Indians already doubt sincerity of American declarations in support of self-determination of peoples throughout the world. Many suspect American “economic imperialism”. Failure of the United States to respond to Indian appeal on Indonesia may further alienate India from western democracies and increase Indian tendency to disparage reliance upon American declarations or promises. Nehru has stated that “failure for whatever reason of these two great powers (US and UK) to intervene effectively in cause of peace and on side of people struggling for freedom cannot but create most unfortunate impression in India and all Asian countries.” NEA agrees with that statement. Mr. Jinnah 59 has declared to the press that “Muslim India will consider this (Dutch action in Indonesia) an unfriendly act on the part of the Government of Holland, calculated to crush the freedom of the democratic Muslim nation of Indonesia.” The Inter-Asian Conference at New Delhi in March 1947 clearly indicated desire for greater integration of Asian countries to protect Asian interests against domination by western powers. American indifference or opposition to Indonesian cause will strengthen the move toward Asiatic federation which might be detached from or even antagonistic toward the western democracies. The Secretary General of the External Affairs Department, Government of India, has said that India’s intended appeal to the UN re Indonesia is a bid for political leadership in Asia. Moslem countries of the Near and Middle East have already displayed an interest in Indonesian affairs. The Foreign Minister of Indonesia has recently been touring the capitals of the Arab world with the objective of enlisting their support for an appeal to the United Nations if no direct solution to the Dutch Indonesian impasse can be found. American prestige would suffer in these countries in the event of American indifference or opposition to Indonesian cause. Egypt and Syria have already concluded agreements with the Indonesian Government. Our Embassy at Tehran reports that the Iranian press has unanimously condemned the Netherlands Government’s action in sending troops into Indonesia. Likewise reports from Manila, Ceylon, and Cairo clearly indicate that the Dutch policy is vigorously deplored in those areas. Under present circumstances, the U.S. might be placed in an extremely unfortunate position of opposing Indonesia and her supporters. Such a position could do immeasurable damage to American prestige in the Near, Middle and Far East. It has been NEA’s position for the past ten days that the US should take the initiative on presenting the Indonesia situation to the UN. It is, however, too late for such action now. Nevertheless, the US may still be able to alleviate the damage to American prestige in Asia by lending active support to a fair consideration of the case by the Security Council. Such action may also enable the US to guide the tone of UN discussion and lessen the attack on the Netherlands. Recommendation: If talks with the Netherlands Ambassador prove unproductive or if the Indian Government submits the case to the UN Security Council the United States might as an initial step submit a letter to the Secretary General of the UN, 60 following the Indian appeal, stating that ( a ) we share the anxiety of other nations over the breakdown of negotiations between the Netherlands Government and the Indonesian Republic; ( b ) we, therefore, earnestly hope that the parties to the dispute will cease hostilities as soon as possible and undertake to resolve their differences either through a resumption of negotiations or by other means of their own choice; ( c ) but pending a peaceful settlement of their differences by the parties or the conclusion of an agreement to endeavor to reach such a settlement, the United States will support a full and fair hearing of the matter by the Security Council with a view to obtaining a speedy and just settlement of the case. Such a course of action as envisaged in the preceding paragraph would accomplish several purposes: 1. It would indicate to the world that the US wishes to secure a cessation of hostilities and supports every effort to obtain a peaceful solution. 2. The door would be left open for an immediate resumption of negotiations or resort to some other method of pacific settlement of the parties’ own choice. 3. It would be a step on the part of the United States to set the pattern of the Council consideration of the case. (It is already quite apparent that the Council discussion will take a serious tone. The Colombian delegate has today stated in the Council that there is “undeclared war” in Indonesia. 61 ) 4. It would not “rob” the Indian Government of its position in the case but instead would place the US in a role similar to that which it has occupied outside the Security Council vis-à-vis the disputant parties during the past twenty months. 59 Mohammed Ali Jinnah, President of the Muslim League. 60 Trygve Lie, of Norway. 61 See United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 66 , p. 1593. Hereinafter cited as SC, 2nd yr . Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State 501.BC/7–2947 [Document 796] Memorandum by the Counselor ( Bohlen ) to the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] July 29, 1947. The Indian Government has announced its intention of raising the Indonesian matter before the Security Council. When we have confirmation from New York that the matter has actually been officially presented to the Security Council, it would be desirable for Mr. Lovett to have a frank conversation with Van Kleffens, the Dutch Ambassador, in order to avoid any misunderstanding in regard to the U.S. position in the light of this new development. If the matter is to be kept out of extensive propaganda debate in the Security Council with widening repercussions throughout Southeast Asia and the Moslem world, it would be desirable for the U.S. to join the British in an offer of mediation to the Dutch. If this were accepted the representatives of the three countries could so state in the Security Council and forestall Security Council discussion for action pending the outcome of such mediation. It would be desirable if Mr. Lovett would be in a position to make this suggestion to Ambassador Van Kleffens, but in view of the President’s previous decision not to undertake joint good offices, it would be necessary to obtain his consent to such an offer from the U.S. If you agree that it would be desirable to make this offer, would you be able to obtain Presidential approval? 62 62 The Secretary replied in the affirmative and added: “Draft brief statement of the case for President’s consideration, which he can OK GCM”. Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman 501.BC/7–3047 [Document 797] Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman 63 secret Washington , July 30, 1947. Subject: The Indonesian Situation Since I spoke to you last about the Indonesian situation and the British suggestion that we join them in a mediation offer, there has been a new development in the situation. The Indian Government has announced its intention of raising in the Security Council the question of current Dutch action in Indonesia. In such circumstances the United States will be in a difficult position. We would not be able to support the Dutch position involving the use of force nor to oppose the establishment of a United Nations committee for investigation or settlement which would be bitterly resented by the Dutch and which could be exploited by Communist propaganda. The best method of avoiding this difficult situation in the Security Council would be ( a ) for the Dutch Government on its own initiative to cease hostilities and begin to negotiate with the Indonesians, or ( b ) for the Dutch Government to accept an offer of mediation. In view of the present situation, I believe it would be wise if you would authorize me to inform the Dutch privately that the United States would be willing either jointly with the British or separately by itself to undertake this task. If the Dutch were to accept this offer, then when the case came up before the Security Council it would be possible to state that methods of conciliation as envisaged in Article 33 of the Charter are already in progress and that Security Council discussion should be held in abeyance pending their outcome. G[ eorge ] C. Marshall 63 Notation on the original by President Truman: “Approved Harry S Truman”. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Armour) 856E.00/7–3047 [Document 798] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State ( Armour ) confidential [ Washington ,] July 30, 1947. Participants: Mr. Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs Mr. Norman J. O. Makin, Australian Ambassador Mr. Alfred Stirling, Australian Minister Mr. John H. Morgan, Acting Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs The Australian Ambassador called on me this noon to inform the Department of the purposes of the Australian action in bringing the Indonesian question before the United Nations Security Council. 64 The Ambassador read to me extracts from his telegram of instructions which indicated that the Australian Government desired to avoid any procedural discussions as to the jurisdiction of the Council since it felt that the Indonesian question was clearly a matter of international concern. It desired also to avoid any discussion of the merits of the case since there had been no United Nations’ investigation of the Indonesian situation. The Australian Government desired to see that hostilities cease at once and arbitration be undertaken at the earliest possible moment. It was, therefore, bringing the question before the Security Council under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter and with reference to Article 17 of the Linggadjati Agreement which provided for third party arbitration of disputes which might arise under that agreement. The Ambassador stated that the Australian Government was anxious that we should understand the motives behind its action and hoped that it could count upon American cooperation. I remarked that we were extremely anxious to see as prompt a settlement as possible of this dispute. In our consideration of the situation we had been thinking rather of Article 33 of Chapter 6 calling for pacific settlement than of Article 39. I read the former Article to the Ambassador who remarked that it seemed to have much the same end as was desired by the Australian Government but that it seemed clear from his instructions that the Australian Government was particularly concerned to bring about a prompt cessation of hostilities and for that reason, therefore, had invoked Article 39 rather than Article 33. The Ambassador then repeated his hope that our two governments would find it possible to cooperate toward the same end in this matter and expressed his personal desire to be helpful in this or other matters. Norman Armour 64 Telegram 689, July 30, 5:05 p.m., from New York, reported that the Australian and Indian delegations had that afternoon submitted the Indonesian case to the United Nations Security Council under articles 39 and 34, respectively, of the Charter (501.BC/7–3047). For texts of letters, see United Nations, Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, Supplement No. 16 , pp. 149, 150. Hereafter cited as SC, 2nd yr., Suppl. 16 . The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–3047: Telegram [Document 799] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Batavia , July 30, 1947—3 p.m. 295. Chinese Consul General called at my residence late last night and delivered letter quoted below: “In view of recent large scale destruction of Chinese property and maltreatment and murder of Chinese nationals by Indo troops, whose main war efforts seems concentrated on destroying Chinese interests and taking innocent lives, and the fact that no response has been received from Indo Government to my appeal to spare lives and property of neutrals in war areas, I have the honor to inquire, with, object of preventing further destruction, whether you are prepared on humanitarian grounds to use your good offices by public appeal or in whatever manner you deem fit to urge the Indo Government to stop these acts of vandalism by their army and police. “I feel confident that if world opinion, as may be expressed through you, is brought home to the Indo Government they may the quicker realize that the inhuman and immoral acts now carried out by their troops will be condemned by civilized nations and entirely damage their hope for sympathy from other people.” While I expressed personal regret over destruction Chinese property and grief over loss many Chinese lives, explained to Tsiang Chia-tung, Consul General of China, that it necessary obtain instructions from Department before taking any action. I shall be pleased if Department will instruct me at earliest possible moment re its desires. 65 Chinese Consul General gave me copy of circular letter addressed to USA, British, French and Australian Consul[s] General, substance of which is: He had just returned from visit to Krawang, Tjikampek and Rengkasdengklok and found situation in those places as follows: In Krawang about 110 shops, houses and rice mills were destroyed by fire. All rice mills and 83 houses and shops were Chinese property. Such property after being looted was burned and fire spread to adjoining houses. In Tjikampek over 130 shops, houses and rice mills were looted and burned. All of these were Chinese owned. In Rengkasdengklok 8 rice mills and more than 10 shops and houses belonging to Chinese were burned. According information given him by population, practically no fighting occurred at above named three places, Indo troops having withdrawn before Netherlands troops arrived. Before beginning retreat, Indo troops looted and burned Chinese property mentioned. General opinion among Chinese is that Republic army assisted by Republic police never intended carry out scorched earth policy in strict sense of term but their chief object seemed to create disturbances and loot, after which they dispersed to surrounding village. Since all this occurred in Republic area, there no information available concerning number Chinese lives lost but Consul General Tsiang fears the worst. I have felt many months, based on talks with Indo leaders, that Indos had elimination of Chinese and Chinese interests as important objectives. Foote 65 The Department replied in telegram 205, August 4, noon, to Batavia, that, the situation being before the United Nations Security Council July 31 and the United States having offered good offices to the Netherlands Government, it was not necessary to take action suggested (856E.00/7–3047). The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/7–3047: Telegram [Document 800] The Chargé in Egypt ( Patterson ) to the Secretary of State secret most immediate Cairo , July 30, 1947—6 p.m. 914. ReEmbtel 903, July 29. 66 On being received this p.m. by King Farouk, I thanked HM for condolences offered through Talaat Pasha on occasion death Mrs. Truman. 67 King, on stating he had requested British Ambassador, Netherlands Minister and me call, remarked I had probably already guessed occasion which was Indonesian situation. HM then read from a memo of which he said he would send me a copy as an aide-mémoire only and not as a formal communication citing reasons for Egypt’s concern with current hostilities. Among these he named humanity; Egyptian-Indonesian treaty of friendship; Moslem religion of Indonesians which was real bond with Egyptians; and fact that real war and not police operations as described by Dutch were in progress. According his information, 100,000 well equipped Dutch troops were opposing 200,000 ill trained levies. (King mentioned Mr. Bevin as having described the operations in Indonesia as military action.) HM desired his views be brought attention US Government stating that if US did not do something to better situation in Indonesia, Egypt would think that US viewed Indonesia as merely an eastern country and US was not sincerely devoted to principles of UN. Development such attitude might result in split between East and West (point which HM stressed as being highly important). Egypt felt so strongly re Indonesian situation that had government not been involved presentation its own case before UN, Egypt would have brought Indonesia to attention of UN. On my stating there were reports Nehru planned do so on behalf Indian Government, King stated he thought British had dissuaded him from such action. I endeavored assure HM that my Government was devoted maintenance stability in Far as in Middle East and on July 21 it had expressed profound regret negotiations between Netherlands and Indo Republic had been interrupted and has indicated its hope they will be resumed. 68 Patterson 66 Not printed. 67 President Truman’s mother. 68 The Department replied in telegram 1134, August 4, noon, as follows: “Reurtel 914, July 30. Express appreciation King Farouk his views Indonesian situation which now before United Nations Security Council; adding that US will continue take all possible steps secure peaceful settlement and that US has offered good offices to Netherlands Govt which offer in harmony UN Charter.” (856E.00/7–3047) The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 501.BC/7–3147: Telegram [Document 801] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential niact The Hague , July 31, 1947—3 a.m. 557. Following is transcript verbal message which Vredenburch gave Embassy tonight as transmitted by telephone by Ambassador. Van Kleffens has received instructions to make following statement on Netherlands position if queried whether proffer of United States good offices acceptable on Indonesian situation: Inform United States Government police measures which we were forced to take were intended put end to untenable situation will be concluded within next few days. On that occasion Netherlands Government will gladly avail themselves United States Government’s good offices in order renew consultations with the Republic which consultations were always envisaged by Netherlands Government. We (Dutch) consider that British are no longer free agent (re good offices) for the following reasons: (1) Australia has brought the Indonesian situation to attention Security Council under Chapter VII—this procedure can only be considered as unfriendly; (2) India has now also brought Indonesian question attention Security Council and, furthermore, India has informed us that KLM services will no longer be allowed land Karachi and Calcutta—this means that India is taking action unilaterally without awaiting conclusion Security Council; (3) United Kingdom has been forced by public opinion suspend shipment military supplies Netherlands East Indies and has also informed Netherlands that military equipment this country would only be shipped if we (Dutch) undertook that these goods would not be re-exported; (4) Knowing interests British in Arabia, action taken by Egypt and other Arabic states in concluding treaties with Republic would not ease British position in that area. 69 All this leads us (Dutch) to conclusion that we are doing British favor by not asking them tender good offices once more as they are through force circumstance in impossible situation. End instructions to Van Kleffens . Orally Vredenburch stated that Dutch still stand by Linggadjati but are not prepared to withdraw troops from present positions fearing reprisals; however, Dutch would accept supervisory United States commission to show good faith Linggadjati at a MacArthur, Eisenhower, Wedemeyer 70 level but insist on truce effective where economic potential of Indonesia can be realized; proposal of joint police force still maintains to point where local population will no longer be “terrorized”. Vredenburch emphasized point that if Australia had not taken today’s action above information would have been submitted to both United States and United Kingdom, but, under circumstances, Dutch decided advise United States only for present. Sent Department as 557; repeated London as 82. Department please pass Batavia. Baruch 69 Telegram 920, July 31, 1 p.m., from Cairo, reported the text of Egypt’s offer of good offices to the Netherlands in the Indonesian case (856E.00/7–3147). 70 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan; General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, U.S.A.; and Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, U.S.A., President Truman’s Special Representative to China and Korea (July–September). Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 501.BC Indonesia/7–3147 [Document 802] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) [ Washington ,] July 31, 1947. Immediately on receipt of the President’s approval to conversations with the Dutch looking toward the possibility of a U.S. offer of good offices, we endeavored to reach the Dutch Ambassador and were told that he was at the White House and was leaving by plane at one o’clock. At 12:45 we pulled him off the plane at the National Airport and, by phone, indicated that this Government was disposed to be helpful and, if necessary, would be available to offer its good offices in the hopes that it might remove from or compose the difficulties in the Security Council. The Ambassador said he was on the way to the meeting this afternoon in New York and told me that he had late yesterday afternoon wired his Government, making two observations. First, in spite of the Dutch position that the United Nations had no jurisdiction in this matter, the Dutch Government must consider the very important effect that its position would have on public opinion. He had indicated to his Government that public opinion was of extreme importance and, because of that, he made his second point to his Government, which was a recommendation that the Dutch offer at the United Nations or in other appropriate circumstances to invite the “representatives of several governments” to go to the spot and inspect the situation and make recommendations. He stated that he had received a reply this morning indicating that the Dutch Government was favorably disposed toward his suggestion and said that, in his opinion, it did not remove the possibility of their ultimately or in addition asking for United States good offices. Robert A. Lovett Editorial Note [Document 803] Editorial Note Pursuant to a request by the Australian Representative on the Security Council, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Hodgson, the Indonesian question was added to the agenda of the Security Council on July 31, and discussions proceeded on the basis of a draft resolution submitted by Colonel Hodgson. After three successive meetings devoted to this subject on July 31 and August 1, the Security Council adopted a resolution based on a United States draft which was technically an amendment to the resolution proposed by Australia. Proceedings of these meetings are in SC, 2nd yr ., pages 1615–1713. Text of the resolution, adopted in fragmentary form and in a complicated voting situation on August 1 (Document S/459), is as follows: “ The Security Council , Noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, Calls upon the parties: ( a ) To cease hostilities forthwith, and ( b ) To settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means and keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement.” (SC, 2nd yr ., page 1839, footnote 1.) This Security Council resolution was communicated to the Netherlands and to the Indonesian Republic and replies were duly received. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India 501.BC/7–3147: Telegram [Document 804] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India confidential u.s. urgent niact Washington , July 31, 1947—8 p.m. 460. You may inform Nehru US Govt has noted India’s letter to UN Security Council. US is urgently considering what measures might most appropriately be taken to bring about cessation of hostilities and resumption of negotiations looking toward a peaceful settlement Dutch and Indonesian differences. Marshall The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 856E.00/8–147: Telegram [Document 805] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential u.s. urgent niact Washington , August 1, 1947—7 p.m. 380. Under Secretary Lovett yesterday noon informed Amb Van Kleffens of this Govt’s disposition to be helpful and its readiness to offer its good offices in hope that it might help compose difficulties concerning Indonesia. Amb Herschel Johnson informed Security Council of this offer yesterday afternoon. Van Kleffens this morning informed Council of Netherlands acceptance. You should immediately inform ForMin Boetzelaer you are authorized formally to confirm to him this Govt’s readiness to use its good offices to compose the differences between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic. 71 Repeated to Batavia for info as 204. Marshall 71 Telegram 566, August 2, 1 p.m., from The Hague, reported the Netherlands Foreign Minister’s appreciation and formal acceptance of the offer of good offices. This telegram was repeated as 207, August 4, 1 p.m., to Batavia. (856E.00/8–247) The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–147: Telegram [Document 806] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State top secret us urgent Batavia , August 1, 1947—11 p.m. 302. In talk with Van Mook today he said word from Netherlands indicated White House and Department considering offer of US good offices in Netherland-Indonesian troubles. If such is case, I most solemnly submit following: 1. Republic was ideal which Van Mook and others favored; Republic has some good, efficient and sincere men but they have lost all influence or power to carry out any promises made. Republic fell into hands of class of men holding such power, such as Soetomo and Soedirman, that good men have no authority of any sort. Promises may and will be made but they cannot be carried out with present setup at Djocja. 2. Truce of October 14 was signed but never carried out because Soedirman radioed his forces disregard truce and carry on fighting (mytel 462, December 2, 1946 72 ). Later Sjarifoeddin visited Medan and other fronts to stop firing but when he left areas fighting redoubled. Republic civil authorities have no power and never have had and it sank into hands of fanatics and others who thought chiefly of their personal welfare. 3. When USA recognized de facto Republic govt more power was placed in hands these same men. Truth is there never has been de facto Republic and neither does it exist now except in name only because of fact civil officials from Soekarno to lowest subordinate have no authority over Sumatra or roving gangs or Indo army in Java. One proof thereof is Indo Govt promised safeguard American property with all power at their disposal (mytel 267, July 10) but they proceeded destroy our property in Palembang. This is because Indo cabinet has no power to control Indo army which works independently of govt. Indo scorched earth policy not new. It been going on since May this year as condition rubber and other plantations in Java testify. It has been policy to eliminate foreign capital interests. 4. Press reports of Dutch ultimata are biased and incorrect. So-called ultimata consisted of definite agreements entered into by Van Mook on one hand and Prime Minister Sjarifoeddin on other in order stop chaos and destruction (mytels 271 and 272, July 15 and 17). Sjarifoeddin pleaded for this agreement (mytel 278, July 22) but he and other delegates voted against it because of extreme danger them personally Djocja. 5. I solemnly warn Dept that offer good offices now will surely result burned fingers since there no Republic officials competent to implement any promises made. Soetomo, Soedirman and other such leaders will only demand that Dutch retreat to lines held before July 20. Such would only strengthen hands of same men who chief causes of failure to implement Linggadjati Agreement and would throw country back into worse chaos than ever before. When Djocja has been taken, if such should be decided, and decent men placed in charge Republic government, then will be time to offer good offices. Van Mook would be willing have American supervision of implementing Linggadjati Agreement and establishment United States of Indonesia. I fear good offices now would be great error and do irreparable damage this country. 6. I still maintain my old thesis that 95% of Indonesians are sick of republic and its terrorizing tactics and want only return to pursuits of peace. Proof thereof is that tens of thousands of natives are streaming daily into areas recently taken by Dutch. Republic is an ideal and easily workable if can be placed in hands of decent, sincere men and not gangsters who build up enormous bank accounts abroad from goods smuggled from country. 7. In order prevent embarrassment later, Department is urged not offer good offices until better class Indonesians installed as heads of Republic. 8. Newspaper clippings received today from USA show that press reports are either biased or completely erroneous. Sensational headlines and front page stories are grossly exaggerated if not deliberately misleading. 9. Attitude of Australia and India are difficult to understand. Statements by officials are generally false in fact and implication. It difficult understand purpose such malicious press reports and radio broadcasts and it equally difficult understand why certain governments have declared policies or threatened actions based entirely on false foundations. British, Australian and Indian Governments appear determined maintain present setup at Djocja despite fact they must know that both east and west Java are opposed strongly to middle Java and that east Indonesia and Borneo are likewise opposed. Interference now will create more chaos than this country can now stand. On the other hand 10 days more of present operations will restore peace, place country in hands of decent Republic officials and make offer good offices worthwhile. Foote 72 Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 856 . Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 856E.00/8–247 [Document 807] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) 73 [ Washington ,] August 2, 1947. Participants: Dr. van Kleffens, Netherlands Ambassador Mr. Lovett Mr. Rusk (Mr. Notter) 74 Mr. Villard Mr. Matthews The Dutch Ambassador called this morning at his request and conveyed personally his Government’s acceptance of our offer of good offices. He also expressed his appreciation and understanding of the position taken by the American Representative on the Security Council. I asked Dr. van Kleffens whether it was true, as reported to me, that he had asked the Security Council for a two-hour delay in its consideration of the question to consult his Government to suggest a cessation of hostilities on its own initiative and that this had been refused. He confirmed that this was the case and said that the Indian Representative had actually given as his reason for opposing such a delay his belief that the United Nations should get the credit for stopping hostilities and that it would be unfortunate to have this take place by voluntary Dutch action. I said that we thought the whole performance of the Security Council in its precipitate haste had been both childish and shocking. Dr. van Kleffens referring to his own previous experiences as a member of the Security Council then dwelt at some length on what he described as a serious threat to the integrity and aims of the United Nations, namely, the growing tendency on the part of the Soviet Union and its satellites, the “colored” nations and some of the Latin Americans to form a bloc to utilize the United Nations as a forum for propaganda to serve demogogic ends and to block constructive treatment of questions which should properly come before the United Nations. He said this tendency was true not only of the Security Council but likewise of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. Turning to the situation in Indonesia, Dr. van Kleffens spoke of the great difficulties of getting any agreement with the Indonesians implemented. He described some of the leading personalities, some of whom are Moscow trained, and said that whenever agreement was reached with the Dutch the Indonesian negotiators were repudiated by their own people and were unable to produce any respect for the agreements reached. The so-called “truce” of last October, he said, had never been observed for the moderate Indonesian elements were unable to enforce observance. There had been over a thousand violations since it had been in effect. He likewise cited as an example of Republican failure to live up to their agreement the unwillingness to release hostages and the continuing scorched earth policy under the truce long before the recent Dutch action had been started. All reports now reaching him from Java indicate that wherever Dutch troops have penetrated the countryside is completely peaceful and tranquil with the population flocking back to their labors. Many of the Indonesian officials are doing their jobs under the protection afforded them by the presence of Dutch forces. He is confident that if the moderate Indonesians who have the support of the overwhelming majority of the population are afforded protection, order and stability will be restored and the Linggadjati Agreement can be implemented. He said that he thought the Indonesian Republic officials would probably try to insist that Dutch troops must withdraw to the areas occupied prior to the recent “police action”. This, he said, his country could not afford to accept since it would expose the peaceful natives and officials to the most violent forms of reprisal—particularly the Chinese elements of the population who are not popular with the Javanese—and mean a return to a more chaotic state than before. As an example, he cited the fact in many villages the Dutch on entry had found long rows of shoes. These belonged to members of the Indonesian Army who had promptly discarded them and their arms and taken to working peacefully in the fields. The danger was that on Dutch withdrawal they would attempt to avenge themselves on other natives. Dr. van Kleffens also spoke of rampant corruption on the part of the Indonesian Republican leaders. He said that the Dutch had been accused of blockading Republican ports. This was not true. His Government was only insisting that the proceeds of exports from Indonesia should accrue to the benefit of the Indies and not line the pockets of corrupt officials. The Dutch required only two things: ( a ) evidence that the exports had not been stolen, and, ( b ) evidence that the goods were being sold at fair prices. The ports which the Dutch have occupied are now operating and a vessel loaded with rubber has already sailed from Cheribon. Dr. van Kleffens was asked the extent of Communist influence in the Indonesian Republican area. He said that his Government had indications that it was considerable, that many of the leaders there were Moscow trained. He had some doubt whether he should emphasize this factor in his public discussions of the question and asked for some advice on this subject. Dr. van Kleffens insisted that the Government groups in East Indonesia were bitterly opposed to the irresponsible Republican leaders and had demanded protection. We should bear in mind, he said, that the so-called Republic does not represent the views of these large and important areas in any sense. He said he did not yet know what reply his Government would make to the Security Council but he hoped and believed it would agree to an immediate cessation of hostilities even though this might cause a little difficulty when certain objectives had not yet been reached. He did not know what the Indonesian leaders would do but he feared they would suggest withdrawal to previous positions. L[ ovett ] 73 Initialed by the Secretary of State. 74 Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, and Harley A. Notter, Adviser to Mr. Rusk. The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–347: Telegram [Document 808] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State 75 confidential us urgent The Hague , August 3, 1947—1 a.m. 567. Foreign Office informed Embassy tonight that Van Mook is being instructed make connection with responsible leaders Republic at Djocja to following purpose: (1) inform them text Security Council resolution; (2) obtain agreement immediate cease fire both sides; (3) apprise them offer of good offices and that offer has been accepted by Netherlands Government; (4) inquire whether they (Republic) are willing accept good offices and resume negotiation. Vredenburch states it remains Government policy to stand by principles of Linggadjati but states that agreement will have to be redrafted into more practical form of document without cumbersome annexes. He is not so definite today re Dutch troops not occupying Djocja, noting that military operations are now reported in near proximity Republican capital. 76 Sent Department 567, repeated London 87. Baruch 75 Repeated to Batavia in Department’s telegram 210, August 5, 10 a.m. 76 Telegram 305, August 4, 3 p.m., from Batavia, reported Governor Van Mook’s radio address ordering Netherlands troops to cease hostilities at midnight of August 4 in Java and Sumatra. It reported also an Indonesian statement that the Republic had resumed full liberty of action as it regarded the Linggadjati Agreement to have been broken by the Netherlands. (501.BC/8–447) The Netherlands Ambassador (Van Kleffens) to the President of the United Nations Security Council (Faris El Khoury), at New York 501.BC/8–347 [Document 809] The Netherlands Ambassador ( Van Kleffens ) to the President of the United Nations Security Council ( Faris El Khoury ), at New York 77 No. 3909 Washington , August 3, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to confirm my telegram to Your Excellency of this day, reading as follows: In a letter dated August 1, 1947, Your Excellency was so good as to communicate to me the text of the resolution adopted that day by the Security Council in respect of conditions in Java and Sumatra. I lost no time in conveying that text by telegraph to the Netherlands Government. I have now received instructions to inform Your Excellency as follows: The Netherlands Government, although persisting in its denial of the Council’s jurisdiction in this matter, fully understands the Council’s desire to see the use of arms come to an end in this as in other cases. Moreover the Netherlands Government welcomes the Council’s resolution in this sense that it jutsifies the hope that, under the pressure of world opinion, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia will now be found disposed to carry out what so far it has failed to do in spite of constant and urgent requests and representations on the part of the Netherlands Government and notwithstanding corresponding friendly advice on the part of other powers. In taking police action the Netherlands Government has had, from the outset, strictly limited objectives in view; reference may be made in this connection to the communication made on its behalf to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on July 21 in which the limited nature was pointed out of the action aiming at the cessation of a situation whose continuation could no longer be countenanced in the interest of the people. Having taken into serious consideration the views which led the Security Council to address an appeal to both parties, the Netherlands Government has instructed the Lieutenant-Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies to enter into contact with the authorities of the Republic in order to arrive at the cessation on both sides of hostile action of any kind. The Netherlands Government confidently anticipates that the good offices offered by the Government of the United States of America and gladly accepted by the Netherlands Government will contribute greatly towards attaining the result aimed at in the resolution of the Security Council. Please accept [etc.], E. N. Van Kleffens 77 Copy transmitted to the Department by the Netherlands Ambassador in his note of August 3. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 856E.00/8–447 [Document 810] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) secret [ Washington ,] August 4, 1947. Dr. van Kleffens called yesterday afternoon at his urgent request and talked about the Indonesian problem for an hour and a half. He read me his proposed reply to the Security Council which I considered excellent. Remarking that he hoped the phrase would be of assistance to us in the Greek problem, he pointed out that the Dutch reply expresses the hope that the Security Council will be equally interested in bringing about a cessation of hostilities anywhere. He referred to a Dutch proposal to invite representatives of other powers to send observers to see what actual conditions were in Indonesia. In view of the acceptance by his Government of American good offices he wished to know whether such an invitation would be embarrassing to the US. I said I would like to talk this over with others in the Department and that we would let him know today. He explained that his Government did not want a United Nations Commission, first, because of its legal position that the matter was outside the jurisdiction of the Security Council and, secondly, because the Dutch had information that the Russians would use such a Commission to infiltrate agents with a view to keeping conditions in a continuing state of unsettlement. The Ambassador dwelt on the extreme difficulty of seeing any ceasefire orders were carried out on the Indonesian side and referred to the thousand or more Indonesian violations of the “truce” prior to the initiation of the recent Dutch police operations. He hoped that we would send a number of Army officers, say 20 or 25 who would be in a position to observe on the ground what conditions were and whether the peace is being kept. These observers should, of course, be attached to the official who is selected to carry out our offer of good offices. Dr. Van Kleffens also talked at some length, as he had on Saturday, of the growing “danger” to the real purposes of the United Nations in the formation of a solid bloc consisting of the Soviet and their satellites, the groups of “colored” races, and some of the Latin Americans. L[ ovett ] The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856D.00/8–447: Telegram [Document 811] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent The Hague , August 4, 1947—3 p.m. 570. Embtel 560, July 31. 78 Van Kleffens reports to Foreign Office that while not having discussed matter with Dept, he believes US Govt would have no objection with inviting fact-finding commission to NEI for study and report situation. Vredenburch states that the Netherlands Govt urgently desires definitive view US Govt respecting establishment such commission which would presumably comprise representatives from Brazil, Canada, China, Sweden, Saudi Arabia. Embassy informed that Van Kleffens instructed today discuss with Dept question of US sending military mission to NEI. Foreign Office expresses hope that head of mission would be top flight and have international reputation. Sent Dept 570, repeated London 88. Department pass Batavia. Baruch 78 Not printed; it stated that the Netherlands was considering inviting “neutral” countries to join a fact-finding commission to report NEI conditions (856E.00/7–3147). The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/8–447: Telegram [Document 812] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential The Hague , August 4, 1947—5 p.m. 572. Vredenburch stated categorically today that in event Security Council adjudged unfavorably Netherlands Government “police” action and troops are ordered to return to positions held prior July 20–21 when action commenced Netherlands Government would have no alternative but withdraw entirely from Republican territory as [ and? ] minority groups, both Indonesians and Dutch, would be subject fierce reprisals without military protection. See penultimate paragraph Embtel 557, July 31. Sent Dept 572, repeated London 89. Baruch The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.00/8–447: Telegram [Document 813] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia confidential u. s. urgent niact Washington , August 4, 1947—6 p.m. 209. Deptel 204. 79 We have offered our good offices to the Netherlands and desire, of course, to make them available to Indonesians also but are somewhat at loss how this can be done. Emissaries of Indos have been reported in various countries 80 while some members Indo Govt understood in Batavia. We have no info re authority any these officials, however, and in circumstances leave your discretion means conveying offer good offices Indo Govt. Would appreciate your advice whether Batavia or elsewhere best spot undertake negotiations implementation good offices. Please comment also as to willingness and capacity both sides carry out US recommendations. Marshall 79 Same as telegram 380, August 1, 7 p.m., p. 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] . 80 Telegram 955, August 8, 10 a.m., from Cairo, reported that two Indonesians, Soetan Sjahrir and Hadji Agus Salim, left August 7 for New York as delegates to the United Nations (501.BC/8–847). The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–547: Telegram [Document 814] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , August 5, 1947—11 a.m. 307. In radio broadcast last night Soekarno, as CinC of Republic Armed Forces, gave cease fire order effective at 12 midnite. After reviewing events since July 20, Soekarno said Security Council “appealed to us to cease hostilities”. At ten p.m. last night Sjarifoeddin broadcasted via radio Djocjakarta to effect Republic considers itself no longer bound by Linggadjati Agreement. He stated Dutch violated agreement when they established autonomous states of Banka, Billiton and Riouw. He added Republic wishes solve conflict by peaceful means but that it wishes arbitration by international commission. He said truce means Republic’s fighting youth be released, reinstatement of Republic officials and withdrawal of troops to original demarcation lines. Sjarifoeddin pointed out there still many fighting organizations in action and it will be difficult contact them. General opinion prevails among local Americans, Dutch, moderate Indonesians and others that cease fire order issued by Soekarno will not and cannot be enforced. This opinion based on experience which shows that similar orders issued by Indo civil authorities have never been carried out by Indonesian military and private fighting clubs. Department please pass London and The Hague. Foote Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) 856E.00/8–547 [Document 815] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State ( Lovett ) [ Washington ,] August 5, 1947. Subject: Proposed Australian-United States Joint Mediation on Indonesia. Participants: Mr. Lovett, Under Secretary; Mr. Makin, Australian Ambassador; Mr. Stirling, Australian Minister; Mr. Bohlen; Mr. Rusk; Mr. Matthews Mr. Makin called this afternoon at his request to discuss the Indonesian problem. At considerable length and without understatement Mr. Makin dwelt upon the important role of Australia in that area, and in the world, its keen interest in seeing peace in Indonesia, and its fears that continuance of strife would result in a threat to Australia. (He did not explain the nature of the threat.) With this background the Australian Government had welcomed American initiative before the Security Council and the American offer of good offices. His Government had, however, considerable qualms as to the possibility that the “cease fire” orders would not continue to be respected in view of the strong feelings on both sides in Indonesia. He referred to some radio charges by the Indonesian “Government” that the Dutch are violating the truce. I asked whether he really believed these charges. With some embarrassment he replied that he did not know whether they were true and that he had cited them merely to show continuance of uncertainty. His Government, he continued, had excellent relations with the Indonesians, with the Netherlands East Indies authorities and with the Dutch Government and was more familiar with the real situation in Indonesia than any other Government. Therefore, in the interests of peace he had been instructed formally to state that the Australian Government would welcome the opportunity to mediate jointly with the United States. Upon conclusion of his lengthy buildup I asked why, if his Government felt so keenly about the matter, it waited five days to make the offer. Mr. Makin replied that he did not know but that Mr. Evatt was somewhere at sea and perhaps it had been difficult to communicate with him. I asked further whether his Government had any reason to believe that such an offer of joint mediation would be acceptable to the Dutch. He replied that during the war Australia had rendered great service to the Dutch in the East Indies and had taken care of Dutch wounded and refugees. In view of the closeness of their wartime alliance he felt sure that the Dutch through gratitude would welcome such an offer. I said that the experience of the United States has been that gratitude was a rare and short-lived emotion. I told Mr. Makin that as he knew, the Dutch had accepted our offer of good offices. A similar offer had been extended to the Indonesians but no reply had yet been received. Thus we did not know whether our offer of good offices would be accepted by both parties. Meanwhile I could only say that we would study the suggestions of his Government. Mr. Makin remarked that perhaps India might make some similar offer and if so he wanted us to know that Australia because of her geographic situation and her important role in world affairs was a much more logical partner in mediation than India or for that matter any other country. I asked if this latter included the Philippines and he said yes. I said that our reply at this time to any similar approach by the Government of India would naturally be the same. After the departure of Mr. Makin and Mr. Stirling there was some discussion of the Australian proposal 81 and the following general conclusions were reached: (1) That Australia was motivated largely by Mr. Evatt’s desire to play a leading world role and to take the limelight where ever possible. (2) That it was probable that the Australians have already been in touch with the Indonesians with regard to the American offer of good offices; (3) That if the Indonesians should decline our offer of good offices or attach unacceptable conditions the United States should permit its offer to lapse; (4) That the United States should not mediate jointly with any other power or powers; (5) That unless hostilities were resumed we would favor giving opportunity to both parties to settle their differences through direct negotiations; (6) That if an attempt were made by some other country (probably Australia or India) to force further action by the Security Council we should take the position that as long as there were no hostilities the matter was not one for Security Council action. (Mr. Rusk thought that this position would receive good support in the Security Council.) 81 An Australian press release was issued August 7 expressing readiness to act jointly with the United States In capacity of mediator and arbitrator. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–647: Telegram [Document 816] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State 82 confidential us urgent Batavia , August 6, 1947—4 p.m. 311. Paragraph 2, Deptel 209, August 4. Re good offices and capacity both sides to carry out US recommendations, it my opinion offer good offices must involve more than acting as intermediary as did Lords Inverchapel and Killearn. Indonesians have broadcast from Djocja that arbitration by UN Commission is desired. Van Mook has expressed opinion to me that good offices must at least go far enough to make direct recommendations for settlement and that action similar to Inverchapel’s and Killearn’s is doomed to failure. He believes best way attack problem is for high calibre internationally known man come to Batavia and become thoroughly familiar with all ramifications of entire problem. This he thinks can be done by careful study of facts of situation and listening to opinions and arguments both sides. Our representative after becoming familiar with problem and listening suggestions of both sides would then be able bring them together in attempt reach agreement. If agreement appears impossible, he thinks recommendations by top flight US representative would have considerable weight. I gained impression Dutch would abide by reasonable recommendations. It also probable Soekarno, Sjarifoeddin and few other Indonesian officials would accept reasonable settlement but for reason stated in mytel 302, August 1, there will always be danger that some Indonesians, who now appear holding power at Djocja, would either fail follow recommendations or sabotage agreement reached. It difficult prophesy ability or willingness both sides carry out possible recommendations, especially ability of Indonesians. If decision our representative should appear anti-Dutch, as they think it would be if the matter should be handled by Australia or India, objection may be expected. On other hand, if Indonesians should feel that decisions did not meet their full aspirations, more radical and extremist elements would ground [ charge? ] they came from “capitalistic and imperialistic USA”. In efforts implement our offer good offices, our representative may expect one of toughest jobs known in many years. Negotiations should at least begin at Batavia because of housing accommodations, transportation and availability of records, personnel, et cetera. Am positive that Dutch will insist on Batavia as choice at least for first few meetings. Our representative can then feel his way and decide whether advisable be move to another city. Foote 82 Repeated to The Hague in Department’s telegram 395, August 8, noon. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–747: Telegram [Document 817] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Batavia , August 7, 1947—noon. 312. At 9 o’clock last night Dr. Tamzil, Indonesian Vice Minister Foreign Affairs, came to my home and brought letter from Gani, Vice Premier, to effect his efforts contact Djocja probably could not be relied upon and requested me endeavor convey offer good offices direct to Indonesian Republic (see mytel 308, August 6 83 ). Immediately thereafter Van Mook arranged place services broadcasting station Batavia at my disposal. For about 1 hour Djocja was warned every 15 minutes that I would convey message to Djocja that evening and at 10 hours last night I broadcasted message addressed to President Soekarno or Prime Minister Sjarifoeddin as follows: “I am instructed by my Govt to inform you that the US Govt makes available to the Government of the Indonesian Republic the same good offices that it has extended to the Netherlands Government.” Same message was again broadcasted to Djocja at 9 o’clock this morning. Tamzil was of opinion that Soekarno would probably call Cabinet meeting before replying but it is possible reactions may be obtained sometime today. Department pass London and Hague. Foote 83 Not printed; Dr. Gani had welcomed the offer of good offices but said he had been out of touch with Djocja (Jogjakarta) since July 20 (856E.00/8–647). The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–847: Telegram [Document 818] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State restricted us urgent Batavia , August 8, 1947—11 a.m. 315. Following is verbatim text of reply by Sjarifoeddin on behalf Republican Government to our offer good offices. It was broadcast via Radio Djocjakarta and handed to me late last night by Deputy Premier Gani: “1. The Government and people of the Republic of Indonesia heard with great gratitude and appreciation the broadcast offer of the US Government to extend its good offices to the Indonesian Government in any future negotiation in which the Government of the Republic may be involved. 2. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia has the honor to request the attention of the US Government to the decision adopted by the Security Council of the UN. The Republican Government in adhering to the principle of the UN is fully prepared to submit to the aforementioned decisions, in which arbitration has been recommended as the primary means of settling the dispute. In cordially accepting the good offices of the US Government, the Indonesian Government requests that the US Government should use its influence with the Government of The Netherlands and the Security Council of the UN for the Indonesian proposal that an international arbitration commission should be dispatched without delay to Indonesia. 3. The Republic feels sure the Government of the US, Britain and The Netherlands will all agree, in view of the fact that 2 years of negotiation and mediation failed to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, that in arbitration by a UN commission lies the only and final hope of settling this dispute by peaceful means. 4. The Government of the Republic is unanimous in its conviction that if the US feels able to support the aforementioned proposal, it will for the following reasons be performing a lasting service to humanity: a . The Government and of the Republic would [ The Government of the Republic and of the Netherlands could ] 84 agree to abide loyally by any decision reached by the arbitration commission. b . There is therefore strong reason to believe that such an international commission would bring about a lasting settlement. c . The United Nations would thus be creating much needed precedent to prove to the world that its authority can stop wars and settle disputes. 5. Finally, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia requests the U.S. Government to send a representative as soon as possible by air to Djocjakarta in order that the Republican Government may more fully acquaint the US Government representative with its official point of view. 6. The Republican Government would appreciate by radio early advice of the US Government of the estimated time of arrival of the representative of the US Government at Djocjakarta airport.” ( End of Indonesian reply ). Tamzil, Republican Vice Minister Foreign Affairs, who present when Indonesian reply handed me, invited my attention Sjarifoeddin’s speech (mytel 309, August 6 85 ) to effect Republican Cabinet will “soon name countries which Republic desires to conduct arbitration”. These will probably be Australia, India and other countries known to be friendly. During the conversation, I gained impression Gani and Tamzil, and probably Indonesian Cabinet at Djocja, have little conception of good offices. Evidence is Tamzil said our offer did not contain specific recommendations for settlement. Foote 84 Correction based on telegram 725, August 8, 7:50 p.m., from New York. 85 Not printed. The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–847: Telegram [Document 819] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent The Hague , August 8, 1947—2 p.m. 584. Embtel 557, July 31. Acting Chief Political Section states that FonOff again considerably annoyed by Chifley’s proposal for Australian arbitration of Indo situation. He said Netherlands Government was still as firmly opposed as previously to arbitration of question and now hoping that US would send top flight commission as expeditiously as possible to Indo as Republic could not in his opinion do otherwise than accept US action in this regard. He said all-important thing at the moment was to “reduce temperature” of situation with all possible haste. When asked for clarification of Netherlands Government’s present conception force of Linggadjati Agreement, he said that in terms of contract, agreement was now abrogated but that Netherlands Government felt itself morally bound to maintenance of Linggadjati principles and that Dutch would presumably seek any new contract on this basis. Sent Dept; repeated London 90. Department pass to Batavia. Baruch The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Batavia (Foote) 856E.00/8–447: Telegram [Document 820] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) confidential u. s. urgent niact Washington , August 8, 1947—7 p.m. 216. Neth has accepted US offer of good offices but we have thus far received nothing which can be considered as an adequate Indo reply. An Indonesian message to President Security Council indicates that Indos accept US offer of good offices but request US use these good offices to induce Neth and Security Council to agree to set up international arbitration commission to be dispatched immediately to Indonesia. It would appear Indos misunderstand nature our offer. You should therefore repeat offer to Indo authorities in its original terms (Deptel 209 Aug 4) pointing out that we did not contemplate participation by other states in the exercise of our good offices; that object our good offices was to bring the two parties together with least possible delay to work out between themselves equitable settlement present difficulties. We consider that acceptance by Indos in this sense is condition precedent to discussion of means by which settlement shall be brought about. You should proceed immediately by plane to Djokjakarta and transmit above message personally to Indo authorities. Please report immediately and in detail to Dept on foregoing, from Djokja if possible, 86 stating specifically whether Indos accept US offer on basis indicated above and including your comments and recommendations. Prompt reporting is essential in order that our representative at UN may be properly informed. Also inquire of Indos re status Sjahrir and Salim now in US. Are either or both empowered represent Indos to US Govt or to Security Council or both? Sent Batavia as 216; repeated to Hague as 398. 87 Marshall 86 Telegram 320, August 10, 5 p.m., from Batavia, replied that a full report would be submitted as soon as the visit to Jogjakarta could be arranged (856E.00/8–1047). 87 In telegram 398 the Embassy’s comment was requested. The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) 501.BC/8–847: Telegram [Document 821] The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations ( Johnson ) confidential Washington , August 8, 1947—7 p.m. 344. When the question of the participation of representatives of the Republic of Indonesia arises we believe you should take a position along the following lines: 1. The terms of Article 32 of the Charter apply to Members of the United Nations or “any state which is not a Member of the United Nations if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council.” 2. It would be futile to have extended debate on the question of whether or not the Republic of Indonesia is a “state” within the meaning of Article 32. The United States expressly takes no position on that question and any invitation extended to the Republic of Indonesia would be without prejudice, as is stated in Article 40, to the rights, claims or position the parties concerned. 3. The purpose of Article 32 is quite clear; namely, that parties to a dispute which is being considered by the Security Council should have a right to be heard and to participate in the discussion relating to that dispute. 4. By its resolution of August 1 the Security Council recognized the existence of a dispute and called on the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means. Thus the Security Council has recognized not only the existence of a dispute but also that the parties to the dispute are the Netherlands on the one hand and the Republic of Indonesia on the other. 5. This recognition by the Council of the existence of a dispute and the parties to it clearly calls into play the spirit of Article 32 of the Charter. That is to say that the Security Council has a duty under the spirit of Article 32 of the Charter to permit both parties to the dispute to participate in the Security Council consideration of it. 6. The Security Council has already invited the Netherlands to participate in the Council discussion under Article 32. The United States would be willing to support an invitation to the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia also to participate under Article 32 so long as it is understood that such an invitation would not constitute a finding that the Republic of Indonesia is a “state”. 7. The United States stresses as a fundamental principle the right of a party to a dispute to be heard in the Council’s consideration of that dispute. So long as that principle is recognized it does not matter whether representatives of the Republic of Indonesia are invited under Article 32 of the Charter or under Rule 39 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, but the United States does believe that each party to the dispute under basic principles of equity should have an equal opportunity to express their views before the Council. 88 Marshall 88 On August 12 the Security Council, after extensive discussion, voted to invite the representative of the Indonesian Republic to the Council table. For proceedings of this meeting, see SC, 2nd yr ., pp. 1914–1944. Remarks by the Deputy U. S. Represenative on the Security Council (Johnson) are printed ibid ., pp. 1931–1933. The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/8–947: Telegram [Document 822] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State 89 confidential most immediate The Hague , August 9, 1947—4 p.m. 586. Boetzelaer stated this morning that he welcomes initiative US Government to obtain Republic acceptance to US offer good offices on basis expressed Deptel 398, August 8. 90 He stated that he had no further comment beyond expression of appreciation as matter general principle as he was leaving question negotiations of specific points to Van Kleffens. However, he made it clear Netherlands Government would not consent that Salim or Sjahrir present Republic position before Security Council inasmuch as such representation would imply Republic sovereignty. Australian Legation informs Embassy that Boetzelaer called on Australian Minister last night to tell him that “Netherlands Government did not intend to go beyond offer of US good offices” which is interpreted by Australian Minister as “polite” rejection Australian arbitration proposal. Foreign Office has requested that any publicity with regard to Foote’s visit to Djocja should clearly set out that his mission is exclusively in terms of US good offices and that Foote is not proceeding in exercise his consular functions. It is pointed out that otherwise other consular representatives in Indo would seek opportunities also proceed Djocja. Baruch 89 Repeated by the Department to Batavia in telegram 218, August 11, 6 p.m. 90 Same as telegram 216, August 8, p. 1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] . The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–1247: Telegram [Document 823] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Batavia , August 12, 1947—3 p.m. 322. Deptel 216, August 8. Was in Djocjakarta all day yesterday and returned Batavia late in evening. Trip made in Beechcraft plane of US Navy. As I thought, Indonesians had not faintest idea of meaning good offices and appeared to think any nation offering same was agreeing to act as sort of private attorney to defend Republic’s cause before Security Council. Soekarno opened conversation by saying Republic had accepted our good offices in principle and that it had also accepted on August 10 same offer from Australia. Then in presence of most of Indo Cabinet I made careful explanation of meaning good offices. Soekarno and Sjarifoeddin then said Republic was in most difficult situation since it had requested action by Security Council prior to our offer. They repeated several times that Republic wanted arbitration by Security Council. Minister of Interior [ Education ], Sastroamidjojo, then asked if US offer good offices was meant to exclude action by Security Council. I dodged question by saying US Government was member of the Council and that Council knew of our offer. Soekarno said Republic would certainly demand de jure recognition of sovereign Republic; that he knew Dutch would oppose same and that was reason why they approached Security Council. He repeated Sjarifoeddin’s former statement that Republic wished nominate member of Council’s arbitration committee. Continued in mytel 323. Department pass London, Hague. Foote The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–1247: Telegram [Document 824] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Batavia , August 12, 1947—4 p.m. 323. Continuation my telegram 322. Re last para, Dept 216, inquired many times re status powers and duties both Sjahrir and Salim before obtaining adequate answer. Soekarno said they instructed continue demands for arbitration in Security Council. Since that answer did not satisfy me, I again asked several times later. Soekarno then said they instructed contact Australian and Indian delegates in Security Council and Sjahrir especially instructed propagate Republic’s cause by any possible means in Council, to US Govt and to anyone who would listen. He used Dutch word “verdedigen” which means “to defend”. Following are Soekarno’s exact words: “Sjahrir is not accredited to anyone but is merely advocate of Indonesian cause. He and Salim are both advocates especially in Security Council which is now discussing Indonesian question”. Sjarifoeddin then left room and returned with copy Sjahrir’s instructions which he let me read. In effect they merely said “advocate our cause wherever possible to anyone who listens”. In brief, Soekarno and Sjarifoeddin said Sjahrir and Salim not accredited to any organization or government; they merely to propagate Republic’s cause and have no power make agreements or reach decisions. Continued mytel 325. 91 Dept pass London, Hague. Foote 91 Dated August 12, 5 p.m., p. 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] . The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 856E.01/8–1247: Telegram [Document 825] The Ambassador in the Netherlands ( Baruch ) to the Secretary of State The Hague , August 12, 1947. 595. Government statement reaffirming its aims in Indonesia has been telegraphed Embassy Washington with request it be made available immediately to Department. Briefly statement reaffirms Government’s policy embodied in Linggadjati Agreement; reiterates willingness reduce troop strength as soon as efficient police apparatus established capable of guaranteeing law and order; offers form immediately Federal interim government which shall also govern areas occupied during recent operations; states intention convene immediately round table conference of representatives various participating states and population groups to consult on definite establishment new political structure. Adds Government convinced states and various minorities will agree to proposals and wish take part immediately in their execution, appeals to Republic to cooperate, and expresses hope US good offices will make important contribution towards this end. Rejects arbitration, stating aim is reformation of Indonesian political structure and not ironing out of a difference. Baruch The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–1247: Telegram [Document 826] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Batavia , August 12, 1947—5 p.m. 325. Continuation my telegram 323. After several hours with Soekarno and Cabinet, he asked member my staff if could talk with me alone. We then went to another room and locked all doors. He then said, “I have been talking all day with American ConGen. Now I wish as younger man to talk as to my father. We are in terrible situation, having appealed to Security Council and accepted Australia’s offer good offices. How can we get out and save our face?[”] I admitted it difficult problem for him to solve. Only solution which appeared possible to him at the moment was ask Security Council’s approval our good offices which would make USA agent of Council. I made no comments thereon but said it impossible answer such important question without instructions my Government. Shortly after my plane took off for return Batavia, Radio Djokjakarta broadcast following: “Republic takes firm stand that USA should at Security Council meeting exert its influence to act as arbiter.” While this ambiguous it probably means that we should endeavor persuade Security Council appoint arbitration commission. If that is meaning, Soekarno had no influence with his Cabinet. Continued my telegram 326. 92 Department pass London. Foote 92 Dated August 12, 6 p.m., p. 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] . The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) 501.BC/8–1247: Telegram [Document 827] The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations ( Johnson ) restricted u.s. urgent Washington , August 12, 1947—5 p.m. 345. With respect to Indonesian question Dept. believes you should take a position along following lines: 1. The SC should, during the present phase of the Indonesian case, draw a sharp distinction between its interest in the cessation of hostilities and its possible interest in the ultimate political settlement in Indonesia. 2. With regard to the cessation of hostilities, the SC’s interest continues. Accordingly, pursuant to its resolution of Aug. 1, the SC should ask the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia whether such hostilities have in fact ceased and whether the parties consider some observation of the cease fire order essential. If both parties agree that observation is desirable, or if one party insists that observation is essential, the SC should arrange for observation, with observers as acceptable as possible to the parties. The SC might, for example, invite the parties to consult with the SYG in an effort to arrange suitable observation. If, however, no arrangement which is mutually acceptable to the parties can be reached on such a basis, the SC should itself name observers to assure that hostilities have in fact ceased. In Dept’s view a commission of the SC would be preferable in absence of agreement by the parties but a delegation from the Secretariat, or other observers, would be acceptable. 3. With regard to the SC’s relation to the specific method of settlement of the political issues, the SC should expect the parties to use every available opportunity to agree between themselves as to the method of settlement. If the parties are unable to agree, they should inform the SC. Further action by SC would then depend on circumstances existing at the time including determination of the extent of SC jurisdiction. Marshall The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 501.BC/8–1247: Telegram [Document 828] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Batavia , August 12, 1947—6 p.m. 326. During secret conversation Soekarno openly stated preference for US offer good offices but said did not know how to get out of present situation—appeal to Security Council and acceptance Australia’s offer good offices. He said his position was same as President of France and had little influence on decisions of Cabinet. I gained distinct impression he completely misinformed re military situation, since he told me Indonesian troops victorious all fronts with Dutch in retreat. He went so far as to say he still in charge both west and east Java, while truth is Republic has lost both completely. Furthermore east coast of Sumatra has declared for statehood separate from Republic and within frame of USI. Soekarno looks very ill, having lost probably 30 pounds weight; his face very thin and voice weak. His palace, former home of Governor middle Java, surrounded by troops and heavily guarded day and night. My opinion of Soekarno not changed. He sincere but now lacking old fire and power which won many people to his banner. In brief, Republic wishes arbitration by representatives from countries selected by Republic—such as Australia, India and others definitely pro-Indonesian. I think Cabinet fears USA good offices might be too honest. Indonesians want arbitration and final decisions by their friends—a packed jury. It appears there no possibility of accepting our offer unless such offer recommended by Security Council. Even if accepted, any decision not liked by Indonesian military leaders could not be implemented by Cabinet. Australia, India, extremists and Communists among Indonesians do not want US offer accepted. Department pass London, Hague. Foote The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) 856E.00/8–1347: Telegram [Document 829] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations ( Johnson ) restricted Washington , August 13, 1947—6 p.m. 347. Re various questions raised in debate of Indonesian case on August 12. Following are Dept’s views which it might be helpful for you to know. 1. Renewal of Philippine request to participate in SC discussion. Dept believes US should continue to support Philippine application on basis that its interests as UN Member are specially affected in sense of Art 31. 2. Invitation to East Indonesia and Borneo to participate in SC discussion. As neither is a Member of UN, neither can be invited under Art 31 on ground of specially affected interests. If they ask to be admitted as parties to dispute they thus come within spirit of Art 32 as enunciated in your statement to SC on Aug 12 and should be admitted on same basis as Republic of Indonesia. In any event, they can properly be invited to supply Council with information or give other assistance under Rule 39 of SC Rules of Procedure and Dept considers that their invitation should be supported under this Rule. 3. If you consider it necessary to reply to Hodgson’s 92a question as to what was meant by tender of good offices by US, Dept believes it would be appropriate to reply along lines of Deptel 216 to Batavia of Aug 8, repeated to NY as No. 6 on Aug 9. In addition, you may wish to emphasize in Council that US tender of good offices was designed to bring parties together so that they themselves could take initiative in agreeing on method of settlement which would be most acceptable to them both and that US was hopeful that its assistance in this regard would expedite early agreement by the parties. Efforts of US were merely to simplify and facilitate bringing parties together and US does not wish to interfere with parties’ initiative in choice of particular method of settlement. If another means would be helpful in bringing the parties together, the US would be willing, of course, to withdraw its tender of good offices. 4. We note Belgian question as to which Art of Charter forms basis of Australian resolution for observers in area as agents of SC. In Dept’s view, para ( a ) of Aug 1 resolution was, in Charter effect, a provisional measure under Article 40 which expressly provides that such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. Thus, in Dept’s opinion, if both parties consider observation of cease fire desirable or if one party insists that it is essential, dispatch of observers by SC to observe cease fire would simply be part of provisional measure already taken by SC in para ( a ) of Aug 1 resolution and would therefore be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of either party. It is, of course, also true that under general powers of SC set forth in Art 24, SC could appropriately dispatch observers to area. Dept sees no reason, however, why it should not be freely admitted that Council’s order to cease hostilities in its resolution of Aug 1 was in effect a provisional measure under Art 40. 5. Re Australian draft resolution (urtel 736, Aug 12). 93 Para (2) of Australian resolution is misleading in that it does not adequately reflect complete position of US with respect to its tender of good offices. A statement by you as contemplated in para 3 above would serve to clarify this point. Para (3) of Australian resolution is not, of course, in accord with Dept’s basic policy on this point which remains as set forth in Deptel 345 to you dated Aug 12. Thus, para (3) of Australian resolution should be amended so as to make clear that such a commission would be established solely for the purpose of observing the parties’ compliance with para ( a ) of the SC’s resolution of Aug 1. Lovett 92a Lt Col. William R. Hodgson, Australian representative at the United Nations. 93 Telegram 736 not printed. For text of Australian resolution submitted to the Security Council on August 12, see SC, 2nd yr ., p. 1917, footnote 1. The resolution proposed the establishment of a Security Council commission to report directly to the Security Council on the situation in Indonesia subsequent to the Security Council cease-fire resolution of August 1. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Batavia (Foote) 856E.00/8–1247: Telegram [Document 830] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) 94 restricted us urgent niact Washington , August 14, 1947—7 p.m. 221. On July 31 Under Secy Lovett informed Amb van Kleffens of this Govt’s disposition to be helpful and its readiness to exercise its good offices in the hope that it might help compose the difficulties concerning Indonesia. Amb Herschel Johnson informed the Security Council of this offer the same day. On Aug 1 Van Kleffens informed the Council of the Netherlands acceptance of our good offices and this was subsequently confirmed by the Netherlands FonMin. Having made this offer to the sovereign power and having obtained its acceptance, we endeavored locate properly authenticated representatives of Indos and we instructed the Amer Consul General at Batavia on Aug 4 to offer our good offices to the Indonesian authorities wherever he might be able to contact them. As there was some difficulty in getting into touch with them the Consul General broadcast this Govt’s offer to the Indonesian authorities on Aug 6 and 7. On Aug 7 the Indonesian authorities broadcast a reply stating that they accepted the offer of good offices of the US Govt but at the same time requesting this Govt to use its influence with the Govt of the Netherlands and the Security Council in favor of the Indonesian proposal that an International Arbitration Commission be dispatched without delay to Indonesia. As it appeared that the Indonesians misunderstood the nature of our offer, on Aug 8 the Amer Consul General at Batavia was instructed to proceed to Jogjakarta by plane and repeat our offer to Indo authorities in its original terms, explaining at the same time that object of our good offices was to bring the two parties together with the least possible delay to work out between themselves an equitable settlement to the present difficulties. Mr. Foote was further directed to explain that we did not contemplate participation by other states in the exercise of our good offices. On Aug 11 the Indonesian authorities informed Mr. Foote that they accepted the US offer of good offices in principle but they introduced a condition again by stating that they desired arbitration by Security Council. It appears that Indos, perhaps from a misunderstanding of the nature of our tender of good offices, have in effect rejected this Govt’s offer since they did not wish to use good offices for purpose intended by us, that is, to bring both parties together without delay to work out equitable solution between themselves. The US made its offer in conformity with the well-known international understanding of the term, i.e. that a tender of good offices is an attempt to induce negotiation between disputants. In order that there may be no possibility of any misunderstanding existing on this matter pls ascertain at once from Indos whether they are unwilling to use our good offices to enter into discussions with the Dutch as to the means of attaining a settlement of the dispute. The Neth Govt has indicated its willingness to arrange through direct negotiation for a settlement as proposed by the US. If therefore the Indos are willing to accept as the Neth has done the good offices of the US in bringing about direct negotiation, the US will be glad to pursue the matter further. If on the other hand the Indos insist on specifying a particular method of settlement as they have heretofore done without taking into account whether it would be acceptable to the other party, our offer of good offices necessarily lapses. The US would in that event have no alternative other than to inform the Neth Govt and the Security Council that the Indo authorities have not accepted our offer. You are instructed to inform Vice Premier Gani at once of the foregoing, requesting him to take urgent steps to obtain an immediate reply from his Govt. You should assure him at the same time of our continuing interest in a peaceful solution of the problem and of our desire to be helpful. For your info Dept plans release this message to press immediately following its delivery to Gani. Your report of delivery should therefore be sent with utmost urgency. 95 Lovett 94 Repeated to the Hague in telegram 411 and to New York in 351. 95 Telegram 331, August 16, noon, from Batavia (856E.00/8–1647), reported delivery made on August 16 except for a missing section of telegram 221. The latter was repeated on August 17 to Batavia. For the Department’s press release on August 16, see Department of State Bulletin , August 24, 1947, p. 397. Memorandum by Mr. Ben Hill Brown, Jr., of the Office of the Legal Adviser, to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk) 856D.00/8–1547 [Document 831] Memorandum by Mr. Ben Hill Brown, Jr., of the Office of the Legal Adviser, to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs ( Rusk ) [ Washington ,] August 15, 1947. Subject: Opinion on International Character of the Republic of Indonesia. 96 You have asked this Office for an opinion on the question of whether the Republic of Indonesia constitutes a “state” in the international sense. A state in the international sense is generally described as a recognized member of the family of nations, an international person. Authorities differ in respect to the qualifications for such statehood, but there is general agreement on certain basic requirements. As expressed by Hyde, the following qualifications are necessary: 97 “First, there must be a people … “Secondly, there must be a fixed territory which the inhabitants occupy … “Thirdly, there must be an organized government exercising control over, and endeavoring to maintain justice within, the territory. “Fourthly, there must be a capacity to enter into relations with the outside world. … Independence is not essential. … The requisite personality, in the international sense, is seen when the entity claiming to be a State has in fact its own distinctive association with the members of the international society, as by treaties, which, howsoever concluded in its behalf, mark the existence of definite relationships between itself and other contracting parties … “Fifthly, the inhabitants must have obtained a degree of civilization, such as to enable them to observe … those principles of law which are deemed to govern the members of the international society in their relations with each other”. Some authorities disagree with the statement that independence is not required, holding any state not fully independent, to be an international person for some purposes only. The territory of the Republic of Indonesia for a number of years before the war was generally considered a colony of The Netherlands. Since the war, it has asserted its independence and has been negotiating with the Government of the Netherlands for recognition of independence. Negotiations resulted on November 15, 1946 in the initialling of a draft agreement by representatives of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia. The agreement called for submission to the respective parliaments for approval, but it is understood that it was signed by executive act on March 25, 1947, by both parties after cabinet, rather than parliamentary approval. This agreement offers the colonies a dominion-like status, as a federated entity, in which the Republic would be one of the states, other territories of the colonies to be constituted into at least two major states, and the entity to be known as the United States of Indonesia (USI). The agreement further provides for a Netherlands-Indonesian Union consisting of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the USI, both to be established, if possible, by January 1, 1949. The USI is to become a “sovereign democratic state”, and the Netherlands is to promote its admission to the United Nations after its establishment and the formation of the Union. The agreement provides for further consultation toward the establishment of the USI and the formation of the Union. The question of whether the agreement may be considered as having come into effect at the time of signing must be answered in the affirmative. Although it, by its terms, requires submission to the parliaments, the subsequent act of signing and the decision that reference to parliament was unnecessary must be interpreted as amending that part of the agreement. Further, it is not for a foreign nation to question the authority of the executive. An examination of the agreement leads to the conclusion that even though in effect, it does not change immediately the legal relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands. It contemplates a change, and binds the parties to work to effect the change. However, many of its terms are vague and open to disagreement in interpretation. It may well be called a modus vivendi . It is useful for the purposes of this opinion primarily as an expression of the intention of the parties. In examining the Indonesian situation in the light of Professor Hyde’s qualifications which, on the question of sovereignty, are more favorable to Indonesia than those of other authorities, we may conclude that the first, second and fifth qualifications are met. With reference to the third, the situation is questionable. The Netherlands, in the agreement, recognize the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madoera and Sumatra. It does not, however, recognize it as the legal authority for those areas, and does not admit that the authority of the Netherlands no longer exists. Indeed, if this were true, there would be no need for many provisions of the agreement. This situation is apparently accepted by the Republic. On the fourth qualification, it is believed Indonesia is even further from meeting the requirements. While it is true that certain Arab states have recognized the Republic diplomatically, this is by no means conclusive. Recognition of a state is not purely a legal act, but in part political. While recognition is a factor, it is not determinative and must be considered among other factors. Further, the recognition by a few small states is overshadowed by the failure of the major nations and the majority of the smaller nations to extend recognition. Looking at the agreement, it appears that even if all intended acts were accomplished, the Republic would not have “its own distinctive association with the members of the international society.” The agreement contemplates it becoming one of three or more parts of the United States of Indonesia, a federated (rather than a confederated) entity. Significant also is the undertaking of the Netherlands (accepted by Indonesia) to promote the admission to the United Nations Organization of the United States of Indonesia, not the Republic of Indonesia. It is understood that one of the present disputes is over the Republic’s objection to this subordinated position. The conclusion reached in this opinion must be based on an examination of all the facts, however, and not on a disputed claim of one party. It is the opinion of this Office, therefore, that the Republic of Indonesia is not a state in the sense of being an international person. This opinion does not preclude a later contrary decision in the event of substantial changes in the situation. 96 This subject was the occasion for lengthy discussion at the Security Council meeting on August 12; see footnote 88, p. 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] . 97 Omissions indicated in the original. The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) 501.BC/8–1647: Telegram [Document 832] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations ( Johnson ) restricted us urgent Washington , August 16, 1947—1 p.m. 356. If Netherlands should request ICJ consideration problem of SC jurisdiction in Indonesian question, Dept views are as follows: 1. US believes SC should not hesitate to refer to ICJ questions on which SC desires advisory opinions. Subject to considerations set forth below, US will support SC’s asking advisory opinion of ICJ re SC’s jurisdiction in Indonesian question, assuming, of course, text of resolution requesting opinion is satisfactory. However, US considers principle important that SC remain free, while ICJ is deliberating, to take such further action in conformity with Charter as SC may determine necessary to maintain international peace. 2. Presumably consideration of Australian resolution and amendments suggested in Deptel 347 of August 13 will precede consideration of question of reference to ICJ. Any attempt to change order of SC consideration these two questions would imply attempt to divert or preclude consideration of Australian proposal. Therefore, in Dept’s view, US should not support such attempt. 3. Obviously terms of reference to ICJ must be precise. Therefore, Dept considers that you should take position that vote on resolution to refer matter to ICJ should not be taken until SC members have had full opportunity to study draft resolution. Lovett The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State 501.BC/8–1647: Telegram [Document 833] The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations ( Johnson ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent New York , August 16, 1947—2:40 p.m. 750. Department may wish to consider promptly following official proposals made by Van Kleffens yesterday at SC meeting regarding Indonesian case: (This proposal included in SC verbatim record S/P.V. 185, August 15. 98 ) “I am authorized to say that The Netherlands Govt is prepared to propose to the Republic of Indonesia that each—the Republic of Indonesia and The Netherlands—designate one state, those two states so designated to be asked to appoint one other state which is considered by them to be completely impartial. This impartial state; if it is willing, would then send a number of its nationals to Indonesia to enquire into the situation, to supervise the cease fire, and to see what conditions obtain there. It should be clearly understood that the report these people would make to their Government would be given the very widest publicity. “In case the Republic of Indonesia fails to accept unequivocally the good offices of the United States of America, this third truly impartial state could, at the same time, be empowered by The Netherlands Govt and by the Republic of Indonesia to use its good offices for a two-fold purpose—firstly, to bring about the immediate resumption of discussions between the two parties; and secondly, to report on the situation as it has developed up to date. That is our first proposal which—I want to underline that—takes into full account the fact that some uncertainty still prevails as to whether we can make use of the offer of good offices so generously made by the United States of America or not. “Now, the second proposal of my Govt is that all the career Consuls stationed in Batavia shall jointly and immediately—because the situation has an element of the greatest urgency—draw up a report on the present situation on the islands of Java, Sumatra, and Madura so as to lose no time whatsoever. This can be done almost at once, and it should be done almost at once. We hope that in this way an important contribution will be made towards obtaining an impartial and unbiased understanding of the actual facts and circumstances which my Govt would warmly welcome. The Netherlands Govt, therefore, is requesting those countries that have career Consuls or Consuls General at Batavia to give the necessary instructions to this effect to their representatives. I hope that what I have described is clear and that the constructive character of these proposals will at once be seen.” The Dutch delegation told us informally that if first Dutch proposal is accepted, Dutch Govt would designate a friendly state, probably Belgium, and would expect Indonesia to designate some state such as India or Australia. Dutch Govt would then hope that these two states might appoint US as third impartial state. Johnson 98 See S. C., 2nd yr., No . 77, pp. 2006, 2012–14. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–1747: Telegram [Document 834] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State restricted us urgent Batavia , August 17, 1947—11 p.m. 333. Deptel 221, August 14. Following is verbatim text of Indonesian reply sent from Djocja in Morse via NEI facilities and delivered to me today by Tamzil, Vice Minister Foreign Affairs: “The Government of the Republic of Indonesia states with deep satisfaction that the personal contact and the exchange of views recently held between the Republic Govt and Dr. Walter Foote, Consul General of USA in Indonesia, have opened up a fuller understanding of the efforts of the US Government to achieve a speedy settlement of the Indonesian-Dutch dispute. The Republican Government once more wishes to express its fullest appreciation of the offer of the US Government to extend its good office to both parties in the present conflict. The Republic Govt has from the commencement of hostilities made all possible efforts in urging the United Nations to intervene in the present dispute in order that peace might return once more to Indonesia. The Indonesian Govt felt confident that whilst faced with large scale hostilities such might endanger peace and security in other parts of the world. The Republic Govt believed that in appealing to the UN it was pledging no more than its deep and enduring confidence in the principles and effectiveness of the United Nations Charter. The broadcast appeal of His Excellency, the President of the Indonesian Republic to His Excellency, The President of the USA, was also in keeping with Indonesia’s trust in the same moral influence which the US has in the Security Council, whose home is in her principal city. 2. Having made its appeal to the United Nations who, by the recent decision of the Security Council, have urged both the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands to order the cessation of hostilities, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia feels that it is obliged to abide by the command of the United Nations and by any further steps taken by the Security Council particularly with regard to the despatch of an international arbitration commission to Indonesia. 3. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia has also cordially accepted the good offices extended by the Commonwealth of Australia in the conviction that such an acceptance could only be in accordance with the efforts made by the Australian Government in this matter and that it may contribute to a just settlement. The offer of the Australian Government made it clear to the Republic Government that such an offer could not contradict the offer of the third party, in this case, the offer of the US Government. The Republic Government, therefore, cannot share the opinion that its recent reply to the US Government means a rejection of the US offer to extend her good offices to the Republic Government. 4. Pending the decision of the Security Council, the Republic Government wishes to renew its pledge of confidence that within the power of the US Government lies the possibility of finding a final solution of the Indonesian-Dutch dispute. The Government and the people of the Republic of Indonesia hope that in the future they may always rely upon the USA to use its moral influence to achieve a just and lasting solution in order that peace and security may really return to Indonesia.” End of Indonesian reply . My comments follow in my telegram 334, August 18 [ 19 ]. Department pass Hague and London. Foote Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/8–1847 [Document 835] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [ Washington ,] August 18, 1947. Participants: The Acting Secretary The Netherlands Ambassador Mr. Rusk Mr. Morgan The Netherlands Ambassador called on me this afternoon at his own request and read a long note which he then handed to me. 99 The gist of this note was that the invitation of the Security Council to cease fire had had an effect widely at variance with its intentions—that so far from preventing further bloodshed it had created a situation in which the forces of disorder were able to terrorize the peaceful inhabitants at will. It was therefore clearly asking the impossible to expect the Netherlands authorities to simply look on while the population suffered from the acts of lawless elements not only not restrained but even encouraged by the Indonesian Government. The Netherlands Government which considers this situation untenable, is willing to consider any constructive and practical suggestions the Government of the United States may care to make at this critical juncture. I told the Ambassador that since we had not yet received from our Consul General at Batavia the definite reply of the Indonesian Government 1 to our repeated offer of good offices we could not give him any answer or comment which went beyond that fact. When the Indonesian reply had been received we would have to consider what further steps might be desirable. I expressed strongly to Dr. Van Kleffens the hope that the Netherlands Government would not resort again to military action since such a step might, in view of the feeling in the Security Council, entail serious consequences, perhaps even sanctions. Robert A. Lovett 99 No. 4288, August 18, not printed. 1 Telegram 333, August 17, supra , was received on August 19, 9:06 a.m. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/8–1947: Telegram [Document 836] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Batavia , August 19, 1947—11 a.m. 334. Mytel 333, August 17. Following are my comments on Indonesian reply: 1. Reply is and is meant to be rejection of our offer good offices. Have since learned from Tamzil, Vice Minister Foreign Affairs, that Djocjakarta instructed Sjahrir to press in Security Council demand for appointment international committee to settle Dutch-Indonesian troubles. Message was sent about same time Indonesian reply was given to me. 2. Department’s attention invited mytel 302, August 1. Indonesians have not observed cease fire order and Dutch have lost more men since order given than during operations which began July 20. At same time Indonesians have said Dutch forces consist of Chinese, Arabs and other mercenaries—statement which everyone knows untrue. 3. Republic and its friends, countries like India et cetera, now regard USA as weak country catering to new oriental countries for fear losing some economic advantages. This causes radical and extremist elements of Indonesia to oppose USA good offices and at same time creates hope for de jure recognition. 4. Mytel 302 contained accurate estimate of possibilities. Indonesians do not want our good offices and each additional approach lowers our prestige not only here but in other Orient. Foote The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.00/8–1947: Telegram [Document 837] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia restricted Washington , August 19, 1947—7 p.m. 228. Inform Indo officials that in view Indos’ preference for arbitration we consider our offer good offices as lapsed. For your use if desired Dept issued following statement to press Aug 19: “On Aug 14 Dept instructed AmConGen Batavia convey this Govt’s offer good offices for third and last time to Indo authorities, in hope they would accept our good offices unconditionally as had the Dutch. Foote also instructed inform them that if they insisted on specifying particular method of settlement without taking into account its acceptability to other party our offer good offices would necessarily lapse and US would then have no alternative other than inform Neth Govt and SC that Indo authorities had not accepted our offer. Since Indo reply received on Aug 19 repeated same conditions as before, our offer is considered to have lapsed. Neth Govt, Indo authorities and SC being informed of lapse of our offer. However such lapse does not end our concern in matter. As indicated in Dept’s statement Aug 16 we continue be interested and desire be helpful in achieving a peaceful solution.” Lovett Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon) 856E.00/8–2047 [Document 838] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs ( Landon ) restricted [ Washington ,] August 20, 1947. Participants: Former Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, Republic of Indonesia; Foreign Minister Haji Agus Salim, Republic of Indonesia; C. Thamboe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia; Mr. James K. Penfield, 2 FE; Mr. Dean Rusk, SPA; Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, SEA; Mr. John H. Morgan, NOE; Mr. Philip W. Bonsai, Counselor appointed to the American Embassy at The Hague; Mr. Joseph W. Scott, IS. The Indonesian officials named above called according to previous arrangement. In the course of two hours of conversation they made it clear that they were very eager to have a neutral commission observe the “cease fire” order; that they hoped that such a commission would enlarge its functions to those of arbitration in such a way as to support the purposes of the Indonesians; that they would abide by any decisions made by the Security Council; that in the event the impossible happened and the Security Council should recommend that they return to a colonial status they would then become a “fighting colony”; that their purpose in signing the Linggadjati Agreement was to save the face of the Netherlands Government and provide an easy way to end the de jure sovereignty of the Netherlands Government over Indonesia; that they expected that by means of the Linggadjati Agreement the various states to be set up aside from the Republic of Indonesia would be established in consultation with the Republic and would accordingly form one sovereign state which would really be an enlarged Republic of Indonesia; that they intended to achieve their sovereignty immediately and not eventually; that they believed the Dutch intended to hold them within the old framework of empire if they could do so; that therefore Indonesian and Dutch purposes were fundamentally irreconcilable by negotiation and for that reason they did not wish to make use of the good offices of the United States or any other nation which would merely bring about the resumption of negotiation; that negotiation was impossible anyway as long as the Dutch forces held a pistol to the heads of the Indonesian negotiators; that they believed that the most important factor in the Security Council was the United States and that they had come to Washington to attempt to secure the support of the United States for their objectives. They made it clear that they hoped the United States would begin by supporting the idea of a neutral commission to observe the “cease fire” order and that subsequently the United States would continue to support them in achieving their objectives stage by stage. It was made clear to the Indonesian officials that the United States’ offer of good offices was aimed to provide a method of settlement by negotiation in harmony with the resolution of the Security Council of August 1; that in expressing their willingness to abide by the findings of the Security Council the Indonesians should not only abide by the “cease fire” order but by that part of the resolution which advised them to reach a negotiated settlement; that Department officials had not understood from a careful reading of the Linggadjati Agreement that the Republic of Indonesia itself would become a severeign state but would be one of several states in an eventual United States of Indonesia; that it is not at all clear to us that the Security Council is the place to decide the issue described by the Indonesians as immediate sovereign independence; that we have been going on the assumption as had probably other nations that their differences with the Dutch were negotiable; and that although we had the utmost of sympathy and interest in their ambitions to become independent we were in increasing doubt as to just how we might be useful in the present situation. The attempt was made to give the impression that the Indonesians should not count too heavily on United States support in the Security Council in the achievement of objectives which did not seem to us to fall within the frame of reference of the Security Council. We pointed out that it might be necessary to refer the question of jurisdiction to the World Court. The Indonesian officials took the point of view that if the United Nations Charter was not adequate to cover such a situation and to help all of the nations from Korea to Morocco achieve their independence that then the Charter should be changed. We inquired finally whether negotiations would be possible if the Security Council did send a neutral commission to observe the “cease fire” order and so create a better atmosphere free from coercion on the Indonesian negotiators. They made no clear reply to this beyond reaffirming their desire for such a neutral commission. 856E.00/8–1847: Telegram 2 Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom 856E.00/8–1847: Telegram [Document 839] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom confidential Washington , August 20, 1947—6 p.m. 3591. Dutch requested that US ConGen be directed participate in joint report on situation Indonesia with other career Consuls Batavia (urtel 4464, Aug 18 3 ). Dept replying that in desire to be helpful is willing for ConGen to join with other career consuls in report but recognizes that arrangements for such report will require careful consideration and must be agreeable both Indos and Dutch. Sent London as 3591. Repeated Hague as 426, Batavia as 230 and New York as 366. Lovett 3 Not printed; it reported a similar request to the British (856E.00/8–1847). The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 501.BC/8–2047: Telegram [Document 840] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential u. s. urgent niact Washington , August 21, 1947—6 p.m. 429. Urtel 617. 4 Pls inform FonMin urgently that this Govt strongly hopes, as stated by me to Van Kleffens on Aug 18, that the Neth Govt will not resort again to military action in Indonesia. Pls emphasize that in our view such a step would be like opening Pandora’s box, that ultimate results although at present unforeseeable in all detail are likely to be highly detrimental to the long-term interests of the Netherlands. More immediately, in view of feeling in Security Council, such action might entail serious consequences, perhaps even sanctions. Should sanctions be proposed in Security Council in the sense of Art 41, it is unlikely that the US would be able to oppose. As regards steps to be taken by this Govt with respect to Dutch position vis-à-vis Security Council, next following telegram gives points to be made in Security Council tomorrow by Johnson. Repeated to Batavia as 232. 5 Lovett 4 August 20, 5 p.m., not printed; it reported the possibility of renewal of military action by the Netherlands (501.BC/8–2047). 5 Repeated to New York as No. 368. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands 501.BC/8–2147: Telegram [Document 841] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands confidential us urgent niact Washington , August 21, 1947—7 p.m. 430. Following are the points which Herschel Johnson will cover in a statement to be made before the Security Council on Aug 22: (1) The US Govt has given considerable thought to the problems arising in connection with the cessation of hostilities in Indonesia. We believe that the Security Council acted properly and in conformity with the Charter in calling upon the parties to cease hostilities. Specifically, the US considers that para ( a ) of the Council’s resolution of Aug 1 is, so far as the Charter is concerned, a provisional measure under Article 40. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the seriousness with which the US believes the Council should take into account a failure by the parties to comply with such a measure. (2) We had hoped that the provisional measure which the Security Council took on Aug 1 would result in action by the parties which would clearly indicate that hostilities had in fact ceased and that a situation had been created in which the parties might adjust their difficulties by peaceful means. There have, however, been reports that acts of violence in the area have continued and which indicate that observation of the cease fire, by an agency of the Council, is in order. (3) We believe that the Council should do everything within its competence under the Charter to create conditions which will facilitate agreement between the parties. We believe that the best way to create such conditions at the present time is to despatch an agency of the Council immediately to the area concerned to observe the steps taken by the parties in compliance with the cease fire order of August 1. If this task is undertaken by the Council and is pursued properly and effectively, there is no doubt that the Council would thereby be making a major contribution to a just and lasting settlement of the dispute. (4) The US considers that it is the parties themselves who ultimately bear the responsibility for determining the method and the terms of such a settlement. The US believes this to be true quite apart from any question of the jurisdiction of the Security Council in the settlement of the merits of this case. The US believes that the Council should not impose or attempt to impose a particular method of pacific settlement upon the parties. To do so would not contribute to a lasting or just settlement. (5) The question of the Council’s jurisdiction as to the merits of this case is a very real one; a question which may not be passed over lightly. The constitutional history of the building of the federal structure of the US itself affords ample evidence as to how seriously this Govt regards matters of jurisdiction domestically; we have no less regard for such matters in the field of international affairs. The US considers there is room for doubt as to the Council’s jurisdiction in so far as a settlement of the merits of the Indonesian question is concerned. (6) We recognize that, in the final analysis, the Council itself can alone determine under the Charter whether it has jurisdiction in any question before it. However, we also recognize that the very real doubt that several members of the Council have regarding the Council’s jurisdiction as to the merits of the case before us might very well be alleviated by an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. The Council would remain free, of course, while the International Court is deliberating, to take such action in conformity with the Charter as the Council may deem necessary to maintain international peace. Taking these considerations into account, the US believes that the Council should not hesitate to refer the question of its jurisdiction in this case to the International Court and the US is prepared to support a proposal to that effect. (7) The US proposes that the Council tender its good offices to the parties. In so doing the Council does not raise any question whatsoever as to its competence in this matter. Further, the question of the Council’s jurisdiction would not arise at any stage in the exercise of such good offices since, at each stage, whatever service the Council rendered would be upon the express request of the parties themselves. Specifically, should the parties accept the Council’s tender of good offices they could, for example, request it, through its agency, to act as a mediator or conciliator in suggesting a method of settlement. Or they could ask it to perform any other service they desired. So long as both parties joined in such requests, there is obviously no limit to the service the Council could perform in facilitating a just and lasting settlement of this dispute. 6 Lovett 6 The text of the statement as actually made by Ambassador Johnson on August 22 is printed in SC, 2nd yr ., pp. 2175–2179. Ambassador Johnson concluded his statement by submitting a draft resolution (Document S/514) as follows: “ The Security Council Resolves to tender its good offices to the parties in order to assist in the pacific settlement of their dispute, in accordance with paragraph ( b ) of the resolution of the Council of 1 August 1947. The Council expresses its readiness, if the parties so request, to assist in the settlement through a committee of the Council consisting of three members of the Council, each party selecting one, and the third to be designated by the two so selected.” ( Ibid ., p. 2179, footnote 1.) The resolution was adopted by the Council on August 25 ( ibid ., p. 2209). The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) 501.BC/8–2547: Telegram [Document 842] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations ( Johnson ) restricted us urgent Washington , August 25, 1947—4 p.m. 373. Re composition of commission to observe cease fire order in Indonesia. In Dept’s view, there might be advantage in commission’s consisting of representatives of governments which are members of Council and which have career consuls in Batavia in that such a commission could begin to function promptly. However, if Council will not accept this composition, Dept is agreeable to commission’s being composed either of all members of Council or of any combination thereof which would insure a balanced and impartial group. Lovett The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC/8–2747: Telegram [Document 843] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia confidential u.s. urgent Washington , August 27, 1947—10 a.m. 235. Security Council Aug 25 resolved: 7 [“](3) Notes that Netherlands Government intends immediately request career consuls stationed in Batavia jointly report on present situation in Republic Indonesia, (4) Notes that Government Republic Indonesia has requested appointment by Security Council commission of observers, (5) Requests the Governments, members of the Council, who have career consular representatives Batavia instruct them prepare jointly for information and guidance Security Council reports on situation in Republic Indonesia following resolution of Council of Aug 1, 1947, such reports to cover the observance of the ‘cease-fire’ orders and conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties, (6) Requests Governments of Netherlands and Republic Indonesia grant to representatives referred to in Paragraph 4, all facilities necessary for effective fulfillment their mission.[”] Approach Indonesian authorities accordance No. Paragraph 6 foregoing requesting Republic grant all facilities necessary to the American ConGen and such other US official personnel, civilian and military, as may be designated to assist him in observing and reporting in cooperation with other career consuls. Livengood 8 should collaborate in preparation report and accompany you any necessary travel. Dept will arrange such military, naval and air personnel as may be required. Consult other career consuls and formulate plan for executing above mission including (1) aid required from Dutch and Indos; (2) types and numbers personnel required from governments concerned. Repeated Hague for info as No. 439. Lovett 7 For complete text of resolution, see SC, 2nd yr ., pp. 2173–2174, footnote 3. This resolution was sponsored jointly by Australia and China on August 22 and in effect replaced the Australian resolution of August 12. For the proceedings of the Security Council on August 25 when the resolution was adopted, see ibid ., pp. 2189–2212. 8 Charles A. Livengood had been appointed Consul General at Batavia; the appointment was to become effective upon the departure of Mr. Foote. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State 856E.00/8–2847 [Document 844] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State [ Washington ,] August 28, 1947. Participants: Acting Secretary Lovett Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Ambassador of The Netherlands Mr. Dean Rusk, Director, Office of Special Political Affairs Mr. John H. Morgan, Acting Chief, Division of Northern European Affairs The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. van Kleffens, called on me this afternoon to inform me in advance of announcement by his Government that the Netherlands cabinet had now definitely decided not to take military action against Djokjakarta but to restrict their activities to mopping up behind their lines where guerrilla attacks made this necessary. He indicated that he did not know what acceptance this decision might receive in all quarters and that there might be some resignations in the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies as a result. Upon my inquiry he further stated that his government was ready to accept the good offices of the Security Council as provided in the United States resolution of August 25. I informed the Ambassador that I welcomed this decision but felt that the United States, since its original offer of good offices had been rejected by the Indonesians, could not accept designation as one of the three members of the Council “to assist in the settlement”. Following this, the Ambassador having inquired as to the procedure which the United States might follow in its eventual implementation of the Marshall Plan, I took the occasion to stress strongly to the Ambassador and to urge him to stress strongly to his Government that we felt that the Paris conference had so far produced only sixteen shopping lists and that postively no aid for Europe would be forthcoming from the United States unless Europe produced a reasonable, realistic plan providing for the fullest utilization of Europe’s own resources, for the elimination of present European production bottlenecks, and a progressive diminution of United States aid. When leaving, Dr. van Kleffens expressed the hope that we might find it possible to advise Salim and Sjahrir to induce their government to desist from the constant exhortations to kill and burn which continued to be broadcast from Djokjakarta by high officials in spite of the cease-fire order. Robert A. Lovett The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 501.BC/9–347: Telegram [Document 845] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State confidential us urgent Batavia , September 3, 1947—11 a.m. 344. Re para 2 mytel 341, August 30, 9 all career consuls have now received instructions from their Governments. Most are so vague that officers are in doubt what action to take. Consular meeting been held and following decided: Both Dutch and Indos been asked to name danger points—points which been scenes of trouble or which are now or may be trouble spots; both sides requested furnish facilities to enable members consular mission to proceed to any place decided upon either singly, in groups or as body; all reports to Security Council to be joint reports to be made as often as may appear desirable; joint reports do not affect right of any officer to report to his own Government, members of mission to have access to both Dutch and Indo officials. Decided that consular officers alone would be helpless in efforts perform mission effectively. In view thereof Consuls have recommended to their Governments that four military officers be furnished by each power member of SC represented in Batavia by career Consuls. Such military personnel to be scattered through troubled areas to observe cease-fire order and to report thereon and on any other pertinent subject of interest to consular mission. Dept may desire consider advisability sending one or two C–47 planes with crew. May also be advisable have few army officers available to send to new troubled spots that may arise. Present proposal is to send one or more officers to such fronts as Modjokerto, Ambarawa, Surabaya, Banjoemas, Medan, Padang, Palembang, or any other areas where operations might occur. Consuls and/or military officers also to visit occupied areas to observe conditions and obtain pertinent data. Both sides requested furnish allegations of cease-fire violations. Dutch have agreed furnish all necessary assistance and data desired. Australian and French ConGens flew to Djocjakarta today to obtain data from Indos, such as allegations of violations, list of danger spots and assurances that Indos will extend same facilities and freedom of movement to member consular mission. If Dept agrees send 4 to 10 military officers skilled in observation, it suggested this be done earliest possible moment. 10 I have been selected by Consuls as Chairman of Security Council Consular Mission. Dept may desire instruct how reports should be sent to Security Council. Some may be telegraphic and others written. Foote 9 Not printed; it mentioned that the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, China, Australia, and the United States were represented at Batavia, with Mr. Foote as senior member (501.BC/8–3047). 10 After further exchange of telegrams, the Department’s No. 247, September 12, 6 p.m., to Batavia, stated that the Navy Department was sending two officers, the War Department six officers and one C–47 plane E.T.A. about September 20 (501.BC Indonesia/9–847). The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC/8–3047: Telegram [Document 846] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 11 confidential us urgent Washington , September 4, 1947—5 p.m. 237. Reurtel 341 Aug 30. 12 Dept desires depend your judgment in consultation other career consuls in developing plans and practical arrangements joint report but offers following suggestions your guidance: 1. Consuls should visit major areas both Dutch and Indo if possible; should not travel in body but should divide task so that each consul observes selected Dutch and Indo areas and makes report; reports should be worked over in concert to form single comprehensive report; task should be completed soonest possible, perhaps 2 to 4 weeks; Dept hopes that single joint report submitted in near future will suffice and that situation will not require additional reports. However, SC or other Consuls might feel situation requires subsequent report. 13 2. Dept can probably arrange provide six to eight military aides in addition to naval personnel already at Batavia to assist you in observation. In event career consuls travel separately you may share aides with other consuls if they so desire. 3. Your No. Para 5 indicates nature report expected on Indos which should be enlarged to full coverage and which should be balanced by parallel reporting on Dutch activities. Reports should be limited actual observance cease-fire orders and conditions prevailing and might include assessment responsibility for failure either party comply cease-fire orders. Lovett 11 Repeated to The Hague in telegram 453, September 9, 11 a.m., and to London in telegram 3904. 12 Not printed. 13 Telegram 246, September 11, 6 p.m., to Batavia, suggested that the joint report be telegraphed directly to the Security Council, with further air-mail reports if needed (501.BC/9–347). The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) 501.BC/9–647: Telegram [Document 847] The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations ( Johnson ) restricted Washington , September 6, 1947—1 p.m. 388. In view of Indonesian rejection of our good offices, Dept would prefer that US not be member of committee which will exercise Council’s good offices. However, since we proposed that Council tender its good offices and since proposal was adopted by Council without reservation by us, it is clear that we would have to accept membership on committee if selected by either party or by other two members. It may be useful for you to have following entirely tentative views of Dept in event US is one of three Council members which will exercise its good offices. We would appreciate your comments on these views. Presumably both parties will communicate their acceptance and their choice of committee members to SYG in writing. If this done we believe SYG should formally notify two so selected and suggest to them that they meet promptly to designate third member. He should, of course, make available secretariat personnel and facilities to two members initially selected as well as to committee itself. 14 If US is selected either by parties or as third member of committee, we believe we should take position that committee should hold initial discussions in NY in which parties do not participate, to decide such questions as: (1) method of reaching agreement within committee; (2) whether committee considers preliminary instructions from Council necessary; (3) manner in which committee is to keep Council informed as to its progress; (4) where committee should conduct its good offices; (5) initial suggestions to be made by committee to parties. Re (1) above, obviously important committee make every effort maintain complete unanimity within itself. Should this prove impossible at any stage, committee should, in our view refer matter in disagreement to Council for decision. Re (2) above, we believe Council should not instruct committee unless specifically so requested by committee and we do not foresee necessity for committee’s requesting instructions except in instances where unable to reach agreement within itself. Re (3) above, believe committee should keep Council informed of its progress through regular reports. Such reports could be considered logical implementation para ( b ) Council’s Aug 1 resolution. Re (4) above, believe committee should conduct its business initially in NY. Thereafter, providing it is agreeable to parties, committee should conduct actual good offices in Batavia. Re (5) above, believe initial suggestions to be made by committee to parties should include examination and exchange of credentials of representatives of parties, time and place of meetings and plan of procedure to be developed in committee prior to its first meeting with parties. In our view, committee should endeavor as promptly as possible to ascertain whether and to what extent parties will accept its mediation. One means by which committee could do this at early stage of its procedure would be by requesting parties to submit their views in writing, separately or jointly, to committee on such preliminary points as: (1) Whether they wish committee to suggest appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. (2) If replies to first question are affirmative, each party might be further requested to state what methods or combination of methods would be acceptable and to what specific issues in dispute such methods are to be applicable. (3) If replies to first question negative, each party might be further requested to state specifically nature of assistance they are prepared to accept from committee. Lovett 14 The Netherlands obtained the good offices of the Belgian Government; the Indonesian Republic, those of the Australian Government. The Belgian and Australian members of the committee thus established then designated the Government of the United States as the third member. (SC, 2nd yr ., p. 2480, footnote 2.) On October 1 Ambassador Warren R. Austin announced to the Council that President Truman had appointed the Honorable Frank Porter Graham as the United States representative on the Good Offices Committee of the Security Council ( ibid ., p. 2480). For Dr. Graham’s appointment, see also Department of State Bulletin , October 12, 1947, p. 731. The Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question held its first informal meeting on October 8 in New York ( ibid ., p. 2527). Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State 856E.00/9–847 [Document 848] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State [ Washington ,] September 8, 1947. Participants: The Secretary The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. Van Kleffens Dr. Van Mook, Lt. Governor General, N.E.I. Mr. Hickerson Dr. Van Mook, Lt. Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies, accompanied by Mr. Van Kleffens, the Netherlands Ambassador, came in to see me at 2:30 PM this afternoon by appointment made at the request of the Netherlands Ambassador. 15 Mr. Van Kleffens opened the conversation by saying he felt that it would be useful for Dr. Van Mook, who was in the United States for a few days to visit his son, to give me a firsthand account of existing conditions in the Netherlands East Indies. He added that this seems especially important because of the situation created by the intervention of the Security Council in what the Netherlands Government still strongly believes is a purely domestic matter. Mr. Van Kleffens went on to say that his Government had felt that the limited military operations which were opened in July were essential as an ordinary police measure but that the Security Council had intervened and issued a cease fire order. Now, he said, a situation has been created in which the Netherlands Government cannot take what it believes would be the correct course and resume military operations without running the risk of sanctions being imposed against the Netherlands by the Security Council. This has resulted in a situation which is completely unsatisfactory from every standpoint. Mr. Van Kleffens said that he felt that it would, therefore, be of very great interest to the Secretary to hear an account of the situation actually existing in Java and the N.E.I. from Dr. Van Mook who has just come from Java. Dr. Van Mook gave a long background review of the Dutch position historically in the N.E.I. He said that he was conscious of the fact that there had been growing aspirations for political independence prior to the war and that the Dutch Government had tried hard to take these into account in its course of action there. He said that these independence aspirations were unquestionably stimulated in every possible way by the Japanese authorities during the military occupation of the Islands. The Japanese had very carefully planned to make things as difficult as possible for the Dutch and the Allies by stirring up local independence agitation which would plague the Dutch when the Japanese had to give up the Islands. Dr. Van Mook said that Soekarno’s collaboration with the Japanese was pretty well known but that he did not believe the carefully laid plans of the Japanese to stimulate an independence movement as a part of a scorched earth policy were fully appreciated. The Japanese began to arm the Indonesians when it became clear that the war was lost, and the Indonesians had been able to seize considerable quantities of Japanese arms and ammunitions as well as former Dutch stocks of arms and ammunitions. Dr. Van Mook went on to say that in spite of the carefully laid Japanese plans it might well have been possible to handle the situation without trouble had it been possible for the Allies to send troops immediately into the N.E.I. to take over the occupation of the Islands from the Japanese. Unfortunately, this had not been possible. The British, in whose area of responsibility the Islands fell, didn’t have the troops. The Dutch, as he said I knew from the wartime days, had been unable to obtain the shipping to send Netherlands forces out there. In consequence, the Japanese remained in the Islands in possession of their arms for several months after V–J Day. Dr. Van Mook said that he would not describe in detail the efforts of the Netherlands Government to reach an amicable accommodation with the Indonesians. He said that he felt that the Department of State had already full information concerning this. He said that the basic difficulty was that the Indonesians really do not have a Government which has discipline and which can control itself let alone Java and Sumatra. He said that instead of the Indonesians being a Government, there are in Java a group of war lords each with his own armed forces, subject to no central control authority or discipline, who are preying on the country. He said that most of the people of Java do not support the Indonesian authorities and that he has been frequently importuned by Indonesians to take such action as may be necessary to restore order. He said that when exports are smuggled out of Java, teach military commander receives part of the proceeds; that sometimes there are as many as 5 Indonesian military leaders in the same district and each insists on receiving a share of the proceeds. In consequence, the owner of the goods receives sometimes as little as 10% of the sale price. The military leaders pay their troops and “feather their nests” with the proceeds of such exports. The military leaders are utterly ruthless in their tactics and are badly feared by all of the inhabitants of the Islands. Dr. Van Mook went on to say that in spite of this many Indonesians have come to him privately and have asked him what the Netherlands proposes to do to restore law and order, these individuals knowing full well that they might be executed if their actions became known to any of the Indonesian military authorities. Dr. Van Mook said that in his opinion the Security Council intervention in this matter had been a failure. The Netherlands military forces had been stopped from taking what they regarded as ordinary police action to restore law and order. The Security Council cease fire order was not being respected by the Indonesians and the Dutch losses were currently running about three-fourths of the losses which they had had during the time the limited military operations were in progress. What is even more serious, he said, is that there is a reign of terror in those areas still controlled by the Indonesians and a terrible uncertainty throughout the entire Islands. He said that he could not see how the Security Council could really settle this matter since there is not really an Indonesian Government. (At this point Mr. Van Kleffens interrupted to say he had recently commented at Lake Success that the Indonesians do not have a Government but that they are a group of undisciplined people with a microphone and a check book.) Dr. Van Mook said that the Netherlands is not a rich country and while this present stalemate continues it is becoming increasingly expensive. The Netherlands Government cannot hold out much longer. If, he said, in the next two or three months there cannot be a settlement of this matter, the only recourse of the Netherlands Government will, in his opinion, be completely to withdraw from the entire N.E.I. He said that he felt that this would result in a reign of terror there but that the Netherlands simply couldn’t hold out much longer. I allowed Dr. Van Mook to tell his story in his own way. I asked an occasional question as he went along for purposes of clarification. At one point during the conversation I asked Dr. Van Mook whether he felt that there was likely to be much guerrilla activity in Java. He replied that he felt that there was not for the reason that guerrilla activity takes place only in areas where the people are hostile to the occupying force and the Indonesians are not hostile to the Dutch. Other than asking questions occasionally for purposes of clarification I made no comment on Dr. Van Mook’s assertions. 15 The Under Secretary of State also received a call from Dr. Van Mook and Ambassador Van Kleffens. The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/9–2247: Telegram [Document 849] The Consul General at Batavia ( Foote ) to the Secretary of State 16 confidential us urgent Batavia , September 22, 1947—11 p.m. 372. Following for Security Council from Consular Commission, Batavia: “1. Although investigations cannot be regarded as complete until reports can be received from all military observers, commission has unanimously reached certain definite and inevitable conclusions after visits by members to 11 different Dutch and Indonesian controlled areas in Java and Sumatra since the commission began its work on September 1. In view of the urgency of the problem we think these should be transmitted to you without delay and very concisely for your advance information. 2. Advances by Netherlands troops between July 20 and August 4 were in the nature of spearheads and some fighting occurred. While the main bodies of Republican troops in most areas retreated, considerable numbers of Republican troops remained between the spearheads in some areas and guerillas remained in all areas. The Indonesian scorched earth policy and other disturbances, including looting and heavy loss of life especially of Chinese, were intensified between and behind the spearheads during and after the Dutch advance. On August 29 the NEI Government declared its intention to ‘complete restoration of law and order and the complete disarmament and winding up of all armed organizations’ opposing NEI authority within a demarcation line covering Dutch advanced positions. The Indonesians did not accept the Dutch demarcation line. The Dutch line entailed patrol and other activities which were regarded by the Indonesians as hostile movements. Patrol clashes and sniping result without diminution notwithstanding the cease fire order. 3. We find that the cease fire order is not fully effective, and that casualties and damage continue and that this state of affairs is due in the main to the situation described above. So long as this situation continues it will be impossible to secure anything like complete observance of the cease fire. 4. We have so far been unable to discover any practical interim measures which would secure a more effective observance of the cease fire or reduce casualties. 5. As the work of the Commission is not yet completed, it is requested that these advance conclusions may be regarded as confidential. 6. Consular mission hopes to complete written report on or about September 30.[”] Please pass to Security Council earliest possible moment. Foote 16 Repeated by the Department to New York; also repeated to The Hague in telegram 481, September 26, 5 p.m. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC Indonesia/9–2247: Telegram [Document 850] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia secret Washington , September 27, 1947—4 p.m. 258. Urtel 372 Sept 22. Personal and strictly confidential for Foote. Dept had expected you would furnish preliminary summary (Deptel 246 Sept 11 17 ) any proposed report for Dept’s confidential comment. In this connection, Dept considers functions Consular Committee technical fact-finding and informational with regard nature violations cease-fire order if any and not concerned with measures for rectification situation. Interim report’s clear implication cease-fire order will be impossible implement so long as opposing forces remain present positions seems constitute judgment outside competence committee. Conclusions on basis data submitted by committee matter for determination by SC. You should be guided by foregoing Dept interpretation in dealing with your colleagues but should not put forward these views to your colleagues as Dept instructions. In view submission interim report Sept 22 and probable non-arrival US Mil observers before Sept 29, Dept does not think there is compelling necessity fix Sept 30 deadline for submission “final” consular report. If your colleagues wish nevertheless submit further report this date, you should, of course, go along with them. It is obvious, however, such report could only be considered interim in view absence info to be furnished by mil observers and fact committee remains in existence until SC satisfied no further need for reports re compliance cease-fire order. Lovett 17 See footnote 13, p. 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 846 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 501.BC Indonesia/10–1047: Telegram [Document 851] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) confidential Washington , October 10, 1947—11 p.m. 466. Re Australian proposal 18 which would provide for a measured withdrawal Dutch and Indo forces from present positions. Dept agrees with purpose of proposal to reduce violations of cease fire. However, we regard proposal as entirely unfeasible in view guerrilla character of military action which has been discussed at length in SC and in view absence static military front. We believe you should abstain in vote on Australian proposal. 19 Lovett 18 For text of Australian proposal, discussed on October 11 in the Security Council, see SC, 2nd yr ., p. 2555. 19 In an urgent telegram, GAdel 28, received by New York on October 14, 12:12 p.m., the Acting Secretary informed Senator Austin that the Department had concluded he should not take an active part and should abstain from voting “in order not to impair usefulness of this Government as the jointly-selected member of the SC’s Committee of Good Offices”. (501 GAdel—Telegrams, 1947) The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/10–1147: Telegram [Document 852] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 20 confidential Batavia , October 11, 1947—10 p.m. 395. From Foote: From SC Consular Commission for the Security Council. The following is summary of main points of consular report which is completed and unanimously agreed upon and which will be forwarded earliest possible moment by air as chapter 4. Exact date of departure from Batavia will be telegraphed: 21 “Paragraph 1. Cease fire orders were duly given but there was no confidence by Dutch or Indonesians that the other side would carry them out, and no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about means of giving effect to the order. Paragraph 2. While the Republican Government ordered their troops to remain in their positions and to cease hostilities, the NEI Government considered it incumbent on them to proceed with the restoration of law and order within the limits of the lines laid down by them. Paragraph 3. The rapid Dutch advance bypassed considerable Republican forces, which remained in their positions in accordance with the Republican cease fire order, while they were subject to mopping up operations by troops under Dutch command in accordance with the Dutch interpretation of the order. The Republican Government directed their forces to defend themselves and to oppose movements within Dutch held territory. The different interpretations of the cease fire order by each side thus made it impossible for the order to be observed. Paragraph 4. Apart from actions involving regular forces, a considerable amount of banditry, including murder, arson and looting, is still being carried on to some extent by irregular bands. Paragraph 5. The population suffered considerably even before the police action from banditry and the scorched earth policy. This was intensified during and after the police action. The Chinese were a special target. Paragraph 6. Administration and cultivation are proceeding under emergency conditions in both Dutch and Republican held territory. In the former there is considerable fear of banditry in the meantime and Republican reprisals in the future. In the latter there are widespread shortages due to the cessation of normal export and import trade. In Republican areas the food situation in most districts is good at present but may deteriorate in a few months time. Paragraph 7. The influential class of Indonesians who number not more than live percent of the population are practically all nationalists and seek some form of independence, although not necessarily supporting the present Republic. There is little hatred of the Dutch whose assistance in running the country is recognized as essential.” [Foote] Livengood 20 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 515, October 14, 1 p.m., and to London in 4422. 21 Telegrams 398 and 399, October 14 and 15, from Batavia, reported that the Committee’s report, drawn up without military assistance, was ready to he sent by plane. Military reports, when prepared, would follow or be made available to the Good Offices Committee. The report stressed violence by irregular bands. Mr. Foote added: “… if Dutch forces withdraw from recently occupied areas, slaughter and other forms of retaliation will be so great as to stagger the world. Our government should stand firm and demand consideration of opinions of other parts of NEI other than middle Java which is hub of present Republic.” (501.BC Indonesia/10–1447, 10–1547) Telegram 399 was repeated by the Department to Sydney for Frank P. Graham in No. 366, October 16, and to The Hague in No. 521, October 17. The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/10–1547: Telegram [Document 853] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Acting Secretary of State confidential us urgent New York , October 15, 1947—12:07 a.m. 1017. For Lovett from Austin. I have the following comments with regard to your telegram GAdel 22 regarding the Indonesian case. The announcement in the Council that I would abstain from voting, on the ground that the US Govt does not wish to impair its position as the jointly selected member of the SC’s committee of good offices, would, in my opinion, be subject to the following serious disadvantages: 1. It would place the Belgian and Australian members of the Council in an embarrassing position. They would resent the implied charge that their representative on the committee would be partial to the party which chose them. This implication would contradict the position which Mr. Graham took with Van Zeeland 23 in the presence of Lie, Hodgson, Nisot 24 at the first meeting of the committee of three to the effect that they would all proceed on the clear understanding that they represented the SC and interests of the world and not those of either of the parties. The Australian and Belgian would probably find it necessary to make a statement in the Council in the defense of their position. If they should take the alternative course and themselves abstain on the same grounds, the SC would be unable to pass any resolution in the face of obvious non-compliance with the ceasefire order. 2. The USSR and Poland would probably accuse us openly of not having the courage to act on the facts found by our own representative and of seeking refuge in a technicality. They would attempt to create the impression that the US was so pro-Dutch that it was unwilling to admit that the Dutch were violating the SC order. 3. In my opinion, the US cannot divest itself of its responsibilities as a permanent member of the SC or as a member of the UN, bound by the Charter, by reason of becoming a member of a good offices committee. The US is obligated to uphold the Charter and the SC’s orders. If we do not do so, particularly under circumstances which lead others to the conclusion that we are trying to avoid hurting a friendly country at a critical time, other nations will be apt to take similar action when it suits them. I am concerned that an abstention by the US on so grave an issue as the enforcement of the SC’s orders might seriously prejudice our moral position and power of leadership in the UN. 4. In my view, our policy should be carefully reviewed in the interests of the US. The facts reported call for some action by the Council to effectuate its earlier decision. Where the issue involved is the question of obedience to the order of the SC, which affects all members of the UN, I doubt whether there is any valid excuse for an SC member’s non-participation in the decision. [ Austin ] 22 See footnote 19, p. 1053 [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] . 23 Belgian representative on the Committee on Good Offices (GOC). 24 Belgian alternate representative on the Security Council. The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/10–1547: Telegram [Document 854] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Secretary of State secret priority New York , October 15, 1947—5:13 p.m. 1027. For Rusk from Noyes. 25 The following is a draft statement in the Indonesian case based on our telephone conversations: 26 “Mr. President, I should like to review, briefly, the parliamentary situation as I see it. On August 1, the Council passed its first cease-fire order. On August 25, the Council organized the Consular Commission to report on the observance of the cease-fire order and the conditions prevailing under military occupation, or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties. By that same resolution the Council tendered its good offices to the parties through a committee of three members of the Council. On August 26, the Council called upon the parties concerned to adhere strictly to the Council’s cease-fire order of August 1. On the 22nd of September, the Council received the interim report of the Consular Commission of Batavia. On October 8, the Council’s Committee of Good Offices held its first informal meeting. In accordance with decisions taken at that meeting, the Committee left last night 27 by plane on its way to Australia and eventually to Indonesia. On October 13, the Council received a telegraphic summary of the conclusions of the first full report of the Consular Commission. The Council has held several meetings in the last few weeks on the Indonesian question and now has before it proposals of several delegations. We have, first, the Russian resolution; second, the Australian resolution, and, third, the United Kingdom resolution as revised by the suggestion of the delegate from Belgium. The Council has discussed these resolutions at some length and certain delegations have presented informally to the Council proposals for modification of these resolutions. I have already given our views regarding the resolution put forward by the Soviet Union. My delegation continues to believe that it would not be wise for the Council to approve this resolution. We cannot help but feel that that is the wrong approach to the problem which the Council faces. The real problem which the SC has before it seems to us to be the long-range settlement of the dispute between the parties concerned. In this respect we agree with the excellent statement made by my Chinese colleague at our last meeting. 28 Both of the parties concerned continue, as I understand it, to subscribe to the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement. That is a fact of vital importance which we should never lose sight of. We have embarked on a course which has as its main objective agreement between the parties on all issues involved in the present situation. Our main hopes, therefore, should be placed on the success of the efforts of our Committee of Good Offices in promoting a settlement of the basic issues involved in the dispute. It is quite clear that our cease-fire order was an essential prerequisite to the attainment of resumption of negotiations between the parties. Likewise, the work of the Consular Commission in observing and reporting on the effectiveness of our cease-fire order is subsidiary and accessory to the main purpose which we have before us. I do not wish to minimize the importance of the cessation of hostilities towards the solution of the long-term problem; I merely wish to present it in its proper perspective. If we approach the problem which is being considered by the Council under the various resolutions before it in this way, it seems to me we may reach a wise solution and one which will lead us toward, rather than away from, a successful disposition of the whole matter. We are in full agreement with those who wish to find a practicable method of bringing to an end the continuing hostilities. We are prepared to support measures which will accomplish this result. It appears to us that the first paragraph of the telegram of October 11 from the Consular Commission provides the best basis for action by the Council at this time. That paragraph reads: ‘Cease-fire orders were duly given but there was no confidence by Dutch or Indonesians that the other side would carry them out, and no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about means of giving effect to the order.’ I call the Council’s attention to the fact that the parties have apparently made no effort to reach an agreement regarding the cessation of hostilities. It seems obvious that the effectiveness of our good offices committee will be substantially prejudiced by the failure of the parties to reach an agreement regarding the cessation of hostilities. It seems to us that an effective truce is a prerequisite for fruitful negotiations. This problem, therefore, naturally becomes the first matter for consideration by the Good Offices Committee. We have no doubt that they can find the way to bring this about without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned in regard to the merits of the dispute. It is our opinion that we can most effectively further the solution of the problem by calling upon the parties to agree upon arrangements for the cessation of hostilities with the aid of the Good Offices Committee. If we are to follow this course, it would appear to be the part of wisdom for the Council to avoid any attempt, on the basis of the limited material before it, to determine whether either or both of the parties in any way bear any responsibility or blame for the present situation. We are hardly in a position to judge whether any technical violations have taken place, or whether any such technical violations are justified under the circumstances—even if it were profitable to make such a determination. Since our Committee of Good Offices will be considering this matter on the spot and in detail very shortly, it would, I submit, be desirable to leave the entire matter in their hands for the present. It may, however, be advantageous for the Council to make certain that all concerned have a clear understanding of the general principle underlying the Council’s cease-fire order. In the view of my Government, the Council’s cease-fire order cannot be interpreted to permit the use of the forces of either party to alter substantially the area under its control on the date of the original cease-fire order. As pointed out by several members of the Council, there will of course be special cases where action by one or the other party is justified by reason of special circumstances. We have discussed the various methods which are available to put an end to these hostilities, and various points of view have been expressed. My own view is that we should not attempt to decide, even in principle, on the basis of the evidence before us here in this Council which of the various methods would be best suited to this case. We should, I believe, have confidence at this state [ stage ] in the desire of the parties to reach an agreement on all matters, and the ability of our good offices committee to aid them in this endeavor. I agree in this respect with my Chinese colleague. It would be my thought that after clarifying our own order, the Committee of Good Offices should be left free in the first instance to try to work out a satisfactory solution. It may of course be necessary, if this effort is unsuccessful, and if the situation requires it, for the Council to take some further action.” [Noyes] Austin 25 Charles P. Noyes, Adviser on Security Council and General Affairs, U. S. Mission to the United Nations. 26 This statement in substantially the form here was made to the Security Council on October 22 by Ambassador Austin (SC, 2nd yr ., pp. 2601–2604). Additionally in his statement he submitted a draft resolution ( ibid ., p. 2604) which is printed in telegram 1060, October 21, p. 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] . 27 October 15. 28 October 14. Memorandum of Conversations by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Lacy) 501.BC Indonesia/10–1647 [Document 855] Memorandum of Conversations by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs ( Lacy ) confidential [ Washington ,] October 16, 1947. Mr. Reuchlin called at his request at 5:30 p.m. He handed me the attached paper which he said had been telephoned to him by Mr. van Kleffens in New York; Mr. van Kleffens had received it from the Secretary General, UN. Mr. Reuchlin asked me if I thought that the adoption of a position by the Indonesians, as set forth in the attached paper, would change the US position in respect of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the Dutch and Indonesians from their present positions. Mr. Reuchlin said that he understood that the US would support the United Kingdom resolution as amended by the Belgians. I told Mr. Reuchlin that I did not believe that the adoption of such a position by the Indonesians would require a change in the US position, as set forth by Senator Austin in discussions of the Security Council; that the United States would, in my opinion, continue to oppose the principles embodied in the resolutions offered by the USSR and Australia; that I did not know whether the United States would support the United Kingdom resolution or not. Mr. Reuchlin expressed the hope that the United States would not agree to any action on the part of the Security Council which would prejudice the final recommendation of the Security Council’s Good Offices Committee. I said the Department was particularly concerned to avoid taking any such position. I reminded Mr. Reuchlin that the views expressed were my own as I had not had the opportunity to consult other interested officers in the Department. [Annex] Document Left at the Department of State by the Netherlands Minister ( Reuchlin ) on October 16, 5:30 p.m. To: Secretary General, United Nations I am instructed by the Republican Government to communicate the following message to the Security Council: “The Republican Government urges the withdrawal of Dutch troops in Republican territory to their positions ante bellum . The Republican Government guarantees safety, peace and order in all areas evacuated by Dutch troops. The Republic of Indonesia herewith accepts supervision as well as cooperation from the Security Council or any other international body set up for that purpose. Thanking you, I remain Sir.” Signed Tambo The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/10–2147: Telegram [Document 856] The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State priority New York , October 21, 1947—12:40 p.m. 1060. Following is US resolution on Indonesian question circulated at SC meeting on October 20: 29 “The Security Council, “Having received and taken note of the summary report of the Consular Commission dated October 11, 1947 indicating that the Council’s resolution of August 1, 1947, relating to the cessation of hostilities has not been fully effective; “Having taken particular note of paragraph 1 of that summary pointing out that no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about the means of giving effect to that resolution; “Calls upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease-fire resolution and pending agreement to cease any activities which directly or indirectly contravene that resolution; “Requests the Committee of Good Offices to assist the party [ parties ] in reaching agreement on an arrangement which will insure the observance of the cease-fire resolution; “Requests the Consular Commission, together with its military assistants, to make its services available to the Committee of Good Offices.” Marshall 29 Submitted by Ambassador Austin to the Security Council on October 22 (SC, 2nd yr ., p. 2604). The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State 501.BC–Indonesia/10–2547: Telegram [Document 857] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Acting Secretary of State secret urgent New York , October 25, 1947—12:10 p.m. 1087. 1. I have carefully considered the draft position telephoned to us yesterday on the Indonesian case. I am in general agreement insofar as it relates to substance but have serious doubts regarding the proposed tactics. 2. If we are to admit, as I agree that we ought, that the report makes clear that the establishment of the Van Mook line was one cause of violation of our cease-fire resolution, and the report certainly indicates it was a major cause, it seems to me it would be far preferable from the tactical point of view for us to take the initiative and to propose mild changes in our own resolution to clarify the meaning of our original cease-fire resolution. We cannot well argue against a clarification of the Council’s original resolution when the report so clearly indicates that differing interpretations of it are responsible for most of the continuing hostilities. I feel that by taking the initiative and putting forward a mild proposal we would obtain considerable credit for taking an honest and courageous stand and at the same time would substantially reduce the pressure to take a stronger stand. We might well avoid, in so doing, being forced to accept a much stronger resolution which might not facilitate the Good Offices Committee’s work. 3. Furthermore, I have already stated in my speech at the last meeting “it may be advantageous for the Council to make certain that all concerned have a clear understanding of the general principle underlying the Council’s cease-fire order. In the view of my Government, the Council’s cease-fire order cannot be interpreted to permit the use of the armed forces of either party by military action to alter substantially the area under its control”. In view of the nature of the report, it would be extremely difficult for me to refuse to place in our resolution the substance of the last sentence quoted above. Since this is the case, I see advantages in taking the initiative to do so and thereby earning some credit. 4. As regards the third paragraph of the Department’s memorandum, I also feel, particularly in view of the discussions we have had here with the British, Chinese, Brazilians and Dutch, that it would be useful for us to propose a revision of our own resolution which would be less rigid and more practicable. 5. I am sending under separate telegram for your consideration a revised draft US resolution, together with a draft statement which I might use either at the meeting on Monday or the following meeting. [ Austin ] The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State 501.BC–Indonesia/10–2547: Telegram [Document 858] The United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) to the Acting Secretary of State 30 secret us urgent New York , October 25, 1947—12:05 p.m. 1088. The following is the draft statement and resolution referred to my previous telegram on Indonesia: The Council has now had an opportunity to examine the report of the Consular Commission and should be prepared to take a decision on this question at an early date. It is clear that we face a difficult and complex problem in our efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a settlement of the broad issues. I am more than ever impressed with the doubtful wisdom of attempting to resolve these complicated issues by decision here in this Council. I therefore stand on the statement I made to the Council at its last meeting and upon the basic principles of the resolution which I put forward at that time. I think our best hope of success in attaining our ultimate objective in this case is to place the matter in the hands of our Good Offices Committee. In our opinion, the report in general confirms and supports the summary conclusions which the Consular Commission sent to us in its telegram of October 11 and which appears as Chapter IV of the report. It fills in a good many of the details for us and provides essential information on which it is possible for us to take action. It is apparent that while major military action has ceased in accordance with our cease-fire resolution, hostilities are continuing with substantial loss of life on both sides. Our cease-first [ fire ] resolution is really not yet fully effective. The report of the Consuls indicates that the major source of difficulty in bringing about a cessation of hostilities has been the difference of opinion between the parties as to the proper interpretation of the Council’s resolution. It seems to us that it is up to the Security Council to remove this serious difficulty and misunderstanding. If this is done, it seems quite likely that the parties themselves with the aid of the Good Offices Committee will be able to work out an effective truce. As I said the other day, my Government’s view is that our resolution of August 1 should be interpreted as not permitting the use of the armed forces of either party by military action to alter substantially the territory under its control, or in other words which it actually occupied, on the effective date of the cessation of hostilities which, as I understand it, is August 4. We believe that the forces of either party are entitled to remain undisturbed in the positions which they held on August 4. It is my view that it would be advisable for the Council to clarify its resolution of August 1 along the above lines. In fact it seems to me that it would be extremely difficult for our Committee of Good Offices to be of any assistance to the parties in reaching agreement on the cessation of hostilities unless the Council has in advance advised the parties and the Committee as to the proper interpretation of that resolution. Even with this clarification it seems clear that the parties and the Committee of Good Offices will face a very confused and difficult situation during the period before an agreement has been reached for an effective truce. The Consuls’ report indicates that the Indonesians claimed that between August 5 and September 26 the Dutch had violated the cease-fire resolution in 811 specific instances. On the other hand, according to the Dutch, the Indonesians had violated the ceasefire resolution in 1,792 specific instances during the same period. Also, the Consuls’ report is replete with instances where one or the other party considered itself justified in particular cases in taking military action which amounted to a technical violation of the cease-fire resolution. In addition, certain specific cases have been mentioned in the Council where it seems clear that technical violations for one or another reason might be justified. As has been pointed out, with the best of good will it has been and will undoubtedly continue to be impossible for each party to know in a particular situation whether in taking certain action it is technically violating the Council’s resolution of August 1, or whether the existing circumstances justify such action. I think, here again, we must rely upon our representatives on the spot to help the parties and the Council reach a solution of these problems. Our Committee of Good Offices has already arrived in Indonesia, as I understand it. It would seem to my delegation that perhaps the best way to handle this particular problem would be to ask the parties, where they consider an action which technically violates the Council’s resolution of August 1 is justifiable in a particular set of circumstances, to report such technical violations to the Committee of Good Offices and together with the reasons therefor. If these cases give rise to difficulties with the other party, they can then be examined by the Committee or the Consular Commission. Revised draft United States resolution: 31 “The Security Council Having received and taken note of the report of the Consular Commission dated October 14, 1947, indicating that the Council’s resolution of August 1, 1947, relating to the cessation of hostilities has not been fully effective; Having taken note that according to the report no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about the means of giving effect to that resolution; Calls upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the ceasefire resolution, and pending agreement to cease any activities which contravene that resolution, unless special justification exists in particular cases. The parties are requested to report such particular cases where they have considered it justifiable to take action inconsistent with the Council’s resolution of August 1, together with the justification therefor, to the Consular Commission; Requests the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties in reaching agreement on an arrangement which will ensure the observance of the cease-fire resolution; Requests the Consular Commission, together with its military assistants, to make its services available to the Committee of Good Offices; Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices, and the Consular Commission that its resolution of August 1 should be interpreted as not permitting the use of the armed forces of either party by military action to alter substantially the territory under its control on August 4, 1947.” [ Austin ] 30 The general approach outlined in telegrams 1087 and 1088 was approved by the Department by telephone on October 27, but Senator Austin’s remarks that day caused the Department to make a remonstrance orally concerning one aspect of the statement. (501.BC Indonesia/10–2747, 10–2947) For Ambassador Austin’s statement as actually made to the Security Council on October 27, see SC, 2nd yr ., p. 2640. 31 For text of revised draft submitted on October 27, see SC, 2nd yr ., p. 2644, footnote 1. The portion of the third paragraph beginning “unless special justification” was omitted in the draft submitted by Ambassador Austin. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/10–2947: Telegram [Document 859] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 32 Batavia , October 29, 1947—11 a.m. 416. From Graham 12. Following are highlights special report of US Navy and Army Advisory Group to Consulate General not submitted Consular Commission (text airmailed Army and Navy): 1. Although influential men both sides sincerely wish agreement, divergence views Dutch and Indo leaders such that no agreement possible without pressure third party. 2. All racial groups in areas surveyed have strong ethnological feelings but will remain united pending Dutch-Republic settlement, after which may be expected seek degree local autonomy under Republic. Republic not unduly concerned by Dutch efforts set up separate areas this time. 3. Determination Republican leaders and intelligentsia not diminished by Dutch military superiority. Masses primarily desire peace and security. 4. Republic political structure appears sound with no rift evident between political and military leaders, although popularity latter may be threat in future. 5. Capabilities Republic limited by shortage technicians and inexperience international relations. Leaders admit need Dutch assistance preferably under third power supervision. 6. Commerce Republic areas at standstill owing war effort and blockade. In Dutch areas, some industrial rehabilitation middle and west Java, little in east Java and Madura. Some resumption production foreign enterprises Sumatra. Textiles and medicines principal shortage both sides. Both badly need all types machines and tools. Food plentiful both sides but distribution difficult Republic areas. Sabotage continues detrimental economy Dutch territories. Health populace better than would be expected owing great efforts both sides make showing for political reasons. 7. Good cohesion in Republic military forces Java, but poor communications result continued operation irregulars Sumatra. Weakness armaments compensated by ability Indos wage continuous economic guerilla warfare. 8. Dutch army can move anywhere without serious difficulty, but given continuing determination Indos, it inadequate to secure areas it might take. Above is consensus nine officers who have travelled widely past month Java and Sumatra. In conversation, ranking two officers expressed view Dutch already over-extended and aware of it. However, Dutch believe they have capability taking Djocja, silencing Indo radio propaganda, then gradually mopping up resistance in plantation areas. Regarding cease-fire, officers feel impossible make effective with Dutch in advance positions and that only solution is pull Dutch back to July 20 positions with possibly internationally-supervised joint police maintain order and prevent Republic reprisals which would otherwise follow against Indo collaborationist officials in areas evacuated. However, they feel only threat sanctions would persuade Dutch agree withdraw. [Graham.] Livengood 32 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 535, October 30, 7 p.m. The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) 501.BC Indonesia/10–2947: Telegram [Document 860] The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations ( Austin ) 33 secret us urgent Washington , October 30, 1947—7 p.m. 529. Reurtel 1114 Oct 29 Dept considers language of Belgian amendment as quoted second paragraph your telegram 34 maintains essential neutral US position. Accordingly we recommend you support this amendment. 35 Counselor of Netherlands Embassy Helb in consultation with Dept officers this afternoon said he was in complete agreement with us that the purpose of the US resolution either in its original language or with the proposed Belgian amendment was to place the entire situation in the hands of the Good Offices Committee. (For your info we understand that proposed Belgian amendment as an interpretation of the cease-fire resolution refers both to past and future alteration of the territory occupied by either side on Aug 4.) Dutch Counselor agrees with us that in effect SC is merely saying at this time what it meant by the resolution of Aug 1. According to Helb it is probable that the Belgians will not directly introduce this amendment. We feel that it would be preferable for another delegation, possibly the Chinese or British, to suggest the change, since Belgium is a member of the Good Offices Committee. You should, when the new language is proposed, give it full support. Lovett 33 Repeated to Batavia in telegram 292, October 31, 2 p.m. (9 for Graham). 34 Text of Belgian substitute for last paragraph of American resolution is as follows: “Advise the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission that its resolution of August 1, 1947 should be interpreted as meaning that any substantial alteration of the territory occupied on August 4, 1947 by the parties would be inconsistent therewith.” (501.BC–Indonesia/10–2947) 35 After extensive discussion on October 31 the Security Council set up a new sub-committee to examine the U. S. draft resolution and amendments (SC, 2nd yr ., pp. 1700 ff.). On November 1 the Council received a draft from the sub-committee which, after considerable debate, was adopted. For text of this resolution, see telegram 296, November 3, to Batavia, p. 1068 [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] ; it is also printed in SC, 2nd yr ., p. 2723. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/10–3147: Telegram [Document 861] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 36 confidential Batavia , October 31, 1947—4 p.m. 423. From Graham 13. Committee flew Djocjakarta October 29 and after reception by Soekarno held formal sessions with Indonesian Cabinet and delegation. Latter under Sjarifuddin as Chairman, Ali Sastroamidjojo (Minister Education) Vice Chairman. Tjoasekin (Surabaya Chinese doctor) and Nasrun (Deputy Governor Sumatra) are members with Sjahrir and Salim also listed. Setyadjid (Vice Pri-Min) and Djunda (Minister Communications) are Deputies. Committee made plain to Indonesians its exact status. Believe Indonesians first time clearly understood limitations good offices. Initial reaction palpably disappointment that powers Committee not arbitral. However in replies to Indonesian questions Committee also made clear how far it could go in proposing methods and terms settlement provided requested by both parties. We of opinion Indonesians reasonably content at end. Following also brought up: (1) Committee inquired Indonesians choice site negotiations. Indonesians stipulated not in Republic or Dutch-controlled area. Named in order Singapore, Johore, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Bangkok, Manila. Committee stated it would consider these suggestions together with these which Netherlands might suggest. Indonesians observed they would count on Good Offices Committee arranging safe conduct their delegation. At end meeting Indonesians asked if Committee had any suggestion regarding site. In personal conversation with me Soekarno suggested it [be] naval vessel, provided it US. (2) Indonesians asked if Republic and Netherlands were only parties to dispute, obviously with non-Republic states in mind. In reply Committee read relevant portions SC resolution, which satisfied them. (3) Indonesians expressed view Committee should endeavor bring about observance cease-fire order in order that requisite atmosphere goodwill be created. Committee replied matter was under consideration SC and Committee would be governed by its direction. Any case, however, Committee would be ready use its good offices bring about atmosphere goodwill. (4) Indonesians stated that they believed necessary establish common basis or point departure before discussions could profitably begin and asked if Committee did not think it should suggest a basis to Netherlands. In reply Committee expressed its hope it would be asked by both parties later to make suggestions on methods and terms of settlement and stated it meanwhile hoped settlement preliminary matters would not be delayed. (5) Indonesians asked Committee use good offices with Netherlands permit Republic communicate its representatives abroad including at SC and stated they must rely Committee provide means transportation between site discussions and Djocjakarta. US Delegation content progress and conduct these meetings. Much due able chairmanship Van Zeeland. Earlier, Kirby 37 approached Scott privately and stated Australian Delegation uncertain regarding procedures enjoined upon Committee by SC. At Kirby’s request US views were set forth along lines Department’s telegram 388 to New York September 6. Kirby replied these views “show first opening I have seen in clouds”. In painstaking exposition of precise nature Committee’s scope at meeting with Indonesians Kirby spoke with great skill and complete fidelity US SC resolution. Between sessions several thousand Indonesians paraded into Palace grounds bearing placards calling for UN action and end colonialism. Manifestation widely vociferous but good natured. Soekarno addressed crowd in good spirit and then dismissed it, which effected quietly. Following state dinner of over 100 guests, Committee returned Batavia next morning to hold first formal meeting with Netherlands representatives. Following this meeting will return Djocjakarta endeavor obtain agreement on site of discussion. [Graham.] Livengood 36 Repeated to The Hague in telegram 541, November 4, 3 p.m. 37 Richard C. Kirby, Australian representative on the Good Offices Committee. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/11–147: Telegram [Document 862] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 38 confidential Batavia , November 1, 1947—11 a.m. 424. From Graham No. 14. Yesterday Committee held first formal meeting with Netherlands delegation. After introductions and exchange expressions good will and confidence, Committee asked if its scope and functions were thoroughly understood by Netherlands delegation as result their reading summary of Djocja proceedings which had been given them previous day at informal meeting with Van Zeeland, Kirby and me. Netherlands delegation replied affirmative. Question site discussions then taken up. Netherlands delegation stated they did not wish discussions held outside Indonesia. Named in order Batavia, somewhere east Indon, alternation Batavia and Djocja. Committee pointed out Indonesians had excluded Indonesia and Netherlands had apparently excluded rest of world. Vredenburch indicated, however, areas outside Indonesia not necessarily entirely excluded by Netherlands delegation. Subject closed with Netherlands delegation request Committee suggest site. Netherlands Delegation then stated would submit next day in writing their proposals for starting point of discussions. Meeting then adjourned. Since some Indonesian members Netherlands Delegation had been introduced as coming from their respective states, Committee took occasion during meeting inquire if “it understood they here in capacity representatives Netherlands Government”. Reply affirmative. Interesting that of 22 Netherlands delegates, advisers, etc., only 6 were European. [Graham.] Livengood 38 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 541, November 4, 3 p.m. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 856E.00/10–3047: Telegram [Document 863] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia secret Washington , November 3, 1947—7 p.m. 295. Following is 4647 Oct 30 from Paris: [Here follows text of telegram, not printed.] Request you approach Sjahrir asking him if he has been misquoted by Humanité . Your discretion point out US has not supplied arms to Dutch nor permitted US ships to carry arms to Dutch during entire course Dutch-Indonesian hostilities; that charge US responsibility for outbreak of hostilities is gross falsehood; that far from having given consent to Dutch to undertake present military action US Govt made every effort to impress upon both Dutch and Indonesians necessity peaceful solution of dispute 39 (Dept Wireless Bulletin No. 172, July 22) and achievement voluntary association for mutual benefit. Point out to Sjahrir extremely serious results of remarks such as those accredited to him by Humanité reminding him of inability US Govt to look with favor on any Communist-dominated Govt. 40 Marshall 39 See press release of July 21, Department of State Bulletin , August 3, 1947, p. 230. 40 This paragraph was repeated to The Hague in telegram 540, November 3, 7 p.m. The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC–Indonesia/11–347: Telegram [Document 864] The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 41 Washington , November 3, 1947. 296. No. 11 for Graham. Following resolution adopted by SC 1 Nov.: “The Security Council, “Having received and taken note of report of Consular Commission dated 14 Oct. 1947, indicating that Council’s resolution 1 Aug. 1947, relating to cessation of hostilities has not been fully effective; “Having taken note that according to report no attempt was made by either side to come to agreement with other about means of giving effect to resolution; “Calls upon parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other, either directly or through Committee of Good Offices as to means to be employed in order to give effect to cease-fire resolution, and, pending agreement, to cease any activities or incitement to activities which contravene that resolution, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property; “Requests Committee of Good Offices to assist parties in reaching agreement on arrangement which will insure observance of cease-fire resolution; “Requests Consular Commission, together with its military assistants, to make its services available to Committee of Good Offices; “Advises parties concerned, Committee of Good Offices, and Consular Commission that its resolution 1 Aug. should be interpreted as meaning that use of armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on 4 Aug. 1947, is inconsistent with Council resolution 1 Aug. 1947; “Should it appear that some withdrawals of armed forces be necessary, invites parties to conclude between them as soon as possible agreements referred to in its resolution 25 Aug. 1947.” Marshall 41 Repeated to The Hague as No. 539. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/11–747: Telegram [Document 865] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State Batavia , November 7, 1947. 437. From Graham 20. “The Representative of Australia and the Representative of Belgium on the Security Council Committee of Good Offices have in their capacity as members of the Committee asked me, as a representative of the United States, to request the Government of the United States to make available to the Committee a public ship of the United States as a meeting place between the Committee and both parties at which the substantive aspects of their dispute are to be discussed. Before the Australian and Belgian representatives formally made this request, the Committee exhaustively explored with both parties every feasible land site in or near Indonesia. None of these sites was mutually agreeable to the parties. In arriving at its decision to request the Government of the United States to make available to it a public ship, the Committee took into account the fact that the Security Council resolution of the first of November 1947, makes it incumbent upon the Committee to remain in close contact with the Consular Commission located at Batavia and with the Commission’s military aides. After it had become unmistakably clear that no suitable land site was mutually agreeable to the parties, both parties requested the Committee to offer its own suggestion as regards a common meeting place for the holding of the substantive discussions. At this point, the Committee normally [ formally? ] suggested as a last resort, that the substantive discussions commence on board a public ship of the United States if such were available. At the same time, the Committee informed both parties that if this suggestion were acceptable, the Committee was prepared to request the Government of the United States to make available to the Committee at any early date such a ship in Java waters. The parties have now formally indicated that they will accept a ship procured through the auspices of the Committee as a meeting place for the substantive discussions. The Belgian and Australian representatives in their capacity as members of the Committee have now formally asked me, as United States Representative, to ascertain whether the Government of the United States will provide a suitable ship to the Committee. I have acceded to this request and herewith transmit it, adding my own that the Department give it most favorable consideration. Finally, it is the intention of the Committee, if the Government of the United States replies affirmatively to this request, to address a communication to the President of the Security Council setting forth its decision as to a meeting place. Signed Frank P. Graham.” 42 [ Livengood ] 42 Telegram 328, November 21, 5 p.m., to Batavia (No. 23 for Dr. Graham), reported that the Navy had arranged for a ship to be there on or about December 2, to be used as a meeting place (501.BC–Indonesia/11–2147). The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/11–1347: Telegram [Document 866] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 43 secret us urgent Batavia , November 13, 1947—3 p.m. 453. From Graham 25. 1. Both parties and Good Offices Committee have each appointed special representatives to meet for discussion regarding implementation SC November 1 resolution. GOC hopes first joint meeting will be held Batavia November 14. 44 2. GOC has held extensive informal meetings in effort reach agreement within itself regarding implementation November 1 resolution. GOC has agreed that: ( a ) If parties reach agreement between themselves regarding implementation November 1 resolution, any such agreement would be within meaning and intent of resolution. ( b ) If parties are unable reach agreement, GOC considers it necessary make its own suggestions regarding implementation November 1 resolution. At this time, there is no agreement within GOC regarding suggestions it should make if parties fail reach agreement themselves. 3. BelDel insists penultimate paragraph November 1 resolution does not call for any withdrawal Dutch forces; that any withdrawal would be “impractical”; that Dutch will in any case refuse to withdraw; that foregoing reasons, BelDel will not support any suggestions by GOC contemplating any withdrawal Dutch forces. BelDel’s position squares present Dutch position, reported conversation Van Vredenburch-Scott in immediately following telegram. 45 On several occasions Van Zeeland has said French will veto any attempt by SC to force Dutch to withdraw. USDel regards this as speculation not calling for comment. 4. AusDel insists, in absence agreement to contrary between parties, that penultimate paragraph November 1 resolution contemplates withdrawal Dutch forces to points occupied by them August 4. 5. USDel has not yet taken firm position within GOC as to whether penultimate paragraph November 1 resolution does or does not contemplate withdrawals. On basis long consultations with US military observers, USDel has formulated interpretation set forth following paragraph. 6. ( a ) “Hostile action” means any movement armed forces in direction of opposing forces; ( b ) “Occupied” means physical occupation; ( c ) “Control of territory” means denial to opposing forces of use of such territory by any means whatever, it being understood that terrain features, roads, transport, weapons available, enter into precise delineation of territory under control in a given area. Alternative definition territory under control is territory in which orders from headquarters may be executed without difficulty. ( d ) Although control over territory may be secured through civil administration as well as through military operations, boundaries of civil administrative units have no bearing on definition of military control if there are opposing forces within such boundaries. ( e ) Entire clause, “to extend its control over territory not occupied by it on 4 August 1947” includes lateral movements between spearheads as well as forward movements. Thus, under penultimate paragraph November 1 resolution, such lateral and forward movements must be considered as being inconsistent with August 1 resolution. ( f ) There is nothing in final paragraph November 1 resolution inconsistent with foregoing interpretation penultimate paragraph November 1 resolution. 7. Prior taking position within GOC, USDel wishes hear from Department that above interpretation is entirely congruous with Department’s and that it does not conflict with any agreements of understandings Department may have reached during course discussions leading to passage November 1 resolution by SC. 8. If Van Vredenburch returns Hague for consultations as presently contemplated by him, Department may wish consider feasibility making its views known appropriate time to Dutch through American Embassy Hague. [Graham.] Livengood 43 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in No. 553, November 14, 6 p.m. Telegram 455, November 13, 6 p.m., from Batavia, not printed, was also repeated in this telegram. 44 At this meeting the Dutch and Indonesians met for the first time in regard to the cease-fire question (501.BC Indonesia/11–1547). 45 Telegram 455, November 13, 6 p.m. (No. 26 from Graham), not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 856E.00/11–1747: Telegram [Document 867] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 46 confidential Batavia , November 17, 1947—9 a.m. 461. From Ogburn. 47 Twelve days Djocja and talks political and military leaders make clear Indos bent upon immediate unqualified independence with Dutch reduced status “most favored nation”. Appear unable comprehend why they should be expected accept any form or shadow of control by Dutch who regarded since police action as supreme national enemy. Whereas police action evidently extinguished remnants trust in Dutch, respect for Dutch apparently completely destroyed during Jap invasion. Alleged failure Dutch offer any real resistance and servility Dutch internees to Japs stressed in every conversation. Believe Dutch lost prestige this period most powerful single factor their subsequent difficulties. In addition contempt for Dutch, Indos seem completely convinced Dutch prewar psychology and intentions unaltered. Although in bearing, Indos Djocja seem almost different race from those Batavia, must be stated Djocja scarcely suggests bastion embattled nationalism. Singular placidity city and surrounding country may evince capacity Republic maintain order but seems more directly related passivity mass Javanese and from contacts Pemoeda, which claims 2½ million members, believe passivity not characteristic Javanese youth, however. Obvious new generation now of age who not habituated Dutch rule and whose idea foreign domination learned under exceedingly oppressive Jap occupation. Consider this embittered and determined element formidable factors situation. Indo leaders themselves admit only fraction whole population politically minded but contend Dutch cannot govern without intermediary this minority and are convinced that hostility to Dutch so widespread that even Dutch controlling all cities, country can be denied by underground forces. (Four members present Cabinet fought in Dutch underground against Germans.) Colonel Tjokrone Goro, Deputy Chief Staff, and Colonel Simatu Pang, Assistant Chief of Staff, discussed military situation frankly. While stating Republic could raise volunteer army any size, equipment being only limiting factor, they admitted serious weaknesses army not only in equipment but poor training officers, and stated Indo roadblocks (with which approaches Djocja fully covered) could not stall Dutch columns anywhere owing lack weapons to defend them. Viewed Indo military position weaker than Vietnam’s owing latter’s access Chinese supplies. However, they claimed real pacification Indonesia impossible, that fragmentation army would not seriously impair its ability make situation eventually intolerable for Dutch. Tjokrone Goro, who was trained Japan and returned Java as platoon leader Jap invasion force, gives impression disabused realist and carries considerable conviction. Believe adequacy food, simplicity of economy, continuing (if diminishing) serviceability essential physical plant, and effect Dutch in giving all Indo political elements single simple aim and providing scapegoat have so far saved Indo leaders from critical test their statesmanship. They frankly confess unreadiness assume full burden running country but apparently envisage Dutch assistance only technical, non-governmental fields. On such basis, difficult estimate Republic’s chance success. Although government based party system, it clear parties lack real definition. Haziness of the principles and programs affect even Communist Party. Discussions lead conclusion Government purely one of leaders with personal followings and that understanding of function parties in representative government scarcely exists. Enormous size present Cabinet (33 members last week, 37 now) indicates all boys must be taken care of. Fact not only limits Government’s ability act with expedition and decision but suggests unreadiness deal with internal rivalries which might shatter coalition in absence external foe, particularly since prerogatives public office will be main plums independent Indonesia. Despite ingenious plans for elections based universal suffrage and far-reaching activities Minister Information, clear public opinion in no state provide check political forces for years. Present Cabinet, which mostly professionals (about one-third educated Holland), probably from [ form? ] best material available. Program apparently simple one raising standard Indo life and education in mildly socialist system with recognition necessity encourage foreign investment. West evidently regarded as source guidance (no interest shown even in SEA union). While some leaders stress Moslemism as source politicial principles, seems have little practical meaning. Believe important keep such men in office. Present obsession is for recognition Indo national equality. If satisfied in form, possible Indos will prove pliant substantive matters. If not, end impossible foresee. In sum, best Dutch policy would seem be to roll with punch much more than heretofore in expectation being on hand when Republic faced with inevitable difficulties and through control main commercial activities, on which revenues state will largely depend, to exert stabilizing force. Risks such course great but may grow greater with delay. Despite uncanny parallels Indonesia and Indo-China, believe situation here simpler and less dangerous in (1) lack dangerous Communist influence, (2) absence third party with foreign backing analogous national union, (3) comparative lack fanatacism Indo character, and (4) failure passions so far lead systematic brutalities. [Ogburn.] Livengood 46 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 558, November 18, 6 p.m. 47 Charlton Ogburn, Jr., of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, was assigned to Dr. Graham’s mission in October. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC Indonesia/11–1847: Telegram [Document 868] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia secret us urgent Washington , November 18, 1947—noon. 316. No. 19 for Graham. Reurtel 25 48 Dept’s views re question withdrawal forces follow: 1. Penultimate para resolution Nov 1 does not require any withdrawals. 2. Last para resolution Nov 1 contemplates parties may agree to withdrawals as part workable arrangement to implement cease fire. 3. GOC may work out with parties such an arrangement. Dept in general agreement with other views urtel 25 except we consider proper meaning “occupied” (urtel para 6 b ) is “control” and prefer alternative definition “control” contained urtel para 6( c ). For your info last para resolution Nov 1 proposed in subcom by Belgian representative SC with concurrence Netherlands Representative. Lovett 48 See telegram 453, November 13, p. 1070 [ Pg. 1070 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] . The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC–Indonesia/12–147: Telegram [Document 869] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 49 confidential Batavia , December 1, 1947—2 p.m. 495. From Graham No. 43. Indonesians November 29 urgently requested GOC investigate reported advance Dutch troops November 9–11 across Van Mook Line in Madura from Pangkatan and Pamekasan to Soemenep. Indonesians claim their forces resisted Dutch advance and that Dutch using food as military weapon in occupation East Madura. First information Dutch action came November 22 in Dutch communiqué stating distribution food and textiles across demarcation line Madura made possible by absence Republican forces. AusDel reaction this time was to pass over incident, apparently considering it unfavorable for investigation from Indonesian point of view, particularly in view evidence Madurese welcome Dutch. USDel position (subsequently supported by AusDel and finally adopted as policy by GOC) was not investigate any alleged violations cease-fire except on complaint one of the parties. Dutch, evidently eager give publicity Madurese situation, arranged tour of islands by foreign correspondents November 25 and unsuccessfully pressed GOC visit Islands for purpose witnessing bull races. 50 Reuters, AP and UP correspondent (who are all generally highly critical Dutch) brought back reports from Madura indicating significant Dutch “violations” of resolution. AusDel then reversed position. Kirby confided member USDel he had earlier advised Indonesians not raise matter but that rectification this mistake would “present no problem”. Exceptionally well-drafted Indonesian request for GOC investigation followed. In response, GOC has requested full information from Dutch. If Dutch-Indonesian disagreement on basic facts develops, GOC will probably send observers, as it obvious Indonesians completely out of contact their forces Madura and their charges based reports correspondents. [Graham.] Livengood 49 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 575, December 3, noon. 50 Telegram 512 (No. 49 from Graham), December 6, noon, from Batavia, reported the GOC had replied that it would send a group to inquire into the situation. The GOC proposed inviting both parties to send representatives at the same time. (501.BC Indonesia/12–647) The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–147: Telegram [Document 870] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 51 restricted Batavia , December 1, 1947—3 p.m. 496. From Graham No. 44. Republican Government November 27 submitted memo to GOC on Republic’s economic plight highlighting (1) intensification by Dutch blockade of shortages created by Japs, (2) effect of police action in successfully cutting Republic off from main food-producing areas Java and Sumatra, and (3) technique Dutch in posing as liberators by distributing supplies to alleviate shortages for which they responsible. Memo (which carried in full by Antara) urged GOC, in order Republic not be at serious disadvantage in forthcoming discussions, to consider measures to ( a ) provide equitable distribution of food and commodities throughout areas of Republic’s pre-July 21 de facto authority, and ( b ) relieve interruption Republic’s economic relations and communications. Further stated belief these matters should be brought SC’s attention soonest. In response, GOC November 29 sent letter Netherlands delegation as follows: Re ( a ), urged favorable consideration this humanitarian, nonpolitical request and suggested use such international agencies as IEFC, ECAFE, and Intercross. Re ( b ), requested Netherlands Government’s concurrence in early implementation May 1947 Netherlands-Indo commercial agreement for distribution Indonesia of Dutch goods Australia including several hundred trucks which in accordance agreement would be allocated both NEI and Republican Governments. GOC agreed resumption economic and commercial contacts Republicans with outside areas would speed restoration peace. Further agreed report SC after week’s time result its intercession with Netherlands authorities. 52 USDel supported GOC action on conviction its acceptance by Netherlands authorities might serve lessen importance attached both sides question troop dispositions and mitigate tendency either sides toward inflexible attitude this matter. [Graham.] Livengood 51 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 574, December 3, noon. 52 In telegram 344 (No. 28 to Graham), December 3, 6 p.m., to Batavia, the Department expressed its hope that such report would not at this early stage lead to substantive discussion in the Security Council. In telegram 353 (No. 31 to Graham), December 5, 7 p.m., to Batavia, the Department pointed out that neither IEFC nor ECAFE undertook operating tasks. (501.BC Indonesia/12–147, 12–547) The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–447: Telegram [Document 871] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , December 4, 1947—10 a.m. 503. Following are highlights views expressed by Vredenburch during 3-hour talk with Scott and Ogburn December 1: 1. Re possibility shipment food and textiles to Republican areas and implementation May 1947 Netherlands-Indo agreement (Graham telegram 44, December 1 53 ), it fantastic expect Dutch cooperation view continued Indo destruction mills and use trucks by Indos for military purposes. Sabotage and insulting Republican propaganda unabated despite activities GOC which this case even used as vehicle for such propaganda. 2. No improvement situation possible until agreement reached paragraph d of GOC proposals for implementing cease-fire (Graham telegram 31, November 19 54 ), demarcation lines established, and forces both parties withdrawn from behind lines. (This connection parties still deadlocked paragraph d , Indos accepting GOC text, Netherlands maintaining prohibition alteration troop positions can apply only forward elements, permitting continuation mopping up rear areas. Vredenburch’s apparent conviction these matters contain key whole problem suggests possibility Dutch working for demarcation lines confining Republicans to central Java which would become permanent arrangement). 3. Republican ability or desire control looters any conditions highly doubtful and its word worthless. Too many Djocja politicians out for graft and “everybody in Djocja is in Government.” Republican intention is foment chaos and wreck GOC as means obtaining SC arbitration of dispute. Republic is totalitarian state denying freedom speech and employing methods terrorism. 4. Republic only one of many groups working for independence. Plans federal USI slowly taking shape. Areas states would be determined accordance democratic procedures articles 3 and 4 Linggadjati with Republicans probably confined central Java. No possibility liberated areas would vote Republican in plebiscites which already projected. Plan autonomous west Java already far advanced by Abdul Kadir, with early plebiscite likely. Defections from Republicans in Java and Sumatra increasing with populations many localities requesting Dutch protection, and might soon snowball such extent as completely change present situation. It was pointed out to Vredenburch that Dutch views of Republic and plans for federation appeared extraordinarily similar French views Viet Nam and plans federation. He was asked what factors here would prevent duplication disastrous Indochina situation; namely, devastation country and inability metropolitan power either hold on without serious drain its resources or let go without risking wholesale reprisals against elements drawn to its side. Vredenburch replied would refer [ prefer? ] question answered by person better informed than he. 5. Linggadjati Agreement “terrible mistake”. Was approved by Netherlands representatives only because Netherlands Government insisted on agreement any price. Dutch now intend “program based principles underlying Linggadjati”. Linggadjati misled majority SC members into assuming Republic and Netherlands were parties dispute. Real parties are Republican Indos and non-Republican Indos. This connection, Netherlands had not recognized de facto authority Republican Government any time but only that it exercised de facto authority at one time in Java, Madura, and Sumatra. 6. Settlement Netherlands-Republican dispute present conditions impossible. Even under favorable conditions, settlement details would require services GOC 6 months or more. View obvious inability present US member remain more than 2, seem most desirable senior foreign service officer be appointed succeed him. Livengood 53 See telegram 496, December 1, from Batavia, p. 1076 [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] . 54 Telegram 467, November 19, from Batavia, not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–447: Telegram [Document 872] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , December 4, 1947—11 a.m. 504. Abbey, 55 Scott, and Ogburn had dinner Palace December 2 with Van Mook, Vredenburch and Koets. Dutch employed occasion express great resentment GOC action forwarding Indonesian memorandum on economic plight Republic (Graham tel 44, December 1 56 ) under covering letter asking favorable Netherlands consideration Indonesian proposals before asking Dutch comments these proposals, which they described as complete falsehoods. Accused GOC of lack impartiality and expatiated on difficulty getting fair hearing Dutch side of case, noting especially insulting behavior Reuters and American press representatives in Madura last week. In response queries Van Mook spoke on plans Indonesian Federation, which he described as indigenous movement (ourtel 500, December 3 57 ), indicated some Republic officials now preparing change sides. All three Dutch commented bitterly on complete unreliability Republic, its powerlessness control local officials, its intimidation opponent and incitement it continued offer to sabotage. Considered continuing destruction factories most serious aspect present situation. If cease-fire order could be effected, Van Mook believed joint- gendarmerie might be formed deal lawless gangs. Stated event failure these measures, resumption police action would be indicated. Possibly with reference question put Vredenburch previous day (mytel 503, December 4), Van Mook stated situation Indochina very different from that Indonesia. In former, popular animosity to Europeans very strong. Mass Indonesians not extremists or fanatics. Only significant anti-Dutch elements apart certain politicians are youths indoctrinated by Japs, numbering perhaps 200,000. He considered completion police action last August would have finished Republic resistance. At close, Van Mook observed no Indonesians invited dinner out of deference possible view Americans that Indonesians working with Dutch are hirelings. He wished to point out these men true Nationalists, that many like Abdul Kadir had risked death at hands Republic to work for good of country. Livengood 55 Glenn A. Abbey, Consul at Batavia, was assisting the Graham mission. 56 See telegram 496, December 1, from Batavia, p. 1076 [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] . 57 Not printed; it reported a Dutch plan to sign agreements, along lines of Linggadjati Agreement, separately with other autonomous areas of NEI (856E.00/12–347). The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–647: Telegram [Document 873] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , December 6, 1947—10 a.m. 510. From Graham No. 47. Following are chief matters concern re future GOC: 1. Apart USDel, GOC in no sense Good Offices Committee as it might have been had each of three members been agreed upon by both parties. Austrian [ Australian ] delegation and Belgian delegation are protagonists Republic and Netherlands point of view respectively and on crucial points are proving nearly as uncompromising as parties themselves. Such partisanship openly acknowledged by Kirby who has several times stated that unless decisions GOC can be reached majority vote, GOC may as well go home. USDel has taken view that if member in minority is willing accept majority, decision can be offered as GOC decision but that manifestly decision by two members cannot be so offered if third member disassociates itself. USDel will continue and increase efforts bring other two delegations together. 2. If Republic authority is in fact crumbling as may be possible, GOC may come to have appearance giving sanction to severe truncation or virtual demise one of parties. Consider responsibility such denouement might be laid at door US by nationalist groups throughout Far East. 3. Other hand, if Republic’s power survival not vitally impaired, then ability GOC effect settlement highly problematic view situation noted paragraph 1 and fact conversations Netherlands and Republic representatives make obvious they not only poles apart but living different worlds. [Graham.] Livengood The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–647: Telegram [Document 874] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 58 confidential Batavia , December 6, 1947—11 a.m. 511. From Graham No. 48. Mytel November 19. 59 Latest meeting SCINR (Special Committee for Implementation November 1 Res.) ended December 2, with agreement in principle all points GOC’s initial proposals for implementation cease-fire except paragraphs on which deadlock continues owing refusal Netherlands SCINR accept. In order by-pass deadlock and reach heart problem, GOC December 4 submitted following proposals parties. 1. Each party to present its concept fair delineation demilitarized zones to be established between Netherlands and Republic occupied territories, such delineation having regard for ( a ) military positions both forces August 4, ( b ) welfare local populations, ( c ) administrative areas, ( d ) topographical features. 2. Each party to present arguments support its case before SCINR and other party. 3. In event disagreement delineation zones, GOC SCINR to propose its concept just delineation based paragraph 1 and taking account arguments parties. Parties would be asked accept this delineation. 4. Upon parties agreeing this plan, standfast and cease-fire orders to be issued all troops and all previous GOC proposals (mytel 31) agreed on by parties to take effect. 5. Upon acceptance demilitarized zones by parties, normal trade and intercourse among all areas to be resumed and forces one party in territory other to be moved across zone with arms under supervision troops [ sic ]. 6. GOC SCINR to make further suggestions re maintenance law and order demilitarized zones. As originally proposed by AusDel, parties would have been asked accept GOC’s decision on delineation in Am. Ps. [ sic ]. This provision ruled out by USDel and BelDel on grounds at least one party certain reject any proposal arbitration. Kirby privately conceded Netherlands rejection such proposal but apparently hoped make issue its rejection in a report to SC. This but one several recent examples AusDel desire make early anti-Dutch case before SC which clearly related expiration Aus membership SC and possibly GOC. [Graham.] Livengood 58 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in airgram A–220, December 11. 59 Telegram 467 (No. 31 from Graham), not printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC Indonesia/12–647: Telegram [Document 875] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia secret Washington , December 11, 1947—7 p.m. 359. For Graham No. 35. View points raised urtel 503 Dec 4 ur Nos. 47 and 48 Dec 6 60 Dept would appreciate receiving appropriate time your frank analysis present situation Indonesia, including your appraisal viewpoints Dutch and Indonesian representatives, viewpoints Australian Belgian members GOC, your opinion best course be followed by GOC, SC or by this Govt unilaterally. Your answers following questions also most helpful; in addition any info along these lines from consulate be appreciated: 1. Status present authority Republic, outlook for its continuation (para 2 ur No. 47 Dec 6) including your view Vredenburch’s estimate support in Java and other potentially autonomous areas. 2. Your evaluation intentions Republican authorities, popular support which they enjoy (para 3 urtel 503 Dec 4). 3. In your opinion is either party deliberately employing delaying tactics? What advantages disadvantages either side result from delay in settlement? 4. What is present scale hostilities and outlook for effective cease fire based on immediate recommendation majority GOC. 5. Are parties willing commence substantive discussions basis Linggadjati agreement: If not what specific clauses are unsatisfactory? 6. Would it be feasible for Committee seek parties’ views para by para on Linggadjati agreement order have issues clearly joined? 7. Not understood whether para 6 urtel 503 Dec 4 expresses your conclusions or Vredenburch’s. 61 Finally, situation described para 1 ur No. 47 not unexpected. Dept believes that in your position you can effectively perform role meant for GOC. In this respect forthright insistence upon implementation cease fire as preliminary immediate systematic consideration substantive points in issue most urgent. Lovett 60 See telegrams 510 and 511, pp. 1079 [ Pg. 1079 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] and 1080 [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] , respectively. 61 Telegram 538, December 15, 10 a.m., from Batavia, replied that Vredenburch’s views were expressed (501.BC Indonesia/12–1547). The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–1347: Telegram [Document 876] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , December 13, 1947—9 a.m. 534. From Graham No. 58. Informal talks held December 11 by GOC with Indo delegation and Netherlands delegation separately. In order set pattern further discussions and isolate areas disagreement, both parties were asked explain why Linggadjati failed prevent development current situation and whether they regarded selves still bound by Linggadjati. Indo delegation took view “picture existing time Linggadjati has ceased exist” but that Republic regarded principles Linggadjati still morally binding. As reasons for breakdown Linggadjati, Indo delegation reiterated familiar charges Dutch violations. These mostly related two basic areas disagreement, namely, legal status Republic and formation other Indo states. Two-hour discussion held on articles Linggadjati related these points. Indos manifestly found it difficult admit limitations de facto authority. In particular, they charged Dutch interference their rights to foreign representation. Upon GOC query basis such rights, they made distinction between diplomatic and foreign relations, citing trade commissions as example latter, and finally yielding to extent admitting Republic under Linggadjati could expect only nonpolitical relationships other countries and then only until establishment USI. Re recognition mere existence de facto authority under Linggadjati, Indos contended Dutch seizure bank [?] and Dutch insistence joint composition gendarmerie all levels (rejecting Indo counter-proposal for joint staff over Indo gendarmerie ) was inconsistent event this limited definition and that articles 1 and 16 clearly implied continued and extended Republic authority. While Indos complained of unilateral formation by Dutch of states east Indon and east and west Borneo, it appeared they did not question admissibility separation of territories from states to form new states or non-inclusion of particular territories in USI provided such questions settled by territories themselves in accordance “democratic procedures” specified in article 3. Such procedures they construed to mean plebiscites. GOC took pains obtain clear statement that Indos regarded as entirely practicable the holding of plebiscites even under present conditions and despite illiteracy rates. Only conditions Indos attached were (1) month’s preparation and (2) international supervision, along lines Amfoge. 62 Sjarifuddin, Sastroamidjojo and Salim took equal parts in discussion. In Netherlands delegation talk, Vredenburch reiterated that Linggadjati not still binding in present form but that “we intend carry out political program based principles underlying Linggadjati”. Regretted inability be more specific but stated full clarification Netherlands position re Linggadjati expected from Hague few days and would be given GOC. Meanwhile, could state basic principles Linggadjati were (1) full rights for all peoples and minorities and (2) cooperation and full equality Netherlands and Indon. Vredenburch recapitulated events leading police action, dwelling particularly Netherlands efforts obtain “silent good offices” two foreign Govts in situation which Netherlands convinced “could not last” and unless remedied would require limited police action. Asked GOC if it wished to receive under pledge secrecy Netherlands documents presented these Govts. GOC felt this unnecessary. (Possible implication whether or not intended that Netherlands exonerated in this action and that action condoned by two other Govts.) Koets described frustration by Republic of Netherlands program economic rehabilitation prior July 21. Ascribed difficulties with Republic to (1) Republic elements opposing any agreement and lack other constructive elements Republic and (2) Republic claim of sovereignty over all Indon. Stated he thought July 15 difficulties at end when Sjarifuddin accepted joint police to supplement states police and to be used only when latter unable maintain law and order and (3) agreeing make statement that agreement reached with Netherlands and that subversive acts must stop. He stated, however, Republic failed carry out either undertaking. Informal talks to continue. [Graham.] Livengood 62 Allied Mission To Observe the Greek Elections; for documentation on this subject, see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. vii , pp. 88 ff. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC Indonesia/11–1347: Telegram [Document 877] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 63 secret us urgent Washington , December 18, 1947—10 p.m. 369. Representative Neth Emb called Dept Dec 15 and reported following as having been given to NEI officials by USDel as US Govt interpretation of SC resolution Nov 1: “A. Hostile Action. This expression is considered as meaning any action beyond position of leading elements of Armed Forces of either party either forward or laterally or threat to take such action in the direction of opposing forces. “B. Control over territory. This expression is interpreted as meaning that territory in which orders from headquarters may be executed without hostile action. That control may be secured through civil administration as well through military operations. The boundaries of civil administrative units, however, have no bearing on definition of military control if within such boundaries there are opposing forces. “C. Control in sense used in B above. “D. To extend its control over territory not occupied by it on Aug 4, 1947. This expression in its entirety is considered as including lateral movements between spearheads as well as forward movements. Both these movements therefore are to be considered as being inconsistent with Security Council’s resolution of Aug 1, 1947.” Neth representative asked whether above is in fact interpretation of US Govt. He was informed that US Govt has given no official interpretation of SC resolution Nov 1, preferring to leave such interpretation to GOC’s discretion. Dept suggests, therefore, that if interpretation of resolution is given, it be made clear that such interpretation is that of USDel or of GOC, as case may be. Dept, of course, recognizes close similarity between above interpretation and that outlined urtel 453 Nov 13 (Graham 25). Dept did not reply urtel 453, since it considers practicable proposals based on SC resolution can best be made by GOC without instruction to USDel from Dept. Dept is confident, however, that any reasonable formula for effectuating purpose of cease-fire resolution which GOC as whole recommends will receive support this Govt and probably SC. Lovett 63 Repeated to The Hague in telegram 604, December 22, noon. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC Indonesia/12–1947: Telegram [Document 878] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 64 confidential Washington , December 19, 1947—8 p.m. 372. For Graham No. 40. Based on your tels and on information from conversations with Neth Emb here and Australian representatives in UN, it appears: 1. Neth unwilling to accept SCINR plan (urtels 48, 56 65 ) on grounds that acts violence, etc., on part Indos still continue despite Indo agreement set forth urtel 31. 66 Further, Dutch unwilling enter seriously into substantive discussions until agreement reached in measures to effectuate cease fire and effectiveness of measures demonstrated. 2. Indos willing accept SCINR plan, but according Dutch, are unwilling or unable put into effect measures which will ensure observance cease fire, specifically stoppage of sabotage, intimidation and provocative propaganda. 3. These attitudes appear to produce stalemate on substantive negotiations. In view of Dutch FriMin’s arrival it seems likely climax in negotiations will soon be reached. Dept therefore suggests that you in your discretion make following approach to problem in GOC: ( a ) Dutch demands for measures to ensure discontinuance of violence appear reasonable and Republic should be willing accept Dutch concrete proposals listed your #56. GOC should take strong position with Republic on this and demand continuing demonstrable compliance on official level with Republic’s prior agreements as stated urtel 31. ( b ) On other hand, Dutch in spirit of conciliation should accept assurances of Republic that it will do all in governmental power to prohibit sabotage, intimidation, reprisal, hostile propaganda, etc., and in absence of verified bad faith or utter inadequacy on part of Rep Govt in carrying out these measures should immediately enter into and continue substantive discussions. Nor should Dutch hold Republic wholly responsible for certain roving bands over which Republic in light of circumstances cannot have control. In other words, Republic should be willing to give assurances that acts of violence will be discontinued and exert itself appropriately to this end. Dutch should be prepared to accept these assurances as bona fide and not take position that Republic unable to guarantee non-violence and therefore substantive discussion to no avail. ( c ) Dept believes appropriate for GOC to take firm stand with parties so that substantive discussion can proceed. Both parties must be made to understand GOC cannot be successful unless each enters into discussion in conciliatory spirit and evidence willingness to compromise both in respect to SCINR plan (urtel 48) and to basic political issues. Dept. believes time has probably come for US to take strong position along these lines to produce positive and salutary effect on other GOC members and on parties. Lovett 64 Repeated to The Hague in telegram 603. 65 Telegrams 511, December 6, p. 1080 [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] , and 526, December 10, not printed. 66 Telegram 467, November 19, not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–2047: Telegram [Document 879] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 67 secret Batavia , December 20, 1947—10 a.m. 555. From Graham No. 67. Further to mytel 64, December 18. 68 1. As already reported, discussions parties proceeding basis paragraph by paragraph analysis Linggadjati (Deptel 35, December 11, 69 paragraphs 5 and 6). Plan is result USDel position in GOC which based conviction that bringing parties within framework Linggadjati offers only hope solution dispute. However, as Department aware, Dutch by various elucidations have backed out of all provisions agreement giving any basis Republic claims solid status. Believe by end month, areas Netherlands-Republic disagreement will be fully and precisely defined. 2. ( a ) Primary area will probably concern basis on which territory states to be delineated including also basis for any subdivision of three component states USI named in Linggadjati. Will relate directly clauses Linggadjati appearing give assurance of territorial integrity Republic, Borneo and East Indonesia decide by democratic process it will have different status. Nature cooperation between Netherlands and Republic in formation USI, as provided article 2, as so related this question. ( b ) If agreement reached this subject, secondary area will probably relate basis determination of relative strength of representation various states in federal bodies, for example, whether Republic if it includes Java, Sumatra, Madura would completely dominate USI on basis its enormous population or be rendered impotent by small states. ( c ) If agreement reached this subject, third area will probably comprise degree sovereignty USI upon its establishment and nature and duration interim arrangements. 3. Question precise legal status Republic would probably disappear if agreement reached these areas. According present indications, however, no such agreement possible. Failing such agreement, USDel believes GOC should ask parties whether they wish it propose terms agreement. (This point will be elaborated in subsequent telegram.) Rejection by Netherlands either of this proposal, or, if proposal accepted, of terms suggested (on which probably only two members GOC could agree), seems certain in light current developments and attitude Netherlands delegate. USDel would then propose full report to SC setting forth irreducible areas disagreement and await instructions. 4. Re assistance Department might render either immediately through approach Netherlands or ultimately in SC, USDel considers there basically only two realistic solutions Indo dispute and that efforts US should be directed toward realization one of these solutions. Continued in following telegram. [Graham.] Livengood 67 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 608, December 23, 6 p.m. 68 Telegram 549, December 18, not printed. 69 Telegram 359, December 11, p. 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] . The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–2047: Telegram [Document 880] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 70 secret Batavia , December 20, 1947—11 a.m. 556. From Graham No. 68. Continued from mytel 67, December 20. 71 Alternate possible solutions Indonesian dispute in USDel view as follows: 1. Construction USI accordance present Netherlands plan (mytel 64, December 18 72 ) under de jure and de facto Netherlands authority: Difficult predict chances success this plan, which involves reduction Republic at least to small state which can take part federal scheme or stew own juices. Theoretically Netherlands probably has capacity make fragmented federal Indonesia acceptable to effective proportion nationalists by meeting their irreducible demands. This would probably require Netherlands to guarantee date on which unqualified sovereignty USI would become fact and to offer outstanding Repub leaders high posts both federal states level in order gain confidence. Repub leaders in present discouraged mood might resign themselves demise Repub and accept such posts. (Appointment Soekarno as High Commissioner Netherlands or Ambassador China, as casually suggested by Vredenburch, would not be enough.) However, current policies NEI Government and extreme local Dutch antipathy to Repub make USDel reluctant accept at face value Netherlands proposals for independent USI in equal partnership kingdom and incline it to believe Netherlands aim is federation in which Netherlands itself will have ultimate voice though speaking through hierarchy Indonesian officials. From contacts with men like Soekarno, Sjarifuddin, Setiatjit, and Leimena, USDel would judge that if these refuse participate Netherlands plan even in their present extremity, plan will be open serious question. Present indications they completely distrustful. If plan in fact aims at USI indefinitely subordinate to Netherlands interests, seems probable (1) Netherlands will be forced indefinitely support extensive military operations NEI, (2) restoration Indonesia as economic asset may be prospect unforeseeable future, with economy Java and Sumatra perhaps even continuing deteriorate, and (3) another revolution, perhaps under much worse auspices than present movement, will be only matter time and will certainly take place if western world again finds itself in tight situation, as threatened by Repub Deputy Chief Staff. Always possible, however, demoralization Repub will proceed such extent if Netherlands given free hand that economic [ economy? ] islands may be restored sufficiently allay political discontent and give Netherlands prestige and authority new lease life. However, USDel regards this eventuality unlikely. 2. Recognition sovereignty of Repub alone or USI with Repub as dominant element: This solution might be followed by serious factional conflicts amounting some areas local war and doubtless national paralysis of Latin American type might characterize political life for years before equilibrium established. Necessarily such upsets would have far-reaching effect economy country and might postpone indefinitely conditions necessary full resumption foreign enterprises. However, unless Netherlands control to be permanent, prospect must eventually be faced. USDel guess is, under circumstances, the longer it delayed, the worse it will be. Moreover, possibility exists that reputed inability Repub control many its officials and maintain its authority some areas due in part distraction its energies by Dutch conflict and that relief Dutch pressure would enable it set house in order without major crises. (This connection, in response informal request by Graham, Sjarifuddin has taken steps prevent recurrence unfortunate broadcasts by Sutomo.) Finally, leadership present Government under professional men seems as moderate, reasonable and responsive Western ideas of any likely arise in future. Without discounting magnitude problems facing such leaders, USDel believes their apparent readiness accept guidance might prove important offsetting factor. In connection foregoing, see Contel 461, November 17. Continued in following telegram. [Graham.] Livengood 70 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in No. 608, December 23, 6 p.m. 71 Supra . 72 No. 540, not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–2047: Telegram [Document 881] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 73 secret Batavia , December 20, 1947—noon. 557.From Graham No. 69. Continued from mytel 68, December 20. 74 1. Either of solutions Indonesian dispute considered by USDel as only realistic ones, admittedly risky with respect stability and rehabilitation NEI. However, while US might exert moderating and stabilizing influence through various forms assistance under either settlement, USDel believes Department should work for one or the other since in questions of ultimate sovereignty there can be no compromise, as events past year Indonesia have shown. Choice best solutions cannot take account local considerations alone but must be based over-all US foreign policy. If Department inclines solution based Netherlands sovereignty, will be sufficient let nature take course in which case function GOC would be merely “explain to world what has happened”, as expressed by Baud. If Department believes dominion status for Indonesia is the answer, maximum pressure must be exerted have Netherlands accept Linggadjati minus subsequent interpretations and subscribe some such plan as paragraph 3 below. 2. View large measure responsibility which US will bear for outcome GOC in eyes world, USDel considers that in event failure bring parties together in areas disagreement outlined paragraph 2, mytel 67, December 20, 75 it might either alone or as part GOC if AusDel and BelDel concur, solicit request from parties (which request likely forthcoming if sufficient pressure put on Dutch) that GOC offer constructive suggestions for resolving these disagreements along following lines: 3. Regarding primary area, plebiscites under international observation would appear be only means settling issues to which either party would find it difficult maintain objection in principle. However, despite confidence Indonesian delegation that plebiscites entirely practicable, USDel not yet entirely convinced and fully realizes magnitude problems involved. Other hand, familiarity Indonesians with elections village level gives some assurance plebiscites practicable. Regarding second area, bicameral legislature of US type would appear offer method safeguarding interests small states while allowing proportional representation. (Abdul Kadir claims he endorses this system.) If all Java-Madura-Sumatra voted join Repub, Repub would probably be willing subdivide on ethnic lines to obviate gross unbalance size states provided Netherlands not in position take advantage this division. Regarding third area, attainment by USI of dominion status seems clearly indicated by letter of Linggadjati Agreement as well as by realities situation. USDel would only add (1) that UN agency should be present during interim period in order help adjust differences set forth in conflicting Netherlands and Repub interpretations of May-July and (2) interim should be shortest possible. 4. Chances are application this procedure would leave Repub areas holding major power independent Indonesia. Regardless whether this desirable, USDel feels it must take some stand clearing it of appearance sanctioning Repub delimitation. Appraisal prospects implementing cease-fire (which not possible without making a political decision of first magnitude) will follow. 76 [Graham.] Livengood 73 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 608, December 23, 6 p.m. 74 Supra. 75 No. 555, p. 1085 [ Pg. 1085 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] . 76 See telegram 565, December 22, 5 p.m., p. 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] . The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC Indonesia/12–1247: Telegram [Document 882] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia secret Washington , December 20, 1947—2 p.m. 373. Urtels 531 and 532 Dec 12. 77 Dept unable at present comply Indo request US Govt lend its offices to secure American economic adviser since Dept believes Dutch would regard such action as compromising neutrality US during negotiations GOC. At same time Dept desires maintain Republic confidence in US and would comply Republic request if Dutch-Indo differences composed. Dept suggests you convey to Tamzil pleasure US Govt at this evidence Republic confidence in US, recalling US Govt’s interest in rehabilitation Indo economy and readiness to supply material assistance and technical advice for this purpose when Dutch-Indo political settlement achieved; and emphasizing desire US Govt avoid any action which might derogate neutral position US as member GOC. For your info Dept believes Republic reps US could not obtain in present employment circumstances here a suitable economic adviser from private business in sufficient time to contribute to alleviation conditions described Tamzil’s memo while negotiations in progress. Dept suggests in conveying foregoing you impress Tamzil urgent importance recovery Indonesia not only to Indonesians but to world economy, fact that such recovery depends upon settlement dispute and necessity Republic’s recognition its obligation to make promptly its full contribution to amicable settlement dispute. 78 Assume you will apprise Graham foregoing. Lovett 77 Neither printed; they reported the Indonesian desire to obtain from U.S. private business circles an economic expert to serve in advisory capacity in regard to economic policy (856D.50A/12–1247). 78 Telegram 570, December 24, 1 p.m., from Batavia, reported that the reply was given Tamzil on December 23 and that he understood the matter (501.BC Indonesia/12–2447). The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–2247: Telegram [Document 883] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , December 22, 1947—5 p.m. 565. From Graham Nr. 73. Further to mytel 69, December 19 [ 20 ] 79 reDeptel 35, December 11, 80 paragraphs 4 and final: Present hostilities on small scale. Low rate Netherlands casualties (one or two killed, four or five wounded per day) cited by Netherlands as proving lack organized resistance behind forward positions. Figures Indo casualties unavailable. Dutch appear less concerned by battle casualties than by acts sabotage, intimidation, abduction, and murder civilians allegedly committed by Republic adherents. Insistence by Dutch on primary necessity implementation cease-fire probably stems not only from natural concern over loss lives and property but from desire keep spotlight on disorders and illegal acts they claim Republic condones or encourages and from determination obtain sanction Van Mook line as limit Republic authority. Republic losses as result non-implementation cease-fire consist (1) loss territories for most part behind Van Mook line over which Dutch consolidating control, and (2) loss troops mostly through dispersal military formations and surrenders. Neither would count against Republic in long run if it could obtain favorable political settlement. Hence political settlement considered primary necessity by Republic. Apparent that cease-fire cannot be implemented unless (1) armed forces are disentangled through establishment demilitarized zones and forces one party withdrawn from territory the other, and (2) Indos are assured of safety from further Dutch attacks and of early and equitable solution political dispute. Lawless bands constitute separate problem and will probably continue plague country regardless ceasefire arrangements. Insofar as implementation depends on (2), only Dutch can give requisite assurance. Insofar as it depends on (1) GOC has been pressing its proposals for past month with Dutch balking on various points of what GOC has considered essentially integrated program. Latest Netherlands move, December 20, was acceptance GOC truce plan of December 4, conditional upon establishment demilitarized zones along Van Mook line. (Mytel 72, December 22. 81 ) This leaves US delegate with two alternate courses action: 1. US delegate can endeavor persuade Australian delegate and Indonesian delegate accept Netherlands program. In 3–hour conversation with US delegate December 19, Van Zeeland urged acceptance this program, stating (1) politically impossible for Beel government agree any withdrawal Netherlands forces, hence demilitarized zones must be established along Van Mook lines, (2) in event failure agreement this program either in GOC or Republic, there would be no implementation cease-fire and no substantive discussions and matter would revert SC which would be powerless take effective action, and (3) that it would be reprehensible for GOC to lead Indonesian delegate believe it could obtain better terms for Republic than terms Dutch December 20 memorandum. He stressed Dutch program was provisional and if accepted, Republic’s rights, claims, and position in final settlement would be unimpaired, that if Republic lived up to program and Dutch then violated it, Republic’s position would be far stronger in SC. He gave personal view that if Netherlands failed to live up to obligations, it would be assuming with respect both Republic and USI, Dutch would be thrown out of Indonesia in 2 or 3 years. US delegate recognizes force Van Zeeland position. Only reservation concerns fact that Dutch are already proceeding creation West Java Negara or Daerah and that, so far as US delegate has learned, Netherlands will not in fact concede “Republic of Djocja,” as Beel terms it, any rights, claims, or position which could be impaired. US delegate further fears that even if Republic accepted program, it would be too much expect it cooperate sincerely and effectively in perhaps fatal truncation its territory, that acts vengeance and destruction would continue and that Netherlands on this excuse would extend police action to Djocja. 2. US delegate could take position that in West Java and Madura Dutch have in fact advanced well beyond August 4 positions and that, as condition to preliminary establishment zones along Van Mook line, provision be made for gradual withdrawal Dutch forces to general area occupied August 4 in West Java, which is crucial area. According evidence based both Netherlands and Republican maps, which US military observers consider best available, Dutch troops made following advances in southern portion West Java after August 4: ( a ) Palaboehanba to Tokiaradoca, ( b ) Soekaboemi to Djampang-Tengah, Sagaranten and Soekanegara, ( c ) Tjibeber to Soekanegara, ( d ) Batoedjajar to Goenoenghaloe, ( e ) Santoba to Tjik and Jang to Pameungpeuk, ( f ) Tjitalenka to Garoet and Tjikadjang, Garoet to Band jar and Bandjarsari, ( g ) Tjitalenka to Panoembangan, Tjiamis, Bandjar and Wangon, ( h ) Boemiajoe to Poewokerto and Wangon. Prior August 4 Dutch had taken road Tegal-Poerbalingga-Poewokerto-Tjiltjap. If US delegate favored Dutch withdrawal in southern West Java to August 4 lines, it would also, in order open communications between Djocja and evacuated areas, have to favor Dutch withdrawal from this road. This justifiable on grounds Dutch would be permitted retain control many other areas not occupied August 4. If US delegate took second position, would be on understanding Dutch withdrawal would be piecemeal by very small areas and that entrance Republican troops would be supervised by military observers. Should development demonstrate lack foundation to Republic’s claim to be government enjoying support people and capable maintaining law and order, US delegate would have firm grounds for reconsidering position. US delegate aware Dutch would reject any proposal based foregoing position and that consequences might be most awkward. US delegate would not consider taking such position except from reluctance be party to truncation or elimination one of parties to dispute. ReDeptel 40, December 19, 82 US delegate considers Dutch December 20 memorandum a logical complement of Dutch December 9 proposal (mytel 56, December 10 83 ) and that our support of former would be logical consequence our support of latter. US delegate would appreciate earliest information whether Department wishes us support both and reject second alternative course above. Re paragraph 1, Deptel 40, December 19, Indos agree principles set forth mytel 31, November 19, 84 but with principles to cooperation only when all agreed upon. Dutch have never agreed point ( d ) providing for standfast order to be issued troops all areas, or wording of ( e ) without which Dutch will consider themselves free continue mopping up operations behind forward positions, which inevitably will provoke retaliation and charges Indo non-compliance. [Graham.] Livengood 79 No. 557, p. 1088 [ Pg. 1088 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] . 80 No. 359, p. 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] . 81 No. 562, not printed. 82 No. 372, p. 1084 [ Pg. 1084 includes portions of Doc. 877 and Doc. 878 ] . 83 No. 526, not printed. 84 No. 467, not printed. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–2347: Telegram [Document 884] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State secret Batavia , December 23, 1947—11 a.m. 569. From Graham Nr. 74. ReDeptel 369, December 18: Military definitions set forth paragraph 6 mytel 453 (Graham 25), November 13, were drafted by US military observers, and were part of a general statement, remainder of which was prepared by USDel, of conclusions regarding SC’s resolution. Kirby and Van Zeeland were aware foregoing and also aware that USDel took precaution of sending military definitions to Department for clearance. USDel took Deptel 316, November 17 [ 18 ] to be reply to mytel 453, November 13. USDel’s general statement met points raised in paragraphs numbered 1, 2 and 3 Deptel 316. USDel took penultimate paragraph Deptel 316 to mean that, with exception of definition of “occupied”, and with exception of Department’s preference for alternative definition of “control”, Department was otherwise in agreement with military definition set forth paragraph 6 mytel 453. US military observer’s definitions were therefore revised in accordance penultimate paragraph Deptel 316 prior presenting them informally to Kirby and Van Zeeland. USDel’s general statement was informally accepted by Kirby, and, with minor alterations, by Van Zeeland and prior his departure for Belgium. Van Zeeland, however, did not accept military definitions. New set of military definitions, based Hague Convention, was therefore prepared by three military observation groups and accepted by GOC. US military observed military definitions have never been presented formally or officially to GOC, although, in informal presentation, USDel did inform Kirby and Van Zeeland that Department was in agreement with definitions as revised in accordance Deptel 316. They have never been given to NEI officials USDel, officially or otherwise, or described as “US Government interpretation”. Although Indonesian delegate has requested GOC provide interpretation of November 1 resolution, Netherlands delegation has not requested GOC interpretation, which hence has not been given either party. If Department did not inform Netherlands’ representative it had advised USDel it agreed generally with revised definitions, USDel will be in position in GOC of having made misstatement of fact, since any impression given Netherlands’ Embassy will be relayed Belgian delegate. [Graham.] Livengood The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–2747: Telegram [Document 885] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State 85 confidential Batavia , December 27, 1947—1 p.m. 572. From Graham No. 75. 1. GOC has adopted an overall program for implementation ceasefire and settlement political dispute. Program, which is lengthy, consists basic statement and two annexes. 2. Basic statement reviews efforts GOC bring parties together in implementation SC resolution, notes parties themselves must bear responsibility for decisions they have made or failed make, warns parties against further delay and calls upon them to: ( a ) sign and put in effect immediately measures contained in this program for implementing cease-fire together with those already presented to SCINRS by GOC ( b ) issue precise orders calling for cessation any activities or incitement activities which contravene SC resolution November 1 and take appropriate measures safeguard life and property, utilizing all means dissemination such orders; ( c ) conclude truce agreement carrying out third paragraph November 1 resolution accepting proposals previously submitted by GOC and annex one of this statement: also reexamine proposals they themselves submitted with view achieving compromise; ( d ) issue instructions their troops in territory other party regarding measures for their movement to own territory, employing GOC military observers if desired in order expedite movements. 3. Basic statement expresses hope both foregoing agreements may be accomplished fact before one month. It notes that parties have stated they will be bound by principles underlying Linggadjati, which GOC believes to be IRCA (independence for Indo peoples). Cooperation between peoples Netherlands and Indos ( c ) sovereign staff on federal basis under constitution to be arrived at by democratic process, and ( d ) Union of USI with Kingdom Netherlands under crown. Statement calls on parties submit concrete elaboration these principles endeavoring meet each other’s views half way. 4. Annex 1 recommends that: ( a ) stand fast and cease-fire orders be issued immediately with application troops both parties along Van Mook lines; ( b ) for time being demilitarized zone be established in general conformity Van Mook lines with GOC reserving attitude regarding delineation such zones western Java until military observers have had opportunity make inquiries this area; ( c ) rights, claims, position parties under SC resolution not be prejudiced by establishment demilitarized zones; ( d ) military observers be at disposal parties initially to assume responsibility determining whether any incident requires enquiry by higher authorities either party; ( e ) pending political settlement, responsibility for maintenance law and order in zones to remain vested in civil police of parties (not excluding temporary use military personnel in capacity police under civil control) with military observers to be available to serve in advisory or other proper capacity; ( f ) trade and intercourse be permitted as far as possible and any necessary restrictions be agreed on by both parties; ( g ) upon acceptance foregoing, military observers to determine whether Republic elements still offering resistance behind Netherlands forward position; ( h ) forces one party to be withdrawn with arms from territory on other party’s side demilitarized zone under observation military observers with exception indicated ( b ) above. 5. Annex 2 offers following principles for acceptance parties as basis reaching political settlement: ( a ) pending political settlement, cessation by parties all activities relating organization states or determination political relationships to USI of territories Java, Madura, Sumatra which comprise area involved Netherlands Republic dispute; ( b ) upon signing political agreement, “civil administrations which were functioning on July 20 to be restored” and Netherlands armed forces be withdrawn to territories occupied by them on July 20; ( c ) upon signing political agreement provision be made for gradual reduction armed forces both sides; ( d ) after signing agreement, free economic activity, trade, transportation and communications be completely restored; ( e ) uncoerced and free discussion vital issues to proceed period six months to year, after which “free elections will be called for self determination by the people of their political relationships to Republic and USI”; ( f ) constitutional convention be chosen according democratic procedure to draft constitution for USI; ( g ) UN agency be asked observe conditions during this period and final formation USI. 6. Statement notes GOC opinion that all parts constitute integrated whole essential to lasting settlement and expresses hope parties reply will provide favorable conclusion for GOC report to SC. 7. Basic statement was initiated by Van Zeeland, annex 1 by Critchley 86 and annex 2 by Graham. Graham emphasizes his part was based USDel statement of conclusions re SC’s resolution (Consulate’s despatch 380, December 3 87 ) and (mytel 74, December 23 88 ) and was strongly supported by Critchley and Van Zeeland. 8. Redraft of statement and both annexes, prepared within USDel in effort bring more coherence and organization into document, was rejected by Van Zeeland without explanation and by Critchley without being read. Critchley apparently feared lose Van Zeeland’s acceptance original document. Document was touched up and adopted by GOC in spirit urgency December 25 and given parties next day. Sjarifuddin had been given preliminary draft on eve his departure Djocja December 24. This draft uses “plebiscites” place “free elections” paragraph 5 ( e ) above. Graham previously indicated feel his belief importance plebiscites. 9. While present GOC intention is make full report to SC by airmail some time after receipt replies parties, exchange of statements is at present on informal level. This connection USDel and BelDel have frustrated efforts Critchley (who under instructions) send telegraphic report SC before December 30. [Graham.] Livengood 85 Repeated by the Department to The Hague in telegram 611, December 29, 6 p.m. 86 Thomas K. Critchley, Australian representative on the GOC, succeeding Richard C. Kirby. 87 Not printed. 88 Supra. The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–3047: Telegram [Document 886] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , December 30, 1947—noon. 576. From Graham No. 76. Latest meetings with Indo delegation and Netherlands delegation held December 18 and 19. Exhaustive discussions Linggadjati, minutes, exchange letters and elucidations served chiefly emphasize total disparity views parties on lines already explored. Vredenburch stated he not convinced paragraph by paragraph examination Linggadjati could be helpful since Netherlands delegation did not consider Linggadjati any longer binding or as affording basis on which settlement could be worked out. Sjarifuddin, with most Indo delegation, returned Djocja December 24. In press interview he stated would not return until “real talks” ready begin and that this would depend only on Dutch. He considered Dutch were by-passing GOC in creation West Java state and in supporting organizations pressing for interim federal govt Indonesia. While he privately told Graham he ready return in several days, he failed return Batavia with Indo delegation December 29. Setiadjit informed Livengood he had “collapsed”. Setiadjit also stated Republic would accept GOC Xmas program (mytel 75, December 27 89 ). Graham had flown Djocja December 27 and asked Soekarno and Sjarifuddin give most careful consideration GOC Xmas proposal as fair, integrated, balanced program, even including general acceptance Van Mook line. He stressed to them and to Masjoemi leaders absolute necessity Republic do utmost, as part this program, put end to killings and acts intimidation and destruction. 90 [Graham.] Livengood 89 Supra . 90 In telegram 580, December 31, 9 a.m., from Batavia, Mr. Livengood reported a meeting on December 30 in his office between the Netherlands Prime Minister (Beel) and the Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister (Setiadjit). Premier Beel stated afterward it was a good meeting. (501.BC Indonesia/12–3147) The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 501.BC Indonesia/12–3147: Telegram [Document 887] The Consul General at Batavia ( Livengood ) to the Secretary of State confidential Batavia , December 31, 1947—4 p.m. 581. From Graham No. 78. GOC met December 29 and 30 consider Netherlands delegation reply GOC Christmas program. 91 Van Zeeland read his notes on conversation held during overnight cruise December 27 aboard Dutch liner. Participants were three members GOC, Beel, Drees, 92 Jonkman, Neher 93 and Van Mook. Gist of remarks, mostly by Beel and Van Mook, were: (1) Policy Netherlands is creation full sovereignism composed number of Negaras of equal status (2) Geographical nature Indonesia requires federal form government if structure to have stability (3) Impossible accept any suggestion Netherlands withdraw from any territories now occupied without security population being thoroughly assured (4) Central and east Java might be included in single Negara , but discussion such possibility now might cause upheavals (5) Future Indonesia will be matter for self-determination by Indonesians (6) Present movements toward organization political units are spontaneous and Netherlands has no right suppress them (7) Republic leaders will pay [ play? ] part in union federal level (8) Netherlands wishes make its position clear to world through GOC and be committed through GOC to accomplish these ends. At end conference with Dutch Ministers, Van Zeeland stated he considered these statements as constituting a true and faithful basis for political agreement. Graham then told Ministers GOC stood unanimously for Annexes 1 and 2 of Christmas program and he was sure would be willing stand for them before world. Discussion on the GOC, in which Van Zeeland reaffirmed his faith in statements Dutch Ministers, hinged mainly on Dutch refusal cease activities looking toward creation states in former Republic territories. Graham and Critchley took view that preservation political status quo pending political agreement constitutes essential quid pro quo for Republic’s general acceptance Van Mook line. Both emphasized that under present conditions of military occupation free expression popular will is impossible while Dutch in fact taking active role creation new political bodies. Critchley contended that Dutch in reply to Christmas program had not moved from their original position. Van Zeeland expressed view Dutch has actually accepted GOC principles “under pressure”. Consistently making distinction between principles and facts, he stated principles advanced by Dutch were unexceptionable and could not be challenged by GOC before stand that good faith either party could not be questioned without rendering negotiations impossible. Regarding facts, he stated he convinced autonomous movements were spontaneous but if GOC wished, he quite willing GOC accept Dutch suggestion that GOC visit east Sumatra and investigate whether separatist movement spontaneous and representative popular will. GOC decided examine Annex 2 point by point with Dutch Ministers in effort find solution permitting preservation essential principles. [Graham.] Livengood 91 Telegram 577 (No. 77 from Graham), December 30, 1 p.m., from Batavia, not printed. 92 Willem Drees, Netherlands Vice Premier and Minister of Social Affairs. 93 Netherlands Minister of Reconstruction. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia 501.BC Indonesia/12–1947: Telegram [Document 888] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia secret Washington , December 31, 1947—6 p.m. 277. Urtel 317 Dec 19 94 much appreciated by Dept. For your info. Dept unfavorably impressed by Australian tactics Dutch-Indo dispute as member GOC and SC. Although selected by Indos, Australians as members SC’s GOC expected to exhibit reasonable neutrality. Far from this being the case, Australian position both on GOC and in SC apparently designed to place Netherlands in embarrassing position with no benefit to operations GOC. For example, Australian delegation GOC proposed interpretation SC’s Nov 1 cease-fire order which they knew was unacceptable to Dutch for purposes, according to our info, of making issue its rejection in a report to SC. Another example Aus rep on SC took occasion discussion Australian continuance on GOC to criticize without documentation and without previous notification Dutch position and to blame Dutch alone for delays in reaching agreement cease-fire. US Govt, as member GOC, determined to maintain essential neutrality in discharge of its responsibilities on that Committee, and therefore, cannot consider prejudicing Committee’s work by engaging in such unneutral act as getting SC to prod Dutch, as Burton 95 suggested (last sentence urtel 317). Dept. leaves your discretion decision as to extent and manner of communicating sense of foregoing to ExtAff, bearing in mind necessity GOC continuance in spirit unanimity. Dept hopes, however, that you will take opportunity to make such representations as will result in modification present Australian attitude. Sent Canberra as 277. Repeated Batavia as 379. 96 Lovett 94 Not printed. 95 Secretary, Australian Ministry for External Affairs. 96 Repeated also to London in No. 9, January 2, 1948, 6 p.m. The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia 501.BC Indonesia/12–3147: Telegram [Document 889] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia secret us urgent Washington , December 31, 1947—7 p.m. 380. For Graham No. 41. Dept grateful excellent reporting and analysis urtels 64, 67 to 71, 73 and 74. 97 Dept still believes final recommendation urtel 69, Dec 20 must be made by GOC as free agent on the spot. Dept appreciates, however, considerations which have prompted request urtel 69 that it relate choice of alternatives to overall US foreign policy. Dept therefore proposes to set forth below major considerations of US policy which should determine the ambit of choice of alternatives, Paras 1 and 2, urtel 68, Dec 20. These follow: (1) Netherlands is strong proponent US policy in Europe. Dept believes that stability present Dutch Govt would be seriously undermined if Netherlands fails to retain very considerable stake in NEI, and that the political consequences of failure present Dutch Govt would in all likelihood be prejudicial to US position in Western Europe. Accordingly, Dept unfavorable to any solution requiring immediate and complete withdrawal Netherlands from Indies or any important part thereof. (2) US has long favored self-government or independence for peoples who are qualified to accept consequent responsibilities. Therefore, Dept favorably disposed to solution providing Netherlands sovereignty for limited period and setting date in future for independence of Indonesians, both Republican and non-Republican. Construction of USI under continued Netherlands sovereignty for limited period with view to incorporation independent USI in Neth-Indo Union or Commonwealth system is consonant, in Dept view, with this principle. (3) Dept desires speediest acceleration trade between all of Indonesia and rest of world. This desire of long standing now heightened by tremendous burden imposed on US ability to supply consumer goods under Marshall Plan. In this connection, for your info, careful estimates recently completed by Dept disclose indispensability of NEI as supplier of food and other commodities to meet needs under ERP. Therefore, Dept unfavorably disposed toward any solution which likely to protract existing disorder in NEI. (Para. 2 urtel 68) Not as statements of pertinent US policy but rather as practical suggestions which Dept hopes will be helpful to USDel in making final recommendation following views set forth: ( a ) Dept regards attempts to induce reversal of Dutch program for formation USI in so far as establishment new states concerned is unrealistic and in some respects undesirable; ( b ) Dept believes Dutch will accept plan set forth para 3 urtel 69 if interim period of continued Dutch sovereignty is provided so that Dutch will have opportunity to prepare for end of period of sovereignty, and so that Dutch will have opportunity during interim period to convince Indos of their mutual dependence on each other. If Dutch realize that they are committed to withdrawal at end of interim period they will be constrained to make most genuine possible efforts to lay groundwork for practical voluntary permanent relationship. Dept’s opinion that while Dutch may now hope to organize USI subject Neth sovereignty, they do not expect to remain sovereign in USI for more than few years. It is Dutch hope that USI will remain within a Dutch Commonwealth system, but they are prepared to face contingency that USI will elect complete independence at end of that period, provided that they are given opportunity interim period to demonstrate at least mutual advantages of economic association. Above principles and observations do not appear conflict with proposals already made by GOC in Basic Statement and Annex 1 as described urtel 75. 98 Is Dept correct in assuming under Annex 2 that ( a ) sovereignty of all NEI lodges in Dutch throughout interim period; ( b ) elections under para 5 e would be for purpose of determining whether each area would be autonomous component of USI or part of Republic or other component within USI; ( c ) Final political affiliation within USI of newly created Dutch-sponsored states would be determined by elections envisaged in para 5 e , but administration would remain as presently established? What provisions can, in your judgment, be made to insure adequate protection of civil and property rights within territory to be taken over by Republic for administrative purposes, as suggested para 5( b ) urtel 75? In respect to foregoing following observations may be pertinent: It would seem to us important that question of interim sovereignty be unequivocally settled in any proposed definitive agreement. It seems equally important that administrative control of disputed territories be not returned to Republican authorities without adequate guarantees that orderly conditions will in fact prevail. Dept recognizes that plebiscites to determine political affiliation will inevitably be influenced toward whatever authority holds administrative control at time such plebiscites are held, and considers that conditions for free expression popular will probably less favorable under Republic control than under Dutch. Therefore the status of the newly-created states during interim period seems crucial. Dept commends initiative GOC in suggesting to parties overall program for settlement. Foregoing observations offered in hope that they will prove useful to USDel in discussions occasioned by Dutch and Republican responses to GOC proposals (urtel 75). Send Batavia as 380. Repeat The Hague as 614 (for info. Ambassador or Chargé d’Affaires only). Lovett 97 For telegrams printed, Nos. 67, 68, 69, 73, and 74, see pp. 1085 [ Pg. 1085 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1088 [ Pg. 1088 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] , and 1093 [ Pg. 1093 includes portions of Doc. 883 and Doc. 884 ] , respectively; other telegrams not printed. 98 No. 572, December 27, p. 1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] . Philippines Philippines Contents Cooperation of the United States with the Republic of the Philippines (Documents 890-909) Cooperation of the United States with the Republic of the Philippines Cooperation of the United States with the Republic of the Philippines 1 1 For documentation on the granting by the United States of independence to the Philippines, see Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , pp. 861 ff. For article by Edward W. Mill on “One year of the Philippine Republic”, see Department of State Bulletin , June 29, 1947, p. 1273. [890] The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State Manila, January 13, 1947—9 a.m. 896.51/1–1347: Telegram [891] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines Washington, January 14, 1947—noon. 811.24596/1–1047: Telegram [892] The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State Manila, January 27, 1947. 811.24596/1–2747: Telegram [893] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines Washington, March 5, 1947. 896.51/3–547: Telegram [894] The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State Manila, March 10, 1947. 896.51/3–1047 [895] The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State Manila, March 14, 1947. 811.24596/3–1447: Telegram [896] The Chargé in the Philippines (Davis) to the Secretary of State Manila, April 29, 1947—3 p.m. 896.51/4–2947: Telegram [897] Memorandum by the Counselor (Cohen) to Brigadier General Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Washington, May 16, 1947. 711.96/5–1647 [898] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines Washington, May 19, 1947—7 p.m. 811.24596/4–2947: Telegram [899] The Chargé in the Philippines (Davis) to the Secretary of State Manila, May 21, 1947. 611.9631/5–2147 [900] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines Washington, June 19, 1947. 611.9631/6–1947 [901] President Truman to President Roxas of the Philippines Washington, August 25, 1947. 896.51A/8–2947 [902] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines Washington, September 9, 1947—5 p.m. 711.962/9–947: Telegram [903] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Mill) [Washington,] November 13, 1947. 896.24/11–1347 [904] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines Washington, November 17, 1947. 896.24/9–1247 [905] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines Washington, December 4, 1947—2 p.m. 896.51/11–1747: Telegram [906] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Gay) to Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, Associate Chief of the Division [Washington,] December 10, 1947. 711.962/12–1047 [907] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Mill) [Washington,] December 11, 1947. 896.50/12–1147 [908] The Ambassador in the Philippines (O’Neal) to the Secretary of State Manila, December 20, 1947—11 a.m. 896.51/12–2047: Telegram [909] The Ambassador in the Philippines (O’Neal) to the Secretary of State Manila, December 31, 1947. 611.9631/12–3147 The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State 896.51/1–1347: Telegram [Document 890] The Ambassador in the Philippines ( McNutt ) to the Secretary of State confidential Manila , January 13, 1947—9 a.m. 73. Deptel 38, January 10. 2 Insistence on loan, which so far as now foreseeable could only be repaid in 1952 from new borrowing or reduction currency reserve, appears tantamount ad hoc decision in advance JFC study. Possibility repay or refinance from currency reserve certainly not ruled out, despite provisions reparations act 85 (mytel 459, September 26 3 ), but point is (1) Philippine Govt urgently needs cash now; (2) cannot commit itself repay in 1952 unless and until JFC study shows way, and is accepted by NAC and Philippine Govt; (3) long term loan was definitely in minds Chief Executives and Congressional leaders (Roxas 4 never contemplated anything else). This telegram continues Embtel 69, 5 drafted before receipt Deptel 38, January 10. McNutt 2 See footnote 25, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 943 . 3 Not printed. 4 Manuel A. Roxas, President of the Philippines. 5 Dated January 11, not printed. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines 811.24596/1–1047: Telegram [Document 891] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines top secret Washington , January 14, 1947—noon. 54. Urtel 58 Jan 10. 3 President sent following memo to SecWar 6 Jan 9: “I enclose a copy of a memo dated Dec 24, 1946 7 which I have received from the Secretary of State regarding the policy of this Govt with respect to the withdrawal of our forces from the Phils. In my opinion the information received from Ambassador McNutt should be accepted as an expression of the wishes of the PhilGovt and the Filipino people. It is desired therefore that the WarDept adopt as our settled policy a program of withdrawing as rapidly as possible the major part of our forces in the Phils, in particular from the metropolitan area in and around the city of Manila, but that the limited forces contemplated in paragraph 5 of the memorandum of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army dated Nov 23, 1946 8 be retained in the Phils on such bases as will be available to this Govt under the military base agreement now being considered by the two governments.” Dept memo referred to was résumé Roxas’ position as stated urtel 994 Dec 23. 9 Byrnes 3 Not printed. 6 Robert P. Patterson. 7 Not printed, but see footnote 22, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 940 . 8 See letter from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State, November 29, 1946, and footnote 16, Foreign Relations , 1946, vol. viii , p. 934 . General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was Chief of Staff. 9 Ibid ., p. 939 . The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State 811.24596/1–2747: Telegram [Document 892] The Ambassador in the Philippines ( McNutt ) to the Secretary of State urgent Manila , January 27, 1947. 157. Following is revised portion of President’s speech dealing with military negotiations as scheduled to be delivered today: “We are, as you know, in the midst of negotiations for an agreement for bases for the mutual protection of the Philippines and the United States. Actually, such an agreement is only an implementation of the commitments and agreements made between the Philippine and United States Governments during the war and immediately thereafter. In these commitments and agreements the Philippine Congress has fully concurred. The exact location of the bases and other military establishments to be maintained here by the United States has been engaging the concentrated attention of the officials of both Governments. I am able to report to you that the United States Government has shown every disposition to consider our wishes in this matter. It has in no instance been arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable in the location of the base sites. Recently the American Government showed extreme anxiety regarding press reports that fundamental relations between the Philippines and the United States were being endangered by the presence of American troops here. It is my judgment that those press reports were largely inaccurate. Partly as a consequence of these reports the United States recently expressed herself as perfectly willing to withdraw all military forces from the Philippines, unless we desired otherwise. America, however, recognized her basic commitment to underwrite the security of the Philippines, in accordance with our wishes. When I advised the American Government that the Philippine Congress by unanimous resolution had agreed to the establishment of American bases here, and that the Filipino people desired the retention of these bases, it was decided to carry out the original program. To test the validity of this assurance that I had given, I polled the people in several of the base areas, notably in Guiuan and in Stotsenberg, as to whether they wished the bases to stay. In Guiuan there was a unanimous and full-throated expression of approval. It was the same everywhere I asked. I am informed that this is the sentiment of the people of Olongapo, and Cavite and elsewhere. I have been entirely motivated in these decisions and attitudes by a determination that we must not be left undefended. I cannot, in good conscience, overlook the absolute necessity of guaranteeing our security by every and all means available to us. In this troubled and critical period of world history to do otherwise would be to betray our sacred trust. The establishment of these bases, not for aggression but for, defense, will guarantee our own safety and advance the cause of world peace and security, which is the aim of the United Nations. Present plans, however, provide a much less ambitious schedule of bases than was originally contemplated. I believe that the views of our negotiators will be met; the basic guarantee of Philippine security remains. Since the matter of the conduct of American troops here became of general concern, conditions have rapidly improved to a point where these troops and forces have again become welcome guests in our land. For this, we must thank both the diplomatic representative of the United States in Philippines and Major-General George Moore, 11 whose prompt and energetic actions resulted in a speedy elimination of the causes of difficulties that had existed. Our relations with the United States Army today are satisfactory. The Army and all its personnel are assisting us in every possible way. With few isolated and probably inevitable exceptions, the American troops are conducting themselves in a manner that reflects credit and honor upon the United States Government. The same, of course, also holds true for the United States Navy through the splendid cooperation of Admiral Good. 12 I expect that the base agreement will be signed within a short time. I will then report upon it to the Congress. Immediately following the signature of the base agreement, I shall undertake to reach an agreement with American authorities on a broad military assistance program, in accordance with the terms of the authorization by the United States Congress. This agreement will provide: 1. The United States will send a military mission to advise our Army and Navy in their organization and training; 2. The United States Army will provide our forces with assistance and cooperation during the next 5 years; 3. The United States Navy will turn over to us 84 ships for our off-shore patrol, some of which will be available for use as light-house tenders and customs and immigration patrol boats. Among these ships will be a number of cargo vessels which will enable us to supply our forces stationed on our various islands. While not being used for these purposes, these vessels will be available for the hauling of critical cargo for government purposes. I do not know what we would do, how we could prevent illegal immigration and smuggling, and other illegal practices if these ships were not being made available to us. The United States Navy has but recently completed preliminary training of our off-shore patrol personnel to take over, maintain and operate these vessels.” McNutt 11 Commander, Philippines-Ryukyus Command, United States Army. 12 Rear Adm. Howard Harrison Good, Commander, United States Naval Forces in the Philippines. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines 896.51/3–547: Telegram [Document 893] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines us urgent Washington , March 5, 1947. 272. Elizalde 13 will sign RFC loan agreement at 10 a.m. Thursday, Mar 6. RFC will issue following press release at 2 p.m. Thursday, Washington time: “The Reconstruction Finance Corporation today announced that an agreement had been signed by the Corporation and the Honorable Joaquín M. Elizalde, Philippine Ambassador to the United States, consummating arrangements for a $25 million loan to the Republic of the Philippines, to mature on January 1, 1952, with interest at two percent per annum. The loan is a part of a credit of $75 million which the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized by Congress, by the Act of August 7, 1946, to extend to the Philippine Government to aid the new Republic to meet its immediate financial requirements during the current period of adjustment to its new status as an independent nation. The terms and conditions of the loan were determined in accordance with recommendations of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, which also approved the amount now requested by the Republic of the Philippines. While the Council recognized that the widespread property damage and dislocation of the Philippine economy resulting from the war made it difficult to determine an appropriate maturity date for the loan, the Council, in the light of such information concerning Philippine resources as was available to it at the time, recommended that the loan mature on January 1, 1952. Further data and information on Philippine resources will become available in the near future. A Joint Financial Commission established by agreement between President Truman and President Roxas is at the present time engaged in studying various aspects of Philippine financial problems and will submit a report to the President of the United States and the President of the Philippines.” Above release approved by NAC and Elizalde. Essential that release in Philippines be identical. Method of issuance may be by Emb, by Phil Govt, or by Emb and Phil Govt jointly, whichever is agreeable to Emb and Phil Govt. Release should be timed to permit publication in Friday morning papers in Philippines. Acheson 13 Joaquín M. Elizalde, Philippine Ambassador. The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State 896.51/3–1047 [Document 894] The Ambassador in the Philippines ( McNutt ) to the Secretary of State No. 632 Manila , March 10, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to report that on March 7, the date of the announcement of the signing in Washington of the 25 million dollar loan, President Roxas issued a lengthy statement expanding on the official United States announcement regarding the signing of the loan. The heart of the President’s statement was in his assertion “I view the terms of the loan to be a provisional arrangement; as additional information is made available from studies now under way, a basis will be provided for a review of the terms of this loan.” The original Reconstruction Finance Corporation statement was issued in Manila by the American Embassy after the President had indicated his preference that it be an Embassy release. The press gave major play to the Embassy’s announcement and used the President’s statement in a supplementary position. The text of the Roxas statement follows: Statement by President Roxas Commenting on the Signature of the $25,000,000 Loan From the RFC I have been advised that Ambassador Elizalde today signed the contract for the extension of a $25,000,000 credit to the Philippine Government by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of the United States. I am happy that the negotiations leading to this loan contract have been successfully concluded. The difficulties involved in arriving at a final conclusion to the negotiations arose in large part because this loan was unprecedented on the part of the RFC which has never before extended a loan directly to a foreign government. This loan meets our immediate fiscal needs. Meanwhile I have already directed that an application be made for an additional loan of $50,000,000 to meet the balance of the requirements for the Government for the remainder of this fiscal year. This application will involve the balance of the $75,000,000 authorized by the United States Congress to be lent to us by the RFC. The signature of the loan contract in Washington concludes months of negotiations. The exact terms of the loan were originally prepared in accordance with the recommendations of the United States Government’s National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. The statement issued by the RFC to accompany the signature of the loan contract was worked out in consultation between Ambassador Elizalde and officials of the United States Government. Secretary of the Treasury Snyder, Undersecretary of State Clayton and Representative C. Jasper Bell participated in the preparation of the statement. It is therefore of considerable significance. The statement points out that the date of the maturity of the loan (January 1, 1952) was set on the basis of such information as was available in Washington at the time of the formulation of the recommendations of the National Advisory Council. I view the terms of the loan to be a provisional arrangement; as additional information is made available from studies now under way, a basis will be provided for a review of the terms of this loan. The Joint Philippine-American Financial Commission is now at work gathering and preparing comprehensive data on the status of the finances of the Philippine Government. This material will soon be available for the purpose I have mentioned. My original request was for a loan to mature in 25 years, with amortization of principal to begin in 5 years. Depending on the findings of the Joint Financial Commission, I have every reason to believe that the United States Government will sympathetically consider our desires on this matter in the light of complete factual information which will soon become available. My report to the nation on the state of our fiscal affairs submitted to Congress in the form of a budget message on February 11, 1947, contained a plain statement of our situation requiring loan assistance. With the $75,000,000 we expect to obtain for this fiscal year, we will be able to meet our needs up until June 30, 1947. The Filipino people must be grateful to the United States Government for this much needed assistance. I wish to express my gratitude to President Truman, to Representative Bell, who is the author of the original congressional loan authorization, and to the other high officials of the United States Government for their sympathetic interest in our situation which has reflected itself in the unflagging efforts to arrive with us at a suitable conclusion to the negotiations. Ambassador Elizalde, who has played an extremely able role in this situation, received every attention and found American officials, including President Truman himself, at all times ready to work with us on this matter. I wish also to express our gratitude to Ambassador McNutt and the American Embassy officials in Manila who have consistently and vigorously supported our loan application from the very day of its submission. Respectfully submitted, For the Ambassador: Comdr. Julius C. C. Edelstein , USNR Acting Director of Information and Cultural Relations The Ambassador in the Philippines (McNutt) to the Secretary of State 811.24596/3–1447: Telegram [Document 895] The Ambassador in the Philippines ( McNutt ) to the Secretary of State Manila , March 14, 1947. 448. Following is statement of President Roxas on signing of base agreement: 14 I consider this a truly historic occasion. I have affixed my signature to an agreement which, I trust, for 99 years strengthens our national defense and assures the security of the Philippine Republic. Moreover, by thus cooperating with the United States in upholding the peace of the Pacific, I firmly believe that we assure the peace of the Pacific and our own safety simultaneously. I do not, however, claim for this administration sole credit for this mighty culmination of our hopes and dreams. The signing of this pact today is a logical development of a policy which has been historically followed and supported by our people. Past administrations have implemented and given it vitality. The Philippine Independence Act calls for military arrangements between the Philippines and the United States after independence. The wartime Government of the Commonwealth initiated and approved legislation which directed the specific negotiation of which this pact today is the happy result. The joint resolution of the United States Congress and the joint resolution of the Philippine Congress furnished the legal authority for this agreement. The President of the United States was authorized to establish these bases here. The President of the Philippines was authorized to negotiate for them. I shall submit this agreement to the Senate for its ratification. The course of the negotiations, considering the tremendous import of the subject matter, has at all times been harmonious and agreeable. Many technical details had to be settled. Many strategic questions had to be decided. The Philippine Government successfully maintained and insisted on certain basic requirements, among them that no operating base should be established in or near a major center of population. The United States Government did not, at any point, show an unreasonable attitude even when agreement with our viewpoint required wholesale changes in military dispositions and plans preparations. To meet our objections, the United States Government radically revised its entire construction program in the Philippines. It modified entirely the physical plans which had been laid for the defense of the Philippines. No single aspect of this entire agreement has escaped drastic revision to meet our desires. This Government has been fortunate in its negotiators. Vice President Quirino, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was in complete charge of the negotiations and conducted them with a skill which did him great honor in this most difficult and technical arrangement. He was ably and brilliantly assisted by a committee appointed by me which consisted of the best minds which could be brought to bear upon this subject. They all participated wholeheartedly in the negotiation and contributed in major measure to its success. The Secretary of National Defense, Mr. Kangleon, represented our military requirements. Secretary of Justice Ozaeta lent his legal talents to the discussion. Members of the general staff of the Philippine Army were regularly consulted. I designated as members of the committee four members of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee all of whom took a direct and most vital part in the negotiation. Senator Francisco, Senator Sebastian, Senator Pandatum, and Senator Cabili, representing both political parties, lent the proceedings a completely nonpartisan spirit, as matters involving our broad national interests must necessarily reflect. I am grateful to all whom I have named. The agreement, itself, does not contain the actual real estate descriptions of the base sites, although we have a general understanding that they will be worked out in all specific details in subsequent discussion, on the basis of surveys to be made jointly by technical representatives of both Governments. I cannot, of course, pass over this occasion without mentioning the historic service rendered to us in connection with this agreement by United States Ambassador Paul V. McNutt. Mr. McNutt acted not only as representative of his Government in this negotiation, but, on a number of vital occasions, as our spokesman as well. He was able to undertake such a role, I know, because of the unique relations between our two countries, which, in every major matter makes our essential interests identical. On the eve of his departure from the Philippines, I wish to say how grateful our entire people are for the affection and devotion which Ambassador McNutt has shown in our cause in this and in other matters. I am proud to participate in this important ceremony. I know it is a memorable day in our history. I hail on this occasion the indissoluble ties of mutual interests and respect which will forever bind the Philippines and the United States. McNutt 14 The agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines on military bases was signed at Manila, March 14, by Ambassador McNutt and President Roxas; Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 1775, or 61 Stat. (pt. 4) 4019. For Acting Secretary of State Acheson’s statement on March 14, see Department of State Bulletin , March 23, 1947, p. 554. The agreement was accepted by the United States on June 16 and by the Philippines on January 21, 1948. The Chargé in the Philippines (Davis) to the Secretary of State 896.51/4–2947: Telegram [Document 896] The Chargé in the Philippines ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State confidential Manila , April 29, 1947—3 p.m. 689. For State and Treasury. This is Treasury cable No. 281. Part 1 Philippine Government note dated April 25 received by Embassy April 28 formally requests that the balance of RFC authorized loan amounting to $50 million be made available as soon as possible under the same terms and conditions as the previous loan. The note states that the request has been held in abeyance until an interim report by the Philippine-American Finance Commission could be submitted covering the extent of actual need for the loan. A copy of the interim report of the Commission including its recommendations is enclosed with the note. Part 2 The Commission recommended that the RFC extend a further line of credit of $50 million to the Philippine Government under public law 656 as follows: “1. $35 million to be advanced from time to time on or before June 30, 1947, as requested. 2. An additional $5 million to be advanced on or before June 30, 1947, if requested, provided that the unexpended balances of $5 million of taxes collected by the United States under the provisions of the Sugar Act of 1937 have not been remitted to the Philippine Government. When such balances are remitted, they shall be applied either to the reduction of the line of credit by the amount remitted or to the repayment of any advances made. 3. The additional $10 million of the line of credit to be advanced at any time on or before September 30, 1947 upon delivery to the Reconstruction Finance Corp of a certificate of the Auditor General of the Republic of the Philippines stating the amounts of the following items for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947: ( a ) Ordinary revenues of the general fund consisting of revenues from taxation, after apportionment to the local governments, incidental revenues, earnings and other credits, receipts automatically appropriated. ( b ) Sums transferred after April 1, 1947, to the general fund from other governmental funds, and ( c ) Cash realized from substitution of promissory notes for cash already paid or to be paid by the Philippine Government to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for capital stock subscriptions during fiscal year 1947. The aforesaid $10 million of the line of credit shall be reduced by the dollar equivalent of the amount by which the sum of items ( a ), ( b ) and ( c ) above exceed 125 million pesos. The above recommendation, if adopted by the Reconstruction Finance Corp after consultation with the National Advisory Council, will, in effect, guarantee to the Philippine Government that the 100 million pesos which the Commission believes will be needed will be provided either from advances under the recommended line of credit or from the sources mentioned above. It is impossible at this time to predict accurately what additional funds may become available to the Philippine Government from those sources. The Commission therefore proposes the foregoing formula to obviate borrowing which might prove to have been unnecessary upon determination of the availability of other funds. The Commission recommends that loans advanced under this line of credit be made at an interest rate of 2 percent and be repayable July 1, 1953, except as earlier repayment may be required under the provisions of paragraph 2 above. The Commission does not recommend any change in the terms or conditions of the loan agreement signed March 5, 1947.” Part 3 The Embassy replied with a note to the Philippine Government April 29 calling attention to the advisability of agreement between the official loan request and the recommendations of the Finance Commission. Reference was also made to the advice received that the 5 million dollars of taxes collected by the US under the provisions of the Sugar Act of 1937 will be remitted to the Philippine Government probably within a week, thus immediately reducing the size of the estimated deficit. Part 4 Copies of loan request with supporting financial data, the report of the Finance Commission and the Embassy note of April 29 being forwarded via airpouch today. 15 Davis 15 Despatch 748, April 29, from Manila, not printed. The balance of the credit was authorized on June 12. Memorandum by the Counselor (Cohen) to Brigadier General Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State 711.96/5–1647 [Document 897] Memorandum by the Counselor ( Cohen ) to Brigadier General Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State Washington , May 16, 1947. Re: Memoranda submitted by Ambassador McNutt. 16 1. Ambassador McNutt’s general observations on Foreign Policy suggests the importance, in developing and extending our foreign aid programs and policies, of putting primary emphasis on the fact that these programs and policies are designed to enable the countries aided to safeguard and promote their own political and economic independence, not to make them our satellites but to keep them from becoming satellites of any power. Such measures of control as we require are intended only to ensure that the funds are used for these purposes. 2. Mr. McNutt significantly points out that despite the widespread sense of gratitude to America for her war and post-war contributions there is great envy of America’s economic power. It is difficult for our people to understand why this feeling should exist, and not to resent it. This feeling of envy which is a great handicap to us can be combatted only by helping these countries out of their present economic distress and making them feel that they as well as we have a real stake in a free world. 3. Mr. McNutt’s comment on the lack of appreciation and understanding of our relations to the Philippines is another illustration of the need of an effective Voice of America. It is, however, only one aspect of American policy which is not adequately understood. 4. I agree that Mr. McNutt’s memoranda should be circulated through the regular Department’s channels. 17 16 Reference is to Ambassador McNutt’s memorandum dated May 6 to the Secretary on the subject of “Report on the Philippines” (not printed). The memorandum briefly covered the Ambassador’s trip from Manila, March 22, by way of southern Asia and Europe to Washington, followed by “general observations with regard to the Philippines” encountered en route, and “general recommendations”. A second, undated, memorandum was entitled “General Observations on Foreign Policy.” 17 Notation on the original by the Secretary of State: “OK for circulation of his memo. GCM” The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines 811.24596/4–2947: Telegram [Document 898] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines restricted u.s. urgent Washington , May 19, 1947—7 p.m. 582. You many inform Roxas that although Article 13 18 gives United States exclusive jurisdiction “in time of war” and United States is now legally at war this Government has no intention of claiming such jurisdiction as it was not understanding of parties to agreement that Article 13(6) should apply during present war. Dept does not consider that this has any bearing on or is a precedent for lease case mentioned your 687, Apr. 29 19 since question in that case is what was intention of parties to lease contract. Pass to Army and Navy. Marshall 18 Reference is to the agreement on military bases signed March 14. 19 Not printed. The Chargé in the Philippines (Davis) to the Secretary of State 611.9631/5–2147 [Document 899] The Chargé in the Philippines ( Davis ) to the Secretary of State No. 833 Manila , May 21, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to transmit herewith 20 a copy of the note of May 16, 1947 addressed to the Embassy by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines, and its enclosure, Resolution of Both Houses in Joint Session, Second Session, First Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, adopted April 9, 1947. The note officially informs the Government of the United States that the Filipino people, at an election held on March 11, 1947, approved the amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines in accordance with the terms of Article VII of the “Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines concerning trade and related matters during a transitional period following the institution of Philippine Independence” signed on July 4, 1946. 21 The Embassy, in telegram No. 801, May 20, 1947, copy attached, notified the Department of the receipt of the above note on May 17, 1947 and requested the Department’s instructions regarding further promulgation of the constitutional amendment. A copy of the Resolution of Both Houses, First Session, First Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, adopted September 18, 1946, proposing the amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines, is also enclosed. Respectfully yours, Nathaniel P. Davis 20 Enclosures not printed. 21 Despatch 1109, August 20, from Manila reported that in a substitute note a sentence was added as follows: “The constitutional amendment became effective on April 9, 1947, the date when the Congress of the Philippines certified that the same had been approved by the Filipino people.” (611.9631/8–2047) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines 611.9631/6–1947 [Document 900] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines secret No. 405 Washington , June 19, 1947. The Secretary of State refers to the Department’s instruction No. 256 of March 7, 1947 22 concerning the interpretation of paragraph 4 of Article X of the United States-Philippine Agreement on Trade. With respect to the interpretation of paragraph 4, the Department has taken the position that as a general rule it should not recommend to the President that he suspend part or all of the Agreement, or use a threat of terminating the Agreement as a means of protecting American nationals and business interests, except in cases of failure of the Philippines to grant American nationals and business interests: ( a ) most-favored-nation treatment; ( b ) such national treatment rights as may be specifically accorded in treaties and agreements between the United States and the Philippines, particularly the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, which it is hoped will be negotiated in the near future; ( c ) pending the conclusion of the United States-Philippine Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, national treatment in those matters customarily the subject of such treatment in more recent United States treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation; ( d ) national treatment in matters with respect to which Philippine nationals and business interests are granted national treatment in the United States. It is contemplated that the above policy decision would be subject to review in the event that a satisfactory treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Philippines is not concluded within a reasonable time. This policy guide has been formulated for the confidential use of officers of the Department and the Embassy in dealing with current problems relating to the rights of American businessmen and the meaning of “discrimination” as used in the Agreement on Trade. It is not deemed advisable to inform the Philippine Government of the above policy decision at the present time, in part, because if it knew of the position taken this Government’s bargaining power in commercial treaty negotiations would be impaired. 22 Not printed. President Truman to President Roxas of the Philippines 896.51A/8–2947 [Document 901] President Truman to President Roxas of the Philippines 23 Washington , August 25, 1947. Dear Mr. President : It is about a year since we exchanged letters concerning the financial problems of your country and the establishment of a Joint Finance Commission to explore these problems and to make recommendations to our two Governments. 24 In the intervening time, the Commission has completed its report 25 and the American members have just reported to me personally. I am highly pleased at the Commission’s findings concerning the basically sound financial condition of your country, its great opportunity to achieve rapid economic development and the very substantial progress which your Administration has made in the past year in putting the Government’s finances in order. The Joint Finance Commission’s report outlines a challenging program of the broadest scope. At the same time, it makes clear the almost unique opportunity which the Philippine economy has over the next few years to forge ahead in its industrial, agricultural and social development. I want you to know that this Government has every hope that your country may succeed fully in achieving this objective. Mr. Snyder, the Chairman of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, has advised me of the sympathetic and favorable reaction of the Council to the program. As the Joint Finance Commission report outlines the problem, the job is very largely up to your Government in putting to best use the resources of your country. This will be a task of considerable technical complexity. If you find that you need technical assistance and wish this Government to furnish it, I hope that you will inform me of your requirements. I know that it will be a source of the highest personal satisfaction to you and to all who are associated with you to be able to lead in the carrying out of this program which offers such great promise to the Filipino people. With best wishes for your success, I am Very sincerely yours, Harry S. Truman 23 Transmitted to Manila in instruction 498, August 29, for delivery to President Roxas. 24 See press release of November 4, 1946, Department of State Bulletin , November 17, 1946, p. 921. 25 The report of June 7, printed in House document No. 390; for summary, see ibid. , July 20, 1947, p. 146. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines 711.962/9–947: Telegram [Document 902] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines confidential Washington , September 9, 1947—5 p.m. 1003. Dept considering and has mentioned to Phil negotiators desirability of omitting from treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation the provision dealing with copyright, para 2 of Art VIII and instead to conclude separate agreement under which each country assures other of protection of its copyright laws and President of US would issue proclamation under sections 8 and 1( e ) of US law of 1909. 26 Chief reasons are that this course would be more in accord with general US policy for extending copyright protection to citizens of other countries and, in present case, lends itself to retroactive assurances that there has been no cessation of such protection. Such assurances believed important to US interests. Phil copyright law of 1924, sections 2 and 10, specifically protects citizens of US. Phil negotiators raise question, however, whether application to US citizens has been repealed by general Phil legislation (presumably Republic Act No. 76) extinguishing all rights of US citizens not enjoyed by foreigners generally. Telegraph soon as possible whether Phil Govt regards its copyright law as continuingly applicable to US citizens and, if not, when ceased be applicable. Dept has only Library of Congress print of Phil law of 1924 and had understood that only alteration is act approved June 20, 1947 (Republic Act No. 167), relating only to administration. Please mail copies all legislation now in force relating copyright and such administrative orders and judicial decisions (if any) as pertain to copyright. Your comment in premises invited. Dept understands Phil negotiators are inquiring of their Govt regarding applicability of Phil copyright law to citizens of US and asking instructions. Additional material for Emb’s general information follows by mail. 27 Marshall 26 For President Truman’s proclamation No. 2819, October 21, 1948, which dealt with the copyright matter, see 62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1568. A revised draft of the treaty had been given the Philippine Embassy on July 15 and had been sent to Manila in instruction 450, July 18 (not printed). 27 Instruction 516, September 18, to Manila, not printed. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Mill) 896.24/11–1347 [Document 903] Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs ( Mill ) confidential [ Washington ,] November 13, 1947. Dr. Maloles of the Philippine Embassy 28 called me this afternoon to inquire if any progress had been made by the Department in determining the answer to be made to the Embassy’s note of May 13, 1947, 29 formally requesting military assistance to the Philippines to the extent of $9,440,667.98 covering subsistence, clothing, and fuel required by the Philippine Army for the fiscal year 1948. In reply to Dr. Maloles’ question I told him that the matter presented in the Embassy note had been given the most careful study and consideration in the Department and that the request of the Philippine Government was very much in the minds of the concerned officials of the Department. Without mentioning the specific SWNCC subcommittee, I told him that there had been several committee meetings in the Department on this subject and that the request for assistance was still under deliberation. I also pointed out that Mr. Ely 30 may have some further information regarding this request when he returns from Manila. ( Comment: This is the first such request for information concerning the status of this note made to the Department since the submission of the note under reference. Mr. Ely and I have considered it significant previously that the Philippine Government had made no inquiry regarding the disposition of this note of the Embassy. Mr. Ely was of the opinion that the failure of the Philippine Government to inquire concerning this note may have indicated their lack of belief that the assistance requested would actually be granted.) 28 Dr. Octavio L. Maloles, Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy. 29 Not printed. 30 Richard R. Ely, Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines 896.24/9–1247 [Document 904] The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines secret No. 31 Washington , November 17, 1947. Sir : Reference is made to Public Law No. 454, known as the Republic of the Philippines Military Assistance Act, and to the Military Assistance Agreement signed between the Philippines and the United States on March 21, 1947. 31 It is now desired to inform you of the present status of plans to extend certain additional military assistance to the Philippines in accordance with the aforesaid Act and Agreement and to ascertain your views with regard to a specific Philippine request for assistance and your views with regard to the long-range military plans of this Government in the Philippines. As you are aware, the Philippine Ambassador to the United States in a note to the Secretary of State of May 13, 1947 formally submitted on behalf of his Government a request for military assistance to the Philippines to the extent of $9,440,667.98 covering subsistence, clothing, and fuel required by the Philippine Army for the fiscal year 1948. A copy of the Philippine Ambassador’s note is enclosed. 32 Following the receipt of the Ambassador’s note, a SWNCC subcommittee was created to study the policy which should be followed and the reply which should be made to the Ambassador’s note. This subcommittee has held several sessions at which the whole question of military assistance to the Philippines was thoroughly considered. In the study made by the subcommittee and in its deliberations, full attention was given to the views and information on the matter supplied by the Chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Philippines. As the study of the situation progressed, it became apparent to the subcommittee that it would be exceedingly difficult to grant the request for assistance contained in the Ambassador’s note of May 13, 1947. In the view of the subcommittee, the report and recommendations of the Joint Philippine-American Finance Commission failed to provide adequate justification for the extension of the type of assistance requested by the Philippines in the Ambassador’s note. With the adjournment of the United States Congress late in July, the possibility of presenting the matter to the appropriate committees of the Congress passed, at least until a new session of Congress in January. Even had the Congress been in session, there was no unanimity of feeling that the Philippine request could justifiably be brought to the attention of the Congress under present circumstances. Agreement was general on the point that, however deserving of attention the Philippine request might be, it would, if granted at all, have to be reduced to the extent of perhaps fifty to seventy per cent of the original Philippine request. In the discussions of the SWNCC subcommittee, it has been emphasized that the total denial of the Philippine request was fraught with possible ominous political consequences. In a paper presented to the SWNCC subcommittee by the representative of the Department of State, the following statement on the subject was made: “The United States Government has in the good will of the Filipino people an asset of tremendous value in the development of our Far Eastern foreign policy. A cardinal objective of this Government is to maintain and strengthen the type of good will which now exists between the two countries. While war was going on and the United States was in great need of the support of the Filipino people, this country pledged all its resources to make Philippine independence, promised for July 4, 1946, effective and meaningful. President Roosevelt, three weeks after Pearl Harbor, declared, ‘I give to the people of the Philippines my solemn pledge that their freedom will be redeemed and their independence established and protected.’ The President also recommended to the Congress that certain military bases be retained by the United States in the Philippines after independence. It was also subsequently recommended that a program of military assistance be developed for the Philippines. The Congress responded to the requests of the President in this regard and passed Public Laws 380 and 454 providing for military bases and military assistance. Following the congressional authorization, agreements regarding military bases and military assistance were signed at Manila between the two governments on March 14 and March 21, 1947 respectively. “The Philippine request of May 13, 1947 is in conformance with the Military Assistance Agreement. It is made in good faith and according to the pledges of this Government.” The subcommittee has been impressed and made duly cognizant of the point of view expressed by the representative of the Department of State and has given this point of view its sympathetic consideration. The subcommittee, nevertheless, felt that it would be most difficult to accede to the Philippine request for such reasons as have been previously mentioned. To sum up, the present attitude of the SWNCC subcommittee with regard to the Philippine request may be said to be as follows: 1. It is recognized that the Philippine request has important political implications. 2. At the same time, it is believed to be impossible to accede to the full Philippine request. 3. It is considered significant that no inquiry has been received from the Philippine Government since the submission of the original Philippine note of May 13. 33 In view of the findings of the Joint Philippine-American Finance Commission, President Roxas may realize that his chances of getting the assistance requested are not very good. 4. The question of whether any part of the assistance requested by the Philippines is to be granted is still under consideration; the prospect of even a portion of the assistance being granted at this time is not good. The Department has even had under consideration the possibility of making no formal reply to the request in question. This would be done simply by withdrawing the proposal from the SWNCC subcommittee and merely holding it in inactive status. The examination of this particular Philippine request by the SWNCC subcommittee has brought to the fore the much broader and important question of the extent to which this Government is actually committed to military assistance and operations in the Philippines. It is strongly believed by the Department that the Philippine Government and Filipino people in general have gained a most mistaken idea regarding the extent to which this Government is committed to extending military assistance to the Philippines. It is considered altogether undesirable and unwise that such a feeling of utter and complete dependence on the United States should be allowed to persist. General MacArthur 34 in a telegram to the War Department of July 26, 1947 suggested that the Philippine Government be informed more definitely as to what the plans of the United States Government were in the Philippines. The Department has shared this concern that the Filipinos be made more aware of our actual military plans in the Philippines. The views of the Department of State and of other concerned officials in the Government are accordingly brought to your attention in order that you may be fully acquainted with the position of your Government in this important matter. The Embassy’s despatches No. 1120 of August 23, 1947 and No. 1185 of September 12, 1947 35 have been carefully noted and are in the opinion of the Department further evidence of the need for reaching some sort of clarification between the Philippines and the United States concerning the exact military program of the two governments in the Philippines. As one step in this direction, the Department believes that consideration should be given to the possibility of informing the Philippine Government that in our best judgment the military strength which we formerly concurred in as a minimum for the Philippines is not only larger than that Government requires but larger than the resources of the Philippines from a financial viewpoint justify. The military estimate of the situation prepared by the United States Military Advisory Group to the Philippines and transmitted to the War Department by Colonel R. H. Kreuter, Military Attaché, under date of August 15, 1947, contains the statement that “It is further agreed that since the Republic desires to have an Army, the most feasible plan is to develop a small military organization within the financial capabilities of the Republic, which can train a reserve civilian army capable of conducting resistance to any aggression, pending aid from the United Nations or other friendly powers.” It would appear to be most desirable that this program for the Republic be carried into effect, and if the Philippine Government insists on carrying through a much larger military program, it is possible that this Government may have to inform the Philippine Government very frankly that it may be counting on assistance from this Government in maintaining its military organization which for a number of reasons will not be forthcoming. You are requested to give careful study and consideration to the views expressed in this instruction and to advise the Department of your views in the matters under reference. Pending further instructions from the Department, no discussions of this matter should be undertaken with the Government of the Philippines. Very truly yours, For the Secretary of State: Norman Armour 31 At Manila; 61 Stat. (pt. 3) 3283, or Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1662. 32 Not printed. 33 This instruction (No. 31) was drafted before the inquiry recorded in the memorandum supra. 34 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan. 35 Neither printed. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines 896.51/11–1747: Telegram [Document 905] The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines confidential us urgent Washington , December 4, 1947—2 p.m. 1259. Amb Elizalde called on Asst Sec Armour Nov 17 and showed Asst Sec copy confidential tel from Pres Roxas instructing him approach Pres Truman and Sec Marshall with view to obtaining additional US financial assistance to extent of 200 million dollars outright grant or 500 million credit. Amb discussed at considerable length economic situation of Phils and stated that US assistance previously given was altogether insufficient particularly with regard to war damage payments. According to Amb economic situation Phils causing great unrest especially among unemployed. Amb repeatedly referred to US assistance to European Govts and China and stressed Phils had every right seek comparable aid. When mention was made of Joint Phil-Amer Financial Report, which indicates no further immediate financial assistance to Phils is warranted, Amb stated report deals primarily with long-range problems. Please seek suitable occasion to discuss matter with Pres Roxas mentioning fact that Amb has raised matter confidentially with Dept. Note that Amb failed specify purposes for which assistance requested and point out US Govt cannot seriously consider request not accompanied by detailed statement purposes and requirements. You should explain to Pres Roxas that Dept’s policy is guided by recommendations Joint Finance Commission report which signed by both American and Filipino members including Finance Secy and Budget Commissioner Philgov. Report specifically states (p. 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 8 ] ) that it “deals primarily with the immediate future” and not merely with long-range problems. For your guidance Dept cannot consider request for financial assistance for unspecified requirements in absence of demonstrated need. Dept not favorably impressed by Amb’s justification of request consisting of vague assertions regarding employment economic conditions and communist propaganda and references large amounts aid going other countries. Also for your confidential info Amb stated he had taken up possibility of congressional action on such loan or grant with Senator Tydings 36 who, he stated, had assured him he would do what he could to assist Phils in this regard. Amb stated he had also queried Tydings on possibility of his (Amb’s) taking matter up with Pres Truman and that Tydings had told him it would be best not to do this and that he (Tydings) would speak to Pres Truman regarding Phil request. Amb now scheduled leave Wash Dec 15 for Manila and has also been asked confer with you on matter. Lovett 36 Millard B. Tydings (Democrat) of Maryland, co-author of Philippine Independence Act and Chairman of Philippine Celebration Commission. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy (Gay) to Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, Associate Chief of the Division 711.962/12–1047 [Document 906] Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy ( Gay ) to Mr. Woodbury Willoughby, Associate Chief of the Division [ Washington ,] December 10, 1947. Status of Treaty Negotiations With the Philippines Summary: No negotiating meetings have been held since July 30, 1947, at which time the Department considered negotiations practically completed. Developments since July 30: August 1—The Philippine negotiators sent a comprehensive report to President Roxas and asked for instructions with respect to further negotiations. August 8–August 22—Department sent two telegrams to the Embassy at Manila in hope that Embassy might be able to expedite Roxas’ instructions to the Filipino negotiators. August 25—U.S. Embassy reported results of conversation with Roxas who indicated treaty before him for prompt decision. October 1—U.S. Embassy reported treaty discussed briefly with Roxas repeating previous concern regarding practice of professions because of Chinese situation. Quirino 37 suggested completion negotiations and signature Manila. October 8—Department replied, while U.S. would be glad to sign treaty in Washington, no objection signing in Manila particularly if negotiations would be facilitated. Since negotiations have been carried to an advanced stage with Philippine Embassy, every effort should be made to avoid reopening entire treaty. December 8—Dr. Maloles advised Department of receipt of message approximately December 2 that the “treaty is being taken care of at Manila”. 38 37 Vice President Elpidio Quirino, Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 38 In a memorandum of December 31, Mr. Gay reported that “Mr. Ely strongly advised sending a negotiator to Manila to complete negotiations.” (711.962/12–3147) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Mill) 896.50/12–1147 [Document 907] Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs ( Mill ) confidential [ Washington ,] December 11, 1947. Ambassador Elizalde called on Mr. Armour today and briefly discussed several matters of interest to his government. He opened the conversation by referring to the Philippine Rehabilitation Act, or the “Philippine War Damage Act”, as he termed it, and particularly singled out for discussion Section 104 of the Act which grants priority in award to claimants with claims less than $500. He strongly criticized this latter provision and said that it was responsible for retarding much of the economic rehabilitation of the islands. He said that claimants obtaining these payments of less than $500 were spending their awards very loosely and contributing to an inflationary situation while at the same time the businessmen who needed funds to rehabilitate the sugar mills and other industrial enterprises of the islands were forced to defer plans for rehabilitation of their businesses. He said further that there were so many claimants for awards under $500 that there would undoubtedly be no money left for payments to businessmen after the smaller claims had been paid off. The Ambassador said that he was not trying to blame Congress for the war damage provisions for, according to the Ambassador, many people, including “some people in our own government”, were responsible for this “mistake” regarding the $500 priority award. The Ambassador stated in summary on this subject that “I served seven years in Congress and the War Damage Act is the worst piece of legislation I have ever seen.” Mr. Armour stated that former Minister-Counselor Nathaniel P. Davis had been in to see him a few days ago and that Mr. Davis had informed him that considerable progress was being made by the United States rehabilitation agencies operating in the Philippines under Title III of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act. The Ambassador acknowledged that considerable progress was being made by the US rehabilitation agencies. He said, however, that President Roxas thought that the 120 million dollars authorized under Title III would have to be at least doubled in order for the work of the rehabilitation agencies to be effectively carried out. Mr. Armour stated that he had also heard that the copra industry was reviving rapidly in the Philippines. The Ambassador said that this was true but that copra was an exception. In reply to a further question from Mr. Armour concerning progress being made in the hemp and sugar industries, the Ambassador acknowledged that the hemp industry was making a considerable recovery, but he stated that the sugar industry was way behind and that exportations of sugar were just now beginning. In connection with the export of copra to this country, the Ambassador brought up the matter of a first-person note which he has sent to the Acting Secretary of State protesting a reduction in the rate of duty on coconut oil imported from other countries, which new duty is contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade approved at Geneva and due to become effective in this country on January 1, 1948. Mr. Butterworth 39 advised the Ambassador that we had not yet received this note. The Ambassador referred several times during the conversation and at the conclusion of the conversation to the Philippine request for additional financial assistance made to Mr. Armour on November 17, 1947. He stated that he had been advised by President Roxas that Ambassador O’Neal 40 had talked to the President concerning the Philippine request. Mr. Armour stated that we had informed Ambassador O’Neal of the Philippine request and had requested him to talk to President Roxas on this matter. Mr. Butterworth advised the Ambassador that we had had no reply from Ambassador O’Neal except to the effect that he expected to talk with President Roxas soon. Mr. Butterworth suggested that Ambassador O’Neal might be transmitting a reply to the Department in the form of a despatch and that this was the reason we had not heard more from Ambassador O’Neal on the matter. The Ambassador stated that we would undoubtedly soon hear from Ambassador O’Neal and that we would know more fully then of the reasons for the request for additional assistance made by the Philippine Government. 39 W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. 40 Emmet O’Neal had succeeded Paul V. McNutt as Ambassador to the Philippines. The Ambassador in the Philippines (O’Neal) to the Secretary of State 896.51/12–2047: Telegram [Document 908] The Ambassador in the Philippines ( O’Neal ) to the Secretary of State confidential Manila , December 20, 1947—11 a.m. 1623. Reference Deptel 1259, December 4. Interview arranged with President Roxas December 17 on request for financial aid. President revealed dissatisfaction with procedure for getting aid on project basis referring specifically to technical requirements for obtaining Eximbank loans regarding these requirements as onerous. He pictured procedure under which Eximbank would rediscount paper of miscellaneous type previously discounted by RFC or similar Philippine institution, consisting of industrial mortgages, home residential loans and loans on small commercial or agricultural properties. He stated unfortunate that current excellent revenue collections Philippine Government resulting Philippines penalized as recipient financial aid. Embassy pointed out that sound business loans on specific projects accorded with United States foreign investment policy; hence advisable request loans not on basis charity but on prospect of affording fair investment return. He made clear on such basis substantial loans might be forthcoming and this procedure far superior to requesting merely grandiose sum for purpose or purposes not clearly defined. He characterized suggestion of President about making large number of small loans by Philippine institution which might be rediscounted under government guarantee as procedure followed in United States with success and that it appeared feasible. (It was explained, however, Eximbank had not previously engaged this type financing.) It was agreed matter would be explored further and in detail with Philippine Secretary Finance with view to setting forth specific projects, amounts and categories. President referred to plans for creation central bank stating draft legislation would be presented to Philippine Congress forthcoming session. He has requested loan of two advisers from Federal Reserve Board to serve several months without cost Philippine Government. Roxas indicated intention central bank to be promotional in nature and would aid in launching new industrial enterprises as well as managing currency. It was pointed out to him delineation of functions desirable and central bank activities should not overlap functions PNB or RFC. President indicated conviction some form import control necessary but under no circumstances would any action be taken to endanger special trade agreement between United States and Philippines. He expressed alarm action might be taken at Habana which would reduce value of preferences currently existing. 41 Ely agreed consult other Department officials and report exact status current negotiations multi-lateral general agreement on tariff and trade. O’Neal 41 For documentation on United States policy looking toward establishment of an International Trade Organization, see vol. i . The Ambassador in the Philippines (O’Neal) to the Secretary of State 611.9631/12–3147 [Document 909] The Ambassador in the Philippines ( O’Neal ) to the Secretary of State No. 1418 Manila , December 31, 1947. Sir : I have the honor to report that the office of President Roxas released the following statement to the press on December 19, 1947, concerning the trade agreement between the United States and the Philippines: “The President has expressed great satisfaction this afternoon when he read the statement made by President Truman at a press conference in Washington yesterday, giving assurances that the preferential trade agreement between the Philippines and the United States would not in any way be altered by any decisions which might be made at the ITO conference in Havana. 42 It would be recalled that President Roxas protested vigorously against attempt in connection with the ITO Charter to modify the trade preferences between the Philippines and the United States for the duration of the trade agreement, and that he had instructed Secretary Abello, who is now head of the Philippine delegation in Havana not to sign any agreement which might in any way disturb our preferential trade with the United States or prejudice the interests of the Philippines. “The President expressed appreciation of the attitude of President Truman and remarked that he is grateful to Ambassador O’Neal with whom he and the Vice-President had conferred on this subject for his cooperation in bringing this matter to the attention of the President of the United States.” At the same time, the Department of Foreign Affairs released the following telegram which it received on December 18, 1947, from the Philippine Embassy in Washington: “2129 Reurad 4286 President Truman at press conference today flatly denied UniStates has any intention abandoning its treaty under which Philippines gets certain preferential treatment from UniStates. President declared there is not a word of truth in any report that the Administration has in mind abandoning this treaty. He added it would not abandon the treaty as long as he was President. “State Department transmitted Ambassador O’Neal’s message American Delegation Havana. Before Truman made statement reaction of Division Commercial Policy Department informally expressed to us was that on basis of Draft Charter approved Geneva there should be no ground for apprehension in this regard as under article 16 paragraph 2 subparagraph b preferences granted Philippines pursuant trade agreement will not be eliminated. They suggest there might be misunderstanding on interpretation. We have arranged for conference tomorrow between Embassy representatives and State Department experts on the subject. Will inform you further.” On the occasion of a subsequent informal meeting with President Roxas he assured me personally of his appreciation of the prompt and definite action taken by our Government in this regard. Press comments on the subject have been reported in Embassy despatch No. 1397 dated December 22, 1948. 43 Respectfully yours, Emmet O’Neal 42 See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry Truman, 1947 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 514, document No. 236. 43 Not printed. Exchange of Ambassadors between the United States and Siam Exchange of Ambassadors between the United States and Siam [Elevation of the Legations at Bangkok and Washington to the rank of Embassy took place on March 26; the new Siamese Ambassador, Prince Wan Waithyakon, presented his credentials to President Truman on April 18, and the American Ambassador to Siam, Edwin F. Stanton, formerly Minister, presented his credentials to the Siamese Council of Regency on May 9.] Index Index Abbey, Glenn A., 1078 [ Pg. 1078 includes portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] Acheson, Dean G.: Burma, 20–22 [ Pgs. 20–22 include portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] French Indo-China, 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , and Doc. 60 ] , 58–59 [ Pgs. 58–59 include portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , and Doc. 102 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Japan: Occupation and control, 189–190 [ Pgs. 189–190 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] , 192–194 [ Pgs. 192–194 include portions of Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , and Doc. 195 ] , 198–201 [ Pgs. 198–201 include portions of Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 205 n [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 209–211 [ Pgs. 209–211 include portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210 ] , 220–221 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 239 ] ; peace treaty, 448 n [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] ; war claims and reparations, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 372 n [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 380 [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 380 n [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 383–385 [ Pgs. 383–385 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , and Doc. 321 ] , 387–388 [ Pgs. 387–388 include portions of Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , and Doc. 323 ] , 408 n [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Korea, 620–623 [ Pgs. 620–623 include portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , and Doc. 477 ] , 625 [ Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 477 and Doc. 478 ] , 626 n [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 628–631 [ Pgs. 628–631 include portions of Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , and Doc. 482 ] Netherlands East Indies, 900–902 [ Pgs. 900–902 include portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 904–906 [ Pgs. 904–906 include portions of Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , and Doc. 706 ] , 911–913 [ Pgs. 911–913 include portions of Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , and Doc. 715 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 918–919 [ Pgs. 918–919 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , and Doc. 722 ] , 941–942 [ Pgs. 941–942 include portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 944–945 [ Pgs. 944–945 include portions of Doc. 743 and Doc. 744 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 766 ] , 973 n [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] Philippines, 1105–1106 [ Pgs. 1105–1106 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1108 n [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 895 ] Acly, R. Austin, 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] , 48 n [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Ahn Chai Hong, 676–678 [ Pgs. 676–678 include portions of Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , and Doc. 522 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , and Doc. 575 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] Albania, 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 614 ] Ali, Asaf, 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 974 n [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] Allen, Richard H. S., 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 931–932 [ Pgs. 931–932 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] Allied Council for Japan. See under Japan . Allied Powers, 596–597 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 540 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] Allison, John M., 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 449–450 [ Pgs. 449–450 include portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 592 n [ Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 620 n [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 713–714 [ Pgs. 713–714 include portions of Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , and Doc. 552 ] , 734–736 [ Pgs. 734–736 include portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , and Doc. 557 ] , 766 n [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 784 n [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 601 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 831–832 [ Pgs. 831–832 include portions of Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] American Republics, question of participation in Japanese peace conference, 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379 ] Andrus, J. Russell, 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Angaur Island. See under Japan : Occupation and control . Argentina, 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379 ] Armour, Norman, 470–471 [ Pgs. 470–471 include portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 783 and Doc. 784 ] , 997–998 [ Pgs. 997–998 include portions of Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , and Doc. 799 ] , 1120 [ Pg. 1120 includes portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] , 1122–1123 [ Pgs. 1122–1123 include portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] Arnold, Maj. Gen. A. V., 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] Arranz, Melecio, 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] Ashida, Hitoshi, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] Atcheson, George, Jr.: Death of, 287 n [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 261 ] 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] Japan: Occupation and control, 156–161 [ Pgs. 156–161 include portions of Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 157 n [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 164–166 [ Pgs. 164–166 include portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , and Doc. 174 ] , 171 n [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 186–191 [ Pgs. 186–191 include portions of Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 194–197 [ Pgs. 194–197 include portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197 ] , 199–200 [ Pgs. 199–200 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 203–204 [ Pgs. 203–204 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 212–214 [ Pgs. 212–214 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 226–227 [ Pgs. 226–227 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 229–234 [ Pgs. 229–234 include portions of Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 238–243 [ Pgs. 238–243 include portions of Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , and Doc. 232 ] , 242 n [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 246–251 [ Pgs. 246–251 include portions of Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , and Doc. 238 ] , 253–257 [ Pgs. 253–257 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 265 n [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 266–269 [ Pgs. 266–269 include portions of Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , and Doc. 251 ] , 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 261 ] ; Peace Conference, 475–476 [ Pgs. 475–476 include portions of Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , and Doc. 390 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] ; peace treaty, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 448 n [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 452–453 [ Pgs. 452–453 include portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 460–461 [ Pgs. 460–461 include portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 461 n [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 376 ] , 466 [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] ; war claims and reparations, 352–353 [ Pgs. 352–353 include portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 383–384 [ Pgs. 383–384 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 404–406 [ Pgs. 404–406 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , and Doc. 339 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] Atherton, Ray, 880–883 [ Pgs. 880–883 include portions of Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , and Doc. 685 ] , 883 n [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] , 886–887 [ Pgs. 886–887 include portions of Doc. 685 and Doc. 686 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 689 ] , 889 n [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 689 ] Attlee, Clement R.: Burma, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 6–10 [ Pgs. 6–10 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , and Doc. 9 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] ; Canada, 881–882 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 684 ] ; Japan, 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 928 n [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] Aung, Le, 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Aung San, U, 1–4 [ Pgs. 1–4 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , and Doc. 4 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 12–15 [ Pgs. 12–15 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 18–19 [ Pgs. 18–19 include portions of Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 21–22 [ Pgs. 21–22 include portions of Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 28 [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 31–32 [ Pgs. 31–32 include portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 33 n [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 34–36 [ Pgs. 34–36 include portions of Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , and Doc. 41 ] , 36 n [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 74 ] Aung Zan Wei, 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Auriol, Vincent, 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Austin, Warren R.: Korea, 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 832–833 [ Pgs. 832–833 include portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 837 n [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 674 and Doc. 675 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 1047 n [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1053 n [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1053–1064 [ Pgs. 1053–1064 include portions of Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , and Doc. 860 ] , 1056 n [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] , 1062 n [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 858 ] Australia: Japan. See under Japan : Occupation and control ; Peace Conference ; Peace Treaty ; and War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests . Korea. See under Korea . Netherlands East Indies. See under Netherlands East Indies . Austria, 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] Ba Maw, 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Ba Pe, U, 6–7 [ Pgs. 6–7 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] , 13 [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 30–31 [ Pgs. 30–31 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] Ba Sein, Thakin, 2 [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] , 7–9 [ Pgs. 7–9 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 11–12 [ Pgs. 11–12 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 14–15 [ Pgs. 14–15 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] Bacon, Ruth E., 454 n [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] Bailey, John A., 442–445 [ Pgs. 442–445 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] Bajpai, Sir Girja Shankar, 985 [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 990–992 [ Pgs. 990–992 include portions of Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , and Doc. 793 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 795 ] Balasanov, G. M., 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 498 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] Balfour, Sir John, 244–246 [ Pgs. 244–246 include portions of Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 470–471 [ Pgs. 470–471 include portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] , 987 n [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] Ball, W. MacMahon, 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] Bao Dai, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 89–90 [ Pgs. 89–90 include portions of Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , and Doc. 108 ] , 93–94 [ Pgs. 93–94 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 119–121 [ Pgs. 119–121 include portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 131–137 [ Pgs. 131–137 include portions of Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 133 n [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 139–146 [ Pgs. 139–146 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 150–154 [ Pgs. 150–154 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] , 152 n [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] Barnett, Robert W., 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 396–397 [ Pgs. 396–397 include portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Baruch, Herman B., 921–922 [ Pgs. 921–922 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 933–938 [ Pgs. 933–938 include portions of Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 743 and Doc. 744 ] , 951–952 [ Pgs. 951–952 include portions of Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , and Doc. 753 ] , 963–967 [ Pgs. 963–967 include portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 979–983 [ Pgs. 979–983 include portions of Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , and Doc. 786 ] , 982 n [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 1001–1002 [ Pgs. 1001–1002 include portions of Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , and Doc. 802 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1011–1012 [ Pgs. 1011–1012 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1018–1019 [ Pgs. 1018–1019 include portions of Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] , 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] Baudet, Philippe, 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 77–78 [ Pgs. 77–78 include portions of Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] Beel, Louis Joseph Maria, 921–922 [ Pgs. 921–922 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 928 n [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] , 931–932 [ Pgs. 931–932 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 963 [ Pg. 963 includes portions of Doc. 765 and Doc. 766 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 1085 [ Pg. 1085 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 1091–1092 [ Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 883 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Belgium: Japan, 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1047 n [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1054–1056 [ Pgs. 1054–1056 include portions of Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , and Doc. 854 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] ; United States, proposed educational exchange agreement with, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Bell, C. Jasper, 1107 [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 894 ] Benton, J. Webb, 907–914 [ Pgs. 907–914 include portions of Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , Doc. 709 , Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , and Doc. 716 ] Berendsen, Sir Carl, 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 382 ] Berlin Conference (Potsdam), 1945 , 479–482 [ Pgs. 479–482 include portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 479 n [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] Bevin, Ernest: Canada, 881–882 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 684 ] ; Fort Knox speech, 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 417 ] ; Japan, 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 355 n [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] ; Korea, 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 749 ] , 988 [ Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 792 ] , 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] ; Palestine issue, 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 686 ] Bidault, Georges, 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 69–70 [ Pgs. 69–70 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 101 n [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Bishop, Max W., 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 177–179 [ Pgs. 177–179 include portions of Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] , 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , and Doc. 187 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 365–366 [ Pgs. 365–366 include portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 492–494 [ Pgs. 492–494 include portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , and Doc. 401 ] Blaisdell, Thomas C, Jr., 363 [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] Blakeslee, George H., 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 330 ] Blum, Léon, 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 63–64 [ Pgs. 63–64 include portions of Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , and Doc. 74 ] , 64 n [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Bohlen, Charles E.: Japanese peace conference, 428–429 [ Pgs. 428–429 include portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 491–492 [ Pgs. 491–492 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 519–523 [ Pgs. 519–523 include portions of Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , and Doc. 420 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 422 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 569 n [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441 ] , 577–579 [ Pgs. 577–579 include portions of Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , and Doc. 447 ] , 584 n [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] , 590–592 [ Pgs. 590–592 include portions of Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] ; Korea, 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 624 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] Bollaert, Emile, 77–80 [ Pgs. 77–80 include portions of Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , and Doc. 94 ] , 82–84 [ Pgs. 82–84 include portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 88–89 [ Pgs. 88–89 include portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 99–105 [ Pgs. 99–105 include portions of Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 133–137 [ Pgs. 133–137 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 139–140 [ Pgs. 139–140 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] , 142–143 [ Pgs. 142–143 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] , 145 n [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] , 153 [ Pg. 153 is part of Doc. 166 ] Bonin Islands, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] Bonnet, Henri, 52–53 [ Pgs. 52–53 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] , 60 [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] Bonsal, Philip W., 1037 [ Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] Borneo. See under Netherlands East Indies . Borton, Hugh, 220–221 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 244–247 [ Pgs. 244–247 include portions of Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , and Doc. 236 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 418 n [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 452 n [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 459–460 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 466–468 [ Pgs. 466–468 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382 ] , 474–475 [ Pgs. 474–475 include portions of Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , and Doc. 389 ] , 478–479 [ Pgs. 478–479 include portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 525–526 [ Pgs. 525–526 include portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 529–530 [ Pgs. 529–530 include portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 531 n [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 425 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 556 n [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 566–568 [ Pgs. 566–568 include portions of Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] Bottomley, A. G., 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 11 ] Bourghiba, Habib, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Bowman, Dean O., 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 280 ] Boyer de la Tour, Gen., 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] Braden, Spruille, 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379 ] Brazil, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 1012 [ Pg. 1012 includes portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] British Commonwealth ( see also under Japan : Occupation and control and Peace treaty ), 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] Brown, Maj. Gen. Albert E., 598–600 [ Pgs. 598–600 include portions of Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , and Doc. 464 ] , 607–608 [ Pgs. 607–608 include portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] , 645–646 [ Pgs. 645–646 include portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 652–653 [ Pgs. 652–653 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 658–660 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 505 ] , 662–663 [ Pgs. 662–663 include portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 674–675 [ Pgs. 674–675 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 677–679 [ Pgs. 677–679 include portions of Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , and Doc. 524 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] , 684–689 [ Pgs. 684–689 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 689 n [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 692–695 [ Pgs. 692–695 include portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537 ] , 700–701 [ Pgs. 700–701 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 731–733 [ Pgs. 731–733 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , and Doc. 554 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 745 n [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 751 [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 756–757 [ Pgs. 756–757 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 767–771 [ Pgs. 767–771 include portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 770 n [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 588 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 782–783 [ Pgs. 782–783 include portions of Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 783 n [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 610 ] , 815–817 [ Pgs. 815–817 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 842 n [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 644 and Doc. 645 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] Brown, Ben Hill, Jr., 1030–1032 [ Pgs. 1030–1032 include portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] Bullitt, William C., 110–112 [ Pgs. 110–112 include portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 126 ] Bunce, Arthur C., 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 498 ] , 656 [ Pg. 656 includes portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 568 ] , 788–789 [ Pgs. 788–789 include portions of Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , and Doc. 607 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] Burma, 1–49 [ Pgs. 1–49 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] American Baptist Mission in Burma, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 29 ] British, relations with, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 769 ] ; military mission, 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] China, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Communists in, 30–32 [ Pgs. 30–32 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , and Doc. 35 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 40–41 [ Pgs. 40–41 include portions of Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , and Doc. 46 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] Communists in government of, U.S. attitude toward, 16–18 [ Pgs. 16–18 include portions of Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , and Doc. 18 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] Constituent Assembly, 23–26 [ Pgs. 23–26 include portions of Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29 ] , 29–30 [ Pgs. 29–30 include portions of Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] , 33–34 [ Pgs. 33–34 include portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] , 33 n [ Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 36 and Doc. 37 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 44–46 [ Pgs. 44–46 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , and Doc. 53 ] Constitution, 24–27 [ Pgs. 24–27 include portions of Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 45 [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Cooperation of Western Democracies on problems of, 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 717 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] French Indo-China, attitude toward, 56–57 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] Government of Burma Act, 1935 , 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 6 n [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] Independence: Anglo-Burmese treaty, Oct. 17, 1947 , 45–46 [ Pgs. 45–46 include portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 45 n [ Pg. 45 includes portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] , 46 n [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 53 ] ; Burmese good will mission to London, 33–36 [ Pgs. 33–36 include portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , and Doc. 41 ] , 36 n [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 38–39 [ Pgs. 38–39 include portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] ; discussions with British, 1–12 [ Pgs. 1–12 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 10 n [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 14 n [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Japan. See under Japan : War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests . Lend-lease, Burmese participation in London talks on, 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 13–14 [ Pgs. 13–14 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] Nationalization of industries, 26 [ Pg. 26 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 53 ] Parties, groups and associations: All-Burma Buddhist Association, 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] ; All-Burma Peasant Union, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 29 ] ; All-Burma Pongyi Association, 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] ; Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 2–3 [ Pgs. 2–3 include portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 n [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 13–15 [ Pgs. 13–15 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 14 n [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 18–19 [ Pgs. 18–19 include portions of Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 22–26 [ Pgs. 22–26 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , and Doc. 29 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 34 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 44 n [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] , 47 n [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] ; Communist Party ( see also Communists , supra ), 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] ; Dobama Asiayone Party, 2 n [ Pg. 2 is part of Doc. 2 ] ; Kachins, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 53 ] ; Karens, 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 45–47 [ Pgs. 45–47 include portions of Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] ; Mahabama, 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] ; Mons, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 53 ] ; Myochit Party, 3 n [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] ; Nagas, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] ; People’s Volunteer Organization, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 29 ] ; Red Flag Communists, 16 n [ Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 30–31 [ Pgs. 30–31 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 37–38 [ Pgs. 37–38 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] ; Red Flag Cultivators Union, 4 n [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] ; Shans, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 53 ] ; Socialist Party, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 31 [ Pg. 31 is part of Doc. 34 ] ; Thakin Party, 11 n [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] ; United Hill Peoples, 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] ; Was, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] ; White Flag Communists, 14 n [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 18–19 [ Pgs. 18–19 include portions of Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 30–31 [ Pgs. 30–31 include portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 42 ] Political situation in, 15–20 [ Pgs. 15–20 include portions of Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 22–24 [ Pgs. 22–24 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , and Doc. 28 ] , 22 n [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] ; assassinations, 36–38 [ Pgs. 36–38 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 36 n [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 40 [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] United States, establishment of diplomatic relations with Burma, 1–49 [ Pgs. 1–49 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] Consular convention with the United States, 20–21 [ Pgs. 20–21 include portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , Doc. 23 , and Doc. 24 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 27–28 [ Pgs. 27–28 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Consular district, redefinition of U.S., 21 [ Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24 ] , 27–28 [ Pgs. 27–28 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 41–43 [ Pgs. 41–43 include portions of Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , and Doc. 49 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Cultural exchanges with the U.S., 7 [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 43 [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Diplomatic relations and exchange of diplomatic representatives, 4–6 [ Pgs. 4–6 include portions of Doc. 3 , Doc. 4 , Doc. 5 , Doc. 6 , and Doc. 7 ] , 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 11–12 [ Pgs. 11–12 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 22–24 [ Pgs. 22–24 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , and Doc. 28 ] , 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 28–30 [ Pgs. 28–30 include portions of Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 42–44 [ Pgs. 42–44 include portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 42 n [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] Educational exchange agreement, Dec. 22 , 47–49 [ Pgs. 47–49 include portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] , 48 n [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Surplus property agreement, Feb. 28 , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Butler, Robert L., 446–447 [ Pgs. 446–447 include portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 449 [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Butterworth, W. Walton, Jr., 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 98 n [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 433 n [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 523–525 [ Pgs. 523–525 include portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 566–570 [ Pgs. 566–570 include portions of Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] , 590–593 [ Pgs. 590–593 include portions of Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 820–821 [ Pgs. 820–821 include portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] , 1123 [ Pg. 1123 is part of Doc. 907 ] Byrnes, James F.: Australian role in Japanese peace settlement, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 433 ] ; Council of Foreign Ministers, 481–482 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 392 ] ; French Indo-China, 52–55 [ Pgs. 52–55 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] , 60–62 [ Pgs. 60–62 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] ; Japan, 156–157 [ Pgs. 156–157 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160–161 [ Pgs. 160–161 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 361 n [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 369 ] ; Korea, 596–599 [ Pgs. 596–599 include portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 890–894 [ Pgs. 890–894 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] ; Philippines, 1102–1103 [ Pgs. 1102–1103 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 1103 n [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] Caffery, Jefferson, 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 62–63 [ Pgs. 62–63 include portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 64 n [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 66–67 [ Pgs. 66–67 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] , 69–70 [ Pgs. 69–70 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 72–74 [ Pgs. 72–74 include portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 76–82 [ Pgs. 76–82 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 86–87 [ Pgs. 86–87 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 101 n [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 118–119 [ Pgs. 118–119 include portions of Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , and Doc. 131 ] , 127–129 [ Pgs. 127–129 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] , 133–135 [ Pgs. 133–135 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148 ] , 136 n [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 145–146 [ Pgs. 145–146 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] Cairo Conference ( 1943 ), 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] Cairo Declaration ( 1943 ), 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 487–488 [ Pgs. 487–488 include portions of Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , and Doc. 396 ] , 490–492 [ Pgs. 490–492 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 448 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 638 ] Canada: Far Eastern Commission, membership on, 885 [ Pg. 885 is part of Doc. 685 ] Japan. See under Japan : Occupation and control ; Peace Conference ; Peace Treaty ; and War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests . Korea. See under Korea . Netherlands East Indies, 1012 [ Pg. 1012 includes portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] Palestine issue, 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 686 ] U.N. Security Council, membership on, 886 [ Pg. 886 includes portions of Doc. 685 and Doc. 686 ] Canberra Conference, 55 n [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] Caroline Islands, and other former Japanese islands, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] Carter, Brig. Gen. Marshall S., 632 n [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 1111 [ Pg. 1111 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] Chakravarti, N. R., 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] Chang Duk Soo, 867 n [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 668 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] Chang Taik Song, 835–836 [ Pgs. 835–836 include portions of Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , and Doc. 640 ] , 841–842 [ Pgs. 841–842 include portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , and Doc. 645 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 649 ] Chauvel, Jean, 133–134 [ Pgs. 133–134 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] Chey, Soon Ju, 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 98 n [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] Chifley, Joseph B., 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 268 n [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 284–285 [ Pgs. 284–285 include portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 903 n [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] China: Burma, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] , 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Chinese Communists, problem of, 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 422 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 451 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 458 ] Constitution, 158–159 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 168 ] Formosa: Japanese external assets in, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 434 ] ; Japanese resources in, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 372 ] ; situation in, 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] ; status of, 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] French Indo-China ( see also under French Indo-China ), 60–61 [ Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 100–101 [ Pgs. 100–101 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 143–144 [ Pgs. 143–144 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] ; Chinese occupation forces in, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] Germany, question of Chinese participation in drawing up peace treaty for, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 441 ] Inner Mongolia, 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] Japan ( see also under Japan : Occupation and control ; Peace Conference ; Peace Treaty ; and War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests ): Chinese attitude toward Japan and U.S. occupation, 547–548 [ Pgs. 547–548 include portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] Japanese external assets (capital goods) in China, Manchuria, and Formosa, 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 434 ] Korea. See under Korea . Kuomintang, 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] Manchuria, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 518–519 [ Pgs. 518–519 include portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419 ] , 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 434 ] , 573–574 [ Pgs. 573–574 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 759 [ Pg. 759 is part of Doc. 577 ] ; Communist domination of, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] ; Japanese external assets in, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 285 ] ; Soviet assistance to Chinese Commists in, 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] Marshall Mission to, 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] Netherlands East Indies. See under Netherlands East Indies . North China, 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 427 ] Sinkiang, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] Sino-Soviet Treaty, Aug. 14, 1945. See under Treaties , conventions and agreements. Soviet Union, Chinese concern regarding relations with the, 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 529 [ Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 451 ] United States: Educational exchange agreement, Nov. 10, 1947 , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] ; Marshall Mission to, 519 [ Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] ; U.S. China policy, 16 [ Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 574 [ Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] ; U.S. relations with China, 50 [ Pg. 50 is part of China ] ; Wedemeyer Mission to China and Korea, 518–519 [ Pgs. 518–519 include portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] China Committee, 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Chistiakov, Col. Gen. Ivan Mikhailovich, 598–599 [ Pgs. 598–599 include portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 642 [ Pg. 642 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489 ] , 656–657 [ Pgs. 656–657 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 693–694 [ Pgs. 693–694 include portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] Cho Pyung Ok, 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 649 ] Chough, P. O. (or Pyungok). See Cho Pyung Ok . Chu Shih-ming, Lt. Gen., 178–179 [ Pgs. 178–179 include portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] Churchill, Winston S., 8 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 392 ] Clark, Lewis, 275–276 [ Pgs. 275–276 include portions of Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 774–775 [ Pgs. 774–775 include portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , and Doc. 592 ] Clayton, William L., 409–410 [ Pgs. 409–410 include portions of Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , and Doc. 343 ] , 1107 [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 894 ] Cohen, Benjamin V., 463 n [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 1111–1112 [ Pgs. 1111–1112 include portions of Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] Collins, Ralph E., 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] Combined Food Board, 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 247 ] Conference of Foreign Ministers, London, Sept. 1945 , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] Coste-Floret, Paul, 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Council of Foreign Ministers ( see also under Japan : Peace Conference ): Establishment of , 479–483 [ Pgs. 479–483 include portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] ; meeting of Mar. 10–Apr. 24 , at Moscow, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 448 n [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 616 [ Pg. 616 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 623 n [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 911 n [ Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] ; meeting, Nov. , at London, 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 564–565 [ Pgs. 564–565 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 568–569 [ Pgs. 568–569 include portions of Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441 ] , 571–572 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 577 n [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] , 592–593 [ Pgs. 592–593 include portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 592 n [ Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 868 n [ Pg. 868 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] Crimea Conference report ( Feb. 11, 1945 ), 485 [ Pg. 485 includes portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 448 ] Critchley, Thomas K., 1096 [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 887 ] Cumming, Hugh, 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 917–918 [ Pgs. 917–918 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] D’Argenlieu, Adm. Thierry, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 58 n [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] , 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] Daridan, Jean, 102–103 [ Pgs. 102–103 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] Davies, John P., Jr., 485–486 [ Pgs. 485–486 include portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , and Doc. 394 ] Davis, Monnet B., 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] Davis, Nathaniel P., 1109–1113 [ Pgs. 1109–1113 include portions of Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 1123 [ Pg. 1123 is part of Doc. 907 ] Dean, Maj. Gen. William F., 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] , 865–866 [ Pgs. 865–866 include portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 is part of Doc. 676 ] De Boar, Feike, 893–895 [ Pgs. 893–895 include portions of Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] , 895 n [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 696 ] Declaration by the United Nations, Jan. 1, 1942 , 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379 ] , 483–484 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 444 ] de Gaulle, Gen. Charles, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] Dening, Maberly E., 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 938–939 [ Pgs. 938–939 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] Derevyanko, Lt. Gen. Kuzma N., 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 178–179 [ Pgs. 178–179 include portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 341 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Diem, Ngo Dinh, 152–155 [ Pgs. 152–155 include portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] , 152 n [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] Douglas, Lewis W., 35–39 [ Pgs. 35–39 include portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 582–583 [ Pgs. 582–583 include portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , and Doc. 450 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 927–929 [ Pgs. 927–929 include portions of Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , and Doc. 731 ] , 931–932 [ Pgs. 931–932 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 938–939 [ Pgs. 938–939 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 961–962 [ Pgs. 961–962 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] Douteau, Robert, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 213 ] Draper, Gen. William H., 313 [ Pg. 313 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 435–442 [ Pgs. 435–442 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 435 n [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 561 n [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 435 ] Drees, Willem, 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Drumright, Everett F., 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 592–593 [ Pgs. 592–593 include portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 592 n [ Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 636–638 [ Pgs. 636–638 include portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486 ] Dufour, Robert, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] Dulles, John Foster, 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 433 ] Dupuy, Lt. Col. Trevor N., 713 n [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 870 [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] , 870 n [ Pg. 870 includes portions of Doc. 671 and Doc. 672 ] Durbrow, Elbridge, 583–584 [ Pgs. 583–584 include portions of Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , and Doc. 451 ] , 643–644 [ Pgs. 643–644 include portions of Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] Eberle, Brig. Gen. George L., 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 224 n [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 439 n [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] Eden, Anthony, 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 392 ] Eggleston, Frederic W., 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] Egypt: Japan, 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] Korea, position on troop withdrawal from, 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] Netherlands East Indies. See under Netherlands East Indies . United States, proposed educational exchange agreement, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Eire. See Ireland. Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D., 626 n [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 868–870 [ Pgs. 868–870 include portions of Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , and Doc. 672 ] , 1002 [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 1103 n [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] Elizalde, Joaquin M., 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 1105–1107 [ Pgs. 1105–1107 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1120–1124 [ Pgs. 1120–1124 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , and Doc. 908 ] Ely, Richard R., 1116 [ Pg. 1116 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1122 n [ Pg. 1122 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] , 1125 [ Pg. 1125 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] Emmerson, John K., 395–397 [ Pgs. 395–397 include portions of Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] , 407–408 [ Pgs. 407–408 include portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , and Doc. 341 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] Evatt, Herbert V.: Japan: Occupation and control, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 242 [ Pg. 242 includes portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 267–268 [ Pgs. 267–268 include portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 283–285 [ Pgs. 283–285 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] ; Peace Conference, 465–466 [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 474–476 [ Pgs. 474–476 include portions of Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , and Doc. 390 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 516–518 [ Pgs. 516–518 include portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , and Doc. 418 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 424 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 551–552 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 571–572 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 577–580 [ Pgs. 577–580 include portions of Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 458 ] ; peace treaty, 446–448 [ Pgs. 446–448 include portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] Korea, 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 546–547 [ Pgs. 546–547 include portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 552–553 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] Netherlands East Indies, 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 976 n [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 1014–1015 [ Pgs. 1014–1015 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] United Nations General Assembly, warmongering resolution, 553–554 [ Pgs. 553–554 include portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] Everson, F. C., 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 269–270 [ Pgs. 269–270 include portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 566–568 [ Pgs. 566–568 include portions of Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] Fahey, Daniel Cox, Jr., 435–436 [ Pgs. 435–436 include portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 506–507 [ Pgs. 506–507 include portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] Fahy, Charles, 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 270 n [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 422–424 [ Pgs. 422–424 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 479–485 [ Pgs. 479–485 include portions of Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , and Doc. 393 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 405 ] Far Eastern Commission (FEC). See under Japan . Farouk, King of Egypt, 1000–1001 [ Pgs. 1000–1001 include portions of Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , and Doc. 801 ] , 1001 n [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] Fearey, Robert A., 556–564 [ Pgs. 556–564 include portions of Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , and Doc. 436 ] Fite, Katherine B., 269–270 [ Pgs. 269–270 include portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 279–280 [ Pgs. 279–280 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Foo Ping-sheung, 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 631 n [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] Foote, Walter A., 890–899 [ Pgs. 890–899 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , and Doc. 701 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , and Doc. 704 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 912 n [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] , 918–919 [ Pgs. 918–919 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , and Doc. 722 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , and Doc. 730 ] , 929 n [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] , 929–930 [ Pgs. 929–930 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , and Doc. 732 ] , 942 n [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 946–948 [ Pgs. 946–948 include portions of Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , and Doc. 748 ] , 951–953 [ Pgs. 951–953 include portions of Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , and Doc. 755 ] , 955–958 [ Pgs. 955–958 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] , 967–972 [ Pgs. 967–972 include portions of Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , and Doc. 774 ] , 972 n [ Pg. 972 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 975–979 [ Pgs. 975–979 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 979 n [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 984–985 [ Pgs. 984–985 include portions of Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , and Doc. 788 ] , 989–990 [ Pgs. 989–990 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 998–1000 [ Pgs. 998–1000 include portions of Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , and Doc. 800 ] , 1004–1006 [ Pgs. 1004–1006 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , and Doc. 807 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1015–1019 [ Pgs. 1015–1019 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] , 1021–1026 [ Pgs. 1021–1026 include portions of Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , and Doc. 829 ] , 1028 [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 830 ] , 1034–1037 [ Pgs. 1034–1037 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , and Doc. 838 ] , 1043 n [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1044–1046 [ Pgs. 1044–1046 include portions of Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , and Doc. 846 ] , 1051–1054 [ Pgs. 1051–1054 include portions of Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , and Doc. 853 ] , 1053 n [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] Formosa. See under China . Forrestal, James, 817–818 [ Pgs. 817–818 include portions of Doc. 623 and Doc. 624 ] Four Power Declaration, June 7, 1945 , 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] France: Communist Party, attitude toward French Indo-China, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] ; attitude toward North Africa, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Council of Foreign Ministers, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 392 ] French Indo-China. See under French Indo-China. Japan. See under Japan : Occupation and control ; Peace Conference ; and War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests . Korea, 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] Siam, border dispute, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 63 n [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 72 ] United States interest in nationalist opposition to the restoration of French rule in Indo-China, 51–155 [ Pgs. 51–155 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] passim French Indo-China, 51–155 [ Pgs. 51–155 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] Annam, 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] Annamite communism, 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] Annamite Nationalist Party, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] Annamite people, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 103–105 [ Pgs. 103–105 include portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 114–115 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] Annamite provinces, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 78–79 [ Pgs. 78–79 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] South Annam, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] Bao Dai, French plans for recall of former Emperor, 139–140 [ Pgs. 139–140 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] , 145–146 [ Pgs. 145–146 include portions of Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] , 150–152 [ Pgs. 150–152 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] Burmese attitude toward, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] Cambodia, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 93–94 [ Pgs. 93–94 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Democratic Party, 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] Free Cambodian Government, 56–57 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] Issarak movements, 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 121 ] Caodaist, 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] China ( see also under China ): Protection of Chinese lives and property, 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 60–61 [ Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 64 n [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] ; French compensation for damages, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] Chinese Communists, influence of, 75–76 [ Pgs. 75–76 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , and Doc. 90 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Cochin-China, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 77–79 [ Pgs. 77–79 include portions of Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 82 n [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 106–107 [ Pgs. 106–107 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 116–117 [ Pgs. 116–117 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , and Doc. 129 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 132–134 [ Pgs. 132–134 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , and Doc. 146 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 140 n [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 151–152 [ Pgs. 151–152 include portions of Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] Communist Party in, 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 110 ] Conciliation Commission, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] Economic conference at Dalat, report on, 147–150 [ Pgs. 147–150 include portions of Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , and Doc. 163 ] ; request for Japanese reparations loan, 147–149 [ Pgs. 147–149 include portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] French administrative control measures, 84–85 [ Pgs. 84–85 include portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , and Doc. 102 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] French censorship, U.S. concern regarding, 67 [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] French Communist Party, attitude toward French Indo-China, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] French military reconquest of Indo-China, U.S. assessment of French capabilities for, 135–136 [ Pgs. 135–136 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] , 138–142 [ Pgs. 138–142 include portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , and Doc. 155 ] French policy toward Indo-China, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 69–70 [ Pgs. 69–70 include portions of Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , and Doc. 81 ] , 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , and Doc. 86 ] , 78–80 [ Pgs. 78–80 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , and Doc. 94 ] , 88–89 [ Pgs. 88–89 include portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 110–116 [ Pgs. 110–116 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 118–121 [ Pgs. 118–121 include portions of Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] , 133–137 [ Pgs. 133–137 include portions of Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 133 n [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 144–145 [ Pgs. 144–145 include portions of Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] French Union, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 96 [ Pg. 96 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] Cambodian adherence to, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Laotian adherence to, 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] Vietnam place in, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 75 [ Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 88 and Doc. 89 ] , 79–80 [ Pgs. 79–80 include portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 134–135 [ Pgs. 134–135 include portions of Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] , 155 [ Pg. 155 is part of Doc. 166 ] Hoa Hao, 132 n [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 145 [ Pg. 145 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] India, 64–65 [ Pgs. 64–65 include portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] Indo-China federation, proposed, 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 66 n [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 79–80 [ Pgs. 79–80 include portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 85 [ Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , and Doc. 102 ] , 89 [ Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 106 and Doc. 107 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 104 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] Indonesia, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] International consultative commission, proposed, 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] Laos, 79 [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 93–94 [ Pgs. 93–94 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 102–104 [ Pgs. 102–104 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 118 [ Pg. 118 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 134 [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] ; Free Lao government, 56–57 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Company, efforts to obtain licenses, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 161 ] National Union Front, 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] , 133 n [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 142–144 [ Pgs. 142–144 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] Social Democratic Party, 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Soviet connection with Vietnam, 136–137 [ Pgs. 136–137 include portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] Soviet objectives, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] Tonkin, 81 [ Pg. 81 includes portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 102 [ Pg. 102 includes portions of Doc. 119 and Doc. 120 ] , 104–105 [ Pg. 104 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 123 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] , 121 [ Pg. 121 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 151 [ Pg. 151 includes portions of Doc. 163 and Doc. 164 ] ; Tonkinese, 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 114–115 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 126 ] ; Chinese in Tonkin, 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] United Nations, possible referral of Indo-China question to, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 56–57 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 59 n [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 67 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 68–69 [ Pgs. 68–69 include portions of Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , and Doc. 80 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 109 [ Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 116 [ Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 126 and Doc. 127 ] ; U.S. position regarding possible French veto, 68–69 [ Pgs. 68–69 include portions of Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , and Doc. 80 ] United States: Contacts with Vietnam leaders, 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 87–88 [ Pgs. 87–88 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , and Doc. 126 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 154–155 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 166 ] Diem appeal for U.S. aid, 154–155 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 166 ] Good offices, U.S. offer of, 52–53 [ Pgs. 52–53 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , and Doc. 61 ] , 58–59 [ Pgs. 58–59 include portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] Good will naval visit to Indo-China, consideration of, 128–129 [ Pgs. 128–129 include portions of Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 128 n [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Lend-Lease weapons, U.S. policy regarding use of in Indo-China, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Material assistance to France for the reconquest of Indo-China, U.S. refusal to extend, 59 [ Pg. 59 is part of Doc. 67 ] Restoration of peace, U.S. interest in, 51–55 [ Pgs. 51–55 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64 ] , 55 n [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 58–60 [ Pgs. 58–60 include portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69 ] , 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 67–68 [ Pgs. 67–68 include portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 68 n [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 95–98 [ Pgs. 95–98 include portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , and Doc. 115 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 108–109 [ Pgs. 108–109 include portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 135–136 [ Pgs. 135–136 include portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , and Doc. 149 ] Vietnam feelers regarding possible U.S. mediation, economic assistance and cultural exchanges, 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , and Doc. 126 ] , 142 [ Pg. 142 includes portions of Doc. 154 and Doc. 155 ] , 154–155 [ Pg. 154 is part of Doc. 166 ] Vietminh, 77–80 [ Pgs. 77–80 include portions of Doc. 90 , Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , and Doc. 94 ] , 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 82 n [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 106–108 [ Pgs. 106–108 include portions of Doc. 122 , Doc. 123 , and Doc. 124 ] , 120 [ Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 131 and Doc. 132 ] , 127–128 [ Pgs. 127–128 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] , 144–146 [ Pgs. 144–146 include portions of Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , Doc. 159 , and Doc. 160 ] Army, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 107 [ Pg. 107 is part of Doc. 123 ] Government, 87 [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] Nambo, 106–107 [ Pgs. 106–107 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] Tongbo, 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 100 [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 122 [ Pg. 122 is part of Doc. 133 ] Vietnam, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 75–77 [ Pgs. 75–77 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 79–81 [ Pgs. 79–81 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , and Doc. 96 ] , 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 82 n [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] , 86 [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 88 [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 91–92 [ Pgs. 91–92 include portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110 ] , 94–95 [ Pgs. 94–95 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 100–101 [ Pgs. 100–101 include portions of Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , and Doc. 119 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 117–118 [ Pgs. 117–118 include portions of Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , and Doc. 130 ] , 121–124 [ Pgs. 121–124 include portions of Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 134–135 [ Pgs. 134–135 include portions of Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 147 [ Pg. 147 includes portions of Doc. 160 and Doc. 161 ] , 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] Vietnam appeal for cessation of hostilities, 94–95 [ Pgs. 94–95 include portions of Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] Vietnam army, 116–117 [ Pgs. 116–117 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , and Doc. 129 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] Vietnam government, 56–57 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 60–61 [ Pgs. 60–61 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 81–82 [ Pgs. 81–82 include portions of Doc. 95 and Doc. 96 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 90–92 [ Pgs. 90–92 include portions of Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , and Doc. 110 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 101–102 [ Pgs. 101–102 include portions of Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , and Doc. 120 ] , 108–109 [ Pgs. 108–109 include portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 120–121 [ Pgs. 120–121 include portions of Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] , 123–125 [ Pgs. 123–125 include portions of Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , and Doc. 135 ] , 127–130 [ Pgs. 127–130 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 138 [ Pg. 138 includes portions of Doc. 150 and Doc. 151 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 867 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 is part of Doc. 871 ] Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang, 127 [ Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] , 127 n [ Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] Vietnam Revolutionary League, 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] Gallman, Waldemar J., 1–4 [ Pgs. 1–4 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , and Doc. 4 ] , 6–14 [ Pgs. 6–14 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 18–19 [ Pgs. 18–19 include portions of Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 64–65 [ Pgs. 64–65 include portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 70–71 [ Pgs. 70–71 include portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , and Doc. 82 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] Gani, Adnan Kapan, 896 [ Pg. 896 includes portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 918–919 [ Pgs. 918–919 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , and Doc. 722 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , and Doc. 730 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] , 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1016 n [ Pg. 1016 includes portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] , 1010–1017 [ Pgs. 1010–1017 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , and Doc. 818 ] , 1029 [ Pg. 1029 is part of Doc. 830 ] Gardes, Commander Alfred W., Jr., 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 55 n [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] Gascoigne, A. D. F., 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] Gerasim Fak ( also Geracim Lee Pak), 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] , 846–847 [ Pgs. 846–847 include portions of Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] Germany, 175 [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 412 [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 419 [ Pg. 419 is part of Doc. 347 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 359 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379 ] , 479–480 [ Pgs. 479–480 include portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] Allied Control Council, 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 334 ] Peace treaty, 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 441 ] Giam, Hoang Minh, 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 81–83 [ Pgs. 81–83 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] , 82 n [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] Giap, Vo Nguyen, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 140 [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] Giau, Tran Van. See Ouang. Giem, Ngo-Dinh. See Diem, Ngo Dinh . Gilbert, Pierre-Eugene, 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 129–130 [ Pgs. 129–130 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] Gillem, Lt. Gen. Alvan C., 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] Good, Rear Adm. Howard Harrison, 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 892 ] Grady, Henry F., 985 [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 990–992 [ Pgs. 990–992 include portions of Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , and Doc. 793 ] Graham, Frank Parker, 1047 n [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1053 n [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1054 [ Pg. 1054 includes portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 1063–1072 [ Pgs. 1063–1072 include portions of Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , and Doc. 867 ] , 1072 n [ Pg. 1072 includes portions of Doc. 866 and Doc. 867 ] , 1074–1099 [ Pgs. 1074–1099 include portions of Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , and Doc. 889 ] , 1076 n [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1080 n [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Graves, Hubert A., 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 244–246 [ Pgs. 244–246 include portions of Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 300–301 [ Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] , 345–346 [ Pgs. 345–346 include portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 470–471 [ Pgs. 470–471 include portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] , 525–526 [ Pgs. 525–526 include portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 529–530 [ Pgs. 529–530 include portions of Doc. 423 and Doc. 424 ] , 531 n [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 425 ] , 532 n [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 574–575 [ Pgs. 574–575 include portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] Greece: Greek frontier problem, 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] ; U.S. aid, 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] ; U.S. educational exchange agreement, proposed, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Grew, Joseph C., 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] Gross, Ernest A., 279–280 [ Pgs. 279–280 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 408–409 [ Pgs. 408–409 include portions of Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , and Doc. 342 ] , 498–502 [ Pgs. 498–502 include portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] Hamid, Sultan, 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 768 ] Hamilton, Maxwell M., 556 n [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 435 ] Harrison, Col. Raymond L., 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 220 ] Harrison, Brig. Gen. W. K., 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338 ] Hatta, Muhammad, 894–895 [ Pgs. 894–895 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] Helb, H. A., 933–934 [ Pgs. 933–934 include portions of Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , and Doc. 736 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] Helmick, Brig. Gen. Charles, 785–786 [ Pgs. 785–786 include portions of Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , and Doc. 604 ] , 825 n [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 876 [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] Hemmendinger, Noel, 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] , 431 n [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 435–437 [ Pgs. 435–437 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , and Doc. 360 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Henderson, Loy W., 16–17 [ Pgs. 16–17 include portions of Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , and Doc. 17 ] Hewes, L. I., 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 249 ] Hickerson, John D., 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 917 n [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] Hilldring, Maj. Gen. John H.: Japan: Occupation and control, 156 n [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 169–171 [ Pgs. 169–171 include portions of Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 202–203 [ Pgs. 202–203 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] , 217–219 [ Pgs. 217–219 include portions of Doc. 213 and Doc. 214 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 225–226 [ Pgs. 225–226 include portions of Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , and Doc. 219 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 261–262 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 265–266 [ Pgs. 265–266 include portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 274 [ Pg. 274 is part of Doc. 253 ] , 275 n [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 302 n [ Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] ; peace conference, 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 461–462 [ Pgs. 461–462 include portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 467–468 [ Pgs. 467–468 include portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 472 n [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 474–475 [ Pgs. 474–475 include portions of Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , and Doc. 389 ] , 476 n [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] ; peace treaty, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] ; war claims and reparations, 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 357–358 [ Pgs. 357–358 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 363–365 [ Pgs. 363–365 include portions of Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , and Doc. 305 ] , 366 n [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 367–370 [ Pgs. 367–370 include portions of Doc. 307 and Doc. 308 ] , 367 n [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 371 n [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 374–376 [ Pgs. 374–376 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 376 n [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 381–382 [ Pgs. 381–382 include portions of Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , and Doc. 318 ] , 385–387 [ Pgs. 385–387 include portions of Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] , 386 n [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 390–391 [ Pgs. 390–391 include portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327 ] , 392 n [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 402–406 [ Pgs. 402–406 include portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , and Doc. 339 ] , 408–409 [ Pgs. 408–409 include portions of Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , and Doc. 342 ] , 413–414 [ Pgs. 413–414 include portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] , 417 n [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 418 n [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 420–422 [ Pgs. 420–422 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 428 n [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] Korea, 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 618–621 [ Pgs. 618–621 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , and Doc. 476 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 635–636 [ Pgs. 635–636 include portions of Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , and Doc. 485 ] , 647 n [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495 ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , and Doc. 496 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 653–654 [ Pgs. 653–654 include portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 509 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] , 701–703 [ Pgs. 701–703 include portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , and Doc. 543 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 742 n [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 742–743 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 771 n [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] Hirohito, Emperor of Japan, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 172–173 [ Pgs. 172–173 include portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] Hirschfeld, H. M., 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 743 ] Ho Chi Minh, 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , and Doc. 60 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 60–63 [ Pgs. 60–63 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 70–72 [ Pgs. 70–72 include portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 77 n [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 80–93 [ Pgs. 80–93 include portions of Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , and Doc. 111 ] , 82 n [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 99–102 [ Pgs. 99–102 include portions of Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , and Doc. 120 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 101 n [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 104–107 [ Pgs. 104–107 include portions of Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , and Doc. 123 ] , 114 [ Pg. 114 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 110–121 [ Pgs. 110–121 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] , 124 [ Pg. 124 is part of Doc. 134 ] , 127–128 [ Pgs. 127–128 include portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , Doc. 138 , and Doc. 139 ] , 130–137 [ Pgs. 130–137 include portions of Doc. 141 , Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 139–140 [ Pgs. 139–140 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , and Doc. 153 ] , 142–144 [ Pgs. 142–144 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 146 [ Pg. 146 includes portions of Doc. 159 and Doc. 160 ] , 150–151 [ Pgs. 150–151 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , and Doc. 164 ] Hoach, Le Van, 82 [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 132–133 [ Pgs. 132–133 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145 ] , 133 n [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 140 n [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 143 [ Pg. 143 includes portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] Hodge, Charles L., 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] , 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Hodge, Lt. Gen. John R., 596–603 [ Pgs. 596–603 include portions of Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , and Doc. 466 ] , 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 600 n [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 606–607 [ Pgs. 606–607 include portions of Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , and Doc. 470 ] , 606 n [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 609–610 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 614–615 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 618–619 [ Pgs. 618–619 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 479 ] , 639–640 [ Pgs. 639–640 include portions of Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , and Doc. 488 ] , 642–643 [ Pgs. 642–643 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] , 645–649 [ Pgs. 645–649 include portions of Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 653–657 [ Pgs. 653–657 include portions of Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , and Doc. 504 ] , 659–663 [ Pgs. 659–663 include portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 665–667 [ Pgs. 665–667 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , and Doc. 513 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 674–675 [ Pgs. 674–675 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 682–688 [ Pgs. 682–688 include portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 691–694 [ Pgs. 691–694 include portions of Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , and Doc. 536 ] , 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 690–704 [ Pgs. 690–704 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] , 707–710 [ Pgs. 707–710 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , and Doc. 549 ] , 708 n [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 714–734 [ Pgs. 714–734 include portions of Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 744–752 [ Pgs. 744–752 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , and Doc. 570 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 757–760 [ Pgs. 757–760 include portions of Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 768–771 [ Pgs. 768–771 include portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 617 ] , 822–824 [ Pgs. 822–824 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 824 n [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 828–830 [ Pgs. 828–830 include portions of Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 835–836 [ Pgs. 835–836 include portions of Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , and Doc. 640 ] , 838–839 [ Pgs. 838–839 include portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 845 n [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 847–848 [ Pgs. 847–848 include portions of Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , and Doc. 649 ] , 852–853 [ Pgs. 852–853 include portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 860–868 [ Pgs. 860–868 include portions of Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670 ] , 870–871 [ Pgs. 870–871 include portions of Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , and Doc. 674 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 877 n [ Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] , 878–879 [ Pgs. 878–879 include portions of Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , and Doc. 682 ] Hodgson, Lt. Col. William R., 1003 [ Pg. 1003 includes portions of Doc. 802 and Doc. 803 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 853 ] Hong Kong, 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 343 ] Hoo, Victor, 861 [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] Hopper, George D., 152–155 [ Pgs. 152–155 include portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] Hornbeck, Stanley K., 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] Hurgronje, Jonkheer Snouck, 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] Idenburg, P. J. A., 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] India, 5 [ Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 4 and Doc. 5 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 23–24 [ Pgs. 23–24 include portions of Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , and Doc. 28 ] , 34 n [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 36 [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] , 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 717 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 769 ] French Indo-China, attitude toward, 64–65 [ Pgs. 64–65 include portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] Indian Communists and French Indo-China, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] Japan ( see also under Japan : War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests ), 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 461 [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 376 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] Korea, 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 853–854 [ Pgs. 853–854 include portions of Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 687 and Doc. 688 ] Netherlands East Indies. See under Netherlands East Indies . Soviet Union: Objectives in India, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] ; representation in India, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Indonesia. See under Netherlands East Indies . Ing, Fong-Sao, 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] Inter-Asian Conference, March 1947 , 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 97 n [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] , 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 795 ] International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 896 ] International cooperation, principle of, 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] International Court of Justice, 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 1032–1033 [ Pgs. 1032–1033 include portions of Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. 833 ] , 1041 [ Pg. 1041 is part of Doc. 841 ] International Emergency Food Council, 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 53 ] , 206–207 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 239 [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1076 n [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] International Labor Office (ILO), 420 [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] International Missionary Council, 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] International Monetary Fund (IMF), 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 11 ] International Red Cross, 64 n [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] International Telephone and Telegraph (IT&T), 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 364 ] International Trade Conference, Havana, 1125 [ Pg. 1125 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] International Trade Organization (ITO), 327–329 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 1125 n [ Pg. 1125 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] ; draft charter for, 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 281–282 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 281 n [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 326–328 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 338–339 [ Pg. 338 is part of Doc. 284 ] , 1125–1126 [ Pgs. 1125–1126 include portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] International Whaling Conference, 1946 , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 207 ] Inverchapel, Lord, 29 [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 192 [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 397–398 [ Pgs. 397–398 include portions of Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , and Doc. 332 ] , 409–410 [ Pgs. 409–410 include portions of Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , and Doc. 343 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 948–950 [ Pgs. 948–950 include portions of Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] Isbrandtsen, Hans, 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] , 913 n [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] Isbrandtsen Steamship Company, 896 [ Pg. 896 includes portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 702 ] , 905–907 [ Pgs. 905–907 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] , 909–911 [ Pgs. 909–911 include portions of Doc. 709 , Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , and Doc. 712 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 956–957 [ Pgs. 956–957 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] Ispahani, M. A. H., 565–566 [ Pgs. 565–566 include portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , and Doc. 439 ] Isthmian Steamship Company, 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 697 and Doc. 698 ] , 908 [ Pg. 908 is part of Doc. 708 ] Italy, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 350–351 [ Pgs. 350–351 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 552 ] ; treaty of peace, 480 [ Pg. 480 is part of Doc. 392 ] ; United States, proposed educational exchange agreement with, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] ; Venezia-Giulia–Yugoslav boundary problem, 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] Jackson, S. H., 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] Jacobs, Joseph E., 511–512 [ Pgs. 511–512 include portions of Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , and Doc. 413 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 674–682 [ Pgs. 674–682 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] , 680 n [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 685–691 [ Pgs. 685–691 include portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 688 n [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 691 n [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] , 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 693–697 [ Pgs. 693–697 include portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540 ] , 700–702 [ Pgs. 700–702 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 704–711 [ Pgs. 704–711 include portions of Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , and Doc. 550 ] , 714 n [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 731–734 [ Pgs. 731–734 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 737 n [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 745–747 [ Pgs. 745–747 include portions of Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , and Doc. 566 ] , 749–757 [ Pgs. 749–757 include portions of Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 760–771 [ Pgs. 760–771 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 776–778 [ Pgs. 776–778 include portions of Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , and Doc. 595 ] , 781–787 [ Pgs. 781–787 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605 ] , 783 n [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 790–794 [ Pgs. 790–794 include portions of Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , and Doc. 611 ] , 803–810 [ Pgs. 803–810 include portions of Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 815–817 [ Pgs. 815–817 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 822–831 [ Pgs. 822–831 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , and Doc. 637 ] , 835–836 [ Pgs. 835–836 include portions of Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , and Doc. 640 ] , 841–851 [ Pgs. 841–851 include portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 857 [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 859–864 [ Pgs. 859–864 include portions of Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , and Doc. 666 ] , 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] , 868–869 [ Pgs. 868–869 include portions of Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] Japan, 156–595 [ Pgs. 156–595 include portions of Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , Doc. 297 , Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , and Doc. 461 ] Allied Council for Japan: Occupation and control, 170–171 [ Pgs. 170–171 include portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 177–179 [ Pgs. 177–179 include portions of Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] , 186–188 [ Pgs. 186–188 include portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 235 n [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 266–268 [ Pgs. 266–268 include portions of Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , and Doc. 250 ] , 285–288 [ Pgs. 285–288 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 290–291 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 295 n [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 311–313 [ Pgs. 311–313 include portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 318–319 [ Pgs. 318–319 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 323–325 [ Pgs. 323–325 include portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 340–341 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 472–473 [ Pgs. 472–473 include portions of Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , and Doc. 387 ] , 499–501 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 448 ] ; terms of reference, 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 313 ] ; war claims and reparations, 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 359 [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 359 n [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 367–368 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 371–372 [ Pgs. 371–372 include portions of Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , and Doc. 310 ] , 375 [ Pg. 375 is part of Doc. 313 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] Assured production capacity levels, 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 367–369 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 374–375 [ Pgs. 374–375 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 410 ] Board of Trade, 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 290–292 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 263 ] Burma, 4 [ Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 3 and Doc. 4 ] Constitution, 156–158 [ Pgs. 156–158 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 156 n [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 178 [ Pg. 178 is part of Doc. 183 ] , 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] ; implementing legislation, 156–157 [ Pgs. 156–157 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160–161 [ Pgs. 160–161 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] Diet, 156–157 [ Pgs. 156–157 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 172–178 [ Pgs. 172–178 include portions of Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 208 [ Pg. 208 is part of Doc. 208 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 320–321 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] ; Diet law, 174–177 [ Pgs. 174–177 include portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , and Doc. 183 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] Economic war potential of Japan, 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] Far Eastern Commission ( see also Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy ): Basic Post-Surrender Policy, 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 423 n [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 352 ] Committees: No. 2 (Economic and Financial Affairs), 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 195 n [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 262 [ Pg. 262 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] ; No. 4 , 169–170 [ Pgs. 169–170 include portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] ; No. 7 , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 334 ] ; Reparations, 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 357 [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 359–360 [ Pgs. 359–360 include portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 395–397 [ Pgs. 395–397 include portions of Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] , 404–405 [ Pgs. 404–405 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 440 [ Pg. 440 is part of Doc. 362 ] ; Steering, 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 423–424 [ Pgs. 423–424 include portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] Establishment of, 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 490–491 [ Pgs. 490–491 include portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 510–511 [ Pgs. 510–511 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 448 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] Levels of industry, 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] Liaison with General MacArthur, 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 202–203 [ Pgs. 202–203 include portions of Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] Occupation and control of Japan, 156–157 [ Pgs. 156–157 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 157 n [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160–162 [ Pgs. 160–162 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , and Doc. 171 ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 164–165 [ Pgs. 164–165 include portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , and Doc. 173 ] , 169–171 [ Pgs. 169–171 include portions of Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 171 n [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 173–175 [ Pgs. 173–175 include portions of Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , and Doc. 181 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 180–183 [ Pgs. 180–183 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , and Doc. 187 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 187 [ Pg. 187 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 189–191 [ Pgs. 189–191 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 189 n [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 194 n [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 196–197 [ Pgs. 196–197 include portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 207–208 [ Pgs. 207–208 include portions of Doc. 207 and Doc. 208 ] , 212–217 [ Pgs. 212–217 include portions of Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , and Doc. 213 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 228–229 [ Pgs. 228–229 include portions of Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , and Doc. 222 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 240–241 [ Pgs. 240–241 include portions of Doc. 229 and Doc. 230 ] , 243–245 [ Pgs. 243–245 include portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 255 [ Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , and Doc. 243 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 261–263 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 270–276 [ Pgs. 270–276 include portions of Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , and Doc. 255 ] , 272 n [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 275 n [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 278–280 [ Pgs. 278–280 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 284–286 [ Pgs. 284–286 include portions of Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , and Doc. 260 ] , 289 [ Pg. 289 is part of Doc. 262 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 303–304 [ Pgs. 303–304 include portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 306–307 [ Pgs. 306–307 include portions of Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 313–318 [ Pgs. 313–318 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 326–327 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 330–332 [ Pgs. 330–332 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 334–336 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] Peace Conference, Japanese, 447–448 [ Pgs. 447–448 include portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 465–466 [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 468–470 [ Pgs. 468–470 include portions of Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , and Doc. 384 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 522–525 [ Pgs. 522–525 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 527–528 [ Pgs. 527–528 include portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 548–549 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439 ] , 570–572 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] , 578–579 [ Pgs. 578–579 include portions of Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , and Doc. 447 ] , 584–586 [ Pgs. 584–586 include portions of Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , and Doc. 452 ] , 587 n [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] Peaceful needs of Japan, 354–355 [ Pgs. 354–355 include portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] Red Cross decision, 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Role vis-à-vis the United States’ interim directives on economic problems, 271–273 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 302–304 [ Pgs. 302–304 include portions of Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] Terms of reference, 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 220 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 273 [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 356 [ Pg. 356 is part of Doc. 298 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 500–501 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 405 ] Voting and veto, 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 435 ] War claims against and reparations from Japan, 346 n [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 347–349 [ Pgs. 347–349 include portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 352–361 [ Pgs. 352–361 include portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , Doc. 297 , Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 365–369 [ Pgs. 365–369 include portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , Doc. 306 , and Doc. 307 ] , 366 n [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 367 n [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 371 n [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 373–380 [ Pgs. 373–380 include portions of Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 376 n [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 383–387 [ Pgs. 383–387 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] , 389–400 [ Pgs. 389–400 include portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334 ] , 398 n [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 403–404 [ Pgs. 403–404 include portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 406–409 [ Pgs. 406–409 include portions of Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , and Doc. 342 ] , 412–414 [ Pgs. 412–414 include portions of Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] , 412 n [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 416–417 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 421–423 [ Pgs. 421–423 include portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350 ] , 425–446 [ Pgs. 425–446 include portions of Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 429 n [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] Hokkaido, Japanese petition regarding restoration of islands belonging to, 199–200 [ Pgs. 199–200 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 200 n [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] Industrial war potential, reduction of, 426–427 [ Pgs. 426–427 include portions of Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , and Doc. 354 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] Level of industry, 303–304 [ Pgs. 303–304 include portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 303 n [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 347–349 [ Pgs. 347–349 include portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Neutral countries, treatment of assets of, 437–438 [ Pgs. 437–438 include portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] ; disposal of Japanese-owned property in, 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 421 ] Occupation and control of ( see also under Allied Council for Japan and Far Eastern Commission , supra ), 156–345 [ Pgs. 156–345 include portions of Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , Doc. 193 , Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , Doc. 207 , Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , Doc. 210 , Doc. 211 , Doc. 212 , Doc. 213 , Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , Doc. 222 , Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , Doc. 227 , Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] Agrarian reform ( see also land reform program , infra ), 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] Allied Council for Japan. See supra. Allied Powers, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 164–165 [ Pgs. 164–165 include portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , and Doc. 173 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 214–216 [ Pgs. 214–216 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 219 [ Pg. 219 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 222–225 [ Pgs. 222–225 include portions of Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , and Doc. 218 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 239–240 [ Pgs. 239–240 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 259 [ Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 267 [ Pg. 267 is part of Doc. 249 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 304 [ Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 268 and Doc. 269 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 456 [ Pg. 456 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 514 [ Pg. 514 is part of Doc. 413 ] Allied Trade Representatives in Japan, 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] American Food Mission to Japan, 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 220 ] Anguar Island phosphate project, Australian and British objections to Japanese participation in, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 241–243 [ Pgs. 241–243 include portions of Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , and Doc. 232 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] ; U.S. position, 236–237 [ Pgs. 236–237 include portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 241–243 [ Pgs. 241–243 include portions of Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , and Doc. 232 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 264–265 [ Pgs. 264–265 include portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Archives of Japan, treatment of, 165–166 [ Pgs. 165–166 include portions of Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , and Doc. 174 ] , 194–195 [ Pgs. 194–195 include portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196 ] Atomic energy research, prohibition of, 175–176 [ Pgs. 175–176 include portions of Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , and Doc. 182 ] Australia ( see also SCAP-sponsored Japanese whaling expedition to Antarctica under Japan : Fishing and whaling , infra ), 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160–162 [ Pgs. 160–162 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , and Doc. 171 ] , 164–165 [ Pgs. 164–165 include portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , and Doc. 173 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 179–181 [ Pgs. 179–181 include portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 220–221 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 267–269 [ Pgs. 267–269 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , and Doc. 251 ] , 283–285 [ Pgs. 283–285 include portions of Doc. 257 , Doc. 258 , and Doc. 259 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] Bonin Islands, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] British Commonwealth, 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 311–313 [ Pgs. 311–313 include portions of Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 318–319 [ Pgs. 318–319 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] ; forces in Japan, 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] Canada ( see also SCAP-sponsored Japanese whaling expedition to Antarctica under Japan : Fishing and whaling , infra ), 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] Capital levy law: Application to Swiss nationals, question of, 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 306–307 [ Pgs. 306–307 include portions of Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] ; exemption of Koreans, question of, 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , and Doc. 187 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] China, 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 290 n [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 295 n [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 312–313 [ Pgs. 312–313 include portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 324–326 [ Pgs. 324–326 include portions of Doc. 279 and Doc. 280 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 405 ] Anti-American propaganda in Chinese controlled press, 238–239 [ Pgs. 238–239 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 239 n [ Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] Japanese external assets in, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 223 ] Registration of Chinese nationals, 183–184 [ Pgs. 183–184 include portions of Doc. 186 , Doc. 187 , and Doc. 188 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] Constitutional Reform Committee, 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] Cultural objects, restitution of looted, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] Disarmament and demilitarization ( see also under Japan : Peace treaty ), 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 276 ] Draft peace treaty. See under Japan : Peace treaty . Economic blockade of Japan, 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 372 ] Economic conditions in, 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 157 n [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 344–345 [ Pgs. 344–345 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] Economic problems, proposed solution by U.S. interim directives, 271–275 [ Pgs. 271–275 include portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 275 n [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 302–304 [ Pgs. 302–304 include portions of Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] , 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] Economic recovery of Japan, policy considerations regarding, 313–317 [ Pgs. 313–317 include portions of Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 276 ] Economic Stabilization Board, 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 344 [ Pg. 344 includes portions of Doc. 286 and Doc. 287 ] Economy of Japan, revival of, 265–266 [ Pgs. 265–266 include portions of Doc. 247 , Doc. 248 , and Doc. 249 ] Education: Australian proposal for International Advisory Board, 169–171 [ Pgs. 169–171 include portions of Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] ; Japanese Educational Reform Council, 318–319 [ Pgs. 318–319 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] ; Japanese educational system, policy for revision of, 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 318–319 [ Pgs. 318–319 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 323 [ Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 410 ] ; U.S. education mission, 318–319 [ Pgs. 318–319 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Elections, 157–158 [ Pgs. 157–158 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 177 [ Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 210 ] Electric steel furnaces, retention of, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] Fishing and Whaling policy, 161–162 [ Pgs. 161–162 include portions of Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , and Doc. 171 ] , 164–165 [ Pgs. 164–165 include portions of Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , and Doc. 173 ] , 179–182 [ Pgs. 179–182 include portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 195–197 [ Pgs. 195–197 include portions of Doc. 195 , Doc. 196 , and Doc. 197 ] , 197 n [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 203–207 [ Pgs. 203–207 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207 ] , 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 227–228 [ Pgs. 227–228 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 403–404 [ Pgs. 403–404 include portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 372 ] Fishing and fish processing operations in Kamchatka and in or near Soviet-controlled areas, 190–191 [ Pgs. 190–191 include portions of Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 203–204 [ Pgs. 203–204 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 294 n [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 295 n [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] Fishing operations off Alaska and Aleutians, 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Informal Interagency Committee on Japanese fishing and marine industry, 179–182 [ Pgs. 179–182 include portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] SCAP-sponsored Japanese whaling expedition to Antarctica, opposition to, 205–207 [ Pgs. 205–207 include portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 212–216 [ Pgs. 212–216 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 229–230 [ Pgs. 229–230 include portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 233–234 [ Pgs. 233–234 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , and Doc. 225 ] , 239–240 [ Pgs. 239–240 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 242–247 [ Pgs. 242–247 include portions of Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , and Doc. 236 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 260 [ Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 409–410 [ Pgs. 409–410 include portions of Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , and Doc. 343 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] Country attitudes: Australia, 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 212–213 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 216 [ Pg. 216 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 221–222 [ Pgs. 221–222 include portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216 ] , 227–230 [ Pgs. 227–230 include portions of Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , and Doc. 222 ] , 230 n [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 239–240 [ Pgs. 239–240 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 242–244 [ Pgs. 242–244 include portions of Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 247 n [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 248–250 [ Pgs. 248–250 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 261–263 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 269 [ Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] ; Canada, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] ; China, 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] ; France, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] ; Korea, 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] ; Netherlands, 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] ; New Zealand, 207 n [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 230 n [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 239–240 [ Pgs. 239–240 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 261–262 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] ; Norway, 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 239–240 [ Pgs. 239–240 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 261 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 246 ] ; Philippines, 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] ; United Kingdom, 205–207 [ Pgs. 205–207 include portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 239–240 [ Pgs. 239–240 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 242–246 [ Pgs. 242–246 include portions of Doc. 230 , Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 260–262 [ Pgs. 260–262 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 301 [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] ; Soviet Union, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] U.S. support for, 212–216 [ Pgs. 212–216 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 222–224 [ Pgs. 222–224 include portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 222 n [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 230 [ Pg. 230 is part of Doc. 222 ] , 234–237 [ Pgs. 234–237 include portions of Doc. 225 , Doc. 226 , and Doc. 227 ] , 243 n [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 248–253 [ Pgs. 248–253 include portions of Doc. 236 , Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , and Doc. 240 ] , 260–263 [ Pgs. 260–263 include portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246 ] , 263 n [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 301–302 [ Pgs. 301–302 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , and Doc. 268 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] Food supplies, 191–192 [ Pgs. 191–192 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , and Doc. 193 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 332–337 [ Pgs. 332–337 include portions of Doc. 281 , Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , and Doc. 284 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Foreign exchange rate, proposed establishment of, 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 311–312 [ Pgs. 311–312 include portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 337–339 [ Pgs. 337–339 include portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] Formosa: Formosans in Japan, status of, 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] ; Japanese external assets in, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 223 ] ; Japanese resources in, 455 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 372 ] France, 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] General Contractors Association, dissolution of, 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] General strike, threat of, 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 188 n [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Gold and silver, use of Japanese-owned gold and silver in revolving fund, 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 293 [ Pg. 293 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 331 [ Pg. 331 is part of Doc. 281 ] , 422–423 [ Pgs. 422–423 include portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] Imperial House Economy Law, 171–173 [ Pgs. 171–173 include portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , and Doc. 179 ] , 171 n [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] Imperial Household, 172–173 [ Pgs. 172–173 include portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] Imperial Household Ministry, 172–173 [ Pgs. 172–173 include portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179 ] India, 161 [ Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] ; withdrawal of Indian troops from Japan, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 369 ] Industrial production, report on, 295–300 [ Pgs. 295–300 include portions of Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] Inter-Allied Trade Board, 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 224 n [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 282 [ Pg. 282 is part of Doc. 257 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 316–317 [ Pgs. 316–317 include portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] Interchange of persons between Japan and other countries, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] International Advisory Board, proposal by Australia, 169–171 [ Pgs. 169–171 include portions of Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] International conferences, Australian objection to Japanese participation in, 222 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] ; U.S. reply, 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] Japanese Holding Company Liquidation Commission, 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] Land reform program ( see also Agrarian reform , supra ), 266–267 [ Pgs. 266–267 include portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] ; Soviet criticism of, 266–268 [ Pgs. 266–268 include portions of Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , and Doc. 250 ] Liaison Missions, 167–169 [ Pgs. 167–169 include portions of Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , and Doc. 176 ] Mitsubishi Trading Company, 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] Mitsui Trading Company, 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] Netherlands, 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] New Zealand ( see also SCAP-sponsored Japanese whaling expedition to Antarctica under Japan : Fishing and whaling , supra ), 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160–161 [ Pgs. 160–161 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , and Doc. 170 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 334–337 [ Pgs. 334–337 include portions of Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , and Doc. 284 ] Occupation costs, 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 217 n [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 272 n [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 422–425 [ Pgs. 422–425 include portions of Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] Patents, Japanese, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] Philippines, 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] Property of United Nations nationals, 305–306 [ Pgs. 305–306 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Rearmament of Japan, control over, 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] Repatriation: Agreement of Dec. 19, 1946 , regarding repatriation of Japanese from Soviet and Soviet-controlled areas, and of Koreans from Japan to North Korea, 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 341–342 [ Pg. 341 is part of Doc. 285 ] Chinese and Korean laborers in Japan, 296–297 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 265 ] Japanese in Manchuria and Soviet-controlled territory, 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 204 n [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 312–313 [ Pgs. 312–313 include portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 340–343 [ Pgs. 340–343 include portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] Japanese prisoners in Southeast Asia, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 255–256 [ Pgs. 255–256 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , and Doc. 244 ] Soviet Union, 166 [ Pg. 166 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 190–191 [ Pgs. 190–191 include portions of Doc. 190 , Doc. 191 , and Doc. 192 ] , 194 [ Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 194 and Doc. 195 ] , 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 270 [ Pg. 270 is part of Doc. 251 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 286–289 [ Pgs. 286–289 include portions of Doc. 260 , Doc. 261 , and Doc. 262 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 312 [ Pg. 312 is part of Doc. 275 ] , 318 [ Pg. 318 is part of Doc. 277 ] , 324–325 [ Pg. 324 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 340–343 [ Pgs. 340–343 include portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 405 ] Land reform, Soviet criticism of, 266–268 [ Pgs. 266–268 include portions of Doc. 248 , Doc. 249 , and Doc. 250 ] Radio broadcasts and articles derogatory to the United States, 210–211 [ Pgs. 210–211 include portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 226–227 [ Pgs. 226–227 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 260 ] SCAP staff, Soviet nominations for positions on, 198–199 [ Pgs. 198–199 include portions of Doc. 198 , Doc. 199 , and Doc. 200 ] Standard of living, civilian, maintenance of minimum, 422–423 [ Pgs. 422–423 include portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 352 ] Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan (SCAP). See infra . Switzerland, 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] Tariffs, 326–330 [ Pgs. 326–330 include portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Terms of surrender, 170 [ Pg. 170 is part of Doc. 176 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 405 ] ; instrument of surrender, Sept. 2, 1945 , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] Trade, 167–169 [ Pgs. 167–169 include portions of Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , and Doc. 176 ] , 173–174 [ Pgs. 173–174 include portions of Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] , 184–186 [ Pgs. 184–186 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , and Doc. 189 ] , 224–225 [ Pgs. 224–225 include portions of Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , and Doc. 218 ] , 231–232 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 257–260 [ Pgs. 257–260 include portions of Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , and Doc. 246 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 410 ] Allied and neutral trade representatives in Japan, 189 [ Pg. 189 includes portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] China, possibility of increased trade with, 209–210 [ Pgs. 209–210 include portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210 ] , 554–555 [ Pgs. 554–555 include portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] Import-export policies, 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 330–332 [ Pgs. 330–332 include portions of Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] Occupied Japan Export-Import Revolving Fund, establishment of, 276–279 [ Pgs. 276–279 include portions of Doc. 254 , Doc. 255 , and Doc. 256 ] , 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 316 [ Pg. 316 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 343–344 [ Pgs. 343–344 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] Private trade with Japan, U.S. policy with respect to restoration of, 280–283 [ Pgs. 280–283 include portions of Doc. 256 , Doc. 257 , and Doc. 258 ] , 290–294 [ Pgs. 290–294 include portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 290 n [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 300 [ Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 265 and Doc. 266 ] , 310 [ Pg. 310 is part of Doc. 274 ] ; U.K. position on, 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 369 ] Trade Unions, 188–189 [ Pgs. 188–189 include portions of Doc. 189 and Doc. 190 ] Trading Companies, dissolution of, 253–254 [ Pgs. 253–254 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , and Doc. 241 ] Travel documents for Japanese nationals, 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] United Kingdom ( see also SCAP-sponsored Japanese whaling expediation to Antarctica under Japan : Fishing and whaling , supra ), 165 [ Pg. 165 includes portions of Doc. 172 and Doc. 173 ] , 169–170 [ Pgs. 169–170 include portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 290 n [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 295 n [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 304–305 [ Pgs. 304–305 include portions of Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] , 499 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 405 ] British troops in Japan, withdrawal of, 300–301 [ Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 369 ] U.K. Liaison Mission in Japan, 255–256 [ Pgs. 255–256 include portions of Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , and Doc. 244 ] United Nations Economic Committee for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), relationship to Japan and Korea, 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 308–311 [ Pgs. 308–311 include portions of Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , and Doc. 275 ] , 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] United States. See Japan : United States , infra. War Crimes trials, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] ; question of further international trials, 269–270 [ Pgs. 269–270 include portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 279–280 [ Pgs. 279–280 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 304–305 [ Pgs. 304–305 include portions of Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] War criminals, 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] ; disposition of property of convicted, 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 162–164 [ Pgs. 162–164 include portions of Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , and Doc. 172 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] War Indemnity Special Measures-Laws, 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] Zaibatsu, 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 390 [ Pg. 390 includes portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] Dissolution of, 272 [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 305–306 [ Pgs. 305–306 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 319–323 [ Pgs. 319–323 include portions of Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279 ] Holding Company Liquidation Commission, 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] State-Army Mission to Japan ( 1945 ) regarding the, 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] Okinawa, question of return to Japan, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Peace Conference, 180–181 [ Pg. 180 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 214 [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 220–221 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 220 n [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 249 [ Pg. 249 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 415–417 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 417 n [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 468–469 [ Pgs. 468–469 include portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] Australia, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 465–466 [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 472 n [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 474–476 [ Pgs. 474–476 include portions of Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , and Doc. 390 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 517–518 [ Pgs. 517–518 include portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 543–545 [ Pgs. 543–545 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 551–552 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 571 [ Pg. 571 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 577–580 [ Pgs. 577–580 include portions of Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] Burma, 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] Canada, 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] China, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 472–474 [ Pgs. 472–474 include portions of Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , and Doc. 388 ] , 472 n [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 505 n [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 510–511 [ Pgs. 510–511 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 518–523 [ Pgs. 518–523 include portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , and Doc. 420 ] , 527–531 [ Pgs. 527–531 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , and Doc. 425 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 545–552 [ Pgs. 545–552 include portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 556–557 [ Pgs. 556–557 include portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 560–571 [ Pgs. 560–571 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] , 577–582 [ Pgs. 577–582 include portions of Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , and Doc. 449 ] , 584–588 [ Pgs. 584–588 include portions of Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , and Doc. 455 ] , 587 n [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] , 590–593 [ Pgs. 590–593 include portions of Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] Council of Foreign Ministers, primary responsibility for drawing up peace treaty for Japan, Soviet insistence upon, 464–465 [ Pgs. 464–465 include portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 473–474 [ Pgs. 473–474 include portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 479–483 [ Pgs. 479–483 include portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 488–490 [ Pgs. 488–490 include portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 510 n [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 522–523 [ Pgs. 522–523 include portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 422 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 425 ] , 544–545 [ Pgs. 544–545 include portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 563–564 [ Pgs. 563–564 include portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 581–584 [ Pgs. 581–584 include portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , and Doc. 451 ] , 586 [ Pg. 586 includes portions of Doc. 451 and Doc. 452 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] , 593 [ Pg. 593 is part of Doc. 458 ] France, 457–458 [ Pgs. 457–458 include portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] India, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] Korea, 637–638 [ Pgs. 637–638 include portions of Doc. 485 and Doc. 486 ] ; question of representation at Japanese peace conference, 511–512 [ Pgs. 511–512 include portions of Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , and Doc. 413 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Mongolian People’s Republic, question of participation, 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] Netherlands, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] New Zealand, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 472 n [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] Pakistan, question regarding participation of, 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 565–566 [ Pgs. 565–566 include portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , and Doc. 439 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] Philippines, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] Preparatory conference, U.S. proposals for, 458–459 [ Pgs. 458–459 include portions of Doc. 374 and Doc. 375 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 464–479 [ Pgs. 464–479 include portions of Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , and Doc. 392 ] , 472 n [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 488–491 [ Pgs. 488–491 include portions of Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , and Doc. 398 ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 505 n [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 509–511 [ Pgs. 509–511 include portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , and Doc. 412 ] , 517–523 [ Pgs. 517–523 include portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , and Doc. 420 ] , 527–533 [ Pgs. 527–533 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , and Doc. 426 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 548–550 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 556–595 [ Pgs. 556–595 include portions of Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , and Doc. 461 ] Soviet Union, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 465–466 [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 469–470 [ Pgs. 469–470 include portions of Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , and Doc. 384 ] , 472–475 [ Pgs. 472–475 include portions of Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , and Doc. 389 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 488–491 [ Pgs. 488–491 include portions of Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , and Doc. 398 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 493–494 [ Pgs. 493–494 include portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 509–512 [ Pgs. 509–512 include portions of Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , and Doc. 413 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 517–518 [ Pgs. 517–518 include portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 520–521 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 523–525 [ Pgs. 523–525 include portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 527–532 [ Pgs. 527–532 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , and Doc. 426 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 545–546 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 548–552 [ Pgs. 548–552 include portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 554–556 [ Pgs. 554–556 include portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 560–571 [ Pgs. 560–571 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441 ] , 573–578 [ Pgs. 573–578 include portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , and Doc. 446 ] , 580–591 [ Pgs. 580–591 include portions of Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , and Doc. 457 ] , 587 n [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] , 593–594 [ Pgs. 593–594 include portions of Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , and Doc. 460 ] United Kingdom, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 470–474 [ Pgs. 470–474 include portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , and Doc. 388 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 510–511 [ Pgs. 510–511 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 522–523 [ Pgs. 522–523 include portions of Doc. 419 and Doc. 420 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 528–532 [ Pgs. 528–532 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , and Doc. 426 ] , 545–546 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 556–557 [ Pgs. 556–557 include portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 565–571 [ Pgs. 565–571 include portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441 ] , 574–577 [ Pgs. 574–577 include portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , and Doc. 445 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 581–582 [ Pgs. 581–582 include portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449 ] , 584–588 [ Pgs. 584–588 include portions of Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , and Doc. 455 ] , 587 n [ Pg. 587 includes portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] , 590–593 [ Pgs. 590–593 include portions of Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] , 591 n [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] Voting procedure: Simple majority, 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] Two-thirds majority, 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 475–476 [ Pgs. 475–476 include portions of Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , and Doc. 390 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 520–522 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 570–571 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] Veto question, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 520–521 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 523–525 [ Pgs. 523–525 include portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 560–563 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439 ] , 573–574 [ Pgs. 573–574 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] Four power unanimity, 457–458 [ Pgs. 457–458 include portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 465 [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 522–525 [ Pgs. 522–525 include portions of Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , and Doc. 421 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 527–529 [ Pgs. 527–529 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , and Doc. 424 ] , 531 [ Pg. 531 is part of Doc. 425 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 548–549 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 563–564 [ Pgs. 563–564 include portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 566–570 [ Pgs. 566–570 include portions of Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 448 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] Six power unanimity, 457–458 [ Pgs. 457–458 include portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] Peace treaty, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 268–269 [ Pgs. 268–269 include portions of Doc. 249 , Doc. 250 , and Doc. 251 ] , 278 [ Pg. 278 is part of Doc. 255 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 258 ] , 294 [ Pg. 294 includes portions of Doc. 263 and Doc. 264 ] , 300–301 [ Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 402–404 [ Pgs. 402–404 include portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , and Doc. 336 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 413–414 [ Pgs. 413–414 include portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] , 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 446–595 [ Pgs. 446–595 include portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , Doc. 369 , Doc. 370 , Doc. 371 , Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , Doc. 400 , Doc. 401 , Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , Doc. 404 , Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , Doc. 419 , Doc. 420 , Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , Doc. 424 , Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , Doc. 444 , Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , Doc. 458 , Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , and Doc. 461 ] passim American Republics, participation of, 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379 ] Argentina, question of participation in, 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379 ] Australia, 446–450 [ Pgs. 446–450 include portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , and Doc. 369 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 466–467 [ Pgs. 466–467 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382 ] , 475–476 [ Pgs. 475–476 include portions of Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , and Doc. 390 ] , 510–517 [ Pgs. 510–517 include portions of Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , Doc. 414 , Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , and Doc. 417 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 551 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 433 ] British Commonwealth Conference at Canberra, 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 524–526 [ Pgs. 524–526 include portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 532–535 [ Pgs. 532–535 include portions of Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , and Doc. 427 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] British Commonwealth countries, 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 533–534 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] China, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] Cuba, 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] Disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] Disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, draft treaty on, 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] , 451 [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 451 n [ Pg. 451 is part of Doc. 369 ] , 459–460 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 503–504 [ Pgs. 503–504 include portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 513–514 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 550 [ Pg. 550 is part of Doc. 432 ] Draft peace treaty, U.S. proposal for, 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 485–487 [ Pgs. 485–487 include portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , and Doc. 395 ] , 486 n [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394 ] , 495–496 [ Pgs. 495–496 include portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 502–503 [ Pgs. 502–503 include portions of Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , and Doc. 407 ] , 500–509 [ Pgs. 500–509 include portions of Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , Doc. 410 , and Doc. 411 ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 559 n [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 562–563 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 435 ] Economic matters, British Commonwealth views on, 533–534 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] Economic reform, 562–563 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 435 ] India, 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] Industrial disarmament, 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 435 ] Mandated islands, Australian interest in disposition of former Japanese, 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 366 ] Mexico, proposed participation in, 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379 ] New Zealand, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] Post-treaty security controls, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 454–456 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 459–460 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 475–476 [ Pgs. 475–476 include portions of Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , and Doc. 390 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394 ] , 513–514 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] Separate peace treaty without the Soviet Union, question of, 483–485 [ Pgs. 483–485 include portions of Doc. 392 and Doc. 393 ] , 498–502 [ Pgs. 498–502 include portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] Soviet Union, 464–466 [ Pgs. 464–466 include portions of Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 486–487 [ Pgs. 486–487 include portions of Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , and Doc. 395 ] , 498–502 [ Pgs. 498–502 include portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] Territorial dispositions, 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 538–540 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] Bonin Islands, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] Kurile Islands, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 424 ] Marcus Island, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] Nanpo Shoto Island, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Nansei Shoto Island, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Quelport Island, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] Ryukyu Islands including Okinawa, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] Sakhalin Island (Karafuto), southern part, 487 [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 424 ] United Kingdom, 448–451 [ Pgs. 448–451 include portions of Doc. 366 , Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , and Doc. 369 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 525–526 [ Pgs. 525–526 include portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] United Nations role in post-peace treaty period, 455–456 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 459–461 [ Pgs. 459–461 include portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 413 ] United States. See under Japan : United States : Department of the Army , Joint Chiefs of Staff , Navy Department , State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee , and War Department . Political parties, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 455 ] Restitution of identifiable property confiscated in Japan from Allied nationals, 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 432–435 [ Pgs. 432–435 include portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , and Doc. 359 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] ; Restitution Advisory Committee, proposed, 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Ryukyu Islands, question of U.S. base in, 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 435 ] Soviet Union ( see also under Occupation and Control , Peace Conference , and Peace Treaty , supra, and under War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests , infra ), objectives in Japan, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 594–595 [ Pgs. 594–595 include portions of Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , and Doc. 461 ] Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan (SCAP) ( see also MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas ): Occupation and control, 156–158 [ Pgs. 156–158 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160–171 [ Pgs. 160–171 include portions of Doc. 168 , Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 171 n [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 173–174 [ Pgs. 173–174 include portions of Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] , 175 n [ Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 179 [ Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 183 and Doc. 184 ] , 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , and Doc. 187 ] , 185–186 [ Pgs. 185–186 include portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 188–190 [ Pgs. 188–190 include portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 195–196 [ Pgs. 195–196 include portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 199–201 [ Pgs. 199–201 include portions of Doc. 199 , Doc. 200 , and Doc. 201 ] , 203–204 [ Pgs. 203–204 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 206 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 208–210 [ Pgs. 208–210 include portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 214–216 [ Pgs. 214–216 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 218–230 [ Pgs. 218–230 include portions of Doc. 214 , Doc. 215 , Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , Doc. 219 , Doc. 220 , Doc. 221 , and Doc. 222 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 233–235 [ Pgs. 233–235 include portions of Doc. 223 , Doc. 224 , Doc. 225 , and Doc. 226 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 236–237 [ Pgs. 236–237 include portions of Doc. 226 and Doc. 227 ] , 239–241 [ Pgs. 239–241 include portions of Doc. 228 , Doc. 229 , and Doc. 230 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 248–249 [ Pgs. 248–249 include portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237 ] , 251–253 [ Pgs. 251–253 include portions of Doc. 237 , Doc. 238 , Doc. 239 , and Doc. 240 ] , 256–265 [ Pgs. 256–265 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , Doc. 246 , Doc. 247 , and Doc. 248 ] , 271 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 272 n [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 273–274 [ Pgs. 273–274 include portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 276–278 [ Pgs. 276–278 include portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 282–283 [ Pgs. 282–283 include portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258 ] , 287–298 [ Pgs. 287–298 include portions of Doc. 261 , Doc. 262 , Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 301–305 [ Pgs. 301–305 include portions of Doc. 266 , Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , and Doc. 270 ] , 301 n [ Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267 ] , 308–318 [ Pgs. 308–318 include portions of Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , Doc. 276 , and Doc. 277 ] , 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 314 n [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 320–333 [ Pgs. 320–333 include portions of Doc. 278 , Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , Doc. 281 , and Doc. 282 ] , 335–336 [ Pg. 335 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 340–345 [ Pgs. 340–345 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] , 340 n [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 462 [ Pg. 462 includes portions of Doc. 376 and Doc. 377 ] , 463 n [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 499–500 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 507–508 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 558–559 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 589 [ Pg. 589 is part of Doc. 455 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] Peace treaty, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 499–504 [ Pgs. 499–504 include portions of Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , and Doc. 407 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 413 ] , 536–537 [ Pgs. 536–537 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 591–592 [ Pgs. 591–592 include portions of Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] War claims and reparations, 346–348 [ Pgs. 346–348 include portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290 ] , 353–354 [ Pgs. 353–354 include portions of Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , and Doc. 295 ] , 356–359 [ Pgs. 356–359 include portions of Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , and Doc. 300 ] , 361–365 [ Pgs. 361–365 include portions of Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , and Doc. 305 ] , 366 n [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 367–368 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 370–380 [ Pgs. 370–380 include portions of Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 371 n [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 374 n [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 382–389 [ Pgs. 382–389 include portions of Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , and Doc. 325 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 403–404 [ Pgs. 403–404 include portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 413–414 [ Pgs. 413–414 include portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] , 418–419 [ Pgs. 418–419 include portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 426 n [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 437–441 [ Pgs. 437–441 include portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] , 443–444 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] United States: American Food Mission to Japan, 183 n [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 201 n [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 228 [ Pg. 228 is part of Doc. 220 ] Committee of Three, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Department of the Army, 303 n [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 302–304 [ Pgs. 302–304 include portions of Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , and Doc. 269 ] , 313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 382–383 [ Pgs. 382–383 include portions of Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , and Doc. 319 ] , 435–442 [ Pgs. 435–442 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 563 [ Pg. 563 is part of Doc. 435 ] Education Mission to Japan, 318–319 [ Pgs. 318–319 include portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] Initial Post-Surrender Policy, 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 182 n [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 200–201 [ Pgs. 200–201 include portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] ; revision of, 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff: Occupation and control, 162 [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 174–176 [ Pgs. 174–176 include portions of Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , and Doc. 182 ] , 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 229 n [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 263 [ Pg. 263 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 272 n [ Pg. 272 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 332 n [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Peace treaty, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 460 n [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 495–496 [ Pgs. 495–496 include portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] War claims and reparations, 354–355 [ Pgs. 354–355 include portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 366 n [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 370–371 [ Pgs. 370–371 include portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 374–380 [ Pgs. 374–380 include portions of Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , and Doc. 316 ] , 398–399 [ Pgs. 398–399 include portions of Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 426 [ Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Navy Department: Occupation and control, 164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] Peace treaty, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] War claims and reparations, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 388 n [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338 ] , 407–408 [ Pgs. 407–408 include portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , and Doc. 341 ] Remittances from United States to Japan, U.S. policy toward, 166–167 [ Pgs. 166–167 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] State Department legal adviser, views on peace treaty, 479–485 [ Pgs. 479–485 include portions of Doc. 391 , Doc. 392 , and Doc. 393 ] State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC): Occupation and control, 162–164 [ Pgs. 162–164 include portions of Doc. 170 , Doc. 171 , and Doc. 172 ] , 162 n [ Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 170 and Doc. 171 ] , 171 n [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] , 174 [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 174 n [ Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 179 and Doc. 180 ] , 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 192 n [ Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 192 and Doc. 193 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 271–273 [ Pg. 271 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 302–307 [ Pgs. 302–307 include portions of Doc. 267 , Doc. 268 , Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] , 313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 326 [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 280 ] Peace treaty, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 496 [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 507 [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] War claims and reparations, 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 356–358 [ Pgs. 356–358 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 357 n [ Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 360 n [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 367–371 [ Pgs. 367–371 include portions of Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , and Doc. 309 ] , 374–375 [ Pgs. 374–375 include portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 376 n [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 381–383 [ Pgs. 381–383 include portions of Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , and Doc. 319 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 329 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 402–404 [ Pgs. 402–404 include portions of Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , and Doc. 336 ] , 406–407 [ Pgs. 406–407 include portions of Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , and Doc. 340 ] , 418 [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 420–421 [ Pgs. 420–421 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 441–442 [ Pgs. 441–442 include portions of Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] United States Commercial Company (USCC), 168–169 [ Pgs. 168–169 include portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 290–291 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 263 ] War Department: Occupation and control, 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 161 [ Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 169 and Doc. 170 ] , 164 [ Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 195 [ Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 195 and Doc. 196 ] , 197–198 [ Pgs. 197–198 include portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] , 200–201 [ Pgs. 200–201 include portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 246 [ Pg. 246 includes portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] , 270–272 [ Pgs. 270–272 include portions of Doc. 251 and Doc. 252 ] , 273 n [ Pg. 273 is part of Doc. 252 ] , 275 n [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Peace treaty, 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 460 n [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 507–509 [ Pgs. 507–509 include portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 413 ] War claims and reparations, 354 [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 368 [ Pg. 368 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 388 n [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 405–408 [ Pgs. 405–408 include portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , and Doc. 341 ] , 413–417 [ Pgs. 413–417 include portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] , 420–421 [ Pgs. 420–421 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] , 425–426 [ Pgs. 425–426 include portions of Doc. 352 and Doc. 353 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 359 ] War claims and reparations, 345–446 [ Pgs. 345–446 include portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , Doc. 291 , Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , Doc. 294 , Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , Doc. 297 , Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , Doc. 334 , Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] Advance transfer of Japanese reparations, 273–274 [ Pgs. 273–274 include portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 357–359 [ Pgs. 357–359 include portions of Doc. 298 , Doc. 299 , and Doc. 300 ] , 365–366 [ Pgs. 365–366 include portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 370 [ Pg. 370 is part of Doc. 308 ] , 371 n [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 370–377 [ Pgs. 370–377 include portions of Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , Doc. 311 , Doc. 312 , Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 381–385 [ Pgs. 381–385 include portions of Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , and Doc. 321 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 439–441 [ Pgs. 439–441 include portions of Doc. 361 , Doc. 362 , and Doc. 363 ] , 443–444 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] Allied Commission on Reparations, 380–381 [ Pgs. 380–381 include portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] Allied Council for Japan. See under Japan : Allied Council , supra. Country attitudes and interests: Australia, 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 346 n [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 367–368 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 395 n [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397–399 [ Pgs. 397–399 include portions of Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 404 n [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 440–441 [ Pgs. 440–441 include portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Burma, 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 389–390 [ Pgs. 389–390 include portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327 ] , 411–412 [ Pgs. 411–412 include portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 485 ] Canada, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] China, 346–347 [ Pgs. 346–347 include portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 358–359 [ Pgs. 358–359 include portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 361–362 [ Pgs. 361–362 include portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 362 n [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 372–373 [ Pgs. 372–373 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 407–408 [ Pgs. 407–408 include portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , and Doc. 341 ] , 407 n [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 410–411 [ Pgs. 410–411 include portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 426–430 [ Pgs. 426–430 include portions of Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 432–433 [ Pgs. 432–433 include portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 443–444 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] France, 350–351 [ Pgs. 350–351 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 407–409 [ Pgs. 407–409 include portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , and Doc. 342 ] , 412–413 [ Pgs. 412–413 include portions of Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , and Doc. 345 ] , 413 n [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] India, 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] Malaya, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 364 ] Netherlands, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] Netherlands East Indies, 358–359 [ Pgs. 358–359 include portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 364 ] New Zealand, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] Philippines, 358–359 [ Pgs. 358–359 include portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 430 [ Pg. 430 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 443–444 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] Soviet Union, 346 n [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 353 [ Pg. 353 includes portions of Doc. 293 and Doc. 294 ] , 356–357 [ Pgs. 356–357 include portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299 ] , 359–362 [ Pgs. 359–362 include portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , and Doc. 303 ] , 365–366 [ Pgs. 365–366 include portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 372–373 [ Pgs. 372–373 include portions of Doc. 309 , Doc. 310 , and Doc. 311 ] , 372 n [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] , 384–385 [ Pgs. 384–385 include portions of Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , and Doc. 321 ] , 387 [ Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 395–397 [ Pgs. 395–397 include portions of Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , and Doc. 331 ] , 399–400 [ Pgs. 399–400 include portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 430–431 [ Pgs. 430–431 include portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 405 ] United Kingdom, 345–346 [ Pgs. 345–346 include portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289 ] , 345 n [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 358–359 [ Pgs. 358–359 include portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 359 n [ Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 361–362 [ Pgs. 361–362 include portions of Doc. 302 and Doc. 303 ] , 362 n [ Pg. 362 is part of Doc. 303 ] , 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 383–384 [ Pgs. 383–384 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , and Doc. 320 ] , 388–390 [ Pgs. 388–390 include portions of Doc. 322 , Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397 [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 399 [ Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 332 and Doc. 333 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 410–412 [ Pgs. 410–412 include portions of Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , and Doc. 344 ] , 412 n [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 423–425 [ Pgs. 423–425 include portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 427–430 [ Pgs. 427–430 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 445–446 [ Pgs. 445–446 include portions of Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] Inter-Allied Japanese reparations conference, proposal for, 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] Japanese technical personnel, utilization of by claimant countries, 418–421 [ Pgs. 418–421 include portions of Doc. 346 , Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] Korea: Japanese external assets and industrial facilities in South Korea, 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 400–402 [ Pgs. 400–402 include portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] Korean claims for reparations, 604–605 [ Pgs. 604–605 include portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 485 ] ; fertilizer, 394 [ Pg. 394 is part of Doc. 329 ] Manchuria, Japanese external assets in, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 285 ] Merchant shipping, division of, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 385–387 [ Pgs. 385–387 include portions of Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] Nations to be invited to submit reparations claims, list of, 350–351 [ Pgs. 350–351 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] Naval vessels, disposition of, 360–363 [ Pgs. 360–363 include portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] , 363 n [ Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304 ] , 372 [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] , 372 n [ Pg. 372 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] , 397–398 [ Pgs. 397–398 include portions of Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , and Doc. 332 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 407–409 [ Pgs. 407–409 include portions of Doc. 339 , Doc. 340 , Doc. 341 , and Doc. 342 ] , 407 n [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 408 n [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 412–413 [ Pgs. 412–413 include portions of Doc. 343 , Doc. 344 , and Doc. 345 ] , 413 n [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] Production of consumption goods needed by victims of Japanese aggression, 366 [ Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 305 and Doc. 306 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] Reparations, 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 157 n [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 159–160 [ Pgs. 159–160 include portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 163 [ Pg. 163 is part of Doc. 171 ] , 184–185 [ Pgs. 184–185 include portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 207 [ Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 273–274 [ Pgs. 273–274 include portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253 ] , 297 [ Pg. 297 is part of Doc. 265 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 315–316 [ Pg. 315 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 333 [ Pg. 333 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 345–348 [ Pgs. 345–348 include portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290 ] , 345 n [ Pg. 345 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 360–361 [ Pgs. 360–361 include portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 382–383 [ Pgs. 382–383 include portions of Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , and Doc. 319 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 406–407 [ Pgs. 406–407 include portions of Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , and Doc. 340 ] , 413–418 [ Pgs. 413–418 include portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , and Doc. 347 ] Allocations procedures for industrial facilities in Japan, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 370–371 [ Pgs. 370–371 include portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 371 n [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 374 n [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 378–380 [ Pgs. 378–380 include portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 383–387 [ Pgs. 383–387 include portions of Doc. 318 , Doc. 319 , Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] Reparations from current production, 348–349 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 554–555 [ Pgs. 554–555 include portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] Reparations shares, 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 348 [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 395–399 [ Pgs. 395–399 include portions of Doc. 329 , Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 395 n [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 397 n [ Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331 ] , 404 [ Pg. 404 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336 ] , 410–412 [ Pgs. 410–412 include portions of Doc. 342 , Doc. 343 , and Doc. 344 ] , 412 n [ Pg. 412 includes portions of Doc. 343 and Doc. 344 ] , 422 [ Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 349 and Doc. 350 ] , 424 [ Pg. 424 includes portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , and Doc. 352 ] , 428–431 [ Pgs. 428–431 include portions of Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , and Doc. 356 ] , 429 n [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 431 n [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 435–437 [ Pgs. 435–437 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , and Doc. 360 ] , 445–446 [ Pgs. 445–446 include portions of Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] Reparations Technical and Advisory Committee (RTAC), 370–371 [ Pgs. 370–371 include portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 379–380 [ Pgs. 379–380 include portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338 ] , 427–428 [ Pgs. 427–428 include portions of Doc. 353 , Doc. 354 , and Doc. 355 ] , 431–432 [ Pgs. 431–432 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , and Doc. 357 ] , 440–441 [ Pgs. 440–441 include portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 443 [ Pg. 443 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Supreme Commander. See supra. Sweden, 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Switzerland, 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] United States ( see under Joint Chiefs of Staff , Navy Department , State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee , and War Department under Japan : United States , supra ): Japanese Reparations Policy Committee, 184–185 [ Pgs. 184–185 include portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] Overseas Consultants ( see also Strike Engineering Corporation, infra ), 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 416–418 [ Pgs. 416–418 include portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 420–421 [ Pgs. 420–421 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] , 435–438 [ Pgs. 435–438 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 440–442 [ Pgs. 440–442 include portions of Doc. 362 , Doc. 363 , and Doc. 364 ] Strike Engineering Corporation ( see also Overseas Consultants, supra ), 413–414 [ Pgs. 413–414 include portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346 ] , 421–422 [ Pgs. 421–422 include portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 359 ] U.S. claims, 217 n [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 213 ] U.S.-owned property, restoration of, 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 364 ] U.S. Reparations, Restitution and Restoration Mission to Japan, 363–365 [ Pgs. 363–365 include portions of Doc. 303 , Doc. 304 , and Doc. 305 ] , 381–382 [ Pgs. 381–382 include portions of Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , and Doc. 318 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 442–445 [ Pgs. 442–445 include portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 445 n [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, 994 [ Pg. 994 is part of Doc. 795 ] Johnson, Herschel V., 983–984 [ Pgs. 983–984 include portions of Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , and Doc. 787 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 is part of Doc. 821 ] , 1021 n [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] , 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] , 1028 [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 830 ] , 1032–1034 [ Pgs. 1032–1034 include portions of Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , and Doc. 834 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] Jones, J. Weldon, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] Jones, Owen T., 666 [ Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] Jonkman, Jan A., 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 921–922 [ Pgs. 921–922 include portions of Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] , 931–932 [ Pgs. 931–932 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Josselyn, Paul R., 54–55 [ Pgs. 54–55 include portions of Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64 ] Joyner, Calvin, 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 498 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] Juin, Gen. Alphonse Pierre, 73–74 [ Pgs. 73–74 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] Kades, Col. Charles L., 502–503 [ Pgs. 502–503 include portions of Doc. 405 , Doc. 406 , and Doc. 407 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] Kadir, Abdul, 1077 [ Pg. 1077 is part of Doc. 871 ] , 1079 [ Pg. 1079 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 881 ] Kamchatka, 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] Kangleen, Ruperto, 1109 [ Pg. 1109 includes portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] Karafuto ( see also Sakhalin), 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 342 n [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 285 ] Katayama, Tetsu, 256–257 [ Pgs. 256–257 include portions of Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , and Doc. 245 ] , 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] Keen, Col. James, 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] Keenan, Joseph B., 269–270 [ Pgs. 269–270 include portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] Kennan, George F., 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 485–487 [ Pgs. 485–487 include portions of Doc. 392 , Doc. 393 , Doc. 394 , and Doc. 395 ] , 486 n [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 536–543 [ Pgs. 536–543 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , Doc. 429 , and Doc. 430 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] , 784 n [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 601 ] , 807 n [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 626 ] Khoury, Faris el-, 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] Killearn, Lord, 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 769 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] Kim Doo Bang, 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 529 and Doc. 530 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Kim Il Sung, 685–686 [ Pgs. 685–686 include portions of Doc. 529 and Doc. 530 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Kim Koo, 598–600 [ Pgs. 598–600 include portions of Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , and Doc. 464 ] , 620 n [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 644–645 [ Pgs. 644–645 include portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 680 n [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 683–684 [ Pgs. 683–684 include portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 547 and Doc. 548 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 749–750 [ Pgs. 749–750 include portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] , 826 [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 649 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] Kim Sung Soo, 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] Kimm Kiusic, 511–512 [ Pgs. 511–512 include portions of Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , and Doc. 413 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 676–677 [ Pgs. 676–677 include portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 787 [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 787 n [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 823–824 [ Pgs. 823–824 include portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] Kinh, Nguyen, 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Kirby, Richard C., 1066–1067 [ Pgs. 1066–1067 include portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 869 ] , 1079 [ Pg. 1079 includes portions of Doc. 872 and Doc. 873 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] , 1093–1094 [ Pgs. 1093–1094 include portions of Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] , 1096 n [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] Kislenko, Maj. Gen. A.P., 287 [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 343 [ Pg. 343 includes portions of Doc. 285 and Doc. 286 ] Koets, P. J., 892–893 [ Pgs. 892–893 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , and Doc. 695 ] , 1078–1079 [ Pgs. 1078–1079 include portions of Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , and Doc. 873 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] Koo, V. K. Wellington, 227–228 [ Pgs. 227–228 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 519–520 [ Pgs. 519–520 include portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 568–569 [ Pgs. 568–569 include portions of Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 442 ] , 587–588 [ Pgs. 587–588 include portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , and Doc. 455 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] Korea, 596–889 [ Pgs. 596–889 include portions of Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , Doc. 469 , Doc. 470 , Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , Doc. 508 , Doc. 509 , Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , Doc. 593 , Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , Doc. 617 , Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , Doc. 620 , Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , Doc. 624 , Doc. 625 , Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , and Doc. 689 ] Allied Board, 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] Allied Powers, 596–597 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 688 [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 699 [ Pg. 699 is part of Doc. 540 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] Anti-American attitudes and propaganda, 750–751 [ Pgs. 750–751 include portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] , 751 n [ Pg. 751 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 654 ] Australian interest in, 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 546–547 [ Pgs. 546–547 include portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 552–553 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] ; representation for British Commonwealth, 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] ; representation on United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 654 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] Bunce Mission, 667 n [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] Canadian withdrawal from United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, discussions regarding possibility of, 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 880–886 [ Pgs. 880–886 include portions of Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] China, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 610–611 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 629–632 [ Pgs. 629–632 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , and Doc. 483 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 642–644 [ Pgs. 642–644 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 560 and Doc. 561 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 797–799 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 831–832 [ Pgs. 831–832 include portions of Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 687 and Doc. 688 ] Division of Korea along 38 degree North latitude line for purposes of military occupation, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 702–703 [ Pgs. 702–703 include portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 625 ] Economic situation in, 684 [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] Election of National Assembly under U.N. observation: U.S. proposal for, 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 834–835 [ Pgs. 834–835 include portions of Doc. 638 and Doc. 639 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] ; U.N. General Assembly resolution on, 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 660 ] ; preparations for, 860–863 [ Pgs. 860–863 include portions of Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , and Doc. 665 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] , 868–869 [ Pgs. 868–869 include portions of Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] , 872–873 [ Pgs. 872–873 include portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 685 ] Four Power conversations, See United States : Proposal , infra. Independence, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 596–602 [ Pgs. 596–602 include portions of Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , and Doc. 465 ] , 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 466 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 614–616 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 624–626 [ Pgs. 624–626 include portions of Doc. 477 and Doc. 478 ] , 632–633 [ Pgs. 632–633 include portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 638–639 [ Pgs. 638–639 include portions of Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , and Doc. 487 ] , 646–647 [ Pgs. 646–647 include portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 702–703 [ Pgs. 702–703 include portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 734–735 [ Pgs. 734–735 include portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 738–740 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 742–743 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 749–751 [ Pgs. 749–751 include portions of Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , and Doc. 569 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 773–774 [ Pgs. 773–774 include portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 595 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 784–785 [ Pgs. 784–785 include portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 794–795 [ Pgs. 794–795 include portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 799–801 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 815–816 [ Pgs. 815–816 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , and Doc. 623 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 818–819 [ Pgs. 818–819 include portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 828–829 [ Pgs. 828–829 include portions of Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 832–834 [ Pgs. 832–834 include portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 836–838 [ Pgs. 836–838 include portions of Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , and Doc. 642 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 851–852 [ Pgs. 851–852 include portions of Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , and Doc. 654 ] , 856 n [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 858–859 [ Pgs. 858–859 include portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] , 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , and Doc. 665 ] , 872 [ Pg. 872 includes portions of Doc. 674 and Doc. 675 ] , 883–885 [ Pgs. 883–885 include portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] Japan: Japanese external and industrial assets in Korea, 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 400–402 [ Pgs. 400–402 include portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] Japanese peace conference, question of Korean participation in, 511–512 [ Pgs. 511–512 include portions of Doc. 411 , Doc. 412 , and Doc. 413 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] Korean reparations claims against Japan, 604–605 [ Pgs. 604–605 include portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 485 ] Joint United States-Soviet Commission, 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 671–672 [ Pgs. 671–672 include portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 725 [ Pg. 725 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , and Doc. 575 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , and Doc. 665 ] Convening again of, 598 n [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 601–602 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 619 n [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 623–625 [ Pgs. 623–625 include portions of Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , and Doc. 478 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 479 ] , 633–635 [ Pgs. 633–635 include portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 638–645 [ Pgs. 638–645 include portions of Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 641 n [ Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 488 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] ; Marshall-Molotov exchange of letters regarding, 624–625 [ Pgs. 624–625 include portions of Doc. 477 and Doc. 478 ] , 629–630 [ Pgs. 629–630 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 632–635 [ Pgs. 632–635 include portions of Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , and Doc. 484 ] , 638–644 [ Pgs. 638–644 include portions of Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 655–657 [ Pgs. 655–657 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 659–660 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 505 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 687–688 [ Pgs. 687–688 include portions of Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 698–699 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 540 ] , 708 [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 748–749 [ Pgs. 748–749 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 758–759 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 764–765 [ Pgs. 764–765 include portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] , 770–772 [ Pgs. 770–772 include portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 815 n [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] ; South Korean reaction to, 645–649 [ Pgs. 645–649 include portions of Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] Meetings and discussions, 649–653 [ Pgs. 649–653 include portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 655–663 [ Pgs. 655–663 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 668–674 [ Pgs. 668–674 include portions of Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] , 684–689 [ Pgs. 684–689 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 693–701 [ Pgs. 693–701 include portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 733–737 [ Pgs. 733–737 include portions of Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 737 n [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 744–745 [ Pgs. 744–745 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , and Doc. 564 ] , 751–754 [ Pgs. 751–754 include portions of Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 756–757 [ Pgs. 756–757 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 760–763 [ Pgs. 760–763 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , and Doc. 582 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 769–771 [ Pgs. 769–771 include portions of Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 781–783 [ Pgs. 781–783 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 793–794 [ Pgs. 793–794 include portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 614 ] , 815–816 [ Pgs. 815–816 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , and Doc. 623 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] , 832 n [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] Consultations with Koreans, question of, 655–663 [ Pgs. 655–663 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 668–671 [ Pgs. 668–671 include portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 674 n [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 679–682 [ Pgs. 679–682 include portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] , 686–689 [ Pgs. 686–689 include portions of Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 688 n [ Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532 ] , 693–694 [ Pgs. 693–694 include portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 698–701 [ Pgs. 698–701 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 700 n [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 703–707 [ Pgs. 703–707 include portions of Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , and Doc. 545 ] , 713–714 [ Pgs. 713–714 include portions of Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , and Doc. 552 ] , 732–733 [ Pgs. 732–733 include portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 737 n [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 748–749 [ Pgs. 748–749 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 752–754 [ Pgs. 752–754 include portions of Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 757–759 [ Pgs. 757–759 include portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 763–765 [ Pgs. 763–765 include portions of Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] , 767–773 [ Pgs. 767–773 include portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 770 n [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 588 ] , 777–778 [ Pgs. 777–778 include portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 793–794 [ Pgs. 793–794 include portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 798–799 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] Deadlock, 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 698–701 [ Pgs. 698–701 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , and Doc. 542 ] , 700 n [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 701 n [ Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 703–708 [ Pgs. 703–708 include portions of Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , and Doc. 550 ] , 713–714 [ Pgs. 713–714 include portions of Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , and Doc. 552 ] , 718 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 731–742 [ Pgs. 731–742 include portions of Doc. 552 , Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , Doc. 559 , Doc. 560 , and Doc. 561 ] , 756–757 [ Pgs. 756–757 include portions of Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 803–804 [ Pgs. 803–804 include portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 837–838 [ Pgs. 837–838 include portions of Doc. 640 , Doc. 641 , and Doc. 642 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] ; Marshall-Molotov exchange regarding, 748–749 [ Pgs. 748–749 include portions of Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 755–756 [ Pgs. 755–756 include portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , and Doc. 576 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 763–766 [ Pgs. 763–766 include portions of Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , and Doc. 585 ] , 769–772 [ Pgs. 769–772 include portions of Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] Elections, issue of, 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 734–735 [ Pgs. 734–735 include portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 588 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 778 [ Pg. 778 is part of Doc. 595 ] Joint status report, 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , and Doc. 585 ] , 769–774 [ Pgs. 769–774 include portions of Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 781–783 [ Pgs. 781–783 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] Korean political parties, non-cooperation by certain, 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 680–681 [ Pgs. 680–681 include portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 680 n [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 547 and Doc. 548 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 801–802 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 612 ] Political platform, issue of, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 514 ] Press releases and information, 652–653 [ Pgs. 652–653 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 505 ] Provisional government: Selection and establishment of, discussions regarding, 671–673 [ Pgs. 671–673 include portions of Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , and Doc. 516 ] , 675–677 [ Pgs. 675–677 include portions of Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , and Doc. 520 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 705–707 [ Pgs. 705–707 include portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 719 [ Pg. 719 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 556 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 742–743 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] ; structure and principles of organization, discussions regarding, 655 [ Pg. 655 is part of Doc. 503 ] , 671–672 [ Pgs. 671–672 include portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 674–676 [ Pgs. 674–676 include portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , and Doc. 520 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 530 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 717–718 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 770 [ Pg. 770 is part of Doc. 588 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 610 ] , 797–801 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] Recess, U.S. proposal for, 808–809 [ Pgs. 808–809 include portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 644 and Doc. 645 ] Withdrawal of American and Soviet troops, Soviet proposal for. See under Occupation forces , infra . Soviet delegation, 644–645 [ Pgs. 644–645 include portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 644 n [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 644 and Doc. 645 ] Departure of, 843 [ Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 843 n [ Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] Problems created by presence in South Korea, 807–809 [ Pgs. 807–809 include portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] Soviet protest regarding Seoul Police Chief statement, 835–836 [ Pgs. 835–836 include portions of Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , and Doc. 640 ] , 841–842 [ Pgs. 841–842 include portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , and Doc. 645 ] Soviet protest regarding treatment of employees of Soviet delegation, 821–822 [ Pgs. 821–822 include portions of Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , and Doc. 628 ] ; U.S. reply, 846–847 [ Pgs. 846–847 include portions of Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] U.S. delegation, 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] ; report of, 757–760 [ Pgs. 757–760 include portions of Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 757 n [ Pg. 757 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] Korean Commission in Washington, 651 n [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 509 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 838 n [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] Moscow Agreement ( 1945 ), 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 598–602 [ Pgs. 598–602 include portions of Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , and Doc. 465 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 615–618 [ Pgs. 615–618 include portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 621–625 [ Pgs. 621–625 include portions of Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , and Doc. 478 ] , 628–629 [ Pgs. 628–629 include portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 632–635 [ Pgs. 632–635 include portions of Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , and Doc. 484 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 485 and Doc. 486 ] , 640–642 [ Pgs. 640–642 include portions of Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489 ] , 646–648 [ Pgs. 646–648 include portions of Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , and Doc. 496 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 656–658 [ Pgs. 656–658 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , and Doc. 505 ] , 660 [ Pg. 660 is part of Doc. 505 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 673–678 [ Pgs. 673–678 include portions of Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , Doc. 520 , Doc. 521 , and Doc. 522 ] , 680–681 [ Pgs. 680–681 include portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 683 [ Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 528 ] , 686–689 [ Pgs. 686–689 include portions of Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 691 [ Pg. 691 includes portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] , 693–694 [ Pgs. 693–694 include portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 698–699 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 540 ] , 702 [ Pg. 702 is part of Doc. 542 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 707 n [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 714–718 [ Pgs. 714–718 include portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 739–740 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 742–744 [ Pgs. 742–744 include portions of Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] , 747–752 [ Pgs. 747–752 include portions of Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , and Doc. 570 ] , 757–758 [ Pgs. 757–758 include portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 762–765 [ Pgs. 762–765 include portions of Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] , 767–768 [ Pgs. 767–768 include portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] , 770–774 [ Pgs. 770–774 include portions of Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 777–779 [ Pgs. 777–779 include portions of Doc. 594 , Doc. 595 , Doc. 596 , and Doc. 597 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] , 789–790 [ Pgs. 789–790 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , and Doc. 609 ] , 794–795 [ Pgs. 794–795 include portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 797–799 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 803–805 [ Pgs. 803–805 include portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 614 ] , 816–817 [ Pgs. 816–817 include portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] , 831–833 [ Pgs. 831–833 include portions of Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 862–863 [ Pgs. 862–863 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , and Doc. 665 ] National Korean government, 632–633 [ Pgs. 632–633 include portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] North Korea (Soviet zone), 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 634–635 [ Pgs. 634–635 include portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 690–691 [ Pgs. 690–691 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 612 ] Army of, 640 [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 825–826 [ Pgs. 825–826 include portions of Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 844–845 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 658 ] Japanese external assets in, 232 [ Pg. 232 is part of Doc. 223 ] ; Japanese repatriates in, 342 n [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 285 ] Possibility of attack on South Korea, 844–847 [ Pgs. 844–847 include portions of Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] , 845 n [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 646 ] Occupation forces, question of withdrawal of, 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 783–785 [ Pgs. 783–785 include portions of Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , and Doc. 602 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 611 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 806 [ Pg. 806 is part of Doc. 613 ] Soviet proposal in Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission for withdrawal of troops from Korea, 816–817 [ Pgs. 816–817 include portions of Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 824–829 [ Pgs. 824–829 include portions of Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 843–945 [ Pgs. 843–945 include portions of Doc. 645 , Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , Doc. 648 , Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , Doc. 689 , Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , Doc. 709 , Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , and Doc. 744 ] , 852–853 [ Pgs. 852–853 include portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] ; Korean attitude toward, 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 852–853 [ Pgs. 852–853 include portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] ; U.S. discussion of and response to, 817–818 [ Pgs. 817–818 include portions of Doc. 623 and Doc. 624 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] , 832–834 [ Pgs. 832–834 include portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 658 ] Soviet resolution at U.N. General Assembly, 849 n [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 857 n [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] Political parties, groups and associations: All-Korean Labor Confederation, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 483 ] All-Korean Peasant Union, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 483 ] All-Korean Youth Union, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 483 ] Anti-Trusteeship Committee for National Independence, 620 n [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 693–694 [ Pgs. 693–694 include portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 698–700 [ Pgs. 698–700 include portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 764 [ Pg. 764 includes portions of Doc. 582 and Doc. 583 ] , 769–770 [ Pgs. 769–770 include portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 827 [ Pg. 827 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634 ] Chambers of Commerce, 686–687 [ Pgs. 686–687 include portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] Chungking exile group of Koreans, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 703 [ Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] Communists, 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 529 and Doc. 530 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 668 ] Dai Han Youth League, 877 [ Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] Democratic People’s Front. See People’s Democratic Front , infra. Hankook Democratic Party, 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 505 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 705 [ Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 867 n [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 668 ] Korean Independence Party, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] Korean National Association, 826 n [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] Korean National Revolutionary Party, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 483 ] Korean Representative Democratic Council, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] Laboring People’s Party, 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 547 and Doc. 548 ] National Unification Headquarters, 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 502 ] North Korean Democratic People’s Coalition Front, 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] North Korean Labor Party, 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 644 and Doc. 645 ] North Korean Party, 685 n [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 529 and Doc. 530 ] Northwest Young Men’s Association, 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , and Doc. 575 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 649 ] People’s Committee of Northern Korea, 634 [ Pg. 634 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 644 and Doc. 645 ] People’s Democratic Front, 704–706 [ Pgs. 704–706 include portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 745–746 [ Pgs. 745–746 include portions of Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , and Doc. 565 ] , 758–759 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 768–769 [ Pgs. 768–769 include portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , and Doc. 588 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 614 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] Protestant Association, 659 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 505 ] Rapid Realization Youth Party, 675 n [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] Representative Democratic Council, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] Rightist Youth Alliance, 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] South Korean Democratic People’s Front, 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] South Korean Labor Party, 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 768 [ Pg. 768 includes portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 842 [ Pg. 842 includes portions of Doc. 644 and Doc. 645 ] United Council, 745 [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] , 745 n [ Pg. 745 includes portions of Doc. 563 and Doc. 564 ] Political situation, 682–684 [ Pgs. 682–684 include portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , and Doc. 529 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] Provisional Democratic Korean Government, 632–633 [ Pgs. 632–633 include portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 638–639 [ Pgs. 638–639 include portions of Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , and Doc. 487 ] Provisional government of all Korea, 597–598 [ Pgs. 597–598 include portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 600 [ Pg. 600 includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 624–625 [ Pgs. 624–625 include portions of Doc. 477 and Doc. 478 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 650–651 [ Pgs. 650–651 include portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 658 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 505 ] , 661–662 [ Pgs. 661–662 include portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , and Doc. 507 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 509 ] , 668–669 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 616 ] , 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] South Korea, 597–599 [ Pgs. 597–599 include portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 604–605 [ Pgs. 604–605 include portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] , 607–608 [ Pgs. 607–608 include portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 662 [ Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 506 and Doc. 507 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 560 ] Army, question of forming a South Korean, 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 658 ] Arrests of leftist leaders, 752–753 [ Pgs. 752–753 include portions of Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , and Doc. 571 ] , 752 n [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , and Doc. 575 ] , 766 [ Pg. 766 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] ; North Korean protest, 839–841 [ Pgs. 839–841 include portions of Doc. 642 , Doc. 643 , and Doc. 644 ] ; Soviet complaints, 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 762–763 [ Pgs. 762–763 include portions of Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , and Doc. 582 ] , 762 n [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 780 [ Pg. 780 is part of Doc. 597 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 610 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 614 ] ; U.S. reply, 767–768 [ Pgs. 767–768 include portions of Doc. 586 and Doc. 587 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 589 ] Comintern fifth column in, 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] Constitution, temporary, 875–876 [ Pgs. 875–876 include portions of Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , and Doc. 678 ] , 876 n [ Pg. 876 includes portions of Doc. 677 and Doc. 678 ] Elections in, 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 755–756 [ Pgs. 755–756 include portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , and Doc. 576 ] , 763–764 [ Pgs. 763–764 include portions of Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , and Doc. 583 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 790–792 [ Pgs. 790–792 include portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 617 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 824–825 [ Pgs. 824–825 include portions of Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , and Doc. 632 ] , 825 n [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 649 ] , 853 [ Pg. 853 includes portions of Doc. 654 and Doc. 655 ] , 857 [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 860–861 [ Pgs. 860–861 include portions of Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , and Doc. 663 ] , 863–867 [ Pgs. 863–867 include portions of Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 878–879 [ Pgs. 878–879 include portions of Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , and Doc. 682 ] Independent South Korea, 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 740–741 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] ; question of recognition of an, 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 471 ] Interim Government (SKIG), 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 803–804 [ Pgs. 803–804 include portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 825 n [ Pg. 825 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632 ] , 829–830 [ Pgs. 829–830 include portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 830 n [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] , 865–866 [ Pgs. 865–866 include portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] Interim Legislative Assembly (SKILA), 596–597 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 717–719 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , and Doc. 575 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582 ] , 785–787 [ Pgs. 785–787 include portions of Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605 ] , 787 n [ Pg. 787 includes portions of Doc. 604 and Doc. 605 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 799–800 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 829 [ Pg. 829 includes portions of Doc. 635 and Doc. 636 ] , 838–839 [ Pgs. 838–839 include portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] , 869 [ Pg. 869 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 871 n [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 874–876 [ Pgs. 874–876 include portions of Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , and Doc. 678 ] , 879–880 [ Pgs. 879–880 include portions of Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] Japanese industrial facilities in, treatment of, 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] Labor organizations, U.S. policy regarding, 813–814 [ Pgs. 813–814 include portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] Military government, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 838–839 [ Pgs. 838–839 include portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 664 and Doc. 665 ] Civilianization of, 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 612 ] Interim directive, July 24 , 714–731 [ Pgs. 714–731 include portions of Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , and Doc. 553 ] Military Governor of U.S. Zone ( see also Maj. Generals Lerch and Dean ), 599 n [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 717 [ Pg. 717 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , and Doc. 575 ] 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 813 [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 619 ] , 859 [ Pg. 859 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] National police, problems concerning, 802 [ Pg. 802 is part of Doc. 612 ] Provisional government in South Korea, 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 647–648 [ Pgs. 647–648 include portions of Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , and Doc. 496 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 702–703 [ Pgs. 702–703 include portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 547 and Doc. 548 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 552 ] Rehabilitation program for, 788–789 [ Pgs. 788–789 include portions of Doc. 605 , Doc. 606 , and Doc. 607 ] Terrorism and assassinations in South Korea, 866 n [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] , 876–878 [ Pgs. 876–878 include portions of Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , and Doc. 680 ] Trade, 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] ; opening of Korean trade, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508 ] , 663 n [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508 ] , 711–713 [ Pgs. 711–713 include portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] , 726 [ Pg. 726 is part of Doc. 552 ] ; stimulation of Korean exports, 635–636 [ Pgs. 635–636 include portions of Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , and Doc. 485 ] Soviet Union ( see also Joint U.S.-Soviet Commission ), 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 601–604 [ Pgs. 601–604 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 609–619 [ Pgs. 609–619 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 621–629 [ Pgs. 621–629 include portions of Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , and Doc. 479 ] , 626 n [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 631–635 [ Pgs. 631–635 include portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , and Doc. 484 ] , 637–646 [ Pgs. 637–646 include portions of Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , and Doc. 494 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 498 ] , 652–653 [ Pgs. 652–653 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , and Doc. 501 ] , 655–662 [ Pgs. 655–662 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , and Doc. 507 ] , 665–666 [ Pgs. 665–666 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , and Doc. 512 ] , 672–673 [ Pgs. 672–673 include portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 680–684 [ Pgs. 680–684 include portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , and Doc. 529 ] , 686–691 [ Pgs. 686–691 include portions of Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , Doc. 532 , Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 693–708 [ Pgs. 693–708 include portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , and Doc. 550 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 733–734 [ Pgs. 733–734 include portions of Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 738 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 740–762 [ Pgs. 740–762 include portions of Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] , 764–765 [ Pgs. 764–765 include portions of Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] , 774–776 [ Pgs. 774–776 include portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 779–781 [ Pgs. 779–781 include portions of Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , and Doc. 598 ] , 783–785 [ Pgs. 783–785 include portions of Doc. 599 , Doc. 600 , Doc. 601 , and Doc. 602 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 797–799 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 803–805 [ Pgs. 803–805 include portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 808 [ Pg. 808 is part of Doc. 614 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 616 ] , 815–817 [ Pgs. 815–817 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 819–822 [ Pgs. 819–822 include portions of Doc. 625 , Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , and Doc. 628 ] , 824–826 [ Pgs. 824–826 include portions of Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 831–832 [ Pgs. 831–832 include portions of Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 844–845 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 852–856 [ Pgs. 852–856 include portions of Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , and Doc. 658 ] , 861–862 [ Pgs. 861–862 include portions of Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 668 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] Soviet efforts to consolidate influence, 682–684 [ Pgs. 682–684 include portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , and Doc. 529 ] Soviet intransigence regarding Korea, 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 615 [ Pg. 615 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] Soviet objectives in Korea, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Japan (SCAP). See MacArthur : Korea . Trade Association of Korea, 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508 ] Trusteeship, Four Power, 544 [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 617 n [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 673 [ Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 779–780 [ Pgs. 779–780 include portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 625 ] ; Korean opposition to, 599–600 [ Pgs. 599–600 include portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 644–646 [ Pgs. 644–646 include portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , and Doc. 494 ] , 648–649 [ Pgs. 648–649 include portions of Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 653 [ Pg. 653 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501 ] , 657 [ Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 504 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 509 ] , 681–684 [ Pgs. 681–684 include portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , and Doc. 529 ] , 686 [ Pg. 686 is part of Doc. 530 ] , 689 [ Pg. 689 is part of Doc. 532 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540 ] , 700 [ Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 540 and Doc. 541 ] , 707 [ Pg. 707 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545 ] , 709 [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 547 and Doc. 548 ] , 750–751 [ Pgs. 750–751 include portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569 ] , 772 [ Pg. 772 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 798–799 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 844 [ Pg. 844 is part of Doc. 646 ] Unification of, 596–598 [ Pgs. 596–598 include portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 602–603 [ Pgs. 602–603 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 612 [ Pg. 612 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 701–704 [ Pgs. 701–704 include portions of Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 735 [ Pg. 735 is part of Doc. 556 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 773–775 [ Pgs. 773–775 include portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , and Doc. 592 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 806–808 [ Pgs. 806–808 include portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 810 [ Pg. 810 is part of Doc. 616 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 827–829 [ Pgs. 827–829 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 638 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] United Kingdom, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 610–611 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 629–630 [ Pgs. 629–630 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 632 [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 636–639 [ Pgs. 636–639 include portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , and Doc. 487 ] , 642–644 [ Pgs. 642–644 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 560 and Doc. 561 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 773 [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 775 n [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 781 [ Pg. 781 includes portions of Doc. 597 and Doc. 598 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 797–799 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 667 n [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 864–865 [ Pgs. 864–865 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , and Doc. 667 ] United Nations General Assembly, consideration of problem of Korean independence: Adoption of resolution, Nov. 14 , 857 n [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 862–865 [ Pgs. 862–865 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , and Doc. 667 ] , 867 [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 668 ] , 869 [ Pg. 869 includes portions of Doc. 670 and Doc. 671 ] , 871–873 [ Pgs. 871–873 include portions of Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 includes portions of Doc. 676 and Doc. 677 ] , 879–880 [ Pgs. 879–880 include portions of Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] , 883–884 [ Pgs. 883–884 include portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] ; text, 857–859 [ Pgs. 857–859 include portions of Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , and Doc. 661 ] Amendments to resolutions submitted, 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 853–854 [ Pgs. 853–854 include portions of Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] Australian position, 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 552–553 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] Chinese reactions to U.S. resolution, 831–832 [ Pgs. 831–832 include portions of Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] Korean representation during consideration, question of, 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 815–816 [ Pgs. 815–816 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , and Doc. 623 ] , 822 [ Pg. 822 includes portions of Doc. 627 and Doc. 628 ] , 824–825 [ Pgs. 824–825 include portions of Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , and Doc. 632 ] , 828–829 [ Pgs. 828–829 include portions of Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 839 n [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] ; Soviet resolution, 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] ; provision in resolution of Nov. 14 , 857–859 [ Pgs. 857–859 include portions of Doc. 659 , Doc. 660 , and Doc. 661 ] ; text of resolution adopted by Committee No. 1 , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] Observers for Korean elections, 735–736 [ Pgs. 735–736 include portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 739–740 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 742–743 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] Resolution. See Adoption , supra. Soviet opposition to referral, 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 803–804 [ Pgs. 803–804 include portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 806–809 [ Pgs. 806–809 include portions of Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] ; Soviet reactions to U.S. resolution, 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 658 ] ; Soviet resolution on Korean representation, 849–850 [ Pgs. 849–850 include portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652 ] , 851 [ Pg. 851 includes portions of Doc. 652 and Doc. 653 ] ; Soviet resolution on withdrawal of troops, 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 857 n [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] Temporary Commission on Korea, 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 611 ] , 808–810 [ Pgs. 808–810 include portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 834–835 [ Pgs. 834–835 include portions of Doc. 638 and Doc. 639 ] , 851–854 [ Pgs. 851–854 include portions of Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] , 858–862 [ Pgs. 858–862 include portions of Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] , 865–869 [ Pgs. 865–869 include portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] , 871–875 [ Pgs. 871–875 include portions of Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , and Doc. 677 ] , 877–888 [ Pgs. 877–888 include portions of Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , and Doc. 688 ] United States initiative: Consideration of question of referral, 546–547 [ Pgs. 546–547 include portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 552–553 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 735–736 [ Pgs. 735–736 include portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 739–741 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 755–757 [ Pgs. 755–757 include portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 763 [ Pg. 763 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] Referral to General Assembly, 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 792–811 [ Pgs. 792–811 include portions of Doc. 609 , Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , Doc. 613 , Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , Doc. 616 , and Doc. 617 ] , 820 n [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 820–821 [ Pgs. 820–821 include portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] ; draft of U.S. resolution, 794–796 [ Pgs. 794–796 include portions of Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , and Doc. 612 ] , 809–810 [ Pgs. 809–810 include portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] U.S. resolution, 553 [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 553 n [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 849 n [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 850–851 [ Pgs. 850–851 include portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 853–854 [ Pgs. 853–854 include portions of Doc. 654 , Doc. 655 , and Doc. 656 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 856 n [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 658 ] ; text, 833–835 [ Pgs. 833–835 include portions of Doc. 638 and Doc. 639 ] Withdrawal of troops, provision in resolution of Nov. 14 , 858–859 [ Pgs. 858–859 include portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661 ] ; Soviet resolution, 849 [ Pg. 849 includes portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 857 n [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] United Nations membership for Korea, support for, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 633 [ Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 483 ] , 638 [ Pg. 638 includes portions of Doc. 485 and Doc. 486 ] , 716 [ Pg. 716 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 749 [ Pg. 749 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568 ] , 794–795 [ Pgs. 794–795 include portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 612 ] United Nations Security Council, considerations regarding possible referral of Korean question to, 601 [ Pg. 601 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 613 n [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] United States: Ad Hoc Committee on Korea, 713 n [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 738–742 [ Pgs. 738–742 include portions of Doc. 560 and Doc. 561 ] American occupied zone, 597 [ Pg. 597 is part of Doc. 462 ] Background on relations with Korea ( 1882–1947 ), 796–803 [ Pgs. 796–803 include portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Korea (CG USAFIK) ( see also Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge ), 596–597 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 479 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 639–641 [ Pgs. 639–641 include portions of Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , and Doc. 488 ] , 643 [ Pg. 643 includes portions of Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , and Doc. 491 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 800 [ Pg. 800 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 807–808 [ Pgs. 807–808 include portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 840–841 [ Pgs. 840–841 include portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 658 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 includes portions of Doc. 676 and Doc. 677 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 687 and Doc. 688 ] Department of the Army, 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 654 ] , 852 n [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 654 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] Economic assistance to Korea, 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] Foreign Liquidation Commission, credits for Korea, 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] Grant in aid program, 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 666–667 [ Pgs. 666–667 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , and Doc. 513 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 690 n [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 736 [ Pg. 736 includes portions of Doc. 556 and Doc. 557 ] , 740–741 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] Joint Chiefs of Staff, 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 639 n [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 714 n [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 715–717 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 729 [ Pg. 729 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 791 [ Pg. 791 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 813 n [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 619 ] , 817 [ Pg. 817 includes portions of Doc. 623 and Doc. 624 ] , 843 [ Pg. 843 includes portions of Doc. 645 and Doc. 646 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 654 ] Navy Department, 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 740–741 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] Objectives in Korea, 715–724 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] Policy toward Korea, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540 ] , 701–702 [ Pgs. 701–702 include portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 731 [ Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 552 and Doc. 553 ] , 738–741 [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 784–785 [ Pgs. 784–785 include portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 612 ] Position in, 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 424 ] , 584 [ Pg. 584 includes portions of Doc. 450 and Doc. 451 ] Proposal for Four Power conversations on Korea, 613 [ Pg. 613 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 771–776 [ Pgs. 771–776 include portions of Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 771 n [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 803–804 [ Pgs. 803–804 include portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 863 [ Pg. 863 includes portions of Doc. 664 and Doc. 665 ] ; British and Chinese acceptance, 775 n [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] ; question of Korean representation, 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 776 n [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 785–786 [ Pgs. 785–786 include portions of Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , and Doc. 604 ] ; Soviet refusal to participate, 779–781 [ Pgs. 779–781 include portions of Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , and Doc. 598 ] , 789–790 [ Pgs. 789–790 include portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , Doc. 608 , and Doc. 609 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 837 [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] Relief and rehabilitation, 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 623 [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] Secret agreements regarding Korea, U.S. denial of, 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 654 [ Pg. 654 is part of Doc. 502 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 535 ] State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, 855–856 [ Pgs. 855–856 include portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 879 [ Pg. 879 includes portions of Doc. 681 and Doc. 682 ] State-War Committee, 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] ; draft report and recommendations, 608 [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 610–618 [ Pgs. 610–618 include portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 628 [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 740 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 560 ] State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 639 n [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 713 n [ Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 550 and Doc. 551 ] , 714 n [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 718–719 [ Pg. 718 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 738 n [ Pg. 738 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 741–742 [ Pgs. 741–742 include portions of Doc. 560 and Doc. 561 ] , 742 n [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 746 [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] , 746 n [ Pg. 746 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] , 755–757 [ Pgs. 755–757 include portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , and Doc. 577 ] , 761 [ Pg. 761 includes portions of Doc. 579 and Doc. 580 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 769 [ Pg. 769 includes portions of Doc. 587 and Doc. 588 ] , 774 [ Pg. 774 includes portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 813–814 [ Pgs. 813–814 include portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] , 813 n [ Pg. 813 is part of Doc. 619 ] , 830 [ Pg. 830 is part of Doc. 636 ] , 856 [ Pg. 856 is part of Doc. 658 ] Strategic importance of South Korea to the U.S., 805–806 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 814 [ Pg. 814 includes portions of Doc. 619 and Doc. 620 ] , 817–818 [ Pgs. 817–818 include portions of Doc. 623 and Doc. 624 ] U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), 866 [ Pg. 866 includes portions of Doc. 667 and Doc. 668 ] , 868–869 [ Pgs. 868–869 include portions of Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 is part of Doc. 676 ] War Department, 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 618–619 [ Pgs. 618–619 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 627–628 [ Pgs. 627–628 include portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 631 [ Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 481 and Doc. 482 ] , 635–636 [ Pgs. 635–636 include portions of Doc. 483 , Doc. 484 , and Doc. 485 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 661–663 [ Pgs. 661–663 include portions of Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 679–680 [ Pgs. 679–680 include portions of Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 721 [ Pg. 721 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 730 [ Pg. 730 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 740–743 [ Pgs. 740–743 include portions of Doc. 560 and Doc. 561 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] Wedemeyer Mission, 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 690 n [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 708 n [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , and Doc. 550 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 747–748 [ Pgs. 747–748 include portions of Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , and Doc. 567 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 568 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 788 [ Pg. 788 includes portions of Doc. 605 and Doc. 606 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] ; report, 796–803 [ Pgs. 796–803 include portions of Doc. 611 , Doc. 612 , and Doc. 613 ] , 796 n [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 611 and Doc. 612 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] Koretsky, Vladimir, 226–227 [ Pgs. 226–227 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] Korotkov, Lt. Gen. G. P., 684–685 [ Pgs. 684–685 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , and Doc. 530 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Kreuter, Col. R. H., 1119–1120 [ Pgs. 1119–1120 include portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] Kurile Islands: Japanese external assets in, 159 [ Pg. 159 is part of Doc. 168 ] Japanese repatriates in, 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 342 [ Pg. 342 is part of Doc. 285 ] Southern Kuriles, question of return to Japan, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] Territorial disposition of, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 424 ] Kyaw Nyein, U, 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] Lacoste, Francis, 58–59 [ Pgs. 58–59 include portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] , 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] Lacy, William S. B., 903–904 [ Pgs. 903–904 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , and Doc. 705 ] , 1058–1059 [ Pgs. 1058–1059 include portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] Laithwaite, Sir Gilbert, 1–3 [ Pgs. 1–3 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , and Doc. 3 ] , 6–9 [ Pgs. 6–9 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] , 7 n [ Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 35–39 [ Pgs. 35–39 include portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43 ] Landon, Kenneth P., 51 [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 128–129 [ Pgs. 128–129 include portions of Doc. 138 , Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 939 n [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 743 ] , 953 [ Pg. 953 includes portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , and Doc. 755 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 1037–1039 [ Pgs. 1037–1039 include portions of Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , and Doc. 840 ] Langdon, William R., 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 596–600 [ Pgs. 596–600 include portions of Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , and Doc. 464 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] , 607 [ Pg. 607 is part of Doc. 470 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 642–654 [ Pgs. 642–654 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] , 656–663 [ Pgs. 656–663 include portions of Doc. 503 , Doc. 504 , Doc. 505 , Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 665–675 [ Pgs. 665–675 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , Doc. 514 , Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 861 n [ Pg. 861 includes portions of Doc. 662 and Doc. 663 ] , 865–866 [ Pgs. 865–866 include portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] , 867 n [ Pg. 867 is part of Doc. 668 ] , 868 [ Pg. 868 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 871–877 [ Pgs. 871–877 include portions of Doc. 673 , Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , and Doc. 679 ] , 879–880 [ Pgs. 879–880 include portions of Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 687 and Doc. 688 ] Law, Lt. Col. Willian, 87–88 [ Pgs. 87–88 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 92 [ Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 110 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , and Doc. 126 ] League of Nations, 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 882 [ Pg. 882 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 686 ] Lebedeff, Maj. Gen. N., 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 498 ] , 672 [ Pg. 672 is part of Doc. 515 ] , 675 [ Pg. 675 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Leclerc, Maj. Gen. Jacques-Philippe, 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 73 [ Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 85 and Doc. 86 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] Leimena, Johannes, 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 is part of Doc. 880 ] Lerch, Maj. Gen. Archer L., 599 n [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 755 [ Pg. 755 includes portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , and Doc. 575 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] Lie, Trygve ( see also U.N. : Secretary General ), 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 56 n [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 820 n [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 832 [ Pg. 832 includes portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 995 n [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 853 ] Lieftinck, Pieter, 924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 728 ] Limb, Coe B. C., 651 [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 651 n [ Pg. 651 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 568 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] , 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 838 n [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 864 [ Pg. 864 includes portions of Doc. 665 and Doc. 666 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] Linggadjati Agreement. See under Netherlands East Indies : Agreements. Liu Yu Wan, 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] Livengood, Charles A., 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1053–1054 [ Pgs. 1053–1054 include portions of Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , and Doc. 853 ] , 1063–1067 [ Pgs. 1063–1067 include portions of Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 1069–1083 [ Pgs. 1069–1083 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 1085–1098 [ Pgs. 1085–1098 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , and Doc. 887 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Lokanathan, P. S., 308–311 [ Pgs. 308–311 include portions of Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , and Doc. 275 ] Loudon, Alexander, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 706 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] Lovett, Robert A.: Appointment as Under Secretary of State, 466 n [ Pg. 466 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] Burma, 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 47–49 [ Pgs. 47–49 include portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] French Indo-China, 138–139 [ Pgs. 138–139 include portions of Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , and Doc. 152 ] , 144–145 [ Pgs. 144–145 include portions of Doc. 157 , Doc. 158 , and Doc. 159 ] Japan: Occupation and control, 244–246 [ Pgs. 244–246 include portions of Doc. 232 , Doc. 233 , and Doc. 234 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 285 [ Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 294–295 [ Pgs. 294–295 include portions of Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265 ] , 305–306 [ Pgs. 305–306 include portions of Doc. 269 , Doc. 270 , and Doc. 271 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] ; peace conference, 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 489–491 [ Pgs. 489–491 include portions of Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , and Doc. 398 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 505–506 [ Pgs. 505–506 include portions of Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , and Doc. 410 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 569 n [ Pg. 569 includes portions of Doc. 440 and Doc. 441 ] , 577 [ Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 444 and Doc. 445 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] , 586–587 [ Pgs. 586–587 include portions of Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] , 590–592 [ Pgs. 590–592 include portions of Doc. 455 , Doc. 456 , Doc. 457 , and Doc. 458 ] ; peace treaty, 466–467 [ Pgs. 466–467 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382 ] , 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 486 [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394 ] , 486 n [ Pg. 486 includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] ; war claims and reparations, 429 n [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 431–432 [ Pgs. 431–432 include portions of Doc. 355 , Doc. 356 , and Doc. 357 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 445–446 [ Pgs. 445–446 include portions of Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] Korea, 754–756 [ Pgs. 754–756 include portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , and Doc. 576 ] , 761–762 [ Pgs. 761–762 include portions of Doc. 579 , Doc. 580 , and Doc. 581 ] , 765–766 [ Pgs. 765–766 include portions of Doc. 583 , Doc. 584 , and Doc. 585 ] , 771–774 [ Pgs. 771–774 include portions of Doc. 588 , Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , and Doc. 591 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 779–781 [ Pgs. 779–781 include portions of Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , and Doc. 598 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 794–796 [ Pgs. 794–796 include portions of Doc. 610 , Doc. 611 , and Doc. 612 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 815–816 [ Pgs. 815–816 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , and Doc. 623 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] , 828–829 [ Pgs. 828–829 include portions of Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 836–837 [ Pgs. 836–837 include portions of Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , and Doc. 641 ] , 846–847 [ Pgs. 846–847 include portions of Doc. 646 , Doc. 647 , and Doc. 648 ] , 864–865 [ Pgs. 864–865 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , and Doc. 667 ] , 868–869 [ Pgs. 868–869 include portions of Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , and Doc. 671 ] , 872–881 [ Pgs. 872–881 include portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , Doc. 676 , Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , Doc. 679 , Doc. 680 , Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] , 883–889 [ Pgs. 883–889 include portions of Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , Doc. 687 , Doc. 688 , and Doc. 689 ] Netherlands East Indies, 973–974 [ Pgs. 973–974 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 973 n [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] , 987 n [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 is part of Doc. 794 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1002–1004 [ Pgs. 1002–1004 include portions of Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1006–1008 [ Pgs. 1006–1008 include portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1010–1011 [ Pgs. 1010–1011 include portions of Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , and Doc. 811 ] , 1013–1015 [ Pgs. 1013–1015 include portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , and Doc. 816 ] , 1026–1029 [ Pgs. 1026–1029 include portions of Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , and Doc. 830 ] , 1032–1033 [ Pgs. 1032–1033 include portions of Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. 833 ] , 1035–1037 [ Pgs. 1035–1037 include portions of Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , and Doc. 838 ] , 1039–1044 [ Pgs. 1039–1044 include portions of Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. 845 ] , 1046–1048 [ Pgs. 1046–1048 include portions of Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , and Doc. 848 ] , 1048 n [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 847 and Doc. 848 ] , 1052–1054 [ Pgs. 1052–1054 include portions of Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , and Doc. 853 ] , 1059–1061 [ Pgs. 1059–1061 include portions of Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , and Doc. 858 ] , 1064–1065 [ Pgs. 1064–1065 include portions of Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , and Doc. 861 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] , 1083–1085 [ Pgs. 1083–1085 include portions of Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , and Doc. 879 ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] , 1099–1101 [ Pgs. 1099–1101 include portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] Philippines, 1120–1121 [ Pgs. 1120–1121 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , and Doc. 906 ] Soviet objectives toward Japan, 594–595 [ Pgs. 594–595 include portions of Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , and Doc. 461 ] Statement on the death of George Atcheson, Jr., 287 n [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 502 n [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] Lozovsky, Solomon Abramovich, 360–361 [ Pgs. 360–361 include portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 361 n [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 302 ] Lykke, Knut, 218 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas ( see also Japan : Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan), 87–88 [ Pgs. 87–88 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 87 n [ Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 103 and Doc. 104 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 119 [ Pg. 119 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 119 n [ Pg. 119 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131 ] , 1002 [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 1002 n [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] Japan: Occupation and control, 157 n [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 157–158 [ Pgs. 157–158 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 169–174 [ Pgs. 169–174 include portions of Doc. 175 , Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , and Doc. 180 ] , 176–179 [ Pgs. 176–179 include portions of Doc. 181 , Doc. 182 , Doc. 183 , and Doc. 184 ] , 182–183 [ Pgs. 182–183 include portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , Doc. 186 , and Doc. 187 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 188 [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 188 n [ Pg. 188 is part of Doc. 189 ] , 191–192 [ Pgs. 191–192 include portions of Doc. 191 , Doc. 192 , and Doc. 193 ] , 197–198 [ Pgs. 197–198 include portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] , 200–203 [ Pgs. 200–203 include portions of Doc. 200 , Doc. 201 , Doc. 202 , Doc. 203 , and Doc. 204 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 234 n [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 235 [ Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 238 [ Pg. 238 is part of Doc. 228 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 243 [ Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 231 and Doc. 232 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 263–264 [ Pgs. 263–264 include portions of Doc. 246 and Doc. 247 ] , 269–270 [ Pgs. 269–270 include portions of Doc. 250 and Doc. 251 ] , 279–280 [ Pgs. 279–280 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] , 284–285 [ Pgs. 284–285 include portions of Doc. 258 and Doc. 259 ] , 295 [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 309 [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 321–323 [ Pgs. 321–323 include portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 499–500 [ Pg. 499 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 500 n [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 434 ] , 579 [ Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 446 and Doc. 447 ] ; peace conference, 464 [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 464 n [ Pg. 464 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc. 379 ] , 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 489 [ Pg. 489 includes portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] , 554–556 [ Pgs. 554–556 include portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] ; peace treaty, 448 [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 448 n [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 449 n [ Pg. 449 is part of Doc. 368 ] , 450 n [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 454 n [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 459–463 [ Pgs. 459–463 include portions of Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378 ] , 461 n [ Pg. 461 is part of Doc. 376 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 512–515 [ Pgs. 512–515 include portions of Doc. 412 , Doc. 413 , and Doc. 414 ] , 537 [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 557 [ Pg. 557 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] ; war claims and reparations, 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 354–355 [ Pgs. 354–355 include portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 360 [ Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 367 [ Pg. 367 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 371–372 [ Pgs. 371–372 include portions of Doc. 308 , Doc. 309 , and Doc. 310 ] , 375–376 [ Pgs. 375–376 include portions of Doc. 313 , Doc. 314 , and Doc. 315 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 386 [ Pg. 386 is part of Doc. 321 ] , 391–392 [ Pgs. 391–392 include portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 398 [ Pg. 398 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332 ] , 402–403 [ Pgs. 402–403 include portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] , 414–416 [ Pgs. 414–416 include portions of Doc. 345 and Doc. 346 ] , 421 [ Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 348 and Doc. 349 ] , 442–443 [ Pgs. 442–443 include portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] , 555 [ Pg. 555 is part of Doc. 434 ] , 558–559 [ Pg. 558 is part of Doc. 435 ] Korea, 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 599 n [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 601–603 [ Pgs. 601–603 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 605–606 [ Pgs. 605–606 include portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , and Doc. 469 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 630–631 [ Pgs. 630–631 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , and Doc. 482 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 639 [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 639 n [ Pg. 639 includes portions of Doc. 486 and Doc. 487 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 682 [ Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 714–715 [ Pgs. 714–715 include portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] MacDermot, D. F., 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 450–451 [ Pgs. 450–451 include portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 636–638 [ Pgs. 636–638 include portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] MacKenzie King, W. L., 880 n [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 880–887 [ Pgs. 880–887 include portions of Doc. 683 , Doc. 684 , Doc. 685 , and Doc. 686 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 689 ] MacKereth, Gilbert, 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 928 n [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 732 ] Makin, Norman J. O., 220–221 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 252 [ Pg. 252 is part of Doc. 239 ] , 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] , 447 [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 447 n [ Pg. 447 is part of Doc. 366 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 453 n [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 466–467 [ Pgs. 466–467 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 903 n [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 997–998 [ Pgs. 997–998 include portions of Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , and Doc. 799 ] , 1013–1015 [ Pgs. 1013–1015 include portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , and Doc. 816 ] Malaya, 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 334 [ Pg. 334 is part of Doc. 282 ] , 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 637 [ Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 485 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 717 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 769 ] French Indo-China, attitude toward, 97 [ Pg. 97 is part of Doc. 114 ] Japan, 358 [ Pg. 358 is part of Doc. 299 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 364 ] Malay Federation, 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] Maloles, Octavio L., 1116 [ Pg. 1116 includes portions of Doc. 902 and Doc. 903 ] , 1122 [ Pg. 1122 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] Manchuria. See under China . Marcus Island, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] Marshall, George C.: Burma, 1–3 [ Pgs. 1–3 include portions of Doc. 1 , Doc. 2 , and Doc. 3 ] , 6–7 [ Pgs. 6–7 include portions of Doc. 6 , Doc. 7 , and Doc. 8 ] , 10–11 [ Pgs. 10–11 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 13–20 [ Pgs. 13–20 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , Doc. 17 , Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 22–24 [ Pgs. 22–24 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , and Doc. 28 ] , 28–30 [ Pgs. 28–30 include portions of Doc. 29 , Doc. 30 , Doc. 31 , Doc. 32 , Doc. 33 , and Doc. 34 ] , 32–35 [ Pgs. 32–35 include portions of Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 39–44 [ Pgs. 39–44 include portions of Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] French Indo-China, 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 66–72 [ Pgs. 66–72 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 74–76 [ Pgs. 74–76 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , and Doc. 90 ] , 78 [ Pg. 78 includes portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , and Doc. 93 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 83–103 [ Pgs. 83–103 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , Doc. 107 , Doc. 108 , Doc. 109 , Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , Doc. 114 , Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , Doc. 117 , Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 106 [ Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 108–110 [ Pgs. 108–110 include portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , and Doc. 126 ] , 116–121 [ Pgs. 116–121 include portions of Doc. 126 , Doc. 127 , Doc. 128 , Doc. 129 , Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , and Doc. 133 ] , 123 [ Pg. 123 includes portions of Doc. 133 and Doc. 134 ] , 125 [ Pg. 125 is part of Doc. 135 ] , 127 [ Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 131–137 [ Pgs. 131–137 include portions of Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 139–144 [ Pgs. 139–144 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 146–147 [ Pgs. 146–147 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 150–152 [ Pgs. 150–152 include portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , Doc. 163 , Doc. 164 , Doc. 165 , and Doc. 166 ] Japan: Occupation and control, 165–169 [ Pgs. 165–169 include portions of Doc. 172 , Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , Doc. 175 , and Doc. 176 ] , 173–176 [ Pgs. 173–176 include portions of Doc. 178 , Doc. 179 , Doc. 180 , Doc. 181 , and Doc. 182 ] , 182 [ Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 184 , Doc. 185 , and Doc. 186 ] , 186 [ Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 188 and Doc. 189 ] , 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 194–195 [ Pgs. 194–195 include portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196 ] , 199 [ Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200 ] , 203–204 [ Pgs. 203–204 include portions of Doc. 203 , Doc. 204 , and Doc. 205 ] , 205 n [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 212 [ Pg. 212 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 224–226 [ Pgs. 224–226 include portions of Doc. 216 , Doc. 217 , Doc. 218 , and Doc. 219 ] , 229 [ Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 223 ] , 234–235 [ Pgs. 234–235 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 238–239 [ Pgs. 238–239 include portions of Doc. 228 and Doc. 229 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 244 [ Pg. 244 includes portions of Doc. 232 and Doc. 233 ] , 246–247 [ Pgs. 246–247 include portions of Doc. 233 , Doc. 234 , Doc. 235 , and Doc. 236 ] , 253–260 [ Pgs. 253–260 include portions of Doc. 239 , Doc. 240 , Doc. 241 , Doc. 242 , Doc. 243 , Doc. 244 , Doc. 245 , and Doc. 246 ] , 266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 275 [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 286–287 [ Pgs. 286–287 include portions of Doc. 260 and Doc. 261 ] , 290 [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 307–308 [ Pgs. 307–308 include portions of Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , and Doc. 274 ] , 311 [ Pg. 311 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275 ] , 337 [ Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 283 and Doc. 284 ] , 340 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 285 ] , 343–344 [ Pgs. 343–344 include portions of Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287 ] , 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] ; peace conference, 457–458 [ Pgs. 457–458 include portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 464–466 [ Pgs. 464–466 include portions of Doc. 378 , Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 469 [ Pg. 469 includes portions of Doc. 382 and Doc. 383 ] , 472–475 [ Pgs. 472–475 include portions of Doc. 385 , Doc. 386 , Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , and Doc. 389 ] , 477 [ Pg. 477 is part of Doc. 390 ] , 488–489 [ Pgs. 488–489 include portions of Doc. 396 and Doc. 397 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 505–506 [ Pgs. 505–506 include portions of Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , and Doc. 410 ] , 505 n [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 509 [ Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 516–519 [ Pgs. 516–519 include portions of Doc. 415 , Doc. 416 , Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 522 [ Pg. 522 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 527–529 [ Pgs. 527–529 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , and Doc. 424 ] , 528 n [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 543–547 [ Pgs. 543–547 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , Doc. 431 , and Doc. 432 ] , 544 n [ Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431 ] , 551–552 [ Pg. 551 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 554 n [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 564–568 [ Pgs. 564–568 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , and Doc. 440 ] , 570–571 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 442 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] , 578–580 [ Pgs. 578–580 include portions of Doc. 445 , Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 578 n [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 582–584 [ Pgs. 582–584 include portions of Doc. 448 , Doc. 449 , Doc. 450 , and Doc. 451 ] , 587–588 [ Pgs. 587–588 include portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , and Doc. 455 ] , 590 [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] , 590 n [ Pg. 590 includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456 ] , 592 [ Pg. 592 includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] ; peace treaty, 447–448 [ Pgs. 447–448 include portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 448 n [ Pg. 448 includes portions of Doc. 366 and Doc. 367 ] , 450 [ Pg. 450 includes portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 460–462 [ Pgs. 460–462 include portions of Doc. 375 , Doc. 376 , and Doc. 377 ] , 515 [ Pg. 515 includes portions of Doc. 413 and Doc. 414 ] , 536 n [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] ; Soviet objectives in, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] ; war claims and reparations, 347–348 [ Pgs. 347–348 include portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 348 n [ Pg. 348 is part of Doc. 290 ] , 352–353 [ Pgs. 352–353 include portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294 ] , 355–357 [ Pgs. 355–357 include portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , Doc. 297 , Doc. 298 , and Doc. 299 ] , 359–360 [ Pgs. 359–360 include portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , and Doc. 302 ] , 365–366 [ Pgs. 365–366 include portions of Doc. 304 , Doc. 305 , and Doc. 306 ] , 389–392 [ Pgs. 389–392 include portions of Doc. 324 , Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 397–399 [ Pgs. 397–399 include portions of Doc. 330 , Doc. 331 , Doc. 332 , and Doc. 333 ] , 404–407 [ Pgs. 404–407 include portions of Doc. 335 , Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , Doc. 338 , Doc. 339 , and Doc. 340 ] , 410 [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 410 n [ Pg. 410 includes portions of Doc. 342 and Doc. 343 ] , 413 [ Pg. 413 includes portions of Doc. 344 and Doc. 345 ] , 424–427 [ Pgs. 424–427 include portions of Doc. 350 , Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , Doc. 353 , and Doc. 354 ] , 429 [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 432 [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 432 n [ Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 356 and Doc. 357 ] , 433 n [ Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 357 and Doc. 358 ] , 446 n [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] , 508 [ Pg. 508 is part of Doc. 410 ] , 526 [ Pg. 526 is part of Doc. 421 ] , 542 [ Pg. 542 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] Korea, 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] , 546–547 [ Pgs. 546–547 include portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 552–553 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 600–601 [ Pgs. 600–601 include portions of Doc. 463 , Doc. 464 , and Doc. 465 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 605–606 [ Pgs. 605–606 include portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , and Doc. 469 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 609 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 617–619 [ Pgs. 617–619 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 621–626 [ Pgs. 621–626 include portions of Doc. 475 , Doc. 476 , Doc. 477 , and Doc. 478 ] , 623 n [ Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 628–632 [ Pgs. 628–632 include portions of Doc. 478 , Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , and Doc. 483 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 632 n [ Pg. 632 includes portions of Doc. 482 and Doc. 483 ] , 637–640 [ Pgs. 637–640 include portions of Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , and Doc. 488 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] , 642–644 [ Pgs. 642–644 include portions of Doc. 488 , Doc. 489 , Doc. 490 , Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 647–649 [ Pgs. 647–649 include portions of Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 652–657 [ Pgs. 652–657 include portions of Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , Doc. 502 , Doc. 503 , and Doc. 504 ] , 659–660 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 505 ] , 662–663 [ Pgs. 662–663 include portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 665–669 [ Pgs. 665–669 include portions of Doc. 510 , Doc. 511 , Doc. 512 , Doc. 513 , and Doc. 514 ] , 671 [ Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515 ] , 673–676 [ Pgs. 673–676 include portions of Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , Doc. 519 , and Doc. 520 ] , 678–682 [ Pgs. 678–682 include portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] , 684–685 [ Pgs. 684–685 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , and Doc. 530 ] , 687–688 [ Pgs. 687–688 include portions of Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 690–691 [ Pgs. 690–691 include portions of Doc. 533 , Doc. 534 , and Doc. 535 ] , 690 n [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 695–704 [ Pgs. 695–704 include portions of Doc. 536 , Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] , 707–713 [ Pgs. 707–713 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] , 736–737 [ Pgs. 736–737 include portions of Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , Doc. 558 , and Doc. 559 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 742 n [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 744–749 [ Pgs. 744–749 include portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 751–760 [ Pgs. 751–760 include portions of Doc. 568 , Doc. 569 , Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , Doc. 576 , Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 762–764 [ Pgs. 762–764 include portions of Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , and Doc. 583 ] , 766–772 [ Pgs. 766–772 include portions of Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 774–775 [ Pgs. 774–775 include portions of Doc. 589 , Doc. 590 , Doc. 591 , and Doc. 592 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 781–783 [ Pgs. 781–783 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 785 [ Pg. 785 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] , 787–788 [ Pgs. 787–788 include portions of Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , and Doc. 606 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 790 n [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 792–793 [ Pgs. 792–793 include portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 803 [ Pg. 803 includes portions of Doc. 612 and Doc. 613 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 815–817 [ Pgs. 815–817 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 815 n [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 819–820 [ Pgs. 819–820 include portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626 ] , 822–826 [ Pgs. 822–826 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , Doc. 631 , Doc. 632 , and Doc. 633 ] , 828–829 [ Pgs. 828–829 include portions of Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 832–833 [ Pgs. 832–833 include portions of Doc. 637 and Doc. 638 ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , and Doc. 641 ] , 841–843 [ Pgs. 841–843 include portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 649 ] , 850–851 [ Pgs. 850–851 include portions of Doc. 651 , Doc. 652 , and Doc. 653 ] , 854–855 [ Pgs. 854–855 include portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , Doc. 657 , and Doc. 658 ] , 857 [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 859–862 [ Pgs. 859–862 include portions of Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , Doc. 662 , Doc. 663 , and Doc. 664 ] , 865–866 [ Pgs. 865–866 include portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] , 868–871 [ Pgs. 868–871 include portions of Doc. 669 , Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , and Doc. 674 ] , 868 n [ Pg. 868 includes portions of Doc. 669 and Doc. 670 ] , 875 [ Pg. 875 includes portions of Doc. 676 and Doc. 677 ] , 877 [ Pg. 877 includes portions of Doc. 678 and Doc. 679 ] , 879–881 [ Pgs. 879–881 include portions of Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , Doc. 683 , and Doc. 684 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] Netherlands, 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 717 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] Netherlands East Indies, 896–900 [ Pgs. 896–900 include portions of Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702 ] , 910–912 [ Pgs. 910–912 include portions of Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , and Doc. 714 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 includes portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 920–927 [ Pgs. 920–927 include portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , and Doc. 730 ] , 929–931 [ Pgs. 929–931 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] , 934–938 [ Pgs. 934–938 include portions of Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , and Doc. 740 ] , 945–950 [ Pgs. 945–950 include portions of Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 952–953 [ Pgs. 952–953 include portions of Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , and Doc. 755 ] , 955–957 [ Pgs. 955–957 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] , 959–963 [ Pgs. 959–963 include portions of Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , and Doc. 766 ] , 966–967 [ Pgs. 966–967 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 969–971 [ Pgs. 969–971 include portions of Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , and Doc. 773 ] , 974–979 [ Pgs. 974–979 include portions of Doc. 775 , Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 982–987 [ Pgs. 982–987 include portions of Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , and Doc. 790 ] , 986 n [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 789 ] , 989–990 [ Pgs. 989–990 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 is part of Doc. 794 ] , 996–998 [ Pgs. 996–998 include portions of Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , and Doc. 799 ] , 996 n [ Pg. 996 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1011–1013 [ Pgs. 1011–1013 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1015–1025 [ Pgs. 1015–1025 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 1033–1034 [ Pgs. 1033–1034 include portions of Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , and Doc. 834 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1048–1051 [ Pgs. 1048–1051 include portions of Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , and Doc. 849 ] , 1053 [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1059–1060 [ Pgs. 1059–1060 include portions of Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , and Doc. 857 ] , 1065–1067 [ Pgs. 1065–1067 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 1067–1068 [ Pgs. 1067–1068 include portions of Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , Doc. 863 , and Doc. 864 ] , 1070 [ Pg. 1070 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 includes portions of Doc. 866 and Doc. 867 ] , 1075–1080 [ Pgs. 1075–1080 include portions of Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , and Doc. 874 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 876 ] , 1085 [ Pg. 1085 includes portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 1087–1088 [ Pgs. 1087–1088 include portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] , 1093–1094 [ Pgs. 1093–1094 include portions of Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] , 1096–1097 [ Pgs. 1096–1097 include portions of Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , and Doc. 887 ] Philippines, 1103 [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 1108–1109 [ Pgs. 1108–1109 include portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1111 n [ Pg. 1111 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1112–1113 [ Pgs. 1112–1113 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , and Doc. 900 ] , 1112 n [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1115–1120 [ Pgs. 1115–1120 include portions of Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , and Doc. 905 ] , 1115 n [ Pg. 1115 includes portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1124–1125 [ Pgs. 1124–1125 include portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] U.N. General Assembly, warmongering resolution, 553–554 [ Pgs. 553–554 include portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] Marshall Plan, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 889 ] Martin, Edwin M., 184–186 [ Pgs. 184–186 include portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , and Doc. 189 ] , 347–350 [ Pgs. 347–350 include portions of Doc. 289 , Doc. 290 , and Doc. 291 ] , 370–371 [ Pgs. 370–371 include portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 418 n [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 427 [ Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354 ] , 435–438 [ Pgs. 435–438 include portions of Doc. 358 , Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361 ] , 445–446 [ Pgs. 445–446 include portions of Doc. 364 , Doc. 365 , and Doc. 366 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] Maslov, A. S., 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 824 [ Pg. 824 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] Matthews, H. Freeman, 409 [ Pg. 409 includes portions of Doc. 341 and Doc. 342 ] , 948 n [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] , 972 [ Pg. 972 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] McCoy, Maj. Gen. Frank R. ( see also Far Eastern Commission under Japan ): Japan , occupation and control of , 156–157 [ Pgs. 156–157 include portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 157 n [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 169 [ Pg. 169 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176 ] , 176 n [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 197–198 [ Pgs. 197–198 include portions of Doc. 196 , Doc. 197 , Doc. 198 , and Doc. 199 ] , 198 n [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 202 [ Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 202 and Doc. 203 ] , 217 [ Pg. 217 is part of Doc. 213 ] , 225 [ Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 217 and Doc. 218 ] , 234–235 [ Pgs. 234–235 include portions of Doc. 225 and Doc. 226 ] , 253 [ Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240 ] , 261–262 [ Pg. 261 is part of Doc. 246 ] , 271–275 [ Pgs. 271–275 include portions of Doc. 252 , Doc. 253 , and Doc. 254 ] , 275 n [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 307 n [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 330–331 [ Pgs. 330–331 include portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] ; war claims and reparations, 347 [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 347 n [ Pg. 347 includes portions of Doc. 289 and Doc. 290 ] , 371 n [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 373 n [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 374 [ Pg. 374 includes portions of Doc. 312 and Doc. 313 ] , 376 [ Pg. 376 includes portions of Doc. 314 and Doc. 315 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 383 [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] , 383 n [ Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 318 and Doc. 319 ] 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 416 [ Pg. 416 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 423 [ Pg. 423 is part of Doc. 350 ] , 425 [ Pg. 425 is part of Doc. 352 ] , 428–429 [ Pgs. 428–429 include portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 431 [ Pg. 431 includes portions of Doc. 355 and Doc. 356 ] , 436 [ Pg. 436 is part of Doc. 359 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 446 [ Pg. 446 includes portions of Doc. 365 and Doc. 366 ] McDiarmid, Orville J., 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] McNutt, Paul V., 1102–1105 [ Pgs. 1102–1105 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , and Doc. 893 ] , 1108 n [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 895 ] , 1108–1109 [ Pgs. 1108–1109 include portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1111–1112 [ Pgs. 1111–1112 include portions of Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1123 n [ Pg. 1123 is part of Doc. 907 ] Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Company, 112 [ Pg. 112 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 148 [ Pg. 148 is part of Doc. 161 ] Meyrier, Jacques, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 98 n [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] Mexico, 463–464 [ Pgs. 463–464 include portions of Doc. 377 , Doc. 378 , and Doc. 379 ] Middle East, 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] Mitcheson, John L. M., 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 931 n [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 961–962 [ Pgs. 961–962 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , and Doc. 764 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] Moffat, Abbot Low, 53–55 [ Pgs. 53–55 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , Doc. 63 , and Doc. 64 ] , 55 n [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 67 n [ Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78 ] , 917–918 [ Pgs. 917–918 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 953–954 [ Pgs. 953–954 include portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , and Doc. 755 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] Molotov, V. M.: Japan, 361 [ Pg. 361 is part of Doc. 302 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 465–466 [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 469–470 [ Pgs. 469–470 include portions of Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , and Doc. 384 ] , 473–482 [ Pgs. 473–482 include portions of Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , Doc. 389 , Doc. 390 , Doc. 391 , and Doc. 392 ] , 565 [ Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 578 [ Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 445 and Doc. 446 ] , 580–582 [ Pgs. 580–582 include portions of Doc. 447 , Doc. 448 , and Doc. 449 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] Korea, 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 622–624 [ Pgs. 622–624 include portions of Doc. 476 and Doc. 477 ] , 629 [ Pg. 629 is part of Doc. 479 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 631–635 [ Pgs. 631–635 include portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , Doc. 483 , and Doc. 484 ] , 637–642 [ Pgs. 637–642 include portions of Doc. 485 , Doc. 486 , Doc. 487 , Doc. 488 , and Doc. 489 ] , 648 [ Pg. 648 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496 ] , 655–656 [ Pgs. 655–656 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 659–660 [ Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 505 ] , 665 [ Pg. 665 is part of Doc. 510 ] , 669 [ Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 681–682 [ Pgs. 681–682 include portions of Doc. 526 , Doc. 527 , and Doc. 528 ] , 687–688 [ Pgs. 687–688 include portions of Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 693 [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 696 [ Pg. 696 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538 ] , 698–699 [ Pg. 698 is part of Doc. 540 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 713–714 [ Pgs. 713–714 include portions of Doc. 550 , Doc. 551 , and Doc. 552 ] , 732–735 [ Pgs. 732–735 include portions of Doc. 553 , Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 741–744 [ Pgs. 741–744 include portions of Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , Doc. 562 , and Doc. 563 ] , 748 [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] , 753–754 [ Pgs. 753–754 include portions of Doc. 570 , Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] , 758–760 [ Pgs. 758–760 include portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 762–765 [ Pgs. 762–765 include portions of Doc. 580 , Doc. 581 , Doc. 582 , Doc. 583 , and Doc. 584 ] , 768–772 [ Pgs. 768–772 include portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , Doc. 588 , and Doc. 589 ] , 771 n [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 775–776 [ Pgs. 775–776 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 779–781 [ Pgs. 779–781 include portions of Doc. 596 , Doc. 597 , and Doc. 598 ] , 790 [ Pg. 790 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609 ] , 798 [ Pg. 798 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 815 n [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] , 827–828 [ Pgs. 827–828 include portions of Doc. 633 , Doc. 634 , and Doc. 635 ] , 836 [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] Mongolian People’s Republic: Japanese peace conference, question of participation in, 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] ; nonrecognition by the United States, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] ; Soviet control over, 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 601 ] Morgan, John H., 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 907–909 [ Pgs. 907–909 include portions of Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , and Doc. 709 ] , 972–973 [ Pgs. 972–973 include portions of Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 986–987 [ Pgs. 986–987 include portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 997 [ Pg. 997 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] Morlière, Gen. Louis, 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] , 71 [ Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 84 n [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] Moscow Conference ( Oct. 1943 ), communiqué of the, 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 392 ] Moscow Conference of three Foreign Ministers ( 1945 ): Japan, 214 n [ Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 354 n [ Pg. 354 is part of Doc. 295 ] , 454 [ Pg. 454 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 482 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 494 [ Pg. 494 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401 ] , 510–511 [ Pgs. 510–511 include portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] , 543 n [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] ; Korea, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 765 [ Pg. 765 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584 ] , 775 [ Pg. 775 includes portions of Doc. 591 and Doc. 592 ] , 779 [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] Moscow Declaration, Oct. 30, 1943 , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Moutet, Gustave, 72–73 [ Pgs. 72–73 include portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , Doc. 85 , and Doc. 86 ] , 76 [ Pg. 76 includes portions of Doc. 89 and Doc. 90 ] , 86–87 [ Pgs. 86–87 include portions of Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] Moutet, Marius, 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , and Doc. 60 ] , 55 [ Pg. 55 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64 ] , 59–63 [ Pgs. 59–63 include portions of Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 62 n [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 63 n [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 65–66 [ Pgs. 65–66 include portions of Doc. 74 , Doc. 75 , and Doc. 76 ] , 70–72 [ Pgs. 70–72 include portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 76–77 [ Pgs. 76–77 include portions of Doc. 89 , Doc. 90 , and Doc. 91 ] , 81–83 [ Pgs. 81–83 include portions of Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Mueller, Maj. Gen. Paul J., 17 [ Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17 ] , 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] Mus, Paul, 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 99 [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 101 [ Pg. 101 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Nadjamoeddin, 890–891 [ Pgs. 890–891 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , and Doc. 692 ] Naggiar, Paul-Emile, 369 [ Pg. 369 is part of Doc. 307 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Nanpo Shoto Island, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Nansei Shoto Island, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 496 n [ Pg. 496 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] Nauru, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Near East, 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 795 ] Netherlands, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] Burma, 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] Cooperation between Western Powers (U.S., U.K., France and the Netherlands) regarding Far East, Netherlands proposals regarding, 911 [ Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 717 ] , 917–918 [ Pgs. 917–918 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] Japan ( see also under Japan : Occupation and control , Peace Conference and War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests ), 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] Netherlands East Indies. See under Netherlands East Indies , infra. U.S. loan to, 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] Netherlands East Indies, 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 358–359 [ Pgs. 358–359 include portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 364 ] , 890–1101 [ Pgs. 890–1101 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , Doc. 698 , Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , Doc. 709 , Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , Doc. 716 , Doc. 717 , Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , Doc. 722 , Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , Doc. 727 , Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , Doc. 776 , Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , Doc. 820 , Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , Doc. 830 , Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , Doc. 845 , Doc. 846 , Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , Doc. 850 , Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , Doc. 862 , Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , and Doc. 889 ] Agreements: Linggadjati Agreement (known also as Cheribon Agreement), initialled Nov. 15, 1946 , signed March 25, 1947 , 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 890 n [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 696 ] , 898–899 [ Pgs. 898–899 include portions of Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , and Doc. 701 ] , 902–904 [ Pgs. 902–904 include portions of Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , and Doc. 705 ] , 906–907 [ Pgs. 906–907 include portions of Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] , 907 n [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 909 [ Pg. 909 is part of Doc. 709 ] , 911–914 [ Pgs. 911–914 include portions of Doc. 711 , Doc. 712 , Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , and Doc. 716 ] , 911 n [ Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 912 n [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 916–919 [ Pgs. 916–919 include portions of Doc. 718 , Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , and Doc. 722 ] , 919 n [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 721 and Doc. 722 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 is part of Doc. 727 ] , 925 [ Pg. 925 is part of Doc. 728 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 929–930 [ Pgs. 929–930 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , and Doc. 732 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 739 ] , 940–941 [ Pgs. 940–941 include portions of Doc. 741 and Doc. 742 ] , 943–946 [ Pgs. 943–946 include portions of Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , and Doc. 746 ] , 950–952 [ Pgs. 950–952 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , and Doc. 753 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 756 ] , 957 [ Pg. 957 includes portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 760 and Doc. 761 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 766 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 973–974 [ Pgs. 973–974 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] , 977 [ Pg. 977 includes portions of Doc. 780 and Doc. 781 ] , 982–984 [ Pgs. 982–984 include portions of Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , and Doc. 787 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 789 ] , 998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] , 1002 [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 807 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1009 n [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 is part of Doc. 831 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 is part of Doc. 838 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1077–1078 [ Pgs. 1077–1078 include portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] , 1078 n [ Pg. 1078 includes portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] , 1081–1083 [ Pgs. 1081–1083 include portions of Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 1085–1086 [ Pgs. 1085–1086 include portions of Doc. 878 and Doc. 879 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 885 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Efforts to implement, 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 920–923 [ Pgs. 920–923 include portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 923 n [ Pg. 923 is part of Doc. 727 ] , 925–930 [ Pgs. 925–930 include portions of Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , and Doc. 732 ] , 934–935 [ Pgs. 934–935 include portions of Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , and Doc. 737 ] , 941–943 [ Pgs. 941–943 include portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 760 and Doc. 761 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , and Doc. 772 ] , 972 [ Pg. 972 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 975–976 [ Pgs. 975–976 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 985–986 [ Pgs. 985–986 include portions of Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , and Doc. 789 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] ; Netherlands proposals, 931 n [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 931–936 [ Pgs. 931–936 include portions of Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 934 n [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 938–948 [ Pgs. 938–948 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , Doc. 741 , Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , and Doc. 748 ] , 945 n [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 743 and Doc. 744 ] , 950–951 [ Pgs. 950–951 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 953–955 [ Pgs. 953–955 include portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] , 957–960 [ Pgs. 957–960 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , and Doc. 762 ] , 964 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 766 ] , 966–967 [ Pgs. 966–967 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 976–977 [ Pgs. 976–977 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , and Doc. 781 ] , 979 n [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 979–980 [ Pgs. 979–980 include portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] ; Indonesian reply, 946–948 [ Pgs. 946–948 include portions of Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , and Doc. 748 ] , 951–958 [ Pgs. 951–958 include portions of Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] , 961–967 [ Pgs. 961–967 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 970–972 [ Pgs. 970–972 include portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , and Doc. 774 ] , 972 n [ Pg. 972 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 977–979 [ Pgs. 977–979 include portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 979 n [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] ; U.S. views, 960–961 [ Pgs. 960–961 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , and Doc. 763 ] Netherlands-Indonesian agreement regarding shipment of food, May 1947 , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 is part of Doc. 871 ] Arbitration: Australian proposal, 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] British-American arbitration, suggestion for, 931–932 [ Pgs. 931–932 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 939–940 [ Pgs. 939–940 include portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 743 ] British proposal, 987–989 [ Pgs. 987–989 include portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , and Doc. 791 ] ; U.S. position, 987 n [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] Indonesian desire for arbitration by international commission, 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 1017–1019 [ Pgs. 1017–1019 include portions of Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , Doc. 819 , and Doc. 820 ] , 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 1028 [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 830 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , and Doc. 836 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 is part of Doc. 838 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 is part of Doc. 871 ] ; Netherlands opposition to, 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] Australia, 903–904 [ Pgs. 903–904 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , and Doc. 705 ] , 1001–1002 [ Pgs. 1001–1002 include portions of Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , and Doc. 802 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 includes portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] , 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 1025–1026 [ Pgs. 1025–1026 include portions of Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , and Doc. 829 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1054–1055 [ Pgs. 1054–1055 include portions of Doc. 852 and Doc. 853 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] Offer of good offices, 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 1014–1015 [ Pgs. 1014–1015 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] Security Council, Australian referral of Indonesian question to. See under U.N. : Security Council , infra . Security Council, Good Offices Commission ( see also under U.N. : Security Council, infra ), 1047 n [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] Belgiun, 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1047 n [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1054–1056 [ Pgs. 1054–1056 include portions of Doc. 852 , Doc. 853 , and Doc. 854 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] Borneo, 346 [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] , 411 [ Pg. 411 is part of Doc. 343 ] , 891–892 [ Pgs. 891–892 include portions of Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , and Doc. 693 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] , 954–956 [ Pgs. 954–956 include portions of Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 766 ] , 983–984 [ Pgs. 983–984 include portions of Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , and Doc. 787 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 879 ] Cease fire, 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] , 898 n [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] Celebes, 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] China, 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] Chinese in Indonesian Republic, appeal for U.S. good offices regarding treatment of, 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 999 n [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 799 ] Fact-finding mission, proposed membership on, 1012 [ Pg. 1012 includes portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] Communism in, 917–918 [ Pgs. 917–918 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] East Indonesia, 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 892–893 [ Pgs. 892–893 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , and Doc. 695 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 716 ] , 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] , 954–956 [ Pgs. 954–956 include portions of Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 965 [ Pg. 965 is part of Doc. 766 ] , 983–984 [ Pgs. 983–984 include portions of Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , and Doc. 787 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 879 ] Agreement of Den Pasar ( Dec. 1946 ), 890–891 [ Pgs. 890–891 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , and Doc. 692 ] Constitution, 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693 ] Den Pasar Conference, 893 [ Pg. 893 includes portions of Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , and Doc. 695 ] Egypt: Concern regarding situation in Netherlands East Indies, 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1000–1002 [ Pgs. 1000–1002 include portions of Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , and Doc. 802 ] ; offer of good offices, 1002 n [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] ; Treaty of Friendship with Indonesian Republic, 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] Good offices or mediation ( see also Good Offices Committee under U.N. : Security Council , infra ), 939 [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] Australian offer of good offices, Indonesian acceptance of, 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] British offer of good offices, 988 [ Pg. 988 is part of Doc. 790 ] , 990–991 [ Pgs. 990–991 include portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] Egyptian offer of good offices, 1002 n [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] Indian approach regarding U.S. good offices, 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 974 n [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 792 ] Joint Australian-American mediation, Australian proposal for, 1014–1015 [ Pgs. 1014–1015 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 1015 n [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] Joint British-American good offices, British proposal for, 948–949 [ Pgs. 948–949 include portions of Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , and Doc. 749 ] , 997 [ Pg. 997 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] ; U. S. refusal, 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 950 n [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 956 [ Pg. 956 includes portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , and Doc. 758 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] U.S. offer of good offices, 993 [ Pg. 993 is part of Doc. 794 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 999 n [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1001 n [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1004 n [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1009–1018 [ Pgs. 1009–1018 include portions of Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , and Doc. 819 ] , 1016 n [ Pg. 1016 includes portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] , 1021–1022 [ Pgs. 1021–1022 include portions of Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , and Doc. 824 ] , 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 1026–1029 [ Pgs. 1026–1029 include portions of Doc. 828 , Doc. 829 , and Doc. 830 ] , 1029 n [ Pg. 1029 is part of Doc. 830 ] , 1034–1038 [ Pgs. 1034–1038 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , and Doc. 838 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] ; Netherlands acceptance, 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] , 1023 [ Pg. 1023 includes portions of Doc. 824 and Doc. 825 ] , 1028 [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 830 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] ; Indonesian refusal, 1017–1018 [ Pgs. 1017–1018 include portions of Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , and Doc. 819 ] , 1028–1029 [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 830 ] , 1034–1036 [ Pgs. 1034–1036 include portions of Doc. 833 , Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , and Doc. 836 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 is part of Doc. 838 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] ; lapse of U.S. offer, 1037 [ Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] Government, 896–897 [ Pgs. 896–897 include portions of Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , and Doc. 698 ] , 899 [ Pg. 899 includes portions of Doc. 700 and Doc. 701 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 718 ] Hostilities, renewal of, 978 [ Pg. 978 includes portions of Doc. 781 and Doc. 782 ] , 981–990 [ Pgs. 981–990 include portions of Doc. 783 , Doc. 784 , Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , Doc. 788 , Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 982 n [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 993 [ Pg. 993 is part of Doc. 794 ] , 1000–1001 [ Pgs. 1000–1001 include portions of Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , and Doc. 801 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 848 ] ; U.S. attitude toward, 992–996 [ Pgs. 992–996 include portions of Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , and Doc. 796 ] , 998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] India, 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] , 1025–1026 [ Pgs. 1025–1026 include portions of Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , and Doc. 829 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] Concern regarding situation, 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 990–992 [ Pgs. 990–992 include portions of Doc. 791 , Doc. 792 , and Doc. 793 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1016 [ Pg. 1016 includes portions of Doc. 816 and Doc. 817 ] Good offices, possible extension of, 1014–1015 [ Pgs. 1014–1015 include portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] Security Council, Indian referral of Indonesian question to. See under U.N. : Security Council , infra. Security Council, possible Indian referral of Indonesian question to, 987 [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 792 ] , 993–997 [ Pgs. 993–997 include portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , and Doc. 798 ] Indonesia, Republic of, 56–57 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 541 [ Pg. 541 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 890–896 [ Pgs. 890–896 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , Doc. 696 , and Doc. 697 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 702 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 721 and Doc. 722 ] , 925–927 [ Pgs. 925–927 include portions of Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , and Doc. 730 ] , 931–932 [ Pgs. 931–932 include portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 934–935 [ Pgs. 934–935 include portions of Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , and Doc. 737 ] , 938–939 [ Pgs. 938–939 include portions of Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 742 ] , 943–950 [ Pgs. 943–950 include portions of Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] , 955 [ Pg. 955 is part of Doc. 756 ] , 958–961 [ Pgs. 958–961 include portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , and Doc. 763 ] , 963–964 [ Pgs. 963–964 include portions of Doc. 765 and Doc. 766 ] , 966–967 [ Pgs. 966–967 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 971–973 [ Pgs. 971–973 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 978–980 [ Pgs. 978–980 include portions of Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 982–985 [ Pgs. 982–985 include portions of Doc. 785 , Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , and Doc. 788 ] , 991–992 [ Pgs. 991–992 include portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1003–1009 [ Pgs. 1003–1009 include portions of Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , Doc. 806 , Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , and Doc. 809 ] , 1013–1014 [ Pgs. 1013–1014 include portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1016–1017 [ Pgs. 1016–1017 include portions of Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , and Doc. 818 ] , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 is part of Doc. 821 ] , 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] , 1025–1026 [ Pgs. 1025–1026 include portions of Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , and Doc. 829 ] , 1031–1032 [ Pgs. 1031–1032 include portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] , 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 1063 [ Pg. 1063 includes portions of Doc. 858 and Doc. 859 ] , 1072–1074 [ Pgs. 1072–1074 include portions of Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , and Doc. 868 ] , 1076–1083 [ Pgs. 1076–1083 include portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 1085–1089 [ Pgs. 1085–1089 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , and Doc. 881 ] , 1091–1092 [ Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 883 ] , 1096 [ Pg. 1096 includes portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] , 1098 [ Pg. 1098 is part of Doc. 887 ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 889 ] Army, 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1008 [ Pg. 1008 is part of Doc. 807 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 867 ] Burma, 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] Cabinet, 898–899 [ Pgs. 898–899 include portions of Doc. 699 , Doc. 700 , and Doc. 701 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 721 and Doc. 722 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] , 970–972 [ Pgs. 970–972 include portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , and Doc. 774 ] , 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1017–1018 [ Pgs. 1017–1018 include portions of Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , and Doc. 819 ] , 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] , 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 867 ] Communists in, 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] French Indo-China, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] Government, 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 954–955 [ Pgs. 954–955 include portions of Doc. 755 and Doc. 756 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 762 and Doc. 763 ] , 962 n [ Pg. 962 includes portions of Doc. 763 and Doc. 764 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 971–972 [ Pgs. 971–972 include portions of Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , and Doc. 774 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 978–979 [ Pgs. 978–979 include portions of Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 986–988 [ Pgs. 986–988 include portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 999 [ Pg. 999 is part of Doc. 799 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1012–1017 [ Pgs. 1012–1017 include portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , and Doc. 818 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 1076 [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] International status, 1030–1032 [ Pgs. 1030–1032 include portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] Soviet objectives in, 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] United States: American rights and property, U.S. interest in restoration of, 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 920 n [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] ; Indonesian invitation for U.S. representatives to visit, 1018 [ Pg. 1018 includes portions of Doc. 818 and Doc. 819 ] ; Indonesian request for American economic adviser, 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] , 1090 n [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] Indonesian Central National Committee, 890–891 [ Pgs. 890–891 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , and Doc. 692 ] , 893–894 [ Pgs. 893–894 include portions of Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] Japan, war claims against, 358–359 [ Pgs. 358–359 include portions of Doc. 299 and Doc. 300 ] , 377 [ Pg. 377 is part of Doc. 315 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 444 [ Pg. 444 is part of Doc. 364 ] Java, 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 702 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 927–928 [ Pgs. 927–928 include portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 739 ] , 939–940 [ Pgs. 939–940 include portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 743 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 982–983 [ Pgs. 982–983 include portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 807 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1009 n [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 is part of Doc. 831 ] , 1049–1051 [ Pgs. 1049–1051 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 1076–1078 [ Pgs. 1076–1078 include portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] , 1086–1087 [ Pgs. 1086–1087 include portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 1092 [ Pg. 1092 is part of Doc. 883 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 885 ] Madura (Madoera), 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 702 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 is part of Doc. 831 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 869 ] , 1078 [ Pg. 1078 includes portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] , 1086 [ Pg. 1086 is part of Doc. 879 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 1092 [ Pg. 1092 is part of Doc. 883 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 885 ] Malino area, 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693 ] Malino principles, 892 [ Pg. 892 includes portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693 ] Masjoemi. See Council of Indonesian Moslem Organizations under Political parties, infra. National Assembly, working committee of, 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] Netherlands, 892–894 [ Pgs. 892–894 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] , 903 [ Pg. 903 includes portions of Doc. 703 and Doc. 704 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 717 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 1079–1081 [ Pgs. 1079–1081 include portions of Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , and Doc. 875 ] , 1083–1084 [ Pgs. 1083–1084 include portions of Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , and Doc. 878 ] , 1086–1090 [ Pgs. 1086–1090 include portions of Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , and Doc. 883 ] , 1092 [ Pg. 1092 is part of Doc. 883 ] , 1097–1100 [ Pgs. 1097–1100 include portions of Doc. 886 , Doc. 887 , Doc. 888 , and Doc. 889 ] Commission General to the East Indies, 893–895 [ Pgs. 893–895 include portions of Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] , 894 n [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 934 n [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 739 ] , 940 [ Pg. 940 is part of Doc. 741 ] , 953–954 [ Pgs. 953–954 include portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , and Doc. 755 ] , 957 [ Pg. 957 includes portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] Economic agreement, question of U.S. moral support for proposed, 904–905 [ Pgs. 904–905 include portions of Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , and Doc. 706 ] Foreign Office Branch in Batavia, U.S. query regarding functions, powers and procedures of, 916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 916 n [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 718 ] Military force against Indonesia, 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 922 n [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 927–929 [ Pgs. 927–929 include portions of Doc. 729 , Doc. 730 , and Doc. 731 ] , 932–933 [ Pgs. 932–933 include portions of Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 939–940 [ Pgs. 939–940 include portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 942–944 [ Pgs. 942–944 include portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 949–951 [ Pgs. 949–951 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , and Doc. 752 ] , 961–963 [ Pgs. 961–963 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , and Doc. 766 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 766 and Doc. 767 ] , 969–971 [ Pgs. 969–971 include portions of Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , and Doc. 773 ] , 973 [ Pg. 973 includes portions of Doc. 774 and Doc. 775 ] ; U.S. representations to Netherlands regarding possibility of, 950 [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 962–963 [ Pgs. 962–963 include portions of Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , and Doc. 766 ] Netherlands-Indonesian Union, 912–914 [ Pgs. 912–914 include portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , and Doc. 716 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 742 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 760 and Doc. 761 ] , 964–965 [ Pg. 964 is part of Doc. 766 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 includes portions of Doc. 781 and Doc. 782 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 is part of Doc. 831 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 885 ] , 1100 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 889 ] Perseroan Bank, 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 702 ] , 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] Political parties: Central Indonesian National Committee ( Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP)), 894–895 [ Pgs. 894–895 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 894 n [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] Communists, 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 867 ] Council of Indonesian Moslem Organizations ( Masjoemi ), 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 891 n [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 739 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Indonesian Nationalist Party ( Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI)), 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 894 n [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] Pemudas ( Pemoeda ), 937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 739 ] , 1072 [ Pg. 1072 includes portions of Doc. 866 and Doc. 867 ] Socialist Party, 937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 739 ] Private estates and enterprises, discussion regarding return of, 918–919 [ Pgs. 918–919 include portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , Doc. 721 , and Doc. 722 ] , 966 [ Pg. 966 includes portions of Doc. 766 and Doc. 767 ] Shipping, question of possible discrimination in favor of Batavia Conference, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 706 ] Soviet Union, 982 n [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 1011 [ Pg. 1011 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 1055–1056 [ Pgs. 1055–1056 include portions of Doc. 853 and Doc. 854 ] Sumatra, 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 901 [ Pg. 901 is part of Doc. 702 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 739 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 769 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 979 [ Pg. 979 includes portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 982–983 [ Pgs. 982–983 include portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1009 n [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 1031 [ Pg. 1031 is part of Doc. 831 ] , 1050–1051 [ Pgs. 1050–1051 include portions of Doc. 848 and Doc. 849 ] , 1064 [ Pg. 1064 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 1076–1078 [ Pgs. 1076–1078 include portions of Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , and Doc. 872 ] , 1086–1087 [ Pgs. 1086–1087 include portions of Doc. 879 and Doc. 880 ] , 1089 [ Pg. 1089 is part of Doc. 881 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 885 ] Trade: NEI Export-Import regulations, Jan. 29 , 897 [ Pg. 897 includes portions of Doc. 697 and Doc. 698 ] , 899–900 [ Pgs. 899–900 include portions of Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702 ] , 910 [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 918 [ Pg. 918 includes portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 is part of Doc. 727 ] , 1008 [ Pg. 1008 is part of Doc. 807 ] ; U.S. inquiry and representations, 900–902 [ Pgs. 900–902 include portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , and Doc. 703 ] , 920–921 [ Pgs. 920–921 include portions of Doc. 723 , Doc. 724 , and Doc. 725 ] , 923 [ Pg. 923 is part of Doc. 727 ] ; U.S. policy regarding opening of trade on non-discriminatory basis, 925–926 [ Pgs. 925–926 include portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] S.S. Martin Behrman case 896 [ Pg. 896 includes portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 899–900 [ Pgs. 899–900 include portions of Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702 ] , 902–903 [ Pgs. 902–903 include portions of Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , and Doc. 704 ] , 905–906 [ Pgs. 905–906 include portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 905 n [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 909–910 [ Pgs. 909–910 include portions of Doc. 709 and Doc. 710 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 956–957 [ Pgs. 956–957 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] , 957 n [ Pg. 957 includes portions of Doc. 758 and Doc. 759 ] ; U.S. representations, 900–901 [ Pgs. 900–901 include portions of Doc. 701 and Doc. 702 ] , 900–911 [ Pgs. 900–911 include portions of Doc. 701 , Doc. 702 , Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , Doc. 709 , Doc. 710 , Doc. 711 , and Doc. 712 ] , 910 n [ Pg. 910 is part of Doc. 710 ] , 913 [ Pg. 913 includes portions of Doc. 714 and Doc. 715 ] Truce of Oct. 1946 , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 934 n [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 742 ] , 944–946 [ Pgs. 944–946 include portions of Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , and Doc. 746 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 783 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 807 ] United Kingdom, 918 [ Pg. 918 includes portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 921 [ Pg. 921 includes portions of Doc. 724 and Doc. 725 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 939–940 [ Pgs. 939–940 include portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 948–950 [ Pgs. 948–950 include portions of Doc. 747 , Doc. 748 , Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 769 ] , 972 n [ Pg. 972 includes portions of Doc. 773 and Doc. 774 ] , 987–989 [ Pgs. 987–989 include portions of Doc. 789 , Doc. 790 , and Doc. 791 ] , 1001–1002 [ Pgs. 1001–1002 include portions of Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , and Doc. 802 ] , 1044 n [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] United Nations: Indonesian question, possible referral to United Nations, 982 n [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 795 ] ; India, possibility of referral by, 987 [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 792 ] , 993–997 [ Pgs. 993–997 include portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , and Doc. 798 ] ; Netherlands attitude toward, 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 931 [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 743 ] , 987 [ Pg. 987 includes portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 992–993 [ Pgs. 992–993 include portions of Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , and Doc. 794 ] Security Council: British troops in Indonesia in 1946 , case involving, 986 [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 789 ] Indonesian question, 1947: Appeals to Security Council, considerations regarding, 903–904 [ Pgs. 903–904 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , and Doc. 705 ] , 987–988 [ Pgs. 987–988 include portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 991 [ Pg. 991 is part of Doc. 792 ] , 993–997 [ Pgs. 993–997 include portions of Doc. 794 , Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , and Doc. 798 ] Australian and Indian referral of Indonesian question to the Security Council, 997–998 [ Pgs. 997–998 include portions of Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , and Doc. 799 ] , 998 n [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 829 ] ; Security Council resolution, August 1 , ordering cease fire, 1003 [ Pg. 1003 includes portions of Doc. 802 and Doc. 803 ] , 1009–1010 [ Pgs. 1009–1010 include portions of Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , and Doc. 810 ] , 1017 [ Pg. 1017 includes portions of Doc. 817 and Doc. 818 ] , 1024 [ Pg. 1024 includes portions of Doc. 826 and Doc. 827 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 829 ] , 1027 n [ Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 829 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 is part of Doc. 838 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1048 [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 847 and Doc. 848 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1060–1063 [ Pgs. 1060–1063 include portions of Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] , 1064 n [ Pg. 1064 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1068–1069 [ Pgs. 1068–1069 include portions of Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , and Doc. 865 ] ; Security Council resolution, Nov. 1 , reaffirming cease fire and establishing Good Offices Committee, 1065 n [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1068–1072 [ Pgs. 1068–1072 include portions of Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , and Doc. 867 ] , 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 1080 [ Pg. 1080 includes portions of Doc. 873 and Doc. 874 ] , 1083–1084 [ Pgs. 1083–1084 include portions of Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , and Doc. 878 ] , 1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] , 1099 [ Pg. 1099 includes portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] Consular Commission at Batavia (Australia, Belgiun, China, France, United Kingdom and United States): Instructions to, 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1046 [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 846 ] , 1046 n [ Pg. 1046 is part of Doc. 846 ] , 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 1060 [ Pg. 1060 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1064 n [ Pg. 1064 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 1069 [ Pg. 1069 includes portions of Doc. 864 and Doc. 865 ] Netherlands proposal regarding, 1033–1034 [ Pgs. 1033–1034 include portions of Doc. 832 , Doc. 833 , and Doc. 834 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , and Doc. 840 ] Reports from and activities of, 1044–1045 [ Pgs. 1044–1045 include portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1051–1052 [ Pgs. 1051–1052 include portions of Doc. 848 , Doc. 849 , and Doc. 850 ] , 1056–1057 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] , 1061–1063 [ Pgs. 1061–1063 include portions of Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] Security Council resolution, Aug. 25 , 1042–1043 [ Pgs. 1042–1043 include portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , Doc. 843 , and Doc. 844 ] , 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] U.S. military personnel and aircraft to assist, 1045–1046 [ Pgs. 1045–1046 include portions of Doc. 845 and Doc. 846 ] , 1045 n [ Pg. 1045 is part of Doc. 845 ] , 1052 [ Pg. 1052 includes portions of Doc. 849 and Doc. 850 ] , 1063–1064 [ Pgs. 1063–1064 include portions of Doc. 858 , Doc. 859 , and Doc. 860 ] Deliberations by the Security Council, 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] Borneo and East Indonesia, question of participation in discussions, 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] British resolution, 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] Commission to observe situation, Australian resolution proposing, 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 829 ] , 1027 n [ Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 829 ] , 1032–1033 [ Pgs. 1032–1033 include portions of Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. 833 ] Indonesian participation, question of, 1021 n [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] , 1022–1023 [ Pgs. 1022–1023 include portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , and Doc. 825 ] ; Netherlands opposition to, 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] ; U.S. position, 1020–1021 [ Pgs. 1020–1021 include portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] International Court of Justice, question of advisory opinion regarding Security Council jurisdiction, 1032–1033 [ Pgs. 1032–1033 include portions of Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. 833 ] , 1041 [ Pg. 1041 is part of Doc. 841 ] Philippine participation, question of, 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] Soviet resolution, 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] ; U.S. opposition to, 1058 [ Pg. 1058 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] U.S. position, 1024–1027 [ Pgs. 1024–1027 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , Doc. 828 , and Doc. 829 ] , 1032–1033 [ Pgs. 1032–1033 include portions of Doc. 831 , Doc. 832 , and Doc. 833 ] , 1040–1042 [ Pgs. 1040–1042 include portions of Doc. 840 , Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] U.S. resolution, 1056 n [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1059–1060 [ Pgs. 1059–1060 include portions of Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , and Doc. 857 ] , 1059 n [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] ; revision of, 1060–1063 [ Pgs. 1060–1063 include portions of Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] , 1061 n [ Pg. 1061 includes portions of Doc. 857 and Doc. 858 ] , 1062 n [ Pg. 1062 is part of Doc. 858 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1065 n [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] ; Belgian amendment to, 1064–1065 [ Pgs. 1064–1065 include portions of Doc. 859 , Doc. 860 , and Doc. 861 ] , 1064 n [ Pg. 1064 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] Good Offices Committee, 1041–1042 [ Pgs. 1041–1042 include portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1057 [ Pg. 1057 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] Meetings and activities, 1047 n [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1053–1054 [ Pgs. 1053–1054 include portions of Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , and Doc. 853 ] , 1053 n [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1055–1063 [ Pgs. 1055–1063 include portions of Doc. 853 , Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , Doc. 856 , Doc. 857 , Doc. 858 , and Doc. 859 ] , 1064 n [ Pg. 1064 includes portions of Doc. 859 and Doc. 860 ] , 1065–1067 [ Pgs. 1065–1067 include portions of Doc. 860 , Doc. 861 , and Doc. 862 ] , 1070–1083 [ Pgs. 1070–1083 include portions of Doc. 865 , Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , Doc. 868 , Doc. 869 , Doc. 870 , Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , Doc. 873 , Doc. 874 , Doc. 875 , Doc. 876 , and Doc. 877 ] , 1070 n [ Pg. 1070 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] , 1075 n [ Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 869 ] , 1085–1098 [ Pgs. 1085–1098 include portions of Doc. 878 , Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , Doc. 881 , Doc. 882 , Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , and Doc. 887 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Membership, 1047 [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1047 n [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 853 ] Netherlands acceptance of, 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] Security Council resolution, Nov. 1 , 1068–1069 [ Pgs. 1068–1069 include portions of Doc. 863 , Doc. 864 , and Doc. 865 ] Site for Netherlands-Indonesian meetings, 1066–1067 [ Pgs. 1066–1067 include portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] ; request for U.S. ship, 1069–1070 [ Pgs. 1069–1070 include portions of Doc. 864 , Doc. 865 , and Doc. 866 ] , 1070 n [ Pg. 1070 includes portions of Doc. 865 and Doc. 866 ] U.S. delegate, instructions to, 1074 [ Pg. 1074 includes portions of Doc. 867 and Doc. 868 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] , 1083–1085 [ Pgs. 1083–1085 include portions of Doc. 876 , Doc. 877 , Doc. 878 , and Doc. 879 ] , 1099–1101 [ Pgs. 1099–1101 include portions of Doc. 888 and Doc. 889 ] U.S. position, 1047–1048 [ Pgs. 1047–1048 include portions of Doc. 847 and Doc. 848 ] U.S. resolution, 1042 n [ Pg. 1042 includes portions of Doc. 841 , Doc. 842 , and Doc. 843 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] Truce (cessation of hostilities), 1009–1011 [ Pgs. 1009–1011 include portions of Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , and Doc. 811 ] , 1024–1025 [ Pgs. 1024–1025 include portions of Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , and Doc. 836 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 848 ] Indonesian cease fire, 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] Netherlands cease fire, 1009 n [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] Observers, proposals for impartial, 1011–1012 [ Pgs. 1011–1012 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1011 n [ Pg. 1011 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] , 1033 [ Pg. 1033 includes portions of Doc. 832 and Doc. 833 ] Renewal of hostilities, U.S. representations regarding possible, 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] , 1039 n [ Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , and Doc. 840 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] Van Mook line, 1060 [ Pg. 1060 includes portions of Doc. 856 and Doc. 857 ] , 1075 [ Pg. 1075 is part of Doc. 869 ] , 1091–1092 [ Pg. 1091 is part of Doc. 883 ] , 1095 [ Pg. 1095 is part of Doc. 885 ] , 1097–1098 [ Pgs. 1097–1098 include portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Withdrawal of Dutch and Indonesian forces from present positions, Australian proposal for, 1053 [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1053 n [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] ; Indonesian reaction, 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] ; U.S. position, 1053–1055 [ Pgs. 1053–1055 include portions of Doc. 851 , Doc. 852 , and Doc. 853 ] , 1053 n [ Pg. 1053 includes portions of Doc. 851 and Doc. 852 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] United Nations Commission, Netherlands opposition to proposals for, 1011 [ Pg. 1011 includes portions of Doc. 810 and Doc. 811 ] United States, 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] American mission to head Indonesian constabulary ( gendarmerie ), proposal for, 973–974 [ Pgs. 973–974 include portions of Doc. 774 , Doc. 775 , and Doc. 776 ] American rights and property, 920 [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 920 n [ Pg. 920 includes portions of Doc. 723 and Doc. 724 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] Economic agreement, proposal, question of U.S. support for, 904–905 [ Pgs. 904–905 include portions of Doc. 704 , Doc. 705 , and Doc. 706 ] Export-Import Bank, question of loans, 924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 728 ] , 933–934 [ Pgs. 933–934 include portions of Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , and Doc. 736 ] Mediation ( see also under Good offices or mediation, supra ), 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 939 [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] Netherlands East Indies Export-Import regulations. See under Trade , supra. S.S. Martin Behrman case. See under Trade , supra. U.S. and British persuasion or influence on Indonesian Government, suggestions for, 931–936 [ Pgs. 931–936 include portions of Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , Doc. 736 , Doc. 737 , and Doc. 738 ] , 931 n [ Pg. 931 is part of Doc. 733 ] , 939–940 [ Pgs. 939–940 include portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 943 [ Pg. 943 is part of Doc. 743 ] , 966–967 [ Pgs. 966–967 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] ; U.S. attitude toward, 941–942 [ Pgs. 941–942 include portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 942 n [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 743 and Doc. 744 ] , 949–950 [ Pgs. 949–950 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] U.S. military or financial aid to support Netherlands military efforts in Indonesia, non-extension of, 993 [ Pg. 993 is part of Doc. 794 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] U.S. military mission to supervise truce, Netherlands willingness to accept, 1002 [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 1011–1012 [ Pgs. 1011–1012 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] U.S. representations to Indonesian Republic, 950–953 [ Pgs. 950–953 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , and Doc. 755 ] , 956–957 [ Pgs. 956–957 include portions of Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , and Doc. 759 ] , 959–960 [ Pgs. 959–960 include portions of Doc. 760 , Doc. 761 , and Doc. 762 ] , 959 n [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 760 and Doc. 761 ] , 960 n [ Pg. 960 includes portions of Doc. 761 and Doc. 762 ] , 970–971 [ Pgs. 970–971 include portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , and Doc. 773 ] , 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] U.S. statement on Indonesia, June 25 , 958–959 [ Pgs. 958–959 include portions of Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. 761 ] United States of Indonesia, 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 892–893 [ Pgs. 892–893 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , and Doc. 695 ] , 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 912–914 [ Pgs. 912–914 include portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , and Doc. 716 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 721 and Doc. 722 ] , 924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 728 ] , 926 [ Pg. 926 includes portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] , 929–931 [ Pgs. 929–931 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , and Doc. 733 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 941 [ Pg. 941 is part of Doc. 742 ] , 945 [ Pg. 945 includes portions of Doc. 743 and Doc. 744 ] , 947 [ Pg. 947 includes portions of Doc. 746 and Doc. 747 ] , 951–955 [ Pgs. 951–955 include portions of Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , and Doc. 756 ] , 959 [ Pg. 959 includes portions of Doc. 760 and Doc. 761 ] , 964–966 [ Pgs. 964–966 include portions of Doc. 766 and Doc. 767 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 1031–1032 [ Pgs. 1031–1032 include portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] , 1038 [ Pg. 1038 is part of Doc. 838 ] , 1077 [ Pg. 1077 is part of Doc. 871 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 876 ] , 1086–1089 [ Pgs. 1086–1089 include portions of Doc. 879 , Doc. 880 , and Doc. 881 ] , 1092 [ Pg. 1092 is part of Doc. 883 ] , 1095–1096 [ Pgs. 1095–1096 include portions of Doc. 885 and Doc. 886 ] , 1100–1101 [ Pg. 1100 is part of Doc. 889 ] ; membership in the United Nations, question of, 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 1031–1032 [ Pgs. 1031–1032 include portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] Netherlands-Indonesian Union. See under Netherlands East Indies , supra. Netherlands Kingdom, 912–914 [ Pgs. 912–914 include portions of Doc. 713 , Doc. 714 , Doc. 715 , and Doc. 716 ] Netherlands New Guinea, 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] New Guinea, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] New Zealand: Japan. See under Japan : Occupation and control , Peace Conference , Peace treaty , War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests . U.S. educational exchange agreement, negotiations regarding, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Nguyen Vinh Thuy. See Bao Dai. Nisot, Joseph, 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 853 ] Noce, Maj. Gen. Daniel J., 385–386 [ Pgs. 385–386 include portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 406 [ Pg. 406 includes portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 606 [ Pg. 606 includes portions of Doc. 468 and Doc. 469 ] Nolting, Frederick, 932 [ Pg. 932 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] Norway. See under Japan : Occupation and control : Fishing and whaling : SCAP sponsored Japanese whaling expedition to Antarctica. Novikov, Nikolay Vasilyevich, 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 210 [ Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 360–363 [ Pgs. 360–363 include portions of Doc. 300 , Doc. 301 , Doc. 302 , Doc. 303 , and Doc. 304 ] , 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 468 n [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 640 n [ Pg. 640 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488 ] Noyes, Charles P., 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] Nuremberg war crimes trial, 305 [ Pg. 305 includes portions of Doc. 269 and Doc. 270 ] Ogburn, Charlton, Jr., 51–52 [ Pgs. 51–52 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , and Doc. 60 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 136 n [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 1072–1074 [ Pgs. 1072–1074 include portions of Doc. 866 , Doc. 867 , and Doc. 868 ] , 1077–1078 [ Pgs. 1077–1078 include portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] Oliver, Robert T., 603–604 [ Pgs. 603–604 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 651–652 [ Pgs. 651–652 include portions of Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , and Doc. 500 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 509 ] , 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 568 ] , 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 871 [ Pg. 871 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] O’Neal, Emmet, 1123–1126 [ Pgs. 1123–1126 include portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] . Open door policy, 905 [ Pg. 905 includes portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] O’Sullivan, James L., 51 n [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 53–54 [ Pgs. 53–54 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] , 60–62 [ Pgs. 60–62 include portions of Doc. 68 , Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , Doc. 71 , and Doc. 72 ] , 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 64 n [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 74–75 [ Pgs. 74–75 include portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , Doc. 88 , and Doc. 89 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 77 [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 77 n [ Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 90 and Doc. 91 ] , 82 n [ Pg. 82 is part of Doc. 96 ] , 83–87 [ Pgs. 83–87 include portions of Doc. 97 , Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , Doc. 100 , Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104 ] , 90–91 [ Pgs. 90–91 include portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 93–95 [ Pgs. 93–95 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 93 n [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 99 n [ Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 101–102 [ Pgs. 101–102 include portions of Doc. 118 , Doc. 119 , and Doc. 120 ] , 108–109 [ Pgs. 108–109 include portions of Doc. 124 and Doc. 125 ] , 111 [ Pg. 111 is part of Doc. 126 ] , 117 [ Pg. 117 includes portions of Doc. 128 and Doc. 129 ] , 120–123 [ Pgs. 120–123 include portions of Doc. 131 , Doc. 132 , Doc. 133 , and Doc. 134 ] , 126–127 [ Pgs. 126–127 include portions of Doc. 135 , Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] , 131–132 [ Pgs. 131–132 include portions of Doc. 142 , Doc. 143 , and Doc. 144 ] , 136–137 [ Pgs. 136–137 include portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 139–141 [ Pgs. 139–141 include portions of Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , and Doc. 154 ] Packer, Earl L., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 13–17 [ Pgs. 13–17 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , Doc. 15 , Doc. 16 , and Doc. 17 ] , 19–20 [ Pgs. 19–20 include portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , Doc. 20 , Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 22–28 [ Pgs. 22–28 include portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , and Doc. 30 ] , 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 28 n [ Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 30–37 [ Pgs. 30–37 include portions of Doc. 33 , Doc. 34 , Doc. 35 , Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 40–45 [ Pgs. 40–45 include portions of Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , Doc. 48 , Doc. 49 , Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , and Doc. 53 ] , 43 n [ Pg. 43 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49 ] , 44 n [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Pak Tyaseb ( also Pak Tsi Seb), 821 [ Pg. 821 includes portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] , 846 [ Pg. 846 includes portions of Doc. 646 and Doc. 647 ] Pakistan, question of participation in Japanese peace conference, 524 [ Pg. 524 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 565–566 [ Pgs. 565–566 include portions of Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , and Doc. 439 ] , 575 [ Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444 ] Palestine issue, 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 686 ] Papua, 365 [ Pg. 365 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 384 [ Pg. 384 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320 ] Paris Peace Conference ( 1919 ), 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] Paris Peace Conference ( 1946 ), 127 [ Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138 ] Patterson, Jefferson, 1000–1001 [ Pgs. 1000–1001 include portions of Doc. 799 , Doc. 800 , and Doc. 801 ] Patterson, Robert B.: Japan, 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 346 ] ; Korea, 605–606 [ Pgs. 605–606 include portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , Doc. 468 , and Doc. 469 ] , 608 n [ Pg. 608 includes portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 619 [ Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 472 and Doc. 473 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 625–628 [ Pgs. 625–628 include portions of Doc. 477 , Doc. 478 , and Doc. 479 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 630–631 [ Pgs. 630–631 include portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , and Doc. 482 ] , 649 [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] ; Philippines, 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1102 n [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1103 n [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] ; retirement, 417 [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 346 ] Paul-Boncour, Jean, 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] Pauley, Edwin W., 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 352 [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 352 n [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 380–382 [ Pgs. 380–382 include portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , Doc. 317 , and Doc. 318 ] , 380 n [ Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 429 n [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 605 [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] , 605 n [ Pg. 605 includes portions of Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] Pearson, Drew, 457 [ Pg. 457 includes portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] Pearson, Lester, 887 [ Pg. 887 is part of Doc. 686 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 689 ] Penfield, James K.: French Indo-China, 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] ; Japan, 300–301 [ Pgs. 300–301 include portions of Doc. 265 , Doc. 266 , and Doc. 267 ] , 345–346 [ Pgs. 345–346 include portions of Doc. 287 , Doc. 288 , and Doc. 289 ] , 428–429 [ Pgs. 428–429 include portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 459 [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 459 n [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 470–471 [ Pgs. 470–471 include portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385 ] , 476–477 [ Pgs. 476–477 include portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 492 [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 506 [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 554 [ Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 574–575 [ Pgs. 574–575 include portions of Doc. 442 , Doc. 443 , and Doc. 444 ] ; Korea, 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 610 n [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 647 [ Pg. 647 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495 ] , 674 [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 674 n [ Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , and Doc. 518 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 811 [ Pg. 811 is part of Doc. 617 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 1037 [ Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 1037 n [ Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] Petersen, Howard C.: Japan, 197 [ Pg. 197 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197 ] , 203 [ Pg. 203 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204 ] , 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 381 [ Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317 ] , 385 [ Pg. 385 includes portions of Doc. 320 and Doc. 321 ] , 390–392 [ Pgs. 390–392 include portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , Doc. 327 , and Doc. 328 ] , 405 [ Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338 ] , 413–418 [ Pgs. 413–418 include portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , Doc. 346 , and Doc. 347 ] , 420–421 [ Pgs. 420–421 include portions of Doc. 347 , Doc. 348 , and Doc. 349 ] , 438 [ Pg. 438 includes portions of Doc. 360 and Doc. 361 ] ; Korea, 618–619 [ Pgs. 618–619 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 635 [ Pg. 635 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484 ] , 649 n [ Pg. 649 includes portions of Doc. 496 , Doc. 497 , and Doc. 498 ] Pethick-Lawrence, Lord, 10 [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 10 n [ Pg. 10 is part of Doc. 9 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 389 n [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Phetsarat, Prince, 57 [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 57 n [ Pg. 57 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 139 [ Pg. 139 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152 ] Philippines, 1102–1126 [ Pgs. 1102–1126 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , Doc. 894 , Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] Agreements: Military assistance agreement, between the U.S. and the Philippines Mar. 21 , 1117–1118 [ Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 904 ] , 1117 n [ Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 904 ] Military bases agreement between the U.S. and the Philippines, Mar. 14 ,1103 [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] , 1108–1109 [ Pgs. 1108–1109 include portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1108 n [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 895 ] , 1112 [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1112 n [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1118 [ Pg. 1118 is part of Doc. 904 ] RFC loan agreement ($25 million), Mar. 6 , 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1105–1107 [ Pgs. 1105–1107 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 896 ] Independence, 95 [ Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114 ] , 105 [ Pg. 105 is part of Doc. 121 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] , 130 n [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] Japan ( see also under Japan : Occupation and control ; War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests ), 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 234 [ Pg. 234 is part of Doc. 225 ] , 257 [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 504 [ Pg. 504 is part of Doc. 407 ] , 548 [ Pg. 548 is part of Doc. 432 ] Joint Finance Commission (JFC), 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. 893 ] , 1107 [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 894 ] , 1109–1111 [ Pgs. 1109–1111 include portions of Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , and Doc. 897 ] , 1114–1115 [ Pgs. 1114–1115 include portions of Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] , 1114 n [ Pg. 1114 includes portions of Doc. 900 and Doc. 901 ] , 1117–1121 [ Pgs. 1117–1121 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , and Doc. 906 ] Korea, 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 862 [ Pg. 862 includes portions of Doc. 663 and Doc. 664 ] , 873 n [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 888 [ Pg. 888 includes portions of Doc. 687 and Doc. 688 ] Netherlands East Indies, 1014 [ Pg. 1014 is part of Doc. 815 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] United States: Copyright laws, reciprocal protection of, 1115–1116 [ Pgs. 1115–1116 include portions of Doc. 901 , Doc. 902 , and Doc. 903 ] , 1115 n [ Pg. 1115 includes portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] Educational exchange agreement, negotiations regarding, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Financial assistance: Philippine request for balance of RFC loan ( $50 million ), 1109–1111 [ Pgs. 1109–1111 include portions of Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , and Doc. 897 ] , 1111 n [ Pg. 1111 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] ; Philippine request for $200 million grant or $500 million credit, 1120–1121 [ Pgs. 1120–1121 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , and Doc. 906 ] , 1123–1125 [ Pgs. 1123–1125 include portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] Military assistance program, 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 892 ] , 1116–1120 [ Pgs. 1116–1120 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , Doc. 904 , and Doc. 905 ] Military mission, 1104 [ Pg. 1104 is part of Doc. 892 ] State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 1116–1119 [ Pgs. 1116–1119 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, negotiations regarding, 1113–1115 [ Pgs. 1113–1115 include portions of Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] , 1121–1122 [ Pgs. 1121–1122 include portions of Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , and Doc. 907 ] , 1122 n [ Pg. 1122 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Philippines, 1117 [ Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 904 ] , 1119–1120 [ Pgs. 1119–1120 include portions of Doc. 904 and Doc. 905 ] U.S. naval vessels for the Philippines, 1104–1105 [ Pgs. 1104–1105 include portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. 893 ] Withdrawal of U.S. forces from, 1102–1103 [ Pgs. 1102–1103 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] Pickelle, Frank E., 326–330 [ Pgs. 326–330 include portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 326 n [ Pg. 326 is part of Doc. 280 ] Pixton, Lt. Col., 435–436 [ Pgs. 435–436 include portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] Plimsoll, Maj. James, 218–220 [ Pgs. 218–220 include portions of Doc. 214 and Doc. 215 ] , 227 [ Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 445 [ Pg. 445 includes portions of Doc. 364 and Doc. 365 ] , 568 [ Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 439 and Doc. 440 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] Pomeroy & Company, J. H., 241–242 [ Pgs. 241–242 include portions of Doc. 230 and Doc. 231 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 247 ] Potsdam Conference. See Berlin Conference. Potsdam Declaration, 156 [ Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 167 ] , 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 193 ] , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 250 [ Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 237 ] , 314 [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 487–488 [ Pgs. 487–488 include portions of Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , and Doc. 396 ] , 491–492 [ Pgs. 491–492 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 448 ] , 610 [ Pg. 610 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945 , 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 212 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] , 794 [ Pg. 794 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611 ] , 833 [ Pg. 833 is part of Doc. 638 ] Powles, G. R., 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] Quelport Island, 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] Quirino, Elpidio, 1108–1109 [ Pgs. 1108–1109 include portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1122 [ Pg. 1122 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] , 1122 n [ Pg. 1122 includes portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] Quoc, Nguyen Ai. See Ho Chi Minn. Ramadier, Paul, 60 n [ Pg. 60 includes portions of Doc. 68 and Doc. 69 ] , 66–67 [ Pgs. 66–67 include portions of Doc. 75 , Doc. 76 , Doc. 77 , and Doc. 78 ] , 73–74 [ Pgs. 73–74 include portions of Doc. 85 , Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 74 n [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 78–83 [ Pgs. 78–83 include portions of Doc. 91 , Doc. 92 , Doc. 93 , Doc. 94 , Doc. 95 , Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98 ] , 79 n [ Pg. 79 is part of Doc. 93 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 129 [ Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 131 [ Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143 ] Rance, Maj. Gen. Sir Hubert E., 3 [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 3 n [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 6 n [ Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7 ] , 12 [ Pg. 12 is part of Doc. 11 ] , 14–15 [ Pgs. 14–15 include portions of Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 36–37 [ Pgs. 36–37 include portions of Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , and Doc. 42 ] , 44–45 [ Pgs. 44–45 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , and Doc. 53 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] , 389 n [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Reber, Samuel, 886–887 [ Pgs. 886–887 include portions of Doc. 685 and Doc. 686 ] Reed, Charles S., II, 52 [ Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , and Doc. 60 ] , 54 [ Pg. 54 includes portions of Doc. 62 and Doc. 63 ] , 58 [ Pg. 58 includes portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] , 61 [ Pg. 61 includes portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71 ] , 62 n [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 72 [ Pg. 72 includes portions of Doc. 83 , Doc. 84 , and Doc. 85 ] , 75–76 [ Pgs. 75–76 include portions of Doc. 88 , Doc. 89 , and Doc. 90 ] , 84 [ Pg. 84 includes portions of Doc. 98 , Doc. 99 , and Doc. 100 ] , 88–89 [ Pgs. 88–89 include portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107 ] , 93–94 [ Pgs. 93–94 include portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112 ] , 99–100 [ Pgs. 99–100 include portions of Doc. 115 , Doc. 116 , and Doc. 117 ] , 100 n [ Pg. 100 is part of Doc. 117 ] , 103–107 [ Pgs. 103–107 include portions of Doc. 120 , Doc. 121 , Doc. 122 , and Doc. 123 ] , 110–116 [ Pgs. 110–116 include portions of Doc. 125 , Doc. 126 , and Doc. 127 ] , 119–120 [ Pgs. 119–120 include portions of Doc. 130 , Doc. 131 , and Doc. 132 ] , 123–126 [ Pgs. 123–126 include portions of Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , Doc. 135 , and Doc. 136 ] , 128 [ Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 138 and Doc. 139 ] , 132–135 [ Pgs. 132–135 include portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , Doc. 145 , Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148 ] , 137–143 [ Pgs. 137–143 include portions of Doc. 149 , Doc. 150 , Doc. 151 , Doc. 152 , Doc. 153 , Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] , 146–150 [ Pgs. 146–150 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , and Doc. 163 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] Rees-Williams, Lt. Col. D. R., 20 n [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] Reuchlin, Jonkheer O., 468 [ Pg. 468 is part of Doc. 382 ] , 953–954 [ Pgs. 953–954 include portions of Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , and Doc. 755 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 789 ] , 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 1058–1059 [ Pgs. 1058–1059 include portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] Rhee, Syngman, 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 596 n [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] , 598–600 [ Pgs. 598–600 include portions of Doc. 462 , Doc. 463 , and Doc. 464 ] , 603–605 [ Pgs. 603–605 include portions of Doc. 465 , Doc. 466 , Doc. 467 , and Doc. 468 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 607–608 [ Pgs. 607–608 include portions of Doc. 470 and Doc. 471 ] , 611 [ Pg. 611 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 620–621 [ Pgs. 620–621 include portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , Doc. 475 , and Doc. 476 ] , 620 n [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 621 n [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 644–648 [ Pgs. 644–648 include portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , Doc. 493 , Doc. 494 , Doc. 495 , and Doc. 496 ] , 651–654 [ Pgs. 651–654 include portions of Doc. 498 , Doc. 499 , Doc. 500 , Doc. 501 , and Doc. 502 ] , 661 [ Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506 ] , 664 [ Pg. 664 is part of Doc. 509 ] , 677 [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 677 n [ Pg. 677 is part of Doc. 520 ] , 680 [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 680 n [ Pg. 680 includes portions of Doc. 524 , Doc. 525 , and Doc. 526 ] , 683–684 [ Pgs. 683–684 include portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 691–692 [ Pgs. 691–692 include portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535 ] , 693 n [ Pg. 693 includes portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 694 [ Pg. 694 is part of Doc. 536 ] , 696–697 [ Pgs. 696–697 include portions of Doc. 537 , Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540 ] , 700–705 [ Pgs. 700–705 include portions of Doc. 540 , Doc. 541 , Doc. 542 , Doc. 543 , and Doc. 544 ] , 704 n [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 708–711 [ Pgs. 708–711 include portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , Doc. 547 , Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , and Doc. 550 ] , 708 n [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 709 n [ Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 547 and Doc. 548 ] , 711 [ Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] , 714 [ Pg. 714 includes portions of Doc. 551 and Doc. 552 ] , 745–750 [ Pgs. 745–750 include portions of Doc. 563 , Doc. 564 , Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , Doc. 567 , and Doc. 568 ] , 758 [ Pg. 758 is part of Doc. 577 ] , 776 [ Pg. 776 includes portions of Doc. 592 and Doc. 593 ] , 785–787 [ Pgs. 785–787 include portions of Doc. 601 , Doc. 602 , Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605 ] , 799 [ Pg. 799 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 801 [ Pg. 801 is part of Doc. 612 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 816 [ Pg. 816 includes portions of Doc. 622 and Doc. 623 ] , 819 [ Pg. 819 is part of Doc. 625 ] , 822–824 [ Pgs. 822–824 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , Doc. 630 , and Doc. 631 ] , 826–827 [ Pgs. 826–827 include portions of Doc. 632 , Doc. 633 , and Doc. 634 ] , 826 n [ Pg. 826 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633 ] , 828–830 [ Pgs. 828–830 include portions of Doc. 634 , Doc. 635 , and Doc. 636 ] , 838–839 [ Pgs. 838–839 include portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 848–849 [ Pgs. 848–849 include portions of Doc. 649 , Doc. 650 , and Doc. 651 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 654 ] , 857 [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 859–860 [ Pgs. 859–860 include portions of Doc. 660 , Doc. 661 , and Doc. 662 ] , 862–867 [ Pgs. 862–867 include portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668 ] , 869–871 [ Pgs. 869–871 include portions of Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , Doc. 672 , Doc. 673 , and Doc. 674 ] , 874 [ Pg. 874 is part of Doc. 676 ] , 878 [ Pg. 878 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680 ] , 880 [ Pg. 880 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] Rhee, Mrs. Syngman, 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] , 822–823 [ Pgs. 822–823 include portions of Doc. 627 , Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] , 845 [ Pg. 845 is part of Doc. 646 ] , 848 [ Pg. 848 is part of Doc. 649 ] Rice Study Conference in India, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] Ringwalt, Arthur R., 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 418 n [ Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347 ] , 420 n [ Pg. 420 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348 ] Robertson, Lt. Gen. H. C. H., 268 [ Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250 ] , 284 [ Pg. 284 is part of Doc. 258 ] Robinson, Hamilton, 166–167 [ Pgs. 166–167 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] Roosevelt, Franklin D., 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 422 ] , 1118 [ Pg. 1118 is part of Doc. 904 ] Roxas, Manuel A., 493 [ Pg. 493 is part of Doc. 400 ] , 1102–1106 [ Pgs. 1102–1106 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1102 n [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1108–1109 [ Pgs. 1108–1109 include portions of Doc. 895 and Doc. 896 ] , 1108 n [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 895 ] , 1112 [ Pg. 1112 includes portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , and Doc. 899 ] , 1114 [ Pg. 1114 includes portions of Doc. 900 and Doc. 901 ] , 1114 n [ Pg. 1114 includes portions of Doc. 900 and Doc. 901 ] , 1119–1126 [ Pgs. 1119–1126 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , Doc. 906 , Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] Royall, Kenneth C., 275 n [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 319 [ Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 277 and Doc. 278 ] , 321 [ Pg. 321 is part of Doc. 278 ] , 417 n [ Pg. 417 is part of Doc. 346 ] , 441 [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] , 441 n [ Pg. 441 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363 ] Rusk, Dean, 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 820 [ Pg. 820 is part of Doc. 626 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1006 n [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] , 1030 [ Pg. 1030 is part of Doc. 831 ] , 1035 [ Pg. 1035 includes portions of Doc. 834 and Doc. 835 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 1043 [ Pg. 1043 includes portions of Doc. 843 and Doc. 844 ] , 1056 [ Pg. 1056 is part of Doc. 854 ] Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905 , 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] Ryan, James W., 905–907 [ Pgs. 905–907 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , and Doc. 708 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] Ryukyu Islands: Territorial dispositions, 452 [ Pg. 452 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371 ] , 460 [ Pg. 460 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 512 [ Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] ; U.S. base in, question of, 560 [ Pg. 560 is part of Doc. 435 ] Saint Laurent, Louis S., 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 689 ] Sainteny, Jean, 53–54 [ Pgs. 53–54 include portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , Doc. 62 , and Doc. 63 ] , 62 [ Pg. 62 includes portions of Doc. 71 and Doc. 72 ] , 74 [ Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 86 , Doc. 87 , and Doc. 88 ] , 83 [ Pg. 83 includes portions of Doc. 97 and Doc. 98 ] Sakhalin (Karafuto) Island, southern part of, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 487 [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 517 [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 530 [ Pg. 530 is part of Doc. 424 ] Salan, Gen. Raoul, 108 [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 124 ] , 108 n [ Pg. 108 is part of Doc. 124 ] Salim, Hadji Agoes (Agus), 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , and Doc. 772 ] , 1012 n [ Pg. 1012 includes portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] , 1021–1023 [ Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , and Doc. 825 ] , 1037 [ Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 876 ] Saltzman, Brig. Gen. Charles E.: Japan, 275 n [ Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254 ] , 280 [ Pg. 280 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257 ] , 302–303 [ Pgs. 302–303 include portions of Doc. 267 and Doc. 268 ] , 313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 428 n [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 429 n [ Pg. 429 is part of Doc. 355 ] , 435 [ Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 358 and Doc. 359 ] , 474–475 [ Pgs. 474–475 include portions of Doc. 387 , Doc. 388 , and Doc. 389 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 492 n [ Pg. 492 includes portions of Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 429 ] ; Korea, 771 [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 771 n [ Pg. 771 includes portions of Doc. 588 and Doc. 589 ] , 773 n [ Pg. 773 is part of Doc. 589 ] , 786–787 [ Pgs. 786–787 include portions of Doc. 603 , Doc. 604 , and Doc. 605 ] , 789 n [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] , 811–812 [ Pgs. 811–812 include portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] 818 n [ Pg. 818 is part of Doc. 624 ] , 828 [ Pg. 828 includes portions of Doc. 634 and Doc. 635 ] , 831 [ Pg. 831 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637 ] , 838 [ Pg. 838 is part of Doc. 642 ] , 869–870 [ Pgs. 869–870 include portions of Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , and Doc. 672 ] Sam, Nguyen Van, 106–107 [ Pgs. 106–107 include portions of Doc. 122 and Doc. 123 ] , 132 [ Pg. 132 includes portions of Doc. 143 and Doc. 144 ] , 133 n [ Pg. 133 includes portions of Doc. 144 and Doc. 145 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] Sanson, Sir George, 396 [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 396 n [ Pg. 396 is part of Doc. 330 ] , 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] Sao Shwe Thaike, Saopha of Yawnghwe, 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] Sargent, Clyde B., 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] Sargent, Sir Orme G., 582 [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449 ] , 582 n [ Pg. 582 includes portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449 ] , 591 [ Pg. 591 includes portions of Doc. 456 and Doc. 457 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 928 n [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] Sastroamidjojo, All, 1022 [ Pg. 1022 includes portions of Doc. 823 and Doc. 824 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1082 [ Pg. 1082 is part of Doc. 876 ] Saw, U, 3–4 [ Pgs. 3–4 include portions of Doc. 2 , Doc. 3 , and Doc. 4 ] , 3 n [ Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3 ] , 7–9 [ Pgs. 7–9 include portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8 ] , 11–15 [ Pgs. 11–15 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , Doc. 13 , Doc. 14 , and Doc. 15 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] , 24 [ Pg. 24 includes portions of Doc. 27 and Doc. 28 ] , 37–38 [ Pgs. 37–38 include portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Schermerhorn, Willen, 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 894 n [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] Schnee, Alexander, 932–934 [ Pgs. 932–934 include portions of Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , and Doc. 736 ] , 939 n [ Pg. 939 includes portions of Doc. 740 and Doc. 741 ] , 942–945 [ Pgs. 942–945 include portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , and Doc. 744 ] Schuyler, Brig. Gen. C. V. R., 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 507 n [ Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 410 ] Scott, Joseph W., 1037 [ Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 1066 [ Pg. 1066 is part of Doc. 861 ] , 1071 [ Pg. 1071 is part of Doc. 866 ] , 1077–1078 [ Pgs. 1077–1078 include portions of Doc. 871 and Doc. 872 ] Sebald, W. J., 287–288 [ Pgs. 287–288 include portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 287 n [ Pg. 287 is part of Doc. 261 ] , 290–300 [ Pgs. 290–300 include portions of Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , Doc. 265 , and Doc. 266 ] , 290 n [ Pg. 290 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 295 n [ Pg. 295 includes portions of Doc. 264 and Doc. 265 ] , 307–313 [ Pgs. 307–313 include portions of Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , Doc. 275 , and Doc. 276 ] , 317–319 [ Pgs. 317–319 include portions of Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , and Doc. 278 ] , 323–325 [ Pgs. 323–325 include portions of Doc. 278 and Doc. 279 ] , 325 n [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 337–345 [ Pgs. 337–345 include portions of Doc. 283 , Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] , 439 [ Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362 ] , 502 [ Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406 ] , 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 547–548 [ Pgs. 547–548 include portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] , 554–556 [ Pgs. 554–556 include portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 588–590 [ Pgs. 588–590 include portions of Doc. 454 , Doc. 455 , and Doc. 456 ] , 594 [ Pg. 594 includes portions of Doc. 459 and Doc. 460 ] Setiadjit ( also Setyadjid), 977–978 [ Pgs. 977–978 include portions of Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , and Doc. 782 ] , 977 n [ Pg. 977 includes portions of Doc. 780 and Doc. 781 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1097 n [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Shabshin, A. I., 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Shang Chen, Lt. Gen., 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 288 n [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 547 [ Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432 ] Shaw, Patrick, 288 [ Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] Shtikov, Col. Gen. Terenty Fomich, 644 [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 644 n [ Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 491 , Doc. 492 , and Doc. 493 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 498 ] , 655–656 [ Pgs. 655–656 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 658–660 [ Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 505 ] , 662–663 [ Pgs. 662–663 include portions of Doc. 506 , Doc. 507 , and Doc. 508 ] , 668 [ Pg. 668 is part of Doc. 514 ] , 673–675 [ Pgs. 673–675 include portions of Doc. 515 , Doc. 516 , Doc. 517 , Doc. 518 , and Doc. 519 ] , 678–679 [ Pgs. 678–679 include portions of Doc. 521 , Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , and Doc. 524 ] , 679 n [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] , 684–689 [ Pgs. 684–689 include portions of Doc. 528 , Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , Doc. 531 , and Doc. 532 ] , 684 n [ Pg. 684 includes portions of Doc. 528 and Doc. 529 ] , 693–694 [ Pgs. 693–694 include portions of Doc. 535 and Doc. 536 ] , 697 [ Pg. 697 includes portions of Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540 ] , 707–708 [ Pgs. 707–708 include portions of Doc. 544 , Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 733 [ Pg. 733 includes portions of Doc. 553 and Doc. 554 ] , 737 [ Pg. 737 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559 ] , 744 [ Pg. 744 includes portions of Doc. 562 and Doc. 563 ] , 753 [ Pg. 753 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571 ] , 755–756 [ Pgs. 755–756 include portions of Doc. 573 , Doc. 574 , Doc. 575 , and Doc. 576 ] , 760 [ Pg. 760 includes portions of Doc. 577 , Doc. 578 , and Doc. 579 ] , 762 [ Pg. 762 includes portions of Doc. 580 and Doc. 581 ] 766–767 [ Pgs. 766–767 include portions of Doc. 584 , Doc. 585 , and Doc. 586 ] , 777 [ Pg. 777 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595 ] , 781–783 [ Pgs. 781–783 include portions of Doc. 597 , Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600 ] , 783 n [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 793 [ Pg. 793 is part of Doc. 610 ] , 815–817 [ Pgs. 815–817 include portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , Doc. 623 , and Doc. 624 ] , 823 [ Pg. 823 includes portions of Doc. 628 , Doc. 629 , and Doc. 630 ] , 835–837 [ Pgs. 835–837 include portions of Doc. 638 , Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , and Doc. 641 ] , 841–844 [ Pgs. 841–844 include portions of Doc. 643 , Doc. 644 , Doc. 645 , and Doc. 646 ] , 847 [ Pg. 847 includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Shwe Baw, U, 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 27–28 [ Pgs. 27–28 include portions of Doc. 29 and Doc. 30 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 32 [ Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 34 and Doc. 35 ] , 34 [ Pg. 34 includes portions of Doc. 37 and Doc. 38 ] , 41–42 [ Pgs. 41–42 include portions of Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 389 [ Pg. 389 includes portions of Doc. 324 and Doc. 325 ] Siam, 56–57 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 350 [ Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 915 [ Pg. 915 is part of Doc. 717 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 1127 [ Pg. 1127 is part of Siam ] Burma, 8–9 [ Pg. 8 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] French Indo-China: Attitude toward, 65 [ Pg. 65 is part of Doc. 74 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] ; boundary dispute, 63 [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 72 ] , 63 n [ Pg. 63 is part of Doc. 72 ] Japan, 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] Tin, 1946 agreement regarding export of, 901–902 [ Pgs. 901–902 include portions of Doc. 702 and Doc. 703 ] United States, exchange of Ambassadors with, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 1127 [ Pg. 1127 is part of Siam ] Siberia, Japanese repatriates in, 340–342 [ Pg. 340 is part of Doc. 285 ] Singapore, 70 [ Pg. 70 includes portions of Doc. 80 and Doc. 81 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] Sino-Japanese War, 1895 , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 611 and Doc. 612 ] Sjahrir, Sutan ( also Soetan), 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 144 n [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] , 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 891 n [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 896 [ Pg. 896 includes portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 899 [ Pg. 899 includes portions of Doc. 700 and Doc. 701 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 912 n [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 916 [ Pg. 916 is part of Doc. 718 ] , 919 [ Pg. 919 includes portions of Doc. 721 and Doc. 722 ] , 922 [ Pg. 922 includes portions of Doc. 725 , Doc. 726 , and Doc. 727 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , and Doc. 730 ] , 929–933 [ Pgs. 929–933 include portions of Doc. 730 , Doc. 731 , Doc. 732 , Doc. 733 , Doc. 734 , and Doc. 735 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 739 ] , 952–959 [ Pgs. 952–959 include portions of Doc. 752 , Doc. 753 , Doc. 754 , Doc. 755 , Doc. 756 , Doc. 757 , Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , Doc. 760 , and Doc. 761 ] , 961–964 [ Pgs. 961–964 include portions of Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , and Doc. 766 ] , 962 n [ Pg. 962 includes portions of Doc. 763 and Doc. 764 ] , 966–967 [ Pgs. 966–967 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , and Doc. 768 ] , 969 [ Pg. 969 is part of Doc. 769 ] , 979–980 [ Pgs. 979–980 include portions of Doc. 782 and Doc. 783 ] , 990–991 [ Pgs. 990–991 include portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] , 1012 n [ Pg. 1012 includes portions of Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1019 [ Pg. 1019 includes portions of Doc. 819 and Doc. 820 ] , 1021–1023 [ Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of Doc. 821 , Doc. 822 , Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , and Doc. 825 ] , 1036–1037 [ Pgs. 1036–1037 include portions of Doc. 835 , Doc. 836 , Doc. 837 , and Doc. 838 ] , 1044 [ Pg. 1044 includes portions of Doc. 844 and Doc. 845 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1068 [ Pg. 1068 includes portions of Doc. 863 and Doc. 864 ] Sjarifoeddin ( also Sjarifuddin), 894–895 [ Pgs. 894–895 include portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 894 n [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 937 [ Pg. 937 is part of Doc. 739 ] , 970 [ Pg. 970 includes portions of Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , and Doc. 772 ] , 976–980 [ Pgs. 976–980 include portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1016–1018 [ Pgs. 1016–1018 include portions of Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , and Doc. 819 ] , 1022–1023 [ Pgs. 1022–1023 include portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , and Doc. 825 ] , 1065 [ Pg. 1065 includes portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1082–1083 [ Pgs. 1082–1083 include portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1087–1088 [ Pgs. 1087–1088 include portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] , 1096–1097 [ Pgs. 1096–1097 include portions of Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , and Doc. 887 ] Smith, F. W. H., 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 1 n [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Smith, Rufus Burr, 350–351 [ Pgs. 350–351 include portions of Doc. 290 and Doc. 291 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 400 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 400 n [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 428 [ Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 354 and Doc. 355 ] , 442 n [ Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 363 and Doc. 364 ] Smith, W. Bedell, 286 [ Pg. 286 is part of Doc. 260 ] , 458 [ Pg. 458 is part of Doc. 374 ] , 465–466 [ Pgs. 465–466 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381 ] , 465 n [ Pg. 465 is part of Doc. 379 ] , 469–470 [ Pgs. 469–470 include portions of Doc. 382 , Doc. 383 , and Doc. 384 ] , 473–474 [ Pgs. 473–474 include portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] , 624 [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 624 n [ Pg. 624 is part of Doc. 477 ] , 775–776 [ Pgs. 775–776 include portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593 ] , 821–822 [ Pgs. 821–822 include portions of Doc. 626 , Doc. 627 , and Doc. 628 ] Snow, Conrad E., 214–216 [ Pgs. 214–216 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 400–402 [ Pgs. 400–402 include portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] Snyder, John W., 1107 [ Pg. 1107 is part of Doc. 894 ] , 1114 [ Pg. 1114 includes portions of Doc. 900 and Doc. 901 ] Soedirman, Gen., 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 891 n [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 895 [ Pg. 895 is part of Doc. 696 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 768 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 includes portions of Doc. 781 and Doc. 782 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 989 [ Pg. 989 includes portions of Doc. 790 and Doc. 791 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] Soekarno (Sukarno), 891 [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 891 n [ Pg. 891 includes portions of Doc. 691 and Doc. 692 ] , 893–895 [ Pgs. 893–895 include portions of Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] , 898 [ Pg. 898 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 932 [ Pg. 932 includes portions of Doc. 733 and Doc. 734 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 937–938 [ Pgs. 937–938 include portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] , 958 [ Pg. 958 includes portions of Doc. 759 and Doc. 760 ] , 961 [ Pg. 961 includes portions of Doc. 762 and Doc. 763 ] , 964–969 [ Pgs. 964–969 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , and Doc. 769 ] , 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 includes portions of Doc. 781 and Doc. 782 ] , 990 [ Pg. 990 includes portions of Doc. 791 and Doc. 792 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1016–1017 [ Pgs. 1016–1017 include portions of Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , and Doc. 818 ] , 1022–1025 [ Pgs. 1022–1025 include portions of Doc. 823 , Doc. 824 , Doc. 825 , Doc. 826 , Doc. 827 , and Doc. 828 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1049 [ Pg. 1049 is part of Doc. 848 ] , 1065–1066 [ Pgs. 1065–1066 include portions of Doc. 860 and Doc. 861 ] , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Soekawati, 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 968 [ Pg. 968 is part of Doc. 768 ] Soetomo (Sutomo), Gen., 952 [ Pg. 952 includes portions of Doc. 752 and Doc. 753 ] , 978 [ Pg. 978 includes portions of Doc. 781 and Doc. 782 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] , 1005 [ Pg. 1005 is part of Doc. 806 ] , 1088 [ Pg. 1088 includes portions of Doc. 880 and Doc. 881 ] So Nyun, U, 35 [ Pg. 35 includes portions of Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , and Doc. 40 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 39 [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 39 n [ Pg. 39 includes portions of Doc. 42 and Doc. 43 ] , 42 [ Pg. 42 includes portions of Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 46 n [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 53 ] Southeast Asia Federation, 22 [ Pg. 22 includes portions of Doc. 24 , Doc. 25 , and Doc. 26 ] , 27 [ Pg. 27 is part of Doc. 29 ] , 56 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] , 103 [ Pg. 103 includes portions of Doc. 120 and Doc. 121 ] , 110 [ Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 125 and Doc. 126 ] , 1073 [ Pg. 1073 is part of Doc. 867 ] Soviet Union, 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 463 [ Pg. 463 includes portions of Doc. 377 and Doc. 378 ] , 479–480 [ Pgs. 479–480 include portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 553–554 [ Pgs. 553–554 include portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 881 [ Pg. 881 is part of Doc. 684 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 807 ] Burma, 44 [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] China, policy toward, 528 [ Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 422 and Doc. 423 ] , 573 [ Pg. 573 is part of Doc. 442 ] , 595 [ Pg. 595 includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461 ] Constitution, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] Far East, Soviet objectives in, 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] , 594–595 [ Pgs. 594–595 include portions of Doc. 459 , Doc. 460 , and Doc. 461 ] French Indo-China, Soviet connection with, 136–137 [ Pgs. 136–137 include portions of Doc. 148 , Doc. 149 , and Doc. 150 ] , 141 [ Pg. 141 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154 ] India, Soviet objectives in, 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] , 583 [ Pg. 583 includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450 ] Japan. See under Japan . Korea. See under Korea . Mongolian People’s Republic, Soviet control over, 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 601 ] Netherlands East Indies. See under Netherlands East Indies . Satellites: Balkan satellites, organization of, 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] ; infiltration devices used in, 784 [ Pg. 784 is part of Doc. 601 ] Satellite treaties, 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 478 [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 392 ] Siberian maritime province, 604 [ Pg. 604 is part of Doc. 466 ] Spoor, Gen. S. H., 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 971 n [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 984–985 [ Pgs. 984–985 include portions of Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , and Doc. 788 ] Staggers, John W., 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 692 n [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 568 ] Stalin, Generalissimo Iosif Vissarionovich, 211 [ Pg. 211 is part of Doc. 210 ] , 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 622 [ Pg. 622 is part of Doc. 476 ] , 685 [ Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 529 and Doc. 530 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] Stanton, Edwin F., 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] , 56–58 [ Pgs. 56–58 include portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] , 87–88 [ Pgs. 87–88 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 102–103 [ Pgs. 102–103 include portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , and Doc. 126 ] , 129–130 [ Pgs. 129–130 include portions of Doc. 139 , Doc. 140 , and Doc. 141 ] , 1127 [ Pg. 1127 is part of Siam ] Stevens, Francis B., 784–785 [ Pgs. 784–785 include portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602 ] Stirling, Alfred, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 247 [ Pg. 247 includes portions of Doc. 235 and Doc. 236 ] , 392 [ Pg. 392 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328 ] , 449–450 [ Pgs. 449–450 include portions of Doc. 368 and Doc. 369 ] , 466–467 [ Pgs. 466–467 include portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , Doc. 381 , and Doc. 382 ] , 903–904 [ Pgs. 903–904 include portions of Doc. 703 , Doc. 704 , and Doc. 705 ] , 997 [ Pg. 997 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 1013 [ Pg. 1013 includes portions of Doc. 813 , Doc. 814 , and Doc. 815 ] , 1015 [ Pg. 1015 includes portions of Doc. 815 and Doc. 816 ] Strike, Clifford S., 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 201 ] , 303 [ Pg. 303 is part of Doc. 268 ] , 382 [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 385–387 [ Pgs. 385–387 include portions of Doc. 320 , Doc. 321 , and Doc. 322 ] , 391 [ Pg. 391 is part of Doc. 327 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 415 [ Pg. 415 is part of Doc. 346 ] Stuart, John Leighton, 66 [ Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 75 and Doc. 76 ] , 98–99 [ Pgs. 98–99 include portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] , 143–144 [ Pgs. 143–144 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 564–565 [ Pgs. 564–565 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 573–574 [ Pgs. 573–574 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 584–587 [ Pgs. 584–587 include portions of Doc. 450 , Doc. 451 , Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , and Doc. 454 ] , 631–632 [ Pgs. 631–632 include portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , and Doc. 483 ] Suphanavan, Prince, 56–57 [ Pg. 56 is part of Doc. 65 ] Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan (SCAP). See under Japan. Switzerland, 208–209 [ Pgs. 208–209 include portions of Doc. 208 and Doc. 209 ] , 257 n [ Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 244 and Doc. 245 ] , 306 [ Pg. 306 includes portions of Doc. 270 and Doc. 271 ] , 437 [ Pg. 437 includes portions of Doc. 359 and Doc. 360 ] Syria, 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 795 ] Tamzil, Mohammed, 971 [ Pg. 971 includes portions of Doc. 772 and Doc. 773 ] , 975 [ Pg. 975 includes portions of Doc. 777 and Doc. 778 ] , 1016–1018 [ Pgs. 1016–1018 include portions of Doc. 816 , Doc. 817 , Doc. 818 , and Doc. 819 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1036 [ Pg. 1036 includes portions of Doc. 835 and Doc. 836 ] , 1090 [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] , 1090 n [ Pg. 1090 includes portions of Doc. 882 and Doc. 883 ] Tarassenko, Vassili A., 580 [ Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 447 and Doc. 448 ] Teheran Declaration, Dec. 1, 1943 , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 392 ] Thach, Pham Ngoc, 87–88 [ Pgs. 87–88 include portions of Doc. 103 , Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 88 n [ Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , and Doc. 106 ] , 92–93 [ Pgs. 92–93 include portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] , 109–110 [ Pgs. 109–110 include portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , and Doc. 126 ] Thakin Mya, 11 [ Pg. 11 includes portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , and Doc. 11 ] , 29 n [ Pg. 29 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32 ] , 36 n [ Pg. 36 includes portions of Doc. 40 and Doc. 41 ] Thakin Nu, 33–42 [ Pgs. 33–42 include portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , Doc. 38 , Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , Doc. 43 , Doc. 44 , Doc. 45 , Doc. 46 , Doc. 47 , and Doc. 48 ] , 37 n [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] , 38 n [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 40 n [ Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45 ] 44 n [ Pg. 44 includes portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , and Doc. 52 ] , 44–47 [ Pgs. 44–47 include portions of Doc. 50 , Doc. 51 , Doc. 52 , Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] Thakin Soe, 16 n [ Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 37 [ Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 41 and Doc. 42 ] Thamboe, C., 1037 [ Pg. 1037 includes portions of Doc. 837 and Doc. 838 ] , 1059 [ Pg. 1059 includes portions of Doc. 855 and Doc. 856 ] Than, Nguyen Hai, 144 [ Pg. 144 includes portions of Doc. 157 and Doc. 158 ] Than-Tun, 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 19 [ Pg. 19 includes portions of Doc. 18 , Doc. 19 , and Doc. 20 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 46 [ Pg. 46 is part of Doc. 53 ] Thein Pe, 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 18 [ Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18 ] Thompson, Geoffrey H., 130 [ Pg. 130 is part of Doc. 141 ] Thompson, Llewellyn E., 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] Thorp, Willard L., 184 [ Pg. 184 includes portions of Doc. 187 and Doc. 188 ] , 459 n [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 537 n [ Pg. 537 is part of Doc. 429 ] Tin Tut, U, 1 [ Pg. 1 is part of Doc. 1 ] , 11–13 [ Pgs. 11–13 include portions of Doc. 9 , Doc. 10 , Doc. 11 , and Doc. 12 ] , 15 [ Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 14 and Doc. 15 ] , 30 [ Pg. 30 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34 ] , 33–34 [ Pgs. 33–34 include portions of Doc. 36 , Doc. 37 , and Doc. 38 ] , 38 [ Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 42 ] , 47 [ Pg. 47 includes portions of Doc. 53 , Doc. 54 , and Doc. 55 ] , 48 n [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Tounkin, Gregori Ivanovich, 645 n [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 498 ] , 656–657 [ Pgs. 656–657 include portions of Doc. 503 and Doc. 504 ] , 679 [ Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 523 and Doc. 524 ] , 681 [ Pg. 681 is part of Doc. 526 ] , 687 [ Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 530 and Doc. 531 ] , 807 [ Pg. 807 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614 ] , 855 [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] Treaties, conventions, and agreements ( see also Agreements under individual countries ): Anglo-Burmese treaty, Oct. 17 , 45–46 [ Pgs. 45–46 include portions of Doc. 52 and Doc. 53 ] Berlin (Potsdam) Protocol ( 1945 ), 479 [ Pg. 479 includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 481–482 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 490 [ Pg. 490 is part of Doc. 397 ] , 510 [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 510 n [ Pg. 510 is part of Doc. 411 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 546 [ Pg. 546 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] , 596 [ Pg. 596 is part of Doc. 462 ] Cheriban Agreement. See Netherlands East Indies : Linggadjati Agreement. Den Pasar Agreement ( 1946 ), 890–891 [ Pgs. 890–891 include portions of Doc. 690 , Doc. 691 , and Doc. 692 ] Egyptian-Indonesian treaty of friendship ( 1947 ), 1000 [ Pg. 1000 includes portions of Doc. 799 and Doc. 800 ] Franco-Vietnamese accords of Mar. 6 and Apr. 3, 1946 , 71 [ Pg. 71 includes portions of Doc. 81 and Doc. 82 ] , 80 [ Pg. 80 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94 ] , 91 [ Pg. 91 is part of Doc. 109 ] , 134 n [ Pg. 134 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146 ] , 137 [ Pg. 137 includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150 ] General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1123 [ Pg. 1123 is part of Doc. 907 ] Hague Convention ( 1907 ), 501 [ Pg. 501 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 1094 [ Pg. 1094 includes portions of Doc. 884 and Doc. 885 ] International whaling agreements, 206–207 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 426 ] ; Whaling Convention, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 222–223 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] Japanese fleet, agreement on disposition of ( 1945 ), 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Linggadjati Agreement. See under Netherlands East Indies . Moscow Agreement ( 1945 ): Japan, 214–216 [ Pgs. 214–216 include portions of Doc. 211 and Doc. 212 ] , 325 [ Pg. 325 is part of Doc. 279 ] , 346 n [ Pg. 346 includes portions of Doc. 288 and Doc. 289 ] , 371 [ Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 308 and Doc. 309 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] , 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 500 [ Pg. 500 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 511 n [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 448 ] , 588 [ Pg. 588 includes portions of Doc. 454 and Doc. 455 ] Korea. See under Korea . Potsdam Protocol. See Berlin Protocol, supra . Repatriation of Japanese and Koreans ( 1946 ), 171 [ Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 176 , Doc. 177 , and Doc. 178 ] Siam, agreement regarding export of tin ( 1946 ), 901–902 [ Pgs. 901–902 include portions of Doc. 702 and Doc. 703 ] Sino-Soviet Treaty ( 1945 ), 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 520 [ Pg. 520 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 528–530 [ Pgs. 528–530 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , and Doc. 424 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 550–551 [ Pgs. 550–551 include portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 566 [ Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439 ] , 570 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 573–574 [ Pgs. 573–574 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 444 ] , 585 [ Pg. 585 is part of Doc. 451 ] Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Dorpat, 483 [ Pg. 483 is part of Doc. 392 ] Swiss-Japanese treaty of settlement ( 1911 ), 307 [ Pg. 307 includes portions of Doc. 271 , Doc. 272 , and Doc. 273 ] Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ( 1918 ), 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 498 n [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 405 ] Treaty of Versailles ( 1919 ), 498 [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 498 n [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 405 ] U.S.–Japan, convention regarding publication ( 1905 ), 508–509 [ Pgs. 508–509 include portions of Doc. 410 and Doc. 411 ] U.S.–Korea, treaty of 1882 , 796–797 [ Pgs. 796–797 include portions of Doc. 611 and Doc. 612 ] U.S.–Philippines, trade agreement ( 1946 ), 1112–1114 [ Pgs. 1112–1114 include portions of Doc. 897 , Doc. 898 , Doc. 899 , Doc. 900 , and Doc. 901 ] , 1125–1126 [ Pgs. 1125–1126 include portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] U.S.–U.K.–U.S.S.R.–China, agreement on disposition of certain Japanese naval vessels ( 1945 ), 388 [ Pg. 388 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323 ] , 393 [ Pg. 393 includes portions of Doc. 328 and Doc. 329 ] , 408 [ Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 340 and Doc. 341 ] Whaling Convention, 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 222–223 [ Pg. 222 is part of Doc. 216 ] , 245–246 [ Pgs. 245–246 include portions of Doc. 233 and Doc. 234 ] ; international whaling agreements, 206–207 [ Pg. 206 is part of Doc. 207 ] , 213 [ Pg. 213 is part of Doc. 211 ] , 218–219 [ Pg. 218 is part of Doc. 214 ] , 221 [ Pg. 221 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 534 [ Pg. 534 is part of Doc. 426 ] Yalta Agreement ( 1945 ), 487 [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 490–492 [ Pgs. 490–492 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 422 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 573–574 [ Pgs. 573–574 include portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443 ] , 581 [ Pg. 581 is part of Doc. 448 ] Truman, Harry S.: Burma, 23 n [ Pg. 23 includes portions of Doc. 26 and Doc. 27 ] , 23–24 [ Pgs. 23–24 include portions of Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , and Doc. 28 ] , 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] Conversation with Herbert V. Evatt, 536 [ Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 543–544 [ Pgs. 543–544 include portions of Doc. 429 , Doc. 430 , and Doc. 431 ] Correspondence with: George Atcheson, Jr., 157–160 [ Pgs. 157–160 include portions of Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , and Doc. 169 ] ; Kimm Kiusic, 511 [ Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412 ] , 516 [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] ; W. L. MacKenzie King, 880–881 [ Pgs. 880–881 include portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 689 ] ; Syngman Rhee, 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 620 n [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] ; Manuel A. Roxas, President of the Philippines, 1114–1115 [ Pgs. 1114–1115 include portions of Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] ; Sao Shwe Thaike, Saopha of Yawnghwe, President of the Union of Burma, 49 [ Pg. 49 includes portions of Doc. 55 , Doc. 56 , and Doc. 57 ] ; Vietnam National Union Front, 142–143 [ Pgs. 142–143 include portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , and Doc. 157 ] Council of Foreign Ministers, 481 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 392 ] Greece and Turkey, message to Congress, Mar. 12 , regarding aid to, 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] Japan: Japanese islands, 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] ; Japanese surrender, 215 [ Pg. 215 is part of Doc. 212 ] ; occupation and control of , 157 [ Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 167 and Doc. 168 ] , 160 [ Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 168 and Doc. 169 ] , 200 [ Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 200 and Doc. 201 ] , 231 [ Pg. 231 is part of Doc. 223 ] ; Peace Conference, 543 [ Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 429 and Doc. 430 ] ; Peace treaty, 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] ; statement of policy on Japan, Aug. 29, 1945 , 320 [ Pg. 320 is part of Doc. 278 ] ; war claims and reparations, 352 n [ Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 292 and Doc. 293 ] , 355 [ Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 295 , Doc. 296 , and Doc. 297 ] , 380–381 [ Pgs. 380–381 include portions of Doc. 315 , Doc. 316 , and Doc. 317 ] , 402 [ Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] Korea, 599 [ Pg. 599 is part of Doc. 463 ] , 603 [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 617–618 [ Pgs. 617–618 include portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 620 [ Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 473 , Doc. 474 , and Doc. 475 ] , 710 [ Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 747 [ Pg. 747 includes portions of Doc. 565 and Doc. 566 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 611 and Doc. 612 ] , 796 n [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 611 and Doc. 612 ] , 839 [ Pg. 839 includes portions of Doc. 642 and Doc. 643 ] , 841 [ Pg. 841 includes portions of Doc. 643 and Doc. 644 ] , 883 [ Pg. 883 includes portions of Doc. 684 and Doc. 685 ] , 885–886 [ Pgs. 885–886 include portions of Doc. 685 and Doc. 686 ] , 889 [ Pg. 889 is part of Doc. 689 ] Netherlands East Indies, 948 [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] , 950 n [ Pg. 950 includes portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , and Doc. 751 ] , 996 n [ Pg. 996 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 996–997 [ Pgs. 996–997 include portions of Doc. 795 , Doc. 796 , Doc. 797 , and Doc. 798 ] , 997 n [ Pg. 997 includes portions of Doc. 797 and Doc. 798 ] , 1002 [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1047 n [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] Philippines, 1102–1103 [ Pgs. 1102–1103 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , and Doc. 892 ] , 1105 [ Pg. 1105 includes portions of Doc. 892 and Doc. 893 ] , 1107–1108 [ Pgs. 1107–1108 include portions of Doc. 894 and Doc. 895 ] , 1114 n [ Pg. 1114 includes portions of Doc. 900 and Doc. 901 ] , 1114–1115 [ Pgs. 1114–1115 include portions of Doc. 900 , Doc. 901 , and Doc. 902 ] , 1115 n [ Pg. 1115 includes portions of Doc. 901 and Doc. 902 ] , 1120–1121 [ Pgs. 1120–1121 include portions of Doc. 904 , Doc. 905 , and Doc. 906 ] , 1125 n [ Pg. 1125 includes portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] , 1125–1126 [ Pgs. 1125–1126 include portions of Doc. 908 and Doc. 909 ] Siam, 1127 [ Pg. 1127 is part of Siam ] Trusteeship. See under United Nations . Tsarapkin, Semem Konstantinovich, 198 [ Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199 ] , 308 [ Pg. 308 includes portions of Doc. 273 and Doc. 274 ] , 487 n [ Pg. 487 includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395 ] , 487–488 [ Pgs. 487–488 include portions of Doc. 394 , Doc. 395 , and Doc. 396 ] , 488 n [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 491–492 [ Pgs. 491–492 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] , 779 n [ Pg. 779 includes portions of Doc. 596 and Doc. 597 ] Tsiang Chia-tung, 998–1000 [ Pgs. 998–1000 include portions of Doc. 798 , Doc. 799 , and Doc. 800 ] Tsui, Tswen-ling, 51–52 [ Pgs. 51–52 include portions of Doc. 58 , Doc. 59 , and Doc. 60 ] Tsuru, Shigeto, 344–345 [ Pgs. 344–345 include portions of Doc. 286 , Doc. 287 , and Doc. 288 ] Tu Ve, 64 [ Pg. 64 includes portions of Doc. 73 and Doc. 74 ] , 90 [ Pg. 90 is part of Doc. 108 ] , 126 [ Pg. 126 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136 ] Tydings, Senator Millard E., 1121 [ Pg. 1121 includes portions of Doc. 905 and Doc. 906 ] , 1121 n [ Pg. 1121 includes portions of Doc. 905 and Doc. 906 ] Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 850 [ Pg. 850 includes portions of Doc. 651 and Doc. 652 ] , 854 [ Pg. 854 includes portions of Doc. 655 and Doc. 656 ] , 858 [ Pg. 858 is part of Doc. 660 ] , 873 [ Pg. 873 includes portions of Doc. 675 and Doc. 676 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 685 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 789 ] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See Soviet Union. United Kingdom, 68 [ Pg. 68 is part of Doc. 78 ] , 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] , 479–480 [ Pgs. 479–480 include portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392 ] , 484 [ Pg. 484 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 491 [ Pg. 491 includes portions of Doc. 397 and Doc. 398 ] , 572 [ Pg. 572 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] Japan. See under Japan : Occupation and control ; Peace conference ; Peace treaty ; and War claims and reparations : Country attitudes and interests . Netherlands East Indies. See under Netherlands East Indies . United Nations, 233 [ Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224 ] , 276 [ Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255 ] , 317 [ Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 276 and Doc. 277 ] , 455–456 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 419 ] , 564 [ Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436 ] , 720 [ Pg. 720 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 807 ] Atomic energy, U.N. decisions regarding research and development of, 176 [ Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 181 and Doc. 182 ] Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 327 [ Pg. 327 is part of Doc. 280 ] , 1007 [ Pg. 1007 is part of Doc. 807 ] General Assembly: General Assembly session, 471 [ Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 384 and Doc. 385 ] , 474 [ Pg. 474 includes portions of Doc. 387 and Doc. 388 ] , 497 [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 497 n [ Pg. 497 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404 ] , 505–506 [ Pgs. 505–506 include portions of Doc. 408 , Doc. 409 , and Doc. 410 ] , 506 n [ Pg. 506 includes portions of Doc. 409 and Doc. 410 ] , 517–518 [ Pgs. 517–518 include portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 517 n [ Pg. 517 is part of Doc. 417 ] , 532 [ Pg. 532 includes portions of Doc. 425 and Doc. 426 ] , 552 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] Korean question. See Korea : United Nations General Assembly . Warmongering resolution, 552–554 [ Pgs. 552–554 include portions of Doc. 433 and Doc. 434 ] , 553 n [ Pg. 553 is part of Doc. 433 ] Japan: Membership, question of, 476 [ Pg. 476 includes portions of Doc. 389 and Doc. 390 ] , 503 [ Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] ; U.N. role in post-peace-treaty period, 455–456 [ Pg. 455 is part of Doc. 372 ] , 459–461 [ Pgs. 459–461 include portions of Doc. 375 and Doc. 376 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 513 [ Pg. 513 is part of Doc. 413 ] Korea. See Korea : United Nations . Secretary General ( see also Trygve Lie ), 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 609 ] , 795 [ Pg. 795 is part of Doc. 611 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 820–821 [ Pgs. 820–821 include portions of Doc. 626 and Doc. 627 ] , 836 n [ Pg. 836 includes portions of Doc. 639 and Doc. 640 ] , 836–837 [ Pgs. 836–837 include portions of Doc. 639 , Doc. 640 , and Doc. 641 ] , 837 n [ Pg. 837 includes portions of Doc. 640 and Doc. 641 ] , 857 n [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] , 872–874 [ Pgs. 872–874 include portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676 ] , 884 [ Pg. 884 is part of Doc. 685 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 986 [ Pg. 986 is part of Doc. 789 ] , 995 [ Pg. 995 is part of Doc. 795 ] , 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] , 1025 [ Pg. 1025 includes portions of Doc. 827 and Doc. 828 ] , 1047 [ Pg. 1047 is part of Doc. 847 ] , 1058–1059 [ Pgs. 1058–1059 include portions of Doc. 854 , Doc. 855 , and Doc. 856 ] Security Council, 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 69 n [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 481–482 [ Pg. 481 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 482 n [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 392 ] , 576 [ Pg. 576 is part of Doc. 444 ] Greek problem, 1010 [ Pg. 1010 includes portions of Doc. 809 and Doc. 810 ] Indonesian question. See under Netherlands East Indies : United Nations : Security Council . “Parties to a dispute,” 1020–1021 [ Pgs. 1020–1021 include portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] Trusteeship by United States over former Japanese islands, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 495 n [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] , 533 [ Pg. 533 is part of Doc. 426 ] , 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] Veto, Russian abuse of, 521 [ Pg. 521 is part of Doc. 419 ] United Nations Charter, 475 [ Pg. 475 includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389 ] , 734 [ Pg. 734 includes portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556 ] , 739 [ Pg. 739 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 742 [ Pg. 742 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] , 1032 [ Pg. 1032 includes portions of Doc. 831 and Doc. 832 ] , 1034 [ Pg. 1034 includes portions of Doc. 833 and Doc. 834 ] , 1040–1041 [ Pgs. 1040–1041 include portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] , 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 853 ] Articles: Art. 10 , 756 [ Pg. 756 includes portions of Doc. 575 and Doc. 576 ] ; Art. 24 , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 829 ] ; Art. 31 , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] ; Art. 32 , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 is part of Doc. 821 ] , 1026 [ Pg. 1026 includes portions of Doc. 828 and Doc. 829 ] ; Art. 33 , 993 [ Pg. 993 is part of Doc. 794 ] , 997–998 [ Pgs. 997–998 include portions of Doc. 797 , Doc. 798 , and Doc. 799 ] ; Art. 34 , 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 998 n [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] ; Art. 39 , 998 [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] , 998 n [ Pg. 998 includes portions of Doc. 798 and Doc. 799 ] ; Art. 40 , 1020 [ Pg. 1020 is part of Doc. 821 ] , 1027 [ Pg. 1027 is part of Doc. 829 ] , 1040 [ Pg. 1040 includes portions of Doc. 840 and Doc. 841 ] Chapters: II, 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] ; VI, 69 [ Pg. 69 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80 ] , 992–993 [ Pgs. 992–993 include portions of Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , and Doc. 794 ] ; VII, 992 [ Pg. 992 includes portions of Doc. 792 and Doc. 793 ] , 1001 [ Pg. 1001 includes portions of Doc. 800 and Doc. 801 ] ; XI, 68–69 [ Pgs. 68–69 include portions of Doc. 78 , Doc. 79 , and Doc. 80 ] United Nations Committee for International Bill of Rights, 226 [ Pg. 226 is part of Doc. 219 ] , 254 [ Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 240 and Doc. 241 ] United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 281 [ Pg. 281 is part of Doc. 257 ] United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE): Japanese relationship to, 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 308–311 [ Pgs. 308–311 include portions of Doc. 273 , Doc. 274 , and Doc. 275 ] , 309 n [ Pg. 309 is part of Doc. 274 ] , 865 [ Pg. 865 includes portions of Doc. 666 and Doc. 667 ] ; Korean relationship to, 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 667 n [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 864–865 [ Pgs. 864–865 include portions of Doc. 665 , Doc. 666 , and Doc. 667 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 1076 [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] , 1076 n [ Pg. 1076 is part of Doc. 870 ] United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] United States: Advisory Committee on Occupied Areas Affairs (OAC), 266 [ Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249 ] , 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] Budget Bureau, 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] Burma, relations with. See under Burma . Commander-in-Chief, Army Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC), 190 [ Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 190 and Doc. 191 ] , 598 [ Pg. 598 includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463 ] Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE), 241 [ Pg. 241 is part of Doc. 230 ] , 264 [ Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 247 ] , 618 [ Pg. 618 includes portions of Doc. 471 and Doc. 472 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 852 [ Pg. 852 is part of Doc. 654 ] Commander-in-Chief, Southeast Asia, 193 [ Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 193 ] Commodity Credit Corporation, (CCC), 277 [ Pg. 277 is part of Doc. 255 ] Congress: Fulbright Act, 1946 , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Japan, 136 [ Pg. 136 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149 ] , 245 [ Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 233 ] , 313–314 [ Pgs. 313–314 include portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276 ] , 373 [ Pg. 373 is part of Doc. 311 ] , 401–402 [ Pgs. 401–402 include portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335 ] , 453 [ Pg. 453 is part of Doc. 371 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] , 498 n [ Pg. 498 is part of Doc. 405 ] , 559 [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 561 [ Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 435 ] Korea, 602 [ Pg. 602 is part of Doc. 465 ] , 609–610 [ Pg. 609 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 616–619 [ Pgs. 616–619 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 627 [ Pg. 627 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 630 n [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 706 [ Pg. 706 is part of Doc. 544 ] , 715 [ Pg. 715 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 740–741 [ Pg. 740 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 743 [ Pg. 743 is part of Doc. 561 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 783 [ Pg. 783 includes portions of Doc. 599 and Doc. 600 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] Maritime and Fisheries Committee, 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] Philippines, 1104–1106 [ Pgs. 1104–1106 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1108 [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 895 ] , 1117–1118 [ Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 904 ] , 1121 n [ Pg. 1121 includes portions of Doc. 905 and Doc. 906 ] , 1122–1123 [ Pgs. 1122–1123 include portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] Senate ratification of satellite peace treaties, 470 [ Pg. 470 includes portions of Doc. 383 and Doc. 384 ] Sugar Act of 1937 , 1110–1111 [ Pgs. 1110–1111 include portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] Constitution, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 401 [ Pg. 401 is part of Doc. 334 ] Department of Agriculture, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 263 ] Department of the Army. See under United States under Japan and Korea . Department of Commerce, 258 [ Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 245 ] , 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 263 ] , 364–365 [ Pgs. 364–365 include portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305 ] , 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 711–712 [ Pgs. 711–712 include portions of Doc. 549 and Doc. 550 ] Department of Labor, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 263 ] Educational exchange agreements, 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Export-Import Bank: Japan, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 188 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 728 ] , 933–934 [ Pgs. 933–934 include portions of Doc. 734 , Doc. 735 , and Doc. 736 ] ; Philippines, 1124 [ Pg. 1124 includes portions of Doc. 907 and Doc. 908 ] Foreign Funds Control, 166–167 [ Pgs. 166–167 include portions of Doc. 173 , Doc. 174 , and Doc. 175 ] Foreign Liquidation Commission, 727 [ Pg. 727 is part of Doc. 552 ] , 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] , 789 [ Pg. 789 includes portions of Doc. 606 and Doc. 607 ] French Indo-China. See French Indo-China : United States . Fulbright Act, 1946 , 14 [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 14 n [ Pg. 14 includes portions of Doc. 12 and Doc. 13 ] , 48 [ Pg. 48 is part of Doc. 55 ] Greek and Turkish Aid Progran, 265 [ Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248 ] Japan. See Japan : United States . Joint Chiefs of Staff. See under United States under Japan and Korea . Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 495 [ Pg. 495 is part of Doc. 402 ] Korea, relations with. See Korea : United States . Lend-Lease, 13 n [ Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 11 and Doc. 12 ] , 13–14 [ Pgs. 13–14 include portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13 ] , 53 [ Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 60 and Doc. 61 ] Mongolian People’s Republic, non-recognition of, 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] National Advisory Council (NAC) on International Monetary and Financial Problems, 1102–1107 [ Pgs. 1102–1107 include portions of Doc. 890 , Doc. 891 , Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1110 [ Pg. 1110 is part of Doc. 896 ] , 1114 [ Pg. 1114 includes portions of Doc. 900 and Doc. 901 ] National Maritime Union, 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 706 ] Navy Department. See under United States under Japan and Korea . Netherlands, U.S. representations regarding N.E.I., export-import regulations and S.S. Martin Behrman case. See Netherlands East Indies : Trade . Netherlands East Indies. See under Netherlands East Indies : United States . Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner (OFLC), 407 [ Pg. 407 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340 ] Office of Military Government for Germany, 201 [ Pg. 201 is part of Doc. 201 ] Philippine Independence Act, 1108 [ Pg. 1108 is part of Doc. 895 ] , 1121 n [ Pg. 1121 includes portions of Doc. 905 and Doc. 906 ] Philippine Rehabilitation Act, 1122–1123 [ Pgs. 1122–1123 include portions of Doc. 906 and Doc. 907 ] Philippines, relations with. See under Philippines . Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC): Japan, 185 [ Pg. 185 is part of Doc. 188 ] , 291 [ Pg. 291 is part of Doc. 263 ] ; Philippine loan, 1102 [ Pg. 1102 includes portions of Doc. 890 and Doc. 891 ] , 1105–1107 [ Pgs. 1105–1107 include portions of Doc. 892 , Doc. 893 , and Doc. 894 ] , 1109–1111 [ Pgs. 1109–1111 include portions of Doc. 895 , Doc. 896 , and Doc. 897 ] , 1111 n [ Pg. 1111 includes portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] , 1124–1125 [ Pgs. 1124–1125 include portions of Doc. 907 , Doc. 908 , and Doc. 909 ] Republic of the Philippines Military Assistance Act, 1117 [ Pg. 1117 is part of Doc. 904 ] Siam, exchange of Ambassadors with, 9 [ Pg. 9 is part of Doc. 8 ] , 20 [ Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23 ] , 1127 [ Pg. 1127 is part of Siam ] Soviet Union, U.S. containment policy, 805 [ Pg. 805 is part of Doc. 613 ] State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee. See under United States under Japan and Korea . State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee: Japan. See under Japan : United States . Korea. See under Korea : United States . Philippines, 1116–1119 [ Pgs. 1116–1119 include portions of Doc. 902 , Doc. 903 , and Doc. 904 ] Sugar Act of 1937 , 1110–1111 [ Pgs. 1110–1111 include portions of Doc. 896 and Doc. 897 ] Three Secretaries, meeting of, 626 n [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 478 ] Treasury Department, 292 [ Pg. 292 is part of Doc. 263 ] United Nations General Assembly, U.S. referral of Korean problem to. See under Korea : United Nations General Assembly . U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK), 382 n [ Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 317 and Doc. 318 ] , 516 n [ Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416 ] , 752 [ Pg. 752 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570 ] U.S. Army Military Government (USAMGIK), 204 [ Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205 ] , 251 [ Pg. 251 includes portions of Doc. 237 and Doc. 238 ] , 400–401 [ Pg. 400 is part of Doc. 334 ] , 667 [ Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513 ] , 678 [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 678 n [ Pg. 678 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522 ] , 711–713 [ Pgs. 711–713 include portions of Doc. 549 , Doc. 550 , and Doc. 551 ] U.S. Commercial Company (USCC), 636 [ Pg. 636 includes portions of Doc. 484 and Doc. 485 ] , 663 [ Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 507 and Doc. 508 ] War Department ( see also under United States under Japan and Korea ), 614 [ Pg. 614 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 617 [ Pg. 617 is part of Doc. 471 ] , 626 [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 1103 [ Pg. 1103 includes portions of Doc. 891 and Doc. 892 ] War Production Board, 296 [ Pg. 296 is part of Doc. 265 ] Universal Postal Union Congress in Paris, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] Valluy, Gen. Jean, 86 n [ Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 102 and Doc. 103 ] , 93 [ Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 110 and Doc. 111 ] Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout, Carel Godfried W. H. Baron 900 n [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 701 and Doc. 702 ] , 900–901 [ Pgs. 900–901 include portions of Doc. 701 and Doc. 702 ] , 905–906 [ Pgs. 905–906 include portions of Doc. 705 and Doc. 706 ] , 951 [ Pg. 951 includes portions of Doc. 751 and Doc. 752 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 1004 [ Pg. 1004 includes portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] Van Hoogstraten, J. E., 918 [ Pg. 918 includes portions of Doc. 719 , Doc. 720 , and Doc. 721 ] , 927 [ Pg. 927 includes portions of Doc. 729 and Doc. 730 ] Van Kleffens, Eelco N., 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 706 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] , 986–987 [ Pgs. 986–987 include portions of Doc. 789 and Doc. 790 ] , 992–994 [ Pgs. 992–994 include portions of Doc. 792 , Doc. 793 , Doc. 794 , and Doc. 795 ] , 996 [ Pg. 996 includes portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1001–1004 [ Pgs. 1001–1004 include portions of Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , Doc. 802 , Doc. 803 , Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1006–1012 [ Pgs. 1006–1012 include portions of Doc. 806 , Doc. 807 , Doc. 808 , Doc. 809 , Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1021 [ Pg. 1021 includes portions of Doc. 821 and Doc. 822 ] , 1028 [ Pg. 1028 is part of Doc. 830 ] , 1035–1036 [ Pgs. 1035–1036 include portions of Doc. 834 , Doc. 835 , and Doc. 836 ] , 1039 [ Pg. 1039 includes portions of Doc. 838 , Doc. 839 , and Doc. 840 ] , 1043–1044 [ Pgs. 1043–1044 include portions of Doc. 843 , Doc. 844 , and Doc. 845 ] , 1048 n [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 847 and Doc. 848 ] , 1048–1050 [ Pgs. 1048–1050 include portions of Doc. 847 and Doc. 848 ] , 1058 [ Pg. 1058 includes portions of Doc. 854 and Doc. 855 ] Van Mook, Hubertus J., 890 [ Pg. 890 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691 ] , 892–894 [ Pgs. 892–894 include portions of Doc. 692 , Doc. 693 , Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696 ] , 907 [ Pg. 907 includes portions of Doc. 707 and Doc. 708 ] , 912 [ Pg. 912 includes portions of Doc. 713 and Doc. 714 ] , 924 [ Pg. 924 is part of Doc. 728 ] , 926–927 [ Pgs. 926–927 include portions of Doc. 728 , Doc. 729 , and Doc. 730 ] , 930 [ Pg. 930 is part of Doc. 732 ] , 933 [ Pg. 933 includes portions of Doc. 734 and Doc. 735 ] , 935 [ Pg. 935 includes portions of Doc. 736 and Doc. 737 ] , 938 [ Pg. 938 includes portions of Doc. 739 and Doc. 740 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 942 n [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 945–947 [ Pgs. 945–947 include portions of Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] , 957–958 [ Pgs. 957–958 include portions of Doc. 758 , Doc. 759 , and Doc. 760 ] , 960–963 [ Pgs. 960–963 include portions of Doc. 761 , Doc. 762 , Doc. 763 , Doc. 764 , Doc. 765 , and Doc. 766 ] , 966–973 [ Pgs. 966–973 include portions of Doc. 766 , Doc. 767 , Doc. 768 , Doc. 769 , Doc. 770 , Doc. 771 , Doc. 772 , Doc. 773 , Doc. 774 , and Doc. 775 ] , 975–980 [ Pgs. 975–980 include portions of Doc. 777 , Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , Doc. 780 , Doc. 781 , Doc. 782 , and Doc. 783 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 984–985 [ Pgs. 984–985 include portions of Doc. 786 , Doc. 787 , and Doc. 788 ] , 989–990 [ Pgs. 989–990 include portions of Doc. 790 , Doc. 791 , and Doc. 792 ] , 1004–1005 [ Pgs. 1004–1005 include portions of Doc. 804 , Doc. 805 , and Doc. 806 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1009 n [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1015–1016 [ Pgs. 1015–1016 include portions of Doc. 815 , Doc. 816 , and Doc. 817 ] , 1048 n [ Pg. 1048 includes portions of Doc. 847 and Doc. 848 ] , 1048–1051 [ Pgs. 1048–1051 include portions of Doc. 847 , Doc. 848 , and Doc. 849 ] , 1078–1079 [ Pgs. 1078–1079 include portions of Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , and Doc. 873 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Van Poll, J. M., 894 [ Pg. 894 includes portions of Doc. 695 and Doc. 696 ] , 929 [ Pg. 929 includes portions of Doc. 730 and Doc. 731 ] , 946 [ Pg. 946 includes portions of Doc. 745 and Doc. 746 ] , 984 [ Pg. 984 includes portions of Doc. 786 and Doc. 787 ] Van Sant, Edward R., 181 [ Pg. 181 is part of Doc. 184 ] , 227–228 [ Pgs. 227–228 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] Van Vredenburch, Jonkheer, 900 n [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 701 and Doc. 702 ] , 900 [ Pg. 900 includes portions of Doc. 701 and Doc. 702 ] , 905–909 [ Pgs. 905–909 include portions of Doc. 705 , Doc. 706 , Doc. 707 , Doc. 708 , and Doc. 709 ] , 911 [ Pg. 911 includes portions of Doc. 711 and Doc. 712 ] , 914 [ Pg. 914 is part of Doc. 716 ] , 928 [ Pg. 928 is part of Doc. 730 ] , 934 [ Pg. 934 includes portions of Doc. 735 and Doc. 736 ] , 936–939 [ Pgs. 936–939 include portions of Doc. 738 , Doc. 739 , Doc. 740 , and Doc. 741 ] , 941–947 [ Pgs. 941–947 include portions of Doc. 742 , Doc. 743 , Doc. 744 , Doc. 745 , Doc. 746 , and Doc. 747 ] , 950–952 [ Pgs. 950–952 include portions of Doc. 749 , Doc. 750 , Doc. 751 , Doc. 752 , and Doc. 753 ] , 963–966 [ Pgs. 963–966 include portions of Doc. 765 , Doc. 766 , and Doc. 767 ] , 976 [ Pg. 976 includes portions of Doc. 778 , Doc. 779 , and Doc. 780 ] , 980 [ Pg. 980 is part of Doc. 783 ] , 982 [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 982 n [ Pg. 982 is part of Doc. 785 ] , 1001–1002 [ Pgs. 1001–1002 include portions of Doc. 800 , Doc. 801 , and Doc. 802 ] , 1009 [ Pg. 1009 includes portions of Doc. 808 and Doc. 809 ] , 1011–1012 [ Pgs. 1011–1012 include portions of Doc. 810 , Doc. 811 , Doc. 812 , and Doc. 813 ] , 1067 [ Pg. 1067 includes portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 1071–1072 [ Pgs. 1071–1072 include portions of Doc. 866 and Doc. 867 ] , 1077–1079 [ Pgs. 1077–1079 include portions of Doc. 871 , Doc. 872 , and Doc. 873 ] , 1081 [ Pg. 1081 includes portions of Doc. 874 and Doc. 875 ] , 1083 [ Pg. 1083 includes portions of Doc. 876 and Doc. 877 ] , 1087 [ Pg. 1087 is part of Doc. 880 ] , 1097 [ Pg. 1097 includes portions of Doc. 886 and Doc. 887 ] Van Zeeland, Paul, 1055 [ Pg. 1055 is part of Doc. 853 ] , 1066–1067 [ Pgs. 1066–1067 include portions of Doc. 861 and Doc. 862 ] , 1091–1094 [ Pgs. 1091–1094 include portions of Doc. 883 , Doc. 884 , and Doc. 885 ] , 1096–1098 [ Pgs. 1096–1098 include portions of Doc. 885 , Doc. 886 , and Doc. 887 ] Villard, Henry S., 994–996 [ Pgs. 994–996 include portions of Doc. 795 and Doc. 796 ] , 1006 [ Pg. 1006 includes portions of Doc. 806 and Doc. 807 ] Vincent, John Carter: French Indochina, 58–59 [ Pgs. 58–59 include portions of Doc. 65 , Doc. 66 , and Doc. 67 ] ; Japan, 205 [ Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 206 and Doc. 207 ] , 392–393 [ Pgs. 392–393 include portions of Doc. 327 , Doc. 328 , and Doc. 329 ] , 395 [ Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 329 and Doc. 330 ] , 457–458 [ Pgs. 457–458 include portions of Doc. 373 and Doc. 374 ] , 459 n [ Pg. 459 is part of Doc. 375 ] , 467 [ Pg. 467 includes portions of Doc. 381 and Doc. 382 ] ; Korea, 601–604 [ Pgs. 601–604 include portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 603 n [ Pg. 603 includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466 ] , 618–619 [ Pgs. 618–619 include portions of Doc. 471 , Doc. 472 , and Doc. 473 ] , 621 [ Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 475 and Doc. 476 ] , 626 n [ Pg. 626 is part of Doc. 478 ] , 628 n [ Pg. 628 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479 ] , 630 [ Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 479 , Doc. 480 , and Doc. 481 ] ; Netherlands East Indies, 917 [ Pg. 917 is part of Doc. 719 ] , 942 [ Pg. 942 includes portions of Doc. 742 and Doc. 743 ] , 944 [ Pg. 944 is part of Doc. 743 ] , 948 n [ Pg. 948 includes portions of Doc. 747 and Doc. 748 ] , 949 [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 749 ] , 949 n [ Pg. 949 is part of Doc. 749 ] , 974 [ Pg. 974 includes portions of Doc. 775 and Doc. 776 ] , 981 [ Pg. 981 includes portions of Doc. 783 and Doc. 784 ] , 983 [ Pg. 983 includes portions of Doc. 785 and Doc. 786 ] Volcano Islands, 538 [ Pg. 538 is part of Doc. 429 ] , 540 [ Pg. 540 is part of Doc. 429 ] Vyshinsky, Andrey Yanuaryevich, 518 [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 518 n [ Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 527 [ Pg. 527 is part of Doc. 422 ] , 535 [ Pg. 535 is part of Doc. 427 ] , 549 [ Pg. 549 is part of Doc. 432 ] , 552–553 [ Pg. 552 is part of Doc. 433 ] , 556 [ Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 434 and Doc. 435 ] , 564–565 [ Pgs. 564–565 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , and Doc. 438 ] , 567 [ Pg. 567 is part of Doc. 439 ] , 570–571 [ Pg. 570 is part of Doc. 441 ] , 748 n [ Pg. 748 includes portions of Doc. 566 and Doc. 567 ] , 792 [ Pg. 792 is part of Doc. 609 ] Wan Waithyakon, Prince, 1127 [ Pg. 1127 is part of Siam ] Wang Shih-chieh: French Indo-China, 98 [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] , 98 n [ Pg. 98 is part of Doc. 115 ] ; Japan, 432–435 [ Pgs. 432–435 include portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , Doc. 358 , and Doc. 359 ] , 472 [ Pg. 472 includes portions of Doc. 385 and Doc. 386 ] , 496–497 [ Pgs. 496–497 include portions of Doc. 402 , Doc. 403 , and Doc. 404 ] , 505 [ Pg. 505 is part of Doc. 408 ] , 518–522 [ Pgs. 518–522 include portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419 ] , 523 [ Pg. 523 is part of Doc. 420 ] , 525 [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 525 n [ Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421 ] , 527–529 [ Pgs. 527–529 include portions of Doc. 422 , Doc. 423 , and Doc. 424 ] , 535–536 [ Pgs. 535–536 include portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429 ] , 545 [ Pg. 545 is part of Doc. 431 ] , 547–552 [ Pgs. 547–552 include portions of Doc. 431 , Doc. 432 , and Doc. 433 ] , 554–557 [ Pgs. 554–557 include portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435 ] , 562 [ Pg. 562 is part of Doc. 435 ] , 564–573 [ Pgs. 564–573 include portions of Doc. 435 , Doc. 436 , Doc. 437 , Doc. 438 , Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , Doc. 441 , and Doc. 442 ] , 579–580 [ Pgs. 579–580 include portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448 ] , 587–588 [ Pgs. 587–588 include portions of Doc. 452 , Doc. 453 , Doc. 454 , and Doc. 455 ] ; Korea, 631–632 [ Pgs. 631–632 include portions of Doc. 481 , Doc. 482 , and Doc. 483 ] , 831–832 [ Pgs. 831–832 include portions of Doc. 636 , Doc. 637 , and Doc. 638 ] Washington Conference ( 1921–1922 ), 797 [ Pg. 797 is part of Doc. 612 ] Weckerling, Gen. John, 645 [ Pg. 645 is part of Doc. 493 ] , 650 [ Pg. 650 is part of Doc. 498 ] Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C., 518–519 [ Pgs. 518–519 include portions of Doc. 417 , Doc. 418 , and Doc. 419 ] , 690 [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 690 n [ Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534 ] , 704 [ Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544 ] , 708 n [ Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 545 , Doc. 546 , and Doc. 547 ] , 710–711 [ Pgs. 710–711 include portions of Doc. 548 , Doc. 549 , and Doc. 550 ] , 741 [ Pg. 741 is part of Doc. 560 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 568 ] , 754 [ Pg. 754 includes portions of Doc. 571 , Doc. 572 , and Doc. 573 ] , 796 [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 611 and Doc. 612 ] , 796 n [ Pg. 796 includes portions of Doc. 611 and Doc. 612 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] , 809 [ Pg. 809 includes portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616 ] , 855 n [ Pg. 855 includes portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 855–856 [ Pgs. 855–856 include portions of Doc. 657 and Doc. 658 ] , 1002 [ Pg. 1002 includes portions of Doc. 801 and Doc. 802 ] Wever, G. A., 904 [ Pg. 904 includes portions of Doc. 704 and Doc. 705 ] , 925–926 [ Pgs. 925–926 include portions of Doc. 728 and Doc. 729 ] Whitman, Roswell H., 183 [ Pg. 183 includes portions of Doc. 186 and Doc. 187 ] , 224 [ Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217 ] , 227–228 [ Pgs. 227–228 include portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220 ] , 288–289 [ Pgs. 288–289 include portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] Widjojoatmodjo, Abdul Kadir, 985 n [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] , 985 [ Pg. 985 includes portions of Doc. 787 and Doc. 788 ] Williams, Jay Jerome, 692 [ Pg. 692 is part of Doc. 535 ] , 750 [ Pg. 750 is part of Doc. 568 ] Wisner, Frank G., 314 n [ Pg. 314 is part of Doc. 276 ] , 330 [ Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 280 and Doc. 281 ] , 332 [ Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282 ] Wooldridge, Rear Adm. E. T., 478 n [ Pg. 478 is part of Doc. 391 ] , 495–496 [ Pgs. 495–496 include portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403 ] , 503–504 [ Pgs. 503–504 include portions of Doc. 406 and Doc. 407 ] , 559 n [ Pg. 559 is part of Doc. 435 ] World Court, case involving status of Eastern Carelia, 482–483 [ Pg. 482 is part of Doc. 392 ] World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), 815 [ Pg. 815 includes portions of Doc. 621 and Doc. 622 ] World Federation of Trade Unions Conference in Prague, 220 [ Pg. 220 is part of Doc. 215 ] , 237 [ Pg. 237 is part of Doc. 227 ] Xuan, Nguyen Van, 140 n [ Pg. 140 includes portions of Doc. 152 and Doc. 153 ] , 146–147 [ Pgs. 146–147 include portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161 ] , 150 [ Pg. 150 includes portions of Doc. 161 , Doc. 162 , and Doc. 163 ] , 152 [ Pg. 152 includes portions of Doc. 165 and Doc. 166 ] Yalta Conference, decisions of, 473 [ Pg. 473 is part of Doc. 387 ] , 488 [ Pg. 488 is part of Doc. 396 ] , 491–492 [ Pgs. 491–492 include portions of Doc. 397 , Doc. 398 , Doc. 399 , and Doc. 400 ] Yeh, George, 143–144 [ Pgs. 143–144 include portions of Doc. 155 , Doc. 156 , Doc. 157 , and Doc. 158 ] Yim, Louisa, 786 [ Pg. 786 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604 ] , 812 [ Pg. 812 includes portions of Doc. 617 and Doc. 618 ] , 857 [ Pg. 857 includes portions of Doc. 659 and Doc. 660 ] Yingling, Raymond T., 279 [ Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 255 and Doc. 256 ] Yoshida, Shigeru, 158 [ Pg. 158 is part of Doc. 168 ] , 191 [ Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192 ] , 210–211 [ Pgs. 210–211 include portions of Doc. 209 and Doc. 210 ] , 256 [ Pg. 256 includes portions of Doc. 243 and Doc. 244 ] Young, Col. Edward H., 279–280 [ Pgs. 279–280 include portions of Doc. 255 , Doc. 256 , and Doc. 257 ] Yuen Tse-kien, 51 n [ Pg. 51 is part of Doc. 58 ] , 90–91 [ Pgs. 90–91 include portions of Doc. 108 and Doc. 109 ] , 94 [ Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 111 and Doc. 112 ] , 98–99 [ Pgs. 98–99 include portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116 ] Yugoslavia, 25 [ Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 28 and Doc. 29 ] , 41 [ Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 45 and Doc. 46 ] , 351 [ Pg. 351 is part of Doc. 291 ] , 804 [ Pg. 804 is part of Doc. 613 ] Zimmerman, E. C., 896 [ Pg. 896 includes portions of Doc. 696 and Doc. 697 ] , 906 [ Pg. 906 is part of Doc. 706 ]